Lebanon 2008 - 2009
The National Human Development Report
toward a citizen’s state
toward a citizen's state

report summary
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND STUDY TEAMS

This project is the result of a collaborative effort between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) which composed the steering committee for the report and supported the NHDR project team that directed the project. In addition, an advisory board that brought together public intellectuals, policy makers and academics from the public and private sector was established to guide this very complex process. We extend our deepest gratitude to them all for their cooperation, input and effort during this process.

*Toward a Citizen’s State* is the outcome of three years of an elaborate participatory process that included multiple roundtables, focus groups, and brainstorming sessions with over 150 academics, experts and policy makers in different fields as well as a wide range of citizens. To all those who participated in these discussions, debates and especially focus groups we would like to extend our sincerest thanks and appreciation for their contributions toward making this project a success. We hope that our collective effort will indeed bear fruit.

The final version of this report is the intellectual product of four core authors who utilized the project outline, the work of participating authors that included background papers commissioned for this report, discussions from focus group meetings, the written inputs of discussants, the debates that took place during the workshops and roundtables and their own knowledge. They were assisted in this process by the NHDR team. Our deepest thanks to those individuals for their considerable intellectual efforts. Without you this report would not have been possible.

To assess the status of human development and create a comprehensive statistical compendium on its various aspects; political, social, economic, cultural, demographic etc., the project carried out considerable research and analysis of existing and new data. The statistical compendium that resulted would not have been possible without the technical advice and cooperation of a large number of individuals who gave of their time and knowledge generously. To all we extend our thanks.

The process of producing the NHDR also generated two other parallel projects that focused on specific aspects of citizenship and also resulted in two independent publications: *Education and Citizenship: Concepts, Attitudes, Skills and Action among ninth grade students in Lebanon* and *A Hundred and One Stories to Tell: Civic Initiatives in Public Life*. While the first sought to assess concepts, attitudes and knowledge among ninth grade students across the country on issues of citizenship and democracy, the latter collected, rewrote and publicized a hundred and one initiatives undertaken by individuals and organizations to make a difference in some aspect of public life in Lebanon. We are grateful to the individuals and organizations that participated in the production of each of these publications and to all those who shared their stories with us.

Our sincere appreciation also goes to the advertising agencies, graphic designers and various media outlets that we partnered with as part of an extensive outreach component to generate debates on the rights and responsibilities of state and citizens. In particular our thanks go to Saatchi and Saatchi, especially Elie Khoury and to Rana Yahya of Just Imagine who sponsored the visual communication components of this project and its multiple reports. Saatchi supported the audiovisual production of TVCs for *One Hundred and One Stories to Tell* and *Toward a Citizen’s State* as well as the launch event of this report, while Rana Yahya produced all three book covers and related brochures and posters. We would also like to thank our civil society partners who joined forces with us in organizing diverse activities including workshops and roundtable discussions. Our gratitude also goes to the different media outlets for producing documentaries, writing stories and lending us their platforms especially for our *One Hundred and One Stories to Tell* media campaign to highlight citizen initiatives in public life. Your enthusiasm and belief in the project’s message insured successful outreach and wide ranging discussions on the role of citizens in making a difference in their own environments.
National Human Development Report

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### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Community Development Project</td>
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>Council for Development Reconstruction</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>CERD</td>
<td>Center for Educational Research and Development</td>
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<td>CivED</td>
<td>Civic Education</td>
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<td>CIIESIN</td>
<td>Center for International Earth Science Information Network</td>
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<td>EdL</td>
<td>Electricité du Liban</td>
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<td>EPI</td>
<td>Environmental Performance Index</td>
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<td>ESFD</td>
<td>Economic and Social Fund for Development</td>
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<td>FHH</td>
<td>Female-Headed Households</td>
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<td>FPL</td>
<td>Food Poverty Line</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GDI</td>
<td>Gender Development Index</td>
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<td>GEM</td>
<td>Gender Empowerment Index</td>
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<td>GFCF</td>
<td>Gross Fixed Capital Formation</td>
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<td>GoL</td>
<td>Government of Lebanon</td>
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<td>HBS</td>
<td>Household Budget Survey</td>
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<td>HCE</td>
<td>Household Consumption Expenditure</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Household Expenditure</td>
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<td>HHD</td>
<td>Household</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLCS</td>
<td>Households Living Conditions Survey</td>
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<td>HPI</td>
<td>Human Poverty Index</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Higher Relief Commission</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Cooperation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRFED</td>
<td>Institut de Formation en Vue du Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>KILM</td>
<td>Key Indicators of the Labor Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>Least Cost Diet</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHH</td>
<td>Male-Headed Households</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoEHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Higher Education</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>MoL</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor</td>
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<td>MoIM</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Municipalities</td>
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<td>MoSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
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<td>MPHS</td>
<td>Multi Purpose Household Survey</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NHDR</td>
<td>National Human Development Report</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSSF</td>
<td>National Social Security Fund</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHC</td>
<td>Primary Health Care</td>
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<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>Poverty Gap</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
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<td>UBN</td>
<td>Unsatisfied Basic Needs</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>USJ</td>
<td>Université Saint Joseph</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordinances</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit for Social Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>YCELP</td>
<td>Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy</td>
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Toward a Citizen’s State is the fourth National Human Development Report (NHDR) for Lebanon. The first of the three was published in 1997 on “A Profile of Sustainable Human Development”, the second in 1999 on “Youth and Development” and the third in 2002 on “Globalization: Toward a Lebanese Agenda”. Work commenced on this current report at the end of 2005 in partnership with the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). The theme was first chosen, the general framework for the development of key concepts outlined, a work plan was drawn up that included a list of background papers and brainstorming workshops and discussion groups were organized. This took place under guidance of a steering committee that included the different concerned parties. Of course the project team faced a series of challenges connected to the political and military insecurity that Lebanon witnessed during 2005-2008. Despite these exceedingly difficult circumstances, work continued diligently to develop and produce the report, and gather the necessary statistical data and indicators needed to measure human development, human poverty and gender empowerment in Lebanon.

In parallel to working on this report, two other important and complementary reports were produced on citizenship in Lebanon. The first was on Education and Citizenship that was published in partnership with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. This report analyzes the results of a survey on ninth grade students and examines their knowledge of and attitudes toward concepts of citizenship and participation in Lebanon. It is also part of an international survey that follows a unified methodology and allows a comparison between Lebanon’s results and twenty eight other countries. The second book was launched in February 2009 under the title of One Hundred and One Stories to tell. It documents civic initiatives undertaken by individuals and civil society organizations in support of civic values and participation. It embodies the vibrant and diversified civil society that Lebanon is known for.

The launch of Toward a Citizen’s State is particularly timely, since Lebanon is still searching for the appropriate formula for national reconciliation and has been living through continuous dialogue sessions in search of agreements that would reinforce partnership, participation, co-existence and political stability. This report has contributed to a certain extent, through the multiple and different roundtable discussions and focus group meetings that brought together policy makers, intellectuals, activists, academics and representatives from the different groups. We hope that through the discussions that will continue after the launch of this report, we are able to contribute to a general reform agenda that would reinforce citizenship in Lebanon and enhance the role of the state and of civil society.

Citizenship in Lebanon was addressed in this report from three principle perspectives. The first addresses citizenship and the sectarian state. It explores the relationship of the state, its institutions, its constitution and its laws, including personal status laws to citizens. This exploration also engages with Lebanon’s system of consociational democratic governance in its different manifestations and therefore addresses the relationship of the state to the individual communities and their representatives and the impact this has on the relationship of citizens to their state. The second perspective focuses on socio-economic citizenship rights and considers social policies from the viewpoints of citizenship rights and comprehensive social development at one and the same time. As such, it examines the relationship of state to citizens and focuses on the rights to education, health and employment, and addresses the problems of poverty and social exclusion. The third perspective looks into citizenship, culture and education and explores shared common cultural values as well as cultural differences that could have a negative impact on national identity in relation to communal identities as sub-national modes of identification.

This report also explores the different roles of the state, civil society, and the private sector and presents specific recommendations on the issues raised. These are presented in the last chapter of the report. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in partnership with CDR, hopes to engage with the executive and legislative branches of government on the one hand and civil society organizations as well as academics, experts, the media and Lebanese citizens in general on the other hand, to support the general reform process and strengthen citizenship in Lebanon. Empowering citizens leads to a reinforcement of democracy, good governance, the rule of law
and justice reform, as well as social equity toward a sustainable human development in Lebanon.

In addition to all this, this report also presents new statistical information that complement existing surveys that have been conducted until 2004, the most important of which are the *Mapping of Living Conditions (1998)*, *Changes in the Map of Living Conditions between 1995-2004 (1997)* and the *Map of Poverty and Living Conditions Survey in Lebanon, 2004* that were produced in 2008 by UNDP in partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Central Administration of Statistics.

United Nations organizations will also work to support Lebanon’s governmental institutions to implement the national statistical master plan in the coming few years so as to make available credible statistical information in all fields, economic, social and others.

UNDP also looks forward to a continued partnership with CDR for the production of the following National Human Development reports in Lebanon that would complement and support this current report and its efforts to become a thematic studies series, and a general statistical reference for sustainable human development in Lebanon.

March, 2009

Marta Ruedas  
Resident Representative
Lebanon today presents a paradox. On the one hand, it boasts a vibrant multicultural society, an active private sector, and a liberal and democratic political system. On the other, in the last three decades, it has been plagued with civil wars, external wars, military occupations and acute political uncertainty. More recently, its citizens have come together to achieve dramatic and relatively peaceful political change. Yet the country has also seen a rise in sectarian divisions and animosity which have manifested themselves in periodic street clashes in Beirut and around the country. These have brought Lebanon to the verge of renewed sectarian strife.

These seemingly contradictory elements cannot be explained away as symptoms of external interference or deficiencies in the civic values of citizens. Rather, they are the result of complex and intersecting political, social, and economic factors that are directly related to the status of Lebanon’s democratic institutions and system. They are also deeply rooted in the ways in which Lebanese citizens define themselves as Lebanese and the vision they have of their nation and state in a regional and global context. Toward a Citizen’s State, the fourth National Human Development Report for Lebanon since 1996, tries to analyze some of these issues from three different perspectives -political, social, and cultural.

Written over the past three years and in the midst of ongoing political and military turbulence, this report tries to unpack the main elements of dissent and consent regarding what makes this country work. It represents a first attempt to explore the questions of citizenship and identity-making as they relate to larger governance and policymaking processes. It also opens up a political, social, and economic dialogue grounded in questions of justice and equity and explores the impact of the latter on development in the country. The idea is to put forward strategies for reform, based on sound analysis and divorced from political grandstanding. The hope is to reinvigorate political engagement and debates over identity and visions for the country and set forth an agenda toward sustainable growth and peace based on values of justice and equity.

The basic premise of this report is that citizenship is the foundation of democracy, that democratic practices cannot be limited to the procedural dimension, despite its importance, and that effective citizenship concerns not only voting without coercion, but also the formation of relations between citizens and the state and among citizens themselves. The development of such relationships is an ongoing process and is closely connected to various aspects of societal formations. As such, this report considers citizenship from a twin perspective-first, as a legal framework that regulates the interaction between citizens and the state and among citizens themselves. While the former is regulated by the state, the latter is impacted by social, cultural, and, in Lebanon, religious norms.

In this regard Toward a Citizen’s State seeks to unpack the different mechanisms that define citizenship and democratic practices in Lebanon and to propose an agenda for moving toward a citizen’s state. As the Human Development Report 2002 argues, democracy is not only valuable in its own right but is also tied to human development. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, establishes a broad concept of citizenship, encompassing political, civil, and social rights. For UNDP, democratic governance is a key condition for human development, since it is through politics, and not just economics, that it is possible to create more equitable conditions and to expand people’s options. Here, political rights are intricately connected to democracy, social rights to human development, and civil rights to human rights, while all of these facilitate and promote the exercise of citizenship.

From this perspective, this report is a call to Lebanon’s decision and policy makers, public intellectuals and to members of civil society to recognize that citizenship is an essential weapon not only in the struggle against social and economic inequity but also in the attempt to widen the conception of politics itself. Here, it is important to point out that politics is not only about what politicians do but the choices that citizens make when they decide to get involved in public affairs. In this sense Toward a Citizen’s State attempts to go beyond a rights-based approach to citizenship to emphasize the importance of social practices that can generate or underpin such rights. In so
doing, the report will explore each of the three different dimensions of citizenship—the political, the social, and the cultural—in an integrated manner.

Furthermore, irrespective of the differences between major philosophical perspectives on citizenship, they all share a common interest in the rights and obligations of citizenship. Citizenship here is not a universal value free notion, but rather carries within it the agenda of active participation (far beyond electoral seasons). Responsible citizenship is connected to civic values such as democracy, equity, human rights, tolerance and social responsibility, solidarity and justice. These values are also directly linked to the view of civil society as a form of association of individuals involved in networks, such as NGOs, political parties, social or economic associations, syndicates or labor unions, etc that individuals participate in voluntarily. The idea is that such forms of active citizenship or constructive participation in public life are what make for a productive social capital and economically competitive society. It is also the arena where politics are made through rational dissent, debate and non-violent conflict.

On the methodological front, recognizing the difficulties of addressing the dilemmas of citizenship in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious context like Lebanon that is also witnessing political and military turbulence necessitated a flexible mechanism that could adapt to rapidly changing circumstances and would allow the innovative integration of citizen concerns and actions, beyond the norms of academic analysis, opinion polls and surveys. Taking cue from Bourdieu, it required an approach that would allow us to highlight contradictions without necessarily resolving them. In other words, it demanded a construct that was both top down and bottom up simultaneously.

In this spirit, we launched two separate projects that would shed light on different aspects of citizenship. Given the significance of education to the process of cultivating well informed citizens, the first project, Education and Citizenship, was undertaken with the aim of identifying where the youth of Lebanon are today with respect to notions fundamental to democracy, citizenship and social solidarity and compare them to those of twenty eight other countries. The second, A Hundred and One Stories to Tell project sought to document civic initiatives in public life. These were complemented by a comprehensive Statistical Compendium that mapped out the status of human development in Lebanon in a wide variety of arenas; social, economic, political and cultural at national and governate levels where possible.

Education and Citizenship considers that essential education comprises of the knowledge, concepts and competencies that every citizen needs to earn to be an active citizen. As such it sought to gauge the extent to which young people in Lebanon were equipped and ready to exercise the rights and obligations of citizenship and the degree to which they were prepared to become active citizens. Covering over 3,000 ninth grade students, in public and private schools in Lebanon, the project focused on what young people (14 year old) should know about a number of topics related to democratic institutions, including elections, individual rights, national identity, political participation, and respect for ethnic and political diversity. These concepts were deemed to be vital for democratic regimes such as the one in Lebanon. It also explored key factors in their educational setting that impact their civic attitudes and how they compare to their peers in different countries.

These questions are particularly relevant to a project whose primary theme is citizenship. The centrality of education for the promotion of democratic practices and the cultivation of civic identities is widely accepted. As much research from around the world indicates, educational methodologies and practices in schools have a tremendous impact on the values of students, their knowledge and sense of civic responsibilities. This surge of interest across the globe in civic education has been ongoing for almost two decades; partly a result of globalization and partly a result of the increased democratization in various countries. However, one of the most profound changes that is reorienting citizenship education, is the recognition that it is valuable for children as children. In other words, citizenship education is no longer considered solely as a content area designed to prepare young people for their

1 In political philosophy literature three major traditions can be identified: liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism.
2 The two main schools of thought on civil society and associational life are represented by Robert Putnam and Jurgen Habermas. The latter in particular has come under extensive criticism for the exclusions that his theory of the public sphere embodies.
adult roles in society, but, rather, as a tool that will help them improve and understand their lives and interactions in society. What was evident from the study on Lebanon is that rather then prepare students in this manner, schools had to a large extent been transformed to spaces that are echoing the vertical divisions plaguing Lebanese society today.

These ideas about active citizenship are the reality of hundreds of individuals whose stories are included in A Hundred and One Stories to Tell book project that reflects a passionate belief in the positive contribution of individuals and groups towards the construction of their social realities. From Lebanon’s northern border to its southern tip, it depicts a ground crowded with individuals and groups passionately invested in constructing hope and seeking change in Lebanon. At a time of considerable political and social unrest in Lebanon, we found it particularly pertinent to try and capture these passions and say, in a loud and collective voice, citizens still believe. They are making a difference and when they get together they do indeed change the world; at least their own world.

Acknowledging this central role of passion in the construction of social and political identities is also vital to a wider conception of democracy. Passion here is fundamental to notions of citizenship and civic agency that often take center stage in discussions about declining participation in democracy. Understanding such agency requires that we see citizenship not just in formal/legal terms but also with regard to meanings, practices, communication and identities. From this perspective we are able to transcend restricted notions of civil society and in the process acknowledge the role of individuals and groups in making a difference. This acknowledgement also allows us to go beyond the different models of democracy that either sees political actors as being moved primarily by their interests or that just focus on the role of reason and moral consideration in the democratic process.

In Lebanon, the 101 Stories to tell captured the deep sense of responsibility that citizens have toward each other and toward their communities. They also showed the value of cumulative work in pushing and achieving greater democratization and policy change. At the same time, they also highlighted disconnect between an active citizenship on the ground, trying to make a difference and a polity that has flirted with civil conflict on several occasions in the last few years.

Addressing these issues in today’s world, let alone in a context like that of Lebanon of the past three years is no easy task. The question “Are you from Mars?” became a favorite refrain during the production of this project. Who has time to discuss the role of the state and of citizenship in the midst of one of the most acute political crises that the country has ever faced and in the aftermath of a string of assassinations that destabilized the country, a devastating war, a series of “mini” civil conflicts, and the gradual paralysis of all state institutions. Did the report discuss the role of the state? “What state?” we were asked. “We cannot agree on who we want to represent us, let alone what role the state should play.” In this environment, organizing an event, no matter how big or small became an unwelcome chore. Would there be a car bomb? An assassination? A parliamentary session for the election of the president that would shut down half the city, only to yield further political stalemate? Would there be a strike that would escalate into conflict? Would there be riots and burning tires?

What kept this project going was the belief that this was indeed the moment to talk about citizenship and what the Lebanese wanted of their country. This was the time to discuss the visions they have for their future and how to realize them. This was indeed the time to begin discussing what role citizens should play in the shaping of their futures and how to harness their energy for a more equitable and democratic system. In 2005, more than two thirds of the Lebanese population took to the streets, in two separate rallies, in support of their beliefs. Since then, many have been increasingly disenfranchised and disappointed by ‘politics as usual’. This ‘politics as usual’ is a product of the system that exists and the challenge today is how to bring those citizens out again, in support of something...
they can believe in. Can the energies of *One Hundred and One Stories to Tell* be collected and turned into one thousand and one? How can the positive and passionate belief and investment of the Lebanese in their country be drawn upon in ways that will allow them to overcome the divisions that riddle their society and perhaps help Lebanon live up to the myth of being a country that exemplifies the dialogue of cultures and their harmonious coexistence.

It was this belief in the capacity of individuals and groups to make a difference and in the ability of the Lebanese to overcome their differences that allowed this journey to begin. We hope that the work we have done will instigate some debate on the vision(s) of the Lebanese for their country and the means to be used in order to move forward, for as Margaret Mead once said, “*Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.*”

Maha Yahya
Project Director
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND STUDY TEAMS

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NATION, STATE AND CITIZENSHIP
PART ONE
NATION, STATE AND CITIZENSHIP

This summary report is in four parts. Part one outlines a conceptual approach to citizenship in a context like Lebanon, and its connections to democracy and the role of the state. This is followed by an overview of political, social and economic events and their impact on Human Development as well as the methodology and structure of the report. Part Two then presents a balance sheet on the elements of integral citizenship; political, social and cultural. Part Three outlines a general assessment of the attitudes of citizens toward key issues such as national and civic identities and democracy. Part Four presents elements of an agenda for progress Toward a Citizen’s State.

1.1 CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY, AND ROLE OF THE STATE

A. Citizenship and Civic Myths

Citizenship is a social category that addresses the group or communal nature of social life in a “universal” manner. The rights and obligations of citizens vary depending on the history, cultural background, and sociopolitical context of each country. Irrespective of these differences, citizenship cannot be reduced to a set of services (rights and obligations); to do so is to depoliticize it. Rather, citizenship is a way of being in public life.

The most common form of citizenship is national citizenship; a form that ties individuals to a sovereign political entity and to a socially and spatially bounded community. A series of actions that include identification documents, taxation, and common history among others connect citizens to their nation-state.

Another central factor in the establishment and endurance of national citizenship is the founding civic myth of the nation-state. These myths also allow the political community to institutionalize the rights and responsibilities considered key to nation-state citizenship and which include the actions mentioned above. In this context, citizenship can be understood as a set of practices (judicial, economic, political, social and cultural) which classifies members of society and directs the flow of resources to individuals and groups. However, none of those concepts have remained static over the last two centuries. For example, and as Marshall and others have argued, in several western countries, initial civil rights (for example liberty of person) were augmented with political rights (for example right to vote) and social rights (for example healthcare). The acquisition of these new rights brought with them new obligations whereby, for example, increased social rights required greater taxation. The expansion of these rights strengthened the moral and functional ties between nation and state and by extension have reinforced the nation-state itself. This understanding of citizenship by necessity recognizes the multiple forms of affiliations that characterize complex and heterogeneous societies such as the one in Lebanon.

In Lebanon, even though multiple civic narratives such as the maintenance of equal distance between the state and the various religious groups, economic liberalism, and the state as patron of religious institutions, resonate and overlay each other, the most important and enduring of all is the myth of sectarian pluralism. This myth has been the basis for public life and identity politics in the country for more than a century. It tells the story of Lebanon as a country composed of different “natural” religiously defined communities. In this story, these religious communities (or sects) are said to have preexisted the Lebanese state and have maintained historical continuity and cohesion through time. One of the most ardent advocates of this myth, Michel Chiha, is also considered one of the main authors of the first Lebanese constitutions.

This notion of sectarian pluralism has dominated both public and private life in Lebanon and has resulted in a particular relationship between individuals, communal groups and the state. It is enshrined in various articles of the constitution, and is apparent in the judicial organization of daily life that has allowed religious communities to mediate the relationship between citizens and the state and among citizens. It is also visible in the troubled and sometimes contradictory relation between the civic notion of the state and the inherent recognition of the “rights” of each of the eighteen legally recognized religious communities. It also extends to the writing of Lebanese history which as Beydoun argues, expands

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2 Also referred to as fragmented political culture, consociational, confessional, sectarian, plural etc. Suad Joseph (ed), 2000, Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, Syracuse University Press, New York.
and contracts according to the identity of its historian and his or her communal affiliations. More critically, this notion of sectarian pluralism has manifested itself recently in increasing polarization between different communal groups and the marginalization of alternative forms of identification.

What has supported the predominance of this civic myth and thus the infiltration of political sectarianism into all aspects of public life is the misinterpretations ascribed to the National Pact (al-Mithaq al-Watani). Even though it was struck on the eve of Lebanon’s independence between the two main political leaders at the time, President Bishara el-Khoury who was said to represent the Christians and Prime Minister Riad al-Solh who was said to represent the Muslims, it was not publicly acknowledged as a “Pact” until four years after its announcement. The content of the Pact was summarized by the two “no” that were famously depicted by Georges Naccache in one of his articles. These are the Muslim “no” to Syrian (or Arab) unity, and the Christian “no” to western tutelage. These two “nos” are euphemistically presented as an attempt to safeguard Lebanon’s future and independence by acknowledging solidarity with Arab states on their issues and confirming its openness to western civilization and institutions. Lebanon’s independence was a prerequisite on this front.

The ministerial declaration of the first independence government led by Riad al-Solh (Box 1 - see Chapter 3 for fuller excerpts of this declaration) was meant to embody these principles and thus act as the definitive authority on interpreting the content of the Pact. However, in the decades following independence, the National Pact was gradually reduced to a sectarian power sharing formula for the major religious groups. It became increasingly known as a charter of “sectarian coexistence,” or the “Pact of Coexistence” (Mithaq al-‘Aysh al-Mushtarak). In time, this situation would extend to every facet of public life including the Taif constitution that saw the end of the fifteen year civil war in Lebanon. Taif was officially referred to as the “Document of National Accord” (Wathiqat al-Wifaq al-Watani). Both the text of the accord and the preamble to the constitution, mention the “Pact of Coexistence,” holding that any political authority contravening this pact lacked legitimacy. However, “coexistence” was left undefined, as was the essence of the relevant “Pact:” Is it referring to the well-known Pact of 1943, or the recognized sectarian “formula” for the division of power, or something else entirely? The ambiguity in what is meant by the “pact of communal coexistence” that is included in the preamble of the current constitution left the door wide open for alternate interpretations and facilitated the 2007-2008 controversy over the “legality” and “constitutionality” of the current government. During Lebanon’s recent political crisis, government ministers who resigned believed that their very act of resignation had robbed the cabinet of legitimacy. More critically this interpretation of the Taif as the “pact of communal coexistence” contravenes the general spirit of the constitution that envisages the long term abolition of sectarian based power sharing schemes.

This vagueness also has a negative impact on notions of citizenship and its presentation in the public sphere. At best it has led to considerable confusion in the ways in which citizens view their leaders and institutions and their understandings of concepts such as public or national good and shared public space. This confusion has solidified the position of the sect or community, as the main authority or reference point for citizens and the mandatory access point for citizens to state institutions. The sect in this regard becomes the principle conduit that shapes the formation of citizens’ attitudes and that of their communities towards the state and its institutions.

The move from the National Pact (al-Mithaq al-Watani) to the “Pact of Coexistence” (Mithaq al-‘Aysh al-Mushtarak) has reduced the former to a mere power sharing formula between the major religious groups.

Ambiguity in the meanings of “communal coexistence” in the preamble of the constitution facilitated diverging interpretations and solidified the position of the sect, as the main reference point for citizens.

In time, this situation would extend to every facet of public life including the Taif constitution that saw the end of the fifteen year civil war in Lebanon. Taif was officially referred to as the “Document of National Accord” (Wathiqat al-Wifaq al-Watani). Both the text of the accord itself and the preamble to the constitution, mention the “Pact of Coexistence,” holding that any political authority contravening this pact lacked legitimacy. However, “coexistence” was left undefined, as was the essence of the relevant “Pact:” Is it referring to the well-known Pact of 1943, or the recognized sectarian “formula” for the division of power, or something else entirely? The ambiguity in what is meant by the “pact of communal coexistence” that is included in the preamble of the current constitution left the door wide open for alternate interpretations and facilitated the 2007-2008 controversy over the “legality” and “constitutionality” of the current government. During Lebanon’s recent political crisis, government ministers who resigned believed that their very act of resignation had robbed the cabinet of legitimacy. More critically this interpretation of the Taif as the “pact of communal coexistence” contravenes the general spirit of the constitution that envisages the long term abolition of sectarian based power sharing schemes.

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new forms of power and politics at the sub-national level. These have challenged traditional economies of centrality and marginality. This loss of power has also generated a crisis in the political power of the Lebanese state and in its claim to control borders, resources and force.

In such a context, nation building and state sovereignty and the emergence of citizenship as the basic tenet of the political system are undermined. What is meant by nation building here is the historic move from sub-national interests to the privileging of national identity in a public sphere that includes state institutions as well as NGOs bringing together both political and civil society. It is a sphere in which citizens are equal before the law and enjoy public freedoms. State sovereignty is understood here as the ability to be above all internal forces within the limits of the law and to be independent of external forces within the limits of the constitution.

B. Citizenship and Democracy

Any discussion of citizenship and the rights and duties associated with it also brings up a discussion of democracy and the kind of political framework necessary for the guarantee of these rights. Moreover, various views of democracy inadvertently deal with how citizenship rights are claimed, attained and maintained. From this perspective, citizenship is not just a legal norm, or a right bestowed by the state but is something attained through practice. Citizenship rights are also often the outcome of struggles around specific issues. As experience from around the world shows, citizenship action can also bring significant changes to policy and help to build

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responsive and accountable states.\(^7\) In other words the practices of citizenship and democracy are closely intertwined and build up on each other.

In this regard, a consensus within the international development community has grown around the role of democracy in the improvement of public policies. Considered as a core value, democracy offers prospects for better citizen participation in the formulation of government policies. What is important in this process is that it is not enough for countries to be democratic; the substance or quality of their democracies is equally important. In other words, the question is not simply an issue of rights as much as it is of underlying societal structures.

\[\text{“...it is not enough for countries to be democratic; the substance or quality of their democracies is equally important.”}\]

From this perspective, this report concludes that building a citizen’s democracy is not about adopting a standard institutional definition of democracy be it participative, representative, deliberative etc. as much as it is a process of struggle and contestations that takes place over long spans of time. As such, this report analyzes some of the intrinsic properties of the democratic regime in Lebanon and the ways it which can be enhanced so as to improve the well being of its citizens and facilitate effective social development. It also explores the conditions under which the Lebanese regime can deliver adequate social protection and provide equitable opportunities for growth as a fundamental right of citizenship and the role that such policies can play in consolidating the democratic regime in this transitional period.

C. The Role of the State

Debates over citizenship are also directly connected to questions about the changing role of the state. In the last two decades, globalization, the increased influence of multi-national companies, the growth of global risks (financial, ecological, human etc.), claims of minorities, the emergence of allegiances based on additional forms of identity such as gender, religion, and shared historical trauma, among other factors have placed additional strains on the traditional role of the state and on concepts of citizenship.\(^8\) In response, many theorists and activists have tried to imagine new integrative mechanisms including alternative forms of citizenship. Many offer direct criticism of Marshall’s national trilogy of territorially grounded political, social, and cultural citizenship.

In such a context, debates on the role of the state acquire an additional dimension as social development, social justice, and social equity come to be regarded as key goals of macroeconomic policies.\(^9\) That healthy, well educated populations have very productive impacts on the economy is a well documented fact.\(^10\) At the same time, the growing recognition by various political schools that sustainable peace and political stability are to a certain degree affected by the policies enacted to address basic needs and equity has meant that socioeconomic rights have been recognized through both international accords and constitutional rights.\(^11\) Many of these debates are entangled in debates on the meanings of citizenship rights and responsibilities.

These issues are also directly connected to questions of equity; a fundamental premise of citizenship. The issue here is that while citizenship is directly linked to questions of identity and is attained as several theorists have argued through multiple sites of action and not just vis-à-vis the state, it is the role of the state to view all its citizens equitably and insure a level playing field among them. As is argued in Chapter Two of the main report, these issues are directly connected to equitable and sustainable human development and prosperity.

A concern with equity has also profoundly influenced the approach of the United Nations to human development and questions of governance and justice. In today's more integrated world, equity is considered a global legal concept and social growth is considered important to economic productivity. For the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) it led to the creation of the Human Development Index as well as a set of supplementary indices. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of these indices, these showed disparities among nations and regions and among segments of the population within countries.

\[\text{\footnotesize \cite{7} There are multiple views on the role of the state in social development and welfare provision. See among others N. Yeates, 2001, Globalization and Social Policy, Sage, London; Maha Yahya, 2004, Towards an Integrated Social Development Policy, UN-ESCWA, Integrated Social Policy series, no. 8, Beirut.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize \cite{10} Nutrition studies for example indicate that investing in child nutrition results in stronger adult workers while increasing the labor force’s average education by one year may increase GDP by 9 percent. This holds for the first three years of extra education. Returns beyond those years diminish to around 4 percent, thus pointing to a major opportunity for a country like Lebanon. UNDP, 2000, Linking Economic Growth and Social Development in Lebanon, p. 41; see also Amartya Sen, 2000, Development as Freedom, Anchor, New York.}\]
GDP, and the economy was stagnant. grown to US$25 billion, equivalent to 150 percent of which a decade earlier stood at about US$2 billion, had nearly 25 percent of GDP in 2000. Gross public debt, three-quarters of revenues, the overall fiscal deficit reached idly increasing interest payments absorbing over three-size of capital expenditures during the 1990s. With rap-
total public sector interest payments were double the support focused on concessionary loans. As a result, ket borrowing at high interest rates while international all capital expenditures during this period through mar-
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however, as well as recurring Israeli aggressions eroded high costs associated with post-civil war reconstruction, level but still stood a quarter below its pre-war level. The per capita income had more than doubled from the 1990 civil war reconstruction was almost complete and real occupation for over twenty-two years. Essential post-
withdraw from areas in the South and the Bekaa it had occupied for over twenty-two years. Essential post-
civil war reconstruction was almost complete and real per capita income had more than doubled from the 1990 level but still stood a quarter below its pre-war level. The high costs associated with post-civil war reconstruction, however, as well as recurring Israeli aggressions eroded the revenue base of the state. To finance the reconstruc-
tion program, the Government of Lebanon (GoL) funded all capital expenditures during this period through market borrowing at high interest rates while international support focused on concessionary loans. As a result, total public sector interest payments were double the size of capital expenditures during the 1990s. With rapidly increasing interest payments absorbing over three-
quarters of revenues, the overall fiscal deficit reached nearly 25 percent of GDP in 2000. Gross public debt, which a decade earlier stood at about US$2 billion, had grown to US$25 billion, equivalent to 150 percent of GDP, and the economy was stagnant.

Against this background, the government of the late Prime Minister Hariri launched an economic recovery program. It solicited external support for this program at the Paris II meeting in 2002 at which the international community provided US$2.4 billion in direct financial support (non-project financing). Complemented by the contributions of Lebanon’s financial sector, namely the central bank and commercial banks, Paris II boosted confidence in the country and resulted in a significant decline in interest rates on debt which fell from 17 percent of GDP in 2002 to about 10 percent of GDP in 2005. In 2004, and despite increasingly detrimental political bickering, macroeconomic performance exceeded all expectations with real growth at 7.4 percent, the overall budget deficit declining to less than 8 percent of GDP (from 25 percent in 2000), and the primary budget surplus improving to 2.3 percent of GDP. The introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) benefited fiscal adjustment but impacted the purchasing power of Lebanese citizens. Because of political wrangling the structural components of Paris II, namely privatization, were never fully implemented. By the end of 2004, the level of gross public debt reached 165 percent of GDP and 175 percent of GDP.

On the social front levels of satisfaction of unmet basic needs declined even as income related poverty rose. Deprivation rates had dropped down from 30.9 percent of households in 1994/5 to 24.6 in 2004/2005. This improvement occurred particularly in the fields of education (+9), housing (+9) and access to water and sanitation (+2). However, income related indicators especially with regard to employment and economic dependency worsened during the same period from 43 percent to 52 percent of the entire population. This improvement, as will be discussed below, conceals a regression in the quality education as well as a mismatch between distribution of facilities and need.

A. Insecurity, Political Change and Conflict

These improvements in Lebanon’s economic outlook were such that an average annual growth rate of 6 percent to 7 percent was officially expected for 2005-2007. Unfortunately due to a series of internal and external shocks including the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, on Feb. 14, 2005 along with MP Basil Fuleihan and 20 other civilians, the string of assassinations of public figures and car bombings that followed in the period 200-2008, the Israeli war of July

12 ibid

13 A string of politically motivated assassinations followed Prime Minister al-Hariri’s murder and included in 2005 intellectual and journalist Samir Kassir (June 2), George Hawi (June 21), MP Jubran Tueni, (Dec 12). In 2006 they targeted Minister Pierre Gemayel (Nov 21). In 2007, MP Walid Eido (June 13), MP George Ghanem (September 19), Brigadier General Francaise el Haj (December 12)
2006, the Nahr el Bared crisis, and continued internal political instability, Lebanon never achieved this growth rate. As a result, Lebanon’s socio-economic environment over the past three years has been adversely affected with a devastating impact on the average annual growth rate that dropped to around 1.6 percent in the period from in 2005 to 2007. As of June 2008, the gross public debt stood at US$44.5 and net public debt at US$ 40.4 billion.\(^{14}\)

At the same time, the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri was also a watershed in Lebanon’s political history. It prompted hundreds of thousands of people to take to the streets in protest for the following two months, leading to the resignation of the government and the eventual withdrawal of close to 14,000 Syrian troops, stationed in Lebanon since 1978. It also curtailed the hegemonic role that Syria had taken in Lebanon’s internal decision-making process particularly since the Taif accords of 1990.\(^{15}\) Because of these events, the rate of economic activity declined dramatically leading to an estimated real growth of 1 percent. The shock of the assassination, political turbulence and insecurity kept large investors away and consumers at home. Rising oil prices and increasing transfers to the Electricity Company (EdL) compounded this situation.\(^{16}\)

The 2005 parliamentary elections transformed the power balance within parliament and led to the formation of a new Cabinet with broad support. Around fourteen dialogue sessions aimed at national reconciliation were held between March and June 2006.\(^{17}\) These brought together the main religious and political leaders in the country. Lebanon seemed to be on the verge of a new beginning. Confidence was high and despite the economic challenges that followed Prime Minister al-Hariri’s assassination, the incoming government of Prime Minister Siniora exerted significant efforts to redress the fiscal situation and rejuvenate the economy. Between July 2005 and June 2006, all public finance indicators were showing strong improvements and expectations were that the real growth rate for 2006 would reach 5-7 percent. A tourist season of record proportions was expected, exports increased by more than 30 percent, the primary surplus in the budget more than quadrupled, and the balance of payments, which had showed a deficit of US$1.5 billion in June 2005, recorded a surplus of US$2.6 billion twelve months later, on the eve of the July Israeli war.

Following the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006, Israel launched a massive offensive against Lebanon that inflicted substantial damage to lives and livelihoods and had a devastating effect on Lebanon’s macro-economic and social environments. Around 1,187 people mainly women and children were killed close to 4,398 were injured (15 percent of those injuries being permanent) and a quarter of the population or one million was displaced. Physical and civilian infrastructure and public services and utilities were severely damaged. Aerial bombardment flattened entire villages in the South of Lebanon and the Bekaa valley and whole neighborhoods in Beirut’s southern suburbs and partially damaged or destroyed hundreds of others. Direct costs were estimated at US$2.8 billion while indirect costs or estimated losses in output and income for 2006 reached a ceiling of USD 2.2 billion. (See Statistical Compendium)

Consequently, the economy over 2006 reported a combination of stagnation and inflation, governed initially by the national dialogue that was taking place and then by the fall out as a result of the Israeli war. Inflation rose by 7 percent during 2006, the highest in a decade, and was worsened by the shortage in supplies resulting from the war blockade, leading to a situation of stagflation. Public finance deteriorated as the public deficit rose from its expected 8 percent in mid year to 12 percent by the end of the year raising the debt to GDP ratio to a record 181 percent. Saddled by post-war reconstruction costs, public debt rose to US$41 billion.

To counteract this situation, on August 31, 2006, less than three weeks after the cessation of hostilities, the GoL presented a program for early recovery priorities at an international donor conference convened by the Government of Sweden and closely coordinated with UNDP. The conference succeeded in raising around US$900 million for immediate and early recovery while an Adopt a Village or Bridge scheme was also initiated. Within a year, close to 90 percent of the destruction wrought by Israel on the public infrastructure networks had been repaired.\(^{18}\)


\(^{15}\) During the civil war Syria was also involved politically and militarily. The tensions between Lebanon and Syria date back to the French mandate when Syria grudgingly accepted Lebanon as an independent nation-state.

\(^{16}\) In 2005, transfers to EdL from the budget reached about US$650 million.

\(^{17}\) These did not yield any results even though there was agreement over 4 out of 6 items on the agenda.

\(^{18}\) For additional information on recovery programs see www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb.
In May 2007 another crisis erupted in north Lebanon when violent clashes broke out between the militants of Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese army in and around the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al Bared. Losses in lives and livelihoods were high. (See Chapter Two of full report for further details) Recovery and reconstruction of the camp and surrounding areas are estimated to require a total of US$445 million and will take several years to complete. Of this amount the GoL was able to mobilize US$ 123 million at the 2008 Vienna donor conference.

**B. Political Fallout (2006-2008)**

Beyond wars and conflicts, the political polarization between the two main political coalitions (the March 14 majority and the March 8 "opposition") which began to materialize after the 2005 parliamentary elections developed into a harsh political conflict. Details notwithstanding, this conflict manifested itself in three grand gestures; each of which was to have a significant impact on social stability, economic prosperity and security. On November 11, six ministers belonging to the coalition of "opposition" political parties known as "March 8," resigned from government rendering the cabinet illegitimate in the eyes of some. Parliament was shut down for both ordinary and extraordinary sessions to elect a new president. Effectively, the country remained without an acting legislative body for a year and a half and without a president for six months leading to a paralysis of government.

This situation was compounded by the one year and a half "sit in" by the March 8 coalition in Beirut’s downtown meant to pressure the government to resign. The "sit in" effectively shut down the center of the city and impacted economic growth and investor confidence in Lebanon. The opposition strike in January 2008 would herald the first of many sectarian skirmishes that culminated in the May 7th civil conflicts that shut down the country followed by the August 2008 clashes in Tripoli. These led to multiple deaths and injuries. For the first time in many years, the prospect of a renewed civil war loomed close. (see Chapters Two and Three).

The **Doha Accord**, brokered by Qatar with explicit global and regional support brought an end to these conflicts and ostensibly laid out the essential steps for long-term stability. Chief among these was the agreement to revive the 1960 electoral law that is based on the qada (sub-districts) as the foundation for elections to take place in 2009 and which consecrates communal rather than national representation. The deal also paved the way for the eventual election of General Michel Suleiman as Lebanon’s new president.

"**Most worrisome, is the increasingly overt sectarian tone to political discourse, action and subsequent conflict that for the first time in 15 years, brought the country to the brink of the civil war...**"

Most worrisome, however, is the increasingly overt sectarian overtones to political discourse, action, and subsequent clashes. Politicians and the media (in particular television stations), all emphasize sectarian representation at the expense of national or civic representation. The ownership and direct financial sponsorship of political parties of specific TV stations meant that these outlets subscribed directly to the political positions of their respective coalition. The public discourse and language used to describe their opponents degenerated in direct proportion to the political positions of those they represented. Furthermore, the electoral law agreed upon in Doha also consecrates sectarian representation at the expense of national or civic representation (see Chapter Three). These elements obviously have serious implications for the long-term prosperity of the country.

**C. Policy Choices (1993-2006)**

In addition to the political deadlock and security crisis, policy choices made in the early nineties during post-civil war reconstruction, have also had an impact on the political, social, and economic outlook for Lebanon. On the political front they influenced reform efforts and aggravated sectarian divisions in the country. On the economic front, they contributed to a drop in annual growth rates. And on the social front they led to an improvement in Human Development Indicators coupled with an increase in income-related poverty.

Politically, the non-implementation of the Taif accords and in particular the clauses dealing with decentralization and the de-confessionalization of parliament through the establishment of a congress for religious representatives have further ingrained sectarian divisions in the country and bolstered the power of traditional sectarian leaders and war lords at the expense of the state. Similarly, despite several attempts by civil society groups and different political leaders, efforts to legislate a civil status laws have been unsuccessful. As a result, the relationship of Lebanese citizens to the state continues to be mediated by the religious sect to which they belong and Lebanese citizens remain unequal before the law in terms of personal status matters. These issues will be discussed at length in Chapter Three.
Political deadlock and the non-implementation of Taif has meant that the relationship of Lebanese citizens to the state continues to be mediated by the different religious communities.

On the economic front the average annual growth rate in the post-civil war period of 1993 to 2004 was less than half the rate predicted by the various post-civil war reconstruction programs of the first half of the 1990s. While these programs set 8 percent (at constant prices) as an approximate target, the actual rate for the period was only around 3 percent. At the same time, public debt has increased tremendously since the mid-1990s. Public debt and public debt service rates (registering successively 178 percent and 16 percent of GDP in 2006) tended to escape control because the primary surplus turned, for the first time since 2002, into a primary deficit in 2006. Although the Government restored its primary surplus in 2007 and met key Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) targets in the financial sphere, stagnation and/or deterioration have characterized other critical spheres of the real economy such as external migration, unemployment and inflation rates, while the poverty headcount has risen, as we shall see shortly.

Among the policy choices that have had considerable impact are the following, each of which has contributed to the overall situation with varying intensity:

Post-civil war reconstruction plans: Plans proposed for the reconstruction and reconstitution of state and society in the post civil war period, aimed mainly to rehabilitate and develop infrastructure, particularly electricity, telecommunications, vital public facilities such as the airport and port, water and wastewater networks, hospitals, schools, and roads. Despite their impressive scope, these successive plans, set specific developmental targets that that were never fully realized while the implementation of the Paris I and II conferences that focused to a large degree on public debt-related issues was hindered by political deadlock. Moreover, none of these plans presented a global approach for addressing major macroeconomic imbalances, enhancing sectoral development and reforming public institutions. In other words, while projects carried out contributed to improved social and economic indicators, they lacked a comprehensive developmental vision for the Lebanese economy; one that invests primarily in human capital and other sources of comparative advantage. This approach limited the overall impact of the reconstruction process on economic growth. Only recently have social issues and the enhancement of private sector initiatives garnered interest through programs such as the Community Development Project (CDP) and the Economic and Social Fund for Development (ESFD) program both housed at the CDR.

Weak post-civil war social policies: Despite the relatively high jump in the share of public social expenditures as a percentage of public expenditures, post-civil war social policies did not achieve their intended outcomes. Due to a variety of reasons including a fragmented vision, overlapping jurisdictions, lack of clear targeting criteria and duplication of initiatives and projects, increases in public expenditures did not succeed in bridging the gap between economic growth and socio-economic deprivation and in alleviating various forms of poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion. Chapter Four of this report addresses these issues at length.

Public deficit and public debt: These were in part the result of an expansionary public expenditure policy coupled with a rigid monetary stabilization policy instituted in the immediate post war era (1990). However, the repercussions of this mix tended to decrease after 1997 as the rapid rise in public expenditures slowed down. Domestic political instability, the persisting conflict with Israel (flaring up in 1993, 1996, and 2006) with its considerable damage to lives and livelihoods, and the slow pace of public sector reform have further exacerbated the situation.

D. Socio-Economic Outcomes

D.1 Overlapping geographies of poverty and of conflict

Beyond the disastrous impact of wars and insecurity on Lebanon, the overlap between the geographies of conflict and the geographies of poverty means that the poorest strata of the population in the poorest regions of the country have suffered the most. More than 60 percent of those living in the qadas of Bint Jbeil, Tyre, Nabatieh, Marjaayoun, and Baalbak, as well as the southern suburbs of Beirut—that is, in the areas most heavily bombed during the thirty-three days of direct conflict, lived in extremely poor conditions prior to the
conflict. This overlap exacerbated their adverse living conditions, enhanced their vulnerability and accentuated their exclusion. For example, a postwar survey conducted by MOSA, CAS, UNDP and ILO found that around 80 percent of those living in the qadas mentioned above were displaced by the 2006 war. Furthermore, close to 65 percent of families reported a reduction in their incomes in the post war period as compared to 2.9 who reported an improvement.

The overlap between the geographies of conflict and the geographies of poverty means that the poorest strata of the population in the poorest regions of the country have suffered the most

It is apparent that the level of deterioration was also determined by pre-war income levels, in that 67.7 percent of households with an income of less than LL400,000, or the minimum wage, reported a deterioration in their situation as opposed to 46.1 percent with incomes of more than LL2,500,000 million. Those families became more reliant on external aid, particularly local politically affiliated NGO’s. Close to 17.8 percent of families reported receiving aid from different political parties during the war and 56 percent after the war. (See Chapter Two)

The same is true for the Nahr el Bared crisis and the more recent clashes in Tripoli and the Bekaa where much of the damage and destruction also occurred in areas where the existing physical, economic and educational capital is most depressed. These latter clashes have further aggravated the living conditions of their populations and enhanced their exclusion from both access and opportunity.

... this period was also marked by remarkable social solidarity that emerged during the war and beyond...

Of note in this context is the remarkable solidarity that emerged during the war showing itself in the ways in which Lebanese citizens rallied to provide support to the one million displaced individuals across the country. Expatriates, professionals, students, and civil society organization came together to organize support systems for these families (see 101 Stories to Tell for further information on some of these initiatives). While this kind of social solidarity is by no means a novelty for Lebanon, the context in which it occurred and which included profound disagreements over who was to blame for the war, was very important.

D.2 Challenges to government reform initiatives: Paris III and beyond

Prior to the war, the GoL was in the final stages of a consultative process over a proposed economic and fiscal reform plan that was to be presented at the Beirut I donor conference. Due to political instability, the conference was held in Paris in what became known as the Paris III conference. It succeeded in mobilizing close to US$7 billion in grants and loans for Lebanon. While too early to assess, the actions taken on social service delivery and poverty reduction strategy by the government in conjunction with the implementation of the Paris III agreement is bound to bear results in the near future. These include the institution of safety nets, the establishment of improved targeting systems, and the implementation of reforms in the ministries of Education, Health and Social Affairs. An inter-ministerial committee for social issues that will elaborate a national social development strategy has also been created.

However, the prevailing political, economic and social conditions in the country pose several challenges to the implementation of this program. A major issue is how to preserve and sustain social stability while maintaining commitment to containing current levels of expenditures, adjusting prices on key public goods and services (gasoline, electricity, etc.), accelerating the process of privatization of selected public entities, raising some key tax items (VAT, interest), and restructuring the government’s subsidy policy. These challenges are further amplified by the prevailing political and military instability. Although the Social Action Plan component is meant to minimize the impact of these fiscal and economic adjustments on the needy and vulnerable groups, this option is being hindered major obstacles as follows:

First, Lebanon’s profound on-going political divisions hamper the creation of an adequate climate for economic growth and development.

Second, current social conditions are tense and insecure, not only because of the destructive repercussions of the July 2006 war but also due to rising inflation, nourished by internal, regional, and international factors. These are having a negative impact on the purchasing
power of wage earners, who represent around two-thirds of the total active population. At the same time, although the lower poverty headcount is slightly above its 2002 level, rising inflation is and deteriorating socio-economic conditions are not only affecting those living below the poverty line but is also threatening large social groups that are located immediately above the upper poverty line and are highly sensitive to internal and external shocks. This issue is discussed at length below and in Chapter Four of the main report.

1.3 IMPACT ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Against this backdrop of events how has human development in Lebanon faired? Has it departed from past trends? How does it compare to other middle income or Arab countries? What are the issues it must now consider to advance its human development in an equitable manner?

A. Human Development Indices

While the shorter-term impacts of events of the past few years have been outlined, their long-term impact on human development will take more time to assess. It is however apparent that despite political stability and military insecurity Lebanon has not fared any worse than other countries in the MENA region. In fact, like many of those countries, Lebanon witnessed a paradox of sorts. While income poverty deteriorated in the last decade or so, human development indicators have improved as has access to basic services and satisfaction in basic needs. Delivery of education and health services contributed to this development even as they fell short of their declared targets. In short, empirical findings, as we shall see below, suggest that even with low-income growth levels, attention to education and health services can reap tremendous benefits for the overall human development of the country.

** Despite political stability and military insecurity Lebanon has not fared any worse than other countries in the MENA region **

Since the 1970’s and despite fifteen years of civil war and other conflicts, Lebanon has been making steady progress on all fronts. Key national human development indicators have improved. Life expectancy has risen and infant mortality has dropped. In the last decade or so overall educational delays have also dropped as have illiteracy levels from 31 percent in the 1970’s to 11.5 percent in 1996 to 9.95 percent in 2004. Not surprisingly, an examination of illiteracy per age group indicates that the largest portion fall within the higher age groups whereby 0.34 percent of those illiterate today are in the 15-24 age group as opposed to 4.27 percent in the 65+ age bracket (Figure 1. See Chapter Two in full report and Statistical Compendium)

Notwithstanding short comings in the data (see statistical Compendium), calculations of the regional HDI at the level of the Mohafaza or governorate, (Lebanon’s largest sub-national administrative division) show the uneven spread of Human Development across national territory. While the Beirut and Mount Lebanon regions stand out with human development values higher than the national average (0.794 and 0.774 respectively), the North and the Bekaa exhibit lower levels (0.705 and 0.713 respectively). Concerted national efforts are required to improve the level of human development in the North Lebanon, Nabatieh, Bekaa, and South Lebanon governorates particularly in terms of income generating activities for the North and improvements in literacy levels in the Bekaa and Nabatieh regions. These results confirm findings in other poverty and deprivation-related studies, such as the Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) assessment.

These findings are also supported by calculations of the Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) at national and governorate levels.
levels. Poverty is a multifaceted phenomena and measuring human poverty is a complex matter no matter which tool one uses. While approaches that measure value in terms of money fail to capture other dimensions fundamental to basic standards of living, the capability and basic needs approach that focuses on assets and access suffers from a certain level of subjectivity. Collectively, these give an indication of the status of the population, and particularly of its poorest and most vulnerable segments.

**“ HDP and HPI calculations point to considerable regional disparity... and are supported by other poverty and deprivation related studies... there is also inter-regional disparity and multiple poverty pockets “**

While the data used should be treated with some caution (see note below table 2.5), HPI calculations for Lebanon based on national data also indicate discrepancy between the governorates with regards to poverty levels as well as type of poverty. While Beirut and Mount Lebanon report levels lower than the national average, the rest of the governorates report considerably higher levels. Further analysis also indicates that despite the fact that Lebanon is close to achieving its national MDG target on illiteracy, some regions continue to suffer from unacceptably high levels. Further breakdown by gender indicates that a larger portion of those illiterate are female. Similarly, even though, as the North reports the highest levels of income poverty, other regions in the country, particularly the Bekaa and Nabatiyeh suffer from different kinds of exclusions that could potentially maintain families within a vicious poverty cycle (See Chapter Two and Statistical Compendium). However, these findings also camouflage the problems of poverty pockets that exist in each of these regions and that as we shall see shortly point to considerable intra-regional discrepancy.

A second Human Poverty Index (HPI-2) was also calculated since it includes an additional dimension related to social exclusion. Although normally applied to OECD countries, this index was found relevant to Lebanon, where inequity and exclusion are often more closely connected to opportunity than to access and are directly related to questions of citizenship rights. Even though we used different criteria to assess functional literacy in Lebanon and thus values are more indicative than accurate, the exercise yields several interesting results.

As the table indicates, even though Lebanon is doing as well as other OECD countries on issues of long-term unemployment and longevity, the country’s main areas of deprivation are to be found among that proportion of the population that lacks functional literacy skills and in the growing income gaps, as measured by the percentage of the population living 50 percent below the median gap. Further disaggregation indicates that the largest percentage of long-term unemployment levels is among

![Table 1: HPI-1 for Lebanon](image-url)
Table 2: HPI-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Human poverty index HPI-2</th>
<th>Probability at birth of not surviving to age 60 (% of cohort)</th>
<th>People lacking functional literacy skills (% aged 16-65)</th>
<th>Long-term unemployment (as % of labour force)</th>
<th>Population living below 50% of median income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>14.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: International data are from HDR 2007/2008. Lebanon data: probability of survival are based on 1996 values. No adjustments were carried out; functional literacy rates were estimated based on available information - see statistical compendium.

the youth (6.3 percent of total labor force) while data at the Mohafaza level indicates that the North and Bekaa exhibit long-term unemployment rates lower than the national average. At the same time, the growing importance of specific skills in an increasingly knowledge driven economy and the changing demands of the labor market suggests the need to improve the functional literacy levels of Lebanese youth and building up their ability to compete in today’s economy.

On the gender front, the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) reflects inequalities between men and women. The GDI for Lebanon roughly follows the pattern of the HDI, but is at a lower level, a phenomenon indicative of the presence of gender inequality. While GDI trends show that Lebanon has made some strides, it is still far from demonstrating gender parity. To measure the impact of gender inequality on human development the value of Lebanon’s GDI value was compared to its HDI value and was found to be 98.4 percent. Of the 157 countries with both HDI and GDI, 107 countries have better ratios than Lebanon.24

It is important, never the less, to emphasize the considerable achievements made with respect to both higher female life expectancy and school enrollment and achievement. Despite higher illiteracy levels among older women, female adult literacy levels have also increased considerably in the past years especially in younger age brackets and have led to gender parity in gross enrolment ratios (Table 4). Female students now outnumber male students at secondary and tertiary levels at the ratio of 1.12 and 1.19 respectively up from 0.68 and 0.92 in the 1970’s.25 However, female adult literacy levels still lag behind those for males, particularly in outlying rural areas. Another area of great inequality is in the gaps in income and income-earning opportunities. The ratio of female to male estimated income is 0.32.

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) focuses on women’s opportunities as opposed to their capabilities. Neither the global HDR nor previous NHDR’s have calculated the value of the GEM in Lebanon for more than a decade. Only one estimate of GEM, 0.212 for 1992, is available and it is indicative of a very low level of achievement (at the time, Lebanon ranked 103 out of 116 countries considered). The situation has improved in the last sixteen years and the GEM for Lebanon today stands at 0.350. Female participation in the political process has improved slightly, with an increasing number entering parliament. Furthermore, 2004 saw the first time appointment of two female ministers. Control over economic resources has also improved significantly in part due to larger female participation in the work force and higher rates of female enrolment in education. Clearly, however there are still possibilities for improvement, particularly given the levels of female graduates at the tertiary level, the increasing level of female participation in the labor force and the rising number of female entrepreneurs (See Statistical Compendium). Change can also be induced by encouraging greater female participation in the political process through the adoption of female quotas in parliamentary elections and making it possible for women to run in their areas of residence or birth.

Lebanon’s progress on the MDGs was also mapped out for this report. These confirm the findings of the various HDIs and allow the identification of a series of new issues. These include:

- A weak employment to population ratio of 35.7 percent as compared to 47.8 percent for the Middle East, the majority of those employed working in the trade and services sectors and more than two thirds (62 percent) in salaried employment. Youth suffer from higher levels of unemployment with young women suffering the most from the consequences of the economic slowdown.
- Growing poverty in terms of money, leading to

### Table 3: Gender development index (GDI) for Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life expectancy index</th>
<th>Adult literacy index</th>
<th>Gross enrolment index</th>
<th>Education index</th>
<th>Income index</th>
<th>GDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female 0.770</td>
<td>Male 0.782</td>
<td>Female 0.839</td>
<td>Male 0.742</td>
<td>Male 0.807</td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female 0.726</td>
<td>Male 0.864</td>
<td>Male 0.646</td>
<td>0.835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4: Gender parity index of gross enrolment rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, 2006

### Table 5: Gender empowerment measure (GEM) for Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seats in parliament held by women (% of total)</th>
<th>Female legislators, senior officials and managers (% of total)</th>
<th>Female professional and technical workers (% of total)</th>
<th>Estimated earned income (PPP $US)</th>
<th>Share of population</th>
<th>GEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female 4.7</td>
<td>Male 95.3</td>
<td>Female 11.12</td>
<td>Male 88.8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 54</td>
<td>Male 54</td>
<td>Male 45</td>
<td>Female 15942</td>
<td>Female 0.502</td>
<td>0.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 0.498</td>
<td>Male 0.498</td>
<td>Female 0.349</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Both the GDI and GEM point to considerable gender disparity on all fronts but education.”

### B. Inter-Country Comparison

The human development rank of Lebanon compares well to that of Arab countries and developing states in general (Table 6). Gulf countries such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have a higher HDI, in part due to higher levels of income and increasing investments in human capabilities. Despite all the upheavals Lebanon has managed a better performance than immediate Arab neighbors such as Jordan and Syria. This is partly the result of major investments due to rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts and sustained high levels of social indicators, which compare favorably even with countries at the top of the medium human development group. In particular investments in education have had a considerable impact resulting in a combined enrolment ratio that is higher than that of all Arab countries in the middle-income group except Jordan and comparable to if not higher than the ratios for countries in higher income groups. Cyprus, in the high human development group of developing countries, shows a substantially better human development performance than Lebanon, even though it share similar traits including the comparable basis of the two economies. Most higher income group countries address human development concerns such as education and health more efficiently, and provide better economic opportunities for all. Similarly, despite increasing poverty, Lebanon registers a relatively low HP1 rank (18) in comparison with other Arab countries including even those in the higher income bracket, such as the UAE. However, it is doing rather poorly on the gender-related development index. In part, this is due to the large difference between males and females in estimated earned income as well as to significant difference in political representation.

### C. Lebanon and the MDGs

Lebanon’s progress on the MDGs was also mapped out for this report. These confirm the findings of the various HDIs and allow the identification of a series of new issues. These include:

- A weak employment to population ratio of 35.7 percent as compared to 47.8 percent for the Middle East, the majority of those employed working in the trade and services sectors and more than two thirds (62 percent) in salaried employment. Youth suffer from higher levels of unemployment with young women suffering the most from the consequences of the economic slowdown.
- Growing poverty in terms of money, leading to
Table 6: Select international and regional comparisons in indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.912</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.912</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.349*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * calculated by the NHDR- may not be comparable to other countries. All other data from HDR 2008.

Increased regional and interregional disparities as well as an increase in urban poverty pockets.

- Elevated rates of illiteracy, particularly among women over forty years of age, especially in rural areas such as the Bekaa as well as regional and inter-regional and inter-urban disparities in rates of completion of primary education. High drop out rates of 10.7 percent in basic education (primary and intermediate cycles) and repetition rates in public schools of 20-24 percent are particularly problematic. 26

- Infectious diseases and under-five mortality rates continue to be a problem. High infant mortality rates are related to inadequate neonatal care or insufficient immunizations for children. These are in part the direct result of the absence of a national health policy as well as unsafe environments. It is also due to unequal access to medical services across the country.

- Improvements in maternal health, in pre- and postnatal care as well as in increased dissemination of family planning methodologies also mask regional disparities. Primary health care is also underutilized as health care tends to focus on curative rather than preventive measures.

- Improved incidence of tuberculosis and underreporting of HIV/AIDS cases, the latter being considered taboo socially. This makes it particularly hard to treat the disease and to promote precautionary measures such as safe-sex practices.

Despite increased efforts to improve environmental performance Green House Gas emissions (GHG) caused mainly by pollution from the energy sector continue to rise. However the use of Ozone-depleting Substances (ODS) has declined considerably due to increasing use of alternative materials in industrial production and the encouragement of more bio-friendly agricultural practices. The use of CFCs has been reduced by almost half, for example. Access to safe drinking water also continues to be a problem partly as a result of interrupted services whilst access to wastewater networks has improved. More critically the problem of solid waste disposal continues to be a major problem with more than 700 open dump sites. Devastating fires that hit the country in the past two years also pose an additional environmental challenge.

- Lebanon's high debt to GDP ratio (one of the highest in the world) will hinder the implementation of a successful development plan. Debt servicing obligations will reduce the effective capacity of the government to address growing development needs.

D. Mapping Inequity

Several issues are brought to light by analysis of these indices. The first relates to gender inequities while the second relates to human poverty.

D.1 Inequities of birth: Let the numbers tell the story

While some progress has been made on gender issues, considerable disparity in the human development of

---

26 Social Action Plan Report, Towards Strengthening Social Safety Nets and Access to Basic Social Services, sent to Paris III.
As discussed earlier, on literacy issues women are making better progress. When it comes to income, males continue to have the upper edge. Even though the salary scale for entrants into the labor market is relatively gender blind, the discrepancy between male and female earned income increases the further individuals advance in their careers. Despite these and other cultural and legislative obstacles to the participation of women in the labor market (see Box 2.8 in Chapter Two), women are increasingly asserting their economic independence, both as employees of the public and private sectors and as entrepreneurs (Statistical Compendium).

Furthermore, and as the GEM indicates, despite considerable gains, gender empowerment at decision-making levels remains pitifully low, particularly when the comparatively high levels of females enrolled in and graduating from tertiary level education are considered. For example in 2006, 54.5 percent of university graduates were female and 45.5 percent were male. Yet, the appointment of females to the higher echelons of the public sector is scarce. Only 6.5 percent of Category 1 positions in the public sector are held by females at a time (1995-2006) when the total number of employees doubled (from 3.3 percent to 6 percent). The same situation applies to Categories 2, 3, and 4 of civil employment and the foreign service sectors as well. The judicial sector on the other hand has witnessed notable developments. The number of female justices has more than doubled in the last decade while the number of male justices has remained approximately the same.

Inequities in appointments also extend to the private sector and institutes of higher education where in 2004, for example, only one out of sixteen deans and two out of thirty-one deans at the Lebanese University and the USJ respectively were female. Three other universities have no female deans at all.

Another facet of gender inequity in Lebanon that has significant impact on the Human Development of the country is connected to the citizenship rights of Lebanese women who are deprived of the right to pass on their citizenship to non-Lebanese husbands and to children born of such marriages. Harsh residency rules for non-Lebanese husbands threaten the integrity of families. For example, whereas a non-Lebanese woman married to a Lebanese man is granted residency and nationality automatically, a Lebanese woman married to a non-Lebanese man cannot grant him residency. Likewise, her inability to transfer her nationality to her own children renders them stateless in cases where the father is also unable to grant citizenship. It also deprives these children of other rights normally granted to Lebanese children. This situation leads to an increased number of

Table 7: Male to female HDI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and above)</th>
<th>Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education (%)</th>
<th>GDP per capita (PPP US$)*</th>
<th>Life expectancy index</th>
<th>Education index</th>
<th>GDP index</th>
<th>Human development index (HDI) value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>4.792</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>14.860</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>0.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>9.561</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>0.791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated earned income substituted for the GDP per capita which is not available based on gender.

Sources: All data is from 2004-2005. Columns 1, 4, 5, HDR 2008 columns 2,3 calculations based on National Household Survey.

29 It rose in Category 2 civil service from 6.6 to 17.37 percent; in Category 3 from 6.67 to 27.22 percent and in category 4 from 11.7 to 28.7 percent.
30 A non-Lebanese man married to a Lebanese woman will be granted residency only if he certifies that he will not engage in remunerated jobs, proves that he has a monthly income of LL5 million.
stateless persons in the country and deepens their exclusion from society and impacts their future opportunities. Other inequities embedded in personal status laws also impact various aspects of human development. These are discussed at length in Chapter Three.

“ Citizenship rights also reflect gender inequities and threaten the integrity of families.”

D.2 Life cycle inequities: The poverty trap

Even though the HPI tries to draw a composite profile of poverty in any given context, it fails to capture many other elements related to this phenomenon, including the difference between quantitative and qualitative aspects of deprivation. In the last decade, several attempts were made to map income and standards of living inequity in Lebanon by different institutions. What most of these studies indicate is that Lebanon has witnessed a growth of income-related poverty as well as of inter-regional and intra-regional disparities. Although the percentage of poor individuals on a national scale decreased from 31 percent to 24.6 percent, regional disparities have persisted and even grown, as has the percentage of vulnerable population overall.

More recently, a Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution report for Lebanon monitored poverty trends between 1997 and 2007. According to this report, only 8 percent of the Lebanese population (or 300,000 individuals) suffer from extreme poverty (defined as living below the lower poverty line of US$2.4) and are thus unable to meet their basic food and non-food needs, while close to a third of the population fall below the upper poverty line (US$4 per day). Furthermore, the 2004-2007 period saw overall extreme poverty levels rise after they had fallen between 1997 and 2004.

The poverty headcount has also risen substantially in some of the regions particularly in the North, which has a 52 percent poverty headcount using the upper poverty line, and 17.5 percent using the lower poverty line. It is followed by the South, which has a 42 percent poverty headcount. (Table 2.19) The capital, Beirut, on the other hand has a low prevalence of extreme poverty (below 1 percent) and overall poverty (below 6 percent).

“ While regional disparities are indicated by the increase in the poverty headcount, within-governorate inequality accounts for most of the inequity in Lebanon.”

However, while such regional disparities are not unique to Lebanon, within-governorate inequality accounts for most of the inequality in Lebanon. Much of the recent data indicates that inequality in Lebanon, using the GINI coefficient, is relatively similar to other middle-income countries particularly in the MENA region (0.37) and significantly lower than Latin American countries (average GINI is 0.55). It is estimated to be 0.37 for nominal consumption and 0.3 for real consumption in Lebanon. (Table 8) About 13 percent of aggregate inequality in consumption in Lebanon is attributable to inter-governorate inequality, while the remaining 87 percent is due to within-region inequality. In 2007, governorate intra strata inequality ranged from 18 percent in North governorate to 9.7 percent in South and Mount Lebanon. (See chapter 4 for further discussion of this issue). However, the distribution of expenditures among the population is relatively unequal. While the bottom 20 percent of the population expend only 7 percent of all consumption in Lebanon, the richest 20 percent accounts for 43 percent.

E. Beyond Inequity

Inequalities manifest themselves in a variety of dimensions, including health, education, and income. These dimensions do, however, interact with and reinforce one another. In other words, inequities in one dimension often translate into inequalities in other dimensions. Thus inequities in health impact the earning capacity of individuals while inequities in education impact their future economic opportunities, and so on. For example 23.3 percent of children under five born to illiterate mothers and 20.1 percent of those born to mothers who can read and write but have not experienced secondary education suffer from stunting, which is double the national average of 11.5 percent. In comparison, only 6.7 percent of children born to mothers with a secondary education are stunted. Similarly, being disabled increases the likelihood of poverty. Thus 50 percent of the disabled have a very low level of satisfaction with

32 This study uses expenditure data from the Household Population Survey carried out by the CAS in 2004, MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon.
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
Another study conducted for the NHDR on the civic education of ninth graders and their attitudes, knowledge, and actions in relation to key concepts found a direct statistical correlation between the educational attainment of the parents and the level of knowledge and understanding that students exhibited with regards to civic concepts.39

Furthermore, these income and basic living conditions inequities between and within governorates, point to more embedded issues related to access and to opportunity. For example, the improvement noted in the education sector actually conceals a regression in educational quality and standards as well as a mismatch between regional distribution and need. This was also evident in the survey results of the NHDR's Education and Citizenship Study.40

The impacts of such inequity in access, resources, and opportunity for different strata of the population may have severe implications for the long-term prosperity of the country and the capacity of its population to realize their full potential. As experience from around the world has shown, inequality of opportunity traps people into poverty cycles that often become inter-generational. Economic, social, and political inequalities are embedded in unequal social and cultural institutions. The social networks that the poor have access to are considerably different from the ones that the rich can tap into. Such inequality traps affect not only the distribution but also the aggregate dynamics of growth and development. In the long run this may imply that equity and efficiency may complement, rather than substitute for each other. Sustaining gains in human development and accelerating

Table 8: Inequality measures by governorate, 2004-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Gini index</th>
<th>Theil index</th>
<th>Within strata theil inequality index</th>
<th>Life expectancy index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatiyeh</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Lebanon</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Governorate</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Governorate</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] The Theil index referred to measures the log deviation measure, which is zero for perfect equality and for complete inequality (i.e., a situation in which one person consumes everything) and extends to infinity. It is most sensitive to inequality at the bottom of the distribution range. Source:MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution, p. 44.

their living conditions, 41 percent have an average income of less than USD266 (which is less than the average wage), 38 percent are illiterate, and 68.9 percent have no medical insurance.36 Difficulties in accessing schools and societal stereotyping sustain their continued exclusion. Similarly, youth tend to be the first to lose their jobs when employment becomes scarce, leading to a youth unemployment rate of 19.2 percent as compared to a 7 percent adult unemployment rate. Among female youth unemployment is significantly higher than among male (22.45 percent versus 18.51 percent respectively).37 The conditions of working children can in the future have adverse impact on their health and well-being. Around 26-30 percent of working children complain of having to endure adverse environmental conditions (loud noises, humidity, cold, and heat) for long hours, and this in turn may have long term impacts on their health and productivity.

Over time, this interaction between inequities leads to what is often termed the intergenerational poverty trap. In such situations, gender inequities are very relevant to the social and economic well being of families and, if addressed, can help pull individuals and households out of such cycles of poverty and help enhance the future prospects of children. Countless studies today indicate the direct causal relationship between improved education of the mother and better health and educational outcomes for their children. For example, a recent survey for Lebanon found that 40.7 and 31 per thousand children under five years of age and under 1 year respectively born to illiterate mothers die each year as compared to 13.9 per thousand, or one third fewer, born to mothers who have completed a secondary education.38

Another study conducted for the NHDR on the civic education of ninth graders and their attitudes, knowledge, and actions in relation to key concepts found a direct statistical correlation between the educational attainment of the parents and the level of knowledge and understanding that students exhibited with regards to civic concepts.39

Furthermore, these income and basic living conditions inequities between and within governorates, point to more embedded issues related to access and to opportunity. For example, the improvement noted in the education sector actually conceals a regression in educational quality and standards as well as a mismatch between regional distribution and need. This was also evident in the survey results of the NHDR's Education and Citizenship Study.40

The impacts of such inequity in access, resources, and opportunity for different strata of the population may have severe implications for the long-term prosperity of the country and the capacity of its population to realize their full potential. As experience from around the world has shown, inequality of opportunity traps people into poverty cycles that often become inter-generational. Economic, social, and political inequalities are embedded in unequal social and cultural institutions. The social networks that the poor have access to are considerably different from the ones that the rich can tap into. Such inequality traps affect not only the distribution but also the aggregate dynamics of growth and development. In the long run this may imply that equity and efficiency may complement, rather than substitute for each other. Sustaining gains in human development and accelerating

36 Raw data of the Living Conditions of Households Survey 2004, calculated for the NHDR
37 Jad Chaaban, 2008.
38 League of Arab States et al, 2004, p. 156.
the pace of growth means paying close attention to several new challenges, especially in health and education as the Lebanese compete in a global arena.

The impact of such inequity on access, resources, and opportunity for population may have severe implications for the long-term prosperity of the country… such inequities also go to the heart of citizenship rights.

The adverse impact of such inequity is not limited to the socio-economic well-being of citizens. Rather it goes to the heart of notions of citizenship. As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, democratic citizenship includes not only political and civil rights but social rights as well. People’s understandings of these rights and fulfillment of their obligations as citizens are at the center of their identification as citizens with a particular national identity.

1.4 METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

Addressing citizenship is a difficult task anywhere in the world, let alone a country like Lebanon that not only has eighteen legally recognized religious sects but has also been the site of intense political and civil instability and military conflicts. To begin with, both the concepts of ‘citizens’ and ‘citizenship’ are highly contested in theory and practice raising a lot of challenges for empirical research. In a context as highly charged as Lebanon, addressing these challenges also means exploring ways to engage with discourses of citizenship that exclude or marginalize segments of the population while at the same time examining the different ways in which people position themselves as citizens.

Recognizing the difficulties of addressing the dilemmas of citizenship in Lebanon and given the multiple political and social influences on citizen practices, as well as on the practices of democracy, has meant a somewhat novel departure for this NHDR from some of the norms generally followed in the preparation of such reports. It necessitated a flexible mechanism capable of adapting to rapidly changing circumstances and of allowing the integration of citizens’ concerns and actions, beyond the norms of academic analysis, opinion polls and surveys. Taking our cue from Bourdieu, we have also felt compelled to adopt an approach that would allow us to highlight contradictions without necessarily resolving them. In other words, we have needed to develop a construct that is simultaneously both top down and bottom up.

Accordingly, a multifaceted and outward looking approach has been devised. This aims to:

- Engage the widest possible range of citizens
- Initiate discussion in a variety of forums on different themes related to citizenship
- Bring diverse citizen voices into the project

To achieve these goals and cover the three main aspects of citizenship in Lebanon the study has used various tools. These include the following:

RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION FORUMS

- Substantive desk research on the theme
- Commissioning twelve background papers, four workshop presentations and nineteen discussants to define problems and concepts;
- Organization of thirty-seven discussion forums and roundtables including academics, practitioners, and members of the general public. These included:
  - Twelve workshops and fifteen thematic focus groups meetings (on six themes);
  - Four general roundtables with specific groups;
  - Two training workshops for young journalists and university students;
  - Partnership with a young NGO on three discussion forums with university students;
  - One discussion forum with high school students;

ENGAGEMENT AND OUTREACH

- One major activity entitled One Hundred and One Stories to Tell that aimed to solicit citizenship initiatives in public life. This entailed a wide scale campaign involving the distribution of 12,000 posters and brochures across the country to all municipalities, public and private schools, MoSA’s NGO centers and hundreds of independent NGOs as well as Television commercials that ran for 2 months on the five major news channels in the country.
- A large media campaign on the one hundred and one stories that proved to be the most powerful advocacy tools for the promotion of citizenship. The campaign had a simple idea and included coordination with the five major newspapers in Lebanon (three Arabic, one English, and one French) as well as with the seven major television stations, which all featured these stories in different programs. The idea was that no two news outlets would carry the same story but all would appear under the same title, of One Hundred and One Stories to Tell.
- Launch of a website to encourage forum discussions


42 See Annex for further details on the background papers, workshops and focus groups.
on the theme and background papers. The website has become a major resource for researchers, policy makers, and members of the public seeking data and other matters related to the theme.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

- A major survey on education and citizenship that assesses the concepts, knowledge, attitudes, and actions of ninth grade students on citizenship and democracy. It included 3,111 students in 113 public and private schools in the six governorates (mohafazat) of Lebanon. It also included questionnaires for school principals and civic education teachers.
- Preparation of a statistical compendium that includes political and cultural as well development indicators. The aim is to establish a reference point for academics, policy makers, and researchers alike. Calculating new Human Development Indices for Lebanon including the HPI-2 and the Gender Empowerment Index (GEM) as well as disaggregating the HDI on both gender and regional bases.
- Preparing an updated Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) balance sheet.

IMMEDIATE POLICY OUTCOMES

- Establishment of an Education and Citizenship Observatory in partnership with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and experts in the fields of education. The aim of this observatory is to assess the impact of civic education and pedagogical context on the attitudes, knowledge and actions of students using the education and citizenship survey results, co-organize workshops on the matter, make results with regards to the impact of educational politics and practices on democratic citizenship and peace building better known to decision-makers, researchers, specialists and teachers and monitor progress, in coordination with concerned NGOs progress on the impact of policy or curricular change.

ADDITIONAL OUTPUTS

As a result of this approach, various supplementary items have also been prepared for dissemination independently and with the report, in addition to the NHDR. These include:

- One Hundred and One Stories to Tell: Citizen Initiatives in Public Life (in Arabic and English)
- Education and Citizenship: Concepts Attitudes, Knowledge and Actions of Ninth Graders in Lebanon from a National and International Perspective (in Arabic and English)
- Statistical Compendium on Political, Socio-Economic and Cultural matters (in Arabic and English)

STRUCTURE

The full report is subdivided into six chapters. Chapter One sets the conceptual and analytical framework for the project and the elements for an agenda that would assist the shift referred to in the report’s title, Toward a Citizen’s state. Chapter Two analyses the status of human development in Lebanon today. Chapters Three through Five consider the relationship between the state and one of the three sets of citizen rights—political, social and civic/cultural. Chapter Six elaborates on the agenda needed for the achievement of the move to a Citizen’s state. The aim is to strive toward an inclusive development approach based on principles of citizenship, social justice, and equity, all of which need to be systematically internalized into national strategies and policies.
Lebanon is an electoral democracy, with a universal right to vote granted to all citizens over the age of 21 and regularly occurring elections. Social citizenship rights such as access to education and health are guaranteed while on the cultural front, freedom of thought, worship and expression are legally and constitutionally guaranteed. The preamble of the Lebanese constitution recognizes the international declaration of human rights and holds the Lebanese state accountable for its implementation. Lebanese citizens enjoy a free if increasingly polarized press, freedom of association and protection of persons. Notwithstanding weak implementation, Lebanon has also ratified a good number of international agreements and treaties with regards to international human rights, equality under the law, protection from discrimination, protection of labor rights and the rights of children, and guarantees of women’s rights.

2.1 POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

However, despite these universal rights, there continue to be considerable deficiencies in representative/active citizenship. The emergence of a full civic culture and the establishment of equity among citizens in Lebanon are hampered largely by the ways in which state citizen relations are framed by the constitution and by personal status laws. In other words it is hindered by constitutional clauses and actions that consecrate political and civil divisions among the communal groups. As Chapter Three Political Citizenship of the full report discusses, while the constitution guarantees equity among all Lebanese citizens, and in spite of contradictions between some of its articles, the partial implementation of the Taif constitution, the selective interpretation of certain articles and the lack of a civic status law have all undermined equity among citizens as well as progress toward a citizen’s state. In particular the non-implementation of clauses in the Taif constitution meant to address political sectarianism, such as those related to, the formation of the “National Commission” entrusted under article 95 of the constitution with the task to “study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism,” the implementation of administrative decentralization, strengthening the independence of the judiciary, and the enactment of a new electoral law intended to insure the representation of the “different categories of the population” and to guarantee communal “co-existence,” have left the door wide open for an increasingly dysfunctional system. Several other clauses such as appointments to civil service have also been distorted in practice.

Similarly, guarantees of equity before the law on a wide range of issues is undermined by the state’s relegation of the private affairs of citizens to each of the 18 recognized religious denominations or sects coupled with the absence of a civic status laws. Article 9 of the constitution...

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Box 2 : Select articles from the Preamble of the Constitution

[...]
b. Lebanon is of Arab affiliation and identity; it is a founding and active member of the Arab League and is bound by its charter; it is also a founding and active member of the United Nations and abides by its charter and by the International Declaration of Human Rights. The Lebanese state represents these principles in all rights and domains with no exception.
c. Lebanon is a democratic, parliamentary republic founded on the respect for public liberties, the foremost of which are freedom of opinion and belief; and on social justice and equality in rights and in duties among all citizens without discrimination or distinction.
[...]
f. The economic system is a liberal one that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.
g. The balanced, cultural, social, and economic growth of the regions is a principal pillar of the unity of the state and of the stability of the system.

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43 Cf. article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution, as amended in 1990. (All references are to an English translation of the constitution, with all amendments since 1926, published by the Lebanese Ministry of Justice in 1995).

44 Nawaf Salam, 2007, Taif’s Dysfunctions and the Need for Constitutional Reform, Unpublished paper
consecrates the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis sects and religions; i.e. they are all seen as equal. Individual religious authorities are given full control over the affairs of individuals born to their community. Seven different personal status regimes are applied to the 13 recognized denominations45 and four different regimes to citizens born to the Muslim faith. To this, we can add an undetermined number of civil status laws. This has created a dichotomy between the public and private identities of citizens as members of a national community and of specific religious communities at one and the same time. In the context of today it has meant that often the sectarian identity of individuals has overtaken all other identities including familial, tribal and regional. However, while each religious authority controls the affairs of “its” citizens from the cradle to the grave and Judges in religious courts enjoy great latitude in interpreting legislation, oversight, by the state over their conduct takes place through the General Commission of the Court of Cessation and is limited to monitoring competency in the issuing of verdicts and whether determining these verdicts violate a fundamental tenant of public order. As a result, citizens often resort to changing their sects so as to bypass inheritance or other personal status laws dictated by their sect. More importantly, this implies that while article 9 of the constitution guarantees that “freedom of belief is absolute” individual rights are only acknowledged if one belongs to a specific sect.

In this regard, different kinds of inequities between citizens are ingrained. On the one hand, women are subjected to legally condoned discrimination based on patriarchal religious laws. In turn this impacts the family particularly with respect to child custody and inheritance. Women cannot pass on their nationality to children born to foreign fathers and are granted custody as legal guardians in limited situations in cases of marital disputes and often suffer in issues of inheritance. Similarly, individuals born to different denominations are subject to varied laws with regards to a vast array of matters such as divorce, children rights etc. Many Lebanese have resorted to civil marriage abroad which then “pits Lebanese judges against the world” in the words of Judge John Kazzi.

In this context, the relationship of the state to its citizens is “legally confessionalized”. Sectarian communities have been tasked with mediating the relationship between the state and “its” citizens, not only in practice but through the law as well. This includes political, social and cultural aspects of this relationship. As the state ceded more ground to the individual religious communities, the internal sovereignty of the state has diminished and the political process has tended to lose its effectiveness. From this perspective, personal status laws have also become a source of political power over the various communities.

The Lebanese system is also characterized by a specific brand of consociational democracy whereby all parties govern together and minorities and majorities dissolve into a greater power sharing scheme. While consociational democracy is viewed as a way to “democratically manage diversity” in countries where vertical societal divisions exist, its particular manifestations in Lebanon have led to what Regis Dubray has termed a “catastrophic equality” between the different communal groups. (See Chapter Three in full report). In this regard the claim that consociational democracy has protected minority rights leads to the question of which rights? In other consociational regimes the minority rights that need to be protected are linguistic, ethnic, religious or cultural. In Lebanon such rights are protected by the constitution. However, the power sharing scheme that

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**Box 3: Discrimination among women**

Women suffer degrees of discrimination in both rights and responsibilities that vary both from sect to sect and within the same sect. The most prominent types of discrimination against women as individuals and as members of families include:

- Deprivation of personal independence in issues like legal capacity and the need for a custodian (father, brother, husband, or son);
- Discrimination with regard to marriage contracts, and thus with regard to alimony, desertion, request for divorce and compensation resulting from divorce;
- Discrimination with regard to relations with children, in issues of child custody;
- Discrimination with regard to the inheritance rights of women and their practical ability to exercise these rights.

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45 6 are catholic and so follow the same law
allocates government positions to different religious groups has strengthened vertical societal cleavages and transformed communal groups into opposing parties. It has also reduced citizens to membership in smaller political communities named sects that makes their political or their civic status, contingent on their submission to this categorization.

“...the relationship of the state to its citizens is “legally confessionalized.” Sectarian communities have been tasked with mediating the relationship between the state and “its” citizens, not only in practice but through the law as well.”

In the same vein, political sectarianism in Lebanon has produced a division of power in the public domain that scarcely resembles other consociational regimes. Other forms of consociational rule involve high levels of political cohesion, represented by the unity of the State, and a central authority that is charged with the prerogatives of maintaining the sovereignty and cohesiveness of the national State. Among the prerogatives of central government are policies on citizenship, public finances, fiscal policy, foreign policy, defense policy, and general security (particularly related to cross-border movement, controls on foreign nationals, national intelligence bodies, and so on) as well as the authority for assessing the constitutionality of laws and regulations, the judiciary, and social security. With the expansion of developmental decentralization central authority continues to orient national growth, and ensure that local and regional governments abide by the law. Rather than safeguard those prerogatives of the national state, political groups in Lebanon, in collusion with external powers have assigned each of these ‘national’ tasks to a select religious community. In other words, they have sought to create a political society based on “sectarian specialization,” in state matters with the following division of labor: Shiite liberation, Sunni reconstruction, and Maronite sovereignty.

“...sectarian and external forces combined have assigned the different communities particular national “tasks”; Shiite liberation, Sunni reconstruction, and Maronite sovereignty”

Over time, the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon consecrated the Shiites as the primary force of resistance and liberation through one of their political parties, Hizbullah. Following the withdrawal of the Israeli army in 2000, they maintained their control of the region and the Lebanese army was prevented from commanding Lebanon’s borders with Israel. In time, the resistance has come to be presented by one political group as Lebanon’s prime defense mechanism against the recurring incursions by Israel, thus totally appropriating the state’s normal hegemony over the means of violence, control of borders and foreign policy. The 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon further highlighted the penalties of this process. These consequences are not limited to the human and material damage or to future development initiatives but touches on the unity of the country and the rights of all citizens in a sovereign state.

While the Shiites, “represented” by Hizbullah came to be regarded as the “liberators” of the country, the Sunnis, personified by the late Prime Minister Rafic al Hariri came to be viewed as the prime engine for post civil war reconstruction, a paramount concern in the early 1990’s. The successful post-war reconstruction of Beirut, particularly its historic center and the massive infrastructure projects that were undertaken, lead to a symbolic association in the minds of many and in popular discourse between investments in reconstruction, mounting public debt and Gulf countries. More crudely the Sunnis were said to be “responsible” for a new Gulf aesthetic and for the tremendous public debt. This perspective meant that public discussion of money’s spent (or wasted) in other areas that were not viewed as “Sunni preserves”, such as compensation for the wartime displaced, military personnel, improving the situation of the electricity, state-financed hospitalization and medical care, the contracting operations of the Council for the South, etc were suppressed.46 Political support for such readings not only torpedoed all public debate of the post war reconstruction process or of the state’s fiscal strategy. It also led, rightly or wrongly, to corrupting the political effect of reconstruction itself. Reconstruction became a space for sectarian discrimination and division, rather than unity between a State recovering its power and a society whose physical capital had been disseminated by the civil war.

Along with national defense, post-war reconstruction and public finance, demands for State sovereignty and independence was also associated with a specific sect/community; the Maronite community. From the end of the civil war in 1990 to Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination in Feb 2005, Lebanese Christians, and particularly the Maronites had brandished demands for the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. This was not

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46 This disparity led to a sectarian reading of reconstruction. However, it is also easy to overstate the case, as it ignores the fact that Beirut is the country’s capital, and that the Sunnis make up only part of its inhabitants.
new to the Christian community in general; the two slogans had been pillars of their political rhetoric since the 1920’s even if this vision of sovereignty and independence changed over different historical moments. The Taif agreement that embodied the end of the civil war marginalized a part of this community while the Maronite Patriarch became a key figure in this settlement. However support of this agreement was not a blanket endorsement of Syrian tutelage of the country. Many Christian politicians boycotted the first and second parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996 consecutively. In 2000 a statement of the Maronite patriarch would form the spark for the renewed demand for sovereignty and independence. The formation of the (pro-sovereignty) Qornet Shehwan grouping in April 2001, brought together individuals whose political positions were close to the church and initiated the gradual return of the Lebanese Forces militia to open activity, and launched efforts to coordinate positions with the Free Patriotic Movement and its leader, General Michel Aoun. However, the chronic conflict over who would be considered the main leader of all Christian groups and the entire independence front would reignite with force in the aftermath of the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and the entry of the Muslim Sunnis and the Druze into the fray demanding liberation, independence and sovereignty.

Brandishing such sectarian overtones to the most significant accomplishments for Lebanon transformed them into significant threats to unity. Each of these momentous achievements has become a momentous burden for the country.

The outcome of such a sectarian reading of events transformed the three most significant accomplishments of Lebanon in the post war period into massive burdens and a threat to its unity. The post civil war reconstruction of the 1990s, the liberation of the south in 2000 after 22 years of Israeli occupation, and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and its release from Syrian tutelage in 2005 after 30 years of direct and indirect hegemony is major accomplishments for which the Lebanese paid a very high price. Brandishing such sectarian overtones to these accomplishments transformed them into significant threats to the unity of the country and a source of division among its varied communities. Each of these momentous achievements has become a momentous burden for the country and its citizens.

This situation is facilitated in part by the influence of foreign powers on Lebanon’s internal politics. This influence is well documented to the extent that most political parties proudly display their affiliations to each other. These connections go beyond ideological synergies. Rather they include material, political, symbolic and education mechanisms such as financial assistance, use of international connections to support the positions of particular political parties within the country, symbolic representations, frameworks of analysis and thinking, and even modes of conduct that are transferred to members of the sect or community. Various facets of civic life and civic guarantees disintegrate in the process, as Lebanon is transformed into an arena for external bargaining among regional and international powers. Internally, the conflict between the different groups is a contest over the state and its institutions. Maintaining a weak state in such a context benefits all the different groups and facilitated their control of access to its services.

The influence of foreign powers on Lebanon’s internal politics have transformed it into an arena for external bargaining among regional and international powers.

Institution building has also suffered tremendous setbacks as political/sectarian conflicts materialize in political deadlock. State institutions, usually shaped by negotiations between traditional political leadership over political prerogatives, have been transformed into a primary sphere of contestation between the main sectarian groups based on the projected “rights” of these groups. This has also led to the reproduction of traditional power structures and deficiencies in active / representative citizenship while clientelist networks are camouflaged as the interests of specific communities.

The results of this contestation is that political power struggles over state institutions have been exacerbated to the point where these institutions are considered mere instruments in the larger negotiations between representatives of the different religious/communal groups. This is particularly evident in two issues: 1) negotiations over the appointments of civil servants whereby much of the debate has focused on the “rights” of each religious community in terms of quality of posts and number

47 Syria’s exclusive role as sponsor became stabilized with American and Israeli support in the first half of the 1990s. Most Christians boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections, with the blessing of the Maronite Patriarchate. Progressively, this boycott was enhanced by the exclusion of the Lebanese Forces from power through the imprisonment and trial of its leader, Samir Geagea, and an official prohibition of the group in 1994. However, many Christian figures, both independent and close to the patriarch, continued to cooperate with the president of the Republic and with the Government, as well as public officials who owed their allegiance to Syria. This cooperation did not end what was called at the time “Christian frustration” with their weakened political powers established by the post-Taif Constitution as well as the logic of Syria’s management of these groups.
rather than the merit of the candidates and the require-
ment of the job\textsuperscript{48} and 2) the statements made during the
formation of new governments whereby political leaders
are explicit in their demand for “service” ministries (i.e.
ministries that render the maximum amount of services
at a time of election) but also the rights of religious com-
nunities to specific ministries.

The former action is based on the transformation of the
“transitional character of article 95 of the constitution
through an interpretation that extends its purview
beyond grade one civil servants. The latter is an outcome
of the increasing polarization between communi-
ties and has resulted in political deadlock that is slowly
paralyzing the executive branches of government and its
ability to effectively rule the country. It has also material-
ized in the paralysis over Lebanese University reform
and thus negatively impacted educational standards. In
this context clientelism is camouflaged as the interests
of sectarian communities.

“ Institution building has also suffered
tremendous setbacks as political / sectarian
conflicts materialize in political deadlock”

At the same time, in the last few years, new and detri-
mental constitutional customs have been emerging as
different groups vie for political power and attempt to
reshape political territory in the post-Syrian era. As
Thomas A. Baylis observes in his comparative analysis
of executive power in the emerging democracies of
eastern Europe, “new rules and institutions … do not
instantly produce firm realities but rather create a loose
structure that political actors seek to shape in the interest
of their own power and policy objectives”.\textsuperscript{49} In Lebanon,
and despite the emergence of cross religious political
bloks, these practices have reinforced sectarian political
power over the different communities. One example of
such practices are the different interpretations of the
constitution in 2006-2007 that led to a year and a half
long hiatus in the work of the parliament and paralysis in
government procedures and actions. These have also
undermined the power of the constitution as the single
most binding legal text that governs the state and nation
and have led the country to the brink of the civil conflict.

The electoral law, another sphere of con-
testation between religious communities
has changed 9 times in the past 13 parlia-
mentary elections…

More recent attempts at electoral reform represented by
the Botrous commission assigned by the government of
Prime Minister Sanyoura to draft a new electoral law has
been blocked by a political agreement to end the politi-
cal deadlock and civil conflict that was brokered in
Doha, Qatar this past May. The law’s proposed dual vot-
ing system insures that a little less than half the parlia-
ment is elected based on the principle of non-sectarian
representation in the six historic districts of Lebanon,
while the rest are elected through majoritarian voting
based on the smaller regions. In this, the Botrous law
capsulates the two opposing directions that the
Lebanese polity is pursuing. It tries to marry two voting
systems with the dual identity of voters as citizens and
as members of specific religious communities or geo-
graphic regions. Moreover, it does not reflect the current
demographic and geographic distribution of the popula-
tion by keeping citizens connected to their places of ori-
gin it reinforces their primal loyalties. The proposed law
also includes other reforms such as lowering the voting
age to eighteen, placing controls over campaign funding
and spending, and so forth. Recently, some elements of
the law were adopted by parliament but the key reforms,
such as proportional representation, that would have
allowed the emergence of new national political leader-
sip were sidelined. Other clauses to lower the voting
age to 18 and assign a quota for women were also not
adopted. In their place, a return to the 1960 electoral law
was voted in; one which relies on small districts and

\textsuperscript{48} As a result, appointments of public sector employees, recruited
through a recent mechanism put in place by the government of
Prime Minister Sanyoura and which relies on the professional qual-
fications of candidates rather than their religious affiliation has
been blocked.

\textsuperscript{49} Thomas A. Baylis, “Presidents Versus Prime Ministers: Shaping
Executive Authority in Eastern Europe” in World Politics, 48.3
(1996) 297-323, p. 302
insures that parliamentarians are voted in by their religious compatriots.

The Botrous law encapsulates the two opposing directions that the Lebanese polity is pursuing.

In many ways this act points to the close affiliation between political parties and specific religious communities. Rather than being agents of change, these parties are in fact falling deeper and deeper into crisis, unable to renew their discourse as more and more people lose confidence. The absence of laws guaranteeing national political parties has further hindered the ability of Lebanese society to produce new, "nationally oriented" leadership.

Rather than being agents of change, political parties are falling deeper and deeper into crisis, unable to renew their discourse as more and more citizens lose confidence.

In addition to elections, other mechanisms of political control are also being challenged. While some progress has been made on constitutional reform, aimed at supporting the independence of the judiciary, political interference continues openly in some cases. At the same time, progress on other fronts has also been made with the creation of a new oversight body for the electoral process and a new inter-ministerial committee for social reform.

2.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP

Social citizenship rights are a fundamental component of integral citizenship and necessary for the full exercise of democratic citizenship and expanding people’s capacities. The consensus reached on the basic components of citizenship considers the rights to education and health as crucial. Likewise, elements that hinder the full integration and participation of individuals in society such as unemployment, poverty and inequality are considered basic to the practice of effective citizenship.50

Social citizenship rights in Lebanon have a long and checkered history. The Lebanese state has been historically identified with a laissez faire economic approach where much is left to market forces. At the same time, this liberal and open economic system includes substantive investments in various social sectors such as health, education and a wide range of social welfare and protection policies. Moreover, these rights as well as other fundamental human rights are enshrined in the 1990 Preamble of the Constitution, which recognizes the International Declaration of Human Rights as a fundamental pillar for all citizen rights (Box 4).

However, the translation of these rights into laws and programs has been beset by a series of issues that feed off each other. A large number of these issues are related to the internal structure of Lebanese policy making as well as the particularities of the Lebanese political system where clientelist networks frequently overlap with sectarian identities and in the process hinder the implementation or enactment of national policies seen to threaten the interests of particular groups. As such, social development has been hampered by the absence of a social policy framework, weak coordination, politically-influenced targeting of development aid and the paucity of reliable data, including post project or crisis evaluations. Rather than a comprehensive vision/agenda, a piecemeal approach to social development was instituted. Furthermore, the involvement of alternate considerations in public allocations has undermined government delivery in the social sphere as well as the connections between the state and its citizens causing considerable inequity among citizens. Other factors are related to political and military instability, including a 15 year civil war and several Israeli invasions, as well as a series of other internal factors have resulted in a muddled institutional context where the state’s capacity to lead the development process has been undermined.

As a result, and even though, the post-war period in Lebanon is characterized by a succession of governments that have viewed social rights as part of a larger discourse of balanced development and growth, disparities in growth and development across Lebanese regions, districts and classes have persisted and even grown in some areas. While it is in no way a foregone conclusion that it is government policy that is directly responsible for the exacerbated inequalities and inequities, it remains an open question whether the allocation of public resources has, in fact, been guided by concerns for balanced capacity-building, or whether the channeling of public funds was in fact constrained by other political considerations having to do with sectarian balance, clientelism, and/or other factors.

50 See UNDP, 2005, Democracy in Latin America, Towards a Citizen’s Democracy; p. 118-129
In the absence of this framework or vision, the boundaries of state and non-state intervention have been blurred and the role of different public, private and civil society stakeholders with respect to major public social services (health, education, social welfare) ill-defined. Like many other countries around the world the provision of social services in Lebanon is characterized by a multiplicity of stakeholders that includes a wide range of state institutions, international NGOs, family and communal organizations, and national NGOs, as well as private institutions. A large number of the latter two categories are affiliated with particular religious groups or specific political parties.

Given the delicate sectarian balance required by the dominant political system this has lead to a situation where vested political interests are closely intertwined with sectarian clientelist networks. Often the legacy and power of communitarian factions, in addition to their vested interests, tend to be stronger than those of the state itself.

“This is a profound effect on the equitable and adequate delivery of services. Much decision making within government is subject to a process unrelated to the merits of the proposed policy at a national level. Rather, more often than not, discussion revolves around how the different private/sectarian interests might be affected. This negotiation takes place through the designated representatives of the different sects within government and in turn allows for the institutionalization of confessional/ clientelist networks within state institutions. In such a context procedures and mechanisms of the decision-making process are often subject to confusion and a lack of transparency, and thus leave room for considerable questions such as: on what basis is the sectoral, and sub-sectoral allocation of direct social public investment decided? What is the rationale behind the geographic and spatial distribution of such investments? To what extent are these investments subject to regular outcome evaluations that assess their impact on beneficiaries? These questions highlight issues related to the public supply side of social services, which, is greatly affected by the entanglement of formal and informal decision-making processes; the government, concerned ministries and/or public entities, donor countries or agencies, CSO’s as well as national and international NGO’s. The result has been that the distribution of social expenditures by governorates is not consistent with the regional share of deprived populations.

Social sector spending in Lebanon is high, in nominal terms and as a proportion of GDP with more than 70 percent of that spending coming from the private sector. According to the World Bank, the sum of public and private social spending stood at approximately 21 percent of GDP in 2004, of which 15 percent was supplied by the private sector. The Ministry of Finance estimates that public social expenditures (defined by the operations of ministries of Education, Health and Social Affairs and expenditures channeled through related agencies) stood at 6.75 percent of GDP in 2006 which represents 35 percent of primary expenditures in 2006. When public pensions and end-of-service indemnities are also taken into account, total social expenditures rises to 8.32 percent of GDP, with public social expenditures representing more than 25 percent of government primary expenditures in 2006.

This high social spending is not commensurate with outcomes. A comparative study undertaken by Herrera and Pang (2005), estimates that input efficiency; that is excess public input for a given level of public and private output is of the order of 79-87 percent for education and 71-75 percent for health. In other words, Lebanon uses at least 25 percent more inputs (public spending) to produce the same health outcomes as best practices countries and at least 13 percent more inputs for education. And this does not account for the fact that Lebanon’s share of private spending in total social spending at least for health - but probably also for education, is much higher than most of the 180 countries considered in this study.

This mismatch between spending and outcomes is partly because it is not based on need. Between 1995 and 2005, total public spending on infrastructure related to social outcomes totaled more than US$ 4.4 billion.

52 Ministry of Finance, www.mof.gov.lb
53 As measured by net primary and secondary school enrolment.
54 Life and life disability-adjusted expectancy at birth and immunization rates (DPT and measles).
55 These countries are: Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, Kuwait and Chile.
56 Private spending on health over GDP averages 2.3 percent for the 187 countries sampled - to be compared with 10.2 percent in Lebanon. There is no similar figure for private education. Public education spending averages 4.5 percent of GDP for 166 countries sampled.
57 Total spending by the CDR excludes projects that are national by nature such as airports, highways and the Lebanese University.
However, the allocation of this spending did not match the distribution of poverty (measured by the low satisfaction of basic needs index) in 1995: Beirut received 16 percent of total public investment spending while it only had 8 percent of total households with low satisfaction of basic needs in 1995. Nabatieh was home in 1995 to 11 percent of the households with low basic needs satisfaction; however it received during the next 10 years only 1 percent of total public spending.

In the education sector for example, data across governorates shows that the supply of public education (proxied through school capacity created per 10,000 students) was not commensurate with the variance in school dropout rates. In fact, the North received much less new school capacity than the Bekaa and the South, yet this region had the highest school dropout rates in 2004. The situation is quite similar in the health sector. Regional variability in the supply of public hospitals was inefficient in targeting the regions with the highest health needs (these needs are proxied by using the percentage of individuals with at least one chronic illness). Table 4.2

![Table 9: Public expenditure, poverty and basic needs](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total public investment expenditure (Million US$)</th>
<th>Poverty incidence (%)</th>
<th>Allocation of public investment expenditure</th>
<th>Distribution of low satisfaction of basic needs</th>
<th>Distribution of poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>19.56</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>52.57</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>29.36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>42.21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatieh</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52.57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,467</td>
<td>28.55</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Compiled from the MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution
** Compiled from UNDP, 2005

While inter-sectarian considerations strongly influence the scope and profile of the public provision of social services, (such as the decisions to establish a public school, a university branch, or a hospital in this or that area), the state also indirectly generates public services through non-state actors; NGOs and private sector service providers. However, this public financing of services produced by the civil and private sector does not seem to be based on needs assessments either and any open discussion of these policies is immediately viewed from the perspective of inter-sectarian considerations.

NGOs, some of which are affiliated with particular sectarian institutions get government funding for the provision of some services to poor and vulnerable groups irrespective of how efficient the results may be. These services include free private education, medical centers, orphanages, and elderly care. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) mostly provides support to unemployables (orphans, the elderly, the handicapped, and so on), encompassing on average 35,000 cases per year, through transfers to non-governmental

![Table 10: Supply versus need](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School capacity per 10,000 students</th>
<th>School drop out rates (%)</th>
<th>New hospital beds per 10,000 persons</th>
<th>Population with at least one chronic illness (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatieh</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jad Chaaban and Nisreen Salti, Social Citizenship and the Economy: The Role of Sectarianism in the Allocation of Public Expenditure, Background paper prepared for the current NHDR 2008/2009. Author computations are based on data from the MOSA, CDR, UNDP.
In addition, it supports the creation and development of social development centers, as well as social and health centers run in partnership with NGOs. A total of 360,000 individuals benefited from these services in 1998, but the regional balance appears uneven, as most of the beneficiaries are from the relatively wealthier region of Beirut. Based on the living conditions index from MOSA-UNDP, the World Bank (2005) estimates that 10 percent of the poor benefited from MOSA services in Beirut, in contrast to a fraction of less than 2 percent in the Nabatieh and North Lebanon regions. There were respectively 4.1 and 3.6 social and health centers per 10,000 poor in the regions of South Lebanon and Beirut, but only 1.4 and 1.6 in the Bekaa and North Lebanon regions (table 4.3). Another program which has a social assistance component is the producers’ subsidy for certain crops (wheat, sugar beet, tobacco). In total, it is believed that around 60,000 small farmers, mostly from the Bekaa Valley and the South benefit from such assistance.

The private sector is the other major provider of state funded services. However, the generally weak control and regulatory mechanisms by the state of this process has led to a general excess in supply. This is evident in the health sector, for example, where Lebanon’s hospitalization rate, consumption of pharmaceuticals and general per capita health expenditures, subsidized by the state, are noticeably higher than in other countries in the region. Instead of a lean health sector, thanks to non-state participation and competitive pressures, demand is artificially stimulated, leading to an excess in supply. In general, public policies have failed to either determine the exact scope of services that should be contracted with private providers or adequately control the quantity, quality and costs of these services.

A. The Pillars of Social Citizenship

The weak capacity of Lebanese citizens to directly secure their social citizenship rights in education, health and employment raises a series of crucial questions such as what are the conditions that shape the specific domains of these different rights? How efficient and equitable is the provision of these rights? Is the current situation addressing or contributing to vulnerability and social exclusion? What reforms are needed to insures the guarantee of social citizenship rights and thus sustainable and equitable long-term development?

### A.1 Education

The right to education is enshrined in Lebanon’s Constitution. Similarly, the Lebanese Government is committed to providing full access to basic education for all Lebanese citizens and has ratified international and Arab agreements pertaining to education-related issues. However, over the last two decades, the Lebanese educational system was turned progressively into a “dual system,” in which private education has been sought mostly by the middle- and upper-middle-income groups - with the exception of free private education, which is focused on the very poor - while public education has attracted lower middle-income and poor social groups.

#### SITUATION ANALYSIS

While access is not a major issue in the education sector in Lebanon, quality and opportunity is. While most close to 98 percent of students have access to basic education, this figure is significantly lower for intermediate and secondary level schooling. Moreover, the quality of education varies between schools within the public sector as well as between public and private sector schools. These deficiencies are caused by a number of issues. The government’s scope of coverage of educational needs is one problem; another is the lack of specific strategic management approaches to mobilizing human resources (both quantitative and qualitative).

#### Table 11: Beneficiaries allocation among governorates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Share in governorate</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Share in poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>78,221</td>
<td>8,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>297,819</td>
<td>16,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>327,928</td>
<td>5,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>110,392</td>
<td>6,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>175,152</td>
<td>4,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatieh</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>105,581</td>
<td>1,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Lebanon</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>1,095,363</td>
<td>43,761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


58 The Ministry of Social Affairs’ annual budget is US$60 million, of which 80 percent is spent on the care of 30,000 children, most of them through NGOs (Social Welfare Institutions) that contract with the Government. These reached 156 institutions in 2005.
capital investments as well as oversight of methods of operation and maintenance. This can be attributed to the frequent change in governments, and the different strategies employed by each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major public expenditure indicators (2005–2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEHE expenditures as percent of GDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More recently, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) established a National Education Strategy that was sent to the Cabinet for endorsement in September 2007. The National Education Strategy takes its cue from the Lebanese Constitution, the Document of National Accord (the Taif Agreement), and laws and regulations governing educational matters. These emphasize the freedom of and the right to education and ensuring equal access and opportunity to all citizens. However, various conflicts of interest between public and private stakeholders and postponed the implementation of this national strategy.

High levels of spending on education are not commensurate with outcomes while the GOL’s dual role as both provider and funder of services is reinforcing inequitable access to opportunity among citizens.

At the same time, relatively high levels of spending on education are not commensurate with outcomes. Even though the GOL spends close to 3 percent of its GDP on Education, drop out and repetition rates are still considerably high. As a result, many households have turned to the private sector despite the corresponding increase in their expenditures. In 2005-2006 close to 11.4 percent of GDP was spent on public and private education. Of this percentage, the government’s share was only 4.4 percent and the higher burden was borne by households (7.0 percent). While public spending is similar to OECD counties, private spending is 2-3 times higher. Household expenditure on education reached as much as 13 percent out of total expenses in 2001 (compared to 8 percent in 1966). The high level of household expenditure on education in Lebanon, as compared to other countries may be attributed to the considerable importance given to education. Many families are willing to provide children with a good quality of education, even if high costs are involved. (See Chapter Four)

Today citizen access to education is characterized by the following:

- The GOL’s dual role as both provider and funder of services is creating market distortions that lead to inequitable access among citizens. Through its educational subsidies for the children of civil servants, the GOL is supporting the private school system. In 2007, 90 percent of the children of civil servants, whose education is financed by the government, attended private schools. Up to 19 percent of public spending on education was channelled through scholarships to these children. At the same time, even though lower-middle-income and poor families are the main beneficiaries of public education, related expenditures favor relatively higher-income households. Figure 2 below, which shows the distribution of the Government’s cash grants as a percentage of public resources across households of different incomes indicates that 30 percent of Lebanon’s students are in households with monthly incomes that are less than L.L.600, 000, but this group of students receives only 9.6 percent of public support. Furthermore, as the income brackets of households rises, the level of public support it receives also increases.

- Enrollment, success, grade-age delays and drop-out rates, point to significant geographic and socio-economic and public/private disparities. These disparities reflect problems of equity and efficiency. Private and public education exhibit significant differences when it comes to quality. A study on “Free Compulsory Education in Lebanon” shows that 9 out of 1,000 students from public schools obtain the Baccalaureate without repetition, while 255 out of 1,000 from private schools reach this level. This is not to say that all private schools are superior to public ones, as there are differences in the quality of education provided by private institutions as well. However, overall as a sector, it seems to be functioning more efficiently. In response, civil society organizations have tried to address this deficit either through direct partnerships between schools where for example some private schools are providing support to public school students in Beirut, or through partnerships between the MEHE and NGO’s.

These discrepancies are also evident on a geographic level. Like many developing countries, Lebanon is characterized by regional and inter-regional disparities in educational attainment levels. Illiteracy rates are higher in the more socio-economically deprived regions, where they reach their highest levels in the Bekaa (14.45 percent), followed by South Lebanon (12.42 percent). North

59 MEHE, Figures provided to the NHDR
62 Ibid.
Lebanon has the highest concentration of students who finish elementary education and then drop out of school (43.22 percent). Meanwhile, Beirut and Mount Lebanon exhibit the highest ratios of university education attainment, as the ratios stand at 25.77 percent and 17.06 percent, respectively.

Central urban areas also have better results in terms of educational attainment, as well as better outcomes in terms of success rates whereby urban regions in Beirut and Mount Lebanon graduate a significantly higher number of students without repetition than the more peripheral and less-developed regions. Existing studies suggest that a lack of schools is not the cause since almost all parts of the country enjoy a sufficient number of schools and in some cases, there is even a surplus. However, the quality of education in these schools varies across sectors and regions. A large number of private schools are concentrated in and around the capital Beirut or in other central cities in the regions. As the ratio of public school to private school students by governorate indicates, central urban areas, which have better success rates and higher educational attainment levels, exhibit higher private-to-public attendance ratios (4 in the Beirut suburbs of Mount Lebanon as compared to 0.7 in Nabatieh for example) (Figure 4.3 in Chapter Four).

Student/teacher ratios at public schools also contribute to this discrepancy in quality of education and geographic disparity. Table 12 below shows that the ratios of students per class and students per teacher in public schools falls below international standards, while private schools record a more acceptable level. In addition, the quality of teachers (educational attainment, average age, competence in their subject, and so on.), is lower in public schools, especially pre-secondary schools. For instance, one-third of the teachers in public schools, have, at the most, a baccalaureate degree. Moreover, private schools also seem to be attracting younger professionals whereby 32.1 percent of teachers in public schools are above fifty one years of age, as opposed to 14.9 percent in public schools. However, this distribution also camouflages inefficiencies within the system whereby some public schools exhibit outrageously high student/teacher ratios mainly due to the political /clientelist considerations that generated their establishment in the first place.

Many poor students drop out of school because they believe that they will occupy the same jobs irrespective of their educational attainment…"

Harsh socio-economic conditions further aggravate these disparities. Lead by the belief that they are receiving a lower quality education that will make little difference to their futures, students in poorer areas tend to drop out of school early to join the workforce. For them, the trade off between the opportunity cost of this education and the value added is significantly low.

Figure 2: Distribution of children and public support to households for education, by household income


Figure 3: Educational attainment by region (%)

In other words, they believe that they will occupy the same jobs regardless of the level of education that they attain and so prefer to gain additional years of income. From this perspective any attempt to increase educational attainment in rural areas should concentrate on enhancing quality and spread public awareness about the importance of education and its potential to boost standard of living. Civil society and the private sector have paved the way as they try to improve the access of citizen’s in remote areas to the knowledge economy (See One Hundred and One Stories to Tell)

The educational sector, with few exceptions, also suffers from the exclusion of specific population groups such as the disabled. They are characterized by high illiteracy rates (38.2 percent) and only 5 percent attain secondary level schooling while 2.9 percent graduate from universities. (See Statistical Compendium for a full profile). This is mainly due to the failure to integrate the disabled successfully in mainstream schools. Lebanon has recently enacted a series of laws pertaining to the rights of disabled individuals to quality education in a barrier-free environment. This is also a core tenant of the National Education Strategy. A study conducted in 2007 estimated that the cost of creating a barrier-free environment in all public schools within a six-year plan, would not exceed 1 percent of the MEHE’s budget per annum.

The relationship of state to citizen is being undermined through state support for private sector intermediaries, particularly those with specific communal affiliations. Inefficiencies and sectarian based interference also extends to Higher Education as is evident in the situation of the Lebanese university. The only state sponsored university in the country and once the pride of the academic community the LU has been beset by a series of issues in the war and post period that have weakened its status as a bastion of learning and undermined its characteristic as a melting pot for Lebanese of all walks of life. These include the establishment of multiple branches for the same discipline to satisfy the regional/sectarian demands of different groups (See boxes 3.14 and 4.6 in the full report)
A.2 Health

Today, the right to health in Lebanon is more of a right to medical coverage and assistance. In other words, rather than focus on the necessary pre-emptive care that guarantees a long and healthy life, far more attention and resources have been allocated to costly after-the-fact health care or what is often labeled as curative health care. Despite a variety of issues, the main obstacle to the right to health is also one of opportunity rather than access.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

The health sector has fallen short of the twin goals of access and opportunity. In 2005, per capita expenditure on health in Lebanon was USD 693, which is low compared to the OECD average. Total health care expenditures amounted to USD 2.49 billion or 11.2 percent of GDP. This percentage was the highest among all countries of the Eastern Mediterranean region. Although many European countries spend a comparable percentage of GDP on health care, the value for money (in terms of quality of care and extent of coverage) is far superior to that of Lebanon.

As such Lebanon suffers from low returns on health spending. Although it exhibits acceptable percentages on major health indicators, the latter are similar to neighboring countries that may spend less on this sector. Moreover, the relatively high per capita expenditure on health, on a national level does not adequately reflect the unequal access to health care by poor and vulnerable social groups. (See table D3 in Statistical Compendium)

Today citizen access to health services is impacted by the following:

- The state’s role and involvement in the health sector is generally weak in many respects. Government contribution to the total health care bill is quite low. In 2005, it paid 28.3 percent of the total health care bill in 2005 a figure that is far lower than that of developed countries, where public involvement reaches more than three-quarters of total health expenditures. If NSSF expenditures are removed from the Government’s contribution, the above figure of 28.3 percent would drop to 18.5 percent, indicating an even lower contribution by the public sector and a greater burden being placed on the private sector, particularly households, when it comes to health care financing. However, even this contribution is not reaping the benefits it should as a result of various factors that have a direct impact on citizen access to health services and the quality of these services including political/clientelist considerations.

The government’s contributions are also inefficient. For example, in-hospital medication represents more than two thirds of the NSSF coverage with higher ratios in regions characterized by high poverty rates and in smaller hospitals where there is minimal government oversight. In 2004 it reached a national average of 63 percent. This is in part due to the minimal out - of pocket expenditure associated with in-hospital care for poor households as well as the common practice adopted by many hospitals of increasing the utilization rate of their beds so as to augment the rate of their compensation by the NSSF. Another common practice is the high level of in-hospital medication that reached a national average of 63 percent in 2004 according to the NSSF. This figure is quite high when compared to other contexts such as European countries where it does not exceed 45 percent. There are also major regional variations in the share of in-hospital medication. Higher percentages can be found in peripheral regions that are characterized by higher poverty rates, smaller hospitals and minimal government oversight.

“Efficient contributions and a weak regulatory role have led to inequities in access and opportunity for citizens and considerable leakage in spending”

- The weak regulatory role of the state also lead to a highly fragmented and uneven health insurance framework.

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Table 13: Health spending in OECD countries, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDI</th>
<th>Public expenditure on health (% of GDP)</th>
<th>Private expenditure on health (% of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HDR 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change
Health insurance in Lebanon today includes four major types of financing agents (two public and two private) while the public sector contains six different programs, two of which are direct funded by the Ministries of Health and Social Affairs. The multiplicity of health financing providers, especially in the public sector leads to disparities in terms of eligibility criteria, target groups (different demographic and social characteristics), degree and quality of coverage, beneficiary contributions, and subscription conditions. For example, the eligibility criteria pertaining to each insurance plan have differing procedures, tariffs, contracts and monitoring even though around 95 percent of the service providers are private. Contract conditions are negotiated directly by the private sector with the respective state fund, giving private interests leverage and say over public funds. In addition to its inefficiencies this situation generates considerable inequity among civil servants. They are offered significantly different levels of coverage even though they are employees of the same entity. (Table 4.9 in main report)

As a result, more than half of Lebanese citizens (53.3 percent) do not enjoy any form of health insurance, whether public or private.73 Lack of health coverage is directly correlated with income and poverty levels. The recent MoSA, UNDP study on Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution indicates that of the total 8 percent very poor individuals in the country, only 16 percent have insurance. This figure increases to 25 percent among the relatively poor, i.e. those who fall between the lower and upper poverty lines.74

…more than half of Lebanese citizens do not enjoy any form of health insurance

Regional disparities are also evident in the degree and quality coverage for individuals and households. Beirut and Mount Lebanon enjoy the highest percentage of insured individuals (59.1 percent and 53.8 percent respectively), while Nabatiyeh has the lowest, at less than one-third (31.5 percent). Although the NSSF accounts for the highest share of insured population, coverage also varies by region, depending on the relative weight of declared wage earners out of the total labor force. Many NGO’s, whether civic or those affiliated with political parties have stepped in to cover for disparities in insurance coverage or to supplement them. (Box 5)

The Ministry of Health (MoH) has taken responsibility for individuals not covered by any insurance plan, whether public or private, irrespective of their income or asset status. It also covers costly health services that the private sector tends to avoid. In 2007, hospitalization consumed most of the MoPH’s expenditures as it covered 27% of hospitalizations, compared to 15% coverage of services in 2005. Salaries and pharmaceuticals, did not exceed 30 percent.75 Yet the government’s weak regulatory oversight means that it is unable to curb hospitalization costs. Hospitals tend to price their own services and require the MoPH to cover the costs according to their set price-list. In addition, the high out of pocket costs for outpatient care drives many to resort in-hospital care further increasing its share of the bill. As its financial obligation accrue over the years the Ministry has tended to delay payments. For example, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) currently owes private hospitals and outpatient facilities a total of LL 500 billion.76 Payment of this money continues to be deferred indefinitely.

Out-of-pocket spending for households is also quite high reaching about 60 percent of total health care expenditure, which is equivalent to about 82 percent of total private expenditures.77 On average, a Lebanese household spends LL 2,609 million78 per year on health care, which equals 14.1 percent of total household yearly expenditures, or more than eight times the official minimum

-- Box 5: Heart Beat (101 Stories to Tell) --

Combining a unique talent for music, singing and surgery, Heart Beat was founded in 2005 by a group of surgeons. They organize and perform in fundraising concerts for children who suffer from heart disease but whose families cannot afford the costs of treatment. The same doctors and support staff also go on to perform these life saving procedures free of charge. Heart Beat also partners with private sector entities over specific activities. In addition to various public and private benefactors, concerts are their window onto the world. Their first Deir al-Qamar, concert supported three operations, the 4,000-person concert in Biel in 2006 funded seventy operations, and the Faqra concert in the summer of the same year gave another 135 children a second chance at life. Their most recent 2008 concert at the Casino du Liban was a raging two-day success and will fund another 100 or so surgeries.

Heartbeat is not the only one. Braveheart is another NGOs established by parents whose children were born with this disease.

73 MOSA, CAS, UNDP. 2006, Living Conditions of Households.
74 MOSA, CAS, UNDP. 2008.
75 MOSA, CAS, UNDP. 2006, ibid
76 World Bank, 2008, Towards Financial Equilibrium in the Sickness and Maternity Branch of the NSSF.
77 WHO, National Health Accounts series.
Moreover, the burden of out-of-pocket health care expenditures (as a proportion of household expenditures) is not equitably distributed. Poorer families spend a relatively larger portion of their income on health care services than higher-income families. For example, individuals earning LL 300,000 to LL 500,000 per month spend as much as 17 percent of its expenditures on health services as compared to a 14.1 percent national average. This declines to 8.1 percent for the highest income group who make more than LL 5 million per month.

The relationship of state to citizen is also being undermined by the overlap between political sectarianism and clientelism as well as by state support for private sector intermediaries, particularly those with specific communal affiliations. Several public hospitals have been constructed and equipped for operation but divergent political interests or bureaucratic reasons have delayed their opening, effectively wasting the huge investments made in these facilities. Similarly, many religious/political groups find it easier and more profitable to construct and run new tailor-made hospitals rather than operate existing non-functioning ones. Encouraged by current public health financing plans, these groups usually develop private hospitals. However, given the government’s weak regulatory role, the actual quality of health services in hospitals located in peripheral regions is uncertain.

### A.3 Employment

The right to decent work is guaranteed by the more than 50 treaties that Lebanon has ratified among which are 7 principle agreements. However, the absence of a modern institutional framework for the Lebanese labor market and the persistent application of long-outdated labor laws has hindered the implementation of these treaties. This situation has also delayed the ratification of other treaties such as syndicating the rights of civil and agriculture sectors as well as foreign labor. A new labor law was proposed by the Ministry of Labor over ten years ago and several versions of it have been discussed yet it remains un-ratified by Parliament. Other proposals to upgrade the legislative framework for the labor market have suffered a similar fate. This situation has aggravated existing problems in the labor market with negative economic and social repercussions that affect poor and middle-income groups in particular.

### SITUATION ANALYSIS

In 2004, 44 percent or 1.2 million of Lebanese residents were economically active. However, the general rate of economic activity in Lebanon is lower than that of other developing countries for several reasons: (1) rising emigration particularly by males of different age categories, (2) weak participation of women in the economic sector, and (3) under-declaration of female labor engaged in artisanal, agricultural and rural labor.

At the same time, Lebanon today is also characterized by a younger labor force due to demographic shifts since the 1970s. The highest rate of economic activity (61.4 percent in 2004), is among the 25-29 age group in part as a result of a significant increase in female economic activity from 20.2 percent in 1970 to 37.3 percent in 2004. Higher education is a key factor for female entry into the labor market. The percentage of female employees with a university diploma or higher reached 34.1 percent, as compared to only 15.9 percent of males.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economically active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Today citizen access to employment is impacted by the following:

- There is a significant gender gap in the rates of economic activity. Despite considerable gains in gender parity in education whereby the gender gap that was evident in the 1970s has been almost eliminated and even surpassed to the advantage of females in secondary and tertiary level education, these gains have not been reflected in the labor market. Only 19.6 percent of females aged 15 to 64 are working and they form 21.5 percent of the total labor force. The rate of economic activity in the 15-64 age group is 76 percent for men as compared to 25 percent for women. Two out of every three women work in administration or education, compared to one out of every four men.

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79 MOSA, CAS, UNDP 2006, ibid.
Low female participation in the labor force is due in part to prevailing societal values that are also reinforced through the current educational system that tends to reproduce the same limited pattern of gender roles. For example, an examination of the current civic and history text books taught in all schools found that women are only portrayed in traditional gender roles while all leadership roles are relegated to males. In addition, employed women face wage discrimination. The 2004 national household survey found the ratio of estimated female to male earned income was 0.31. These differences tend to be more pronounced in the private sector and in the agricultural sector.

At the same time, the number of female owned enterprises is on the rise for middle and upper middle income groups. Similarly, the percentage of independent self-employed workers has risen by 3 percent (25 percent in 1997 to 28.5 percent in 2004) accompanied by a fall in the share of salaried employees in the total labor force (67 percent to 62.1 percent). At the same time, high levels of emigration, especially of younger and highly skilled workers, have historically played an important role in keeping unemployment levels down. However, they have also drained the country of its highly skilled workforce. These have impacted the supply end of the labor market. It is not clear what the recent global financial crisis and the foreseen return of emigrants from the Gulf in particular, will have on unemployment levels in the country.

The concentration of the Labor force has shifted. The city of Beirut’s share of the total workforce fell from 25.4 percent in 1970 to 13.1 percent in 2004. Comparatively, the share of the labor force in Beirut’s suburbs and the surrounding areas of Mount Lebanon increased from 40 percent in 1970 to 44.1 percent in 2004. Similarly, the share of the labor markets in the governorates of South Lebanon and Nabatiyeh and North Lebanon have increased in the same period. The latter are comparatively higher than the Bekaa. (Table 14) This shift implies easier access by citizens to employment in their regions.

The Lebanese labor market exhibits sharp disparities between supply and demand. Even though demand for skilled labor in the knowledge industry among other newer skills is increasing at a considerable pace, the number of graduates from the requisite faculties is not commensurate. At the same time, the labor market is

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**Box 6: A small loan for big dreams: Al Majmoua**

Leila did not know what the future would hold. For years her ambitions were limited to supporting her husband provide for their family through her old sewing machine. In 1995 she participated in a communal loan with a group of women from her village. “The idea of getting a loan through a collective guarantee to four women seemed quite strange. Banks, if they agree to see someone poor like me would request impossible guarantees.” Leila now runs a small sewing factory that employs eight women and she owns twelve sewing machines. When asked about her family, she replies, “Thanks to God and the support of al Majmoua, my son graduated from university recently, my other children are in school, and we are saving for the marriage of our eldest daughter.”

The Lebanese Association for Development - Al Majmoua - an independent, apolitical, NGO is a leading micro finance agency in Lebanon. Given that the informal sector is the backbone of the Lebanese economy Al Majmoua’s core business is to provide micro loans to individuals who have limited or no access to formal lending channels. They target the poor in general, and focus especially on women micro-entrepreneurs. Al Majmoua is active across Lebanon, including the Palestinian Camps. To date, Al Majmoua has disbursed 90,000 loans for a total amount of USD 85 million and offered non-financial services to more than 2,500 women. It currently has 11,500 active beneficiaries, including more than 5,000 women, for a total outstanding portfolio of USD 8.25 million. In addition to loans, beneficiaries profit from other non-financial capacity building services and other activities, many of which are specially designed for women. To date, Al Majmoua has directly impacted, more than 20,000 households economically and socially. Al Majmoua’s partners include a wide spectrum of international and regional donors.

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80 CRDP, UNESCO, PNUD, Programme d’Appui à la Réforme du Système Educatif Libanais - LEB/96/005, 2002

81 Only 1997 data is available on this issue. The household survey of 2004 does not include such information.
unable to absorb the large number of graduates from the faculties of literature, law and the social sciences. Similarly graduates of vocational and technical institutions are not necessarily addressing changing market needs. This situation is further aggravated by two distinct characteristics of the Lebanese Labor market. On the one hand, 88 percent of businesses in Lebanon have fewer than five employees. These businesses usually perform simple functions and their ability to expand their employee base is rather limited. On the other hand, larger institutions, characterized mainly by an oligopolistic structure, are unable to provide employment opportunities even for the current number of highly skilled and competent graduates with competitive and technical areas of expertise.

Citizen rights to employment have been impacted by geographic and gender disparities, a weak relationship between educational institutions and the business community and the lack of a pension system for the private sector.

The weak relationship between educational and vocational institutions and the business community has negatively impacted the performance of the labor market. Training, orientation and preparation of students prior to graduation as well as mid career training are almost nonexistent. More than 87 percent of institutions claim they do not need to train their employees.

The weak wage structure, especially in the private sector also impacts labor market. This weakness in the wage structure can in part be explained by the deterioration in the current conditions of enterprises (informal ones in particular). The 2006 average wage, of LL 1,180,000 is low when compared to the cost of living and there has been no official wage adjustment in the private sector since 1996, while the general consumer price index rose roughly 58 percent during 1996-2007.

The absence of a pension system for the private sector also has significant repercussions for citizen rights to employment. Lebanon is characterized by a multiplicity of its retirement systems; two public and one private each of which has different eligibility and funding criteria. According to available statistics, the three retirement plans cover less than 40 percent of the labor force, while salaried workers make up more than 60 percent of this total. Moreover, these plans ingrain inequity among citizens in that the rate of return differs from one system to another and some restrict labor mobility etc. draft law was put forward by the Ministry of Labor to the Government two years ago, but remains in Parliament awaiting ratification.

The labor market in Lebanon is also characterized by the presence of large numbers of formal and informal foreign laborers and domestic workers. The size of the legally registered labor market tends to fluctuate and depends on specializations (See statistical compendium and CAS website). However, legal domestic workers, mainly from countries of Asia, face a significant amount of discrimination that needs to be addressed.

At the same time, available data on formally registered foreign employees does not reflect the actual size of foreign labor in Lebanon. For instance, unofficial estimates of low-skilled Syrian and Asian labor suggest that there are 100,000-150,000 Syrian construction workers alone. Iraqi and Palestinian refugees fleeing war and insecurity form another pool of foreign informal labor. However, Both population groups lack basic civil and social rights. The Iraqi refugee population for the most part has been in Lebanon for the last decade and a half and is currently estimated at 50,000, with a steady flow back to Iraq.

### Table 14: Distribution of the labor force in the different Lebanese governorates (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Beirut</td>
<td>33.50</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>13.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon - suburbs</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>28.40</td>
<td>44.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon excluding suburbs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>14.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>17.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


84 NSSF  
85 CAS  
87 ILO, 2001, *Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon*, Beirut, Lebanon
depending on security conditions. The Palestinian refugee population that originally fled to Lebanon in two waves in 1948 and 1967 is currently estimated at around 250,000 individuals living in different refugee camps around the country. Despite the length of their stay in Lebanon, Palestinian refugees continue to be regarded as resident foreigners and are excluded from the Lebanese labor markets by two legal considerations. The first is the legal categorization of Palestinian refugees as foreigners as defined by the 1964 Law that states, “foreigner is understood to mean, in this law, any natural or juridical person who is not a Lebanese citizen.” The other legislative item that limits the access of Palestinians to the Lebanese labor market is their exclusion even from the category of “foreigner” by the legal concept of reciprocity, which holds that favors, benefits, or penalties that are granted by one state to the citizens or legal entities of another should be returned in kind. In Lebanese labor laws, foreigners are granted work permits only if their country of origin grants Lebanese citizens work permits. In this regard Palestinian residents fail to meet the concept of reciprocity, as they do not belong to any recognized state and thus fall under a de facto category of “stateless foreigner” which has not been addressed in Lebanese legislation.

Recently, the Lebanese government has ratified a new law which permits Palestinians to be employed in 72 new professions. (See Tables B.15 in statistical compendium for population characteristics).

B. Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Exclusion

Freedom from poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion is also a basic social citizenship right. Even though closely correlated, one phenomena does not necessarily lead to the other. Vulnerability does not necessarily imply poverty. Similarly while poverty either may cause social exclusion or be caused by it, social exclusion is not necessarily determined by poverty. Each of these phenomena has its own determinants, specificities and manifestations. As such, strategies to address questions of social citizenship rights in Lebanon must consider populations that are poor, vulnerable and / or socially excluded. This differentiation should take into consideration the following:

Poverty in Lebanon is not a major concern. However the risk of falling into poverty is. In 2004, extreme poverty was limited to 8 percent of residents. Another 20 percent lay between the lower and the upper poverty lines placing them at great risk of falling into poverty in the event of any shock, political, social or economic. Both categories represent around one-third of the resident population and are mainly concentrated in the peripheral areas of the country, especially the north.

Vulnerability concerns segments of the population that are at risk. Unlike poverty, it is a transversal phenomenon that appears among different social groups. In addition to specific vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities, orphans, working children, female heads of households, etc., vulnerability also affects social segments that lie immediately above the upper poverty line, representing around one-third of the resident population where 32 percent of households have a total monthly revenue less than 1.5 times the upper poverty line.

“While only 8 percent of the Lebanese are poor, one third of the Lebanese population is vulnerable to falling into poverty. Such conditions sometimes lead to limited social exclusion.”

Social exclusion is to some extent distinct from poverty and vulnerability, even though these two phenomena can sometimes lead to the exclusion of some groups from access to a decent quality of social services. In this sense, social exclusion as compared to poverty and vulnerability is intended to focus more on structural bottlenecks to equity and social injustice. While the majority of Lebanese citizens do not face systematic deprivation of social rights, different kinds of exclusion do exist. As in other countries, the vulnerable and the poor in Lebanon tend to be excluded not from access, but from opportunity. In Lebanon, problems in the State’s social services delivery systems (mainly education and health), including the sectarian / clientelist interests and the uncoordinated involvement of private sector entities all contribute to the creation of an inequitable and inefficient mechanism for social service provision. As a result, some groups tend to be “left out” and are thus subject to one form of exclusion or another. It should be noted that long-time resident Palestinian refugees, Iraqi and other refugees as well as foreign labor face forms of exclusion that Lebanese citizens are not subjected to.

90 Ibid.
91 MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, Ibid.
B.1 Characteristics of poverty and vulnerability in Lebanon

The latest studies on poverty in Lebanon indicate that 7.9 percent\(^92\) of the population lives in extreme poverty, i.e., below the lower poverty line,\(^93\) which is equivalent to USD 2.4 per capita per day. This portion of the population, which numbers about 300,000 people, cannot meet their most basic needs for survival. Using the upper poverty line\(^94\) of USD 4 per capita per day, increases those affected by poverty to 28.5 percent of the population.\(^95\) Therefore, 20.5 percent of Lebanese live between the lower and upper poverty lines.

The poverty gap index measures the mean distance below the lower poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line. Therefore, it depicts the mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. The overall poverty gap index in Lebanon was measured at 8.1 percent,\(^96\) which means that a large segment of the poor are far below the upper poverty line. This makes them highly prone to falling into extreme poverty if they are subjected to an external shock. Since Lebanon faces a high risk of such political or military shocks, the possibility of falling into severe poverty is quite high for many of those currently considered in the “near poor” segment of the population.

Vast regional disparities also characterize the incidence of poverty in Lebanon. Poverty levels are least significant in Beirut, where extreme poverty is 0.67 percent of the population and overall poverty at 5.18 percent. In contrast extreme poverty in the Governorate of North Lebanon is as high as 17.75 percent and overall poverty reaches 52.27 percent. The South, which includes two major urban areas (the cities of Sidon and Tyre), is the second poorest governorate in the country, with an extreme poverty rate of 11.64 percent and overall poverty of 42.21 percent.

There are also inter-regional disparities, particularly between urban and rural areas. This implies that both the inter- and intra-regional differences should be taken into consideration when enhancing social rights and designing poverty reduction policies. For example, Akkar has the highest percentage of lower and upper poverty lines (20 percent and 62 percent respectively) as compared to Koura/ Zghourta area where poverty rates are 4 percent and 25 percent respectively. These disparities are verified by both qualitative and quantitative methods for measuring poverty. In general, and with few exceptions, mapping the poverty headcount at the strata level against the unmet basic needs results indicate similar levels of deprivation at the qada level.

Poverty is also closely correlated with unemployment and low levels of education. Basically, the poorer you are, especially if female, the more likely you are to be officially unemployed. In 2004, the unemployment rate was estimated to be 7.9%. Estimates that consider the impact of political turbulence and global financial crisis have yet to be undertaken.\(^97\) However, a recent study estimated the total percentage of unemployment among the poor to be 14.9 percent, and 14 percent among the near poor, falling to 6.7 percent for the better-off portion of the population. Poor females register an unemployment rate of 26.6 percent, while only 8.2 percent of better-off females are unemployed. Unemployment among better-off females is lower than the national average of female unemployment (9.4 percent).\(^98\)

Similarly, poor youth are also vulnerable to unemployment. The unemployment rate among young people between the ages of 15 and 24 is 20 percent, and is measurably higher among the poor. For every two poor young people holding a high school diploma, one is facing the prospect of unemployment. One out of three poor youth with a university diploma is unemployed, compared to one out of five among non-poor university graduates. Solutions for breaking the cycle of poverty for these individuals must address the very structure of the labor market and economic enterprises. The role of non-governmental organizations here has been quite critical in providing economic support and training to poor individuals as well as students from across Lebanon’s socio-economic spectrum.

Education is also strongly associated with the incidence of poverty. As indicated earlier, the education sector suffers mainly from problems of opportunity, or the provision of quality education. While the distribution of better-off individuals across the various levels of education is similar to the national average the poorer an individual is, the lower the level of education he/she is likely to have achieved. A total of 15 percent of the poor are illiterate and 6.44 percent are barely able to read and write, while 43.62 percent have only reached elementary level schooling. Similarly 18.63 percent of better-off individuals

\(^{92}\) ibid
\(^{93}\) The lower poverty line is the share of non-food expenditures for households whose total expenditure is equivalent to the food poverty line (the cost of minimal essential calorie requirements).
\(^{94}\) The upper poverty line estimates the non-food component of the poverty line as the non-food expenditure of households whose food expenditure is equal to the food poverty line.
\(^{95}\) MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, ibid.
\(^{96}\) ibid.
\(^{97}\) MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, Living Conditions of Households.
\(^{98}\) MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, ibid.
have a university level education as compared to only 3.24 percent of the poor. Many studies suggest that even a moderate improvement in the quality of education could contribute to a significant reduction in poverty.

### B.2 Vulnerable groups and exclusion

Vulnerability a transversal phenomenon affects a cross section of the population as well as specific social groups. In Lebanon these include female-headed households, the disabled, working children, fishermen, agricultural and seasonal workers, the elderly and the unemployed. (See statistical compendium for key characteristics of the main vulnerable groups in Lebanon).

- **Female-headed households** represent 14.2 percent[^9] of total heads of households in Lebanon. More than three quarters of female-headed household are widows. One third of these women are illiterate and close to 60 percent are without health coverage. They also suffer from reduced economic activity, low-income levels, and old age. Close to 40 percent exhibit low and very low Unmet Basic Needs and more than 50 percent make less than $400 a month. Civil society initiatives to address some of these issues are apparent in the *One Hundred and One stories to tell*.

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[^9]: ibid
Working children between the ages of 10 and 19 are estimated at around 45,000. The largest number of working children is in the North, namely Minyeh and Tripoli, where poverty headcounts are also the highest. Close to 80 percent of working children are male and more than 88 percent of these children are 15-19 years of age. Working children face various difficulties, particularly when it comes to their education and health conditions. Around 77 percent have no medical insurance, and almost half have only elementary school education and another 30 percent have secondary school education. More than 44 percent of those report psychological pressures in their work environment and another 45 percent report work long hours in adverse in environmental conditions.

The elderly defined as the segment of residents who are aged 65 constitute 7.5 percent of the total Lebanese population, or 277,000 individuals. Fewer than half benefit from medical insurance even though close to half suffer from 1-2 chronic diseases. Limited economic activity renders them dependent on others for support. Around 40 percent are illiterate and close to 50 percent have a monthly income less than $400.

Approximately 75,000 citizens (about 2 percent of the Lebanese resident population) are disabled, of whom 84.8 percent suffer from one disability and 10.5 percent from two disabilities. More than one quarter (27.3 percent) are above the age of 64. Close to 70 percent do not have medical insurance and 38 percent are illiterate. More than 55 percent survive on less than $400 a month. Of those 21 percent have a monthly income of $266.

Agricultural workers make up an estimated 7.5 percent\textsuperscript{100} of the total active population. Many farming operations are small-sized, which limits the volume and diversity of production and hence depresses revenues. Similarly, fishermen, estimated at 6,550 in 2004, suffer from high levels of deprivation\textsuperscript{101}. They earn little revenue in a very seasonal sector.

Deprivation levels are high for both population groups in money metric and unmet basic needs terms. Close to 67 percent of agricultural workers and fishermen are over the age of 50 and almost 80 percent do not have health insurance. One third are illiterate and another third have only elementary school education. Civil society organizations have actively helped both improve their skills and promote their produce both within Lebanon and abroad.

Among the employed, non-salaried workers, especially those in the agriculture and construction sectors, face a high risk of falling into poverty. Recent data indicates that the qadas exhibiting a high concentration of agricultural employment are the ones where the incidence of poverty is the highest. For example, the population involved in agricultural activity ranges between 33.1 percent in Hermel and 18 percent in Akkar (with the exception of Batroun), while the national average is 8 percent.\textsuperscript{102}

Institutionalized children are another vulnerable group. These include orphaned children or those at risk of abuse or neglect and who are assigned to residential care. However, most children placed in residential care institutions come from poor families that cannot support them. There are currently 23,463 institutionalized children below the age of 18, or 1.92 percent of all children in the same age group in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{103} In its current form, institutionalization is not a last resort. Rather, it is utilized by families to alleviate economic constraints.

2.3 CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP

On the civic/cultural front, Lebanese citizens enjoy considerable freedoms. Freedom of association is guaranteed as are freedom of opinion and personal liberties (the latter are protected by the constitution through articles 8 and 13). The same cannot be said of the right to life, humane treatment, and security. Human rights violations continue to occur, albeit in a downward trend, while the lack of resources has weakened the administration of justice. Around 17,000 individuals remain “disappeared” from the era of the civil war and despite considerable pressure by concerned civil society groups, limited action has been taken to identify their whereabouts. Prison populations are of particular concern here since their rights are frequently violated and prisons tend to be significantly overcrowded and physically run down. Refugees, particularly Palestinian and Iraqis, have very few guarantees and even though the right to work for Palestinians was enlarged recently, the latter still suffer from a considerable civil rights deficit.

Similarly, even though some progress has been made regarding the rights of women, of labor, and of children, these remain deficient. Honor crimes and domestic violence against women and children and crimes against foreign labor persist in the absence of adequate legislative framework and protection and the relegation of family

\textsuperscript{100} MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} UNDP, 2005, Millennium Development Goals: MDG Costing - Lebanon.
\textsuperscript{103} MoSA, UNICEF, 2007, Children Deprived of Family Care in Lebanon.
matter to the different religious courts is not helpful. In
the absence of civic legal reference-points for dealing
with family violence, authorities refrain from stepping in
under the pretext of not wanting to interfere in the pri-
ivate affairs of the different sects. The limited capacity of
the state to enforce protection and its inability to claim a
monopoly on the use of force in these spheres and oth-
ers remain a source of concern. Perhaps a comparison
between “honor crimes” and the Penal Code provides a
most telling example of this phenomenon, along with
disparities in wages, social security, and stereotypes in
school textbooks, and so on (see Chapters 2, 3 and 5 in
main report).

Lebanon enjoys one of the freest presses in the Arab
region and right to freedom of the press is widely imple-
mented. Most of the visual, audio, and written media in
Lebanon is privately owned and politically independent
of the state, with significant margins of freedom and
maneuver. However, the right to freedom of information
citizens is undermined by the undue influence of busi-
ness/political/sectarian interests on this sector
where all the major media outlets are owned by politi-
cal/sectarian groups. This overlap means that the role of
these outlets has become increasingly circumscribed by
the interests of these parties and that, as a result, they
act as a reflection of social structures rather than a pub-
lic arena for open debates over matters of public interest
or for holding public servants accountable. Legislative
reform would go a long way toward breaking the monopoly
of these groups over this sector.

In this regard, freedom of the press has also been cur-
tailed in the last three years by the assassination of two
well known journalists; Samir Kassir and Gebran Tueni
and assassination attempts against others. Attacks
against journalists perceived to be on the opposite politi-
cal side have also increased. Several journalists for
example were forced to flee their homes during the May
7th, 2008 civil conflict in Beirut and one TV station was
burnt and shut down. The regulatory legislation govern-
ing the media sector has also been applied selectively
with some outlets being sent to court for specific infrac-
tions but not others.

Similarly, censorship over artistic activity by the inter-


distribution of books and magazines with anti-regime
content, or ban artistic events and plays that are deemed
to harm religious feelings.104 Despite these attempts the
cultural scene is thriving with a wide panoply of literary,
artistic and poetic production. The myth of sectarian plu-
ralism and a nation representing a universal message of
humanity have also pervaded Lebanese literary writings
since the 19th century. Lebanon’s position as the Arab
region’s capital for translation has been also enhanced this
ability to play a trans-cultural role, a conduit between
cultures and civilizations. Even though a quasi-archival
literary culture that revered in its parochialism developed
during the period of the civil war, it still refrained from
delving into the sectarian overtones of the ongoing con-
lict. The post-war period however has seen an eruption
of post-modern artistic practices that use a wide range
of artistic techniques to open Lebanon’s contemporary
history and with it the history of its recent conflict to
questioning. Recent attempts by the Internal Security
apparatus to censor such practices were blocked by the
Minister of Culture at the time, Tarek Mitri.

Sectarian interests have also spilled over into the writing
of history and have undermined the right of Lebanese
youth to an adequate and equitable education whilst
reinforcing existing societal and communal divisions.
Continued disagreement over a revised and “unified”
history book has meant that schools have resorted
to supplementing the currently sanctioned history

104 For example, university professor Adonis ‘Akra, was prevented
from signing his book of memoirs of prison; the publisher, Dar al-
Tali’a, was ordered shut. See www.amnesty.org/report2004/lbn-
summary-ara. In addition, the musician Marcel Khalifeh was pros-
ecuted for signing the verse “I am Youssef, My Father” by
Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, then cleared by a Beirut judge
on December 14, 1999. The films The Da Vinci Code and Jesus of
Nazareth were also banned.
curriculum, which dates back to the 1970s, and thus leaves untouched some thirty-five years of contemporary history, with alternative histories. As a result, various studies, including the Education and Citizenship Survey conducted by the National Human Development Report (NHDR), show a fundamental disagreement in political culture among Lebanese youth around ancestors (good or bad historical figures) and Lebanon’s geopolitical context (including which countries are to be considered its friends or enemies). These absences lay national history text (including which countries are to be considered its or bad historical figures) and Lebanon’s geopolitical culture among Lebanese youth around ancestors (good and critical skills to make informed opinions, popular stereotypes that have permeated students’ immediate environment are reinforced, as are differences in what children are taught about nation, identity, and civic values at various schools.

Sectarian interests have spilled over into the writing of history

Consequently, and even though some progress has been made in different arenas, serious deficiencies continue to plague the ability of citizens to hold state representatives accountable. These deficiencies have also manifested themselves in other spheres of public life and have further accentuated political and social instability among citizens.

One of those spheres is civil society. Citizenship is not simply about the role of the state in ensuring citizen rights. It is also about the partnerships and the initiatives that citizens undertake to improve their lives and the lives of those around them. These may be initiated as individual initiatives, as an effort undertaken by a particular non-governmental organization or by leaders in the private sector. All those actors are considered as members of civil society.

Lebanon boasts a large network of civil society organizations classified as non-governmental organizations and also include political parties, business and family based associations or religious organizations. More than two thirds of those organizations are considered general NGOs that offer a wide range of services. At the same time, family associations seem to be more numerous in the Mohafazat of the South, Nabatiyeh and Mount Lebanon (15 percent, 16 percent and 12 percent respectively); the same areas where a larger percentage of religious organizations are also based. Further analysis indicates that on a national level close to 21 percent of NGOs have a self declared religious affiliation. The highest percentage are in Mount Lebanon and Nabatiyeh (25 percent each) followed by the Bekaa (21 percent), the South (18 percent), the North (15 percent) and Beirut (18 percent), (see indicators section for the sectarian breakdown of those NGOs).

Despite the differences between these types of organizations, along with the private sector, they have played and continue to play a considerable role in addressing some of the adverse outcomes of the security and economic crisis. Civil society organizations do so as part of their daily mandates, businesses in the private sector undertake such activity as part of specialized programs and often in partnership with local or international NGO’s, while individual initiatives are carried out on ad hoc basis. The variety of services that these organizations offer ranges from the artistic and cultural to socio-economic development and advocacy work. Even though impossible to quantify in terms of scope, outreach and efficacy the impact that some of these organizations are having on the ground is evident. The NHDR’s 101 stories to tell documented a fraction of these initiatives, many of which have also been included throughout the report.

Civil society organizations have played and continue to play an important role in alleviating some of the prevalent social and economic conditions

The Lebanese private sector has also demonstrated a strong commitment to addressing key issues that inhibit socio-economic development. Through various internal measures and external outreach, it is playing a vital role in enhancing economic development and in addressing some of the chronic problems facing different communities. In part this is evident in some of the

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106 Schools are still teaching books first published in 1968 (for secondary classes) and 1970 (for primary and intermediate classes), the latter produced in conjunction with decree number 14529, dated 23 May 1970. Official government exams are for ninth graders and the Lebanese Baccalaureate are based on these books.

107 MOSA, June 2008, Evaluation of the Non-Governmental Organisations National Survey: A Community Development Project of the Council of Reconstruction and Development (Draft report) prepared by Karin Seyfert based on field work implemented by Etudes et Consultations Economiques (ECE) in association with PADECO Co. Ltd.
initiatives that key members of the business community have undertaken to address perceived needs. Among others, these include efforts to support innovative development and entrepreneurship skills among the Lebanese youth in particular partnerships with a variety of NGOs to rehabilitate and beautify postwar Beirut; efforts to address regional disparities in literacy and access to IT, a media program to generate national and communal solidarity and help those in need, and a variety of projects for environmental sustainability as well as small grants programs to small-scale entrepreneurs in various regions. In 2006 the private sector was quick to get involved through the Adopt a Bridge scheme that insured the reconstruction of what was damaged by Israel.

"The Lebanese private sector has also demonstrated a strong commitment to addressing key issues that inhibit socio-economic development"

Despite this range of activities and growing practice of philanthropy and corporate social responsibility, pro-development activities are still viewed by the private sector mainly as voluntary or 'add-on' activities rather than a tool with which they can advocate for long term development of the country and thus of their own businesses. Many of these efforts have yet to move beyond voluntary philanthropic contributions to become structured community investments with proactive management. As a result, these efforts remain scattered and fragmented, with limited investments in partnership toward development.

Collectively, it is difficult to assess the reach and impact of these initiatives on development for a variety of reasons. First, given the fragmented nature of these initiatives, it is complicated to estimate the exact dollar figure of what is being spent by these organizations and assess their outcomes. Second, no monitoring and evaluation scheme exists that can assess the effectiveness of these interventions, and whether they reached their target populations and stated aims. Third and most importantly, in the absence of a larger framework for development, many initiatives end up duplicating each other.

Finally, the efforts by members of civil society, whether individuals or CSOs have also been impacted by the intersection of sectarian/political interests with clientelism and at times regional and global political struggles. In turn this has often subordinated the civil to the communal and political in many arenas. While some CSOs are directly connected to sectarian based political parties and form the social arm of these parties, others played a large role in the democratization of public life in the early 1990s and the acquisition of various political and civil rights, such as the right to monitor parliamentary elections, or the re-establishment of municipal elections after a 36 year hiatus. This period also saw the launch of associations that were largely independent of sectarian political structures and, given the professional background of many participants, did not seek the approval of sectarian leaders to advance their demands. These campaigns focused on civic rights and exhibited new ways of organizing civil action. As such they attracted varying levels of media coverage and support from diverse groups. However, despite their accomplishments, many were unable to withstand the rise of sectarian polarization at the end of the 1990s and have since been considerably weakened particularly on issues of national interest. Although, as the 101 stories to tell project indicates, many such organizations are still actively trying to address local issues or perceived gaps in daily lives, overall they seem to have resigned from broad based organization over political issues that may serve to deepen democratic processes in the country. The meager attendance to events organized by civil society activists in protest of renewed conflict is but one example.

This intersection between sectarian, political and clientelist interests has also undermined the role of professional syndicates as engines for social and economic reform. Historically, professional syndicates have played a significant role in the development of the country. Duiring the 1960’s and 1970’s reform attempts of state institutions and systems of governance were in part taken as a result of pressure from labor unions and different syndicates. Widespread movements by civic and social organizations, particularly among laborers, agricultural workers and students prompted government reconsideration of a large array of policies. In other words, social gains were in part the result of class-based social movements as they were of sectarian or elite-based struggles. In the postwar period syndicates became increasingly politicized and their role as agents of change has diminished considerably. Electoral campaigns are focused on political positioning rather than reform programs addressing the needs of their membership. Given the nature of Lebanese society and the makeup of its political parties as described in Chapter Three, this politicization carries overt sectarian overtones. The extent of their paralysis is evident in the ways in which demonstrations by the General Labor Union on socio-economic issues become fodder for

political bickering between the different political parties. These have sometimes disintegrated into civil conflict; the most recent of which are the events of last May that brought the country to the verge of civil war again.

“The intersection of sectarian/political interests with clientelism and at times regional and global political struggles has subordinated the civil to the communal and political.”

In this regard, and despite this critical role played by civil society in increasing democratization they are also plagued by many of the same problems that affect society at large, including sectarianism and nepotism. In this regard, and as in other contexts, civil society is not an autonomous agent separate from existing social constructs and networks in Lebanon. Rather it remains just as embedded as the latter in the social and political power structures that make up the country. Evidence indicates that it is only when civil society groups have been able to bypass their primal identities as members of religious communities that they have been able to make a difference on a national scale. In other words, in many ways it is the embeddedness of social actors and members of civil society organizations in the very societal structures that many of them are seeking to change that has reduced the power of these groups.
3

ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS OF CITIZENS
In this overall framework, the question is where do the Lebanese stand on issues related to their civic status and to the question of national identity and what impact does this have on the vision they have for their country. Despite advances made on the political, social and cultural aspects of citizenship, Lebanon remains in crisis in part due to regional and global power struggles, military conflicts and, more recently, widespread economic crisis, which is itself in part due to precarious internal conditions such as those mentioned above. Polls also indicate that Lebanese citizens across the board are concerned about the future of their country. This has hindered progress toward democratic citizenship and economic, social, and political development.

Various surveys and polls conducted by different agencies indicate that the Lebanese are, at best, confused about the status of citizenship rights and are torn between wanting a civic state and considering the current sectarian system necessary to maintain national unity and guarantee the rights of minorities. For example, an survey conducted in 2004 by faculty at the Université St. Joseph (USJ) found that around 45.5 percent of Lebanese believe that confessionalism directly contradicts national unity and another 42.3 percent believe that it contributes to this unity. These figures differ considerably from one sect to another. However, when the question is applied to Lebanon as a whole, the percentage of those who believe that confessionalism is in direct contradiction to national unity rises to 63.3 percent while 25.4 percent considered that it contributes positively and another 11 per cent abstained from responding. Within communities, the percentage of those who consider confessionalism contradicts national unity is also high.109 However, these results are belied by answers to other questions related to civic status laws in the same survey. More than two thirds of Lebanese believe in the right not to be subjected to the power of confessional authorities. Yet only half of those asked expressed support for a civic status law, while 11.7 percent did not respond. The wide popular support for civic status laws is no surprise given that the 1998 campaign on this issue garnered close to 50,000 signatures from citizens and the support of around seventy-five organizations. It is still not clear how far the Lebanese will go in their demands for such a law. (Table 16)

Another study conducted by Theodore Hanf in 2006 to explore the attitudes of Lebanese towards a variety of issues related to identity and the state support these findings. Results indicate that despite an increasing acceptance of the enforcement of the 1936 law that establishes a secular community that one can opt into, enjoying the same rights as other religious communities, an equal percentage believe that the current sectarian structure is one that can neither be bypassed nor overcome. This latter figure is interesting in itself, since it indicates the first instance of clear majority support for this policy since 1987. To a certain extent, these results indicate tendencies among Lebanese, who, on the one hand, are at best confused about the status of citizenship rights and are torn between wanting a civic state and considering the current sectarian system necessary to maintain national unity and guarantee the rights of minorities.

### Table 15: Sectarianism and national unity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Druze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sectarianism contradicts national unity in Lebanon</td>
<td>66.42</td>
<td>60.66</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectarianism contributes to national unity in Lebanon</td>
<td>25.87</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>13.62</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jean Mourad, 2006, p.18 - Note: Given the dramatic political crisis that has plagued Lebanon since the survey was conducted and the current political polarization in the country these figures may have changed.

hand, would like a modern, functioning, and sectarian state and, on the other, accept the reality of the sectarian structure in Lebanon.

Results of this same study also indicate that the largest portion of respondents supported a division between state and religion. However, the percentage of those requesting this separation seems to have decreased from an overwhelming 93 percent in 1987 during the civil war to 79 per cent in 2006. This decrease corresponds to the increase of respondents who believe that the system is flawed and cannot be dealt with. (Table 17 and 18)

Table 16: Attitudes toward a civic status law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right to adopt a civic status law (National)</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Druze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to adopt a civic status law (by Religious Community)</td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Druze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>19.47</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>23.26</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>11.34</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid

Table 17: Attitudes toward religion and politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;One should not mix religion and politics.&quot;</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The best solution to Lebanon’s present dilemma is a completely secular state and society.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Every Lebanese should have the right to join a secularized community that has the same rights as the other communities - personal status law, political representation, etc.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;It doesn’t matter what anyone wants, secularization doesn’t seem to have a chance in Lebanon. Community membership is a reality you have to accept.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 18: Attitudes toward sectarianism and the political system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The system has been flawed from its inception because it institutionalises the separation of the various communities. For this reason it should be replaced by a system more appropriate for a country aspiring to modernity.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Lebanese have reached a level of maturity that helps them get past sectarian isolation. And we will be able to build a new political system in the near future.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Come what may, our communities are rooted in society and are not going to disappear. In the long run their power and resilience will stand in the way of important changes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Considering the reality of Lebanese society, this system is acceptable, and if correctly applied, it can work.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Perhaps it doesn’t look like it, but it is possible that the political system can be changed in the near future.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The strength of the different communities makes fundamental long-term change in the political system impossible.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid.
Similarly, the attitudes of the Lebanese toward democracy are ambiguous at best. In 2006, close to 70 percent of Lebanese polled seemed to accept the particular form of consociational democracy (power sharing) that characterizes Lebanon. At the same time, more than 50 percent also accepted a majoritarian system of governance while another third considered the one party system adequate. Responses to other statements, however, indicate that a large portion of those polled advocate a power sharing system for reasons other than conviction. As Hanf states “...the Lebanese are in favor of a system of democratic power-sharing because they do not see any alternative. A majority are democrats by conviction, and a larger majority by necessity.”111

“A majority of the Lebanese are democrats by conviction, and a larger majority by necessity”

This confusion with regard to democracy coupled with the ongoing political and economic crisis has also undermined the belief common among many Lebanese in the superiority of a free-market system and in the wisdom of laissez-faire policies. Naturally, this also influences people’s choice of government. In a question asking respondents whether they would prefer, “an honest and clean government that rules with a firm hand” or “a government that is perhaps a bit corrupt but respects civil freedoms?” an overwhelming 85 percent favored an honest and clean government that ruled with a firm hand, up from two thirds who favored the same in 2002. Only 15 percent want more freedom even if a degree of corruption is its inevitable accompaniment.112

These findings are confirmed in another more recent poll conducted by the Lebanese Opinion Advisory Committee (LOAC) which indicates a rise in support for the equal representation of Muslims and Christians in parliament as mandated by the Taif agreement. In tandem, the number of individuals who do not support this arrangement and believe in a non-confessional parliament, also as required by the Taif constitution, has dropped almost by half in 2007 to rise again in 2008. Support for the distribution of parliamentary seats based on proportional representation of each confession, however, has remained steady.113 These results can perhaps be explained by the rise in sectarian tensions and skirmishes in the aftermath of the July 2006 war on Lebanon and the opposition sit-in. These results also indicate the extent to which attitudes toward democracy in Lebanon, as in other parts of the world, are driven by political events. Lebanon’s political and military turbulence of the past three years has played a particularly big role.

These positions are also largely reflected in the attitudes of Lebanese youth toward citizenship, democracy, inter-communal coexistence, and the culture of law.114 The survey, undertaken by the NHDR in partnership with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, to assess the knowledge, attitudes, and concepts of students with regard to citizenship and democracy, found that the grasp of Lebanese students of the three concepts of citizenship covered in the study, namely democracy, good citizenship, and state responsibilities, was uneven. They indicated that students seemed to be responding in an academic manner perhaps either due to their desire to say answer correctly or to their limited experience in democratic decision-making, or perhaps to the high degree of polarization in the country.

National sentiment among Lebanese students is very strong, with a powerful penchant toward protectionism and sovereignty. There is no consensus, however, among youth on political options that may be described as national or common.

“National sentiment among Lebanese students is very strong, with a powerful penchant toward protectionism and sovereignty”

A question on Lebanon’s most important historic leader produced ambiguous results at best. Only one figure, Emir Fakhreddine, had any direct historic connection to Lebanon and was named by around 6.5 percent of the students. Around 34 percent of students named too many figures to be classified in one particular category and another 35 percent did not name anyone. The vagueness of the preferred historical leader suggests that the powerful national sentiment evidenced in their responses owes more to a desire to glorify the nation than to civic culture. A similar ambiguity was evidenced in student responses to questions asking them to identify countries considered friends or foes of Lebanon.

On the social front, the tendency to favor social cohesion and the preservation of the current sectarian political system ranges from moderate to strong among

112 Ibid.
114 UNDP, MEHE, CDR, 2008, ibid.
Table 19: Attitudes of Lebanese youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Don’t agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1b: Candidacy and voting in parliamentary elections should be based on support of/clergymen</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2b: When I can vote, we – my family and I – should vote for the same candidate</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3b: Each sect should educate its own and provide scholarships for them</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4b: Ministries and civil sector posts should be equally distributed among the zaims</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5b: The State’s top three posts should go to the leaders of the three main sects</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lebanese youth. More than a third of students agree that elections and voting should be condoned by religious leaders while around a quarter believe that voting in elections should take place based on overall family preferences. Furthermore, almost two thirds (64 percent) of the student population believe that each religious sect should educate its own ‘followers’ and should provide educational grants for them. This reflects the current strength of religious leaders as the place of first rather than the last resort for the provision of services as well as for guidance on political choices across all sects. In the same vein more than 75 percent of the surveyed students agreed that ministries and positions in government should be distributed between political leaders equally while more than half agreed that the three top positions in government should be distributed among the three main religious sects. These responses indicate not only an understanding of the state as an arena where spoils are subdivided among the religious sects and their leaders and thus an acceptance of the current status quo but also points to an alarming endorsement of this status quo by the youth of today based on criteria that have nothing to do with merit.

Finally, the study makes clear that Lebanese youth derive their political positions for the most part from immediate family contexts and not from a larger network of peers. It also indicates that their positions on issues of public interest are gleaned from their home environments and that schools in general are basically the place to study and master the requisite responses to pass their exams. In addition to their poor exposure to different media outlets, this situation reinforces their tendency toward uncritical engagement in politics.

The tendency to favor social cohesion and the preservation of the current sectarian political system ranges from moderate to strong sometimes sanctioned by those elected to condone it, and of students’ inconsistent expectations of themselves and others.

On the culture of law there also seems to be some confusion. Responses indicated that while students seem to expect others to respect the law, their criticism of violations of the law are quite limited. In other words, violations of the law do not solicit strong adverse reactions from students and seem to be at least partially endorsed by them, reflecting perhaps a confused understanding of legal sanctions. This is also a possible reflection of political conditions in Lebanon today, where breaking the law is
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TOWARD A CITIZEN'S STATE
Moving toward a citizen’s democracy requires concerted efforts on several fronts. This section will review the broad principles necessary for this move in Lebanon and make a series of short and medium term policy recommendations fundamental to this process.

These recommendations is that they are the outcome of three converging factors; a specific understanding of citizenship in relation to democracy that goes beyond rights and responsibilities; analysis of the particular context of Lebanon and empirical findings. The question to be asking is what mix of policies will strengthen democratic traditions, insure equity and fortify Lebanon’s dynamic market, lead to widespread economic and social security, and encourage entrepreneurial innovation and upward mobility, while insuring long lasting peace and stability. Some of these recommendations are also necessary to strengthen the allegiance of citizens to their state and to each other as citizens.

The principle idea that governs these recommendations is that achieving a citizen’s state requires a change in values and a change in policy. In other words, achieving a citizen’s state will require government action as well as cultural transformation. The protection of ethnic and religious identities and of minorities in a country with eighteen different religious communities can only take place by insuring irreversible equity among all citizens. At the same time, instating the different policy changes and reforms needed also requires a new social contract between the state, the private sector, and civil society. From this perspective these recommendations will focus on three main principles:

- Restoring relevance to political debate;
- Establishing irreversible equity among citizens;
- Promoting democratic cultural practices. They should be considered as a package deal and not as piece-meal efforts at reform.

4.1 BRINGING MEANING BACK TO POLITICAL DEBATE

The report argues that the first step in the transition toward a citizen’s state in Lebanon should be to restore content and relevance to politics at all levels. Political discussion in Lebanon has become increasingly limited to negotiations between representatives of the different sectarian communities and the public good is defined primarily as the maintenance of balance between the projected interests of the different communities without regard for efficiency, long-term sustainability, or development imperatives. In this context, the interests of citizens as part of a communal grouping have replaced their interests as individual members of a larger national polity. This has made it increasingly hard for independent individual and collective voices to be heard.

To restore content to politics beyond these narrow confines, a discussion of what it means to be a citizen in Lebanon needs to take place. Such a discussion will by necessity begin from the question of what type of nation does Lebanese society aspire to and what sort of state should it thus have? In the process, it must focus on how to reform institutions to make them more effective, equitable, and transparent and how to promote responsible political parties and practices. This would also include parliamentary reform as well as electoral reform.

“...The NHDR calls for a wide reaching and honest debate on the role of the state and the ways in which it can reflect the vision of the nation to which the Lebanese aspire...”

A. Vision for Lebanon and Role of the State

A key issue in this process is the legitimacy and role of the state. Without the capacity to guarantee the rights of citizenship, sustainable development and democracy cannot be maintained. In this regard, Lebanon needs to move beyond the framework of electoral democracy, which, despite its importance, is not enough. This report therefore calls for a wide reaching and honest debate not only on the role of the state, but on the ways in which it can respond to the nation to which the Lebanese aspire. Such a debate would have to tackle the place and role of Lebanon’s confessional communities, the economy, social development, and cultural pluralism.
This debate on the vision for Lebanon needs to respond to the question of what makes Lebanon a nation and how it can achieve a balance between the rights of individual citizens and those of sectarian communities, or more broadly between the demands of citizenship and sectarian pluralism. In such a context, sectarianism is a form of political ideology that is only possible within the state and not outside of it. The political role of sectarianism is its most important role and the one that allows its reproduction at different levels of society and in other arenas.

"Sectarianism is a form of political ideology that is only possible within the state and not outside of it."

In a sense the Taif Accords tried to respond to this issue and reconcile the two philosophical traditions that have governed Lebanon regarding the relationship of communities to the state; the first a form of pluralism that advocates consensus between the major confessional groups (consociational democracy) and the second a universalism that supports the rights of individuals as individuals and not as members of a community. It included articles that guaranteed the rights of communities as well as the rights of individuals in the political process. These revisions of the Taif Accord were based on the premise that democratic citizenship rights are what make pluralism possible. However, the partial implementation of the Taif Accord, the contradictions among some of its articles, and political/sectarian interference in the process of institutional reform and in the justice system have all undermined civic state building in the last eighteen years.

What has become clear is that even though the Lebanese agree that the country is suffering from a severe political and national crisis they do not agree on the means to emerge from this crisis. In this respect there are two main tendencies:

"The Taif Accords tried to reconcile the two philosophical traditions that have governed Lebanon regarding the relationship of communities to the state."

A constitutional-legal-civic approach that believes institution building and equity among citizens are the only way out of this crisis. Lebanon’s true role here is as an emblem of inter-religious coexistence and tolerance. Only through de-confessionalizing the system can Lebanon live up to this role.

A sectarian-pact approach that believe the National Pact between the main religious groups as the guarantee for peaceful coexistence among communities and as such the best entry point from which to address the ongoing Lebanese crisis. Here the rights of individuals are assumed to be the same as those of their religious communities. In other words, for advocates of this position, ignoring the sectarian reality of Lebanon is a jump into the unknown.

Of note is that these positions do not correspond to the political divisions in the country as proponents of both positions cross over the current political divide. At the same time, advocates of the first position are considerably weaker politically and are unable to force a political discourse that can identify ways out of this crisis and the means to implement them.

"Differ at positions on the best approach to address this relationship do not correspond to the current political divide in the country."

From this perspective, this national debate also needs to address the specific characteristics of consociational democracy in Lebanon. As practiced in Lebanon today, consociational democracy has become a tool that contradicts fundamental tenants of democracy such as transparency and promotion of public over private good. It establishes a ruling cartel that could potentially increase the risk of greater societal conflict through its neglect of social and economic issues vital to the everyday lives of individuals. In this the Lebanese experience is similar to that of Venezuela and Austria where political participation effectively became the political distribution of state institutions among key groups.

"As practiced in Lebanon today, consociational democracy has become a tool that contradicts the fundamental tenants of democracy."

This debate also needs to address the ways in which the state can effectively guarantee the security of all its citizens, insure a functioning legal system, settle conflicts in accordance with democratic rules, and establish macroeconomic balance whilst strengthening social security and development options for its citizens based on the principle of universality. From this perspective, it also needs to include a discussion of the economic options that exist for Lebanon and on which the social rights of citizenship depend. The report contends that there are different ways to guarantee social citizenship rights in keeping with a mixed market economy model. This debate, however, must be at the center of public discussion and not limited to technical circles.

115 Ibid.
This leads us to the fundamental question of whether the Lebanese can achieve consensus between citizenship (as equal rights, obligations, and opportunities) and political sectarianism or between their civic and political identity and their societal or communal/sectarian identity. In other words, can they live together as both equal and different?

The debate also needs to address the ways in which the state can effectively guarantee the security of all its citizens.

Responding to this question and thus identifying a vision for Lebanon that moves toward a citizen’s state presupposes a more basic discussion of a series of interconnected questions that have had and will have a determining impact on any vision for Lebanon and on the role of its state and citizens. Among these are:

- Is Lebanese society composed of individuals with no consideration for communities or communities with no consideration for individuals? Or is it a social construct seeking to establish different ways of being that do not necessarily eliminate each other?
- Should state/citizen relations be governed by the constitution or by the national pact? Or should it be governed by both in such a way that the constitution frames the relationship of the state to individuals and the National Pact to communities? What are the lessons to be learnt from the civil war and more recent civil conflict?
- In this regard, what are the determinants of democracy in Lebanon? To what extent are political practices common to the country since independence effective in sustaining democracy in Lebanon? If Lebanon is to adhere to the current consociational model, then what are the pitfalls that need to be addressed?
- What is the role of the state in this context? The state, as outlined in Chapter One of this report is both the outcome of societal struggles (be they economic, religious, or other) and the site of that struggle and negotiation. In such a context, is the state a tool in the distribution of power among confessions, as is the case today, and thus unconcerned with citizens as individuals? Or should the state be focused on the rights and obligations of its citizens irrespective of their multiple identities. The rights of communities in this latter perspective are limited to a freedom of existence and expression that is binding for both state and religious communities.
- What are the specific social and economic rights associated with each of these choices? Who controls the instruments of force and monopolizes the means of violence?

What role is Lebanon to play in the region? Is Lebanon to be the bridge between differing groups? Is it to offer a message of peaceful coexistence? Is it to work on bridging differences among others? Or is it to be the stage upon which regional conflicts are played out? What is the role of the state in this process and what are the roles of the different communities and political parties?

B. Political Culture

An informed public is a key constituent of democratic systems. Citizens play a critical role in overseeing the action of their state and holding their public officials accountable. In Lebanon, and despite the high levels of societal politicization, political culture is considerably weak. In this regard, a concerted and sustained effort is necessary for the enhancement of political culture in Lebanon around key themes generally accepted as fundamental to the Lebanese polity.

An informed public is a key constituent of democratic system

These include the constitution, particularly the preamble and its commitment to the International Declaration of Human Rights, the First Ministerial Declaration which, as discussed in Chapter One is different from the National Pact and the Taif Accord.

Strengthening political culture can take place on several fronts, including education, the parliament, civil society, and the media.

- Education: The Ministry of Education and Higher Education can integrate these issues into educational curricula (civic education, history) in a systematic and comprehensive manner.
- Parliament: The Lebanese parliament can work toward the creation of an institution whose role is to enhance and improve political culture among the public and political elite. The role of such an institution would be to act as a conduit for partnership with civil society, to provide policy direction and research on democratic governance in Lebanon to parliamentarians, and to publicize the work of parliament to the public at large.
- Civil Society: Civil society organizations (NGOs, political parties, syndicates, and so on) can play an active role in spreading these principles across all sectors of society. This can take place through:
  - Organization of local grass root workshops on democratic governance and the meanings of
citizenship. By necessity these would include discussions of the rights and obligations of citizenship and the role of citizens in a democratic context.

- Partnerships with advertising agencies and different media outlets to promote the main articles of these texts and make them available to as wide a public as possible.
- Partnerships with parliamentarians and other stakeholders to enhance civic oversight over state performance in the areas of human rights. The aim would be to build partnerships between parliamentarians and international and national organizations working on human rights issues. Specific indicators that would measure performance on these issues could be established. These would also help ingrain international human rights and democratic standards into everyday practices.

### 4.2 ESTABLISHING IRREVERSIBLE EQUITY

Clearly, a debate on the vision for Lebanon will impact the role of the state in all sectors. The establishment of irreversible equity among citizens is a cornerstone of this agenda without which the country cannot move forward. This means that state/citizen relations need to be redefined on the basis of equity, justice, and sustainability, which in turn requires a reformed constitutional/legislative framework. This would include a civil personal status law, an electoral law that allows non-sectarian representation, and a focus on quality rather than access in social and economic reform. All of these policy recommendations are based on the current constitutional rights guaranteed to Lebanese citizens. They are geared toward the empowerment of citizens and giving them greater control over their own lives and insuring a direct relation to their state.

The establishment of irreversible equity among citizens is a cornerstone of this agenda without which the country cannot move forward.

### A. Political Rights and Public Office

The political rights of citizenship extend beyond the electoral process and encompass a range of other rights that include the right to fair and equal treatment and to accurate representation. As discussed in Chapter Three, the rampant spread of political sectarianism and clientelism has greatly impacted these rights. Restoring some balance to state-citizen relations requires a change in values and culture or a move from a logic of sectarian subdivision of state institutions to instituting guarantees for sects and minorities that they will not be discriminated against. To aid this process the following actions need to be taken:

- A new citizenship law should be created; one that grants expatriates the rights to Lebanese citizenship if they meet a collective set of criteria (such as having been born in Lebanon, having lived in Lebanon for a set number of years, having a permanent residence, and so forth). Under this new law, Lebanese women would also be granted the right to pass on their nationality to foreign-born spouses and children. In parallel, a revision of procedures granting large groups Lebanese citizenship in the early 1990s should be undertaken to make sure they meet with the new criteria. Following the passage of this law, a population census should be undertaken. It would be the first since 1932.

- Full implementation of the Taif Accord in particular the clause related to the establishment of a senate composed of religious leaders followed by a de-confessionalization of all public offices.

- Implementing the recently established criteria for the selection of public sector employees, which are based on professional merit. This process includes the vetting of applicants anonymously and through selection committees of qualified and non-partisan individuals. The selection process must be transparent and open to public scrutiny. The Council of Ministers should be required to implement the recommendations of the selection committee.

- Creation of a new law for political parties that encourages the establishment of inter-sectarian parties. Such a law should also subject these parties to close public scrutiny.

- Reinforcing the judicial system in ways that guarantee its independence and its oversight over executive power.

- Revision of the electoral laws is perhaps the most important of these reforms. The right to vote, to run for
public office, and to representation are inherent rights of citizenship. In Lebanon, as discussed in Chapter Three, these have been undermined by an unstable electoral law that has changed nine times in the thirteen elections since independence and by an insistence on applying a law that considers communal representation only. Furthermore, requiring citizens to vote from village of origin rather than place of residence undermines their ability to influence their immediate environments.

In parallel, the non-implementation of the Taif Accord in the form of establishing a senate of religious leaders as a first step to de-confessionalizing parliament has undermined the civic status of citizens and imprisoned them within predetermined units and identities. It is only by de-confessionalizing parliament that the non-sectarian considerations for the election of candidates will come into play and meaning will be restored to politics and the political process.

At this stage, such a revision entails the passing of the Botrous law, despite some of its shortcomings, as a package deal and not in a piecemeal manner. This should be considered a first step toward the full de-confessionalization of parliament. At the very least, the law’s proposed dual voting system insures that a little less than half the parliament is elected based on the principle of non-sectarian representation in the six historic districts of Lebanon, while the rest are elected through majoritarian voting based on the smaller regions.

**B. Personal Status Laws**

The 1990 Lebanese constitution redefined the role of the state to some degree in that it enshrined the state’s positive neutrality toward all religious communities while at the same time establishing the international declaration of human rights as a fundamental principle of Lebanese policy-making, thus recognizing the rights of individuals as individuals separate from their communities. However, the current organization of personal status laws relegates control of all personal and family matters to the eighteen officially recognized religious sects in Lebanon. This creates substantial inequity among citizens on a wide variety of matters including divorce, child custody, inheritance, and so forth. Crucially, it is also used as an argument for the continued denial of Lebanese women’s right to grant Lebanese citizenship to their non-Lebanese spouses or to children born to non-Lebanese fathers.

To achieve equity among citizens on this front and thus meet the standards required by the Lebanese constitution, the following legislative and judicial changes should be undertaken. Even though some of these proposals enjoy considerable support from a substantial part of the Lebanese population, implementing them will require considerable political will and consensus building efforts particularly among the different religious leaders.

“To achieve equity among citizens and thus meet the standards required by the Lebanese constitution, a series of legislative and judicial changes should be undertaken on civil and personal status laws.”

**CIVIC LAWS**

- Create a family court system that has legal jurisdiction over family matters including child custody and alimony as well as the power to protect women and minors in cases of domestic or child abuse. It would include social specialists and doctors amongst other human resources needed for it to function. In the process the minimum age for child custody should be increased and unified while alimony may be connected to an objective norm or standard such as the minimum wage.

- Implement an optional civic status law. Such a law would uphold the freedom of choice for Lebanese citizens whilst maintaining the integrity of the different religious communities. The need for such a law is evident in the considerable inequity among citizens in personal status matters and the increasing number of civil marriages that are taking place outside of Lebanon. From a legal perspective, the establishment of such a law is a necessary step to insure the coherence of the Lebanese legal system on family and personal matters. As it is right now, and to quote Judge John Kazzi, the Lebanese system “pits Lebanese judges against the world” as they find themselves forced to become experts in the legal systems where civil marriages are conducted. It is also paramount for the establishment of a common ground of civic action for Lebanese citizens and to undermine the hold of political sectarianism and its divisive and violent results over the country.

Such a law would also institute equity with regard to personal matters both between the genders and between individuals of different religious denominations. For women, this is critical since the current laws rob females of their independence by requiring a guardian, who is usually a male member of the family, with regard to specific issues. It undermines their relationship with their children.

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116 See Ahmad Beydoun, 1999, Nineteen Surviving Sects: The Lebanese and the Battle for Civil Marriage. See for details on the varied positions of the different religious leaders on the question of civil marriage.

include opportunity and quality, or what Sen calls the capability approach. It means expanding people’s capacities through investments in their health, education, and ability to manage risks.

Such an approach has dual implications. On the one hand, it necessitates a new social contract that would govern the relationship of the state, private sector, and employees. It also assumes that social policy cannot substitute for development. In Lebanon, this would need to occur on several parallel tracks that include rethinking social rights from three interrelated perspectives:

- **Equity and cohesion** of service standards that would include the integration of marginalized and vulnerable groups
- **Coordination and efficient targeting** of social delivery services that in turn improve social outcomes
- An integrated social development approach would need to maintain fiscal sustainability and avoid possible adverse effects such as high inflation and lower growth rates. Here there is a need to include pro-poor growth policies and partnerships with the private sector particularly with regards to higher education, vocational training, and employment and job creation issues.

With this in mind, the policy recommendations below also have the twin aims of 1) enhancing socio-economic equity among citizens and 2) reinforcing the direct relationship of the state to citizen, as well as improving transparent and democratic governance modalities. They rest on the assumption that the state’s role is to guarantee these rights, provide the regulatory environment for the different stakeholders and insure the implementation of all legislative decisions taken in that respect.

**C. Socio-Economic Citizenship Rights**

On the social front, investment in integrated social development is an investment in stability. This necessitates a new social contract between the state, the private sector, and employees. Investment in integrated social development is an investment in stability. This necessitates a new social contract between the state, the private sector, and employees.

At the same time, as a provider of some of these services, the performance of state institutions needs to be improved with the aim of achieving greater efficiency in the allocation of resources and in social outcomes. As such they include sectoral and inter sectoral recommendations. The purpose is to enhance the quality of public education, replace the various health insurance funds with one unified health care insurance system that covers the entire population, develop an efficient and equitable pension scheme and follow a national pro-poor
growth strategy. While these are not comprehensive, they create a roadmap of sorts for generating greater socio-economic equity among citizens and in the long run improving economic productivity.

However, prior to the implementation of sector specific strategies, loopholes at the macro level of decision-making, social service delivery, and implementation must also be taken into account. This includes some of the overlap between ministries in different areas of service provision and which has begun to be addressed through the Inter-Ministerial Social Action Plan committee. Further support to this committee should be extended to insure the full implementation of its proposed course of action. There is also a need for greater regulation and clearer partnership criteria between state agencies and NGOs. The basis on which NGOs are allocated funding is murky at best and even though many services provided by them are funded by the government, this is rarely evident in their outreach programs. In other words, they appear to be the direct service providers for services that are in reality government-based. Given that a large portion of those NGOs are affiliated with a political or religious entity, this process further undermines trust in state institutions whilst making these groups the natural conduit for access of citizens to their state. A project to regulate this relationship was undertaken by MoSA but has since been neglected.

C.1 The right to education

The right to education should be about opportunity as well as access. Improving the educational system can have a significant impact on building human capital, insuring an effective and well trained labor force and in the process decreasing poverty. The major challenge facing the Lebanese educational system is not access, which as discussed is guaranteed by the Lebanese constitution but quality, particularly of the public school system. In what follows are a series of policy proposals that aim to strengthen the regulatory role of the state, improve the efficiency of the current system as well as its effectiveness so as to foster civic attitudes and values among students, strengthen state/citizen relations and improve access/opportunity. Some of these proposals may also be a catalyst for fostering a more tolerant society and help build a more lasting civil peace.

To be effective these proposals should be taken as a comprehensive package. Many build up or include proposals made by other stakeholders including the Educational Development Program (EDP) at the MEHE. In addition to basic education, these policy recommendations also address vocational training and higher education. The underlying principle is that school education should also prepare students to be responsible and active citizens of the future while vocational and university education should give them the tools needed to be productive.

Improving access as a basic right

- Insure the implementation of the free and compulsory primary education law and extend it to become a Universal Basic Education (UBE) for ages 6 to 15.
- Insure access of excluded groups, such as the disabled through educational grants or making schools access friendly. Special measures to address the needs of learning challenged children including school counselors and supplementary classes should be encouraged at the school level. Given the over staffing of the educational system a number of those teachers can be retrained to act in this capacity.

Enhancing opportunity: Improving the pedagogical environment

- Enhance the quality of education: develop a new curriculum based on analysis of Learning Achievement, build an Examination Management System, generate automated official exams based on a developed Question Bank System, introduce a drop-out prevention program, unify and standardize psycho-social assistance, and introduce a school rating system to monitor the quality of education.
- Improve effectiveness and competence of Public School Principals by ensuring that public school principals undertake a leadership development program. Provide additional training on participatory methods of decision making and on ways to increase the involvement of parent councils in schools.
- Promote the professional development of teachers through additional training. This includes training for civic education and other teachers on participatory rather than indoctrination teaching techniques. Such training should also include suggestions for teachers on how to create low budget extra curricular activities related to the curricula that enhance the civic values and social solidarity among students.
- Review the History and Civic Education Curricula to address the gaps identified in the Education and Citizenship Survey. Addressing gaps in the history curriculum is central to establishing a unified platform from which to discussion national issues while addressing identified gaps among other issues in the civic education curricula is instrumental for fostering communal coexistence, democratic participation and long term peace.
the case of the History curricula, such a history book could conceivably include alternate points of view of troubled periods in Lebanon’s contemporary history.

- Work with international and other civil society organizations to undertake extra curricular activities that encourage civic values and attitudes among citizens.

- Establishment of an Education and Citizenship Observatory to monitor the impact of education on civic values, generate requisite studies on the matter and provide policy recommendations for necessary change. The observatory would also conduct a communication and outreach program to sensitize the public on the importance of these issues.

- Interventions at the level of higher education to enhance opportunity should focus on reform of the Lebanese University which guarantees universal access to all Lebanese citizens at minimal costs. This university has been beset by a series of issues, many of which are stemming from political/sectarian interference in its operations and the clientelist networks they generate. These have undermined its position as a bastion of higher education and have badly impacted its administrative and pedagogical value. From this perspective, the autonomy of the university needs to be affirmed. Merging the different branches into 3 or 3 major campuses may be a first step in this direction and would allow the University to re-occupy its pre-war role as a space that brings together students of different political affiliations, sectarian backgrounds, and regional difference. Another step in enhancing student opportunity is to improve academics by encouraging research and quality publications. Raising promotion criteria for professors in terms of their research activities would also advance this goal. A third step would be to reconsider some of its academic programs in an effort to meet market demand. This will be elaborated upon further.

**C.2 The right to health**

Like education, reform of the health sector needs a change of focus. Stark differences in health outcomes between the regions and groups reflect disparities in access to information, facilities with reasonable standards and protection from risks. Such inequity in turn leads to vastly different opportunities in life. From this perspective, in addition to coverage and assistance, the right to health should be considered as a right to preventive rather than curative care. This would not only enhance the general health and longevity of the population but would also improve the efficiency and equity of the system. As such a revised health care sector should focus on expanded knowledge, access and financing of affordable care. This would entail the following:

- **Finalize the reform strategy** that strengthens the regulatory role of the state its capacity to implement all legislative decisions, defines the role of the different public and private stakeholders, monitors their performance and the financing of health services. National Health accounts should also be updated.

- **Review the current geographic mapping of hospitals and primary health care centers.** The aim is to avoid construction of new facilities in areas that are over served and directing donor investments towards primary health care. Such a mapping exercise would also allow decision makers to consider needs based on population size, geographic location and the optimal size of necessary hospitals in order to improve health and equity outcomes.

- To insure citizen access to adequate health care and reinforce the regulatory role of the state, the **accreditation program** proposed by the MoH should be implemented in full. This program emphasized a broader multidimensional approach that included managerial processes, and clinical outcomes. Based on a new interpretation of an existing legislation, the accreditation standards were developed using international standards with the aim of strengthening quality assurance.

- **Develop a unified health care insurance scheme** that is to be financed through tax reforms. Such a scheme should replace all existing schemes and cover resident populations in Lebanon. Based on a suitable management information system, such a proposal would harmonize costs, prices and quality of health services whilst insuring transparency of the system. This approach would also need to take into account ongoing studies for reform of the NSSF. These will include proposals for improving the administrative and technical efficiency as well as ensuring the NSSF’s financial sustainability.

- **Strengthen primary health care (PHC) facilities and expand their scope** by increasing their geographic distribution. This would also guarantee access of citizens in rural areas to immediate health care when needed whilst reducing the need for curative health care procedures and their associated costs. The current hospital accreditation system should also be expanded to PAC facilities. At the same time, the distribution of drugs/medicine in Primary Health Care Centers (most of which are contracted by NGOs) should also be regulated and free

118 In collaboration with the World Bank, the NSSF is undertaking a study entitled “Reforming the NSSF Health Insurance Branch: How to Provide High Quality Health Services in a Sustainable and Equitable Way”.
citizen access to these drugs insured.

- **Expand knowledge of health care** among the population at large through outreach programs, public information campaigns and partnerships with civil society organizations. Lack of knowledge leads to underinvestment in health care as well as payments for inappropriate health care. Community based health personnel can provide cost effective instruction in disease prevention and healthy behavior particularly to mothers.

### C.3 Beyond basic needs: The right to social integration

Social Citizenship rights, as outlined in chapter four extends beyond basic needs to include the right to social integration in its various dimensions of employment, and freedom from poverty and vulnerability.

**THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT**

As outlined in chapter four of the report, the right to employment and thus decent living is a fundamental citizenship right. Like many other countries around the world, access to labor markets- both formal and informal- determine economic opportunities for a large segment of the population. The functioning of this market, wages and employment conditions, deeply impacts the quality of life for workers and their families as well as equity across workers and between workers and employers. Imperfections in the labor markets can lead to inefficient and often unfair outcomes affecting economic growth and productivity.

Addressing the deficiencies in the right to employment and thus lead to significant equity gains and improve market outcomes requires public intervention in the labor market, that would take shape through the:

- **Instigation of a tripartite dialogue** between representatives of governments, employers and workers to jointly shape labor standards, policies and programs. The aim would be to address the current imbalances that limit regulations and standards to formal sector workers thus leaving a large segment of the labor force unprotected. By necessity such an approach requires a fundamental shift in values by making sure that the informal economy is regarded as a fundamental and complementary (some would even say entrepreneurial) part of the formal economy. The informal sector here includes different income groups and individuals who chose to be there voluntarily such as young professionals and others who are there by necessity such as seasonal agricultural workers.

In this regard, the goal of this commission would also be curb unemployment and facilitate citizen access to labor markets by addressing legislative bottlenecks that hinder employment for various categories of the population. The challenge here is to design programs that balance equity and efficiency. More critically, it requires a comprehensive a consistent and coherent policy package that may include macro-economic reforms and adjustments such as (1) improving the overall investment climate, (2) developing well-defined sectoral policies, and (3) reassessing fiscal and monetary policies.

- **Addressing the gap between supply and demand** in labor markets is also a key cornerstone in facilitating the right to employment for citizens. This implies addressing the shortcomings in vocational and technical education system and higher education curricula. Vocational training programs are key for the economic sustainability of many industries in the country. If implemented, the following measures can improve vocational training and in the process insure their effectiveness in meeting market demands. These include:

  - Rationalize Vocational and Technical Education (VTE) system by revising school distribution, upgrading curriculum, teaching methods, and learning assessment tools, and recruiting competent human resources based on VTE system needs.

  - Restructure VTE programs based on an assessment of current and future market demand and collaborate with business owners to redefine the VTE program framework credential levels and demands. Programs that have very low or no demand should be eliminated and new programs created that cater to new labor market demand based on new technologies. Additional retraining programs for specific sectors where new technologies are constantly developing (the printing houses sector for example) should also be implemented.

  - Develop a more market-oriented curricula at the Lebanese University by focusing on the introduction and development of more applied and technology-related majors and specializations. Liaising with private sector and key economic sector representatives in the process would aid in reorienting the necessary programs.

  - Establish an intermediary matchmaking entity between employers and employees. Several stakeholders such as associations and unions, the National Employment Office (NEO) and the Directorate General for Vocational and Training Education (DGVTE) can play such a role. The role of this entity is to insure that the labor force is being trained based on contemporary market need. It would also investments in new industries and by exten-
In such a context the first step to be taken is instigated. The creation of an unemployment fund is an integral part of social contracts, particularly in the context of heightened political uncertainty. This fund would build on existing background documents and legislation such as the background documents of the law for the creation of the National Social Security Office in the mid-1960s that explicitly raised the possibility of broadening the scope of this law to include an unemployment insurance branch. Unfortunately, several factors have delayed the implementation of this scheme (1) the outbreak of the civil war in the mid-1970s, (2) the huge economic and social costs resulting from the war, and the (3) different priorities set in the post-war reconstruction agenda.

Implementing an unemployment fund also requires an accurate and updated database, an institutional framework, and relevant human and administrative resources responsible for following-up, monitoring and assessing the impact of the goals of the unemployment fund. Conditions, regulations, eligibility criteria and sound financial regulations should be determined. It is also important to consider the successive phases and time frame required for the policy’s implementation with adequate time for concerned stakeholders (employers, employees, the Government, etc.) to prepare for its implementation.

FREEDOM FROM POVERTY

Addressing disparity, inequity, poverty and social integration through social protection and pro-poor policies are also central principles of socio-economic citizenship rights. Social protection policies present a crucial opportunity-enhancing role for the poor and vulnerable. They help families avoid hardship whilst expanding their opportunities and giving societies the ability to embark on the necessary reforms, especially ones intended to have beneficial impacts on the government’s fiscal position. Moreover, such social protection programs, if properly defined and implemented can eliminate the need for special compensatory programs each time reform is instigated.

In such a context the first step to be taken is the establishment of a long-term social development strategy that includes short and medium term goals with a related working plan to reduce poverty. These should complement ongoing efforts by the GoL to expand existing safety nets to vulnerable populations and create new ones. This strategy should involve all stakeholders including institutions (local and national), international and national organizations and NGOs, local communities and members of civil society and strengthen coordination among all these actors. It would also establish an efficient mechanism to measure poverty using both money metric indicators and the Unsatisfied Basic Needs approach on regular basis in order to be able to carefully assess the impact of economic and social policies and reforms (such as increase in VAT, reform of NSSF, increase in fuel prices, reform in social ministries etc.) on poverty and inequality. It should also include a communication and outreach program in partnership with various media outlets.

A key node in any socio-economic strategy that aims at greater equity in rights and in access is a pro-poor growth development strategy. This includes giving special priority and focus to the economic and fiscal policies that serve to reduce poverty and that ensure pro-poor economic interventions. This should include tax and wage reform plan especially since the minimum wage remains below the poverty line. It can also include support for small and medium enterprises (SME’s that dominate the Lebanese economy and generate the majority of employment opportunities in Lebanon. Such support may increase their access to financial resources, particularly female led enterprises, support the regularization of landownership in rural areas and facilitate the bureaucratic procedures associated with the formal registration of such enterprises.

In addition to poverty reduction and sectoral enhancement measures the aim of this strategy would also be to devise and implement a job creation policy focusing on empowering and enhancing productive sectors. This would follow the outcomes of the social dialogue on employment issues and reform of the vocational training curricula. Access to employment through community development programs is an important pillar in this process. It would:

- Devising a sound targeting mechanism that would ensure both geographic and population targeting. Such a mechanism would give priority to addressing regional disparity and the needs of identified vulnerable groups. In this context, special attention should be given to peripheral regions such as Akkar, Bint Jbeil, Ba’alabak, Hermel, and so on, and specific poverty pockets within these regions including urban poverty zones as well as specific vulnerable groups such as female heads of households, elderly, unskilled laborers, farmers, etc.
- Use public works programs where possible to support the working poor or the unemployed.
- Involve municipalities in the implementation of interventions. This would insure the sustainability and institutionalization of
these initiatives. In this regard, some capacity building for local municipalities will need to be carried out.

Managing life risks is also key to preventing individuals and families from falling into destitution. In this context, there is a need to accelerate the implementation of the new pension program law, whose aim is to replace the three existing funds.\textsuperscript{119} This program should also include mechanisms for the protection of low-income earners by proposing a better balance in their retirement schemes. Despite some drawbacks (see full report Chapters Four and Six) this scheme would shift the burden on the budget imposed by pension payments in the long run, extend social protection to workers currently not covered and promote equity among public and private sector workers in terms of income replacement. During the transition period some creative solutions could be proposed such as making the transfer to the new system optional or restricted to certain age brackets (usually young) or issuing bonds that mature upon the entitlement of the employee to retirement.

119 The private sector end-of-services indemnity, the Civil Servants Cooperative (CSC), and the Security Forces Fund are the current sources of retirement pensions.

4.3 DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTION OF CIVIC CULTURE

The move toward a citizen’s state is not possible without the promotion of a civic culture and expanding the realm of politics. This necessitates larger support for democratic processes within and among institutions (be they state or non-state) and a more concerted promotion of a civic culture. The aim is to put in motion a course of action that enhances democratic empowerment among citizens, allowing for greater participation and better balance between representation and governance in association with ongoing reform efforts.

“\textit{The move toward a citizen’s state is not possible without the promotion of a civic culture}”

First, whilst Lebanon boasts an active civil society, attested to by the larger number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and extensive civic initiatives that exist,\textsuperscript{120} there is still a considerable deficit in civic attitudes. This deficit is apparent in various aspects of social formations and thus requires action on several fronts. First, reform efforts must also be extended to civil society organizations. This can take place through strategies that aim at greater transparency and accountability within non-state institutions be they syndicates, NGOs, private sector entities, or political parties. These institutions are the key to the larger process of democratic and civic transformation and a pre-requisite for embedding a culture of democracy at all levels of society. In tandem, additional strategies to strengthen the relationship with state institutions should also be put in place.

Second, promoting civic culture requires sustained attention to the education of Lebanese children and youth, in terms of curricula, pedagogical approach, and general school environment. As the NHDR study on education and citizenship made evident, while students seem to understand what democracy and citizenship mean, such an understanding is not necessarily reflected in their current behavior or intended future participation. To address the lapses identified in the Education and Citizenship survey, the following actions need to be undertaken:

- Improving students’ Knowledge, Concepts, Attitudes, and Actions in the area of citizenship needs greater attention at the educational level. Contradictory answers in various areas and the mismatch between concepts, attitudes, and actions indicate that in various instances students, teachers, and school principals respond to certain questions in an academic manner (i.e., the way they think they should respond) whereas current or intended actions fall within a different sphere of their value system.

- The prevalence of social variables over educational variables, which may at the present time be attributed in part to the political tension in Lebanon, points to a general weakness of the educational system and in embedding civic knowledge and values among students. Addressing these weaknesses in the educational system requires a comprehensive review of the educational context and of the Civic Education curriculum. Such a review would also need to encourage students (as well as teachers and principals) to communicate their opinions with greater freedom and transparency and to provide them with the tools to express themselves without concern for what should be said.

- Of all the apparent educational variables, the educational environment (student activities, elections, etc.) seems to be extremely important for the development of

\textsuperscript{120} See UNDP, CDR, FES, 2009, \textit{101 Stories to Tell: Civic Initiatives in Public Life}, an NHDR publication, Beirut, Lebanon.
citizenship education among students. Specific efforts to cultivate these values need to be undertaken. Here teachers may be trained to develop extracurricular activities that address perceived gaps in the curricula or that engage students further in more abstract concepts.

Revision of the educational context should address both the legislative framework that guides teaching practices, the revision of the existing Civic Education and general school curricula, as well as teaching methods and training of teachers.

The creation of an Education and Citizenship observatory, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education should be pursued. The role of this observatory would be to conduct annual or bi-annual evaluations of progress in citizenship education and the promotion of civic values among Lebanese students.

Finally, a more concerted sponsorship of civic culture must include a national strategy for the promotion of arts and cultural activities, the practice of which is a right of all citizens. On the media front, access to knowledge is a fundamental right to citizenship, enshrined in the Lebanese constitution. At the same the media plays a critical role in the formation of public opinion. The following are some of the steps that may be taken to address shortcomings in the right of access to knowledge and in the development of an informed public.

Elimination of the distinction between the political and non-political press. This distinction opens the media to political manipulation, particularly given that there is no set interpretation of what “political” means.

Penalties for media outlets should be related to the nature of the accusation and not a general temporary closure of the outlet as is the case now. Journalists should also be given some legal protection when reporting on a story related to persons bearing diplomatic immunity.

Preparation of a law that supports investigative journalism with the aim of combating corruption and promoting greater transparency in public life.

Censorship by the internal security services of artistic and literary works should be cancelled. A new law should be drafted through a committee composed of members of civil society, particularly artists, writers, playwrites, Civic Education teachers and leading intellectuals whose role is to monitor the post-production impact of works of art based on clearly identified criteria. All decisions made by this committee should be considered temporary pending their revisions by the judicial system. In this regard, a special court for cultural and artistic work should be created, similar to the court specializing in printed media.