Urbanisation, Displacement & Humanitarian Action

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1. Introduction & Background

Urbanisation is one the mega trends of our time: more than 3 billion people, the majority of the world’s population, will live in cities within this decade. The pace of urbanisation is much faster in the developing world, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. Already now, more than 1 billion people live in urban slums. Forced migration is one important driver of urbanisation, both in cases of large-scale displacement to urban areas but also in the case formerly rural dwellers chose to settle in town when they return. As forced migrants increasingly chose to go to towns and cities, we are likely to see more displacement to so-called urban areas in the future.

Why should this be an important concern to the Danish Refugee Council (DRC)? The global trends indicated above imply that DRC has to A) investigate the trend of increasing displacement to urban areas as well as its implications for humanitarian action and B) assess the need to adapt existing approaches and/or develop new ones in order to be prepared to meet the humanitarian challenges of the future. More displacement to urban areas simply means that the context for humanitarian action will partly shift towards urbanised areas. Like most other humanitarian INGOs, DRC is in the process of accumulating both experiences and tools in order to be ready to take on this challenge.

With a strong background in displacement situations in European contexts, DRC has been working in urban areas for many years. More recently, humanitarian programmes are been implemented in Middle Eastern and Sub-Saharan African cities. From these experiences, DRC knows that working in cities and urban areas, as opposed to remote rural settings, presents us with considerable challenges such as scale, humanitarian
access, possibilities for identification and targeting, local bureaucracies, the complexity of different actors on the ground as well as the need to understand livelihood strategies and protection challenges in particular urban environments. However, urbanities also bring along certain opportunities: cities are often better resourced, logistics are sometimes easier, qualified staff more readily available and urban economies frequently offer more diverse livelihood opportunities to people of concern.

Policy research during recent years has shown that numerous large scale displacement situations in urban areas such as Khartoum, Nairobi or Damascus continue to be characterised by a discouraging lack of durable solutions, convention responsibilities that are systematically violated, completely inadequate provision of basic services to forcibly displaced persons, reluctant authorities as well as hesitant donors. In other words, the provision of protection space in urban areas poses a serious challenge to the international community.

Being a rights-based organisation with a strong protection mandate, DRC insists that forced migrants (IDPs and refugees) have the right to protection, no matter where they are. That this cannot be taken for granted is amply demonstrated by UNHCR having recently issued a new policy for the protection of refugees in urban areas as well as the fact that a disproportionate amount of humanitarian assistance continues to be allocated for interventions in rural or camp-like settings.

The 2009 UNHCR policy is the result of a series of processes and preparatory studies, and replaced the previous 1997 policy, which was widely criticised for being both unclear in terms of the responsibility to protect in urban areas and inadequate in terms of providing guidance for meeting the above-mentioned challenges. The focus on displacement in urban areas within UNHCR has triggered an intense debate on the issue among humanitarian actors worldwide. Urbanisation & displacement is currently a ‘hot button’ in humanitarianism and a range of policy research initiatives are conducted by actors such as IASC, UNHCR, Tufts/Feinstein, ODI and others.

Practitioners agree that the growing presence of IDPs and refugees in urban areas presents us with a unique challenge and that the bulk of the humanitarian toolbox has emerged from humanitarian experiences in rural areas predominantly. However, what is it more precisely that makes the design and implementation of humanitarian programmes in urban environments so different?

It is against this background that the Danish Refugee Council has chosen the topic of ‘displacement & urbanisation’ as a Strategic Focal Area (SFA) for 2010 and 11. DRC believes that those organisations who invest in collating and developing tools and approaches to humanitarian action in urban areas are likely to be better prepared to meet future challenges.

2. Three Case Studies (Damascus, Grozny & Mogadishu)

In order to gather experiences from displacement situations in urban environments that could point towards critical – and general – issues at stake for a medium sized INGO such as the Danish Refugee Council, it was decided to strive for a comparative analysis of different geographies and displacement scenarios in areas where DRC is operational. The final choice was to select Damascus, Grozny and Mogadishu.

| Displacement / Lack of Durable Solution: | Damascus, Syria, Middle East |
| Durable solution / Return: | Grozny, Chechnya, Europe |
| Acute Crisis / Protracted Emergency: | Mogadishu, Somalia, Horn of Africa |
## Case 1: Damascus

### Conflict History & Displacement Situation

The US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent civil war have caused the displacement of approximately 4.5 million Iraqi civilians: 2.5 have fled to other parts of Iraq and 2 million have travelled to neighbouring countries, mainly Syria and Jordan;

The large number of refugees seeking safety in Syria came after the violence following the bombing of the Samarra Shrine in February 2006;

The vast majority of refugees originate from urban areas inside Iraq (Bagdad mainly) and stay in urban areas, mostly in the outskirts of Damascus; smaller groups stay in towns such as Homs and Daraa;

Nobody knows precisely how many refugees there are. UNHCR registers refugees and maintains a database that is updated every month. According to UNHCR, the February 2009 figure for actively registered refugees stands at 162,000. How many unregistered refugees there are is unknown. Reasons for not registering with UNHCR are related either to the lack of need/interest in UNHCR assistance of any kind, or fear that ones personal data might fall into the wrong hands. Given the nature of the sectarian conflict inside Iraq, both reasons are plausible.

Official figures from the Syrian government stand at more than 1 million refugees in Syria – from Iraq alone – plus Palestinians and other groups. The figure for Iraqis may be much lower but the Syrian government has a natural interest in keeping the figures high, partly in order to maintain international attention on the plight of the displaced Iraqis in Syria, and partly because Iraqi refugees naturally affect the diplomatic relationship between Iraq and Syria.

The Government of Syria has so far declined offers for assistance to a comprehensive refugee profiling exercise in the country.

### Key Protection Challenges

The integration of Iraqis in Syria is not likely to be openly supported by the Syrian government, the position of which is clear: as ‘Arab brothers’, Iraqis are welcome as long as necessary and they have legal access to social services such as education. However, they are not permitted to take up formal employment, have to renew their residency permits on an ongoing basis, are expected to make a living by means of UNHCR assistance (food and cash), remittances and private savings, and are meant to leave Syria again in the future.

Since resettlement is an option for only a few, and return to Iraq at present is not an option for significant numbers either due to both security and economic reasons, Iraqi refugees in Syria are effectively denied their right to a durable solution;

Key challenges are thus related to their status, access to shelter, access to
Income as well as the confusion, hopelessness, frustration and violence that comes along with long-term displacement;

Vulnerability increases as resources become depleted over time; i.e. the longer displacement lasts, the more will living conditions for Iraqis in Syria deteriorate;

Particular protection problems relate to refugee children due to child marriages and child abuse;

Men in general and young men especially are said to be vulnerable in the sense of disorientation, frustration and as the cause of domestic violence;

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<tr>
<th>DRC’s Humanitarian Response</th>
<th>DRC was 1. INGO to receive accreditation from Syrian Government in 2007 – operations started early 2008</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The <strong>objective</strong> is to enable the refugee population to cope with displacement issues and promote their co-existence with host communities in Syria;</td>
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<td><strong>Key sectors</strong> are:</td>
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<td><strong>Community Services:</strong> operation of 7 community centres (5 inside Damascus), which provide legal support, social counselling, IT, language classes, tuition programmes, skills training, etc) for refugees and host communities;</td>
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<td><strong>Education:</strong> capacity building of MoE through school rehabilitation, equipment of schools, staff training and direct educational support to children;</td>
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<td><strong>Livelihood Support:</strong> provision of support to specific groups at risk (adolescents and women) through vocational training, social counselling and other assistance;</td>
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<tr>
<th>Critical Issues and Lessons in terms of Displacement &amp; Urbanisation</th>
<th>Damascus is logistically ‘easy’ in terms of movements, procurement, staff recruitment, project site access, etc;</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Refugees have relative access to basic services provided by GoS;</td>
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<td>‘Integration’ is facilitated by close linguistic and cultural similarities;</td>
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<td>Although concentrated in a number of neighbourhoods and suburbs, refugees in Damascus are scattered – and thus very difficult to identify, reach and assist;</td>
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<td>DRC has to operate under the umbrella of the Syrian Arab Red Cross (SARC), which considerably limits the possibilities for outreach and communication; humanitarian diplomacy is extremely important in the case of Syria;</td>
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<td>SARC has so far declined any suggestions for surveys and/or in-depth studies documenting both numbers and characteristics of refugee populations;</td>
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<td>DRC is restricted from having contact with refugees outside of project sites, meaning that self-targeting mechanisms are employed; these are constantly adjusted according to the profile of the users of DRC’s assistance;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Issues relating to legal status and residence permits are of central importance because these give access to basic social services;</td>
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Any programme has to focus on protection issues in terms of legal status and access to rights as well as livelihood support in terms of income generation; Damascus itself has significantly changed due to the presence of refugees;

Case 2: Grozny

| Conflict History & Displacement Situation | Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the North Caucasus has experienced several open wars: Two wars were fought between Chechen separatist forces and the armed forces of the Russian Federation and allied Chechens, in 1994–1996 and 1999–2002, resulting in the large-scale displacement, including secondary displacement, of an estimated 800,000 persons from Chechnya to Ingushetia and Dagestan, as well as within Chechnya (IDMC Oct 2009). In 1992 Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania fought over the territory of Prigorodny with the result that the majority of ethnic Ingush residents of NO-A were displaced, with many fleeing to Ingushetia, and others remaining displaced within NO-A. South Ossetia, a disputed territory of Georgia, fought with Russian support for independence from Georgia in 1990 and 2008—displacing an estimated 135,000 persons (UNHCR)–and may now de facto obtain it. Today, over 70,000 persons remain displaced within the North Caucasus, including: IDPs from Chechnya in Ingushetia: 8,722 IDPs from the 2nd Chechen war remain displaced in Ingushetia (DRC-UNHCR Database, 31 January 2010), along with a small number of IDPs from the 1st Chechen war. IDPs from Chechnya in Dagestan: As of January 2010, an estimated 3,652 IDPs from the two Chechen wars remain displaced in Dagestan (UNHCR/Vesta, 2010). IDPs in Chechnya: An estimated 34,108 IDPs, including some returnees from Ingushetia, remain displaced within Chechnya (UNHCR/Vesta, 2010). IDPs from Prigorodny conflict in NO-A in Ingushetia: At least 9,938 IDPs from NO-A are residing in Ingushetia, although the total figure could be higher (UNHCR/Vesta 2010). Displaced persons in NO-A from the Georgia-South Ossetia conflicts: Up to 22,000 persons and 1,000 persons remain displaced in NO-A from the 1991-1992, and August 2008 Georgia-South Ossetia conflicts respectively. Following this last conflict, a further 1,000 persons are said to have applied for refugee status in NO-A (UNHCR, 2009). |

Key Protection Challenges | The existence of IDPs is largely neglected in state structures after mass de-registration of IDPs on the Federal Migration Service lists; the federal government has taken control, largely rebuild Grozny town and claims to have solved the displacement problems in the region; |
Housing, land and property rights are absolutely central: many IDPs have not been compensated for the loss of property and are forced to live in sub-standard temporary shelters; most lack tenancy contracts;

While formal structures of governance are all in place, many are unclear, dysfunctional and characterised by high levels of corruption at all levels; IDPs are in a very weak position to engage with formal structures regarding their specific rights as IDPs in terms of personal documentation, status, residence registration, social security, social welfare entitlements, etc;

Among IDPs, we find very high crowding rates, poverty levels and unemployment rates; there are few income generation and self-reliance opportunities in Chechnya; access to social, natural, physical, human and financial capital is severely constrained by war-related damages; the labour market in Grozny cannot absorb a growing number of young Chechens;

Need for social infrastructure (child friendly space, kindergarten, playgrounds)

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<th>DRC’s Humanitarian Response</th>
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<td>DRC has been operational in the NC since 1997 and implemented a major relief operation during the second Chechen war between 1999 and 2002;</td>
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<td>The objective is to protect and promote durable solutions to displacement problems in the North Caucasus, on the basis of human rights and humanitarian principles;</td>
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<td><strong>Key Sectors</strong> are:</td>
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<td><strong>Housing &amp; Infrastructure</strong>: construction of apartment blocs for IDPs from ‘temporary accommodation centres’; upgrading of ‘hostels’ in Grozny; focus on vulnerable families and closing down the worst temporary settlements; rehabilitation of related infrastructure such as water points, access roads and child friendly space;</td>
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<td><strong>Livelihood Support &amp; Income Generation</strong>: focus on young IDP between 21 and 35 of age; provision of grants for individual and group income generation activities such as hairdressers shop, bakery, internet café, etc. provision of vocational and business training;</td>
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<td><strong>Legal Aid &amp; Institutional Development</strong>: assistance to ID documentation problems; court representations; co-operation with local NGO in legal issues; training of rights holders and duty bearers; production of legal information material; support to the processing of land and property applications;</td>
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<th>Critical Issues and Lessons in terms of Displacement &amp; Urbanisation</th>
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<tr>
<td>DRC - NC has an ‘strategy for operating in urban environments’, based on two substantial surveys, one among residents of ‘temporary shelters’ and ‘hostels’, the other among IDPs living in private accommodations;</td>
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<td>Conflicts have accelerated urbanisation processes; ‘return’ is not return to the village...but to town;</td>
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<td>Highly regulated and bureaucratised environment means that the list of stakeholders is long and that the institutional landscape of projects in Grozny</td>
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is very complicated and difficult to navigate;

Low level of trust in municipal authorities among IDPs and citizens in general; paired with authorities' negligence of displacement problems, it is a challenge to mobilise government support for pro-IDP rehabilitation initiatives;

Advocacy in terms of access to HLP rights is critical; DRC’s legal clinics and local NGO partners are important tools to support access to these rights; legal advice is based on self-targeting principles;

Although logistics in terms of movements and procurement are relatively uncomplicated, security constraints continue to make operations difficult;

Donor interest has declined substantially;

Urban shelter is a central precondition for durable solutions; shelter in terms of ‘social’ apartment blocs and / or support to rebuild private accommodations;

Access to income generation is the other major constraint for IDPs, and others, in Grozny;

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<tr>
<th>Conflict History &amp; Displacement Situation</th>
<th>Two decades of political turmoil, no functional government, resumption of fighting since 2010, Transitional Federal Government is in conflict with a number of Armed Opposition Groups;</th>
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<td>Protracted and complex emergency, exacerbated by a fragile government not in control of most of the country;</td>
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<td>In Mogadishu, fighting is nearly continuous and intense, town is an epicentre of violence;</td>
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<td>Various insurgent groups vying for power leads to continues displacement, loss of livelihoods, food insecurity, high levels of malnutrition;</td>
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<td>Many have left the contested areas of Mogadishu for the Afgoye Corridor, one of the largest IDP concentrations in the world with roughly 360000 IDPs;</td>
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<td>Extremely difficult humanitarian access due to direct attacks on UN, INGO assets, cumbersome registration, taxation by Al Shabaab, etc</td>
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<td>Most implementation is done by national staff;</td>
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<td>Interventions are possible but demand great flexibility and are suspended regularly; a lot depends on building capacities of local partners;</td>
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<td>Donor fatigue, access problems, corruption, etc continue to impede assistance</td>
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Key Protection Challenges

43% of the population depend on humanitarian aid, including 1.4 million internally displaced;

Urban poor are progressively less resilient to the perpetual shocks that they are exposed to, finding it increasingly impossible to meet daily needs;

High levels of urban malnutrition, related to disease and lack of dietary diversity;

Primary coping mechanisms and social support networks are eroded;

‘Traditional’ clan protection systems are weakened;

DRC’s Humanitarian Response

The objective is to address immediate humanitarian needs in the short run and to create conditions for safe return and reintegration of displaced populations in the long run and through improvements in urban livelihoods, infrastructure and governance, combined with measures to protect rights and livelihoods;

Remote Control Programme – first visit by International staff early 2011; daily management by SAACID, monitored by DRC staff;

Wet Feeding – 80 000 hot meals (2100Kcal meal prepared on WFP food) cooked every day in public kitchens in 16 districts in Mogadishu; meals are redistributed at home; 95% of beneficiaries come 17+ times per month to the feeding centres;

Other urban interventions in Greater Mogadishu include: Skills Training, Funds for small business; potable water through water trucking; latrines incl. handwash facility; hygiene NFIs, construction and upgrading of boreholes and wells; referral of malnourished children to feeding centres; Shelter kit distributions; support to IPD camp security;

Critical Issues and Lessons in terms of Displacement & Urbanisation

Operational environment allows for self-targeting only! Waiting at the feeding centre is both shameful and time-consuming, ensuring that only those in real need will present themselves to the street kitchens; Important to make the service accessible in terms of access, time, etc; need to monitor who makes use of the service and adjust programming accordingly;

Unstable situation limits possibilities for data collection and registration; the lack of IDP data and poor access means lack of knowledge on pockets of vulnerability in Mogadishu;

Each district in Mogadishu has its own power dynamics and ‘authorities’ – no central bureaucracy, bringing in resources leads to acceptance by local power brokers; the institutional landscape fluctuates according to the conflict; this calls for constant attention and co-operation with stakeholders;
Urban violence and insecurity;
IDPs need cash for survival; Mogadishu is a vibrant urban economy, that has however suffered from the conflict; security permitting, there is a need for cash based interventions as well as strategies that seek to enhance income generation opportunities;

Urban displacement can be repeated, circular, intra-urban, urban – rural – urban, peri-urban, etc.; highly mobile population!

Difficult to differentiate between displaced and urban poor in general;

Wet feeding is not a sustainable practice but at present the most feasible and safe food security activity while better options are explored; cooked food is of little value while dry food (having a high market value) distribution is too vulnerable to looting, robbery and extortion;

3. Conclusions & Lessons Learnt

3.1 Universal lessons from three cases?
Comparison is really difficult! Towns, displacement scenarios, objectives of assistance, perspectives for durable solutions and protection challenges are vastly different! To what extent is ‘urban’ a common denominator?

3.2 What is different about working in urban settings – as opposed to rural ones?

Colleagues ask me: “We’ve been working in towns on the Balkans throughout the 90s – without really conceptualising it in terms of urban interventions. So what is new here?”

In DRC’s perspective, it is a matter of which organisational level we look at. To put it bluntly, IDPs and refugees stay the same, their human rights are the same and their basic needs in terms of food, shelter, health, education and protection remain the same as well. What may be significantly different is the context in which, and consequently the conditions under which humanitarians operate.

From an organisational point of view, this implies that the overall policy apparatus and humanitarian approaches such as the mandate, perspectives on protection and livelihoods as well as the DRC Assistance Framework remain just as valid as they do in rural contexts. Neither does it appear that the way DRC has organised its core- and support sectors of intervention will need to be adapted.

Designing and implementing humanitarian programmes in urban areas does make an essential difference to those who do so in practice – because the circumstances are often quite different from rural settings. In that sense, what is needed, are tools and approaches to be readily applied under urban conditions. Critical examples are profiling tools and methodologies, innovative and flexible ways to identify and target potential beneficiaries, elaborated forms of stakeholder analysis tools or tools that can map urban markets and livelihood strategies. Many of these tools do already exist, some need to be adjusted to a new setting and a few are formed anew from innovative approaches in concrete field settings.
3.3 Research and Knowledge is even more critical

One key experience is that we are generally working more ‘in the dark’ in urban areas. Technical, political, security, etc. challenges mean that we – in many cases - lack the detailed knowledge on the characteristics of the target population. At the same time, everything is more complex – or at least it appears to be: more stakeholders, sometimes more rules, more partners, differences between IDPs, migrants and hosts tend to disappear over time meaning that you don’t really know who your beneficiaries are and where you can start, etc. Categorisation, profiling & labelling is a major challenge. Displaced populations can at times be difficult to identify; they are mixed with the urban population; they may stay privately with hosts; they may want to remain hidden because of fear; they are perhaps highly mobile within the city; authorities may ignore the problem or be interested in obscuring the facts; etc

Urbanities receive migrants, forced ones but also voluntary, transitory, circulatory, economic and political ones. The boundary between urbanisation in general and displacement induced urbanisation becomes blurred. In a way, urbanities further accentuate the mixed migration dilemma.

At the same time, the institutional landscape in urbanities is generally more complex; there are more and different actors, i.e. humanitarian agencies are not alone in providing services. In some of the cases, this means that we had to face more bureaucracy and more rule-sets. Typical ‘partners’ would include municipal authorities, line departments, private service providers, faith based organisations, local NGOs, police stations, immigration services, banks, etc.

All this means that a) co-ordination and co-operation is more complicated and time consuming and b) that working through existing structures is more important than ever before!

Targeting is based on knowledge & understanding – which is often a critical issue (eg resistance to profiling among authorities, refugee/IDP populations mixed with host communities, perhaps they have to hide from authorities, etc.) Profiling tools do exist but it can be challenging to apply these in practice. Almost needless to say, the notion of ‘community’ takes on different meanings in an urban context

As mentioned earlier, self targeting approaches are more commonly used by DRC in urban areas. The process of targeting occurs by means of ‘fine-tuning’ the product (supply and demand logic). Identification & registration systems have to be adapted and your service has to be accessible in terms of time, security, distance, etc. Like other organisations, DRC makes use of new communications systems (SMS, email, internet, cash transfers, etc) in order to reach out to people of concern.

3.4 Work as integrated as possible!

Displaced persons in urban areas do not live in closed camps, i.e. there may be more close interaction with host communities (but necessarily so). Depending on the type of displacement situation, history, cultural and linguistic differences and similarities, etc relations between IDPs, refugees and hosts may be characterised by of tension, antagonism, fear, suspicion, etc (e.g. Iraqis in Damascus, Somalis in Nairobi). In order to avoid creating further tensions due to a partial focus of displaced populations exclusively, working integrated is more important than ever.

Again, this means that we should work through existing structures instead of putting up parallel ones. The complex institutional landscape described above needs more co-ordination, co-operation and partnerships
with mayors, town councils, faith based organisations, red cross/crescent, line ministries, police stations, NGOs, etc. Service provision to forced migrants need to be planned together with urban planning in general, while carefully monitoring the existence and / or emergence of possible isolated pockets of forced migrants in towns.

In this context, it is important to mention that refugees, returnees and IDPs affect the city and forms urbanisation processes in itself – poses great potentials and challenges. Examples are Damascus, Grozny, Mogadishu but also Nairobi, Karthoum, Juba are good examples.

3.5 Get a thorough understanding of protection challenges and livelihood strategies!

The new UNHCR policy aims to transform cities into legitimate protection spaces. Earlier challenges to this were perceptions of forced migrants in town as ‘matters out of place’ or ‘irregular movers’. Often, refugees and IDPs get no assistance because it was believed that ‘since they are in town, they can cope’ or because they are ‘irregular movers’ and because of fear to create incentives for more (forced) migrants to come to the town. Questions of the legal status in the city become absolutely central to their own perception as well as to how humanitarian assistance should be conceived.

Authorities were and are frequently reluctant to acknowledge and assist: they are already faced with massive urbanisation problems and do not want refugees to come to the city also (the positive contributions to urbanisation processes made by displaced populations is rarely acknowledged.

Donors used to be hesitant because they would rarely want to fund programmes that are in opposition to official government policies.

Yet at the same time, urbanities create new forms of vulnerability (child labour, security risks, police harassment, prostitution, domestic violence, etc). The above mentioned challenges to profiling, targeting and outreach imply that there are invisible pockets of vulnerability, displaced people in need of support and without sufficient access to their rights.

Securing protection space in urban environments is a major task and can be major challenge as well. Typical DRC protection activities are:

- Social & legal counseling services
- Support to documentation
- Advocacy for durable solutions
- Support for tenure issues, LPR, residency, etc
- Provision of child friendly space
- Advocate for enactment of domestic legislation
- Focus on special vulnerabilities
- Provision of Information material
- Establishment of refugee / IDP representations
Livelihood systems in town are different from those in rural areas. Urban livelihoods can be difficult to understand for an outsider. While urban agriculture may well play a role, food (in-)security in an urban setting works differently.

People need cash for survival, thus they need jobs, e.g. labour in the informal economy. The cost of living is usually higher than in rural areas and forced migrants face stiff competition from host urban populations (urban poor). In order to be able to survive in the city, urban livelihood skills are needed. Depending on the origin of the forced migrant these may lack if refugees/IDPs come from rural areas.

Since refugees, returnees or IDPs are often more vulnerable, they are also more likely to be exploited by employers, civil servants and landlords.

Potential for urban economy (Damascus, Nairobi, Mogadishu ref. / IDP Communities, links to diaspora economies may provide income)

Typical livelihood oriented activities implemented by DRC in urban areas include:

- Shelter options: upgrade slums, high rise dwellings, rent houses, host families, collective centres
- Micro credit, grants, job placements, vocational training, etc.
- Skills training programmes
- Support to industry
- Provision of communal infrastructure (schools, roads, water, sanitation, child friendly spaces, community centres, etc.)
- General strengthening of public service provision
- Provision of financial assistance