HUMANITARIAN QUALITY ASSURANCE: SOUTH SUDAN

Evaluation of the 2013 Juba conflict response

Effectiveness Review Series 2014/2015

Internally Displaced People queuing inside the camp at UN House. Photo: Kieran Doherty/Oxfam

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE CRISIS

On 15 December 2013, heavy fighting between factions of the South Sudanese armed forces broke out in the country’s capital city, Juba, and spread rapidly across the country. The fighting, which resulted from a political show-down between the country’s president and the former deputy president, quickly took on ethnic dimensions, with Dinka elements of the armed forces firstly turning on soldiers of Nuer origin inside the barracks, and then on Nuer civilians on the streets and in their homes.

In Juba, civilians (mainly Nuer), immediately sought refuge in the UNMISS (United Nations Missions in South Sudan) bases: Tom Ping and UN House. Within one week an estimated 25,000 people were sheltering in the UNMISS compounds, while attacks continued across the city.¹

Violent fighting between pro- and anti-government forces erupted across a large part of the country, fuelled by existing ethnic conflicts and other types of dispute. Within one month, eight of the country’s ten states were affected, and an estimated 395,000 people had been displaced by the crisis, including 352,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) and about 43,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. Within two months the situation had worsened significantly, with an estimated 738,000 IDPs and 130,400 refugees. Valerie Amos, the UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator, declared the crisis a ‘level 3’ global emergency.²

By the end of 2014, there were an estimated 1.5 million IDPs in South Sudan and 469,000 new South Sudanese refugees³ in neighbouring countries. Furthermore, as a result of massive displacement, widespread losses to livelihoods, and disruptions to harvest and commodity flows in important trade corridors, the country was on the brink of a major food insecurity crisis, with 2.5 million people projected to be in IPC Crisis or Emergency phases from January to March 2015,⁴ and a total of 5.8 million people in need of external assistance to feed themselves.⁵ ⁶

1.2 THE RESPONSE

Oxfam was one of the first agencies to respond to the needs of the first IDPs in Juba. On 23 December 2013 Oxfam started to supply water and install sanitation facilities in UN House, and supported the World Food Programme’s (WFP) food distributions in both UN House and Tom Ping compounds. Given the high insecurity in the capital and across the country, many other agencies evacuated or temporarily suspended operations.

Once water supply was established, Oxfam added a hygiene promotion component, as well as diverse EFSVL (Emergency Food Security and Vulnerable Livelihoods) interventions to complement the food supplied by WFP.

Other organisations working with IDPs at UN House included: ACTED, Solidarités International, Concern, Unicef, World Food Programme and Médecins Sans Frontières.

Despite persisting insecurity across the country, from January 2014 Oxfam conducted rapid assessments (many of which were multi-agency) of humanitarian needs in other states. It launched responses in
Minkaman (Lankes) in January, Malakal and Melut (Upper Nile) in March, and Waat and Lanklen (Jonglei) in May and October respectively, and Kajokei (Central Equatoria) in November 2014.

By December 2014 Oxfam had delivered assistance and protection to 354,777 people in South Sudan, at a cost of about $27 million.

Although Oxfam no longer provides assistance in UN House compound, the humanitarian crisis continues and, at the time of writing this report, 34,674 people are still displaced.

1.3 THE HIT EVALUATION

This HIT (Humanitarian Indicator Tool) evaluation focuses on Oxfam's response to the needs of IDPs in UN House in Juba. The period covered by this evaluation is January to December 2014.

This evaluation uses a methodology designed to enable Oxfam GB to estimate how many disaster-affected men and women globally have received humanitarian aid from Oxfam GB that meets established standards for excellence.

The methodology is based on a Humanitarian Indicator Tool consisting of up to 13 quality standards and a scoring system (see Appendix 2). It requires documented evidence, complemented by verbal evidence, where available, to be collected and analysed in relation to each standard. A rating is generated for the programme’s results against each standard, and as a cumulative total.

A quantitative summary of the results of the evaluation is provided in Section 2. A fuller explanation of the rating for Oxfam’s performance against each standard is provided in Section 3.

Photo credit: Mackenzie Knowles Coursin/Oxfam. Approximately 12,000 IDPs sought refuge in UN House, Juba within the first two weeks of the conflict.
2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS

2.1 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

The quantitative ratings given for each standard and the cumulative total are provided in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Quantitative ratings for the South Sudan programme, using the Global Humanitarian Indicator tool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Level of achievement</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Timeliness: Rapid appraisal of facts within 24 hours, plans in place and scale-up or start-up commenced within three days</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
<td>6/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coverage uses 10% of affected population as a planned figure with clear justification for final count</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
<td>6/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards</td>
<td>Almost met</td>
<td>4/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MEAL(^3) strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators</td>
<td>Almost met</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs</td>
<td>Not met</td>
<td>0/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
<td>3/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys</td>
<td>Partly met</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Programme (including advocacy) addresses specific concerns and needs of vulnerable groups</td>
<td>Almost met</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively auctioned</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
<td>3/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Programme has an advocacy/campaigns strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field</td>
<td>Fully met</td>
<td>3/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming</td>
<td>Partly met</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Resilience</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Final rating Equivalent to 31/42 74%
3 DETAILED ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

3.1 EXPLANATION OF SECTION CONTENTS

In this section of the report, the data collected from documented and direct sources are analysed against the requirements for the quality standards, and justification of the rating for Oxfam GB’s performance against each standard is provided. The data sources are provided in footnotes, together with other explanatory information.

3.2 ANALYSIS USING STANDARDS AND BENCHMARKS

3.2.1 Quality Standard One: Timeliness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeliness: Rapid appraisal of facts within 24 hours, plans in place and scale-up or start-up commenced within three days</th>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements to fully meet the standard:

- Initial assessment/rapid analysis of existing information within 24 hours of predefined trigger and scale-up or start-up within three days of assessment/rapid analysis.
- Triggers pre-defined in contingency plan and responded to.
- Monitoring of ongoing situation took place.
- Monitoring data were analysed and reacted upon.
- If monitoring data were not acted upon earlier, reasons are identified and justified.\(^{10}\)

Following the outbreak of violence at the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) barracks in Juba on the night of 15 December 2013, Oxfam first received news on 16 December of the displacement of large numbers of people to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) compounds through its national staff and contacts in other NGOs.\(^{11}\) Oxfam made initial preparations to support an assessment and subsequent humanitarian effort through the WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) Cluster as soon as it was safe to do so, while continuing to monitor the evolution of the violence in Juba and other states and its impact on displacement, as well the wider political context.
Over the course of the following day, during which sporadic violence continued on the streets of Juba, and Oxfam South Sudan staff were ‘hibernating’, the country management intensely lobbied UNMISS for access to the compounds and deployment of patrols to hotspot residential areas from which IDPs continued to flee.

On 18 December, two days after the displacement started, Oxfam, attempted to carry out a joint assessment with IOM, CRS and Medair, but was requested by UNOCHA not to do so, on the grounds that this could create a ‘pull factor’ for further displacement to the UNMISS compounds.12

Following discussions with UNOCHA and a subsequent apology for preventing access,13 the postponed assessment was carried out on 19 December. Based on a rapid needs assessment of an estimated 12,000 people in UN House, the decision was taken to immediately begin food distributions, with Oxfam as implementing partner for WFP, and for WASH to start up immediately, with Oxfam leading on sanitation, and Solidarités International leading on water.14

Registration for food distribution started in UN House on 22 December, as did groundwork and pre-positioning of materials for latrine building and water storage.15 The first latrines, water and food were provided to the IDPs on 23 December, three days after the assessment was carried out. Three days later, Oxfam took over leadership on water in addition to sanitation, due the sudden evacuation of Solidarités’ International staff in response to a major security incident.16 From then on, Oxfam’s own staff and the remaining national staff of Solidarités International worked as one team to implement a full WASH response, comprised of water supply and storage, sanitation (latrines, handwashing, bathing areas), hygiene promotion and waste management.

Over the coming weeks, Oxfam progressed from providing only food to providing a range of EFSVL activities. In February Oxfam started to distribute charcoal for cooking, which was becoming a critical need in the camp, and in March it distributed fuel efficient stoves to vulnerable households and block leaders. In the same month Oxfam started to provide all households in UN House with milling vouchers so they could mill the whole grain being provided to them by WFP.17 Finally, in August 2014, Oxfam began to implement income-generating projects, including cash-for-work options for people able to make liners for the fuel-efficient stoves.

Not only did Oxfam fully meet the standard for timeliness (6/6) of its response in UN House, it is also commended for doing so while simultaneously evacuating non-essential staff and launching assessments and responses in other locations across the country.18
3.2.2 Quality Standard Two: Coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coverage uses 10% of affected population as a planned figure with clear justification for final count</th>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements to fully meet the standard:

- 10 per cent of affected population reached, or
- Justification for not reaching 10 per cent of affected population with agreement from region or HD.
- Beneficiary numbers increase according to need – there are no spikes especially in last months of programme.

Approximately 12,000 IDPs sought shelter in UN House in Juba in the first two weeks of the conflict. This number remained stable for approximately six months, but in June 2013 a further 20,000 IDPs were transferred from other sites in Juba, thus making a total IDP population in the UN House compound of over 30,000.
Oxfam’s initial response in Juba was designed to meet the humanitarian needs of all 12,000 IDPs in UN House. To ensure coverage, Oxfam designed and measured coverage of its WASH component using Sphere indicators and based on a total population of 13,500. As shown in Figure 3.2, Oxfam met its initial target in December and January, and its revised target in March and April. The WASH component was then handed over to Solidarités International.

Figure 3.2: Number of beneficiaries reached, based on Sphere indicators for water supply, quality, and latrine coverage

Food distributions, for which Oxfam supported WFP, reportedly reached over 14,000 people, although WFP recognised some minor calculation errors in beneficiary counting methods. The other EFSVL interventions implemented by Oxfam targeted and reached the following numbers of beneficiaries:

Table 3.1: Target and actual beneficiaries of Oxfam’s EFSVL interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Target number of beneficiaries</th>
<th>Actual number of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charcoal vouchers</td>
<td>Entire population of UN House</td>
<td>Varied by month in accordance with population increases, reaching c25,000 by the end of 2014.(^\text{19})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milling vouchers</td>
<td>Entire population of UN House</td>
<td>Varied by month in accordance with population increases.(^\text{20}) Monthly totals range from c10,000 to c25,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel efficient stoves</td>
<td>300(^\text{21})</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash for work/income-generation</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>288(^\text{22})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is therefore considered that Oxfam met the standard for beneficiary coverage.
3.2.3 Quality Standard Three: Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards</td>
<td>4/6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements to fully meet the standard:

- Sphere standards proposed and put in place with adjusted indicators for context.
- Training in standards carried out for staff and partners with direct reference to Sphere.
- Indicators use standards and monitoring against standards takes place regularly.
- Standards evaluated.

Water, sanitation and hygiene promotion (WASH)

From the earliest stages of the response in UN House, Oxfam’s WASH team demonstrated direct application of Sphere standards, as shown in Table 3.1. Within the first week of starting up the WASH component, the Oxfam team created a set of daily indicators to monitor progress at activity-level, based on the ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office) Emergency Preparedness and Response contract, which integrates Sphere indicators for water quality and supply, latrine coverage and hygiene promotion in its results framework. The same indicators were used in situation reports throughout the WASH response, until it was handed over to Solidarité International at the end of April 2014.

Early achievements were mentioned by Oxfam’s Acting Country Director in the internal situation report produced two weeks after the start of the response:

‘OCHA cites that the water provision is exceeding minimum standards. Since we’re leading on clean water delivery . . . we should DEFINITELY recognise the contribution of Oxfam’s South Sudan WASH team – excellent work.’

As also shown in Table 3.1, achievement of Sphere standards was explicitly discussed in reports to ECHO and DfID, together with explanations for deviations from the suggested indicators due to contextual constraints (such as an oscillating camp population and lack of available land for latrines).

The WASH team’s use of Sphere technical standards is attributable to the recruitment of experienced staff and to capacity building carried out in previous responses and within the ECHO Emergency Preparedness and Response grant, which started in October 2013. This capacity was further strengthened following the recommendation of the Real Time Evaluation regarding the need to apply technical standards in conjunction with Sphere standards relating to gender, community participation and protection. In response to this recommendation, a Programme Quality Manager was recruited to guide and support programme staff working on the UN House response and all other locations across the country.
Emergency Food Security and Vulnerable Livelihoods (EFSVL)

Unlike WASH, the EFSVL component did not explicitly reference Sphere standards either in proposals or reporting. Nonetheless, Oxfam’s design and implementation of this component appears to be in line with the standards and key indicators, as shown in Table 3.1. Indicators for the cash and vouchers and food transfers were taken into account in the design of the response and in reporting of progress, both in situation reports and donor reports. A clear example is the charcoal voucher component of the response, which reflects the key action ‘assess people’s ability to access fuel’.30 Similarly, Oxfam’s decision to distribute milling vouchers follows the key action ‘if wholegrain cereal is distributed, ensure recipients have either the means to mill/process it or access to adequate milling/processing facilities’.31

Given the explicit use for WASH and the implicit use for EFSVL, it is considered that Oxfam almost met the standard for using Sphere technical standards (4/6).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sphere standard</th>
<th>Evidence of use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cash and voucher transfers standard 1: Access to available goods and services.</strong></td>
<td>‘It is not recommended to use cash grants, mostly because there is no payment agent accessible in a safe manner to the IDPs. Inside UN House there is a KCB branch but IDPs are not entitled to use it…most of the IDPs have lost their I.D. documents…money transfer agents move around using armed escort and it is very unlikely that UN House will let the agents’ escorts enter the camp. Recommended response activities: commodity voucher…and value voucher…’ Source: Oxfam EMMA Follow-up Action Plan, April 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food security – food transfers standard 2: Appropriateness and acceptability</strong></td>
<td>‘The focus is on the charcoal distribution project which started on 4 February and is addressing one of the greatest needs in the camps – lack of fuel to cook food.’ Source: Oxfam SitRep 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WASH – Hygiene promotion standard 2: Identification and use of hygiene items</strong></td>
<td>‘Additional focused group discussions with women were organized to demonstrate the reusable sanitary pads – AFRIpads – which were accepted by women. The distribution of the AFRIpads to 5,000 women of reproductive age in POC1 and extension 1 is planned by Oxfam in the coming weeks.’ Source: SitRep 15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cash and vouchers are considered as ways to address basic needs and to protect and re-establish livelihoods.

Food security – food transfers standard 2: Appropriateness and acceptability

The food items provided are appropriate and acceptable to recipients so that they can be used efficiently and effectively at the household level.

Indicator: Programme design takes into account access to water, cooking fuel and food processing equipment.

WASH – Hygiene promotion standard 2: Identification and use of hygiene items

The disaster-affected population has access to, and is involved in identifying and promoting the use of hygiene items to ensure personal hygiene, health, dignity and wellbeing.
**Excreta disposal standard 2: Appropriate and adequate toilet facilities**
People have adequate, appropriate and acceptable toilet facilities, sufficiently close to their dwellings, to allow rapid, safe and secure access at all times, day and night.

**Water supply standard 1: Access and water quantity**
All people have safe and equitable access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking and personal and domestic hygiene. Public water points are sufficiently close to households to enable use of the minimum water requirement.

- **Excreta disposal standard 2: Appropriate and adequate toilet facilities**
  - People have adequate, appropriate and acceptable toilet facilities, sufficiently close to their dwellings, to allow rapid, safe and secure access at all times, day and night.

- **Water supply standard 1: Access and water quantity**
  - All people have safe and equitable access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking and personal and domestic hygiene. Public water points are sufficiently close to households to enable use of the minimum water requirement.

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- Results Indicators
  - 100% of sanitation beneficiaries have access to latrines with a maximum of 50 people per latrine
  - 100% of the target population is provided with safe water for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene use within agreed SPHERE standards

Sources: DFID RRF Proposal 1 Jan 2014 and ECHO proposal October 2013

- In UN House (PoC 1 and Extension 1), based on a population size of 15,000, 89% of the population have been provided with access to the latrines as per the 1:50 ratio. Please note that the person per latrine ration has not always been consistent due to changes in the population size. Camp settings have restricted the construction of WASH infrastructures (as a result of a lack of space), which has caused issues in ensuring that interventions are in accordance with SPHERE standards, for example, person equitable access to water supply and sanitation (per latrine ratio) infrastructures. Furthermore, population size calculations have been problematic due to limited accurate information available and been based on estimates from partner agencies, which has caused issues in ensuring that WASH interventions are in accordance with SPHERE standards.

Source: DFID RRF final report narrative report Annex D

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- Results Indicators
  - 100% of the target population is provided with safe water for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene use within agreed SPHERE standards

Sources: DFID RRF Proposal 1 Jan 2014

- Water indicators: Avg. weekly water provision – Litres per person per day; No. of tap stands; camp water storage capacity; chlorination levels at water point.

Oxfam Daily Indicators January 2014

- Average access to per person per day is slightly higher than 15l/p/d if using a more realistic working figure of the camp population – 11,000 individuals – now agreed among the partners operating in the camp.

Source: SitRep 6 2014
3.2.4 Quality Standard Four: MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators</th>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements to fully meet the standard:

- Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) staff in post.
- Budget reflects MEAL activities.
- Evidence of use of Oxfam Minimum MEAL standards.
- Indicators in logframes replicated in MEAL strategy and plan.
- Data collected, analysed and fed back to staff and partners.
- Evidence that data are used to adjust programme activities.
- Indicators reported against in donor reports at activities, outputs and outcomes levels.
- Review or learning days held with technical staff.
- OPAL has MEAL plan in place and is updated regularly.
- Final evaluation planned.

As soon as it began to respond to the crisis, the South Sudan team urgently and repeatedly requested support from an international MEAL specialist, but Oxfam’s headquarters and regional centre were unable to deploy any suitable expertise until June 2014, six months into the programme.

In the meantime, the country team put in place a basic set of daily indicators that helped staff to monitor progress at the activity level. Although these were entirely quantitative (see Table 3.3), they helped to establish a routine for monitoring and guided the team through a highly-pressured first phase of the response in UN House.

The timing of the Real Time Evaluation, which was conducted six weeks into the response, was helpful for identifying ways to improve MEAL, particularly in terms of capturing the views of beneficiaries. Following a staff workshop on the RTE findings and recommendations, the technical teams began to apply a wider range of MEAL tools, such as water point and household questionnaires, a post-distribution monitoring survey following charcoal distribution, and a baseline survey for the fuel efficient stoves initiative.

Teams were very receptive to the results of these exercises. When the water assessment highlighted a need for appropriate hygiene items for cleansing after latrine use, which was corroborated by the observations by staff of water bottles thrown into latrines, budgets were adapted to include Ibreek for each household. A subsequent post-distribution monitoring (PDM) indicated that 92 per cent agreed that the use of the Ibreek had greatly impacted on reducing the incident of bottle dropping into the latrines.
The PDM for the charcoal distribution showed that families highly valued the charcoal, but that the rate of consumption was higher than originally estimated. On this basis Oxfam decided to double the quantity distributed to each household in subsequent rounds.

Other MEAL tools and exercises that contributed to informing and adapting the response included: focus group discussions on WASH, EFSVL and protection issues, an Emergency Mapping Market Analysis (EMMA), and an internal learning event to share the strengths and identify ways to address weaknesses of Oxfam’s responses in different locations across the country. Oxfam’s range of MEAL tools and processes also enabled it to report satisfactorily to its key donors, ECHO and DFID.

Overall, the only significant criticism of Oxfam’s MEAL for the UN House response relates to disaggregation of data by gender, age and other contextual variables. In some cases the separate data collection exercises permitted this (such as separate focus groups for men and women), but in other cases data was not disaggregated to permit stronger analysis and more targeted programming.

Oxfam reported to its key donors for the response, ECHO and DFID, using the logical framework and results framework in the original proposals. As the indicators in these frameworks were quantitative and output-oriented, reporting followed suit. Data on beneficiaries’ views is conspicuous by its absence.

On this basis it is considered that Oxfam almost met the standard for MEAL (2/3).

Table 3.3: Daily Indicators used by the South Sudan WASH team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water Indicators</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Average weekly water provision – litres per person per day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number of tap stands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Camp water storage capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chlorination levels at water point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sanitation indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Latrine coverage per person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of latrines desludged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of latrine decommissioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of newly constructed Latrines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of newly constructed bathing units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of hand washing points per latrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hygiene promotion indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of people participating in hygiene awareness sessions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of people participating in sessions on latrines usage/waste water/cause of malaria and diarrhoea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of jerrycans cleaned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of people participating in environmental cleaning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of WASH volunteers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Solid waste management – no. of trips/trucks removing waste from the camp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.4: Use of monitoring tools and processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring tool/process</th>
<th>When first used</th>
<th>How often used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Observation</td>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RTE</td>
<td>February 2014</td>
<td>Once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PDM Surveys</td>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>Not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Water-point and household surveys</td>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>Multiple times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. FGDs</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Multiple times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. EMMA</td>
<td>April 2014</td>
<td>Once, and results shared with EFSVL cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Learning event</td>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>Once</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.5 Quality Standard Five: Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs</th>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements to fully meet the standard:

- Evidence of consultation with community on programme areas such as targeting, preferences for cash/food, siting of latrines and design, distribution, information channels, etc.
- Evidence of sufficient information provided to communities about dates of distributions.
- Feedback shows that information received is sufficient.
- Evidence of complaints being addressed and reported on to complainant.
- Evidence of feedback incorporated into planning – changes made to programmes after consultation.
- Feedback from communities around needs and concerns is positive.
- Evaluation reports state that programme is relevant to needs and context.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.4, the South Sudan team requested support on accountability (and monitoring) from the earliest stages of the response, but did not receive it. It is not surprising, therefore, that the response had weaknesses in these areas for several months. For example:

- Decisions on locations of water and sanitation installations and distribution methods took into account physical and security constraints, as well as recommendations from previous studies and experiences, but were not consulted with the affected population.
- Systems or mechanisms for collecting beneficiary feedback were not put in place, apart from an information point in UN House through which IDPs sometimes gave feedback, and a cell phone number that was not actively promoted as an accountability mechanism and for which no records of calls were kept.
- A complaints-handling system was not put in place.

There were, however, isolated examples of good practice, such as the provision of information about the charcoal voucher system through posters, drama and the camp’s own radio programme Talk Talk, and consultation with women about the contents of a personal hygiene and dignity kit.

The atmosphere of insecurity and ethnic targeting goes some way towards explaining the lack of interaction with the IDPs in the UN House camp, at least at the beginning of the response. It was not safe for Oxfam’s Nuer staff to move around the city and the camp, which severely limited Oxfam’s ability to communicate with the mainly Nuer IDPs in UN House. Oxfam staff found themselves reliant on communicating through camp residents who were able to speak English, even if they were not formal or legitimate representatives of the population there. This also contributed to tensions, which were already high due to people’s sudden lack of freedom and the crowded environment in the compound.

Later, once the situation stabilised, Oxfam liaised with block leaders, some of whom were chosen by the IDPs in their block while others were self-appointed. Following the activation of the Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster (CCCM), more uniform community leadership structures were established and consultation became feasible. Also, as Oxfam acquired more local staff, language difficulties that prevented more consultation in the early stages were overcome, and communication through exercises, such as focus group discussions and key informant interviews, became easier. Still, however, Oxfam’s efforts to generate feedback and manage complaints were not systematic or documented.

It is therefore considered that Oxfam did not meet the standard for accountability (0/3).

### 3.2.6 Quality Standard Six: Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This standard was not applicable to this evaluation, given that Oxfam’s response was not implemented through partners.

3.2.7 Quality Standard Seven: Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirements to fully meet the standard:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Assessments look at safe access to services and other protection issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Documented evidence that programmes respond to identified protection issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protection issues identified by other actors acted upon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protection expertise called in when programme requires it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Technical teams do safe programming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advocacy strategy includes protection and action is taken.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Oxfam’s South Sudan team did not have protection expertise at the start of the response and therefore relied on other organisations to assess protection needs. Through liaison with the protection cluster, the key issues identified were:

• Physical protection of civilians from the effects of armed conflict.
• Targeting of civilians and targeted destruction of property.
• Physical and sexual violence leading to separation of families and psychosocial trauma.
• Forced recruitment of children.

Oxfam’s response in UN House directly addressed the need for physical protection. By contributing to meeting water, sanitation, hygiene and food security needs, the programme enabled people to stay in a place of relative safety. Oxfam also advocated to WFP to transition from distributing CSB to grain and other food items, in response to IDP’s claims that this was a deliberate strategy to discourage them from staying in the camp.

In terms of programming choices, Oxfam took a number of decisions that directly relate to conflict-sensitivity and safe programming. For example:

• Nuer staff did not participate in the response until the situation had stabilised and no threats to their personal safety were perceived.
• The EFSVL team chose to use a charcoal voucher system that involved camp traders to avoid the need for people, particularly women, to venture out of the camp to buy or collect fuel.
• The EFSVL team installed grinders within the camp to avoid the need for IDPs to leave the camp to mill their grain or trade it for pre-milled items.

• The WASH team installed door locks and solar lighting in the sanitation blocks in response to reports from the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster about women being raped there at night.48

In focus group discussions on protection held from October to December 2014, the majority of participants indicated that they felt safer due to Oxfam’s charcoal and milling services. In particular, many felt they avoided potential incidents of rape, abduction, harassment, unlawful arrest and detention, intimidation and theft that might have faced if they had been obliged to go outside of the camp looking for these services. This was confirmed by a survey carried out by IRC in January 2015 and in interviews conducted by Oxfam, as conveyed in Box 1.

Box 1: UN House: Case study

Nyoruop is balancing a large sisal sack on her head. It contains grain that will feed her family. She hands a voucher to the charcoal vendors and smiles, waiting patiently for them to give her the bags of charcoal equivalent to that voucher. She has been a resident of the UN House IDP camp since December 2013.

‘I came here to protect myself and my family. When we heard about the fighting, we knew that we had to leave so that we are not targeted. On 16 December, my neighbour heard that people were running to the UN House so I decided to bring my family here on the second day. I was nine months pregnant at that time. I felt like I was just about to give birth.’

Preparing a meal for her family was very challenging without enough money to buy supplies and fuel to cook. ‘The charcoal vouchers really help. Before that, we had to walk outside to fetch firewood and that could take time and could also be risky. Old people, if they did not have help, would struggle to fetch wood. Some would not go and collect at all because they were too old and could not do it. Now that it’s close by and quite easy to get, it’s really relieved some of the stress. Cooking or boiling water has become easier.’

Finding safe water to drink was also challenging when they arrived. Before Oxfam set up its water supply system, clean water for cooking and drinking had to be bought. Sanitation was poor as organisations were scrambling to respond to the situation. This paid off because Nyoruop and her family now have unlimited access to clean water and sanitation facilities. After almost three months, she says that life in the camp has changed for the better to accommodate the needs of the people there.

It is therefore considered that Oxfam met the standard for safe and conflict-sensitive programming (3/3).
3.2.8. Quality Standard Eight: Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements to fully meet the standard:

- Gender analysis carried out, well documented and strategy written.
- Evidence that this is used to guide design and delivery.
- Sex disaggregated data collected, reviewed and used to make appropriate adjustments.
- Programme and advocacy planning addresses needs, roles and power relations of men and women.
- Evidence that programme contributes to gender equity (services provide for men/women needs as appropriate).
- Gender minimum standards used and adhered to.
- Programme partners with capacity and support to mainstream gender throughout the programme cycle.

The South Sudan response in UN House did not include a gender analysis as part of the initial assessment, or a gender strategy as part of overall intervention strategy. However, it should be noted that the provision of charcoal and use of a voucher system to collect charcoal inside the camp were both designed to reduce women's workload and prevent exposure to potential abuse and violence outside the camp.

As highlighted in the RTE, monitoring processes were not designed to elicit the views of women and men separately, and general monitoring data were not disaggregated by sex. The RTE Action Plan included several recommendations relating to improving gender-sensitivity and the gender equity of the response, such as consulting women on the location of WASH facilities and including women leaders in the leadership groups. These were taken forward by Oxfam's Regional Gender Adviser and through the recruitment of a national Gender Adviser.

Shortly after making a commitment to improve the gender-sensitivity of its response, Oxfam became aware of significant gender inequality in the camps. According to a report by Amnesty International, female-headed households had worse shelters, women were not included in the consultations with traditional leaders, and there was no a mechanism to bring their voice into improving the humanitarian response. Also, no female hygiene kits had been distributed by any organisation.

Oxfam responded rapidly to several of the issues highlighted by the Amnesty report. The team immediately consulted groups of women on the possible contents of a female hygiene/dignity kits, and subsequently procured and distributed a kit containing reusable menstrual pads. As mentioned in Section 3.2.7, Oxfam also installed a pilot solar lighting system in the camp, next to a latrine block, in order to
improve the security and protection of women and vulnerable groups using the latrines overnight. In focus group discussions the majority of women (and men) reported that they felt safe thanks to the lighting provided by Oxfam.

Oxfam also decided to target more women than men in its income-generating activities. Over 70 per cent of those benefiting from these activities were women, including female heads of households and widows.

Given the improvements on this issue over time, it is considered that **Oxfam partially met the standard for gender equity (1/3)**. To fully achieve the standard, Oxfam should have ensured gender analysis formed part of all assessment, monitoring and learning processes from the very start of the response.

### 3.2.9 Quality Standard Nine: Programme (including advocacy) addresses specific concerns and needs of vulnerable groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programme (including advocacy) addresses specific concerns and needs of vulnerable groups</strong></td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Requirements to fully meet the standard:**

- Differentiated vulnerability analysis/assessment data identify especially vulnerable groups, and used to inform design and appropriate actions to meet their specific needs (link also to Standard 7 and safe programming).
- Evidence of balanced representation of vulnerable people in managing assistance provided and ongoing feedback/consultation.
- Evidence that intervention design and delivery ensures vulnerable groups have full access to assistance and protection services.

Oxfam’s priority in the first weeks of its response was to establish water and sanitation as quickly as possible, to avoid a rapid deterioration in the health of the overall population, particularly children and the elderly, who are the most vulnerable in these situations. By mid-January, Oxfam’s team was assured of a regular and sufficient supply of water for the number of people in the camp, and was close to reaching the desired number of latrines for the overall camp population. The team did not know, however, if vulnerable groups had equal access to such facilities, or if they had any particular needs, to which Oxfam or another agency had not yet responded.

During the RTE and through observation of the IDPs, Oxfam identified potential inequalities in terms of access to assistance, and specific needs of vulnerable groups. These findings led to the following adaptations of the response:

- Construction of six ‘disabled-access’ latrines
- Child-focused hygiene messaging and activities, such as drawing and singing songs about hygiene practices.
• Prioritisation of people with disabilities and single-headed households for distribution of charcoal vouchers
• Prioritisation of widows and female-headed households as beneficiaries of income generating activities.

These measures did not go as far as enabling vulnerable groups to manage the assistance, but they do demonstrate Oxfam’s commitment to addressing the specific concerns and needs of vulnerable groups. It is therefore considered that Oxfam almost met this standard (2/3).

3.2.10 Quality Standard Ten: Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned</th>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements to fully meet the standard:
• Contingency plan in place, updated regularly and used.
• Evidence of monitoring of chronic situation and triggers in place for action.
• Evidence of links to existing preparedness programmes where relevant.
• Evidence of surge capacity.
• Evidence of success of preparedness programmes on current response.

South Sudan’s contingency plan, which was created in July 2013, was one of the foundation stones for this response. It identified three conflict-related scenarios (and one associated with flooding), listed management arrangements, and presented feasible funding and logistics options. Although the events that triggered this crisis were not specifically detailed in the contingency plan, the arrangements proved to be very relevant.

Oxfam is very well connected with other international agencies, donors and civil society organisations in South Sudan and the wider region. Three relationships greatly facilitated Oxfam’s early response: UNOCHA, which enabled Oxfam to be among the first agencies to conduct an assessment in UN House; Solidarités International, which provided staff and equipment to Oxfam when circumstances led to evacuation of Solidarités International’s international team at the start of the crisis; and ECHO, with which Oxfam was already implementing a contract for disaster preparedness, and through which personnel were trained, equipment was prepositioned and 2.5 million euros made available in funding, thus giving Oxfam surge capacity for responding to new crises.

Oxfam’s preparedness certainly contributed to the timeliness of its initial response in UN House, as discussed in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. It also contributed to the usage of Sphere standards, as mentioned in Section 3.2.3, and possibly in other aspects of its programme.
Additionally, not only was the Oxfam team in South Sudan prepared for responding to the conflict, it also prepared for a potential cholera outbreak. In February 2014, ahead of the rainy season (from March to November), Oxfam coordinated with various partners and allies, including in the WASH cluster, to review levels of stock, gauge response capacity and develop situation-specific contingency plans.

By the start of the rainy season Oxfam had already implemented work to improve drainage in the UN House camp, add roofs to the latrines, and to ramp up public health messaging related to flooding and cholera. In addition, Oxfam placed an order for WASH equipment to be sent from its warehouse in Bicester, UK, to be used in the event of a cholera outbreak, and through coordinated efforts with MSF, Oxfam supported the establishment of a cholera consultation facility in UN House. While direct attribution is not possible, it is likely that Oxfam’s interventions made a significant contribution to preventing the spread of cholera within the UN House camp.  

In view of the above, it is considered that Oxfam met the standard for preparedness (3/3).

### 3.2.11 Quality Standard Eleven: Programme has an advocacy/campaigns strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programme has an advocacy/campaigns strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements to fully meet the standard:

- Advocacy strategy in place and evidence that it was written with input from programmes and field strategy endorsed by Oxfam Rights in Crisis (RiC) campaign management team with SMART objectives for change.
- Campaigns/policy and media staff in place.
- Budget sufficient for strategy implementation.
- MEAL plan in place, including evaluations.
- Proactive and reactive media work including press conferences, blogs and journalist trips.
- Evidence of lobbying at national and/or global level.
- Evidence of outcomes from advocacy messages – not necessarily Oxfam alone.
- Global – involvement of global RiC Campaign network including teleconferencing, lobbying in capitals, sharing of product.

Oxfam produced an advocacy strategy for South Sudan within two weeks of the start of the conflict. The objectives of the strategy were as follows:
• Protection of civilians.
• Humanitarian access and assistance.
• Political process: paving the way for unity, reconciliation and constructive dialogue.

Although largely written by the regional Rights in Crisis team, the strategy reflected the country team’s inputs and priorities as they attempted to access IDPs amid ongoing violence and insecurity.

A large number of media interviews were given to major outlets by the acting Country Director in the week following the outbreak of violence. Specialised media and advocacy personnel, funded by Oxfam’s Rights in Crisis campaign, were deployed shortly afterwards, thus enabling the country director to focus on the demands of the growing response. Resources were also made available in the Oxfam’s New York, Washington DC, London, Melbourne, Brussels, Den Haag, Madrid, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi advocacy offices.

Early successes of the advocacy strategy include:

• Meetings with Valerie Amos, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, during her visit to South Sudan, January 2014, and in preparation for her address to the UNSC that same month.

• The convening of a civil society forum of South Sudanese CSOs in Nairobi in February 2014, to help support actors coordinate their engagement with, and put pressure on, IGAD, the regional organisation leading peace negotiations between the warring factions.

• Successful high-level lobby with the UNSC member states ahead of the UNMISS mandate renewal in March 2014. This led to a much greater profile of the protection of civilians within mandate language.

• Development and sign off by 22 organisations on ‘Loaded Guns, Empty Stomachs’ the first joint agency position in South Sudan on the food security situation in April 2014.

Oxfam regularly updated its advocacy strategy and produced materials to adapt to the changing context, including media interviews and briefings that focused on humanitarian needs in the rainy season, a private lobby brief in March 2014 that focused on revision of the UNMISS mandate to ensure protection of civilians, and multiple briefings and papers from April to September 2014 that warned of the impending food security crisis. Examples of Oxfam’s efforts to communicate these messages included:

• A communication booklet called ‘Above and Beyond’, which showcased those affected by the conflict and offered an alternative message of peace and hope during the early days of violence. These stories were picked up by radio outlets across the East Africa region and Ambassadors from the US and elsewhere, and were requested to be shared by the UN ahead of its first South Sudan donor conference.

• PA post-ceasefire policy compendium covering both the short- and long-term needs in South Sudan to support ongoing lobby work and ensure all lobbyists were coordinated with key messages and the updated situation.

• Direct lobbying of the key delegations, including all five members of the UN Security Council permanent members.

• Joint agency messaging on country and regional level to support the Oslo conference and its objectives around an increase in funds for the response and resolution of the crisis.

• Significant media coverage of visits to the camps in South Sudan by the CEOs of Novib and Oxfam GB. Oxfam achieved regular and ongoing media coverage of its programmes and key messages from December 2013 through to June 2014.
An in-depth specific review or evaluation of Oxfam’s advocacy work around the South Sudan crisis had not been conducted at the time of this evaluation but, based on records of internal stocktakes and reports of activities and achievements in regular SitReps, it is considered that Oxfam met the standard for advocacy and campaigns (3/3).

### 3.2.12 Quality Standard Twelve: Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Met</th>
<th>Almost Met</th>
<th>Partially Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements to fully meet the standard:

- Job profiles match competency frameworks.
- Interviews conducted using frameworks.
- Inductions systematically carried out.
- Majority of end of deployment appraisals are positive.
- Development programme staff have scale-up in their job descriptions.
- Staff stay for duration of contract.

As mentioned in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the speed of Oxfam’s response and its early achievements in coverage were largely due to the presence of the humanitarian team in the country prior to the outbreak of conflict. Thanks to recent recruitment processes to hire experienced staff for the ECHO-funded Emergency Preparedness and Response programme, basic technical teams with knowledge of Oxfam’s practices were already in place in the latter months of 2013.

However, due to the speed and size of the scale-up, combined with security constraints, normal human resource processes and practices for the UN House team of 17 (and others responding in other locations) were not followed in the early stages of the response. Existing staff whose ethnicity allowed them to move freely and work in the camps were redeployed across the country without formal changes to their objectives or formal assessment of their capacities to undertake new roles. New (or redeployed) staff coming to take up additional positions or to replace existing team members taking planned leave were mainly given spontaneous, on-the-job inductions. Personal performance objectives were not established or modified, and end-of-deployment appraisals were not documented.

Improvements to this situation were made following the RTE, which highlighted the above issues. An induction pack of key documents was created and provided to new staff, and a system of group inductions was put in place. Also, taking into account the psychological impacts of the violence and pressures of the response, Oxfam purchased an online and telephone service for staff support.
In terms of overall capacity, although the Humanitarian Department in Oxford and the Regional Centre in Nairobi managed to provide additional capacity through deployments for WASH, EFSVL, and advocacy in a timely manner, clear gaps remained in the areas of MEAL, gender, and protection and, as noted in the relevant sections of this report, two of these areas were the weakest of the response.

Therefore, while recognising the significant achievements and dedication of the South Sudan team, it is considered that Oxfam only partly met the standard for appropriate staff capacity (1/3).
APPENDIX 1: SOURCES OF DATA

Interviews and coordination:

- Humanitarian Coordinator, Acting Country Director South Sudan during the crisis
- EFSVL Rapid Response Team
- Programme Quality Manager, South Sudan

Documents:

Strategy

- South Sudan Humanitarian Crisis Response Plan revision (January–June 2014): Proposed way forward
- Drew, E. J., South Sudan Exit Strategy (July 2013)
- WASH Exit Strategy (n.a.) (n.d.)

MEAL

- Oxfam South Sudan Generic Concept Note (January 2014)
- Email from Safari Djumapili, OCHA to sector leads and co-leads, Planned rapid need assessments in Juba on 19 Dec 2013 (18 December 2013)
- Population Estimation (n.a) (n.d.)
- Oxfam Real Time Evaluation Action Plan (n.d.)
- Internal SitReps 1-30
- Daily indicator reports from 19 January 2014
- About Camp Managers (n.a.) (n.d.)
- Camp Management Committee (n.a.) (n.d.)
- Oxfam, Helping families tackle hunger (n.a.) (n.d.)

Funding

- Oxfam proposal to DFID Rapid Response Facility: Emergency Response to Conflict Affected Population in South Sudan, proposal and annexes (January 2014)
- Oxfam proposal to ECHO (single form plus annexes): Emergency preparedness and response to vulnerable populations in South Sudan (October 2013)
- Oxfam GB donor update: South Sudan emergency response (January 2013)
- Oxfam final report to ERP: Small-scale income-generating activities and provision of fuel efficient stoves for IDPs in Juba (March 2014)
- Oxfam Generic project proposal for the large-scale introduction of fuel-efficient stoves (March 2014)
• South Sudan CHF Final Report WASH cluster (n.d.)
• Oxfam final payment request (October 2014)
• Oxfam funding grids (January–December 2014)
• Email from Ulrich Wagner to Jane Cocking to request CatFunds (3 March 2014)

Technical (ESFVL and WASH)
• Henderson, E., ESFL Trip Report (January 2014)
• Oxfam, EMMA Terms of Reference South Sudan (January 2014)
• Oxfam EMMA Follow Up Action Plan (April 2013)
• Charcoal and Milling vouchers June 2014
• Oxfam South Sudan ESFL response: Approach for first phase (January 2014)
• Charcoal market assessment + feasibility of charcoal vouchers (n.a.) (n.d.)
• Emergency Wash response meeting minutes, Unicef (20 December 2013)
• Email Jesse Pleger, invitation to Infectious Disease Working Group meeting (20 December 2013)
• WASH Cluster response plan (December 2013)

Advocacy
• Amos, V., Georgieva, K., Shah, R., Call For Action On South Sudan (April 2014)
• ACAPS Briefing Note December 2013
• Drew, E.J., Advocacy Updates (December 2013)
• Citizens for Peace and Justice press release (April 2014)
• Oxfam in South Sudan media background briefing (January 2011)
• Crisis Action, Sudanese civil society say there is no short cut to national dialogue (n.d.)
• Oxfam, South Sudan Crisis Media Messages (March 2014)

Communications
• Oxfam South Sudan Updates (March–August 2014)
• Gatwech Choi, S., Staff Blog Date: (n.d.)

Human Resources
• Oxfam Evacuation Scenarios (n.d.)

External reports
• OCHA South Sudan crisis situation updates (December 2013–February 2014
• WFP South Sudan SitRep (December 2013 to January 2014)
• IGAD press release (x2)
• Humanitarian Country Team: Strategic Statement South Sudan Crisis, December 2013–March 2014
• UN House Overall Map (19 December 2013)
### APPENDIX 2: HUMANITARIAN INDICATOR TOOL FOR SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS

Degree to which humanitarian responses meet recognised quality standards for humanitarian programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Quality standard</th>
<th>Fully met (score 6)</th>
<th>Almost met (score 4)</th>
<th>Half-met (score 3)</th>
<th>Partially met (score 2)</th>
<th>Not met (score 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rapid appraisal of facts within 24 hours of pre-defined trigger, plans in place and scale-up or start-up commenced within three days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Coverage uses 10% of affected population as a planned figure with clear justification for final count</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Programme (including advocacy) addresses specific concerns and needs of vulnerable groups</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Evidence Description</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Programme has an advocacy/campaigns strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Country programme has an integrated approach including reducing and managing risk through existing longer-term development programmes and building resilience for the future</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

1 Updates 17.12.13 to 22.12.13, Emma Drew and Ferran Puig
2 SitRep 9
3 As a result of this crisis.
4 SitRep 18
5 FEWSNET SitRep 3
6 RRP South Sudan 2014
7 In 2015, Oxfam is also responding in Kotdalok (Jonglei) and Wau (Western Bahr El Gazal).
8 Due to its location in Juba, many other NGOs are able to access IDPs in UN House. As defined in its exit strategy, Oxfam decided to focus on meeting needs in other locations where access is more complex.
9 Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning
10 Reason may include donor reluctance, lack of media interest or others.
11 Drew, E., Update 1 South Sudan 16.12.13
12 Drew, E., Update 4 South Sudan 18.12.13
13 Interview E. Drew
14 Drew, E., Update South Sudan, 20.12.13
15 Puig Abos, F., Update South Sudan 22.12.13; Interview E. Drew
16 Interview E. Drew
17 Interview Rumi
18 SitRep 10/11
19 Interview Khodeza Akhter Jahan Rume and email E. J. Drew 15.04.15
20 Interview Rumi
21 Interview Rumi
22 Email E. J. Drew 15.04.15
23 ECHO EP&R proposal
24 SitRep 2
25 ECHO Final Narrative Report
26 Final report to DfID
27 SitReps 3 to 12
28 Interview with E. Drew
29 RTE
30 Sphere Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response
31 Sphere Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response
32 SitRep 1
33 RTE report (n.d.)
34 SitRep 15
35 SitRep 16; MEAL PDM Report on IBREEK, E Tata (April 2014)
36 Notes by E. J. Drew on Learning Workshop (March 2014)
37 Issues relating to accountability are discussed in section 3.2.5
38 Interview E. Drew
39 SitReps 7, 8 and 9
40 SitReps 5 and 17
41 Interview E. Drew
42 Interview E. Drew
43 SitRep 7 and 8
44 SitReps 1,2 and 3
45 SitRep 1
46 SitRep 4
Elderly, disabled, HIV positive, single women, female-headed households are examples