HUMANITARIAN QUALITY ASSURANCE: NEPAL

Evaluation of Oxfam’s response to the 2015 earthquake

Effectiveness Review Series 2015/16

Photo: Pablo Tosco/Oxfam. Gita lost her house in the Sanagaun village during the April 25 earthquake. After the earthquake she lived in a tent built with plastic sheets in front of her old house.

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 NEPAL 2015 EARTHQUAKE

A 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal on 25 April 2015 at 11:56 local time, creating large-scale damage and many casualties. The initial Nepal Flash Appeal was released around 29 April\(^1\) and appealed for $415 million to reach over 8 million people with life-saving assistance and protection over the next three months. A subsequent second major earthquake of magnitude 6.8 occurred. The revised Flash Appeal was released on 2 June\(^2\) for $422 million to reach 2.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance for a five-month period.

Figure 1.1 Earthquake affected areas

![Earthquake affected areas](http://mapaction.org/)

1.2 GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN INDICATOR TOOL

This HIT evaluation focuses on Oxfam’s response to the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. The period covered is late April 2015 to end December 2015. The evaluation was undertaken from December 2015 to February 2016.

This evaluation uses a methodology designed to enable Oxfam to estimate how many disaster-affected men and women globally have received humanitarian aid from Oxfam that meets established standards for excellence. The methodology is based on a Humanitarian Indicator Tool consisting of up to 15...
quality standards and a scoring system using established benchmarks for each standard. It requires documented evidence, complemented by verbal evidence where available, to be collected and analysed in relation to each standard. A rating is generated for the programme’s results against each standard, and as a cumulative total. Where relevant, areas for potential learning in relation to particular standards are highlighted for Oxfam’s consideration.

Table 1.1 provides a summary of the results of the evaluation with a quantitative rating given for each standard and the cumulative total. A fuller explanation of the rating for Oxfam’s performance against each standard is provided in Section 3.

Table 1.1 Quantitative ratings for the response, using the Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rapid appraisal of facts within 24 hours, plans in place and scale-up or start-up commenced within three days</td>
<td>6/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coverage uses 10% of at-risk population as a planned figure with clear justification for final count.</td>
<td>4/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical aspects of programme measured against Oxfam-endorsed standards</td>
<td>2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators leading to improved assistance through learning from experience and reflection</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Programme (including advocacy) addresses specific concerns and needs of vulnerable groups</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Programme has an advocacy/campaigns strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming</td>
<td>3/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Country programme has an integrated approach including reducing and managing risk through existing longer-term development programmes and building resilience for the future</td>
<td>1.5/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Programme is coordinated with and complementary to the response of other humanitarian actors</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended purpose</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final rating Equivalent to</td>
<td>34.5/54 64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 BACKGROUND

2.1 CONTEXT OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Nepal has had significant earthquake preparedness investments made by many organisations, including Oxfam, over the last few years and these did play a key part in how the response was initiated in the first days. Much of the earthquake contingency planning had been based upon a magnitude 8+ earthquake, approximately twice the shock forces of the 7.8 earthquake that occurred (earthquake magnitude values are measured on a logarithmic scale). The Nepal team had managed a Cat 3 flood within the previous 12 months, so had had some very recent, quite large-scale emergency response experience.

The government had formerly adopted the cluster system, so was quite familiar with the way the international humanitarian system might operate and took on leadership of clusters at the national level with IASC agency co-leads. However, Nepal is in the process of drafting a new constitution struggling to deal with a number of contentious issues especially on the limitation of boundaries for a federal set up that have divided the political parties and affected the performance of the government.

Nonetheless, a lot of government authority was delegated quite quickly down to district levels, which proved to be the real decision-makers on the ground, with national departments giving policy guidance, at least until the Earthquake Reconstruction Authority came into force. Although the earthquake was not as large as had been planned for, government was often considered to be slow to start its response.³ After five to six weeks central government was thought by some to have become very obstructive through the imposition of restrictive customs controls and other bureaucratic hurdles, although this was in the context of a flood of agency staff. (One Nepali newspaper reported around 42,000 foreign visas were issued after the earthquake up to early July.)⁴

In considering the extent to which international organisations were able to surge their capacity to respond, doubtless many organisations were on the ‘starting blocks’ for a UN level 3 disaster response. Fortunately, however, a ‘ground zero’ style situation, such as had occurred in Haiti in 2010, was not repeated. As with the Philippines Haiyan response, the IASC agencies were keen to ensure their mechanisms for response were fully utilised and it was clearly evident that all major organisations brought in considerable surge resources to make sure their responses were not undersized. Like the Philippines, Nepal was always going to be an easy country to scale up in; Nepal has a very benign security environment, at least for international staff, and in many other ways is an easy and accessible country to travel to and work in, although not without its problems. The evaluator considers that some organisations responded as though this was a level 3 disaster (equivalent to Oxfam’s Category 1), while in fact it was a level 2 crisis (equivalent to Oxfam’s Cat 1).⁵ Thus, in effect, the international surge of response was oversized.⁶⁷ It was in this context, which was as competitive as the few other well-funded responses seen in the last twenty years, that Oxfam’s own initial response must be seen.

The earthquake occurred around six to eight weeks before the monsoon season, which it was known would bring great difficulties for accessing remote mountain regions. Furthermore, the level of destruction and associated task of rebuilding meant that many remote households also faced the prospect of housing problems in the winter months, from October onwards. The level of destruction in the valley districts of Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur was significant, yet not overwhelming, and of course these were closer to assistance in all its forms. This meant that rural areas were presumed by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to be in need of more assistance. Vulnerability analysis led by
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) categorised house damage and geographical remoteness (i.e. away from roads and in mountains) as the most important factors to drive prioritising response, over and above underlying socio-economic vulnerabilities. Thus the view very quickly formed by the HCT and large donors was that this was a rural shelter disaster and efforts should be directed accordingly.

Based upon this context analysis, within a few days the HCT prioritised core/critical sectors: shelter, food security, health and WASH, for response out of the valley by pushing for relief assistance before the monsoons hit in the most remote hill Village Development Committees (VDCs). A significant United Nations Humanitarian Air Service/United Nations World Food Programme (UNHAS/WFP) air operation was undertaken with priority given for shelter and food supplies. It should be noted that ongoing displacements remained relatively small, varying between 100–180k after the initial first week or so, as many people went back to their homes, so large camps did not form and any temporary camps didn’t remain for long. This meant that most of the efforts could be focused on non-camp assistance in villages, which of course has a much stronger recovery, rather than emergency, component and required agencies to be adaptive in their response very early on. However, the spectre of subsequent monsoon/landslide-induced displacements and widespread disease outbreaks meant an eye was always kept on maintaining capacity to respond to new emergencies.

Although early communications from UN agencies raised concerns about the level of funding for the Flash Appeal, it was apparent that funding would not be a major limitation as there was more money initially being committed to Nepal outside the Flash Appeal. As of the time of writing, funding remains relatively good with 65 percent of commitments through the Flash Appeal and nearly as much outside the Flash Appeal, suggesting that funding was good overall and not a significant constraint for a large response to be mobilised.

The Nepal Humanitarian dashboard in the revised Flash Appeal released 2 June depicts the envisaged scope of the response.

**Figure 2.1 Nepal Humanitarian dashboard**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key figures</th>
<th>Strategic objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 500,000 households without houses</td>
<td>1. Save lives and alleviate suffering by providing and/or ensuring access to multi-sectoral assistance to those most affected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 million people require immediate food assistance</td>
<td>2. Protect the rights of those most affected, and promote inclusive access to humanitarian assistance, with particular attention to the most disadvantaged groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 million people in need of medical care and access to health services</td>
<td>3. Support the recovery and resilience of the most affected by protecting, restoring and promoting their livelihoods and well-being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 million people in need of water services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0 million people in need of sanitation services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0 million people in need of hygiene services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 million people in need of protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 million school-aged children require education in emergency support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404,000 children suffering from malnutrition including 10,000 SAM children, 70,000 MAM and 309,000 pregnant and breastfeeding women</td>
<td>14 Priority affected districts: Bhaktapur, Chaudh; Dolakha, Gorkha, Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Makawanpur, Nuwakot, Okhaldhunga, Ramechhap, Rasuwa, Sindhuli, Sindhupalchok</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Humanitarian assistance was still being delivered in June to areas that would be rendered inaccessible by the rains, so this overlapped with the government of Nepal’s launch of the Post Disaster Needs Assessment in late June. An international pledging conference for rehabilitation was held shortly afterwards with international donors. From July onwards, therefore, clusters and the response as a whole tried to move efforts towards recovery, while cognisant of the remaining residual emergency risks. The shelter cluster, given the scale of the response and materials to be shifted, remained with an emergency focus for a longer period of time.

2.2 BACKGROUND TO OXFAM’S WORK IN RESPONSE

Oxfam had been working in Nepal for several decades. The programme was managed by Oxfam GB and no other Oxfam affiliate was working in Nepal immediately prior to the response. Oxfam GB had undertaken work on contingency planning for the earthquake, so was prepared for this event and subsequently mobilised a large team, partners and resources to respond. Oxfam India mobilised very quickly using their capacity in adjacent Bihar and beyond, and played a prominent operational role in Gorkha in the first few weeks.

The pre-earthquake budget was £3.5m p.a. with around 64 posts. In the first three months post-earthquake, with a year 1 budget of £26.6m, there were 72 international staff and 189 national staff in post.\textsuperscript{11} Within the earthquake-affected areas Oxfam was already working in the urbanised districts of Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Lalitpur, along with some work with partners in Gorkha district and Sindhupalchok, up to 2011. Before the response, Oxfam had not been working in Dhading and Nuwakot, the other two districts where Oxfam responded to the earthquake, so this required the setting up of new district offices, establishing relationships with authorities, and finding new partners.
Figure 2.2 Areas of Nepal where Oxfam responded to the earthquake

CONTEXT: A 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal on 25 April at 11:59 local time causing large scale damage. The epicenter is located 81 km northwest of the Nepali capital Kathmandu at a depth of 15 km. Hundreds of aftershocks reported including a 5.7 magnitude earthquake in Sindhupalchok caused further damage. A second earthquake on the 12 of May caused further damage to infrastructure. 141 deaths and 3,159 injuries.

WHERE WE’RE WORKING

Update as of 25 May 2015

- 139,488 people supported
- 30,000 people benefited from chlorinated water distribution
- 13,678 tarpaulins provided
- 4,844 emergency food baskets
- 15,601 hygiene kits
- 362 latrines installed
- 200+ staff and volunteers

- 17,625 people benefited from livestock feeds distribution
- 2598 hygiene kits distributed
- 1 (10,000L) bladder tank set up
- 343 water filters distributed
- 575 water purification (FLuxus bottles) distributed
- 5000 Aqua tabs distributed
- 37 latrines completed
- 136 tarpaulins provided

- 17,710 emergency latrines
- 5434 HH received emergency shelter kits which include tarpaulins, blankets, ground sheets, first aid kits, cooking sets, solar lanterns, and solar lanterns
- 3256 hygiene kits distributed to 2018 HH or 10,000 individuals
- 4 community water filters installed in VDCs
- Early recovery strategy considering unconditional cash transfers. Government regulations currently being reviewed

- 28,120 people currently working in 2 VDCs; assessment ongoing to cover 3 more VDCs
- 4554 tarpaulins have been distributed

- 24,704 working in 8 VDCs
- 4844 tarpaulins distributed
- 4844 emergency relief KITs + food baskets
- 9 emergency latrines installed + 2 hand washing stations

- 51,329 people currently working in 10 VDCs and 1 IDP camp (initially 4 IDP camps)
- 3,325 kits distributed
- 298 latrines completed
- Oxfam teams chlorinating water provided people across Kathmandu per day (reach and impact will be clarified in the coming weeks)

3 OXFAM’S QUALITY STANDARDS

In this section, data collected from documents and direct sources are analysed against the requirements for the quality standards, and a justification of the rating for Oxfam’s performance against each standard is provided. The data sources are given in endnotes, together with other explanatory information. The work was made provision for a notional 15 days to undertake a desk review of information provided by Oxfam’s teams, primarily from the country office with some from Oxfam (GB) head office in the UK. Data were collected from documents, a few key stakeholders’ interviews, and an e-survey, which was undertaken to compare perceptions of performance with scorings made by the evaluator.

Note: The requirements to fully meet the standards are extracted from the HIT guidance note and are all listed in bold under each indicator. The evidence is then provided under each requirement heading.

3.1 QUALITY STANDARD 1: TIMELINESS

The scale-up to the response in Nepal must be viewed in the context of a substantial amount of emergency preparedness work being undertaken in Nepal by the global humanitarian community, including Oxfam. Thus, in essence, many agencies were already on the ‘starting blocks’. Oxfam’s own response to this rapid-onset disaster came on the heels of their own slow response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa, which in terms of timeliness of response was very weak.\(^1\) In the light of this slow response Oxfam had brought in its ‘no regrets’ policy.\(^1\) In this situation the overall conditions were right for a rapid response, and progressive operational scale-up for Oxfam was to be expected.

Emergency preparedness plans in place and used

Oxfam was able to initiate response activities based upon contingency stock of WASH and shelter items and, broadly speaking, based upon the contingency plan, the day after the earthquake. The first WASH activities in Kathmandu were actually reported on 28 April,\(^1\) i.e. within three days of the earthquake. Plans with partners were initiated and measures that included the training of government officials proved beneficial.\(^1\) However, while accepting in-country capacity had a different geographical and programme focus, there may have been scope for the plan to have increased provision for using national staff capacity more in leadership roles. However, preparedness for Cash Transfer programming was more complex, and in the end was not realised: ‘In the flood response in 2014 there was a CTP and Oxfam worked together with MoFALD. They were very impressed with Oxfam’s performance and fully agreed to the guidelines developed for CTP, but everything changed after the earthquake as staff from MoFALD were deployed to other districts, etc. and Oxfam’s CTP preparedness work was “lost”’.\(^1\)

Evidence of initial appraisal of facts or assessment within one day and decisions made

Initial assessments were made in Kathmandu on 26 April and discussion about expanding activities in the Kathmandu Valley started at this point. It was verbally reported that Oxfam India was in Gorkha on day 2 and at least one, if not more, national development team managers were in Sindhupalchok on day 2 to undertake initial assessments. Further assessments were undertaken after the first week. The Gorkha assessment was undertaken and documented\(^1\) with shelter, as well as WASH sectors proposed. EFSVL work/assessment started in Kathmandu Valley in early May.\(^1\) In Nuwakot multi-sector assessment of shelter/WASH EFSVL was undertaken in early May.\(^1\) The concept notes to the DEC\(^2\) describes the full range of initial assessments that were carried out (although not all were
Implementation within first three days

Nepali project managers made assessments to Gorkha and Sindhupalchok within a few days, which was formerly reported by 30 April. By 2 May Oxfam reported working in six districts, namely Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, Gorkha, Nuwakot and Sindhupalchok, and was planning to reach Dhading the next day. Oxfam had been working on assessment with the protection cluster in Kathmandu Valley and districts out of the valley. On 5 May Oxfam was established and reporting on work in all seven districts that they would continue to work in. The RTE also concluded that Oxfam made a very rapid initial response based upon preparedness measures in place.

Implementation team accompanied assessment team

Response activities were reported in sit reps as being undertaken at the same time as assessments drawing upon contingency stocks. (As if to reinforce the importance of the point of implementing while assessing, it was reported in the media and HCT that agencies were barred from villages to just assess, unless relief goods were also distributed.)

Rapid onset PIP or project on OPAL

On the day of the earthquake, Oxfam HD was in contact with the RD and agreed to mobilise significant resources and engage all out with a major response to the earthquake. That day, specialist advisers were already working to mobilise international staff to support the in-country response. A series of concept notes (file dated from 26, 27 and 28 April) were produced for a variety of donors. By 30 April, Oxfam reported securing funds of around £1 million for programming, which positioned them for fast ongoing scale-up. This was underwritten by a £1 million cat fund request made on 28 April by the RD and approved in writing on 30 April by the HD Director. The date of the first version of the rapid onset PIP was 27 April.

Other surge metrics

In terms of human resource capacity, this should be measured by number of partners/their staff, national staff and international staff. In terms of the latter Oxfam had brought in 27 international staff within five days, 61 by the end of May, and 76 by mid-June. (Caution should be exercised when using international staff as the metric as the right balance of partners, national and international staff is what drives a holistic, connected and sustainable response.) Notably the RTE highlighted that perhaps too many international staff were brought in. This was echoed by the sentiment ‘Government needs money not foreign experts to deal with the post-quake situation’.

The initial response clearly was very fast, though it should be noted that conditions for doing so were all in place, so anything less than this would have been very disappointing. Clearly Oxfam did well to surge in so much international staff capacity, but it raises the question, does Oxfam need to consider whether it is possible to ‘over surge’, a consideration that does not sit consistently with the ‘no regrets’ policy. Evidence also suggests that EFSVL did not start on day 1–3, but this is not considered material.

Notwithstanding the important caveat about the amount of international staff surged into the response, overall it is considered that Oxfam met the standard for timeliness (6/6).
3.2 QUALITY STANDARD 2: COVERAGE

Ten to 25 percent of affected population reached for all sectors planned or justification for not reaching this figure with agreement from region or HD and advocacy and referral of unmet needs to other organisations

The starting point for the potential size of Oxfam’s response was determined in the earthquake contingency plan. For an earthquake of this size in Kathmandu Oxfam estimated that it would mount a response for 100,000–300,000 people at a total estimated cost of +/-12 million USD for a Cat 2 crisis. Understandably for a contingency plan, this is quite a broad population range, so clearly in the event of a response it would be refined, but by whom and when?

As of 26 April Oxfam was using an overall affected figure of 3.5 million, which was the figure subsequently used by the Flash Appeal for food security. Oxfam took an initial decision to work in WASH, emergency shelter and EFSVL with the initial response targeting 10 percent of the total affected population of 3.5 million both in Kathmandu and outside the Kathmandu Valley. This is documented in the concept note prepared on 27 April: ‘As total estimated number of affected population throughout the country is around 3.5 million, Oxfam will plan to reach 10 percent of the affected population initially and increase gradually based on the availability of resources’. As this is explicit in the concept note it is presumed that the 10 percent figure was agreed (as opposed to 25 percent). This is considered to be the documented evidence that justified the response being based upon a lower figure.

This provided a notional figure of 350,000 people to be responded to in ‘all sectors’ that Oxfam would typically work in (EFSVL, shelter, WASH) if the standard is to be met. The target as written implies an ‘all or nothing’ approach, i.e. if you get involved in any sector at all then it has to be at this scale. By 19 May the OI humanitarian dossier set out an overall Oxfam response figure of 400,000 people, which was further disaggregated by sector: 19,000 households for work livelihood activities and re-establish basic asset base; 350,000 people for WASH; 50,000 households (approximately 275,000 people) for shelter. This was spread over four districts outside the Kathmandu Valley, which was a large geographical spread and one of the largest agency footprints of the response. So by this point, following an OI intervention, the targets were differentiated.

A valid benchmark for numbers affected was taken from the Flash Appeal (29 April) and revised Flash Appeal (2 June). Oxfam’s response is considered against these figures as these offer a better sector benchmark, especially by the time of the revised Flash Appeal. The revised Flash Appeal focuses on 14 priority districts (Oxfam’s response was within these 14) and for all clusters/sectors, figures had varied considerably from those set out in the initial Flash Appeal. This then raises the question: 10 percent of what, as the caseload varied in terms of sector and time? Table 3.1 summarises the figures and shows the complexity. It is proposed that Oxfam clarifies/determines which data source should be used for target setting, and that this is clearly stated.

Table 3.1: Overall figures in need (in 14 districts) compared to Oxfam’s intended response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Flash Appeal 29 April, cluster figure</th>
<th>Revised Flash Appeal 2 June, cluster figure</th>
<th>End April Oxfam figures (% compared to Flash Appeal)</th>
<th>End May Oxfam figures (% compared to revised Flash Appeal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food security (EFSVL)</strong></td>
<td>3.5 million</td>
<td>1.4 million</td>
<td>0.4 (11%)</td>
<td>0.1 million (7%) (19,000 HHs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shelter</strong></td>
<td>0.5 million</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>0.1 million (20%)</td>
<td>0.27 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WASH</strong></td>
<td>4.2 million</td>
<td>1.05 million</td>
<td>0.4 (9.5%)</td>
<td>0.35 (33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures of those affected change rapidly during rapid onset disasters and are always a political hot potato, so there is ample scope to lose track. In this case it was not clear who had responsibility to decide what would be the target for the response once the earthquake had hit and by when it should be agreed and then revised. Hence, we seem to have a variety of figures with numbers emerging and being settled upon in some way that is not apparent.

The programme design addresses risks and constraints so that the proposed action is realistic and safe

Early concept notes and logframes to OI, DFID, ECHO, OFDA all contain a list of anticipated risks. These were found to vary somewhat across proposals, but broadly speaking captured the risks that were to be expected. These risks were addressed in programme design, except the limited availability of required WASH and shelter stocks in the market (this risk was highlighted in the DFID and OIJR NEPAL concept notes). In fact, the biggest constraint proved to be the supply of shelter materials, in particular CGI sheets. In the Philippines Haiyan response, the scale of the disaster was such that supply needs meant bulk purchase both inside and outside the country was required, as requested by the shelter cluster. Similarly, in Nepal this was almost immediately recognised as a rural shelter disaster\(^{38}\) with shelter needs massively outweighing supply. In this environment, nothing less than decisive action in week 1 was required to manage the obvious risks of delay that arise when demand is huge.

Somewhat unexpectedly, around four to five weeks into the response, customs duties were imposed for goods brought in by agencies other than the UN and Red Cross, closing the door on duty free imports. It was recognised that once customs duties were imposed, all orders would have to replaced and this could lead to a potential bottleneck, as noted in the shelter coordinator’s report\(^{39}\) and so agencies would effectively be in competition with each other. Therefore, in the early days, modest CGI purchases could have been made in Nepal and from India (India before week 5/6 when customs duties were introduced), but orders were not placed in time and were reportedly delayed for many weeks, despite the risk being highlighted in concept notes. Effectively the decision was taken to be procedural and deny the existence of risks of programme delays. This has been attributed to the senior logistics manager at the time insisting on waiting for all programme plans to be formulated and waiting for a bulk purchase,\(^{40}\) a decision reportedly backed up by the business support manager. These delays severely compromised Oxfam’s ability to deliver fast on the second stage of its shelter response. The supply issue was a risk highlighted in general terms in project proposals/concept notes, but not managed effectively. It raises the question of how senior management balances risks of not following procedures (championed by business support functions) against compromising timely programme delivery (a concern often championed by programme staff).

Beneficiary numbers increase according to need – there are no spikes especially in last months of programme

By 28 April Oxfam had classified this as Cat 2 response, which was a rapid and correct judgement. However, as noted by the RTE, after the initial surge the response was slow to get off the ground. One participant described the response as ‘A great vertical take-off – but then we lost momentum.’ The following table draws from Oxfam snapshots of the reported response and sets out figures of people served, comparing these with Oxfam mid-May targets. (These figures are cumulative but go down at some points, which highlights inconsistency in data collection/reporting.)
Table 3.2: Numbers of those reached by Oxfam, by sector, over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shelter</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
<th>Hygiene promotion</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Livelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target (mid-May)</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>53,800</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>53,800</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>15,200</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>74800</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>85,800</td>
<td>26,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July*</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>223,950</td>
<td></td>
<td>249,628</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Aug*</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>345,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>260,749</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Sep*</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>395,550</td>
<td></td>
<td>270,842</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Oct</td>
<td>295,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>266,700</td>
<td>44,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Nov</td>
<td>302,000</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>231,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>47,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This information was provided by the WASH technical team leader.

Note: Family size is taken as 5.5. Where snapshots counted items such as HP kits, food baskets and tarpaulins, the numbers of items were multiplied by 5.5 to get a figure for people served. Emergency latrines are considered to serve 50 people where a population equivalent is not provided.

EFVSL overall

The work of EFSVL is broadly speaking categorised under the food security cluster. As with WASH, the total caseload, as defined by government/Nepal Red Cross/cluster was initially overestimated (by clusters) which made it hard for EFSVL to pitch its target at the ‘right market share’. Using the revised Flash Appeal figure of 1.4 million people in need of emergency food assistance, Oxfam aimed to achieve a figure of about 7 percent of the total numbers affected. However, by the end of May Oxfam reported a modest figure of just under 5,000 food baskets delivered. EFVSL was slow to start and did not deliver at the scale expected, a point that was agreed by the current EFSVL lead. Perhaps EFSVL should have been more modest in their initial target, despite the default institutional position to go ‘big’. A more modestly sized response may well have been the implicit understanding that the team had, but this was not documented clearly and thus not justified, leaving the EFVSL open to criticism of lack of clarity, as well as under-achievement. The current EFSVL coordinator highlights the challenges encountered with cash programming, which he considers should have been central to Oxfam’s response, but was late, and should have been much bigger, which he considers a major failing. Therefore, it is considered that Oxfam partially met this indicator for EFVSL.

WASH overall

The early arrival of the Oxfam senior WASH manager was considered to be a key factor in driving this scale of Oxfam’s WASH ambition, with crucial follow up support from a very experienced Nepali international staff member deployed from Oxfam Australia. Oxfam’s position in the global WASH cluster, its relationship with UNICEF globally and nationally, and its WASH stocks, gave Oxfam programmatic confidence. However, despite key factors (outlined above) in place, WASH struggled to maintain momentum after a quick start, certainly with respect to data, which paints a much weaker picture than some believe was the case, and there appeared to be a big jump between the end of May and the end of July. The former WASH team leader acknowledged there were data problems, and that figures in some reports showed assistance was less than previously indicated, but suggested that the use of sanitation and hygiene promotion figures would give a more realistic reflection of work done in
WASH overall (data for water; water work trucking, water treatment chemicals is harder to quantify). The HIT process requires a view to be formed on basis of documented evidence, which does look questionable in places, but by August, Oxfam had met its WASH targets. However, this highlights the need for Oxfam to agree data-reporting protocols, i.e. what counts and how to count it, in order to help address this problem of under reporting.

Shelter overall

This is a sector that Oxfam has much less institutional commitment for than WASH and EFSVL.\(^{44}\)\(^{45}\) Documents imply that Oxfam was much less clear for emergency shelter with the concept note for the DEC\(^{46}\) specifying a response for 0.1 million, while the RTE reported Oxfam had decided to engage decisively in emergency shelter – which is consistent with its policy – for a population of 0.4 million. By the end of May Oxfam reported\(^ {47}\) the distribution of 15,000 emergency tarpaulins (considered as covering about 75,000 people), with orders coming from Nepal, China, India and UK. The RTE noted that emergency shelter distributions (tarpaulins) were reduced from 50–70,000 families to 15,000 (about 0.08 million people), which was in response to national and district government requirements after the acute emergency phase (after week 5 tarpaulins were only to be distributed with CGI sheets).\(^ {48}\) The RTE also noted improved shelter (CGI et al.) was cut from 14–16,000 to 6,000 families due to CGI supply bottlenecks that were apparent by week 5/6. Oxfam India had tried to bring CGI sheets from India but these were stuck at the border for two months, so all reliance was inevitably placed on Nepali suppliers.

Emergency shelter for 0.08 million people represents about 3.2 percent of the total emergency shelter caseload (as of early June based upon the revised Flash Appeal) and this was a reduction from the initial commitment of 0.4 million. However, the terrain and dispersed nature of the population in priority rural areas in Nepal goes so much against being able to achieve these targets, that the RTE considered the targets as unrealistic. Nonetheless, late in the programme, Oxfam again increased its shelter targets and after six months had met/exceeded its original (late May) target of assistance for 270,000 people. The relative and absolute scale of Oxfam emergency and temporary improved shelter (TIS) contribution is evident from data from the shelter cluster web site.\(^ {49}\)

Figure 3.1: Comparison of agency shelter programme assistance delivery
So, based upon reported delivery and subsequent delivery beyond even the initial optimistic target, it is considered that Oxfam met this indicator for emergency shelter.

**Budget and funding scale up**

As of 2 May the proposed budget was stated as USD 32m. By the time of the next Funding Grid of 9 May, the proposed budget had increased to USD 56m. In the Joint Oxfam Response Strategy v2 dated 19 May the budget was USD 56m for three years. By mid-December the country proposed to increase this to USD 62.4m. From 26 April a series of proposals were prepared for a number of donors: DFID, ECHO, OFDA, and others, each with a chunk of the proposed caseload allocated. Funds were allocated rapidly from the cat fund, along with other donors, and quickly pledged. Oxfam quickly gained and retained a very enviable funding position.

An analysis of this data suggests: shelter was able to deliver over 100 percent of its figure six months after the response started; WASH delivered its targets; EFSVL met 25 percent of its targets after one month and nearly 50 percent after six months. The overall response Oxfam undertook was very significant both in geographical, as well as sector terms. Clearly, there were issues with the scale of the WASH and EFSVL response. The modest EFSVL can be traced back to its relative absence in the contingency plan and provision for stocks/purchase agreements. The funding and staffing scale-up was significant too. Thus due to weak performance of EFSVL, overall it appears that Oxfam nearly met the standard for coverage (4/6).

### 3.3 QUALITY STANDARD 3: TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PROGRAMME MEASURED AGAINST OXFAM-ENDORSED STANDARDS

As noted above, the response in Nepal was primarily concerned with assistance to populations (approximately 1.5–2.5 million) who were rebuilding their lives mostly in rural areas, with some urban affected and relatively few in camp situations (0.1–0.2 million). This meant that standards needed to take account of the fact that just 7–12 percent of assistance would be service provision in camps, but overwhelmingly assistance would not be service provision, but rather material/cash support with an eye on supporting longer-term development for households in villages. Furthermore, external assistance typically comes as a supplement to whatever resources the households and communities can salvage/utilise, so Oxfam assistance did not need to fulfil the full need, rather that households had enough means of their own with support from external sources, e.g. Oxfam. The situation was further complicated because district level authorities decided their own rules, which were often not defined as hard standards, leaving national guidelines to be used, or not! Finally, the steer to agencies was to not try and reach Sphere standards in the camps, so Oxfam and others pitched assistance levels at first phase emergency levels, e.g. one latrine for 50 people, rather than 1:20. This meant standards were hard to agree, and on the face of it Oxfam and other agencies could be open to criticism for meeting higher standards.

Oxfam endorsed technical standards and the Core Humanitarian Standard referenced and put in place with actions and indicators adjusted to context

(The Core Humanitarian standards were only fully introduced mid-way through this programme, so it is suggested that it is not reasonable to expect these to be explicitly referenced, at least not before the visit of Oxfam humanitarian MEAL lead, Vivien Walden, in November.)
A selected audit of the key documents was undertaken. Specifically, a search was made for a clear statement of what standards were expected and which standards these were. The logframes and strategies have outcomes and outputs set down, which are mostly qualitative in nature. Documents often don’t make reference to standards, and where they are mentioned it is not clear whether they are part of national policy and/or cluster standards or Oxfam standards. In cases where just material/cash was given, standards for inputs could have been provided. Although there were cluster standards, there was no guidance or accessible documentation regarding the standards, leaving less experienced staff and partners to guess or scour files for the standards. In general there was a lack of clarity about indicators in the relief and early recovery phase, which was a concern alluded to by the MEAL team leader, who noted a need to tighten this up for the recovery phase going forward. Table 3.3 details searches made, with extracts from documents included in italics.

Table 3.3: Selective extract of information about standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EFSVL broadly speaking followed district directives. Most cash interventions followed the Oxfam humanitarian dossier (which was not stipulated in project documentation), but where required needed to comply with government directives, e.g. to use only conditional cash. However generally standards were not clear.</th>
<th>Outcomes for: 2.1 basic food needs and 2.2 immediate resumption of normal livelihood activities, 2.3 stabilise their livelihood strategies in the medium-term post-disaster period, 2.4 District-specific livelihood profiles and market mapping + assessment. Indicators are all around percent targets. No input indicators that define the standard of assistance to be provided.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Nepal Earthquake Response Programme Global Logframe v3_07062015.docx</td>
<td>No input indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Nepal EFSVL Strategy_V1.pdf</td>
<td>No input indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFSVL Strategydraft V2+.doc</td>
<td>No input indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam EFSL indicator framework.xlsx</td>
<td>No input indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shelter. Standards were mostly absent from strategy documents logframes, etc. it was reported that this arose because these are higher-level documents and it was assumed staff would be familiar with standards. It was acknowledged this could be a problem, which could have been addressed with an operational document, which was drafted, but never finalised.</strong></td>
<td>3.1 earthquake affected households receive emergency shelter kits, 3.2 vulnerable households receive improved emergency shelter kits. No standards included for what should be in kits, i.e. no input indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Nepal Earthquake Response Programme Global Logframe v3_07062015.docx</td>
<td>No input indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NepalEarthquakeShelterStrategyMay2015PRA15FinalDraft.doc</td>
<td>Includes references to adequate and appropriate shelter solutions and shelter cluster guidelines but does not make explicit reference to standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Nepal_SHELTER Strategy_Revision 1_Draft_Aug 2015.doc</td>
<td>WASH. Used a combination of Sphere and cluster during emergency phase and during recovery phase used transitioning to using a mix of government and Sphere. However, this was not always clear in documentation and often referred onto other documentation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Standards set down for 1.1 sanitation, 1.2 hygiene and 1.3 water. Some use of some Sphere input indicators, some left open to interpretation.

Coordinate at inter-cluster level to ensure that Oxfam’s WaSH work is linked to Health, Shelter and Protection promoting inclusive programming adhering to humanitarian standards and principles.

According to international standards during the emergency phase while it would depend upon the national standards and indicators during recovery phase.

70% of stored drinking water samples from targeted households meet international drinking water standards. Water supply should be not less 38l/day Max collecting distance specified

The minimum standards are aligned with the National Position, while the desirable actions focus upon resilience, quality control and building back better.

Toilet facilities repair/rehab or construction following the agreed (national/Sphere standards). The water quality (in case there is a provision and/or repair/rehab) passed the standards.

Women’s rights organisations supported to deliver interventions for women.

Oxfam 16 Minimum Standards for Gender in Emergencies. The minimum standards are grouped together based on: promoting gender equality through internal practices; gender analysis through the project cycle; participation, dignity and empowerment; addressing gender based violence; and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA).

Women’s rights standards are upheld in all Oxfam interventions. (a) All staff are trained on Oxfam minimum standards on Gender in Emergencies.

Training in standards carried out for staff and partners using direct references to above standards

The programme was supported by a useful number of Oxfam advisory visits from UK; PHE x 4, PHP x 2, Gender x 2, EFSVL x 2. It is expected that all advisers would have raised the issue of standards on their visits and undertaken at least ad hoc awareness-raising on standards, as well as the delivery of some formal training sessions. (Only one advisory visit report was found on Box.) A variety of training sessions have been delivered by in-country staff and during advisory visits. Table 3.4 documents evidence of whether standards were included in training materials.
### Table 3.4: Overview of training delivered

**EFSVL.** There has been very little formal training, more of an emphasis on *ad hoc* mentoring.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Delivery</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jude Powell visit April/May</td>
<td>No evidence of training given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larissa Pelham visit June</td>
<td>No evidence of training given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant October</td>
<td>HEA with more emphasis on baseline and little/nothing on standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash coordinator October</td>
<td>Cash training for staff, but again no training on standards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Shelter**

- **Shelter Workshop held 5–6 October 2015** for Oxfam and partner staff. (Another shelter a workshop is planned which will include standards.)
  - Standards shared through presentations, printouts and group-work material:
    - **Inclusion:**
      1. IASC Gender Handbook: Gender and Shelter in Emergencies
      2. ADCAP: Minimum Standards for Age and Disability Inclusion in Humanitarian Action.
    - **MEAL and Shelter:**
      1. Core Humanitarian Standards.
      2. Technical Appendix – Communicating with Communities – Shelter Cluster.
    - **Cash and Shelter:**
      1. Technical Appendix – Cash for Shelter – Shelter Cluster
      2. Livestock Shelter:
        1. LEGS Handbook – 2nd Edition
      3. Sphere Standards:
        - Shelter, Settlements and NFI
      4. Winterisation:
        1. Winterisation Guidelines – Shelter Cluster Nepal
      5. Urban Programming:
        1. Urban Shelter Guidelines (NRC/Shelter Centre)

- **ITS Training at Samari-1 Nuwakot 8–9 November 2015.pdf** Targeted at artisan level
  - No explicit mention.

**WASH**

- **AWD Preparedness Training Nuwakot.ppt**
  - Strengthening common standards and approaches used in AWD preparedness and response.

- **Jenny Lamb May + July visit**
  - Jenny Lamb undertook capacity-building work for WASH, but despite request, no information was provided about what was covered in the way of standards.

- **A variety of national and district training**
  - Covering: Wash and hygiene (June 15), FCHV (July 15), outbreak control (Aug 15), PHP and PHE (Sep 15), WSP (Nov 15), MHM (Nov 15), Gravity water (Jan 16). None of the documentation sent explicitly mentioned standards.

**Gender and protection**

- **Gender training materials**
  - Minimum Standards Gender Analysis – Project Cycle.

- **Tess Dico-Young, Global Gender Adviser on her visit in September 2015.**
  - Provided training on Oxfam’s gender in emergency (GiE) standards.
GIE training in all districts July to Nov 2015  In each district (mix of Oxfam and partner staff), induction on Oxfam safeguarding policy organised for Oxfam and partner staff in all ER districts.

Pillar Duch  Induction on protection-based policy line conducted in every district (except Nuwakot and Sindhupalchok).

MEAL Plan Emergency Response 2015–16.doc  CHS orientation to be provided by Vivien Walden.

Overall

MEAL Plan Emergency Response 2015–16.doc  CHS orientation to be provided by Vivien Walden.

**Indicators use standards and monitoring against standards takes place regularly**

There is a lack of consistent reference to standards, which makes monitoring against standards a rather difficult task. Standards for inputs/materials quality control are the responsibility of logistics, who monitor at the supply end (no documentation was available for review). MEAL emphasis is on post-distribution monitoring and perceptions/feedback/complaints of assistance, so they do not really monitor against standards. During the early stages of response, PDM occurred weekly and a weekly report was sent to managers. Three of these PDM reports were reviewed, none of which explicitly mentioned what standards Oxfam was using/had set. Typically, information/findings were presented in this form, which reported feedback but does not state what standards were applicable or whether these were met.

**Usefulness and quality of items**

- 100% reported that they received Hygiene Kit
- 84% reported that Hygiene Kit was useful
- 76% reported that distributed Hygiene Kit was used by all the family members
- 100% reported that they were satisfied with the quality of Hygiene Kit distributed

Lately, with reduced distribution, this monitoring is occurring every two to four weeks. Outcome-level monitoring, which touches upon whether standards have been reached, is included in logframes (which as noted above is limited) and occurs as part of the donor reporting cycle with data collected by MEAL and reports generated by the funding team. Selected donor reports were reviewed for evidence of reporting against standards:

- 20150831 Oxfam DFID RRF Final Report FINAL.docx mentions Sphere and Nepal government standards, but provides no evidence of whether standards were actually met.
- 20151009 Oxfam SIDA RRM Nepal Earthquake Final Report SUBTOUK.docx, includes targets and numbers met, but again it is not clear what input standards are expected.
- 20150831 UNICEF Progress Report 4.docx, includes targets that are qualitative and there is no explicit mention of what standards are being used.

Shelter sector did not monitor against standards (which were anyway not clear) as PDM emphasis was on perceptions and not standards. The former shelter team leader acknowledged that the PDM needed to be improved to focus on standards explicitly and to understand whether Temporary Improved Shelter inputs had resulted in expected improvements/standards for housing.
Standards evaluated

There have been at least three independent reviews/evaluations of Oxfam’s response, namely the RTE, the DEC evaluation and the DFID partners monitoring visit. None of these goes into much detail in systematically reviewing standards of Oxfam’s work. However, some key points were evident:

- Oxfam treating emergency shelter materials like a NFI meant that standards were compromised. (RTE in June).
- There was little knowledge about minimum standards for gender in emergencies for new staff and partners (RTE June).
- Newer partners are unfamiliar with Oxfam’s approach and humanitarian standards (RTE June).
- Oxfam emergency toilets were considered to meet standards (RTE June).
- One rather than two tarpaulins supplied, which is below Sphere\(^6\) (DFID Monitoring report).
- The key point that comes out is that standards for house rebuilding for earthquake resistance are not set or adhered to. (From DEC evaluation September – this is a general comment and not directed at Oxfam specifically).

Technical standards referenced above and CHS are mentioned by name.

As noted above The Core Humanitarian standards were only fully introduced mid-way through this programme. The DEC measured the response against the CHS, which provided another opportunity to build knowledge of these standards. Technical standards are seldom mentioned by name, so it is unclear where most response standards have come from (national, cluster, Sphere).

In conclusion, standards-setting was complex, but has been very weak overall. Objectives and targets were of course set, often with a qualitative target, which we may presume as the standard. Associated indicators were either qualitative or often limited to numbers to be served. Overwhelmingly agency material/cash assistance, rather than service provision, was required to support and integrate with recovery and longer-term development efforts of households and communities, so input standards should have been clearly set, but there was no evidence of this; for example, how much and what quality of food and shelter assistance should have been provided by Oxfam? For the most part it is not clear which of these standards were to be followed. Some logs/procurement processes include standards, and were reportedly in place (although not available for review), but in any case, these are somewhat buried in procurement documentation.

There is always a discussion to have in-country about which standards prevail, Oxfam, Sphere, national government or cluster. Sphere advises using the higher standard where differences exist between government and Sphere. It is therefore necessary to clearly state which standards apply and, ideally, include them in Oxfam documentation rather than assume staff and partners will search out relevant documents.

During interviews with MEAL/shelter/EFSVL team leaders, they all acknowledged the shortcomings in the setting down of, and compliance with, standards. It proved very hard to track down precisely what standards Oxfam was following, even drilling down into documentation. How then can beneficiaries know the standards that they should expect, not to mention partners and the many new staff Oxfam recruited? While Oxfam may have achieved quite high standards in their work it is not absolutely clear what these are, with information dispersed and opaque. Overall ambiguity prevailed, giving an impression that everyone will come to understand the standards by a process of osmosis. Given this, it is considered that Oxfam partially met the standard for technical standards (2/6).
3.4 QUALITY STANDARD 4: MONITORING, EVALUATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEARNING (MEAL) STRATEGY AND PLAN

Evidence that programme design used lessons learned from other relevant responses

Oxfam brought its recent and longer-term learning about scale-up to the fore in this response by rapid mobilisation of resources and deployment of key advisers into the response early on. These advisers are critical, in as much as they bring with them access to knowledge from other responses. In this sense Oxfam’s advisory deployment ensured that a very significant body of previous response learning was instilled into the programme design at the start. Unintentionally, this will have diluted the voice of in-country learning, e.g. from recent large floods, as the international voice tends to be louder. Specifically, there was a lot of cyclone Haiyan (Philippines 2013) learning introduced: deployment of dedicated IM capacity with dedicated IMs deployed in most districts; accountability tools and practices; MAC team deployed. System wide, ALNAP and others are now very fast in providing synthesis of past learning, based upon much better documented responses. The ability to absorb and apply many of the system-wide lessons is perhaps the bigger challenge if staff do not personally identify with them and it is less clear whether all or nearly all system lessons from other response were taken on board. The findings of the RTE, and there are many recommendations, suggest that while much has been learnt and acted upon, recurring lessons continue to be required. However, this should perhaps be quantified – an exercise that is beyond the scope of this work.

Logframes indicators replicated in MEAL strategy and plan

The MEAL plan earthquake response 2015–2016 sets out information on all areas of response to be monitored. It does not repeat the logframe indicators in the plan itself, although it references this to some extent in the MEAL plan. There appears to be partial congruence with the logframe and means of verification are set out. The logframe indicators are not always SMART. Gender is featured as part of the logframe activity and to some extent it is explicit within food security and shelter activities, but not WASH. The monitoring framework is built in as part of the MEAL work plan. It does not relate specifically to the logframe, so only some of the indicators appear to be measured. This could have been tighter and better aligned.

Indicators reported against in donor reports both activities, outputs and outcomes

A number of donors reports were reviewed, all of which comply with this requirement

- 20150831 Oxfam DFID RRF Final Report FINAL.docx
- 20151009 Oxfam SIDA RRM Nepal Earthquake Final Report SUBTOUK.docx
- 20150831UNICEF Progress Report 4.docx

MEAL staff in post

By May, the programme had deployed an international MEAL coordinator. This built upon the pre-existing national staff MEAL development post capacity (programme quality manager). By June, MEAL officers were recruited and assigned to each district. The MEAL capacity for this response is well resourced, with good technical support and the team has remained pretty much fully staffed throughout. However, capacity-building remains to be done for team and partners.
Evidence of use of OI Minimum MEAL standards

OI standards are listed below, and all of these were broadly speaking complied with, or are in process (for mid-term and final reviews and evaluations, which are not yet due).

- Rapid assessments: undertaken and included FGD.
- In-depth assessments: Detailed Needs Assessment (DNA) included household questionnaires. Follow-up assessments, where conducted (around October), included further community consultation.
- Baseline: conducted as part of DNA.
- Data collection: regular monitoring conducted.
- Phasing: clear move from relief to early recovery. Full recovery planning now underway.
- Accountability system in place: established – see more below.
- RTE: Conducted.
- Midterm review: planned.
- Final evaluation: planned.
- Learning: learning workshops held and more planned.

Data collected, analysed and fed back to staff and partners

Input monitoring was undertaken by support and programme teams, while output monitoring was done both by the programme team and MEAL. MEAL focused more on perception, satisfaction and use, while the programme teams monitor delivery. Although a lot has been done in terms of MEAL, the focus has been on monitoring outputs, and after the emergency phase it appears that there are shortages in terms of evaluating outcomes. This will be addressed in the coming months. The one-year evaluation will also be an opportunity to assess impact. A baseline survey was done, but no endline undertaken, so it will be a challenge to provide precise statements on what was achieved. However, a recovery baseline is planned for March 2016 and is expected to double up as an endline for the first phase.

The MEAL focus has been on Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) and perception surveys. PDM formats have been developed and data collection is undertaken on smart phones with consolidated reports being prepared and reviewed weekly. These were reportedly distributed by email. The survey focused on levels of coverage perceptions and assistance utilisation - where required, the intervention was adjusted. In each district a monthly partner review workshop is conducted in which monitoring data is shared and reviewed (three of the PDM workshops were reviewed as mentioned under standard 3 above). However, the system was reportedly somewhat lacking in overall coherence, notably the linkages between districts are not particularly strong, suggesting improvement could be made to render the system more holistic and connected.

Evidence that Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) information [RTEs, other evaluation and review information and monitoring data] is being shared internally and used to adapt programmes and address poor performance

M&E information is generated and shared with subsequent programme adaptation at three levels:

- Quick fixes/immediate problem-solving with follow-up by email.
- Learning review workshops (see below) during which more substantial issues are raised and addressed.
- Lessons learnt and highlighted in donor reports along with programme adjustments highlighted and acted upon.
Review or learning days are held with technical staff and key findings shared internally.

The programme has conducted a number of learning workshops\(^5\) in each district during the period August to September as part of the response. Gorkha district has already conducted two. There are planned learning reviews for each district every three months. There is an annual review planned for March 2016. These workshops include staff and partners and are structured around exchange of learnings/findings with participants.

**Budget reflects MEAL activities**

The budget makes provision for the full range of activities including budget lines for staff, vehicle and travel costs, materials, communication and workshops. Ample provision is being made for next year to continue with a full team of MEAL staff along with sufficient budget lines for expenditure to support their ongoing work.

**OPAL has MEAL plan in place and is updated regularly**

Rapid onset PIP was prepared and this included logframes and feedback mechanisms. Subsequently a full MEAL plan was produced and included. The PIP is now (belatedly) in transition from rapid onset to longer term PIP. A more comprehensive and coherent MEAL plan is under preparation and will be submitted as part of the PIP.\(^6\)

**Final evaluation planned which includes community perceptions**

A mid-term review/light evaluation of the relief and early recovery phase is planned for February 2016. This will include an endline survey and the conducting of a baseline for recovery. At the time of writing, a one-year impact evaluation was planned for May/June 2016 using the contribution to change methodology. Once a year a mid-line evaluation is planned. In all of these, community perceptions will be gathered through feedback mechanisms: FGDs, public hearings and questions asked about community perception of services provided.\(^6\) The programme runs to March 2019, so a final evaluation of the whole programme is some way off.

There is much that worked well with the MEAL capacity and systems: learning from previous responses; building upon pre-existing capacity; a greater move towards the use of tool boxes/SOPs, which were adapted for the Nepal context; a generous budgetary provision; deployment of international capacity and quite rapid recruitment of district staff; and feedback loops built up. The major shortcomings are a) standards are unclear (see above) b) outcome/impact monitoring is weak c) eight months on, the system still appears somewhat fragmented, although work is still being undertaken to join everything together. To some extent, management reporting lines make it more difficult to build coherence: IM coming as a separate function; material input quality control being part of logs; and separation of programme and MEAL. However, this also provides checks and balances and this follows Oxfam core business practice. Taking all this into account overall it appears that Oxfam almost met the standard for MEAL (2/3). With full MEAL resources budgeted for going forward into the recovery period, and plans being put in place, enhancing existing MEAL work to fully meet the standard should be very achievable.
3.5 QUALITY STANDARD 5: FEEDBACK/COMPLAINTS SYSTEM FOR AFFECTED POPULATION IN PLACE AND FUNCTIONING

Accountability work was quite prominent for the overall humanitarian response in Nepal given the emphasis, capacity and funds provided under the OCHA-led Communicating with Communities (CWC) initiative. This included a CWC cross cluster working group, and projects providing considerable information/feedback mechanisms. This built upon system-wide work undertaken in the Philippines Haiyan response. This was a project that Oxfam connected with through regular reporting and participation. Oxfam remained engaged in, and briefed upon, the CWC work plan, strategy and progress.

Evidence of a systematic, impartial and ongoing analysis of the risks, context and needs of different groups

This was undertaken as part of the rapid response and then the detailed needs assessment (reports reviewed and noted above).

Evidence that communities are aware of, can access, and are consulted on the design, monitoring and implementation of complaints mechanisms

The system was set up in May by one of Oxfam’s RRT members and has continued since that time. There is no documentation that shows how communities were consulted on the design of the system, although communities reportedly requested to be consulted in person rather than by phone, but afterwards indicated they were happy with phone contact. Community members are aware of the complaints mechanisms and do use it (reference: complaints logs).

Evidence of complaints being addressed in a timely, fair and safe manner and reported on to complainant

The Oxfam feedback and complaint system guidelines set out the procedure for complaints to be handled, with the MEAL team taking the complaints and requesting action on them. This provides an important separation between those delivering programme and those handling complaints. Oxfam maintains logs of complaints that are sent in to the hotline, which are tabulated on a district basis and include the action proposed. The date the complaint was made and the date of completion of action is included, showing that complaints are typically addressed between one to a few days. Some districts started this system later. Nuwakot started in August while Gorkha records go up to July. So while records are not always complete, those sections that are indicate a comprehensive and responsive complaints mechanism.

Evidence of feedback incorporated into planning and programmes adapted after consultation and in response to changes in context, people’s needs and capacities

Information about complaints is shared at programme team meetings. This is done in a variety of feedback formats provided to programme teams. One such format details complaints and responses to issues of WASH, shelter and general issues dated from July. One example verbally reported was that the contents of hygiene kits were changed on the basis of complaints.

Evidence of inclusive representation and participation of communities, including the most vulnerable, at all stages of the response on programme areas, such as targeting, preferences for cash/food, siting of latrines and design, distribution, etc.
Scattered evidence of this is available in the rapid assessment reports of May and June, and in DNA reports. These demonstrate consultations with VDCs, focus group discussions, with women, household visits, etc. These indicate consultation with communities at the assessment stage. Targeting in some districts was not permitted as in some cases district government set blanket distribution, meaning targeting discussions were not relevant. Reports understandably do not document and precisely record all details, such as preferences, siting of facilities, etc., so it is difficult to prove this level of detail.

**Evidence of information about Oxfam and the programme provided to communities in languages, formats and media that are easily understood, respectful and culturally appropriate – posters, billboards, ration cards as examples**

Oxfam reportedly used a variety of communication channels: banners, billboards and transparency boards, as well as IEC. A variety of documents were shared with evidence.

**Evidence of consultation regarding information channels**

No evidence was available.

**Feedback shows that information received is sufficient**

The accountability adviser stated that in general terms beneficiaries were aware of what Oxfam was doing. This is captured in the revised PDM forms and exit interviews (conducted during distributions) and fed back to teams. For example, a power point on HH latrine distribution, which was presented by the MEAL officer to the WASH team, who reviewed the demonstration and information plans as a result.

**Examples of good practice captured and shared**

One example shared verbally was that there were delays in distribution of CGI sheets as Oxfam wanted to make sure these were of the right quality (and there were numerous factors that caused delay as noted above). There were complaints from communities about the delay. Oxfam fed back the reasons for the delay and communities accepted this as reasonable. Another example related to feedback on the types of sanitary towels provided, and feedback resulted in these being changed. Documentation to support this was not available.

**Feedback from communities around needs and concerns is positive**

In general, Oxfam’s accountability officer considered it difficult to meet community’s expectations and to get positive feedback. The team has drafted a report on accountability, which included information on overall levels of satisfaction.

**Evaluation reports state that programme is relevant to needs and context**

The RTE, which evaluated the programme till end June, broadly considers the EFSVL response to be appropriate. It was not explicit about the WASH response, but did not say the response was inappropriate. It considered that the cash vouchers could have featured more strongly as an appropriate response, while noting markets would not have supported this in the first two weeks and there was a reluctance on the part of the national government to allow unconditional cash grants. Oxfam’s shelter response was less successful initially as the bulk of the tarpaulins arrived at a time when government and community wanted to switch to CGI sheets. The CGI sheet arrival was plagued by delays, which rendered the response somewhat late.

The available evidence demonstrates that Oxfam has established a robust complaints mechanism that listens to feedback and takes action where it deems appropriate. SOPs and guidance is available for
complaints. Strong feedback mechanisms appear to be in place, but more could be done to prove that consultation occurs throughout the programme cycle and is listened to. Oxfam requires an exacting level of information to demonstrate full compliance with this standard. In order to meet this, Oxfam would need to establish a series of information capture mechanisms that involve a mixture of surveys, photographs and more detailed reports, but staff need to know how to prove full compliance in advance of a response if this can ever be done fully. In conclusion, much good work has been done and overall it appears that Oxfam nearly met the standard for feedback and complaints (2/3).

3.6 QUALITY STANDARD 6: PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS DEFINED, CAPACITY ASSESSED AND PARTNERS FULLY ENGAGED IN ALL STAGES OF PROGRAMME CYCLE

The government of Nepal requires international NGOs to implement their programmes through national (registered at central level) and local (registered in districts) NGOs. It should also be noted that partnership work includes work with key government departments, so broader than the NGO requirement set down by government. In the past it has also included the Nepal Red Cross. The scale of the earthquake response meant that partners were often newly contracted by several international organisations simultaneously, meaning their ability to manage several contracts running concurrently may have been compromised. Oxfam had three pre-existing relationships with partners in the three Kathmandu Valley districts so were able to scale these up quickly after the earthquake response as these were all part of the contingency plan. By the third week of May, 13 partners were listed in the Oxfam response, which then rose to a total of 18 in the earthquake affected districts.

Partner capacity assessment carried out

The annex of the contingency plan included a top line partner capacity assessment. Three partners had pre-existing agreements with Oxfam: ENPHO, Lumanti and DEPRCOS. It is reported that all of these had pre-existing partner assessments, (these are kept by the Business Support Directorate, but have not been reviewed). Sixteen new partners have been taken on for the earthquake response and all have had partner assessments completed.

Capacity-building plan in place (if needed)

Pre-earthquake, the Humanitarian Investment Plan (HIP) focused on disaster preparedness and response capacity building for government partners including MoHA, MoFALD, MoUD, MoAD, DDRC, WASH and food security cluster members – the Water Supply and Sanitation Division Office (WSSDO), the District Public Health Office (DPHO) and civil society. Oxfam's shelter strategy dated May and August 2015 makes no mention of partners' capacity building. Oxfam shelter programme was considered to be an NFI distribution programme of tarpaulins initially followed by CGI sheets, which is perhaps a reason why capacity building focused on people in affected villages and makes no mention of partners. Oxfam Nepal EFSVL Strategy_V1 (not dated) makes no mention of partner capacity-building, while the Oxfam Nepal EFSVL strategy draft ver2 makes reference to capacity building, but provides no further detail. The Earthquake Response Programme WaSH Strategy September 2015 is more explicit about capacity building of partners. The WaSH Capacity Building Strategy dated 4 October 2015 outlines a plan in greater detail. In addition, the WaSH section has documented partners’
capacity-building work in Dhading in September 2015 and the senior WaSH adviser (formerly WaSH manager) is now dedicated to capacity building (as is the case with the former shelter manager).

**Documented evidence of Oxfam support to partner on capacity building (training or staff secondment for example)**

Partners receive some technical capacity-building, but as stated above, this appears to be weak overall. As of late January 2016, more-general capacity building of partners had not been started, but there are plans to start this at some point. There are two positions in the Programme Quality Department dedicated to partnership quality, and partners’ capacity-building is a major focus for the coming months (including a revision of the selection process and standard tools and processes for capacity-building planning and monitoring).

**Partner agreement clearly states expectations and outcomes for both parties**

Project agreements for Lumanti, WHR, ENPHO, KIRDARC and DEPRCOS were reviewed. Only some of these included mention of objectives (logframes with further detail are available, but have not been shared or reviewed). Objectives were very broad with Oxfam’s general expectations being set out. The level of detail about expenditure provided in budgets was clear. Other key documentation, such as the PCRA report, audit report, MTR, Annual Report, and PGA, etc. may provide further details (not all of these were available for review).

**Partner actively involved in planning, monitoring and evaluation**

The Oxfam Contingency Plan incorporates partners in its response in a very generic way, but this does include a listing of partners (existing, potential and strategic partners) in Annex IV (this was not available for review). The preparatory work had clearly been done, although it is not clear how much this involved partners. There was a partner meeting reported early on in the first week after the earthquake. District learning-review workshops’ reports were checked for partner input. Four of these reports showed partners’ participation, although Dhading appeared not to have partners present. Monthly partners’ review meetings are held in districts as part of the monitoring system.

**Partner feedback is positive**

As of late January 2016 there is no mechanism for systematically capturing feedback from partners, and none of the district workshop documents reviewed included anything on partner feedback. This appears to be a significant gap, at least in documented form.

Documentation on partners overall was somewhat weak (or not available) so the impression is given that partnership is not a very well documented component of Oxfam’s programme, which may or may not reflect the strength of partnership. However, this overall view was confirmed by a senior staff member with a more informed perspective, and the MEAL coordinator, although the latter noted that much more emphasis will be put on this going forward. Existing partnerships were strong, but where Oxfam took on new partners in new districts, combined with the fact that Oxfam was more operational in these locations, full partner engagement was slow to occur. Perhaps understandably, although not justifiably, given Oxfam mounted a massive response that also required many new partners, partnership-support considerations were left behind during this response and remain somewhat lagging. Although the response was implemented through partners, there was little mention of this, which could be due to Oxfam having a high profile in the media. Unless Oxfam is willing to be partner-led rather than sector/service provision led, perhaps this will always be the case. Therefore, given the nature of Oxfam’s response and the documentary evidence outlined above, it is considered that overall it appears that Oxfam partially met the standard for partner relationships and engagement (1/3).
3.7 QUALITY STANDARD 7: PROGRAMME IS CONSIDERED A SAFE PROGRAMME: ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID HARM AND PROGRAMME CONSIDERED CONFLICT SENSITIVE

Although Nepal has not been in active conflict since 2007 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, there have been limited outbreaks of political and ethnic violence, predominantly in the south of the country and away from earthquake-affected areas. Immediately after the earthquake there was some looting, but the situation calmed down quite quickly. Recently there has been more ethnic violence, but again mostly in the south, away from priority earthquake-affected districts. In the current situation, armed conflict is not a major issue, but risks to women and children should still be anticipated. Nepal does have a history of trafficking, so the issue of trafficking or girls and women specifically requires close attention.

Assessments look at safe access to services and other protection issues

An early protection assessment was undertaken by Pilar Duch, Oxfam’s Protection Adviser, from 26 May–9 June 2015 and identified a number of key issues, namely access to aid for vulnerable and marginalised groups, inclusive targeting, and safe sector programming. This analysis highlights that ethnicity/caste is a major concern. It also highlighted that GBV/trafficking was of secondary concern. Rapid Needs Assessment reports and Detailed Needs Assessments were reviewed. The RNA reports considered women’s/girls’ protection issues and interviewed women giving attention to issues and interventions that might give rise to protection concerns. There is evidence of a good initial specialist assessment, and ongoing programme assessments with protection mainstreamed within these. However, protection issues were absent from Detailed Needs Assessments reports.

Documented evidence that programmes identify and respond to protection issues and unintended negative effects, including potential abuse by staff and people’s safety, security, dignity and rights

For most programmes (protection adviser’s report, RTE) it was reported that early on Oxfam addressed obvious protection concerns, e.g. the way toilets were set up. However, there was a lack of awareness of less obvious protection issues, some of which would have been less well understood by international, and to some extent, national staff. The RTE highlighted that early on there was insufficient attention paid to these protection issues and staff were insufficiently briefed on protection. Later in the programme there was at least one case of a safeguarding complaint (subsequently found to have no basis), which served to show that the response mechanism was functional and decisive action was taken.

Oxfam has been active in raising protection issues in the training provided for staff and partners. Training addressed the issues of safeguarding and protection together. This was evident in training documents e.g. training in Kathmandu in January. In addition, one of Oxfam’s key partners, WHR, conducted awareness-raising on GBV, supported referral systems, and organised self-defence training. At the national level, Oxfam has a national staff protection adviser, who reports to the gender adviser. The gender adviser matrix manages district gender officers in how they perform the function of protection function within their roles. In the context of a non-armed conflict situation, and where most of the issues are female related, combining this with the gender role is an entirely valid approach. Oxfam
uses its district gender officers, its national protection adviser, its partner WHR, and its seats on the protection cluster and GBV sub-cluster as a means to address protection issues throughout its programme. An example of Oxfam addressing a protection issue occurred in Gorkha, when the gender officer called a meeting to raise a major concern, which was subsequently documented.86

Protection issues identified by other actors acted upon

The national protection cluster, which includes child protection and GBV sub-clusters and government counterpart, was active from the start of the response. At the start of the response Oxfam participated regularly in the national protection cluster and GBV sub-cluster, but latterly has chosen to focus more on the district level, working with and through the Women’s Development Office. Trafficking was a major concern that was identified early on, along with the emphasis on the provision of child and women friendly spaces and work on raising awareness of human rights issues. Oxfam’s partner WHR, who programmes in all districts, has been active in setting up spaces of sanctuary for women at risk (perhaps a reactive measure), as opposed to women-friendly spaces. Oxfam’s feedback mechanisms are linked into the protection cluster to report on any trafficking issues. Both the DEC evaluation and DFID monitoring reports were very quiet on protection issues, so it is difficult to comment further.

Protection expertise called in when programme requires it

As noted above, within one month of the response starting, Oxfam called in specialist protection advice from the global pool. Additionally, there was originally one person in the MEAL team (Karuna Amatya) who acted as the focal point for dealing with protection/safeguarding issues. However, since September, a national protection adviser (Sandhya Shrestha) has been in-post who reports to the national gender adviser. A further visit from a global protection adviser is planned later in 2016. Each district team has a gender officer and these roles have protection/safeguarding responsibility within their JDs. These gender officers have all received protection orientation as part of their general induction. In the context of a non-armed conflict situation, and where most of the issues are female related, combining this with the gender role is considered an entirely valid approach. There is back up from within the office from the wider national team and further expertise in the RC and the global pool. The programme has sufficient expertise at all levels that hold responsibility for dealing with protection issues. Thus protection issues get dealt with in a variety of ways: through the work of the district gender officers, as part of the accountability work, through the telephone hotline, and through the complaint mechanism. There is feedback into management level, and sit reps and other sit reports raise protection concerns.87

Technical teams do ‘safe’ programming (avoid negative effects, and are conflict sensitive)

As explained above, the programme teams in all districts have protection expertise available to draw upon and support safe programming day to day. Development strategy is set at national level and is generally considered to be reasonable, although the current protection adviser,88 considers there is still work to do at a district level to do safe programming consistently. Within the sector areas some examples of programmatic entry points that are protection sensitive are evident. For example, WASH has identified the importance of menstrual hygiene as a protection issue (as well as being important for health and dignity reasons). Protection did not feature in the draft August 2015 shelter strategy. The draft EFSVL strategy makes ample reference to social protection, but not to safe programming per se.

Advocacy strategy includes protection and action is taken

Oxfam’s Rights in Crisis Campaign Strategy for Nepal Earthquake May 2015–March 2016 (version not dated) included equitable access to assistance and protection as one of two main objectives. This focuses on protection threats and socio-vulnerability and exclusion, particularly for those relocated/resettled. The draft October national influencing strategy shifts the focus to broad policy
reform on food and economic justice, gender justice and women’s rights, and the rights of people in emergencies.

Overall, it is evident that Oxfam has well-resourced protection expertise at all levels of the programme, with a dedicated adviser, district focal points, and a specialist partner who brings further capacity and expertise. Protection clearly features in some key documentation, but it is perhaps not consistently highlighted. However, the programme areas of EFSVL, WASH and shelter were relatively quiet on protection-related issues and good examples of what is confronted were not forthcoming. Given this then **overall it appears that Oxfam nearly met the standard for safe programming (2/3).**

3.8. QUALITY STANDARD 8: PROGRAMME (INCLUDING ADVOCACY) ADDRESSES GENDER EQUITY AND SPECIFIC CONCERNS AND NEEDS OF WOMEN, GIRLS, MEN AND BOYS

**Gender analysis carried out, well documented and strategy written**

The pre-existing Oxfam country programme is considered to have a strong gender focus and so provided the basis for developing a good early analysis post-earthquake. The latest country programme strategy document puts gender at the heart of Oxfam’s work in Nepal. An updated earthquake response logframe shows analysis has been updated. The RTE reported that a rapid gender needs assessment was undertaken immediately and that the work done by the programme advisers with the in-country gender adviser was good. However, it went on to say that the response was initially slow to comprehensively understand and take account of gender-related risks. The gender strategy included analysis of protection issues for women, issues for female-headed households, and set down gender outcomes in a logframe. Further work has been undertaken in more depth by some of the districts. Ongoing gender analysis was evident in sit reps. As is invariably the case, the need to bring women into leadership roles was recognised as being critical.

**Evidence that this is used to guide design and delivery**

The RTE notes that specialist gender expertise was not sufficiently well resourced at the time (late June) and that while programming did clearly take account of gender, it could have been stronger. As noted, the need to bring women into leadership roles was identified and this has been more successfully addressed in some districts (documentation to support this was not made available), although this appears not to be comprehensively addressed, with evidence being too ad hoc. Work remains to be done to improve the enabling environment to encourage and support the changes that women leaders can bring.

**Sex disaggregated data collected, reviewed and used to make appropriate adjustments**

Sex disaggregated data was much more of a challenge at the outset of the programme and the teams were really struggling to get hold of this. This is still weak, although does vary from district to district with some districts managing this better. Oxfam’s partner WHR compiles reports on the basis of sex disaggregated data (e.g. December 2015, monthly report), but this is very limited and no comprehensive overview is provided. (This data was not made available.)
Programme and advocacy planning addresses needs, roles and power relations of men and women

The view of the national protection adviser\textsuperscript{93} is that Oxfam staff at national level understand and use power analysis to guide strategy development and management oversight, although it is recognised that this is not particularly strong at the district level. All Oxfam staff are trained in power relations. As part of Oxfam’s training on gender, protection and inclusion, the country programme includes an exercise in power relations, the power walk, which featured in training here.\textsuperscript{94}

Evidence that programme contributes to gender equity (services provide for men/women needs as appropriate)

A recent analysis undertaken by Oxfam’s partner WHR demonstrates that Oxfam remains committed to ongoing review and programme adjustment where required.\textsuperscript{95} Oxfam also continues with its ongoing review to examine gender equity, e.g. as evidenced in a gender workshop report.\textsuperscript{96}

Gender minimum standards used and adhered to

The Nepal country programme uses the Oxfam gender in emergency minimum standards and has done so from the beginning of the response. Gender officers, who are based in all district offices as well as the capital, are trained on these standards and monitor the programme against them. These standards have been shared with staff and partners in training courses, and when the Training of Trainers course for gender was run by the gender adviser in September. Oxfam produced a poster\textsuperscript{97} on gender and emergency as another way to inform and promote standards. The programme managers may have had less exposure to these standards, although some bring knowledge from previous Oxfam programmes. The national gender coordinator conducts monitoring visits, which includes reviewing adherence to gender standards.\textsuperscript{98} The protection adviser acknowledged that the extent to which partners were reached was uncertain and is an area that needs further investigation.

Programme partners with capacity and support to mainstream gender throughout the programme cycle

Oxfam has one partner WHR programme on women and human rights and so has a good capacity to engage with gender. A review of the overall capacity assessment\textsuperscript{99} of other partners showed that Community & Rural Development Society, Nepal (CARDSN) and the Kakani Center for Development of Community (KCDC) documented their specific gender capacity, which was felt to be good. All of the four pre-existing (pre-earthquake) partners had gender training provided by the DRR team before the response. All partner agreements include gender. Oxfam gender officers at the district and national level offer ongoing support and hand-holding although this work needs further strengthening.\textsuperscript{100} As outlined above, partners have had some training, but further support would be useful. However, as there was no estimate available of the amount of training and capacity building that partners received, it is not possible to say whether this is adequate or not. Overall, the protection adviser, Sandhya Shrestha,\textsuperscript{101} (who used to cover gender) considers that there is a mixed capacity overall and in some cases understanding is quite limited. What appears to be lacking is an overview assessment of capacity and plans to support partners’ capacity to mainstream gender when required.

The Oxfam country programme has given a great deal of attention to gender, but it has not always had the right amount of leadership from gender focal points at critical times and as a result it has not always been mainstreamed to the extent that Oxfam would wish to see. However overall documentation demonstrates this there has been a lot of good work undertaken. Taking this into account overall it appears that Oxfam almost met the standard for gender (2/3).
3.9 QUALITY STANDARD 9: PROGRAMME (INCLUDING ADVOCACY) ADDRESSES SPECIFIC CONCERNS AND NEEDS OF VULNERABLE GROUPS

Differentiated vulnerability analysis/assessment data identify especially vulnerable groups, assess their capacities, and are used to inform design and appropriate actions to meet their specific needs.

Oxfam considered vulnerable groups in Nepal to be socially excluded groups, such as children, PLWD, older people, LGBTI and people living with HIV and caste (as well as girls/women, addressed more fully above). The caste system remains very strong in Nepal and affects large numbers of people, so most attention in this section is focused on this issue. Although not explicitly mentioned, there is also a valley-centric Newari bias, which overlays caste, leaving other groups marginalised to a greater or lesser extent. Finally, one other dimension of vulnerability Oxfam has identified is the lack of proof of citizenship, often arising through loss of documentation during the earthquake, which although not initially identified did come to light and receive attention. This can be critical as without ID cards it can be difficult to receive assistance through government and other channels. The draft October national influencing strategy explicitly focuses on citizenship, which touches upon the right to land.

The protection adviser, Pilar Duch, brought out the issue of caste in her mid-June report. The gender and social inclusion report provides a reasonably good analysis of caste issues and provides some data on numbers and the scale of the problem. Further analysis that specifically referenced caste was contained in the Gender Strategy, September 2015. Of concern was that the EFSVL, shelter and WASH strategies were all very quiet on caste/social inclusion and only mentioned it in passing, if at all. Tackling this is a complex issue and, as noted in the gender and social inclusion report, is sometimes considered to be something that would disrupt social cohesion. It is an issue not well understood by most outsiders and often not fully acknowledged by most insiders. Documentation and analysis tend to suggest this appeared to be an issue left to protection and gender advisers, who reportedly picked it up in their work, although no documentation was available to substantiate this.

Evidence of balanced representation of vulnerable people in managing assistance provided and ongoing feedback/consultation

A number of sit reps were selected on a random basis and reviewed. None of these highlighted social inclusion/caste in reporting to the global level. WHR includes a separate listing of some caste groups that received assistance, but the picture provided is very limited.

Evidence that intervention design and delivery ensures vulnerable groups have full access to assistance and protection services

The one clear example given was that Oxfam lobbied for those without ID cards to get proof of citizenship and so be able to access assistance from the government and others. Documentary evidence was not provided to support this. As noted, Oxfam’s work in gender is considered reasonably strong. So this overall conclusion focuses on other vulnerabilities and has looked most systematically for evidence of programming to deal with social exclusion arising from caste. As set out above there is relatively little real evidence that this has been addressed systematically and it is particularly lacking in the programme strategy documents, although Oxfam’s country staff felt this was an area they had performed in relatively well. Given the absence of supporting documentation overall it appears that Oxfam partially met the standard for vulnerable groups (1/3).
3.2.10 QUALITY STANDARD 10: EVIDENCE THAT PREPAREDNESS MEASURES WERE IN PLACE AND EFFECTIVELY ACTIONED

Contingency plan in place, updated regularly and used

Oxfam has been involved in earthquake contingency planning since at least 2008 for WASH. More recently the Oxfam Great Britain (OGB) and Oxfam Hong Kong (OHK) multi-hazard contingency plan was produced in 2012, which was updated in February 2015. A further revised draft was prepared in July 2015 and awaits completion. The plan covers hazards: earthquakes, floods and disease outbreaks. (At this stage plans, rightly, do not cover armed conflict, which was clearly much more prominent in the period 2005-2006.) Oxfam was also in the later stages of a £2m DFID funded 3.5-year Urban Risk Management Programme focused on the Kathmandu Valley and Far Western Terai Municipalities, which addresses the likely impacts of a large earthquake when the earthquake occurred. Oxfam featured as part of the wider planning process of the clusters, being part of the plan for the WASH cluster, and with IOM on site planning on locations that were identified for potential IDP caseloads, but in the event were not used (as part of the DFID urban risk programme).

Response activities outlined in the plan were EFSVL and WASH. In the light of Oxfam’s actual response, it seems a notable omission that shelter is not mentioned. Furthermore, although EFSVL was included in the plan, there was no evidence of any early tangible earthquake response results reported that showed this sector got going as well as the WASH response did. A senior staff member considers EFVSL work undertaken as part of the floods response was strong, but this did not translate into a strong early response in the earthquake. The most obvious measure of a plan’s utility is whether contingency stocks are used, which they were, and whether partnerships with clusters, both government and IASC leads, were invoked. In the case of WASH, Oxfam did work as a funded partner of UNICEF.

All the main response actors, government, Red Cross, UN INGOs/NNGOs, continued to be actively engaged in contingency planning for a secondary disaster during the June/July/August period that could have arisen because of flood/landslide-induced displacements and diarrhoea outbreaks. Oxfam was active in planning forums at the national and district level in particular to make WASH stocks available for such eventualities. Oxfam and UNICEF were notable as they both had sufficient capacity to have contingency stocks for new disasters, as well as engaging with ongoing response activities.

Risk Analysis informs preparedness plans including: Power analysis, Environmental Impact Analysis, Climate Change Analysis, PCVA reports

Significant risk analysis has been undertaken in Nepal. The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium is a body that, along with others, has led the process of risk analysis. The overview hazard and risk analysis is contained in the 2011 IASC contingency plan and Oxfam’s risk analysis is based upon this. This documentation does not explicitly address power, environmental and climate change analysis. No specific Oxfam PCVA was available for review, so it is assumed nothing was undertaken.

Evidence of links to existing preparedness programmes

Oxfam has been undertaking a range of preparedness planning activities in Nepal for many years. The planning has evolved to become multi-sectoral and links with some CBDRM activities that have been conducted in previous years. In the last year, staff have also undertaken the response to the multiple Cat 2 floods, and the contingency plan was revised in February 2015 with this experience in mind.
Staff database in place with surge capacity

The contingency plan includes a number of annexes that specify key staff with roles and contact details, a communication tree and staff contact lists. The main body of the CP identifies the regional focal point. It also states ‘The country team would have to cope with estimated 2 weeks without significant international personnel assistance but request of regional / global staff surge capacity covering all disciplines requested immediately. Subject to scale of problems on their side of the border request to Oxfam India for key staff.’

Emergency response team responded

Core team members were mobilised and started the response based upon plans the next day. Oxfam India arrived on day 2 of the earthquake using Bihar response stores and by hiring Nepali staff. However, there was something of a disconnect as Oxfam India did not use OGB partners113 so presumably were not fully integrated with the planning process. The plan overall included work on training volunteers. This covered mobilisation of volunteers who were trained under the Urban Risk Management Project and DIPECHO in Kathmandu for the community search and rescue, first aid treatment of injured people and delivery of the injured to the nearby hospital, which worked well, followed by distribution of WASH and shelter kits, which also worked well. However, in the event, and perhaps due to the earthquake magnitude, this was not sufficient. The plan included stocks, which proved essential for Oxfam to initiate a response immediately, but it did not include enough work on pre-identified suppliers, or EFSVL related plans/stocks. JDs were not prepared for additional national staff recruitment, which was a critical detail that was omitted.114 The work on training up some government staff in WASH was considered useful.

Evidence of success of preparedness programmes on current response

It is clear that over the years, Oxfam, along with many actors, has invested a lot of time, effort and money into preparedness measures. There was much very good work undertaken on preparedness planning by Oxfam, and the RTE notes that preparedness work was one of the three key factors that enabled Oxfam to respond in a very rapid way. Just how much preparedness is required to be ready enough is an important question to consider, while recognising that plans have to be continually dusted off and reengaged with.

Oxfam (WASH and CBDRR, WASH in Health Sector), British Red Cross Society (Community Mobilisation and NFI stockpiling), IOM (more on strategic intervention, such as open spaces, GIS mapping, developing debris removal and dead body management strategies), WFP (staging in airport), USAID (Water System in Police Stations) and DIPECHO (for WASH preparedness in Health Sector) were the only agencies working for earthquake preparedness in Kathmandu Valley. The focus was on selective communities of Kathmandu Valley and no planning for earthquake preparedness in the other 11 severely affected districts beyond the Kathmandu Valley was undertaken.115 It seems that Oxfam, like all other actors, was so preoccupied with an urban disaster that it all but forgot to plan in any meaningful way for the predominately rural disaster that actually occurred. A wider evaluation of system preparedness measures for all actors in the response has not yet been undertaken, but it is to be hoped that this question could be addressed as it is an important point to understand for Nepal and beyond.116

It is worth noting that preparedness planning is as much about engaging staff and partners to have an attitude to respond as it is about other measures, e.g. stocks. There were clearly areas where planning could have been improved, notably with being prepared for EFSVL and having an institutional willingness to follow on with a shelter response after the initial tarpaulins were delivered. All agencies were too focused on an urban response.117 The surge capacity plan could have been more explicit about international staff deployments and how these would integrate with the country staff. However, the key notable aspect that comes out is that Oxfam had some very valid measures in place and, more
significant, was prepared to launch a very large response to what was initially thought to be a
devastating earthquake. In this sense, preparedness planning can be considered to have put Oxfam in
a very high state of attitudinal readiness and so, despite limitations, overall it is considered that
Oxfam almost met the standard for preparedness (2/3).

3.11 QUALITY STANDARD 11: PROGRAMME
HAS AN ADVOCACY/CAMPAIGNS
STRATEGY AND HAS INCORPORATED
ADVOCACY INTO PROGRAMME PLANS
BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD

Advocacy strategy in place and evidence that it was written with input from programmes and
field endorsed by OI RiC Campaign Management Team with SMART objectives for change

An initial OI media strategy was put in place on 31 May, revised by early July, and followed by the
RiC (Rights in Crisis) strategy, which was put in place by 6 July. This was subsequently reviewed in
September and October. The Advocacy Strategy was reportedly endorsed by the OI RiC Campaign
Management Team. The six-month campaign to focus on reconstruction and the means to achieve
this had direct relevance to programme work, which fed directly into the campaign using Oxfam’s
programme experience and on-the-ground knowledge of what communities were facing with the
approaching winter. The more reactive fuel crisis work was again extremely relevant given this was
stilling efforts to complete winterisation programmes and, of course, contributing to further hardships of
the poor.

Campaigns/policy and media staff in place

The MAC team was quickly established by May, and remained mostly fully staffed. The EQR
Organograms original.ppt file from May 2015 shows that the team consisted of MAC Manager, Policy
Lead, Policy and Advocacy Adviser (research/policy), Policy and Advocacy Adviser (field, roving),
Media Lead, and Media & Communications officer. This team was supplemented by several ad hoc
staff from OI. The team was considered to be sufficient to fulfil its functions.

Budget sufficient for strategy implementation

The budget under review made provision for six MAC team members, including costs for travel, etc.
Initially no budget provision was made for workshops and training, but this was rectified and later
versions of budget were updated to include workshops, which included capacity building for staff and
budget lines for partnerships enabling the MAC team to work with three or four partners. The budget
was considered sufficient to undertake the tasks required.

MEAL plan in place including evaluations

The initial MAC strategy included objectives, sub-objectives, and targets for advocacy work and
outputs. Actions and plans in some areas are clear, but do not provide the strongest basis for
monitoring. However, the first strategy identified that the MEAL plan would be put in place by August.
The September/October version (there are two documents) provides a clearer framework of outcomes,
outputs and activities, but does not set down clear means of measuring progress at the objectives level.
A MEAL plan was prepared in draft, but never fully completed. The MAC plan was intended to be
reviewed every three months but this occurred once, in September. As part of the review process the MAC team has conducted one learning/review event, this was documented and PowerPoint documentation made available. The MAC work has not been evaluated.

**Proactive and reactive media work including press conferences, blogs and journalist trips**

Oxfam’s media and campaigning work has become more effective over the last few years, drawing upon experience from Haiti and most recently from the Philippines cyclone Haiyan response so it was well placed to be effective by fielding strong teams and plans. At the global level, Oxfam would undoubtedly have been very active in its media reporting in the first days and weeks of the response. However, no documentary evidence of this was found in the files, and although requested, was not made available. At the national level a quite negative local media stance was taken on aid and foreign assistance, which meant national media work had to be very low profile. However, some months on the situation had changed and documents provided on file suggest that some national media work was undertaken around the six-month mark. Media briefing around this time provided information updates on Oxfam’s activities and achievements to date. Oxfam was active on Facebook, in local media and on Twitter, posting on the importance of reconstruction efforts and the need for an Earthquake Reconstruction Authority, which at the time had been agreed, but was somewhat stalled. However, Oxfam may not have fully understood the complexities of the Nepal political situation, perhaps leading it to be overly ambitious with its media and campaigning work.

**Evidence of lobbying at national and/or global level**

An OI endorsed media/advocacy briefing highlighted the need to reinstate the Earthquake Reconstruction Authority, and highlighted that delays in agreeing the policy framework, coupled with the fuel crisis, were severely hampering the recovery progress. This work was supported by the preparation of a paper, holding two workshops, lobbying in clusters.

**Evidence of outcome from advocacy messages, but not necessarily Oxfam alone**

Clearly attribution of efforts is always complex, especially as Oxfam often works with others to be effective in lobbying. Nonetheless the evidence cited by the former MAC team manager was that Oxfam was instrumental in the renewal of government commitment to fast-track the bill on the ERA, a shift of major national media houses away from a preoccupation with politics and moving their attention back to the race against time to ensure earthquake reconstruction efforts were accelerated and that they addressed winterisation. This was underpinned by the prepared reconstruction policy paper, but this was not available for review, although there was supporting email trail to show its existence.

**Global – involvement of global RiC Campaign network including teleconference, lobbying in capitals, sharing of products**

The campaign centred on the six-month marking of the earthquake with its emphasis on winterisation, which was a key piece of work prepared for national and international audiences. The OI RiC team were very much involved in this to produce the media brief, papers and planning of key stakeholder engagement.

Oxfam was well placed to have an impact with its MAC work and this potential was, broadly speaking, realised. Oxfam led in key areas on reconstruction, winterisation and the fuel crisis. Overall positive and sensitive work was undertaken, although some weaknesses of the documentation make it somewhat challenging to provide a full audit trail, so this conclusion is drawn from staff views as much as hard evidence. The team was fully staffed, well-resourced and active in its media, advocacy and communication work. However, there were weaknesses, as a proper MEAL plan was not put in place and documentation was not always provided, although was reported verbally to exist. However, picking up on the humanitarian department director’s comments, it may be worth Oxfam reflecting internally on
whether the MAC work was too ambitious and would have benefited from more focus. On balance it appears that Oxfam nearly met the standard for advocacy/campaigns (2/3).

3.12 QUALITY STANDARD 12: COUNTRY PROGRAMME HAS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH INCLUDING REDUCING AND MANAGING RISK THOUGH EXISTING LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES AND BUILDING RESILIENCE FOR THE FUTURE

Community hazard and risk analysis informs both contingency plans and long-term programme strategy

The Oxfam contingency plan for Nepal (version 2012 updated 2015) does not include any references to community hazard and risk assessments or village disaster plans. This planning was undertaken by partners, but is not documented as part of the CP with information being kept under each project intervention. This includes preparing a hazard map during the process of PCVA, which is the key step in every CBDRM, based on which community, VDC/Municipality and District DRM the plan is prepared.136

Oxfam did not always programme in all the areas where plans had been prepared. This is in part because risk analysis was based upon seismic studies undertaken at the national level. Unlike in the flooding planning, community hazard and risk analysis was not a significant drive for overall contingency planning. Detailed multi-sector assessments were undertaken for Dhading, Gorkha, Sindapulchok and Nuwakot, conducted/compiled by the EFSVL and MEAL teams, and these highlighted the biggest risks for communities and the associated needs. The EFSVL strategy considered the community level post-earthquake risk analysis comprehensively. The shelter strategy was less clear in setting out hazards and risks identified by the community, although the obvious ones: landslides, monsoon rain and winter weather, were identified by government, the HCT and shelter clusters. For example, the extent to which communities perceived a need to build back earthquake-resistant housing did not come up, so no specific provision appears to have been made for this. Similarly, the WASH strategy does not appear to have been strongly informed by community hazard and risk analysis, but rather on what local authorities and HCT were expecting to be the risks. Therefore, there is no real sense of whether communities would prioritise rebuilding better quality toilets, household water quality improvements or work on hygiene improvements.

Evidence of early planning for exit or transition to reduce dependency and promote longer-term positive effects

This specific Oxfam requirement needs to take into account that Oxfam is in a funding-rich situation for the earthquake response, which means that it is not planning an exit for three years for some parts of the programme. Nonetheless, transition planning has been underway since the outset and places emphasis on a move towards building partner capacity (though as noted below this is weak). The Philippines Haiyan response was important in that one key lesson learned was the need for transition planning to occur from the outset. In order to support this, a transition adviser post was envisaged in
May and recruited by early June. This post holder has been supporting the CD to work full time on all aspects of transition and a move back towards normalisation as soon as possible. This is not explicitly about transition of programme activity type, *per se*, but more about the country programme management, and ways of working. However, overall there have been delays in strategy development for the recovery phase, which articulates how the transition should occur, so documentation remains in draft. The team is working to address this, but recruitment problems with the humanitarian programme director have been a major obstacle to this proceeding in the timeframe intended.

**Contingency plans show surge capacity from within existing programmes**

The contingency plan states that all national staff would be available for deployment to a Cat 2 or Cat 3 earthquake response, so shows total commitment for surging staff from existing programmes. It is not explicit about the extent to which it would use partners as part of the surge, except where these are clearly part of the CP/response plan. While this was categorised as Cat 2 response, the surge of international staff that occurred was in line with what would be expected for a Cat 3 response. This meant during the first two to four months of the response many national staff took less senior positions, but it also enabled other staff to return to their normative development programming work.

**Capacity planning spreadsheet shows national staff and posts filled**

This is a very large programme, which has necessitated the recruitment of large numbers of new national posts. Given many other agencies have also been recruiting significant numbers of new staff, the market is very competitive and it is to be expected that some staff positions would remain vacant at any particular point in time. A snap shot of the recruitment spreadsheet for national and international staff posts shows that 84 percent of posts are filled, with another 2 percent under offer, showing a 14 percent gap for ongoing recruitment. (The figures for posts that arise from the new management structure agreed by the end of December are not included here, as these are recent changes and could create an unrealistic impression.) Given the market and programme change, this is considered a reasonable rate of post occupancy.

**Table 3.5: Summary of recruitment progress, December 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filled posts</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of which covered short term</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of which covered long term</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>posts under offer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gap / ongoing recruitment</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential and actual negative effects on the environment, economy, livelihoods and wider context have been identified and acted upon**

The earthquake response strategy, and necessarily the EFSVL strategy, go into livelihoods in some depth and consider the economy more widely. The EFSVL activities are reportedly designed to not cause environmental impacts. There is some analysis of the potential negative effects of the earthquake and, to a lesser extent, of the intervention itself, although the latter has not thought through...
the concern of ‘do no harm’. It appears as if environment is not dealt with at all. There is work being undertaken on climate change and adaptation, but this does not directly relate to environment.\textsuperscript{139}

**Transition and recovery strategies build on local capacities where appropriate**

For the first three or four months, local capacity was almost not taken into consideration. However, there has been a progressive shift, and local knowledge and capacity is being considered more. In the recovery programme going forward in 2016/17 it is much more centre stage. This is also evident from the recruitment of senior national staff at managerial level and their inclusion in CMT (50 percent of the CMT members in the present structure are Nepali national).\textsuperscript{140} As noted in the partner capacity building section, this has been weak and ad hoc.

Long-term programme strategies are designed to reduce and manage/respond to risks identified, including the development of inclusive local leadership as first-responders in future crises.

Long-term programme strategies are mainly focused on the Sustainable Development Programme. Therefore, focus is now on the regular development programme to build resilient communities. No details were available about how the longer-term development programme outside the earthquake-affected area will do this. In terms of preparing leadership for the emergency response, three Programme Managers out of seven districts for EQ Recovery are Nepali national and all the Programme Support Coordinators in second line in the district are Nepali nationals. These key post holders would be expected to be leaders in any future response for Oxfam or other organisations, at least for Cat 1 and Cat 2 responses.

**Evidence of plans for resilience\textsuperscript{141} programming for future or links to existing programmes to promote early disaster recovery and benefit the local economy**

All the efforts under the Sustainable Development Programme are centred on building resilient communities through the intervention in Gender Justice, Food Security and Economic Justice, along with the DRR and Climate Change Adaptation Programme. All these efforts will help the community to build their resilient capacity to cope with any future disaster and for quicker recovery from shocks. Within the earthquake response programme EFSVL is centred on resilience-building and the shelter work is focused on ‘build back better’ approaches to deliver more seismic resistant houses. Oxfam has DRR staff in all districts to build links and focus on resilience.

**Evaluation of resilience measures already in place**

None of the evaluations (RTE, DEC or DFID monitoring report) looked at whether resilient measures were in place. However, future evaluations have an opportunity to examine this.

Integration is always a challenge when Oxfam has a modest-sized development programme, which is then almost instantaneously overtaken and subsumed by a programme that is five times the budget and which demands work in geographical and sector areas where Oxfam was not present before. Clearly Oxfam struggled with this for several months as it came to terms with an operational, international staff dominant response, but its efforts towards integration of the different programme arms have come a long way since. It should be noted that some of the key conditions to do so are present; namely enough funds, reasonably secure environment and general awareness amongst political and public alike that integration, risk reduction and resilience-building are critical. Taking account of where Oxfam is now it is considering the progress made, overall it appears that Oxfam initially partially met, and now nearly meets, the standard for integration, risk reduction and resilience, so this is accorded a half-way mark to show work in progress (1.5/3).
3.13 QUALITY STANDARD 13: EVIDENCE OF APPROPRIATE STAFF CAPACITY TO ENSURE QUALITY PROGRAMMING

Oxfam affiliates worked well together and staff scaling up was impressive, with staff drawn from several affiliates: Oxfam Ireland, Novib and Oxfam India, as well as OGB. It is worth noting that Oxfam did not have another big scale-up at this time so could service the scale-up fully.

Staff Capacity Planner created for all posts grade C2 and above within 1 day of initial assessment

A global staff tracker, which was managed and held by OGB humanitarian department, was produced on Saturday 25 April and regularly updated thereafter. This identified all the senior posts at grade C and above (although posts were not graded in this document), along with potential individuals to fill these positions. These set out the majority of posts envisaged on the day of the earthquake. This did not take into account in-country posts and capacity – it would have been useful to have this information alongside the globally managed information. (A national tracker was first produced on 28 May.)

At least 80% of surge positions grade C2 and above filled within 3 working days of receipt of staff requisitions

The initial staff tracker of 25 April identified 18 senior global posts of which 17 had post holders identified from regional and global surge pools. The tracker on 29 April showed 32 out of 39 identified posts filled, so about 82 percent.

Job profiles match competency frameworks

HR review job profiles to ensure these include competencies. As of January, HR Manager Asif Daniel reported that all profiles included competency frameworks. Data on the percentage of these that include competency frameworks were not available early on, but it is assumed this is 100 percent. A number of job profiles were reviewed, all of which included competency requirements.

Interviews conducted using frameworks

Many of the interviews were conducted from HD/Oxford/regional centre early on and by August/September the country office led interviewing for all recruitment. Since the HR Manager arrived mid-June all interviews were conducted using competency frameworks, with appropriate questions. Interview questionnaires were developed by technical staff and then HR checked to ensure competencies were included.

Evidence of agreed performance development objectives for staff on contracts of longer than 6 months

Oxfam in Nepal provides a comprehensive package of information and tools for all staff, which includes performance management guidance, objective setting, a performance review form and guidance on SMART objectives, etc. From October, all – 100 percent – national and international staff have had performance development objectives. All new staff agree objectives in their probation period using the annual objectives form. For short-term staff working less than three months, HR use an abridged form, so, for example, RRT staff deployed to the response, etc. will have these too. In July there was an objective-setting workshop for all staff and a follow-up workshop in January 2016.
Inductions systematically carried out with evidence that all staff C2 and above are informed of Oxfam’s mandate, values and key policies and the consequences of not adhering to them

Right from the earliest days in the programme all new staff were given an induction. From June there was a more fully structured induction programme, run three times per week as a group event. These were usually of one day’s duration covering basics such as Oxfam’s purpose, values and ways of working, then IT finance, gender, security, etc. (The generic programme and checklist were provided.) This is undertaken as standard practice for all sub-office locations (not just earthquake locations) in Nepal for all staff. No special session that highlighted the consequences of failing to adhere to Oxfam’s mandate, values and key policies was given for staff C2 and above, although some of this is addressed through ongoing information about fraud, etc.

At least 75% of end of deployment appraisals demonstrate satisfactory achievement of agreed objectives and performance standards

Over the period June 2015 to January 2016, two international staff and five national staff have not received satisfactory performance ratings or did not complete their probationary period. The total staff over this period is about 280, which means 98 percent of staff demonstrated satisfactory (or above) achievement of agreed objectives and performance standards.

Development programme staff have scale-up in their job descriptions (JDs)

Around 21–23 development team staff were seconded to the response (out of the total pre-earthquake team of about 53–56). The seconded staff were all given a JD for the duration of their surge work. Two development staff had scale-up in their JDs prior to the response. While this might be considered to be a limited commitment, in light of the numbers deployed to the response, this was clearly not a problem.

Staff stay for duration of contract

Six international and 53 national staff members ended their contracts early, which is about 17.7 percent. The national staff market was more volatile/competitive so some staff left for better opportunities.

Evidenced coordination with technical OI counterpart

At the start of the response there were calls three times a week to Oxford/HD, reducing to two per week until late January, from which time they were made on an as-required basis. Calls to the region were sometimes made on a daily basis and these have now moved to a structured call on a monthly basis. There are also regular email exchanges as required.

Oxfam has met all the requirements under staff capacity, exceeding quantitative measures where stipulated, and it is considered they also exceeded requirements for other measures, taking the context into account. Thus overall it appears that Oxfam met the standard for staff capacity (3/3).
3.14 QUALITY STANDARD 14: PROGRAMME IS COORDINATED WITH AND COMPLEMENTARY TO THE RESPONSE OF OTHER HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

The coordination environment was typically complex with a full, clusterised system bringing its own multiple demands. There were high levels of delegated government authority to district level, so all actors needed to operate at district as well as national level. In addition there were many new organisations arriving ignorant of the history of the area and there was a large geographical spread and lots of elbowing for programme space. This was compounded for Oxfam, like many other organisations that scale up massively, by a significant turnover of senior programme staff. WaSH suffered least from leadership turnover, while EFSVL experienced a lot of change at national lead and district programme level.

Assessment reports identify the roles, responsibilities and capacities of national and local authorities, humanitarian organisations and other relevant major stakeholders

There was not much evidence of systematic mapping of other actors’ roles and presence in assessment reports. The Nepal earthquake rapid-assessment report, Gorkha May 2015, included a systematic listing of other actors and their roles mapped out by location and sector. The following needs assessment reports did not include such a systematic listing: a) Dhading detailed needs assessment July 2015, b) Nuwakot, Sindhupalchok, Gorkha detailed needs assessment July 2015, c) Nuwakot multi-sector detailed needs assessment report, Oxfam June 2015, d) Emergency Food Security and Vulnerable Livelihoods (EVSVL) Assessment Earthquake Response in Kathmandu Valley. EFSVL had very little systematic role mapping undertaken.

Evidence that programme design complements the response of other humanitarian actors

Some of the key donors’/funding arrangements required coordination with other implementing partners. In particular, the DFAT Humanitarian Partnership Agreement: Nepal Earthquake Emergency Response Implementation Plan (ERIP) and the DEC proposal required coordination with other DEC members, namely Care, Caritas, Oxfam, Plan, Save the Children, Tear fund, British Red Cross, World Vision and others. The RTE notes that Oxfam coordination on cash was poor, particularly with respect to EFSVL work. DEC and DFID monitoring reports were reviewed, but had nothing specific to say about Oxfam and coordination.

Evidence of participation in relevant coordination bodies and active collaboration with others

The response was organised on a cluster basis at the national, and to a great extent at district level as well. All of the districts that Oxfam worked in were within the 14 designated priority districts, so, in general, all these had comprehensive cluster coordination services provided with associated demands. Real decision making took place at a district level with government chief district officers (CDOs) leading the decision-making process in the District Disaster Relief Committee (DDRC) meetings (and of course outside these) during the disaster phase. From July onwards there was a move back towards normalisation of development coordination structures, meaning the Local Development Officer (LDO) held the lead role at the district level. However, shelter cluster/actors continued in emergency distribution mode beyond this. Oxfam needed to straddle at least four national cluster coordination forums: EFSVL, Protection (including gender), shelter, and WASH, and in addition early recovery and CCCM clusters, as well as be present in the district coordination forums, cash, gender and CWC
working groups. On occasion, Oxfam had a presence at the HCT (on a rotation basis as part of Association International NGOs).

Attendance at cluster meetings was reported during early sit reps\textsuperscript{153} for WASH, EFSVL and protection (gender). There was no explicit mention of attendance at shelter cluster meetings in early sit reps. (From 3 May coordination ceased to be reported explicitly as a separate section in the sit reps.)

More specific coordination forum engagement is listed below.

- **HCT/ICCM**: Occasional presence observed (this was by invitation).\textsuperscript{154}
- **WASH**: Regular presence observed\textsuperscript{155} and minuted at national and district level. Oxfam active in technical working groups. Took on an active *de facto* co-lead role in the national level sanitation TWG.
- **Shelter**: National-level cluster meetings were attended by the Oxfam advocacy officer for the first few weeks then by shelter team leader with around 80 percent attendance over the first six months at the national level. In addition, there was attendance at the Winterisation Technical Working Group and Recovery and Reconstruction Working Group and Nepal Earthquake Recovery Monitoring Assessment Group. District shelter sub-clusters were formed around May, with Oxfam attendance initially more sporadic, led by PHE or PM, then by dedicated shelter officers once these were in post from July in Sindhupalchok and Gorkha, but less regularly in other districts.\textsuperscript{156}
- **EFSVL**: Food security cluster was the key national forum. No documented information was provided for the first six months. From November ad hoc and irregular attendance at national meeting, approximately 25 percent of meetings attended. District level attendance at food security clusters estimated to be 60–70 percent.\textsuperscript{157}
- **Protection**: Attendance at national and district level unknown.
- **Cash working group**: This group was managed under the auspices of OCHA and is intended to be a multi-cluster forum. Historically it draws heavily from people with EFSVL backgrounds, so such people are often in attendance. This was the case for Oxfam EFSVL team.\textsuperscript{158}

The overall coordination context was reported as requiring strengthening. High turnover of staff, both at the UN and INGO level, has been raised as a factor hindering effective coordination. The RTE noted that many of those interviewed stated that coordination could be better and that more coordination would have helped, for example, in cash-programming. The RTE further notes that, ‘External coordination amongst other NGOs and partners has been somewhat weak although the limits on staff time make this excusable. Recent collaboration with government has been well received and this is an area where Oxfam must continue to invest.’ The DEC evaluation reported that DEC/HC members worked closely with government authorities at district level, VDCs and Ward Citizen’s Forums and with the clusters, although again staff turnover and high workload hindered effective coordination.\textsuperscript{159} It went on to say that ‘there was a lot of competition between INGOs to work in particular areas, with agencies “booking” disaster-affected areas to carry out their responses.’ Therefore, it reasonable to expect that Oxfam should not attend all meetings, in all locations, at all times. The RTE points out that the decision to attend must be made on a strategic basis which is undoubtedly appropriate advice. WASH was seen to be regular, shelter was weak initially, while EFSVL has been variable, though they also attended the Cash WG too.

**Evidence of regular contribution of relevant programme information through coordination channels**

The key channels for information exchange through coordination channels are attendance at district coordination forums to provide information verbally (some details are minuted, some not – and these minutes are outside Oxfam’s control) and input of data into 4Ws (who, what, where, when), which reports on activities and locations. A review of information provided through 4Ws is given here. This
was handled by a multi-sector coordination reporting person for Oxfam, although there was reportedly some confusion in the first month.\textsuperscript{166} It should be noted that information shared by Oxfam to cluster leads for input to the 4Ws can be a challenging task for a number of reasons, yet without this coordination and agency, visibility is poor.

\textbf{WASH:} Information provided regularly from the outset into 4Ws. Information provided through regular attendance at district meetings.\textsuperscript{161} 4Ws reporting for WASH cluster round 13–17 were made available and these correspond with the period August to September 2015.

\textbf{Shelter:} Reported as weak for the first few weeks,\textsuperscript{162} but subsequently full compliance until the end of six months, although reportedly tailed off after this.\textsuperscript{163} (4Ws data available.\textsuperscript{164})

\textbf{EFSVL:} 4Ws data requested but not provided, so this could not be verified.

\textbf{Protection:} 4Ws regular reports shared.\textsuperscript{165}

An overall picture emerges of Oxfam being active and present in the district-level forums, as noted in the RTE, and well connected with local government, which is the most important operational level coordination. Oxfam has been fairly active at national-level forums, where some national policy is shaped, and has engaged reasonably well. Oxfam’s own institutional position\textsuperscript{166} to limit commitment in clusters at the national level and not engage beyond attendance was apparent. The complexities and transactional nature of the coordination system with multiple, parallel and often incoherent ways of working, mean all actors must make strategic and tactical choices around engagement. It is considered that Oxfam participated in the coordination system well enough. However, there was not much evidence of Oxfam playing a strong leadership role in any of the forums and standing out as being particularly influential,\textsuperscript{167} perhaps because of their policy position (beyond the shelter winterisation TWG\textsuperscript{168} and latterly the sanitation TWG\textsuperscript{169}). The evidence of contribution to 4Ws reporting is weak. For these reasons \textit{it appears that Oxfam almost met the standard for coordination (2/3)}.

### 3.15 Quality Standard 15: Resources Are Managed and Used Responsibly for Their Intended Purpose

Since the start of the response there have been five Business Support Managers; much of the verbal feedback comes from the current post holder.\textsuperscript{170} A regular country programme audit was originally scheduled for March/April 2015, but this was postponed due to the earthquake. At the time of writing this was rescheduled for mid-March 2016 Clearly, this will look much more deeply at resource management and thus will provide a far more definitive view.

\textbf{Programme expenditure is regularly monitored against budget}

Budget monitoring was conducted from May 2015 and featured in management meetings with verbal updates, analysis and action agreed. No budget monitoring documentation was available for the May to June period, but from July onwards, budget-monitoring reports that were shared with SMT were available for review.\textsuperscript{171} From July, reports were produced every three to five weeks, so there is evidence that more structured and documented budget monitoring took place from that point. Minutes for management team meetings that reviewed expenditure were not seen. It was verbally reported by the BSM that regular reviews were held that looked at donor reporting, programme spend of individuals grants, budget versus actuals, etc. Some email traffic was available demonstrating action taken.
From November, budget monitoring was decentralised with the national level responsible for consolidating the overview with a requirement for the district level to review and recommend action (which is evident from the December budget-review spreadsheet). In November there was a major review by SMT. The impact of the fuel crisis and goods stuck on border were major unplanned and unexpected programme impediments. Some £9 million had been spent out of the £25 million budget for three years (as of December overall actual earthquake programme expenditure was 60 percent against 75 percent of the total forecast budget). SMT recognised a need to considerably reduce budgets by £5 million over the three-year period. A December budget-review spreadsheet was shared with evidence of planning for reductions accordingly, along with emails to each of the five districts requesting and showing agreed actions.

**Evidence of appropriate, systematic measures to minimise waste and maximise value for money assessed in the context of timeliness and quality**

The response was massive and required rapid scale-up, so undoubtedly controls in the first weeks and months were looser than they could have been. Broadly speaking, this would be in line with the emphasis put upon timeliness of response, and so, as might be expected, there is a trade-off between full controls and matching requirements to scale up. However, the current BSM feels that the balance was too much on speed of procurement and cited this as an issue that has arisen before in reviews of Oxfam’s Haiti response (2010) and Philippines Haiyan response (2013).

Oxfam Nepal have followed Oxfam standard procurement systems from the beginning with adaptations as set down in a revised earthquake emergencies procurement policy in May and revised in August. Oxfam consider VfM and timeliness, as key tender selection criteria with weightings given to these, and this is set out in tender documents (documents were not available for review). The Oxfam country office has a series of framework agreements with suppliers (available but not found on Box). One of the biggest budget items for Oxfam was the purchase of winterisation kits, which included CGI sheets – the biggest single purchase item and so worthy of specific attention (documents were not available for review.)

In terms of waste, some concerns were raised and this resulted in a warehouse management audit in November/December, which highlighted some losses, e.g. that there were small quantities of soap seemingly left behind in the warehouse, i.e. not allocated to programme areas – they may have been forgotten. Some mattresses got wet, and some cement hardened/expired. A final report has been produced (not available for review). Beyond the warehouse, there could be some wastage in the programme once goods have left and are handed over to district offices and partners. This is outside the BSM’s direct control as responsibility moves to programme staff, but seemingly these are not tracked directly, as evidenced by a lack of clarity at the SMT level of whether, and how much of an issue, losses of goods might or might not be. Of course, monitoring and verification occurs through partners and using PDM, but there was a sense that oversight is weaker furthest from point of procurement and systems are not joined up.

However, a big issue at programme level might be the tension between the targeted approach that Oxfam wishes to see verses local government dictating a blanket approach. (Local government may not consider a blanket approach as wastage, but there is a finite amount of resources available.) However, in some cases, there has been Oxfam targeted distribution and then local government has required a follow up blanket distribution, resulting in some doubling up and a form of wastage. This was not quantified and there was no sense of how big an issue this was.

**Evidence of active measures to prevent and/or act upon corruption, fraud, conflicts of interest and misuse of resources**
Oxfam Asia regional office employs a counter fraud specialist, who visited the programme in June 2015 and, at the time of writing, is due to return again in May 2016. A number of preventive/awareness measures have been put in place, with the Oxfam (GB) global newsletter, *Stewardship Magazine*, the Asia RC bribery bulletin, and a poster around reporting fraud sent out to all staff. A global OGB complaint fraud awareness week was held in November, at which some of this material was used in Nepal as a means of bringing attention to this issue.

Oxfam’s BSM and CD manage fraud cases. The mechanism for reporting cases is that staff may raise a concern using a fraud report form, and the BSM checks and investigates. Where required, details are forwarded to the counter fraud specialist, along with the Fraud and Corruption Team (FACT) in Oxford. If further investigation is required, then TOR will be drawn up to request an external or internal investigator from the regional centre or Oxford investigators.

In terms of acting upon identified cases, there were quite a number of fraud cases identified with Dhading being reported as particularly problematic. It is understood that Oxfam has had a ‘clear out’ of staff in Dhading as part of dealing with this problem (details were not requested as this is an area being investigated by appropriate channels). In terms of issues to deal with in respect of partners, there is one significant case currently undergoing investigation. In addition, there has been a recent review undertaken by the finance team of partners’ financial control arrangements (the report is still in draft and was not available for review).

**Evidence of programme actions to minimise environmental damage incurred by the response**

Oxfam in Nepal were a) not aware of any Oxfam policies, b) did not have their own analysis of what environmental damage the programme might be causing, c) were not aware of whether other organisations connected with the Nepal earthquake response had undertaken an environment analysis or produced any guidance. (OCHA and UNEP conducted a visit in August 2015 to look at this issue – no documents appear to be publically available.)

Overall, the operation is very significant in terms of material procurement and distribution, and this is undertaken over a wide geographical area. This sort of operation is high risk, yet needs flexible systems to respond in a timely way and at the scale Oxfam expects. There is a considerable tension here that Oxfam and others know all too well. It requires considerable effort to get the control environment adapted and scaled up early on and then sustain a culture of awareness and zero tolerance, along with action when required while the programme has to continue at ‘pace’. The current BSM felt that patterns of control weakness that emerged for resource management in Haiti and the Philippines were being repeated in the Nepal response and there were some other weaknesses, noted above. However, it should be emphasised that a desk review of this nature cannot possibly do anything more than scratch the surface, which is, of course, precisely the reason why audits and a range of other tools are employed to look more deeply. Given that there are some problems, but the team has shown evidence of policy and good practice in place, along with action taken to deal with problems identified, it is considered that overall it appears that Oxfam almost met the standard for use of resources (2/3).
RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Self appraisal should be included as part of the HIT process.

This is proposed in order to build ownership and understanding of the process, which may not have much resonance with teams as it is being conducted remotely. This was undertaken for the first time for this evaluation. Responses were not reviewed until the first draft of this report was prepared so as not to prejudice findings. Disappointingly, the response rate was very low, with just two of the 14 people invited actually responding (note four weeks were allowed for response, which was considered plenty of time). Nonetheless responses, with averages, are included here.

Table 4.1: Comparison of evaluation ratings and self assessment ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Evaluation rating</th>
<th>Self assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rapid appraisal of facts within 24 hours, plans in place and scale-up or start-up commenced within three days</td>
<td>6/6</td>
<td>5/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coverage uses 10% of at-risk population as a planned figure with clear justification for final count</td>
<td>4/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical aspects of programme measured against Oxfam-endorsed standards</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>4/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators leading to improved assistance through learning from experience and reflection</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>2.5/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>2.5/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Programme (including advocacy) addresses specific concerns and needs of vulnerable groups</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively.actioned</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. Programme has an advocacy/campaigns strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>3/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/3</td>
<td>1.5/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Country programme has an integrated approach including reducing and managing risk through existing longer-term development programmes and building resilience for the future  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.5/3</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Programme is coordinated with and complementary to the response of other humanitarian actors  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>2.5/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended purpose  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Final rating
Equivalent to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34.5/54</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.5/54</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recommendation 2:** Use infographics to represent complex data sets about programme progress and scale up.

The complexity of presenting response data and of understanding trends is something that Oxfam will continue to confront. Indeed, in grappling with this problem, the WaSH cluster in Nepal produced some diagrams to present this complexity in a visual form, or infographic. An example is included below to illustrate the point. (Please note there are apparent data inconsistencies, but the point is to look at the bigger idea these illustrate). The use of infographics is something the shelter cluster is very strong on. It is suggested that Oxfam utilise such infographics to better communicate and monitor their response going forward. It is worth noting that Oxfam should also address counting protocols, without which, glaring inconsistencies may be revealed in such graphs.

**Figure 4.1: Example of Nepal WaSH cluster infographics**
**Recommendation 3:** Build a humanitarian timeline from the outset of any major response.

A skeleton time line was prepared with an outline of key events (using MS timeline as a free add-on to MS PowerPoint). Oxfam programme staff were approached to provide a fuller picture, but unfortunately this could not be undertaken. However, although it is incomplete it may prove useful to include this outline here as it demonstrates what can be done.

**Figure 4.2: Example of timelines using MS timeline**

**Timeline of Earthquake and Oxfam response Day 1 – Day 7**

**Timeline of Earthquake and Oxfam response Week 2 – week 8**
APPENDIX

Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Humanitarian PMEAL Adviser</td>
<td>30/11/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Standards Programme and Communications Coordinator</td>
<td>30/11/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and Information Management Officer</td>
<td>30/11/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFSVL Adviser</td>
<td>7/1/15 (cancelled – compassionate leave)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Public Health Engineering</td>
<td>18/12/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Department Director</td>
<td>21/12/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>12/2/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning MEAL Coordinator</td>
<td>7/1/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Quality Manager</td>
<td>15/1/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaSH Coordinator</td>
<td>12/1/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of EFSVL</td>
<td>7/1/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former head of shelter</td>
<td>8/1/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible for partners during earthquake response</td>
<td>Requested -on compassionate leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and Protection Coordinator</td>
<td>12/1/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC Manager</td>
<td>8/1/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Systems Manager</td>
<td>29/1/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Manager</td>
<td>25/1/16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

3. Numerous national media reports in first couple of weeks
7. Reportedly shared in early HCT meetings
8. IOM-CCCM Displacement tracking matrix
10. Revised Flash Appeal for Nepal earthquake response
11. Oxfam transition presentation December 2015
12. 0/6 for timeliness of response – Liberia and Sierra Leone HITs
13. See Oxfam’s Humanitarian dossier
14. Oxfam sit rep 28 April
15. Head of Public Health Engineering
16. Response Country Director
17. NEPAL EARTHQUAKE RAPID ASSESSMENT REPORT – Gorkha 27–29 May
18. EFSVL assessment report for Kathmandu early May (not dated)
19. Needs Assessment Nuwakot District 1–4 May
20. Concept note submitted to DEC
21. Oxfam sit rep 2 May
22. Oxfam sit rep 5 May
23. Richard Luff in attendance at HCT
24. Humanitarian Department director
25. Funding approved Oxfam sit rep 30 April
26. Email exchange Regional Director for Asia and Humanitarian Department director 28 and 30 April
27. Email Knowledge and Information Management Officer
28. Email from Oxfam Knowledge and Information Manager
29. Oxfam RTE
30. Published in a national Nepali newspaper in late May
31. Lack of funding, middle income country, sparsely populated areas, nomadic populations, Oxfam targeting most marginalised
32. Oxfam contingency plan updated February 2015
33. Oxfam sit rep 26 April
34. 20150427_Concept_Note_Oxfam_revised MOFA
36. As per PIP early June
37. Concept note to DEC
38. Re HCT characterised the crisis
39. Shelter team leader handover note; 19102015
40. Re conversation with Head of Public Health Engineering and Humanitarian Department Director
41. EFSVL coordinator late 2015
42. EFSVL coordinator from 2016
Key informant interview with Wash coordinator

Knowing Oxfam well, the author describes Oxfam’s position on shelter as institutional ambivalence – it does a huge amount, but is in denial about this

Oxfam RTE

Concept note to DEC

Oxfam Nepal snapshot 31 May

Ref first draft shelter strategy


Email exchange with Planning MEAL coordinator 16/12/15

Oxfam endorsed standards: see Guidelines for Consultant

Conversation with Planning MEAL coordinator

Conversation with Head of EFSVL

Conversation with former shelter team leader

Key informant interview with Wash coordinator

Spreadsheets listing visits sent by country office 14 December

Box is Oxfam’s online file sharing solution

Series of docs sent by technical staff member outline programmes


Reporting from nfi pdm: a glance from nuwakot, Wash pdm report_ktm valley

Head of Public Health Engineering reported this as a decision taken in order to increase coverage, but could not remember if this had been documented

Email Planning MEAL coordinator

Conversation with Planning MEAL coordinator

Conversation with Planning MEAL coordinator


Conversation with Planning MEAL coordinator

Information provided verbally by Planning MEAL coordinator

Common Feedback Form_CFP_Oxfam_Aug, September and November 2015.docx

CFP Mid Term Update, Presentation for CwC WG 5 Nov 15, Uptake of CFP Findings

Programme Quality manager

Consolidate Complaints and feedback log – 23 September 2015


Pictures, posters, billboards, banners, etc.

WaSH Review Meeting – HHs Latrine Distribution.pptx

‘HotlineFeedbackReporting_Earthquake Response_July 2015’

Joint Oxfam Response Strategy EMERGENCY: NEPAL EARTHQUAKE Date Created/Updated: 19 May 2015

Oxfam’s Nepal Earthquake Response Partner agreement spreadsheet (not dated)

Senior staff member

Email Planning MEAL coordinator

Nepal Oxfam Great Britain (OGB) and Oxfam Hong Kong (OHK), 30 March 2012 and Updated on February 2015

Email Planning MEAL coordinator

Protection mission report P D 20150617

Needs Assessment Nuwakot District, EFSVL Assessment Kathmandu,

84 Training on protection & safeguarding, 11 January 2016, Kathmandu, Nepal
85 WHR December ‘15 Report for OXFAM.doc
86 As reported by Gender and protection coordinator
87 Random review of sit rep 9, 3 July; sit rep 16, 15 May; sit rep 30, 23 July
88 Key informant interview with Gender and protection coordinator
89 Oxfam country strategy 2015–2020 Nepal
90 GENDER IN EMERGENCIES LOG FRAME_EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION (October 2015)
91 Gender in Emergency Strategy, September 2015
92 Random review of sit rep 9, 3 July; sit rep 16, 15 May; sit rep 30, 23 July
93 Key informant interview P D
94 Orientation on gender in emergencies for Sindhu Oxfam team (not dated)
95 Impact of the 2015 Earthquake on Women A Study of the Socio-Economic Impact of the 2015 Earthquake on Single Women-Headed Households in Nepal
96 Gender Workshop Findings. MS 1-4: Promoting Gender Equality through Internal Practices (not dated)
97 Poster English Minimum Standard of GiE_Final
98 TRIP REPORT – Nepal 29 September–1 October 2015
99 Partner capacity assessment forms
100 Country Director
101 Key informant interview
102 Elderly, disabled, HIV positive, single women, female-headed households are examples
103 See P Duch mission report 20150617
104 Protection mission report P Duch 20150617
105 Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Report – Final, not dated
106 sitrep11nepalearthquake05may2015final (1), nepaearthquakeresponsesituationreport18, nepaearthquakeresponsesituationreport32
107 Interview with Gender and protection coordinator
108 Self-appraisal and comment from CPM
109 Richard Luff as UNICEF WaSH cluster lead for SARC 2007–2010
110 Senior staff member suggests that Oxfam Nepal would not previously have been confronted with a need to undertake shelter work, so may not have considered if for this reason
111 Email response from senior staff member
113 Head Oxfam India and Head of Public Health Engineering visit
114 Phone call with Head of Public Health Engineering
115 Email from senior staff member
117 Including myself in supporting WaSH preparedness while in role as UNICEFs regional WASH adviser covering preparedness planning
118 Nepalearthquakemediastrategy_31May2015.doc
119 OI MEDIA STRATEGY dated 3 July 2015
122 Interview with MAC Manager
123 Interview with MAC Manager
124 COMBINED RESPONSE MASTER BUDGET+ Budget codes 18062015.xls
125 v4_MAC Budget_revised_29Sept2015 (1).xlsx
MAC Manager
From negative to positive media coverage 10 December 2015
This will be taken as a given as Oxfam is never known to lose a media opportunity
https://www.facebook.com/OxfamInNepal/
http://bit.ly/1XBk8p4
This was the view of the Humanitarian Department Director
Rebuilding a more Resilient Nepal, Launch of Policy Brief, 29 October 2015, and Civic Political Dialogue with representatives of key government agencies (i.e. the NPC, leaders of political parties, others) to present Oxfam and partners’ views re bill on reconstruction
Email from MAC manager to Global Head of Humanitarian Campaigning (maternity cover)
Senior staff member
Email HR Manager 11 Feb
EFSVL coordinator 2016
Country Director
Email Senior staff member
Oxfam defines resilience as the ability of women, men and children to realise their rights and improve their well-being despite shocks, stresses and uncertainty
Interview Humanitarian Department Director
Tracker on 25, 29 and 28 May reviewed
District Programme Manager, EFSVL (Emergency Food Security and Vulnerable Livelihoods) Assistant, Information and Data Management Officer, disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Programme Manager
Interview HR Manager
Performance Management Training (Field Staff).ppt from this workshop
Check with first HR Manager
Induction Schedule February 1, 2016.docx
Induction Checklist.doc
For the sake of differentiation, this evaluation report refers to ‘partnerships’ when funds or materials were transferred directly to another organisation, and to ‘coordination’ when a direct transfer of funds or materials did not take place.
DFAT proposal
Evaluator’s own knowledge of coordination from time spent as national WASH cluster co-lead from May to August
Oxfam sit reps 28 April to 4 May
Richard Luff regularly attended HCT meeting
By Richard Luff as WaSH cluster coordinator
As reported verbally by former shelter team leader
Interview head EFSVL from November 2015
CWG meeting minutes 15 and 28 August
DEC Nepal earthquake appeal response review
Richard Luff knowledge as WaSH cluster coordinator from May to August
WaSH cluster meeting minutes
Head of Public Health Engineering
As reported verbally by former shelter team leader
https://data.hdx.rwlabs.org/dataset/scnepal-agency-data
Examples of 4Ws from 13/07/2015 and 30/11/2015
Reportedly documented somewhere, but not tracked down
167 Meeting minutes reportedly available, but not sourced on shelter cluster website
168 As reported by former shelter team leader
169 As observed by the author while working as WaSH Cluster Coordinator
170 Key informant interview Business Support Manager
171 Evidence reviewed were the budget monitoring spreadsheets from 7 July, 31 October and the latest from December.
172 150519_ Nepal Emergency Response Procurement.pdf
173 Nepal ER 2014 _ Procurement process and DoA.pdf
174 Stewardship Magazine Final Edition November 2015
175 Bulletin 2 – UK Bribery Act from Asia RC
176 Take care of this coin 2015 A1
177 International Suspicion Report Form – fraud, theft, bribery, nepotism and other financial abuse
178 Business Support Manager