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Executive Summary

It is widely recognised that the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) International, People In Aid and The Sphere Project share commonalities. The 2011 Sphere Handbook and 2010 HAP Standard have intentionally built on and been structured to complement each other. This Joint Deployment, conducted under the banner of the Joint Standards Initiative (JSI), was an effort to synergise the services offered by the three initiatives and offer a common quality and accountability (Q&A) platform to the wider sector during the 2011 Horn of Africa drought response. This was not the first joint deployment (Kashmir earthquake in Pakistan, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, Haiti earthquake) but it was the first deployment where a distinct team was formed which jointly represented the standards of the initiatives with the aim of bringing greater coherence to the range of services offered during a humanitarian response. Although each initiative has its own specific mandate and areas of specialisation and services, in view of the desire for greater coherence under the Joint Standards Initiative, the deployment to the Horn of Africa presented a timely opportunity for collaboration.

In July 2011, HAP International, the Sphere Project and People In Aid called for greater quality and accountability in the humanitarian response to the Horn of Africa. An agreement between the three initiatives was made to collaborate on a joint deployment to the Horn of Africa to assist agencies in responding to the crisis. The overarching aim of the deployment was ‘to support humanitarian agencies in providing accountable and appropriate programming that meets accepted standards of quality and accountability’.

The objectives of the Joint Deployment were:

- To identify and support the delivery of appropriate support and learning activities with humanitarian actors in order to strengthen their understanding of, and ability to apply, established quality and accountability mechanisms and approaches
- To collaborate with relevant stakeholders and advocate for quality and accountability of the wider humanitarian response, including through raising awareness of existing approaches to Q&A and highlighting strengths and gaps observed to date
- To document and share good practice and learning in order to build on the pool of resources available for senior managers and practitioners in the Horn of Africa and globally, and for use as part of wider discussions on the ‘state of’ quality and accountability as part of current humanitarian response.

The Joint Deployment took place over a 9-week period between 27 October 2011 and 31 January 2012. The underpinning concept of the Joint Deployment was to build on a process of taking account of key stakeholders, most importantly affected communities.

Several themes and trends emerged, including the need for good people-management processes and practices and the need for increased peer learning, and the need for capacity building on the practical application of humanitarian standards. However, the most prominent trend which emerged was the lack of effective engagement with affected populations. This echoes the findings of previous evaluations of significant humanitarian responses. For example, the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (1996) recommended that agencies strengthen their systems for improving accountability to recipients of assistance, by establishing mechanisms for consultation with people affected by humanitarian emergencies. Eighteen years after the Rwanda Genocide, which many regard was the catalyst for the establishment of HAP, People In Aid and The Sphere Project, the humanitarian sector continues to struggle with keeping affected populations at the centre of their responses.

The three initiatives recognise that the Joint Deployment in the Horn of Africa worked with a small sample but taken alongside other findings from Haiti and Pakistan deployments, we urge the humanitarian community to take into consideration the issues raised by this report. The three standards initiatives are ready to separately support agencies with their accountability to affected populations and to staff, while the on-going Joint

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1 Accountability is the means through which power is used responsibly. It is a process of taking account of, and being held accountable by, different stakeholders, and primarily those who are affected by the exercise of power.
Standards Initiative will support the sector more widely in raising awareness of the standards which the sector has developed and of which there appeared to be too little knowledge in the field.

The JSI is currently in the process of consolidating its own learning in relation to the implementation of the deployment. Future Joint Deployments will build upon the lessons learnt (from the Horn of Africa deployment and where relevant feedback into the overarching JSI process). In the meantime, if you have any questions or feedback on this report, please do not hesitate to contact Gregory Gleed on ggleed@hapinternational.org.
1. Introduction

On 27 October 2011, the Joint Deployment commenced with the presentation of the Joint Deployment Terms of Reference (ToR) to the Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) Quality and Accountability Sub-Group in Nairobi, Kenya and ended on 31 January 2012. The purpose of the deployment was to support the humanitarian system in providing accountable and context-informed programming that meets accepted standards of quality, both in the immediate humanitarian response, and in the development and implementation of organisational and operational strategies for short- and long-term recovery and the prevention of future crises.

The report includes: the humanitarian context in which the deployment took place; the findings of the scoping mission; a brief overview of the key activities of the deployment; an assimilation of the key findings from the main activities of the deployment; and it concludes with several recommendations based on the collective learning of the Joint Deployment.

2. Humanitarian Context

The 2011 East Africa drought was as a result of the worst water shortage in 60 years. An estimated 10 million people were affected by a severe food crisis across Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. The situation was compounded by large numbers of refugees from southern Somalia fleeing conflict to neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia and the extremely high food prices. Other countries in East Africa, including Sudan, South Sudan and parts of Uganda, were also affected.

On 20 July, the United Nations (UN) declared a famine in two regions in the southern part of Somalia. Tens of thousands of people are believed to have died in southern Somalia before famine was declared. On 3 August, famine was further declared in the Balcad and Cadale districts in Middle Shabelle as well as the IDP settlements in Mogadishu and Afgooye. In addition, the Kenyan Red Cross warned of a looming humanitarian crisis in the north-western Turkana region of Kenya, which borders South Sudan.

Extremely high food prices during 2011 exacerbated the situation. In July 2011, staple prices were at 68% over the five-year average including increases of up to 240% in southern Somalia, 117% in south-eastern Ethiopia, and 58% in northern Kenya.

Humanitarian actors were criticised for not responding quickly enough to the crisis. Despite early warnings in late 2010 and a UN appeal in November that year, humanitarian funding was only increased in June and July 2011.

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2 See Annex
3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14023160
4 http://www.economist.com/node/18929467
5 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FSNAU_FEWSSNET_020811press%20release_030811_final.pdf
6 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_report_216.pdf
7 http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/Horn_of_Africa_Drought_2011_06.pdf
3. Scoping Mission

An initial joint assessment\(^\text{10}\) was conducted in Nairobi from 15 to 23 August 2011. The consultation process identified several common trends and themes in relation to quality and accountability in the 2011 drought response. The team met with representatives of 26 agencies during the 9 days of their stay, including 17 national and international NGOs, 2 UN agencies, 2 donor representatives, 3 interagency network representatives and 2 media development agencies. In addition, they attended 3 interagency meetings and presented the aims of their mission and invited discussion with and contact from additional agencies, both UN and international NGOs.

Some of the key quality and accountability issues raised through the consultations were:

- **People management processes and practices:** During the scale up phase of the emergency, good people management practices were seen to be too cumbersome for the immediate human capacity demands. Organisations were skipping critical steps such as reference checks and inductions, which increases risk and potentially compromises quality.

- **Contextual knowledge:** Established agencies spoke of the importance of contextual knowledge for the delivery of effective programming; in particular in the Horn of Africa, the dynamics of pastoralist communities. There was disagreement on the longer term effect of particular programmes. Certain agencies perceived that particular interventions could potentially exacerbate the situation for chronically drought-affected communities in the long run.

- **Peer learning:** A variety of innovative accountability mechanisms and projects were reported as being implemented at different project sites by some international NGOs and their partner agencies. However, frustration was expressed in gaining up to date case studies and tools between agencies.

Based on the findings of the assessment mission, Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Joint Deployment were developed and shared with the IAWG Quality and Accountability Sub-Group for feedback. The feedback was integrated prior to the deployment and presented and discussed with the IAWG Quality and Accountability Sub-Group at the beginning of the Joint Deployment.

4. Key Activities

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was developed between the IAWG and JSI to promote better coherence and collaboration between the Joint Deployment and the IAWG Quality and Accountability Sub-Group. The following is a summary of the main activities undertaken during the deployment in which the IAWG played an important role. Each activity has been highlighted under the 3 objectives of the ToR.

**Objective 1:** To identify and support the delivery of appropriate learning activities with humanitarian actors in order to strengthen their understanding of, and ability to apply, established quality and accountability mechanisms and approaches.

- The Joint Deployment team was part of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) regional and Kenya real-time evaluation (RTE) Advisory Group. As part of the advisory group, the team took part in several meetings to discuss methodology as well as which stakeholders the RTE should engage with. It was identified that the RTE methodology did not include consultations with affected communities; therefore the primary findings of the inter-agency mapping exercise which led to the *Voices of Affected Communities* report was shared with the RTE to strengthen the evidence base.

- During the deployment the team continuously engaged representatives from approximately 40 agencies to identify quality and accountability gaps and emerging issues. Individual advice and support was provided where possible.

\(^{10}\) Read more about the Findings of the Horn of Africa assessment mission.
The Joint Deployment team took part in the Emergency Capacity Building Project's (ECB) flood simulation as observers. A break-out session on accountability was organised in which the JSI team was able to engage with national and regional aid workers. The session highlighted the lack of awareness and knowledge of the application of humanitarian standards.

**Objective 2:** To collaborate with relevant stakeholders and advocate for quality and accountability in the wider humanitarian response, including through raising awareness of existing approaches to Q&A and highlighting strengths and gaps to date.

- The team presented to the Water and Environmental Sanitation Coordination group (WESCOORD/WASH cluster). The objective of the presentation was to introduce the group to relevant accountability tools and to gain a greater understanding of constraints faced by the cluster.
- The Joint Deployment in conjunction with the IAWG Quality and Accountability Sub-Group and Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB) hosted a round table conference in Nairobi, Kenya on accountability to communities. The conference was entitled “Putting principles and standards into practice” and was attended by 38 participants from 23 agencies.

**Objective 3:** To document and share good practice and learning in order to build on the pool of resources available for senior managers and practitioners in the Horn of Africa and globally, and for use as part of wider discussions on the state of accountability of the current humanitarian response.

- The first assessment of the Joint Deployment was an interagency quality and accountability mapping exercise with the in-country Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) hosted by UNOCHA. In total, 25 agencies were represented, 36 staff members participated and 109 host community members were consulted from 10 stakeholder groups.
- The second assessment of the Joint Deployment took place in Mwingi, Kenya. A series of key informant interviews were conducted in order to complement the findings of the inter-agency quality and accountability mapping exercises in Turkana. In total 19 individuals took part in the key informant interviews over a period of 4 days. The sample of individuals consisted of a diverse group of interviewees, which included representatives from government ministries, private businesses, religious institutions, INGOs, and community groups.

5. Key Findings

The perceptions, opinions and feedback presented in this section have not been triangulated with data from other sources. For this reason, the report does not claim to represent an exhaustive overview of quality and accountability in the 2011 Horn of Africa drought response. It is written to illustrate trends and themes as identified by the Joint Deployment team to serve as learning from which improvements can be built.

The perceptions, opinions and feedback presented in this report refer directly to 4 source documents:

- *Moving Towards Improved Accountability and Quality in the Horn of Africa*[^11]
- *Voices of Affected Communities, Turkana, Kenya*[^12]
- *Roundtable Conference Report, Nairobi, Kenya*[^13]
- *Joint Deployment: Key Informant Interviews, Mwingi, Kenya*[^14]

Those wishing to gain further understanding of the following findings should consult the source documents.

5.1 Upholding Humanitarian Principles

“The right to receive humanitarian assistance . . . must be provided according to the principle of impartiality . . . provided solely on the basis of need and in proportion to need . . . (which) reflects the wider principle of non-discrimination” (2011 Sphere Handbook, Page 22)

During the initial scoping mission, agency staff told us that agencies were being heavily influenced by the presence of the media in certain geographic areas. The drought affected large swathes of the Horn of Africa; however, the coverage of aid agencies was concentrated to certain areas. This resulted in questions around coverage, coordination, and delivering aid on the basis of the proportion of need. Also, the relative ease of access to certain locations was also given as a justification for the concentration of agencies in certain geographic areas. It must also be stated that factors such as security and seasonal flooding also affected access to certain populations.

Likewise, issues of delivering aid on the basis of need and in proportion to need was questioned in relation to politically motivated aid in Mwingi. It was reported that certain communities would receive aid as a result of an individual’s political agenda rather than the recognition of the greatest need. Several participants mentioned that local politicians were organising food distributions in an effort to boost their popularity. On a larger scale, a representative from an established national NGO stated that politicians at Nairobi level would facilitate food distributions in the region. The sporadic distributions are perceived to have limited impact and are potentially making communities more vulnerable as they became reliant on intermittent distributions.

In Turkana, access to humanitarian assistance of vulnerable groups in relation to people with disabilities and the elderly highlighted issues of exclusion, a sense of discrimination and a lack of special effort to ensure their representation in the on-going project activities. They also highlighted concerns of accessing food distributions and difficulties in transporting food. These findings highlight the need for special measures to facilitate access for vulnerable groups.

5.2 Rights-based Approach

During consultations with affected communities in Turkana, various groups highlighted that they did not have a clear understanding of their rights and wanted to be sensitised so they could hold organisations accountable for their actions. The provision of information on the rights of the individual was highlighted as a key area by a representative of the Government of Kenya in Mwingi. He perceived that educating communities about their rights was central to communities playing a stronger role in the development of community-based resilience strategies.

5.3 Participation

“The priority needs of the disaster-affected population are identified through a systematic assessment of the context, risks to life with dignity and the capacity of the affected people and relevant authorities to respond.” (Core Standard 3, 2011 Sphere Handbook, Page 61)

Certain organisations appeared to be systematically failing to harness the local knowledge and expertise from the relevant administrations and the affected community members. The lack of effective engagement with communities and key stakeholders affected the quality of the response. Some individuals consulted over the period of the deployment highlighted that at times agencies, through their actions, increased the risk towards vulnerability.

Both of the assessments that were carried out emphasised the importance of community-wide participation. In Turkana, affected communities highlighted the over-reliance of organisations on the use of committees or structures within the community to select beneficiaries, pass on information and provide feedback on

15 Protection Principles, 2011 Sphere Handbook, Pg 37
programmes. In both regions it was mentioned during consultations that the local leaders had manipulated their position of authority for their own personal gain.

The feedback from participants in Lodwar stressed the importance of needs-based programming. They perceived that at times projects were donor-driven which resulted in lower impact or becoming ill directed. Therefore, they stated that disaster-affected communities’ needs have to be carefully understood and aid delivered accordingly. Examples of ill-directed programming included malnourished children being provided with maize, and drought-affected communities being given dry foods to cook when they had no access to water.

There was an issue in both Turkana and Mwingi of drawing on local expertise in the design and implementation of effective projects. In Turkana, a common trend that emerged amongst the groups consulted was the lack of participation with affected communities, which in their view resulted in unsustainable and unsuitable projects with no real impact. This was also strongly echoed by the district-level government officials in Turkana who said that there was a lack of active and tangible involvement of district government in the assistance programmes - local capacities and expertise, which was available, had not been used. In both Turkana and Mwingi, district level officials spoke of occasions when they had not been consulted before programme design and implementation, resulting in unsuitable seeds being distributed.

5.4 Design and Response

“The organisation shall enable the people it aims to assist to provide feedback and influence or make decisions about the project in a way that is continuously adapted to the context and the intervention. As a minimum, informed consent shall be obtained for the action.” (Participation, Requirement 4.2, 2010 HAP Standard, Page 18)

The need to have sustainable, self-reliant programmes that build resilience in the long-term was strongly emphasised by every stakeholder group consulted in Turkana. Sustainability was the strongest trend to emerge from the key informant interviews in Mwingi. Concerns and dissatisfaction was expressed, and the group of men consulted in Kakuma said that “hit-and-run projects” had been implemented which left little trace or impact. While the government officials lamented that “dependency syndrome has been created by flooding of food aid in Turkana - a sack of maize is sold cheaper in Kakuma, than in Kitalie (the bread basket of Kenya)” and recommended that there needs to be a shift from food aid to food security. In Mwingi, several government representatives stated that food distributions are having a negative effect. They perceived that people were becoming dependent on food aid rather than pursuing their usual livelihood strategies. Semi-permanent settlements had sprung up on the road-side as they had been receiving food aid. The semi-permanent settlements represented a break from the traditional pastoralist lifestyle as these communities would usually not establish themselves within an area for a sustained time period.

The importance of the quality assessments and the implementation and design of quality interventions is an essential part of minimising the risk towards vulnerability\textsuperscript{16}.

5.5 Coordination and Collaboration

“Humanitarian response is planned and implemented in coordination with relevant authorities, humanitarian agencies and civil society organisations engaged in impartial humanitarian action, working together for maximum efficiency, coverage and effectiveness.” (Core Standard 2, 2011 Sphere Handbook, Page 58)

During the scoping mission, inter-agency information was seen as one of the biggest problems at Nairobi level and was hampering the effectiveness of the response. Nairobi coordination mechanisms provided a platform for regional and national fora to discuss coordination efforts. A constraint faced by the scoping mission was the inability to access programme sites in order to assess the usefulness of these coordination mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{16} Core Standards, Sphere Handbook 2011, Pg 65
At the round table conference, a representative from the Government of Kenya (GoK) argued that the most significant accountability issue was the lack of coordination between the GoK and humanitarian agencies. He referred to the difficulty in retrieving information from agencies to effectively coordinate the response, which resulted in the duplication of efforts and the concentration of aid in certain geographical areas. He concluded that the focus of accountability efforts during the current response was towards the donor rather than towards affected communities.

The views of the GoK representative at the roundtable conference were echoed by the District Steering Group (DSG) in Turkana. A high-level district official commented that “there is a lot of publicity about the Turkana region and increased humanitarian activity, but the coordination is poor and needs a better approach. There has been too much duplication. There is no centre point so feedback cannot be given, it is very scattered, politics is not the reserve of the Government only, INGOs have engaged in it and caused problems as well”.

Coordination was also highlighted as an area of weakness by affected communities in Turkana. They urged organisations to have inter-linked and holistic programmes, so that they could be sustainable and more effective. Duplication was highlighted as another issue, as they felt that majority of organisations intervened in the same area without taking into account the programmes that had already been implemented.

In contrast to the Turkana DSG, the DSG in Mwingi was perceived by many informants to provide strong effective coordination at the local level. The effectiveness of the group came from the wide participation of a variety of stakeholders. In addition, the DSG was structured to allow the timely flow of information from the community level. The sub-chair of the DSG stated that the ability to allow the flow of accurate and timely information from the community was the strength of the local coordination mechanism.

5.6 The Importance of Contextual Knowledge

During the initial scoping mission, agencies who had worked in the region for many years spoke of the importance of local knowledge and understanding. This was in specific reference to the influx of new agencies and the scale-up of organisations into areas they had not previously been operational.

The concerns shared during the scoping mission were echoed by a local aid worker from the North Eastern Province. The individual felt that more needed to be done in relation to accountability towards affected communities. A major barrier of accountability towards affected communities was the lack of contextual knowledge of new agencies responding in the North Eastern Province, despite the relative wealth of resources.

5.7 Complaints Handling

“The organisation shall identify and put in place complaints procedures that are based on the preferences of the people it aims to assist, staff and other stakeholders, after consulting them.” (Complaints Handling, Requirement 5.2, 2010 HAP Standard, Page 21)

In Turkana, a majority of the community members highlighted that they were not aware of the process through which they could raise concerns and complaints safely with organisations. Currently they approach staff, but “we talk, but there is no action”. There was a fear of being struck off the distribution lists, repercussions on future assistance and examples of complaints that had not been received or handled well. This causes despondency and anger, with the youth group saying they would raise their concerns “through demonstrations - there is no avenue for dialogue”.

In reference to PSEA, there was limited awareness on the issues as well as reporting mechanisms in Turkana. Some community members highlighted that they had their own monitoring mechanisms and prevented such incidents from occurring while other groups highlighted that these incidents had happened

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17 Core Standards, 2011 Sphere Handbook, Pg 65
and had been reported but were either not handled in a confidential way or they were not sure of the outcomes. The government officials highlighted that cases of SEA had been reported, with the highest numbers coming from within education and food distribution systems. Gender imbalance, fear of retaliation and stigmatisation impeded reporting of PSEA since there were more male officials or the reporting officer would be a male within the government departments. At the policy level, protection issues in general were not highlighted or a part of the agenda of the DSG meetings.

5.8 Recruitment and Good People Management

“Our human resources policies aim to be effective, fair and transparent” (Staff Policies and Practices, Principle 2, People In Aid Code, Page 3)

“Dialogue with staff on matters likely to affect their employment enhances the quality and effectiveness of our policies and practices.” (Consultation and Communication, Principle 4, People In Aid Code, Page 5)

Several issues were identified that could have been averted with good people management processes.

A discussion session with staff in Kakuma, as part of the Turkana mapping exercise, highlighted that, overall, policies of their agencies were not accessible, too difficult to understand or vague. Staff stated that they struggled with the policies of their organisations in their daily work. Some staff highlighted that relevant policies were only shared once something had gone wrong, and they felt that some policies were skewed towards the protection of affected communities but not of staff. It may be surmised that the managers were not given appropriate guidance so that they are equipped to implement policies effectively\textsuperscript{18}.

In Mwingi, no staff interviewed had signed a Code of Conduct (CoC). In a contrasting situation in Turkana, staff demonstrated good awareness of their roles, responsibilities and their Code of Conduct. However, when questioned on how to report an abuse or infringement of the CoC, they displayed little awareness beyond reporting the issue to their line manager and they were not aware of any formal procedure to follow when reporting a complaint. In order for the policies to be respected all staff should be aware of grievance and disciplinary measures\textsuperscript{19}.

This raises the important issue of the comprehension of agencies’ policies and an understanding of practical application of them. Establishing policies on corruption or exploitation will serve little use if employees do not appropriately understand what the policies stand for and what should be done if they are not adhered to.

During the Turkana mapping exercise, issues of nepotism in recruitment processes resulting in a lack of inclusiveness of the local community were mentioned. Recruitment process should be fair, transparent and consistent to ensure the most appropriate person is appointed\textsuperscript{20}.

In Mwingi, the difficulty faced with regard to recruitment was the high staff turnover resulting in discontinuity and the lack of adequate knowledge. This was partly due to the funding cycles.

The Joint Deployment team identified a need for organisations to develop the skills of their staff continually so that their commitments are met more effectively\textsuperscript{21}. The common understanding of the application of humanitarian principles and the use of the standards of the JSI were extremely limited. During several meetings and consultations at Nairobi and local level, staff commonly showed limited understanding of humanitarian standards.

\textsuperscript{18} Principle Two, People In Aid Code of Good Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel, Pg 10
\textsuperscript{19} Principle Three, People In Aid, Code of Good Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel, Pg 12
\textsuperscript{20} Principle Five, People in Aid, Code of Good Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel, Pg 16
\textsuperscript{21} Staff Competency, 2010 HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management, Pg 13
6. Recommendations

The following recommendations are intended to serve as a space for reflection on how quality and accountability of programming can be improved in relation to the findings presented in this report.

The 2011 Horn of Africa drought was characterised by heightened insecurity within the region. The incursion of Kenyan troops into Somalia in the midst of the emergency compounded an already complex situation. On several occasions agency staff told us that some agencies were intervening in certain geographic areas due to ease of access and the attention of the media. This resulted in questions around coverage, coordination, and delivering aid on the basis of need. In addition, the Joint Deployment team identified vulnerable persons from affected communities who stated that they were not accessing the same level of services as able bodied people. In certain contexts, social and cultural conditions require special measures to be taken in order for the rights of affected communities to be respected. In relation to the vulnerable consulted during the deployment, it appeared that special provisions had not been taken.

During the deployment some individuals consulted at senior levels showed limited awareness of the Standards and their use, and at a field level the practical application of the standards was limited. There is a recognition that the development of joint training materials would be of benefit to the whole sector. Greater ownership and endorsement of the standards needs to be reflected in humanitarian agencies. It was noted that most staff from HAP’s membership and People In Aid’s membership were unaware of the Standards and had not been made aware of their organisations accountability commitments.

Recruitment and good people-management processes need to be strengthened. Agencies must strive for more fair and transparent recruitment. They must also engage in behavioural competency-based selection of staff. Specifically, they must focus efforts on employing people who have demonstrated key competencies that would ensure their effectiveness, particularly understanding of the humanitarian context, excellent listening skills, and strong coordination/collaboration abilities. Once staff are on board, they must receive proper induction which introduces them to the local context/culture as well as standards and how to apply them in their particular situations. Agencies should also study and adopt good practice in remote management so that they can provide the necessary leadership to staff even at a distance.

During the assessment mission, the limited coordination between responding agencies was perceived to hamper the effectiveness of the response. The findings were further supported during the Turkana mapping exercise as the poor inter-agency coordination and coordination with the local administrative government was seen to be extremely problematic. Similar sentiments were echoed during the Nairobi round-table conference from a GoK representative. Incidents of duplication and unsustainable programmes were commonly shared during consultations.

Feedback from community consultations found that affected communities wanted to learn more about their rights so they could hold organisations accountable for their actions. In a similar vein, a representative from the GoK and a member of the Mwingi DSG perceived that educating communities on their rights was central to affected communities playing a stronger role in developing community resilience strategies with regard to the effects of drought. However, an affected community being aware of their rights does not provide a mechanism in which they can demand that their rights be upheld, or which they can hold organisations accountable.

Community consultations in Turkana found that community members were generally unaware of how complaints could be lodged. In addition, there was a fear of repercussions if they were outspoken against organisations. Also, several individuals consulted during the Turkana assessment highlighted the difficulty in accessing staff from aid agencies when an issue arose that they felt comfortable about bringing to the attention of the agency. They described being turned away at the gate, or having to wait a long time before being able to access the agencies. Consultations in Mwingi established that agencies operating within the area did not have formal complaints mechanisms. The absence of formal complaints mechanisms, the
difficulty of affected communities in effectively engaging with agencies, and communities perceiving that they did not know enough about their rights amounted to a situation in which affected communities had great difficulty in holding agencies accountable for their actions.

The most salient finding of the Joint Deployment is the need for better engagement with affected communities throughout the project cycle. Furthermore, representatives from the GoK in both Mwingi and Turkana perceived that their contextual technical expertise was not being considered in the design of projects. Affected communities and representatives felt that some agencies were implementing projects with little consideration of the needs of affected communities and local expertise. This was stated to have resulted in unsustainable projects that in some cases were increasing the vulnerability of affected communities. Humanitarian accountability requires a balance in the decision making process between affected communities, local experts, and aid agencies. Effectively engaging with communities throughout the project cycle and allowing for the communities to play an active role is fundamental to ensuring the quality and accountability of a humanitarian response.
Annexes

Annex 1: Joint Deployment Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference:
Joint Standards Initiative Deployment to the Horn of Africa
October 2011

An integrated approach to quality and accountability is being proposed to support and build on regional expertise and capacity in developing context-appropriate systems and processes to improve the impact of the response.

The deployment will:

- act to influence the quality of aid delivery during the current response;
- support and promote good practice leading to greater impact and aid effectiveness;
- seek to complement and build on existing expertise and projects in the region;
- target need appropriately at a grass roots, organisational and systemic level, and;
- draw upon and highlight the unique contribution to Q&A of each of the participating initiatives.

The Joint Standards Initiative (JSI) team will specifically use the HAP 2010 Standard, the Sphere minimum standards and the People In Aid Code as widely accepted, core reference tools on Q&A for the humanitarian sector. They will also work with relevant initiatives and support agencies.

The JSI team will endeavour to ensure that interventions and support reach actors at all levels of the response, including international and national actors.

PROPOSED AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF A JOINT STANDARDS INITIATIVE (JSI) DEPLOYMENT

A detailed work plan will be developed by the team in the early days of the deployment. This work plan will build upon the findings of the initial assessment, reaffirm their validity and detail specific locations and timeframes where the activities described below can be achieved.

Specific objective 1: To identify and support the delivery of appropriate support and learning activities with humanitarian actors in order to strengthen their understanding of, and ability to apply, established quality and accountability mechanisms and approaches.

Activities will include:

- Development of increased training capacity: The team will work with relevant stakeholders with existing capacity in staff development to increase access to appropriate training in quality and accountability. The JSI team will provide resource materials and coaching to identified training providers, and assist in the coordination of training delivery. The team will also provide briefings and specialised, tailored trainings as relevant.

- Technical advice will be provided to humanitarian agency staff at a range of levels, including at a senior level to ensure leadership in activities, regarding integration of humanitarian accountability into the design, development and delivery of programs and in staff management, in measuring performance against the Q&A standards, and in strengthening accountability when working with partners.
• Collaboration on multiagency projects that would provide immediate support and wider generalisation in terms of learning on the “mainstreaming” of quality and accountability.

**Specific objective 2: To collaborate with relevant stakeholders and advocate** for quality and accountability of the wider humanitarian response, including through raising awareness of existing approaches to Q&A and highlighting strengths and gaps observed to date.

Activities will include:

• Based on information gathered from field visits undertaken as part of agency support activities, share perspectives both of affected populations and of the workers seeking to assist them regarding their experience of the humanitarian response and ideas for improvements.

• Invigoration, support to and establishment of local Q&A working groups as appropriate: including working with the IAWG Q&A Sub-Group, assessing the viability and demand for working groups in hub locations, and continued support of the Dadaab Q&A working group.

• Conducting several events, locally and globally as appropriate, such as round table discussions on the challenges of putting commitments to Q&A standards into practice and other accountability and context specific issues where relevant and strategic.

• Advocating for an increase in quality and accountability of the wider humanitarian response through a variety of means as appropriate.

• Ensuring that protection from sexual exploitation and abuse issues is placed and remains on the agenda of key actors and work towards the establishment of an appropriate and effective means of response.

**Specific objective 3: To document and share good practice and learning** in order to build on the pool of resources available for senior managers and practitioners in the Horn of Africa and globally, and for use as part of wider discussions on the ‘state of’ quality and accountability as part of current humanitarian response.

Activities will include:

• Documenting and disseminating key learning related to quality and accountability in this context, including beneficiary and staff perceptions of Q&A as part of the emergency response and key recommendations for the humanitarian community regarding the strengthening of Q&A and coherence amongst the initiatives.

• Documenting and disseminating case studies, good practice and tools (in collaboration with participating agencies) related to accountability for wider sharing amongst the responding actors and globally.

**AFTER ACTION AND FOLLOW UP**

All components of the deployment will be reviewed / evaluated at the end of the initially planned deployment.

When the deployment is terminated, a follow up mission to support ongoing work and assess sustainability and impact will be conducted.
### Annex 2: Joint Deployment Team Timeline

#### Scoping Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martin Fisher</td>
<td>Sphere Training and Learning Management</td>
<td>The Sphere Project</td>
<td>15-23 Aug 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory Gleed</td>
<td>Accountability Advisor</td>
<td>HAP International</td>
<td>15-23 Aug 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teresa Kamara</td>
<td>Regional Consultant East Africa</td>
<td>People In Aid</td>
<td>15-23 Aug 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barb Wigley</td>
<td>Programmes Coordinator</td>
<td>HAP International</td>
<td>15-23 Aug 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Joint Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 Jan – 4 Feb 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Kiani</td>
<td>Senior Quality and Accountability Advisor</td>
<td>HAP International</td>
<td>25 Oct – 26 Nov 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teresa Kamara</td>
<td>Regional Consultant East and Central Africa</td>
<td>People In Aid</td>
<td>Aug 2011 – Feb 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul O'Hagan</td>
<td>Sphere Consultant</td>
<td>The Sphere Project</td>
<td>6 – 21 Dec 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 – 31 Jan 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3: Overview of Participating Agencies, Institutions, and Government Ministries

1. ACAPS
2. ActionAid
3. CARE Kenya
4. CARE Somalia
5. Catholic Diocese
6. Concern
7. Equity Bank
8. Farm Africa
9. Film Aid
10. Food and Agriculture Organization
11. German Agro Action
12. HelpAge
13. HIJRA
14. International Aid Services
15. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
16. International Medical Corps
17. International Organisation for Migration
18. International Rescue Committee
19. Jesuit Refugee Services
20. Kenyan Red Cross Society
21. Lodwar Police
22. Lodwar Prosecution Office
23. Lutheran World Federation
24. Merlin
25. Ministry of Agriculture
26. Ministry of Education
27. Ministry of Gender & Social Development
28. Nahdir Konlen child rights radio programme
29. National Council of Churches Kenya
30. National Disaster Operations Centre
31. National Drought Management Authority
32. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
33. Oxfam GB
34. Oxfam Novib
35. Plan
36. RedR
37. Save the Children UK
38. Tearfund
39. The Emergency Capacity Building Project
40. Transparency International
41. Turkana Women Advocacy Development Organisation
42. UNDP
43. UNICEF
44. United Nations Development Programme
45. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
46. UNWOMEN
47. World Vision