Evaluation of Sida’s Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts

Rwanda Country Report
Violent conflicts lead to immense suffering, constitute major obstacles to development and prevent people from escaping poverty. While poverty is generally decreasing on a global level, people living in poverty are increasingly concentrated to fragile countries affected by conflict. Today, there is a broad consensus within the international community on the need to invest in peacebuilding and conflict prevention to reach the Global Goals. As a response, Sida is increasingly focusing support to countries affected by conflict.

Support to peacebuilding is not new. Sida has been engaged in conflict and post-conflict countries since the agency was established. Often, the devastating effects of conflict, and in its aftermath, the prospects of supporting the development towards more peaceful inclusive societies, has been the very reason for Swedish engagement. In other contexts, support to peacebuilding has been more indirect through engagement in sectors and areas of support far beyond projects supporting conflict resolution and dialogue. Engagement in for example the health sector, institution building, decentralisation or livelihoods, has often had the purpose of contributing to sustainable peace or to implement peace agreements.

Effective support to peacebuilding implies learning from previous support, from what has worked well and what has worked less well. This evaluation is the first of its kind, taking a long-term perspective to capture general lessons learned and impact of Sida’s approach to peacebuilding. The aim of the evaluation is to systematise experiences and learnings from Sida’s support to peacebuilding from four different country contexts: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia. We hope that the findings of this evaluation can contribute to sharpen Sida’s engagement for peacebuilding to support people’s ability to escape poverty.

We wish to express our gratitude to the evaluation team and to the time and interest invested by all those who have participated in the evaluation. The evaluation process has served as a dynamic learning tool for Sida to compile the collected knowledge from staff at Sida, partners, experts and other stakeholders.

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Sida

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Sida
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo</td>
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<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Economic Community of the Great Lake States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defence of the People</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East Africa Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDPRS</td>
<td>Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Rwandan Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GiZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRDP</td>
<td>Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>M &amp; E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry for Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MIGEPROF</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MRND</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Movement for Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian’s People Aid</td>
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<td>NST-1</td>
<td>National Strategy for Transformation</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCN</td>
<td>Réseau Citoyens Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rwanda Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDRC</td>
<td>Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>RITA</td>
<td>Rwanda Information Technology Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNP</td>
<td>Rwanda National Police</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNPB</td>
<td>Swedish National Police Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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Preface

This report provides the findings of a country evaluation of Sida’s peacebuilding support to Rwanda, which forms part of the Evaluation of Sida’s support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts. The other countries evaluated were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala and Somalia. The evaluation was commissioned by Sida and carried out by Tana Copenhagen between May 2018 and January 2019.

The Rwanda evaluation was undertaken by Cécile Collin.

Members of the overall evaluation team were:

- Erik Bryld, Team Leader, lead author Somalia
- Julian Brett, evaluator, lead author Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Nadia Masri-Pedersen, evaluator, lead author Guatemala.

Quality assurance of the report has been provided by André Kahlmeyer.

This report incorporates feedback from Sida and the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali.
Executive Summary

This report presents the Rwanda case study for the Evaluation of Sida’s support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts and is an annex to the evaluation synthesis report that provides the evaluation’s main findings and recommendations.

Rwanda recovered from the Genocide against the Tutsi that caused 800,000 deaths by promoting socio-economic rights with spectacular economic growth and governance reforms. However, underlying causes of conflict remain in this small, densely populated country where the population still rely mainly on agriculture. The ethnic polarisation that led to the Genocide has had a strong influence on the social tissue and political representation throughout Rwanda’s history. Trauma and grief still underlie many social and political relationships. Human rights, political space, freedom of expression, and the operating space for media and civil society remain controlled.

Relevance
The three strategies for Swedish cooperation during the period evaluated addressed sectoral priorities and include peacebuilding as an objective, in addition to being a cross-cutting component. Interventions related to democracy and human rights have consistently been considered a significant objective, though the proportion of funding dedicated to them has varied over time - from 3% - 11% until 2006 and between 14% - 46.8% since then, with peaks of over 40% in 2009 and 2012.

Sida’s engagement reached a peak in 2014 and has primarily had a development and statebuilding focus. The evaluation team finds that this has followed the key needs of the country. In the aftermath of the Genocide, assistance was geared to relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, while an increasing share of the funds was directed to budget support and contributions to state reforms between 2000 and 2009. This included land reform and decentralisation. Budget support stopped in 2009, however, in response to Rwanda’s role in regional conflict dynamics.

The evaluation finds that Sida’s approach of supporting interventions dedicated to peace and democracy from various angles (in some cases pioneering them) - including capacity building components for a broad range of stakeholders (e.g. institutions dedicated to gender, universities, CSOs) and in conjunction with support to larger national interventions on socio-economics - appears particularly relevant.

Effectiveness
Sida has engaged in a number of jointly funded interventions through a number of different levels, including regional Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR) and capacity development of national state institutions, and local CSOs. Sida has also participated in major peacebuilding actions, such as transitional justice mechanisms and the tripartite support to the police together with the South African Police (SAPS). The modalities used have proved to be effective on peacebuilding interventions, through a flexible, long term partnership approach. Assessing effectiveness, however, is challenged by Sida’s limited systems to measure the risks, challenges and potential negative effects of the interventions. This evaluation notes that it has been difficult to find a balance between compromising and influencing within the political economy of state and conflict dynamics. Sida has also contributed in a number of ways to gender mainstreaming, although a great deal remains to be done in terms of the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment at the local level.

**Impact**

The evaluation finds that Sida’s engagement has contributed to peacebuilding relevant results relating to reconciliation, peace education, transitional justice, DDR, the police, and the ability to exert critical thinking. Activities, which have been implemented by various NGOs, interact also with the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, and have contributed to the evolution of the approach to peace education, from teaching reconciliation to debating reconciliation and broadening it to a large audience, notably in schools. In addition, Sida’s work has impacted on local governance and improved interactions between state institutions and the population, as well as capacity building of local CSOs. Given the large share of the support devoted to state institutions, it is also clear that Sida has maintained a particular focus on statebuilding.

In terms of gender equality and women’s empowerment, Sida has contributed to institutions dedicated to gender promotion and mainstreaming (so called Gender Machinery) through UN Women. This includes: the Gender Monitoring Office under the Prime Minister, the National Women’s Council, and the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion. Rwanda is world-leading when it comes to political representation of women with notably 61% of women parliamentarians, 50% in the Cabinet. However, despite the existence of a strong institutional and normative framework in favour of women and visible progress at the national level, the situation of women at the grassroots level and the implementation of this national framework remains a challenge.

**Sustainability**

Sida’s strong ownership and leadership have contributed to the sustainability of funding at the institutional level, as evidenced by the continual functioning of institutions funded at earlier stages of Sida’s engagement.

The evaluation finds that the results of institutional support have been maintained and funded by the State. Peace education has been institutionalised into the national curriculum, with an evolution to a more open approach to debates owing to the facilitation of discussions. Regarding community-based mechanisms for peacebuilding, the
sustainability of the interventions is stronger when coupled with income generating activities; for example, cooperatives mixing groups from different backgrounds around a common economic project, or when the approach is institutionalised (with then some potential limitations in terms of freedom of speech and independence). At the community level, sustainability has been less obvious. A sustainability driver could possibly be the association of grassroots dialogue dynamics with livelihoods related activities, that would provide revenue to existing dialogue groups.
1 Introduction

This report presents the Rwanda case study for the Evaluation of Sida’s support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts and is an annex to the evaluation synthesis report that provides the evaluation’s main findings and recommendations. The evaluation is the first longitudinal evaluation of peacebuilding related strategic engagements undertaken by Sida and has the objective to evaluate how Sida has approached peacebuilding on the strategic level in different contexts. The focus is thus not on individual project results, but rather the overall approach taken by Sida in the given context in terms of its influence on peacebuilding and the lessons that may be derived from this.

The evaluation utilises Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) evaluation standards and principles and it focuses on four of the five major OECD-DAC evaluation criteria (namely relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). Case studies of Sida approaches to peacebuilding over time in four countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Somalia and Rwanda) are used to provide data. The longitudinal approach means that the evaluation looks back to the early 1990s.

In this case study report, we first present a historical perspective of peace and conflict in Rwanda as well as an overview of key drivers that need to be considered and addressed to engage in effective peacebuilding. This is followed by an overview of the international engagement in Rwanda during the evaluation period and a similar assessment specific to Sida in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we present the main findings from this case study in accordance with the four OECD-DAC evaluation criteria required by the evaluation terms of reference. And finally, in Chapter 5, we present the conclusions and lessons learned from the evaluation findings in Rwanda.

The report analysis builds on: (i) extensive desk study of available Sida and related contextual information, (ii) interviews with Sida staff in Stockholm, Kigali and via Skype, and (iii) interviews with implementing partners, development partners and resource persons in Rwanda and over Skype. A field mission to Rwanda took place between 1-5 October 2018 and was located in Kigali.

A few limitations need to be taken into consideration when reading the report. Firstly, the longitudinal element of the evaluation means that data is needed all the way back to the early 1990s. However, the evaluation team has not been able to obtain much information from Sida or other sources prior to 1998. Similarly, it has been challenging to identify implementing partner staff to interview from this period. Secondly, where interviews with stakeholders from this period have taken place, it has some-
times been difficult for the individuals concerned to recall specific details of the engage-
gements supported, including their effects. In general, the data has become more com-
prehensive the closer we come to the present period. This also coincides with a
significant strengthening in Sida’s results based management.
2 Peace and Conflict in Rwanda

2.1 OVERVIEW OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN RWANDA DURING THE EVALUATION PERIOD

The peace and security dynamics in Rwanda are deeply rooted in the country’s history, particularly during and since colonial times. In this section, we provide a summary of the main developments and challenges that the country has faced that are relevant to peacebuilding.

The 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi was the consequence of decades of separation between Hutu and Tutsi building on the socio-economic structure of the pre-colonial kingdom, then reshaped and emphasized during the colonial period with ethnically based policies enforced by the Belgians. A coup d’état in the late 1950s led to inter-ethnic violence and Tutsi migration to Uganda as refugees. Ultimately, tens of thousands of Tutsi fled to neighbouring countries, mostly Uganda, and repressive killings occurred in Rwanda where several thousand Tutsi were killed.\(^1\) Following independence from Belgium in 1962, Hutu governments instituted an authoritarian/military regime which reduced political space and later led to the emergence of organised Tutsi resistance, most notably the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda. In 1986, when discussing the fate of the 1959-1962 refugees, the Central Committee of the dominant National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) said that the Tutsi refugees’ return was not possible because the country was overpopulated.

The RPF was created in Uganda in 1988 and attacked the regime of President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1990, starting a war. The RPF was supported by Uganda – largely assisted by the US, while Belgium, France and Congo helped Habyarimana’s Government (Noroît operation). In 1993, a power-sharing agreement (the Arusha Agreement) between the main conflicting parties was signed and a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established to support the implementation of the Agreement.\(^2\) The mission was deployed for 3 years and left on March 1996 but was widely criticised as a result of its limited mandate (under UN Charter Chapter VI, which prevented military interventions by the Mission) and lack of willingness of UN members to contribute troops at the peak of the Genocide. The number of troops was

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1. BBC (2014) Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter.
reduced to 270 in April 1994 as a result of the non-establishment of the transitional government, as planned in the Arusha Agreement.

UNAMIR was unable to halt the rapidly escalating violence that occurred following the shooting down of the presidential airplane on 6th April 1994 killing both the Rwandese and Burundian Presidents. In the months between April and July 1994, 800 000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. The Genocide ended when RPF forces took control of Kigali and the rest of the country. In the process, an estimated 2 million (mainly Hutu) fled to Zaire (since 1997, the Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC) and neighbouring countries, amongst them extremist Hutu militia, the **Interahamwe**, and members of the Habyarimana regime’s Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). The latter subsequently created the armed terrorist group **Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda** (FDLR).³

Following the Genocide, the conflict migrated to the neighbouring DRC and the Rwandan war became extra-territorial with the displacement of Rwandan Hutu armed groups along with the flow of civilian refugees. Up to one million refugees were located in camps, where weapons circulated and which were organised by former Hutu leaders, benefiting to some extent from the vast international assistance provided to the refugees. In the DRC, the conflict further expanded and became more complex with the involvement of Congolese stakeholders as well as the fragmentation of armed groups, who used the leverage of the political economy related to peace agreements and demobilisation processes to expand their influence.⁴

During Rwanda’s reconstruction and development after the Genocide, community based transitional justice mechanisms - “Gacaca” - were created to reduce the significant back-log of genocide cases and to promote communal healing. The Government also prioritised strengthening socio-economic rights. Less progress, however, was made on civil and political rights and the role of independent civil society – and challenges here lie particularly in the lack of freedom of expression. This is due notably to the fact that media was an essential component used to spread genocide propaganda, the most famous example being the role of **Radio Mille Collines**.

Rwanda has also made significant progress in gender equality (with positive changes in Gender Inequality Index scores) and women’s empowerment, where Parliamentary elections in September 2013 saw women fill 64% of the seats.⁵ As illustrated in Table 2.1 below, Rwanda has made progress across a range of other socio-economic indicators; the Growth Development Product (GDP) doubled between 2005-2010 and 2015-

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2018, while the GINI coefficient indicates persistently strong inequality. The Human Development Index also doubled between 1995 and 2015. Infant mortality rates diminished significantly from 111.4 deaths per 1000 live birth in 1990-1995 to 31.1 in 2015.

Table 2.1 Evolution of key indicators

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average GDP (current billion USD (up to 2017))</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>8.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows % GDP (up to 2017))</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom in the World (0.0-7.0)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>6.5 (1999)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Press (0-100)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>83.25</td>
<td>84.17</td>
<td>81.17</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Inequality Index (GII) (0-1)</td>
<td>0.58 (1995)</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.38 (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (HDI) (0-1)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.50 (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient) (0-1)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>0.49 (2000)</td>
<td>0.52 (2005)</td>
<td>0.51 (2010)</td>
<td>0.50 (2013)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births)</td>
<td>111.4</td>
<td>119.4</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>36.57</td>
<td>31.1 (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Remittances, received (% of GDP)</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons (total displaced by conflict and violence)</td>
<td>300000 (1994)</td>
<td>323438</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuge population by country or territory of origin (up to 2016)</td>
<td>62259</td>
<td>27240</td>
<td>37680</td>
<td>52075</td>
<td>76806</td>
<td>157264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Official Development Assistance received (% of GNI) (up to 2016)</td>
<td>35.67</td>
<td>26.19</td>
<td>20.60</td>
<td>19.53</td>
<td>15.12</td>
<td>13.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish percentage of total aid (ODA)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>3.95 (2014)</td>
<td>3.10 (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Official Development Assistance Received Per Capita (Current USD) (up to 2016)</td>
<td>72.45</td>
<td>61.22</td>
<td>46.14</td>
<td>83.81</td>
<td>97.52</td>
<td>94.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability (-2.5 - 2.5)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness (-2.5 - 2.5)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<td>Political Stability &amp; Absence of Violence (-2.5 - 2.5)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>-1.33</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Quality (-2.5 - 2.5)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption (-2.5 - 2.5)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>-1.36</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law (-2.5 - 2.5)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Enrolment (primary and secondary gross), gender parity index</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate)</td>
<td>0.3(1991)</td>
<td>0.56(1996)</td>
<td>0.89(2002)</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure as % of government spending</td>
<td>20.08</td>
<td>20.38</td>
<td>12.17</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The country has experienced stability since the end of the Genocide; although low-level attacks, particularly related to the regional dynamics, may occasionally affect parts of the country. Transparency International ranks Rwanda at 48 in 2017 on the corruption perception index, which is significantly better than most other sub-Saharan states, except Cape Verde and Botswana. However, there are shortcomings in terms of civil and political rights. Reporters without Borders ranks the country 156 out of 180 on the worldwide index on press freedom. According to interviewees, there is limited information on the actual situation and potential repression of CSOs.

and communities more broadly. This makes it difficult to assess precisely if the situation is improving or not in terms of democratic space and human rights.

Some basic conflict drivers still remain, including the high demographic pressure, with relatively little evolution in terms of family planning. The population doubled between the early 1990s and 2016, from around 6 million to 12.3 million (World Bank), while the gross birth rate decreased from 6.3 in 1993 to 3.9 in 2016 (but with significant progresses in terms of neonatal health).\(^8\) The country was amongst the leaders on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) indicators, with rates higher than the average of Sub-Saharan African countries. Significant progress has been achieved particularly in gender equality, women’s empowerment, universal primary education, child and maternal mortality, HIV prevalence, and environmental sustainability.

Despite the good results in terms of statebuilding, the Freedom of the World rating shows a decline between 2015-2018, indicating that institutions do not constitute a sufficiently robust framework for long-term democratic governance. Indeed, the change of the Constitution in 2017 granted the President the possibility to go beyond two electoral terms and raises the question of how this will evolve. The parliamentary opposition is still very limited, although two opposition parties (the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda and Parti Social Imberakuri) secured two seats each in the parliamentary elections of 2018).

There are also risks of instability at the regional level, due to uncertainty concerning the political evolution of Burundi, DRC and Uganda, which feature varying risks of instability as well as intricate geopolitical interests. These regional dynamics will continue to impact Rwanda’s development. For example, a recent diplomatic crisis between Rwanda and Burundi developed into low scale military attacks, and reciprocal support to opposition armed groups, which are based in South Kivu.\(^9\)

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\(^8\) World Bank Open Data, Births per Woman, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN.
\(^9\) https://kivusecurity.org/about/armedGroups. RED-Tabara. Also known as FRONABU-Tabara, this was the first Burundian group to set up a rear base in eastern Congo following the re-election of Burundian President Nkurunziza in 2015. Originating from the militant wing of Alexis Sinduhije’s Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie (MSD) opposition party, RED-Tabara recruits benefited from military training in Rwanda before crossing into the Ruzizi Plain. Emanating from a long tradition of Rwandan-backed rebellions in eastern Congo, including the RCD-Goma and the CNDP, the M23 emerged in early 2012 under the leadership of Sultani Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda. Most of its leaders came from the Congolese Tutsi community. While it quickly acquired a significant fighting force, leading to its historic occupation of Goma in November 2012, the M23 was riven by internal fissures from the beginning and never managed to develop the strength of Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP. In early 2017, parts of the former M23 attempted a short-lived revival in Rutshuru territory. There were continued reports of ex-M23 activity in Rutshuru and Masisi territory.
In the meantime, the alliance between Rwanda and Uganda seems to have faltered, while the Museveni Government also appears relatively fragile.10

Until 2017, Rwanda’s long-term development goals were mostly defined in “Vision 2020”, which aims to transform the country from a low-income, agriculture-based economy to one that is knowledge-based and service-oriented with middle-income country status by 2020. In order to achieve this, the Government has developed a medium-term strategy: the second Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 2), which outlines its overarching goal of growth acceleration and poverty reduction through four thematic areas: economic transformation, rural development, productivity and youth employment, and accountable governance. Vision 2020 also covers the first four years of a new 30-year Vision for the period up to 2050, “Vision 2050”. Vision 2050 highlights universal access to improved living standards, sustained food security, protection of the Rwandan family, and universal access to quality affordable services in health, education, finance, housing, energy, infrastructure. Rwanda “will work toward reaching 'upper middle income' by 2035 and high income by 2050.”

The implementation instrument for all the above will be the National Strategy for Transformation (NST1). The NST1 also embraces the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which consists of 17 Goals with around 170 targets and indicators, across a range of economic, social, and environmental issues; the Africa Union’s Agenda 2063 and its First 10-Year Implementation Plan (2014-2023). NST1 is built on 3 pillars: Economic Transformation, Social Transformation, and Transformational Governance. The Overarching objective of the Economic Transformation pillar is to: *Accelerate inclusive economic growth and development founded on the Private Sector, knowledge and Rwanda’s Natural Resources.* The overarching goal for the Social Transformation Pillar is to *Develop Rwandans into a capable and skilled people with quality standards of living and a stable and secure society.* The overarching goal for the Transformational Governance Pillar is to *consolidate Good Governance and Justice as building blocks for equitable and sustainable National Development.*

Of particular relevance to peacebuilding is the focus on values: self-determination, including self-sufficiency as a nation (Kwigira), solidarity and dignity (Agaciro) unity and Rwandan identity/culture, integrity, equity (including gender), transparency and openness, accountability, community participation and contributing to local innovation, and national stability. Vision 2020, as well as Vision 2050 and NST1, also plans

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to decrease the dependency on foreign aid and to transition from being a low to an upper middle-income country, building on examples of other successful transitions.

2.2 SIGNIFICANT DRIVERS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN RWANDA

Rwanda faces structural conflict drivers in terms of poverty and use and distribution of revenues, the ability to access natural resources, identity and political representation, the large number of refugees outside of the country, as well as the role of neighbouring countries and regional dynamics. Most of these factors were highlighted in the 2004 Strategic Conflict Assessment undertaken by Sida. The peace and conflict drivers can be summarised as:

• **Identity and political representation:** the history of the country was marked - until recently when the 2003 Constitution promoted non-discrimination - by the monopolisation of power and political representation by one ethnic group. The ethnic polarisation that led to the Genocide has had a strong influence on the social tissue and political representation throughout Rwanda’s history. Trauma and grief still underlie many social and political relationships.

• **Refugees, diaspora and regionalisation of the conflict:** in relation to the environment of violence and exclusion, the vast number of refugees in Uganda integrated into the local Ugandan socio-economic tissue – as well as political life, with positions in the Ugandan Army - from where they could create a movement to regain control of Rwanda’s territory. There were around 900 000 Tutsi refugees abroad according to UNHCR in 1990. After the Genocide, a similar situation occurred in the DRC with the Hutu FDLR, which partly explains the presence of armed groups of Rwandese Tutsi groups (such as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), then M23) fighting against Rwandese Hutu groups. The diaspora of various political motivations is still an important factor in the political evolution of the country.

• **Demographic pressures and access to resources:** there used to be a traditional division of land between cattle breeders and cultivators, which created a challenge in terms of governance and management of the land. As mentioned above, the lack of family planning in the 1980s increased demographic pressures. The population grew from 5.18 million in 1980 to 7.11 million in 1990 while the average size of the plots decreased. In 1990, one quarter of the rural population was landless, in some districts by up to 50%. This caused specific challenges for young men who could not marry or sustain a family without an income.

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11 2004 Strategic Conflict Assessment undertaken by Sida.
Governance: the culture of violence and ethnic based propaganda relayed by media prior to the Genocide was widely used to ensure the monopoly of power. The Rwandan culture is also marked by a strong sense of hierarchy and authority. Since the Genocide, the RPF Government has made significant efforts to build up the capacities of institutions and a well-functioning state. The use of Gacaca traditional community-based mechanisms, for example, appears as a strong driver for peace. However, the limitations facing the political opposition and civil society in terms of restrained freedom of expression constitute a challenge for a constructive political debate, which could otherwise contribute to build the future of the country. A further key player is the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), that still has a strong role in society and thus has an important role to play in terms of building sustainable peace.

Use of the media: the media played a significant role in Rwanda history. The importance of Radio Mille Collines was infamous during the Genocide for launching propaganda and promoting hate for the extremist branch of Habyarimana’s MRND. The Government remains cautious in its approach to freedom of expression and media.

2.3 KEY INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING EVENTS

Based on the contextual developments and international support, the evaluation team has identified the following four periods as key for the evaluation of the Rwanda support:

1991-1996: Conflict and genocide

Key features of the context included a) war, first peace agreement, rising tensions, genocide b) positioning of international players, identification and immediate response to the genocide:

- 1990: President Habyrimana introduced multi-partyism and the abolition of ethnic identity cards- although this never happens. RPF attack in Rwanda.
- 1991: A ceasefire between RPF and the Habyarimana regime was reached.
- 1991: New multi-party constitution promulgated
- 1992: UNSG’s Agenda for Peace launched providing an enhanced UN role in preventative diplomacy, peace keeping etc.
- 1993: Power sharing agreement between Hutu leadership and Tutsi minority: Arusha Accords
- 1994: Presidential airplane shot down on 6th April. The Genocide against the Tutsi led to the killing of an estimated 800 000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu between April - July, up to the military victory of the RFP.
1996-2002: Rehabilitation and regionalisation
Key features for this period included: (a) reconstruction and rehabilitation; (b) state building; (c) development of the conflict in Eastern DRC, change of regime, and peace agreement; (d) launch of the Gacaca:

- 1996: Genocide trials began
- 1997: Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) established. Over 70,000 combatants reinserted until 2015.
- 1999: The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed by 6 countries (DRC, Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, et Uganda). Rwanda army close to Kinshasa;
- 1999/2000: Fight between Rwanda and Uganda armies in Kisangani (DRC). "6 days War”.
- 2001: Rwandan government began reconciliation/judicial processes within the communities (Gacaca)
- 2002: Various Great Lakes peace talks in South Africa and Zambia leading to Global and Inclusive Agreement in Gbadolite. Rwanda and DRC sign peace deal. Rwanda commits to withdraw its 30,000 troops from the DRC, and DRC accepts the return of 12,000 Rwandese Hutu militants.

2002-2010: Development
Key features for this period included: a) consolidation of the RPF power; (b) improvement of the development indicators; d) implementation and closure of transitional justice mechanisms; e) persistence of insecurity in the DRC and peace agreements; f) agreement on the refugees return; g) integration in the East African Community (EAC) and membership of the British Commonwealth, h) increased attention to conflict minerals and related regulation at international level, i) statebuilding reforms:

- 2002: Rwanda Poverty Reduction Strategy
- 2005: Mass release of prisoners. FDLR says it is ending armed struggle.
- 2006: Process of creating ethnically diverse administrative regions
• 2007: Peace deal with DRC signed
• 2008: Rwanda joined East African Community
• 2008: RPF won large majority in parliamentary elections
• 2009: Rwanda joined British Commonwealth
• Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
• 2010: Agreement between DRC, Rwanda and UNHCR for the return of 50,000 Tutsi Congolese refugees in the DRC, and planning for the implementation of Local Peace Committees in the DRC.

2010-2018: Development
Key features for this period included: a) change of constitution, b) continuity of Rwanda’s involvement in regional conflict:

• 2010: President Kagame re-elected.
• 2012: US, UK, Sweden and the Netherlands suspend their assistance to the Rwandan Government over accusations of arming the M23 (deriving from CNDP)
• 2013: RPF victory in parliamentary elections
• 2015: A referendum was held regarding a change in the Constitution. Among other things, the possibility for a third presidential term was included
• 2016: Vision 2050
• 2016: UN report indicated that the Rwandese government supports Burundian rebels seeking to oust Burundian President Nkurunziza.
• 2017: President Kagame won third term
• 2018: Minor attacks from Burundian border by unidentified armed groups in southern Rwanda.
3 Sida’s key priorities and theories of change

The following outlines the team’s overview of Sida’s support to peacebuilding in Rwanda based on the data available.

3.1 OVERVIEW OF SIDA SUPPORT

Sida’s aid to Rwanda has increased over time since it started in 1998, with some fluctuations depending on the support to national programmes and multilateral interventions.

Table 3.1: Swedish aid to Rwanda

As shown in the graph below, the share of the sector “governance and civil society” was particularly significant as of the end of 2000 decade.

Table 3.2: Share of Governance and Civil Society within the Sida portfolio
Multilateral assistance also represented a strong share of the overall assistance at the end of the nineties, decreased in the 2000s and restarted in 2013.

*Table 3.3: Proportion of multilateral assistance from Sida*

At the regional level, the level of funding to the DRC has been higher than in Rwanda since 2006. The difference, however, must consider however the specific demographics of the two countries. As an illustration the amount of assistance by inhabitant is much lower in the DRC, as highlighted in the table below.

*Table 3.4: Regional funding from Sida*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall assistance (ODA, all donors, all sectors) by year, 2015-2016</th>
<th>Overall assistance per inhabitant</th>
<th>Swedish assistance 2015-2016 (M USD)</th>
<th>Overall Swedish assistance per inhabitant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2.1-2.6 billion USD</td>
<td>25-31 USD/pers.</td>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>0.6 USD/pers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1.08-1.15 billion USD</td>
<td>90-96 USD/pers.</td>
<td>26-32</td>
<td>2.1-2.7 USD/pers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2.32-2.58 billion USD</td>
<td>43-48 USD/pers.</td>
<td>90-131</td>
<td>1.6-2.4 USD/pers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>798-962 million USD</td>
<td>49-60 USD/pers.</td>
<td>42-54</td>
<td>2.6-3.4 USD/pers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2 SIDA SUPPORT AND THEORIES OF CHANGE

Sida started to intervene in Rwanda bilaterally in 1997, though some humanitarian assistance was provided earlier. Sweden was not involved at the time of the active conflict. Sweden supported diplomatically the RPF at the UN in New York.
1996-2002

No Swedish country analyses or strategies were identified by the Evaluation Team prior to 2000. OECD-DAC statistics show that Sweden provided limited funding prior to the Genocide: 12 USD 0,13 million in 1990, USD 1,79 million in 1991, USD 0,30 million in 1992, USD 3,35 million in 1994. The Swedish funding level was almost similar in the DRC.

A regional and country strategy was prepared for 2000-2001 and provided the framework for assistance that included a regional envelope of SEK 100 million of humanitarian assistance, and SEK 50 million for the three countries Burundi, DRC and Rwanda, of which SEK 30 million was for Rwanda. Priorities were (1) peace, stability and reconciliation, (2) democracy and human rights, (3) economic reforms and macroeconomic stability and (4) institutional support and development of capacity. Capacity development, HIV/AIDS and gender equality were cross-cutting issues.

Most of the assistance before 2000 was emergency assistance, relief and rehabilitation, notably in relation to refugees, as well as telecommunications, but some assistance took place already in the field of human rights and community policing by 1996 and peacebuilding assistance represented 4 grants out of 8. Total Swedish support to Rwanda between 1998 and 2002 amounted to USD 61 million, with variations from USD 8,1 million in 2001 to USD 15 million in 2000 and 2002. By 1999, Sweden was providing USD 2.4 million in general budget support. Governance and civil society represented USD 0,9 million (up from USD 0,3 million in 1998), USD 2,1 million in 2000 and USD 0,9 million in 2002. The share of peacebuilding interventions in the overall budget varied from under 5% to 14 %, and was thus relatively limited.

2002-2009

In 2004, Sweden published a detailed Conflict Strategic Assessment for the Great Lakes and a Strategy. The Strategy for Rwanda indicates that one of the main objectives was “to create opportunities for poor people to improve their living conditions”. Peacebuilding, along with democracy and governance, was considered a priority and was to receive the second largest envelope of funding after poverty oriented economic and social development.

Over the period, a total of more than USD 126 million was allocated to the country by Sweden. The flow of Sida assistance varied over time, from USD 15.6 million in 2002 to 8.6 million in 2004 and 22.8 million in 2005, but with a general tendency to increase. Previous interventions on health had limited effectiveness, as mentioned in the Strategy 2004-2008, and hence the support was redirected.

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12 OECD-DAC, Total ODA of Sweden to Rwanda, current prices.
Sweden produced two strategies on international development during this period. Compared with previous support, the perspective is much more on building sustainable development and opening democratic space, including peacebuilding to heal the remaining damage of the Genocide and limit the risks of a renewed conflict. A regional perspective also appears in terms of risks related to insecurity. Although Rwanda’s role in the region is mentioned, it does not really link with the conflict drivers, which include regional dynamics. The Evaluation Team assess that the fact that the strategies are public, which is good in terms of transparency, may be a reason why some underlying issues are not explicitly spelled out.

The strategies were informed by several studies and a constant follow up of the context through Sida’s partner NGOs, although it was not clearly documented and did not constitute a fully-fledged conflict analysis. In 2010, a comprehensive study was drafted on ethnic identity and social cohesion in Rwanda by the NGO Interpeace, during which over 2000 persons were interviewed. In 2013, an internal stakeholder analysis was produced of the key stakeholders’ power relationships and included planning in relation to potential conflict scenarios, which seems essential in post-conflict countries. This is however not fully detailed (with analysis of the different sections within institutions etc.). Political economy aspects, for example, are not fully analysed for each intervention (see below under effectiveness).

The 2010-2013 Strategy for Rwanda was generally focused on reducing poverty and improving conditions for sustainable peace and reconciliation, as well as greater respect for human rights. Development cooperation targeted the sectors democracy and human rights, the environment and natural resources, and market development. The strategy indicated that this is based on the analysis of Rwandan priorities and comparative advantages, considering other donors’ commitments, and the relevance of these from a conflict-prevention and human rights perspective.

Sida’s theory of change was to highlight the importance of democracy and respect for human rights, as well as reduced poverty and income gaps as prerequisites for sustainable peace and reconciliation. It specified this, as well the importance of transparency and pluralism for increased democracy and their link to sustainable, peaceful development in the region. Support to the police on human rights was implemented through a tripartite cooperation between the Rwandan, Swedish and South African police services. Sweden’s support also included the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme III (2009–2011), which was the third and final stage of Rwanda’s national Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme that started in 1997. The issue of natural resources was addressed via the National Land Centre, on land tenure, based on the rationale that this would secure livelihoods and lead to an adaptation to climate change. Support to local research capacities was also continued.
The strategy indicated that support to information and communication technology and infrastructures would phase out. The strategy also clearly mentioned that, “in light of the uncertain regional conflict situation, the assessment is that, at present, conditions for budget support at general or sector level do not exist.” Sweden's budget support to state institutions had already been stopped in 2009 for this reason. In 2012, several other donors interrupted their funding because of the UN Group of Experts report which showed the involvement of Rwanda in DRC M23 support. The strategy did not make any reference to a regional approach, though challenges and positioning of Rwanda at the international level were considered.

In 2013, at the regional level, a Peace, Security and Cooperation framework was signed by International Conference on the Great Lakes Region countries. There was a plan to have a Trust Fund to support its implementation, but it never materialised and interventions remained at the country level.

The most recent strategy for **2015-2019** prioritises similar issues:

- a better environment, limited climate impact and greater resilience to environmental impact, climate change and natural disasters,
- strengthened democracy and gender equality, and greater respect for human rights, as well as
- better opportunities and tools to enable poor people to improve their living conditions.

The strategic aims include addressing poverty by transforming the economy and the lack of political pluralism. It mentions that conflict prevention and reconciliation are cross-cutting themes as well as the link between climate, environment and conflict and that “increased democratisation and strengthened opportunities to express criticism and opposition are crucial for securing Rwanda’s long-term stability and the respect for human rights”. Rwanda’s role in the regional context is not significantly addressed, although the importance of a regional approach is highlighted. The strategy is aligned with Rwandan national strategies and policies. These documents do not make reference, however, to human rights.

The overall rationale or theory of change for Sida's interventions is that the support to civil society and community-based dynamics will promote critical thinking as a way to open up a space for discussions and expression, and to ensure the respect of all human rights. The fulfilment of these rights is also conducive to long term stability since it will allow the institutionalisation and expression of grief in a public space as a way to mitigate the need for violent action. This said, much of the support remains oriented to development type activities overall in the country.
### 3.3 Timeline Overview

The following timeline provides an overview of key contextual events and international efforts, which Sida would have needed to relate to in one way or another, and which is used as a basis for the analysis of findings in the next chapter.

**Table 3.5: Timeline overview**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Context</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010-2019</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EDPRS 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kagame re-elected</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in the constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td>Third strategy (2015-2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleged support to Burundian rebels</td>
<td></td>
<td>ICGLR Peace, Security and Development Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vision 2050</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF victory in parliamentary elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>Several donors suspend their assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2002-2010</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kagame re-elected</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EDPRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda joins EAC &amp; Commonwealth</td>
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<td>Second strategy (2010-2013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF wins majority in elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement for the return of 50000 refugee Tutsis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace deal with DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>End of budget support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass release of prisoners</td>
<td></td>
<td>First strategy and Great Lakes Strategic Assessment (2004-2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>First multi-party elections</td>
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<td>Government Programme of Reforms</td>
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<td>New Constitution</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1990-2002</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sun City, Luanda, Pretoria Agreements</td>
<td></td>
<td>MoU with the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of demobilisation commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gacaca Courts initiate</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNSG’s Agenda for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Kagame becomes president</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Genocide begins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF secure entire territory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTR established</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Power sharing agreement between Hutu and Tutsis signed in Arusha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arusha Agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New multi-party constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>promulgated</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Creation of RPF</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
4 Findings

In the following, we present and analyse the findings in accordance with the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria as identified in the Terms of Reference (ToR). Given the longitudinal aspect of the evaluation, the assessment against the evaluation criteria relates to the individual periods of importance for the Rwanda context and Sida’s engagement as identified in the timeline in the chapter above.¹³

4.1 EARLY 1990s UNTIL 2002

Key contextual events of relevance for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation of the RPF</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arusha Agreement</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98-97 First Congolese War</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>98-2002: Second Congolese War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagame President</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun City, Luanda, Pretori Agreements</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR 1 and 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of the Demobilisation Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.1 RELEVANCE

Sweden started to provide support to the country at the time of the Genocide, mostly related to humanitarian needs, including the refugees. Support was almost non-existent before that. Human rights considerations, notably justice, were not ignored, as illustrated by the support to investigation and a small grant to communal police. The transition period after the Genocide was also relatively long, since it lasted 9 years before the first elections were conducted. In Rwanda itself, the sense of memory and commemoration was included in the reconstruction and started as early as 1995 to rebuild Rwandan identity. The Government’s peacebuilding approach included the creation of Ingando¹⁴, solidarity camps to educate on Rwanda and citizenship. It turned into Itorero.¹⁵ This relates in particular to the work of the reconciliation

¹³ Note: while the evaluation period starts in the early 1990s, the team has only obtained written documentation from 1998 onwards. Thus, the coverage during this period is mainly based on interviews.

¹⁴ Ingando camps are Rwandan political and civic reeducation and indoctrination camps. These camps were created by the ruling party of Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Ingando camp participants are required to wear military uniforms, live together and participate in shared activities.

¹⁵ The “Itorero” is a Rwandan civic education institution which aims mainly at teaching all Rwandese
commission and the importance of external initiatives as a way to broaden the knowledge base of the population, and open them up to other perspectives. A transition by Sida from relief towards more structural support occurred at the end of this time period, and budget support started in 1999 with USD 2.7 million and almost USD 7 million in 2000.

As already noted, there were no Swedish country analyses or strategies relating to development cooperation with Rwanda before 2000. According to stakeholders interviewed, Sida’s interventions were based first on the priorities identified by international organisations such as the UN, and then on Government requests. The interventions in Rwanda focused on material relief assistance, or reconstruction and rehabilitation, through ICRC, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, UN Women and various international NGOs. Assistance included a broad range of sectors, including education and health. There is limited data available on the results of these interventions, except from the general evaluations conducted at that time (see below). Funding was mainly channelled through multilateral organisations with joint funding.

In terms of peacebuilding, the conflict dynamics and the extent of the shock of the Genocide reshaped the perception and position of marginalised groups, such as women, who played a specific role in the reconstruction of the country. Hutu women were the first to come back from DRC and took important roles in relation to family livelihoods and production. It is not clear, however, how Sida specifically addressed this from the data available.

Multilateral DDR related interventions also started at that time and were reported upon as of 1998, with USD 1.38 million followed by USD 1.33 million in 1999 (under Sida’s humanitarian assistance strategy), and relatively small-scale interventions through NGOs on democracy and human rights, such as the Réseau Citoyen, African Rights, Trocaire, and Prison Reform International (which was key since the Gacaca courts handled around a million cases and charged 120,000 prisoners for genocide). But this remained quite limited compared to the overall budget. Most of the support was directed to joint humanitarian interventions and to state institutions and programmes.

The focus on emergency, relief and rehabilitation was relevant to peacebuilding given the country context. Attention was paid to rehabilitation in order to rebuild the country. Stakeholders interviewed by the Evaluation Team hardly mentioned missed opportunities at this stage of the response. The support to UNHCR to address the refugee crisis in the DRC also contributed to addressing a key issue related to stabilisa-

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tion in the region. The support to civil society was relevant from the perspective of supporting human rights, democratization and building up their capacity.

4.1.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The focus on channelling assistance mainly via multilateral agencies during this period is likely to have contributed to effectiveness by enabling a pooling of international funds and reducing the management burden on the Swedish Embassy. From 2000, Swedish humanitarian assistance to Rwanda started to turn into development-oriented approaches and support to state reforms. This included support to specific institutions playing a key role on the rule of law, based on the requests of the Government. These included the General Auditor’s Office and the Unity and Reconciliation Commission. Sweden also funded the National Electoral Commission, as well as the Rwanda Legal and Constitutional Commission through a UNDP Basket Fund, and hence contributed to statebuilding. The response to demands from the Government and national policies contributed to promoting ownership, while the State leadership over the process was quite strong.

In 2004, a review of the performance of Sida’s assistance to the Great Lakes 1999-2002 found that “the gradual shift from humanitarian assistance towards a more long-term, bilateral development co-operation was in general successful but took some time due to organisational structures at Sida.” It mentioned also that there were structural and organisational limitations in the development cooperation section (human resources, no delegation and no procedural agreement with Rwanda). This was partly corrected in the following years with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with the Government in 2002, along with other donors, and an increased delegation to design projects at the local level. The bilateral co-operation included strategic interventions of an ad-hoc nature (for example, study visits or short-term consultancies), mainly due to the preparation for long-term development co-operation. According to the review, Sida positioned itself in terms of approach based on potential comparative advantages in its co-operation with Rwanda and Sida’s flexible and somewhat limited bureaucracy was welcomed by Rwandan partners. This is coherent with the analysis of the portfolio and feedback from interviewees.

Two evaluations conducted on the international humanitarian response, one focusing more on the regional strategic coordination mechanism, give indications on the

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18 Ibid

performance of the international response to the Genocide and the present Evaluation Team did not identify more specific analysis of Sida’s interventions. Those evaluations mention that the humanitarian response substituted for the lack of political response to the crisis, and how assistance was used by several categories of stakeholders to serve specific interests, in contrast to humanitarian principles, despite the fact that it played a key role in alleviating human suffering. They also highlighted the need for a coordinated regional response and strategic framework between agencies as well as for governance and justice system. Interventions to support democracy and governance also constituted one of the elements of the response - though amounts remained limited, while the evaluations highlighted the importance of initiating such interventions right after a crisis.

4.1.3 IMPACT

While Sida and other donors’ interventions helped to set the groundwork for rebuilding the country, it is difficult to attribute specific impacts to one donor, especially in a context where many donors intervened and the context and local dynamics also had an influence over the results. It is possible to say however that Sida’s engagement had an impact on the alleviation of human suffering and began to address the dynamics of poverty alleviation and access to basic services. As such, some elements of impact can be identified, in terms of statebuilding, stabilisation and human development (with the HDI rising from 0.25 in 1990 to 0.33 in 2000). The decrease of humanitarian need in the country allowed some longer-term development interventions to begin at this time, which contributed to improving Rwanda’s socio-economic performance (see table 2.1 above).

4.1.4 SUSTAINABILITY

In light of the absence of data on the results of Sida’s support during this period, it is difficult to assess its sustainability. Some results are noted in terms of what is now termed the humanitarian-development nexus. The review of the performance of Sida’s assistance to the Great Lakes 1999-2002, for example, mentions that “some humanitarian projects, mainly in the health sector, have been successfully transformed by the implementing organisations into more long-term engagements in line with the Government’s policies.”

During this phase, foundations were laid in terms of statebuilding, peacebuilding and reconciliation, which were further capitalised upon over the next decade. The institutions that were given this initial support (the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, Office of the Auditor General) still exist today and are now funded by the Government, indicating some sustainability effects.

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4.2 2002-2010

Key contextual events of relevance for this period:

|------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|

This period provides the first real opportunity for a strategic assessment of Sida in Rwanda.

4.2.1 RELEVANCE

Sida’s support during the period became more structured and documented and is regarded by the Evaluation Team as relevant to Rwanda’s needs as well as international assistance priorities. There was also an increased reference to the regional context, which is regarded by the team as relevant, although not very concrete.

This decade was a time of transition from addressing the consequences of the conflict to increased statebuilding and reform of public administration. This included, in relation to Sida’s peacebuilding interventions, transitional justice, DDR and support to the police as a start for three phases of decentralisation and support to local governance. Those initiatives had a structural component of support to the police, the decentralisation process, land reform, the continuous support to the National University of Rwanda which started in 2002 (notably for the Centre for Conflict Management and the creation of a Master of Security Studies), and the Office of the Auditor General and Rwanda Information Technology Authority (RITA). Sida also supported joint interventions led by other donors, through UN entities, like OCHA, un-earmarked funds to UNHCR or such as the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) led by the World Bank, which promoted a holistic approach to the whole region.

On 15 March 2002, the Rwandan Government, together with the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, signed a memorandum of understanding to frame their cooperation in the country. A draft independent review was also conducted at this time. It is noticea-
ble that already at this stage, Sweden expressed concerns, about the importance of opening up the political space, improving the human rights situation, donor coordination, supporting demobilisation and the referendum for the new constitution.21

While acknowledging that the democracy and human rights situation in Rwanda was not satisfactory, the 2004 Strategy22 recognised these sectors as a prerequisite for peace and long-term development, with a strong emphasis that Rwanda promote peace and cooperation in the region as a whole. The broad involvement in development provided an opportunity to continue the dialogue about democracy, human rights and regional development. The rationale or theory of change was also to redirect development in rural areas, since “underdevelopment of rural areas generates conflicts.” This was coherent with Rwanda’s poverty strategy in which rural development was given the highest priority. The assumption was also that “Democratic reforms and respect for human rights correlate positively with an improved standard of living, and a progressive development policy”. Here the two main intervention logics included that support in terms of development would address the issues of democracy and human rights, and that the fight against poverty would lead to stability and peacebuilding.

The 2004 Strategy for Rwanda is also part of a broader regional strategy, along with country strategies for DRC, Burundi and Uganda. The role of regional integration could play for stabilisation was one of the underlying assumptions. A regional approach is particularly relevant for the Great Lakes region. However, this did not materialise, except for the support to regional organisations that is mentioned in the strategy. The document indicates notably that “Sweden supports EAC within the framework of the Strategy for Swedish support for poverty reduction and sustainable development in the Lake Victoria Basin and surrounding region 2004-2006”, as well as that activities are under way to re-establish the regional cooperation through the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL) of which DRC, Burundi and Rwanda are members. Sweden also made “contributions to the preparations for the International Conference on Peace, Security and Development for the Great Lakes Region” (the support was channelled through UNDP in Kenya). The strategy makes reference to linkages with EU interventions, although this is not very explicit.

The overall approach promoted by the Rwandan Government was that the fulfilment of socio-economic rights would ensure its legitimacy and hence that a decrease in poverty and an increase in access to basic services would lead to peacebuilding. According to reports and interviewees, this proved to be correct in the short-term but missed the importance of inclusion, citizen participation and critical thinking aspects.

22 ibid.
Rwanda’s approach was mostly to invest in visible and tangible outputs and let outstanding and problematic issues resolve themselves. The approach was also articulated with the support to national reforms and, as such, Sida’s theory of change includes both addressing the immediate consequences of the conflict as well as contributing to structural reforms that would support long term stabilisation. The Evaluation Team regards these as relevant objectives.

Budget support took an increased significance from 2002 with strong variations depending on the year. In 2002 the budget support amount to USD 5 million, the increase indicated that Sida favoured support to countries with strong signs of development and who were in a stable political situation, instead of support during crisis. This is also coherent from an accountability perspective given the risks that the country faced in terms of peace and security following the Genocide, as well as the needs to rebuild the country and strengthen its institutions.

With regard to gender equality and women’s empowerment, the 2004 Strategy relates to the gender situation and the plight of children in conflict. This included specific support to women’s groups. In relation to minorities, the Twa benefited from the overall non-discriminatory policies defined in the Constitution. The Twa did not play a specific role in the conflict and do not appear as a specific category in Sida’s interventions. Their level of vulnerability is also not clearly analysed.

### 4.2.2 EFFECTIVENESS

During the decade which followed the Genocide and the initial phase of rehabilitation, new interventions were supported by Sweden through its support to the overall development efforts of the Rwandan Government. Budget support represented a significant share of the overall funding between 2002 and 2008 (at USD 51.78 million) in total or 41% of the overall funding provided by Sweden. Additional support was provided to state institutions and reforms, such as DDR, local governance, decentralisation, and support to universities (research represented between USD 2 - 4 million each year from 2003). As such, the support to statebuilding was a strong component that could contribute also to peacebuilding; for example through enhancing land access, local governance, and refugee return and reintegration. According to interviewees, Sida played a lead role in terms of education and capacity building, and there are several examples of successful individuals who gained prominent positions in public and corporate sector in the country after attending courses sponsored by Sida; for example, through the ICT Master programme at the University of Rwanda, funded by Sida (one student became the Minister for ICT).

Sida’s interventions on peacebuilding, stability and reconciliation during this period covered support to the National Reconciliation Commission, in collaboration with the UK, financing the Genocide Memorial Centre and a study of Rwandans’ attitude to the peace and reconciliation process as well as developments in the country. Support was also provided to the Gacaca courts, which constituted a form of transitional justice, through locally owned mechanisms at the grassroots level. The mechanism con-
tributed to the recreation of the sense of identity of the Rwandan nation by redefining collective norms and values and reshaping layers of authorities at the local level, notably by conferring a role to “wise people” of the communities. This approach highlighted the interest of having specific and endogenous mechanisms to solve issues. It offered “moral compensation” through the public acknowledgment of the crimes but it did not allow for the full resolve of the immeasurable legacy of the conflict.\textsuperscript{23}

In terms of approaches, some aspects were mentioned in the 2004 Strategy on the Swedish comparative advantage: \textit{International pressure and financial support are essential for the national peace processes and regional normalisation process to succeed. Long-standing commitment through, for example, missionary churches and the fact that we were not a colonial power. Sweden is perceived as a neutral actor by the countries in the region.} This was also verified in practice, according to the interviewees. As in other countries and for further follow-up interventions, Sweden was perceived by partners as neutral, collaborative, flexible and committed to a partnership approach. During this period, long-term partnerships started with several phases as a follow-up, notably with the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP), DDR and police support.

Interviewees also consider that Sweden did not seek “\textit{quick wins}”, in contrary to other donors, but sought to address challenges with a longer-term perspective. This continuity allowed the interventions to be built progressively and to capitalise on successive phases. As a consequence, Interpeace could put in place a network of 7000 peace actors.

### 4.2.3 IMPACT

Results from various reconciliation efforts that contribute to understanding and overcoming trauma constitute a resilience basis that can limit the risks of radicalisation and manipulation, of youths, as illustrated below in Box 4.1.

\textit{Box 4.1 Interpeace & IRDP}

Since 2001 Sweden has supported Interpeace for community dialogue initiatives. Interpeace used to work with IRDP until 2013 when, because of management and political issues, it was replaced by the NGO Never Again.

The launch of the interventions was based on the specific challenges faced in Rwandese society, while support was shifting from NGOs to donor governments. With the initiation of Gacaca, some people fled the country, others decided to eliminate witnesses and the genocide survivors, and some decided on revenge and killed the genocidaire suspected. At that

\textsuperscript{23} During the field work in Rwanda, it was indicated that the Gacaca worked because it was not possible to contest the mechanism at any level, partly due to the strong rule and leadership of security forces and the new state in the country. The transitional justice mechanisms however only addressed the cases of genocide crimes, and the general genocide related violence did not get a healing space.
time dialogue was impossible on 1994 events. IRDP was created with the general aim of reducing the mistrust between members of the same society. The IRDP programme was also created to provide more space for other categories of people to give their thoughts on human rights and justice in Rwanda and to help the society break the violent silence. The IRDP programme sought to facilitate dialogue between people from different political backgrounds.

The 2008 evaluation concluded a unanimous success of the project; highlighting for examples that “the IRDP/Interpeace programme has made a significant and strategic contribution to the possibility of building peace in Rwanda. It has selected activities, participants, and strategies which have real influence, and a combined impact greater than any one of its elements. This positive assessment is supported by those interviewed, virtually without exception. 24

IRDP/Interpeace has established itself as an interlocutor, described in terms such as credible, neutral, objective, and accepted. It has been particularly adept at identifying important issues which were controversial or taboo, yet which needed to be discussed in order for Rwanda to progress in the direction of peace-building, and at engaging those at elite and decision-making levels in dialogue. It has dared to open difficult themes, and has managed to inform and include the full range of actors, from the base to the high political levels.” 25

This was further emphasized by the 2011 evaluation, which noted that “the IRDP/Interpeace Peacebuilding Programme continues to be of great strategic relevance for the prospects of peacebuilding in Rwanda. It has succeeded in bringing into the open a number of highly sensitive and controversial issues, yet of crucial importance for the future of peace in the country; in the process, it has engaged a broad range of people in growing numbers, from youth in schools and universities and ordinary “people on the hills” to local authorities and the main decision-makers at national level. In particular, it has uniquely succeeded in bringing groups of the Rwandan diaspora around the world into this ongoing and ever widening dialogue.” 26

Evidence from interviews with stakeholders during the field work on the role of women and marginalised groups was limited. However, reports indicate that support was provided to vulnerable children, since the number of orphans and children at risk (exploitation, street children) was quite significant after the war (every one in five children was reportedly an orphan). On gender equality, specifically in relation to Sida’s interventions, the right of women to land ownership was included as part of the reform and non-discriminatory practices.

4.2.4 SUSTAINABILITY

The sustainability of specific peacebuilding initiatives is difficult to determine, since they cover behaviour changes and personal feelings in relation to the conflict after-

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25 Ibid
26 External Evaluation of the IRDP/Interpeace Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme, Guus Meijer & Dr. Théogène Bangwanubusa, October 2011.
math. The interventions included support to national institutions, which still exist today. As such, there is some sustainability. The interventions were based on the demand by the national authorities, which exerted a strong ownership over the interventions. The institutionalisation of the reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms also supported the sustainability of the results.

4.3 2010-2018

Key contextual events of relevance for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RPF Victory in Parliamentary Elections</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in the constitution</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleged support to Burundian rebels</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kagame reelected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.1 RELEVANCE

Sida’s overall support during this period strongly increased compared with earlier phases, with an increased role for civil society, as reflected in the strategy. It ranged from USD 13.9 million in 2012 to a peak of USD 40.9 million in 2014 but has decreased since. At the time of writing in 2018, it is USD 13.1 million. Over the period, the funding to the democracy and human rights objectives, which was included in the two strategies for 2010-2013 and 2015-2019, represented a significant share of the funding, from USD 4 to 9 million, from 13% in 2011 up to 46.8% of the overall budget in 2012. Peacebuilding interventions covered a broad range of topics, with a more important role devoted to NGOs and civil society, which is of particular relevance in the Rwandan context. They reflect the contributions of Sida to the promotion of dialogue and decrease of insecurity risks.

Overall, the evaluation team finds the interventions are highly relevant in the context, targeting both consequences of the conflict and structural conflict drivers (poverty, inequality, discrimination). Peacebuilding was targeted through various angles: including peace education, community dialogue, local governance, access to justice, capacities of the police to interact with vulnerable groups (women in the first place).

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27 Support to civil society was one of the sub-objectives of the Human Rights and Democracy component for the strategy 2015-2019, along with support to media and support for human rights, especially for women and girls, while the focus in the previous strategy was more on public administration and rule of law.
At the regional level however, there is no integrated approach between the various embassies and Sida HQ to respond to the regional dimensions of the conflict.28

An objective of the 2015-2019 strategy specifically concerns gender mainstreaming, including strengthened capacity of Rwandan society to promote gender equality and enhance enjoyment of human rights, especially for women and girls. It materialises through funding to various state institutions via UN Women, as well as integration of the promotion of women directly or as a cross-cutting approach in other interventions. The evaluation finds that this is relevant, as a first step before broadening the support to women at the grassroots level.

4.3.2 EFFECTIVENESS

Sida’s approaches to its support to Rwanda during this period are generally seen as relevant and effective. In terms of modalities, Sida has partnerships with a number of NGOs for peacebuilding interventions, who in turn support local CSOs. This is due to the nature of the needs in Rwanda, and a relatively limited scope of those programmes – which favour implementation by CSOs - given the sensitivity of the subjects and lack of comprehensive knowledge on the extent of the needs.

A significant share of the interventions has also been carried out through multilateral organisations, which can be regarded as easing the management burden on the Embassy. The One UN system was created in 2008 and benefited from Sida, a major contributor: USD 0,9 million in 2008, USD 1,57 million in 2009, USD 1,66 million in 2010, USD 10,2 million in 2014 (25% of the overall funding of Sweden to Rwanda), USD 2,38 million in 2015, USD 1,17 million in 2016 and USD 3,39 million in 2017. This contributed to building a multilateral structure in country that can work with the government. A global evaluation of the Delivering as One Model29, undertaken in 2012 found notably that the Delivering as One system “provided greater coherence in advocacy and policy dialogue as well as increased visibility”.

Sida has also played a significant role in joint interventions with other donors and as such in triggering joint approaches across donors. This is the case notably by funding the joint DDR programme and by starting to be involved in a civil society fund, along

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28 There is also a strong imbalance in the level of support per inhabitant provided between the various countries. It is much higher in Rwanda than in the DRC (2,1 USD/ person in Rwanda versus 0,8 USD/ person in the DRC, based on openaid.se statistics for 2015-2016) without considering the respective cost of operations related to the geography. This means that his overall there is no clear approach to prioritise support to the most deprived countries. Also, this raises the challenges of dimensioning the responses based on the existing organisational systems of Sweden or based on the actual conflict dynamics and integrated objectives, for which an arbitration and a balance needs to be found.

with DfID and USAID. The limited number of staff at the Embassy justified this approach, as well as the level of trust in those joint approaches.

In addition, support to NGOs was able to act on drivers of peace and by raising the profile of CSOs’ work in the country and lead to some changes related to the analysis provided. This was done through the Interpeace’s work on community reconciliation, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) work on local governance, access to Justice with Réseau Citoyens – Citizens Network, Peace Education and Trauma Healing with Aegis Trust, amongst others.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mainly falls under the responsibility of the implementing partners, with limited involvement of the staff at the Embassy, who have developed frameworks over the recent years, as part of the global approach, which also introduced operationalization plans. The projects were evaluated relatively regularly and the Evaluation Team collected a number of these reports. There have been initiatives from the Embassy to introduce outcome mapping, which proved to be a very useful tool to measure the changes. However, data collected on the reporting is not always consistent, and since the methods changed, it cannot be compared with earlier stages. This evolution indicates dependency on the personality and experience of Embassy staff, instead of more systematic or strategic approaches. In that respect, some partners also expressed concerns about the turn over at the Embassy, and the fact that all the staff were not experienced in peacebuilding. To have technical assistance, support from the HQ in those cases, or to ensure that staff deployed in conflict, post-conflict and fragile countries receive training on the specificities of those areas could be options to consider.

Stakeholders praised Sida for their communication and partnership skills. These stakeholders have welcomed the fact that the Embassy participates each time they are invited, which serves as a good sign of support of their partners. One institution was particularly glad that the Ambassador participated even after the funding was finished, indicating that this support to the approach was not only bound by the accountability within a project.

Despite strong donor coordination mechanisms imposed by the Government, there is still limited harmonisation of the donor approaches. There appears to be room for further interaction and exchange across the structures, and a first step could be at the level of projects funded by Sweden. Some subjects such as local governance and community dialogue appear as cross cutting and could be integrated in various interventions to maximise the coverage. In addition, each NGO develops to some extent its own tools and approaches, though several structures work on similar and interre-

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30 Interview in Kigali.
lated subjects. This is a recurrent issue but still needs to be addressed in future planning of Sweden’s interventions in the country.

Interviewees indicate an attention to Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity, which have to be analysed for projects to be approved. Implementing partners however mostly do this at the project formulation stage. The actual indirect – and potentially negative - effects of the interventions do not seem to have been analysed, despite the frequent monitoring. This overall support to partners and relative flexibility means that there is a strong level of trust in the analysis even though they sometimes operate in a politicised context and can influence the conflict dynamics. Interventions that change the dynamics also contribute to creating new types of needs, and potentially new tensions that can lead to conflict. The Evaluation Team notes that, since the situation is stable, the broader peacebuilding objectives may not be systematically considered when it comes to addressing root causes of conflict (land reform, economic development and poverty, family planning). There is then some limited follow up of the effects on the various conflict drivers, except when it concerns interventions that relate more directly to peacebuilding. In relation to this, the peacebuilding perspective is not really mainstreamed across interventions to the extent that it could be.

4.3.3 IMPACT

Rwanda has been stable since the end of the Genocide, though low level attacks, particularly related to the regional dynamics, have occasionally affected the country.

The support to the state institutions on reconciliation and justice has contributed to the legitimacy of the Government. This is the case for example for the DDR interventions, which responded to the interests of the Government and which may affect regional dynamics.

The CSOs in Rwanda are also not fully independent since they need approval by State institutions for all their interventions and can get various types of pressures, in addition to being officially registered and being sometimes closely linked with the RPF. However, they would mention their approach as a successful one since they are able to influence the Government and remain authorised, in contrast to violence in Burundi or DRC for example. This implies that the boundary between influencing and adapting to the local dynamics is quite fine, but there are no precise analyses, criteria or approaches to this. Local CSOs also face challenges directly or indirectly relating to the sensitivity of the issue they focus on and as such they manoeuvre through complex dynamics and need constant follow up.

Sida’s peacebuilding support during this period contributed to a number of changes and outcome level, as illustrated in Box 4.2 below. These include results in terms of capacity building of the structures that have been supported over the years, notably the local CSOs.
Box 4.2: Examples of results contributing to peacebuilding

- **Community dialogue and citizenship.** Included in several types of projects, Sida contributed to creating space for discussion and to increasing linkages between groups. It also helped to strengthen the space for local governance, through interaction of citizens with the administrative entities to provide feedback and recommendations on public policies. Those initiatives on dialogue and healing interventions have contributed to promoting this field of intervention in Rwanda, creating local expertise on the matter and increasing government interest gaining more interest. Interviewees indicate also for example that intermarriages happen again in Rwanda.

- **Peace education.** The peace education activities, implemented by various NGOs and funded by Sida, that interact also with the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, contributed to an evolution of the approach to peace education in a less divisive way from teaching reconciliation to debate reconciliation, as well as to broaden it to a large audience, notably in schools. Nonetheless, a potential issue would be that children going to school (whose rate is relatively high in Rwanda though the quality of education is rather low compared with the region\(^{31}\)) are not the most marginalised and at risk.

- Support to the second phase of the DDR, which led to the demobilisation of 4000 soldiers and over 4000 members of armed groups in the DRC, almost all FDLR. It has some specificity, in the sense that it was the cross-border demobilisation of FDLR who operated in the DRC and is constituted of ex-genocidaires. According to the MDRP Evaluation of 2010\(^{32}\), FDLR were considered as the most significant threat at the time. Tutsi affiliated groups, which received alleged support from Rwanda at times, in particular CNDP, integrated the Congolese Army in some cases with key positions and without breaking the chain of command. More recently, the UN Group of Experts report for the year 2012 highlighted the support of Rwanda to the M23. This situation was justified at Sida by the fact that the Government wanted to limit the scope of the programme, since the coverage “could not comprise everybody” it had to be limited otherwise it would become too difficult. The final evaluation\(^{33}\), undertaken in 2017, of the second phase of the DDR in Rwanda mentioned very good results in terms of appreciation of the various services provided and socio-economic integration (with higher employment rates than the average population). The approach was also comprehensive and included support to the dependent and disabled. In total, with the first two phases of DDR, around 60 000 members of armed militia were reintegrated. This was part of the MRDP managed by the World Bank and covering seven countries, for a total of 300 000 people demobilized until 2010.

\(^{31}\) Human Capital Index of 0.37 is lower than countries such as Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Republic of Congo and even Burundi, and is similar to DR Congo. World Bank, Human Capital Index, https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/interactive/2018/10/18/human-capital-index-and-components-2018.

\(^{32}\) 2010, Scanteam, End of Programme Evaluation of the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme.

• Support to the media, with Pax Media. An earlier project was designed to support the media, and could not be fully executed because of constraints related to the sensitivity of the subject and the work of the CSO. This is the only example of a project constraint.

• A cross border project was implemented by Never Again / Interpeace in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, with various partners (Pole Institute, APC, CEJAP in the DRC and CEMAP in Burundi). It covers cross border dialogue for peace. Another project supported by World Vision / International Alert aims to promote cross-border trade and access to markets. These are the only examples of cross border interventions to date.

In terms of gender mainstreaming, there are clear results since Sida included support to institutions dedicated to gender promotion and mainstreaming (the so called Gender Machinery) through UN Women. This includes: the Gender Monitoring Office under the Prime Minister - a structure dedicated to Gender Mainstreaming -, the National Women’s Council, and MIGEPROF, the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion. Despite the existence of the strong institutional and normative framework in favour of women and visible progress at the national level, the situation of women at the grassroots level and the implementation of this national framework remains a challenge. Rwanda is, however, world-leading when it comes to political representation of women, 61% parliamentarians, 50% in the Cabinet.

Some local level initiatives also specifically target women, as well as youth, such as the support to cross border trade with World Vision, or local level economic activities. In terms of approach, the local level initiatives have paid attention to include a certain percentage of women, and in some cases designed specific activities and group meeting protocols to ensure that their needs could be considered. The support to cross-border trade through the World Vision project (USD 2 million in 2015, USD 1.16 million in 2016, and USD 1.87 million in 2017) mostly benefits Rwandan people, since access to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) market is reduced for Congolese products, as standards are quite specific. The arrival of Rwandan products creates increased competition for women in the DRC, according to some interviewees, and can make that population even more vulnerable.

The land reforms (Sida funded the Ministry for Land Administration with USD 8.7 million in 2011 and USD 0.75 million in 2017) and reshuffling the access to property for women could potentially influence the marriage of boys – owing to the dowry practices - and their level of livelihoods, since plots are being reduced.

Although the access to land by women is an achievement, the question would be which measure should be put in place to reduce the pressure on cultivable land, youth employment and poverty in the country. Those dynamics should be clearly analysed to determine their effects on the short and long term to make sure that all outcomes are considered.
Overall, the promotion of gender has seen significant progress in Rwanda and is largely visible in the institutions. The promotion of gender also forms a part of the overall dynamic of non-discrimination. Given the regional challenges in addressing gender issues, notably with the recurrent phenomenon of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in the DRC, there could be opportunities for the successful Rwandan experience to be replicated in neighbouring countries through regional workshops. This could also constitute an entry point to have regional discussions and experience sharing amongst the most vulnerable victims of violence (not to mention the political interest).

4.3.4 SUSTAINABILITY

There are some sustainability elements, notably when the interventions concern support to state institutions. The institutions supported by Sida are still active today, notably the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, and RITA at the university. The national organisations that Sida supported were able to gain some recognition and now constitute key elements of leveraging further additional funding. Recently, Aegis Trust’s Peace Education manual was also formally included in the primary school curricula.

The community structures created for the dialogue express their motivation but given the constraints that all individuals face, the sustainability of these initiatives is not certain. An NGO suggested that coupling this type of peacebuilding work with income generating activities, for example with joint cooperatives people would facilitate the continuity of the dynamics of exchange and mixing amongst the population, and strengthen social cohesion.
In the following we present the conclusions in accordance with the OECD-DAC criteria.

5.1 RELEVANCE

The evaluation finds that Sida’s interventions addressed some of the key needs of the country taking into account the extent of the crisis left by the Genocide, the evolution of the context and the specific role of the government. However, there is a lack of regional strategies, programming and interventions, while Sida is rather well positioned due to its neutral position the region, in contrast to other donors.

Since the strategies that the evaluation team consulted were quite broad, there is consistency with the project portfolio. The interventions addressed both immediate consequences and to some extent structural drivers of the conflict. Rwanda also highlights the need for specific interventions based on the local context created through detailed and updated analysis, notably in order to tackle and adjust to the specific drivers of peace and conflict, needs, culture and dynamics.

Sida has supported some innovative peacebuilding approaches in the country, though their geographical reach remains sometimes limited (only a few areas are covered for NGO projects), approaching peacebuilding from a variety of angles. This included an essential contribution to the prison system, transitional justice, access to justice, DDR, police, elections, support to critical thinking and peace education, promoting reconciliation, freedom of expression, and local governance. Peacebuilding interventions took an increased share of the budget over the years, representing between 3% and 11% until 2006, and between 14% and 46.8% since then with peaks over 40% in 2009 and 2012.

The volume of funding increased as Rwanda became more stable (and is proportionally higher than in neighbouring countries still experiencing conflict, such as DRC\textsuperscript{34}), which highlights that there is a trend to support interventions in more stable contexts. This can be justified in terms of accountability and return on investment but also means that the most vulnerable situations may not be the ones gaining the most support. This can further delay the transformation of conflict in such fragile situations.

\textsuperscript{34} 2,1 USD/ person in Rwanda versus 0,8 USD/ person in the DRC, based on opendaid.se statistics for 2015-2016.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

5.2 EFFECTIVENESS

Interventions on peacebuilding had noticeable successes, for example on transitional justice and DDR, largely because of the use of specific local solutions and a strong political leadership. There are also noticeable results on human rights and democracy through NGOs, though overall this remains more of a long-term process. In Rwanda, an emphasis on civil society and bringing constructive approaches into public policies is important. This is of particular relevance to local governance mechanisms as well as through capacity building of grassroots dynamics. In this area, the coverage is also rather limited to date, with a potential for further expansion, noting the key importance of the institutionalisation of those local mechanisms. The overall emphasis on supporting statebuilding, in particular between 1998 and 2008 through budget support, was successful in strengthening state administration functions.

The approach of supporting interventions dedicated to peace and democracy from various angles – such as capacity building for institutions dedicated to gender, universities, CSOs, and in conjunction with support to larger national interventions on socio-economics - appears particularly relevant. There are nonetheless remaining challenges for human rights and freedom of expression. The evaluation finds that poverty reduction as a way to address peacebuilding is an approach that needs to be complemented by work on reconciliation, debate, trust and trauma healing.

The evaluation finds that the collaborative partnership approach on a relatively long-term engagement gives Sida a comparative advantage. Yet, this should not leave aside strong analysis of the various levels of effects of the interventions in the specific context of the Great Lakes, and on the conflict dynamics. Risk analysis, including potential negative effects should be also constant all over the project cycle (not only in terms of conflict sensitivity at the project level), and form part of the M&E. For this, independent analyses by Sida or external stakeholders should play a role. Neutrality of the partners is indeed a specific challenge, particularly in the country, and in the region. Taking this into account, further analysis on adapting to certain situations to get an entry point and influencing the local dynamics should be made. This means checking if the interventions compromise more than they influence, and identify the criteria for what Sida can accept in terms of such compromises.

There is a risk also of forgetting the peacebuilding dimension of some interventions, notably development related interventions when the situation is stable, as such integration of the peacebuilding perspective is sometimes not very clear for all the stakeholders. Results in terms of peacebuilding are not always very clear. This is for example the case for land reform, youth employment.

Finally, this case study illustrates the role of local ownership and leadership. Sida’s supportive approach is then of particular interest to build local systems and capacities that can in turn take their own initiative to address the evolution of the issues.
Given the examples of successes at various levels, and on addressing gender and vulnerable issues at the national level, there could be an interest to promote those successful approaches to the neighbouring countries – first DRC -, by organizing partnerships and regional interventions, starting with workshops, visit tours or joint activities.

5.3 IMPACT

The evaluation finds that Sida’s support to peacebuilding has contributed to a number of results, including in relation to civil society capacity, DDR, the police, and gender equality (see box 4.2). The evaluation finds that contributing to this was a part of Sida’s integrated and multi layered approach. Sida has also had an impact in supporting:

- Reconciliation to address underlying causes of grief and violence by setting up grassroots mechanisms with a multi-ethnic audience. Interviewees indicate that interethnic marriage happens again in Rwanda for example.

- Promotion of a culture of debate and openness to critical thinking through the promotion of peace education and the possibility to discuss and raise taboos or express personal feelings on the situation.

- Capacity building for a professional civil society, including media, which allows them to interact with state officials and gain legitimacy, as well as to influence public policies.

- Support to gender mainstreaming at the institutional level, via the development of several dedicated institutions, as well as promotion of women at the community level through promotion of livelihoods.

- Statebuilding through the support to institutions and to government programmes in key sectors where there has been strong ownership.

- Local governance mechanisms which contribute to strengthening the governance chain and creating space for discussion, feedback and exchange on public policies.

- Land management, and then limitation of conflict over access to resources and livelihoods for the communities, notably with the return of refugees.

This adds also to the interventions in other sectors, since in responding to conflict, all types of interventions can play a role in addressing short- or long-term conflict drivers or immediate fragilities. A lot of the results highlighted in this report are also due to the strong leadership and political will of the Government. This highlights the importance of ownership for the success of international assistance interventions. As such political will and ownership could be considered more systematically as part of
the humanitarian-security-development nexus. The results in particular at the community level on dialogue and peace education, also point to the significance of addressing social drivers to conflict and the sense of identity, in order to complement poverty reduction approaches and deal with the conflict driver of access to resources.

### 5.4 SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability has principally been generated by the strong political leadership over the interventions. Results of the institutional support have been maintained and funded by the State. Peace education has been institutionalised into the national curriculum, with an evolution to a more open approach to debates owing to the facilitation of discussions. Regarding community-based mechanisms for peacebuilding, the sustainability of the interventions is stronger when coupled with income generating activities, for example cooperatives regrouping around a common economic project, or when the approach is institutionalised (with then some potential limitations).
# ANNEX A: ASSESSMENT OF CONFLICT DRIVER CONSIDERATIONS IN COUNTRY STRATEGIES

Assessment of inclusion of / reference to conflict and peace drivers in country strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Criteria: reference to conflict/peace drivers in:</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Drivers included in strategy background analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 2015-2019</td>
<td>1. Context analysis</td>
<td>The document relates to several of the conflict drivers such as the need for enhancing space for civil society and promote human rights. Brief mention of regional dimension of conflict. There is no reference to the identity dimension of the conflict</td>
<td>- Focus on national unity and reconciliation at the cost of public debate and political pluralism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Developments in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are unstable and Rwanda’s relations with, and actions in, eastern DR Congo entail a risk of international conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DR Congo and the Region of 2013 is an important cornerstone for continued dialogue and peacebuilding at a regional level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Overall theory of change</td>
<td>Rather simple: build on previous work and Sida comparative advantages to promote democracy and address inequities. Not clear how enhanced Sida will contribute to change in conflict pattern</td>
<td>- Rwandan politics is development-oriented but authoritarian and has a democracy deficit, with a lack of openness for genuine public participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus</td>
<td>Analysis is limited in the document itself, but there is a logical reference between context and sectors supported</td>
<td>- Consensus-building is a greater priority than open political debate, which in the long run risks leading to instability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 2010-2013</td>
<td>1. Context analysis</td>
<td>Several conflict and peace drivers are referred to in the analysis, including the regional dimension, and au-</td>
<td>- Lack of any real opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Separation of powers and consensus decisions are the fundamental political principles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- The capacity of the Rwandan media to scrutinise the state apparatus is inadequate, as freedom of expression is partly restricted, self-censorship is used and journalists lack education and professionalism. Although some improvements have been made regarding respect for freedom of the media, the new genocide ideology law from 2008 runs the risk of limiting freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of association.

- Rwandan civil society is relatively large in terms of number of organisations, but few of these can be regarded as independent, and only a few concentrate on policy and advocacy work, and on human rights.

- Relations with the Government are sometimes strained, and the conditions for an open dialogue between civil society and the Government are limited due to self-censorship.

- Cases of recruitment of child soldiers from Rwanda to various combat groups in the DRC have been reported, both from villages in the border regions and from refugee camps. National legislation and policies to protect the rights of children have been strengthened, but poverty and inadequate capacity to transform policy into practice limit the impact.

- The country is in an exposed regional position and Rwanda’s actions play a key role in achieving stability and security in the Great Lakes region.

- Threat of the FDLR to the civilian population in the DRC. It is essential that the issue be resolved, through such means as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegra-
- A fundamental prerequisite for a positive development in Rwanda is stability in eastern DRC and in the Great Lakes region as a whole. Rwanda has made international commitments aimed at contributing to a resolution of the conflict in eastern Congo, but it also has a responsibility and an important role to play in the general regional context. Rwanda must therefore also look upon the country’s development from a conflict-prevention perspective which has a bearing on the entire region.

There are approximately 55,000 refugees in Rwanda, primarily from the DRC and Burundi, while there are an estimated 60,000 Rwandan refugees, primarily in the DRC and Uganda (April 2009).

Growing income gaps and rising underemployment and unemployment risk creating a breeding ground for renewed social tensions and conflict, which in the long term may also have an impact on stability in the country and the region.

Overall strong analysis of Rwanda situation, but reflections on conflict drivers and peace building opportunities is limited though referred to in terms of need for democratic development and regional dimension. Only two para of 20 page summary refer directly to conflict.

200 pages regional strategic conflict analysis, including regional level analysis, and country specific analyses, 20 pages for Rwanda.
| 3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus | Strong linkages between the strategy and the development needs. Linkages to conflict analysis less detailed |

Legend:

| Conflict and peace drivers well integrated in strategy document (or clearly aligned with background analysis of drivers) | Green |
| Conflict and peace drivers included in part of the document | Yellow |
| Conflict and peace drivers mentioned but not prioritisation not substantiated based on this | Orange |
| Conflict and peace drivers not included in strategy | Red |
# ANNEX B: OVERVIEW OF SWEDISH GLOBAL POLICY GUIDANCE AND RWANDA COUNTRY STRATEGIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Swedish Global Policy Guidance</th>
<th>Sida Strategies for Rwanda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategi Hållbarfred 2017-2022</strong> <em>(Swedish Government Policy)</em>&lt;br&gt;Objective(s):&lt;br&gt;• Improve the prevention of armed conflict&lt;br&gt;• Effective conflict resolution, sustainability of peace and state building&lt;br&gt;• Increased human security&lt;br&gt;• Strong emphasis on women, youth and marginalised groups&lt;br&gt;• Emphasis on UN and OECD-DAC alignment&lt;br&gt;• Support should be long-term, yet fast/responsive, flexible and with a calculated risk</td>
<td><strong>Rwanda Country Strategy 2015-2019</strong>&lt;br&gt;Better environment, limited climate change and greater resilience to environmental impact, climate&lt;br&gt;Democracy and gender equality and greater respect for human rights&lt;br&gt;• Capacity of civil society to promote greater popular participation and accountability, peace and reconciliation, and greater respect for human rights&lt;br&gt;• Better quality of; and access to, free and impartial media, including an open internet&lt;br&gt;• Strengthened capacity of Rwandan society to promote gender equality and enhance enjoyment of human rights, especially for women and girls&lt;br&gt;Better opportunities and tools to enable poor people to improve their living conditions&lt;br&gt;• Greater opportunities for women and youths&lt;br&gt;• Increased access to services and support, particularly for women and youth&lt;br&gt;• Strengthened competitiveness among producers and suppliers for goods and services&lt;br&gt;• Enhanced opportunities for actors to promote labour rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace and Security for Development 2010-2014</strong> <em>(Swedish Government Policy)</em>&lt;br&gt;• The policy defines peacebuilding as the process that endeavours to support the transition from armed conflict</td>
<td><strong>Rwanda Country Strategy 2010-2013</strong>&lt;br&gt;Democracy and human rights&lt;br&gt;• Increased transparency in public institutions and enhanced accountability&lt;br&gt;• Strengthened rule of law and re-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Objectives:

1. **Promote peace**
   - Dialogue, confidence-building and conflict management
   - Women, peace and security
   - Institutions of the rule of law with a particular emphasis on “transitional justice”
   - Influencing actors to support peacebuilding; capacity development to manage conflicts; involvement of women in peacebuilding process; promoting dialogue processes

2. **Promote security**
   - Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
   - Security sector reform (SSR)
   - Small arms and light weapons, mines

3. **Peace dividends**
   - Improvement in people’s lives to ensure population support for peace (jobs, health, education etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy for Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation 2005 (Sida policy)</th>
<th><strong>Sida Rwanda Country Strategy 2004-2008</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approaches:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objective:</strong> to create opportunities for poor people to improve their living conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Risk awareness: understanding the effects of development cooperation in a violent context</td>
<td><strong>Approaches:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Aspects of the regional conflict and national conflicts related to sustainable peace, reconciliation and stability (including creating increased trust between the parties to a conflict; peace negotiations; implementation of peace agreements; participation of women and their influence in the peace process; creating reconciliation and actions that address the structural causes underlying the conflict)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment and natural resources</th>
<th><strong>Spect for human rights</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Efficiency and sustainable use of natural resources</td>
<td>• Sustainable peace and improved security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthened land rights</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Market development</th>
<th><strong>Research</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Improved conditions for poor people in rural areas</td>
<td>• Greater expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greater efficiency and quality in the research management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Conflict sensitivity: ensure development cooperation does not have a negative impact
- Promote peace and security: target attitudes and behaviours of parties to conflict (e.g. house and road construction, good governance and democracy that is inclusive of marginalised groups; trade; media; agriculture; SSR). The interventions must contribute to prevention or resolution of conflict.

The genocide must be dealt with if it is to be possible to concentrate Rwanda’s resources on the fight against poverty.

- A regional and national conflict perspective must permeate cooperation with Rwanda.
- A rights perspective that includes accountability, participation and non-discrimination will be adopted when efforts are planned.
- Detailed dialogue strategy will be included in the annual country plans.

Sectors:
- Peaceful development and democratic governance
- Economic growth and socio-economic development based on sustainable use of the natural resource base

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding 1999 (Sida policy)</th>
<th>No assistance during armed conflict (very short), or even in the earlier years which were already unstable, since 1990, and no prevention in this case, but prevention of forthcoming conflicts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Conflict management: aid financed projects implemented during armed conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conflict prevention: activities aimed at preventing violence or escalation of violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Long- and short-term measures to reduce risk of violent conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Objectives:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promote a culture of prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Identify structural risk factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Develop the international system of norms and strengthen its implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strengthen the international institutional framework and its preventive instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strengthen Sweden’s capacity for international conflict prevention activities in different policy areas (foreign policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and security, trade, migration and development assistance)

- Enhancing respect for human rights and international law
  - Strengthen measures to protect civilian populations
  - Integrate conflict prevention with development cooperation work and develop a common perspective
  - Prevention language
  - Conflict analysis should be a natural part of the preparatory process

*No global policy data available pre-1999*
ANNEX C: COMPARISON BETWEEN SWEDISH AND SIDA POLICY GLOBALLY AND IN RWANDA

Overall, there are specific peacebuilding / peace and security approaches at SIDA HQ level, but in this case, we compare them with general country development strategies. They refer also to a broad diversity of contexts, while Rwanda is comparatively stable, so all the components may not apply. As such, this analysis mostly considers to what extent the general principles or approaches that are mentioned in the global strategies are considered at the country level.


In the country strategy,
- No reference to risk analysis, nor to conflict sensitivity.
- Quite a good integration of “Promote peace and security: target attitudes and behaviours of parties to conflict”. Assumption that development assistance can include addressing democracy and human rights, and then attitudes / behaviours of one party to the conflict. Some reconciliation work, but strong support to the government / regime, though issues are acknowledged (though not / hardly quantified).

(2010-2014 Global) - (2010-2013 Country)

- Strong consistency on objectives 1 Promote Peace, and Objective 3, Peace Dividends. On Promote Security, support to the DDR in Rwanda, but no SSR, while quite one sided.
- Definitions of peacebuilding become more specific to include the participation of women.
- Interesting mention of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity as a cross cutting issue but this does not translate clearly and explicitly in the various sectors
- Focusing specifically on initiatives that seem to translate into more long-term development, and addressing some conflict drivers.
- More direction from global therefore and this reflects in the country strategy where outcomes are operationalised, and broken down into smaller steps
- Global is more specific about how to support peace
- Seeking out joint donor programmes is explicitly mentioned- this correlated with the Sida aid patterns for Rwanda during these years (more emphasis on joint and multilateral)
- Suggests that engagement should be preceded by a risk and conflict assessment no evidence of these for Rwanda


- Limited explicit linkages since Rwanda more oriented to development and support to CSOs.
• Both appear quite broad.
• 2013 conflict analysis possibly more linked to the global strategy
## ANNEX D: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

### Swedish Embassy
- Jenny Ohlsson, Ambassador
- Sara Haglund, Programme Officer Democracy and Human rights
- Clément Kirenga, Programme Officer Democracy, Human rights and Gender
- Théobald Mashinga, Environment and Natural Resource
- Brice Mukashema, Programme administrator

### Partners (current and previous)
- Jean Paul Mugiraneza, Interpeace
- Eric Ndushanbi, IRDP
- Joseph Nkurunziza, Never Again
- Freddy & Anita Kayirangwa, Aegis Trust
- Roisin Devale, NPA, Country Director
- Betty Mutesi, International Alert, Country Manager
- Hugo Moudiki Jombwe, RCN, Country Director & Jonathan Lea-Howarth, Projects Coordinator
- Albert Baudoin, PAX Express, National Coordinator

### State institutions
- Seraphine Mukantahana, National Commission on DDR, Chairperson
- Rose Rwabuhizi, Gender Monitoring Office, Chief Gender Commission,
- Nadine Umutoni Gatsinki, Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, Permanent Secretary
- Jean Mukume, Rwanda University, Centre for Conflict Management, Chair

### Other donors
- Thibaut Moyer EU Delegation, Head of Economics and Governance, & Alain van den Brande, Cooperation Officer
- Harold Vandermeulen, Belgian Embassy, Cooperation Manager, & Christophe Cardon, First Secretary
- Laurent Deniau, French Embassy
- John Callan, US Embassy, Political Officer
- Michel Muhirwa, GIZ, Refugee Component Leader
- Mahamoud Zinelabdin, Republic of Sudan, Director for Planning and Coordination

### SIDA
- Mikki Boström, Former Head of Dev Coop
- Kikki Nordin, Former Head of Dev Coop (phone)
- Sandra Diesel, Former Programme Officer (phone)
- Joakim Molander, Former Head of Dev Coop
- Hanna Doller, Former BBE Peace and Security (phone)
- Malin Eriksson, Former BBE Peace and Security
ANNEX E: LIST OF REFERENCES

**Rwanda**


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Jones, M. (2004) *Swedish Support to Decentralisation Reform in Rwanda*


OECD (2018) *Dataset: Total official flows by country and region (ODA + OOF).*

OECD (2018) *Dataset: Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions.*

OECD (2018) *Dataset: Creditor Reporting Systems (CRS).*


Evaluation of Sida’s support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts – Rwanda Country Report

This report presents the Rwanda case study for the Evaluation of Sida’s support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts and is an annex to the evaluation synthesis report. The evaluation has been commissioned by Sida and undertaken by Tana Copenhagen. It assesses Sida’s approach and support to peacebuilding at the strategic level and seeks to identify what has worked well and what has worked less well. The evaluation finds that Sida’s peacebuilding support has been relevant. The engagement has contributed to a range of relevant results from a peacebuilding perspective, including relating to transitional justice; Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration; and peace education. With regard to the latter, Sida’s support has contributed to the evolution of an approach from teaching reconciliation to debating reconciliation and broadening it to a large audience, notably in schools. Sustainability has been increased where the support has been institutionalised; for example, through inclusion in the national curriculum.