

**ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN LOGONE  
AND CHARI (FAR NORTH CAMEROON)**


**FINAL REPORT**

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## Localization map



## **Abbreviations and acronyms**

ALDEPA : Association Locale pour le Développement Participatif (Local Association for Participative Development)

BUCREP : Bureau Central de Recensement de la Population (Central Bureau for Population Census)

CALF : Centre d'Alphabétisation fonctionnelle (Functional Alphabetization Centre)

CDR : Comité Démocratique Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Democratic Committee)

CEOCA : Centre d'Ecoute, d'Orientation, de Conseil et d'Accompagnement

FAN : Forces Armées du Nord (Northern Armed Forces)

GUNT : Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition (Transitional National Union Government)

MNJTF: Multi-National Joint Task Force

RGPH: Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (General Census of Population and Housing)

## 1. Executive summary

UNDP is planning to contribute to the consolidation of peace in some Logone and Chari areas sharing borders with Chad and prone to extremism. Young people are the main targets of the activities to be undertaken. To this end, an assessment was made on the sources of conflict and extremism, local conflict resolution mechanisms and participation of youth and women in these mechanisms. Various data collection tools have been exploited based on targets. Literature review and the analysis of field surveys made it possible to arrive at four observations. First, the situation of the Logone and Chari is different from that of the other Far North localities affected by Boko Haram. Second, past and present conflicts are interwoven. Third, extremism is present there, but its motives are more related to identity and socioeconomic factors than religion. Fourthly, stability in the Logone and Chari is highly dependent on the social and political context in the neighboring Nigerian and Chadian territories and correlatively on the sustainability of the lacustrine and trans-boundary socioeconomic activities. Indeed, in the north of Kousseri, the area is relatively rich with economic opportunities. However, the rules of access and exploitation, as well as the framework for cross-border transactions, create tensions between communities, between young people and public officials in charge of trade regulation. By breaking mobility, Boko Haram has considerably reduced opportunities for young people. The difficulties of resettlement and idleness are sources of opportunistic adherence to the Islamist insurrection. This situation also leads to violent moods against the state, concerned with order and respect for norms. On a daily basis, inter-community relations remain marked by the stigma of inter-ethnic violence in the early 1990s. Extremism is primarily related to identity. It structures political, associative and corporatist affiliations. It influences business relations and Islamic doctrinal affiliations. Communitarianism is perceptible. The influence of religious debates in progress in Ndjamena is timidly felt. The majority Arabs know what it would cost them to appear Islamist. The other communities are mainly followers of traditionalist Islam. Traditional chiefdoms remain the preferred framework for solving social conflicts in rural areas. Administrative, security and judicial authorities are seized for major disputes. Young people and women are put aside from conflict management mechanisms. Children, on the other hand, grow older by copying their elders. They aim to carry out the same activities, but require more education and job training. However, one sees in them the premises of an identity consciousness. Recommendations were made to help prevent the resurgence of conflicts and extremism, and above all to prepare young people to resist the signs of radicalization in the future. These include the formalization of procedures, the archiving of treated cases and the capacity-building of the traditional mechanisms for conflict prevention, conciliation and counter-radicalization. The popularization of a theology of peaceful coexistence and alternative messages as well as supplying youth and women's associations with better tools in preventing conflicts and extremism are urgent in areas that are exposed to new ideas and transmigration of actors who disseminate them. More specifically, it is imperative to facilitate access of young people and women to skills training and income-generating activities, particularly in trade and agriculture. Capacity-building and small equipment grant to youth peace organizations could increase their ability to strengthen peaceful coexistence and preventing extremism.

## 2. Context and justification

The Logone and Chari Division is situated at the edge of the Far North Region of Cameroon. From the South to the North, it is made up of the following sub-divisions: Waza, Zina, Logone Birni, Kousseri, Goulfeï, Makary, Blangoua, Fotokol, Hile Alifa, and Darak. The division mainly hosts Choa Arabs, Kotoko, Musgum, and Kanuri and other communities who are rather few in number (Fulani, Massa, Haoussa). To the north, on the meadows of the lake, some foreign communities especially West-Africans settled to practice farming, fishing, and fish trade. As a result of the 1970s and 1980s drought, important waves of Nigerians, Malians, and Senegalese migrants had had socio-economic opportunities round this oasis in the heart of semi-arid regional space.

The water of the lake and the fisheries, pastoral and agricultural resources that it contains, or which flows from it, constitute the main factor of social stability in this zone surrounded by conflicts in neighboring countries. If the estimate of 30 million people benefiting from the Lake seems exaggerated<sup>1</sup>, it remains all the same that those who depend on the Lake are quite numerous. Compared to the rest of the Far North Region, the northern part of the Logone and Chari is therefore better off in natural resources and therefore less inclined to radicalization because of resources scarcity. This would involve more risks tied to the management of resources, particularly accessibility problems and exploitation conditions<sup>2</sup>.

This relativity of the socio-economic variable of extremism is valid only when it is taken in isolation, without correlating it with the environmental, sociopolitical or socio-religious circumstances, as shown in the link between the 1970-1980s Sahelian drought, the political or religious manipulation of vulnerabilities, and social crises in Chad and Nigeria<sup>3</sup>. Resources, identities and violence have often been intertwined in the history of the Chad basin. The struggle for the control of water ponds and grazing areas has often been a struggle for the preservation of a way of life without which pastoral communities are transformed rather quickly into formidable predators<sup>4</sup> or militants of extreme causes<sup>5</sup>. Even in the Chadian civil war, it was communities rather than ideologies that fought.

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<sup>1</sup> IRD, *Le développement du lac Tchad : situation actuelle et futurs possibles*, Editions de l'IRD, 2014.

<sup>2</sup> C. Seignobos, Boko Haram et le lac Tchad Extension ou sanctuarisation ?, *Afrique Contemporaine*, n° 255, 2015.

<sup>3</sup> C'est le cas des Mbororos fréquemment cités parmi les coupeurs de routes et les preneurs d'otages.

<sup>4</sup> Le mouvement islamiste Maitatsine qui a ensanglanté des grandes villes du Nord Nigeria dans les années 1980 a massivement recruté parmi les victimes des sécheresses qui sont allés grossir les rangs des nécessiteux urbains.

<sup>5</sup> Entretiens et sources sécuritaires.

The areas affected by Boko Haram belonged to an integrated geo-economic, geo-cultural and geopolitical area. If all socio-economic indicators are bad in the southern part of Chad basin, it is also worthy of note that many sources of money were available. Boko Haram exploited these sources of money (fishing, trade, trafficking, etc.)<sup>6</sup>.

Reliable data on the enrolment of youths from the Logone and Chari are not available. It is however admitted that Kousseri played a key role in the transit of weapons, the move of militants and money, Boko Haram intelligence and recruitments.<sup>7</sup> The leader of Boko Haram in Ndjamena and organizer of the suicide bombings in 2015, stayed in Kousseri for some time.<sup>8</sup> During interviews, it appears that some people joined with whole family, while others carried logistical and basic needs such as fuel, food. Others seem to have joined as fighters, especially further north. But it appears that the level of enrolment is far higher in Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga Divisions.

Logone and Chari is inhabited by the Kotoko, traditionally fishermen who are the most ancient settlers, Choa Arabs who are most in number<sup>9</sup> and practice semi-nomadic breeding and urban trade, Kanouri practicing mainly trade, Mousgoum and Massa Fisheries. They all practice farming. The population of the Division is estimated at 624,000, of which 365,100 affected by the Boko Haram crisis (58% of the workforce), 117,200 displaced in April 2016, 96,100 IDPs as a result of the conflict, 14,200 IDP victims of flooding, 6,900 out-of-camps refugees, 221,900 members of host communities and 26,000 returnees.<sup>10</sup> The demographic structure of the displaced population is described as follows:

"The displaced population is made up of 51% women and 49% men. 67 per cent of displaced persons are under 18 years of age. Of this population, 39% is 0-5 years old. People aged over 60 represent 3% of the population. The average size of a displaced household is 7.7. 98% of

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<sup>6</sup> See GABAC, The financing of Terrorism in Central Africa, April 2017, <http://spgabac.org/rapports-des-exercices-de-typologies/>

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Judiciary sources, Ndjamena.

<sup>9</sup> See, Saïbou Issa, Arithmétique ethnique et compétition politique entre Kotoko et Arabes Choa dans le contexte de l'ouverture démocratique au Cameroun, *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2005). The results of the 1987 Census give the following figures: Arabes Choa (38%), Kotoko (35%), Kanouri, Mousgoum, Massa, Mandara... (27%).

<sup>10</sup> *Évaluation multi sectorielle rapide Département du Logone et Chari, Extrême Nord, Cameroun, 01 – 07 Juin 2016,*

[https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/rapport\\_evaluation\\_multisectorielle\\_lc\\_v1.0\\_fr.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/rapport_evaluation_multisectorielle_lc_v1.0_fr.pdf)

displaced households have children. For these families with children, the average number of children per household is."<sup>11</sup>

In March 2017, Blangoua received 7564 IDPs, 1261 unregistered refugees and 559 returnees. In Kousseri, they were respectively 19634, 32 and 6. Goulfeï received 3616 IDPs.<sup>12</sup>

### 3. Literature review

Context analysis refers to indicators of violence and radicalization in the Logone and Chari Division. It is worth adding the massive enrolment of youths in intercommunity violence which opposed the Choas Arabs and the Kotokos in the early 90's. Dozens were killed. Social cohesion was spoilt. Mosques and cemeteries were separated. There was quasi-ethnic division of markets. Inter-ethnic marriage stopped. Ethnic belonging governed political affiliation. Children from mixed couples suffered from misperceptions and suspicion. Between 1992 and 1995, highway robbers were instrumented to set scores. It led to the deployment of two special anti-crime operations.<sup>13</sup>

Several indications suggest that the perception and the experience of radicalization along the Cameroon eastern frontier vary from one community and village to another. Sometimes it is the reproduction of historical antagonisms that motivates departures. In other circumstances, people are attracted by religious ideologies. In some areas, border closure enhanced unemployment and led to opportunistic enrolment because booty and money were expected. From its location in between Chad, Nigeria and the Lake, the Logone and Chari is a suitable zone for disseminating new ideas and cognitive influences intervening in its immediate vicinity. Some studies advise to question violence in Chad basin by combining past antagonisms, internal dynamics, regional context and circumstances.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Matrice de suivi des déplacements (DTM), numéro 7, mars 2017. [https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/cmr\\_report\\_rd7\\_fr.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/cmr_report_rd7_fr.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> See : Saïbou Issa, 2010, *Les coupeurs de route, histoire du banditisme de grand chemin dans le Bassin du Lac Tchad*, Paris, Karthala ; Saïbou Issa, 2012, *Ethnicité, frontières et stabilité aux confins du Cameroun, du Nigeria et du Tchad*, Paris, Harmattan ; Antoine Socpa, 1999, « L'hégémonie ethnique cyclique au Nord-Cameroun », *Africa Development*, vol. 24, n°1 ; Antoine Socpa, 2003, *Démocratisation et autochtonie au Cameroun, trajectoires régionales différentes*, Verlag Münster ; Antoine Socpa, 2002, « Le problème Arabes Choa – Kotoko au Cameroun : Essai d'analyse rétrospective à partir des affrontements de janvier 1992 », *African Anthropologist*, vol. 9.

<sup>14</sup> See Alawadi Zelao, « Conflictualité interethnique et régression scolaire dans la ville de Kousseri », [www.rocare.org/Zelao.pdf](http://www.rocare.org/Zelao.pdf); Saïbou Issa, 2010 ; Harouna Barka, « Les batailles de mémoire dans le Logone et Chari et leurs enjeux identitaires et politiques », <http://www.rhus.association.usherbrooke.ca/wp-content/articles/612.pdf>

Apart from scientific analyses<sup>15</sup>, some evaluation have been carried out on the sources of conflict and Boko Haram operations<sup>16</sup>, conflict resolution mechanisms, the impact of Boko Haram on conflict management mechanisms, humanitarian and subsistence needs, child and women protection<sup>17</sup>.

The analyses shows an imbrication of past antagonisms, identity perceptions, access to resources and power struggle whenever there is a perspective of change. It is when articulating these factors that we better understand conflict amongst communities, political pressure groups. Consequently, the subsidiary principle would function accurately in conflict management. It is a tacit share out of roles between administrative authorities, traditional authorities and security services depending on the nature and the intensity of a conflict.

Concerning the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation, the accounts are unanimous to depict a crisis situation as well as for the internal displaced and host communities. The Division shelters 113 511 IDPs, 26 731 non-registered refugees and 17 917 returnees. This makes approximately 53% of IDPs in the Far North Region not counting the Minawao camp refugees.

The basic social services, subsistence means, employment, vocational training, access to education remain insufficient both in quality and quantity. Promiscuity raises some conflicts between migrants and host population, even though at times it is about misperceptions.

In Kousseri and Goulfey, but also in Makary, it is difficult for children to be registered in modern school due to the financial constraints their parents are facing. The majority does not have birth certificates thus they are obliged to suddenly abandon their studies. Children constitute a good family labour facility for farming, keeping animals and small businesses for families. Young girls are strolling the whole day, they are employed in the selling of edible products. They are exposed to premature marriages and consequently to a great offspring and the promotion of joblessness. Nevertheless, investigations show that some youth succeed to

<sup>15</sup> See the special issue of *Afrique contemporaine*, Comprendre Boko Haram, n° 255, 2015.

<sup>16</sup> PNUD, Conflits et mécanismes de résolution des crises à l'Extrême-Nord du Cameroun, [earlyrecovery.global/.../rapport\\_de\\_letude\\_sur\\_les\\_conflits\\_et\\_mecanismes\\_final.pdf](http://earlyrecovery.global/.../rapport_de_letude_sur_les_conflits_et_mecanismes_final.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Plan International Cameroon, *Evaluation des besoins humanitaires dans le Département du Logone et Chari*, Rapport d'étude, janvier 2017 ; GIZ Maroua, *Etude sur la compréhension de la doctrine Boko Haram, son fondement et son mode opératoire dans la Région de l'Extrême-Nord Cameroun*, juin 2016.

get activities that give them some income in the domain of digital/or electronics and its derived products. The existence of some care centers are mentioned under the supervision of a local NGO, ALDEPA. Youth are invited to discuss about their problems, and the present context. So on this occasion, they are sensitized on sociability, prevention against diseases, etc.

It appears clearly that conflicts are recurrent in the Logone and Chari. These conflicts are being increased since the 1990s. If political battles that come as a result of the advent of democracy explain the repletion of interethnic antagonisms, which the elite manipulates, it is the availability of weapons which is the principal cause of increase of violence. Representations and socio-cultural rivalries remain steady and infiltrate in most social relationships. Trans-border intra-community solidarity is more convivial than the relations between Arabs, Kotoko, Kanuri, Musgum living together in the Division.

Nevertheless, in the same community, existing clanic (Arabs) or dialectal (Kotoko) differences imply political rivalries and socio-economic competitions. Pond, markets, wells, pastures, fishing zones, farming lands, appointment of traditional authorities, urban plot allocation are receptacles of conflict. Identity and utility move together in sustaining conflicts. It appeared that the crisis are also opportunities that social groups exploit whether to prosper their economic activities (Chadian civil war), whether to have access to power positions (violence of 1990s), or to gain profit out of disorder (arm robbers).

The studies have scarcely paid attention to the participation of women and the youth in the decision making process. Education for peace is not specific, as it is diluted in the moral training of children. This training conveys values and community traditions. It is rarely intercultural.

The literature review was unable to identify some previous analysis specifically dedicated to violent extremism, meaning the cognitive process to the sublimation of violence and implement it as the only alternative in solving ideological, political or social conflicts. Eruption of extreme violence such as the battles between Choa Arabs and Kotoko are rather the final stage of a long time intercommunity antagonism which was contained instead of been solved and that exploded when the political opportunity of the 1990s mayhems occurred.

## **4. Methodology**

### **4.1 Choice of localities**

TORs defined the following criterion for the choice of localities to be investigated:

“The five communities will be selected based on the following criteria: 1) Of concern or priority for the Government of Cameroon in regards to fragility and vulnerability to extremism; 2) Current or planned presence of the UN, directly or through implementing partners; 3) Zone of influence and/or vulnerable to Boko Haram; 4) Within the operational area of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF); 5) Vulnerable to movement of population”.

Considering the trans-border nature of the activities envisaged, proximity with the Chadian border is a specific criterion that was taken into consideration. Existing discriminations, ethno-religious diversities, Islamic denominations rivalries in villages, sociopolitical conflicts and intercommunity differences previous to the advent of Boko Haram were also taken into consideration. Amongst the sub-divisions most affected by the presence of IDPs, returnees and more vulnerable to the effects of Boko Haram are Hile Alifa, Makary and Fotokol. These were not taken into account for the following reasons: an unstable security or safety situation which does not give room for a serene development of activities; massive exodus of their population; the distance from the Chadian border (Makary and Fotokol). The identified localities are found in the councils of Kousseri, Goulfei and Blangoua and are situated at the border with Chad. The socio-demographic characteristics of the sampled localities are summarized in the table below:

Council	Localities	total <sup>18</sup> population	Population (center)	Population (rural)	Communities	Religions
Kousseri	Kousseri	101, 246	89, 123	12, 123	Kotoko, Arab, Massa, Sara, choa Musgum, Kanuri,	Muslim Catholic Protestant
	Ridjil-Musgum				Musgum	Muslim Catholic Protestant
Goulfey	Goulfey	58, 117	5, 754	52, 363	Kotoko, Arab, Sara, Massa, Choa-	Muslim Catholic Protestant
	Goulfey-Gana				Kotoko, Arab, Choa-	Muslim Protestant Catholic
	Mara				Kotoko, Arabs, Malians, choa-Sara,	Muslim Protestant
	Mougalam				Kotoko, Arabs, Choa-	Muslim
Blangoua	Blangoua	50, 398	17,442	32,956	Kotoko, Arabs, Kanuri, Mousgoum, Massa, Djoukoun, Kanembou, choa-Haoussa,	Muslim Protestant Catholic
	Blaram				Kotoko, Arabs, Musgum, Djoukoun, choa-Haoussa, Massa,	
	Kobro				Kotoko	
	Dougoumachi				Arabes, kotoko, Musgum	Muslim

In general, these are localities where one or more signs of radicalization, conflict, collective violence were identified during the pre-investigation: Boko Haram attacks, presumption of youth recruitment, weapons and ammunition trafficking to Boko Haram, discovery of caches of weapons, supplying food to Boko Haram, violence against state infrastructures, agro-pastoral and inter-communities conflicts.

<sup>18</sup> BUCREP, « Report of final presentation of results », 2010

## 4.2 Data collection

Data were collected in the ten localities through the following approach:

- Compilation of written data found in books, articles, newspapers, administrative reports, and available expertise results in order to review the existing literature;
- The surveys from each of the ten localities identified on the basis of the following tools: questionnaires, focus groups, and interviews. The research being mostly qualitative, the survey tools were more directed towards the youths, main target of this study, but also towards administrative, secular, traditional, and religious authorities especially targeted by the TOR. The administrative authorities, Sultans and Blamas (chiefs of villages) have been interviewed through an interview guide. It was also the case for the gendarmerie brigades and police commissioners at local levels. Leaders of ethnic organizations, corporate team leaders (trades impacted by the crisis, female associations, and youth associations) have testified about the challenges induced by the crisis.

They revealed the existence of alternate conflict prevention tools. These informal mechanisms are founded on conciliation, intercession, compensation, activation of patriarchal influence tricks where the social capital of peace-makers plays a significant role: parents-in-law, wholesaler good suppliers, creditors, freight forwarders, market managers, etc.

Civil society actors working in relevant areas of this study helped to perceive the evolutions in the relations between social groups. Victims of inner movements were interviewed, but it was more the residents who were surveyed since the actions envisaged seemed to be part of the prospects for building lasting peace between the communities being assessed. Some people, allegedly victims of inter-community or security forces exactions testified. The aim was to measure the types and extent of violence occurring there.

- A sample of 600 young respondents was targeted, 200 in each council. Among them, it was mainly those between 18-34 years old that provided answers to the questionnaire. It turns out that more than half of them are head of families, especially among Muslim communities. The proportion of young women interviewed is about 25%, with accessibility to those who are married being reduced because of social codes

- Young people between 10 and 18 were interviewed through focus groups and informal exchanges. It was the same with IDPs. This is due to the fact that the use of the questionnaire during the pre-survey was not very productive for most of them.

The density of the population of Kousseri (135 907 in 2016)<sup>19</sup>, the diversity of the geographical and ethno-religious origins of inhabitants and the attested exposure of the youths of this city to extremism, explain the choice of a larger sample for this city. The redundancy threshold of the answers was set at 200 youths on the basis of a pilot test conducted at the start of this study. Time and the specification of the target could not give room for the number of questionnaires to be administered on the basis of population size only. Nevertheless, sociological diversity has been taken into account.

- Observation of daily life, activities and socio-cultural division of settlements has been used to facilitate the analysis of perceptions, social relations and income generating activities.
- Casual talks with interlocutors, which, for personal reasons, may not feel at ease answering a classical interview. This is a common among Kotokos because of a high tendency to reserve.
- Interviews over the phone with remote interlocutors and for a better use of the time.

### **4.3 Data analysis**

Data was analyzed as follows:

- Statistical treatment of the questionnaires on SPSS which gives room for an easy grasp of trends;
- Manual treatment of interview guides and focus groups in order to unravel the variables that could better explain the respondents' answers;
- Qualitative, quantitative and analytical synthesis in the presentation of the data.

### **4.4 The selection of 100 youths**

Socio-economic vulnerability, exposure to radicalization, involvement in cultural and associative activities, sociological diversity and gender are the main criteria for preselecting the 100 youths. The list was made through a participatory process:

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<sup>19</sup>[https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/rapport\\_evaluation\\_multisectorielle\\_lc\\_v1.0\\_fr.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/rapport_evaluation_multisectorielle_lc_v1.0_fr.pdf). Citing CFSAM 2015/2016, p. 33

- Field surveys (selection among vulnerable young respondents)
- Exploitation of database from the Regional Coordination of the National Youth Council for Far-North
- Exploitation of database from the Multifunctional Center for Promoting Youth in Kousseri
- Exploitation of databases of the local services of the Ministry of youth and civic education of Blangoua and the one of Goulfei who have a list of vulnerable young people within the framework of a governmental program.

### **A- General determiners of conflicts and extremism**

Source exploitation has enabled to classify them into four main groups which include socio-historical, socio-political and socioeconomic factors.

#### **a- Deep-rooted socio-historical ponderousness**

It is quite difficult to admit the link between historical factors and youth radicalization. Notwithstanding, it appears that the traditional education system has given an important identity, particularly, to clan membership. This model belongs to the informal education within families. The later transmits victories, failures and frustrations to the youth that capitalise them so as to produce introverted and stigmatising attitudes and behaviour towards other ethnic groups.

Comminatory education has an important part on the past and the intra-clan links. As pointed out by Zeltner and Hagenbucher, Choa Arabs are individualist and tied to concentric solidarities which are family, clan, fraction as well as tribe<sup>20</sup>. They provide help to one another base on their family relationship. As Kotoko people are concerned, they are qualified as introverted people who have built up attitude towards other communities in two bases: his antecedence on the land that provides him with atavistic land ownership and his conflict with neighbouring communities (Choa Arabs, Mousgoum)<sup>21</sup>.

In fact, Kotoko people lived in state-city system protected by fancies. Important cities such as Logone, Mser (Kousseri) and Goulfei are built on the left border of Logone River.

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<sup>20</sup> J. C. Zeltner, « Histoire des Arabes sur les rives du lac Tchad », *Annales de l'Université d'Abidjan*, 1970 ; F. Hagenbucher-Sagripanti, *Les Arabes dits Suwa du Nord-Cameroun*, Yaoundé, ORSTOM, 1973.

<sup>21</sup> See A. M. D. Lebeuf, *Les principautés kotoko : essai sur le caractère sacré de l'autorité*, Paris, CNRS, 1969.

This served them as a protection strategy against their enemies from Baguirmi kingdom on the right border of the river. The isolation and the external fear have generated autarky and dialectal particularity that lead the three Kotoko confederations (*lagouane* in South, *mser* in the Centre and *mandagué* in the North) to speak different languages without mutual intelligibility. Kotoko people are perceived as distrustful and revered people. In some literature, they are unreasonably treated as xenophobe because their Kotoko interlocutor had tendency to designate other communities as foreigners<sup>22</sup>. Foreigner means “none originated” which is different from a dweller. If all Kotoko are originated from Logone and Chari, i.e. coming from the land, others are immigrant. According to their tradition, they don’t have right to custom properties which is collective and transmitted by the *Mey* (usually called Sultan).

In the other side, Arab tribes (Salamat, Baniset, Ghawalme, Hemadiye...) that settled South of Lake Chad since the XVIth century, are more united by their common antagonism with Kotoko people than internal cohesion of Arab people.

From the XVIth century to 1893, the Arabs had their own tribal chiefs, but were actually ruled by Kotoko Chiefs that were in their turn vassals of Bornu. Apart from Logone, all other Kotoko cities from Kousseri to the Lake formed the “Kotoko Province of Bornu”.<sup>23</sup> Arabs and Kotoko were subordinates of the *May* of Bornu, a Kanuri empire. In the second half of the XIXth century, Rabbah, a warrior with Arabic culture conquered the Chad Basin and imposed his hegemony over the territories of the kingdoms of Bornu, Baguirmi and Mandara. He overthrown the Kotoko chiefs and designated new representatives among the Choa Arabs.

In 1900, British and French colonial troops conquered the southern part of Lake Chad. They restored kingship, Kotoko Chiefs and allowed them to manage the territory. Many complaints and strikes from Arabs were noticed in the colonial administration’s reports. They complained on customary dues and other taxes, on difficulty to get access to pasture and on land ownership. They blamed on all of Kotoko people because Kotoko traditional aristocracy and educated elites controlled the political, traditional and administrative powers at local and national levels. Arabs had fought against colonial troops and resisted from their

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<sup>22</sup> Tribus sans frontières, *Les affrontements interethniques entre Arabes Choa et Kotoko*, 1992 ; A. Socpa, Le problème arabe choa-kotoko au Cameroun. Essai d’analyse rétrospective à partir des affrontements de janvier 1992, <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/aa/article/viewFile/23071/29921>.

<sup>23</sup> Y. Urvoy, *Histoire de l’empire du Bornou*, 1949.

administration. The later had refused to create schools in their different villages avoiding that they may gain intellectual confidence and re-enforce their adherence to panislamism and panarabism<sup>24</sup>. The Arabs were thus perceived as a danger for the colonial system and the same perception continued after independence. The Arabs were suspected to be the Trojan Horse of Libyan expansionism in Chad Basin, namely the Northern part of Cameroon.<sup>25</sup>

The independent Cameroon government perpetuated the colonial system by keeping the organisational model of traditional management that juxtaposed territorial kinship and ethnic rule. From this, Kotoko chiefs are landlords and govern all those who live in that land. Arab chiefs (Lawans and Blamas) managed people from their clan but without land ownership. A system that may not has changed when growing. The Governor of the North Province (covering present Regions of Adamawa, Far North and North) from Independence to 1983 was a Kotoko (Ousman Mey). Arab people accused him of having maintained the statu quo; the government used the centralised political organisation of the Kotoko for its own agenda. In fact, the traditional authorities were left free to manage their people and spaces, provided that they act to tie them to the whole national territory<sup>26</sup>.

In 1979, the Arab village of Dolle was destroyed by the army because villagers had killed a gendarme who came with his comrades to re-establish order after a conflict. The villagers demonstrated their unhappiness after hopelessly waiting for the government to appoint a teacher in the school they build by themselves.<sup>27</sup>

Choa Arabs who were born before or during the colonial period has grown up with a perception of institutional victimisation and xenophobia from the Kotoko. The Kotoko have grown up with an insecurity complex and a siege feeling which lead them to introvert and tie to traditional values and authority perceived as the best protector against 'foreign' threats. While traditional authorities symbolise the historical legitimacy of the autochthon Kotoko people, they rather incarnate the memory of bullying to the Arabs. These mutual misperceptions persist<sup>28</sup> and prove that they are transmitted to subsequent generations. Even though the young people that are interviewed collectively or individually denied this practice, other are still distrustful.

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<sup>24</sup> French colonial archives in Yaounde.

<sup>25</sup> Interviews in Kousseri and Goulfeï, April 2017.

<sup>26</sup> J.P Fogui, *L'intégration politique au Cameroun*, une analyse centre-périphérie, Paris, LGDJ, 1990.

<sup>27</sup> *Libération*, 30 octobre et 6 novembre 1979.

<sup>28</sup> Interviews Kousseri, April 2017.

As other communities are concerned, Mousgoum and Kanouri in particular, their relation with other groups were marked by socio-political and socio-economic rivalry.

### **b. Appeased but enduring ethno-political rivalries**

The 1990s conflict that opposed Arabs and Kotoko was characterised by the use of guns. Historical cleavages have carried the building up of ethno-political affiliations. The Musgum did not participate into the conflict. The Kanouri were perceived as the natural allies of the Kotoko. This is due to the fact that the most prominent Kanouri businessman of Kousseri, Blama Alifa, was also a leading notable in the Sultan's court.<sup>29</sup>

According to some witnesses of the 1990s violences, junction between Kanouri and Kotoko was an excuse to eliminate economic rivalry between the Arabs and the Kanouri in Kousseri market<sup>30</sup>. As Mousgoum and Kanouri have extracted themselves from the warfare, they still expect to hold an interesting electoral role in Logone and Chari Division. Nowadays, some political tendencies are still visible:

- Re-productivity of political conflicts, in the sense that the two main communities of Logone and Chari generally act for two political parties: the ruling CPDM for the Arabs and the NUDP for the Kotoko. In each elections, there is a risk of confrontation due to the negative perception of each other group. In this purpose, Central Africa Institute for Governance which has conducted a study on intercommunity conflict in Logone and Chari has made the following remark:

« Il ressort que dans l'esprit des élites Kotoko l'image de l'Arabe s'articule autour de quelques images fortes (qui peuvent paraître caricaturales) et empreintes de violence. Ils les traitent de fourbes, envahisseurs, belliqueux... Certes, l'attitude parfois effrontée et défiante attribuée à l'élite arabe est attestée dans certains faits. Des témoignages confirmés par des sources des milieux judiciaires sont à cet égard édifiants. Des arabes, coupables de meurtre de ressortissants de la communauté Kotoko au cours d'altercations isolées, ont été secouru par des élites fortunées, issues de leur communauté. Loin de procéder d'une démarche compassionnelle, ce type d'intervention semble davantage participer d'une volonté claire de défiance à l'endroit de la communauté de la victime (Kotoko). Un jeune commerçant arabe dont nous avons voulu connaître l'avis sur la question n'a pas hésité à dire que « *dans ce genre d'affaire, c'est notre honneur qui est en jeu. Ces gens là (les Kotoko) quand ils nous tuaient avant, qui nous défendaient ? C'était eux qui avaient l'administration et savaient lire les lois. Aujourd'hui, si avec l'argent qu'on a, on peut aider un de nos frères qui a un problème avec un Kotoko ce n'est que justice* ». <sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup>Interviews in Kousseri, April 2017.

<sup>30</sup> Interviews Kousseri, April 2017.

<sup>31</sup> [http://www.irenees.net/article227\\_es.html](http://www.irenees.net/article227_es.html)

The delicate co-management of urban land by the Kotoko Sultan and the Arab mayors. The Sultans feel that their historical monopoly on land tenure is challenged;

- The frequent creation of traditional titles through the foundation of new villages raises tensions with the Sultans. Administrative authorities seem to let the people create villages as they are settling on rural lands. This was sometimes done against the Sultan's opinion. In this process, administrative authorities are being accused of corruption.<sup>32</sup>
- Intra ethnic tensions notably between Kotoko chieftaincies that is manifested by the propensity of ancient chieftaincies to extend their authority on new territories liberated by the retreat of Lake Chad waters. It is the case of Goulfei's authority that spreads to Blangoua subdivision. Young people from Blangoua have confessed during a focus group that Goulfei elites constitute a barrier to the development of their locality. The fact since 2015 the Lawanat of Nganatir remains without a Chief is considered as a manipulation from the ruler of Goulfei who, according to them, want to hold his authority on them by appointed his own person. The former Lawan was a Kanouri.<sup>33</sup> 68 Blamas of the Blangoua Subdivision are supervised by the Wakil who represents the Sultan of Goulfey.

### **c. A shading socioeconomic environment**

Risk of youth to radicalisation is favoured by socioeconomic glum. The scarcity of job opportunities for educated young people of the locality appears through the practice of precarious activities.

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<sup>32</sup> Interviews in Kousseri, April 2017.

<sup>33</sup> Interviews in Kousseri, April 2017.

**Table 1 : Main occupation of the respondents**

	Main occupation														Total
	wit ho ut	Agri cultu re	driv er	trader	Reso urcef ul perso n	stu den t	teach er	Gara gist	Mar ket gard ener	Mo tota xim an	fish ern an	Dres s mak er	Tran sport er		
Mara	1	23	0	3	2	4	2	6	2	1	1	6	1	51	
Mou gala m	2	38	0	4	9	4	6	5	0	2	0	0	3	71	
Goul fey	2	46	1	9	9	8	8	15	0	1	0	5	2	105	
Kous seri	1	35	0	9	20	3	3	6	0	9	8	10	3	106	
Ridjil Mous goum	5	15	0	11	7	6	2	8	0	7	3	2	6	67	
Total	11	157	1	36	47	25	21	39	2	21	12	23	15	400	

These activities produce small benefit which does not enable to satisfy primary needs such as health and children education.

**Table 2 : yearly outcome of the respondents**

												Total
	10,00 0 to 30,00 0	31,00 0 to 60,00 0	61,00 0 to 90,00 0	91,00 0 to 120,0 00	121,0 00 to 150,0 00	151,0 00 to 180,0 00	181,0 00 to 210,0 00	211,0 00 to 300,0 00	301,0 00 to 400,0 00	401,0 00 and Plus		
locali ty	Mara	7	12	0	5	4	0	4	2	3	11	48
	Mougala m	14	20	0	4	6	0	7	4	1	9	65
	Goulfey	14	14	1	8	5	0	14	5	5	24	90
	Kousseri	23	22	0	4	4	12	16	1	0	8	90
	Ridjil Mousgo um	6	12	0	5	10	2	12	0	0	7	54
Total		64	80	1	26	29	14	53	12	9	59	347

Out of 347 respondents, only 70 live above Cameroon monetary poverty level fixed at 339 715 FCFA.<sup>34</sup> That is to say about 80% live below this scale. The jobs they practice are

<sup>34</sup> INS, Quatrième enquête camerounaise auprès des ménages : tendances, profils et déterminants de la pauvreté au Cameroun de 2001 à 2014, Yaoundé, décembre 2015, p. 15.

seasonal and their outcome depends on the context. So, since 2014, mechanics are suffering from restriction of interurban traffic. Agriculture is limited to subsistence.

The source of young people frustration derives also from the link between ethnicity and access productive activities.

**Table 3 : Representation of communities in productive activities**

	Other communities that share the same activities												Total
	Non informed	Ara be	Gora ne	Guizi ga	Haou ssa	Kane mbu	Kan uri	Koto ko	Mas sa	Musg un	Peu lh	Sa ra	
Local Mara	0	23	0	0	2	0	1	8	5	1	0	11	51
ity Mougalam	2	45	0	0	3	0	4	11	4	0	0	2	71
Goulfe y	0	50	1	0	10	0	8	15	11	1	0	9	105
Kousse ri	0	46	0	2	0	7	9	14	4	13	3	8	106
Ridjil Mousgoum	4	30	0	1	1	0	10	8	3	3	3	4	67
Total	6	194	1	3	16	7	21	56	27	18	6	34	400

About half of the respondents reveal that they share their activities with Arabs and with about 15% of Kotoko. The question aims at identifying the level of inter-community economic interaction. Complementary interviews have identified the frustration of none Arab youth. They think that Choa Arab help one another. That is why their children always receive financial or goods support as compare to others who do not sponsor their kinfolds.

The activities structure of youth has shown that the majority of them practice nonqualified jobs. This can be justified by the lack of professional training structures as seen in the table below.

**Table 4:** Schools and professional training centres

Localities	Schools/public centres	Schools/ private centres	Total
Kousseri	- Government Technical school - Centre of Promotion of woman and family (CPFF) - SAR-SM	- Professional training centre of Kousseri (CPFK) - Salam Institut - Private Professional Institut of Kousseri (IPPK)	6
Goulfey	CETIC	0	1
Blangoua	0	CFAVIHR	1

Source : Fieldwork, April 2017

To these training centres, it is worth adding the functional alphabetisation centres (CALF). There are 3 in Kousseri with 89 students (68 boys and 20 girls), 3 in Goulfey with 138 learners (41 boys and 97 girls). Government donation is therefore trivial. Private structures are taking the ground in Kousseri. There are some structures that combine learning and job in various domain of life. In Goulfey and Blangoua, professional training for youth is also insignificant. Apart from the technical high school (CETIC) in Goulfey and the CFAVIAHR funded by Codascaritas of the Catholic Church in Blangoua, youth from both Subdivisions do not have opportunity to get access to variety of professional training. The multifunctional centre of promoting youth whose vocation is professional learning and national integration are not operational neither in Kousseri, Goulfey nor Blangoua.

The local economic environment does not provide job opportunities to youth. In Kousseri, youth are concentrated in the informal sector. Therefore, they are far from getting professional jobs and then limited to traditional activities which include agriculture, fishing and informal trade that they even lack sponsor from government as well as developmental partners.

Due to the security crisis caused by Boko Haram, the youth of all the localities are generally pessimistic on the future of their professional life. They diversely perceive the effect of the crisis on their socioeconomic activities.

**Table 4 :** Effect of security crisis on socioeconomic activities

	Effect of security crisis on socioeconomic activities				Total
	Lose of job	Slow down of economic exchange	Reduction of production	others	
Mara	1	26	16	8	51
Mougalam	2	38	17	14	71
Goulfey	22	41	32	7	102
Kousseri	32	36	31	4	103
Ridjil	15	29	17	4	65
Mousgoum	14	9	8	0	31
Goulfey Gana	12	11	7	0	30
Blaram	6	9	8	0	23
Dougoumachi	17	14	17	0	48
Blangoua	10	4	10	0	24
Kobro	131	217	163	37	548
Total					

**Source :** Synthesis of field research, April 2017

The effects of Boko Haram security crisis is perceived in all sectors. Young people in Kousseri complain about the loss of activities, particularly the low rate of economic

exchanges that were oriented to neighbouring Nigeria and Chad. Motorbike drivers are forbidden to interurban traffic and the access to Ngueli Bridge has reduced import and export activities towards Chad. It is also noticed that localities from Chadian border observed drastically drop of commercial exchanges due to the restrictions of navigation on Logone River. Accordingly, 53% of young people in Mougalam, 40% in Goulfey, 50% in Mara, 44% in Ridjil Mousgoum think that they are the main victims. From inquired localities, it clearly appears that the crisis has affected production (30%), exchange (40%) and jobs (24%).

To the direct impact of the crisis, it is worth adding its psychological effect. Fear, suspicion and stigmatisation have been increased by the arrival of displaced population and the enrolment of youth by Boko Haram members. The analysis of the questionnaire reveals that 44% of the respondents think that the crisis has led to social deconstruction because of displacements and the radicalization of some youth. Massive displacements are perceived by 33% of youth as structured element of the crisis accompanied with general psychosis. Suspicion towards foreigners and towards unknown people has been increased, giving room to fear.

## **B. Permeability to innovations and cognitive risks**

The cognitive bases of radicalization of young people are linked to ignorance, to social and doctrinal influences as well as to the scarcity of socialization frameworks.

### **a. Young people with little education and influence**

The rural literacy rate in the three subdivisions under focus is far below the regional rate of 47.3% for 15-24 year olds in 2007.<sup>35</sup>

The adults interviewed, as well as many youths, admitted that there is a tendency among young people in the lacustrine part of the Blangoua subdivision to open up to new forms of thought, often radical, coming mainly from Nigeria and Chad. This is partly due to the strong presence of people frustrated in their activities and who have found opportunities at the Lake. There are also multiple traffics there, the frequent crossing of Chadian fighters in the area and, even up till nowadays, the action of the militants of Boko Haram or the bearers of their ideology.

The proximity of Blangoua to the fishing areas under the control of Boko Haram over the past years seems to have influenced the attitude of the young people who saw an

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<sup>35</sup> MINEPAT, Rapport régional de progression des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement, Région de l'Extrême-Nord, 2010, p. 9.

opportunity to access the fishing areas as did the Boudouma in the Chadian part of the Lake.<sup>36</sup> According to displaced fishermen in Kousseri, Maiduguri's preachers, fish and agricultural products dealers preached Boko Haram's ideology on the Lake islands or during conversations in market sheds.<sup>37</sup> Young people would have adhered to this revolutionary way of thinking both by conviction and by economic opportunism.

There is indeed a cognitive vacuum which the bearers of innovative ideas have facilities to penetrate. The Arab uprising of Dollé in 1979 had already been motivated by the preaching of a scholar who had returned from Chad, who would have drawn the attention of the population to the necessity of sending their offspring to school so that they should not indefinitely undergo the domination of the elites, namely the Kotoko, who are educated and have access to the state apparatus.<sup>38</sup>

In the context of the civil war in Ndjama in 1979 and 1980, the populations of the Logone and Chari and those of Kousseri in particular, became intuitively the allies of the belligerent factions which reflected their own local litigation, that is, the Arabs for the Government of the National Transitional Union (GUNT), which also included the Revolutionary Democratic Committee (CDR) of the Arab leader Acheikh Ibn Oumar; the Kotoko for the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) of Hissène Habré hostile to the Libyan presence in Chad and perceived as a bulwark against Gaddafi's Arab-Islamic expansionism.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, it is widely admitted among the people of Kousseri that youths of the Logone and Chari, in the 80's, joined the rebels, however in very limited numbers.

#### **b. Perception of youths' motivation to join Boko Haram**

The above examples show that extremism, in its political, identity, religious, etc. forms can follow several paths and build slowly or rapidly under favorable circumstances. The young respondents understood this through their answers on the motivations of their mates to join the insurgents.

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<sup>36</sup> Interviews, Blangoua, April 2017.

<sup>37</sup> Interviews, Kousseri, April 2017.

<sup>38</sup> Interviews, Kousseri, April 2017.

<sup>39</sup> Interviews with civil and military authorities who worked in Kousseri in the 1980s ; data completed in Kousseri and Maroua in Avril 2017.

**Table 7:** Perception of youth motivation to join Boko Haram

	Motivations des jeunes					Total
	Beliefs/ Religion	Lack of perspectives	Clan/Family Influence	Friend Influence	Not know	
Mara	26	14	11	0	0	51
Mougalam	38	20	13	0	0	71
Goulfey	34	33	19	9	10	105
Kousseri	26	32	19	13	16	106
Localit y						
Ridjil	25	22	11	3	6	67
Mousgoum						
Goulfey Gana	4	10	7	8	3	32
Blaram	9	4	1	4	12	30
Dougoumachi	3	10	4	2	6	25
Blangoua	7	15	5	11	13	51
Kobro	5	8	2	6	4	25
Total	177	168	92	56	70	563

**Source:** Fieldwork, April 2017.

The table shows three main trends in the reasons for radicalization of young people in the localities studied.

The first refers to the religious motive which remains dominant in the general configuration of enrollment factors that should be distinguished from the general factors of extremism. It is indeed, the decision taken in the plunge to join the ranks of the terrorist organization. While the young people in Mougalam (53%) and Mara (51%) place more emphasis on the religious factor, it remains that in all the three districts, religious beliefs are perceived as the primary cause of radicalization of young people with an overall rate of about 32%. This perception, however, remains localized in the Kotoko villages near the Logone, mainly Muslim, influenced by new currents of thought coming from Nigeria and little open in economic exchanges with other localities.

The second incentive is economic and is shared by young people from all localities. With a general rate of nearly 30% and disaggregated percentages of 32% in Kobro and 40% in Dougoumachi, it is noteworthy that insufficient employment, production equipment (fishing nets, improved canoes, conservation materials, farm tools, agricultural inputs, facilities for conditioning and evacuation ...) lead to exodus and opportunistic ideological attraction.

In Goulfey-Gana, Ridjil-Mousgoum, Blangoua and Kobro, 17% of respondents believe that community and family education plays a role in the construction of radicalization

or non-prevention against extremism. During the focus group discussions, the young people indicated that parents are too busy with the necessities of everyday life to take care of the moral training of a large progeny. It is the task of the mothers, themselves limited by their thin knowledge of the external life. It is more the community discourse that shapes the minds. 13% attest that young people are victims of mimicry and follow-up.

Some interviewees said they knew young people who had been trained "in Nigeria" by their friends. Indeed, several groups of companions have joined Boko Haram in other areas, particularly the Mayo Sava Division. The left-behind youth are taken in hand by group leaders who exploit their sense of collective marginalization in order to breathe a better air. Social stress appears to be the main vulnerability that arises from marginalization and exposes young people to those who offer alternatives.

**Table 7 : The impact of marginalization on youth behavior**

	Impact of marginalization			Total
	Hate	Lack of confidence	Depression	
Mara	4	1	0	5
Mougalam	1	4	5	10
Goulfey	4	4	5	13
Kousseri	4	16	45	65
Ridjil	5	10	24	39
locality Mousgoum	4	1	0	5
Goulfey Gana	1	4	0	5
Blaram	1	1	0	2
Dougoumachi	0	1	0	1
Blangoua	3	5	1	9
Bichara	27	47	80	154
Total				

As pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, the elements that draw people towards radical positions are not very far from the motives of keeping youths in the Boko Haram arena. The data from the surveys as presented reflect youths' point of view, many of whom know a relative, acquaintance or family member enrolled by Boko Haram.

**Table 8** : Perception of the motives for keeping youths in Boko Haram

	Motives					Total
	Money	Better conditions	Promises for a wished change	Ideology adoption	Others	
Locality						
Mara	8	12	9	10	12	51
Mougalam	12	21	8	11	19	71
Goulfey	21	34	14	24	12	105
Kousseri	24	35	19	23	5	106
Ridjil	9	24	7	16	11	67
Mousgoum						
Goulfey Gana	6	13	8	5	0	32
Blaram	7	10	6	7	0	30
Dougoumachi	5	10	5	5	0	25
Blangoua	12	16	10	13	0	51
Kobro	6	7	5	7	0	25
Total	110	182	91	121	59	563

**Source** : Field survey, April 2017.

Without being direct actors, the data show that the majority of the youths are convinced that the recruits stay there because Boko Haram offers better living conditions. Several respondents say that many youths on the shores of Lake Chad, including Kofia in the Blangoua council, Tchol, Toumboum-Ali, Fili-mbodo in the Hilé-Alifa Council or Loko-libi, Kassoua-Maria, Aissa-Koura in the Darak Council joined Boko Haram and stayed there because of better living conditions. 32% share this opinion against (21%) for ideological reasons and (20%) for the attractiveness of money.

A better grasp of the situation could have been provided if records of people's personal stories were to be accessed for follow up of the motives underlying personal reasons among the radicalized. But at the time of the investigation, it was not possible to find drop-outs of Boko Haram.

### c. The aponia of alternate arguments

Various facets of extremism were put forth in the Logone and Chari before the advent of Boko Haram. For several years, the ideological battle between traditionalists and reformists led the Chadian Muslim society whose ideas easily cross the nominal border between Ndjama and Kousseri. Surprisingly, nothing was done till March 2013 where sensitization about violent extremism was launched. This extremism came as a result of Boko Haram activity in the vicinity of Cameroon. The Logone and Chari had to become a target of attacks and the security situation relatively improved, to see discussion initiatives to fight

radicalization led mainly by the administrative authorities. Few CSOs are trying to raise awareness about extremism in general.

But those who were most expected were religious leaders and other preachers who are able to construct and disseminate alternative arguments based on the Quran, the Sunnah and examples of everyday life. But this applied preaching is awaited and should address, in a combinatory way, identity and religious sources of extremism. This should be done in conjunction with Chadian religious leaders through an alternate current that would make the difference between doctrinal struggles and the common struggle for peace and the preservation of the youths against extremist ideas supposed to come from Islamic texts.

Moreover, permeability to extremist discourses takes advantage of the scarcity of spaces for dialogue among the youths. Admittedly, a guidance, counseling and support Centre (CEOCA) was set up in the Kousseri Council. But the Centre is not functional: no staff, redeployment of equipment in other services...<sup>40</sup> In short, cognitive responses to the extremist discourses of identity groups, fundamentalist doctrines and of Boko Haram in particular, are neither audible nor visible nor relevant.

### **C. Needs in primary education at the beginning of the 2016-2017 school year**

The five proposed localities for the project intervention are: Blangoua center, Kousseri, Goulfey center, Kobro and Goulfey Gana. Kobro belongs to Blangoua subdivision. Goulfey Gana depends on Goulfey subdivision. Field surveys reveal that it is difficult to distinguish Kousseri city from its rural areas insofar as the District stretches on 160 km<sup>2</sup>, which means 16 km of long and 10 km of large. Apart from small Arab Lawanats, the rest is urban and occupied by Kotoko, Kanuri, Haussa, Musgum. However, it would be inappropriate not to consider these communities in the subdivision which is highly marked by tensions between Arab Choa and Kotoko.

Therefore, under Kousseri, within the list of requirements of the target population it should be understood the district of Kousseri. Apart from Amchedire and Mawak which are schools situated in Arab area, the choice of other intervention schools in the District would be determined by the nature of their specific needs and assistance given to internal displaced. School that home internal displaced are: primary schools of Adjaine, Alaya, Arkis, Babou I

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<sup>40</sup> Fielwork data, Kousseri, Avril 2017.

and II, Djagare, Harazaya, Kousseri I A and B, Kousseri II A and B, Krouang, Madagascar and Mawack.

The list of needs in equipment and material is joined as an appendices. The following governance problems were identified:

**a. Teaching facilities and school management problems**

- Most of schools are built up with provisional materials or have dilapidated buildings: doors and windows are broken which exposed students to severe weather between November and February, lack of ceiling that inhibits students from understanding their teacher in rain season ;
- Pupils tied in class due to 5 pupils per bench ;
- In Goulfei Gana and Kopro, scholarly children are highly implicated in family subsistence activities ; thus the rate of about 15 per cent school dropout ;
- Parent teachers are highly used in both urban and rural schools with less motivation due to the irregularity of payment with insignificant salary;
- Non-existence of School Boards (PAEE, AME and School Council), less implication of parent in the school projects ;
- The majority of children do not have Birth Certificate, consequently, they drop out their study in class six because they can neither write common entrance nor First School leaving certificate.

**b. Social problems affecting education**

- Girls reveal that house whole work and the lack of electricity are affecting their performances at school;
- Girls point out that they are victimised through moral violence by their teachers and their classmates;
- Comminatory education of girls does not permit them to integrate with boys ;
- Mistrust of parents toward school security reduces attendance rate, especially in Blangoua and Kopro.

### **c. Main trend in primary education**

In 2000<sup>41</sup>, the following data were obtained from the analysis of school situation in Logone and Chari:

- More urban schooling than rural: Goulfey 28%, Kousseri 38%.
- Girl schooling: correlation between breeding map and schooling rate ; transhumant and fishing areas are those providing lower rate of female (Goulfey 16%, Blangoua 4.6%).

These data have sensibly changed but the primary completion rate is the lowest in the country, especially girls who are exposed to early marriage and parents preferences in schooling only boys for financial reasons and mental inhibition. The tendency of girl under school attendance has remained high in the Arab community because of seasonal transhumance and the limited number of schools in their villages. According to those in charge of basic education and local elites interviewed in this issue, the fragmentation of communities does not make easier to meet the needs for creating schools, hence, relative distance of schools from more remote villages.

In 2010, according to data published by the Divisional Delegation of basic education of the Logone and Chari, the school-age population for the whole Division was estimated at 121,000 children, with a schooling population of 88,411, which makes a school enrollment rate of 73.07%. Various compiled sources remain either vague or contradictory because they reveal great disparities between localities. Thus, while the rate of Kousseri is estimated at more than 90%, Makary has 46,500 scholarly children with 21,960 enrolled (47.22%). The major challenge is to retain children in school and to produce their birth certificates.

## **D. Specific causes of disputes**

### **a. Youth access to land**

The issue of young people's access to land is becoming acute in the large localities of Kousseri, Goulfey and Blangoua, where there is great speculation on land. Young people do not have the financial means to acquire plots of land for the construction of a dwelling or shop, the setting up of a factory or crops cultivation. Apart from access by inheritance of family spaces, no administrative, traditional or community arrangements grant young people access to land. In rural areas, young people can get land through parents or traditional

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<sup>41</sup> Atlas de la province de l'Extrême-Nord, MINREST/INC, Paris, 2000, C. Seignobos et O. Iyébi-Mandjeck (éd).

authority by means of interpersonal negotiation. The Blamas allow land to the young in exchange for a tithe on the crops. But for many of the young people met in this survey, the question of land should be considered not in terms of access but in its efficient use.

As a result, young people of Blaram, Mougalam, Kobro, Mara and Goulfey Gana considered themselves as being abandoned in technical, material and financial support for improving their products, supporting the conservation and facilitating the flow to more profitable markets. They declared being willing to create cross-sectoral groups, that is, organizations of young farmers, fishermen or herders who, besides the economic aspects, will be ready to welcome literacy workers, trainers in production techniques, trainers in all aspects of life that can enable them learn how to contribute more to well-being and social cohesion at the local level<sup>42</sup>.

### **b. Identity discriminations**

This aspect has been discussed above, but it is important to recall it in the specific sources of daily frictions that lead young people to group according to their ethnicity. This is especially noticeable with 25-34 age groups<sup>43</sup>. They may have been more in contact with scenes of intercommunity exclusion and identity extremism. The 10-15 years old are almost indifferent to rivalries. They declared that, at school, they play with "everyone". However, when they are at home, the circle of friends seem more restricted to the neighbourhood's children. This age group is conducive to prevention activities against extremism through the promotion of collective games and other board games likely to promote intercultural fellowship at school and outside. They are, however, not exempt from derogatory remarks against their comrades (see box1). The oldest young people seem, in the light of what they say to be eligible for identity and ancillary religious de-radicalization.

#### **Box 1: Children guilty of discrimination?**

Mrs. K. and other members of the alien communities in Goulfey feel discriminated. Ms. K. says that her children have been sent away, insulted or simply prevented from drawing water from the public water points at Goulfey, while the city has several. The children of Mrs. K. were blamed for not being Muslim. She reported that at school, her children suffered the same abuse, sometimes in the presence of their teachers. For this family there is a great need to work on the mentalities of the local populations in order to change their attitude towards the non-native inhabitants of Goulfey.

<sup>42</sup> Source: Group discussion, April 2017.

<sup>43</sup> Source: Group Discussion, April 2017.

### **c. Administrative pressures**

Young people identify two categories of pressures. The first categories are those which are permanent, usually coming from the administrative and security officials as far as administrative policing, traffic control and collection of communal taxes are concerned. Then, there are the cyclical pressures, particularly linked to restrictions of the intercity circulation of motorbikes. As much as the respondents acknowledged that some of them do not respect rules, they complained about the lack of understanding of authorities, who punish them for delays in paying taxes or "excusable faults" (speeding, overloading, expiry of personal documents or that of their gear ...) and racketeering cases are also listed.

### **d. Generational exclusion**

The feeling of exclusion of young people is more perceptible in rural areas where their desire for emancipation from the family is thwarted by social codes to which parents are committed. Social reproduction through marriage (often early), learning and reproduction of parental careers, rules of intergenerational communication that leave little room for dialogue and therefore the expression of difference, give rise to clearly marked attitudes of mistrust. As reported the older ones, young people listen to the advice of the elders, but apply them in their own way. In a group discussion in Kousseri, young Arab Choa scholars criticized what they named the "wealth patriarchy" that would govern the choices and political behaviour of the community. A bell sound different from that heard among those who practice small trades thanks to the accompaniment of the so-called oppressive patriarchs.

### **e. Delinquency**

About the main threats to peace caused by the youths, the latter mostly presented the issue of Boko Haram. However, more than half of the valid answers incriminate social conflicts (above) and delinquency.

Table 9: Sources of major threats to peace and social cohesion

	Sources of threats				Total
	BokoHaram	security forces	social conflicts/ Delinquency	none	
Mara	1	0	9	39	49
Mougalam	2	0	11	58	71
Goulfey	5	1	15	79	100
Kousseri	25	0	44	37	106
Localit y RidjilMousgoum	10	0	31	26	67
GoulfeyGana	18	0	0	13	31
Blaram	15	0	0	15	30
Dougoumachi	5	0	0	20	25
Blangoua	16	0	2	33	51
Kobro	3	0	12	10	25
Total	100	1	124	330	555

Source: Fieldwork, April 2017.

The trend towards juvenile delinquency is widespread. It is attributable to the absence of parents, especially the father, in the daily monitoring of the child. It is also due to the ignorance of mass pedagogy by parents who have to educate many children simultaneously. To their own children, there are also internally displaced children who are wandering among the youngest (under 15) notably in Kousseri, Blangoua and Goulfei. It is in Kousseri and its vicinities that the tendency to delinquency is considered as the highest.

In all the localities studied, the phenomenon of narcotic consumption was a great preoccupation of the populations. In Blangoua especially, the consumption of "Tramol" and the "Indian hemp" is considered as responsible for the deviations of the young people below 25 years old.

#### Box 2: Drugs and radicalization in Blangoua

Bought in Nigeria and distributed on the islands of Lake Chad, drugs transit to Blangoua where other processes of chemical re-composition are carried out to create new molecules. The phenomenon is more worrying because it widely takes place. Each market has a well-known area of selling these "medicines." The Charifadis sector of Blangoua central market and Tchinchina market are providers. The young rebels who ransacked the divisional office of Blangoua and the residence of the deputy mayor and took away the donations of President Paul Biya to the displaced are suspected of belonging to this new class of radicalized people encouraged by the consumption of narcotics.

### **f. Community stigma**

It refers to the inquisitive gaze fixed on the Kanuri community perceived as an accomplice of Boko Haram. Cases of invective were reported during the investigations. This perception deprives the Goni (Kanuri Islamic scholars) of their peaceful potential as religious leaders. Their sermons are deemed hypocritical. They themselves feel threatened by Boko Haram who assimilates them to opponents of reformism; and suspected by the security services and administrative officials as sympathizers for the Islamist sect<sup>44</sup>.

### **g. Conflictual indifference**

The analysis of the above table suggests, however, that almost 60% of the young people interviewed do not accurately identify the sources of threats to peace in their region. This attitude reflects an impression of resignation and indifference, characteristic of a youth prey to doubt and for which the succession of crises seems to have normalized the instability. This is the meaning that could be given to the words of Alifa Mahamat of Blaram in the district of Blangoua when he says: "No matter what happens to us, our fate is sealed. We have nothing to gain, or to lose, each one is now seeking his way. We have almost all known; no risk surprises us now "<sup>45</sup>.

But it would be wrong to take the silence of most young people on this subject as indifference. It would rather be a response to the absence of interlocutors willing to discuss their opinions. They react according to circumstances by symbolic resistances of non-participation in public demonstrations or solicitations for work of common interest, corporatist mobilizations, self-regulation to challenge perceptions (motorbike drivers for example), or even spontaneous and strong eruptions (see Box 3).

Some young people explain their varied attitude by the fact that the persistence of threats is due to the inadequacy of the State's responses to the problems and vectors of instability.

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<sup>44</sup> Interviews in Kousseri, April 2017

<sup>45</sup> Interviews in Blaram, April 2017

Tableau 10: Actors and internal causes of threats

	Causes of threats				Total	
	Government	Population	Poverty/ Unemploy ment	Securiti ty forces		
Mara	4	5	0	3	12	
Mougalam	1	3	2	16	22	
Goulfey	3	4	3	18	28	
Kousseri	9	6	43	17	75	
Localit y	RidjilMousgoum	9	14	18	6	47
	GoulfeyGana	2	5	0	0	7
	Blaram	3	5	0	0	8
	Dougoumachi	1	1	0	0	2
	Blangoua	3	6	0	0	9
	Kobro	4	2	0	0	6
Total		39	51	66	60	216

Source: Fieldwork, April 2017.

It appears that poverty and its unemployment corollary are designated by young people as a structural threat to peace and social cohesion. It is also noted that the State, represented here by the "government" and the forces of law and order, are perceived by young people (nearly 50%) as actors of social disharmony. This trend is more pronounced in the villages bordering Chad on the Logone River, where the security framework is very restrictive, given the prohibition of commercial navigation on the river by the Chadian authorities.

#### Box 3: Youth mood in Blangoua

On 10<sup>th</sup> April 2016, following a dispute between police officers and a young motorcyclist regarding the observance of the prohibition to travel at certain hours of the night, the offender was placed in police custody. Young people from Blangoua revolt, ruminating for a few days the prohibition to use even the carts used to transport sand. Young people gnawed their brakes in idleness. So a very large number of them that night who tried to get access to the residence of the Divisional Officer, who was protected by the security forces. The insurgents then went to the Divisional Office that they ransack and robbed the food destined for internally displaced persons. They tried to vandalize the home of the Ministry of Agriculture' Delegate, who was considered as closer to the Divisional Officer and allegedly a "hijacker" of WFP aid. Faced with the determination of the security forces, the crowd went to the residence of the second Deputy Mayor where the young people plundered, ransacked and demolished. Then they tried to head for the Madaik village, on the banks of the Logone river, where a checkpoint was found, which was reputed to be harassing and corrupt. The mediation of elders and heads of families calms them.

## E. Youths and conflict resolution

### a. Common mechanisms for solving conflicts

In the overall, common means of addressing conflicts are traditional, associative, judiciary, administrative and by security services. These mechanisms are resorted to as shown in Table 11 below.

**Table 11** : Resort to conflict resolution mechanisms

	Resorted to Institutions for conflict resolution				Total
	Court	Security Forces	Tradi. authorities	SDO/DO	
Mara	8	32	9	1	50
Mougalam	16	27	24	4	71
Goulfey	21	44	38	2	105
Kousseri	16	69	18	3	106
Ridjil	9	45	13	0	67
Mousgoum					
Goulfey Gana	0	23	9	0	32
Blaram	0	23	7	0	30
Dougoumachi	0	17	8	0	25
Blangoua	0	40	11	0	51
Kobro	0	15	10	0	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>562</b>

Source : Field work, April 2017.

Three tendencies resurface from this table. First of all, very few resort to the administrative authority, which stands out as the president of the commission in charge of solving agro-pastoral conflicts, is called to bring solutions to land problems. Very few turn to this commission because the procedure is lengthy, costly and deals much more with within countryside litigations and on large scale spaces. The judiciary is resorted to in cases where human or material damages have been recorded. The court is seen as “the justice of the Arabs” and the populations seem to dread it because of the time it takes, its cost and the uncertainties of the verdict<sup>46</sup>.

Sultans, Lawans and Blamas are the closest authorities to the populations. Customary

<sup>46</sup> Source : groupes de discussion, avril 2017.

conflict management bodies are functional in all chiefdoms. They are, as the case may be, customary courts, assemblies of notables or specific committees formed by the chiefs to resolve inter-community conflicts. 27% of the youths position traditional authority as a proximity interlocutor, more able to grasp the complexity of conflicts within communities.

The pre-eminence of the security forces in the management of conflicts is a recent fact to be related to the current crisis. This has much to do with their presence and their interventions than a preferential resort of the populations to the police and the gendarmerie. The fact that this trend is predominant in all the localities studied also reflects their deployment and the growth of the workforce throughout the northern part of the Division. Hundreds of soldiers of the Multinational Force are positioned against Boko Haram. Respondents' responses are therefore contextual. There is confusion between protection of populations and resolution of conflicts.

In the course of the interviews, it became apparent that the population believes that it is thanks to the defense and security forces that calm reigns, that people avoid conflicts so as not to be blamed for causing trouble when everyone is supposed to remain vigilant and not grant access to Boko Haram. However, it is noticed that the police and gendarmerie are more resorted to in the city, while community leaders retain control over disputes in villages. Regarding the types of conflicts which are solved, Table 12 below gives an account of it.

**Table 12** : Types of conflicts solved

	Cases of resolved conflicts				Total
	Theft	Assault	Family Conflits	Agro-pastoral Conflicts	
Mara	28	4	13	4	49
Mougalam	34	5	23	6	68
Goulfey	43	18	25	15	101
Kousseri	63	6	26	9	104
Ridjil	31	4	16	12	63
Mousgoum	18	2	7	4	31
Goulfey Gana	16	5	7	1	29
Blaram	13	3	5	3	24
Dougoumachi	23	17	6	3	49
Blangoua	10	8	4	2	24
Kobro	279	72	132	59	542
Total					

**Source** : Fieldwork ; April 2017.

More than 50 per cent of the youths consider that thefts occupy traditional chiefs and security forces in the first place. This is followed by so-called family disputes, which in

fact include matrimonial disputes, inheritance problems, disputes between neighbors, breaches of trust in commercial transactions, adulteries and out of wedlock pregnancies ... Despite the increased presence of security forces, there are always isolated cases of physical violence (fights, bandits, use of white weapons ...). The low proportion of respondents who identified land disputes is partly explained by the fact that they are often managed by reconciliation between the persons concerned, witnesses and notables.

However, it is important to note that interviews with religious dignitaries, notably imams, priests and pastors, reveal a growing trend towards turning to religious leaders. It was known that Muslim leaders were regularly solicited by their communities to settle the various home disputes, succession or adultery. But the growing interest of Christian communities for pastors and priests to settle social problems seems new, especially in the parishes of Makary (which covers Goulfey) and Blangoua. According to Pastor Siam Antoine of Blaram, youth and women problems are resolved by the church in a church council. Out of 559 respondents, 103 (almost 20%) realized that there is renewed interest in religious leaders in conflict management. These are especially youths of the localities of Goulfey, Mougalam, Mara and Blaram who make the observation.

### **b. Youths and women implication**

Whether they are traditional, institutional or originating from the civil society, conflict management mechanisms are less inclusive towards youths. Apart from the associative frames set up by the youths themselves or civil society organizations committed to the inclusion of women and youths in the promotion of peace and social cohesion, prevailing trends do not grant importance to the contribution of these sociological categories. The table below presents their views on this subject.

**Table 13** : Implication of youths and women in the mechanism of conflict resolution

		Participation		Total
		Yes	No	
Localit y	Mara	15	36	51
	Mougalam	33	38	71
	Goulfey	55	50	105
	Kousseri	28	78	106
	Ridjil	13	54	67
	Mousgoum			
	Goulfey Gana	2	30	32
	Blaram	1	29	30
	Dougoumachi	9	16	25
	Blangoua	10	41	51
	Kobro	2	23	25
	Total	168	395	563

**Source:** Fieldwork, April 2017.

The observation is striking, which shows that more than 70% of young people and women share the feeling of exclusion from crisis and conflict resolution mechanisms. This tendency is stronger in Ridjil-Mousgoum (80%), Kobro (92%) and Goulfey-Gana (93%), where traditional constraints based on consideration for elders and obedience to traditional authorities are acute. At the same time, it may be admitted that some of them have the right to expression.

Yet we must remain cautious because what seems to be an inclusion of youths in crisis-resolution bodies is nothing but the measures taken by youths in order to take part in decision making. This can be seen in associations, youth organizations or discussion forums where meetings are held with the elders to consider and mutualize the efforts of all. We also note the presence of young notables in the court of chiefs, but they are heirs of the titles devolved to their ascendants.

### **c. Prevention of extremism and social cohesion youth organizations**

The promotion of peace and social cohesion by the youths remains dependent on their ability to organize and implement concrete actions. In the study areas, many youth organizations are actively working to facilitate inter-community cohesion, preventing the risk of inter-ethnic escalation, deconstructing active and discursive vectors of violence, not only among youths, but also within their respective communities. Some organizations stand out (see Annex).

If the visibility of these organizations is somewhat overshadowed a low rate of realization, that is, mainly linked to limited resources which they have. It should be admitted that they symbolize a raise of awareness which, failing to act, allows the measuring scale of actions deficit and the hurry to invest in the backing of rural and urban society in terms of capacity building so as to promote togetherness.

In short, the matrix in the 3<sup>rd</sup> appendix provides profile of the main mechanisms for conflict resolution in the area of study. It emerges from this that, traditionally, conflict management is the responsibility of traditional authorities. They have the customary court recognized as an official judicial body with the Sultans, and the frameworks of conciliation and arbitration with the chiefs of villages commonly called Blamas. Religious leaders are also facilitators in social conflicts resolution.

The evaluation of these mechanisms shows that they are quite effective in management of social conflicts (conjugal, intra-community land, economic relations, etc.) but very restricted in the treatment of cases involving physical integrity or men life, as well as in inter-community conflicts. The main strength of these mechanisms lies in the resolution of proximity disputes and their ability to stem the maturation of these disputes towards greater conflicts.

However, they cannot be considered as capable of preventing conflicts, due to the lack of permanent early warning system that permits to anticipate recurring antagonisms such as agro-pastoral or inter-community disputes. Despite their institutional features, customary courts remain informal in their procedures as well as in implementing sentences. Without archives and predictability of verdicts, they are perceived as elderly and illiterates' court. This justifies the tendency of young people especially to refer to security forces to solve their disputes.

Moreover, it is the collegiate bodies of elders who are more and more mediating in internal conflicts within Arab community or Kotoko community, more precisely when cases are concerned with political rivalries or disputes between sultanates. As a result, administrative, political and economic elites are highly involved in the promotion of social cohesion. This makes it partially competes with the land dispute management commission which is under the competence of the administrative authority. This commission is suffering

from material, technical and financial difficulties for its diligent deployment on the field and it is also perceived as vulnerable to corruption and influence.

## F. Means for the promotion of peace and prevention of extremism

### a. Communities raising

Youths' proposals are framed down in the table below.

**Table 14** : Means for communities raising

	Means			Total
	Funding of production activities	Reconstruction of social fabric	Improvement of Production tools	
Mara	16	24	11	51
Mougalam	9	34	28	71
Goulfey	28	48	29	105
Kousseri	38	39	29	106
Ridjil	16	30	21	67
Locality Mousgoum	15	8	9	32
Goulfey Gana	16	9	5	30
Blaram	13	7	5	25
Dougoumachi	26	15	10	51
Blangoua	11	8	6	25
Kobro	188	222	153	563
Total				

**Source** : Field survey

The reconstruction of the social life is considered by 40% youths as a key sector which needs to be addressed. At the heart of this proposal, we find families who are scattered, because of forced displacements, communities falling prey to conflicts and to poor representations, the care-taking of children with no assistance, entertainments with and between youths, women empowerment in moral education of youths, more involvement of religious leaders in the production and the delivery of peace-keeping messages, etc.

The second axis of thought is socio-economic reinforcement. Either they are IDPs, host populations, refugees or returnees, they undergo the consequences of insecurity. The recovery action should dwell much on resilient populations, namely on youths' capacity-building, the putting in place of support programs for young entrepreneurs in farming, that is, farmers and fishers so much so that they should be able to produce

and to prevent youths from falling victims of poverty and their exhibition to risk of radicalization. This youths' concern shared up to 33%. It is even stressed about in the formulation of their specific and economic needs.

**Table 13** : Specific youth needs

	Needs				Total
	Feeding	Manure and production tools	Funding of RGA	Support and follow up of production	
Mara	5	12	20	13	50
Mougalam	7	4	28	30	69
Goulfey	9	7	52	30	98
Kousseri	30	10	26	37	103
Ridjil	13	9	25	15	62
Locality Mousgoum					
Goulfey Gana	0	16	11	5	32
Blaram	1	17	7	5	30
Dougoumachi	1	13	6	5	25
Blangoua	2	26	14	9	51
Kobro	2	13	7	3	25
Total	70	127	196	152	545

The following percentages were recorded :

- Needs for AGR funds (36%)
- Support and production follow up (28%)
- Manure and production tools (23%)
- Feeding (12%)

Feeding needs were more widely reported by children in focus groups. Depending mainly on the poverty of the parents, subsistence and leisure constitute their main concerns because they are hungry and bored. Those who do not go (or no longer) to school, ask for the apprenticeship (carpentry, building, sewing, transformation of agricultural products ...) and literacy.

## b. Prevention against radicalization

**Table 12 : Solutions against radicalization of youths**

	Youth Proposals				Total	
	Creation of jobs	Fight against drug consumption	Sensitization	Dialogue		
Locality						
	Mara	24	4	11	7	46
	Mougalam	51	3	14	1	69
	Goulfey	56	8	18	12	94
	Kousseri	61	9	25	8	103
	Ridjil	36	10	14	2	62
	Mousgoum					
	Goulfey Gana	13	3	11	2	29
	Blaram	13	9	7	1	30
	Dougoumachi	11	6	6	1	24
	Blangoua	21	10	12	7	50
	Kobro	10	6	3	6	25
	Total	296	68	121	47	532

**Source :** Fiedwork, April 2017

The trends displayed by the youths show that the creation of income-generating activities is the first bulwark against vulnerability to extremism. 55% of the youths direct counter-radicalization actions towards job creation. However, this would not be enough if there were not, concomitantly, a mental channeling of the youths and the struggle against the stimulators of deviation, which are cheap drugs that circulate in the Logone and Chari. Approximately 23% prioritize sensitization and about 13% consider combating drug consumption and other derived products. These trends are consistent with the threats to peace and social cohesion formulated by the youths.

### c. Role of Vigilante groups

Alongside the defense and security forces, vigilance groups have been identified as an essential actor in producing security against Boko Haram's threats. Perceptions, however, are ambivalent and require contrastive perspectives. As an early warning mechanism, the vigilance groups' contribution to preventive intelligence, detection of suspects and containment of Boko Haram's attacks and suicide bombings is welcomed by the population and by the traditional, administrative and security authorities.

However, their work suffers from insufficient training, material and financial resources to compensate the time they are spending and allow a better mobility, despite the periodic support provided by the Head of State. The time of their methodical demobilization

is a matter for both communities and authorities, who are afraid that their eventual dissatisfaction will later turn them into a new security threat in the border areas (see Appendix).

#### **d. Reforming koranic schools**

UNDP has already conducted many studies,<sup>47</sup> workshops and trainings<sup>48</sup> on koranic schools in the Far-North Region. It is admitted that students are exposed to socio-economic and cognitive vulnerability.

First, they are left to themselves by parents who abandon them to teachers (marabouts) who are responsible for their spiritual training, shelter and feeding them as far mobile schools are concerned. This category of schools is prohibited because of the enrollment risks perceived by administration.

Second, koranic schools are limited to the learning of reading Qur'an, the practice of Islamic worship and theological knowledge for those who foster the study for many years. Below the age of twenty, students are not prepared enough to resist ideological manipulation, due their limited knowledge. Even beyond this age, most of them stop learning religious texts once they have "finished" the Qur'an, that is to say, completed their reading with a teacher.

Teachers themselves are at risk because neither their level of knowledge and socio-economic status nor their remuneration prevent them from temptation. Moreover, the content of teachings they provide and the pedagogical approach they adopt are not designed to prevent them from doctrinal drifts in the sense that most of them do not know much. Besides this, Koranic schools do not provide professional training. They remain traditional in their function of spiritual training of both children and adults.

Various analyses made on the future of Koranic schools have shown that banning them would simply aggravate the ignorance of young people, since there would be no alternative, especially for over aged children to be enrolled in primary school. To take only the case of Chad, the public authorities and those responsible for Islamic education have

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<sup>47</sup> Namely the the elaboration of a baseline, action plan and a platform for dialogue in Far North ; training plan for kuranic teachers and professional training plan for non scholarized children, October 2016.

<sup>48</sup> Namely the workshop for the validation of the modules for capacity building of the kuranic school teachers in February 2017; the workshop for pedagogic capacity building of kuranic school teachers in Maroua, July 2017.

turned to the Khalwas, known as renamed or modernized Koranic schools. The following extract defines the Khalwas:

“To the extent that the Koranic school unquestionably answers the criteria of relevance from the point of view of the families concerned, it can particularly be a powerful means of dispensing the fundamental acquisitions of reading, writing, calculation and capacity in solving daily life problems, which are precisely the goals of basic education. This objective has become accessible with the renewal and progressive rejuvenation of the Koranic teachers (...) (who) expressed their enthusiasm to participate in this experience. In this context, the main objective of the program is to accelerate the renovation of Koranic schools so that the education they provide can better fulfill the aims of basic education and effectively contribute to the growth of schooling and / or literacy rates. ... Voluntary communities will then benefit from new premises and facilities for their Koranic school ... Renovated education programs will be designed, discussed and distributed. These programs will determine the expected content of the lessons and establish criteria and conditions for linking the Koranic school with the Arabic-language (madrassa) or bilingual primary school and the vocational training programs on the other. Teachers of Koranic schools (500) will benefit from pedagogical training related to the new programs and will receive an identical grant identical to the community teachers, as agreed by the validation workshop. 45,000 pupils' textbooks and teacher guides will be distributed in schools. The supervision of the Koranic schools will be introduced and reinforced by training 50 pedagogical advisers and 10 inspectors of Koranic schools, to which motorcycles will be awarded for their functions. These improvements will enable some pupils from Koranic schools to continue their education and training in the formal education system, while others will acquire vocational skills that can promote their socio-professional integration ”.<sup>49</sup>

While in Chad the formalization of Koranic schools is progressing, in Cameroon, the process is still in the evaluation phase, defining approaches between the Ministries in charge of Basic Education and Territorial Administration (in charge of cults). In 2015, a census of Koranic schools in the Far-North had provided the following estimation: for Logone and Chari: 321 schools, 648 teachers and 20334 pupils. The borough of Kousseri had 18 schools, 256 teachers and 2691 pupils. In Goulfeï, there were 20 schools, 31 teachers and 1393 pupils. In Blangoua, there were 102 schools run by 75 teachers. Most of the villages (Goulfeï Gana, Kobro, Mougalam ...) had only one school with one or two teachers for about one hundred pupils.

The observation that can be made is that after a period of suspension of their activities because of administrative prohibition, Koranic schools reopened and continue to function exactly as in their former days. Discussions with teachers reveal that Logone and Chari marabouts are among the most enthusiastic to receive training to improve the quality of the training they provide and to adapt it to the new needs of the learners and the requirements of

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<sup>49</sup> UNESCO/BID Document d'appui au programme prioritaire pour la promotion de l'éducation bilingue au Tchad, 2007-2010, octobre 2006.

the social environment. They are the first to have begun the process of creating an association of mutual pedagogical assistance and collegiate management of their common problems.

### **G. Conclusion**

Before Boko Haram, the youths of Logone and Chari were involved in several income-generating activities. On the shores of Lake Chad, agriculture, livestock and trade used to employ thousands of young people. Arabs, Kotoko, Kanouri, Mousgoum and many other national and foreign communities live together there. Despite the relative economic specialization of the communities, interdependence was perceptible. Most of the young people in Goulfei and Blangoua were turned towards the Lake and to the neighboring countries (Nigeria and Chad) where they used to sell their products. In many cases, their employers or customers resided in northeastern Nigeria, and specifically in Maiduguri. As in Mayo Sava, young people in the northern part of the Logone and Chari were economically dependent and almost culturally shaped by interactions with Nigeria, while those of Kousseri and Logone Birni were in the orbit of Ndjamen. However, the Kousseri-Maltam-Fotokol-Gamboru axis served them to bridge the gap between Chad and Nigeria in the context of smuggling of goods and, more broadly, of cross-border trade.

Cross-border mobility have created economic and cultural dependence, which are sometimes favorable to integration, sometimes with warlike solidarity. The later have been expressed on several occasions which include the Chadian civil war, inter-ethnic clashes between Choa Arabs and Kotoko or in the forming of arm robbers. Young people have sometimes violently expressed their dissatisfaction with the application of control measures which, according to them, hinder their cross-border activities. This was the case in December 2007 in Kousseri when young smugglers burned Ngueli's customs office, set fire to customs officers' houses, ransacked vehicles and some people were seriously wounded. The Blangoua and Kousseri mood movements indicate the level of young people determination to oppose even by violence, what they considered as abuse.

The difficult conditions in which young people are looking for money, the regional environment marked by the recurrence of violence as a means of resolving disputes, the local context marked by intercommunity animosity and stigmatization constitute the ways of building rough attitudes. Mistrust of public officials is perceptible because they are perceived as corrupted or officials allied to the opposing community. As a result, their measures or

decisions taken in conflicts resolution or the implementation of law are always questioned. Hence, despite their clear desire to free themselves from the socio-cultural constraints that inhibit their involvement in conflict management mechanisms, young people give more credit to traditional ways of solving social conflicts.

However, some have created civil society organizations which are not only promoting social cohesion but are also trying to regulate the behavior of corporate members such as mototaximen, which is made up of thousands of young people, since they are also urban and intercity contractors and smugglers. It was also noticed that the consumption of narcotics, the scarcity of leisure jobs apprenticeship impact the behavior of young people. Therefore, eldest young must be reframed while the youngest ones must be modeled with socialization, relaxation and learning activities so as to drop them out from their elder' experiences.

## **H. Recommendations**

### *A. The choice of the five target localities*

Surveyed localities are located in an area of sociological and economic continuity within which Kousseri is the epicenter by playing the role of diffuser of products / ideas coming from (or going to) Ndjamena (Chad) and Gambaru (Nigeria) on one hand and in the North-South direction towards Goulfei and Blangoua on the banks of the Lake. Kousseri for its centrality, Goulfei as an epicenter of intercommunity and agro-pastoral conflicts, Blangoua for the socio-economic wrath of young people and their cross-border interactions through smuggling, Kopro and Goulfei Gana for exposure to cross-border arms and ammunition trafficking, like others, are suggested as a pole of intervention. Dougoumachi between Blangoua and the Lake could substitute Goulfei Gana for its proximity to the Lake and its situation on the transit line of cross-border trade and therefore its exposure to the risks of recruitment of idle young people due to the stoppage of the disturbance Income-generating activities. Appendix 6 summarizes the motives for which these localities are recommended.

### *B. To strengthen communities' capacity to better adapt and prevent themselves from effects of violent extremism:*

1. Stabilize young people incomes:
  - Reduce the dependence of local producers vis-à-vis of the usual flow patterns by: organizing young people into producer associations; designing storage

warehouses; improving conservation techniques; facilitating access to local markets;

- Support the small-scale transformation of agricultural, livestock and fishing products in order to facilitate the transition as semi-finished products on the local market;
- Sensitize young people on emerging and promising sectors.

2- Assess, in a participatory way, the effects of inter-community conflicts and Boko Haram. That is to say:

- Organize a group assessment and awareness workshop: mototaximen; cross-border young economic operators; young hosts and displaced; radicalized relatives;
  - Organize a workshop discussion between local elected representatives, notables and traditional leaders;
  - Organize discussion/evaluation forums in villages by doing a campaign on raising awareness about child protection;
  - Organize a dialogue session on religious speeches between leaders of all with Islamic tendencies, Koranic teachers, teachers of madrasas and leaders of local Islamic associations;
  - Organize an intercommunity workshop for young peace ambassadors.
3. Create cross-community and cross-border platforms for exchanging experiences between youth associations.

#### C. To reverse radicalization's trend:

1. Clear off the marginalization feeling of young people and women
  - Include youth representatives in all traditional mechanisms and conflict regulation committees;
  - Strengthen youth and women's associations capacity in the reconciliation and social reintegration processes of fragile persons;
  - Create notability titles to young people within the traditional chiefdoms;
  - Create a permanent intergenerational dialogue in the framework of preserving peace.
- 2- Produce and disseminate alternative discourses:
  - Train religious leaders in de-radicalization mechanisms;
  - Collectively, design alternative discourses based on religious precepts and disseminate them through Koranic schools, madrasas, mosques, libraries;

- Train young preachers in the theology of de-radicalization and facilitate the organization of itinerant preaching.
- 3- Establish monitoring mechanisms for younger people (10-18 years):
    - Create a "children's place" that should be in the framework of playful socialization through sport, board games, entertainment reading, theater, fairy tales developing socialization and tolerance;
    - Systematize children participation in extra-curricular activities;
    - Train chaplains of all obedience on the values of peace and facilitate their access; to students and groups of children in a good settings;
    - Extend and operationalize the CEOCAs.
  - 4- Strengthen local civil society by supporting youth organizations that are able to relay and sustain messages of inclusive attitudes.

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