CONFlict, CAMPs AND COercION:
THE CONTINUING LIVELIHOODS CRISIS IN DARFUR

Final report

A Report to WFP Sudan

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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1

1 Front page pictures by Caterina Galluzzi, WFP, Sudan
Executive summary ........................................................................................................... 6

Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 14

ACRONYMS ....................................................................................................................... 24

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 25
   1.1 Purpose of the study ................................................................................................. 25
   1.2 Timing and team members ..................................................................................... 26
   1.3 Guide to this report ................................................................................................. 26

2. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 27
   2.1 The conceptual framework: livelihoods framework ................................................. 27
   2.2 How the study incorporated links between livelihoods and protection ............... 28
   2.3 Sample ..................................................................................................................... 28
   2.4 Methods ................................................................................................................ 29
   2.5 Constraints encountered ....................................................................................... 30

3. OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT ........................................................................................ 32
   3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 32
   3.2 The changing nature of conflict: 2004 to 2006 ..................................................... 32
   3.3 Role of the African Union ....................................................................................... 35
   3.4 Local efforts at self-defence and reconciliation ..................................................... 36

4. LIVELIHOODS IN DARFUR: OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 38
   4.1 Livelihoods in Darfur before the conflict ................................................................. 38
      4.1.1 An introduction to livelihoods in Darfur ............................................................. 38
      4.1.2 Livelihood zones in North Darfur ..................................................................... 39
      4.1.3 Livelihood zones in West Darfur ....................................................................... 40
      4.1.4 Livelihood zones in South Darfur ..................................................................... 42
   4.2 Impact of the conflict ............................................................................................... 43
      4.2.1 Population displacement and restricted mobility ............................................. 43
      4.2.2 Destruction and loss of assets .......................................................................... 43
      4.2.3 Reduced labour migration and remittances .................................................... 44
      4.2.4 Declining agricultural production .................................................................... 45
      4.2.5 Livestock losses and disruption of migration .................................................. 45
      4.2.6 Daily labouring and petty trade ....................................................................... 47
   4.3 Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 48

5. TRADE AND MARKETS .................................................................................................. 50
   5.1 Disruption to trade: an overview ............................................................................ 50
      5.1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 50
      5.1.2 How trade has been disrupted ......................................................................... 50
      5.1.3 How the market network has changed .............................................................. 51
   5.2 The grain trade ......................................................................................................... 52
   5.3 The livestock trade .................................................................................................. 56
   5.4 Trade in cash crops .................................................................................................. 60
      5.4.2 Tombac ............................................................................................................. 60
      5.4.3 Groundnuts ...................................................................................................... 61
5.4.4 Fruit and vegetables................................................................. 62
5.5 Conclusions.................................................................................. 64

6. CHANGES IN LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN NORTH DARFUR........ 65
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 65
6.2 IDPs in camps and towns as well as urban populations in GoS held areas 66
  6.2.1 History of conflict and population movement.......................... 66
  6.2.2 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 67
6.3 Exploited and coerced rural populations and IDPs in GoS held areas .72
  6.3.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements.............. 72
  6.3.2 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 72
6.4 Pastoralists in SLA held areas.................................................... 75
  6.4.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements.............. 75
  6.4.2 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 75
6.5 Settled farming populations and IDPs in SLA held areas.............. 78
  6.5.1 Introduction, history of conflict and population movements..... 78
  6.5.2 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 79
6.6 Arab nomads in GoS held areas.................................................. 82
  6.6.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements.............. 82
  6.6.2 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 83
6.7 Conclusions.................................................................................. 85

7. CHANGES IN LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN WEST DARFUR.......... 87
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 87
7.2 IDPs in towns and urban residents, in Geneina, in the agro-pastoral South and West Jebel Marra lowland livelihood zones................................................. 88
  7.2.1 Overview of conflict and population movements.................. 88
  7.2.2 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 89
7.3 Exploited and coerced rural populations and IDPs...................... 94
  7.3.1 History of conflict and population movements.................... 94
  7.3.2 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 94
7.4 Population groups who are less directly affected or who have some access to land
  a) Population groups with some access to land ................................ 96
  7.4.1 History of conflict and population movements.................... 96
  7.4.2 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 97
  b) Population groups less directly affected.................................... 98
  7.4.3 History of conflict and population movements.................... 98
  7.4.4 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 98
7.5 Arab nomads and the occupation of land.................................... 99
7.6 Conclusions.................................................................................. 100

8. CHANGES IN LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN SOUTH DARFUR........ 102
8.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 102
8.2 Severely conflict-affected with some exploitation and coercion – GoS-held areas:
  East and South Jebel Marra lowlands, and IDPs................................ 103
  8.2.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements.............. 103
  8.2.2 Changes in livelihood strategies............................................. 103
8.3 Resident populations and IDPs in SLA-held areas....................... 106
  8.3.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements.............. 106
Executive summary

Introduction
This purpose of this study, commissioned by WFP is the following:

(1) To enhance understanding of how livelihoods and markets have been impacted by the current conflict in all three Darfur states
(2) To assess the impact of food aid on livelihoods
(3) To recommend how livelihoods can best be supported
(4) To indicate how livelihoods are likely to be affected by three different scenarios, and the implications for interventions

It is the first region-wide study of livelihoods in Darfur since the Tufts study of 2004/05, and particularly focuses on how livelihood strategies have changed during the conflict years.

Methodology
The methodology is underpinned conceptually by the adapted livelihoods framework for emergencies, developed by Tufts University. Purposive sampling was used to represent different livelihood zones and key population groups (both according to WFP beneficiary groups and according to ethnicity). The study is principally based on a qualitative approach using a number of different PRA techniques such as proportional piling. Information was collected through focus group discussions and key informant interviews according to a series of checklists. Protection issues, which are central to understanding livelihoods in Darfur in the current context, were incorporated into all the checklists. The study also draws on a review of relevant literature.

Changes in the nature of the conflict
The early stage of the current conflict was characterised by widespread violence and the systematic destruction of livelihoods. This typified the conflict in late 2003/early 2004. By early 2005, large-scale violence decreased but fighting has continued in parts of South and West Darfur creating new waves of displacement: more than 200,000 in the first quarter of 2006. North Darfur has been affected by recent clashes between different SLA factions.

Key changes in the nature of the conflict since 2004 include:

- More localised and smaller scale displacement in areas of strategic interests for both GoS and SLA (especially in West and South Darfur)
- The involvement of some new tribes in the conflict
- Attacks becoming more individualised, targeted at households for personal gain rather than being politically motivated
- Increased banditry and looting on roads
- New outbreaks of fighting between SLA factions
- Splits within certain tribes in terms of their allegiance to GOS/Janjaweed or to the SLA
- The potential for conflict with Chad and related instability in West Darfur.
- Increasing politicisation within some IDP camps, most evident in the largest camps

A culture of impunity has prevailed in Darfur and for most of the population the threat of violence remains.
The presence of the AU since May 2004 has had mixed results. It has not met expectations – either locally or internationally – in protecting vulnerable population groups in Darfur, although it has had some success with preventive deployment initiatives and in providing AU escorts for IDPs collecting firewood. But on the latter the record is inconsistent and has failed in locations such as Kebkabiya.

As both the GoS and the international community have failed to protect, so local people have taken their own measures. This ranges from setting up local defence forces, to the leaders of particular ethnic groups negotiating some kind of neutrality, to local reconciliation efforts between different tribes. Finding ways of building on some of the most promising of these local initiatives will be critical to making any high level peace agreement work, yet will require great skill, sensitivity and local knowledge.

**Devastation of livelihoods**

Before the conflict, livelihoods in Darfur were based upon a combination of farming, herding, trade and labour migration. The region was normally able to achieve food self-sufficiency, except in very bad drought years. The more prosperous and surplus-producing parts of the region were a source both of employment and grain for poorer deficit parts of the region. The most food insecure part of the three states has long been the north-east of North Darfur.

The combination of population displacement, widespread destruction and looting of assets and restricted movement had an immediately devastating impact on lives and livelihoods at the outset of the conflict. Within the first year of the conflict the livelihoods of over a million people were more or less destroyed. This figure has continued to rise as the number of IDPs has risen, to over 2 million today.

The main ways in which the conflict has devastated livelihoods are the following:

1) Human capital has been badly affected by displacement, the outflow of men and boys to Central Sudan to escape the violence, and the number of conflict-related deaths.
2) Most of the looting and loss of assets happened when villages were attacked and often destroyed. The loss of assets includes houses, livestock, agricultural tools and infrastructure, seed and food stores. Looting and theft continues in many towns and camps.
3) Livestock losses have continued for reasons other than looting. Many households engaged in distress sales of animals early in the conflict, either to raise income when other livelihood sources collapsed or because of the fear of being looted. The consequence of restricted livestock movement and blocked migration routes has since accelerated livestock losses through disease and lack of pasture and water, a particular issue for pastoralists.
4) Crop production – both of staple grains and of cash crops – has been badly affected. This is partly because of the destruction of agricultural infrastructure and implements. (Thus, many farmers are now cultivating manually on hard clay soils and on wadi land). But more significantly it is because of the very restricted access to farmland for much of Darfur’s rural population. The agricultural season in 2005 was marginally better than in 2004, a combination of higher rainfall and some improvement in security. But households are still accessing only a small proportion of their total farmland, and in areas where there are high concentrations of Arab pastoralists there were many reports of animals grazing the crops before they were harvested.
5) There has been a loss of public infrastructure in many rural areas, including health centres, schools and water supplies. Development assets such as grain banks and revolving funds have often been looted.

6) Labour migration, a mainstay of Darfur’s economy, has more or less stopped. This includes migration to Central Sudan and beyond, for example to Libya, but also labour migration within Darfur.

7) Those who are still living and working away from their home villages are facing much greater difficulty in sending back remittances. The pattern is mixed. In some cases the amounts have increased since the start of the conflict when remittances collapsed, but the frequency of receipt has dropped. In GOS held towns it is generally easier to send back money. In some other places the level of remittances has dropped or stopped altogether, for example in rural areas that are hard to access and in some SLA-held areas.

8) Darfur’s natural resource base has been badly affected. Large-scale population displacement has resulted in environmental degradation, especially around camps and towns where natural vegetation is rapidly exhausted and there is severe pressure on water sources. Environmental degradation is also an issue where pastoralists are gathered in large concentrations, causing overgrazing and depleted water resources.

9) Many schools in Darfur are no longer functioning, or more commonly, families can no longer afford to send their children to school. This is one of the main items of expenditure that some households have had to sacrifice, especially IDPs. This poses a threat to human capital in the longer term, for which the experience of South Sudan is a salutary reminder where a generation grew up more or less uneducated.

How livelihood strategies have changed

As a result of all of the above, few people in Darfur have access to their pre-conflict livelihoods. Instead, large numbers have become dependent on daily labouring and petty trade, a precarious alternative to their diverse and adapted traditional livelihood strategies. Brick-making is the most common source of daily labour, although whether it is sustainable is a moot point, especially if construction and investment in property in towns levels off or even declines. Generally these labouring opportunities are poorly remunerated. Wage rates have gone up in some places during the conflict, for example where there is demand for labour in large towns, or since food aid has been provided relieving the pressure on households. In other places it has declined if the labour market has become saturated.

The other livelihood strategy on which many still depend, especially IDPs, is the collection of grass and firewood for sale. This is associated with very great risks as venturing out of towns and villages exposes many individuals and groups to the threat of attack and rape. In some areas, particularly the Jebel Marra lowlands, the firewood trade is controlled by Arab pastoralists and is not available to other ethnic groups. Access to wild foods is similarly restricted by insecurity.

Between 2004 and 2006, the livelihood opportunities for some people have slightly improved. Some have been able to start farming as a result of a marginal improvement in security and the start of food distribution in rural areas. Over time IDPs have also engaged more in petty trading activities if they managed to save enough capital or had access to gifts or loans from relatives or traders.
In short, any pre-conflict livelihood strategies that have persisted are now operating at much reduced levels. All are directly affected by levels of insecurity and the restricted movement of people, livestock and trade. Income earning opportunities remain very limited for most of the conflict-affected population of Darfur.

The study identifies five groups of people, according to how their livelihoods have been affected by the conflict and the ongoing threats they face. These are presented below according to declining severity of livelihood insecurity:

1. Displaced populations in GoS held areas, in camps or in towns
The study sample included IDPs in towns and camps in Al Fashir, Kutum and Kebkabiya in North Darfur; in Geneina, Mornei, Habilla, Zalingei and Garsilla in West Darfur; and in Kass and Nyala in South Darfur. Most have no access to pre-conflict livelihood strategies and have lost their livelihood assets. They now only have access to very limited and poorly remunerated income earning opportunities. Although the range of daily labouring opportunities has often expanded since people first became displaced, these offer a precarious source of livelihood and the labour market is saturated. Some livelihood strategies are associated with very high risks, particularly if it involves travelling outside areas of displacement. In many locations women reported ongoing harassment and rape when collecting firewood and grass. Where Arab groups control access to natural resources, some IDPs have to pay to engage in livelihood activities outside the vicinity of the camp or town. This is where some of the worst cases of abuse are taking place. Urban residents in these places face similar risks. They may have had more opportunities at first, but the need to provide assistance to the displaced has quickly used up their financial assets. In some places the over-crowding and competition for work and basic services since the influx of IDPs has created tensions between IDPs and the resident population. For many of these IDPs, return to their area of origin is highly unlikely until security improves in the wake of a peace agreement, for which disarmament will be key.

2. Coerced and exploited resident populations in GoS held areas
This category refers mainly to people from tribes that are not aligned to the GoS, living in villages and some of the smaller towns in Darfur. The study sample for this category included mainly Fur populations living in or near their land in Seraf Omra and Kebkabiya AUs in North Darfur; Fur residents in Abbata, Tama in Umm Shayala (close to Mornei) and Masalit IDPs in Umm Tajok in West Darfur; and the mainly Fur resident population in Kass AU in South Darfur. Although most have not been displaced, many in this group are living under very controlled regimes, having to pay protection payments to the Janjaweed or to settled Arab populations living within the same communities in order to pursue their most basic livelihood strategies. The nature of the payments depends in part on the ethnicity of the groups being charged, and whether protection by Arabs was requested or imposed. All are compromised by restricted mobility, for example to reach their farmland, markets, or to engage in activities like firewood collection. Their livelihood security depends upon the extent of the protection payments they must make, how many of their assets have been looted, the fertility of the land to which they have access, and the extent to which they are hosting IDPs. In the longer term, however, this group may recover more quickly because they have not moved from their land. But the rebuilding of social relationships will take a long time, especially where one part of the community has exploited and/or extracted protection payments from the other.
3. Resident populations living in SLA held areas (both farmers and pastoralists)

a) The study sample for this group covers the following farming populations: in North Darfur, Berti goz farmers in Saiyah in Mellit locality, Tunjur wadi farmers in Jambolee in Kutum locality, Berti cash crop farmers in Dar Es Salaam AU and tombac farmers in Shengil Tobai in North Darfur; and in South Darfur the resident (mostly Birgid) population in Muhajaria AU, and the resident Ma’aliya population in Mazroub and Jad el Seid in Adila locality.

This group generally enjoys greater mobility than for example group 2 above, within SLA-held territory, but their livelihoods are badly affected by restricted access to GOS-held markets. This affects access to the labour market, to sell forest products, and to sell cash crops. In some areas that are marginally more secure (eg Dar Es Salaam), or because of restricted livestock movement (eg Saiyah) there are high concentrations of both livestock and people, creating unsustainable pressure on water and other basic services. Yet there is no maintenance of these basic services (eg boreholes) and some services have collapsed (eg education) since government withdrew. They mostly have better access to their land than group 2 although they still face threats of insecurity. But this does mean that there are greater opportunities for IDPs in these areas to work as agricultural labourers. In some areas, looting of livestock remains a threat.

b) The pastoralist sample for this group included Meidob and Zaghawa pastoralists in North Darfur. They have also suffered from lack of access to markets in GOS-held towns, affecting their ability to sell livestock and purchase grain, which was their main livelihood source before the conflict. Trade with Libya, which used to be a major livelihood source, has officially stopped. Livestock herds have been severely depleted, initially from looting and subsequently through restricted movement which caused a large number of deaths due to lack of water and pasture. Like the farming population, they suffer from lack of maintenance of basic services, in particular water and veterinary care. Income earning opportunities are extremely limited and local markets are functioning at very low levels. Attacks and looting continue.

For both of these groups, their ability to recover will depend upon the lifting of restrictions on movement and trade.

4. Resident settled populations in GoS held areas that are less directly impacted by the conflict or who have some access to land

a) This sub-group includes people from tribes that have remained neutral in the conflict or that have aligned with the GoS. The study sample included settled Arabs in West Darfur (Umm Tajok, Nur El Huda), resident Rizeigat in Ed Daein AU and resident Habbaniya in Buram AU. This group does not face the exploitation and abuse described for group 2 above, but they are suffering from severe disruption to trade, particularly for cash crops and livestock. Some have had livestock looted. Depending on their location, some also have restricted access to their agricultural land because of insecurity, particularly where there is neighbouring SLA-held territory. However, this group may eventually recover more quickly than others, depending upon the extent to which their assets have run down, and the rebuilding of relationships with other neighbouring groups.

b) This sub-group includes those who have been able to retain some access to land. The study sample included Sileia in the northern part of west Darfur. Residents in Seleia are able to continue some farming activities although they only have access to about 30% of their
land. IDPs in the area can also find agricultural work. When food distribution in this area was stopped for reasons of insecurity, some were forced to collect more firewood, with associated risks.

5. Pastoralist groups in GoS-held areas.
This group refers to tribes that are aligned to the government, mostly Arab tribes. The study sample included the Northern Rizeigat near Kutum (as well as settled Arabs near Kebkabiya) in North Darfur; and Arab nomad groups near Abbata and in Salaa (near Habilla) in West Darfur. Many of them have been closely associated with the Janjaweed, and are perceived as such. Although able to roam and graze on land that was once farmed, the migration patterns that are fundamental to their livelihood strategies have been badly affected. They are now mostly concentrated at the southern end of their migration routes, which puts pressure on grazing and water resources and hence on livestock condition. Access to trade routes over long distances is restricted and sale of livestock is now limited to less profitable local markets. Some members of this group have benefited from the extortion and demand for protection fees, and looting of non-Arab groups. Depending on location, they in turn have also suffered looting and attacks by the SLA.

The constraints and threats that these five groups face have changed relatively little since the conflict began, but they have varied in intensity according to location, ethnicity and over time. The impact of the conflict over the last three years has been gradual impoverishment and the erosion of any assets that have not been looted.

To summarise, the severity of people’s livelihood insecurity is determined by:

(1) the extent to which their former livelihood strategies and assets have been affected or destroyed
(2) the robustness of their current livelihood strategies and the risks they currently face.

Trade and markets
The impact of the conflict on markets has been disastrous, negatively affecting trade in all of Darfur’s principal commodities. The disruption to trade started early in the conflict and has gradually got worse. Some of this has been deliberate and some is the inevitable consequence of operating in a war zone. The main obstacles are the following:

1) Displacement of producers and traders
2) GoS restrictions on transporting goods into and out of SLA-held areas. For some commodities this is an outright embargo, for example fuel
3) Insecurity in moving through many rural areas, particularly from GoS to SLA-held territory and vice versa
4) Increasing risks of banditry and looting
5) Frequent checkpoints, random payments and some additional ‘protection’ payments
6) ‘Double’ taxation if passing through SLA and GoS-held territory

The consequences are very much inflated transport costs, the withdrawal of many traders from the area, the disappearance of many primary village markets, and large price...
differentials over relatively short distances. The movement of many goods has reduced to a trickle and trade that used to take place over large distances has become very localised.

Livestock trade is reduced to sale for local consumption in many places, whereas before the conflict livestock export was the foundation of the Darfur economy. Trade routes have changed, becoming longer, more circuitous and expensive. And the involvement of livestock traders has become ethnically determined to a much greater extent than ever before.

The market in locally produced cereals has all but collapsed. It has been replaced by trade in food aid which has had a hugely stabilising effect on prices and has kept the market functioning. Many grain traders welcome this, otherwise they would have gone out of business. Indeed, grain prices are now more sensitive to changes in ration size and distribution patterns than to ‘normal’ seasonal trends.

The disappearance of the big traders in cash crops such as tombac and groundnuts has had a number of negative impacts: lack of market outlets but also lack of credit for farmers and falling prices. This has created unfavourable terms of trade for cash crop farmers as grain prices have risen, often in the better-off areas of Darfur that used to enjoy buoyant cash crop economies.

The impact of food aid on livelihoods

The impact of food aid on extremely precarious livelihoods in Darfur has been overwhelmingly positive. It is not just a source of food for consumption but also a valuable income transfer, especially for IDPs who have limited livelihood alternatives. The relative contribution of food aid as a source of livelihood was frequently reported to range from 40 to 80%. In some places it has reduced dependence on damaging coping strategies, such as begging or the sale of valuable assets. In Dar Zaghawa and Dar Meidob in North Darfur there was a significant drop in livestock sales when food distribution started as pastoralists no longer had to engage in distress sales to raise income.

The distribution of food aid has encouraged some people to return to their villages, both from camps and from hiding in the bush, thus enabling agricultural production particularly during the last rainy season. This study came across no evidence of disincentive effects of food aid on agricultural production. On the contrary, despite the risks and insecurity that many farmers face in accessing their land, cultivating their crops emerged as a clear priority.

Indirectly, the distribution of food aid has had a positive impact in protecting IDPs and some resident populations. It has provided them with a ‘safe’ source of food and income so they do not have to engage in some of the most risky and dangerous livelihood strategies, for example firewood collection around Kebkabiya where levels of harassment are very high (and food aid rations have been 100%). It has also strengthened the bargaining power of IDPs when negotiating for daily labour. In Kebkabiya and Kass towns they reported that they no longer have to take any work they can out of sheer desperation. Where food aid is being provided to all population groups in an area (from different tribes, both IDPs and the host population) it has eased relationships. This is particularly important where there is a very large IDP population relative to the resident population placing great strain on existing resources and services. But this should not generate any sense of complacency. Food aid alone cannot protect people and the preoccupation with security for most interviewees for this study was very striking. There have also been problems with registration, especially in
West Darfur. Some of the most vulnerable have been excluded and now have to depend upon damaging and risky coping strategies. Meanwhile there are claims of corruption and double registration of others.

A large proportion of Darfur’s population is very reliant on food aid as a source of livelihood, but for good reason, because there are few alternatives. Despite fears of some government and aid agency officials that IDPs in camps have got used to high levels of services and will never return home, these were not the views of IDPs interviewed for this study. Most clearly do want to return home as soon as it is secure enough to do so.

The scale and reach of the food aid operation run by WFP is a success story, not least the extent to which it has protected precarious livelihoods. Premature cuts in food aid, as is happening in 2006, could quickly undo the valuable gains of the last 18 months. Without the injection of food aid, livelihoods will deteriorate further, there will be population movements from rural areas to camps, tensions between groups will increase, and the spectre of famine on the horizon looms once again.

**Future prospects**

Many people in Darfur are extremely pessimistic about their future. This was very striking in the numerous focus group discussions for this study, captured in the following two quotes:

- ‘God knows. The future is black. There is not a glimmer of light’
- ‘What can you do when half of the population is armed, and half is not’

For many, they do not expect the situation to improve or even to be able to contemplate return for another three to five years, some said ten. These are depressing predictions yet show how deep-rooted many Darfurian people perceive the conflict to have become and how much has to change before peace and security can be restored. There is an awareness that it will take much more than a peace agreement signed in Abuja to end this conflict. Disarmament is seen as key to improving security. Involvement of traditional elders and tribal leaders living in Darfur will be essential to any efforts to achieve social reconciliation.

This study has considered three possible scenarios, of current levels of insecurity remaining the same, of security improving, and of a deterioration in security. It outlines the livelihood and humanitarian implications of each. At the time of writing Darfur’s future hangs in the balance and it is hard to say which of the three scenarios is most likely. But what is clear is that even when there is a peace agreement that all have signed up to and that is being implemented on the ground, it will take a long time (at least a year and possibly longer) before security improves to the extent that the displaced can return home and community relationships can start to be rebuilt. During this transition period humanitarian assistance must continue.
Recommendations

This section sets out a number of recommendations for the humanitarian community. The first set of recommendations on food aid area are directed particularly at WFP and its donors. The subsequent recommendations are more widely relevant to the international humanitarian community and will depend to some extent on how the situation unfolds. These recommendations should be read in conjunction with the three possible future scenarios for Darfur presented in Chapter 10.

1. Food aid

Recommendations and rationale

- The provision of food aid to meet the food needs of IDPs, resident and rural populations must continue until:
  - the conflict is resolved and peace and security are restored
  - IDPs have returned to their villages, have access to agricultural land and have successfully produced one harvest
  - there has been some minimum recovery of assets.
  - people have secure alternative livelihood strategies

Food aid is currently also the main form of livelihood support in Darfur as the provision of food aid means that people do not have to engage in damaging coping strategies and any income earned from selling food aid is spent on essential non-food needs and investment in livelihoods. Only if other livelihood support interventions really expand in the current context, with a demonstrable positive impact on livelihood security, may it be advisable to reduce food aid levels. On the other hand, if security deteriorates further, there are likely to be rising food aid levels.

- It is possible that total quantities of food aid required can be reduced by addressing some of the diversion and inequalities in distribution. This needs to be done by close monitoring, removing multiple registrations and making sure the most vulnerable are targeted.

- However, the ongoing provision of food aid needs to be supported by ever-stronger assessments of need and well-informed targeting (see below).

- The recent reduction in food aid rations because of funding constraints could not have been worse-timed as the population of Darfur enters the hungry season. The impact of these cutbacks must be monitored, to warn of rises in malnutrition and mortality so that emergency measures can be taken, and also to understand the impact of the cutbacks on lives and on livelihoods. Particularly important will be monitoring the impact on agricultural production during the rainy season. This should be done by regular visits by VAM staff, during cultivation to get the most accurate information (rather than depending upon recall). Market monitoring should also be stepped up.

- Any reduction in food aid rations shows up quickly in increased cereal prices. Cereal prices all over Darfur, therefore, need to be monitored carefully. Although it is probably no longer justifiable to supplement the ration with the specific objective of stabilising the market, if cereal prices rise sharply in the future, this may need to be reconsidered.

Food aid targeting

- As a general principle targeting of food aid should continue to be carried out on a geographical basis rather than within affected communities. According to severity of
livelihood insecurity, IDPs in camps and towns are currently the highest priority, and Arab nomad populations the lowest priority (see our concluding analysis of differing livelihood insecurity for the five different groups identified by this study). However, food aid must be provided to both IDPs and to resident populations in rural areas to reduce the risk of creating further displacement.

- Where residents outnumber IDPs and are still able to depend upon pre-conflict livelihood sources (e.g., agricultural production), it may be possible to vary the ration so that they receive a proportion of the ration that IDPs receive. But in many places differential rations could increase tensions between resident and IDP groups, resulting in greater exploitation of the latter. Therefore any decision to vary the rations between groups in the same area must be based on a well-informed assessment of need and of risk.

- In rural communities food aid rations should not differ between residents and IDPs as their livelihood situation is usually very similar, and many rural communities support large numbers of IDPs with limited humanitarian assistance.

- As a general guideline, resident rural populations should receive food aid at least through the hungry season and during cultivation up until harvest time, for as long as their access to agricultural land is severely constrained. Whether they receive food aid during the rest of the year should be dependent on the harvest performance, and whether people were able to hold on to their harvest.

- To determine the food aid ration for resident rural populations in GOS-held areas, WFP should consider whether payments are being made to the Janjaweed, in particular sharing of the harvest, and how food aid distribution could ameliorate or exacerbate this situation.

- Food aid should not be provided to people illegally occupying the land of others.

**Agencies concerned**

- The recommendations above are of direct relevance to WFP and its cooperating partners, but also to the donors funding the Darfur food aid operation.

- WFP should step up its monitoring of cooperating partners to prevent corruption and any sales of food aid direct to traders. It should provide support to cooperating partners in addressing problems of inequality of food distribution.

**Pre-conditions/ timeframe**

- A continued large-scale food operation is almost inevitable in Darfur until the conflict is resolved. See pre-conditions above.

**Risks**

- One of the greatest risks is that donor funding for such a large-scale and expensive food aid operation dries up prematurely.

- Equally significant is the risk of security deteriorating, restricting humanitarian access.

- There is also the risk that food aid allocations are perceived to be based on ethnic or political affiliations, especially if rations are reduced. Care must be taken to ensure that food aid allocations are based on objective assessments of need, supported by a communications strategy.
2. Livelihood support interventions

Whilst all recommendations in this report are a form of livelihood support, a number of specific community level and input based livelihood support interventions are recommended. These are summarised in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended action</th>
<th>Target group</th>
<th>Agencies concerned</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural support eg provision of seed(^2), consideration of local seed fairs, provision of pesticides</td>
<td>All rural populations still cultivating, especially in SLA-held areas where agric services have collapsed</td>
<td>Donors, FAO &amp; INGOs</td>
<td>In advance of/ during the agricultural season until normal agricultural services resume</td>
<td>Provision of inappropriate seed from outside Darfur. Late provision of seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary care</td>
<td>Pastoralists in both SLA and GoS-held areas. Rural farming populations with livestock, especially in SLA-held areas where there are no vet services.</td>
<td>Donors, FAO &amp; INGOs</td>
<td>Ongoing until normal veterinary services resume</td>
<td>Targeting of some ethnic groups over others which could fuel tensions and perceptions of the partiality of humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of water sources</td>
<td>Rural populations in SLA-held areas. Pastoralists with heavy livestock concentrations in GoS or SLA-held areas</td>
<td>Donors, UNICEF &amp; INGOs</td>
<td>Immediate and urgent</td>
<td>Rehabilitated water sources become targets for further attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fodder for donkeys &amp; small stock, esp. for newly displaced to protect limited livestock assets</td>
<td>IDPs facing restrictions on movement</td>
<td>Donors, FAO &amp; INGOs</td>
<td>During the dry season</td>
<td>Could fuel further environmental degradation around heavy concentrations of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash transfer interventions eg cash for work, cash grants, micro-credit</td>
<td>IDPs in camps or towns enjoying greater security</td>
<td>Donors, WFP, UNDP &amp; INGOs</td>
<td>Immediate on pilot basis in areas where there has been no looting or attacks in recent months. Can be expanded when markets functioning better.</td>
<td>Cash transfers could make the recipient vulnerable to attack (or even the agency managing the cash transfers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale restocking eg donkeys</td>
<td>IDPs with greatest prospects for mobility, eg to original area. Resident rural populations (in both GoS &amp; SLA-held areas) that have been looted but now enjoy much greater security</td>
<td>Donors, FAO &amp; INGOs</td>
<td>Immediate on pilot basis, expanding if successful (learning from current INGO interventions)</td>
<td>Restocked households become vulnerable to attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened firewood patrols</td>
<td>IDPs in camps &amp; towns facing greatest threat of</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Environmental degradation in area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) CRS has recently evaluated its experience of running seed fairs in West Darfur, using local seed. Although the evaluation is not available at the time of writing, the learnings from this experience should be taken on board by other agencies as a potentially valuable intervention that encourages the use of local seed. However, careful analysis of who would benefit from seed fairs, and how this might affect local conflict dynamics, should precede any intervention.
attack and rape in surrounding area

Support to education
IDPs in camps & towns
Donors, UNICEF & INGOs
Immediate until livelihoods and income recovers
Free education to IDPs could fuel tensions with resident populations. May need to be provided to both

Vouchers for items of key expenditure. e.g. grain milling, clothes, cooking fuel, health care
IDPs in camps & towns
Donors & INGOs
Immediate until livelihoods and income recovers
May be labour intensive to set up and manage. Cannot be sustainable under current context.

- The last three recommended actions in the table are designed to reduce IDP expenditure so that their meagre income can be invested in other livelihood opportunities. This may also reduce the sale of food aid and thus the outflow of trade in relief wheat from Darfur to Central Sudan.

- An area deserving further study concerns the transfer of remittances. This important source of income is usually more available where communication systems are working. Ways of facilitating the transfer of remittances to more remote areas should be explored.

- Finally, humanitarian and development agencies need to develop greater flexibility in response options, to be able to switch quickly from life-saving humanitarian assistance to assistance that also includes livelihood support. Agencies will also need to speed up their ability to implement livelihood support interventions for the newly displaced, so that they can retain the livelihoods assets they brought with them.

There are other forms of livelihood support at the policy level, which require monitoring and advocacy on the part of WFP and others. These are discussed below.

3. Protection

- Protection of population groups (especially IDPs in camps and towns) subject to ongoing violence and rape must be strengthened. This has long been called for yet inadequate action has been taken. AU firewood patrols should be extended (as recommended in the table above) and made as reliable as possible, learning from the ones that work best, to afford protection for one of the most risky livelihood strategies.

- Pressure should be brought to bear on the Sudanese police force and on local authorities to register and to act upon reports of rape, theft and destruction of assets to end the prevailing culture of impunity.

- Ways of protecting farmers during the agricultural season should also be explored, possibly through AU patrols in areas where the risk of attack is greatest. If successful, this could enable larger agricultural areas to be cultivated.

- Protection payments paid by exploited and coerced population groups should be more closely monitored, not least to understand better the nature and extent to which this is happening. Pressure should be brought to bear on local authorities and on local leaders to reduce this exploitative and damaging practice.
• Little is known about the occupation of land in North and South Darfur. This needs to be investigated (in consultation with IDPs coming from the areas of possible occupation) before plans for return are made.

• It is clear that many IDP populations have undergone changes in leadership during their period of displacement. This will have implications for their return, as leadership in camps entails a different set of responsibilities than leadership in home communities. The implications of this for return need to be investigated further.

• Food aid has had an important role in the protection of conflict affected populations by reducing their need to engage in highly risky livelihood strategies and increasing the bargaining power of IDPs in an exploitative labour market. It should continue to do so. Conversely, problems with registration and unequal distribution can lead to protection problems for those who are excluded from distribution. The exclusion of vulnerable groups from distribution should be addressed. WFP’s presence and that of its cooperating partners has had a protective impact. For this reason, WFP should maintain as much of its decentralised structure as possible.

• Because of the close links between protection and livelihood issues, it is important that on-going risks to livelihoods are incorporated into food security assessments (by all actors). This includes on-going risks of looting, attack, harassment and abuse when carrying out different livelihood activities, restrictions of movement, as well as the payment of protection fees. WFP VAM assistants are well aware of these risks and could easily report them along with other food security information. It is also important to monitor the protective impact of livelihoods interventions.

Agencies concerned
The main responsibility for the protection of civilian population lies with the GoS, and its responsibilities under International Humanitarian Law should be stressed. OCHA, ICRC and UNHCR (in West Darfur) are currently the main agencies dealing with protection issues. However, WFP and other agencies also have a role to play, mainly through ensuring that assistance effectively reaches the most vulnerable, through retaining a presence, and through monitoring the on-going risks to livelihoods, protection payments to Arab groups, and the protective impact of livelihoods interventions.

Pre-conditions/timeframe
The involvement of many agencies in protection issues must be well coordinated under a single protection working group. Each agency which monitors livelihood protection issues must receive training from an agency with experience in this field. These activities should be on-going.

Risks
The involvement of many agencies in protection could weaken the work of the expert agencies such as ICRC. Highlighting and publicising protection payment regimes risks increasing the abuse of those who are forced to pay.
4. Assessment, analysis and monitoring

- If the conflict continues, aid agencies (and especially the UN on behalf of other agencies) need to more explicitly link conflict and livelihoods analysis, to inform strategic planning and to minimise any negative impacts of humanitarian assistance (eg so that assistance is not given to those ‘occupying’ the land of others). Strengthening understanding of the conflict should also feed into improved scenario planning as there has been a tendency to assume the situation will remain the same, or will improve in programme planning.

- This study was not able to assess the livelihoods of many large urban populations (for example Geneina, Al Fashir, Nyala). This needs to be done through a separate household survey in these towns as they are difficult to assess using qualitative methods.

- To assess whether conditions for recovery are being met (see below), it will be important to monitor the changes in livelihoods as a result of the implementation of the peace agreement. This includes the monitoring of changes in protection payments, monitoring of movement of people and trade between SLA and GoS held areas, the regeneration of markets (in terms of numbers of traders, origin, availability and price of goods) and the return of IDPs to their home villages. Findings need to be consolidated and shared amongst the wider humanitarian community so that international support to the recovery process is fully informed.

- The system of sentinel site monitoring initiated by UNICEF should be supported by WFP food security monitoring. The sentinel site monitoring system needs to include the five categories of population groups identified in this study. Based on the findings of this livelihoods study, we recommend the following sites as representative of each group:

Proposed locations for sentinel site monitoring

1. Displaced populations in GoS held areas, in camps or in towns
   - IDPs in Kutum, North Darfur
   - IDPs in Nyala (and/ or Kass), South Darfur
   - IDPs in Geneina, West Darfur
   - IDPs in Habila, West Darfur

2. Coerced and exploited resident populations in GoS held areas
   - Coerced resident rural population in Wadi Barei area (Kebkabiya, Seraf Omra, Birka Saira), North Darfur
   - Coerced resident rural population in West & South Jebel Marra lowland area (eg Zalingei, Garsila areas), West Darfur

3. Resident populations living in SLA held areas
   - Pastoralists
     - Zaghawa pastoralists in Dar Zaghawa, North Darfur
   - Farmers
     - Tombac farmers in Shengal Tobai area, North Darfur
     - Goz farmers in Sayah area, North Darfur
     - Agro-pastoralist goz farmers in Shearia, Mershing area, South Darfur

19
4. Resident settled populations in GoS held areas that are less directly impacted by the conflict or who have some access to land
   - Agro-pastoralist (groundnut) farmers in Ed Daien area, South Darfur
   - Low productivity agro-pastoral farmers in north of West Darfur, Sileia

6. Pastoralist groups in GoS-held areas
   - Arab pastoralist groups in Wadi Barei area
   - Arab pastoralist groups in West Darfur (possibly in Geneina/ Kereinik area)

Agencies concerned
WFP is the agency most experienced in livelihoods and food security assessments in Darfur, and should therefore take the lead in any future emergency food security or livelihoods assessments. UNICEF is leading on the sentinel site system, but given WFP and FAO’s expertise in food security they both need to provide substantial input into this system. Many other agencies have set up monitoring systems and these should be more strongly coordinated into one system for Darfur.

Pre-conditions/timeframe
The key agencies working on food security and nutrition in Darfur need to agree on methods, indicators and locations for on-going monitoring, and to share the work between them.

Risks
Objectives of monitoring are not clarified and agreed at the start, leading to a system which becomes unwieldy, unfocussed and unsustainable. There are inadequate resources, or will, to coordinate existing monitoring systems.

5. Advocacy
   - Ongoing advocacy and awareness-raising of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is essential to maintain humanitarian assistance in a climate of waning interest and declining funds amongst donor governments. Good monitoring and analysis recommended above should feed into this. The success of WFP’s food aid operation last year also needs to be promoted, accompanied by a clear explanation that this is just the ‘sticking plaster’, that the fundamental causes of one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises have not yet been successfully resolved and that high levels of humanitarian need persist.

   - Advocacy messages need to draw attention to the consequences of livelihoods not being supported whilst the emergency continues, in terms of increased vulnerability of the population, impoverishment, an increased need for food aid, and more difficult and costly recovery and rehabilitation.

   - There is also a need for advocacy to address livelihood support issues at the policy level. This should includes messages aimed at the GoS on the need to open the border with Libya to support livelihoods in North Darfur, and the need to address and eliminate protection payments to Arab groups by strengthening the protection provided by national and international institutions. Some other examples are given below, for example highlighting the importance of local peace and reconciliation efforts in addition to the high level Abuja peace talks, and advocating on appropriate conditions for recovery.

Agencies concerned
WFP can take a greater role in advocacy by disseminating the findings from its food security assessments and monitoring, and advocating for the interventions it cannot implement itself. The UN agencies can join forces on some of the issues.

**Pre-conditions**
Assessments need to be objective and use agreed methods.

**Risks**
Unless advocacy messages are directly based on evidence on the ground, WFP could be perceived as being politically motivated and its staff will face security problems.

6. Supporting existing peace-building and reconciliation efforts

- Almost all the international investment in peace-building so far has happened at a high political level, mainly in Abuja. Yet there is scope and a need for local level peace-building/reconciliation work. This could be done through the sensitive design and implementation of livelihood support projects that meet common needs and can start to build bridges between divided communities. Opportunities for supporting local-level peace agreements between tribal leaders could also be explored. However, this work must be extremely well informed, and requires great skill and sensitivity, especially in the current context. When there is positive evidence of implementation of the high-level peace agreement on the ground, investment in local-level peace-building will become essential if peace is to last. This must also take into account how leadership roles have changed as a result of the conflict, and new leaders that have been appointed.

- The international community can learn much from the reconciliation efforts currently being made by traditional leaders. These efforts need to be better understood and supported. This should include in particular the support of local initiatives to negotiate access to livestock migration routes.

**Agencies concerned/pre-conditions**
This activity should only be undertaken by agencies which have extensive local knowledge of Darfur, its people, and the conflict; and the necessary expertise in local level peace-building and reconciliation. It should also be done only by agencies which are planning to have a long term presence in Darfur beyond the current humanitarian crisis.

**Risks**
If done badly or if poorly informed, at best this could stall local level reconciliation efforts. At worst, it could exacerbate the conflict.

7. Recovery (see also Chapter 11)

- Full scale recovery of livelihoods will not be possible, until there is peace and security. The conditions for recovery are as follows:
  - a peace agreement has been signed and is implemented on the ground
  - there is evidence of disarmament by all sides in the conflict
  - the GoS has agreed to make a significant contribution towards compensating for, and rehabilitating damaged and destroyed assets, in particular compensating for stolen livestock
the issue of land occupation has been resolved wherever it is an issue
there is evidence that protection payments and coercion of one ethnic/ armed
group over another is declining and that free movement of all ethnic groups –
esential to livelihood revival – is being re-established
the GoS has lifted its embargo and other restrictions on the movement of goods
outside GoS towns, indicating a commitment to the re-establishment of trade,
esential to Darfur’s recovery.

Not all of these conditions will be met equally in all locations at the same time. The first
three conditions are the *sine qua non* for any investment in the recovery of livelihoods.
The second three may be location specific. Therefore recovery is likely to be a phased
process geographically. It is very possible that return of IDPs will occur soonest in many
parts of North Darfur where land occupation is not as big an issue. It will be slowest in
parts of West Darfur, along Wadi Barei and in the Jebel Marra area where many IDPs are
likely to remain in the camps until land occupation is resolved.

When return does happen it is likely to be a gradual process whereby some family
members (men and elders) will return first and cultivate for a season, testing out security
before other family members join them.

Before recovery can start, the following investigations need to take place:
• Understanding the potential impact of changes in leadership structures on the return
  process to home villages.
• Mapping the extent of land occupation in North and South Darfur
• Estimating the proportion of IDPs that will not return and the assistance they may need to
  develop alternative livelihoods in their place of displacement, including pastoralists who
  have lost all their livestock.

When recovery is possible, priorities in order of timing are the following:
1) the re-establishment and/ or rehabilitation of basic services: water, health
   and education in rural areas.
2) assistance with transport and shelter
3) more individualised support and rehabilitation of livelihoods, for example
   through the provision of agricultural inputs, and irrigation pumps for
   cultivating wadi areas
4) throughout, the continued provision of food aid will be essential until
   returning households have successfully cultivated through one agricultural
   season (in turn dependent on adequate rainfall).

After such massive devastation of livelihoods, the amount of time it will take to recover
should not be underestimated. Realistic timeframes must accompany any recovery plans,
despite the familiar pressures to implement and withdraw quickly from recovery projects.
Some different sets of skills will be required amongst humanitarian agencies.

*Risks*
Yet there are also dangers from investing in recovery too early, as follows:
1) the danger of encouraging and/ or consolidating current illegal land occupation
2) making people more vulnerable to attack by restocking them with valuable assets
3) donors could inadvertently play into the GoS policy of ‘encouraging’ IDPs to return home before security has improved, where the voluntary nature of the return is questionable

4) with too great a focus on recovery, the aid community (and donors in particular) could lose sight of the vital importance of maintaining humanitarian assistance, which currently makes the difference between survival and famine for so many. Downgrading the need for humanitarian assistance before the crisis has been resolved could also result in IDPs and others engaging in damaging livelihood strategies, some of which would expose them to increased risk of attack and violence

5) even premature talk of recovery could exacerbate the conflict if those unhappy with the partially signed Darfur Peace Agreement feel it is being imposed upon them.

8. Endorsement of recommendations from the Tufts livelihood study

This study endorses the recommendations of the Tufts livelihoods study for some of the necessary structural changes to begin work towards recovery, including (see page 112-113 of Young et al, 2005):

- The setting up of a land commission covering all three states, with representation from all the relevant parties. This commission would be responsible for:
  - mapping existing ‘hakura’ and livestock migration routes,
  - administering land tenure, and strengthening farmers rights over their land,
  - the rehabilitation of water points in rural areas, and
  - overseeing the restitution and compensation in case of land disputes.

- The creation of a livestock reconciliation, restitution and compensation commission. This commission would be responsible for:
  - overseeing procedures for registration and verification of livestock losses
  - overseeing the taxation of livestock sales, using the funds raised to compensate those who had livestock stolen in the conflict
  - encouraging the voluntary return of livestock
  - providing certificates of ownership for livestock, and allowing export markets to only accept certified livestock
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Action Contre le Faim</td>
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<tr>
<td>APU</td>
<td>Agricultural Planning Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Administrative Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>community based organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEZ</td>
<td>food economy zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAA</td>
<td>German Agro-Action</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>global acute malnutrition</td>
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<td>GOS</td>
<td>government of Sudan</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>international NGO</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice &amp; Equity Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPs</td>
<td>policies, institutions and processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>participatory rural appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUK</td>
<td>Save the Children UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army/ Movement</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDD</td>
<td>Sudanese dinar</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAM</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (WFP)</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme, UN</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of the study

This study was commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Khartoum in 2006. The overall purpose of the study is:

(5) To enhance understanding of how livelihoods and markets have been impacted by the current conflict in all three Darfur states
(6) To assess the impact of food aid on livelihoods
(7) To recommend how livelihoods can best be supported in the current context of ongoing violent conflict and insecurity, both in terms of programming and advocacy
(8) To indicate how livelihoods are likely to be affected by three different scenarios, and the implications for interventions

The full Terms of Reference are presented in Annex 1.

The Darfur crisis has been described as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. It is therefore apt that WFP has been running the world’s largest emergency food aid operation in Darfur since 2003/04. At its peak, it was distributing 440,000mt to almost 3 million beneficiaries.

As is usually the case in humanitarian emergencies, most monitoring and studies of the impact of the crisis in Darfur have focussed on malnutrition, mortality and other indicators of potential famine or of the impact of life-saving interventions. Monitoring the impact of conflict on livelihoods is usually a lower priority. Three years into this conflict is therefore an appropriate moment to be investigating how livelihoods have been affected, and indeed how they have changed during the conflict years. This has been the focus of this study, as much as possible building on the earlier Tufts study: ‘Darfur – Livelihoods under Siege’, carried out in late 2004 (Young et al, 2005) and drawing comparisons with it. This earlier work is the only other comprehensive study of livelihoods in Darfur since the conflict began. We have also drawn upon many other studies and assessments that are more location-specific, as far as possible broadening or deepening the analysis. For example, our sample for South Darfur deliberately complemented the areas covered by the earlier World Vision livelihoods study, enabling us to compare some of our findings but also to strengthen understanding of livelihoods in different areas (World Vision, 2005).

Although the impact of this massive food relief operation on malnutrition has been monitored annually, its impact on livelihoods has not been assessed before. Yet the objectives of WFP’s EMOP for 2005 were extended beyond life-saving objectives to increase the availability of food in the market, to supplement income and to compensate for milling losses. The commissioning of this study was therefore timely to explore how livelihoods have been impacted by food aid, both positively and negatively, and to feed into and inform future decision-making by WFP and its donor agencies.

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3 The three scenarios are: insecurity staying as it is right now; security improving; insecurity worsening.
1.2 Timing and team members
Preparatory work for the study commenced in February. Field work in all three Darfur states was carried out in March and April. The analysis and write-up began in April and continued throughout the month of May. The report was finalised in June.

Whilst the analysis for this study was underway the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed. As far as possible we have taken the implications of this into account, especially in the later chapters of the report. The findings of this study should feed into discussions and decisions about appropriate follow-up in terms of recovery options as well as feeding into immediate decisions about food aid and other humanitarian interventions in Darfur. The findings of this study were presented to the ‘Food Aid Forum’ organised by WFP in Khartoum in early June to inform future strategic decision-making about the role of food aid in Sudan.

Most of the members of the study team are experienced food security professionals working in Darfur, for WFP, FAO and selected NGOs. Their local knowledge, understanding of the conflict and experience in doing survey work were invaluable. This report has been written by two of the expatriate members of the study, but with continued input from the Darfurian team members.

1.3 Guide to this report
This report commences with an explanation of the methodology for the study. Chapter 3 describes the current conflict in Darfur and especially how the conflict dynamics have changed during the conflict. Chapter 4 begins the discussion on livelihoods. It describes the principal livelihood zones before the conflict and gives an overview of how livelihoods have been affected by the conflict. Chapter 5 analyses how trade and markets for Darfur’s main agricultural products, including livestock, have all been negatively affected by the conflict and the implications for livelihoods. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present and analyse the detailed findings of the field work, state by state. This is done by categorising the population in each state into different groups according to their current livelihood sources and how they have been affected by the conflict. Each chapter focuses on how their livelihood strategies have changed as well as the ongoing threats that they face. All our findings on how food aid has impacted on livelihoods are drawn together in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 turns to the future, first giving local people’s perceptions of the future, and then developing three different scenarios and the implications of each for livelihoods and for humanitarian response. Chapter 11 considers the issue of recovery: the pre-conditions for recovery, priority needs and the risks of starting recovery too early. Finally, the conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter 12.
2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 The conceptual framework: livelihoods framework

The livelihoods framework, adapted for emergencies by Tufts University, formed the conceptual framework for the study and was used to develop the checklists for field work (Jaspars, 2006). This same framework formed the basis of the Tufts livelihoods study in Darfur in 2004 (Young et al., 2005).

Livelihood assets determine both the resilience and vulnerability of people’s livelihoods. This includes human assets (skills, knowledge, education, ability to labour), social assets (social status, and social networks), natural assets (land, forest, water), physical assets (livestock, shelter, equipment and materials), and financial assets (income, access to credit and loans, remittances). In conflict related, or political emergencies, assets can turn into liabilities. For example, in Darfur the ownership of these assets has made some people more vulnerable to attack and exploitation. The emergency livelihoods model includes a sixth asset: political assets, which can be interpreted as proximity to power.

Figure 2.1 Adapted livelihoods framework for humanitarian crises

Source: Feinstein International Famine Center, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University

Policies and institutions include those systems (at both macro and micro-level) which determine people’s protection and welfare or, in their absence, their vulnerability. Institutions include: judicial systems and rule of law, systems of leadership (both formal and informal), systems of conflict resolution, public services and markets. Markets, both in terms of people’s access to markets and how trade has been affected by the conflict, were a particular focus of this study. The most important policies for this study (both explicit and implicit) were considered to be policies on land rights, movement of goods within Darfur and taxation (formal and informal by the Government of Sudan [GoS] and the Sudan Liberation Army [SLA]), and GoS policy on the return of IDPs to their place of origin. Key processes which determine people’s livelihood security within Darfur are long term processes of political, social and economic marginalisation (both within Sudan and within Darfur), history of drought and environmental degradation, and the dynamics of the conflict and how this has changed over time. (See Chapter 3). Policies, institutions and processes determine the
access people have to assets and whether they can hold on to them. Assets, such as land or social status, in turn determine the dynamics of the conflict and determine access to and functioning of markets. As the conflict is fought along ethnic lines, vulnerability is closely linked to people's ethnicity and political affiliation.

Livelihood strategies are determined both by livelihood assets and policies, institutions and processes (PIPs). Assets and PIPs determine the livelihood options available to people, and the feasibility of different livelihood strategies. The way in which the conflict is being fought also determines the risks associated with some of the strategies that people adopt. Strategies of households in Darfur include: agricultural and livestock production, trade, seasonal migration for work, migration for work outside of Darfur, collection of wild foods, and firewood and grass collection. The livelihood strategies of different groups may compete: for some, their options may be severely restricted by the conflict, forcing people to rely on dangerous and risky strategies. For others, there may be benefits to be gained from the continuation of the conflict.

Livelihood goals include the priorities and aims of the affected people themselves, for example, acquiring a sense of control over their life, as well as food and income security. Actual livelihood outcomes may be quite different if their efforts are thwarted, for example if they are rendered destitute from looting.

This conceptual framework was used to determine what information should be collected, although questions to interviewees and to focus groups were not ordered according to the different elements of the framework as this did not necessarily reflect how people would naturally talk about their livelihoods and their aspirations.

2.2 How the study incorporated links between livelihoods and protection

Protection issues were incorporated into all the checklists, in particular the risks associated with certain livelihood strategies, the continued risk of looting and theft, and the exploitation of some groups by others. Community leaders were asked about the history of security incidents, which usually gave information about the looting and theft of livelihood assets, and whether this was still a risk. In focus group discussions about how livelihood strategies have changed and current livelihood sources, the team asked about associated risks, for example the risk of attack or rape. People were also asked whether they felt safe where they were living now. When discussing expenditure, people might talk about the fees they had to pay to (usually armed) groups for protection to be able to farm their land, to move to markets, or would be asked about this indirectly. This issue sometimes came up in community leaders’ interviews, which would then be cross-checked in focus group discussions.

2.3 Sample

The study used purposive sampling to ensure that the different WFP beneficiary groups (IDP, resident, host, returnees) were included, as well as a representation of the different livelihood groups and ethnic groups. As much as possible, both urban and rural populations were included in the sample as well as a balance of areas held by the GoS and by the opposition movements, either the SLA or JEM.
For each state, 5 or 6 main localities were selected. Al Fashir, Kebkabiya, Seref Omra, Malha, Saiyah, Kutum, and Dar Zaghawa localities were covered in North Darfur. The livelihood zones this covered included goz, tombac, agro-migrant, wadi, and pastoral. The ethnic groups represented included: Fur, Gimir, Tama, Meidob, Berti, Tunjur, Northern Rizeigat (Ereigat) and Zaghawa.

Geneina, Seleia, Umm Tajok, Habilla, Mornei, Umm Shalaya, Zaleingei, and Garsilla localities were covered in West Darfur. The livelihood zones covered included: northern agro-pastoral, southern agro-pastoral, and west Jebel Marra lowland. Ethnic groups represented included: Fur, Masalit, Tama, Misseriya and many different Arab groups.

Kass, Buram (and Tullus), Muhajeria, Ed Daien and Adila localities were covered in South Darfur. This included the following livelihood zones: low rainfall agro-pastoral, agro-pastoral with groundnuts in goz, cattle agro-pastoral, and South Jebel Marra lowland. Ethnic groups represented included: Fur, Habbaniya, Berti, Southern Rizeigat and Dinka.

The sample for each state is presented in Annex 2.

2.4 Methods
The study used mainly qualitative methods; key informant interviews, focus group discussions and PRA techniques such as proportional piling and timelines. Key informant interviews were done with agency representatives in Khartoum and each place visited, as well as with community leaders and traders. Some quantitative information was collected, for example on market prices, wage rates and expenditure. Secondary information was reviewed from crop assessments, market monitoring, nutritional surveys, and food security and livelihoods assessments done by others.

In each state the study team broke into three sub-teams to carry out the field work in different locations simultaneously. Each team had one expatriate and at least one female team member. Where possible, translators familiar with the local language were used as women often do not speak Arabic (for example, in the case of the Fur, Masalit and Meidob). The time for field work was 6 days, 4 days and 5 days respectively for North, West and South Darfur.

Field work in a particular location would generally start with interviews with local authorities, NGO representatives and community leaders to gain an overview. Community leader interviews were carried out for IDP populations and resident populations. The main method used was to develop a timeline, which charted changes in the security situation, population movements and changes in livelihood strategies throughout the conflict.

Interviews with community leaders were followed by focus group discussions with representatives of different livelihood groups or beneficiary categories. In camp or other IDP situations, people were often organised into different focus groups according to their area of origin, and sometimes according to sex. In rural populations, the community leaders’ interview would usually be followed by separate male and female focus group discussions. For urban resident populations, men and women were interviewed together in focus groups,

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4 With the exception of the team that visited Direige camp and Buram in South Darfur.
5 With the exception of the team that visited the Ed Daien area in South Darfur.
or female focus groups would be selected. In all locations shortage of time often meant that the team had to prioritise focus group discussions on the spot and adapt the approach accordingly.

The main topics covered in focus group discussions (whether men and women separate or combined) included:
- History of displacement/population movements and security incidents
- Information about former livelihoods
- Changes in livelihood sources since the start of the conflict
- Remaining livelihood assets and factors influencing their ability to maintain these assets (e.g. livestock)
- Main expenditures (including payment for “protection”).
- Risks associated with livelihood strategies and how insecurity has changed
- Impact of food aid
- Links with, or information about, areas of origin and their farms
- Changes in leadership
- Thoughts about the future and priorities. Possibility and conditions for return

The emphasis varied according to the group being interviewed. Proportional piling or ranking was used to determine the relative importance of different livelihood sources at different points in time. This method was similar to that used in the Tufts livelihoods study (Young, 2005).

In each place a separate market assessment was carried out, usually based on interviews with grain, livestock and cash crop traders. This focussed on information on changes in the market chain, in flow and sources of goods, the number and profile of traders, transaction costs, and on the impact of food aid.

Writing up and discussion of findings was done as soon as possible after the field work in a particular location had been completed, often on the same day. After all the field work for each state was completed, one day was kept free for debriefing, analysis and reporting by all the sub-teams together.6

For the purpose of analysis, different populations have been grouped according to the severity of livelihood insecurity they face. This has been judged according to:
1) the extent to which their former livelihood strategies and assets have been affected or destroyed
2) the robustness of their current livelihood strategies and the risks they face.

2.5 Constraints encountered
Shortage of time in all locations limited the number and depth of interviews that could be carried out. A trade-off had to be made between geographical coverage and depth of inquiry. In many of the larger towns, selecting representative focus groups of urban resident populations was difficult and was sometimes abandoned. Information in these cases is from key informants or secondary information.

6 For logistical reasons, it was not possible to get all teams together to debrief on West Darfur immediately after the West Darfur field work was completed. Debriefing for both West and South Darfur was done on one day after the South Darfur field work was completed.
Another constraint was the expectations that were raised by a WFP assessment team asking questions which sometimes biased answers towards eliciting a food aid response. This was particularly the case in situations where food distribution had recently ceased. Information was cross-checked as much as possible, but where answers are thought to be unreliable the information has not been included in the analysis. Amazingly, the team was able to follow the original itinerary, with two exceptions. A planned assessment in Kalma camp in Nyala was not possible because the IDP population had not received food aid for 45 days and refused to answer any questions until the resumption of food distribution. One sub-team was clearly not welcome by the SLA in Serafiya in North Darfur and therefore turned back.

In places where one group (often Fur) was controlled or exploited by another (often different Arab groups), it was sometimes difficult to get in depth information about livelihood sources and expenditure (in particular payments for protection) if both groups were present at the interview (for example in Abbata). Or the assessment had to be cut short (for example in Umm Shalaya).

Arab nomadic groups are not adequately represented in the study. Two groups were interviewed; one in Masri near Kutum in North Darfur and another in Salaa, near Habilla in West Darfur. This provides only limited information on the situation of nomadic Arab pastoralists in the areas to which they have been displaced or where they have newly settled as a result of the restriction of their traditional migration routes. The groups that were interviewed were reluctant to talk as they felt that any information they gave might be used against them. To have spent more time with Arab nomadic groups would have required careful planning and more time.

An Arab agro-pastoralist group was also interviewed in Kebkabiya locality
3. OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT

3.1 Introduction

The Darfur crisis is the result of a war between the national government of Sudan (GoS), and rebel opposition movements (the Sudanese Liberation Movement - SLM - and Justice and Equality Movement - JEM). It is being played out along ethnic lines, between GoS supported Arab militias – the Janjaweed – and other tribes supporting the SLM such as the Fur, Zaghaowa and Masalit (and now others). The SLA split in 2005, when Minni Arcua Minawi, a Zaghaowa, was elected as the new SLA leader at which point the previous leader, Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur, a Fur, formed a rival faction. This split has exacerbated the ethnic divisions within the SLA. The JEM split in May 2004, when Colonel Gibril Abdul Karim Barey formed the NDRM (National Movement for Reform and Development), and later a small unit was formed by Mohammed Salih Harba who called themselves JEM field command. The Darfur conflict has been aptly described as a political crisis that has becoming increasingly tribal at local level (Tanner, 2005).8

There are a number of underlying causes to the conflict in Darfur; the main ones are the following:

- Marginalisation and neglect of Darfur by central government for decades
- Marginalisation of Arab nomad tribes within Darfur
- National and international strategies of arabisation (the “Arab gathering”).
- Drought and competition over resources within Darfur
- Previous tribal conflict between Fur and Arab, Zaghaowa and Arab and Masalit and Arab in the late 1980s and 1990s, largely as a result of the reasons above

3.2 The changing nature of conflict: 2004 to 2006

In late 2003/early 2004, the conflict was characterised by violent and severe attacks and counter-insurgency, by combined GoS and Janjaweed forces, and SLA attacks on GoS areas and institutions of strategic interest. GoS and Janjaweed attacks were associated with mass killing, large scale burning of villages, looting of assets, and displacement. SLA strategies centred on gaining and maintaining control over key parts of Fur and Zaghaowa homelands – Jebel Marra, Jebel Si, and Dar Zaghaowa – and the homelands of some others not directly associated with the GoS, for example the Meidob and the Berti. Initially, the SLA focussed its attacks on GoS military targets, using small groups with high mobility. The SLA also attacked Arab pastoralist settlements in North Darfur, looting livestock.

The conflict varied in nature in each of the Darfur States. In North Darfur, GoS/Janjaweed strategies were characterised by counter-insurgency to undermine the support base of the SLA (Tanner, 2005). Their initial targets were therefore focussed on Dar Zaghaowa and Fur heartlands such as Jebel Si (and Jebel Marra in West and South Darfur). The campaign was ruthless, destroying everything on which livelihoods depended. Many people were displaced several times. The Janjaweed are still present in the most fertile areas of North Darfur around Kebkabiya and Seref Omra, and in Kutum where the Arab pastoralists

(northern Rizeigat) had their damras or traditional settlements. Movement was, and continues to be, restricted for both the resident and the IDP populations in these areas, through strategies of fear, intimidation and extortion. Any movement outside of towns risks attack or rape. Alternatively, the cost of staying on your own land is the payment of protection fees to Janjaweed in the surrounding areas as documented in Chapter 7.

The same strategies have been used in West Darfur which has some of the best arable land and rich rangelands in Darfur as well as large seasonal water courses (‘wadis’). The Janjaweed attacked and burnt villages on a massive scale, leading to displacement of almost the entire rural population who are now residing in camps or towns. Arab tribes now occupy many villages or farm land, graze livestock and in some cases have started cultivation. Some villages were burnt after the original inhabitants were displaced, leading to speculation that GoS war strategies are aimed at preventing the return of the original inhabitants (UNHCR, 2005, November). Paying protection fees by some to stay on their land is also common. In South Darfur, the nature of the conflict varied by place, in some cases being centred around land (particularly in the foothills of Jebel Marra, e.g. Kass). Both the SLA and GoS have fought over areas of strategic interest in South Darfur as it provides access to Jebel Marra and to central Sudan. It is also Darfur’s most prosperous economy.

By early 2005, a large proportion of villages was destroyed, although by the middle of 2005 there appeared to be a decrease in large scale violence. At the time, there were optimistic predictions of good harvests following good rains and greater security. This soon changed when fighting resumed, mainly in South and West Darfur, in late 2005.

In early 2006, all the features of the conflict from the past few years are still present: continued attacks by GoS and Janjaweed, targeted looting of remaining livestock, the continued threat of violence and restriction of movement of IDPs and for some people who are still living on their own land. Cases of rape continue to be reported by women venturing out of towns and camps to collect firewood or to farm. Crops planted risk being destroyed by livestock belonging to Arab nomads before they can be harvested. Towns and IDP camps remain vulnerable to attack, both organised attacks and individually targeted attacks. For example, as recently as February 2006 a major attack took place on Kutum town and IDP camp. Meanwhile, the control and exploitation of some groups over others appears to have been consolidated. Since mid-2005, the SLA and JEM increased their attacks on areas of strategic interest held by the GoS in South and West Darfur and on Arab pastoralists, culminating in an attack on pastoralists in Al Malam in South Darfur in August (O’Neill and Cassis, 2005, November).

Key changes since 2004 include:

- More localised and relatively smaller scale displacement (in parts of South and West Darfur) in areas of strategic interests for both GoS and SLA.
- The involvement of new tribes in the conflict (e.g. the Fallata and part of the Birgid in South Darfur joining the GOS/Janjaweed)
- Attack and looting in some cases being targeted more at individual households for personal gain rather than being politically motivated (e.g. aimed at IDPs in Kebkabiya and Geneina).
- Increased banditry and looting along roads
- New risks being posed by the split in the SLA and consequent clashes between SLA factions
• Splits within certain tribes in terms of their allegiance to GOS/ JJ and to the SLA e.g within the Birgid and Maaliya in South Darfur, sometimes manipulated by government.
• The potential for conflict with Chad and related instability in West Darfur.
• Increasing politicisation within some IDP camps, most evident in the largest such as Kalma camp in South Darfur and Ardamata camp in West Darfur
• A recent increase in attacks on humanitarian agencies (looting of vehicles)

Since late 2005 there have been increasing numbers of ‘hotspots’ of fighting, leading to an estimated 200,000 newly displaced between December 2005 and March 2006 (IRIN, 21 April 2006). The renewed fighting in South Darfur has in part has been attributed to attempts by the SLA to consolidate a base in the area, and the priority the government has given to driving the SLA out and to protect certain trade routes. Some of this may also be related to the consolidation of positions prior to a renewed ceasefire agreement as the 6th round of Abuja talks commenced in September- October 2005. The major clashes have occurred in South and West Darfur, in Golo and Rokoro in Jebel Marra, in Jebel Moon north of Geneina, and Gereida and Shearia in South Darfur.

At the time of the study, North Darfur was the most stable of the Darfur states, where most rural areas are controlled by the SLA and major towns are controlled by the GoS. This has changed since the recent partial signing of the peace agreement, which has triggered clashes between the different SLA factions, for example in the Tawila area in the immediate aftermath. Even before the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement there had been clashes between SLA factions in the Korma area.

Chadian rebel groups have been mobilising in Darfur for the past year or so. There are close links between the Chadian rebel group RDL (Rally for Democracy and Liberty, composed of Arabs, Tama, and Gimir), based near Geneina, and the Janjaweed of West Darfur, many of whom originally came from Chad. On the 18th of December, Chadian rebel groups attacked Adre in Chad. Chad declared a “state of belligerence” with the Khartoum regime, accusing it of supporting the raid on Adre. This was followed by looting and burning of villages in Chad by Janjaweed, leading to an estimated 50,000 displaced inside Chad, and the arrival of about 13,000 Chadian refugees in West Darfur. More Chadians arrived in Darfur in May and June following Janjaweed incursions into Chad (IRIN, 2006, 29 June). Some Sudanese refugees have since returned from Chad to join IDPs in camps in West Darfur. IDPs in Habilla, close to the Chadian border, fear increased insecurity in the area due the presence of Chadian rebel groups, which they think leads to a risk of attack from the Chadian army in Sudan. Indeed, the failed attempt by Chadian rebels to reach N’Djamena in April 06 had a destabilising effect on border areas of West Darfur.

It is important to make distinctions between different types of Janjaweed, and the different types of extortion and harassment they are involved in. It is also important to acknowledge the differences of opinion between Darfurians as to who the Janjaweed are. Many indiscriminately call all Arabs ‘Janjaweed’ (and not only from the Northern Rizeigat), whereas others believe that only some Arabs have joined the Janjaweed and use the term to describe the Arab militias. What was particularly striking in this study is the lack of distinction that many people now make between Arab militia, the Sudanese Army, and the Police. All can at various times be referred to as Janjaweed. This matches other reports that Janjaweed have been absorbed into the army or police (O’Neill and Cassis, 2005, November).
In this study, the people we interviewed referred to the following groups as Janjaweed:

- Arab militias who come from elsewhere who burn, rape, attack and loot
- Arabs who control the countryside surrounding GOS-held towns/camps who restrict movement by attack and rape, and demand ad hoc protection fees (if movement does take place)
- Local Arabs (from within the community) or settled Arabs who take protection money from others within the community on a regular basis
- Arab militia who accompany road convoys and demand payment for protection
- Non-Arab groups (in particular Tama and Gimir) mobilised by the GoS

For most people in Darfur, the threat of violence remains. Most residents and IDPs of certain ethnic groups in GoS held areas still do not feel safe to venture far outside of towns or settlements. Increased fighting in parts of Darfur continues to create new waves of displacement. A war economy has developed based on looting and extortion, from which certain groups in Darfur are able to benefit. Without any significant actions to stop extortion, then those groups involved are able to consolidate their position to continue to do so. Crimes continue to be perpetrated with impunity, with little or no action to prevent criminal activity, nor to register or act upon cases of rape and attack reported to government authorities. The ethnic dimension of the conflict and increased polarisation between different ethnic groups is tearing the social fabric of Darfur apart and with it, the possibility of a swift return to former livelihoods.

3.3 Role of the African Union
The role of the AU in the initial ceasefire agreements was:
- to monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
- to assist in the process of confidence building.
- to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all Parties with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation in Darfur.

As soon as the AU arrived, however, it became clear that the number of ceasefire violations were so numerous that it was impossible to monitor them all. The success of the AU mission in contributing to a secure environment and the protection of civilians has been limited. For example, work with the Sudanese police has been difficult since most IDPs do not trust the police as they have not respected human rights, or in many cases followed up on abuses reported to them (O'Neill and Cassis, 2005, November). This was confirmed by IDPs interviewed for this study.

Another problem is that the expectations of the conflict-affected population differ from the AU’s actual mandate. Many are puzzled by AU personnel coming to question them about alleged abuses, but then not acting upon this. In Malha, the study team was asked why the AU was there, as the local population thought that they had taken adequate measures themselves to ensure their security.
There are some positive examples of the AMIS’ performance, for example in the establishment of firewood patrols. Firewood patrols in Kutum for IDPs have been successful as they were implemented on a regular basis and protected IDPs from being harassed. Firewood patrols in Seraf Omra have also had a positive impact on reducing abuse and increasing income. In Kutum, the AU also escorted IDPs in Fata Borno to the market in Kutum to sell agricultural produce. On the whole this increases essential access to markets for the IDPs, but the AU escort was attacked on at least one occasion. The IDPs consequently questioned how the AU could protect them, if they could not even protect themselves. Nevertheless, the presence of the AU in Kutum has helped livestock traders prevent theft of livestock before market day; they built a fenced area near the AU compound to hold livestock which stopped the looting of animals. Firewood patrols in other areas have not been so successful, however. For example in Kebkabiya, firewood patrols are not organised on a regular basis, and have thus been less effective in preventing abuses.

The Darfur Peace Agreement was being negotiated at the time of this study and has since been partially signed. A new ceasefire agreement is part of this. The partial signing has already led to a deterioration in security throughout Darfur. Negotiations are still on-going on the possible deployment of UN forces, which would have the mandate to disarm parties that violate the ceasefire and the militias. It is unlikely that if agreement is reached, they would be in place before the beginning of next year. In the meantime, there are calls for an increase in AU forces in Darfur, with greater punitive powers.

3.4 Local efforts at self-defence and reconciliation

Given the continuing security risks, and the slow progress in peace negotiations, many conflict affected communities in Darfur have taken their own measures for protection and conflict resolution.

In a number of places such as Kutum Malha and in villages such as Sileia in West Darfur, the population has set up their own defence forces from within the population, not including Arab groups but rather from the ethnic groups most at risk. These may sometimes be joint community/GoS defence forces. In Kutum, each quarter of the town elects some youths to work together with policemen to patrol the area. In Malha, after a visit by the Wali (see below) 400 youths were recruited by the GoS to defend the community in case of attack. These are now considered GoS forces. These communities reported feeling safer as a result of these initiatives.

Much can be learned from local efforts to remain neutral, to avoid attack, and to promote reconciliation. An example from Malha, which was one of the places visited by the study team is given in Box 3.1 below.
### Box 3.1 Local peace and reconciliation efforts: a case study of Malha

Malha is geographically isolated in the far north east of Darfur, and much of the population depends on the sale of livestock in exchange for grain and other goods. The population of Malha is therefore highly dependent on the supply of food and other goods from outside the area, mainly Mellit, Al Fashir and Omdurman. Throughout the conflict, Malha has attempted to stay neutral in order to prevent attacks from both the SLA and GoS as this would cut off their supply routes and threaten their survival. In 2003, community leaders from Malha sent a delegation to the SLA. They suggested that the SLA would be free to move in the area, but that:

1. the police should stay in Malha town so that the government would not attack and payment of civil servants would continue.
2. SLA should not attack neighbouring tribes.
3. there should be free movement of people and livestock.

The SLA took Malha in November 2003, however, and the GoS supported by the Janjaweed attacked in January 2004. The Meidob did eventually convince the SLA to leave Malha town so that they would no longer be cut off. In February 2004, they met with the President to explain that they are not part of the SLA and the Wali of North Darfur visited Malha. Today, Malha town is nominally GoS held, with an army garrison on the perimeters outside of town, GoS trained defence forces and a government representative who is a Meidob from Malha. The SLA control the area outside of Malha town and a large part of rural Mellit AU. Malha has not been attacked since January 2004 and the population can move freely in and out of Malha.

There have also been local reconciliation efforts between the Meidob, Zayadia and Berti. They have no interest in each other’s land (the Zayadia Arabs have their own Dar east of Mellit town) and they are not direct opponents in the conflict, but rather were drawn into it by each side of the conflict. More importantly, their livestock migration routes used to traverse each other’s land, but currently Meidob cannot travel far enough South during the dry season, and the Zayadia cannot reach their northern grazing grounds in the rainy season. Each therefore has little to gain but much to lose from the current conflict. Talks started in June 2005, and were progressing well until the GoS became involved. The future of the talks are unknown, but both Zayadia and Meidob seen by the study team were clear that with GoS involvement or even support, the reconciliation efforts would fail as there is deep mistrust of GoS by both sides.

The efforts of the Meidob, Berti and Zayadia followed the participation of tribal leaders in peace initiatives in Abuja and Libya, and in particular the efforts of Nazir Saeed Madibu of the Southern Rizeigat. This Nazir is strongly opposed to the involvement of the Southern Rizeigat in the Janjaweed although there are reports that some young Rizeigat men have still joined up. Like most of the Southern Rizeigat, the Beni Hussein Arabs from Sereif in north Darfur have been able to keep out of the conflict, even though they are surrounded by the opposing sides, have been approached by each and have come under immense pressure from government (Young et al, 2005, June). In Geneina, Arab and Masalit leaders have agreed a compromise which allows the Arabs to keep their Amirs but the original system of electing the sultan remains (Flint and De Waal, 2005). There are also reports of talks between Rizeigat and Zaghawa leaders about access to livestock migration routes, and of the Mema in Wad’ah in Dar El Salaam negotiating some kind of neutrality with the SLA.
4. LIVELIHOODS IN DARFUR: OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT

4.1 Livelihoods in Darfur before the conflict

4.1.1 An introduction to livelihoods in Darfur

Located in the transitional zone between the Sahelian and desert zones, rainfall in Darfur region varies widely from less than 100 mm in the desert zone in the far north, through the Sahelian zone where there is 100 to 500 mm of rainfall per year, to the Sudanic zone in the south which enjoys 500 to 900 mm of rainfall per year. Jebel Marra, which rises to an altitude of 3000m, has a significant effect on the amount of rain that falls in Darfur, and on its reliability.

These wide-ranging rainfall patterns account for the region’s ecological diversity from north to south and have a profound impact on livelihoods in Darfur. The fundamental livelihood strategies in Darfur are based on agricultural production, livestock, trade and migrant labour. Indeed, a key feature of livelihoods in Darfur is the mix of farming and herding strategies for most households. Despite the tendency – especially in the current conflict – to distinguish between pastoralists and farmers, pre-conflict nearly all farmers were herding animals and nearly all herders were engaged in some crop cultivation. The distinction between farmers and herders is more accurately a distinction between sedentary agro-pastoralists and more mobile pastoralists, closely linked to ethnicity (Young et al, 2005). Indeed, over the years a number of Arab nomadic tribes have become increasingly settled – at least part of the tribe whilst others migrate with the livestock. This trend is associated with the following factors:

- loss of livestock due to drought or conflict
- greater access to services
- new water points
- insecurity
- profitability of cultivation (in particular groundnuts)
- opportunities in urban centres

(Al Massar, 2003)

Darfur region has normally been able to achieve food self-sufficiency, although within the region this has usually meant significant grain flows from surplus producing areas in South and West Darfur states to the normally food deficit North Darfur state. Only in very bad drought years has Darfur had to rely on grain imports from elsewhere in Sudan. These kind of grain flows have been hampered by the remoteness of Darfur, which in turn is a consequence of geographical distance and very poor road and transport infrastructure.

As one of the least developed regions in Sudan, subject to highly variable and declining rainfall, Darfur has also been one of the most food insecure areas of Sudan.

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9 This section is based on Young et al, 2005
4.1.2 Livelihood zones in North Darfur

Before the conflict the most detailed work studying and understanding livelihoods took place in the traditionally most food insecure state of North Darfur where rainfall is lowest and most variable. Indeed, North Darfur has been at the centre of most pre-conflict efforts to improve and protect food security, including early warning (EW) and information collection. The most food insecure area in North Darfur has long been the north east (Malha, Mellit and Umm Keddada AUs).

Save the Children UK (SCUK) divided up North Darfur into six livelihood or ‘food economy zones’ (FEZs) for monitoring purposes before the conflict. These are shown on the map in Figure 4.1 and summarised in Table 4.1. (For this study the terminology ‘livelihood zones’ is used).

Table 4.1: Summary of livelihood zones in North Darfur pre-conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihood zone</th>
<th>Location &amp; main ethnic groups</th>
<th>Ecology</th>
<th>Livelihood strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1) Goz          | Wide area: Umm Keddada, Mellit, Sayah, most of Al Fashir & northern Dar El Salaam AU, Berti, Felata, Zaghawa & others | Mostly goz soils Rainfall: 150-250 mm | • Rainfed cultivation: millet & watermelon  
• Small to medium herds of shoats  
• Poor households: agricultural labour  
• Medium income households: trade, remittances, livestock sales  
• Herding for others is means of acquiring livestock |
| 2) Pastoral     | Northern part of the state: Meidob, Zaghawa, Zayadiya, northern Rizeigat | Semi-desert. Rainfall less than 200 mm, declining northwards | • Livestock herding is core livelihood strategy  
• Livestock sales: key markets Mellit, Kutum, Al Fashir, Seraf Omra  
• Export trade in sheep & camels to Libya, Central Sudan and beyond  
• Goats sold for local consumption  
• Wild foods important in drought years  
• Women from poor households migrate to goz FEZ for agric. labour in rainy season  
• Labour migration, especially to Libya for the Meidob, but also to Al Fashir, Nyala and Chad for the Zaghawa – remittances |
| 3) Agro-migrant | From non-wadi areas of Kutum & Fata Borno AU to Jebel Si' Kebkabiya AU, Fur & Tunjur | Stony hills & hard, sandy clay soils Rainfall: 200-250 mm | • Millet farming on limited land holdings  
• Small to medium-sized herds of sheep, goats & a few cattle (& livestock sales)  
• Labour migration of men to Central Sudan - remittances  
• Women migrate to S/ W Darfur for agricultural labour – remittances & in-kind payment  
• Wild food consumption |
| 4) Mixed cash crops | Southern Umm Keddada & southern Dar El Salaam AUs, Berti, Hamar, Zaghawa plus others | Poor savannah with relatively dense vegetation Rainfall: 300-400 mm | • Cash crops: groundnuts, melon seed, sesame (Dar El Salaam)  
• Markets: Taweisha, El Laeit, Dar El Salaam  
• Poor hhs provide agric labour to better-off  
• Livestock holdings: sheep, goats, cattle & some riding camels |

10 By 1983 only one-third of the Zaghawa were living in Dar Zaghawa. Many had moved to other parts of Darfur as traders and farmers, thus extending their social networks

39
### 4.1.3 Livelihood zones in West Darfur

Livelihoods in West Darfur vary widely from areas of high agricultural productivity (wadi land and higher rainfall) in the south of the state to areas of lower agricultural productivity (lower rainfall and sandy soils) in the north of the state. The presence of a number of large wadis (Kaja, Azum, Barei, Arebo, and Salih) and numerous small *khors* are central to both agricultural livelihoods and to pastoralist livelihoods in West Darfur.

Before the conflict SCUK had just started to document the livelihood zones in West Darfur. The results from this preliminary baseline work, with additions from the field work for this livelihoods study, are presented in Table 4.2. Most detailed was SCUK's description of the ‘agro-pastoral with low productivity’ FEZ for which a full baseline assessment was completed in 2002.

Particularly noticeable in West Darfur is the impact of tribal conflict long before 2003: from the late 1980s in the Jebel Marra area and from the mid 1990s elsewhere. Livestock had been looted and there was a de-stocking of camels in many of the more insecure areas because they were most likely to be stolen, and of cattle in some southern areas. Livestock trading had similarly contracted with many people only travelling to local markets (SCUK, 2002a). These were all portents of the devastating impact on livelihoods that the current and much more intense conflict would have.

| 5) Tombac | Tawila, Korma, western Al Fashir & southern Dar El Salaam AUs, Tunjur, Fur, Zaghaba, Bornu, Kinein, Gimir & Bargo | Fertile clay soil around wadis Rainfall: 200-350mm declining northwards | Presence of Dinka IDPs involved in generally exploitative share-cropping |
| 6) Wadi | Crosses Kutum, Fata Borno, Kebkabiya & Seraf Omra AUs (wadi Kutum, wadi Barei & wadi Borgo Fur, Tunjur & Gimir | Alluvial, silt, clay and/or loamy wadi soils Rainfall: 300-400 mm in Kebkabiya area; 200-300 mm in Kutum area | Produces most of Sudan’s supply of tombac Tombac markets: Al Fashir, Tawila, Korma, Tabit & Shengil Tobaya Dependent on grain purchase for food, supplemented by own millet production & milk, for poor hhs also payment in kind for agric labour, wild food & milk |
| 7) Urban | Al Fashir town, Kebkabiya and other urban areas | | Traders & businessmen Civil servants Artisans (carpenters, blacksmiths etc) Casual labour & petty trade Some agricultural activities |

Source: Adapted from SCUK Food Economy Profiles, 2004.4.1.3 Livelihood zones in West Darfur

| 5) Tombac | Tawila, Korma, western Al Fashir & southern Dar El Salaam AUs, Tunjur, Fur, Zaghaba, Bornu, Kinein, Gimir & Bargo | Fertile clay soil around wadis Rainfall: 200-350mm declining northwards | Presence of Dinka IDPs involved in generally exploitative share-cropping |
| 6) Wadi | Crosses Kutum, Fata Borno, Kebkabiya & Seraf Omra AUs (wadi Kutum, wadi Barei & wadi Borgo Fur, Tunjur & Gimir | Alluvial, silt, clay and/or loamy wadi soils Rainfall: 300-400 mm in Kebkabiya area; 200-300 mm in Kutum area | Produces most of Sudan’s supply of tombac Tombac markets: Al Fashir, Tawila, Korma, Tabit & Shengil Tobaya Dependent on grain purchase for food, supplemented by own millet production & milk, for poor hhs also payment in kind for agric labour, wild food & milk |
| 7) Urban | Al Fashir town, Kebkabiya and other urban areas | | Traders & businessmen Civil servants Artisans (carpenters, blacksmiths etc) Casual labour & petty trade Some agricultural activities |
## Table 4.2: Summary of livelihood zones in West Darfur pre-conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihood zone</th>
<th>Location &amp; main ethnic groups</th>
<th>Ecology</th>
<th>Livelihood strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Pastoral groups</td>
<td>Dry season: wadi Barei, W Geneina, wadi Kaja/ Mahba &amp; Sirba/ Sileia areas Rainy season: northern part of Kulbus locality, border with N Darfur Arabs incl. Awlad Ganub, Shigart, Maharia, Aballa Rizeigat, Beni Halba, Misriya, Khuzam and Mahdi camel-herding nomads, Salamat, Nawayba, Awlad Rashid</td>
<td>Wadi land in the south Semi-desert in the north</td>
<td>• Livestock herding (by order of importance): camels, sheep, few cattle &amp; goats • Seasonal migration • In drought years move south to Fora Boranga • Consumption of wild food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Agro-pastoral – north – low productivity</td>
<td>Kulbus &amp; Geneina provinces – northern part of W Darfur Gimir, Maseria Jebel, Eringa, Massalit and others</td>
<td>Sandy/ sandy clay soils with some mountainous areas Rainfall: 300-500mm</td>
<td>• Millet cultivation as main staple • Also okra, sesame &amp; groundnuts • Only few hhs have access to wadi land: onion, tomatoes, okra &amp; mangoes • Livestock holdings: mainly sheep &amp; goats • Close to Geneina: wood/ charcoal, grass selling &amp; labour • Male migration to Khartoum, Fashir &amp; Gezira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Agro-pastoral – south – high productivity</td>
<td>Southern part of W Darfur (incl wadi Azum &amp; wadi Barei; Habila &amp; Moreni areas) Massalit, Singar, Fur, Burgo &amp; Zagha</td>
<td>Fertile wadi land Rainfall: 500-700 mm</td>
<td>• Rainy season: sorghum cultivation on flooded wadis and groundnuts as cash crop on sandy clay soils • Wadi cultivation of vegetables in winter • Tombac cultivation around Moreni • Fruit gardens for some (eg in and around Habila) • Livestock holdings: cattle and goats • Some migrated north during rainy season • Major market: Fora Boranga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) West Jebel Marra lowland</td>
<td>Zalingei, Garsilla, Wadi Saleh Majority Fur</td>
<td>Fertile wadi land Rainfall: up to 700mm</td>
<td>• Rainy season: millet, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame, karkadeh etc • Irrigated during winter: cash crops, vegetables, onions, wheat etc • Fruit gardens as cash crops • Tombac farming in some places • Small numbers of cattle and shoats • Labour migration to Khartoum, Egypt &amp; Libya – remittances • Zalingei – trading opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Highland (mixed cash crops)</td>
<td>High altitude areas of Jebel Marra Fur</td>
<td>Fertile land and temperate climate Rainfall: over 700mm</td>
<td>• Natural spring irrigation • Fruit and vegetable production • Good access to markets • Wood and forestry production • Limited dependence on livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Urban</td>
<td>Al Geneina town Mixed tribes</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Trade &amp; government salaries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 The list of Arab tribes is compiled from SCUK (2002a), Al Massar (2003) and from the fieldwork for this livelihoods study. Many of the Arab pastoralists originally came from Chad
4.1.4 Livelihood zones in South Darfur

The cultivated area in South Darfur has been gradually expanding for the last few decades as population growth in this state has been highest. (Population in South Darfur is almost double the population in each of North and West). As well as natural population growth there has been significant migration into the state, especially from the drier and less productive North Darfur. Tribes that have moved into South Darfur over the years include the Birgid, Ma’aliya and Zaghawa (Young et al, 2005). Of the three states, South Darfur has the most favourable conditions for rural livelihoods.

Pre-conflict livelihood zoning in South Darfur was least advanced. The livelihood zones for this state, presented in Table 4.3, were identified by participants at a workshop run by UNICEF in Nyala in March 2006 and are supplemented with information from team members for this study. However, they are not as detailed as the livelihood zones for North and West Darfur.

Table 4.3: Summary of livelihood zones in South Darfur pre-conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihood zone</th>
<th>Location&amp; main ethnic groups</th>
<th>Ecology</th>
<th>Livelihood strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Low rainfall agro-pastoral</td>
<td>Areas bordering North Darfur: Shearia, Mershing Zaghawa, Birgid</td>
<td>• Millet &amp; sorghum production • Groundnuts as cash crop • Livestock holdings: cattle</td>
<td>• Goz soils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a) Agro-pastoral: cash crop, groundnuts, dominant</td>
<td>Ed Daein, Buram, Tullus, Rehed El Berdi Rizeigat, Ma’aliya, Gimr, Tama, Zaghawa, Habbaniya, Fallata, Beni Halba, Dinka IDPs</td>
<td>• Millet &amp; sorghum production as staples and as cash crops • Production of groundnuts, sesame, karkadeh • Large Dinka labour force, working as sharecroppers, agricultural labourers and renting land • Gum arabic • Livestock: cattle</td>
<td>• Goz soils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b) Agro-pastoral: livestock, cattle dominant</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>• Cattle pastoralism, migrating between Bahr el Arab and Nyala, or just into North Darfur • Millet &amp; sorghum production as staples and as cash crops • Groundnut production</td>
<td>• Goz soils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) South Jebel Marra lowland</td>
<td>Kass, Shertai Mixed: Fur, Gimr, Tama, Beni Halba, Turjun</td>
<td>• Fertile land • Rainfall: up to 700mm</td>
<td>• Rainy season: millet, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame, karkadeh etc • Irrigated during winter: cash crops, vegetables, onions, wheat etc (less than W Jebel Marra lowland) • Fruit gardens as cash crops • Trade • Large numbers of cattle and shoats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2  Impact of the conflict

4.2.1 Population displacement and restricted mobility
The immediate impact of the conflict was rapid and widespread population displacement across all three Darfur states. By September 2003 there were an estimated 250,000 displaced. The numbers continued to increase sharply, throughout the first half of 2004, to reach 1.45 million by September 2004, 1.8 million by August 2005 (WFP, 2005). By the time of writing, they have risen to over 2 million – over 30% of the estimated pre-conflict population of Darfur of 6.26 million.

A very large number of people have died as a direct result of this conflict. Estimates of the total number of excess deaths range from 35,000 to 70,000 between March and September 2004 (by WHO) to a total of 157,819 between September 2003 and June 2005 (by CRED)\(^\text{12}\).

Widespread displacement has been accompanied by very restricted mobility, for reasons of insecurity, ‘control’ of the population in certain areas and difficulties of moving from GoS-held to SLA-held areas. Thus, most IDPs are unable to cultivate as explained in chapters 6, 7 and 8, or at best are cultivating on a minimal scale on land loaned by others. Only a few still have seasonal access to part of their former farms.

There has also been a significant (although unquantified) outflow of men and boys from Darfur, mainly to Central Sudan and to Khartoum in particular. This dates back to the very early months of the conflict. It was not so much the pull of the labour market that triggered this outflow (as would be expected in peacetime). Rather it was the fear of insecurity and the fact that men and boys were being targeted and killed in attacks.

This massive scale of displacement and the large number of deaths have had a hugely negative impact on human capital in Darfur, which in turn has impacted on livelihoods. One of the immediate impacts is the increase in female-headed households. This was widely reported during the fieldwork for this study, with some communities estimating that up to three-quarters of households are now female-headed, especially in IDP camps. The study team’s assessment of the reasons for this are, by order of importance:

(i) men moving to Central Sudan in the early stages of the conflict
(ii) men joining the rebel movements or Janjaweed as fighters
(iii) men killed during the conflict.

After such devastation, human capital is going to take some time to recover to be fully productive once again.

4.2.2 Destruction and loss of assets
The widespread destruction of assets early in the conflict is well known and has been well-documented. The extent of the devastation varies from one location to another, but the pattern is similar. Typically attacks on villages resulted in: the burning of houses and all household goods; the loss or destruction of agricultural tools; the looting and destruction of food and seed stocks; looting of livestock (discussed in section 4.2.5 below); the looting or destruction of irrigation pumps; attacks on shops and grinding mills; and the looting of development assets such as revolving funds and grain banks.

\(^{12}\) Personal communication, Helen Young
The scale of destruction of these physical assets has been immense, particularly in West Darfur where so many villages have been burned and razed to the ground. At the same time important natural assets have been destroyed, for example hand-dug wells have been destroyed or contaminated and fruit trees cut down. And social infrastructure such as schools and health units, were rarely spared. All of this has severely depleted Darfur’s agricultural productive capacity. The investment required to rebuild these assets will be enormous.

4.2.3 Reduced labour migration and remittances

As a result of restricted population movements, labour migration has more or less stopped since the conflict began, within Darfur and beyond. The closing of the border with Libya in May 2003 had an immediate impact in halting the movement of migrant workers between Darfur and southern Libya. This has been well-documented in the Tufts study which estimated the number of Darfur migrants in Libya to be in the range of 150,000 to 250,000 generating around $15 million of remittances per year before the conflict. This in turn was their conservative estimate of the amount of lost income from migrants in Libya when the conflict began (Young et al, 2005). During the last three years there are reports of some illegal movement of migrant traffic between Darfur and Libya, for example there appear to be some goods from Libya in markets in Dar Zaghawa, but this is on a very small scale and is very risky. Essentially, the flow of remittances from Libya has stopped. This has had greatest impact in areas like Dar Meidob where it was an important source of pre-conflict income.

Labour migration flows to Central Sudan and further afield (Egypt and the Gulf) very quickly stopped when the conflict began because of insecurity and the risks of travel. Even though there was an outflow of men and boys to Central Sudan for security reasons, as mentioned above, this does not appear to have resulted in a significant increase in remittances back to Darfur. On the contrary, it was reported during this study that many Darfuris now living in Central Sudan are hosting large numbers of family members so there is less surplus income to send home and not all migrants have found work. This is consistent with reports of recent returns from Khartoum in late 2005/ early 2006 as the humanitarian (food) crisis in Darfur stabilised with the large-scale distribution of humanitarian assistance, especially food aid.

The study team was repeatedly told in focus group discussions that remittances that had previously been an important source of people’s livelihood had either dried up, or were much less regular and predictable than before the conflict. There were many reports of money or goods in kind being looted when migrant workers did try to send them back to family members. This is probably worst in rural areas but in some towns the closure of banks has presented another hindrance, for example in Kebkabiya. In many places, it was reported that since the start of the conflict remittances had increased, but the frequency with which they were sent was lower than before the conflict. The total amount of remittances is therefore still far less than before the conflict. This was reported mostly in GoS held towns where communication systems are generally better, for example, in Mornei, Kutum, Al Fashir, and Zalingei. A similar pattern was reported in some SLA held areas, including Dar Zaghawa and Saiyah where remittances have to be hand-carried by relatives.

In the main urban areas – Al Fashir, Nyala and Geneina – it is possible that the employment opportunities and income generated by the presence of aid agencies and AU has partially offset the drop in remittances for some households, but this requires further investigation, not least to understand who is benefiting and how.
4.2.4 Declining agricultural production

The impact of the conflict on agricultural production was immediate. In the first year of the conflict many villages were attacked during the weeding period or shortly before or during harvest time. Standing crops were burnt or destroyed by the Janjaweed, or grazed by their livestock. FAO/ WFP estimated that only 45% of the millet crop was harvested. As a result, estimated production was severely down on previous years although rainfall conditions had been generally good.

The following harvest of 2004/05 was once again very depressed: an estimated 296,000 mt, 45% less than the average (WFP, 2005). This happened to be a severe drought year. North Darfur recorded the lowest rainfall level in 10 years, similar to levels in 1984 and 1990 which were two of the worst years of drought and famine in the last two decades (SC-UK, Nov 04). But the main reasons why the harvest was so low were to do with:

(1) population displacement
(2) insecurity and therefore loss of access to all but the closest farmland to villages. (Access is usually worse in GOS-held areas where farmers will frequently travel no more than 30 minutes distance from the village; in SLA-held areas access is usually better, but still constrained)
(3) loss of agricultural tools; this is particularly an issue for more fertile clay and wadi soils where irrigation pumps have been destroyed and/ or draught animals looted affecting ploughing capacity

These factors explain the very reduced area planted by resident households in Darfur: only 30 to 40% of the 2003 season according to WFP’s assessment (WFP, 2004). In this same assessment only one-third of the sample households reported any agricultural cultivation.

In 2005 the FAO/ WFP crop assessment estimated a substantial 47% increase in area cultivated in Greater Darfur compared with the previous year, which they attributed to improved rainfall, high cereal prices and a slight increase in security (FAO and WFP, 2006). The increase in security is, however, marginal; most of those interviewed for this study were only cultivating a very small proportion of their total farm land. The ability to farm was usually greater in SLA-held areas, for example in Saiyah and Dar El Salaam.

The impact of increased cereal prices in encouraging crop production was not evident in this study. More concerning were frequent reports in areas shared by pastoralists and settled farmers (for example in Kekbabiya AU, and in parts of West Darfur) of animals grazing the crops before they were harvested.

4.2.5 Livestock losses and disruption of migration

Livestock losses have been devastating for the majority of Darfur’s population who have lost their animals; livestock are their main financial asset. Livestock losses are a result of looting, distress sales and deaths. The impact has been severe for pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and farmers. In 2004 FAO estimated livestock losses amongst IDPs in GOS-held areas to be more than 90%, and between 60 to 90% for IDPs in SLA-controlled areas in North Darfur (FAO. 2004). The scale of these livestock losses was confirmed in discussions with IDPs during this study.
IDPs and resident populations who were attacked suddenly and without warning suffered the greatest losses. Many were lucky if they managed to escape even with a donkey, for example from the Jebel Si areas in 2003/04 and from many villages in West Darfur. If households became displaced out of fear, or because they had been warned of an impending attack, they were more likely to move with their animals. However, some were looted in subsequent attacks on neighbouring villages and towns, or lost their animals when they arrived in IDP camps, either because they died for lack of pasture, or more commonly because of distress sales at hugely reduced prices (see Chapter 5).

Indeed, livestock prices more or less collapsed in the first year of the conflict as many people rushed to destock, partly out of fear that holding livestock made the household vulnerable to attack, and partly to raise income as normal income generating activities collapsed and as grain prices soared. These patterns are very evident amongst those pastoralist groups which are aligned to the opposition movements.

All pastoralist groups, including those aligned with the GoS/Janjaweed, have experienced looting, and are suffering from restrictions on movement and disruption to normal migratory routes. This has resulted in very high concentrations of livestock in certain areas, usually the pastoralists’ area of origin in the case of the opposition aligned groups, and in parts of West and North Darfur for those aligned with the GoS. This in turn has put immense pressure on limited water and grazing resources at a time when the maintenance system for most water sources has collapsed. Outbreaks of animal disease have been common, usually in the absence of any veterinary services. The combined impact of all of this is evident in Dar Zaghawa where a group of men interviewed in Umm Haraz village for this study reported that more than half of their herds had been depleted. See Figure 4.2

**Figure 4.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of Conflict on Livestock in Dar Zaghawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Looted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Focus group discussion with men in Um Haraz village, Dar Zaghawa

Interviewees in Malha similarly reported high losses of livestock: 60% due to looting, especially in the south, and 40% from livestock deaths, especially in the north where there were high concentrations of animals. The disruption to livestock migration in 2004/05 had serious consequences for livestock mortality because it was a drought year when there was a severe shortage of pasture in the north of Darfur.
The map in Figure 4.3 shows the migration routes that pastoralists used to follow before the current conflict began. The number of different migration routes and the distance of some of them are striking. Before the conflict, there were 11 official stock routes in Darfur, which were regulated through legislation. Enforcement of these official stock routes was weak however, and in reality many more than 11 routes existed (Al Massar, 2003). Yet most of these are now disrupted or blocked since the conflict began. As a result, there are heavy concentrations of livestock in certain areas:

(1) North Darfur: in Dar Meidob and Dar Zaghawa as mentioned above, but also in Jebel Si and the Kebkabiya/ Seraf Omra areas
(2) West Darfur: in Wadi Salih, Habila, Geneina
(3) South Darfur: Dar Rizeigat & around the Buram area

There are many unanswered questions about what has happened to the looted livestock. There are anecdotal reports that livestock were taken out of Darfur and sold in Chad or in Central Sudan, that they were killed locally, for example to feed the military or those who had stolen them, or that they are now part of the increased herds of the looters. One of the few areas where there were reports of increased livestock holdings during this livelihood study is Dar Rizeigat.

4.2.6 Daily labouring and petty trade
This has always been an important source of income for the poorest households in Darfur. Since the conflict very large numbers of people have become dependent on daily labour as one of their main sources of income as the rest of their livelihoods have collapsed. This is especially the case for IDPs and for resident households who have no or very limited access to agricultural land, who have lost their livestock and who are unable to travel to trade or to find work elsewhere.

In this livelihood study brick-making emerged as one of the most important sources of daily labour. Indeed, there must be more bricks being made in Darfur than at any time in its history, usually around towns and very expanded population centres. Other daily labour opportunities include: domestic labour, collecting firewood and grass. Many people interviewed by the study team reported an increase in dependence on casual labour over time, between the initial period of displacement and 2006. In some places there has been an increase in petty trading opportunities, for example for IDPs in Kutum camp and in Mornei. Wage rates also changed since the start of the conflict: some have decreased due to increased competition and more people looking for work, for example in Abu Shouk camp. See Table 4.4. In other places, however, wages have increased, either because people are working longer hours, or because of a decrease in competition for work (in turn related to the provision of food aid), or an increase in demand.

The very large presence of the international humanitarian community has undoubtedly contributed to employment opportunities and construction work, but this is mainly confined to the major towns. It is most marked in Geneina.
### Table 4.4. Wage rates for daily labour: 2003/04 compared with 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brickmaking</td>
<td>Abou Shook, Al Fashir</td>
<td>IDPs in camp</td>
<td>500 SD/1000 bricks</td>
<td>350 SD/1000 bricks</td>
<td>Increased number of people looking for work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200-300 SD/day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kassap camp, Kutum</td>
<td>IDPs in camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>400 SD for women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500 SD for men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gara Farajwiya</td>
<td>IDPs in rural area</td>
<td>200 SD/day</td>
<td>400 SD/day</td>
<td>Little demand for bricks when first arrived. Oxfam GB now active in area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geneina</td>
<td>IDPs in town</td>
<td>200-250 SD</td>
<td>300-500 SD</td>
<td>Construction boom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kass</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>200 SD/1000 bricks</td>
<td>300 SD/1000 bricks</td>
<td>Availability of relief has increased negotiating power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ed Daien</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td></td>
<td>500-700 SD/day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual labour</td>
<td>Malha</td>
<td>Urban residents and IDPs</td>
<td>500 SD/day</td>
<td>300 SD/day</td>
<td>Increased number of labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(general)</td>
<td>Habilla</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>300 SD/day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zalingei</td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td>300-400 SD/day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic labour</td>
<td>Habilla</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>100 SD/day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geneina</td>
<td>IDPs in town</td>
<td>100 SD/day</td>
<td>100 SD/day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ed Daien</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td></td>
<td>150-200 SD/day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>Gara Zawiya</td>
<td>IDPs in rural area</td>
<td>300 SD/day</td>
<td>400 SD/day</td>
<td>Working longer days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kutum</td>
<td>IDPs in town</td>
<td>300 SD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not working on farms in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seref Omra</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>200 SD</td>
<td>200 SD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Umm Shayala</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-300 SD/day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Umm Tajok</td>
<td>IDPs (Masalit)</td>
<td>200 SD/day</td>
<td>300 SD/day</td>
<td>Reduced competition for work since start of food distribution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of these are poor substitutes to pre-conflict livelihood strategies. There is very high competition for work which means that daily employment is both unpredictable and usually infrequent. Even though wage rates have increased in some places, they are still low. Firewood and grass collection for sale have both become important sources of income for many IDPs, usually women. However, the risks associated with these activities are immense: risks of attack, harassment and rape, widely reported during this study.

### 4.3 Conclusions

The combination of population displacement, widespread destruction, looting of assets and restricted movement had the most devastating impact on lives and livelihoods at the outset of the conflict. Very rapidly, within the first year of the conflict, the livelihoods of over a million people were more or less destroyed. As the number of IDPs has continued to rise since, so has the number whose livelihoods have been shattered.
Any livelihood strategies that have persisted are now operating at much reduced levels. This applies to remittances, agricultural production and livestock production. All are directly affected by levels of insecurity and the restricted movement of people, livestock and trade. Indeed, although lack of manpower has sometimes been cited as the main reason for depressed agricultural production, this study concludes that the main reason is insecurity hampering the access of many farmers to their land. Whilst people have shown remarkable resilience in the current situation, reliance for many on precarious and poorly paid daily labouring is no substitute for their pre-conflict livelihood strategies which were based upon agricultural production, livestock, trade and labour migration.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present a more detailed analysis of how livelihood strategies have changed in each of the three states, by grouping together population groups who have been similarly affected and who now face comparable levels of livelihood insecurity.
5. TRADE AND MARKETS

5.1 Disruption to trade: an overview

5.1.1 Introduction
Darfur’s economy has always been based on an intricate web of trading relationships, between pastoralists and farmers, north and south, rural and urban. These have been an integral part of every household’s livelihood strategies. For its main export products, Darfur is heavily dependent on trade with Central Sudan: livestock, tombac, groundnuts, gum arabic and sesame. Sometimes Central Sudan is just a gateway to markets further afield, especially for livestock to the Gulf. Darfur also has its own direct export trade in livestock to neighbouring countries: Egypt and Libya in particular.

These trading systems have developed and flourished despite Darfur’s very limited transport infrastructure: only 7% of its roads are paved and 12% gravelled (Hamid et al, 2005). Improved transport and communications have long been identified as one of the single biggest potential contributors to strengthening Darfur’s economy (see Swift and Gray, 1989). But there has been precious little investment for decades.

This chapter explains how trade has been disrupted and how parts of the market network have collapsed. It then proceeds to review what has happened to trade in some of Darfur’s main products. It is not a comprehensive study of war economies that have developed in Darfur since the conflict began, which would have required longer and more investigative fieldwork than was possible for this study.

5.1.2 How trade has been disrupted
The disruption to trade has been one of the most insidious and negative impacts of the conflict. It started early and has gradually got worse. Some of this has been deliberate, and some is the inevitable consequence of operating in a war zone. The main obstacles are the following:

7) Displacement of producers and traders
8) GoS restrictions on transporting goods into and out of SLA-held areas. For some commodities this is an outright embargo, for example fuel
9) Insecurity in moving through many rural areas, particularly from GoS to SLA-held territory and vice versa
10) Increasing risks of banditry and looting
11) Frequent checkpoints, random payments and some additional ‘protection’ payments
12) ‘Double’ taxation if passing through SLA and GoS-held territory

13 Surprisingly, a CARE study in 2004 concluded that ‘most rural and urban markets are well functioning and competitively operating’ (2004: 5), but this did not last for long.
14 In Dar Zaghawa GoS has restricted the amount of grain that can be taken from GoS held towns to SLA-held areas to half a sack
15 In order to move goods from Mellit to Sayah in North Darfur, fees have to be paid to: 1) the central market, 2) the AU office, 3) the traffic police, 4) military intelligence, plus fees at checkpoints
At best, these factors raise transport costs and prices and reduce the frequency of traffic, but trade continues. See Table 5.1 for an indication of how transport costs have been affected. At worst, they block trade completely, now a common phenomenon.

**Table 5.1 Selected transport costs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport route</th>
<th>Pre-conflict (SDD)</th>
<th>Now – March/ April 2006 (SDD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ed Dairen to Omdurman</td>
<td>SDD 100,000 per truck for livestock</td>
<td>SDD 200,000 per truck for livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutum to Khartoum</td>
<td>1,000 per guntar</td>
<td>2,000 per guntar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malha to Omdurman</td>
<td>400-500 per guntar</td>
<td>2,000 per guntar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there is plenty of ‘smuggling’ to get round these embargoes and restrictions, it carries high costs and risks.

### 5.1.3 How the market network has changed

The previous hierarchy of markets in Darfur, at least for the cereal trade were:
- village and rural assembly markets (primary markets, usually weekly);
- intermediate town markets (secondary markets, often twice per week); and
- main town markets (urban markets, daily).

Most of the secondary and urban markets are still functioning but the primary village market network has been devastated by the conflict. During the fieldwork for this study we were frequently told of large numbers of rural markets that no longer function, sometimes because the village has been destroyed and abandoned, and sometimes because mobility of goods is so severely restricted. The following are a number of examples:
- Dar Zaghawa was very badly affected. Most markets collapsed during the first three years of the conflict and local people had to pay middlemen to bring food from markets in GoS held towns such as Kutum and Dor.
- Out of 7 markets in the Sayah area in Mellit locality in North Darfur, only 2 are still functioning.
- In the Kebkabiya area very few rural markets are functioning, three in particular: Gara Zawiya, Mastariyha and Gergo, all closely controlled by the Janjaweed.
- In the Muhajeria area (SLA territory in South Darfur) out of 14 local markets only 4 are reported to be still functioning. One – Abu Dungul – has grown greatly in significance.
- Close to Kass town, the villagers of Singita village have reported that only 5 out of the 13 village markets they used to frequent are still operating.
- In Zalingei all markets have collapsed (except Zalingei itself), including Kuja which was one of the biggest.

At the secondary market level there have been many changes. Some markets have grown and become more important trading centres, usually those serving SLA-held areas, for example Kulkul on the border of Mellit and Al Fashir localities and Muhajaria in Shearia locality. Others, like Mellit market, which used to be a major trading hub with Libya as well as a major market centre for the north-east of North Darfur, have become shadows of their former selves. Similarly, the traditionally thriving trade triangle between Zalingei, Geneina and Nyala has been badly affected. Zalingei, once a key market for agricultural produce, has suffered a major decline and is now very poorly supplied.
However, the major urban markets such as Al Fashir, Nyala and Geneina have generally expanded, especially for basic goods such as food, to cater for their swollen populations. But trade in cash crops in these urban hubs has all but collapsed.

A new phenomenon is the development of sizeable markets in IDP camps, especially the large ones such as Abu Shouk. Trade in food aid is usually the focus of these new markets, but a large number of other food and household commodities are also being traded.

5.2 The grain trade

The trade in locally produced grain collapses...

Market flows of locally produced grain have really dried up as agricultural production has declined. This is the inevitable consequence of so many farmers having become IDPs and because of the limited access of much of the remaining resident rural population to their farms, especially in GOS-held areas. Indeed, in the first year of the conflict, a grain trader in Al Fashir reported that most millet being sold came out of household stores. When those ran out then local supply really declined. Flows of local grain to Geneina market dried up as early as December 2003.

Trade in locally produced grain is also badly affected by the difficulties of moving grain from traditional surplus areas to key markets. This has resulted in extraordinarily high price differentials between areas that are in quite close proximity. For example, farmers in the surplus-producing area of Dar Es Salaam, under SLA control, are unable to bring their millet to GoS-controlled Al Fashir market. In March 2006 there was a SDD 3,000 price differential for a sack of millet between Umdul (SDD 4,500/ sack) in Dar Es Salaam and Al Fashir market (SDD 7,500/ sack). Trade restrictions do not only affect trade between SLA and GOS markets, but also within GOS-held territory. For example, Ed Daein market would normally be supplied with grain from Buram, Tullus and Intekaina in the southern part of South Darfur. Transport costs have now escalated because of the high risks involved, especially from banditry: between Intekaina and Ed Daien they have more than doubled. These trade flows have stopped as a result, as have flows of grain to Ed Daein from Shearia and Muhajaria, both in SLA-territory. Ed Daein now has to depend upon very localised production which even before the conflict was only enough for about five to six months of the year, now even less.

This massive contraction of grain flows is a common pattern. Traders in the major urban centres no longer send their trucks and agents out to rural markets. The risks are too high and the returns too low. Instead, locally produced grain is mostly brought into the market in very small quantities by local producers, for example to Al Fashir market by donkeys rarely carrying more than 4-5 mulwa at a time. In Habila in West Darfur, donkeys transport 1 to 2 sacks of grain at a time from Chad, into a market that used to be a major source of supply for both Geneina and Nyala. Arab women also bring in small quantities of millet produced in the surrounding areas.

Traders that used to deal in large quantities of grain between secondary and urban markets operated on a high degree of trust. Evidence of this were deferred cash payments from one trader to another until all the grain had been sold. This informal credit system meant that cash flow would not constrain levels of business. Since the conflict began this system has completely broken down. Cash payments now have to be made up front at the moment of...
purchasing the grain from another trader. This is an understandable response to the high risks of trading and transportation where looting and commandeering of trucks are major threats in the current environment. But the consequence is that cash flow now severely restricts the level of trading, at a time when official channels of credit are also very limited. (Many banks have closed down or have imposed ceilings on loans).

In short, the trade in locally produced grain in all three Darfur states has all but collapsed. See Table 5.2. Whereas 300 to 500 sacks of millet used to be brought into Al Fashir market every day, now it is rarely as much as 50 sacks, a decline of over 80%. Similarly, for many individual traders, their turnover in local cereals has fallen dramatically. In Zalingei, cereal traders used to sell 5 to 10 sacks of millet per week; now they sell 1 sack every 2 to 3 weeks.

Table 5.2 Key changes in Al Fashir, Nyala and Geneina markets for locally-produced grain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Pre-conflict</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AL FASHIR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of grain traders</td>
<td>200 to 300, of which 100-150 were large-scale traders</td>
<td>No. of traders has increased as IDPs with money, eg from Korma &amp; Tawila have moved into grain trading in Fashir, and also some ex-tombac traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of sacks entering the market per day (local produce)</td>
<td>300-500</td>
<td>Max of 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of supply – local production</td>
<td>Al Fashir locality (Abu Zareiga, Tabit, Korma, Tawila, Dar Es Salaam, Shengil Tobai); sometimes Mellit Rural Council</td>
<td>Very local, from nearby villages by donkey. No longer from Tawila or Korma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NYALA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of grain traders</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of sacks entering the market per day (local produce)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of supply – local production</td>
<td>North east (El Malam, Tabit, Mershing, Juruf, Doma; southern area (Buram, Rehed El Berdi, Umm Dafog); western area (Wadi Salih, Jebel Marra, Kass, Seraf Omra, Fora Boranga, Umm Dukhun)</td>
<td>Rehed El Berdi. Very small amounts from Jebel Marra, Wadi Salih, Fora Boranga and Umm Dukhun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENEINA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of grain traders</td>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>Less than 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of sacks entering the market per day (local produce)</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of supply – local production</td>
<td>South (Beida, Fora Boranga, Mornei); east (Kerenek, Seraf Omra); north (Kulbus, Sirba,, Sileia, Bir Dageeg, Tendelti etc)</td>
<td>Villages very close by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...relief food takes over

This collapse in the trade of local grain has been replaced to an extraordinary extent by relief grain, initially sorghum and now wheat as the main form of food aid available in Darfur. A grain trader interviewed in Al Fashir has switched her business totally to relief. Rather than employing agents to buy grain in local markets as was the system pre-conflict, she now has
agents buying grain on a daily or monthly basis from IDPs, by cora. In a number of places, IDPs act as middlemen buying up grain in small quantities then selling on to larger traders, for example in Mornei. The grain is repacked in sacks and sold on. The provision of such large quantities of relief grain has played a critical role in keeping traders in business. In Al Fashir the number of grain traders has actually increased, although in Geneina it has fallen as some traders have gone bankrupt or have moved to Chad. The number of cereal traders in Kutum has also halved and some have moved to Al Fashir. See Table 5.2 above. For the grain traders who are still in business, they are dealing almost entirely in relief food. Without it, the number of grain traders going out of business would undoubtedly have been much higher.

Relief food has also become an important commodity traded between certain markets, replacing previous flows of local grain. For example Ed Daien now receives relief wheat and sorghum from Nyala replacing previous trade flows from Buram and Shearia.

One of the challenges that grain traders now have to contend with is the unpredictable fluctuations in prices. No longer following familiar trends according to the fortunes of the agricultural season, prices are now hugely influenced by the timing and levels of food aid distribution. These are neither regular nor consistent. In Ed Daein market some small traders have gone out of business when prices have unexpectedly dropped; having paid cash up front for their grain stocks they cannot endure such price changes for long. The unpredictability of prices has (amongst other factors) discouraged traders from holding significant stocks. This was reported in Kebkabiya market. In short, the grain market is now highly sensitive to changes in food aid levels. A 50% drop in rations will immediately show up in increased grain prices. This was evident in Muhajaria where IDPs reported that they have stopped selling relief grain since the ration has reduced. Similarly flows of relief grain to Ed Daien from Nyala have more or less halved since January 2006 since rations levels have been cut.

The provision of food aid has disturbed normal geographic price patterns as well as seasonal trends. For example, Malha in the food insecure north-east of Darfur will often record the highest grain prices across all three states, whilst Buram in one of the main surplus-producing areas of South Darfur would record the lowest. This pattern has been turned on its head since Malha has been a regular recipient of food aid in recent months and Buram, classified as being less ‘war-affected’ receives none.

Despite these distortions, overall the large quantities of food aid available in Darfur have had a hugely stabilising effect on the grain market, and in turn on food security. (See also Chapter 9). It has kept the market functioning and has maintained prices at affordable levels although still usually higher than pre-conflict prices, except for wheat. See Table 5.3 below. Malha provides a useful counter-example of what could have happened across the region in the absence of food aid. In the months when it was cut off from trade and from food aid distributions, in late 2004, the price of millet rose to SDD 19,000 per sack. In January 2006 it was SDD 6,000 per sack, with the regular provision of food aid. Marketed relief grain is an affordable source of food for those who have been missed from general food aid registration and for those who are not eligible for humanitarian assistance, for example civil servants, but who are nevertheless struggling to cope with the increased cost of living. Similarly, some of the Arab nomad populations who are not included in the distributions have had access to

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cheap grain on the market. Even IDPs who are receiving food aid, and who sell some of their ration at the time of distribution to raise income, frequently end up buying grain back again when their supply runs out before the next distribution. A pattern that farmers would have followed on an annual basis, selling at harvest time to raise cash and having to buy back in the hungry season when prices are higher, is now playing out on a monthly basis for some IDPs.

An earlier study concluded that: ‘Urban cereal traders did not appear to be overly irritated with competition from food aid nor economically hurt by it, given the larger economic slowdown in Darfur beyond their control’ (Hamid et al, 2005: 21). This study not only concurs with this finding but goes further to conclude that many grain traders interviewed actually welcomed the availability of relief grain without which many more would have gone out of business.

Somewhat bizarrely, a new market opportunity has developed since the provision of large amounts of food aid to Darfur: the export of relief sorghum and wheat from Darfur to Central Sudan17. Between 7 and 10 trucks (of 25-30 tons) carrying relief wheat are reported to be leaving Al Fashir for Khartoum every week, and more during food aid distributions. There are similar outflows to Central Sudan from other markets such as Nyala and Mornei. To purchase a 50kg sack of relief wheat in Al Fashir costs just SDD 1,500 to 1,600. With all the additional transport and taxation costs, it can be sold in northern parts of Central Sudan for SDD 7,500. This compares with the local price in these wheat-producing areas of SDD 13,000/ sack. Similarly, sorghum currently costs SDD 5,500 per sack in Al Fashir, but SDD 9,000 in Khartoum. This price differential makes it worth the transportation costs to export relief sorghum from Darfur to Central Sudan. An earlier study similarly commented on how sorghum prices in the main markets of Darfur have, since September 2004, been the lowest in the country, even lower than the main production area of Gedaref (Hamid et al, 2005).

Such significant flows of grain out of the normally isolated and food insecure region of Darfur, into the ‘breadbasket’ of Sudan, are unprecedented, but must be seen in the overall context of the hugely positive impact of the food aid operation on lives and livelihoods in Darfur. See Chapter 9. Indeed, it is hard to see how this trade could be stopped whilst successfully meeting the enormous food needs of Darfur. Possible options that could be explored are included in the recommendations.

Sorghum is also being transported and sold in South Sudan, in Raja and Wau, from Nyala. The price in these parts of South Sudan is said to be SDD 8,500 per sack of sorghum, compared with SDD 6,000 in Nyala. See Table 5.3.

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17 The reasons for the sale of food aid by beneficiaries are discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 on each of the three states, and in chapter 9 on the impact of food aid.
Table 5.3 Price comparisons for grain, selected markets in Darfur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Sorghum</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Price (pre-conflict)*</td>
<td>Price now**</td>
<td>Price (pre-conflict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Fashir</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>1,500-1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyala</td>
<td>4,000-4,500</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneina</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutum</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Daeien</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>9,500-10,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhajaria</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zalingei</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>3,500-4,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All prices are quoted as SDD per sack: 90kg sacks for millet and sorghum and 50kg sacks for wheat
** ‘Now’ refers to March/April 2006, the month in which the study was carried out

5.3 The livestock trade

Changes in trade routes

If the transportation of grain over large distances has become insecure and risky, the movement of livestock has become even more so. As one of the most frequently looted assets in the conflict this has had a major impact on livestock trade. Yet as the Tufts study illustrated, livestock marketing was one of the mainstays of the Darfur economy, ‘with a multiplier effect that is felt in almost every household’ (Young et al, 2005: 63).

Described as ‘highly broker-dominated’ (ibid:56), the livestock trade was a huge source of employment for thousands of traders, agents and middlemen. Livestock offtake was channelled through eight primary markets: El Geneina, Kebkabiya, Kutum, Buram, Fora Boranga, Zalingei, Rehed el Berdi and Gimalaya; and four secondary markets: Nyala, Al Fashir, Ed Daeien and Mellit (ibid.)

There are some well-documented cases of the looting of very large numbers of traded animals early on in the conflict. Livestock traders interviewed for this study, operating on a smaller scale, recounted losses of anything from 10 to 40 cattle at a time when they were being transported between markets in Darfur. As a result, traders soon started to alter the usual and most direct routes that they would have used pre-conflict, to avoid certain areas and to try and find the most secure alternatives. A selection of these ‘crisis trade routes’ are shown in Table 5.4. What is striking about each of them is how much longer they take, incurring substantial additional expense and impacting negatively on the condition of the animals when they reach their final destination.

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18 For example, 3,500 camels were intercepted on their way to Libya, in September 2003, and taken by the SLA to Chad (Young et al, 2005)
Table 5.4 Selected examples of how livestock trade routes have changed since the conflict began

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Pre-conflict</th>
<th>No of days</th>
<th>Now – 2006</th>
<th>No of days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nyala to Al Fashir</td>
<td>Direct, following road</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>Nyala-&gt; Shearia-&gt; Dar Es Salaam-&gt; Fashir OR Muhajeria-&gt; Khazan Gedeid -&gt; Dar Es Salaam-&gt; Fashir</td>
<td>10-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habila to Khartoum</td>
<td>Habila-&gt; Zalingei-&gt; Jebel Marra -&gt; Khartoum</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Habila-&gt; Fora Boranga-&gt; Umm Dukhun-&gt;Kubum-&gt; Tullus-&gt; Buram-&gt;Adila-&gt; Kordofan-&gt; Khartoum</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews with livestock traders

The ways in which livestock are being transported have also changed. This is illustrated well along the route from Nyala to Al Fashir. Pre-conflict, cattle were driven on the hoof along the shortest possible route. As security deteriorated, cattle were transported by truck, at huge expense. See Box 6.1. For a short period of time after rebels had intercepted this trucking operation, meat was actually being carried by bus between Nyala and Al Fashir (Hamid et al, 2005). This highly unusual form of trade took place between August and November 2005. Since then, traders have again adapted the route, now passing through SLA-held territory on the hoof as described in Table 5.4. The very high risks associated with livestock movements means that the number of animals moved on the hoof at any one time has declined, and the cost of protecting them has increased. This is illustrated in two case studies in Box 5.1. The cost of transporting cattle on the hoof from Nyala to Omdurman has gone up three and a half times.

Box 5.1 Two case studies of the increased expense of livestock movement during the conflict

**Transporting cattle from Al Fashir to Nyala**
Pre-conflict, the livestock trader purchased 50 to 60 head of cattle in Nyala and hired 2 to 3 men to drive them to Al Fashir. Each driver was paid SDD 5,000 for the trip and the cost of food for all of them was SDD 10,000. The cost per head of cattle works out at around SDD 450. When the conflict began, the trader’s cattle were looted on 3 trips out of 5. He resorted to trucking, 12 to 13 head of cattle at a time. The cost of the truck was SDD 140,000, two drivers were paid a total of SDD 40,000 and a total of SDD 7,500 had to be paid to GoS and to rebel forces. The total cost of the operation was SDD 187,500, or SDD 14,500 per head. This means of trucking was not sustainable, and on the new route through Dar Es Salaam the estimated cost per head is around SDD 1,500.

**Transporting cattle from Nyala to Omdurman**
Prior to the conflict, cattle were driven on the hoof from Nyala to Omdurman in a batch of around 1000 head. These were sub-divided into three sub-batches of around 330 head. For each sub-batch, there were 6 drivers paid SDD 30,000 each, and one manager, paid SDD 300,000. This totalled SDD 480,000. The cost of transport per head of cattle was thus approximately SDD 1,500. Now the sub-batches have been reduced to 200 head, each requiring 8 drivers and 1 manager. The animal drivers are now paid around SDD 55,000 each and the manager is paid SDD 800,000. 2 soldiers are hired for protection and paid a total of SDD 60,000 each. Thus the total cost of transportation has risen to SDD 1,360,000, or SDD 6,800 per head.
It has now become very risky for traders to travel with cash to purchase livestock. Some have adapted to this challenge by purchasing and sending commodities such as sugar to the area of livestock supply, selling it and using the proceeds to purchase animals. A livestock trader in Nyala recounted how he has used this method for buying and transporting animals from Fora Boranga and Idd El Firsan, to bring to Nyala market.

**Changes in number and types of traders**

Not surprisingly, one of the consequences of the insecurity and high risks now associated with livestock trading in Darfur has been the withdrawal of large traders and marketing companies from outside, both from Central Sudan and from further afield. This was widely reported from all the major livestock markets visited during this study, in both GoS and SLA-held areas. For example, in Buram there used to be 30 to 40 traders operating in the livestock market from Central Sudan. All have left. A similar pattern was reported in Ed Daien. In Al Fashir market the number of camel traders from Central Sudan, has reduced from 25 to 2. (See Table 5.5 below). This has had a knock-on effect on smaller rural markets which used to be served by agents of the larger traders. These agents no longer operate, for example in markets like Malha, Muhajeria and Zalingei.

Traders from further afield, including Libya and Jordan, that used to operate in Nyala market have also left. The export of meat from Nyala abbatoir to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Gulf States has collapsed. Production at the abbatoir stopped in June 2004 when it could no longer honour a contract to supply meat on a weekly basis to Libya (Young et al, 2005).

The long-established export of camels and sheep, on the hoof, from North Darfur to Libya was abruptly halted when the border with Libya was closed in May 2003, putting around 1,500 drovers out of work (ibid.), and denying many pastoralist households in Dar Meidob and Dar Zaghawa an important outlet for their livestock.

Within Darfur, the livestock trade has become ethnically divided to a much greater extent than ever before. In some areas, only certain ethnic groups can operate. In the words of one livestock trader in Al Fashir market: ‘livestock trading has become tribal’. In North Darfur the Zaghawa appear to be dominating the trade as one of the few tribes that can pass through SLA-held territory safely. They now dominate the trade from the SLA-held market of Muhajaria to Al Fashir. Arab pastoralists/traders in the Kebkabiya area are having to use Zaghawa traders to transport their animals out of the locality to Al Fashir and beyond, once again passing through SLA-held territory. The Fellata and Berti are also involved in the livestock trade in Al Fashir market, but to a lesser extent. Meanwhile, in West Darfur Arab tribes dominate the livestock market. Traders from other ethnic groups who would have been active and would have had their own network of agents, ‘sebaba’, in the past are now restricted to operating as middlemen for the Arabs, for example within Geneina town. Some are pushed out altogether, for example from Mornei market. Thus, a major source of livelihood for many has disappeared. Arab traders, on the other hand, are able to move freely within most of West Darfur, accessing key markets such as Fora Boranga. But they face the same difficulties as Arab traders in Kebkabiya in transporting their stock out of the area. To reach Omdurman, for instance, they must now take a circuitous route through Buram to avoid SLA-held areas. See Table 5.4.

**Changes in livestock sales**

Many people interviewed for this study reported large numbers of distress sales early on in the conflict. This was for two main reasons. First, to prevent looting. Second, if IDPs were
able to take their livestock with them to IDP camps, they often sold them in the first months of displacement because there was no assistance, and because it was not possible to keep livestock in the IDP settlements or camps. This led to a collapse in livestock prices in the first year of the conflict. Figure 5.1 illustrates this for goats. In 2006, prices have increased as numbers of livestock for sale have fallen, and because of a reduced need to sell livestock to meet food needs since the start of food distribution.

**Figure 5.1**

![Change in price of goats as a result of conflict](image)

**An overall decline in livestock marketing**

The impact of all of this has been a major decline in livestock marketing. Trade between some areas has stopped completely, for example between Nyala and traditional sources of supply to the north-west: Kass and Zalingei, or the east towards Labado. Elsewhere it is operating at a trickle compared with pre-conflict levels. In Geneina market, there used to be up to 1000 sheep and 1000 camels on one market day; now there are a maximum of 300 sheep and 50 camels per market day. This means that there are larger price differentials between markets in Darfur than used to be the case. In major areas of supply, like Ed Daien and Buram, livestock prices have dropped by as much as 50% compared with pre-conflict levels. In markets where demand is high, such as Al Fashir and Geneina, prices have sharply increased (see Table 5.5). Trade can no longer flow smoothly in response to these signals. Instead, most livestock are traded over very short distances, from nearby villages to the market. And most is destined for local consumption.

This is a huge change from the export-oriented trade of the past and a major blow to Darfur’s economy. The impact this has had on Al Fashir market, previously one of the foremost livestock markets in the entire Darfur region, not least for the export of sheep and camels, is shown in Table 5.5. The market has really declined in significance whilst others have increased, notably Muhajeria and Shearia.

Darfur’s loss may be to Kordofan and Chad’s gain. Some livestock traders from Darfur are reported to have moved east and west respectively. And Chad has become the preferred market for those who can get there because of the better prices they can command. This is

---

19 This was very widely reported during the livelihood study, in towns such as Kutum, Habila and Al Fashir.
the case for Zaghawa pastoralists who are taking their camels to Chad from Dar Zaghawa, and for some Arab and other traders from West Darfur who are now using a route through Chad to Libya, although it is still very risky. There does appear to be some smuggling of camels from Darfur into Libya, but not on the same scale as pre-conflict.

Just as in peacetime the multiplier effects of the livestock trade benefited so many, ‘the repercussions of this disruption are felt, in varying degrees, in almost every household throughout the population’ (Young et al, 2005: 74).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Pre-conflict</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of market days</td>
<td>Every day</td>
<td>Sat, Tues, Thurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of cattle</td>
<td>Tullus, Buram, Rahed el Berdi, Fora Boranga, Beni Halba</td>
<td>Areas close to Fashir. Shearia &amp; Muhajaria and some places in N Kordofan. Small supplies from N Kutum (2-3 X per month)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of camels</td>
<td>Kababish, Dar Zaghawa &amp; north of Kutum, Fora Boranga</td>
<td>Kebkabiya &amp; Seraf Omra, some from Mellit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of sheep</td>
<td>North of Kutum, Dar Zaghawa</td>
<td>Kebkabiya, Shengal Tobaya, Khor Abashi (thru Shegal Tobaya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of cattle sold</td>
<td>Pre-conflict: so many (every day) that couldn’t all fit into the fenced area</td>
<td>Sat – max 80 Tues – max 200 Thurs 100-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of camel traders</td>
<td>10 local traders; 25 traders from other parts of Sudan (eg Dongola, n &amp; e Sudan)</td>
<td>2 from Dongola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of cattle traders</td>
<td>30-40 (from Omdurman &amp; local)</td>
<td>3 local &amp; 10 from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of sheep traders</td>
<td>More than 25 from outside Darfur</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of sheep sold</td>
<td>More than 1000 per market day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of cattle</td>
<td>SDD 40,000</td>
<td>SDD 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of camels</td>
<td>SDD 110,000 (average)</td>
<td>SDD 90,000 – 170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of sheep</td>
<td>SDD 6000-8000</td>
<td>SDD 20,000-30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkeys</td>
<td>SDD 4000-6000</td>
<td>SDD 25,000-30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongola donkey</td>
<td>SDD 7,000-8,000</td>
<td>SDD 120,000-170,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 Trade in cash crops

5.4.2 Tombac

Al Fashir is the main market for tombac (chewing tobacco) for Sudan. The biggest tombac growing area is the tombac livelihood zone in North Darfur stretching from Korma southwards, through western parts of Al Fashir, Tawila to Shengil Tobai and southern parts of Dar Es Salaam. Tombac is also produced in West Darfur around Mornei and Arrar, and in South Darfur around Garsila and Kass. Al Fashir market used to receive supplies from all of these areas. Most of the tombac was exported to other parts of Sudan, such as Khartoum, Dongola, Port Sudan and Juba. Tombac was also exported abroad to Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and in small quantities to Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates and India. Darfurians have dominated the tombac trade throughout Sudan.

When the conflict started some tombac traders incurred major losses when their stores were burned. Tawila, a centre for the tombac trade, was badly affected. An estimated 40,000 to
50,000 guntar were burnt in one of the first attacks on the town\textsuperscript{20}. In response, most traders rapidly moved their stocks into Al Fashir town where the stores are now full to bursting. One tombac trader estimated that there is now five years’ supply in the town\textsuperscript{21}. As a result, the price has fallen from SDD 25,000 per guntar for average quality tombac before the conflict, to SDD 18,000 per guntar now. Farmers have also changed their practices to sell all of their tombac at harvest time to minimise the risks of it being destroyed.

Tombac production has continued during the conflict years, but at reduced levels. In May 2004 the area under cultivation was estimated to have fallen by about 20%. In some ways it is a crop well-suited to conflict because it does not require daily attention and instead can be cultivated in chunks of time, and it is not palatable to livestock (compared with many other crops). But it is very labour intensive to cultivate. One household cannot cultivate one feddan without additional labour. This means that most farmers require credit from tombac traders at the beginning of the cultivation season. And this credit is now in short supply. The number of tombac traders has declined, especially small traders and agents of larger traders, both of which would previously have operated at the local level and been sources of credit to farmers. The small traders simply cannot survive the increased risks in the current environment. Indeed, a number of traders went out of business after the attack on Tawila. Other traders from the area have withdrawn to the relative safety of Al Fashir town. The impact of this reduction in traders showed up during the study team’s field work in Shengil Tobai. Lack of credit is one of the reasons why local farmers are struggling to continue cultivating tombac. As most of the tombac livelihood zone in North Darfur is under SLA control, transport prices to Al Fashir are high. From Tana and Shengil Tobai to Al Fashir they have increased from SDD 500 per guntar pre-conflict to SDD 1,200 per guntar in 2006. And as farm gate prices for tombac have halved, this imposes a double pressure on local farmers.

In Mornei, in West Darfur, the impact of the conflict on tombac production and the tombac trade has been more severe. Traders have left the area, production has declined as so many farmers have become displaced, and prices are low (SDD 5,000 per guntar for average quality tombac compared with SDD 15,000 per guntar before the conflict). The quantity of tombac now transported out of Mornei is a mere 6% of its pre-conflict level: 4,000 guntar compared with 64,000 guntar in more peaceful times.

\subsection*{5.4.3 Groundnuts}

Groundnuts are another important agricultural export from Darfur, especially produced in the east and south of South Darfur (Ed Daien and Buram areas), and in the mixed cash crop livelihood zone of North Darfur (Umm Keddada and southern Dar Es Salaam AUs). South Darfur alone used to produce one-third of Sudan’s groundnut harvest (Abaker, 2004).

Similar to the livestock market, traders and companies from Central Sudan that played a key role in the groundnut economy of Darfur have withdrawn. With them has gone a major source of credit on which many groundnut farmers used to depend. The impact of this was evident in Ed Daien, previously a major market for groundnuts (which also suffered from poor rainfall and low production in 2005/06). The groundnut market was almost empty when the study team visited in April although this should have been a busy time of year. In Ed Daien the slump in the groundnut economy has had a knock-on effect on Dinka IDPs who have

\textsuperscript{20}One trader is estimated to have lost the equivalent of $100,000.
\textsuperscript{21}One of the characteristics of this crop is that it can be stored for up to 5 years.
depended upon sharecropping in the area for over a decade. (See Chapter 8). Most of them are now having to sell all their groundnuts at harvest time, when the price is lowest, to pay back any loans that they have managed to secure from the host population. In Buram the withdrawal of groundnut traders has had a doubly negative impact. Not only have groundnut farmers lost their buyers, but those same traders from Central Sudan used to bring commodities such as sugar, clothes and oil into Buram market.

In the groundnut-producing areas visited by the study team in South Darfur, groundnut prices had mostly halved from pre-conflict levels. See Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Groundnut prices: selected markets in South Darfur (SDD/ guntar)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Price pre-conflict</th>
<th>Price Apr 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buram</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jad El Seid (SLA)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Ferdous (Ed Dâien area)</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.4 Fruit and vegetables

Jebel Marra is the main source of production for fruit and vegetables in Darfur, although wadi areas in West, North and South Darfur are also important for their fruit and vegetable gardens. Two of Jebel Marra’s most famous products are oranges and potatoes, both of which were exported to Central Sudan before the conflict.

The Jebel Marra area has been particularly badly affected in the current conflict. (See Chapter 3). Orange production is down by an estimated 50%. Despite this, trade in fruit and vegetables from Jebel Marra has surprisingly continued since the conflict began. But the terms for carrying out this trade certainly have changed. Because most of Jebel Marra is SLA-held, traders are no longer allowed to carry goods into the area from GoS towns, and therefore trucks have to enter empty whereas before they would have carried consumer goods such as sugar and flour, which would have been sold. Traders are also facing much higher transport costs, and fees at checkpoints. Between Al Fashir and Jebel Marra, for example, one trader reported that he now has to pass 14 checkpoints each way, 7 of which are GoS and 7 are SLA. These additional costs are shown in Table 5.7. Similarly, a fruit trader in Nyala reported that transport costs had doubled since the conflict began.

Table 5.7 Impact of conflict on the trade in oranges from Jebel Marra to Al Fashir

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Pre-conflict</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport cost from Jebel Marra to Al Fashir – 1 carton of fruit (35 – 40 dozen oranges)</td>
<td>SDD 2,000</td>
<td>SDD 3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of trips trader makes per week</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes and fees</td>
<td>SDD 20,000 to GOS &amp; SDD 10,000 at 1 checkpoint outside Fashir</td>
<td>SDD 40,000/ truck to GOS; SDD 40,000-50,000/ truck to SLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total cost: SDD 30,000</td>
<td>Pass 14 checkpoints &amp; pay average of SDD 500 to 1,000 at each one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of oranges at farm gate</td>
<td>SDD 200/ dozen</td>
<td>SDD 700/ dozen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Retail price of oranges – Al Fashir

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price Range</th>
<th>SDD 600-700</th>
<th>SDD 1000 – 1200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

No of traders going from Fashir to Jebel Marra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>11-12</th>
<th>5-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Time to reach Jebel Marra from Fashir

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>4 hours (used to travel by night)</th>
<th>7 hours (have to travel by day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Interview with orange trader, Al Fashir market

At the same time the opportunities for selling oranges and other fruit has reduced, for two reasons. First, traders which used to supply a range of secondary markets in Darfur now find that it is too insecure to serve any more than one. Second, although the population of towns such as Nyala and Al Fashir has massively expanded, purchasing power has not and fruit is regarded as a luxury item. Demand has therefore not matched population growth. Traders who used to export oranges from Jebel Marra via Nyala to Central Sudan no longer do so because of insecurity and very high transport costs. Oranges from Darfur can no longer compete with oranges from Egypt.

Like the livestock trade described above, the orange trade has developed an ethnic dimension. Only Fur traders are now accepted into Jebel Marra. Traders from other ethnic groups have had to stop.

Kutum used to be one of the main centres for vegetable production in Darfur. As for oranges, this trade has continued throughout the conflict, but at much reduced levels. Production in the wadi gardens has drastically declined because most of the farmers have been displaced and those who continue to cultivate now have to do so manually since their pumps have been looted. Al Fashir is now the only market that is supplied from Kutum, whereas Kutum used to supply at least 15 markets. Traders from Al Fashir pay much higher transport costs and taxes now compared with before the conflict (see table 5.8). Fees are paid at both GoS and SLA checkpoints on the way to Al Fashir. GoS taxes are said to have increased because markets are now the only source of taxation for local government. Traders are not able to take cash to Kutum, but instead organise cash transfers via traders in Al Fashir that have links with traders in Kutum. This was possible throughout the war, as traders could make big profits if they reached Kutum with goods such as sugar and tea, so the risk was worth taking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Pre-conflict</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport cost from Kutum to Al Fashir. Hire of one truck including cost of fuel. One truck is usually hired between 5-6 traders</td>
<td>SDD 80,000</td>
<td>SDD 120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity purchased per trip (sacks of onions)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes and fees</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>50,000 twice at GoS checkpoints. 3-4000 twice at Kafod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of registered vegetable traders in Kutum</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews with vegetable traders in Kutum market

A fruit trader interviewed in Al Fashir used to supply Mellit, Umm Keddada, Kutum and Tawila. Now he only sells in Al Fashir.
5.5 Conclusions
Trade in all major products produced and consumed in Darfur has been negatively affected by the conflict, directly impacting on livelihoods. If it had not been for food aid, the grain market would have collapsed with fatal consequences. The livestock trade, Darfur’s lifeblood and an important contributor to the economy of Sudan, has massively contracted, with evidence of some displacement of the trade to neighbouring Kordofan and to Chad. Since so many households in Darfur have lost their livestock, their main engagement with the livestock market is now as purchasers and consumers of meat which has mostly become more expensive. Meanwhile livestock herders of all different tribes and allegiances are negatively affected by the insecurity and risks of transporting animals over any significant distance. A common theme is the remarkable localisation of trade in Darfur, especially of grain and livestock, that are now rarely transported over any significant distance. Yet this is in a region that once thrived on trade over hundreds and thousands of kilometres.

The withdrawal from Darfur of traders and companies from Central Sudan has affected the trade of all Darfur’s major export products. The consequence has been falling prices while the price of cereals has mostly increased. This has created unfavourable terms of trade for cash crop farmers, often in the better-off areas in Darfur that used to enjoy buoyant cash crop economies.
6. CHANGES IN LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN NORTH DARFUR

6.1 Introduction
As in the rest of Darfur, the conflict in North Darfur is being fought mostly along ethnic lines. Those most severely affected include the Zaghawa and Fur. As the original support base of the SLA, they were early targets of attack by both the GoS and Janjaweed. Most of rural North Darfur is now held by the SLA, while most towns are under control of the GoS. In the Kebkabiya, Seraf Omra and Birka Saira area, along Wadi Barei, a large swathe of the countryside is controlled by the Janjaweed.

During the fieldwork for this study in March/ April 2006, North Darfur was the most stable of the three Darfur states. This has since changed as it has been the scene of some of the most violent intra-SLA clashes since the partial signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May.

The areas visited by the study team have been grouped into the following five categories according to the decreasing severity of livelihood insecurity they face. This chapter describes the changes in livelihood strategies for each in turn:

1. **IDPs in camps and towns as well as urban populations in GoS held areas.** IDPs within this group have suffered the greatest devastation of livelihoods and loss of assets. Our sample included IDPs in camps in Al Fashir (Abu Shook) and Kutum (Kassap) as well as IDPs living in Kutum town and in Kebkabiya town. It also included the urban residents in Kebkabiya and Kutum.

2. **Exploited and coerced rural populations in GoS held areas.** This group, who are mainly Fur, still live in or near their own land, but their movement is extremely restricted. They pay a variety of protection fees to Arab groups who control the area. The sample included mainly Fur residents in Seraf Omra and in villages in Kebkabiya AU.

3. **Pastoralists in SLA held areas.** One of the greatest constraints for this group is restricted access outside SLA-held territory, in particular to markets in GoS-held towns. Limited movement outside SLA held areas also affects livestock migration. The sample included Orchii and Umm Haraz villages in Dar Zaghawa, and Malha in Dar Meidob.

4. **Rural farmers in SLA held areas.** This group is also affected by restricted access to GoS held territory, which affects sale of cash crops and forest products. Our sample included Berti Goz farmers in Saiyah, Tunjur wadi farmers in Jambolee, Berti cash crop farmers in Dar Es Salaam and tombac farmers in Shengel Tobai.

5. **Pastoralists in GoS held areas.** This group, which is mainly the Northern Rizeigat, also face restricted access to markets and to traditional livestock migration routes. They have been most strongly associated with recruitment into the Janjaweed. Our sample included Masri damra near Kutum as well as more settled Arabs in Gara Zawiya village near Kebkabiya.
6.2 IDPs in camps and towns as well as urban populations in GoS held areas

6.2.1 History of conflict and population movement

The conflict started in North Darfur, with SLA attacks on Al Fashir, Mellit and Kutum in April, May and August 2003. The GoS responded with air attacks on villages and increased support for the Janjaweed, launching a campaign of systematic destruction of livelihoods by the burning of villages, looting, killing and rape. Fur and Zaghawa heartlands, such as Jebel Si, Fornong, and Dar Zaghawa, were severely affected. Almost the entire population from these areas was displaced.

IDPs arrived in Kutum, Al Fashir and Kebkabiya towns from early 2003, often having been displaced many times. No formal camps existed at that time, so in Al Fashir IDPs settled in a tree nursery and in Kutum in the wadi. Camps were established in early 2004. Security was poor at first, but has improved over time. The risk of looting and theft remains, however, for all population groups. Table 6.1 provides more information on the camp populations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Estimated population*</th>
<th>Origins of IDP populations</th>
<th>Dates of camp establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abou Shook, Al Fashir</td>
<td>50,823</td>
<td>Jebel Si Fata Borno Tawilla Korma Abu Deleg (Dar El Salaam)</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People from Abou Deleg arrived in October 2004.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassap, Kutum</td>
<td>21,669</td>
<td>Fornong area (NW of Kutum): including Fata Borno, Aamu, Barakatala, Jango, Furong, Disa, Dor Gedara near Kebkabiya Aserief, Anka, Bere (NW of Kutum). Dar Zaghawa (about 30% of the IDPs).</td>
<td>January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People from Fornong West arrived in March 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More IDPs arrived in April 2004, mainly those who had been displaced elsewhere at first (e.g. Korma and Seref Omra).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*WFP figures

Each of the towns visited also had significant numbers of IDPs living in the town (see table 6.2). In Kebkabiya, IDPs did not have a choice whether to stay in a camp or in town. Very early on it became apparent that camps could not be safely established on the outskirts of the town. The entire IDP population is now living inside the town.
Table 6.2 Estimates of IDPs and residents in towns, North Darfur*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>IDP numbers</th>
<th>Resident numbers</th>
<th>Origins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Fashir</td>
<td>33,426</td>
<td>NA (186,000 before the conflict)</td>
<td>About 60% from Tawilla and Korma; the remainder from Dar Es Salaam, Kutum, Dar Zaghawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutum</td>
<td>26,396</td>
<td>17,598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebkabiya</td>
<td>44,398</td>
<td>19,024</td>
<td>Jebel Si</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* WFP figures

Early in the conflict some people moved to Khartoum, but many have been returning since mid-2005, either because they are unable to find work or because their relatives were no longer able to assist them. In some cases they have missed registration for food distribution.

Like the IDPs, resident populations in towns have also suffered from attacks and looting. The entire population of Kutum was displaced following the attack in August 2003, and about 75% have since returned. Kutum has experienced much looting and attacks after this; the latest attack was in February 2006, although there appears to have been an improvement in security afterwards, at least in the two months prior to the study. In Kebkabiya looting and killing within the town was most serious between August and December 2003, but has continued, targeting individual households, since.

6.2.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

IDPs in camps
IDPs completely lost their former livelihood strategies, and most were able to bring little or nothing with them. In Abou Shook, only 30% of households were able to bring assets with them. Even if people did manage to bring livestock, many of these died or were sold in 2004 (ACF, 2005, December). In Kutum those who came from nearby were able to bring some assets, in particular donkeys.

Immediately after arrival in the camps, the main income sources for IDPs were generally restricted to the money they had brought with them, sales of livestock and kinship support. Other income earning opportunities included selling food aid, sale of water, brickmaking, domestic work, firewood collection, and work for NGOs such as digging latrines and maintaining water pumps. Some IDPs receive remittances.23

In Abou Shook, IDPs have been able to find agricultural work on nearby farms on a seasonal basis. Some, mainly those from Tawilla, returned to their home villages to farm. This started in mid-2005 but all returned after the GoS attack on Tawilla in September 2005.

Between 2004 and 2006 some income earning opportunities increased but others have decreased. Employment with NGOs has gone down, there is a decrease in IDP women engaging in domestic labour in town because of the risk of sexual exploitation. Even if the livelihood source has stayed the same, wages may have declined because of increased competition. For example, a labourer in Abou Shook used to receive 500 SD for 1000

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23 In Abou Shook, these were IDPs from Jebel Si, in the agro-migrant zone. Income from remittances was a major pre-conflict livelihood source for people in this zone.
bricks, but now this has reduced to 350 SD. Changes in income sources for IDPs in Kassap camp are shown below:

**Figure 6.1**

*Changes in income sources for IDPs in Kassap camp*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>livelihood sources</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firewood and gas.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brickmaking</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty trade</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO employment</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of livestock</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: focus group of male IDP community leaders

Petty trading has become an important new source of income in both Abou Shook and Kassap camps. In Kutum, some IDPs knew residents in town before the conflict which increased their chances of getting commodities on credit from traders. Firewood has become the main source of income for IDPs in Kassap camp, because of regular AU firewood patrols. Before the AU started its patrols, firewood collection was much riskier and could be halted by the Janjaweed. All IDPs in Kassap camp (and anyone living outside of Kutum in SLA held areas) need a permit to take food and other goods into the camp, except for small amounts (1 or 2 LBs). Women reported that there was always a risk that food bought in town would be stolen on the way back to the camp. There are some small food stalls in the camp, but prices are higher than in town.

The main expenditures for IDPs vary by location. In Abou Shook the main expenditure is firewood; a family might spend up to 1400 SD/week on firewood. This is because it has to be collected from further away now, but risks of abuse remain. IDPs in Abou Shook also pay for transport into Al Fashir town to find work, which costs 100 SD for a round trip. Other expenditures include mainly food items, milling and clothes (see Figure 6.2). People who still have livestock now need to buy fodder in the market. The total expenditure for a family of 6 in Abou Shook was estimated to be about 6000 SD/week, whereas in Kassap this was 4000 SD/week.

IDPs living in camps have benefited from good NGO services in terms of health care, water, and food aid. This has resulted in Abou Shook in a dramatic reduction in the prevalence of malnutrition from 39% (<-2 Z-scores) in June 2004 to 25.9% in June 2005 and 18.5% in November 2005 (ACFa, 2006, March). The latest malnutrition levels are still well above what is acceptable, however, or what can be considered ‘normal’ for the time of the year in Darfur.
IDPs in towns

Where there is a choice of living in town or in camps, it is usually the better-off displaced who choose to stay in town, renting their own accommodation. Many received assistance from their relatives initially. The livelihood strategies of IDPs in towns are similar to those in the camps and include: casual labour such as brickmaking, domestic labour, and farm work. IDPs in Al Fashir are slightly different because they came from a wide variety of backgrounds, including urban people from elsewhere. Employment opportunities range from civil servants, trading agents (especially tombac), and work with humanitarian agencies (security, drivers, etc.), but many are also involved in casual labour.

Another source of income is remittances. IDPs in Kutum town and some (but not all) IDPs in Kebkabiya report that the relative importance of remittances as a livelihood source has increased since the start of the conflict as it has become easier to send back remittances now compared with the start of the conflict. But this does not necessarily mean that they have reached pre-conflict levels.

As for IDPs in camps, opportunities for petty trade have increased over time. For example, some IDPs in Kebkabiya have started to build relationships with large traders and can get loans. They are now trading in sugar, tea, onions and coffee in quarters where IDPs are living. The changes in livelihood sources for Kebkabiya IDPs are shown in Figure 6.3 below:
In Kutum town some IDPs have started doing farm work this season. It was too insecure to do this before, and even now there is still the risk of abuse or attack. There are a variety of arrangements that can be made with land-owners, depending on whether IDPs have relatives in town with farms. These include the loan of agricultural land, renting land, use of the land in return for payment for the digging of a well (10,000 SD), or daily wage labour at 2-300 SD/day (available about 2-3 times a week). The majority have to rent land (about 70%) but it takes time to build up the capital to be able to do this.

IDPs in town often have higher expenditures than those in camps, for example payments for rent, water (4500-6000 SD/month in Fasher), and firewood (1500 SD/week in Kutum). In Al Fashir, rent represents the main expenditure averaging a monthly rate of 7,500-10,000 and it is usual that more than one household are sharing the houses/rent. IDPs may also have to buy fodder for their livestock (about 800 SD/week in Kutum). Expenditure for IDPs in Kebkabiya town is shown in Figure 6.4.

Despite the distribution of general rations, supplementary feeding programme, and other relief programmes, malnutrition levels in Kebkabiya have remained consistently high. The prevalence of malnutrition was 16.2% (<-2 Z-scores) in May 2004, 17% in May 2005 and 18.2% in 2005. This prevalence is unusually high for Kebkabiya as before the conflict it was a well off and surplus producing area. Indeed, the rates reported in 2004 and 2005 are similar to those reported in the famine in 1991\(^\text{24}\). This could indicate problems of diversion and unequal distribution of relief resources.

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\(^{24}\) In May 1991, an Oxfam survey found 19% malnutrition (<80% WFH) (Shutta and de Jonge, 1991)
Urban residents

Kutum and Kebkabiya are both in the wadi food economy zone. Thus, before the conflict, people were mainly dependent on rainfed and irrigated farming, fruit production, and livestock. Trade was also a major livelihood source for many. During the conflict, livestock and food stocks were looted. Shops were also looted and many traders left the towns. Irrigated gardens and fruit orchards were destroyed.

Access to farm land is now extremely limited; only land closest to town is safe. In Kebkabiya, about 25% of the resident population still have access to wadi farms, but only 5% have access to rainfed farms. Production has decreased dramatically in both places and the land that can be cultivated has to be done manually. Income from cash crops is limited because large-scale traders no longer come to the area to buy fruits and vegetables and the access to markets outside of the immediate towns has decreased.

Food aid is the major livelihood source in Kebkabiya now. Firewood collection remains a source of income but is risky. Sending remittances has become more difficult since the start of the conflict as the bank has closed. In Kutum, there has been a slight improvement between 2003 and 2006, as vegetable production, petty trade and casual labour have all increased as sources of income. Many residents share their land with IDPs, however.

The burden of hosting IDPs shows up in expenditure. For those hosting IDPs in Kutum, the cost of daily consumption has doubled or tripled. Total expenditure in Kutum for a host family was about 10,000 SD/week. Interviewees saw both positive and negative impacts of the IDP influx. Examples of positive impacts include the fact that some of the IDPs are teachers and the residents can benefit from this, and they benefit from the services provided to IDPs. However, their presence also means that house rents have gone up, and as mentioned before the cost of daily consumption has increased greatly for host families, including water and electricity.

Both IDPs and residents face many on-going risks to their livelihoods:
• It is insecure outside the towns, which means that movement is limited to the immediate vicinity of the towns, severely restricting livelihood options.
• Serious incidents continue to be reported (e.g. the attack on Kutum and the camp in February 2006). The risk of looting and theft remains in all places.
• Domestic labour for IDPs in Abou Shook decreased as a source of income because of the risk of harassment or rape of women
• Firewood collection remains hazardous (except for IDPs in Kutum camp)
• Movement of goods from Kutum town into the camp is restricted, and subject to theft.

6.3 Exploited and coerced rural populations and IDPs in GoS held areas

6.3.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements

This section is concerned with certain ethnic groups, in particular the Fur, who have stayed on or close to their land in GoS held areas, mainly along the fertile Wadi Barei, under the tight control of neighbouring or incoming Arab groups. It describes the costs that this involves.

Since the start of the conflict, the Kebkabiya/ Seraf Omra area has seen an influx of Arab nomads. The reasons for this include the restriction of pastoralist migration routes elsewhere and therefore concentrations of livestock in these areas, the location of the headquarters of the Janjaweed in Misteriha (close to Kebkabiya), and access to fertile land especially now that most of the original inhabitants have been displaced. The distinguishing feature of this area is that Arab pastoralist populations and other tribes aligned with the GoS (eg Tama and Gimr) are able to move freely throughout the area, but that the movement of the Fur and some other groups is extremely restricted.

Seraf Omra town has experienced a number of influxes of IDPs, as follows:
(1) a major influx of Fur IDPs in August 2003, mostly from West Darfur
(2) a second wave of IDPs from Kulbus in November/December 2004
(3) a third wave in October 2005 as a result of clashes between the Hotaiya (cattle herding pastoralists) and Nawaiba (camel herding pastoralists) near Jebel Marra.

The IDP population in Seraf Omra is now about 23,279, compared to a resident population of 32,553. The majority of IDPs are Fur, with significant numbers of Zaghawa and Jebel Masirya. Each influx of IDPs has been associated with tension over water sources and some verbal and physical abuse against the IDPs.

Gara Farajawiya is one of the few Fur villages that is still inhabited, to the west of Kebkabiya town. Just over half of the current population are IDPs and just under half are residents. Most IDPs arrived in July 2003 when their villages were attacked and burnt.

6.3.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

This area is in the wadi food economy zone. Before the conflict there were some mutual arrangements between Fur and Arab groups in the area. For example, Arab pastoralists looked after the animals of Fur farmers, and Arabs (who have been settled in the area for 40...
to 50 years) had been given land by the Fur to cultivate. When the conflict started these arrangements either fell apart or changed radically in nature.

Early in the conflict the resident population in Seraf Omra and Gara Farajawiya were severely affected by looting of livestock and the destruction or theft of irrigation pumps. Theft and looting continues up to today.

For those who have been able to stay and continue cultivating their land during the conflict (or who have returned), there has been a high cost involved. Many livelihood activities carried out by both Fur residents and IDPs require payment for protection to Arab groups. The nature of the protection regime varies. Young et al (2005) cite examples from parts of Wadi Barei where there were already settled Arab groups before the conflict. Fur leaders requested their protection from other incoming Arab tribes so that they could stay on their land. An inter-agency assessment report in March 2004 reports a payment of 1.8 million SDD (about $7000) by residents of Birka Saira to the Janjaweed since August 2003. This saved Birka Saira from attack although looting has continued on an individual basis (OCHA, 2004, March). In other places the payment of protection fees on a regular basis was not based on a request for protection. Instead, Fur residents appear to have been coerced into this, as is the case in Gara Farajawiya.

Table 6.3 gives a flavour of some of the different types of protection payments, many of which are combined, ie paid by the same household.

Table 6.3 Range of protection payments reported by resident and IDP populations in the Wadi Barei area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of protection payment</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Where reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly payment per households</td>
<td>SDD 200/ mth</td>
<td>Young et al, 2005; Oxfam, 2005; interviewees for this study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment for travel to market</td>
<td>SDD 500/ trip (Gara Farajawiya to Kebkabiya)</td>
<td>Interviewees for this study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing crops and food with Arab groups/ Janjaweed</td>
<td>Daily sharing of meals Share of 1/3 to ½ of harvest</td>
<td>Oxfam, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection fees to farm own land (IDPs and/ or residents)</td>
<td>One-off payment of SDD 3,000</td>
<td>OCHA, 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Seraf Omra AU, out of a total of 18 affected village councils, people were able to return to 9 after their initial displacement and were able to continue farming, but they had to pay the Janjaweed in order to do so (OCHA, 2004, March). Interestingly, some protection payments appear to have reduced when international agencies have a working presence in the area.

But despite these protection payments access to farmland is nearly always very much reduced compared with pre-conflict levels. In Gara Farajawiya some people managed to farm in 2005 on nearby farms. But whereas before they used to have 2 to 4 farms per household, three to four households are now sharing 2-3 mukhamas. Last season all households tried to cultivate, but only about 40% managed to weed their farms and only about 17% were able to harvest. They did not use ploughs for fear of looting so all cultivation was done by hand. Farmers were given one month by herders to complete their

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28 Results from proportional piling
harvest. If they did not meet the deadline, their crops were grazed, a common outcome for many.

In short, the resident population in Gara Farajawiya has seen a drastic decline in their main pre-conflict sources of livelihood, including agriculture, livestock, trade and remittances (see figure 6.5). Even firewood collection is no longer possible because it is controlled by Arab groups from whom they have to buy firewood. They are now dependent on precarious livelihood sources: brickmaking, agricultural labour, and petty trade, yet still have to find the money to pay some of the protection payments listed above. The provision of food aid was considered very irregular and thus not a major livelihood source.

![Figure 6.5: Changes in livelihood sources for residents in Gara Farajawiya](image)

Source: IDP men focus group in Gara Farajawiya

For IDPs in Seraf Omra, at the start of the conflict their major source of income was the sale of firewood and grass, millet farming and casual labour. Firewood had to be bought from Arab groups after which the IDPs could sell it on in the market. The few IDPs in Seraf Omra that are still farming their own land have to pay ‘rent’ to Arab groups to do so, as well as paying for protection of the farm and sharing the harvest. They were only able to retain about a quarter of their harvest as many are paying their protection fees in kind. Food aid is now their most important livelihood source. However recently, in March 2006, income from firewood collection started to increase with the start of AU escorts. For both residents and IDPs, in both Gara Farajawiya and Seraf Omra, brickmaking has also become a significant source of income, accounting for approximately one-third of livelihood sources.

On-going threats to livelihoods in this group include:

- very limited livelihood options as long as access to land is restricted
- the payment of protection fees is a major expenditure for all Fur living on or near their own land and a potential source of impoverishment
- some Fur are subjected to exploitative labour relations with settled Arabs
- the risk of looting and theft continues.
6.4  Pastoralists in SLA held areas

6.4.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements

Pastoral populations in SLA held areas include the Meidob and the Zaghawa in the far north of the state. Most of their homelands (or Dars) are now held by the SLA, although in Dar Meidob, Malha town, the administrative centre of Malha Rural Council, is held by the GoS.

Dar Zaghawa is part of the SLA heartland and has consequently suffered a severe GoS counter-insurgency campaign. GoS bombardment and attacks by the Janjaweed started in March 2003 and continues up until today. A large number of villages were burnt and looted and most of the population fled into the bush or to Chad. They did not return to their villages until the start of the food distribution in mid-2005. Not everyone has returned, however; in the villages visited by the team only about 40% of the population had returned. At the same time, Dar Zaghawa received an influx of displaced people from elsewhere (e.g. Kutum, Kebkabiya in North Darfur and Seleia and Kulbus in West Darfur), estimated at between 40 and 60% of the current population in places visited.

Malha town came under SLA control from November 2003, despite the efforts of community leaders to keep a government presence there to keep the roads to Al Fashir and Omdurman open. In January 2004, Malha and the surrounding area (Usher, Afro and Madu) were attacked by the GoS and Janjaweed (who were from the neighbouring Zayadia tribe and who joined the conflict at this stage), amidst much killing, burning and looting. People from Malha fled to the surrounding hills and returned after 12 days. Since then, community leaders in Malha have made every effort to keep a government presence in Malha town, to prevent them from being attacked and to keep the road to Omdurman open. The surrounding countryside is controlled by the SLA. Janjaweed attacks south of Malha continue, for example in March 2004 the Janjaweed attacked Nusub.

In Malha there are three types of displaced;
- From the 2002 conflict with the Berti
- From villages south of Malha: which were attacked by the GoS and JJ
- Meidob from Nyala and Fasher who moved voluntarily because they felt unsafe

As a result, the population in Malha has increased from 5000 to 12,000. This creates pressure on water supplies and on other basic services.

6.4.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

Dar Meidob

The Meidob in Malha are historically one of the most vulnerable groups in North Darfur, in part due to their geographical isolation, but also because of the large livestock losses they experienced in the famine of 1984-85. The area only has limited potential for agriculture, so grain used to be brought in from outside the area, mainly from Mellit and Al Fashir. Before the conflict, Malha was one of the first communities to show signs of deteriorating food insecurity in North Darfur, and has shown some of the highest rates of malnutrition in the past (Young and Jaspars, 1995).

The main pre-conflict livelihood sources for pastoral populations in North Darfur were livestock, seasonal migration for work, migration to Libya and elsewhere, remittances,
agriculture and wild foods. Trade with Libya was also an important livelihood source. Since
the start of the conflict migration for work is no longer possible, and trade with Libya and
remittances have stopped since the closure of the border. Livestock trade from Dar Meidob
still continues between Malha and Omdurman, but is restricted because traders from
Omdurman take smaller numbers and no large animals (like camels). The closure of the
road to Mellit, has meant that very little millet reaches the market in Malha. This can only be
brought by passengers on the bus who can take one or two sacks. The study team only
observed 1 kora of millet in the market.

At the start of the conflict the Meidob depended to a large extent on ‘mukheit’ which they had
stored in anticipation of times of food shortage29. Despite the large scale losses of livestock
due to looting at the start of the conflict, livestock still formed one of the main sources of
income at this time. This led to a further reduction in livestock holdings and a sharp decline
in prices.

Some farmed in Malha in 2004-05, but production was low due to poor rains. Crop
production improved in 2005/06, however, when larger numbers of people were able to plant
and the rains were unusually good. The number of petty traders and casual labourers has
increased since the start of the conflict. However, the relative importance of petty trade as a
livelihood source has not changed since before the conflict because the competition between
traders means that little income is gained from this activity. Similarly, more people are
looking for casual work now, but often cannot find it. The wage rate has decreased from 500
SD to 300 SD/day. (see Figure 6.6).

The livelihoods of IDPs depends on their previous livelihood sources, where they came from,
and whether they had relatives in Malha. Some IDPs from towns such as Al Fashir and
Nyala came with cash and were able to set up small businesses. Those with relatives
received assistance from them. Others now have livelihood sources similar to the poor
resident population in Malha (many of whom were previously displaced in times of drought).
The main income opportunities are the sale of firewood and grass, collection of wild foods
and farming.

29 Mukheet is a wild food which can be stored for many years.
The main livelihood source for everyone is now food aid, which has reduced the need to sell livestock or to consume wild foods. This led to an increase in livestock prices. No food aid is sold as this is almost their only source of grain from outside the immediate area. Also, long accustomed to preparing for times of shortage, whatever is not consumed is stored in the home. Some of the poorest in Malha said that because of food aid, their situation now is better than before the conflict.

**Dar Zaghawa**

Dar Zaghawa is also traditionally one of the most food insecure areas of Darfur, although slightly less so than Dar Meidob. The Zaghawa diversified their livelihood sources since the 1970’s. Many migrated out of Dar Zaghawa and settled elsewhere. Those who remained behind, therefore, had strong social and economic links with other Zaghawa throughout Darfur. This greatly assisted in times of localised food scarcity.

Livelihood sources before the conflict were similar to those in Dar Meidob, except for the importance of trade with Libya. At the start of the conflict, people hid in the wadis or mountains and mainly depended on the collection of wild foods. Large scale trade in livestock and other commodities stopped as traders from Kutum and Al Fashir no longer come to the area. This also reduced herding as a livelihood source. The current options are to sell livestock in Birmaza and Kulkul markets (in SLA held territory), which is a long and hazardous journey, or to sell in Chad. Despite these difficulties, the sale of livestock was one of the only livelihood sources at the start of the conflict. Like in Malha, excessive sales led to a further reduction in livestock holdings and a sharp decline in prices.

Access to grain for purchase was difficult because of restricted access to GoS markets. Smaller markets in Dar Zaghawa stopped functioning in 2003, and only some (for example Orchii) are beginning to recover following the start of the food distribution. To access markets in GoS held towns, people from Dar Zaghawa paid middlemen, for example from Kutum and Dor, to buy food in markets and take it up to Dar Zaghawa.
Remittances remained an important source of income in Dar Zaghawa. The relative importance increased from 18% before the conflict to as high as 25% now, according to a focus group discussion with men in Umm Haraz (note that this does not mean that the total amount received is more now than pre-conflict). Remittances from Al Fashir and Khartoum increased in amount but the frequency of receipt has fallen. The importance of agriculture has only recently increased. Little or no planting took place in 2003 and 2004 as most of the population was still in hiding or displaced out of the area. In 2005-06, those who planted in Umm Haraz had a good harvest and households were able to get between four and nine sacks of millet, which is above average for the area.

Livelihood sources for IDPs in Dar Zaghawa are similar to those of the resident population. In some places, for example, Um Haraz, relations between the resident community and IDPs is fragile because of competition over limited resources, mainly water.

Food aid is now the main livelihood source in Dar Zaghawa. As in Malha, the provision of food aid has reduced the need to sell livestock. It also means that people no longer have to pay middlemen to get grain from markets in GoS towns. Food aid has helped revive markets in Dar Zaghawa as people now have some income.

Many threats to livelihoods remain for both the Zaghawa and the Meidob.

- Limited income earning opportunities due to loss of access to markets in GoS held towns.
- Concentrations of livestock and people in a small area continues to put pressure on water and other basic services, and creates risk of disease.
- Lack of maintenance of services such as water pumps and boreholes and the high cost of fuel. This could lead to continuing death of livestock.
- Markets function at very low levels, and supply of goods from GoS held towns is restricted.
- On-going attacks and looting in both Dar Meidob and Dar Zaghawa.
- Relations between IDPs and residents in Dar Zaghawa could deteriorate if resources decline further.

6.5 Settled farming populations and IDPs in SLA held areas

6.5.1 Introduction, history of conflict and population movements

The sample for this section covers a range of livelihood zones across a large rural swathe of SLA-held territory. Key characteristics of the sample villages are summarised in Table 6.4. Whilst their livelihood sources before the conflict were quite different, there are many similarities now in terms of the constraints and on-going risks they face.
Table 6.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Livelihood zone</th>
<th>Key features of conflict and population movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Goz Laban, Mellit & Saiyah AU | Goz                  | • First attacked in January 2005, and since in early 2006  
• Some left to join IDP camps, others lived in the bush and have since returned or live in makeshift shelters near the village |
| Jambolee, Kutum rural & Fata Borno AU | Wadi              | • Attacked early in the conflict. Latest attack in May 2006 on two villages in Jambolee VC.  
• Some displaced to Kutum, Al Fashir & Khartoum  
• Others lived in the bush, returning to the village when general food distribution started in mid 2005 |
| Um Dul, Dar Es Salaam AU | Border of goz & mixed cash crop | • Has not been attacked but has received influx of IDPs, especially from Shearia since Aug 2005 (many with livestock)  
• Some better-off households have left, but outnumbered by incoming IDPs |
| Shengal Tobai, Tawila & Korma AU | Tombac            | • Area attacked Feb/ March 2004 triggering large displacement.  
Shengil Tobai IDP camp established Feb 2004  
• Shengal Tobai attacked in Feb and in July 2005  
• SLA in control, but close proximity to GoS: ‘grey zone’ |

6.5.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

Goz farmers in Goz Laban, Saiyah

Pre-conflict, agriculture was the main livelihood source, supplemented by daily labour, brickmaking, work on irrigated gardens in Mellit, and the sale of grass and firewood. The area benefited from its location on the trade route between Mellit and Libya creating opportunities for casual labour and petty trade. Households also depended upon remittances from long-term migration to Libya, Khartoum and the Gulf.

Each of these former livelihood strategies has been devastated by the conflict. Agriculture now makes almost no contribution because of insecure access to farms; it was hardly mentioned by some focus groups. Seasonal and other labour migration has stopped completely because of restricted movement. Casual labour opportunities in Mellit and locally have declined as trade with Libya has stopped and the market has collapsed. And there is no safe passage to Mellit market to sell grass and firewood.

When the population was displaced in the bush around Saiyah, they mainly lived off wild foods, occasionally venturing into Saiyah to get food. Now, they are highly reliant on food aid, accounting for about three-quarters of their current livelihood sources. Other opportunities are limited to poorly remunerated water and firewood collection. However, it is interesting to note that remittances have actually increased since the start of the conflict although the frequency of receipt has decreased. Overall, the level of remittances has gone down.

Focus groups told the study team that the main constraints to livelihoods are currently lack of water and lack of health services. Water, for livestock and for people, is now a key expenditure. Taxes are also being paid to the SLA.

Agro-pastoralists/wadi farmers in Jambolee

Before the conflict the people in Jambolee were mainly dependent on (in order of importance) agriculture (only some had wadi land), livestock, migration for work, firewood and grass collection, and the production of vegetables as cash crops.
When they were attacked and displaced into the surrounding hills they were principally dependent upon wild foods for a period of over two years. The adults were unable to enter Kutum town safely. Only the children could take firewood into the market for sale, bringing back food, but even they faced the risk of the military taking some goods off them.

Since the people of Jambolee have returned to the village they have been able to cultivate. Indeed, in the last agricultural season about 50% of the community had a harvest. Some have even been able to cultivate vegetables. But the main constraint they face is lack of access to GOS-held markets. There are currently no traders coming to buy livestock and grain from the village, and many people from Jambolee have not been to Kutum market since the start of the conflict although it is less than thirty minutes by car. The villagers only have access to markets in SLA held areas where the price of basic goods is higher, but they receive less for what they are selling: grass. The lack of safe access to Kutum also affects remittances which have effectively stopped, as has migration for work.

People in Jambolee reported paying some taxes to the SLA, but this was very irregular, on average 1-2 kora per family, every two or three months.

**Mixed cash crop farmers in Dar Es Salaam**

Before the conflict Dar Es Salaam was a surplus producing area supplying Al Fashir market. It was also a source of agricultural labour opportunities for poor households from the goz zone. The main sources of income were the sale of cash crops, especially groundnuts, sesame and watermelon seed, contributing 30-50% of livelihood sources. Other cash crops were dried okra, dried tomato, and cowpea.

One of the immediate impacts of the conflict was the looting of livestock. This in turn triggered distress sales because of fear of looting. This has had a knock-on effect on the trade in cash crops. Livestock used to be sold in order to buy cash crops when prices were low, in order to sell when cash crop prices increased. But there is now a lack of livestock capital.

However, the most significant impact of the conflict is lack of access to GoS-held markets. This has become even worse in the past year as the GoS has imposed greater restrictions on movement into Al Fashir market since the SLA’s presence has become stronger in Dar Es Salaam. Thus, farmers can no longer sell their cash crops or surplus grain production except in much smaller and less lucrative local markets such as Sag El Nam, Abu Deleg, Abashi, Gareid and Bursham. As a consequence, the prices of millet, groundnuts and sesame in Dar Es Salaam are about half their pre-conflict levels. People are mostly eating what they have produced, only selling small quantities to cover other food purchases.

The loss of income from cash crops and livestock means that people are now more reliant on agricultural labour. At the same time, however, the area under cultivation has been reduced and the labour market has become more saturated.

The recent arrival of IDPs in the area is creating pressure on water sources as many have arrived with livestock. Water was consistently raised as an issue to the study team. People

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30 An ACF survey confirms the relatively good production in 2005/06 in this area. 50% of the population had also cultivated in nearby Korma (ACF, 2006, March).
with livestock moved into the area because of its relative security. Better-off households, for example from Al Fashir, have also moved their herds into this area. This has had a positive impact as it has provided an additional source of income for local people, to water and look after the animals, but it is likely to create an unsustainable pressure on existing water sources.

Dar Es Salaam was not receiving food aid at the time of the study, and this is reflected in the high expenditure on food (72%) (see Figure 6.7). Education fees have dropped but are still unaffordable. However, their priority needs really relate to livelihood interventions to maintain existing assets.

**Figure 6.7**

Changes in expenditure in Umm Dul, Dar Es Salaam

![Graph showing changes in expenditure]

Source: focus group of resident women in Umm Dul

**Tombac farmers in Shengel Tobai**

Before the conflict tombac was the most important source of livelihood in this area. It has been badly affected by the conflict in the following ways:

1. restricted access to farms, fuelled by a general feeling of insecurity and fear of travelling to more distant fields
2. lack of maintenance of water harvesting structures
3. the loss of tractors, horse or camel ploughs so farmers have to cultivate manually
4. the withdrawal of many tombac traders from the area\(^{31}\), who were a critical source of credit for many farmers, funding production of this labour-intensive crop. The agricultural bank, another source of credit, has also withdrawn.
5. the fall in tombac prices in Shengal Tobai as the number of traders has fallen, the amount they purchase has dropped, and they now pay in instalments. (See also Chapter 5 on the tombac trade).

Before the conflict tombac farmers sold to Shengil Tobai, Tawila, Al Fashir, Nyala, Korma, Malam, and Dar Es Salaam markets. Now they are mainly restricted to SLA-held markets:

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\(^{31}\) The number of tombac traders coming to Shengal Tobayi was reported to have dropped from 4 to 6 to only 2.
Shengil Tobai, Tabit and Dar Es Salaam. Some tombac is still sold in Al Fashir but traders from Shengel Tobai are not able to take the goods there and the transport costs have more than doubled.

Other sources of income have also been negatively affected by the conflict: loss of livestock and loss of remittances because the hawala system is no longer functioning in Shengal Tobai and it is very risky to travel with money into the area.

For IDPs, some still have access to land. See Figure 6.8. Others work as share-croppers (about 10%)\(^\text{32}\) or as wage labourers earning SDD 150-200/day. The supply of labour is very high so they are not able to find work every day. But the continued production of tombac in the area, albeit at a reduced scale, does mean that there are greater opportunities for agricultural labouring than in many other parts of Darfur. Indeed, this is the most important livelihood source for many IDPs interviewed.

![Figure 6.8](image)

Source: focus group of IDPs in Shengel Tobai

On-going threats to livelihoods in all the above livelihood zones include:
- restricted access to markets in GoS-held areas, limiting livelihood options and income
- lack of basic services such as health care, education, maintenance of wells and boreholes, and a gradually deteriorating infrastructure as a result
- continued looting of livestock in some areas (e.g. Saiyah, Dar Es Salaam).
- pressure on resources as many rural people are hosting IDPs from other areas, sometimes with limited or no humanitarian assistance
- concentrations of livestock which put pressure on water and pasture with the risk of disease outbreak (in Dar Es Salaam and Saiyah).

### 6.6 Arab nomads in GoS held areas

#### 6.6.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements

Pastoralist populations currently in GoS held areas in North Darfur are mainly Arab nomads from the northern Rizeigat tribe. Whilst they have no ‘Dar’ or homeland over which they have

\(^{32}\) They carry out all cultivation activities up to harvest time, and keep one-third of the harvest of cash crops.
jurisdiction, they had 12 settlements or ‘damras’ to the west of Kutum, where traditionally
women, children and old people would be left. The team visited one of these damras (Masri). Some Arabs have settled over the years, due to loss of livestock as a result of
repeated drought and other crises; the team visited settled Arabs in Gara Zawiya close to
Kebkabiya. Our findings on the impact of conflict and changes in livelihood strategies for the
Arab nomads remaining near Kutum are similar to those found in the Tufts study for Arabs
near Kebkabiya (Young et al, 2005).

The damras near Kutum came under SLA attack in early 2004 (IRIN, 2006, Feb). Only four
of the original 12 damras remain; the others were destroyed or abandoned for security
reasons (OCHA, 2006, March). It is likely that many of those who left the damras are now in
Kebkabiya locality and in West Darfur, in some cases occupying the land of others.
Indeed, IDPs in Gara Zawiya were reported as coming from North Kutum with their
livestock\(^{33}\). Others moved to the remaining damras.

Masri was not attacked was because it had a Janjaweed camp closeby, and the Ereigat, the
tribe living in Masri has members high up in government.\(^{34}\) The risks would have been too
high for the SLA. The population in Masri did report insecurity in the area, however,
because of the possibility of attack from the SLA. The damras have also received influxes of
Arab pastoralists who are unable to travel further north (OCHA, 2006, March).

6.6.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

Before the conflict, men from Masri travelled with livestock along different migration routes,
which varied according to sub-tribe, from as far south as Umm Dukhun in West Darfur in the
dry season and as far north as Wadi Howar in the far north of North Darfur in the rainy
season. Now livestock migration to Wadi Howar and other traditional rainy season grazing
areas is no longer possible as Arab nomads would have to cross SLA held areas in Dar
Zaghawa and Dar Meidob. Livestock movement is restricted to areas around Jebel Si, Seref
Omra and Kebkabiya in North Darfur, and around Geneina, Zalingei, and Wadi Saleh in
West Darfur. These areas now have very large concentrations of livestock with consequent
outbreaks of disease (see chapter 4). Some Arab nomads have had livestock looted by the
SLA, and this was also reported by people in Masri and Gara Zawiya.

According to community leaders in Masri, the relative importance of different livelihood
sources before the conflict was as follows:

- Livestock sales to Libya/Egypt/Khartoum \(31\%\)
- Agriculture \(20\%\)
- Migration to Libya/Khartoum \(16\%\)
- Purchase with sale of animals \(15\%\)
- Milk/meat \(8\%\)
- Firewood and grass \(6\%\)
- Wild foods \(5\%\)

Note: these percentages are from proportional piling

\(^{33}\) Others were Fur and Zaghawa

\(^{34}\) Ereigat in government include Abdalla Safi El Nur, who is a general in the air force and the most influential Aballa Rizeigat
in Khartoum (he was also governor of Darfur for 14 months from January 2000), and Hussein Abdalla Jibril, also a general
and later an MP and chairman of the parliamentary security and defense committee. Together with a third (Jibril Abdulla),
they were responsible for the mobilisation of Aballa Arabs in North Darfur. The Ereigat are also settled in Misteriha, the
main Janjaweed camp, near Kebkabiya (Flint and De Waal, 2005).
They report that now their only source of income is local livestock sales. Receiving remittances from people in Khartoum is still possible for people in Masri, but is not a major source of income. Livelihood sources in Gara Zawiya before the conflict were similar to those indicated for the Ereigat above.

Livestock sales, whether to local markets or for export, were the most important source of income before the conflict. Livestock could be sold in many markets within Darfur. Both groups also exported livestock to Libya, Egypt, Omdurman. This has drastically changed. Arabs from Masri can now only sell in Kutum and from Gara Zawiya can now only sell in Seraf Omra, mainly to butchers for local consumption. In Gara Zawiya, interviewees reported having to depend on Zaghawa traders to buy livestock and take them out to other areas as only they can pass through SLA-held territory. The main item purchased by Arabs in Masri is relief wheat, which is sold by the town residents and IDPs.

In Masri, the main livelihood sources at the start of the conflict were the use of money they still had, and food stocks. Arabs in Gara Zawiya appeared better off as they did not suffer insecurity in the immediate vicinity. They were able to move freely to Kebkabiya and Seref Omra markets.

The proximity of SLA held areas continues to pose security risks for those remaining in the damras near Kutum, which is restricting their movement for farming, collection of wild foods, and even accessing the market in Kutum. More men stay in the village than before the conflict because they fear attack. Women used to be able to travel to a number of markets and other villages to sell their products, but this is no longer safe. Now they only go to Kutum on market day and in large groups. Even then it is not very safe, but the security situation has improved somewhat recently.

In Gara Zawiya, the relative importance of agriculture as a source of income has increased as trading opportunities have declined. 75% of the population were cultivating at the time of the study. Those not cultivating are either IDPs or families with inadequate family labour. In other words, insecurity is not a constraint to agriculture for the Arab population of this village. There is now a supply of agricultural labour from Fur and Zaghawa IDPs living in the village, and they also rely heavily on Fur farmers from neighbouring villages (including Gara Farajawiya) using a share-cropping approach (see section 6.3 for exploitative relations between the two groups).

On-going threats to livelihoods include:
- Concentrations of livestock due to restricted migration patterns. This leads to shortages of water and pasture, and the risk of disease and death
- Inability to trade in distant and more profitable livestock markets
- Risk of attack by the SLA for Arab nomads close to Kutum, resulting in restriction of movement for agriculture, collection of wild foods and travel to markets even closeby.
- IDPs of non-Arab origins living in or close to Arab settlements suffer from exploitative labour relations (see section below for more information), and limited income earning opportunities.

35 The Ereigat sold in Kutum, Korma, Al Fashir, Jebel Si and Kebkabiya. Arabs from Gara Zawiya sold in Al Fashir, Nyala, Geneina, Ed Daein, Seraf Omra and Fora Boranga
36 The damras were not receiving food assistance at the time of the study.
6.7 Conclusions

IDPs have lost their previous livelihood sources and were mostly unable to bring assets with them to towns or camps. Food aid has become a very important livelihood source, and has contributed to a decline in malnutrition in some places but not all. However, livelihood options remain limited to casual labour, firewood collection, and some agricultural work. Work opportunities with NGOs have decreased, and increased competition for casual labour has often reduced wages. Petty trading opportunities, and in some cases farm work (Kutum), has generally increased. In Kassap camp in Kutum, firewood has increased as a source of income since the start of AU firewood patrols. Expenditure is usually higher for IDPs in towns than for IDPs in camps, as they often have to pay for rent and water, but is highest of all for residents as they are often hosting IDPs. Whilst security inside the camps and towns has been improving, the risk of theft and looting remains in all cases. Security outside the towns is poor, which means that any livelihood activity which involves going outside the immediate perimeters of town is hazardous.

Rural residents and IDPs of certain ethnic groups in GoS rural areas have suffered and are still suffering a wide range of abuses during the current conflict, including a crippling regime of protection payments. Livestock and irrigation pumps were looted, and access to land, markets and natural resources such as grass and firewood is severely restricted. Their ability to work on their own farms is also very constrained and usually involves substantial payments to the Janjaweed or to neighbouring Arab groups. In short, many livelihood activities are subject to the payment of protection fees.

The common constraint facing all population groups in SLA-held territory is the lack of access to GoS-held markets, dramatically impacting on most of their main livelihood sources. Pastoralists are unable to sell livestock and purchase grain which was their main way of making a living pre-conflict. Restricted movement of livestock means there is pressure on existing water and pasture resources, the risk of disease and has led to many deaths. The situation has improved slightly over the past year, because of the start of general food distribution and some farming opportunities, coinciding with a good agricultural season. Petty traders and casual labourers have increased in Malha, but income has fallen because of the number of people seeking this work. Some people from Dar Zaghawa are still displaced, and in both Dar Zaghawa and Dar Meidob the population is hosting a number of IDPs. Both populations continue to face the risk of attack.

Farmers in SLA held areas have similarly lost livelihood sources as a result of restricted access to GoS towns: lack of access to employment and seasonal wage labour (e.g. Saiyah), lack of access to sell forest products in the market (Jambolee, Saiyah), the inability to sell cash crops (Dar Es Salaam and Shengel Tobai). Other impacts vary by location. A key issue in Dar Es Salaam and Saiyah is the concentration of livestock and people in a small area, leading to unsustainable pressure on water and basic services. Whilst many IDPs in these areas are without assets, some still have access to their own land. Others are able to work as agricultural labourers, an opportunity not available to many IDPs in GoS-held areas. The main impact of the conflict on the Arab nomads in North Darfur is the loss of livestock due to looting and disease, and loss of livestock trade. Other livelihood sources are also restricted. Farming is possible for some of the more settled Arabs, sometimes with exploitative labour practices using IDP labour. It should be borne in mind, however, that members of the Northern Rizeigat are also gaining significant benefits from the conflict, due
to development of a war economy based on looting, protection payments and extortion, all of which involve members of the Northern Rizeigat.
7. CHANGES IN LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN WEST DARFUR

7.1 Introduction

The whole of West Darfur state has been severely affected by conflict. The conflict in West Darfur is mainly about land and started well before 2003. The Masalit and Fur populations in particular have been driven off their land, their villages burnt and assets looted, and the majority are now displaced in camps or towns. Many people from West Darfur were displaced to Chad. With the recent spread of the conflict into Chad, some of these refugees have returned, and an estimated 13,000 Chadian refugees have come into West Darfur.

There are some people who have been able to stay on their land, including those closely aligned with the GoS and those who are paying protection fees to Arab groups. West Darfur has many communities with previously settled Arabs living alongside other tribes. The only people who currently have free movement throughout West Darfur are Arab nomads and some GoS allied groups. There are reports that some Arabs have settled on, or occupied villages and/or farmland that has been deserted by the displaced.

Return has been limited in West Darfur but is actively encouraged by GoS through promises of the provision of services and the creation of ‘model villages’. The concept behind model villages is that if people can be concentrated in one area, they can be more easily assisted. However, this also reduces farmers’ access to their former land and livelihood strategies, while giving Arab nomads more access to land for pasture. Given the nature of the current conflict, such policies can easily be seen as being politically motivated. This policy seems to have ceased in 2006 (INTERSOS/ UNHCR, 2006).

The population in West Darfur, has been grouped into four categories in decreasing order of severity of livelihood insecurity:

1. **IDPs and residents in towns in Geneina, in the agro-pastoral south and the West Jebel Marra lowland livelihood zones.** This group covers IDPs in camps and in towns and the resident population. This group is most severely affected because of loss of assets and previous livelihood strategies, limited current options and on-going risks. Fieldwork was done in Geneina, Zalingei, Garsilla, Habilla and Mornei. Camps visited included Ardamata camp in Geneina, Al Jabalin in Garsilla, and Hisahisa in Zalingei.

2. **Exploited and coerced rural populations and IDPs.** This group covers Fur and Masalit residents and IDPs who pay Arab groups for protection to be able to farm and trade. It is based on field work in Abbata (near Zalingei), and in Umm Tajok with IDPs. It also includes some Tama who are paying local Arab groups based on field work in Umm Shayala.

3. **Population groups who are less directly affected or who have some access to land.** This covers two sub-groups. The first are Arab, or other tribes allied to the GoS (such as the Gimir) who are less affected because they have not been attacked. The sample included the resident population in Umm Tajok, Arab residents in Abbata, Nur El Huda and draws on information from other reports. The second sub-group comprises IDPs and residents with some access to land, based on field work in Sileia.

4. **Arab nomad populations (some of whom are occupying land).** This group is found throughout West Darfur. It has been affected by restricted livestock migration and

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37 For example in South West Darfur this is limited to about 12,000
access to markets, but enjoys better security and access to land for farming and grazing. Information on this group is based on the team’s visit to Salaa, and information from both Arab and non-Arab groups in other places visited.

Unfortunately, the team was unable to visit rural populations who stayed on their land in SLA held areas due to restrictions on humanitarian access, which has been a particular issues in West Darfur.

7.2 IDPs in towns and urban residents, in Geneina, in the agro-pastoral South and West Jebel Marra lowland livelihood zones

7.2.1 Overview of conflict and population movements

Villages and towns in this area suffered severe Janjaweed attacks, sometimes accompanied by GoS bombardment, between September and November 2003. Attacks happened at the worst time- the harvest period. People moved from the country side into towns in vast numbers. Camps were established in some towns in early 2004. Other towns became one big IDP camp (e.g. Habilla and Mornei). Both residents and IDPs in these towns face continuous harassment and abuse.

The surrounding countryside is controlled by Arab nomads and militia who exert various degrees of control over both IDPs and urban resident populations. This ranges from controlling the trade in local cereals and livestock into the towns (e.g. Habilla) to controlling the collection and sale of firewood (Zalingei and Garsilla) or imposing a number of ad hoc fines or protection fees for livelihood activities which require travel outside of the town perimeters.

A number of people left for Khartoum and Chad but this was limited to people who had money for transport. The main reasons were:

- avoiding arrest (but many men fleeing Garsilla were captured by Janjaweed or GoS forces on the road and killed
- lack of food and other services upon arrival in the towns in West Darfur
- fear of attack in the town
- search for work opportunities (although some of them have started coming back in recent months)
- loss of labour opportunities (for the resident population in Zalingei).

In some places, for example Geneina, there are IDPs living in camps and IDPs living in the town. For those who chose to stay in town it was mainly because they have relatives in the town. In Garsilla and Zalingei all IDPs are living in camps. In most of the places where people moved to, the IDP population outnumbers the resident population (see table 7.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>IDPs in town</th>
<th>IDPs in camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geneina</td>
<td>127,929</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>102,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zalingei</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>&gt; 78,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garsilla</td>
<td>&gt; 30,000</td>
<td>12,507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habilla</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mornei</td>
<td>4592</td>
<td>68,881</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures supplied by WFP
For both IDPs and residents in this group the security situation is still poor and the risk of abuse and harassment continues. Whilst security in the towns has improved for some (e.g. Mornei) all people interviewed mentioned on-going looting inside town and camps. There is little change in security outside the towns. In West Darfur this is exacerbated by tensions with Chad; people in Habilla in particular felt insecure because of the presence of Chadian rebels.

### 7.2.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

#### IDPs in camps and towns

The livelihood zones of the agro-pastoral south and west Jebel Marra lowlands were areas of high productivity producing a surplus before the conflict. They also had some of the richest pasture in Darfur. Trading in agricultural products was an essential source of livelihoods in the area, with small traders from villages taking goods to towns or traders’ agents travelling to villages from Zalingei or Nyala.

For this livelihood zone IDPs now have little or no access to their former livelihood strategies. Most arrived with nothing and depended on the assistance of relatives and begging at first. The exception is Mornei, where some IDPs had fled before their villages were attacked and so were able to come with cash, food stocks and some livestock.

The livelihood options for IDPs in camps and in towns now are very similar in all locations in central and southern parts of West Darfur. The main livelihood sources at the time of the study included food aid, brickmaking, firewood collection, charcoal production and some petty trade. In Garsilla, Zalingei and Mornei some people received remittances but this does not appear to be very regular. In Mornei women IDPs from Wadi Saleh said this now represented about 11% of their livelihood sources. Interestingly, cash transfers increased in Mornei because of improvements in communications and the installation of telephone lines.

The relative importance of food aid varied because ration sizes varied between beneficiaries in different locations, and because of problems related to registration. For example in Habilla IDPs in town, residents and rural populations all received a 50% ration at the time of the study, whereas in Mornei IDPs and residents in town still received a 100% ration, but the ration for people in rural areas had been cut completely. In some places there were clearly also problems with registration. For example in Ardamata camp the focus group of IDP women did not consider food aid a significant livelihood source now, ‘because you can register 5 people in a household but only 1 appears on the list (see below)’ (see Figure 7.1 below). Problems with registration in Geneina have also been reported elsewhere (Young, 2005). Similar problems were reported in Mornei where some families receive a small amount of food aid for the number of people, but others are over-registered.
Firewood collection remains hazardous for all IDP groups interviewed. Only women in Habilla reported a slight improvement in the security situation around the town and reduced risks associated with firewood collection. In Garsilla and Zalingei firewood collection is controlled by Arab nomads who collect it and sell it in the market. Other ethnic groups and IDPs are intimidated, beaten, and harassed when attempting to collect firewood. In Zalingei the alternatives are firewood collection with AU escorts or buying kerosene for cooking (an estimated 1000 SD/month). In Mornei women initially organised payments for the Janjaweed when collecting firewood in order to protect themselves and went in large groups. Payments of between 100-200 SD/woman were reported. They stopped this when the AU arrived about one year ago but cases of rape are still being reported on a monthly basis. The AU has not yet started firewood patrols in this area.

Brick-making and other forms of casual labour in the construction industry are some of the main labour opportunities available. In Geneina there appears to be a construction boom, driven by:

1) the presence of the humanitarian community and the high rents they are paying. (As a smaller town than Nyala or Fashir, Geneina has been impacted by the influx of humanitarian agencies to a much greater extent).

2) building being seen as a reliable and low-risk investment in the current context, eg compared with trade and transport risks.

Large numbers of IDPs from Mornei went to Geneina to work in construction. Examples of wage rates in Geneina are shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Wage rate end of 03/ early 04</th>
<th>2006 – now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic work – washing 1 doz clothes</td>
<td>SDD 200</td>
<td>SDD 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic work – sweeping a compound</td>
<td>SDD 100</td>
<td>SDD 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting &amp; selling stones</td>
<td>SDD 400/ pile. In a month will</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Collecting & selling sand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collecting &amp; selling sand</th>
<th>collect &amp; sell 2 to 4 piles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brick-making</td>
<td>SDD 200-250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood</td>
<td>SDD 400 per donkey load</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: focus group of IDP women staying in Geneina town

In Habilla and Mornei, the main recent change in livelihood sources for IDPs has been the increased opportunity for charcoal production. Traders come from Geneina and Nyala because the price of charcoal is low. Travel along the road is possible with Janjaweed escorts. In Habilla men pay the Janjaweed 1000 SD/person/week to be able to stay outside the town to prepare it. After packing and selling they pay a further 100 SD/bag. However, despite the payment of fees for protection, charcoal production is still profitable. In Mornei many produce charcoal inside their compounds. If they have a large ‘factory’, 3-4 men can produce up to 50 small sacks in one month. Since one bag is sold for 600 SD, this can earn up to 7500 SD/month per person (if no protection fees are paid).

Petty trade has been an important source of income for women in Habilla and in Mornei. In Habilla this was mostly the sale of mangoes and other fruits or vegetables, but this has declined over time (see Figure 7.2).

Figure 7.2

Changes in livelihood sources for IDPs in Habilla

Source: focus group of women IDPs in Habilla

The produce often comes from IDP farms but is brought to the market by Arab women. IDPs buy the fruit on credit and hope to sell with profit. They might buy one container of mangos (100 pieces) for 1200 SD and sell it for 1500 SD. However, it can take up to one week to sell the produce, or they are not able to sell it at all. This activity has decreased in the past year because of the number of cases reported to the police when IDPs cannot pay back the Arabs. There were four such cases in the month prior to the study. In Mornei

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38 The driver pays 3000 SD for protection and even passengers have to pay 100 SD each.
women also trade in mangoes but they collect these themselves from their own farms. If they meet the Janjaweed they pay fees of between 300-1000 SD/sack. Despite this, a focus group discussion with men ranked the sale of mangoes as the third most important livelihood source at present (see table 7.3). Other forms of petty trade carried out by women in Mornei are tea and coffee stalls in the market. For this, women have to have a license which costs 3500 SD. In addition they pay the health authority 100 SD on a weekly basis.

Table 7.3 – Ranking of income sources for Masalit IDPs in Mornei

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income source</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firewood and building materials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood and charcoal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment by NGOs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of food aid</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty trade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvesting and sale of mangoes</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash transfers/remittances</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivation (wadi land)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal farm work</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Access to land is limited for all IDPs. Around Geneina few IDPs have access to agricultural land as it is too far away, and travelling more than 1 km from the camp is a problem because of insecurity. For those who do have land, they have been able to harvest very little because of animals grazing the farms. Similarly in Garsilla access to land is extremely limited, especially for IDPs. No IDPs in Zalingei are farming. Some IDPs in Mornei have been able to do farm work on wadi farms close to town; the study team observed cultivation on wadi land up to about 10 km out of town. Some people went back to cultivate in their home villages last year (mainly villages in the Umm Shayala area) but then returned to Mornei for the food distribution.

As for IDPs in North Darfur, much of IDP expenditure is on food (ranging from about 40 to 60%). This usually includes items bought for sauce, such as okra, tomato, as well as meat. Expenditure on firewood varies.

Figure 7.3

Monthly expenditure by IDPs in Zalingei (SD)

Source: focus group of IDP women in Hisahisa camp in Zalingei
**Urban residents**

The urban residents are from the same livelihood zones as the IDPs, but being an urban population, trade was a more important source of income. As for the IDPs the livelihoods of the urban residents have been severely affected by the conflict. They too have limited access to land, had livestock looted or sold and lost income from trade. In many cases the livelihood sources for residents are now similar to those of the IDPs. They face the same problems as IDPs in moving outside of the immediate boundaries of town. Residents in Mornei reported that they now had to buy firewood whereas before they would have collected it themselves.

Amongst the resident population in Geneina it was reported that many were not able to access their wadi farms. When they can, farmers are reported to be switching from tomatoes and leafy vegetables to onions on their wadi land because it is more ‘camel-proof’. In other places too, farming is restricted to nearby wadi land. Winter crops (irrigated) are now confined to the immediate outskirts of Zalingei and to Abata. Some residents in Habilla also planted farms around the town in 2005/06. In Mornei residents face an additional problem in that the IDPs settled on their farm land.

The contribution of trade as a source of income for resident households has drastically declined or stopped completely. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the producers of cash crops (mainly vegetables and tombac) have been displaced so production is much reduced. Second, many traders from the towns have left and fewer traders come from elsewhere to buy goods. Third, the roads are often not safe and/ or traders have to pay large amounts of money on taxes and protection. Fourth, there are fewer markets to supply (there are no more village markets).

Casual labour is now one of the main sources of income. Resident households in Geneina have benefited from the construction boom described earlier. Also, many households have a family member working for an international agency which represents a significant injection of cash into the town’s economy. In other areas residents face competition from IDPs for casual labour.

The relationship between IDPs and residents varies. In Zalingei the residents felt that the IDPs were responsible for an increase in the price of essential goods and for water shortages. However, they saw the presence of IDPs as positive because of the provision of food aid, rehabilitation of health facilities, free medication sometimes, better education, availability of cheap labour as well as increased employment opportunities with humanitarian agencies. The views of Mornei residents were much more negative. They felt that work opportunities had declined for residents, IDPs were living in their houses, there is overcrowding in town and a shortage of water. The IDPs are also perceived to be affecting the customs and culture of Mornei residents as the people of Mornei are urban and the IDPs are villagers from rural areas.

**On-going risks to livelihoods:**

**IDPs:**
- Looting within the camps (mainly Geneina camps)
- Harrassment, beating and rape associated with firewood collection (Zalingei, Geneina, Garsilla)
- Grazing of nomad animals on farms during harvest time
- Payment of protection fees for carrying out basic livelihood strategies (such as making charcoal or collecting fruit from own farm)
- Control of trade and natural resources by Arab nomads
- Risk of deteriorating relationship between IDPs and residents, in particular in Mornei where residents could force IDPs to leave the town.

**Urban residents:**
- Continued risk of being attacked or having house burnt in town (Zalingei)
- Continued risk of looting in towns.
- Continued insecurity preventing farming far outside of the main centres.

### 7.3 Exploited and coerced rural populations and IDPs

#### 7.3.1 History of conflict and population movements
This section covers the population groups who are able to cultivate but who pay for protection to Arab groups to be able to do so. Arrangements vary according to the ethnic group that is paying for protection and their previous relationship with different Arab groups. The study team found evidence of the payment of ‘protection money’ by Fur (in Abbata), Masalit (in Umm Tajok) and Tama (in Umm Shayala). Whereas the Tama initially requested the Arabs within their community to protect them from outsiders, for others the payment of protection fees appeared to be imposed.

All communities described in this group comprised both Arab and non-Arab populations before the conflict and received a number of displaced people during the conflict. The largest numbers of displaced were in Abata and Umm Tajok. The number of pastoralists in the area increased since the start of the conflict. IDPs in Umm Tajok are Masalit from villages about 7-8 km away and Fur from surrounding villages. About 10% of the Fur returned to their villages with ‘encouragement’ by the government, eg with promises of protection. In the areas of return, there is reported to be a Janjaweed camp which is ‘policing’ the area. The movement of the resident Fur is controlled and they are unable to leave. The Fur in Umm Tajok described it as ‘living in a big prison’.

#### 7.3.2 Changes in livelihood strategies
In Abbata the main livelihood sources before the conflict were rainfed farming (contributing around 50%), followed by irrigated farming (23%) and trade (19%). Livestock and remittances were also important for some, but much of their livestock was looted during the conflict and sending back remittances is no longer safe. The contribution of agriculture as a livelihood source also decreased despite the payment for protection to be able to do so. Not only is access to land constrained, the grazing of livestock on food crops is a major problem.

To make up for lost income the resident farmers have taken up agricultural labouring on irrigated farms, which used to be done just by the poorest families. Other income earning opportunities include brick making and firewood collection, but firewood collection still exposes women to severe risks. The settled population in Abata and the IDPs are receiving food aid but the Arab nomads only receive non-food items. This has the potential to exacerbate hostilities between these groups.

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39 Interviews with Fur residents and IDPs were difficult in Abbata as there was an official government visit at the same time, and it was not possible to interview different ethnic groups separately.
The main market for produce from Abbata used to be Zalingei, but traders no longer come from Zalingei and Nyala to buy produce. This means that farmers have to travel to Zalingei themselves to sell their produce, and have to pay protection fees in order to do so. Individuals pay SDD 100 as an escort fee and SDD1000 for a sack of onions. In Abbata the resident population is Fur and protection fees appear to be imposed on them. The payment of protection money to Arabs is happening despite the presence of a police station, army post and rural council executive officer in Abbata.

IDPs in Umm Tajok, in particular Masalit IDPs, faced systematic abuse and harassment, including payments for protection to the local Arab (Mahadi) population. For example, some roads are planned in the area where the IDP compounds currently are, and they will have to move and pay another 10,000 SD for a new plot of land. They feel unable to protest or for anyone from the community to represent their interests as this will have negative consequences. They reported protection payments of SDD 500/household which goes to the traditional leadership of the host population. Their marginalisation extends to limited access to water and food aid. Masalit IDPs can often only access water after the residents are served, and as a result many IDPs have stopped going to the borehole and now go to the wadi for water. Only about a quarter of Masalit IDP households reported to be registered for food aid. When re-registration took place in 2005 there were rumours that if you registered you would be returned to your village and would receive no food aid. So many people deliberately avoided registration. As a result, agriculture and firewood collection have become important livelihood sources to compensate. Income from agriculture includes both farm labour and bringing thorns for making fences. There is a lot of competition for firewood collection and Masalit women are often harassed when they do this, including verbal abuse.

The situation in Umm Shayala is different in that the majority ethnic groups (mainly Tama) requested local Arabs to protect them. The ‘protection’ arrangements appear to have been made in phases; which are described in Box 7.1 below;

### Box 7.1 – Protection payments in Umm Shayala

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov/Dec 2003</td>
<td>The Tama asked the local Arabs to negotiate with the Janjaweed not to attack them. The community collected 100 bags of cereals and 50,000 SD and gave this to 2 local Arab leaders to give to the Janjaweed. At this time the Janjaweed also arrested local residents and demanded payment for their release: 100,000 SD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 2004</td>
<td>Local Arab leaders put 5-6 people in each village to protect non-Arab tribes from attack. They were paid a salary of 15,000 SD a month, which was collected from the community. Each household was asked to contribute 300 SD a month. Some IDPs from Dirassa paid 500 SD/month to make sure that their houses were not destroyed in the villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>A 100-strong GoS police force came to Umm Shayala but left after 6 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Oct/Nov 2005</td>
<td>The community organised protection through a combination of Arabs and local youths. Everyone who had a gun was asked to protect. Each sheikh pays 2500 SD (per month) and 1 bag of grain. The focus group of women residents reported that until now every household collects 10 fadra on a regular basis for protection and that they pay protection fees for their farms: 1000-2000 SD for small farms and 5000-7000 SD for big farms (which have irrigation pumps). IDPs report paying 500 SD/household/month to the ‘police’ for protection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By May 2004 people in Umm Shayala had little food stocks or money left as, in addition to the protection payments, they had not been able to harvest their crops in 2003. Three of the local traders had left because of the money they had to contribute for the protection of the
community. Delegations were sent to Zalingei and Geneina to request assistance from NGOs and GoS and they eventually received 950 sacks of grain from the GoS strategic reserve and another 400 in August 2004.

The main livelihood sources for people in Umm Shayala before the conflict were agriculture, both irrigated and rainfed (West Jebel Marra lowlands), as well as livestock and migration to Libya, Khartoum and Egypt. They continued some cultivation throughout the conflict, but much livestock was looted and remittances no longer come in. In both 2004 and 2005 they managed to do some cultivation on farms nearby. Food aid started in June 2005, but only lasted 6 months. Other sources of income include collecting firewood and wood for construction, petty trade and casual labour on tombac farms. IDPs have the same livelihood strategies.

Some traders still come to collect tombac. Traders also come from Geneina and Nyala to collect firewood and building material. People from Umm Shayala can travel to the market in Nyala to purchase goods but have to pay 200 SD at every checkpoint (for about 10 checkpoints).

On-going threats to livelihoods include:
- Insecurity still persists outside of the main centres and people are only able to farm part of their land.
- A significant proportion of people’s income pays for protection.
- Destruction of the social fabric of mixed Arab/non-Arab communities. Protection payments are extracted by one section of the community from others within that same community. It is questionable whether these communities will be able to live together peacefully again when the conflict ends.
- The differential provision of assistance to Arab and non-Arab populations could cause resentment and exacerbate conflict between groups.

7.4 Population groups who are less directly affected or who have some access to land

a) Population groups with some access to land

7.4.1 History of conflict and population movements
In the northern part of West Darfur, some communities have been able to stay on their land and many IDPs have access to agricultural labour. Whilst some of the residents and IDPs in this area face similar problems to those living in camps elsewhere in West Darfur (see earlier section), the extent of ‘control’ by Arab nomads of the surrounding countryside is not as severe as in the more southern locations. The study team visited Seleia.

Seleia came under attack at different times between February and June 2004. The Masalit and Zagawa from the area have fled to Chad and the remaining population is mainly Tama, Erenga and the Jebel Misseriya, all of whom also have members in Chad. Some youths from the Jebel Misseriya tribe initially joined the JEM while others joined the GoS side. In the past two years the area has suffered from attacks by the NDRM on GoS garrisons, Janjaweed camps and on the humanitarian community and counter-attacks by GoS on the Jebel Moon area – the home of the Jebel Misseriya. Seleia itself was not attacked although
the surrounding villages were and it has therefore received a large influx of IDPs. Humanitarian assistance to the area was suspended for some months because of insecurity related to the Chadian situation and problems with registration; humanitarian assistance has only recently resumed.

7.4.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

In Seleia, both the resident and IDP populations have been affected by the conflict, but they are differentiated from the other IDP and resident groups because they still retain some access to land. Access to land to cultivate in the area of Seleia is indicated by the low grain prices in this area (even in the absence of food aid). Millet prices are the lowest in West Darfur. In May 2006, the price of a sack of millet in Sileia was 3800 SD, when this was 6,800/sack in Geneina and 8000 SD/sack in Mornei and Habilla40.

Before the conflict the resident population in Seleia was mainly dependent on rainfed agricultural production, irrigated agricultural production, livestock and trade. The area cultivated was highest in 2003 but has gradually declined since. In 2005, the area cultivated was only 30% of ‘normal’, mostly around Sileia town, but the harvest was better than either of the last two seasons because of the good rainfall. Nearby farms were shared with IDPs. In addition to sharing land, the IDP influx puts a lot of pressure on other resources, such as water, health services and schools, heightening the tension between IDPs and host population.

IDPs in Sileia had similar livelihoods to the residents before the conflict. When they first arrived the IDPs were mainly dependent on wild foods for which the area is well known. Now their livelihood options are very similar to those of IDPs in camps and towns described in section 7.2: firewood collection, casual labour and brick-making. When food distribution stopped, farm labour in Chad became the most important livelihood source for Erengar IDPs. Work on farms in Chad now accounts for about 70% of their livelihood sources. For the Jebel Misseriya IDPs their main source of income now is from the collection of firewood and grass, but a significant proportion of their livelihood sources also comes from cultivation (about 20%). Firewood and grass collection increased since food distribution stopped and is still associated with a significant risk of harassment. See Figure 7.4 below:

40 This information was provided by Abdulrahim Norein, VAM assistant in Geneina
On-going threats to livelihoods include:
- Limited access to farm land
- Nomad livestock grazing on cultivated farms
- Risks associated with livelihood activities such as firewood collection
- The absence of food distribution in Sileia means that people have to take greater risks in their livelihood strategies.

b) Population groups less directly affected

7.4.3 History of conflict and population movements

There are a number of other communities which have been able to stay on their land and farm in GoS held areas of West Darfur. They include communities of settled Arabs or those who aligned themselves with the GoS, for example the Gimir. These communities have not been attacked. Many, however, received an influx of IDPs. Tribes who have aligned themselves with the GoS include: Tama, Gimir, Erenga, Borgo, Dajo, and some of the Misseriya Jebel (UNHCR/Intersos, 2005, July).

7.4.4 Changes in livelihood strategies

The main impact of the conflict on people in Nur El Huda was the looting of some livestock between November 2003 and 2004, but since January 2004 the situation has improved. Their main livelihood source is agriculture, the same as before the conflict. They have had normal harvests and do not have any problems with security. This village may have been slightly unusual as it is a village of mixed ethnic groups, but it is also a well-known centre for Islamic learning. Findings are similar for GoS aligned communities. For example in a Gimir village close to Habilla (lor) people have been able to cultivate their farms as before. A settled Arab village just north west of Geneina, Um Elker, was also secure in 2005. The
main impact of the conflict was some looting of livestock but no one was displaced. Farming took place in both 04/05 and 05/06, and the main source of income is from the sale of farm products (as well as firewood and grass) (Inter-agency mission, 2005, September).

On-going threats to livelihoods include:
- The main threat for Arab or GoS aligned tribes is the loss of livestock

7.5 Arab nomads and the occupation of land

Before the conflict West Darfur had a large number of Arab nomads, some of whom had already settled in or close to settled farmer communities. Livestock formed their main livelihood source, both through the provision of milk and meat and through trade. There were seven official livestock migration routes in West Darfur. Livestock moved north in the rainy season and south in the dry season.

In 2004, nomads were not able to go north due to the presence of the SLA. Most livestock stayed in Wadi Saleh, Habilla and Geneina (OCHA/FAO, 2005, Feb). As much of the settled farming population was displaced by this time, they could use most of the state as grazing land. Four out of the seven routes in West Darfur now no longer function. By late 2005, nomad concentrations were mainly in Kereneik, Sirba, Seleia, Habilla and Mornei areas. In addition to nomadic populations from West Darfur, there is now also a more permanent presence of nomads from North Darfur as their livestock migration routes have been similarly restricted due to conflict. West Darfur is one of the few areas where they are able to move freely and find sufficient pasture. In areas of livestock concentration, accessible water points are overcrowded and problems with lack of veterinary services were also reported to the study team (in Abbata).

Trade in livestock has declined because few livestock traders from Omdurman, El Obeid and Nyala now come to West Darfur. For example, trips to Omdurman from Abbata only happen once a year now, instead of twice, and take one month longer. This has also reduced income from herding.

Some Arab nomadic groups have settled in villages and on land from which people were displaced. Without exception, the IDPs interviewed for this study (in Zalingei, Geneina, Habilla, Mornei), informed us that their land was occupied, examples of what they told us are given in Box 7.2 below:

Box 7.2 – Information on the occupation of land from IDP interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zalingei</td>
<td>IDPs say they have information that Arab tribes have occupied or are living in their areas and are cultivating their farms, especially the more fertile farms along the wadis. They cannot access their farms now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneina</td>
<td>A lot of the women reported that Arabs were now living in their villages. From Buray they are cutting the trees and bringing them in for firewood for brick-making. They have even cut the mukheit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habilla</td>
<td>IDPs say the Arabs have settled on their farms. They got this information from butchers who go out of Habilla town to butcher wounded animals for the Arabs. Some of the community leaders also accompanied the UNHCR mission, and saw for themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mornei</td>
<td>IDPs from Wadi Saleh say that Arabs lived in their original villages. But new Arabs have since come and settled in the area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Traditional leaders from the non-Arab tribes believe the occupation of land is part of an intentional government strategy to drive them off the land. Government representatives, however, state that the problem is only temporary and a result of blocked migration routes. In July 2005, the West Darfur Security Committee issued a decree that anyone who occupied the land of refugees or IDPs had to vacate immediately or face arrest. No action followed, however (UNHCR, 2005, November).

In Salaa, the majority of the current population is Arab (from the Awlad Rashid tribe). They previously had their traditional damra close to the village and were therefore known to the original population. A UNHCR report states that the village was predominantly Masalit before the conflict with a significant Tama component.

Before the conflict the nomads stayed in their damras for 1-2 months. The young men used to travel with the livestock while the women and children stayed behind in various damras along the migration route. In 2005 they moved into the village, which was empty, because the water supply is better than in the damra and the land is more fertile. The women and children now stay there permanently. They are no longer living in their nomad tents but have built more permanent dwellings similar to those of the original villagers. Whilst cultivation was a livelihood source before the conflict, the relative importance of this has increased during the conflict. They have to cultivate because they can no longer purchase cereals (since most farmers have been displaced). In 2005/06, both cultivation and pasture was good. An important livelihood source at the time of the study was food aid, provided by WFP.

The male focus group in Salaa told the study team that security had improved as a result of the conflict. Before the conflict they faced problems in using their traditional migration routes as they would find them cultivated by farmers, which is no longer the case.

There are other places where the occupation appears to be by new Arabs coming into West Darfur (from North Darfur or Chad). Some Arab settlements appear to be more permanent than others. UNHCR reports a large number of occupied villages in Geneina, Habilla, Wadi Saleh, Mukhjar, and Zalingei localities (UNHCR, 2005, November).

On-going threats to livelihoods include:
- There is an increased risk of disease for the livestock of the nomad population, and for some income is reduced because of a decline in livestock trade
- Continued occupation of land by Arabs will make the return process extremely problematic
- Provision of humanitarian assistance to people living on land which is not theirs risks consolidating the occupation. At the same time, however, excluding Arabs from assistance could exacerbate existing tensions and increase exploitation and harassment of non-Arab groups.

7.6 Conclusions

The vast majority of the rural population in the southern agro-pastoral and West Jebel Marra lowlands has been displaced. Both IDPs and residents have lost most of their previous livelihood sources. Livelihood sources are now limited to poorly remunerated casual labour, firewood and grass collection, charcoal production and in some cases, petty trade. Some
have seen a little improvement in livelihood options over the past two years: for example brickmaking in Geneina, charcoal production and petty trade in Habilla and Mornei, farm work in Mornei. These strategies are however very precarious, yield little income and in some cases involve payments for protection to the Janjaweed. Not all have experienced this small expansion of options, however. There has been no change in Zalingei and Garsilla. Whilst security inside the towns seems to have improved, cases of looting and theft are still common. All IDPs and residents in these areas still face significant risks when venturing outside of town; cases of rape and attack are still common.

Some Fur, Masalit and Tama groups are paying Arab populations to be able to stay on their land and continue to engage in agricultural production and trade. By doing so they have retained the right to their land but at great cost. The fees paid for protection vary according to ethnic group and the nature of the arrangement; i.e. whether it was originally by choice or whether the payments were imposed. In all cases the protection payments represent a considerable proportion of expenditure and agriculture and trade are still considerably reduced compared to before the conflict.

Others were able to stay on their land because they were closely aligned to the GoS. For this group the main impact appears to be loss of livestock, but they have been able to resume farming activities.

In the northern part of the state, some residents and IDPs still have some access to land. But this is limited to only a proportion of the land cultivated before the conflict, and often the harvest is destroyed by livestock. Since food distribution stopped in Sileia, those living close to the Chad border were getting most of their livelihood sources by working on farms in Chad. Others have increased firewood collection, but this entails taking considerable risks.

Movement for Arab nomads has become more restricted due to their inability to move north. This is creating concentrations of livestock with the consequent risk of disease. Nomads are also facing difficulties in purchasing grain as production is very low and most of the farming villages have been destroyed. They are, however, benefiting from the desertion of villages as this provides plenty of pasture and available farmland. Many Arabs who were previously mobile appear to have settled more permanently on the sites of abandoned villages. This will seriously hinder the potential for IDPs to return to their areas of origin. It also provides aid agencies with dilemmas about the provision of assistance.
8. CHANGES IN LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN SOUTH DARFUR

8.1 Introduction

The conflict in South Darfur is about gaining or maintaining access to areas of strategic interest, for example the road to Jebel Marra and to Khartoum. Whilst the pattern of conflict in South Darfur was much the same as elsewhere, with attacks and burning of villages, and large numbers of displaced moving to camps and towns, the severity of the impact varies very much by area. Areas which are worst affected include Kass, which is on the road to Jebel Marra and the highly contested SLA held areas of Shearia, Gereida and a large part of Adilla locality. These areas have seen some of the worst fighting and displacement in Darfur so far in 2006. Other parts of South Darfur have experienced much less direct conflict, such as Edd Al Fursan, Rehed al Birdi and Buram.

The areas visited by the study team have been grouped into the following four categories according to the decreasing severity of livelihood insecurity:

1. Severely conflict-affected with some exploitation and coercion. This category covers the resident population and IDPs in GOS-held areas in East and South Jebel Marra lowlands, and IDPs near Nyala. This group has been directly affected by the conflict in terms of high loss of assets, restricted movement for the majority of the population according to ethnicity, exploitation and coercion of some ethnic groups. Our sample covered the resident population and IDPs in Kass town and in nearby Singita village, Angara village in Nyala locality; and IDPs in Direige camp in Nyala

2. Resident populations and IDPs in SLA-held areas. There is greater freedom of movement for the majority of the population within SLA territory, but not beyond. Our sample included Muhajaria within Shearia locality, and Mazroub and Jad el Seid within Adila locality

3. Populations in GOS-held areas which are less directly affected, and IDPs, subdivided into two groups:
   a. In the Ed Daien area where the livelihood zone is agro-pastoral with groundnuts: Although directly affected by the conflict, the impact has been less severe for the resident population in terms of loss of assets and control of population movement, although the impact is more severe for those who have been displaced. The sample included Ed Daien town (both Dinka IDPs and Darfuri IDPs) and El Ferdous village (resident population, Dinka and Darfuri IDPs)

   b. In the Buram and Tullus area where the livelihood zone is cattle agro-pastoral. This area has suffered few attacks and therefore minimal loss of assets. The main disruption is to trade. There is no humanitarian assistance.
8.2 Severely conflict-affected with some exploitation and coercion – GOS-held areas: East and South Jebel Marra lowlands, and IDPs

8.2.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements

Rural areas in Kass locality suffered from intense and systematic attacks in the early stages of the conflict. Indeed, some of the worst atrocities of the current Darfur conflict have been reported from this area. A number of IDPs interviewed reported multiple attacks, multiple displacement and the serial loss of assets. Whilst much of the rural population has been displaced to the major towns in the area and to camps outside the towns, there has also been displacement within rural areas, usually from smaller to larger villages which are regarded as more secure.

In both Angara and Singita villages there are a number of returnees, most of whom have come back during the last year. The reasons for their return are reported to be a) the provision of food aid by WFP to villages in 2005, and b) some improvement in security. There was also evidence of government putting pressure on villagers who became displaced to return. IDPs from Singita who stayed briefly in Kass town reported being ‘chased out’ of schools in which they were staying and ‘encouraged’ by government to return.41 Villagers in Angara similarly reported GOS ‘encouragement’ to return when they ‘imposed’ a local-level peace process. Despite this pressure, most appear to have returned of their own accord.

IDPs in Kass town interviewed for this study reported some improvement in security in the town compared with earlier in the conflict when there were frequent attacks and security incidents. But they are still fearful to be out in the streets after sunset, and there are still regular reports of rape in the town and of occasional looting. In short, movements for IDPs and most urban residents is tightly controlled.

8.2.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

Resident population

The resident population in this area is within the south Jebel Marra lowlands livelihood zone. Agriculture used to be the dominant source of livelihood in these fertile geographical areas, and has declined dramatically as a result of the conflict. It now represents only 10% of livelihood sources in Singita, and just under 20% in Angara42. The principal constraint is insecurity, limiting access to land closest to the village – up to 30 minutes distance in the case of Singita. This means that they may only be cultivating around 2 mukhamas now compared with 8 to 12 mukhamas pre-conflict. In Singita they are also suffering from a lack of draught power to plough since their livestock have been looted. Most cultivation now has to be done manually, even on heavy clay soils. In Kass town only an estimated 10 to 20% of the resident population is now cultivating compared with 70 to 80% of the town’s population pre-conflict. The majority Fur population are only able to access farms up to about 5 km from the town because of the threat of insecurity, whereas pre-conflict they farmed up to 60 to 70 km from Kass town.

41 The GOS has subsequently built a new mosque, school and health centre in Singita, apparently to very high standards. But up until the time of the study team’s visit in April 2006 the villagers had not been given access to any of these new buildings, although they had been completed many months previously. There is some speculation that these buildings were constructed in response to high profile international media coverage of the impact of the attacks on the village in which one child had been badly burned.

42 According to focus group discussions with women in each respective village.
Where (usually Fur) households are able to cultivate, particularly on their wadi farms, it is very common for them to be paying fees for protection to neighbouring Arab communities to protect their farm from attack and hence to protect their crops. Residents from Singita village – famous for its tomato production – reported that they, plus three other villages, have to pay a total of SDD 140,000 to protect their wadi farms. This works out at a payment of approximately SDD 1,000 per mukhamas. But it is not a guarantee that the crops will be protected. During the last season pastoralists migrating into the area – who are not benefiting from these extortion payments – were reported to have let their animals graze on the wadi farms numerous times. There are a number of consequences of this system of control: not only is the return to the farmer very much reduced but they have also now shortened the production season from around nine months to just two to three months.

Livestock, which was usually the second most important source of livelihood pre-conflict, has been even more seriously affected as a result of the widespread looting of animals early on in the conflict, (and still continuing albeit to a lesser extent as there are few animals left to loot). In Angara village the women interviewed estimated a decline in the contribution that livestock activities make to livelihoods from around 25% to 0% since the conflict began.

Remittances accounted for almost 20% of total livelihood sources pre-conflict according to a group of men interviewed in Singita. But this has really dropped off during the conflict as young men are no longer free to move to Central Sudan and beyond to work as they did before. Sending back money and resources has become a very risky and hazardous business.

Trade has been badly affected by the various trade restrictions outlined in chapter 5. Whereas pre-conflict the villagers of Singita had access to at least 13 nearby markets within a 2 to 3 hour radius, during the conflict this has reduced to 7, and travelling to most of these 7 markets requires payment of some protection fee to ensure safe passage.

To compensate for these livelihood losses households have resorted to the collection of firewood and za’af to make mats, and to making charcoal in the case of Angara, often taking considerable risks in the process. However, the marginal improvement in security has made a difference, not least in Singita where the residents now venture outside the village to collect firewood whereas in the early stages of the conflict in late 2003/ early 2004 they resorted to burning the leaves of the dom palm because it was just too dangerous to leave the village. The importance of firewood and grass collection has become even greater since food aid rations to Singita were stopped in October 2005.

In Angara village, the arrival of a number of businessmen who are renting land for vegetable production for the much expanded Nyala market, has introduced an important source of new income, both in terms of rent for the land and more significantly agricultural labour opportunities which now contribute an estimated 50% to livelihoods.

**IDPs in Kass town and in Direige camp**

For many IDPs food aid has become their most significant source of livelihood; according to IDP women in Kass it represents almost 40% of their current sources of livelihood. This has replaced their early dependence on relatives and begging when they first became displaced, which at that time also represented about 40% of their livelihood sources. See Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1

IDPs in Kass town: changes in livelihood sources during the conflict

Source: focus group discussion with IDP women

Whether they are able to collect firewood and grass depends totally on security in the surrounding area. Thus, IDPs in Kass town do not engage in this activity, except for their own household use, venturing out approximately every couple of weeks when accompanied by AU patrols. However, in Direige camp IDPs are engaged in firewood and grass collection. Combined, they now account for about 70% of total livelihood sources.

Daily labour is the other significant livelihood strategy although the labour market varies from town to town. In Nyala, wage rates of SDD 500 for 1000 bricks were reported and work is available about three times per week whereas in Kass wage rates are SDD 300 per 1000 bricks and the availability of work is much less predictable, more like once every two weeks. Indeed, since a number of international aid organisations (MSF and WES, for example) have left Kass the construction industry has declined, exacerbated by the gradual impoverishment of the resident population who are no longer investing in construction.

Government restrictions have got in the way of some IDP income generating activities in Kass. For example, some IDP men who tried to engage in petty trade in vegetables were told they had to have both ‘health’ and ‘labour’ cards, at rates which were simply unaffordable. Taxes were also applied to brick-making, effectively reducing the wage-rate to IDPs. There seem to be better opportunities for agricultural labouring around Kass town than around Nyala. But this is poorly paid, at about SDD 100 per day for weeding, and mostly engages women because it is regarded as too risky for men to venture out of the town.

Ongoing threats include:

43 The payment is SDD 1000 for weeding 1 mukhamas, which usually takes 10 to 11 days.
• Continued insecurity and individualised attacks, even inside Kass town
• Lack of access for much of the resident population beyond a tight radius around towns and villages, because of insecurity and the risk of attack
• Men targeted in killings whilst women face the threat of rape
• High reliance on food aid as livelihood options are very restricted. Any reduction in food aid could increase exploitation of IDPs in the labour market if their bargaining power is reduced
• Rural population likely to return to IDP camps if food aid is not available through the rainy season, or if security deteriorates

8.3 Resident populations and IDPs in SLA-held areas.

8.3.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements
Muhajaria has been under SLA control since late 2003/ early 2004. Villages in the surrounding area came under combined attack from GOS and Janjaweed forces around July 2004. This triggered the first influx of IDPs to Muhajeria, some of whom had experienced multiple displacement before they reached the town. The second influx of IDPs was more recent, from Shearia locality between October 2005 and February 2006. In the meantime, the area surrounding Muhajaria has generally become more secure so that the population – both IDP and resident – are able to venture further from the town.

Adila locality is the home of the Ma’aliya, an Arab tribe that has mostly sided with the SLA although part of the tribe has aligned with the GOS/ Janjaweed making this one of the few tribes that has actually split internally during the current conflict. The Ma’aliya have a history of tribal fighting with the Rizeigat; the current conflict is an opportunity for some of these old scores to be settled once again.

The GOS withdrew all government officers from Adila early last year (accompanied by the sabotaging of water sources before they left – see below), and shortly afterwards launched a combined GOS/ Janjaweed attack on villages in the area in April/ May 05 as the SLA tried to extend their area of control south and east. There was a counter-attack from the SLA who now control 90% of Adila locality north of the railway line (World Vision, 2006). In villages such as Jad El Seid and Mazroub as many as 60% of the resident population is reported to have left, because of ongoing insecurity and the destruction of water sources.

Dinka IDPs were living in Adila locality before the current Darfur conflict. Some of them have been displaced, for example from Jad El Seid when it was attacked, but have since come back when the SLA took control. Their personal security is more assured in this area compared with neighbouring Ed Daien (see below), but their livelihoods are badly hit. A number of them have returned to the south, in January/ February 2005 and again in January/ February 2006.

8.3.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

Resident population and Darfur IDPs
Although within SLA-held territory there is greater movement for many ethnic groups than in GOS-held territory in South Darfur, movement out of the area is highly restricted and risky.
Thus, the markets of Ed Daien and Adila (which is held by GOS) are out of bounds for SLA villages in Adila locality. Nyala market is out of bounds for Muhajaria. If individuals coming from SLA areas are caught, they are usually arrested and have to pay a fine to be released.

Muhajaria is in the low rainfall agro-pastoral livelihood zone, where the principal sources of livelihoods are agriculture (staple grains and groundnuts), livestock and trade. Each has been affected. The area cultivated has reduced because of insecurity, but there has been a significant improvement in the last year. For example, IDP women reported travelling to work on farms that are up to three hours' distance – an estimated 15 km – in the last season of 2005/06. However, the surplus production can no longer be sold in Nyala as before. Similarly, it is very difficult to transport groundnuts out of the area. Most of the crop is processed locally into oil.

Livestock holdings have been reduced, through increased sales to raise income and from looting. But there are still large numbers of livestock in the area (especially cattle), a busy livestock market, and this is an important source of employment for IDP men who draw water from wells through the night for animals the following day.

Similar to many other IDPs in Darfur, IDPs in Mujaharia are mostly dependent on daily labour, the range of which has gradually expanded since they first became displaced. See Figure 8.2. Unlike many IDPs in GOS-held areas there are more opportunities for agricultural labouring, including fencing. Relief food is also a significant source of livelihood, even though the rations were reduced to half shortly before this study took place.

Figure 8.2

Adila is one of the less productive or fertile areas of South Darfur with sandy/goz soils and poor water resources. Similar to Muhajaria, the principal sources of livelihood have not changed much since the conflict began, but the restrictions on movement have affected
each, probably more so than in Muhajeria. In Jad El Seid, the gradual decline in agriculture has been supplemented in a major way with the collection of firewood and charcoal (even though the price that firewood fetches is less than in pre-conflict years). See Figure 8.3.

Figure 8.3

![Residents Jad el Seid: changing livelihood sources](image)

Source: Resident men focus group discussion

In Mazroub, villagers reported a similar decline in agricultural production, particularly in 2005/06 which was worse than the previous year, unlike many other parts of Darfur. For groundnuts, only one-third of the pre-conflict area was cultivated. The reasons were insecurity (attacks in this area took place just before the agricultural season); pest infestation (in the absence of any pest control by government); and poor rainfall. According to the World Vision (2006) livelihoods study, another factor affecting production was lack of money to hire labourers.

As far as livestock are concerned, households with large herds have mostly left Adila for the more secure pastures of Kordofan. Other households have stayed but are struggling with the lack of veterinary services and scarce water.

Lack of water emerged as a major problem in both Jad El Seid but especially in Mazroub. The four boreholes in Mazroub were all destroyed before GOS left the area. The closest functioning boreholes are now two to three hours’ distance. This is having very serious consequences for households without means of transport, such as a donkey. Although UMCOR is working in the area to repair boreholes, it has not yet reached Mazroub.

Some remittances were reported by households in Jad El Seid, but because of the trade restrictions the money has to be smuggled back from family members in El Obeid and Nyala.

**Dinka IDPs**

Dinka IDPs were principally dependent on sharecropping before the current conflict (see later section on Ed Daien). Since the conflict began this has continued but on a much reduced
scale. They estimated that sharecropping opportunities had reduced by 50% (or by even more in 2005 during the period of insecurity). For example, one farmer who would normally have sharecropped with ten to twenty Dinka IDP households in the past is now sharecropping with just seven. Loans from the host community are no longer available and the price of groundnuts has halved.

In response, the Dinka are having to depend much more on agricultural and daily labouring, but at lower wage rates than before the conflict. For example, before the conflict daily wage rates for domestic labour in Mazroub were SDD 200-300/ day; now they are SDD 100-150. The price of a grass mat, another income generating activity, has dropped from SDD 500 to SDD 300. And the amount of food aid they are receiving is reported to be less than in the pre-conflict years; many missed registration due to misunderstandings and misinformation.

The water problems mentioned above have hit the Dinka very hard. Few have donkeys and are therefore having to pay as much as SDD 50/ jerrycan of water in Mazroub (SDD 5/ jerrycan at the water source). Water now regularly accounts for 20 to 30% of expenditure and cereals for around 40%, forcing all 'non-essential' expenditure to be dropped. This includes education and children have been taken out of school.

All the Dinkas interviewed in SLA areas want to return to the south, although they realise that this needs to be done sensitively and 'quietly' so as not to provoke any local backlash to stop them. They are very much aware of the long-term contribution they have made to the groundnut economy, and the value of such a plentiful source of cheap labour.

Ongoing threats for people living in SLA-held areas in South Darfur include:
- Lack of access to GOS-held market towns
- Ongoing insecurity triggering temporary population displacement and restricted access to agricultural land
- Lack of, or deteriorating basic services and lack of maintenance eg water, agricultural and veterinary services
- Competition for labour

8.4 Populations in GOS-held areas which are less directly affected, and IDPs:

a) Ed Daien area - agro-pastoral with groundnuts

8.4.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements
Ed Daien is the heart of Dar Rizeigat. The positioning of the southern Rizeigat in the current conflict is an interesting one. Having been active members of the Murahaliin in the long-running civil war in South Sudan, their current nazir – Saeed Mahmoud Ibrahim Musa Madibu – has taken a different line in the Darfur conflict. Early on, he refused to back the Janjaweed and has since steered a tough but highly respected course between Khartoum, the Janjaweed and the SLA. As leader of the most powerful tribe in Darfur, he commands considerable authority (Flint and de Waal, 2005). However, despite his tireless efforts, other senior Rizeigat politicians have taken a different line and there is evidence of Janjaweed activity and recruitment in the area, outside Ed Daien town, particularly in Assalaya.
In July 2004, the SLA launched a series of attacks on Dar Rizeigat. However, the intervention of the Rizeigat nazir prevented this from escalating and the SLA withdrew to Mahajaria (ibid). But there have also been attacks by government-backed militias, partly because of the close proximity of the SLA. Villages west and north-west from Ed Daien have been affected, with populations that were predominantly Birgid, Berti and a few Zaghawa. This provoked a wave of displacement towards Ed Daien town and to certain villages such as El Ferdous where the population has more than doubled. These IDPs are mainly from the Dinka, Birgid and Berti tribes.

Dinka IDPs have been present in Darfur since 1987/88 with a second influx in 1992. By the start of the current conflict there were approximately 84,000 displaced Dinka in the area. Since their arrival they have had a very marginalized status in Darfur, but soon became a key resource for groundnut farmers as cheap agricultural labour and sharecroppers. In the current conflict many have been displaced again within Ed Daien locality, an estimated 29,000 by the end of 2004 (SCUK, 2004).

8.4.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

Resident rural population: Rizeigat
Dar Rizeigat is a generally fertile area where pre-conflict livelihoods were based on agriculture (both staple grains and especially groundnuts as a cash crop); livestock and trade. All three livelihood sources have been negatively impacted by the conflict.

As far as agriculture is concerned, the impact has been mixed. Households with land close to SLA-held territory have had to reduce the area they cultivate, by around 50%, because of the threat of insecurity on more distant fields. But for others, usually the better-off, they have actually increased the area they now cultivate by as much as 30 to 40%44. Indeed, this was one of the few occasions when interviewees for this study acknowledged how they have gained from the conflict, principally from the availability of even cheaper labour from Dinka IDPs who have been newly displaced within Darfur in the last three years. The increased area is mostly planted to groundnuts. But the knock-on effects have been limited as the groundnut market has been so badly affected by the conflict. (See Chapter 5). As traders from Central Sudan have withdrawn, groundnut prices have slumped and it is now much harder for farmers to get loans. Some farmers (Rizeigat and Ma’alia) reported having to sell all their groundnuts at harvest time when the price is lowest in order to pay back their loans.

This surplus of cheap agricultural labour has not been so positive for poor resident households in El Ferdous, for whom this would have been an important livelihood source before the conflict; they are now facing much greater competition for work. Nor has it been so positive for those who are unable to access all of their farms, who are now depending to a large extent on casual labour and firewood collection to replace lost earnings from livestock, trade and agriculture. The cost to the Dinka is described below.

Livestock – mostly cattle – are suffering from restricted mobility. Normally they would spend the dry season in Bahr El Arab and migrate north in the rainy season, as far as North Darfur

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44 Reported in focus group discussion with traditional leaders in El Ferdous
(Al Fashir). But this is no longer possible due to the presence of the SLA north of Ed Daein. There is therefore an overcrowding of livestock in the area, causing overgrazing, pressure on water sources and outbreaks of disease when veterinary care is collapsing. This has not yet resulted in a significant increase in mortality, but it has affected the condition of the animals. Some households have sold their livestock for fear of looting. Livestock marketing opportunities have also declined as traders from Central Sudan have left and as trade routes have become longer and more risky. (See Chapter 5). But interestingly livestock prices have not shown much of a fall. The explanation is likely to be that people are choosing (and are able) to hold onto their animals rather than to sell them.

**Darfur IDPs: Birgid and Berti**

IDPs originating from within Darfur were interviewed in El Ferdous and in Ed Daein town. Most are assetless after their villages were attacked, and very few are able to cultivate apart from some IDPs on the east side of Ed Daein town. They reported that some farms on the west side of Ed Daein town have now been occupied by the Janjaweed.

Similar to many other IDPs living in and around GOS towns, these people are earning a meagre livelihood dependent on daily labour and are very reliant on food aid. However, it is interesting to note that in Ed Daein town in particular, wage rates are slightly higher and work is more available than in some other locations. See Table 8.1.

**Table 8.1 Wage rates for IDPs, Ed Daein town**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily labour activities</th>
<th>Wage rate</th>
<th>Availability of work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brick-making (men)</td>
<td>SDD 500-700/ day</td>
<td>4-5 days per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic labour</td>
<td>SDD 150-200/ day</td>
<td>6 days per week</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They face similar security risks to many other IDPs in other areas if they venture outside the town, for example to collect firewood. The security situation has marginally improved during 2006, partly because of the interventions of the Rizeigat nazir and a desire to show that Ed Daein is a safe area for other ethnic groups. But there are still individual cases of IDP harassment.

**Dinka IDPs**

Before the Darfur conflict, the majority of Dinka IDPs were working as sharecroppers (approximately 65% of households). Others were working as agricultural labourers (around 20% of households) and a few – usually the sultans – were leasing agricultural land (15% of households). During their stay in South Darfur, the Dinka have mostly been subjected to exploitative forms of share-cropping by the host population. Their stressed and impoverished status showed up in persistently high rates of malnutrition. With the support of international aid organisations, some had been given land and settled in San Nam el Naga. Those who had been settled for longest had started to accumulate and to build up their asset base. In the current conflict this made them more vulnerable to attack and this was done in a very organised fashion. Their livelihoods have been totally wiped out in very systematic, non-violent, but complete looting of Dinka households in San Nam el Naga.

Most of these Dinka IDPs are dependent once again on a very precarious livelihood based on daily labouring. But they, too, are restricted in their mobility and no longer have access to places like Muhajaria where they might have sought work in the past. See Figure 8.4 for an

45 However, it is speculated that there is some arrangement between the Rizeigat and the SLA that enables them to move their livestock northwards. This is unconfirmed.
illustration of how the livelihood sources of IDPs from San Nam el Naga have changed completely since the conflict began.

**Figure 8.4 Sources of livelihood: Dinka IDPs from San Nam El Nagaa**

Those who are still sharecropping are doing so on even more exploitative terms. See Table 8.2. In short, their power to negotiate has been seriously weakened and they are now very vulnerable. Opportunities for share-cropping have really declined. The number of land leasers has also reduced as there is more competition for available land with the large presence of new IDPs originating from within Darfur.

The pressure that Dinka IDPs are now facing is evident in how their expenditure has changed. Whereas before the conflict more than half of the expenditure of Dinka IDPs in San Nam el Naga was investment-oriented (for example, spent on livestock, draught power and ploughs), it is now entirely survival-oriented, spent on food. (A number of Dinka IDPs are not currently registered for food aid).

**Table 8.2 Share-cropping and land leasing arrangements for Dinka IDPs: pre-conflict and 2005/06**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Terms of agreement for sharecropping</th>
<th>Sharing of harvest for sharecroppers</th>
<th>Land rents for leasers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-conflict</td>
<td>Sharecropper receives 10 mulwa of grain, SDDD 1,000/ mukhamas and drinking water</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>SDD 100/ mukhamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>Sharecropper receives 7 mulwa of grain and SDD 700/ mukhamas and drinking water</td>
<td>Unpredictable. Equal sharing of harvest no longer guaranteed. Cases of sharecroppers being cheated of their share</td>
<td>SDD 200-300/ mukhamas. More marginal land and hard to come by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most of the Dinka IDPs interviewed indicated a strong desire to return home, back to the south, probably after the next agricultural season. But their sultans are more reluctant, wanting facilities such as health and water to be available first, and also favouring return to larger villages, possibly to consolidate the power base they have built up amongst the South Darfur IDPs. On this issue some tension was evident between the chiefs and their people. Meanwhile, some Dinka IDPs have already returned.

Ongoing risks for the population in the Ed Daien area include:

- The risk of attack and incursion from the SLA which would further disrupt the livelihoods of those who have been able to maintain some semblance of their pre-conflict livelihood
- Fear of attack which could mean that the area cultivated close to SLA-held territory is reduced
- The risk of exploitation and cheating in sharecropping arrangements between Rizeigat and Dinka IDPs, at the expense of the Dinka
- Rising tension between IDPs and residents over food aid as the former are registered but the latter receive nothing, which could erupt into violent incidents

8.5 Populations in GOS-held areas which are less directly affected, and IDPs

b) Buram and Tullus: cattle agro-pastoral

8.5.1 Brief history of conflict and population movements

Within Buram locality two out of the seven AUs are now under SLA control: Gareida and Gughana. Although Buram town was attacked early in the conflict (when many Habbaniya traditional leaders were killed), there have generally been few direct attacks in this GOS-held area although the threat of insecurity increases towards SLA-held areas.

Buram locality is dominated by the Habbaniya, Arab baggara pastoralists who are closely aligned with government in the current conflict. A number of Habbaniya have become displaced and have moved to Buram town from villages close to SLA-held territory. Recent conflict between the Burgo (who were accused of being aligned to the SLA) and the Habbaniya resulted in many Habbaniya becoming displaced from the northern parts of Buram locality. Meanwhile the Burgo displaced moved into the Gareida area. But there has since been some reconciliation between the two tribes and the IDPs have returned. There is a strong Janjaweed presence in GOS-held Buram, to protect it from SLA incursions.

There are some similarities between Buram and Ed Daien localities, but one of the key differences is that Buram (along with Rahel El Birdi and Edd Al Fursan) has not been considered ‘war-affected’ by most of the international humanitarian community. Therefore it has received no humanitarian assistance and there have been remarkably few assessments conducted in Buram. (None could be found to feed into this study). Whilst this is interpreted locally as evidence of partiality in the way that humanitarian assistance is being provided, at
the same time the local authorities are extremely resistant to international agencies coming to work in the area for fear that it would herald the establishment of IDP camps.\textsuperscript{46}

The dominant group in Tullus is the Fellata (non-Arab pastoralists), now closely aligned with government in the current conflict. Tullus locality also borders Gareida in the east, hence also experiencing greatest insecurity in this direction. Tullus is hosting an estimated 16,000 IDPs, both locally displaced and displaced Fellata from much further afield, for example from Shearia and from Jebel Marra. Unlike Buram, Tullus has been assessed by humanitarian agencies a number of times, but very little assistance has been forthcoming.

There have also been tribal tensions between the Habbaniya and Fellata. Although both are aligned with government in the current conflict, the power balance between them has been disturbed resulting in clashes in April 06 which triggered small-scale displacement. There has since been some reconciliation between the two but at the time of the study no return yet of IDPs.

### 8.5.2 Changes in livelihood strategies

Along with Rehed el Berdi and Edd Al Fursan, Buram locality is one of the foremost agricultural areas of South Darfur, indeed of all three Darfur states. All are in the cattle agro-pastoral livelihood zone. It has been an important source of surplus grain production supplying Nyala town and other deficit areas in South Darfur. It has also been a major area of cash crop production: groundnuts, sesame, kerkadeh and gum arabic. Yet the majority of the population are traditionally pastoralists with large holdings of cattle, sheep and goats. Local leaders in Buram estimated that about 70% of the population are first and foremost herders (ie pastoralists, although still engaging in agricultural cultivation), and 30% are dependent principally on agriculture.

Since the conflict began the area cultivated has declined, particularly north and west of Buram towards SLA-held territory in Gareida. The reasons for this decline are to do with population displacement, fear of insecurity, and dependence on manual cultivation instead of animal traction (because some livestock have been looted, and the fear that the remaining livestock will be if they are taken to the fields). Security deteriorated in 2005, negatively impacting on area cultivated. An estimated 60% of farmers moved to the towns. In this respect, Buram differs from Edd Al Fursan and Rehed Al Birdi where the principal reason for a decline in area cultivated in 2005 was cited as ‘not enough money to hire labourers’. Insecurity was not mentioned in either place as a negative factor on area cultivated (World Vision, 2006).

Some livestock destocking was also reported by residents in Buram town. This is due to a combination of distress sales in order to raise income to substitute for the decline in cash crops, and because of a fear of looting.

The main problem that the population of Buram has faced since the conflict began is restricted mobility. This has had a major knock-on effect on two important pre-conflict livelihood strategies: trade and livestock migration.

\textsuperscript{46} Even for this livelihoods study, it took some time before the local authorities agreed to meet and work with the study team.
As a surplus-producing area, trade in grain is a lifeline. Yet the main trade route from Buram to Nyala, through Gareida, is now blocked as this passes through SLA-held territory. Instead, traders now have to pass through Tullus to the north-west, or travel in a north-easterly direction. Both of these routes are longer and more expensive. (See also Chapter 5). Similar to elsewhere, companies and traders from Central Sudan have withdrawn from the area, and even the bank has reduced its cash ceiling for loans. This has had a profoundly negative effect on some of the main cash crops from this area: groundnuts and gum arabic. The impact of this disruption to trade has shown up in prices. Whereas the price of grain has increased (indeed, one of the highest prices for millet recorded by the study team was unexpectedly found in Buram, usually an area of surplus production: SDD 11,500 per sack), the prices of all other products from this area have slumped. Prices have more or less halved for groundnuts and cattle, and have totally collapsed for gum arabic (from SDD 7,500 per guntar for gum arabic pre-conflict, to SDD 1,900/ guntar now). This translates into very poor terms of trade for cash croppers: seven guntars of groundnuts now have to be sold to purchase one sack of millet. Relief food has had no stabilising impact on this market as no humanitarian assistance has been provided to the area. The price of any goods brought into Buram (such as sugar) can now be expected to increase by 30 to 50% in the rainy season when the area becomes inaccessible as traders are no longer holding stocks of commodities.

As far as livestock migration is concerned, agro-pastoralists from Buram used to spend the dry season along the Umbelasha and Bahr El Arab rivers in South Sudan, and move north during the rainy season to Nyala and beyond (Al Masaar, 2003). Their were three different migration routes north, some going as far as Al Fashir in North Darfur. Since the conflict began all of these routes are blocked as they go through SLA-held territory. As a result, the cattle are staying longer in the Buram area, putting pressure on water sources and grazing, and reducing the land available for cultivation. But they are also spending longer in Bahr el Arab, infested by tsetse fly and where there are no veterinary services. Interviewees estimated that 60% of livestock losses have been due to disease and lack of water.

The Fellata in Tullus are facing similar restrictions on livestock migration, unable to move east because of the SLA or west to the Central African Republic (CAR)\(^\text{47}\). This is placing enormous strain not only on grazing, but also on water sources shared by humans and animals.

Gum arabic harvesting in the Buram area has also suffered during the conflict as more distant areas have become inaccessible because of insecurity and fears of attack.

The women focus group interviewed in Buram reported that their response to this pressure on their normal livelihood strategies is greater engagement in daily labouring within the town (brick-making and construction), petty trade and the selling of some household and productive assets. Approximately 10% of households are said to be receiving remittances, from relatives in Nyala, Khartoum and as far afield as Saudi Arabia.

The stress that households are under shows up in their expenditure patterns. Pre-conflict in this relatively well-off area, education was the main item of expenditure. It has now dropped to fourth place, after food, water and health expenditures.

\(^{47}\) The Darfur conflict has spilled over into the CAR, particularly the ethnic divisions.
8.6 Conclusions
The first group considered in this chapter is the most severely conflict affected: the movement of IDPs and urban residents (of particular ethnic groups – especially the Fur) in the Jebel Marra lowlands is tightly controlled. This once fertile and productive area is highly insecure and large areas of farmland are simply not being cultivated although they are being grazed by Arab pastoralists. The situation of the resident rural population around the Kass area is similar to that described for some ethnic groups in GoS held areas in North and West Darfur as they also have to pay a number of protection fees to be able to stay on their land and to cultivate. The situation of IDPs in Kass is very similar to IDP populations in Zalingei and Garsilla, in the same livelihood zone although in a different state.

In some ways, livelihoods in SLA-held areas are more intact for the resident population than for many ethnic groups living in GOS-held areas. The freedom for the resident population to move within SLA territory is noticeable. But livelihoods have come under immense pressure as a result of the restrictions on people, goods or livestock moving outside SLA-held areas into GOS-held areas and vice versa. The withdrawal and absence of any government services is also a major problem, especially where water sources have broken down and where services provided by international humanitarian agencies are thin on the ground (as in Adila). This leaves agricultural production at the mercy of pest infestations, livestock without veterinary services, and humans with much reduced health facilities. IDPs in SLA-held territory, however, generally have greater opportunities for daily labouring than IDPs in GOS-held areas, especially agricultural labouring during the rainy season.

In the GOS-held part of Ed Daien locality and in Buram locality, the impact of the conflict depends very much on ethnicity. For the majority Rizeigat and Habbaniya, many of whom are still living in their area of origin, the main impact of the conflict has been the collapse of trade in cash crops such as groundnuts, gum arabic and staple grains; the restricted movement of livestock; and reduced access to agricultural land. However, the better-off in Dar Rizeigat have also benefited, from even cheaper agricultural labour supplied by the Dinka from South Sudan. The extent to which the resident people has been negatively affected by the conflict depends on their socio-economic status: in the Ed Daien area the poorest are affected most, now competing for labour opportunities with a large IDP population. In Buram, grain prices have soared in the absence of any stabilising effect of food aid.

The Dinka IDPs are particularly vulnerable in South Darfur. Their marginal status before the conflict made them very vulnerable to attack, especially those who had most successfully built up their livelihoods and their asset base. All of these hard-earned gains have been lost in a flash. They have become very impoverished and dependent upon ever more exploitative sharecropping arrangements and daily labouring. Many indicated their desire to return to the south, ideally after the 2006/07 agricultural season.
9. THE IMPACT OF FOOD AID ON LIVELIHOODS

9.1 Introduction
During the current crisis the three Darfur states have received more food aid than ever before in Darfur’s history. During 2005, the peak of the food aid distribution, over 500,000mt were distributed to almost 3 million beneficiaries.

Monitoring of the impact of humanitarian assistance in Darfur has focused on health and nutrition indicators. Numerous nutrition and mortality surveys have been conducted by NGOs over the past three years, and two province wide food security and nutrition surveys by WFP and UNICEF’s in September 2004 and 2005.

The impact of food aid on livelihoods in the current Darfur conflict has not been assessed before. However, there are implicit objectives related to livelihoods in WFP’s EMOPs. In 2005, the rations were modified and cereals increased to compensate for milling losses, and to increase the availability of food in the market. 25 gr/person/day of sugar was added to the ration to supplement income. Also in 2005, the coverage of food distribution was expanded to include rural areas, to reduce the risk of further population movements to IDP camps and towns. The impact of food aid on livelihoods was a central issue for this study. It has been approached by attempting to answer the following questions:

- What is the significance of food aid as a livelihood source for different population groups in Darfur?
- What has been the impact on population movements?
- What has been the impact on agricultural production, both positive and negative?
- What impact has food aid had on the choices of resident rural populations?
- What has been the impact of food distribution on leadership structures?
- What has been the impact in protecting assets?
- What has been the impact on protection?
- What has been the impact on markets?
- What evidence is there of any disincentive effects and of dependency?

The chapter starts with a brief description of the impact of the humanitarian operation on malnutrition, before answering each of the questions posed above. At the time of writing, the decision had recently been made to cut food aid rations in Darfur by 50% over the coming months because of funding constraints. This chapter ends by considering the potential impact of those cuts.

9.2 An overview of the impact on nutrition
The WFP/UNICEF food security and nutrition assessment in 2005 showed that the prevalence of acute malnutrition had declined from 21.8% in September 2004 to 11.9% in September 2005. See Table 9.1. These findings are not strictly comparable as the sample for 2004 only included IDPs and host populations, whereas the sample in 2005 was much larger and almost 40% of the sample were rural residents. However, the general trend of a decrease in the prevalence of malnutrition between 2004 and 2005 is confirmed by NGO surveys which have sampled the same populations over time. The prevalence of malnutrition
was lowest in West Darfur, which was explained in part because of the better availability of basic services. It is easier to provide food aid and good health services to a population which is mostly living in camps. In North Darfur, where the largest proportion of the sample in 2005 was rural residents, the malnutrition levels were still just above 15% (<-2 Z-scores). It should also be noted that North Darfur is normally the most food insecure of the three states, and that 2004-05 was a year with poor rains followed by a poor harvest.

Reductions in the prevalence of malnutrition have been attributed to the regularity and quality of the food aid basket which has improved dietary consumption, as well as to improvements in health, water and sanitation as humanitarian interventions. However, the report also went on to conclude that there is ‘little evidence to suggest that these improvements are the result of any sustainable improvement in livelihoods’ (WFP & UNICEF, 2005: 76, italics added).

Table 9.1 Malnutrition rates in Darfur: 2004-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>GAM 2004*</th>
<th>SAM- 2004**</th>
<th>GAM- 2005</th>
<th>SAM- 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Darfur</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Darfur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Darfur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WFP & UNICEF, 2005
* GAM = % <-2 Z-scores; SAM = % <-3 Z-scores

Whilst there has been a general improvement in the nutritional situation between 2004 and 2005, the prevalence of malnutrition remains unacceptably high in some areas. For example, in both Kebkabiya town and Abou Shook in Al Fashir, the prevalence of malnutrition was still around 18% in October/November 2005 (ACF, 2006, March). UNICEF’s latest nutrition update reports that malnutrition rates in West Darfur are stable at low levels, stable in North Darfur at high levels (above 15%) and increasing in South Darfur.

9.3 The significance of food aid as a source of livelihood

In this study we explored the relative importance of food aid as a source of livelihood to households, using proportional piling techniques. The process could sometimes be compromised by interviewees wanting to stress to us (as representatives of WFP) the importance of food aid in their lives, therefore over-emphasising its relative significance, or on occasion under-emphasising it if they wanted to make the case that they needed more food aid. As far as possible we used processes of triangulation to verify questionable results.

The overwhelming finding is how significant food aid is, not just for consumption but also as an income transfer, especially for IDPs who have very limited livelihood alternatives. For those who are receiving food aid (both IDPs and resident populations), it was frequently identified as the most important source of livelihood. The relative contribution it made compared with other livelihood sources was often said to be in the region of 40 to 80%, although sometimes it was down in the low 20s. In the northern parts of North Darfur, such

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48 In South Darfur, the highest rates have recently been found in parts of Ed Daid in early 2006 (18.5% in Jad El Seid, Al Mazroub, Haskanita, Fataha in February and 17.9% in Ed DAien and Adilla in April) and in Adelfursan in March 2006 (18.3%).
49 Food aid has an impact in two main ways: by providing a source of income through the sale of food aid; by releasing income that would otherwise be spent on food.
as Dar Zaghawa and the Sayah area, the relative importance of food aid appeared greatest. This is because alternative livelihood strategies are very limited in these places.

For IDPs the role of food aid has been described as ‘their ticket into the market economy’ (Hamid, 2005: 34). Many IDPs interviewed for this study reported selling their rations, to pay for milling, other food needs (mainly sauce to eat with the wheat or sorghum) or other needs such as education. Some reported selling ¼ to 1/3 of their rations to raise cash for other needs. Only in areas where there are significant other income earning opportunities, for example vegetable production for residents in Kutum and charcoal production in Mornei, were sales of food aid less important. The only population that did not report selling any food aid were people in Malha: they stored any food aid they did not need for immediate consumption, in anticipation of future periods of shortage. When the labour market is so saturated and wage rates low, the significance of food aid as an income transfer should not be under-estimated.

Food distribution was associated with a reduction in damaging coping strategies, for example many IDPs had been dependent on relatives and some had resorted to begging when they first became displaced, until the general food distribution began. At that point dependence on relatives reduced and begging stopped. Other examples are given in sections 9.7 and 9.8.

The significance of food aid as a livelihood source is even better illustrated by evidence of the strategies people adopted when food aid has been cut back or stopped. Food aid rations were cut for some populations when crop assessments showed they had a harvest or due to insecurity and lack of access.

- In Sileia in Kulbus AU in West Darfur, begging noticeably increased when food aid distribution was temporarily suspended for security reasons between September 2005 and March 2006.
- Firewood collection also increased in Seleia as a result of stopping the ration, with consequent risks of harassment. Others migrated to Chad for work.
- Expenditure on food by residents in Dar Es Salaam, who do not receive food aid, is almost 80% of total expenditure.
- IDPs in Umm Shayala, who were not receiving food aid, were observed to be in physically poor condition. They were dependent upon the same livelihood strategies as IDPs in Mornei who received a 100% ration.
- In Buram, expenditure on food has displaced education. This is a common phenomenon with children being taken out of school. It was also reported by IDPs in Muhajeria who are adjusting to reduced rations.
- The resident population in Kass town who no longer receive food aid say that the income they used to spend on investment, for example construction, is now being spent on food.

9.4 The impact on population movements

One of the objectives of extending the general food distribution to so many rural areas was to encourage those resident populations to stay put and not to join crowded IDP camps putting pressure on urban areas. Interviews conducted for this study provided plenty of evidence that this has been achieved, and indeed that it has encouraged some IDPs to return to their villages.
In Dar Zaghawa and Jambolee, people who had fled to the surrounding hills and wadis were encouraged to move back to their villages when food distribution started. People from Angara village in Nyala locality in South Darfur, and Singita village in Kass locality moved back from IDP camps. Some IDPs moved from Abou Shook camp in Al Fashir back to Tawila when the food distribution started there (although they since had to return to Abou Shook when Tawila was attacked). Some IDPs in Mornei in West Darfur went back to Umm Shalayya to farm when food distribution started there.

The provision of food aid suddenly made it more feasible to re-engage in what is left of rural livelihoods in areas where it was safe to go (see also section 9.5 below).

The flipside of this is that a number of interviewees in the villages mentioned above, especially Singita and Angara, indicated that they would return to the IDP camps if food aid distributions were stopped or were inadequate, especially during the forthcoming agricultural season. Indeed, this had already started to happen in Angara where rations have been cut to ¼. Similarly, IDPs from Mornei who farmed in Umm Shayala returned to Mornei when food distribution in Umm Shayala stopped.

A different kind of population movement was reported as a by-product of food distribution in Dar Meidob. The arrival of food aid trucks has encouraged some resident people to travel back on the trucks to Fashir and Mellit for limited trading purposes.

### 9.5 The impact on agricultural production

Encouraging the resident rural population to remain in situ, and some IDPs to return, has had a positive knock-on effect on agricultural production, especially during the last rainy season. This was highlighted in a number of focus group discussions in rural villages, for example in Umm Shayala and in Singita. It is worth noting that even before the conflict, food shortages were cited by local people as one of the major constraints to cultivation, especially during the weeding period. Indeed, the World Vision ‘Livelihoods and Food Security Assessment’ of 2005 found that ‘weakness and health problems’ were cited as constraints to agricultural production in Edd Al Fursan, Rehed Al Birdi and Adila, which possibly relates to food shortages (World Vision, 2005: 38). Both of these first two locations are receiving very small amounts of food aid.

The importance of providing food aid to rural areas during the 2006 rainy season was emphasised by many resident rural interviewees. Even when security eventually improves, the provision of food aid throughout the agricultural season was identified as a priority to assist the recovery process.

The team came across no evidence of disincentive effects of food aid on agricultural production. On the contrary, despite the risks and insecurity that many farmers face in accessing their land, cultivating their own crops emerged as a clear priority, even if it is on land that has been loaned. When farmers in traditionally surplus areas (Dar Es Salaam in Al Fashir locality) were asked if food aid has had a depressing effect on grain markets and has been a disincentive, they were very clear in their response. It is the restrictions on trade and the movement of goods that is preventing them from selling their crops, not food aid. All

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50 See SCUK monitoring reports for North Darfur, especially the ‘Village & Household Survey for 2002/03’ (SCUK, 2002b).
those interviewed who are still farming welcomed the provision of food aid. Although the study team did not visit the wheat-producing areas of Jebel Marra, they did enquire whether the distribution of relief wheat had affected local wheat production, but in fact there is very little wheat now being grown in Jebel Marra. Most has been burnt and destroyed. There are now just scattered pockets for local consumption. (It is also worth noting that grain prices for local staples – millet and sorghum – are still higher than pre-conflict prices despite the large injections of food aid).

The challenge for WFP and other humanitarian agencies is how to use agricultural cultivation as a criterion for eligibility of food aid. Although the ability to cultivate seems an entirely logical choice of indicator (and was used to justify the suspension or reduction of food aid to villages such as Singita and Angara at harvest time last season), there is a delicate balance to be struck. There needs to be some caution in equating ability to cultivate with food security. Most farmers are cultivating much smaller areas, the harvest is unreliable because of the inability to spread risk over geographical distance, and the risk of destruction of the harvest by livestock is often high. Our findings also show that it is rare for everyone in the rural areas to have a harvest (for example only 50% were able to cultivate in Jamboolee), and that many rural villages are hosting an IDP population. In short, many of these people still face large food deficits.

9.6 Impact on leadership structures

For many IDP populations, their leadership has changed in their place of displacement. Quite often their traditional leaders are no longer with them. This is for a number of reasons: they had died in the conflict, they had decided to move to town rather than to the camp (for example, in the case of Abou Shouk), or they had remained in the village with those who stayed in the area. The leaders’ credibility with the displaced population also depends on their actions during the war. For example, IDPs in Abou Shook said they would not accept those who stayed in town as their leaders anymore as they are now perceived as taking the GoS side. Others similarly mentioned that those whose actions were seen to be too close to GoS interests will no longer be accepted. In the camps, new leaders (still called sheikhs or omdas) were elected. In some cases they were the old sheikhs, in others representatives of a sheikh who was still in the village or staying in town, or someone who had not been a leader before but was respected by the population for his actions during the war. Sometimes more leaders are elected in the camps than there were in the home villages (for example an IDP population in Kassap camp in Kutum elected 63 ‘sheikhs’, of which only 10 were leaders before).

The main role of the new leadership is to facilitate food distribution (and other forms of assistance), for example providing lists of people for registration, organising people during distribution, and acting as intermediaries between the IDP population and the relief agencies (ACF, 2005, December). The latter includes transferring messages from the NGO to IDPs, and also transferring complaints and feedback on distribution to the NGO. The ability to influence food distribution creates a very powerful position in the camp as food aid is the main resource for many. There is evidence in some cases (for example Geneina) that traditional leaders have abused their position of power to register those closest to them or to access more food than they were entitled to. In rural resident populations, community

51 The exception was a group of quite well off men in Kutum, who said that the reduction in millet prices resulting from food distribution was good for consumers, but bad for producers.
based relief committees are only just being established, so the impact of these committees on traditional leadership is not yet known.

The responsibility of the new leaders is thus quite different from the responsibility of traditional sheikhs and omdas in their village. The responsibility of the latter used to be the settlement of disputes over land and livestock, the collection of taxes as well as representing their community. The replacement of this leadership with people who do not have experience of these issues could have serious implications when IDPS return to their areas of origin.

The impact of food aid on leadership is not restricted to traditional leadership but also applies to political and military leadership. The presiding authorities, whether different SLA factions or GoS officers, compete for aid resources in areas they control or want to control. The distribution of food aid can be seen as legitimising their control, and the more resources they can pull in the better the leadership may be perceived. This in turn leads to political leadership being increasingly vocal about needs in their particular areas of control, tending to exaggerate numbers in need.

### 9.7 The impact on assets

For households that had not been attacked or looted, distress sales of assets was a common response in the early stages of the crisis. This was reported by residents in Kebkabiya town and by both Zaghawa and Meidob pastoralists. The arrival of food aid usually put a stop to this destructive coping strategy. In Kebkabiya, the provision of food aid started quite early in the conflict. In the northern pastoralist zones of North Darfur it is a more recent phenomenon. The people of Umm Haraz started to receive regular food aid distributions from April 2005, from which time they reported that they have stopped distress sales of livestock. A similar pattern was reported in the Malha area. When community leaders in Malha were asked about the impact of food aid, their first response was that it increased livestock prices. Food aid reduced their need to sell livestock, and consequently the prices rose. The value of protecting assets is not just an immediate one. It will make a substantial difference to the recovery process when peace is finally restored.

In Malha, where people are used to dealing with regular periods of food shortage, they are selling none of the food aid they receive. Instead, any surplus grain is stored as a preparedness measure. Thus, it becomes an additional asset for the household to draw upon in times of real scarcity, to which the Malha people are well-accustomed.

### 9.8 The impact on protection

Indirectly, the distribution of large amounts of food aid has had a positive impact on protection by providing them with a ‘safe’ source of food and income so that they do not have to engage in some of the most risky and dangerous livelihood strategies. Examples of this include:

- In Umm Haraz in Dar Zaghawa and in Jambolee near Kutum – both in SLA-held territory – the provision of food aid has reduced the need for these rural populations to travel to GoS-held market towns, such as Kutum, which reduces the risk of attack or arrest.
• The provision of food aid has also reduced the need for Meidob and Zaghawa pastoralists to forage for wild foods, thus reducing their exposure to the risk of attack.
• In Kebkabiya town where IDPs have been receiving 100% rations, this has helped them to have some cash to purchase firewood. Venturing outside the town carries enormous risks of attack, rape and killing. This impact of food aid was also reported in Seraf Omra and Momei.

A more subtle, but nevertheless important by-product of the provision of food aid to IDPs is the way it has strengthened their bargaining power when negotiating for daily labour. This was reported by IDPs in both Kass and Kebkabiya towns. Women IDPs in Kass explained that this was one of the main reasons why the daily wage rate for brick-making has increased from SDD 200 per day when they first arrived in 2004, to SDD 300 per day in 2006. They are no longer having to take any work they can out of sheer desperation.

In Momei, the presence of food aid (and of humanitarian agencies distributing it) was said to create a feeling of some security for the population living there.

Where food aid is being provided to all population groups in an area – from different tribes, to IDPs and to the host population – it has helped to ease relationships. This has been important in places where there is a very large IDP population relative to the resident population, placing great strain on existing resources and services. In Dar Zaghawa the effect was described as creating a ‘generalised sense of equity’. In Kebkabiya town it is a critical factor in maintaining relationships between the townspeople and the very large IDP population they now host. This was also the case in Momei, Habilla and some other towns and villages.

In some areas of West Darfur, there is great tension between Arab and non-Arab tribes living within the same communities, or within the same area. WFP has in some cases registered both groups in order to ease tensions and to avoid exacerbating conflict. The dilemmas can best be illustrated by the cases of Salaa and Abatta. In Salaa, Arabs are occupying the land of others, but have been provided with food aid for the reasons explained above. However, this risks consolidating the occupation of land. (The practice has not been repeated elsewhere). In Abbata, the Arab nomad population is only provided with non-food items by ICRC while the IDPs and settled residents are provided with food aid. This is exacerbating existing tensions between these groups. A similar situation is found in Ed Daien town where the resident population is not receiving food aid and there are strong tensions between them and IDPs.

Whilst there are many positive examples of how food aid can have a protective impact, food aid alone cannot ensure people’s protection. IDPs in Fata Borno were very clear that their main problems were related to security and that ‘having food aid is not enough’. The protective impact of food distribution should not be over-played, nor should this analysis give any sense of complacency. As described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, much of Darfur’s population is still engaged in livelihood strategies that expose them on a daily basis to unacceptable levels of risk and violence, especially IDPs.

A potential negative impact of food aid on protection is often the taxation of food aid by the warring parties, or increased risk of attack either during distributions, or of households who have received food aid. This study did not find evidence of such practices.
Problems with registration or inequalities in food distribution can also create protection problems: it is usually the most vulnerable populations who are excluded and who then have to engage in damaging and risky coping strategies (Jaspars, 2000). This is an issue affecting every large-scale food aid distribution, and some such problems were found in Darfur, in particular West Darfur where the irregularities seem particularly serious. Early in the crisis hurried registration in this state meant that it was not very systematic; some were excluded and others were able to register more than once. It has never really recovered from this unfortunate start. The re-registration process in 2005 was fraught with problems of misinformation, political manipulation and rumours that IDPs who registered would be forced to return home. As a result, many bona fide IDPs were missed off the registration lists amidst claims of corruption and double registration of others. Ration cards are for sale in Geneina. To buy a ration card for one person costs around SDD 1,000. Many Dinka IDPs in the Ed Daein/ Adila areas also seem to have been missed off registration, partly because of misinformation. (See also Chapter 8).

9.9 The impact on markets

The impact of food aid on the markets of Darfur is covered in some detail in Chapter 5. It has kept the grain market functioning when otherwise it would most likely have collapsed. It has provided an opportunity for petty trading for some IDPs. And above all, it has stabilised prices at levels that are affordable for those who are not registered for food aid, or for whom their ration is insufficient. This is one way in which it is benefiting many of the Arab pastoralists who are not currently receiving food aid, yet need to purchase most of their grain requirements. In the words of one interviewee in Angara village, 'life was easier to manage' when food distribution started in the village and grain prices fell.

In one notable example, the arrival of food aid actually kick-started a market that had stopped functioning since the start of the conflict. This was in Orchii in Dar Zaghawa where a whole range of other commodities became available again such as okra, sugar and clothes. The revival of the market in turn triggered the resumption of the school.

In Malha, which has always been poorly integrated into the grain marketing system of North Darfur in years of food crisis, food aid is currently the only source of grain flowing into the town. There is no grain trade. (And as noted above, recipients of food aid are not selling any of it).

9.10 Has food aid created dependency?

The fear, or even claim, that such a large food aid operation is encouraging dependency is occasionally voiced. Dependency has long been a concern of the international humanitarian community. The findings of this study should quell such concerns about Darfur.

It is indeed true that a large proportion of the Darfur population is very reliant on food aid as a source of food and as a source of livelihood as described above. But this is for good reason.

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52 See Buchanan-Smith, 1988
53 See Harvey and Lind, 2005. They argue for a distinction to be made between ‘dependency’ and ‘disincentive’, as we have made in this chapter. They also warn against dependency arguments being used to reduce relief without justification, or to shift prematurely to developmental approaches. Particularly relevant to this study, they conclude that ‘rather than seeing a risk of dependence as a justification for reducing relief, agencies should aim to provide assistance early and generously, to enable people to maintain their livelihoods and forestall a slide into destitution’ (ibid:3).
For most of those recipients there are few alternatives. The ability to return to, or rebuild their pre-conflict livelihoods is simply not an option. Most IDP interviewees compare their life in camps very unfavourably with their life back home. In Ardamata IDP camp they described how degrading it is to stand in food aid queues compared with how they used to live before. In the words of one of the IDP leaders in Momei: ‘before we came here, we lived a dignified life’.

The fact that many conflict affected people in Darfur have become ‘dependent’ on WFP food aid, should be considered a testimony to WFP’s success in being able to provide a reliable source of food. This is a rare occurrence in humanitarian operations. Unfortunately, with the current constraints in donor funding, and the ration cuts WFP has had to make, this is about to be reversed. Conflict affected populations will no longer be able to depend on food aid to assist them in supporting their livelihoods to the extent it did in 2005.

Although some aid agency staff and government officers express concern that IDPs in camps have got used to high levels of services and will never return home, these were not the views of IDPs interviewed for this study. Most of them clearly do want to return home as soon as it is secure enough to do so. Of course it is likely that some will not, and that one of the legacies of this crisis will be some expansion of the urban population of Darfur\(^54\), but the indications are that the majority will return. IDPs who now have experience of higher levels of services than they have ever known before may become more vocal in demanding their rights and improved infrastructure when they return to their home areas, but in many ways this is consistent with a rights-based development process\(^55\).

It could be argued that food aid has created ‘dependency’ or vested interests in new IDP leadership structures, as their positions depend on the distribution of food aid, and in agency staff, especially those whose jobs depend on the continuation of a major food aid operation. These need to be borne in mind as potentially influencing how assessments are supported, carried out, interpreted and used.

### 9.11 The potential impact of declining food aid

Many of these generally positive benefits could quickly unravel as food aid rations decline, especially through the forthcoming agricultural season. Some of the most concerning risks are the following:

- resident rural populations move to IDP camps and towns and do not engage in agricultural production in 2006 for lack of food
- grain prices rise to unaffordable levels
- distress sales of assets resume, further weakening livelihoods
- greater competition for casual labour resulting in lower wages
- exploitation in the labour market increases
- those currently paying protection fees to Arab populations will find it harder to do so, with obvious consequences for their safety.

\(^{54}\) There are some lessons to be learned from the displacement from Angara village in the late 1980s when the population moved to Nyala town to escape tribal conflict. A few did stay in Nyala, but the majority returned to the village.

\(^{55}\) This is true for IDPs from the impoverished Jebel Si area, where services and infrastructure were notoriously poor before the conflict, who are now experiencing much better levels of services in Abu Shouk camp.
• increase in damaging and risky coping strategies, for example collecting firewood and grass in very dangerous areas, moving to markets where there is a high risk of attack and/or arrest, farming in areas where it is not safe.
• tensions between host populations and IDPs escalate, breaking out into conflict in some places
• tensions between Arab and non-Arab populations increase
• more children drop out of school as expenditure on education switches to food
• some rural markets collapse once again.
• malnutrition and mortality rises

9.12 Conclusions
The achievement of WFP and its cooperating partners in getting so much food aid into Darfur and reaching so many beneficiaries, especially in more inaccessible rural areas, is truly to be commended. The impact on extremely precarious livelihoods has been overwhelmingly positive, and there was no evidence of any disincentive effects. It has lifted the food relief programme from being life-saving to also helping to protect what was left of people’s livelihoods, and reducing the need for many to engage in damaging or unsafe coping strategies. Undoubtedly without this intervention Darfur would have experienced a famine of horrifying proportions. In short, the food aid operation of 2005 is an unsung success story.

The prospects for 2006, however, look very different as food aid levels fall alarmingly low just as the hungry season begins. This is no strategic reduction of the food aid operation; it is entirely funding-related. The gains in protecting livelihoods in 2005 could soon be undone, and the spectre of famine on the horizon looms once again.
10. FUTURE PROSPECTS

10.1 Local people’s perceptions of the future

The pessimism that many people expressed about the future was very striking in the numerous focus group discussions and interviews during the field work for this study. A flavour of this is captured in the words of some of those interviewed during the field work in Box 10.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 10.1 Quotes that capture how interviewees responded to questions about the future in Darfur</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘God knows. The future is black. There is not a glimmer of light’ (Sileia, West Darfur)</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘We do not expect any security’ (South Darfur)</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘If we say 1 or 2 years (for improvement in the situation) we may be deceiving ourselves’ (Kebkabiya locality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘What can you do when half of the population is armed, and half is not’ (Kebkabiya locality)</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Allah Karim’ (Sayah area)</td>
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The pessimism that people expressed was greatest in some of the most controlled and contested areas such as Kebkabiya, Seraf Omra, Geneina and Zalingei. In Zalingei, for instance, residents said that as long as they see the situation deteriorating they are making no plans for the future. Instead, they are preoccupied with how to survive in the current conditions. This response was not untypical of IDPs in camps, where access to basic services and improved security in their current context are their priorities. For many, they do not expect the situation to improve or even to be able to contemplate return for another three to five years, some even said ten.

A woman in Singita creatively used the beans from the proportional piling exercise to express how they feel in terms of power relations. Although the Fur in the area are more numerous, in terms of power they have only 29% of the power; the Arab groups have 71%. She then demonstrated visually how they feel encircled, controlled and trapped by the Arab tribes.

These were depressing predictions, yet invoke a sense of how deep-rooted many Darfurian people perceive the conflict to have become, and how much has to change before peace and security can be restored. Many of these people placed their hope in the arrival of a UN peacekeeping force. In contrast, Arab nomads in Masri warned that UN forces would face difficulties if they came to Darfur.

In areas which had been somewhat less devastated by the conflict, there was slightly greater optimism, for example in some SLA-held areas where people are able to maintain some semblance of their former livelihoods, for example in Shengil Tobai. But this optimism was still qualified with: ‘conflict is like the rain. You never know when it will come’. Residents in areas like Buram, which has been less directly affected, were noticeably more able to envisage and engage with the prospect of a peaceful future beyond the current conflict. There are of course also those who have benefited from the conflict, and a very limited number of people for whom the situation now is not all that different from that before the conflict (for example some settled Arab communities in West Darfur). Some Arab pastoralists now have better access to fertile land, are gaining in income from the exploitation
and looting of non-Arabs. However, even these groups are suffering from restricted migration and trade routes which in the long term negatively affects their livelihoods.

For all groups, there was an awareness that it will take much more than a peace agreement signed in Abuja to end this conflict and restore peace. Disarmament is seen as key to ending insecurity (see Chapter 11). There is acute awareness of how difficult it will be to coexist with those with whom you were fighting, or who have exploited you, and how much needs to happen to rebuild relationships. In the words of one interviewee in Kebkabiya: ‘it will take a long long time’. This is a major preoccupation of many of the tribal leaders; some are very distrustful of the role that government may want to play. See the following Chapter 11 on the recovery process.

Yet most of those interviewed want to, and plan to, restore their traditional livelihoods when peace is re-established. Those who became displaced but their land has not been occupied by others, do not expect to lose their right to the land because they did not stop cultivating voluntarily. It is a very different picture in areas where there has been land occupation and this will have to be resolved before return can be contemplated.

### 10.2 Possible future scenarios

#### 10.2.1 Introduction

The following section is based on brainstorming and discussions amongst the study team, and discussions with OCHA in Darfur and Khartoum. It depicts three possible future scenarios: that current patterns of conflict and insecurity remain the same, that security improves, and finally, that it deteriorates.

It is written with the following recent events in mind:

1) The signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja, by government and the largest of the SLA factions, on May 5th, yet the refusal of two other rebel groups (the second of the SLA factions and the JEM) to be party to this agreement.

2) A UN Security Council resolution on Tuesday 16th May that paves the way for the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force in Darfur, despite GoS resistance.

#### 10.2.2 Scenario 1: Current levels and patterns of insecurity remain the same

**Assumptions**

This scenario assumes that the signing of the Peace Agreement makes no difference to the conflict on the ground, possibly because not all parties active in the conflict have signed up, and/or it is not implemented.

**Predicted pattern of continuing conflict and insecurity**

- Continued hotspots in ‘grey areas’ that are not occupied by either GOS or SLA (eg Shearia, Shengal Tobai, and between Nyala and Fashir)
• Continuing conflict in areas of strategic significance, eg to control trade routes in South Darfur
• Incidence of conflict/attacks in areas where the town is controlled by GOS and the rural area by SLA
• Areas of conflict and areas of stability that can shift at any time
• Continued looting and theft by the Janjaweed and by the SLA, increasingly on an individualised basis targeting those with assets
• Continued exploitation of non-Arab groups by Arab groups, strengthening the consolidation of control of one group over another
• Continued harassment and abuse of IDPs when they venture outside of the immediate vicinity of their areas of settlement.
• Increased banditry
• Occasional targeting and looting of aid agency vehicles and assets
• GoS continues to push policy of return of IDPs despite lack of improvement in security
• Controlling authorities (GoS/Janjaweed or rebel groups) compete over aid resources, especially food aid, by being increasingly vocal about humanitarian needs
• Continued misinformation campaigns and political manipulation, for example any reduction in services/humanitarian assistance by the aid community may be misunderstood by local people and perceived by IDPs as endorsing the GOS policy of return

Implications for livelihoods
• In some areas (eg some SLA areas) there will continue to be freedom of movement within a confined area for certain ethnic groups. In other areas freedom of movement of certain ethnic groups will continue to be severely constrained
• Movement between SLA and GOS areas will continue to be very restricted and risky which means limited access to markets for those in SLA held areas and thus continued reliance on food aid as their main source of food.
• Large numbers of IDPs remain in camps, which continue to rely on food aid as their main livelihood source
• There will be continued influxes of new IDPs from areas where conflict flares up, and the movement of some IDPs between camps, and between camps and farms in the agricultural season
• Environmental destruction intensifies around towns and where there are high concentrations of livestock
• Continued expenditure on protection fees by certain ethnic groups in certain areas, which may get worse if humanitarian assistance declines
• Continued risks associated with some livelihood strategies, for example firewood collection
• Access to land for farming will remain limited although there may be opportunities for increasing agricultural production in more stable areas
• Livestock migration routes will remain restricted, with associated risks of animal disease and death
• Continued loss of assets through looting, and a disincentive to rebuild assets for fear of becoming vulnerable to attack
• Opportunities for return will be limited.
Implications for humanitarian response

- Most important will be the continued provision of food aid to IDPs, resident and rural populations, very possibly within an environment of declining aid resources for Darfur as ‘donor fatigue’ sets in. Assessments will need to be refined.
- Ongoing advocacy to maintain humanitarian assistance for Darfur will be essential.
- This situation will require more refined information gathering and analysis to deepen understanding of the conflict and its impact on livelihoods, with more systematic assessments and careful strategic planning.
- This should feed into continuing humanitarian and livelihood assistance, so that the response is more sensitised to the current conflict (eg so that assistance is not given to those ‘occupying’ the land of others).
- Livelihood support to those still living in rural areas should increase (eg agricultural support, veterinary care, water interventions).
- Agencies will need to become more flexible in their response options i.e. able to shift from purely life-saving to a combination of life-saving and livelihood support. This includes an ability to implement livelihood support more quickly for those newly displaced.
- Protection of population groups subject to ongoing violence and rape should be stepped up.
- Some peace-building/reconciliation work could take place at local level, building on current local initiatives and building bridges between communities through some livelihood support projects.
- Provision and maintenance of basic services to SLA areas eg education, health services, water supply.

10.2.3 Scenario 2: Security improves

Assumptions
The peace agreement is implemented on the ground, and eventually the remaining rebel groups sign up to it. In the meantime protection by AU or UN forces steps up and is more effective. (NB None of those interviewed expected the situation to change significantly on the ground for at least one year, even in the most positive scenario).

Predicted pattern of conflict and insecurity

- Movement between SLA and GoS held areas will slowly start to improve.
- Harassment and exploitation of particular population groups will persist until disarmament has been effective. (Likely to take some time).
- Overall, looting and attacks decrease but renegade militias continue to live by the gun and to attack and rape.
- Opportunistic banditry continues.
- Outbreaks of tribal fighting as scores are settled for some of the atrocities that have taken place.
- Only when disarmament has been effective and militias disbanded will security really start to improve.

Implications for livelihoods

- Gradual recovery of trade as movement between SLA and GoS areas improves.
- In the short term (at least one year), no significant change in the livelihood options available to people.
Most IDPs will remain in camps until they are convinced that security has improved and that disarmament has been effective (see next chapter). There may be increased movement between camps and farms/areas of origin.

When disarmament has been effective
- Livelihood strategies available to IDPs and to resident populations will gradually expand as movement outside the main settlements becomes safer and the threat of attack subsides (e.g., when collecting firewood and grass).
- Trade slowly begins to recover as restrictions on the movement of goods and people are relaxed.
- More farmland becomes accessible for agricultural cultivation.
- Livestock migration routes begin to open up as local agreements are made and hold between different tribes.
- Partial return of some individuals (men and elders) to villages that were abandoned and/or destroyed to test out security. Will eventually be followed by other family members, but probably over a period of a couple of years.
- IDPs whose land has been ‘occupied’ by others are likely to remain displaced, requiring full humanitarian assistance, until the land issue has been resolved.

Implications for humanitarian response
NB See also the following chapter 11 on the recovery process.
- The humanitarian food aid operation should continue as a life-saving and livelihood support mechanism until widespread return has happened and IDPs have gone through at least one successful agricultural season.
- Livelihood support interventions (water, veterinary care, agricultural support) should be stepped up as access to agricultural land, grazing land, and trade opportunities increase.
- Increased support should be provided for basic services in rural areas that have not been occupied: health, water, and education.
- Where return is possible, support with transport and shelter should be provided to IDPs.
- Limited cash transfer interventions where looting and theft have not occurred for a period of months, and as agricultural production and markets recover.
- Careful monitoring of recovery of markets and trade, as well as agricultural production.
- Sensitive, informed, and skilled reconciliation work should be stepped up at local level, working with tribal leaders, elders, and leading intellectuals.
- There should be advocacy and planning for the resolution of land tenure issues.
- The international aid community’s investment should be closely coordinated with GoS investment in rehabilitation and compensation for lost assets.

10.2.4 Scenario 3: Security deteriorates

Assumptions
Under this scenario it is assumed that the peace agreement collapses and the conflict intensifies. There are a number of different ways in which this could happen, some of which are sketched out below.

Possible political scenarios resulting in increased fighting
- SLA factions increasingly fight between themselves, and against government.
- GOS ‘encourages’ more divisions within the SLA along tribal lines.
• Contested areas become hotspots in the conflict (for example around Jebel Marra, strategic areas in South Darfur).
• GOS intensifies its efforts to ‘empty’ SLA areas.
• Increasing politicisation of IDP camps: fighting breaks out between ethnic groups in the camps and/or are attacked.
• GOS puts increasing pressure on IDPs to return (linked to bullet point above).
• Attempts to arrest those accused of ‘crimes against humanity’ provokes conflict & violence.
• Continued impunity, and weakness of the AU to protect.
• UN forces are deployed amidst much controversy.
• Food aid declines, triggering tension and conflict between population groups competing for resources (eg host population and IDPs, different ethnic groups).
• Chadian conflict spills into West Darfur, based on similar tribal and political affiliations to the Darfur conflict. Results in increased arms in the area and military training of some Darfur young men and boys. Looting of humanitarian agency assets.
• More and intensified tribal conflict within South Darfur.
• Intensified fighting between Janjaweed and SLA in North Dafur: fighting and attacks move to the towns.

Implications for livelihoods
• More displacement from ‘hotspots’ of conflict, which could include larger settlements (eg towns that have not yet been attacked, especially in West Darfur).
• Uprooting of livelihoods and increased displacement in South Darfur.
• Restricted humanitarian access and some humanitarian agencies withdraw.
• Destruction of currently precarious IDP livelihoods if camps are ‘disbanded’, or if humanitarian access to the camps is impeded. This could result in a huge humanitarian crisis.
• More restrictions on trade and the movement of people.
• More exploitation by Arab communities of non-Arabs, including payment of ‘protection fees’.
• More land occupation by Arab groups.
• The livelihoods of the resident rural population and of any IDPs they are hosting are disrupted, leading to further displacement to camps and towns.
• Increased tension and hostilities between IDPs and resident host populations, leading to fewer livelihood options for the displaced.
• Generally, livelihood options will become even more restricted.
• Despair and depression amongst local people re. the failure to protect them.
• IDPs in West Darfur may go to Chad (depending on security associated with the Chadian conflict. They could face an even more serious situation if security in Chad deteriorates and aid agencies withdraw).
• Many of the remaining educated and wealthy people will leave for Khartoum or elsewhere.
• Everyone who remains in Darfur will be affected.
• Advances made in improving nutrition and health will be reversed, resulting in increases in malnutrition and mortality.
• Humanitarian agencies become totally focussed on saving lives (versus supporting livelihoods).
Implications for humanitarian response

- In this scenario, the focus should be saving lives.
- But it may be possible to intervene to protect livelihoods in more stable areas (most likely rural areas), which will reduce the flow of IDPs to camps and towns.
- Protection issues will be paramount, requiring much more effective protection from the international community than has hitherto been the case.
- But humanitarian agencies could become targets if there is armed resistance to the deployment of UN forces.

10.3 Conclusions

Since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement the situation in Darfur has been both tense and extremely fragile. Although this seemed to be Darfur’s best hope for peace, the fact that all rebel groups have not signed up to it is a major blow. Fighting soon broke out in the Tawila area between SLA factions, and cynicism is expressed about the likelihood of the Janjaweed being disarmed. There is also a gap to be bridged between the political negotiators in Abuja, and traditional leaders and tribal elders living in Darfur. Involvement of the latter will be essential to any efforts to achieve social reconciliation. Yet at the same time, the peace agreement has attracted high-level international backing and is regarded by some as ‘a diplomatic opening’ (at least for UN peacekeeping forces).

At the time of writing, it is thus hard to say which of the three scenarios painted above is the most likely. Darfur’s future hangs in the balance. What is clear is that even when this, or any other peace agreement is fully signed up to, it will take a long time before security improves to the extent that the displaced can return home and community relationships are rebuilt. The views of people interviewed for this study expressed at the beginning of this chapter are a harsh reminder of the long journey still to be travelled before Darfur attains a peaceful future. Thus, whichever of the three scenarios unfolds, even for the most positive one, humanitarian assistance will have to continue, at levels similar to 2005.

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56 See, for example, a report in The Observer 21/5/06, and in The Economist, 5/5/06, www.economist.com
57 See The Economist website, 11/5/06 www.economist.com
11. RECOVERY AND RETURN

11.1 Introduction
The term ‘recovery’ tends to be used rather loosely to describe many types of interventions with a range of objectives. For the purposes of this study we define recovery as ‘the full-scale revival of sustainable livelihoods’ as per the Terms of Reference for the study. We are thus differentiating it from interventions designed to protect and support livelihoods whilst the conflict continues, in other words during the emergency. For the revival of sustainable livelihoods there must be evidence that the conflict is being effectively resolved and that peace is imminent. (Recommendations on how livelihoods should be supported under the current conditions of insecurity are covered in Chapters 10 and 12).

This chapter presents some pre-conditions for supporting the full-scale revival of sustainable livelihoods, priorities identified by the groups and individuals we interviewed during this study plus our own analysis, and finally the dangers of investing in recovery too early.

11.2 Conditions necessary for recovery
The following pre-conditions for recovery have been identified:

1) Recovery can only begin when a peace agreement has been signed and there is evidence that the agreement is being implemented on the ground. However, planning for recovery can start earlier, especially when there are positive indications of a commitment to the peace agreement on the ground.

2) First and foremost, there must be evidence of disarmament by all sides in the conflict before there is any serious investment in recovery. This is the evidence that local people will be using to decide for themselves whether it is safe to return and start their own investment in recovery (see 11.3 below), and it is the ultimate test of whether commitments in a peace agreement are being respected and followed through on the ground.

3) The GoS must have agreed to make a significant contribution towards compensating for, and rehabilitating damaged and destroyed assets. This, again, is widely demanded and expected by the people of Darfur. The contribution of the GoS should more than match the contribution of the international aid community.58

4) The issue of land occupation must be resolved wherever it is an issue (eg in Jebel Si in North Darfur and in many parts of West Darfur) before full-scale recovery can commence in the area concerned.

5) There must be evidence that protection and extortion payments (widely reported to the study team – see Chapters 6, 7 and 8) have stopped, as evidence that exploitation of one ethnic/ armed group over another is declining and that free movement of all ethnic groups – essential to livelihood revival – is being re-established

6) There must be evidence that the GoS has lifted its embargo and other restrictions on the movement of goods outside of GoS towns, to indicate a commitment to the re-establishment of trade, essential to Darfur’s recovery.

58 Indeed, this is one of the GoS commitments in the recently signed Darfur Peace Agreement, although there is much debate and criticism of the level of funding that the GoS has committed to.
It is quite possible that not all of these conditions will be met in all three states at the same time. The first three conditions are the \textit{sine qua non} for any investment in the recovery of livelihoods. The second three may be location specific. Thus, recovery may proceed at different rates in different parts of Darfur. For example, in the northern province of West Darfur where land occupation is less of an issue and some villages have been abandoned but remain standing (for example, around Sileia), conditions 4) to 6) may be met quite quickly, and in much of North Darfur where there has been no land occupation. But in southern parts of West Darfur (for example around Mornei, Habila, Zalingei and Garsilla), and in the South Jebel Marra lowlands of South Darfur, it may take much longer for these conditions to be met.

Unfortunately, what is clear is that none of these conditions have currently been met, despite the recent signing of the Peace Agreement. This is the acid test on the ground. And therefore it is not appropriate to commence recovery programmes with the objective of rebuilding sustainable livelihoods at this time, although planning for recovery can continue, and there is much scope for livelihood support interventions in the current context.

\textbf{11.3 Priorities for recovery, and the return process}

In village after village, and in one focus group discussion after another, ‘security’ was the number one priority, for IDPs, resident populations, traditional leaders and traders alike from all sides of the conflict. Most were very clear that they would not return home (if displaced) or recover their traditional livelihoods until security is assured. When asked how people will know it is secure enough to return, the overwhelming response was: when armed groups (often specified as the Janjaweed) are disarmed. As described in the chapters above, the heavy arming of some ethnic groups at the expense of others is widely seen to create a very unequal balance of power. In the words of one woman in Singita: ‘when the guns are put down, we will know we can return to our normal life. Everyone is armed and wearing uniform now. We don’t know who is who’. In Kassap camp near Kutum, IDPs also mentioned the need for demining to make the area secure. Arab pastoralist groups will not return to their former migration routes unless they know they will not be attacked by the SLA.

After security and disarmament, the next priority was usually compensation, specifically by government which is perceived by many as being directly responsible for much of the looting and destruction of assets and livelihoods of tribes suspected of being on the side of the opposition. In at least two places visited by the study team – Malha in North Darfur and Kass in South Darfur – local leaders also talked of the need for ‘blood money’ to be paid by government, in compensation for those who were killed in the conflict.

In order to support the return process and the rebuilding of livelihoods, there was an almost universal call for the re-establishment and/or rehabilitation of the basic services: water, health and education. After that came calls for more individualised support and rehabilitation of livelihoods, for example through the provision of agricultural inputs, and irrigation pumps for cultivating wadi areas.

In a number of places interviewees emphasised the importance of continuing food aid as livelihoods are slowly re-established, especially during the first agricultural season after their return. Assistance with transport and shelter were also seen to be important.
As far as rebuilding houses and villages are concerned, the preoccupation with security is evident. Very aware of how easily destroyed their houses were, some interviewees talked of rebuilding some of the village infrastructure in concrete. In an earlier assessment, some IDPs had said that they would build more clustered villages with fewer isolated homesteads in future, with protective defences including more fire-resistant houses (Buchanan-Smith, 2005). Some of the IDPs interviewed for this study in West Darfur also mentioned that they would be building houses that are less easy to destroy.

It was mainly community leaders from both sides of the conflict who emphasised the essential process of rebuilding trust and social reintegration. Their involvement in, and commitment to this process will be critical. Some Darfur intellectuals also take this role very seriously.

The increased political awareness amongst Darfurians, including the illiterate and less well educated, since this crisis began was striking in focus group discussions. Perhaps this is not surprising after such an intense and divisive period of conflict. Many rural people had left their villages for the first time, and thus IDP camps were a place where they came into contact with other Darfurians and outsiders. This has raised their awareness of the world outside, and their rights within it. This showed up in frequent calls for justice and trials for war crimes, with some citing the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague.

The process of return of IDPs is likely to be a gradual one, as indicated in the previous chapter whereby some family members (men and elders) will return first and perhaps cultivate for a season, testing out security before other family members return. This was anticipated by a number of IDPs interviewed for this study, and is confirmed by the findings of an earlier study (ibid.) where interviewees forecast that villages closest to towns would be resettled first, and then in rings of increasing distance away from the towns, dictated by security.

There will inevitably be an increase in the urban population as some IDPs choose to remain in towns, for example if they have established businesses or have got used to better education services for their children. Some IDPs in Ed Daein town (originating from within Darfur) indicated a desire to retain at least a presence in town once the conflict is over, first as an insurance because they would be distrustful of any peace agreement for some time, and second because they realise their relatives in town are better off, not least they have escaped attack in the current conflict. But it was very clear in interviews for this study that the majority of IDPs would prefer to return to their rural homes. (See Section 9.7 above). Support from the international community will be essential to facilitate this process, especially to make it possible for some of the poorest IDP households who would otherwise be unable to afford the return home.

After such wholesale destruction of livelihoods, the time it may take to rebuild them should not be under-estimated. The experience of Angara village in Nyala locality is a stark reminder. The village was attacked, assets looted and the population became displaced when there was localised tribal conflict between the Fur and Arabs in the late 1980s. Most did not return until 1994. By 2003, when the current conflict began, they estimated that they had re-stocked to just half of their pre-conflict livestock levels, by selling cash crops and re-investing in livestock. In other words it took nine years to reach 50% of their previous herd sizes. It will take pastoralists (both Arab and non-Arab) at least this much time to start to
recover their herds. Realistic timeframes must accompany any recovery plans, despite the familiar pressures to implement and withdraw quickly from recovery projects.

**11.4 Dangers of starting recovery too early**

There is already evidence of pressure from within the donor community to invest in recovery in Darfur, in the wake of the partially signed Darfur Peace Agreement, and also fuelled by a reluctance to keep pouring in huge amounts of humanitarian funding. Also, as has been well-documented, the current configuration of the international aid system is not well-suited to the long-term provision of humanitarian assistance to protracted crises. Darfur is the latest of many such crises which challenge the system. But there are very real dangers to embarking on recovery programmes too soon, before the political conditions are right.

Some of these dangers are the following:

6) The danger of encouraging and/or consolidating current illegal land occupation

7) Making people more vulnerable to attack by restocking them with valuable assets before security has improved. (IDPs in Direige camp near Nyala and in Ardamata camp near Geneina specifically said they do not want to have livestock in the current context for fear of being targeted, attacked and looted in the camps).

8) Donors could inadvertently play into the GoS policy of ‘encouraging’ IDPs to return home before security has improved, where the voluntary nature of the return is questionable.

9) With too great a focus on recovery, the aid community (and donors in particular) could lose sight of the vital importance of maintaining humanitarian assistance, which currently makes the difference between survival and famine for so many. Downgrading the need for humanitarian assistance before the crisis has been resolved could also result in IDPs and others engaging in damaging livelihood strategies, some of which would expose them to increased risk of attack and violence.

This warning note does not mean that preparatory work for recovery should be held back. But it does caution against the premature launching of full-scale recovery programmes before the conflict has been resolved and there is sufficient evidence that peace is being restored.

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59 It was a familiar problem in trying to maintain adequate levels of humanitarian assistance to the long-running crisis in South Sudan.
12. CONCLUSIONS

At the time of writing, despite the recent signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the conflict in Darfur continues unabated. For some months now North Darfur has been relatively more stable than the other two states, but it has experienced some of the worst clashes between SLA factions triggering displacement and re-displacement. The most serious incidents of ongoing conflict in recent months have been in West and South Darfur. These incidents have triggered new waves of displacement of over 200,000 people in the first quarter of 2006, a stark reminder that the situation continues to deteriorate, albeit at a slower rate than in the first couple of years of the conflict. In terms of broad trends, in North Darfur the conflict is mainly about people, either gaining or maintaining control over populations or undermining their livelihoods; in West Darfur (and parts of North Darfur) it is about control over land and pasture; and in South Darfur it is about controlling strategic interests – trade routes and the economy.

Most of Darfur’s population lives with the continued threat of insecurity. This is worst for residents and IDPs of certain ethnic groups in GoS held towns and villages, who live under tight restrictions and are unable to venture far outside those towns/ villages. Whereas large-scale attacks and looting of assets was a feature of the first year of the conflict, now there is more banditry and individual attacks, targeting households that have significant asset-holdings (although sometimes just a few goats). Rape and harassment are still widely reported, especially by IDPs in camps and towns in GOS-held area.

A culture of impunity prevails. There is little or no attempt to enforce the rule of law in Darfur. Criminal acts go unpunished, and cases of rape and violence are rarely registered by the authorities even when they are reported. Protection continues to be the priority need of much of Darfur’s population.

The conflict has had a totally devastating impact on livelihoods. This happened very fast. Within the first year of the conflict the livelihoods of over a million (whose villages had been attacked and who became displaced early on) had been more or less destroyed. The numbers have steadily risen since. The main ways in which the conflict has devastated livelihoods are the following (this list very roughly follows the chronology through which livelihoods have been weakened or destroyed):

Through death and displacement. Men were targeted in attacks. Many were killed and even more moved to Central Sudan to escape the violence. The number of female-headed households has increased sharply, compounded by the departure of many men to become fighters, on one side or the other. Thus, human capital has been badly affected.

The widespread looting and loss of assets was a very early shock to livelihoods. Most of this happened when villages were attacked and often destroyed. The loss of assets includes: houses, agricultural tools, livestock, seed and food stores, hand-dug wells, agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation pumps, fruit trees. Looting and theft continues in many towns and camps.

138
Livestock losses have continued, for reasons other than looting. Many households engaged in distress sales of animals early in the conflict, either to raise income when other livelihood sources collapsed or because of the fear of being looted as livestock assets made them a target for attack. The consequence of restricted livestock movement and blocked migration routes has accelerated livestock losses through disease and lack of pasture and water, a particular issue for pastoralists. Livestock were the most important asset for many households before the conflict.

Crop production – both of staple grains and of cash crops – has been badly affected. This is partly because of the destruction of agricultural infrastructure and implements. (Thus, many farmers are now cultivating manually on hard clay soils and on wadi land). But more significantly it is because of the very restricted access to farmland for much of Darfur’s rural population. In areas where there are high concentrations of Arab pastoralists, farmers who have been able to cultivate have subsequently lost some or all of their harvest to animals grazing.

There has been a loss of public infrastructure in many rural areas, including health centres, schools and maintenance of water supplies. Development assets such as grain banks and revolving funds have often been looted.

Labour migration, a mainstay of Darfur’s economy, has more or less stopped. This includes migration to Central Sudan and beyond, for example to Libya, but also labour migration within Darfur.

Those who are still living and working away from their home villages are facing much greater difficulty in sending remittances back. The pattern is mixed. In some cases the amounts have increased but the frequency has dropped, especially in GOS held towns where it is generally easier to send back money. But in many places the level of remittances has dropped or stopped altogether, for example in rural areas that are hard to access and in SLA-held areas.

Darfur’s natural resource base has been badly affected. Large-scale population displacement has resulted in environmental degradation, especially around camps and towns where natural vegetation is rapidly exhausted and there is severe pressure on water sources. Environmental degradation is also an issue where pastoralists are gathered in large concentrations, causing overgrazing and depleted water resources.

Many schools in Darfur are no longer functioning, or more commonly, families can no longer afford to send their children to school. This is one of the main items of expenditure that many households have had to sacrifice, especially IDPs. This poses a threat to human capital in the longer term, for which the experience of South Sudan is a salutary reminder where a generation grew up more or less uneducated.

The impact of the conflict on markets has been disastrous, negatively affecting trade in all of Darfur’s principal commodities. Embargoes have been imposed, trade routes have become insecure and have had to be adapted and there are multiple ‘taxes’ and fees to be paid at checkpoints. The consequences are very much inflated transport costs and the withdrawal of many traders from the area. The movement of many goods has reduced to a trickle and trade that used to take place over large distances has become very localised. Livestock trade is now reduced largely to sale for local
consumption, whereas before the conflict livestock export was the foundation of the Darfur economy. The market in cereals has been replaced by food aid. Many in SLA held areas are unable to access markets in GOS-held towns.

A common theme underlying most of this list is the restriction on mobility, of people, livestock and goods.

As a result of all of the above, few people in Darfur have access to their pre-conflict livelihoods. Instead, large numbers have become dependent on daily labouring and petty trade, a precarious alternative to their diverse and adapted traditional livelihood strategies. Brick-making is the most common source of daily labour, although whether it is sustainable is a moot point, especially if construction and investment in property in towns levels off or even declines. Generally these labouring opportunities are poorly remunerated. Wage rates have gone up in some places during the conflict, for example where there is demand for labour in large towns, or since food aid has been provided relieving the pressure on households. In other places it has declined if the labour market has become saturated.

Between 2004 and 2006, the livelihood opportunities for some people have slightly improved. Some populations have been able to start farming as a result of slightly improved security and the start of food distribution in rural areas. Some IDPs have also started farming on a limited basis; for example those in Momei and Kutum. Over time, IDPs have also engaged more in petty trading activities, if they managed to save enough capital to start this or alternatively if they had access to gifts or loans from relatives or traders. On the whole, however, income earning opportunities remain very limited for most of the conflict affected population in Darfur.

The other livelihood strategy on which many still depend, especially IDPs, is the collection of grass and firewood for sale. This is associated with very great risks for many, as venturing out of towns and villages often exposes individuals and groups to the threat of attack and rape. In other areas, particularly the Jebel Marra lowlands, the firewood trade is controlled by Arab pastoralists, so even this income earning opportunity is not possible. Access to wild foods has been negatively affected and remains so, due to restrictions of movement because of insecurity.

The limited income that people are able to earn, is usually spent on food, milling, education, and health care. Food items bought include “sauce” items to eat with the cereals provided by WFP (dried tomato, okra and onions). For most people interviewed the largest proportion of income was spent on food (between 40 and 80%) Depending on location, other major expenses also included firewood and water.

One of the consequences of many of the impacts listed above is the additional burden it has placed on women. The risks they face in accessing agricultural land and natural resources are usually harassment and rape, whereas men risk being killed. For this reason, it is women who venture farthest out of the home and out of the settlement, taking the greatest risks.

Exactly how livelihoods have been affected by the conflict depends on ethnicity, whether the area is GoS or rebel-held, and the livelihood zone. In GoS-held areas certain ethnic groups (such as the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit and many other smaller trips) are particularly vulnerable to attack and exploitation. This study has revealed the widespread practice of ‘protection payments and fees’ being demanded from some of these groups by the Janjaweed and other
Arabs, as the condition for their safe passage to their own farms and to markets. Not only is this a highly exploitative practice, it also puts additional pressure on many impoverished households.

This study identifies five groups of people, according to how their livelihoods have been affected by the conflict and the ongoing threats they face. In order of decreasing severity of livelihood insecurity, these are the following:

1. **Displaced populations in GoS held areas, in camps or in towns.** Many of these people have lost their livelihood assets and now have access to very limited and poorly remunerated income earning opportunities. Although the range of daily labouring opportunities has often expanded since people first became displaced, these offer a precarious source of livelihood and the labour market is saturated. Some livelihood strategies are associated with very high risks, particularly if it involves travelling outside areas of displacement. There are also cases of exploitation and abuse by the Janjaweed and/or the host population, usually based on ethnicity. This can include the payment of fees for engaging in livelihood activities outside the vicinity of camp or town, or the control of natural resources and trade, thus limiting livelihood options for the displaced. For many of these IDPs, return to their area of origin is highly unlikely until security improves in the wake of a peace agreement, for which disarmament will be key. For some, issues of land occupation will have to be resolved before return is feasible.

2. **Co-erced and exploited populations resident populations in GoS held areas**
   This category refers to people from tribes that are not aligned to the GoS, living in villages and some of the smaller towns in Darfur. Although they have not been displaced, many of them are living under very controlled regimes, having to pay protection payments to the Janjaweed (and sometimes to neighbouring Arab communities or Arabs within the same community) in order to pursue their most basic livelihood strategies. The nature of the arrangements varies by location and the ethnic groups involved. All are compromised by restricted mobility, for example to reach their farmland, markets, or to engage in activities like firewood collection. Their livelihood security depends upon the extent of the protection payments they must make, how many of their assets have been looted, and the fertility of the land to which they have access. In the longer term, however, this group may recover more quickly because they have not moved from their land.

3. **Resident populations living in SLA held areas.** This group generally enjoys greater mobility within SLA-held territory than, for example, group 2 above. The major constraints they face are lack of access to markets in GoS-held towns, which for farmers means difficulties in selling crops or finding labour, and for pastoralists means they cannot sell their livestock in return for grain. Migration for work, or with livestock, is severely restricted. A further constraint is lack of access to, and maintenance of basic services such as water, health and education. For farming populations they mostly have better access to their land than group 2, although they still face the threat of insecurity. Pastoralist populations are particularly badly affected by restricted movement. This, combined with looting, has severely depleted livestock herds. Their ability to recover will depend upon the lifting of these restrictions on movement and trade.
4. **Resident settled populations in GoS held areas that are less directly impacted by the conflict or who have some access to land.**

   a. This group includes people from tribes that have remained neutral in the conflict or have aligned with the GoS. This group does not face the exploitation and abuse described for category 2), but they are suffering from the severe disruption to trade, particularly for cash crops and livestock. Some have had livestock looted. Depending on their location, some also have restricted access to their agricultural land. This group may also recover more quickly, depending upon the extent to which their assets have run down, and the rebuilding of relationships with other neighbouring groups.

   b. There is a sub-group which has retained some access to land, but which is otherwise affected by insecurity, restricted movement (only a proportion of land is accessible) and limited labour opportunities.

5. **Pastoralist groups in GoS-held areas.** This group refers to tribes that are aligned to the government, mostly Arab tribes. Many of them have been closely associated with the Janjaweed, and are perceived as such. Although able to roam and graze on land that was once farmed, the migration patterns that are fundamental to their livelihood strategies have been badly affected. They are now mostly concentrated at the southern end of their migration routes, which puts pressure on grazing and water resources and hence on livestock condition. This group is also suffering from restricted access to trade routes over long distances that were integral to their pre-conflict livelihood strategies. Depending on location, some have suffered looting and attacks from the SLA. Members of this group have benefited from the extortion and demand for protection fees, and looting, of non-Arab groups.

Livelihood options have contracted, and for some their pre-conflict sources of livelihood have disappeared altogether. The constraints and threats that these five groups face have changed relatively little since the conflict began, but they have varied in intensity according to location, ethnicity and over time. The impact of the conflict over the last three years has been gradual impoverishment and the erosion of any assets that have not been looted.

What is really striking is how all population groups have been negatively affected by the conflict. There are few winners, and therein lies perhaps the greatest room for hope. As almost all livelihoods are under severe stress there is a common interest in finding resolution to the conflict. However, the challenges of how to do this, as positions become entrenched, enmities and resentment solidify, and the social fabric of Darfur has been torn apart, are immense.

To counter these dismal trends, the provision of food aid has been extremely important. Its impact on livelihoods has been overwhelmingly positive: on health and nutrition, in reversing some population movements to towns and IDP camps, in enabling agricultural production and protecting livestock assets, and in offering an alternative to risky and dangerous livelihood strategies. For some it has been an important source of income. Food aid has also regenerated the grain market at a time when it would otherwise have collapsed. This study came across no disincentive effects of food aid, although it did encounter problems to do with registration.

The extent to which food aid has protected precarious livelihoods does not seem to have been fully appreciated. This study provides the evidence. The scale and reach of the food aid
operation run by WFP and its cooperating partners in 2005 is a success story to be celebrated. Yet this study also concludes with a warning. Premature cuts in food aid, as is happening in 2006, could quickly undo the valuable gains of the last eighteen months. Without the injection of food aid, livelihoods will deteriorate further and famine looms once again.

This study provides a striking contrast with the findings of the food security and nutrition survey in 2005. Nutrition and health of conflict affected populations has improved enormously since the start of the conflict, but these same people have experienced little change in their livelihoods. There are many serious on-going threats to people’s livelihoods. Without levels of humanitarian assistance similar to those in 2005, people’s health and nutrition will rapidly deteriorate.

There is therefore an imperative for humanitarian assistance to continue, especially food aid, accompanied by other life-saving and livelihood support interventions. Most IDPs interviewed in this study indicated their intention to return to their areas of origin, but not until there are guarantees for their security. Only when there is evidence that a signed peace agreement is being implemented on the ground (in particular that disarmament is happening), when land occupation has been resolved, protection payments stopped, and trade embargoes lifted, should recovery programmes start, with the objective of restoring sustainable livelihoods. Unfortunately the current situation on the ground is far from meeting these conditions, which means that it is not yet time for recovery to start. Premature investment in recovery carries with it many risks, in terms of exacerbating the conflict and leaving households even more vulnerable to attack.
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ANNEX 1

Darfur Conflict and its Impact on Traditional Livelihoods
(Terms of Reference)

Introduction and purpose

WFP, in collaboration with its partners, is commissioning a study to assess the impact of the current conflict on the livelihoods of different population groups in all three states of Darfur. The overall purpose of this study is:

(i) to enhance understanding of how livelihoods and markets have been impacted by the current conflict
(ii) to assess the impact of food aid on livelihoods
(iii) to recommend how livelihoods can be best supported in the current context of ongoing violent conflict and insecurity, both in terms of programming and advocacy.
(iv) to indicate how livelihoods are likely to be affected by different scenarios (e.g., insecurity worsening, insecurity staying as it is right now, security improving) and the implications for interventions.

The study will make specific recommendations to WFP, but is intended to be of use and relevance to the wider international humanitarian community.

Objectives:

♦ Where possible, draw upon pre-conflict livelihood profiles for major livelihood groups in all three Darfur States for comparative purposes. (WFP VAM officers will gather and collate as much of this information as possible before the arrival of the external consultants).
♦ Design and implement an appropriate methodology for the study, based on the adapted livelihoods framework for emergencies, purposively selecting key livelihood groups as the focus of the study.
♦ Examine how conflict has impacted, or is part of, the policies, institutions and processes which affect the way households maintain or gain access to assets and keep control over them. This will include an examination of the dynamics of conflict as a process impacting on livelihoods, an analysis of markets, formal and informal governance systems, freedom of movement, rule of law, and respect for human rights.
♦ Show how the current conflict has affected different livelihood groups, how it has created risks and affected vulnerability, for the displaced, the resident rural population and the urban population. This will include identifying changes in livelihood assets and strategies, current strategies used by IDPs, and how relationships between different livelihood groups have been affected.
♦ Examine how food aid, and the way it is distributed, has impacted on livelihoods and give recommendations on how positive impact can be enhanced and negative impacts minimized.
♦ Provide recommendations on livelihood support in the current context of violent conflict, and on the application of humanitarian and livelihood principles.
♦ Identify the pre-conditions for supporting the full-scale revival of sustainable livelihoods for different livelihood groups.
♦ Provide recommendations for assisting IDPs in voluntary return to their respective places of origin or choice—particularly focusing on the hypothesis that in many situations the quality of life for the camp based IDPs may be better than what it was in the pre-crisis period.
♦ Recommend interventions that different national and international stakeholders could undertake in order to support livelihoods in a number of different scenarios (see above).
♦ Provide guidance in the site-identification process for an inter-agency food security and nutrition monitoring system that captures geographical and livelihood diversity of the three States.
Methodology

♦ Where possible, use existing pre-crisis livelihood profiles for different livelihood groups for comparative purposes. Where pre-crisis data does not exist, develop ways of assessing how livelihoods have changed in the fieldwork.

♦ Carry out a literature review to gather information on the dynamics of the conflict, governance systems, human rights abuses etc, in order to inform the methodology, identify key informants and key questions for the field work.

♦ Collect and analyze data on livelihood groups using a purposive sample for each State. PRRA techniques could be employed including key informant focus groups, household interviews, group discussions, visual observation of water points, livestock, agricultural fields and markets.

♦ Specifically focus on key thematic issues such as disruption of the rural and urban market systems as well as the agricultural sector. This analysis could rely on focus groups including traders, farmers, agricultural cooperatives, cereal grain exchanges, etc., in both rural and urban environment.

♦ Prepare a concise analytical report—including explanation of methodology, data analysis, conclusions and recommendations—that addresses the objectives of this study.

Timing

♦ This study is anticipated to take six to seven weeks during February-April 2006.

♦ It will consist of six major activities:
  1. literature review
  2. designing the methodology
  3. training the survey teams
  4. fieldwork
  5. analysis of the findings and report writing
  6. debriefing

Personnel

♦ This study will employ two lead international experts in livelihood and food security analysis with substantial previous experience in Sudan;

♦ These experts will be assisted by professional national and international in-country staff of WFP as well as other agencies interested in this study—FAO, SC-UK. It is highly likely that several other agencies will also participate at the State level. All staff participating in the study will already have experience of doing livelihood assessments in Darfur. As many as possible should have experience of pre-crisis livelihood and food security monitoring.

8th February 2006
# ANNEX 2

## Sampling frame by State

### North Darfur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Al Fashir</th>
<th>Kebkabiya/ Seref Omra</th>
<th>Malha</th>
<th>Saiyah</th>
<th>Kutum</th>
<th>Dar Zaghawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Al Fashir town</td>
<td>Kebkabiya residents</td>
<td>Malha residents</td>
<td>Kutum town residents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam, Shengel Tobai, Sarafaya</td>
<td>Gara Zawiya, Gara Farajawiya</td>
<td>Madu</td>
<td>Goz laban residents</td>
<td>Masri Jambolee</td>
<td>Umm Haraz, Orchii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood zone</td>
<td>Goz Tombac, agro-migrant</td>
<td>Wadi, agro-migrant</td>
<td>Pastoral</td>
<td>Goz</td>
<td>Wadi, pastoral</td>
<td>Pastoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Abou Shouk camp, IDPs in Al Fashir town. IDPs in Shengel Tobai camp</td>
<td>Seref Omra town IDPs, Kebkabiya town IDPs</td>
<td>Malha IDPs</td>
<td>Saiyah IDPs</td>
<td>Kassap camp, IDPs in town</td>
<td>IDPs in Dar Zaghawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Fur, Arab</td>
<td>Meidob</td>
<td>Berti</td>
<td>Fur, Tunjur, Ereigat</td>
<td>Zaghawa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## West Darfur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Geneina</th>
<th>Seleia</th>
<th>Umm Tajok</th>
<th>Habilla town residents</th>
<th>Mornei town residents</th>
<th>Zalingei town residents</th>
<th>Garsilla town residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Geneina residents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident population</td>
<td>Umm Tajok residents</td>
<td>Nur el Huda, Salaa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood zone</td>
<td>Northern agro-pastoral</td>
<td>Northern Agro-pastoral</td>
<td>Southern Agro-pastoral</td>
<td>Southern agro-pastoral/west Jebel Marra lowland?</td>
<td>West Jebel Marra lowland</td>
<td>West Jebel Marra lowland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Ardamata camp, IDPs in Geneina town</td>
<td>IDPs in camps</td>
<td>IDPs in Umm Tajok</td>
<td>IDPs in Habilla town</td>
<td>IDPs in Mornei town, IDPs in Umm Shalaya</td>
<td>IDPs in Habilla town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>Masalit, Erengar, Jebel Miseria</td>
<td>Masalit, Fur, Mahaida</td>
<td>Masalit, Tama, Arab (Awlad Rashid)</td>
<td>Fur, Masalit, Tama</td>
<td>Fur, Arab</td>
<td>Fur, ARab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## South Darfur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Kass &amp; Nyala</th>
<th>Muhajaria</th>
<th>Ed Daien</th>
<th>Adila</th>
<th>Buram &amp; Tullus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Kass residents</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ed Daien residents</td>
<td></td>
<td>Buram &amp; Tullus residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Singita village, Angara village</td>
<td>Resident population</td>
<td>El Ferdous village</td>
<td>Mazroub village</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood zone</td>
<td>South Jebel Marra lowland</td>
<td>Agro-pastoral goz</td>
<td>Agro-pastoral with groundnuts</td>
<td>Cattle Agro-pastoral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Kass town, Direige camp Nyala</td>
<td>IDPs in camps</td>
<td>IDPs in camps in Ed Daien, Dinka IDPs</td>
<td>IDPs in Mazroub, Dinka IDPs</td>
<td>IDPs in Buram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>Predominantly Fur</td>
<td>Predominantly Birgid</td>
<td>Rizeigat, Dinka, mixed</td>
<td>Ma’aliya, Dinka, other</td>
<td>Habbaniya, Fellata</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>