The majority of Deir-ez-Zor governorate has been under control of the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since 2014, leading to extremely limited humanitarian access and a continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation in all communities. Joura and Qosour, neighbourhoods within Deir-ez-Zor city held by the Government of Syria (GoS), have been classified as besieged since January 2015, leading to unique and acute vulnerabilities.

Since ISIL takeover in 2014, it has been difficult to leave the governorate due to stringent movement restrictions, and inward movement has not been significant. Following the start of the Ar-Raqqa offensive in late 2016, there has been small-scale inward movement primarily from Ar-Raqqa, as well as small-scale intra-governorate displacement.

The ongoing Ar-Raqqa offensive has led to anticipation of future displacement into and around the governorate. Key Informants (KIs) reported that future movement primarily depends on the evolution of conflict and whether communities in Deir-ez-Zor are directly affected by ground offensives or airstrikes, as well as changes in current movement restrictions.

Across the governorate, deterioration of agricultural productivity and other pre-conflict industry has severely limited livelihood opportunities, undermining the ability of populations to meet basic needs. Overall, 49% of adults were reportedly working, primarily in temporary or daily jobs, and coping strategies such as spending savings, children working and selling household assets were common.

Markets were generally functioning, though conflict and movement restrictions resulted in access challenges for much of the population. Furthermore, communities commonly reported a lack of affordability of both food and essential non-food items (NFIs) on markets.

In terms of services, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health, education and protection stood out as key concerns. Basic WASH and health services were functioning though with extremely limited capacity. Water was obtained through a combination of the main network and through water trucking, though water shortages were common, and many communities faced sanitation issues due to a lack of sufficient and consistent waste management. Similarly, although health facilities were available in most communities, these primarily had limited services.

No functioning formal schools were reported and most children did not have access to informal learning opportunities, contributing to the reportedly large proportion of children working (estimated at 46%). In terms of protection, females were particularly vulnerable to protection incidents and risks.

Within the besieged neighbourhoods of Joura and Qosour, deterioration has been particularly acute and the situation across all sectors was severe. Residents faced a lack of food and core NFI items in markets due to restrictions on entry of both goods and people.

Further, in Joura and Qosour there was a reported dependence on untreated drinking water sources, a lack of medicine and medical equipment, no functioning formal schools and heavy damage to parts of the city.

1. No large influx of IDPs or refugees has been observed in Deir-ez-Zor since ISIL takeover or the commencement of the Ar-Raqqa offensive in late 2016; were this to happen, the situation of these populations would need to be reassessed.
2. Population figures from the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) 2017. Note that the HNO 2017 figures stated were collected during 2016; recent reports from KIs residing in Al Mayadin and Abu Kamal towns indicate that each may currently have up to 100,000 people living in them.
### Key Sectoral Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Deir-ez-Zor Governorate</th>
<th>Deir-ez-Zor City Besieged Area (Joura and Qosour Neighbourhoods)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food Security</strong></td>
<td>• Markets were functioning in most communities with food available, though 51% of communities faced access challenges primarily due to safety and security concerns. Basic food items were unavailable in 13-20% of communities assessed, whilst prices were reportedly unaffordable in 28-50% of communities. 76% of communities reported that people used coping strategies to deal with a lack of food, most commonly reducing meal size and selling productive assets. Food assistance was not available to people in the governorate.</td>
<td>• Due to access restrictions and security issues, few markets were functioning and accessible. Food in markets was scarce with few items available for purchase and prohibitively expensive when available. A wide range of coping strategies were commonly used, including extreme strategies such as eating food waste or non-food plants. Airdrops have delivered some food, but rations were reportedly commonly unable to meet the level of need or evenly target those in need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livelihoods</strong></td>
<td>• Livelihoods opportunities have declined sharply since the beginning of the crisis, with few jobs available and low wages commonly reported across the governorate. Only 49% of adults were reportedly working, primarily in temporary or daily/casual jobs. Income and produce from agriculture were the primary source of meeting basic needs, with reduced productivity since ISIL takeover. Coping strategies were most commonly reported as spending savings, sending children to work, and selling household assets such as furniture and jewellery.</td>
<td>• Livelihood opportunities have declined due to the extremely unstable security situation. The main sources of meeting basic needs were petty trading, food aid and reliance on assistance. Coping strategies employed included selling both non-productive and productive assets, reducing food intake and non-food expenditure, sending children to work and borrowing money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shelter</strong></td>
<td>• The majority of the population lived in houses or apartments, though some have been living in collective centres since before ISIL arrived (approximately 16,000). Almost half of households were estimated to have suffered damage to their shelters, typically as a result of either conflict (airstrikes/explosives) or general disrepair.</td>
<td>• No camps or collective centres were reported. Most of the population lived in houses or apartments. Heavy damage has affected parts of the city which are completely destroyed. The most-needed shelter items were reportedly iron sheeting, plastic sheeting and timber.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NFIs</strong></td>
<td>• Although NFIs were typically available, 47% of households were estimated to face challenges to accessing markets and items were often unaffordable. The majority of households had some electricity through generators, though supply was commonly inconsistent. The vast majority of households were estimated to resort to coping strategies to deal with a lack of fuel, such as changing diet to prefer food that did not require cooking and reducing expenditure on other items to pay for fuel.</td>
<td>• Many core NFIs were unavailable in markets. Access to electricity was highly limited, with just 20% of the population having access, largely due to a lack of fuel to power generators. Multiple coping strategies were used to deal with a lack of fuel including extreme strategies such as reducing food intake and sending children to work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WASH</strong></td>
<td>• Water was reportedly obtained through a combination of the network and water trucking. Issues with water were reported in more than half of communities, mostly bad taste or colour. Communities primarily reported that access was intermittent. 89% of communities reported that households commonly used coping strategies to deal with a lack of water, including modifying hygiene practices and reducing drinking water consumption. Sanitation was reported as a key issue, with a lack of sufficient and consistent waste management in many communities resulting in flooding and garbage in the streets.</td>
<td>• The main source of water was untreated water from the surface of the Euphrates river, which has reportedly caused sickness after drinking. Water shortages were common, and coping strategies included reducing drinking water consumption, as well as modifying hygiene practices and drinking water meant for purposes other than drinking. Sanitation issues were prevalent and included garbage, sewage and flooding in the streets, and rats and other pests contaminating food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td>• Health facilities were available in the majority of communities, but these primarily had limited services. All communities reported facing barriers to accessing healthcare due to the decline in facilities, services, medicine and equipment available.</td>
<td>• Informal emergency care was the only service consistently available and accessible since June 2016. Most people treated themselves at home and did not have access to basic medicine or medical supplies. Basic medical equipment and medicine were extremely scarce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>• No functioning formal schools issuing recognised certification were reported, and alternative learning centres were rare. In locations with some form of functioning educational centre, safety and security issues whilst travelling as well as a lack of recognised certification were reported as barriers.</td>
<td>• There were reportedly no functioning educational spaces for children remaining in the besieged neighbourhoods. Facilities were reportedly damaged and there were insufficient numbers of qualified teachers willing to teach.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Since the group known as ISIL took control in 2014, ongoing conflict and insecurity across Deir-ez-Zor have limited access to the governorate, undermining the ability of humanitarian actors to respond to and identify needs and vulnerabilities of populations. The situation is particularly challenging in Joura and Qosour neighbourhoods, in Deir-ez-Zor city, which have been classified as besieged since 2015.

The current offensive in Ar-Raqqa governorate has led to anticipation of further displacement and escalation of conflict within Deir-ez-Zor. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation within the governorate has continued to deteriorate. This assessment aims to provide a baseline of sectoral information to inform humanitarian actors and allow ongoing monitoring of the situation.

DEMOGRAPHICS

The majority of the population live in towns and villages along the Euphrates river. The largest urban centres are Deir-ez-Zor city (with an estimated 122,000 inhabitants), which has seen an outflux of population since the beginning of the crisis, Al Mayadin (68,000) and Abu Kamal (39,000). Most communities (76%) have an estimated population of fewer than 10,000 people.

Overall, there were estimated to be more females than males in the governorate. Males were more likely to have left in search of livelihood opportunities with the intention to send back remittances and also to avoid the risk of conscription. KIs also reported a higher proportion of women and children in areas outside of Deir-ez-Zor city, who had moved in search of relative safety. Finally, children under 18 were estimated to comprise over 50% of the population, leading to a high dependency ratio.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age breakdown</th>
<th>Gender breakdown</th>
<th>Average household size: 7 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Male: 40% Female: 60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-17</td>
<td>Male: 40% Female: 60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-59</td>
<td>Male: 40% Female: 60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>Male: 40% Female: 60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The HNO 2017 figures stated were collected during 2016; recent reports from KIs residing in Al Mayadin and Abu Kamal towns indicate that each may currently have up to 100,000 people living in them.
4. Estimated by KIs at the community level and aggregated to the governorate level.

METHODOLOGY

A combination of data sources are used, primarily:

a) Primary data collection conducted between 1 and 4 May 2017 through Syria Relief Network (SRN) and REACH networks across Deir-ez-Zor, comprising interviews with 30 Key Informants (KIs) across the governorate about the situation in 105 of 135 communities. Findings are specific to communities assessed and cannot be generalized further (see Map 1).

b) Secondary data sources including CCCM IDP tracking, REACH/SNFI Cluster assessment of shelter and NFIs in north Syria, and REACH ongoing monitoring of besieged and hard to reach areas (Community Profiles).

Findings are specific to communities assessed and cannot be generalized further. Information on besieged neighbourhoods of Deir-ez-Zor city is presented separately throughout.

MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS

Since ISIL takeover in 2014, civilians have not been formally allowed to move outside the wider ISIL-controlled area (from north-west Iraq to Aleppo governorate), though some were using informal routes to leave the area.

• Ar-Raqqa offensive: Since the beginning of the offensive in late 2016, the detection and closure of informal routes has increased the difficulty of exiting ISIL-controlled areas. As such, informal movement has rarely been attempted over the past two months.

• Movement between communities: Movement between communities in the wider ISIL-controlled area was generally permitted, although movement from some communities inside Deir-ez-Zor governorate was intermittently prohibited. These restrictions were reportedly usually temporary and imposed unpredictably.

• Risks: Numerous risks have been reported when moving between communities, such as harassment and detention of civilians at checkpoints, including based on family affiliation. Women were prohibited from travelling without a male relative and commonly faced intense questioning or harassment even when accompanied.

• Besieged neighbourhoods: In Joura and Qosour, civilians have faced movement restrictions since January 2015. At the time of the assessment, populations could move between the two neighbourhoods, though with the risk of detention and conscription.
**Displacement patterns**

Since the start of the conflict, displacement out of Deir-ez-Zor governorate has been limited, with approximately 75% of the pre-conflict population estimated as remaining in the majority of communities. However, many civilians left Deir-ez-Zor city to surrounding villages due to ongoing conflict, and, since the start of the Ar-Raqqa offensive in late 2016, small inward movements of people from Ar-Raqqa governorate, as well as intra-governorate displacement, have been observed (see Map on following page).

Pattern 1: Arrivals from Ar-Raqqa governorate

- Approximately 2,500-3,000 IDPs from Ar-Raqqa governorate are estimated to have arrived in Deir-ez-Zor governorate between January and April 2017, primarily from Ar-Raqqa sub-district.
- Movement increased in late March, coinciding with the escalation of the Ar-Raqqa offensive and movement of the frontline southwards towards Ar-Raqqa city.
- Most either went to Al Mayadin (1,000-1,250 internally displaced persons) or Abu Kamal towns (820-980 IDPs), with smaller movement to other communities.

Pattern 2: Displacements within Deir-ez-Zor governorate

- Movement of approximately 2,500 people has been observed within the governorate since the start of 2017. This has mostly occurred within Deir-ez-Zor district, though destinations have not been heavily concentrated in any particular sub-districts or communities; such movement has been common since the ISIL takeover to avoid conflict escalation in particular areas.

**Intentions**

Overall, movement intentions remain unclear and dependent on future conflict escalation, movement restrictions and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Further, protection of assets and family ties remain key barriers to movement, leading to a general preference and willingness to stay in current locations. Overall, outward movement in the next month was reportedly preferred in 39% of communities assessed. In these communities, KIs estimated that 20-40% of the population would prefer to leave in the next month, favouring locations outside of Syria, although the feasibility of reaching intended destinations was not assessed.

5. CCCM IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) data triangulated with UNHCR Flash Updates and CCCM IDP Tracking.
6. Stated preference to leave may not necessarily translate to actual movement, due to a number of factors including feasibility of movement and changing preferences.
7. Idleb (10%), Aleppo (8%), Ar-Raqqa (3%), Damascus (2%).
Identified displacement trends in Deir-ez-Zor governorate, 1 January - 4 May 2017

1) Arrivals from Ar-Raqqa governorate
Approximately 2,500-3,000 IDPs from Ar-Raqqa governorate have arrived in Deir-ez-Zor governorate since the start of 2017, primarily from Ar-Raqqa sub-district.

2) Movement within Deir-ez-Zor governorate
Movement of approximately 2,500 people has been observed within the governorate since the start of 2017, with up to 400 people moving each week.

Outward movement
Movement restrictions prevented large-scale outward movement, though up to 800 people were estimated to have left communities in Deir-ez-Zor with intentions to go to Ar-Raqqa, Al-Hasakeh and Homs governorates. It was not possible to verify whether all of these people reached their intended destinations.
Food markets were generally functioning with goods largely coming from Iraq. However, over 50% of communities reported challenges to accessing markets, largely due to safety and security concerns. Further, even if functioning, 84% of communities reported issues with markets, including limited functionality and lack of availability and affordability of goods.

Basic food items were unavailable in up to a fifth of assessed communities, and were prohibitively unaffordable in 28-50% of communities. To deal with a lack of food, 76% of communities reported that people use coping strategies, including reducing meal sizes and selling productive and non productive assets.

Finally, accessing bread was challenging primarily due to reduced functionality of bakeries, linked with damaged buildings and equipment, as well as a lack of fuel and electricity for generators. As a result, most communities relied on homemade bread, with bakeries a secondary source.

Basic food consumption
Rice was the most commonly reported staple food across the governorate, followed by bread and wheat flour. Many communities faced food availability and affordability barriers.

Food sources and markets
Food markets were the most common source of food, followed by local agriculture. Supply routes from Iraq were in operation, with the largest markets in Abu Kamal and Al Mayadin, though challenges to access were commonly reported across the governorate.

Coping strategies
KIs in 76% of communities reported that people used coping strategies to deal with a lack of food, most commonly reducing meal size and selling productive assets.
Bread

Overall, most communities faced challenges to accessing bread and relied primarily on homemade bread. This was primarily due to the reduced functionality of bakeries, as a result of damage to buildings and equipment, and a lack of fuel that limited the use of generators necessary to power bakeries. Bakeries were least likely to be functioning in Susat, Abu Kamal, Sur and Tabni sub-districts.

Proportion of communities with functioning bakeries:
- 20% functioning with sufficient supplies
- 49% functioning without providing enough bread
- 31% not functioning

Bakery functionality per community

Top 5 most commonly reported reasons for bakeries not functioning (% of communities reporting each):
- Building / equipment damaged 39%
- Electricity / fuel expensive or hard to access 33%
- Not enough electricity / fuel available 32%
- Flour expensive or hard to access 17%
- Flour unavailable 13%

Most common source of bread in assessed communities:
- 59% Homemade
- 26% Private bakeries
- 10% Public bakeries
- 5% Other

Food: Joura and Qosour

- The food situation in the besieged neighbourhoods of Deir-ez-Zor city has been critical for many months.
- People obtained food in these neighbourhoods primarily through assistance which arrived through humanitarian airdrops, as well as bartering for the scarce commodities available. Food rations delivered by airdrops were reportedly insufficient to meet needs and commonly not distributed fairly.
- Food in markets was reportedly scarce, and when available, of poor quality. In March, the only remaining core food items in markets were bread from public bakeries (600 SYP; 1.17 USD), bulgur (3,500 SYP per kg; 6.81 USD), eggs (500 SYP each; 0.97 USD), salt (500 SYP per kg; 0.97 USD) and cooking oil (9000 SYP per litre; 17.51 USD). All items were reportedly prohibitively expensive.
- Some bread was available from public bakeries, though there were frequent shortages due to the scarcity and expense of flour, yeast and fuel.
- A wide range of coping strategies were used. Almost all households reportedly reduced meal size and sold productive assets. The extreme coping strategies of going days without eating and eating food waste or plants were also reportedly in use in these neighbourhoods.

8. Exchange rate used is UN Operational Rates of Exchange which has been $1 = 514 SYP since September 2016.
Livelihoods have been severely affected by ongoing conflict. Agricultural trade, the most common source of income pre-conflict, has been hindered by lower availability of seeds and other inputs and a reduction of subsidies, as well as pollution caused by over-extraction of petroleum in the area, particularly since ISIL takeover.

As a result, all communities reported barriers to accessing livelihoods. Household income was estimated as 55,872 SYP (109 USD) per month in November 2016, lower than the average household debt burden of 74,456 SYP (145 USD). Households were reportedly resorting to a number of coping strategies, including spending savings, sending children to work and selling household assets and jewelery.

Livelihoods sources

49% of adults were estimated to be working, primarily in temporary or daily / casual labour jobs.  

Top 5 most commonly reported sources of income (% of communities reporting each)

- Food crop production: 75%
- Livestock products: 61%
- Sale of livestock: 45%
- Waged labour: 39%
- Loans and remittances / in-kind gifts: 34%

Livelihoods barriers

All communities reported barriers to accessing livelihoods sources, primarily due to a lack of employment opportunities.

Top 5 most commonly reported livelihoods barriers (% of communities reporting each):

- Lack of general employment opportunities: 74%
- Low wages: 54%
- Lack of appropriate employment opportunities: 44%
- Security situation in the community: 43%
- Restrictions by authorities: 20%

Income and debt

- The estimated average household income in November 2016 was 55,872 SYP (109 USD).
- To cope with a lack of income, households were most commonly spending savings (reported by 71% of KIs), sending children to work (49%), and selling household assets such as furniture and jewelery (32%).
- Average monthly income was lower than the average household debt burden at 74,456 SYP ($145).

Access to cash

Over the past three months, access to cash has reduced in certain locations, particularly around Sur, Basira, Khasham and Kisreh sub-districts.

Proportion of communities reporting changes to access to cash:

- 37% no change over the past three months
- 19% access decreased for some people
- 44% access decreased for most people

Livelihoods: Joura and Qosour

- Livelihoods opportunities have been affected by the extremely unstable security situation.
- The main sources of meeting basic needs were petty trading, food aid and reliance on assistance.
- Coping strategies included selling productive and non-productive assets, reducing food intake and non-food expenditure, sending children to work and borrowing money.
- Reported barriers to livelihoods were general lack of employment opportunities, insecurity, lack of resources needed to work (e.g. water for agriculture), restrictions by local authorities and discrimination in job provision.

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10. Exchange rate used is UN Operational Rates of Exchange which has been $1 = 514 SYP since September 2016.
The majority of the population were reportedly living in houses or apartments, and informal settlements were uncommon due to ISIL policy of allocating unoccupied homes to displaced persons. Nevertheless, small numbers have lived in collective centres since before ISIL, and recent displacement due to the Ar-Raqqa offensive have caused small numbers of IDPs to move to informal settlements in Al Mayadin. Almost half of all households were reported to have suffered damage to their shelters, primarily due to conflict and general disrepair. 36% of households reported adequacy issues, including a lack of suitability for winter conditions. This has led to high reported need of shelter items, such as concrete and basic electrical items, which were generally unaffordable even when available.

Informal settlements

- There were reportedly eight tented settlements in Deir-ez-Zor governorate (see Map below) in Al Mayadin sub-district at the time of the assessment, hosting an estimated 250-300 people. Many arrived from Ar-Raqqa governorate following conflict escalation.

- Whilst some have lived in these settlements since before ISIL takeover, others were newly established and, at the time of data collection, it was unclear if they would remain.

Collective centres

- There were a total of 196 collective centres (CCs) reported in 49 assessed communities (47%) and most heavily concentrated in Al Mayadin, Thiban, Abu Kamal, Susat, Ashara and Khasham.

- The total estimated population living in these collective shelters was 15,979 people, with the largest numbers in Ashara and Al Mayadin sub-districts.

- Most have been occupied since before ISIL takeover and were managed by the inhabitants.

- Collective centre building types were most commonly schools (reported in 96% of communities with collective shelters), government buildings (27%), agricultural buildings (14%) and residential buildings (4%).
Damage and adequacy

• In November 2016, 36% of households were estimated to have adequacy issues, primarily regarding a lack of suitability of shelter for winter conditions.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 5 shelter adequacy issues</th>
<th>(% of communities reporting each issue of the 36% reporting issues):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaking during rain</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of insulation from cold</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of heating</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of privacy in shelter</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of lighting</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• 46% of households across the governorate were estimated to have some form of shelter damage, primarily caused by conflict (airstrikes/explosives) and general disrepair: 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 5 shelter damage issues</th>
<th>(% of communities reporting each issue of the 46% reporting damage issues):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broken or cracked windows</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors unable to shut properly</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaps or cracks in roof</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some cracks in some walls</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large cracks in most walls</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Overcrowding in houses did not appear to be a key issue in the majority of the governorate, with the exception of in Deir-ez-Zor, Ashara and Kisreh sub-districts where more than 40% of communities indicated that more than half of households were overcrowded.

Needed shelter items

• Overall, 79% of communities reported that they needed some form of shelter item.

• The most commonly reported need was basic electrical items such as wires, sockets and plugs. Although these items were reportedly commonly available, they were often unaffordable for households given other priority expenditures.

• Concrete was also commonly needed, as it was reportedly difficult to obtain and expensive where available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needed shelter items</th>
<th>(% of communities reporting each):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic electrical items</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic tools</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic sheets/tarpaulin</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron sheeting</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricks</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails and screws</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shelter: Joura and Qosour

• Most of the population were reportedly living in houses or apartments. No camps or collective centres were reported in these neighbourhoods.

• Some parts of the city were heavily damaged or completely destroyed.

• A quarter of households reportedly face shelter adequacy issues, such as lack of insulation, heating, lighting and waterproofing.

• The most-needed shelter items were iron sheeting, plastic sheeting and timber.

11. Based on data from the REACH/SNFI Cluster assessment conducted in November 2016; in which KIs estimated the proportion of households affected by adequacy and damage, and then detailed the most common issues.
Markets were generally functioning across the governorate due to supply routes between Abu Kamal and Iraq. However, 47% of communities reported barriers to market access, primarily due to insecurity. Unaffordability of non-food items (NFIs) was also a key issue across assessed communities. Fuel and batteries were highlighted as items most difficult to access.

Fuel shortages are common, resulting in 98% of households adopting coping strategies, including changing diet to prefer food that does not require cooking as well as reducing expenditure on other items to pay for fuel. Kerosene, as well as wood and charcoal, were the most commonly used sources of fuel for both cooking and heating.

In almost all communities (96%), generators were the primary source of electricity, while the main network was reported to provide very limited supply even when functioning.
The majority of the governorate was reportedly connected to the main water network. However, supply was insufficient and, at the time of assessment, supplemented by water trucking. In addition, less than half of households reported that water was safe to drink. In November 2016, only 23% of assessed communities reported that households regularly had sufficient water, with frequent reports of intermittent access, depending on the community. Further, 89% of households had adopted coping strategies, including modifying bathing practices and reducing drinking water consumption.

Sanitation was also a key concern due to a lack of sufficient and consistent waste management. 90% of communities reported sanitation problems, such as garbage in streets and flooding. Finally, in a quarter of communities assessed, 30% of residents either had latrines which were partially functional only or no facilities at all.

Water sufficiency and coping strategies

Communities reported that access was intermittent, and changed depending on the situation in the area.

Water sufficiency and access (% of communities reporting each):

- 23% Nearly everyone has enough water to meet needs
- 66% Access intermittent depending on circumstances
- 11% Nearly everyone has insufficient water to meet needs

89% of households were estimated to use coping strategies to deal with a lack of water.

Strategies used to cope with a lack of water (% of communities reporting each):

- Modify hygiene practices (e.g. bathe less) 44%
- Reduce drinking water consumption 24%
- Spend money usually used for other things to buy water 11%
- Borrow water or receive water on credit 9%
- Drink water usually used for cleaning or other purposes 5%

Access to water

The main network and water trucking were the most common sources of water, used by about half of communities each, with a small number using free neighbourhood boreholes.

Primary sources of drinking water (% of communities reporting each):

- Main network 49%
- Water trucking 47%
- Free neighbourhood boreholes 4%

Most common source of water by community

Quality of water

More than half of assessed communities faced problems with their main source of water, with only 47% of communities reporting that water was safe to drink.\(^{14}\)

Problems with water (% of communities reporting each):

- Water tastes bad: 40%
- Water has a bad colour: 36%
- Water smells bad: 22%
- People get sick after drinking the water: 1%

Sanitation

90% of assessed communities reported experiencing problems with sanitation, due to a lack of sufficient and consistent waste management services across the governorate.

Top 5 sanitation problems (% of communities reporting each):

- Garbage in the streets: 60%
- Flooding in the streets: 35%
- Rats and pests contaminating people and food: 18%
- Open defecation: 11%
- Sewage flowing onto the streets: 10%

Latrine and bathing facilities\(^{15}\)

In November 2016, 25% of communities reported that up to 15% of households did not have access to bathing facilities.

Similarly, 27% of communities reported that about 15% of households did not have access to fully functioning latrine facilities, meaning there were issues with facilities used.

Proportion of communities with access to functioning bathing facilities:

- 75% Everyone or nearly everyone has access
- 25% Some households (up to 15%) do not have access

Proportion of communities with access to functioning latrines:

- 73% Everyone or nearly everyone has access
- 27% Some households (up to 15%) do not have access

WASH: Joura and Qosour

- WASH was a key concern in the besieged neighbourhoods due to a lack of a consistent and safe supply of drinking water, with shortages prevalent.
- The main source of water was untreated water from the Euphrates river, which reportedly had a bad taste, smell and colour and caused sickness after drinking.
- Residents reportedly coped with a lack of water by modifying hygiene practices, reducing drinking water consumption and drinking non-potable water.
- These neighbourhoods faced multiple sanitation challenges, with garbage, sewage and flooding in the streets, and rats and other pests contaminating food.

Education

There have been no functioning formal schools issuing recognised certification since the ISIL takeover. ISIL attempted to establish an alternative schooling system. However, it was unpopular and led to widespread non-attendance. While some children learned at home or received informal learning from other community members, significant barriers to education were reported, even where informal community learning opportunities existed. Main barriers included lack of safety and security while travelling to access informal learning, as well as lack of certification. Lack of educational opportunities may be a contributing factor to the estimated 46% of children working across the governorate.

There were no functioning formal schools in Deir-ez-Zor countryside or in Deir-ez-Zor city.

Top 4 barriers to school attendance (% of communities reporting each):

- Educational centres closed: 68%
- Travel unsafe due to security situation: 28%
- Lack of recognised certification: 27%
- Damaged school facilities: 16%

Education: Joura and Qosour

- There were no functioning educational facilities in these neighbourhoods.
- Facilities were reportedly damaged and there were insufficient numbers of qualified teachers willing to teach.
- In addition, children were often required to work.

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14. Self-reported by households and not based on water testing.
15. Based on data from the REACH/SNFI Cluster assessment conducted in November 2016.
Serious protection concerns were reported in 69% of communities; most commonly, family separation, forced/early marriage and forced recruitment.

- **Children**: In 89% of communities, children (individuals under the age of 18) were reported to be subject to protection risks. These risks included a lack of education opportunities, general violence and recruitment by armed groups (AGs). An estimated 46% of children in affected communities were working.

- **Women**: Women faced specific vulnerabilities, with movement through checkpoints requiring the accompaniment of a male relative, which also affected access to services.

**Protection situations: general**

69% of communities reported that protection situations had occurred in the past month, whilst 20% were not sure and 11% reported that situations had not occurred.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of protection issues that have occurred in the last month?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- No situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1 type of situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2 types of situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 3 types of situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 4 types of situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Not assessed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main protection concerns** (% of communities reporting each):

- Family separation: 54%
- Forced and early marriage: 41%
- Forced recruitment by AGs: 38%
- Domestic violence: 16%
- Inter-communal disputes: 10%

**Protection situations: women**

Protection issues specific to women were reported as having occurred in the past month in all communities assessed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection situations affecting women in the past month (% of communities reporting each):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement restrictions: 98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against women: 61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions preventing service access: 49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Protection situations: children**

89% of communities reported issues specific to children. In 10% of communities, KIs were unsure as to whether child protection issues had been faced, whilst 1% were unsure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection situations affecting children in the past month (% of communities reporting each):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children working: 67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against children: 44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced recruitment by AGs: 41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological trauma: 39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks from general security situation: 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing / separated children: 5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IDP-host community relations**

In all communities assessed, it was reported that there were no major tensions between IDPs and host communities and that relations had not changed over the past month. KIs indicated that this was because there had not been a significant influx of IDPs into the area. As such, changes in prices of goods and access to services were not attributed to IDP presence or movements.

**Protection: Joura and Qosour**

- Multiple severe protection risks existed in these neighbourhoods, including forced recruitment into armed groups, kidnapping and harassment and sexual violence against women.

- The most prevalent child protection challenges were violence against children, separation of children from families and dangers from landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Although the majority of communities reported having access to health facilities (74%), these were primarily private clinics with limited services, such as basic emergency and obstetric care. Surgery and treatment for chronic diseases were reported as priority needs.

All communities reported barriers to accessing health care, largely due to deterioration of facilities and a lack of medicine.

Available facilities and services
74% of communities reported having some available health facilities. However, these facilities were primarily private clinics and services provided were limited.

Barriers to accessing healthcare
All communities reported facing barriers to accessing healthcare, mainly due to the deterioration of facilities and services observed.

Available facilities and services

Types of functioning health facilities (% of communities reporting each):

- Private clinics: 73%
- Hospitals: 68%
- Informal emergency care: 28%
- Mobile clinics / field hospitals: 11%

Most reported needed health services (% of communities reporting each):

- Surgery: 89%
- Chronic disease treatment: 79%
- Antibiotics: 39%
- Rehabilitation for injured: 38%
- Skilled childbirth care: 24%

Health: Joura and Qosour
- Health facilities and services were extremely limited in Joura and Qosour.
- The only available hospital was a military hospital, accessible only to very few members of the community. The risk of detention and conscription at this facility deterred some from seeking treatment there.
- Informal emergency care was the only service consistently available and accessible since June 2016. Most people treated themselves at home and did not have access to basic medicine or medical supplies.
- Medicine was scarce in the neighbourhoods. There was reportedly a major need for contraception due to the high prevalence of sexual violence, including reported rape.
- Antibiotics and artificial limbs were reported as particularly needed medical items, and rehabilitation for those who had recently experienced injuries was reportedly a major gap in provision.

About SRN
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About REACH
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