Ensuring Success

Four Steps Beyond U.S. Troops to End the War with the LRA

Sasha Lezhnev    February 2012
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COVER: A former child soldier is reunited with his family in northern Uganda after defecting from the Lord's Resistance Army. (Caritas Internationalis)
Executive summary

The deployment of U.S. military advisors to central Africa is potentially the most significant step in a decade to end the war against the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA. The comprehensive strategy to end the LRA that U.S. forces should help develop as a result of their deployment will only have a chance of being successful if American forces are supplemented by four additional ingredients from the United States and other supportive countries: troops, transport, intelligence, and a defections strategy, or TTID for short. This includes additional special forces troops, enhanced transport and logistics, upgraded intelligence capacities, and a more effective strategy to increase LRA defections.

If the mission is to succeed, it is essential for the U.S. advisors to stay in the field for a significant amount of time and be buttressed by TTID support. The LRA has decreased its attacks by two-thirds over the past six months in an effort to reorganize and lie low. But this is not a sign of LRA weakness. It is part of the group’s historical pattern of waiting out military incursions and then launching attacks. The LRA are among the best survivors on the planet—and they could simply be playing a waiting game for the departure of the U.S. soldiers. If the advisors withdraw prematurely and TTID support is not given, the LRA will likely reemerge and resume its attacks on civilians.

Despite the U.S. deployment and a new African Union, or AU, initiative, which essentially is a rehatting of the military operation by the four countries involved under AU auspices, there is a serious danger of the LRA reorganizing for attacks because of disturbing trends on both the military and civilian side. On the military side, Uganda is the main force undertaking operations against the LRA, but its current capacity and troop numbers—approximately half of what they were in 2010—are inadequate to be able to pin the group down in the vast territory within which it operates, roughly the size of Arizona and extending into four countries. Moreover, Uganda’s best soldiers are deployed as peacekeepers in Somalia. Some 90 percent of LRA attacks over the past six months have taken place in Congo, but Uganda does not have bases there at the request
of the Congolese authorities.² The shortage of troops is also hurting civilian protection efforts, which are in urgent need of a boost. And the existing deployment is hampered by a lack of mobility and intelligence capacity over the large territory.

On the civilian side, initiatives to lure LRA commanders and fighters out of the bush through defection are far less effective than they were 5 to 10 years ago in northern Uganda. The fear factor among potential LRA defectors is very high; they have very few locations to which they can run away and face attacks from angry local communities. The undermining of Uganda’s Amnesty Act with the trial of former mid-level LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo is further worsening chances that LRA fighters will come out; the case has sparked fear of prosecution among the LRA ranks.

If these issues are not rapidly addressed, there is a significant danger of both major LRA attacks against civilians and a move to rearm with the support of the Sudanese government. The LRA attacked an area less than 100 miles from the South Sudan-Sudan border in late December, and the lessons of the LRA’s history show that if the group is left alone as it has been over the past year, it will reorganize, rearm, and launch offensives to abduct child soldiers and spread fear in rural communities. Furthermore, according to recently returned LRA combatants, LRA leader Joseph Kony appears confident following the U.S. deployment, telling his troops that they have defeated much larger Ugandan army and United Nations military contingents.

In order for the U.S. advisors’ mission to succeed, the United States and other supportive nations must increase their commitments with troops, transport, and intelligence on the military side and a two-tiered defection strategy on the civilian side. The defection strategy should include both an initiative targeted at senior-level commanders to weaken the LRA’s leadership and a substantial aid package to increase radio outreach to LRA fighters and sensitize communities in LRA-affected areas to accept ex-combatants peacefully.

President Obama should follow up the civilian strategy by making a strong diplomatic push to secure elite special forces for the AU mission, from either the current operational armies or other African countries. Simply put, if there are not enough troops to gather effective intelligence on the LRA’s whereabouts and to act quickly on this information, it will be impossible to track down Joseph Kony, head of the LRA, and his leaders. In addition, the administration should help secure helicopters and other transport and intelligence gathering capacities for the troops and broker an agreement among the countries in the region to allow the regional troops to deploy across borders in all LRA-affected regions, including Congo. The $35 million authorized by Congress in December for the Pentagon’s LRA initiatives and $10 million from USAID and the State Department should help in the TTID efforts if USAID and the Pentagon make the most of this funding. The European Union should follow with further support. This would be far more cost effective than maintaining the status quo with the risk of significant civilian casualties and increased instability in the region.
The current danger of attacks: Learning the lessons of the LRA’s past

History is in danger of repeating itself with the Lord’s Resistance Army. Based on past LRA patterns, Sudan’s desire to destabilize South Sudan, and recent LRA attacks near the Sudan-South Sudan border, the threats now are of an increase of civilian-directed attacks against weakly defended villages and an effort to rearm. The following story has occurred at least three times over the past 25 years:

- A lull in anti-LRA operations gives the rebel group several months of breathing space, both in terms of time and maneuvering space.
- The Ugandan government publicly states that the LRA’s defeat is imminent.
- The LRA reorganizes by seeking out new territory, rearming, and/or regrouping through training, farming, and abducting new soldiers.
- A new anti-LRA military operation is planned but without adequate civilian protection or sufficient troops or equipment for the vast territory into which the LRA could easily escape.
- The LRA launches large-scale attacks against civilians, in order to displace thousands of people, find new territory to operate in, and abduct new youth into its ranks.

This chain of events occurred in 1994-6, 2001-2, and 2008-9, and there is a serious risk that the attacks could be repeated today, as the first four parts of the pattern reoccurred in 2011. As a senior Ugandan official stated, “Kony got breathing space in 2011. If history is to teach us anything, the moment you give them breathing space, it will be disastrous for the region. They will go all out to abduct, kill, and destroy.”

Anecdotal testimony from the field seems to confirm that the LRA is not losing steam and could be gearing up for such assaults. In contrast to official reports, ex-combatants who recently escaped from the LRA argue that the rebel group is not under heavy pressure today, despite prompting from the Ugandan army to say otherwise. Silas, who came back from the LRA three months ago, told us, “Life isn’t really harder for the LRA now.” “They move, they eat, just as they did before. I didn’t notice a big change from a year ago.” Several ex-combatants in northeastern Congo have reported a similar story. The estimated strength of the group varies from 250 to 800 fighters with guns, according to recent ex-combatants.

The historical patterns were confirmed by recent interviews with former LRA fighters. As Robert, a senior former commander recalled, “In 1994 [during negotiations with the Ugandan government], Kony directed me not to talk the truth during the peace talks. That was his arrangement to go to Sudan to get guns.” During the 1994-6 LRA offensive, the LRA fighters mutilated the ears and lips of civilians. The 2002 attacks led to thousands of deaths, and the 2008-9 attacks left over 800 civilians dead in a single month. David, a former LRA captain, noted that during lulls in the fighting, “I trained in Sudan three times, and the Sudanese gave us supplies and food. It’s possible to resupply from there now.”
A similar scenario would have the LRA simply lie low over the next several months and wait for the U.S. advisors to leave, as many insurgencies have done against outside forces throughout the world. The number of LRA attacks has decreased over the past six months. If they do adopt a “waiting out” strategy, this would make it very difficult to track the fighters, since the LRA does not have large bases and could hide beneath the trees in small groups in civilian clothes. The fact that there are only 20-30 U.S. advisors deployed in the large operational theater, according to media reports, would make it even more difficult and points to the need for TTID support outlined below. This support would still be absolutely necessary in this scenario to gather effective intelligence on the high command’s locations and to act on this intelligence. Without such support, the advisors would fail in their mission, and the LRA would go back to the status quo ante as soon as the advisors leave.

The military side: Troops, transport, and intelligence support

LRA leader Joseph Kony, late 2011: “The U.S. troops [with the Ugandan army] will do nothing. They will come and try but go back. We will be anywhere and everywhere.”

“The UPDF [Ugandan army] officers don’t know where Kony is. There are rumors that he is in CAR or Darfur. There is persistent talk among UPDF officers that he is moving to Khartoum, but they constantly debate his whereabouts.”

The deployment of U.S. advisors to the battlefield is an enormous step forward on the military side. The reality, however, is that up to 80 advisors in the field and a Ugandan army contingent half of its previous deployment size are insufficient to do the job in locating or pursuing Kony or protecting civilians in a vast 115,000 square mile territory in which the LRA exploits a lack of roads, virtually no government presence, and dense jungle that make it highly difficult to detect its presence. As a western military expert argued, “To put it bluntly, the territory is too vast for the forces at hand. This makes good intelligence difficult to obtain. The [second] key would be to have transport helicopters to move sufficient forces against the LRA.”

If the mission is to succeed, it will need much greater support in gathering intelligence on Kony and his senior leadership and speeding up the ability to act with special forces troops, transport, and intelligence assistance—in short, TTI. In addition, it is essential to field more soldiers from South Sudan, Congo, and the Central African Republic, or CAR, to do civilian protection missions in providing security perimeters for vulnerable communities. As a former captain who commanded over 1,000 troops in the LRA argued,

“I spent 18 years with Kony. The only thing that can be effective now against the LRA is the gun. Don’t leave the UPDF [Ugandan army] alone – the international community should step in. U.S. advisors won’t be effective, though. You need joint troops from other countries. Kony doesn’t fear the U.S. advisors, because he knows the number [of Ugandan troops and U.S. advisors] now is small. One LRA unit can defeat ten UPDF units.”
Uganda is the main force deployed against the LRA, but due to its commitments elsewhere, the size and capability of the force is in serious need of reinforcement to cover the vast territory. The number of its troops has decreased to approximately half of what it was in 2010. The Ugandan army has not undertaken any operations in Congo in the previous two to three months; and its best special forces troops are deployed in the African Union mission in Somalia. As another former senior LRA officer told the author, "The only thing that hurts commanders is attacks, when they’re under pressure. Otherwise they have everything; they live well. There was no reason to defect, only that the battles were difficult at times. But even then, not really, because the Ugandan army was weak." While it is impossible to verify the 10-to-1 kill ratios claimed by ex-LRA commanders, LRA units are adept at evading regional forces and at taking measures to ensure that when they are attacked the commanders escape.

It is essential that additional special forces be deployed to make the LRA mission work. As a regional analyst noted, "It’s extremely dangerous if left only in the hands of the Ugandan government. The momentum must be kept up. But that has not happened over the past year."

The vast size and difficulty of the terrain that the LRA operates from makes it imperative that additional, more specialized military troops and technology are deployed to prevent its commanders from escaping capture once again.

**A jungle the size of Arizona:** the LRA operates across an approximately 115,000 square mile area. Additional troops would greatly help to enable rapid action on intelligence of top LRA commanders.

**Ungoverned spaces:** Northeast Congo, eastern CAR, and western South Sudan have virtually no roads or government presence.

**Minimal army presence:** While most recent LRA attacks were in Congo, the Ugandan army presence in Congo has been nonexistent since mid-2011. The Congolese army has one battalion that undertakes very limited operations against the LRA. The CAR army protects towns with as few as five soldiers. In South Sudan community militias with no military training defend against the LRA with bows, arrows, and a limited number of guns. Ugandan army maintains its main military presence in CAR, despite the bulk of the LRA attacks being in Congo, but its overall LRA numbers are less than half of what they were in 2010.

**Uganda’s commitments elsewhere:** Uganda, the main force confronting the LRA, has roughly 6,000 troops deployed in Somalia, including special forces, and is reportedly making contingency plans for a possible war in support of South Sudan if it is attacked by Sudan. Uganda should be aided by additional forces from other African states.

**The “broccoli forest” terrain that requires special forces and infrared technology:** The LRA operates in a dense jungle that resembles a broccoli forest from above. As Voice of America journalist Ivan Broadhead, embedded with the Ugandan army in December 2011, described, “Within minutes it was all too apparent how impenetrable these forests are - and what a haven they represent to the LRA. This is thick, thick foliage. I’m absolutely soaking wet. I’ve lost the soldiers. Where are they? They’re five yards ahead of you and you wouldn’t know they are there.” Special forces, known for focused missions to capture or kill individual military leaders, could better penetrate key areas than regular troops and attack LRA commanders more effectively.

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**Five reasons why additional special forces are needed**

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According to a senior Ugandan official who spoke off the record, President Museveni would accept other African troops on the LRA mission for two reasons: The Ugandan army is stretched at present, and the LRA affected region is enormous. The additional forces must be ready to engage the LRA on pursuit missions and should have special forces, given the highly specialized nature of the mission: to arrest Kony and his top leadership. Forces from South Africa and Botswana could serve as two options, but regional armies could also be possible, if special forces are available. As South African Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu stated in November, the emerging consensus for African countries is to assume responsibility for managing regional conflicts, and “South Africa is expected to play a significant role in this.” President Barack Obama should contact key African governments to secure special forces to this end and other governments to secure logistical support, and provide more robust intelligence capabilities.

A surge of transport and intelligence support from the United States, Europe, and/or African Union countries will also be critical to the success of the mission. An intelligence boost would enable the anti-LRA force to gather real-time intelligence through technology and human intelligence networks on the whereabouts of Kony and his top commanders, and to centralize the collection of this information, so that the forces can act quickly. Infrared sensing technology should be utilized, given the dense tree cover, and as well as establishing night flights by surveillance aircraft and increasing the coverage of affected areas through unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft. A small investment would go a long way here, as a few helicopter night flights with infrared scanning could be included in the $35 million funds and would greatly help locate the LRA leadership. As they are starting to do, the U.S. advisors and the militaries involved will need to work more closely with local communities and radio networks to make better use of human intelligence. On the transport side, more helicopters are a dire need, and would enhance the potential of the troops by increasing their rapid mobilization capacity. If U.S. or European helicopters are unavailable, other contract helicopters should be leased or procured for the mission.

Finally, a diplomatic agreement is needed on the deployment of all forces, especially Ugandan, in all LRA-affected areas, particularly Congo. Congolese army and government officials complained in 2011 about the Ugandan presence, and the majority of Ugandan troops pulled out of Congo in 2011. As one regional analyst put it, “If I was the LRA, I would head to Congo. There is lots of room to maneuver there.” Now that a U.S. special advisor on the Great Lakes, Barrie Walkley, has been appointed the Obama administration should negotiate to secure an arrangement to ensure that the African Union mission troops are able to move to all areas that the LRA operates in, working with the new AU special envoy for the LRA, Francisco Madeira.
The civilian side: A senior-level defection strategy

While military pressure is important, the LRA will not disappear at the hands of armed forces alone. However, many trends on the nonmilitary side are negative and must be reversed. In contrast to northern Uganda 5 to 10 years ago, almost no LRA fighters are escaping today out of fear of being killed, tried in court, or returning to increased poverty. The United Nations and a few NGOs have been working on defection, otherwise known as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, or DDR, but their efforts are limited in the vast LRA-affected territories and offer the same incentives to a child soldier as they do to top officers. This is a serious problem: The LRA’s ranks are not being depleted fast enough, thus prolonging the war.

A new strategy to encourage defection is needed that is targeted at mid- and senior-level LRA commanders. Coupled with the push factor of the military force, this would act as a pull factor to lure strategically the LRA commanders back to civilian life. Three main elements are necessary for a successful DDR strategy, including an ability to reach the troops with messages, a physical and legal infrastructure to receive them, and concrete incentives for them to come out.

A. Getting the message out to commanders and fighters. Communicating with LRA fighters is an immense challenge due to poor infrastructure. USAID, Invisible Children, and the United Nations are making important contributions to building a radio network for some areas and dropping flyers.

However, there are no strategic communications directed at mid-and senior-level commanders. The general messaging to the rank and file soldiers should be coupled with a targeted approach to such commanders, as commanders who have spent 10 to 15 years with the LRA have different needs and interests than abducted child soldiers who have spent fewer than two years with the group. While the top three LRA commanders have been indicted by the ICC, approximately 50-100 commanders just below them could be targeted by a senior-level defection initiative.

The communications should incorporate family members of LRA commanders to the extent possible, as Kony and commanders appear to place high value on family members living outside the war zone. A northern Ugandan civil society leader recalled to me that “When I met Kony [during the Juba peace process], he was asking about his wife. How is she doing, what are their sons doing? He was very intent on this.”18 Another former LRA commander also emphasized the importance of his family: “I came out mainly because of my family. I met my father, whom I accidentally ran into during a battle. I had heard a former rebel on radio saying he was safe, but I mainly came out because of my father.”19
In order to get the message out, there is also a distinct need to increase radio service in LRA affected areas. Even if they have a radio, most LRA fighters cannot listen to it, as there is no radio broadcast in tens of thousands of miles of operational areas. Currently only a few dozen high frequency, or HF, radios are used for early warning networks in northern Congo, and USAID is starting to work with Vodacom to build a few FM radio towers and get HF radios to Bas-Uele. FM radio service is concentrated in Dungu and Yambio, with smaller stations or relay towers in Faradje and Ezo. Obo has a community radio, but it has a radius of only 20 miles. The United Nations mission in Congo, MONUSCO, is doing good work in this area, but an investment of $100,000 to $200,000 more in radio towers could go a long way to increasing coverage.

If the messages are to have an impact, they must come from senior officials, as lower level messages have a much lower chance of success with higher LRA ranks. To buttress the work of the military advisors, U.S. General Carter Ham or a similar senior U.S. official should personally speak on radio encouraging LRA fighters to come out. The U.S. government should work with Uganda on the messaging, and senior officials such as Chief of Defense Forces General Aronda Nyakairima could also speak. The messages should include evidence of tangible benefits for former fighters, as outlined below.

B. Ensuring that there is a safe environment for the fighters to return to. In stark contrast to northern Uganda 5 to 10 years ago, potential LRA defectors today face serious risks of being killed by communities in Congo, Central African Republic, and South Sudan or facing trial in Uganda. The fear of being lynched by civilians or local defense militias angry at the LRA’s attacks against their villages is acting as a serious obstacle to DDR today. As Joshua, an ex-combatant who was captured by the Ugandan army in late 2011 told me:

“If I wasn’t wounded, I would still be there. I’m certain they would have killed me if I had escaped in Congo. The Congolese people wanted to kill me when I came out of the LRA, but a UPDF soldier found out and took me away. I witnessed on several occasions that communities shot people trying to escape the LRA, even though we are kids, and we came there against our will.”

The new Invisible Children/Justice and Peace Commission rehabilitation center in Dungu, Congo, is be a welcome step to combat this problem, but the reality is that most of the LRA is hundreds of miles away from Dungu at present. Much more is needed in a territory that spans 115,000 square miles. There is almost nowhere for fighters to defect to in eastern CAR, areas west of Dungu in Congo, or South Sudan.

Three steps are necessary to change this equation. First, USAID, NGOs, and other donors should engage in a serious community sensitization effort in northeastern
Congo, eastern CAR, and western South Sudan to help local leaders peacefully accept LRA defectors. Communities should understand that most LRA combatants were abducted against their will and forced at gunpoint to commit abuses and should be made aware of any locations for defectors to report to. Second, the United Nations should establish assembly points in the three affected countries where LRA can safely surrender. The location of these assembly areas could be integrated into sensitization campaigns. Donors should then buttress these efforts by sponsoring at least three more reception centers in LRA-affected areas, including in northern Congo, eastern CAR, and South Sudan.

Third, the Ugandan government should draw a firm line between LRA fighters indicted by the ICC and those who are not. Those who are indicted—the commanders most responsible for the atrocities meted out in the war—should be actively pursued, but those who are not indicted should be given amnesty, in order to speed up the end of the war. This is not an easy choice, but now is the time to pursue an end to the conflict, not to bring prosecutions against mid-level commanders such as Thomas Kwoyelo; these prosecutions are a strong disincentive to defection among LRA fighters.

Drawing a clear line against prosecuting all but the most senior commanders would likely garner support from Ugandan civil society. A recent opinion survey by the Justice and Reconciliation Project in northern Uganda revealed “A resounding 98% of respondents thought that the amnesty law was still relevant and that it should not be abolished. … Our findings reveal that many respondents generally appreciate the blanket character of the current amnesty, excluding the five top LRA-commanders indicted by the International Criminal Court … A majority of those interviewed consistently stated that most LRA senior and junior commanders are abductees themselves who didn’t join the rebel group voluntarily and should therefore be eligible for amnesty instead of facing prosecution at the International Crimes Division of the [Ugandan] High Court.” Uganda should withdraw the Kwoyelo case, extend the Amnesty Act, and pursue the model of Brigadier Sam Kolo’s reintegration through education support, making the most of the current available opportunity to end the LRA conflict once and for all.

C. Having tangible incentives for the fighters to come out. Most LRA commanders still believe that they would have a better life with the rebel group than if they returned home, and aid programs aimed at changing these incentives are currently very limited. Despite five years without attacks, the peace dividend has been paltry for both ex-combatants and victims in northern Uganda. As a former LRA captain explained:

“Being with the rebels was better, because I used to have everything. I would use a gun to get things. I wouldn’t have to struggle. You get everything right away – food, soap, sugar – everything is free. I had two wives. Now, I’ve only experienced difficulty. Here, you work and there is nothing… [Also], people blame me for the deaths in the community.”
This incentive structure has to change, if there is to be any chance in luring the commanders out of the LRA. A benefits package that helps both commanders and communities should be designed urgently and broadcast widely to LRA fighters. As one former combatant argued, “Talking about successes on radio can help. People in the bush need to understand the benefits of being home, so they don’t have to loot.” In particular, USAID should partner with NGOs and Uganda to design specialized programs for mid- and senior-level LRA commanders, as a strategic initiative to bleed the LRA ranks and help end the war. These should include the following:

a. **Education:** When asked about their priorities, former LRA fighters put education for themselves and in particular their children at the top of the list. Strategic DDR packages should include scholarships for former commanders and a limited number of their children and/or literacy training.

b. **Small business and farming:** Ex-commanders and communities alike express a strong interest in small business development, animal husbandry, and agriculture. Participants who succeed in gaining new income through reintegration projects such as the Grassroots Reconciliation Group or the International Organization for Migration should be highlighted on radio.

c. **Medicine:** Many senior commanders are reportedly in need of medical attention after many years in the bush. The broadcasts on radio should note offers of medicine and medical care.

d. **Joint ex-combatant/community projects:** Northern Ugandan religious leaders recently noted that programs for war survivors have been limited. If real reintegration is to be achieved, aid projects must be designed for joint work between former LRA fighters and their home communities, such as group farming projects, group business skills trainings, and more.

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**Conclusion and recommendations**

The Lord’s Resistance Army war has now gone on for 25 years, with over 60,000 children and youth abducted and tens of thousands of people killed. A quarter of a century later, there is a serious chance to end this scourge of humanity. The contribution of U.S. military advisors to the LRA battlefield needs to now spur the needed additional steps to make the resolution of the conflict a reality: more and better African troops and equipment on the ground, an agreement to deploy forces in all LRA-affected areas, and a more effective defection strategy. The following recommendations would help accomplish this goal:

1. **Troops:** President Obama should call on the presidents of key African countries to contribute special forces to the new African Union mission against the LRA.
2. **Transport and intelligence:** The U.S. and European allies should provide a surge of transport and intelligence support to enable the anti-LRA force to gather real-time intelligence on the whereabouts of Kony and his top commanders. This should include infrared sensing technology, the provision or leasing of additional helicopters, flights by surveillance aircraft, and an increase in human intelligence networks on the ground. To accomplish these goals, the Pentagon should use the maximum authority in its spending of the $35 million authorized by Congress for this initiative.

3. **Defection:** Africom chief General Carter Ham should broadcast messages on radio programming targeted at mid- and senior-level LRA commanders to come out of the bush. Family members of senior LRA commanders should also broadcast messages on the programs.

   a. The U.S. government should work vigorously with NGOs and regional governments to:

      i. Sensitize Congolese, Central African, and South Sudanese communities on the need to not harm LRA defectors.
      
      ii. Ensure that the United Nations establishes assembly points in the three affected countries where LRA can safely surrender. The location of these assembly areas should be integrated into sensitization campaigns.
      
      iii. Work with NGOs to set up at least three additional reception centers for former LRA fighters in war-affected areas.
      
      iv. Set up new radio towers and expand the radius of current towers in affected areas of Congo, CAR, and South Sudan, in order to get defection messages out to LRA commanders.

   b. The U.S. government should work with Uganda and NGOs to set up an aid incentive program targeted at non-ICC indicted LRA commanders, including education, family support, and small-business development.

   c. The Ugandan government should halt prosecutions against non-ICC indicted commanders, in order to speed up resolution of the conflict.
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Endnotes

1  According to the LRA Crisis Tracker, there were 113 LRA incidents between August 2011 and January 2012, versus 354 incidents between Jan 2011 and July 2011. Resolve, available at www.lracrisistracker.theresolve.org.

2  According to the LRA Crisis Tracker, from August 2011 to January 2012, 92 percent of LRA incidents (104 out of 113) took place in Congo, with 4 percent (five incidents) in CAR, and 4 percent (five incidents) in South Sudan. Over the past one year (January 2011 to January 2012), 83 percent took place in Congo (390/467), 8 percent in CAR (36/467), and 9 percent in South Sudan (41/467). Resolve, available at www.lracrisistracker.theresolve.org.

3  Interview with senior Ugandan official, Kampala, Uganda, December 14, 2011.

4  Interview with Silas, former LRA combatant, northern Uganda, December 22, 2011.

5  Interview with aid worker who works with former child soldiers in northeastern Congo, Kampala, Uganda, December 18, 2011.


7  Interview with former LRA senior commander, Gulu, northern Uganda, December 23, 2011.


9  Interview with former LRA captain, rural northern Uganda, December 18, 2011.

10 As retold by “James,” an ex-combatant who had very recently returned from the LRA, Gulu, northern Uganda, December 23, 2011.

11 Confidential interview with source familiar with Ugandan army, January 5, 2012.

12 Interview with western military expert via email, January 14, 2012.

13 Interview with former LRA senior commander, Gulu.

14 Interview with former LRA captain, rural northern Uganda, December 18, 2011.

15 Interview with regional analyst, Kampala, Uganda, December 14, 2011.


17 Interview with regional analyst by phone, Washington D.C., January 5, 2012.

18 Interview with northern Ugandan civil society leader, Gulu, Uganda, December 20, 2011.

19 Interview with former LRA captain, rural northern Uganda, December 18, 2011.


21 Interview with Joshua, former LRA combatant, Lamwo, northern Uganda, December 18, 2011.


23 Upon his defection from the LRA in 2005, Brig. Sam Kolo was given limited housing and an opportunity to study. He graduated in January 2012 from Gulu University.

24 Interview with former LRA captain, rural northern Uganda, December 18, 2011.


26 For more information, see http://www.grassrootsgroup.org and http://uganda.iom.int/.

Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on the crises in Sudan, South Sudan, eastern Congo, and areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Enough conducts intensive field research, develops practical policies to address these crises, and shares sensible tools to empower citizens and groups working for change. To learn more about Enough and what you can do to help, go to www.enoughproject.org.