REPORT

Focusing on Fragility:
The Future of US Assistance to Fragile States
Sarah Rose

Summary

Global development is increasingly intertwined with state fragility. Poverty is becoming concentrated in fragile states, and conflict, violent extremism, and environmental stresses can both stem from and be exacerbated by fragility. As a result, many donors—including the United States—are rethinking how their engagement can better help countries address the underlying causes of fragility, build peace and stability, and cope with complex risks.

The United States is the top provider of official development assistance to fragile states, but much of this aid has not focused on reducing fragility. Even where confronting fragility has been a central objective of US development assistance, the track record of success has been mixed, at best. New efforts are emerging to change this story. Reflecting on lessons of the past, the United States government has been developing new policy frameworks, initiatives, and proposed reforms that seek to address shortcomings in how the US government engages in fragile states. To contribute to this conversation, the Center for Global Development convened a working group of more than 20 experts, including former officials from the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the US intelligence community, along with noted academics and policy experts to identify specific ideas for how the US government can more effectively use its development assistance—in conjunction with diplomatic and security assistance tools—in fragile states.

The author is grateful to the members of the CGD Working Group on the Future of US Assistance to Fragile States for their many thoughtful ideas, comments, critiques, and suggestions. This report draws from working group discussions and background research conducted by CGD staff. All members of the working group participated as individuals and their participation does not imply endorsement of every finding or recommendation contained in this report. Any errors or omissions of fact remain the responsibility of the author.

No current US government officials participated formally in the working group, but the author is grateful to several anonymous USAID and Department of Defense officials for guidance and constructive comments along the way. The author also thanks Vijaya Ramachandran for co-leadership of the working group process, Drew D’Alelio for research assistance, and Jocelyn Estes for assisting with the report’s finalization and launch.

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Preface

It has been nearly two decades since the 9/11 attacks thrust fragile states into a central space in American foreign and development policy. Though this fateful date, and the subsequent massive US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, is gradually receding into history, fragile states still feature prominently in US—and global—development efforts.

In our time, the world has seen incredible, sweeping improvements in global living standards. But progress has been uneven, and poverty is now largely concentrated in fragile states. Today, to be serious about development, tackling the causes and consequences of fragility has become imperative.

Donor organizations around the world are increasingly reorganizing and reorienting policies to better support fragile states’ pathways to increased peace, stability, and resilience to cope with complex risks. The United States, a top donor to fragile states, is among them. But while these efforts are critical and commendable, they do not promise to be easy. Grappling with the political incentives of fragile state elites; promoting the inclusive governance that lays the foundation for lasting peace; aligning the efforts of different US agencies toward a common objective; constructively bringing in local partners; and revamping the “nuts and bolts” of how development programs are funded, procured, and staffed are age-old, long-term problems. As is organizing a coordinated response among donors, each with its own culture and way of working. But as development becomes increasingly intertwined with fragility, attention is strategically shifting toward these issues.

Donor organizations around the world are increasingly reorganizing and reorienting policies to better support fragile states’ pathways to increased peace, stability, and resilience to cope with complex risks.

In 2018, CGD brought together former officials from the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, and the US intelligence community, along with noted academics and policy experts, to contribute ideas to address the complex question of how the US government can more effectively use its development assistance—in conjunction with diplomatic and security assistance tools—in fragile states. We hope the resulting report, Focusing on Fragility: The Future of US Assistance to Fragile States, will be a timely contribution, complementing and building upon recent and ongoing efforts by the State Department, USAID, the Department of Defense, the United States Institute of Peace, and the US Congress—as well as the World Bank—to take stock of lessons from past engagement in fragile states and forge a new way forward. The report delivers a frank, insightful diagnostic of some of the key constraints to executing a more effective US development policy in fragile states. It also presents a series of concrete recommendations for establishing new approaches and advancing nascent or ongoing reforms that offer important contributions to this key moment of fragility-focused policymaking and reform.

Masood Ahmed
President
Center for Global Development
Executive Summary

Global development is increasingly intertwined with state fragility. Poverty is becoming concentrated in fragile states, and conflict, violent extremism, and environmental stresses can both stem from and be exacerbated by fragility. As a result, many donors—including the United States—are rethinking how their engagement can better help countries address the underlying causes of fragility, build peace and stability, and cope with complex risks.

The United States is the top provider of official development assistance to fragile states, but much of this aid has not focused on reducing fragility. Even where confronting fragility has been a central objective of US development assistance, the track record of success has been mixed, at best. New efforts are emerging to change this story. Reflecting on lessons of the past, the United States government has been developing new policy frameworks, initiatives, and proposed reforms that seek to address shortcomings in how the US government engages in fragile states. To contribute to this conversation, the Center for Global Development convened a working group of more than 20 experts, including former officials from the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the US intelligence community, along with noted academics and policy experts to identify specific ideas for how the US government can more effectively use its development assistance—in conjunction with diplomatic and security assistance tools—in fragile states.

This report on working group priorities was developed independently of similar, contemporaneous efforts and arrives at many similar conclusions. The recommendations offered herein reinforce, complement, and build upon these earlier pieces’ findings. The report does not cover the complete set of issues related to US development assistance to fragile states nor does it offer an exhaustive set of recommendations. The working group instead focused on five core themes summarized below.

Grappling with elite incentives and power dynamics

Though aid to fragile states often seeks to address technical solutions to symptoms of fragility, fragility is fundamentally a political problem. When political leaders in fragile states choose to maintain their power—and personal gains—through entrenched corruption, political marginalization, and patterns of abuse and intimidation, their incentives to keep institutions weak are stronger than incentives tied to aid. How can US government actors better evaluate the political will and incentive structures of government and nongovernment actors in fragile states? In addition, where there has been political conflict, crafting an elite bargain is often an important first step and can help temper risks from elite spoilers. Such arrangements are also predatory and exclusive and do not lay the foundations for building state legitimacy over the longer term. How can the US government support a shift from closed elite deals to more inclusive processes? Can it do more to shift elite incentives away from exclusionary and destabilizing behaviors?

Key findings

- An effective fragile-state strategy must prioritize governance and human rights, but these issues have not always been sufficiently elevated or integrated into US approaches. Governance tends to exist as a stand-alone priority, siloed—and often sidelined—within agencies, with a relatively small cadre of staff and limited funding focused largely on technical solutions to discrete governance challenges.

- Different parts of the US government have always done various sorts of political analysis—many of very high quality—but they are rarely rolled up into one place in a way that enables all interagency actors to “sing from the same hymn sheet.” Furthermore, institutionalizing a mindset around using this analysis to “think and work politically” remains a work in progress.

- Persistent political exclusion and corruption, especially when compounded by job scarcity and insecurity, create conditions for extremism. But promoting more inclusive political systems and
fostering social cohesion have rarely been significant US priorities. The pressure to demonstrate quick wins, short planning and budgeting cycles, and a bureaucratic culture that emphasizes measurability and accountability have been key barriers to using aid tools to support generational, nonlinear, hard-to-measure progress toward greater inclusion.

- Foreign assistance and diplomatic engagement can and should reinforce one another to influence elite incentives and support inclusive governance objectives, but they have not always been well coordinated in practice.

- Unconditioned assistance does little to change the incentives of elites to address corrupt, abusive elements of their governance. In some cases, conditions on aid—when they are locally led, focused on outcomes, and accompanied by a credible threat of nonfunding for noncompliance—can be a strong tool to support reformist elements in the face of resistance from domestic vested interests.

- Using international rankings to incentivize a “race-to-the-top” can help unify support for some reforms, but indicators are rarely effective in persuading government elites to address issues related to power and corruption that are at the center of fragility.

Recommendations

- Interagency actors should conduct frequent, high quality, intelligence-informed political economy analyses that are actionable and systematically shared among agencies.

- USAID should use assistance to support social cohesion objectives, building on evidence of failures, and adding to the body of evidence about what works.

- The State Department and USAID should ensure diplomacy and foreign assistance reinforce one another in pursuit of governance objectives.

- In implementing its new organizational structure, USAID should ensure strong linkages between the governance unit—now bureaucratically separated from the agency’s prevention, stabilization, countering violent extremism, and transitions work—and the new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization.

- Congress—and the members of the development community—should support efforts like the Global Fragility Act to create fragile-state assistance strategies with more realistic, longer-term time horizons to allow strategic investment in longer-term efforts, like supporting good governance.

Strengthening interagency policy coherence in fragile states

The State Department, USAID, and DOD each tend to view the problems of a particular fragile state—and the strategy for how to address them—through a lens colored by their individual mission and mandate. This does not always sum to a collective goal, however, and the actions of one can sometimes undermine those of another. In recognition of the costly breakdown in interagency alignment, new proposals for interagency frameworks—like the one promoted by the Stabilization Assistance Review—have sought to articulate agency roles and lines of authority. While this is an important step forward, some gaps and limitations remain. How can different US government agencies align in recognition of the importance of confronting fragility? How can they address limited policy coherence and reconcile competing objectives and theories of change, especially where security concerns dominate?

Key findings

- Effective interagency collaboration is necessary to ensure strategic coherence, jointly identify risks and plan for their mitigation, preemptively evaluate trade-offs between short-term and long-term priorities, and keep US government actors from working at cross purposes with one another. Collaboration has improved over the last 10 years, especially at the field level, but challenges remain
in breaking down stovepipes and developing joint plans for sustained, integrated efforts to address fragility.

• Part of the disconnect is at the strategic level. Agencies have individual fragility strategies, but they are not well unified, and each on its own does not sufficiently elevate fragility as a national priority.

• The appropriate level of coordination depends on country context and the nature of the problem to be solved. Washington-based processes can help set direction and locate resources, but they can also interfere when strong field-level processes are underway.

• Intra-agency arm-wrestling can sometimes prevent agencies from optimizing their engagement in interagency structures.

• There is a political imperative to couch foreign aid as tied to US self-interest, which is often focused on security. With aid budgets under pressure, perceptions that funding for a given strategy or project depends on its link to US security interests have sometimes affected the prioritization of other objectives that might be equally or more relevant to helping countries address fragility.

• Security-focused investments, when poorly coordinated with diplomatic and development strategies, can distort or impede progress toward the US government’s longer-term state legitimacy, stability, and resilience objectives.

• In-country aid coordination mechanisms between governments, donors, implementers, and civil society can help orient different US government actors (along with other donors and actors) around a common set of priorities. However, donor partners have typically paid little attention to gathering and applying lessons about how these structures work best and how best to support them.

Recommendations

• The White House should develop a government-wide fragile-state strategy as a framework to elevate fragility as a national policy priority. It should be organized around the central recognition that tolerating or supporting malign elites in pursuit of near-term objectives exacerbates fragility and compromises the long-term interests of the United States. The strategy should bring together interagency actors around common principles, including how to reconcile and unify US government response to democratic declines and closing civic space and how diplomatic and foreign assistance interventions can better reinforce one another.

• To improve agency contributions to the interagency process, each agency’s principle should designate a “broker” for each interagency effort, the single individual responsible for forming a unified agency voice to bring to the interagency.

• Embassy country teams should support the development of robust, host government–led country coordination mechanisms, both to organize the efforts of multiple external actors and to discipline the US government’s own coordination.

Updating the mechanics of US government development assistance to fragile states

The US government’s development tools are not well-suited for addressing fragility, preventing escalation to crisis, and bridging crisis response and development. They are slow to deploy, lack agility, and are often insufficiently coordinated with humanitarian and stabilization response. Siloed funding further restricts the degree to which the US can understand and seek to address binding constraints. What procurement, personnel, bureaucratic, and policy changes could help the US government better respond to the development and crisis prevention needs of fragile states?
Key findings

Funding

• Many of USAID’s development funds lack nimbleness and flexibility, making them ill-suited for, and ineffective at, addressing quick-to-evolve needs associated with fragility. The flexible, nonsectorally earmarked resources need for conflict prevention, in particular, have remained scarce. The growing focus on prevention in Congress and within US aid agencies is welcome.

• Spending directives and limited flexibility not only constrain how the US government can respond to challenges in fragile states, but they can also narrow the way in which agencies identify, perceive, and prioritize challenges to address. Siloed funding—along with unIntegrated workstreams—often forces a choice of which team and funding stream will be used to conduct a situational analysis. This choice ends up defining a problem in a particular way, further limiting the ability to introduce other types of funding, attention, or complementary efforts to address broader factors related to fragility.

• The US aid budget does not place a high priority on multilateral channels. But multilateral development banks are increasingly focused on fragile states. They also help facilitate coordination, allow longer-term, more consistent investment patterns, and spread risk and responsibility among multiple donors.

Staffing

• Staffing flexibility is critical to adequately address fragility. But beyond the priority crises that its conflict and humanitarian rapid response teams typically tackle, USAID is often challenged to quickly reallocate appropriately skilled staff to help missions address pressing crisis prevention efforts or plan medium-term efforts to bridge between crisis response and longer-term development.

• The structure of USAID’s foreign service is not well matched to the changing nature of development and the rising prominence of fragile states in USAID’s development portfolio.

Procurement and programming

• Due to USAID’s extensive procurement and program design processes, it can take well over a year to get from the idea for a program to the beginning of implementation. This time frame is not well-suited for addressing quick-to-evolve needs associated with fragility and taking advantage of narrow windows of opportunity.

• USAID awards have become increasingly prescriptive. But allowing field-based actors to adapt their approaches to shifting realities—especially in less predictable environments like fragile states—is shown to yield better outcomes. USAID has acknowledged the need for greater agility and adaptability and is moving positively in this direction. Still, a culture of risk aversion and time pressure on staff contribute to a preference for “tried-and-true” tools, which is likely to slow the widespread adoption of more adaptive approaches.

• Crisis response is often insufficiently integrated into a larger plan that includes a transition through recovery and back to support for longer-term resilience and development objectives. Momentum—including community trust, early recovery gains, and talented staff—can be lost during the gap period.

• In most fragile states, a significant portion of USAID funds goes to sectors like health, education, and agriculture. Though interventions in these areas often interact with drivers of fragility, programs are not always designed with a good understanding of these interactions, nor are their sectoral goals typically linked explicitly to fragility-conscious objectives like building social cohesion.
Recommendations

Funding

• The administration, Congress, and the development community should support efforts to create longer-term, more agile funding for violence prevention objectives (beginning with but not limited to those proposed in the Global Fragility Act) and activities that support resilience to complex risk.

• The administration should allocate a greater portion of aid funds to multilateral systems, like the multilateral development banks.

Staffing

• To better address emergent crisis prevention needs, USAID should build its fast-response surge staffing capabilities.

• USAID should invest in developing a cadre of staff who understand fragility and can work at the intersection of humanitarian, development, and governance needs.

Procurement and programming

• USAID should ensure that more awards allow for adaptive management. It should also understand how this shift will affect interagency and cross-donor coordination, the use of other learning tools like impact evaluation, and staff skillset requirements.

• To facilitate a more timely response to pressing needs and narrow windows of opportunity in fragile states, USAID should selectively allow greater use of competition waivers for new awards.

• USAID should develop fragility-adapted sector frameworks to help USAID staff understand how sectoral interventions interact with fragility and design programs accordingly.

• USAID should establish a home within its new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization for bridging support between crisis response and a return to longer-term development programming.

Forging a constructive, mutually reinforcing link between security assistance and state legitimacy

Security assistance—aid that seeks to build the capacity of partner countries’ security forces—has implications for the effectiveness of development assistance focused on addressing fragility. Security is a necessary but insufficient component of state legitimacy, and the bi-directional causal links between the two are not well understood. The US government’s security assistance attempts to build fragile states’ capacity to address security threats, but with uneven emphasis on institution building and providing civilian-centric security as important accompaniments to tactical proficiency. There is also little evidence about whether and under what conditions US security sector aid is effective in achieving its objectives. How can US security sector assistance better address fragility by supporting state legitimacy?

Key findings

• Strengthening security alone is insufficient for addressing the root causes of violence in fragile states. It is more important to understand and address how security forces operate within the ecosystem of governance and politics.

• There is little evidence about whether and under what conditions US security sector aid is successful. US security sector programs have rarely been rigorously evaluated, limiting opportunities for accountability and learning about things like impact, value, and risk.
Questions about how to adequately and meaningfully measure security have not been sufficiently addressed as part of the conversation about security sector assistance results.

Because increased tactical proficiency and lethality can lead to increased effectiveness at repression, it is critical that security sector assistance is accompanied by investments in the professionalization and oversight of the security sector. However, the US approach has frequently been to build technical capacity first, then tackle institution-building later, if at all, and often in a limited fashion.

In fragile states with reformist leaders, a military civil engineering unit can complement political transition by helping shift perceptions of the state and the role of the military. However, DOD has typically invested very little in civil works capacity building in partner-country armed forces.

**Recommendations**

- In accordance with congressional mandate, DOD should fully implement its 2017 assessment, monitoring, and evaluation requirements, including dedicating adequate funding for these activities, establishing an independent office of evaluation, and socializing and implementing guidance on developing programs with articulated objectives and theories of change.

- Congress, the State Department, DOD, and USAID should ramp up investments in defense institution building and ensure appropriate sequencing with technical and material support. This should include adequate resourcing and demonstrated political commitment for the Security Governance Initiative established in 2014 to fund defense institution building in select African focus countries.

- DOD and the State Department should support the development of military civil engineering units in select partner countries, targeting those recovering from conflict and with opening democratic processes.

- The State Department should explore better and more meaningful ways to measure security that go beyond objective data to reflect different groups' perceptions of security.

**Identifying and building upon local capacities**

The international community has often approached efforts to build fragile-state legitimacy by fragmenting authority across a range of donors and partner-country elites, with limited success. Efforts that focus on identifying and supporting specific local capacities to perform certain tasks of governance may have more potential. How can the US government identify and partner with local actors to strengthen their capacity and build their legitimacy?

**Key findings**

- The traditional model of institution strengthening in fragile states has often focused on shoring up the central government and working to extend its reach. This has a poor track record of success.

- A bottom-up approach recognizes that capacity is uneven across sectors, domains within sectors, and geographic space, and that even in fragile states there can be islands of good governance with strong service delivery.

- Top-down and bottom-up approaches must strategically intersect. Working locally without a concurrent focus on state-building can undermine state-building goals by circumventing national authority and exacerbating central-local political contests. Exclusively bottom-up approaches ignore broader factors that contribute to local conditions.

- Local ownership over the design and delivery of foreign assistance is considered critical for achieving and sustaining program results, building local capacity, and—depending on the local actors involved
—strengthening the citizen-state compact by shifting accountability for service delivery and results to the partner government.

- USAID’s efforts to increase direct funding to local actors have been challenging, especially in fragile states. The agency has had to balance country priorities with agency or interagency requirements; weigh the benefits of ownership against real and perceived programmatic and fiduciary risk; assess trade-offs between disbursing funds speedily and taking the time to assess and mitigate risk and/or build local implementation capacity; and/or adjust staffing to manage more, smaller grants.

- In the past, USAID provided substantial support for graduate-level training for future developing country leaders, both to build technical skills and to impart democratic values. In shifting away from that model over the last 20 years, the United States may be forgoing—and yielding to China—opportunities to build values and relationships with future fragile-state leaders who will shape their countries’ trajectory.

Recommendations

- USAID and the State Department should conduct capacity mapping as part of the political economy analyses described above to help identify and measure groups’ specific capacities to perform particular tasks of governance, identify elements of what is working and build upon them.

- USAID should continue to expand the notion of local ownership beyond a focus on the nationality of the implementer to incorporate local input into and ownership over priority setting, program design, choice of implementer, and co-financing arrangements. In fragile states, robust political economy analyses must inform how donors think about whose priorities to pursue.

- USAID should invest in the professional development—and democratic values—of the next generation of fragile state leaders by expanding graduate education training.
Introduction

By 2030, it is estimated that half of the world’s poor will be concentrated in fragile states—countries at heightened risk for shocks stemming from conflict, violence, pandemics, and/or natural disasters with limited capacity to cope with them. This shift in the global development landscape, along with the potential cross-border nature of some of the risks, have prompted the United States to rethink how to help countries address the underlying causes of fragility and support a path to greater country-wide resilience to complex risks.

What is fragility?

There is no universal definition of fragility. And for each fragile state, the root causes of fragility and how fragility manifests are deeply contextual. But fragile states do share some broad commonalities. Their governments often lack legitimacy, have limited authority to implement basic policy, struggle to exert control over their territory, and fail to provide basic public services to their citizenry. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development takes a structural resilience lens to its conception of state fragility, talking about the “combination of exposure to risks and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks.” Fragility also tends to be deeply entrenched and politically rooted; addressing its underlying causes, shifting toward greater peace and stability, and building resilience is typically an uneven, generational effort.

“Fragile states have become an increasingly prominent portion of the United States' assistance portfolio.

US funding to fragile states in perspective

Fragile states have become an increasingly prominent portion of the United States’ assistance portfolio. Nearly a third of all development assistance currently goes to fragile states—up from less than 15 percent 20 years ago. This has made the United States the world’s top donor to fragile states. While this is driven to an extent by recent massive investments in Iraq and Afghanistan, it remains the case even when these two countries are excluded.
The United States is also the top donor in many individual fragile states.

While the US provides development assistance to a wide range of fragile states, aid is concentrated in a select few, largely those that have seen recent (or current) active conflict and stabilization activities.
The magnitude of US involvement in fragile states suggests that it can have an important role to play. At the very least, it must ensure its significant volume of aid does no harm.

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Rethinking US engagement in fragile states

US government engagement in fragile states has grown in prominence over the last 15 years. Much of this aid has not focused on reducing fragility, but even where confronting fragility has been a central objective of US development assistance, the track record of success has been mixed, at best. Several new initiatives and proposed reforms seek to learn from the lessons of the past and address shortcomings in how the US government delivers aid to confront fragility. For example, in 2018, the Department of State, USAID, and DOD released the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), a new policy framework that seeks to improve how interagency actors meet stabilization needs. Meanwhile, USAID has begun a bureaucratic transformation process that will, in part, elevate and harmonize the agency’s prevention, stabilization, and crisis response efforts. And the State Department, in partnership with USAID, recently released the Strategic Prevention Project, an assessment of how to target aid better to reduce the risk and severity of violence. Congress is paying attention to fragility, too. Bipartisan coalitions in both the House of Representatives and the Senate introduced legislation that aims to improve the coordination of US government efforts to tackle the root causes of state fragility and violent extremism. Congress also tasked the United States Institute of Peace to develop a plan to prevent extremism in fragile states; the task force’s comprehensive report was released earlier this year.
In 2018, the Center for Global Development convened more than 20 experts, including former officials from the State Department, USAID, DOD, and the US intelligence community, along with noted academics and policy experts to take advantage of this pivotal moment of fragility-focused reforms to contribute specific ideas to the conversation about how the US government can more effectively use its development assistance—in conjunction with diplomatic and security assistance tools—in fragile states. This report on working group priorities was developed independently of other similar, contemporaneous efforts and arrives at many similar conclusions. The recommendations offered herein reinforce, complement, and build upon these earlier pieces’ findings.

The report does not cover the complete set of issues related to US development assistance to fragile states nor does it offer an exhaustive set of recommendations. In particular, the working group chose not to focus extensively on stabilization—a phase following a period of active violence in which civilian and military actors help manage and prevent the resurgence of conflict. Instead, this paper concentrates more on those fragile contexts where security concerns are less dominant or where US objectives are more oriented toward preventing violence and promoting longer-term resilience to complex risks associated with state fragility.

The working group focused on five core themes, which the report discusses in sections as follows:

1. **Grappling with elite incentives and power dynamics.** Though aid to fragile states often seeks to address technical solutions to symptoms of fragility, fragility is fundamentally a political problem. When political leaders in fragile states choose to maintain their power—and personal gains—through entrenched corruption, political marginalization, and patterns of abuse and intimidation, their incentives to keep institutions weak are stronger than incentives tied to aid. How can US government actors better evaluate the political will and incentive structures of government and nongovernmental actors in fragile states? In addition, where there has been political conflict, crafting an elite bargain is often an important first step and can help temper risks from elite spoilers. Such arrangements are also predatory and exclusive and do not lay the foundations for building state legitimacy over the longer term. How can the US government support a shift from closed elite deals to more inclusive processes? Can it do more to shift elite incentives away from exclusionary and destabilizing behaviors?

2. **Strengthening interagency policy coherence in fragile states.** The State Department, USAID, and DOD each tend to view the problems of a particular fragile state—and the strategy for how to address them—through a lens colored by their individual mission and mandate. This does not always sum to a collective goal, however, and the actions of one can sometimes undermine those of another. There have been important recent efforts to articulate agency roles and lines of authority, but some gaps and limitations remain. How can different US government agencies align in recognition of the importance of confronting fragility? How can they address limited policy coherence and reconcile competing objectives and theories of change, especially where security concerns dominate?

3. **Updating the mechanics of US government development assistance to fragile states.** The US government’s development tools are not well-suited for addressing fragility, preventing escalation to crisis, and bridging crisis response and development. They are slow to deploy, lack agility, and are often insufficiently coordinated with humanitarian and stabilization response. Siloed funding further restricts the degree to which the US can understand and seek to address binding constraints. What procurement, personnel, bureaucratic, and policy changes could help the US government better respond to the development and crisis prevention needs of fragile states?

4. **Forging a constructive, mutually reinforcing link between security assistance and state legitimacy.** Security assistance—aid that seeks to build the capacity of partner countries’ security forces—has implications for the effectiveness of development assistance...
focused on addressing fragility. Security is a necessary but insufficient component of state legitimacy, and the bi-directional causal links between the two are not well understood. The US government’s security assistance attempts to build fragile states’ capacity to address security threats, but with uneven emphasis on institution building and providing civilian-centric security as important accompaniments to tactical proficiency. There is also little evidence about whether and under what conditions US security sector aid is effective in achieving its objectives. How can US security sector assistance better address fragility by supporting state legitimacy?

5. Identifying and building upon local capacities. The international community has often approached efforts to build fragile-state legitimacy by fragmenting authority across a range of donors and partner-country elites. This has a poor track record of success. Efforts that focus on identifying and supporting specific local capacities to perform certain tasks of governance may have more potential. How can the US government identify and partner with local actors to strengthen their capacity and build their legitimacy?

Notes


[2] Data are from Foreign Aid Explorer. The current data reflect obligations between 2015 and 2017 and consider as fragile the 30 highest ranked countries on the Fund for Peace’s 2017 Fragile States Index. The historical comparison data reflect obligations between 1998 and 2000 and consider as fragile the 30 highest ranked countries on the Fund for Peace’s 2006 Fragile States Index (the oldest version available).

[3] The data reflect aid disbursements in millions of US dollars and are sourced from the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Creditor Reporting System. For these figures, fragile states are the 35 countries listed as alert, high alert, and very high alert on the 2017 Fragile States Index. Japan’s large contribution is driven mainly by debt relief of around $2 million to Myanmar in 2013. Turkey’s large contribution is driven by its response to the refugee crisis in neighboring Syria.

[4] Data are from the OECD DAC’s Creditor Reporting System. These 20 countries were selected because they either ranked in the top 20 fragile states in the Fragile States Index for the past 10 years, have strategic relevance to the US (Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan), or are part of a region experiencing challenges typical of fragile states, such as internal conflict, terrorism, drought, and weak institutions (West Africa/Sahel).


[7] In particular USIP’s task force report on preventing extremism in fragile states (Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, 2019).
Grappling with Elite Incentives and Power Dynamics

Understanding the incentives of national actors to confront fragility

Donor governments’ approaches in fragile states often focus on narrow, programmatic objectives, rather than on addressing the complex political dynamics at the root of the problem. Fragility is often, at least in part, a political choice since incumbents recognize that strengthened institutions may weaken their political power. They see limited electoral reward for confronting fragility, especially where drivers of fragility include geographic (subnational) or ethnic fractionalization and voting takes place largely along these lines. An external push for change will only succeed when it bolsters internal support. This significantly limits what development assistance can accomplish; its incentives simply cannot compete.

Fragile-state elites can be savvy about monetizing fragility, including with donor aid.

And sometimes the incentives that development assistance creates are perverse. Fragile-state elites can be savvy about monetizing fragility, including with donor aid. They understand well that significant donor resources are sometimes made available to them because of the security risks associated with their fragility, creating an unintended (on the part of the donor) vicious cycle. Donors should be wary of appealing to the enlightened self-interest of leaders and officials without paying attention to the spoiler role they can play.

Understanding external dynamics is also important. The behavior of other donors can also affect leaders’ incentives to confront fragility. The United States’ leverage in policy conversations is different in countries where China, or, in the Horn of Africa, the Gulf States, are positioned as well-resourced and willing alternative donors.

Undertaking politically smart fragility assessments

Donors, including the United States, often have high expectations for reform in partner countries with little grounding in an understanding of the political economy. Attention to political incentive structures must extend beyond the ruling elite to include those of nongovernmental actors. Elites use external resources, including aid, to entrench the coalitions that keep them in power. Donors must be able to look beyond government interlocutors to understand whose interests are served by the status quo. This requires a politically smart fragility assessment: an intelligence-informed, iterative examination of the political system in which a donor intervention will take place, including the formal and informal networks, alliances, and rent flows that support the status quo. Assessments must go beyond a statist view and take into account the informal economic and political structures that shape how the rule of law emerges. Local knowledge is imperative for conducting a politically smart fragility assessment. The Pathways for Peace Framework offers one model, looking at critical actors, institutions, and structural factors, and the interactions between them that influence the potential pathways forward.

Politically smart fragility assessments should also account for the heterogeneity of political will and legitimacy within fragile-state governments. Not only is it detrimental to assume political will in its absence, but it is also disadvantageous to assume the opposite. Governments are not monolithic, and
even within weak and/or kleptocratic governments, there are often segments of the government (ministries or departments within them) that are more legitimately focused on improving service delivery. Donors may do well to build upon and strengthen these relatively more functional components. On the other hand, a politically smart fragility assessment must parse out how these comparatively better-governed sectors fit into elites’ broader system of incentives. Kleptocratic governments that value aid sometimes choose to comply selectively with donor objectives, focusing on those sectors that pose a more limited threat to their power preservation structures and which are more insulated from their rent-seeking behavior. Donors need to understand this well to know how best to employ (or withhold) their aid tools and where to focus them for greatest effect.

Politically smart fragility assessments should capitalize on the resources available across the US government. Classified information and intelligence on the corrupt, criminal, and kleptocratic elements in a fragile state are relevant not only for thinking about political and diplomatic engagement; they have development implications as well. However, this kind of information has not always been brought to bear in development policymaking in an intentional, systematic way.

Furthermore, these cannot be one-off efforts; key political economy questions must be tracked on an ongoing basis. Typically, when a political economy analysis is done, it takes the form of a point-in-time snapshot. This has limited value to inform a multi-year program or strategy since it fails to account for how various developments, including the aid program itself, change the ecosystem during program implementation.

Regular, multistakeholder-focused, political economy assessments have been rare, but donors are increasingly aware of the need for them. Still, it takes time for the practice to become institutionalized and meaningfully incorporated. USAID has good guidance on applied political economy analysis for “thinking politically,” which focuses on the very issues described above. But it also acknowledges that it’s a work in progress, saying the agency is, “working to build a culture where staff and partners continuously explore the context of a given system, to adapt programming according to realities on the ground and opportunities and barriers that emerge. This work is not simply about a particular analytical product; perhaps more importantly, it’s also about a mindset.” Building a common mindset across agencies is more challenging still.

Going hand in hand with the need for more regular political economy assessments is the need for more local input into program design and implementation and more flexible, adaptable, programming that can respond to the assessments’ findings. Donors have recognized the importance of these approaches for some time, but implementation has been slower since they require shifts in well-established bureaucratic culture, practices, and accountability processes. For
instance, within the US government, USAID has been advancing these ideas through its emphasis on collaborating, learning, and adapting (CLA). However, low tolerance for risk and the prescriptive nature of the agency’s traditional approach to designing projects and managing awards has limited the shift to more adaptively managed awards. The new (2018) Acquisitions and Assistance Strategy seeks to address this, promising to structure more procurements to facilitate adaptive management and creatively integrate a wider range of partners, including local partners, into design and implementation.  

**Capitalizing on pockets of political will by supporting reformers**  

Where there has been a recent democratic transition or where high-level leadership is honestly seeking to address fragility, development assistance and other aspects of development policy can be powerful tools to support reformers in the face of resistance from vested interests.

**Aid conditions**

Conditioning aid on policy reforms or other actions has a fraught history. Indeed, many country governments have successfully evaded outside pressure for changes while maintaining aid flows. Nevertheless, almost all development agencies understand that the success and sustainability of most aid-financed interventions require some degree of policy or governance contribution by the country partner. Research suggests that where political leadership is truly committed to a development strategy, conditions can help support reform efforts in the face of resistance from domestic vested interests. But how they are applied matters. Conditionality is a more effective strategy when donors are less prescriptive and more flexible and focus more on desired policy outcomes rather than governance forms. Giving partner-country stakeholders leadership over the conditions’ design and implementation is also important to secure buy-in.

On the other hand, when conditions are seen as externally imposed or preempt local buy-in, elites that feel threatened are likely to undermine them. And donors should never assume that the promise of aid is a primary impetus for a government’s decision to pursue policy and institutional reform. Instead, donors must understand the internal dynamics that could reinforce—or impede—a government’s embrace of a policy condition. Observing how governments generate domestic political dividends can help donors initiate conversations about positive, mutually reinforcing conditions.

Conditions are also unhelpful—and indeed can backfire—where the withdrawal of funding for failure to meet an agreed-upon benchmark is not a credible option or threat. Donor agencies face significant bureaucratic pressure to spend planned funds, stemming either from an internal need to spend down current funds in order to defend future budget requests and/or from other interagency actors that want to shore up certain bilateral relationships in pursuit of other objectives. However, failure to respond to a fissure in the established accountability framework undermines the impact of the aid investment and creates moral hazard for future engagements.
Comparative rankings

Cross-country indexes or other benchmarking efforts that publicly rank countries’ governance or policy performance over time can be influential for some reform-minded governments and help unify support for their efforts. For instance, when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected as Liberia’s president, she championed reforms that would improve Liberia’s standing on the International Finance Corporation’s Doing Business Index. And MCC—which provides large-scale grant funding only to countries that demonstrate relatively strong performance on a series of policy indicators—has spurred reform conversations (of varying degrees of seriousness) in countries seeking access to those funds and the good governance “stamp of approval” they provide.

But even though indicator-based assessments may play a role in shaping policies, resulting reforms often respond more to the indicator itself—or donor demands around the kinds of things the indicator measures—which may or may not address the underlying issues necessary to achieve meaningful reform. This is particularly true of governance-focused assessments. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they are not shown to be effective at persuading government leaders to address issues related to power and corruption.

Supporting inclusivity and social cohesion

In fragile states where there has been political conflict, crafting a political settlement among elites is often an important early step in placating parties to the conflict, shifting their incentives away from continuing violence, and tempering the potential spoiler role they can play. Political settlements are broader than peace agreements. They encompass “the formal and informal processes, agreements, and practices that help consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a means for dealing with disagreements about interests, ideas and the distribution and use of power.” They are important for...
creating stability coming out of conflict. They are also inherently exclusionary and predatory and do not create a foundation for lasting peace and resilience and broad-based economic growth.

Persistent political exclusion, especially when compounded by job scarcity and insecurity, creates conditions for extremism; fosters grievances, while withholding a formal channel for their mediation; and is a central factor behind peace breakdowns and a return to violence. In Afghanistan, for example, elite bargains that attempted to “buy off” local insurgents and give regional leaders autonomy to preserve traditional power balances enabled the continuation of exclusionary practices against women and the propping up of criminal enterprises, among other policies that have undermined the potential for an inclusive, resilient state.

Inclusive settlements, on the other hand, can ensure effective mediation of contests for resources and give space to various actors with distinct interests. They also confer legitimacy upon and restore confidence in institutions that are essential for developing a more resilient state. Inclusive governing coalitions are more likely to facilitate productive discussion about reforms with a broader set of stakeholders, seek to implement those changes in collaboration with them, and design policies and institutions that reflect that inclusive approach. These can all contribute toward legitimacy and stability over the longer term. Indeed, the presence of “inclusive enough” political settlements has been an important characteristic of states that have emerged from fragility.

**Box 2. A precursor to peace in Colombia: Challenging the elite bargain**

Colombia provides a good example of the failure of an exclusionary elite bargain to control violence over the long term. The political settlement reached after the civil war in the 1940s and 1950s created parties controlled by elites, with little representation for poor, rural, Afro-Caribbean, or indigenous Colombians—the majority of the population. While the agreement ended the fighting, its lack of inclusivity allowed extremists to emerge and gain power as excluded populations turned to them to help challenge the status quo. It wasn’t until overwhelming popular demand for a constitutional referendum (in 1991) broke the narrow elite bargain and paved the way for a new, more inclusive state-society relationship that violence began to abate. While violence continued into the next two decades, it never returned to its pre-1991 levels. The real shift to greater inclusivity made Colombia’s peace process one of the more successful accords in recent history.

Despite their importance, promoting more inclusive political systems and fostering social cohesion have rarely been significant US priorities. Often, the US government’s approach has reflected a position that political settlements—and then getting to elections—matter most, rather than fully considering them as part of a broader and longer-term governance strengthening process.

Part of the US government’s limited (to date) focus on shifting elite deals to inclusive political processes stems from the narrow and discrete timeframes that typically govern the actions of US government actors. As described in more detail below, there can be pressure to deliver demonstrable quick wins rather than pursuing long-term goals. Even when taking a longer-term view, concrete planning and accompanying commitments rarely extend beyond a couple of years. Progress toward fostering inclusion and building state-society relations is rarely linear, however, and takes a generation or more—far longer than a budgeting or planning cycle, or even the lifespan of an administration. It is also hard to measure, especially on quarterly or annual reporting cycle timelines, which, in a bureaucratic culture that emphasizes measurability as accountability, makes it less appealing to those keen to demonstrate results.
Increasingly, the need for a shift is recognized. The Strategic Prevention Project recognizes the need for more focus on inclusivity and social cohesion, and the SAR highlights the need to support broader, inclusive processes. Operationalizing these sound recommendations will be the next step.

It can, however, be tricky to pinpoint the right role for a donor to incentivize and support elite bargains that strike the right balance between benefiting both elites, especially those that might play a spoiler role, and the people they purport to represent. While inclusivity is important for longer-term legitimacy and political resilience, change only happens if elites agree to it; too much external (or internal) pressure on the boundaries of the elite settlement can provoke a fracture that contributes to renewed violence.

Still, there are known modalities of donor influence in this area, including pursuing elites to advance a more inclusive agenda, supporting legitimate actors contesting political space to advocate for their inclusion, diplomatic pressure to bring elites to the negotiating table and mediation between parties, applying political and economic pressure to encourage elites to dismantle systems of exclusion, helping service delivery to address perceptions of injustice, and investing in social capital. There may be a key role for aid tools in the latter. Strengthening connections among like-minded communities (“bonding”), forging connections across communities with fewer shared interests (“bridging”), and connecting communities to formal institutions (“linking”) can help put state and society on more equal levels, lay the groundwork for more effective and positive collective action, enable and facilitate constructive dialogue among various stakeholders, and foster joint ownership of a national development and resilience agenda.

Box 3. Social capital interventions: Improving food security and resilience in Ethiopia

USAID Ethiopia’s Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion program in the Borena and Jijiga provinces sought to increase household income, enhance resilience, and improve capacity to manage climate shocks. Following the 2014 drought in Ethiopia, there were major pasture and water shortages, in addition to the spreading of crop diseases, plummeting livestock prices, and increasing prices on goods that households purchase. The program established baseline levels of connection within and across communities through qualitative interviews at the household level, and then performed interim assessments during the program to monitor progress. In both regions, social capital improvements were significantly associated with increased food security and better shock mitigation. That said, wealthier households were better prepared to absorb shocks, and due to strains on resources, were not always able to support poorer households. In addition, community leaders were more often absent during shocks, as they were searching for better terrain for crops and functioning water systems. This put strains on governance structures and undermined the ability of local government to redistribute food and resources. Despite these challenges, the results demonstrated that bonding and bridging interventions, in particular, enabled households across the board to recover and mitigate the effects of shocks.

How donors support these objectives in practice is not entirely straightforward, however. For example, community-driven development programs—in which communities identify, implement, and maintain externally funded development projects—often carry social cohesion objectives. But almost across the board, they have been found to have little or no impact on this desired outcome. The ad hoc projectized nature of most donor-funded community interventions has largely failed to open the door to broader social change. Not only that, the parallel structures these interventions create can undermine local governance, and programs can reinforce existing divisions within targeted communities and incentivize capture, especially where baseline inequality is higher. Furthermore, responsive states, a key ingredient for successful participatory engagement, are often absent in fragile contexts. Nevertheless, studies do show that people in post-conflict environments are eager to
participate in their community. This suggests that donors pursuing social inclusion objectives should pursue fostering social capital with greater intentionality—and with scalable approaches—to increase bonding within communities and bridging across them.

**Elevating and integrating governance into diplomacy, defense, and development**

Ultimately, the United States cannot have an effective strategy in fragile states if it ignores or deprioritizes the politics of fragility. Attention to democracy, anticorruption, rule of law, and respect for human rights are fundamental, but in practice, these have not always been sufficiently elevated or integrated.

Instead, governance tends to exist as a stand-alone policy priority, siloed within agencies, with a relatively small cadre of staff with relatively limited funds supporting programmatic solutions to particular governance challenges. But increasing autocracy and closing political space do more than set back US governance programming; they can also accelerate fragility more broadly, with attendant implications for the US government’s wider strategy.

Even within the segments of the interagency that focus on governance, the sector has often gotten short shrift. For instance, USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) unit sat within the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), but was often sidelined in terms of resources and leadership attention by the more urgent, resource-intensive, and attention-grabbing crises and disasters also under DCHA’s purview. USAID’s response has been to move governance to the new Bureau for Development, Democracy, and Innovation (DDI), along with several other elements (e.g., economic growth, education, and the Global Development Lab). These are probably less likely to sideline DRG with their urgency and intensiveness than its former bureau mates. But DRG will also become one of nine subunits within DDI, suggesting that questions about the sufficiency of resources and leadership attention remain. Furthermore, while the change seeks to establish a resource center for cross-cutting governance support that can better reach throughout the agency and its missions, it also structurally removes governance from the agency’s prevention, stabilization, countering violent extremism, and transitions work—even though governance is central to these issues and over 40 percent of USAID’s governance funding goes to fragile states. USAID acknowledges the need for strong linkages between the proposed new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization and the governance unit within DDI. Though still vague in terms of operationalization, these linkages will be critical.

Diplomatic support for governance efforts is also important. Diplomatic engagement can support reformers during narrow windows of opening, encourage elites to pursue a more inclusive agenda, and advocate for legitimate actors to contest political space. Preventive diplomacy can use mediation and other approaches to help keep disputes from escalating or limit their effect when they occur.

When done well, foreign assistance and diplomatic engagement can and should reinforce one another to influence elite incentives and support inclusive governance objectives. But the degree to which the two efforts are well coordinated has varied. For example, targeted diplomatic efforts combined with an increase in aid in advance of Kenya’s 2013 elections contributed to their relatively peaceful conduct. On the other hand, diplomatic support for the major democratic political transition being led by Ethiopia’s new reformist prime minister has been slower to kick in. The kind of high-level political support from Washington that can help reinforce new democratic openings has been limited.
Recommendations

Interagency actors should conduct frequent, high quality, intelligence-informed political economy analyses that are actionable and systematically shared among agencies. Different parts of the US government have always done various sorts of political analysis—many of very high quality—but they are rarely rolled up into one place in a way that enables all interagency actors to “sing from the same hymn sheet.” Furthermore, while these analyses are often helpfully descriptive, they have rarely taken the next step to describe what actions or approaches they should or should not pursue. Frequent, iterative political economy analyses should identify both political risks as well as capacities/assets for adapting to those risks and discuss how political risks interact with economic, social, environmental, and security risks. Analyses should also draw out key operational advice for missions or operational teams. Though the State Department would likely be well-placed to lead this effort, analyses should capitalize on the relevant expertise among different agencies, including the intelligence community.

Congress—and members of the development community—should support efforts to create fragile-state assistance strategies with more realistic, longer-term expectations. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate versions of the Global Fragility Act recognize that preventing violence is a long-term pursuit. Too often US government efforts in fragile states have operated on short time frames with an outsized focus on delivering quick and visible wins, underprioritizing longer-term development. The legislation asks agencies to take a long-term, 10-year strategic view to focus on efforts, like supporting good governance, whose results may be slower to materialize but are foundational to addressing the underlying drivers of fragility and building resilience. A dose of realism is warranted, however, even within longer-term strategies. Building institutions and social capital are generational pursuits. Though it is fair to expect headway within a decade, implementing agencies and their congressional overseers should still be wary of saddling long-term plans with even longer-term goals.

USAID should use assistance to support social cohesion objectives, building on evidence of failure and adding to the body of evidence about what works. Helping societies build social capital may be one way donors can support a transition from a closed elite political deal to more inclusive forms of governance. However, there is evidence to suggest that many interventions with social cohesion objectives have failed to achieve them. US foreign assistance investments in social capital building should be based on a keen understanding of the limitations of different programming types; be informed by political and social analyses and lessons from past interventions; take an adaptive, long-term approach to social capital investments; avoid prescribing specific forms of community and network engagement; and become comfortable with a drawn-out, nonlinear path to change. Investments should also be accompanied by robust evaluation to draw lessons that can be applied to future programming.

USAID should ensure strong linkages between its governance unit and the new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization. Now that USAID’s democracy, rights, and governance office is bureaucratically divorced from the agency’s work on fragility, violence prevention, counterterrorism, and stabilization, creating strong institutional linkages between the two units will be critical to ensure coherent, governance-focused support to missions in fragile states.

The State Department and USAID should ensure that diplomacy and foreign assistance reinforce one another in pursuit of governance objectives. Each tool is stronger in combination with the other. Diplomacy is often a prominent tool to encourage—or react to—free and fair elections, but the roots and repercussions of governance quality extend far beyond elections. The State Department should actively seek opportunities to use diplomacy to reinforce foreign assistance goals associated with institution strengthening, civil society participation, and reformist transition.
Notes


[10] Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, 2018; de Waal, 2014; de Waal, 2015. In addition, the threat of transnational terrorism typically occupies a fairly low rank on the list of domestic security priorities, giving partner country leaders even less incentive to break that cycle (Watts, 2015).


[15] Most of the fragility assessments conducted as part of the New Deal for Fragile States pilots were one-off exercises that did not contribute to sustained dialogue about resilience and the causes of fragility (Hughes et al., 2014).

[16] World Bank Group, 2017; Cheng, Goodhand, and Mechan, 2018. The EU, World Bank and others are also working to create politically smart fragility assessments but are also in early phases.

[17] USAID’s Country Development and Cooperation Strategies (CDCSs) don’t require political economy analyses specifically. Just over half of the 60 CDCSs reviewed included a supplemental democracy and governance assessment. USAID’s Project Appraisal Documents require an examination of how the local system affects the problem the project seeks to address but doesn’t offer detail about what that should include.


Some of these assessments and rankings are more effective than others (Parks, Rice, and Custer, 2015). Laws and Leftwich, 2014 (p. 1).


Kleinfeld and Bader, 2014.

World Bank Group, 2011.


In addition, an examination of the causes of civil war in post-colonial Sub Saharan Africa found that exclusionary elite bargains were associated with a trajectory toward civil war, while more inclusive agreements fostered more political stability (Lindemann, 2008).

Still, the 2016 Colombia peace deal has not been executed without challenges (Serrano, 2019). US Department of State, 2019.

Natsios, 2010.


Jones, Elgin-Cossart, and Esberg, 2012; Marc et al., 2013; Van Metre and Bishai, 2019.


Frankenberger, 2016.

For example, in 2018, USAID/Ukraine issued a request for proposal to implement a community-driven development project with the goals of creating greater acceptance of shared culture and increasing participation to improve governance and resolve community problems (USAID Ukraine, 2018).

International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 2018; Mansuri and Rao, 2013. The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation paper received some criticism, but the authors stand behind their social cohesion conclusions. See: Oxfam, 2018; Menon and White, 2018.


Mansuri and Rao, 2013.

[54] Just 15 percent of USAID’s funds go toward governance purposes (data are from Foreign Aid Explorer and reflect 2013-2017 obligations).


[56] The Office of Transition Initiatives and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance are also under DCHA.

[57] Data are from Foreign Aid Explorer and reflect 2013-2017 obligations.


[61] The last time an American president visited Ethiopia was nearly two decades ago, and the current secretary of state has not yet set foot in Africa (Devermont and Temin, 2019).

Strengthening Interagency Policy Coherence in Fragile States

Harmonizing objectives and addressing competing theories of change

Much has been made of the need to bring all “three Ds” of US foreign policy—diplomacy, defense, and development—to bear on addressing fragility. But, as the 2015 Fragility Study Group report succinctly states, “It is one thing to bring the entire toolkit of statecraft to bear. It is another thing entirely to make sure that toolkit works in concert toward shared goals.” The latter has eluded US policymakers for decades. Part of the problem is that diplomatic, development, and military actors do not always uniformly agree that addressing fragility is critical for achieving their near-term objectives. Even when they do share the same broad goals of confronting fragility, what is often missing is an agreement on the root causes and a unified theory of change for how to address them.

When crafting an approach to a fragile state, the State Department, USAID, and DOD tend to define the problem, create a strategy for how to solve it, and determine the role of aid in solving it based on their individual and distinct mandates. These visions do not always align toward the pursuit of a collective goal and may work at cross purposes with one another.

In practice, the security perspective is frequently prominent in the US government’s approach to framing the problem and how to solve it. This is driven by several factors. First, in the post-9/11 era, fragile states are often viewed as incubators of threats—including violent extremism, transnational terrorist groups, and criminal traffickers—to the United States and its allies. Second, there is simply a matter of scale. With a topline budget 10 times that of the State Department and USAID—and comparably sized foreign aid funds—DOD can put resources and people behind its objectives in ways the civilian agencies often cannot. Transfer authorities allow DOD to redistribute some of its largesse to the State Department and USAID in pursuit of shared goals. But current transfer authorities have gone unused. And past efforts were met with concerns that the Pentagon maintained considerable influence over these funds, overshadowing civilian agencies’ diplomatic, development, and/or humanitarian objectives—and expertise. The military also tends to have a first-mover advantage. Because it is often first on the ground in conflict situations, it jumpstarts the policy and mission framing process around a national security perspective, which can end up biasing decision making and can crowd out other policy considerations. The pervasive political imperative to couch foreign aid as tied to US self-interest also factors in. US self-interest encompasses a range of elements—including protecting public health and expanding economic and trade opportunities—but over the last two decades, a security-related lens has often dominated, especially for high profile interventions. With aid budgets under pressure, perceptions that funding for any given intervention depends on its link to US interests (i.e., security interests) has affected the prioritization of other objectives that might be equally or more relevant to helping countries address fragility.

The security lens can distort other objectives, however. When poorly coordinated with diplomatic and development strategies and/or when poorly executed, security-focused funding can be at odds with the US government’s longer-term state legitimacy, stability, and resilience objectives. Often, security expenditures are targeted to achieve quick, visible wins with little integration into—and sometimes at odds with—longer-term political and/or development strategies aimed at preventing descent into greater conflict and building resilience to complex risks. In addition, unconditioned interventions intended to achieve security objectives do little to reduce the incentives of the partner government to reinforce and empower corrupt, undemocratic, and/or abusive components of the political economy. And policies aimed at counterterrorism have sometimes been used—intentionally or unintentionally—as a pretext for retaliatory actions against civil society.
Recognizing the costly breakdown in interagency alignment in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Departments of State and Defense along with USAID joined forces to create a new framework for interagency stabilization efforts that capitalizes on the hard-won lessons learned from the past. The resulting Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) is a major step forward in its articulation of mutually agreed lines of authority between departments and agencies and their respective roles in stabilization activities. The new framework identifies the State Department as the overall lead agency for stabilization efforts, USAID as the lead implementing agency for nonsecurity assistance, and DOD as a supporting element that provides security and reinforces civilian efforts.

The SAR has been a welcome development but comes with important gaps and limitations. First, the specifics of what this kind of coordination will look like in practice in different contexts remain to be worked out. And second, crucially, it only applies to stabilization, which is a distinct and defined phase. Left undefined is how interagency authorities and roles should be structured in lower conflict fragile states that are not stabilization priorities or in countries transitioning from stabilization to a longer-term development orientation. The United States Institute of Peace-led Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States proposed to address that gap by proposing a new US Strategic Prevention Initiative that would establish similar roles for the interagency actors under a new violence prevention strategy.

**Understanding the imperative—and challenges—of interagency coordination**

There is widespread recognition that effective interagency collaboration is necessary to ensure strategic coherence, jointly identify risks and plan for their mitigation, preemptively evaluate trade-offs between short-term and long-term priorities, and keep US government actors from working at cross purposes with one another. Evidence suggests that this type of collaboration has improved over the last 10 years, especially at the field level. However, despite this progress, challenges remain in breaking down stovepipes and developing joint plans for sustained, integrated efforts to address fragility.

Part of the disconnect exists at the macro-strategic level. USAID has a fragile states strategy, DOD has a national security strategy that references the risks of state fragility, the State Department and USAID have the Strategic Prevention Project (taking the lens of violence prevention), and the State Department, USAID, and DOD teamed up to create the Stabilization Assistance Review (taking an
even narrower lens of stabilization). But these efforts are not unified, and each on its own does not sufficiently elevate fragility as a national priority.

At the strategic level for specific issues, the interagency has multiple coordination processes at work. The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal body for coordinating foreign policy and national security policies among the interagency and has, at various times, had dedicated committees focused specifically on individual high priority fragile states (e.g., South Sudan) as well as issues related to fragility (e.g., countering violent extremism). It serves in some ways as a potential decision-making counterweight to interagency actors, particularly those in the field, who may favor short-term gains or the preservation of certain relationships in ways that are unaligned with broader US policy interests.

Individual agencies also have their own coordination mechanisms, with varying levels of success and influence. The State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) fosters partnerships with the military so that civilian expertise and ideas can be integrated into DOD planning and operations. Its predecessor, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), was highly focused on interagency planning and coordination in fragile and conflict-affected states (though it emphasized political and military objectives more than development). However, limited funding and authority, bureaucratic turf battles, an unclear mandate (outside of providing surge capacity for Iraq and Afghanistan), and limited demand for services from the field hampered S/CRS’s effectiveness and contributed to its restructuring into CSO in 2011.

USAID’s Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation serves as the agency’s primary point of contact with DOD and advises military commands carrying out development activities in the field. Agencies have also increased staff-to-staff contact, with USAID military liaison officers now embedded in most missions, DOD liaisons at most overseas posts, and State Department and USAID representatives at each combatant command. There are also regional joint planning and agenda-setting events among the State Department, USAID, and DOD. There is evidence that these efforts have made a difference. DOD, the State Department, and USAID staff say that working civilian-military relationships have improved noticeably over the last decade.

Nevertheless, a number of factors constrain the effectiveness of these collaborative structures. Much of the planning and budgeting for DOD, the State Department, and USAID take place on different timelines and in different locations. The lack of common terminology presents another obstacle. Even when planning does take place collaboratively, it’s not always done optimally. For instance, DOD has welcomed civilian participation in its field-level planning processes and often requests more, but the State Department and USAID simply don’t have the personnel bandwidth to contribute. State Department–led Integrated Country Strategies seek to bring together all agencies’ efforts and identify common US priorities in a given country, but these have sometimes served more to justify existing programs than to guide the development of new approaches. And agency field staff still see their primary accountability relating to their own department or agency plans, as opposed to an interagency coordination vehicle. Furthermore, the degree to which the outcomes of higher-level coordinated planning sessions end up translating back to planning or implementation at the country or regional level can end up depending on the individuals involved, the issues they think are important, and the relationships they have across agencies and on the ground.

Fault lines in coordination do not happen exclusively between agencies. Intra-agency dynamics sometimes prevent agencies from optimizing their engagement in interagency structures. Internal disagreements can erupt between regional and functional bureaus or across functional areas (e.g., between counterterrorism and stabilization or human rights staff). When an agency fails to corral the views of all its relevant departments and bureaus, it does not bring a unified voice to the interagency, leaving space for confusion and potentially limiting buy-in.
The persistent nature of interagency coordination challenges suggests the need to recognize the limitations of superstructure coordination in corralling interagency actors. While the NSC and other Washington-based interagency processes can bring certain benefits—setting direction when no field-led process is underway, identifying pots of usable funding, and producing cross-comparative case studies to bring to bear on strategy setting—they can also unhelpfully interfere, especially when strong country processes are underway. Field-level coordination can be particularly important since it is predominantly at the country level that bilateral relationships are formed and managed, where donor coordination takes place, and where strategies and programs are developed. This points to the need for Washington to reinvigorate a focus on how to support alignment on small, specific things in particular contexts.

**Using country-level coordinating mechanisms to help define a coherent interagency strategy**

Beyond US government efforts, coordination mechanisms at the host country level between governments, donors, implementers, and civil society in fragile states can help orient multiple US government actors (along with other donors and actors) around a common set of priorities. When country coordination mechanisms are absent—or, more often, lack investment and quality control—there is no center of gravity for different US government actors (and other donors) to engage in policy discussions, coalesce around collective action, and pool resources. Strong mechanisms, on the other hand, can provide a framework around which to mediate any interagency divisions. Certainly, country coordination authorities will not themselves solve the broader challenges that hamper a whole-of-US-government orientation, but strong mechanisms can help anchor US assistance, while also leveraging other partner resources, providing mutual accountability, promoting “burden-sharing,” smoothing alignment with the partner government, and harmonizing implementation with other donors/partners.

There have been some notable successes with these kinds of mechanisms. In Liberia, a government-led, multi-stakeholder steering committee (in which the United States had a prominent role) signaled the need for the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), made it politically and financially possible, and kept the government and partners talking through difficult inflection points in the transition. The New Deal Compact in Somalia has also provided a useful framework for the government, donors, and civil society to coalesce around prioritization, sequencing, aid effectiveness, and coordination.

Despite the importance of strong country coordination mechanisms for partner-government alignment—as well as intradonor coherence—and despite evidence of their successful application in some contexts, the aid community has generally paid scant attention to gathering and applying lessons about how these structures work best and how best to support them.
**Recommendations**

The White House should develop a government-wide fragile-state strategy as a framework to elevate fragility as a national priority. Such a strategy should be organized around the central point that tolerating or supporting malign elites in pursuit of near-term objectives exacerbates fragility and compromises the long-term interests of the United States. It should develop common principles for interagency actors, including on how interagency actors can better reconcile and unify their response to democratic declines and closing civic space and how diplomatic and foreign assistance interventions can better support one another toward common goals.

Agency heads should designate an agency-level “broker” to unify agency positions in interagency contexts. To improve agency contributions to a given interagency process, each agency’s principle should designate a “broker,” the single individual responsible for bringing relevant intra-agency actors together (e.g., regional and all the various functional offices), corralling their views, and bringing a unified agency voice to the interagency.

Embassy country teams should support the development of robust host government–led country coordination mechanisms. Country coordination mechanisms can have both a disciplining effect on US government “whole of government” cooperation and serve as an organizing function for coordination with government and other local and external partners. The multi-sector scope of such mechanisms can also bring donors into a state-building mindset rather than taking a narrower sector-specific focus. In tandem, embassy country teams should support the generation and dissemination of lessons learned on the effectiveness of these types of structures.

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**Box 5. The value of investment in country coordination mechanisms**

Country-led coordination mechanisms can help align priorities and inspire collective action toward a national state-building agenda. Following the peaceful transition to a new federal government in Somalia in 2012, donors united around a new framework for advancing resilience, state-building, and security. Two years later, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) was established to pool finances from a dense network of donors to align with the priorities set forth in Somalia’s first National Development Plan in three decades. The SDRF set up nine working groups linking donors to coordinate action, and pulled together three separate funding windows, administered by the UN, World Bank, and African Development Bank. It is overseen by an interministerial steering committee run out of the deputy prime minister’s office. Alongside the SDRF, there is a parallel effort coordinating security sector reforms and investments, with a separate government steering committee. The working groups also include civil society and implementing partners, which are important for coordinating the broader response and laying the groundwork for legitimacy among civil society. Furthermore, recognizing the intersection of development, security, and humanitarian needs and objectives, a higher-level coordinating committee, the Somalia Partnership Forum, oversees both strands and provides a forum for inclusive, strategic dialogue among the government and its international partners to promote coherence and coordination.

On the other hand, in Haiti, while the interim Haiti recovery commission and donor recovery conference were put into motion just three weeks into the emergency relief response after the devastating 2010 earthquake, the lack of real investment in the coordinating mechanism hindered its effectiveness. The commission was designed without space for interministerial working groups to guide and support external partners’ efforts. The quick and laudable action on forming the commission and convening a donor conference dissipated as it became bogged down in a fragmented project approval process without the benefit of government-level strategic alignment of projects to a wider reform agenda.
Notes


[64] This is true across a wide range of foreign policy issues. Creating functional interagency coordination is a challenge that transcends state fragility.


[67] According to data on Foreign Aid Explorer, from 2013-2017 military departments funded $71 billion in foreign assistance (obligations), more than the State Department ($70 billion) or USAID ($64 billion).

[68] For example, Section 1207 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (now expired) gave DOD authority to transfer up to $100 million per fiscal year to the State Department. Between FY2006 and FY2010 (when it expired), Section 1207 funded $445 million in projects in 23 countries (Serafino, 2011). Section 385 in the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act allows DOD to transfer up to $75 million to the State Department and USAID to address the root causes of violence, though DOD has not yet used this authority (Government Accountability Office, 2019).


[76] Data are from the Security Assistance Monitor (2014-2018). The Security Assistance Monitor compiles all publicly available data on US security assistance, but totals may be incomplete if some spending details have not been made public.

[77] Watts, 2015; US Agency for International Development, 2016 (p. 34). Some have also argued that the United States’ significant investment in controlling HIV/AIDS in Uganda (around $300 million per year) also contributes to legitimizing weak leadership by maintaining high funding levels despite a negative democratic trajectory.


In 2016, interviewed staff from DOD, State, and USAID affirmed that working civilian-military relationships have improved noticeably in the last ten years (McCannell, 2016).

Burns, Flournoy, and Lindborg, 2016.

The administrations of George W. Bush and Donald Trump refer to these committees as Policy Coordination Committees; under President Barack Obama, they were called Interagency Policy Committees.

Brimley et al., 2015.

S/CRS was established in 2004. While it developed some important groundwork, it also encountered a number of obstacles, including limited funding and authority, bureaucratic turf battles, limited demand for services from the field, and an unclear mandate (Serafino, 2012; McCannell, 2016; Adams, 2014).

Courtney and Loustau, 2018.

Serafino, 2012; McCannell, 2016; Adams, 2014

The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation was originally called the Office of Military Affairs.


McCannell, 2016.


Watts et al., 2018.

Kleinfield, 2016.

Weak or non-existent country-led institutional frameworks and coordination mechanisms between donors and partners has been a chief obstacle to the successful implementation of the internationally agreed New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (Ingram and Papoulidis, 2017).

Hearn, 2015.

Ingram and Papoulidis, 2017; Papoulidis, 2011.

Medinilla, Shiferaw, and Veron, 2019.

USAID’s new deputy assistant administrator level CVE coordinator provides a good example. The position, which is supported by a high-level steering committee and a working level council, has improved the coherence of USAID’s planning and messaging around CVE.
Updating the Mechanics of US Government
Development Assistance to Fragile States

Creating more responsive programming

Many of USAID’s development tools lack nimbleness and flexibility, making them ineffective at addressing quick-to-evolve needs associated with fragility and ill-suited for targeting narrow, governance-related windows of opportunity. Due to extensive procurement and design processes, it can take well over a year to get from program proposal to the beginning of implementation.

Development funds are also fairly inflexible, with allocations largely dictated by congressional spending directives and administration-led priorities. Often, missions have discretion over only a quarter or less of their budgets. Some accounts, like the Economic Support Fund, are more flexible than others, like Global Health, but it can still be hard in practice to quickly move pots of money to address critical emergent issues in fragile states. The Complex Crisis Fund, established by Congress in FY2010, appoints funds to the State Department and USAID to undertake quick response prevention and stabilization activities. But with a peak budget of only $50 million and just $30 million in FY2018, many argue that it is underfunded.

Spending directives and limited flexibility not only constrain how the US government can respond to challenges in fragile states, but they can also narrow the way in which agencies identify, perceive, and prioritize challenges to address. The siloed nature of funding, along with unintegrated workstreams, constrain how the State Department and USAID conduct situational/political economy analyses in fragile states. The very act of choosing the team and funding stream to conduct an analysis decides ex ante what kind of problem there is. For example, by assigning the countering violent extremism (CVE) team, funded with CVE funds, to do a CVE analysis in a fragile state, the challenge is defined as a CVE problem, even if extremism is not the only or even the primary driver or manifestation of fragility. With that initial lens placed on the effort, CVE may become the only funding available. Even those working on CVE become constrained in their ability to bring other types of funding, attention, or complementary efforts to address broader factors related to fragility.

Narrow, focused assessments like these both contribute to and are a symptom of the projectized nature of aid so common in fragile states that prevents national-scale programming that can better tackle the root causes of fragility. A multidisciplinary diagnostic approach is better able to take a wider view that can consider multiple constraints and the relationship among them, including which are relative priorities and which have sequencing considerations. Again, however, for such an approach to make sense, USAID needs sufficiently agile funding to respond to the findings.

The US government does have some nimble development assistance tools. Its humanitarian response teams, led by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), tend to be relatively well-resourced and can be quickly mobilized to meet immediate needs. And the agency’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is organized and resourced to provide fast, agile, short-term assistance to address transition and stabilization needs. But these are separate and specialized corps within USAID with narrow mandates and limited linkages to the rest of the agency’s slow and steady “traditional” development focus.

Lawmakers increasingly understand the importance of agile resources for addressing quick-to-evolve stabilization and violence prevention needs. They also recognize the tension that can exist between ensuring appropriate oversight of funds while providing for speed and flexibility of disbursement. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have released versions of a Global Fragility Act that would establish a “Stabilization and Prevention Fund” with the idea that it would be exempt from directives around specified activities or sectors. In exchange for this flexibility, the State Department and USAID would be required to present, among other things, a long-term plan for...
violence reduction, clear measurable objectives, performance metrics, and a strategy for learning-based adaptation. 

Limited flexibility within individual awards also constrains responsiveness. USAID awards have become increasingly prescriptive about implementation. However, it is not always possible to know at the outset of a program how best to deliver an intervention to achieve the desired outcomes—especially in fragile states. Fragile states often have limited or low-quality data to inform ex ante project design. And conditions on the ground are often more fluid and can quickly change the implementation context. Research shows that allowing those in the field to adapt their approaches to shifting realities, especially in less predictable environments, yields better outcomes.

Some pockets of USAID do emphasize flexibility. Food for Peace programs typically allow organizations to review and refine their technical approach after the award has been made. In addition, the agency’s resilience programming has increasingly adopted shock-responsive approaches that include more flexibility within awards and greater use of crisis modifiers. But for much of the agency’s programming, approaches to designing activities and managing awards have limited opportunities for implementing partners to change course as circumstances or emerging evidence suggest they should.

USAID acknowledges the need for greater flexibility, responsiveness, and adaptability in its development funding, procurement, and programming. This is clearly reflected in its new Acquisition and Assistance Strategy, which charts an encouraging way forward with its emphasis on facilitating adaptive management and reducing the time between design and procurement. Indeed, shifting toward more responsive, flexible, and adaptable development tools is within USAID’s reach. The agency has a number of existing authorities that are infrequently used, some of which offer greater flexibility with regard to resources, personnel, and strategy timeline and may be well-suited for addressing issues related to fragility, conflict, or crisis. For example, design and reform approaches (or inception phase approaches) are considered a best practice but are not widely used outside Food for Peace. The problem is that staff may not always be aware of these procurement types; may, under time pressure, prefer the efficiency of their “tried-and-true” mechanisms; and/or may fear pushback from congressional overseers who are also less familiar with these more flexible, less utilized approaches.

**Building fast-response staffing capability**

Staffing flexibility is also critical to adequately address time-sensitive, but nondisaster-related needs. Beyond the short-term, priority crises that OTI and OFDA typically tackle, USAID does not have expeditionary development capacity and is challenged to quickly reallocate appropriately skilled staff to help missions address pressing crisis prevention efforts, take advantage of narrow governance-related windows of opportunity, or plan medium-term efforts to bridge between crisis response, recovery, and longer-term development. USAID’s organizational culture and accompanying staffing patterns tend to gravitate around the agency’s responsibilities in steady-state operating environments and have not been conducive to maintaining effective nonemergency surge capacity. USAID’s existing surge mechanism (outside of OFDA and OTI) relies entirely on contractors and was able to accommodate less than half the surge requests it received in 2016.

The State Department also has a history with surge staffing. The Civilian Response Corps was created in the mid-2000s to have on-call quickly deployable staff with a range of civilian expertise necessary for violence prevention, stabilization, and transition objectives. It was quickly reduced in size and ambition and ultimately dissolved in 2012 due to a variety of factors, including its expense; difficulties getting the right people to the field; limited demand for its services; lack of a clear vision and mission; and insufficient long-term political support. The State Department’s Conflict and
Stabilization Operations Bureau still maintains a successor network of quickly deployable personnel that conducts research and designs diplomatic strategies or programs in stabilization contexts. However, its narrow scope and uncertain model—due to leadership changes and budgetary uncertainty—have limited its ambition.

**Increasing focus on—and resources for—prevention**

In principle, the US government has long recognized the importance of conflict prevention. The 2004 9/11 Commission Report flagged the importance of prevention and the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (2010) elevated it as a core pillar of foreign policy, recognizing its cost-effectiveness (saving $16 for every dollar invested) compared to crisis response. Indeed, evidence suggests that foreign aid can be quite effective at conflict prevention. On the other hand, aid efforts that respond to conflict have a poor track record of reducing violence and often increase it.

Despite the rhetorical support for prevention, however, funding mechanisms have not fully supported the implementation of the policy. Resources, especially the scarce flexible, nonsectorally driven resources that prevention activities need, have not been prioritized. As a result, even though the State Department and USAID teams are capable of producing high-quality analyses that inform how the US government might approach a prevention strategy in a country, missions have had limited capacity to shift their program funding in response.

Part of the problem with securing resources for prevention is that demonstrating attributable successes to a particular intervention is exceedingly hard. Absent rigorous evaluation—which should be used more than it is but is not always practical or appropriate—it is hard to demonstrate a counterfactual when that counterfactual is the absence of something happening, especially when multiple factors working together are often responsible for impact. Stakeholders hoping for a prominent US prevention win may be unsatisfied with the minor contributing role any individual intervention is likely to play. Not only that, success only comes over the long-term, requiring a sustained commitment that goes beyond the time horizon of many political actors. All of these factors shape the incentives of policymakers and affect what they choose to support. Studies have shown that incumbent politicians in the US are rewarded electorally for investing in post-crisis response but not for investing in prevention.

There are existing accounts that can fund prevention. The Complex Crisis Fund, for instance, is well-suited for funding prevention, and USAID is exploring how to use it better. Historically, it has been underresourced and has been underutilized as a prevention tool, focusing more on crisis response needs and missing opportunities to capitalize on key post-crisis moments to lay the groundwork for prevention.

*Studies have shown that incumbent politicians in the US are rewarded electorally for investing in post-crisis response but not for investing in prevention.*

Growing resources for prevention will require increasing recognition, especially among members of Congress, that prevention matters. There are encouraging signs of this shift. The State Department—
led Strategic Prevention Project pulls together lessons from literature and from US experience to better target foreign assistance to reduce the risk and severity of violent conflict. And the USIP task force report on preventing extremism in fragile states is a clear call for a greater focus on and more resources for prevention. Reflecting the task force report’s core recommendations, both versions of the Global Fragility Act making its way through Congress would require involved agencies to coordinate on identifying and achieving long-term violence prevention goals in a select set of fragile states. Even if the bill ultimately passes, getting sufficiently agile funding to implement agreed-upon strategies will be necessary, as will ensuring prevention priorities are seen as complementary—and not secondary—to stabilization priorities.

Related to limited funding, prevention has also been deprioritized bureaucratically. Until USAID’s recent reorganization, the agency’s violence prevention efforts sat within the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) alongside the agency’s humanitarian response function. The latter, due to its size, scope, and the political attention it attracts, dominated the attention of leadership, effectively sidelining prevention. Prevention activities have also been functionally spread among multiple small offices that work on the same issues in the same country but have different procedures and policies.

The ongoing reorganization of USAID seeks to address these shortcomings. It moved humanitarian response out of DCHA to a new, unified Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance and created, from the former DCHA, the new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization (CPS). This change should allow CPS leadership to dedicate more time to prevention initiatives than DCHA leadership could typically afford. CPS was also designed to better integrate the activities of the various prevention-focused offices. But even though CPS has been formally approved, the details of how it will work and link to the rest of the agency remain to be addressed. Functions and themes critical to fragility and violence prevention will remain spread throughout the agency—in the new Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance and in the governance-focused pockets of the proposed Bureau for Development, Democracy, and Innovation. USAID promises linkages among these units, but the success of the reorganization—and the ability of the agency to increase its focus on prevention—will depend heavily on what these linkages look like and how they work in practice.

**Integrating humanitarian response and development**

When crises emerge in fragile states, development efforts are often supplanted by urgent humanitarian or crisis response efforts with limited planning for the eventual glide path back to development programming. This “missing middle” is not new. As far back as the 1980s, the aid industry was lamenting the gap between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development in the context of the food crisis in Africa. But barriers to bridging this gap persist. Separate financing models and accounts make planning a humanitarian-development transition difficult. The end result is that crisis response is often an intervention unto itself without being integrated into a larger plan that includes a transition through recovery and back to supporting longer-term resilience and development objectives. Too often, planning for a follow-on program begins as OTI or OFDA are phasing out. But this is too late, especially given the lengthy process of designing and making awards for “traditional” development activities. Momentum—including community trust, early recovery gains, and even talented staff—can be lost in the gap period.

Instead, USAID needs to think in terms of developing concurrent synergistic programming to form a bridge between crisis or humanitarian response and steady-state development interventions aimed at building positive resilience. USAID’s Food for Peace offers a model of how to do this, often integrating a strategy for longer-term development and peacebuilding tools into its relief efforts. Similarly, in the agency’s resilience focus countries, efforts are being made to better sequence, layer, and integrate humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding assistance.
Incorporating fragility into sector-based programming

In most fragile states, a significant portion of USAID funds go to sectors like health, education, and agriculture. Though interventions in these areas often interact with drivers of fragility, programs are not always designed with a good understanding of these interactions or explicit fragility-conscious goals like building social cohesion. For the most part, USAID’s sector specialists—who are in functional bureaus and/or who rotate between fragile and nonfragile contexts—tend to look at a country’s challenges from the perspective of service delivery in that particular sector. The State Department and USAID have good guides on conducting conflict sensitivity, but they are voluntary and not always done.

Yet crosswalking sectoral interventions with their implications for fragility is important. While a number of theories of change posit that improving service delivery will help reduce fragility, this merits further exploration. First of all, the source of service delivery may matter; evidence from the Democratic Republic of the Congo shows that the dominance of nonstate providers of health and education services—as a response to low state capacity to provide them—can further erode state authority. But even improved service delivery by state actors may have limited bearing on fragility. New evidence from the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium finds that other aspects of how citizens negotiate their relationship with the state can matter far more than service delivery in a particular sector for forging legitimacy.

Both the State Department, in its Strategic Prevention Project, and USAID, in its new policy framework, are right to point out and commit to remedying the unmet need to modulate the improvement of a particular sector along the spectrum of fragility. They recognize they need to understand better how different groups interact with particular sectors in fragile vs. nonfragile states and how service delivery interventions affect fragility. Better crosswalking sector experts with experts in fragility, conflict, and crisis as well as experts in inclusion could help identify the key sorts of questions sector-focused staff should consider in fragile states.

The structure of USAID’s foreign service is not well matched to the changing nature of development and the rising prominence of fragile states in USAID’s development portfolio.

Building staff skills to meet the challenges of fragility

The structure of USAID’s foreign service is not well matched to the changing nature of development and the rising prominence of fragile states in USAID’s development portfolio. Many staff have limited background in crisis, and senior foreign services officers, in particular, likely find themselves confronted with an entirely new set of challenges than when they started their careers. Many staff are sector specialists but, as mentioned above, are not well specialized in how to think about how to approach sectors in ways that address fragility, build resilience, and meet sector needs. Not only can this affect the results of programming, but it can also limit USAID’s ability to understand how sectoral results bear more broadly on fragility. This suggests a need to increase training for sector experts to think about how sectoral interventions interact with drivers of fragility.
USAID is also underprepared to support staff going into, coming out of, or transitioning between fragile and conflict-affected states. These kinds of environments can take a personal toll on individual staff, especially those without a specific orientation toward fragility and conflict.

**Making the most of multilateral and coordinated engagement**

Changes to US policy and practice will make little difference in the absence of better international partnerships. Multilateral funds and institutions can be a helpful platform for better coordination and help spread risk and responsibility among multiple donors. The strategies of multilateral funds and institutions also tend to be less subject than those of many bilateral donors to changes in political priorities or shifting geostrategic needs, allowing for the longer-term, more consistent investment patterns that peacebuilding and strengthening resilience requires. However, recent funding levels for multilateral efforts suggest they have not been a high priority within the US foreign assistance budget. Funding for the multilateral development banks, for instance, accounts for less than 10 percent of total US foreign assistance.

**Recommendations**

**Funding**

The administration, Congress, and the development community should support efforts to create longer-term, more agile funding for violence prevention objectives and activities that support resilience to complex risk. The longer-term strategies recommended above need longer-term funding and the agility to respond to evolving needs and priorities. Agile funding would also enable the US government to move beyond assessments that tend to look narrowly at a designated area for which there are funds to multidisciplinary diagnostics that can consider multiple constraints, the relationship among them, and sequencing considerations. The Global Fragility Act (both the House of Representatives and Senate versions) seeks to create a pool of resources that would be exempt from specific and minimum funding levels to enable this longer-term planning and programming—a recommendation that deserves support—and, if passed, further action from congressional appropriators. Yet this is a starting point only. The Global Fragility Act's proposed $200 million per year, spread among several focus countries, would need to be complemented by broader efforts to create longer-term, more agile funding for addressing fragility.

**The administration should allocate a greater portion of aid funds to multilateral systems.**

Channeling more funds through multilateral funds and institutions can help reduce the uncoordinated projectization of aid that often fails to address key, systemic issues. Spreading risk among multiple donors also allows for more creative approaches. Multilateral institutions also tend to use approaches that put countries in the driver's seat (e.g., providing budget support and utilizing country systems) and align their activities with host country priorities more than bilateral donors, whose development policies are more influenced by domestic political and geostrategic interests.

**Procurement and programming**

USAID should ensure more of its awards allow for adaptive management. Adaptive management—which allows for programs to make adjustments in response to new information and changes in context during implementation—is a particularly relevant approach in the fluid environment of fragile states. USAID's new Acquisitions and Assistance Strategy promises to structure more procurements to facilitate adaptive management, an approach also championed by both versions of the Global Fragility Act. As part of shifting toward greater adaptive management, USAID should consider what interagency and cross-donor coordination needs to look like when strategies and programming are more fluid in response to contextual shifts and emerging evidence. It must also consider how adaptive management fits into the broader learning toolkit. Adaptation should complement, not supplant, other tools of learning like impact evaluation, yet there are special considerations around how to do impact evaluation within an adaptive context. USAID will also
need to make sure this shift toward greater adaptability is accompanied by staff skill-building to manage and oversee adaptive awards flexibly and constructively.

**USAID should allow greater use of competition waivers to facilitate more timely response to pressing needs and narrow windows of opportunity in fragile states.** Federal agencies are legally required to competitively award most of their grant funds. Unrestricted competition allows agencies to solicit a range of bids and choose the implementer that promises the highest value for money. The competitive process is also a key factor in the length of time it takes to get from a program proposal to the beginning of implementation. USAID allows exceptions to unrestricted competition for emergency or disaster assistance. Further exceptions can be allowed (with case-by-case justification) for critical, time-sensitive objectives (or a handful of other conditions) but are rarely sought. As a result, when USAID identifies new opportunities or needs in fragile states, it typically chooses between taking a year or more to compete a new award or adding money into an existing award regardless of whether it is suitable for the desired intervention. In recognition of the time-sensitive nature of addressing pressing and quick-to-evolve needs associated with fragility and conflict prevention, USAID should judiciously expand the use of justifications to restrict eligibility (JRE) for time-sensitive interventions to help prevent conflict or take advantage of narrow governance-related windows of opportunity in fragile states. This should be accompanied by proactive identification of the partners best suited for different types of interventions and training for USAID staff in appropriate JRE use.

**USAID should develop fragility-adapted sector frameworks to help USAID staff understand how sectoral interventions interact with fragility.** Fragility-adapted sector frameworks help staff understand how to modulate the improvement of a particular sector along the spectrum of fragility, with consideration for how different groups interact with various sectors differently in fragile vs. nonfragile states. USAID should help inform these frameworks by analyzing and evaluating how their programmatic results relate to fragility in order to better position future interventions to have a more transformational perspective.

**USAID should establish a home within its new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization for bridging support between crisis response and a return to longer-term development programming.** Crisis response often supplants development efforts in fragile states and is structured as a separate intervention. Planning for a return to recovery and development happens only when crisis response phases out, leading to gaps and lost momentum. USAID should seek to bridge between crisis or humanitarian response and steady-state development interventions by planning concurrent, synergistic programming. The new Center for Conflict and Violence Prevention in USAID’s new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization could be an optimal structure to help missions and work with OTI and/or humanitarian response to do this.

**Staffing**

**USAID and the State Department should build their expeditionary development capacity to quickly reallocate appropriately skilled staff to help missions address pressing crisis prevention and other fragility-related needs.** USAID and the State Department should develop a new mechanism for surging staff to meet emergent crises and opportunities. A mechanism of this type could also help support the implementation of the SAR’s recommendation that the State Department, USAID, and DOD develop Stabilization, Transition, and Response Teams (heeding lessons learned from the previous, now defunct Civilian Response Corps) to surge joint civilian-military teams for coordinated stabilization response. Congressional action may be required to expand notwithstanding authority for USAID and the State Department to hire more personal services contractors—or develop a new flexible hiring type—that can easily move among offices and between the field and Washington to meet demand. The skillset of surge staff should include the capacity to address crisis or conflict prevention, identify opportunities within narrow windows of governance opening, and/or plan a transition from humanitarian or crisis response through recovery to longer-term development. Developing surge staffing capacity must take place within broader
workforce planning to understand where demand for skills has gone unmet, and where demand is likely to surge. For USAID, it must also be undertaken in conjunction with efforts to empower foreign service nationals. These local staff have the most valuable expertise on and insight into local issues, maintain relationships with local actors, and provide continuity throughout American staffing changes, which new surge capabilities would likely increase.

**USAID should invest in developing a cadre of staff who understand fragility and can work at the intersection of humanitarian, development, and governance needs.** Targeted, mentored rotations in fragile states could help build experience among existing staff in the short term. Hiring new staff based on demonstrated operational skills in fragile environments could build a stronger cadre over the medium term. The State Department and USAID should also contribute ideas that would support the transformation of global affairs education to build, over the longer term, the skills relevant for operating in fragile environments.

**Notes**

[102] DOD still sometimes takes on humanitarian response roles it otherwise wouldn’t because of its ability to mobilize money, personnel, and supplies even more quickly than the civilian agencies. For example, when the West African Ebola outbreak began to escalate, USAID and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) were both at the end of their fiscal years with little funding left to reprogram or divert to the emerging crisis. DOD, on the other hand, had nearly a billion dollars of unspent overseas contingency operations funds, which Congress quickly allowed them to reprogram toward Ebola response. It was another several months before Congress funded a supplemental appropriation for Ebola response capabilities at USAID and CDC.
[105] Honig, 2018; Campbell, 2018.
Burns, Flournoy, and Lindborg, 2016. This is also true across donors globally. In 2016, only two percent of official development assistance to fragile states went to conflict prevention (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018).

Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, 2018; Brimley et al., 2015


Medinilla, Shiferaw, and Veron, 2019.

Mercy Corps, 2014.

In 2016-2017, over a third of USAID’s nonemergency response funds to fragile states went to these three sectors.

Seay, 2013; Seay, 2011.

Cummings and Babu Paudel, 2019.


McCannell, 2016.


A similar recommendation was put forth in Konyndyk and Huang (2017).

Konyndyk and Huang, 2017.

USAID's 2019 Policy Framework promises to advance efforts to increase the voice and influence of foreign service nationals (US Agency for International Development, 2019).
Forging a Constructive, Mutually Reinforcing Link between Security and Legitimacy

A feature common to many fragile states is the inability of the state to provide and maintain security. Because security gaps in fragile states can create negative spillovers that cross borders, donor countries—in particular, the United States—have dedicated significant resources to developing partner-country security forces to address the malign actors that take advantage of weakly or ungoverned areas.

But strengthening security alone is insufficient for addressing transnational terrorist threats, armed rebel groups, and organized criminal networks—much less for confronting the ways in which these actors perpetuate conflict. There is a fundamental need to understand and address how security forces operate within the ecosystem of governance and politics. Even when states have strong military capacity, lower governance capacity makes them more likely to experience violence. The converse is also true: factors that are shown to reduce violence are often associated with good governance and state legitimacy. Studies have shown that things like lower state discrimination against minorities, the existence of an independent judiciary, and the strength of a state’s welfare efforts are associated with lower levels of terrorism.

While the relationship between security and state legitimacy—and the causal pathways between them—is complex, the foundation of the US government’s approaches to security cooperation is typically based on an assumption that professional, well-equipped, and appropriately overseen security forces—at least in part—beget legitimacy. The US government has a well-resourced set of interventions to train and equip police and armed forces, but that may not always be the best way to improve security—or address fragility. There is a risk that agencies are defining a core problem and prescribing solutions in part based on the tools at their disposal.

The US government has a well-resourced set of interventions to train and equip police and armed forces, but that may not always be the best way to improve security—or address fragility. There is a risk that agencies are defining a core problem and prescribing solutions in part based on the tools at their disposal.

The agencies delivering security assistance, DOD and the State Department, recognize the limits of these tools, but the assumptions behind this form of aid still merit greater scrutiny. Experts point out the potential for security assistance to undermine broader US goals (as discussed above), worsen ethnic or intracommunal tensions, distort civil-military relations and their respective prioritization, and facilitate human rights abuses. Fundamentally, the link between security cooperation and fostering state legitimacy requires more testing to understand whether and in what circumstances security sector assistance can effectively accomplish these goals.
Improving the evidence on the impact of security sector assistance

Unfortunately, there is little evidence about whether and under what conditions US security sector aid is successful. There have been some meta evaluations that have looked across the security sector portfolio. They find that security assistance can be effective in improving partner-country stability, but the type of assistance matters (military leader education is more effective than the provision of defense articles), as do partner-country characteristics (assistance is less effective in fragile and weak states). In Africa, studies find that security cooperation has had little or no net effect on political violence.

For the most part, however, security sector programs are rarely evaluated. When they are, evaluations are of generally low quality, limiting opportunities for accountability and learning about things like impact, value, and risk. Not only that, good evaluation is predicated on good program design, identified objectives, and an articulated theory of change that includes assumptions and risks. DOD largely implements security cooperation programs without first making these explicit and in the absence of guidance about how to do so.

There has been progress. The 2016 Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act established monitoring and evaluation standards for all agencies that provide foreign assistance, including DOD. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act also added a new requirement for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation programs, and a January 2017 policy document outlined department roles and responsibilities for fulfilling these functions. Policy, however, is only as good as its implementation, and this one has been slow to get off the ground with paltry funding and inconsistent take-up across the defense agencies implementing relevant programs.

As progress is made on identifying objectives and evaluating results, the State Department and DOD will also need to grapple with the problem of how to adequately and meaningfully measure security. Is it best to measure perceptions of security? Whose perceptions count? Or is it better to use more objective data like homicide rates, which may be of poor quality and/or not track with perceptions? These questions have not been sufficiently addressed as part of the conversation about security sector assistance results.

Prioritizing defense institution building

One concern around security sector assistance is that increased tactical proficiency—combined, in some cases, with aid-funded lethal equipment—can sometimes lead to increased effectiveness at repression, which hampers rather than fosters state legitimacy. These concerns point to the need to ensure that security sector assistance is accompanied by efforts to improve the professionalization of the security sector, and, in the case of the armed forces, strengthen civilian oversight mechanisms. Often, however, the US approach has been to build technical capacity first, then tackle institution-building later, if at all, and often in a limited fashion. In 2014, the Security Governance Initiative (SGI) was established to address deficiencies in support for institution building. The SGI has provided dedicated funds through DOD, the State Department, USAID, and other agencies to focus on improving the management, oversight, accountability, and sustainability of security sector institutions in six African focus countries. Overall, however, these defense institution building programs have typically been small and limited in scope.

On the policing side, community policing—creating partnerships between law enforcement and citizens—and building soft skills among police has been shown to be effective in increasing security and building trust in government. The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs is partnering with the US Institute of Peace to undertake a program of Justice and Security Dialogues, an effort that brings officials, police, and communities together to diagnose concerns and rebuild security. However, these dialogues are currently taking place in just a single locality in each of six countries. For police programs to affect national level fragility and state legitimacy, local-level interventions must be paired with a complementary focus on the institutional level. A larger US program, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), run out of the Department of Justice in partnership with the State Department, DOD, and USAID, focuses on sustainable institutional law enforcement. This approach not only emphasizes capacity and efficiency but also the ability to serve citizens, respect human rights and dignity, and maintain professional standards. But ICITAP’s reach is also limited, with just 35 country programs, mainly in middle-income Latin American and Eastern European countries.

Focusing on sustaining results with long-term commitment and attention to political will

As with all aid programs, questions of sustainability are prominent. Though security sector programming has had little detectable net impact on political violence, peacekeeping efforts have been more successful. Researchers hypothesize that the latter’s long-term nature may contribute to their relative success. US security cooperation, on the other hand, is rarely undertaken as a long-term commitment. Nor has it always been sensitive to political will, as described above. For security sector reform to be effective, partner-country leadership must be the one that demands it. They must also indicate their willingness to accept and ultimately be responsible for investments in areas such as logistics and human resource management that are critical to sustainment priorities over the longer term.

Exploring support for military civil works capacity

Security forces can contribute to state legitimacy through means other than security provision. In fragile states with reformist leaders, a military civil engineering corps can complement political transition by helping shift perceptions of the state and the role of the armed forces. However, the State Department and DOD have typically invested very little in civil works capacity building with partner-country militaries. Supporting the development of military engineering units may be especially valuable in conflict-affected areas where combatant forces have been oversized. Recovery from conflict often brings the challenge of reintegrating ex-combatants, whose numbers can far outstrip the needs of the state’s security apparatus. Training soldiers and ex-combatants in basic engineering skills creates a corps equipped to address acute needs like road repair, ordnance removal, and disaster relief while providing (unarmed) productive employment for former fighters.

The success of such an approach is predicated to a significant degree on the underlying structures of political power and citizens’ other experience with the military. The armed forces’ involvement in civil works can promote healing after a political transition to more inclusive governance. But if elites retain control of political processes and/or the armed forces commit abuses with impunity, a handful of army-supported public infrastructure projects will do little to alter the social compact.
Furthermore, for military civil works units to achieve their objectives of trust and confidence-building, their development would need to be accompanied by clear frameworks that govern how to decide when a civil works project is the responsibility of the military and when it should be contracted out to the private sector. Transparency around the resources transferred to civil works units—and the expected results of their efforts—would also be imperative.

**Recommendations**

DOD should fully implement its 2017 assessment, monitoring, and evaluation requirements. Though the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act added a new requirement for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation programs, and a 2017 DOD policy outlined roles and responsibilities for fulfilling these functions, implementation is still nascent. DOD should

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**Box 6. A tale of two civil works engineering units pre- and post-democratic transition**

After the Liberian civil war, during the country’s democratic transition, the US government supported the Liberian government to rebuild the armed forces. Early on, the two partners negotiated a decision to include an engineering corps as part of the new Liberian military. Trained by the United States and equipped by China, the new engineering unit was deployed first to rural areas to repair roads destroyed in the conflict. Over time, they were increasingly deployed in cities to implement the country’s public works strategy, including, when necessary, responding to the impact of emergencies on public works. For example, in late 2011, Monrovia saw a major riot with young men destroying property and burning government vehicles. The military was mobilized not to quell the violence but to clean up once the riot subsided. This was meaningful. With a history colored by a military coup and a devastating civil war in which people in fatigues were viewed as a threat, seeing the armed forces building rather than destroying or oppressing was instrumental in psychological healing and rebuilding state legitimacy.

The United States supported a similar effort in post–civil war Colombia, helping the government, including the military, take on activities like roadbuilding and water well construction with the goal of helping Colombians rebuild their trust in the state. With political processes still firmly and narrowly under elite control, however, these activities were only a superficial—and mainly ineffective—attempt to foster state legitimacy.

Furthermore, for military civil works units to achieve their objectives of trust and confidence-building, their development would need to be accompanied by clear frameworks that govern how to decide when a civil works project is the responsibility of the military and when it should be contracted out to the private sector. Transparency around the resources transferred to civil works units—and the expected results of their efforts—would also be imperative.

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“The armed forces’ involvement in civil works can promote healing after a political transition to more inclusive governance. But if elites retain control of political processes and/or the armed forces commit abuses with impunity, a handful of army-supported public infrastructure projects will do little to alter the social compact.”

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provide funds on the order of three to five percent of program funds for assessment, monitoring and evaluation. It should establish an independent office for evaluation, which is critical for the integrity and credibility of the evaluations. And it should socialize and implement guidance on how to develop programs with defined objectives and an elaborated theory of change that includes assumptions and risks.

**Congress, the State Department, DOD, and USAID should ramp up investments in defense institution building and ensure appropriate sequencing with technical and material support.** Defense institution building programs are more associated with increased stability than the provision of defense equipment. But they have typically been small and limited in scope. Congress, the State Department, DOD, and USAID should renew their commitment to the Security Governance Initiative and increase its scope and resources. The State Department and DOD should also take seriously the USIP Task Force’s suggestion to better sequence security cooperation to focus first on defense institution building, moving on to tactical assistance and material provision only as countries demonstrate strengthened professionalization, accountability, and oversight of their security services.

**DOD and the State Department should support the development of select partner-country armed forces’ civil engineering units.** In fragile states with opening democratic processes, a civil engineering corps of the armed forces can complement political transition by helping shift perceptions of the state. It may be especially valuable in conflict-affected areas where combatant forces have been oversized, and ex-combatant reintegration is a key issue; engineering training can support the transition of ex-combatants into employment opportunities in the private sector.

**The State Department should explore better ways to measure security that reflect the perceptions of different groups.** Stakeholders, including Congress, are increasingly asking agencies investing in fragile states to report on clear measurable objectives and performance metrics. They will need to grapple with the problem of how to adequately and meaningfully measure security. Objective data like homicide rates may be of poor quality and/or not track with perceptions. Seeking innovative ways to measure different groups’ perceptions of security may be better or at least complementary.

**Notes**


[140] Findley and Young, 2011.


[145] Lucas and McInnis, 2015; McNerney et al., 2014.


The Pentagon’s FY2019 budget request would provide only 0.02 percent of security cooperation funding for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation purposes, far below the international standard of three to five percent of foreign assistance program funds (Blue, Clapp-Wincek, and Benner, 2009).
**Identifying and Building upon Local Capacities**

For 15 years, the international development community has acknowledged the importance of local ownership in the design and delivery of foreign assistance, endorsing it as a core pillar of aid effectiveness. Local ownership is considered critical for achieving and sustaining program results, building local capacity, and strengthening the citizen-state compact by shifting accountability for service delivery—and results—to the partner government. And donors, including the US government, have committed to improving how they incorporate this principle into their aid practices. Locally owned approaches will form the foundation for success in fragile states, too, though they come with specific considerations related to choosing which local actors to support, managing different types of risk, and assessing trade-offs with other bureaucratic imperatives.

**Taking a center-out vs. bottom-up approach to institution building**

The traditional model of institution strengthening in fragile states has often focused on shoring up the central government and working to extend its reach. This has a poor track record of success. A bottom-up approach recognizes that capacity is uneven across sectors, domains within sectors, and geographic space, and that even in fragile states there can be islands of good governance with strong service delivery. An assets-based approach can seek to identify and measure groups’ specific capacities to perform particular tasks of governance, identify elements of what is working, and build upon them.

Capacity mapping can be done as part of a politically smart fragility assessment described above. In doing so, donors should look beyond the national government across diverse subgroups of a society. This process can help assess the possibility of partnerships, where appropriate, with high capacity subnational governmental, civil society, and other nonstate actors who often play a key role in governing and providing services. They should also assess intergroup relationships to identify patterns of exclusion, clientelism, or contested legitimacy. These will be important to inform a donor’s selection of local partners and the ways in which it supports them.

There is some danger that seeking what works in the task of governance evolves into the desire to replicate certain “islands” of effectiveness throughout a state or community. Islands of stability are often stable for very context-dependent reasons and exact replicability is unlikely to be successful and may be undesirable. For instance, in the early 2010s, the World Bank and United Nations were interested in replicating the “island of stability” in the city of Butembo in eastern Congo to other parts of the country. However, the common interest that supported the city’s stability was based on ethnic solidarity and an intra-elite bargain to exclude outsiders from the community’s wealth; it was not based on serving the interest of a multi-ethnic public good—which is what will ultimately be needed to achieve broader stability and resilience in Congo.

Ultimately, the strategic intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches is likely to be important. Working locally without a concurrent focus on state-building can undermine state-building goals by circumventing national authority and exacerbating political contests between central and local levels. Exclusively bottom-up approaches ignore broader factors that contribute to local conditions. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, bottom-up security governance programs have seen limited success because they do not address complex, extralocal issues that drive insecurity.
Partnering with local actors to build capacity and legitimacy

The way that donors plan and deliver aid matters for strengthening local capacities. Over the last decade, the US government has made a strong institutional push to better incorporate local ownership in its aid practices, with USAID rolling out new ownership-focused policies, tools, and approaches.

One of the ways USAID revived its focus on local ownership was with its 2010-2016 Local Solutions initiative. This was a concerted effort to channel more of missions’ program funds directly through local entities. But implementation was challenging in practice. USAID found it must balance country priorities with agency or interagency requirements; weigh the benefits of ownership alongside both real and perceived programmatic, reputational, and fiduciary risk; assess trade-offs between speedy disbursement of funds and the time it takes to assess and mitigate risk and build local implementation capacity; and adjust their staffing mix—and build staff skills—to manage more, smaller grants. These challenges are often most acute in fragile states, where the priorities of some local actors conflict with development objectives, capacity is typically more limited, and local systems are riskier. While USAID succeeded in doubling the percentage of funds going directly to local actors between 2010 and 2016, most fragile states saw few local procurements. In the time period tracked (2012-2016), 36 percent of direct local funding went to fragile states, but nearly 90 percent of that went to just two fragile states: Afghanistan and Pakistan. Removing those two countries from the equation, just 6 percent of local procurements were in other fragile states. And 65 percent of the money went toward a single sector: health.

USAID is not alone in its challenge to localize aid to fragile states. Part of the compact model espoused by the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States includes a commitment by host country governments to reform and strengthen public financial management in exchange for donors delivering a greater percentage of their aid through country systems. A 2014 review showed that little had been done toward this goal by that time. This reflects donors’ limited appetite for risk, as well as the time it takes to transition to new modes of funding and implementation.

Box 7. Ownership through outcome-based payments in Liberia

In Liberia, USAID empowered the government of Liberia’s Ministry of Health through a Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreement (FARA) financing mechanism. While USAID previously channeled its health funds through a US-based, nongovernmental implementing partner, the FARA shifted USAID funding to flow directly through Liberia’s Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Health. The government of Liberia pre-financed all activities and USAID reimbursed the Ministry of Health upon demonstrated completion of mutually agreed-upon deliverables and milestones. The FARA gave the Liberian Ministry of Health more control over implementation and made it accountable for delivering results, and an evaluation confirmed the Ministry of Health was able to maintain levels of service delivery. The FARA may also have generated cost savings by using the Ministry of Health’s own financial and procurement systems. While the FARA promoted local ownership of implementation, however, it did not promote ownership over resources. While the Ministry of Finance drew funds for the up-front costs from a national account, USAID required that all its reimbursements go only to the Ministry of Health, effectively exporting the agency’s earmark.
Of course, direct procurement is not the only—not always the most effective—way to support the capacity of local organizations. USAID grew to recognize this through its experience with Local Solutions, acknowledging that focusing too much on the amounts going to local organizations overshadowed the more important focus on actual capacity building and performance improvement. In response, USAID is now encouraging introspection about what kind of capacity is most important to build and what kind of partnership is best to do it. Direct local contracting does offer some benefits, but it also comes with the burden of fulfilling the US government’s elaborate procurement, accounting, and reporting requirements. This fit will not be right for all local partners. Local organizations can also take on much of the substantive programmatic work by serving as subcontractors, allowing them—with the appropriate contractual relationship—to develop and exercise implementation capacity without having to specialize in the extensive organizational machinery relevant only for donor management. USAID’s new Acquisitions and Assistance Strategy underscores this. It continues to emphasize the importance of diversifying the partner base, including to local partners, but is more expansive in its conceptualization of how procurements can be used to build local capacity.

More fundamentally, the nationality of the implementer is a very narrow lens through which to view ownership—especially if the decisions about what to implement are divorced from local input. A broader view is essential, with local input into and ownership over priority setting, program design, choice of implementer, and co-financing arrangements. But in fragile states, in particular, robust political economy analysis must inform how donors think about whose priorities to pursue.

Expanding investment in US-based skill-building and leadership training

In the 1980s and 1990s, USAID supported thousands of students from developing countries to attend US-based graduate-level education. The goals of the program were to build technical skills and impart democratic values to this cadre of future elites who would have a strong, positive connection with the United States. Over the years, the generalized, stand-alone graduate education program has fallen somewhat out of favor, as training programs have become more oriented around reinforcing skills within the context of a particular development dynamic (e.g., training agricultural entrepreneurs as part of an agribusiness development objective).

Today international training for the next generation of developing country technicians, professionals, and leaders is increasingly dominated by China, which now hosts double the number of African students the United States does. Given the critical role local elites play in preserving or confronting the dynamics that create state fragility, the United States may be forgoing—and yielding to China—opportunities to build values and relationships with future fragile-state leaders who will shape their countries’ trajectories.

Cross-donor coordination is important for reducing the burden on partner countries—and for strengthening ownership and local capacity.

Coordinating better to create space for local capacity building

Cross-donor coordination is important for reducing the burden on partner countries—and for strengthening ownership and local capacity. The projectization of aid—as opposed to supporting
national programs at scale—has meant that donors’ relationships with technical ministries tend to emphasize their role as project clearing houses for donor projects rather than focus on building their capacity for service delivery. Uncoordinated projectization thus not only constrains the extent to which development assistance seeks to address the underlying causes of fragility (rather than pursuing discrete, low-scale, sectoral interventions), it also arguably undermines the social contract between state and society by pointing state-building resources toward individual projects rather than large-scale programs. Strong, well-resourced in-country aid coordination mechanisms like those discussed above can play a role in shifting donor behavior from projectized aid with a high administrative burden to larger-scale interventions.

**Recommendations**

**USAID and the State Department should conduct capacity mapping to help identify and measure specific groups’ capacities to perform particular tasks of governance, identify elements of what is working, and build upon them.** This exercise could be done as part of the politically smart fragility assessments described and recommended above and can help inform the selection of local partners and the ways the United States supports them.

**USAID should continue to expand the notion of local ownership.** USAID has acknowledged the limitations of focusing mainly on the nationality of the implementer. It should continue to broaden its concept of local ownership to incorporate local input into and ownership over priority setting, program design, choice of implementer, and co-financing arrangements. In fragile states, robust political economy analyses must inform how donors think about whose priorities to pursue.

**USAID should invest in the professional development—and democratic values—of the next generation of leaders by expanding graduate education training for students from fragile states.** If the Global Fragility Act passes, the pilot countries selected should be targeted for an increase in temporary student visas for graduate training and leadership development. Of course, one of the shortcomings of graduate education programs is that they often target local elites with limited reach to other groups. Recognizing that future leadership may come not just from existing elites but other groups as well, efforts should be made to recruit students more widely.

**Notes**


[167] This approach is also reflected in USAID’s 2019 Policy Framework. It recognizes that every country has areas of high and low capacity and promises to identify and build upon local capacity and commitment where it is best equipped to do so (US Agency for International Development, 2019).


The 20 countries considered fragile states for this analysis either ranked in the top 20 fragile states in the Fragile States Index for the past 10 years and/or are part of a region experiencing challenges typical of fragile states, such as internal conflict, terrorism, drought, and weak institutions (West Africa/Sahel): Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Hughes et al., 2014.


US Agency for International Development, 2018b. The National Endowment for Democracy has also successfully worked to build local capacity to apply for support and manage resources.

US data are from UNESCO Institute of Statistics. The most recent data are for 2016. Chinese data are from 2018, as reported by the People's Republic of China Ministry of Education (2019). In both the United States and China, only a minority of international students receive official scholarships.
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Working Group on the Future of US Assistance to Fragile States

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Working Group Process

This report was written by Sarah Rose. The author thanks the working group members for their engagement and for many thoughtful ideas, comments, critiques, and suggestions throughout the working group process, which lasted from May 2018 through August 2019. This report draws from working group discussions and background research conducted by CGD staff. All members of the working group participated as individuals and their participation does not imply endorsement of every finding or recommendation contained in this report. Any errors or omissions of fact remain the responsibility of the author.
# Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
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<td>CDCS</td>
<td>Country Development and Cooperation Strategy</td>
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<td>CLA</td>
<td>Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting</td>
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<td>CPS</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Stabilization</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Conflict and Stabilization Operations</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering violent extremism</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DCHA</td>
<td>Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDI</td>
<td>Development, Democracy, and Innovation</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DRG</td>
<td>Democracy, Human Rights and Governance</td>
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<td>FARA</td>
<td>Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreement</td>
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<td>GEMAP</td>
<td>Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program</td>
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<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
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<td>JRE</td>
<td>Justifications to Restrict Eligibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Stabilization Assistance Review</td>
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<td>SDRF</td>
<td>Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility</td>
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<td>SGI</td>
<td>Security Governance Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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