EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In July 2016 Stop Wapenhandel and TNI published the report ‘Border Wars: the arms dealers profiting from Europe's refugee tragedy’

The report revealed:

• how the European policy response to refugees has led to a booming border security market building fences, providing equipment for border guards and establishing surveillance systems;

• the same industry selling arms to the Middle-East and North-Africa, fuelling the conflicts, repression and human rights abuses that have led refugees to flee their homes is also the key winner of EU border security contracts;

• how the arms and security industry helps shape European border security policy, through lobbying, regular interactions with EU’s border institutions and its shaping of research policy;

This briefing takes a look at the most important further steps taken in 2016, including the conversion of the European border security agency Frontex into an European Border and Coast Guard, given additional responsibilities and powers, as well as the migration deal with Turkey.

This report finds that:

• the refugee toll in 2016 (4700 known people have died crossing the Mediterranean sea) is higher than 2015 even though the total number of refugees entering Europe fell, because the EU’s border security policies are predicated on stopping people entering Europe through the most common migration routes, which has led people to undertake ever more dangerous routes;

• European nations, in particular UK, France, Belgium and Spain, have continued to export in 2016 to the Middle East and North Africa, most notably to Saudi Arabia despite its involvement in conflicts in Syria and Yemen that have led to war crimes and fueled the flow refugees;

• Budgets for border security continue to boom at a rapid rate. Frontex’ budget in 2016, €238.7 million, marked a 67.4% increase compared to the €142.6 million in 2015. It is expected to grow to an estimated €322 million in 2020, 50 times its budget of €6.3 million in 2005. The 2016 budget for the EU’s Internal Security Fund was similarly increased by €116.4 million in October 2015 to a total of €647.5 million;

• A substantial proportion of these budgets have benefited arms and security corporations in a border security market that is growing at roughly 8% a year. Airbus, Leonardo, Safran and Thales were all in the news in 2016 for border security contracts. IT firms Indra, Advent and ATOS won significant contracts for projects to identify and track refugees;
• Security fences at Europe's borders have expanded considerably – in Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine – accompanied by frequent reports of violence against refugees by border security guards as well as by extreme-right militias (sometimes in collaboration with police);

• the EU is greatly increasing its military operations on its borders, sometimes in collaboration with NATO, through various missions, Sophia (Libya), Triton (Greece), Poseidon (Italy), Hera, Indalo and Minerva (Spain);

• the transformation of the European border agency, Frontex, into the European Border and Coastguard Agency, grants new centralised powers to purchase equipment and intervene directly in states’ border affairs (without requiring approval) that is already diminishing accountability for the impact of EU member states action on its borders;

• the EU continued its work to externalise its borders, announced the launch of a new Migration Partnership Framework, that includes working on agreements with 16 targeted countries for cooperation to prevent refugees migrating, including countries such as Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan, nation states involved in armed conflicts and severe human rights abuses.
INTRODUCTION

2016 has been the deadliest year ever recorded for refugees trying to come to Europe. Over 4700 known people died while crossing the Mediterranean, even though the total number of migrants entering Europe was significantly lower than in 2015. Many refugees are forced to stay in dire circumstances at borders or in inadequate reception facilities, stuck in limbo and facing a very uncertain future.

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrivals to Europe</th>
<th>Recorded deaths</th>
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<td>3,279</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,046,599</td>
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<td>2016 (until 1 December)</td>
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The ‘refugee crisis’, as it became known in the media, is typically said to have started in April 2015. That month a surge in refugees trying to cross the Mediterranean was accompanied by several boat sinkings, with over 1200 people dying. The deadly toll for migrants headed to Europe has been the reality for years, but it only became a political priority in 2015 due to the media profile and the clear increase in numbers of desperate people trying to enter Europe, in particular because of the civil war in Syria. Since then this ‘crisis’ has been on top of the agenda of the EU, culminating in a string of new measures to try to deal with it.

Despite the death toll and suffering, however, the response of the EU has been less about refugee support and more about strengthening border security with the aim of keeping refugees out. In September the EU once again confirmed this policy in the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap, stating as two of its main objectives: “Never to allow return to uncontrolled flows of last year and further bring down number of irregular migrants”, and “ensure full control of our external borders and get back to Schengen.”

House destroyed by Saudi fighter jets in the south of Sanaa, Yemen (Ibrahim Qasem/Wikimedia)
In July 2016, our report ‘Border Wars: the arms dealers profiting from Europe’s refugee tragedy’, revealed how this approach was leading to a rapid militarisation of Europe’s borders in which arms dealers were the main profiteers. This briefing takes a look at the most important further steps taken in 2016, including the extension of Frontex to an European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) and the migration deal with Turkey.

European Commission President Juncker in his ‘State of the Union’ speech in September summed up the approach of the EU in Orwellian terms: “We will defend our borders […] with strict controls, adopted by the end of the year, on everyone crossing them. Every time someone enters or exits the EU, there will be a record of when, where and why.” Welcome to the EU – a land of armed borders and constant surveillance.

EUROPE PRIORITISES ARMS SALES OVER CONFLICT PREVENTION

From Border Wars: The arms business, in particular sales to the Middle-East and North-Africa, where most of the refugees are fleeing from, is booming. Global arms exports to the Middle-East actually increased by 61 per cent between 2006-2010 and 2011-2015. Between 2005 and 2014, EU member states granted arms exports licences to the Middle-East and North-Africa worth over €82 billion.

With wars worsening in Syria and Yemen, ongoing armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey and Libya, dictatorial regimes in Eritrea, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the continued occupation of Palestinian territories by Israel and the Western Sahara by Morocco, the Middle East and North Africa continue to be the scene of widespread chaos, violence, human rights abuses and conflict. Despite this, EU member states throughout 2016 showed no qualms in continuing to fuel this explosive situation by exporting arms to the region, prioritising arms sales above conflict prevention.

Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Qatar, Algeria, Israel and Turkey were all in the top 20 global arms importers in 2015, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The list is headed by Saudi Arabia, which has no trouble buying weapons in spite of its egregious track record which includes the war crimes in its war on Yemen and acting as an arms supplier to fighting parties in the war in Syria. European nations frequently claim their sales are guided by human rights considerations, yet in 2015, the UK, France and Spain were the biggest arms exporters to Saudi Arabia, behind the US. Belgium was one of the world’s largest small arms sellers to the country, making up over 60% of Walloon (which, just as Flanders, has a separate arms export policy) arms exports in 2015.

The European Parliament called for an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia in February, but to no avail. Neither the European Council nor individual member states want to stop this lucrative business or endanger good relations with the dictatorial regime of the oil-rich country. Some, like the Netherlands, have adopted a more restrained export policy, but EU member states in general continue to send large amounts to the kingdom. In Italy and the UK anti-arms-trade groups have tried to stop arms exports to Saudi-Arabia through legal proceedings.

The UK licensed exports worth £3.3 billion to Saudi Arabia in the first year of the Yemen war (April 2015 to March 2016), the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) revealed. This included smart bombs, components for combat aircraft, armoured vehicles and communications equipment.
In the midst of heated parliamentary and public debate, repeated condemnations by human rights organisations and a legal challenge by CAAT, the British government as recently as mid-November 2016 vowed to continue arms sales to Saudi Arabia.\(^\text{10}\) According to Andrew Smith of CAAT, “the very weak and shameful response [of the Government] makes clear that arms company profits are being prioritised over the human rights and lives of Yemeni people.”\(^\text{11}\) **BAE Systems**, Europe’s largest arms producer, is the main beneficiary.

Even where arms embargoes are in operation, this hasn’t stopped arms sales to the Middle East. In August 2013 the EU countries agreed to “suspend export licenses to Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression”, in the wake of the killing of hundreds of protestors.\(^\text{12}\) Research by Amnesty International, published in May, however showed that since then “14 out of 28 EU member states have remained among Egypt’s main suppliers of arms and policing equipment.”\(^\text{13}\)

**EU RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE TRAGEDY**

During a speech at the Fundamental Rights Forum in Vienna, on 21 June 2016, European Commissioner Timmermans said: “I know that some fear that we are sacrificing the human rights of migrants on the altar of efficient border management. Let me assure you that this is not the case.” He positioned the border security measures the EU takes as aimed at “avoiding loss of life”.

The unfolding evidence points in another direction, however. The one constant goal of EU border policies is getting down the numbers of refugees coming to Europe. This has involved a whole web of measures and practices, many of which show little or no respect for refugees’ lives and rights. Nor is there any evidence that making it more difficult to enter Europe saves lives by discouraging refugees from making the journey. Rather it has forced them into ever more dangerous routes, which is why the number of migrant deaths has actually increased in 2016 compared to 2015.

**ARMIES, FENCES AND RIGHT-WING MILITIAS AT THE BORDERS**

*From Border Wars: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, the Netherlands and Slovenia all send military personnel to assist in guarding borders in the second half year of 2015 and/or the first half year of 2016. Many EU countries have fortified their borders with security fences.*

During the year more and more countries started to deploy armed forces and/or erect security fences at their borders. These developments were accompanied by alarming reports of violence against refugees, growing use of private security firms and even collaboration with right-wing extremist groups.

In July 2016, Serbia announced the start of joint border patrols by the army and police. “Serbia does not want to become a collective centre for migrants”, said Prime Minister Vucic.\(^\text{14}\)

Slovenia and the European border agency, Frontex, openly considered the use of private companies to assist in border security. In Calais this is already reality, with security firms **Eamos Cork Solutions** and **Biro Sécurité** hired by the British government respectively the major of Calais to provide security guards and equipment.\(^\text{15}\) As with all private involvement in military and police work, this poses extra problems regarding training, accountability and (parliamentary and public) control.
In Bulgaria, militia gangs of extreme-right ‘migrant hunters’, including a lot of ex-soldiers, started to patrol the borderlands on their own, occasionally joined by well-known fascists from other European countries. Sometimes wearing uniforms and armed with weapons, they try to forcibly expel refugees or hold them and hand them over to the police. Another group openly announced military trainings and is working together with Serbian ‘patriots’ in patrolling the border. Meanwhile the Bulgarian government in 2016 announced the expansion of a longer existing fence at the border with Turkey, at a cost of €33.7 million. It is far from the only EU or neighbouring country that has erected security fences at the borders. Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine have all done the same. There are also fences at Calais, at the border train station Kastrup between Denmark and Sweden and around the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Mellilla in Morocco. In most cases, a fence is not just a fence, it comes with high-tech surveillance and detection technology, with corresponding price tags.

With all the boosting of border security, reports of violence against refugees are on the rise as well. Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, French police at Calais and the Moroccan and Spanish border guards at Ceuta and Mellilla are the most oft-cited culprits. In November 2016, media reports, backed up with pictures showing injuries, exposed how Hungarian border police were using biting dogs, pepper spray, tasers and truncheons to try and push refugees back to Serbia. Similar stories of police violence were reported from the Bulgarian border with Turkey. Chair of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee Kanev said: “We've documented many allegations of pushbacks — dozens per month. And almost all of those who are pushed back to Turkey report some form of violence or mistreatment.”

**GUNS AT SEA – FRONTEX OPERATIONS**

From Border Wars: EU border security agency Frontex runs several joint naval operations to stop migrants. The operation on the Aegean Sea is supported by a NATO naval mission. Next to this, the EU has the military ‘Operation Sophia’ before the coast of Libya, again to stop refugees from crossing the Mediterranean. This operation, which has been criticised by human rights organisations as well as military experts, marked the first overtly militaristic reaction against refugees on EU level. In general these operations force refugees to find other, more dangerous routes, to Europe.

During 2016 Frontex continued, and sometimes intensified, its military missions in the Mediterranean supporting member states' border control: Triton (Greece), Poseidon (Italy), Hera, Indalo and Minerva (Spain). In total, 31 vessels, six aircraft and four helicopters, as well as over 1300 Frontex' officers, were deployed for these five operations. In 2015, the resources and assets for Triton and Poseidon were tripled, in response to the emerging refugee tragedy.

The Intercept newspaper obtained uncensored incident reports for 2014 and 2015 from Frontex, which suggest Greek and European police forces used firearms to stop refugee-laden boats, thereby injuring or even killing refugees. The Intercept concluded that “[e]ach case of firearms use — even if it resulted in someone being wounded — was described as part of the standard rules of engagement for stopping boats at sea.” This suggests a standing policy to use arms to stop boats or vehicles. One of the incident reports describes shooting at the engine of boat, which resulted in the shooting of a Syrian refugee in the head. This caused serious brain damage, preventing him from speaking or moving. After more than a year he slipped into a coma and died.
In 2015, the EU also started a naval mission on the coast of Libya: Operation Sophia (also known as EUNAVFOR Med), with the aim of undertaking “systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers”. By July 2015 the first phase of EUNAVFOR MED, surveillance and assessment, was fully operational, with four ships, two planes and three helicopters, provided by France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK. The operation moved on to the second phase in October 2015, “the search and, if necessary, diversion of suspicious vessels.”

In June 2016, the Council of the EU extended the mandate for the mission by a year and added two supporting tasks: training of the Libyan coastguards and navy and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo against Libya. The actual training, with some 100 participants (out of a expected total of 1000) started in October, supported by voluntary financial, personnel and equipment contributions from EU member states.

The budget for the additional year was set at €6.7 million, with the budget for the first year being €11.82 million. By August, Operation Sophia reported that 87 suspected smugglers and traffickers had been arrested and more than 255 vessels ‘neutralised’. In November, the operation had expanded to ten vessels (from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK), five helicopters (from Belgium, Italy, Spain and the UK) and three air assets (from France, Luxembourg and Spain).

Human rights and refugee support organisations have opposed Operation Sophia from the start, pointing out that a military operation isn’t the right answer to the refugee tragedy. The training of the Libyan coast guard was cause for further criticism. Judith Sunderland, Associate Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division at Human Rights Watch denounced the hidden EU agenda of getting the Libyan Coast Guard to halt refugees before leaving Libyan waters, saying it was a deliberate attempt to avoid EU’s obligations under international law of non-refoulement (ie not returning refugees to places where their lives or freedoms are threatened).

The refugees detained by Libyan Coast Guard were ending up “in overcrowded, filthy detention centers in Libya where beatings, forced labor, and sexual violence are rife”, Human Rights Watch noted. Just before the start of the training, humanitarian support group Sea-Watch reported an attack by a vessel, with the markings of the Libyan coast guard, on a boat carrying migrants, leading to the drowning of four.

**NATO ASSISTANCE**

During 2016 NATO increased its supportive role in EU border security. In February, NATO ships, already active in the region, started to assist in border security in international waters in the Aegean Sea, joining forces with Frontex and the Greek and Turkish coast guards. Refugees picked up at sea would be brought back to Turkey, according to NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg. Human rights organisations criticised this push back-policy, a clear violation of international law which gives refugees the right to have their application for protection assessed in an EU member state.

In March, five NATO patrol ships expanded their mission into Greek and Turkish waters. While the Turkish government expressed that the mission was successful and could come to an end in December, NATO decided to prolong it into 2017. According to Stoltenberg, speaking at a
press conference in October: “[W]e have seen a very substantial reduction in the numbers of illegal crossings and we have been able to cut the lines of the criminal networks organizing the illegal crossings. And one of the reasons why we have been able to do so is that many of the first sightings has been done by NATO vessels partly because they’re able to operate both in Turkish and Greek territorial waters and also I think it is important to understand that NATO presence in the Aegean Sea adds value, because it is a platform for enhanced cooperation between non-EU NATO ally Turkey with Greece and improved cooperation between Turkey and the European Union.”

At the same press conference, Stoltenberg announced that NATO ships would start to assist the EU Operation Sophia: “Within two weeks, NATO ships and planes will be in the Central Mediterranean, ready to help the EU’s Operation Sophia with situational awareness and provide logistical support. This is yet another example of NATO and the EU working hand-in-hand to increase European security.”

This increasing role of NATO, a military alliance with no humanitarian mandate, is exemplary for the militarization of European border security. It also raises questions about accountability, since NATO falls outside EU parliamentary control and complaint mechanisms.

THE LAUNCH OF A EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD

From Border Wars: In the second half of 2015 the European Commission presented a proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard Agency, building on Frontex. The renewed agency would have substantial more means and powers than Frontex. The idea of a ‘real’ European border guard had been pushed for years by the military and security industry and right-wing politicians.

After an unusually quick process, the European Parliament agreed with the proposal to transform Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, after making some small changes, in July 2015. This was followed by the final approval by the Council of the EU in mid-September. The European Border and Coast Guard was launched officially on 6 October. Croatia hosted the first exercise, five days later.

The new agency basically brings together Frontex and the border and coast guards of EU member states. The most important changes in its mandate, compared to Frontex, are:

- a supervisory role in assessing the border security capacities of member states, which can lead to binding decisions by its management board (which includes representatives from the European Commission and Member States) to take measures to strengthen these;
- the possibility of direct interventions in a member state, even without its consent, by decision of the Council of the EU;
- a mandatory pooling of border guards, based on a rapid reserve pool of 1500 persons, for which member states have to cede personnel;
- setting up its own technical equipment pool, by buying equipment itself or in co-ownership with a member state;
- increased cooperation with third countries, including joint operations (including on the territory of third countries) and the deployment of liaison officers.
The UNHCR and many NGOs, including the International Commission of Jurists, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles and Amnesty International, were critical of the proposed regulation, saying it lacked guarantees concerning human rights of migrants and an independent complaint mechanism.34 ‘Frontexit’, a European campaign for migrant rights, issued a strong worded condemnation of the new agency: “For over 10 years, by reinforcing its quasi-military apparatus, the EU has shown how incapable it was to address the reception and international protection needs, thereby endangering the lives of migrants and refugees with no regard for law or even the value it pretends to stand for. This new mandate is a strong political signal emblematic of an obsession with security based on the rejection of foreigners and racist prejudice.”35

The European Parliament negotiated some changes to the original proposal, somewhat strengthening the attention for refugees’ rights, but the general direction remained the same. With the overwhelming support of the ALDE/ADLE, EPP and S&D partygroups in the Parliament the proposal was adopted with 68% of the votes in favour, 25% against and 7% abstentions.36 MEPs from the Greens and the GUE/NGL-group fiercely opposed the creation of the new European Border and Coastguard Agency.37

The budget of the renewed agency is rising rapidly. The budget in 2016, €238.7 million, marked a 67.4% increase compared to the €142.6 million in 2015. Over €100 million of this is spent on military maritime operations such as Triton (Italy) and Poseidon (Greece).38 The budget for 2017 will be €281 million, growing to an estimated €322 million in 2020.39 An increase of another 34.9% in five years and a dazzling 50 times as high as the budget of €6.3 million Frontex started out with in 2005. The number of staff is also expected to more than double, from 417 (2016) to 1000 (2020).

The new agency held its first European Coast Guard Cooperation Network meeting in Warsaw from 8 till 10 November. Apart from EU member states officials from eight other countries, including Libya and Morocco were present.40 One of the objectives of the meeting was “to keep the EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries and other stakeholders informed about new technological developments in the field of maritime border control”. For this, the industry was invited to showcase drones and aerostats (balloons, airships (zeppelins)) technologies at an exhibition during the meeting.41 It is telling, and worrying, that one of the first actions of the expanded agency was to open the doors and coffers to the military industry.

On 30 November the ECBG announced it will start in 2017 with deploying three off-shore patrol vessels (OPVs) from Finland, Romania and France, which will have multi-national European crews for the first time.42

**DEAL WITH TURKEY**

*From Border Wars: The migration deal between the EU and Turkey was concluded in November 2015, and was updated in March 2016. The basis of the agreement is Turkey committing to step up border security, shelter Syrian refugees and readmit refugees that entered the EU (Greece) from Turkey. In exchange the EU gives Turkey €6 billion, and promised to resettle Syrian refugees from Turkey and to accelerate visa liberalization for Turkish people. The deal was followed by a crackdown on refugees in Turkey, including a sharp increase in unlawful detention and deportation in and from Turkey. Human Rights Watch called it a “new low”, that puts the “very principle of international protection for those fleeing war and persecution at stake”.*
Initially EU officials, including Commissioner Timmermans, were very critical of the Turkish efforts. They insisted Turkey should do more to reduce the number of refugees entering Europe. With increased patrols in the Aegean Sea the numbers did in fact fall quickly, but with the result that many refugees diverted to other migration routes.43 This was one of the causes of the increase in migrant deaths in 2016 compared to 2015. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesperson William Spindler said: “The causes of the increase are multiple: About half those who have crossed the Mediterranean so far this year have travelled from North Africa to Italy – a known more perilous route.”44

Part of the deal is EU financial assistance “to support the Turkish Coast Guard to prevent and better counter irregular migration flows.”45 In 2016, Turkey opened several tenders for strengthening border security capacities, providing another profit opportunity for the military industry.

Since the agreement entered into force, Turkey has dramatically stepped up security at its border with Syria. In September, the government announced that a wall on the border with Syria would be finished in five months. Prior to the announcement, a 200-km part of the wall, started in 2014, had already been completed. State-owned housing developer TOKI would build the rest, with an estimated total cost of €560 million.46

The expansion of border walls is not just targeted at refugees, as an overspill of the war in Syria is a concrete threat to Turkey. However they end up seriously worsening the situation for refugees. In spite of a commitment by the Turkish government to live up to international obligations and welcome Syrian refugees, there are repeated reports about violence against Syrian refugees at the borders, including shootings and beatings. Other refugees have been bussed back to the Syrian side of the border.47

The still nebulous coup attempt of July 2016, and the growing repression in its aftermath, combined with military operations against Kurdish people, have not made Turkey a more stable country where refugees can live in safety and security. Reports that refugees, including children, are working illegally in exploitative conditions, for example in the supply chain for western clothing brands, are likely symptomatic of the conditions for many refugees currently in Turkey.48

**FURTHER EXTERNALISATION OF BORDERS**

*From Border Wars: A long-standing policy of the EU is trying to stop refugees before they reach Europe’s borders. For this the EU works together with third countries, notably in Africa, the Middle-East and Eastern Europe, letting them play the role of border guard outposts. This policy in effect externalises EU’s borders, pushing them from the European Union into adjacent countries.*

As many experts had predicted one of the consequences of the deal with Turkey, and the related attempt to shut off the so-called ‘Western Balkan migration route’, has been a shifting of migration routes. More refugees have tried to cross the Mediterranean from Egypt and Libya, facing a more dangerous journey and resulting in higher numbers of migrant deaths.

Instead of using the onset of these horrific consequences as a lesson and an incentive to change its course, the EU choose to further the externalisation of its borders in an attempt to seal off the new routes refugees have turned to. The likely outcome, of course, will be another shifting of routes to even more dangerous ones.
Following the Valletta Summit between EU and African countries in November 2015, in June 2016 the European Commission announced the launch of a new Migration Partnership Framework. It plans to conclude compacts with Jordan and Lebanon, and agree compacts with Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia and Mali (the five ‘priority countries’), as well as further cooperation with Tunisia and provide support for Libyan border security. The longer list of sixteen priority countries includes countries such as Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan, nation states involved in armed conflicts and severe human rights abuses. Ten of these countries are placed in the categories ‘Very high alert’, ‘High alert’ or ‘Alert’ of the 2016 Fragile States Index of the Fund for Peace, based on factors that could endanger the stability of the state, such as poverty, the lack of human rights guarantees and corruption.

The EU in 2016 also started or intensified border security cooperation with the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. This included the donation of vehicles to the Moldovan Border Police. In August, the Council of the EU extended the mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya, despite criticism for its training of paramilitary forces, including Libya’s Border Guards and Naval Coast Guard (NCG), which both fall under the defence ministry. It approved a budget of €17 million for the mission, which, in light of the security situation in Libya, is run out of Tunis.

Apart from the EU, individual member states have also worked to promote border externalisation. In 2016, Germany signed security cooperation agreements, including border security cooperation, with Egypt and Tunisia, for example. These agreements include the exchange of expertise, intelligence and training, and in the case of Tunisia, donations of large amounts of military equipment.

‘EMERGENCY’ FUNDING

From Border Wars: The importance the EU attaches to control at its external borders is echoed in its funding of border security measures by both member states and third countries. Using several funding instruments, billions of euros are dispersed to buy equipment, services and training.

The British thinktank Overseas Development Institute (ODI) made a “conservative estimate [...] that at the very least, €1.7 billion was committed to measures inside Europe from 2014 to 2016 in an effort to reduce [migration] flows”, adding that this “presents only a partial picture of the true cost.” Furthermore “in an attempt to deter refugees from setting off on their journeys”, “since December 2014 €15.3 billion has been spent” in third countries. Again, “a very conservative estimate.”

Since the start of the ‘refugee crisis’, EU spending on border security, both at its external borders and beyond, has been increasing. The growing budget for Frontex has already been mentioned. Also, ‘regular’ funding through its main instrument, the Internal Security Fund – Borders (ISF – Borders), which covers all countries in the Schengen Area, was accompanied by several ‘emergency assistance’ funding grants. In 2015, almost €12.8 million were granted to Greece, Croatia and France to strengthen border security.

The budget for the ISF–Borders in 2016 was increased by €116.4 million in October 2015 total of €647.5 million. The budget for ‘emergency assistance’ was set at €56 million. In March, the European Commission increased this by another €82 million. Greece was again one of the beneficiaries, receiving €13 million for, among other things, operational support to the Hellenic
Police at the external borders and €5.2 million for support in the ‘hotspots’. The Italian Coast Guard got €2.2 million, among other things, to finance costs for naval personnel and the operational coordination centres.

In September, the Commission awarded a large sum, €108 million, to Bulgaria, to support border and migration management. Around 80% of this will be used for border surveillance, border guards, and other equipment. Although a spokesperson from the Red Cross in Sophia called the situation in the overcrowded refugee reception facilities in the country “really quite critical”, only 20% of the funds will go to increasing and refurbishing those facilities.

In addition to the financial injection given to Bulgarian border security, Frontex has since October 2016 deployed 200 extra guards and 50 extra vehicles at the Bulgarian external borders, in addition to the 173 Frontex officials already active there.

**PROFITEERS**

From *Border Wars: The European border security market is dominated by major arms companies, who have all set up or expanded security divisions, as well as a number of smaller IT and specialist security firms. The big players include arms companies Airbus, Leonardo-Finmeccanica, Thales and Safran, as well as technology giant Indra. Airbus is also the number one winner of EU security research funding contracts.*

Consultancy company Visiongain estimates the worth of the global border security market in 2016 at €16.7 billion, up from €15 billion in 2015. Market Research Future predicts this market to grow at a rate of 8% per year until 2021. Large European arms companies continue to be the major profiteers.

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Airbus, for example, delivered two 215 heavy-lift utility helicopters to the Finnish Border Guard in 2016, with Finnish personnel receiving training at the Airbus Helicopters headquarters in Marignane, France. The company also profits from border externalisation, with the German government donating an array of Airbus equipment for border control, including radar systems, night vision and thermal imaging cameras, to Tunisia.

Naming border surveillance in the Mediterranean as one of the key drivers, Fernando Ciria (Head of Marketing, Tactical Airlifters and ISR at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS)) told journalists that Africa is very promising market for the company, with many orders expected in the next years. The firm plans to promote a new, ground surveillance version for border control missions of its widely sold C-295 transport plane.

In 2015, Airbus planned to sell several of its business units, to refocus on core aerospace and military work. This fits into a common trend in the military industry. The prime reason for this is likely the continued growth in global defence budgets and the fact that Airbus’ other business units, such as border security, have grown large enough to become companies on their own.
However, Airbus in early 2016, retracted its plan to sell its border security unit, as part of a larger deal, mainly due to delays in the finishing of a lucrative border security contract with Saudi Arabia. Instead, Airbus decided to form a new ‘Airbus Electronics and Border Security’ company, which sold 74.9% of its shares to the American investment firm KKR. In 2017, the company will be renamed Hensoldt and separated from the Airbus Group, although they will continue to keep the remaining shares. This doesn’t mean Airbus will completely get out of the border security market, it will, for example, still sell helicopters for border control.

Italian firm Finmeccanica, plagued by corruption allegations, was rebranded Leonardo in the course of 2016. It delivered two AW139 helicopters for border surveillance to Croatia. The total costs of over €30 million were covered by funds from the EU Schengen Facility. The Italian Coast Guard, already the owner of ten AW139s, ordered two more helicopters in August.

At the NATO summit in Warsaw in July, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) was showcased for the first time. It is a system that can be used for border control assistance, among other uses. While US arms producer Northrop Grumman is the main contractor for AGS, Leonardo contributed “the operational control centre ground station, two transportable ground stations and communications technology for the transmission of data and imagery between the remotely piloted aircraft and the ground segment and mission support facilities.” AGS will be in use from 2017 or 2018, at the Italian air force base Sigonella on Sicily.

In September, Leonardo, together with Airbus Defence and Dassault Aviation (France), launched the European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System program. This plans to build new drones to support European intelligence-gathering missions, with the notion that they will also be used for border control missions.

French arms producer Thales also sees prospects for growth in Africa. In the security field, Christophe Farnaud (Vice President Africa) mentions “blue and green [sea and land, MA] border security” as a specific area of development.

At Calais, where for several years now a Thales-supplied surveillance and access control system has been in use, the Calais Research Network spotted two military drones surveilling the Eurotunnel site, most probably Thales’ Spycopters. Thales was also invited by Frontex to present a proposal for a refugee tracking system, with the possible use of smartphone apps, biometrics and smart cards, during a meeting on Lesbos in early 2016. Though Thales’ proposal hasn’t been made public, Unisys, also present at the meeting, presented a proposal that would track as many refugees as possible before they flee conflict zones or are still close to those, with the aim of preventing them from coming to Europe. Refugee support and privacy organisations were very critical of the plans.

Similar to Airbus and Thales, Spanish technology company Indra continues to actively promote border security technology for Africa, for example at the Africa Aerospace & Defence Fair, which took place in South Africa in September 2016. Their focus on Africa capitalises on EU’s financial support for border security equipment purchases in third countries, especially in Northern and Western Africa. German company Veridos already got a piece of the cake in March when the Moroccan government selected it to provide stationary and mobile equipment for screening at all land, air, and sea ports of entry. “We welcome this partnership with Morocco in its special efforts for border control as a Schengen neighboring country”, said Veridos CEO Kunz.
Indra was also one of the exhibitors at the European Day for Border Guards, an annual event organised by Frontex. In March, Frontex awarded Indra a contract to incorporate its Maritime Reconnaissance Intelligence (MRI) aircraft into Operation Triton, to track vessels with migrants on their way to Italy.

In September, the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA) awarded French military and security company **Safran**, as part of a consortium with **Atos** (Spain) and **Accenture** (Ireland), a contract for providing application and infrastructure services for the EU Visa information System and its underpinning Biometric Matching System. Philippe Arnaud, of Safran's Border Control Business, called it “a continuation of our decade-long efforts to help the EU manage its borders”.

Safran has followed Airbus’ example in refocusing on core military business, deciding to sell its security and identity company Morpho. In September, it selected **Advent**, already the parent company of another important player in identity security, Oberthur Technologies, as the buyer. The deal was valued at €2.43 billion.

With the new European Border & Coast Guard now able to buy its own equipment, it has to be seen how this will work out in terms of actual purchases. At the end of October Frontex re-issued a tender for a ‘Trial of remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS) for maritime aerial surveillance’, that had been retracted earlier in the year for unknown reasons. The plan is to have an 800-hour trial of drones surveillance in areas of the Mediterranean Sea, flying from two airports in Greece. The estimated value of the contract is €5.5 million.

Another remarkable tender, because of its further privatization of border security work, is the one issued by the British Home Office in July for private security guards at Calais, Dunkerque and Coquelles. The contract should cover the “provision of a total of forty Authorised Search Officers, 24 hours per day, 365 days per year” for three years, at an estimated value of €80 million.

**DETENTION**

In addition, some arms companies are not only involved in preventing migrants from coming to Europe or monitoring them, but also profit from detaining them. British company **Serco** for example, known for managing the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment, was selected in 2014 to manage detention centre Yarl’s Wood. The contract for seven years (2014-2021) is worth £70 million.

In November, anti-arms trade activists joined the Reclaim Justice Network in a protest at the European Custody and Detention Summit in London, a corporate conference with former sponsors including arms companies such as Thales, **Rafael** (Israel) and **Apelsan** (Turkey).

HORIZON 2020

Under the current cycle (2014-2020) of EU Research & Technology (R&T) Funding, Horizon 2020, eight projects related to border security are under way. Atos and ARTTIC (France) are beneficiaries, alongside Thales, Safran and Leonardo. Research institutions CEA (France) and Fraunhofer (Germany) are also participants. Airbus and Indra are notably absent, as major profiteers of earlier EU funding for border security R&T.

In early 2017, a new round of projects will be awarded, including one on ‘autonomous systems and control systems’ and one on ‘reducing the costs of technologies in land border security applications’.

While Horizon 2020 is up and running, a few projects from the previous cycle, Framework Programme 7 (2007-2013), are still to conclude. One of these is the CLOSEYE-project, aimed at developing “an operational and technical framework that would increase situational awareness and improve the reaction capability of authorities surveying the external borders of the EU”. In June 2016, the project consortium organised a ‘VIP Day’ at the Italian Space Agency in Rome, attended by representatives from the European Commission, the Italian Space Agency, the Italian Navy, the Italian Ministry of Interior, Guardia Civil (Spain), the military Portugese Guarda Nacional Republicana and the companies ISDEFE (Spain), GMV (Spain), Leonardo, Indra and Airbus. The day provided another example of the close cooperation between EU bodies, member states’ military and police forces and the military and security industry.

ARMS AND SECURITY FAIRS

The ongoing externalisation of borders is reflected in the relocation of one of the most important international border security events, the World Border Security Congress (formerly known as World Borderpol) from Athens to Casablanca in Morocco. From 21 to 23 March 2017, border security authorities and industry will gather to discuss “current and future policies, implementation issues and challenges as well as new and developing technologies that contribute towards safe and secure border and migration management.” The congress is supported by the Ministry of Interior of Morocco and by the OSCE. The ‘European refugee crisis’ is high on the conference agenda, with speakers including officials from border forces from Europe and Africa, the commander of Operation Sophia and representatives from companies, including Airbus.

Apart from its own specialist fairs and conferences, border security has become an ever more important part of general arms and security fairs. Journalists from German weekly Die Zeit visited the large French arms fair Eurosatory in June 2016, where they noticed that ‘border security’ was one of the hot topics of the moment, spurred by the ongoing refugee tragedy. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales were among the companies showing off special equipment for border security and control, including drones and a Zeppelin.

CONCLUSION

In 2016, the EU not only continued but intensified its investment in militarised border security. Billions of euros have been sent, which have delivered bonanza profits for the border security industrial complex, at a high human costs, the lives of thousands of refugees and the wellbeing of millions more.

Fleeing from war and repression, refugees to Europe face ever more violence: on their journey, at the EU borders, in overcrowded reception or degrading detention centres, and threatened by attacks from extreme-right gangs. The reluctance of the EU and its member states to provide refuge, the pressure on member states and third countries to step up border security and the
EU’s close connection with the military and security industry to provide ‘solutions’ all add to this cycle of inhumanity.

Amnesty International concluded in 2016 that “[r]ather than promoting solidarity between EU member states, European governments have invested precious time and resources in securing their own national borders and reducing space for the protection of the vulnerable, often traumatized people who have risked their lives to come to Europe.”

The EU claims its tangle of measures is not aimed at refugees, but merely at people smugglers, and that it is paying attention to the root causes of migration. But one thing is clear: the focus of EU border policies is clearly aimed at keeping migrants out and refugees pay the price for this. Migrant support group, Watch the Med, rightly argues that the “only reason migrants have to resort to [smugglers] is the European border regime”, comparing the responsible EU administration and politicians to “the slave regime condemning the slave traders”.

As for the attention to root causes: the EU certainly increased the amount of development aid money for countries of origin or transit of migrants, mainly in Africa, but again the focus is clearly on stopping refugees. Bob van Dillen, from the European federation of Catholic social agencies, Caritas Europe, slammed the humanitarian guise the EU uses to sell its border policies: “The reality is that the EU is stepping up efforts to keep migrants and refugees out at any cost, threatening countries of origin or transit to reduce development aid or withdraw trade preferences should they not cooperate with migrants’ return”, adding that “the root causes of forced migration and displacement require European leaders to address not just development and migration policies but instead start with foreign and security policies based on geopolitical and economic interests”, including the need “to stop selling arms to conflicting parties”.

With no end in sight to war, violence, repression and poverty outside the EU, there is little reason to think there will be an end to migration towards Europe. In years to come, climate change impacts are likely to contribute to the reasons why people leave their homes. Unless the EU changes its course, towards really addressing the root causes of migration, by taking steps such as halting arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa, providing safe means to apply for asylum, and supporting and welcoming refugees, the terrible deadly toll of lost lives and hopes will continue to shame this continent.
### ANNEX 1

**BORDER SECURITY-RELATED PROJECTS FUNDED UNDER HORIZON 2020**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU contribution (mln euros)</th>
<th>Participating companies (* = coordinator)</th>
<th>EU contribution (mln euros)</th>
<th>Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>€0.92</td>
<td>ARTTIC (France)</td>
<td>€11.83</td>
<td>Effective container inspection at border control points (C-BORD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€0.35</td>
<td>CAEN (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€0.13</td>
<td>Oslo Center for Science in Society (Norway)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€0.92</td>
<td>Symetria Security (UK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>€1.40</td>
<td>Smiths Heimann (France)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€0.86</td>
<td>European Dynamics (Luxembourg) *</td>
<td>€4.50</td>
<td>Intelligent portable control systems (iCROSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€0.35</td>
<td>Stremble Ventures (Cyprus)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.28</td>
<td>ITTI (Poland)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.44</td>
<td>Everis Aerospatial Y Defensa (Spain)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.23</td>
<td>Biosec Group Kft (Hungary)</td>
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<td>€0.51</td>
<td>JAS Technologie (Poland)</td>
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<td>€0.17</td>
<td>Trainose Metafores (Greece)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€1.00</td>
<td>Veridos (Germany)</td>
<td>€4.98</td>
<td>Pervasive and user focused biometrics border project (PROTECT)</td>
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<td>ITTI (Poland)</td>
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<td>Intrepid Minds (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.44</td>
<td>Atos (Spain)</td>
<td>€5.00</td>
<td>Proactive enhancement of human performance in border control (BODEGA)</td>
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<td>€0.56</td>
<td>Thales (France)</td>
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<td>€0.44</td>
<td>CEIS (Belgium)</td>
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<td>€0.40</td>
<td>Zanasi Alessandro (Italy)</td>
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<td>Ubium (Finland)</td>
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<td>Happywise (Finland)</td>
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<td>€0.91</td>
<td>Exus Software (UK) *</td>
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<td>Radars for long distance maritime surveillance and SAR operations (RANGER)</td>
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<td>€1.30</td>
<td>Diginext (France)</td>
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<td>€1.35</td>
<td>Leonardo – Finmeccanica (Italy)</td>
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<td>€0.32</td>
<td>Telesto Technologies (Greece)</td>
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<td>€0.47</td>
<td>Atos (Spain) *</td>
<td>€2.25</td>
<td>Reliable European identity ecosystem (ARIES)</td>
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<td>€0.42</td>
<td>Gemalto (Chech Republic)</td>
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<td>€0.34</td>
<td>Safran (France)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.18</td>
<td>Saher (UK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>€0.12</td>
<td>Sonae Center Servicos (Portugal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€1.14</td>
<td>Dr Frucht Systems (Israel)</td>
<td>€5.13</td>
<td>System for detection of threat agents in maritime border management (SafeShore)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.84</td>
<td>UTI Grup (Romania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.42</td>
<td>TG Drives (Czech Republic)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>€0.75</td>
<td>ARTTIC (France) *</td>
<td>€5.99</td>
<td>Training augmented reality generalised environment toolkit (TARGET)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.15</td>
<td>Inconnect (Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€1.20</td>
<td>VectorCommand (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.22</td>
<td>ATRISC (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€0.79</td>
<td>ISCC (Austria)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>€0.26</td>
<td>Oslo Center for Science in Society (Norway)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Numbers as recorded by the International Organization for Migration (IOM)


3. The foundations of the current EU border security policies were laid with the signing of the Schengen Agreement in June 1985 in the eponymous village in Luxembourg. It coupled the gradual opening of internal borders within the common territory of the participating states (since the launch of the supplemental Schengen Convention of 1990 known as the ‘Schengen Area’) with robust controls at the external borders of the area. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 incorporated the Schengen treaties and rules into European Union law, obliging the member states to follow them.

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This briefing updates the July 2016 report ‘Border Wars: the arms dealers profiting from Europe’s refugee tragedy’ that received prominent media attention across Europe for its expose of EU’s militarised border policies. This update shows that the European policy response to the refugee tragedy continues to provide a booming border security market for Europe's arms and security firms, some of whom are involved in selling arms to the Middle East and North Africa and all of whom encourage European policies focused on keeping refugees out. It’s a win-win for the security corporations, but the cost is a deadly toll for migrants forced into ever more dangerous routes as they flee wars, conflict and oppression.