BORDER WARS
THE ARMS DEALERS PROFITING FROM EUROPE’S REFUGEE TRAGEDY
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The refugee crisis facing Europe has caused consternation in the corridors of power, and heated debate on Europe’s streets. It has exposed fundamental faultlines in the whole European project, as governments fail to agree on even limited sharing of refugees and instead blame each other. Far-right parties have surged in popularity exploiting austerity-impacted communities in putting the blame for economic recession on a convenient scapegoat as opposed to the powerful banking sector. This has been most potently seen in the UK, where leaders of the ‘Leave EU’ campaign unscrupulously amplified fears of mass migration to successfully mobilise support for Brexit. Refugees fleeing terrible violence and hardship have been caught in the crossfire; forced to take ever more dangerous routes to get to Europe and facing racist attacks in host nations when they finally arrive.

However there is one group of interests that have only benefited from the refugee crisis, and in particular from the European Union’s investment in ‘securing’ its borders. They are the military and security companies that provide the equipment to border guards, the surveillance technology to monitor frontiers, and the IT infrastructure to track population movements.

This report turns a spotlight on those border security profiteers, examining who they are and the services they provide, how they both influence and benefit from European policies and what funding they receive from taxpayers. The report shows that far from being passive beneficiaries of EU largesse, these corporations are actively encouraging a growing securitisation of Europe’s borders, and willing to provide ever more draconian technologies to do this.

Most perverse of all, it shows that some of the beneficiaries of border security contracts are some of the biggest arms sellers to the Middle-East and North-African region, fuelling the conflicts that are the cause of many of the refugees. In other words, the companies creating the crisis are then profiting from it.

Moreover they have been abetted by European states who have granted the licences to export arms and have then granted them border security contracts to deal with the consequences. Their actions are also in the framework of an increasingly militarised response to the refugee crisis by the European Union.

Under the banner of ‘fighting illegal immigration’, the European Commission plans to transform its border security agency Frontex into a more powerful European Border and Coast Guard Agency. This would have control over member states border security efforts and a more active role as a border guard itself, including purchasing its own equipment. The agency is backed up by EUROSUR, an EU system connecting member and third states’ border security surveillance and monitoring systems.

Militarisation of border security is also demonstrated by the military objectives of the ‘European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean Operation Sophia’ (EUNAVFOR MED) as well as the use of military on many borders, including Hungary, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. NATO naval missions in the Mediterranean are already actively assisting EU border security.

Meanwhile, countries outside the EU are being pushed to take up a role as outpost border guards to try to stop refugees from reaching the EU borders. The recent EU migration deals with Turkey, which have been severely criticised by human rights organisations, deny refugees access to Europe and have resulted in more violence against them.

The report shows that:

• The border security market is booming. Estimated at some 15 billion euros in 2015, it is predicted to rise to over 29 billion euros annually in 2022

• The arms business, in particular sales to the Middle-East and North-Africa, where most of the refugees are fleeing from, is also booming. Global arms exports to the Middle-East actually increased by 61 per cent between 2006–10 and 2011–15. Between 2005 and 2014, EU member states granted arms exports licences to the Middle East and North Africa worth over 82 billion euros

• The European policy response to refugees which has focused on targeting traffickers and strengthening its external borders (including in countries outside the European Union) has led to big budget increases which benefits industry
- Total EU funding for member state border security measures through its main funding programmes is 4.5 billion euros between 2004 and 2020
- Frontex, its main border control agency’s budget increased 3,688% between 2005 and 2016 (from €6.3m to €238.7m)
- EU new member states have been required to strengthen borders as a condition of membership, creating additional markets for profit. Equipment purchased or upgraded with External Borders Fund money includes 54 border surveillance systems, 22,347 items of operating equipment for border surveillance and 212,881 items of operating equipment for border checks
- Some of the arms sales permits to the Middle-East and North Africa are also intended for border control. In 2015, for example the Dutch government granted a €34 million euro export license to Thales Nederland for the delivery of radar and C3-systems to Egypt despite reports of human right violations in the country

- **The European border security industry is dominated by major arms companies**, who have all set up or expanded security divisions as well as a number of smaller IT and specialist security firms. Italian arms giant Finmeccanica identified “border control and security systems” as one of the primary drivers for increase in orders and revenues
- **The big players in Europe’s border security complex include arms companies** Airbus, Finmeccanica, Thales and Safran, as well as technology giant Indra. Finmeccanica and Airbus have been particularly prominent winners of EU contracts aimed at strengthening borders. Airbus is also the number one winner of EU security research funding contracts
- Finmeccanica, Thales and Airbus, prominent players in the EU security business are also three of the top four European arms traders, all active selling to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Their total revenues in 2015 amounted to 95 billion euros
- **Israeli companies are the only non-European receivers of research funding (thanks to a 1996 agreement between Israel and the EU) and also have played a role in fortifying the borders of Bulgaria and Hungary**, and promote their expertise based on the West Bank separation wall and the Gaza border with Egypt. Israeli firm BTec Electronic Security Systems, selected by Frontex to participate in its April 2014 workshop on ‘Border Surveillance Sensors and Platforms’, boasted in its application mail that its “technologies, solutions and products are installed on [the] Israeli-Palestinian border”
- **The arms and security industry helps shape European border security policy** through lobbying, through its regular interactions with EU’s border institutions and through its shaping of research policy. The European Organisation for Security (EOS), which includes Thales, Finmeccanica and Airbus has been most active in lobbying for increased border security. Many of its proposals, such as its push to set up a cross European border security agency have eventually ended up as policy – see for example the transformation of Frontex into the European Border and Coastguard Agency (EBCG). Moreover Frontex/EBCG’s biannual industry days and its participation in special security roundtables and specialist arms and security fairs ensure regular communication and a natural affinity for cooperation.
- **The arms and security industry has successfully captured the 316 million euros funding provided for research in security issues**, setting the agenda for research, carrying it out, and then often benefiting from the subsequent contracts that result. Since 2002, the EU has funded 56 projects in the field of border security and border control.

Collectively the evidence shows a growing convergence of interests between Europe’s political leaders seeking to militarise the borders and its major defence and security contractors who provide the services. But this is not just an issue of conflicts of interest or of profiteering from crisis, it is also about the direction Europe takes at this critical moment. More than a half century ago, then US President Eisenhower warned of the dangers of a military-industrial complex, whose power could “endanger our liberties or democratic processes”. Today we have an even more powerful military-security-industrial complex, using technologies that point outwards and inwards, that right now are targeted at some of the most vulnerable desperate people on our planet. Allowing this complex to escape unexamined poses a threat to democracy and to a Europe built on an ideal of cooperation and peace. As Eisenhower put it: “Down the long lane of the history yet to be written... this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.”
“Arms and technology companies have reaped the main windfalls from Europe’s delusional ‘fight against illegal migration’.”

– Hein de Haas, professor of migration studies at the University of Amsterdam
The journey of Syrian refugees in search of a safe future in Europe is one that is marked by violence. Leaving a war-torn country, where families have witnessed brutal experiences of death and destruction, they then come face to face with more violence on Europe's borders. Whether they travel by sea or over land, whether they use highly paid ‘services’ of traffickers or journey alone, militarised borders are there to greet them. Frontex and NATO patrols in the Aegean Sea, assisted by advanced surveillance systems, are actively seeking to halt refugee boats. In Greece, refugees face teargas from police or attacks from Greek paramilitaries. The land borders with Bulgaria and Macedonia are sealed off by razor-wire security fences, with soldiers patrolling the borders. Even if they are able to find their way through all of these obstacles, refugees continually face the distinct possibilities of detention, deportation or attacks by extreme-right gangs. Welcome to Europe, scene of a war on immigration.

Hamed Shurbaji, 24, majored in French literature at Damascus University when the revolution in Syria erupted. He learned he was wanted by the regime because of his involvement in the peaceful protests during the first year of the movement in 2011. “I couldn't stand it any more,” Shurbaji explained. “My home town Darya was totally destroyed and I lost a lot of family members. I couldn't stay while the security forces were killing innocent people. There was nothing left for me there any more, when all my loved ones were either jailed, killed or scattered abroad.”

He decided to travel to Libya to find a way to Europe. He was able to reach the Libyan border and tried to sneak across it. He spent a day and a half walking on foot near the border in an effort to enter, but he was caught by the Libyan guards. He was accused of being a jihadist who intended to fight in Libya. He was detained and jailed for a few days before he was released.

He headed to Zowara, the Libyan coastal city near Tunisia, where he met a people smuggler. “It took me a whole month to finally get on a boat to Europe, but unfortunately it did not work. The Libyan coast guards stormed the boat and detained us all for two days and then let us go,” Hamed said, describing his first attempt.

His third and final attempt was the most bizarre and horrible of them all. On a two-level boat, the smugglers this time managed to cram in more than 730 people. “We did not expect to see this many people all at once on the same boat,” Hamed said. “After few hours of sailing in sea, the boat started to sink and water started to leak inside the boat. We started to bail the water out using buckets for at least 24 hours nonstop.” A few hours later, they noticed a helicopter in the horizon. It circled around them in the air for few minutes then left. “Right after that, we saw a ship with a Danish flag approaching us fast,” Hamed said. “While we tried to get close to it, the big ship hit the nose of our boat and made it sink even faster.” It took at least five hours to rescue people, and then only with the aid of the Maltese coast guard. Nevertheless, for some it was too late. Nine people drowned and 30 others who were in the lower level of the boat suffocated to death from the smoke from the engine and died, Hamed explained.

The rescue boat dropped them off in Catania, Sicily. “My friend and I headed to France after that, but we were caught by the French police, who took our fingerprints and sent us back to Italy,” Hamed declared. Back in Milan, they met a smuggler who took them by car and smuggled them into Germany. Once he entered Germany, he turned himself in to the German police in Dortmund.
After three months in Germany, Hamed was finally granted refugee status and became a legal resident of Germany.²

By the end of 2015 there were over 60 million persons on the move in this world, according to the UNHCR. Most of them are sheltered somewhere within their countries of origin or in neighbouring countries. Europe, which has rung the alarm about a so-called ‘refugee crisis’ since last summer, was reached by an estimated just over one million migrants in 2015. This is only a very small portion of the global number of displaced people. In 2014 “[d]eveloping countries housed over 86% of the world’s refugees, compared to 70% ten years ago.”³

Nevertheless, media and official discourse in the EU is dominated by unprecedented panic. 2015 and the first months of 2016 have witnessed a grim picture of rapidly increasing border security, increasing use of military personnel and means, and regular EU-meetings, trying to find ‘solutions’ to stop refugees coming to Europe.

Experts, human rights organizations and activists have warned time after time that militarisation of the EU external borders won’t stop desperate people from trying to enter Europe. Instead it will only force them to take more risks, including switching to ever more dangerous migration routes.

And indeed, the consequences of EU measures in recent years to ‘secure’ borders, along with an increase in migrant figures, have been more lethal than ever. The International Organization for Migration counted 3770 dead or missing migrants in the Mediterranean in 2015, noting that that year “marked the sharpest increase in arrivals to Europe and deaths in the Mediterranean.”⁴ The toll in the first five months of 2016 already amounts to 2443 more deaths.⁵ In general, these can be considered conservative estimates, as not all deaths are discovered and counted.

The EU’s response to this tragic death toll though is merely increasing border security and border control initiatives. There is little to no attention paid to the reasons people become refugees. By far the largest share of people arriving in the EU in 2015 came from the war-torn countries of Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, where European and broader western interventions and policies, including arms trade, have added to violence and chaos. Other drivers for migration are repression and human rights abuses, for example in Eritrea, another country many refugees to Europe originate from. In many countries women and LGBTQ+ people are targets for discrimination and violence.

Poverty, hunger and economic inequality are also reasons for migration. Attempts by Western media to dismiss refugees as ‘economic migrants’ or ‘fortune seekers’ disregard the inhumane consequences of an unjust global economic system and the many ways people and planet are being exploited for the benefit of a few.

Apart from extreme-right politicians, who benefits from this war on immigration? As this report shows, one of the main beneficiaries of the EU response to the current refugee tragedy have been military and security companies. A significant part of border security purchases by EU member states, and neighbouring countries, is financed through EU funding. The EU and individual member states have spent billions of euros on border security during the last decade. The military and security industry is not only a beneficiary, it increasingly shapes European border policy by constantly lobbying on border security and control policies, and for more funding for research and purchases in this field. What has emerged is a European border security industrial complex where the interests of European securocrats and the profits of military companies are increasingly aligned.

This report also shows how cynical this profiteering is, because this industry profits from both sides of the tragedy: first, from fuelling conflicts and chaos that force people to flee, and then again from trying to stop these refugees from finding safety and a liveable future. Major European arms firms such as Airbus, Finmeccanica and Thales are some of the most prominent players in this theatre of inhumanity and violations of fundamental rights.
The recent increase of refugees trying to enter Europe is not a phenomenon that came out of the blue. In the last decade the Middle East and North-Africa has been the theatre of expanding chaos, with war, violence, repression, human rights abuses and poverty becoming a reality for more and more people. The consequences of climate change also play an ever more important role in increasing the chaos and its drivers.6

While the causes and backgrounds of these crises are complex and widespread, one thing is clear: the easy availability of arms doesn’t help to prevent conflicts from further escalating. And there is no shortage of weapons in this region; rather it has been flooded with arms. Countries in the Middle East belong to the largest arms purchasers in the world. Next to the USA, the countries that make up the European Union are the most important suppliers of these arms.

Even with (partial) arms embargoes, installed by the UN and/or the EU, against Egypt, Iran, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen and against non-governmental forces in Iraq and Lebanon, EU arms exports to the region have been very significant.7 In the decade from 2005 to 2014, EU member states granted arms exports licences to the Middle East and North Africa worth over 82 billion euros (see table 1).

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are the second and third largest recipients of arms from the EU.

**TABLE 1**

**VALUE OF ARMS EXPORT LICENSES TO MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (2005-2014) IN € MILLIONS (COUNTRIES WITH >50 MILLION EUROS WORTH OF LICENSES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Value (in millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>3,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>2,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>25,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>16,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82,289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Official Journal of the European Union annual reports on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; Table: Stop Wapenhandel*
Since 2008, there has been a large increase in EU arms exports to these countries. The use of such arms to crack down on popular uprisings during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 didn’t result in more restrained arms export policies. And indeed, despite the wars in Syria and Yemen, armed conflicts in Libya, Iraq and Turkey and severe human rights abuses in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, arms exports from EU member states to the Middle-East and North Africa continue. A decrease in exports in 2014 is mostly connected to (temporary) lower spending by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, mainly caused by falling oil prices and revenues.

According to the research institute SIPRI, global arms exports to the Middle-East increased by 61 per cent between 2006-10 and 2011-15.\(^8\) In 2015 Saudi Arabia was the world’s largest arms importer, with Egypt, the UAE, Iraq, Qatar, Algeria, Israel and Turkey also in the top 20.\(^9\) Pieter Wezeman, Senior Researcher with SIPRI, predicted that “large deliveries of arms to the Middle East are scheduled to continue as part of contracts signed in the past five years.”\(^10\)

The quick rise of Daesh (also known as Islamic State) is also partly due to earlier arms exports to the Middle East. Research by Amnesty International showed that Daesh gets most of its weapons from capturing and illicitly buying from Iraqi stockpiles.\(^11\)

In general, non-governmental forces may acquire weapons in ‘illegal’ ways, but usually these arms entered the scene initially through legal channels. Dispersion of weapons, especially small arms, after the end of conflicts is a returning problem. Another example is the spread of weapons from Libya, after the fall of Gadaffi, through illicit arms exports to conflict-torn countries such as Syria and Mali.\(^12\)

Several countries in the Middle-East were involved in supplying arms to diverse parties in the Syrian war. Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates were all named as playing a role in these secretive arms flows. All are important customers of the EU arms industry. The same goes for those countries involved in the Yemen war. While there is a UN arms embargo against the non-governmental forces in this war, EU arms exports to most countries in the Saudi-led coalition (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar and the UAE) remain at high levels.
Several large international arms companies cited instability in the Middle East to assure investors about future prospects for their business.\textsuperscript{13} The arms companies are assisted by European governments, which actively promote European arms in the region and are very reluctant, to say the least, to impose stricter arms export policies. Official representatives of MENA-countries are still welcome guests at major European arms fairs for instance.

Anti-arms trade groups have been pushing for an embargo against Saudi Arabia in particular, citing UN statements on war crimes by the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen war. In February 2016, the European Parliament voted in favour of such an embargo, but the Council of the EU, which decides in these matters, didn’t act.

EU member states continue to grant export licenses for arms transfers to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the MENA region. British Prime Minister David Cameron praised British arms companies that have done business with Saudi Arabia, just hours after the embargo vote in the European Parliament. He said he was proud of the “brilliant things” British arms giant BAE Systems had sold to the country and announced the British have “got more work to do in Saudi Arabia.”\textsuperscript{14}

In 2015 BAE Systems, the largest European arms company, obtained 21.8% of its revenues from sales to Saudi Arabia. Major sales included Typhoon aircraft - in use in the war in Yemen, Hawk training aircraft and the upgrading of tracked armoured personnel carriers. BAE is also competing for four combat vehicle programme contracts in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{15}

Just like BAE Systems, the other three major European arms producers, Airbus, Finmeccanica and Thales, have offices in the Middle East and do good business there. Habib Fekih, President of Airbus Group Africa and Middle East, boasted of increasing military sales due to the conflicts in the region.\textsuperscript{16} Recently Airbus sold two air-to-air refuelling aeroplanes to Qatar, four C295W patrol and transport aircraft to Saudi Arabia and 24 military helicopters to Kuwait.\textsuperscript{17}

Finmeccanica was awarded a contract to upgrade six Royal Bahrain Naval Force ships.\textsuperscript{18} It will also deliver 28 Eurofighter Typhoons, built by a consortium with Airbus and BAE Systems, to Kuwait as part of a deal worth over 9 billion dollars.\textsuperscript{19} Another large sale is that of Kronos radar to Qatar, which will be used to monitor its airspace.\textsuperscript{20}

Some of the largest military contracts, worth over 100 million euros, for Thales in 2015 concerned Middle Eastern countries. Egypt and Qatar purchased Rafale aircraft, while two other undisclosed countries ordered unnamed ‘military equipment.’\textsuperscript{21}
EU RESPONSE TO MIGRATION: MILITARISING THE BORDERS
While the role of the EU in fuelling chaos and conflict in the Middle-East and North Africa, not in the least by continuing arms exports, is undeniable, it fails to take proper responsibility for one of the tragic consequences of the resulting violence and instability. Instead, refugees, looking for a safe place to stay with the chance of building a future life, are framed as a threat to European security and prosperity. They run against the walls of ‘Fortress Europe’, and face ever more (military) means to keep them out or get them out.

This continuing securitisation and militarisation of the borders builds on long-standing EU policies. The foundations of the current EU border security policies were laid with the signing of the Schengen Agreement in June 1985 in the eponymous village in Luxembourg. It coupled the gradual opening of internal borders within the common territory of the participating states (since the launch of the supplemental Schengen Convention of 1990 known as the ‘Schengen Area’) with robust controls at the external borders of the area. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 incorporated the Schengen treaties and rules into European Union law, obliging the member states to follow them.
Since then securing the external borders of the EU has become one of the cornerstones of its communal policies. Europe has subsequently witnessed an increase in surveillance and military patrols, particularly concerning migration routes to South Europe. Forcing migrants to choose ever more dangerous routes has turned the Mediterranean into a death trap. Most of the blame for this has been put on smugglers, but the escalating use of military means to stop migration is the main cause of migrant deaths. In another turn, the EU has been trying to cooperate with third countries to stop migrants on their way to Europe as early on their journey as possible, the so-called externalisation of the borders.

Both of these approaches are highly problematic and have been criticized by human rights institutions and organisations for their consequences, which apart from people dying on their journey include the violation of their rights, including the right to seek asylum. Their call for ‘safe routes’, through which refugees can reach Europe and exercise their rights, has fallen on deaf ears.

**‘FIGHTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION’**

The Hague Programme of 2005 set the agenda for the EU in the areas of ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’. It prioritised the “fight against all forms of illegal immigration”, naming several policy objectives that have remained building blocks of the EU’s migration policies. Those include “cooperation with third countries”, “integrated management of external borders”, “an integrated technological approach” and “improving exchange of information”.22

The European Commission stated that EUROSUR is “a process which will never stop” and will always require improvements, thereby signaling to the military and security industry the promise of an ever ongoing demand for new ‘improved’ equipment.25

At its meeting in June 2014, the European Council concluded: “The Schengen area […] and the increasing numbers of people travelling to the EU require efficient management of the EU’s common external borders to ensure strong protection. The Union must mobilise all the tools at its disposal to support the Member States in their task.”

This alarmist language has been backed-up by military-style rhetoric, framing refugees as a security threat and calling for “a robust fight against irregular migration”.26 In 2015 and 2016 the EU announced a long list of measures against ‘illegal’ immigration, rapidly increasing the military tone of its responses.

**EUNAVFOR MED**

In one week in April 2015, two ships with migrants from Libya on their way to Europe capsized, resulting in the death of hundreds of their passengers. The EU responded by announcing the military operation ‘European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean Operation Sophia’ (EUNAVFOR MED), with the aim of undertaking “systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers.”27 In other words, rather than focus on rescuing refugees, the focus was firmly put on militarily confronting smuggling networks.

The plan, with a EU budget of 11.82 million euros, consists of three phases. The first is “surveillance and assessment of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean”. The second stage moves to “the search and, if necessary, diversion of suspicious vessels.” And the final phase “would allow the disposal of vessels and related assets, preferably before use, and to apprehend traffickers and smugglers.”28
This operation marked the first overtly militaristic reaction against refugees on EU level. The Operation Plan and Rules of Engagement for EUNAVFOR Med are not public. However, Steve Peers, Professor of EU Law at the University of Essex, noted on the basis of available documents: “The EU's own military planners anticipate possible actions on the ground, and a high risk of loss of life of smugglers, military personnel and migrants.”

EUNAVFOR MED has been criticised by human rights organizations as well as military experts. Judith Sunderland, acting deputy director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, said: “[M]ilitary action could expose migrants and asylum seekers to serious risks. Saving lives at sea and bringing people at risk in the Mediterranean safely to EU shores should be the top priority.”

Despite this, the EU moved forward. At the end of July 2015 the first phase of EUNAVFOR MED was fully operational, with four ships, two planes and three helicopters, provided by France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK. “After having achieved all the objectives of the first phase in terms of intelligence gathering, training and deployment”, the operation entered the second phase in October. In January 2016 the EU said “68 boats have been removed from illegal organisations’ availability” as a result of the operation.

In his report on the EUNAVFOR MED operation in 2015, Operation Commander Enrico Credendino, of the Italian Navy, proposes supporting the capacity-building of the Libyan Coastguard, which should take over border control when the EU mission ends, “in exchange for their cooperation in tackling the irregular migration issue.”

**ARMED FORCES AT THE BORDERS**

The militarisation of border security, through the use of military means and personnel, has been going on for years. From the start of the so called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 many countries, especially at the southeastern border of the EU, began to deploy armed forces for border control. Today, the so-called ‘Balkan Route’, the most used way for migrants to West and North Europe, has been almost completely sealed off with thousands of people stuck in dire circumstances in Greece and Macedonia.

In May 2015, Bulgaria sent soldiers to its border with Macedonia, fearing internal turmoil in that country could lead to a wave of refugees. In August it again deployed 25 soldiers and light armoured vehicles to this border, to support border police, although joint patrols weren’t expected. In October an Afghan refugee was killed by Bulgarian border officers. Human Rights Watch documented dozens of other cases of police and military violence against migrants.

Macedonian armed forces used tear gas and stun grenades to stop refugees from entering the country from Greece. Gauri van Gulik, Europe deputy director of Amnesty said: “[T]his kind of paramilitary response is an unacceptable pushback in violation of international law.”

Hungary displayed a similar hard line by adopting a new law allowing the army to use rubber bullets, tear gas and net guns against migrants at its borders. Meanwhile, Serbia announced it could use its army to stop refugees being sent back from Hungary.

In Slovenia, the government also called in the military and hired private security guards to join the border police in patrolling its border with Croatia. Boštjan Šefic, state secretary at the interior ministry, announced that fifty to sixty guards would assist the police at the border.

Austria, Croatia, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic also deployed military personnel to assist with border security. Further down migration routes to Europe, Egyptian armed forces have a shoot to kill-policy against refugees trying to cross its border. Sudanese refugees were killed on at least two occasions in the autumn of 2015. Egyptian border guards also killed an eight-year-old Syrian girl, while firing on a boat with refugees leaving for Europe, following similar incidents in recent years.

**NATO ASSISTANCE**

NATO patrol ships in the Mediterranean initially played a low key role in assisting Frontex border security missions, but have stepped up to a more active role.
In February 2016, responding to a joint request by Germany, Greece and Turkey, NATO decided that its Standing Maritime Group number 2, already active in the region, would start conducting reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance in the Aegean Sea, directly coordinating with Frontex. One month later, five ships from various NATO member states expanded their patrolling mission into Turkish and Greek waters, sharing information with the Turkish and Greek Coast Guards and Frontex. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on one occasion claimed that “NATO ships are not in the Aegean Sea to stop or push back boats with migrants and refugees”, but also made it clear that “in case of rescue at sea of persons coming via Turkey, they will be taken back to Turkey.” Human rights organizations criticised this push back-policy, a clear violation of international law, which gives refugees the right to have their application for protection assessed in an EU member state.

Meanwhile, NATO’s military commander in Europe, US General Philip Breedlove, made the unsupported claim that “Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponising migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve.”

BORDER FENCES AND DRONES

Many EU countries now have fortified borders. Initially built between Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece and Turkey, and around the Spanish territories Ceuta and Mellila in North Africa, they have now expanded to the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Steve Wright, Reader in the School of Social Sciences at Leeds Beckett and a long-time researcher on border technologies says that “the hi-tech border fences become political theatre, symbolizing that the authorities are tackling this critical problem”, warning that “the scope of activity will slowly creep beyond existing borders using surveillance and robotics to create more targeted early warning and deterrence capacities.”

The military and security industry is sure to profit. A border fence is not just a fence. As Wright et al sum up: “The border-exclusion technologies deployed against unauthorised migrants include concrete walls, virtual walls, monitoring and sniper towers, cameras, land radars and wireless telecommunication infrared surveillance, carbon-dioxide probes, information technology, identification systems and immigration databases.”

They warn about a future where (semi-) autonomous systems are used to target migrants. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) for surveillance is already on its way. Border security authorities in the EU are certainly keen on this, but are currently restricted by complex sets of airspace regulations. In February 2016, Finland announced it will test drones to monitor its border with Russia, following the growth of numbers of migrants trying to enter the EU after long journeys northwards through Russia. Also, by the end of this year the use of drones to monitor maritime borders by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) is foreseen. EMSA will outsource operations of the UAVs to a service provider, to be selected through a public tendering process.

FROM FRONTEX TO A EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY

The EU agency for the protection of the external borders, Frontex, was established in 2004. Its main task is coordinating border security efforts of the EU member states and supporting them, sometimes through joint (naval) operations. In the aftermath of several large shipwrecking incidents, with hundreds of migrants dying, such operations, and increased border security measures in general, were presented as the means to prevent people from dying at sea.

However, Frontex Executive Director Fabrio Leggeri was more honest about the real goals, saying that focussing on rescuing refugees would only play into the hands of traffickers. And similar arguments have been made by many European politicians. It blatantly contradicts the evidence provided by researchers and activists who have been saying for years that it’s exactly the increase of border controls and the militarization of border security, thereby denying refugees safe routes to reach Europe, that traffickers profit from. According to Hein de Haas, professor of migration studies at the
University of Amsterdam and former director of the International Migration Institute at Oxford University, “[l]ots of money goes into border controls, but this does not address the causes of migration. Instead, it helps two groups, the smugglers and the migration control industry, while the suffering and border deaths among migrants and refugees increase.”\textsuperscript{60} In other words, the consequences of this policy of failing to provide safe routes is not so much a deterrent as a death sentence for many desperate refugees.

For its operational work, Frontex was completely dependant on personnel and equipment provided by the member states. This was a problem, because member states were notoriously reluctant in pledging assets and in meeting their commitments.\textsuperscript{61} Although since September 2011 Frontex was allowed to buy or lease its own equipment, this never really got off the ground, save for some trials.\textsuperscript{62} In February 2016, Leggeri even mooted the hiring of private firms for Frontex-supported border control work in Greece, given a shortage in personnel provided by member states.\textsuperscript{63}

In the second half of 2015, the European Commission presented plans to replace Frontex with a more robust new institution, a European Border and Coast Guard Agency.\textsuperscript{64} The mandate of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency would differ from that of Frontex in adding some fundamental points, giving it more means of its own and more control over member states’ efforts:

- a supervisory role in assessing the border security capacities of member states, culminating in a binding decision to take measures to strengthen these;
- the possibility of direct interventions in a member state, even without the consent of this member state, by decision of the European Commission;
- a mandatory pooling of border guards, by establishing a rapid reserve pool, for which member states have to cede personnel;
- setting up its own technical equipment pool, by buying equipment itself or in co-ownership with a member state, and being able to claim means of transport and operating equipment bought by member states with money from the Internal Security Fund;
- direct participation in the management of research and innovation activities, including for the use of drones, more advanced surveillance technology and systems to exchange information (as also foreseen under the EUROSUR regulations);
- cooperating with the European Fisheries Control Agency and the European Maritime Safety Agency in providing multi-purpose services to national authorities;
- increased cooperation with third countries, including joint operations (including on the territory of third countries) and the deployment of liaison officers.

The proposal also clearly foresees the use of arms: “While performing their tasks and exercising their powers, members of the team shall be authorised to use force, including service weapons, ammunition and equipment.”\textsuperscript{65}

<table>
<thead>
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<th>TABLE 3</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BUDGET FRONTEX (IN MILLIONS OF EUROS)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>118.2</td>
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<td>Total: 1095</td>
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The budget of Frontex was increased several times during 2015. The budget finally adopted for 2016 is even an astonishing 67% higher than that for 2015. According to the proposal for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, this will be the minimum budget for the new agency in the coming years. For 2017 an extra 31.5 million euros have been requested, including 10 million euros to purchase small and medium size operational equipment.

If the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency proceeds, this would mean a fundamental shift to an EU-controlled system of border security, with the possibility of bypassing the member states and forcing them to strengthen controls and purchase or upgrade equipment. It is not hard to predict that this will lead refugees to use increasingly dangerous
routes, strengthening the business case for traffickers. For the military and security industry, however it means the prospect of more orders from the agency itself and from member states.

**EXTERNALIZING EU BORDERS**

A long-standing policy of the EU is trying to stop refugees before they reach Europe’s borders, known as the ‘externalization’ of its borders. For this the EU works together with third countries, notably in Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, letting them play the role of border guard outposts. In October 2013, Catherine Ashton, then the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, stated: “It is [...] in the EU’s interest to help build the capacities of third States to control their own territory, manage flows of people and goods and address their respective security challenges.”66

However, according to the Red Cross “[f]rom a humanitarian perspective the effects of externalisation are worrying. On the ground level, the journey to the EU has become increasingly dangerous adding even further to migrants’ vulnerabilities. At policy level, the scarcity of legal ways to access the EU makes it more difficult for vulnerable migrants to reach the EU safely and exercise their legal rights.”67

The way the EU persuades third countries to take on their role as outposts has sometimes been perceived as a form of blackmail or bribery.68 A senior diplomat involved in negotiations between the EU and African governments on border security stated that most African governments “say it’s all about Europe externalising and outsourcing its own problems.”69

EU funding of border security programmes and purchases of equipment is part of this outsourcing process. The recently released EUROSUR Handbook, for example, includes strengthening third countries’ capacities through “programmes co-financed by EU and international funds” and “donating assets and technical assistance”, as well as “[t]raining for third-country authorities in border control activities”.70

Another way of supporting third countries’ border security capacities is through permissive application of arms export regulations. In summer 2015, the Dutch government granted a 34 million euro export license to Thales Nederland for the delivery of radar and C3-systems to Egypt, to be used on corvettes imported from France, even though it admitted that grave human right violations take place in Egypt. One of the reasons given by the Dutch government for granting the export license to Thales is the role the Egyptian navy plays in stopping ‘illegal’ immigration to Europe.71

**DEAL WITH TURKEY**

A prominent recent example of the externalization of borders is the deal between the EU and Turkey. In November 2015, a Joint Action Plan was agreed aimed at cooperation on ‘migration management’. In short: the EU promised to give Turkey three billion euros to step up border security, re-admit refugees that entered the EU from Turkey and to shelter Syrian refugees.

Closer cooperation between Turkey and Frontex is part of the Joint Action Plan. Measures to be taken by Turkey include the strengthening of “the interception capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard, notably by upgrading its surveillance equipment, increasing its patrolling activity and search and rescue capacity, including through stepping up cooperation with EU Member States.” From its side, the EU promised to support Turkey in “reinforcing the Turkish Coast Guard patrolling and surveillance capacity as well as other relevant Turkish authorities”.72

In January 2016, Turkey’s Under-Secretariat for Defence Industries released a Request for Information (RFI) to integrate subsystems into a coast guard aircraft, a Beechcraft King Air 350ER, for maritime surveillance operations, including border security missions. No less than 25 companies, including Finmeccanica, responded to this request.73 Earlier Turkey had announced it would build a border security system at its border with Syria. “We may have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on this in the next few years”, an official stated.74
Regarding the Joint Action Plan, European Commission Vice President Timmermans said that “[t]he only benchmark of course are the figures going down”, showing a complete disregard for the safety and wellbeing of refugees.75 In January 2016, he stated that he wasn’t satisfied with Turkey’s efforts: “The numbers are still way too high in Greece, between 2,000–3,000 people (arriving) every day. We cannot be satisfied at this stage”.76 A month later, Frontex Executive Director Leggeri also said that Turkey wasn’t doing enough and needed to install “more stringent border controls”.77

While the EU complained that Turkey should do more to stop migration, human rights organisations rang the alarm about its crackdown on refugees since the signing of the migration deal. Amnesty International noted a sharp increase in unlawful detention and deportation in and from Turkey and warned that the “[p]roposed cooperation between Turkey and EU member states to police the border and prevent irregular crossings is likely to result in more people risking their lives in attempts at longer and still more dangerous sea routes.”78

Refugees also reported increasing violence against them by the Turkish coast guard.79 Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty documented cases of violence against Syrian refugees, including shooting at them to keep them from entering Turkey.80 According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 16 refugees from Syria, including three children, were shot between December 2015 and March 2016 when they tried to cross the border into Turkey.81

In March 2016, the EU and Turkey stepped up their cooperation with an even more controversial agreement, focusing on “the return of all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey.”82 The new deal, which also includes an extra three billion euros support for Turkey, was once again heavily criticised by the UN and by human rights organizations. Human Rights Watch called it a “new low”, that puts the “very principle of international protection for those fleeing war and persecution at stake”.83 Amnesty reported mass forced returns of Syrian and Afghan refugees from Turkey, illegal under Turkish, EU and international law.84

Many aid organisations, including UNHCR, Doctors Without Borders and Oxfam, suspended their work in Greek refugee centres turned into prisons, refusing to become part of a deal they deem to be ‘unfair and inhumane’ and contrary to international law.85

Many experts also doubt the practicability of the measures agreed upon, saying it’s impossible to completely seal off the borders. In addition, tightening border control between Turkey and the rest of Europe may just lead to shifting migration routes, for example Egypt and Libya, again forcing refugees to make more dangerous journeys.

SELLING MILITARIZATION AS A HUMANITARIAN EFFORT

The EU has shown a Janus face in selling the rapid militarisation of its borders: on the one hand emphasising the tough stance in sealing of its borders and on the other hand claiming it to be a humanitarian effort, in terms of strengthening search and rescue capacities.

Rejecting responsibility both for its contributing role in causing people to flee, by fuelling conflict and chaos, and for the consequences of its military response to migration, the EU has repeatedly tried to put all the blame for refugee deaths on traffickers. This has resulted in narrowing its response to ‘taking away the business model of smugglers’, with even more military means to try to accomplish this. This creates a downward spiral: the greater the controls and the more the repression, the greater the risks refugees are forced to take resulting in more deaths.86

In an analysis for the European Parliament (EP) even the Policy Department of its Directorate-General for External Policies in March 2014 had to acknowledge that “it is unclear whether the militarisation of EU border management will actually save lives or create even more danger for migrants”, advising to “steer away from excessively militarised and security-centred approaches.”87 Sound advice, that seems to have been largely ignored.
LOBBING FOR BUSINESS
The arms industry plays a significant role in formulating the foreign and security policy agenda of the EU. Researcher Frank Slijper (Stop Wapenhandel) noted already in 2004 that “[t]he arms industry is deeply rooted in Brussels' decision-making circles. It is of concern that its ability to set the terms of debate and shape the direction of policy can only be expected to grow in the coming years”. Two years later researcher Ben Hayes of Statewatch concluded after investigating the EU Security research programme that on the EU-level “[s]pawned by the military-industrial complex, the security-industrial complex has developed as the traditional boundaries between external security (military) and internal security (security services) and law enforcement (policing) have eroded.”

In a follow-up report, Hayes showed how Europe's largest defence and IT giants were setting the agenda for security-based research in Europe and winning most of the contracts. According to Hayes, “the European Security Research Programme continues to be shaped by prominent transnational defence and security corporations”, leading to “the rapid development of a powerful new ‘interoperable’ European surveillance system that will be used for civilian, commercial, police, security and defence purposes alike.” Border security is an important pillar of this system. Hayes revealed the deep involvement of industry in for example the development of EUROSUR and of autonomous border control systems, also on a political and strategic level. The €20 million TALOS project, for example, sought to develop and field test “a mobile, modular, scalable, autonomous and adaptive system for protecting European borders” using both aerial and ground unmanned vehicles, supervised by a command and control centre”. According to the TALOS project contract, these specially adapted combat robots “will undertake the proper measures to stop the illegal action almost autonomously with supervision of border guard officers”.

In 2011 Malte Luehmann of Brussels NGO Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) warned that the “loose alliance between policy makers and industry has [...] contributed to a worrying expansion of the EU's defence and security structures in terms of decision-making powers, staff and organisational capabilities, and to the overall militarisation of its foreign policy.” He also argued that “the privileged access of industry to European policy-making process through the security and defence community, and the almost complete absence of civil society representation raise serious issues about democracy in the EU.”

Against this background it is not surprising, yet nevertheless hardly known among the wider public, that lobbying by the military and security industry has been highly influential in the shaping of the border and migration policies of the EU, especially the securitisation and militarisation of these.

As Danish researcher Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Centre for Advanced Migration Studies at the University of Copenhagen) wrote: “PSCs [Private Security Companies] establish themselves
as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced PSC products. What he calls “the securitised transformation of Europe’s borderscapes” has clear consequences for refugees, who, looked upon as a threat, are increasingly denied access to asylum and face other violations of their rights as human beings.

**LOBBY ORGANISATIONS**

The most important and influential lobby organisations of the EU military and security industry are the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD; presided by Mauro Moretti, CEO of Finmeccanica) and the think-tank Friends of Europe, whose ‘Security Europe’-policy area has incorporated the former think-tank Security and Defence Agenda (SDA).

EOS has been the most active on the issue of border security. According to Lemberg-Pedersen it is a “comprehensive tool with which PSCs seek to influence the common European border politics so as to create a demand for their products.” In general, the industrial lobby in this field seems to focus more on surveillance, technology and information sharing rather than on the use of traditional military means.

**EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY (EOS)**

EOS is the lobby organisation of the European security industry. Its main objective is “the development of a harmonized European security market.”


Chairman of the Board of Directors: Santiago Roura (Indra)

Vice-chairmen of the Board of Directors: Andrea Biraghi (Selex ES (Finmeccanica)) / Mark Miller (Conceptivity)

CEO: Luigi Rebuffi (former Thales)

EOS has identified ‘border security’ as one of the main areas of concern in the field of European security. It has two working groups on border control issues:

- The Working Group on Border Surveillance is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of Selex ES, an Italian electronics and information technology business focused on the defence and security sector, that is a part of Finmeccanica.
- The Working Group on Smart Borders is co-chaired by Olivier Touret of Morpho, a French company specialised in electronic security and identity solutions, part of Safran, and Yves Lagoude of Thales.

The Working Group on Border Surveillance strives to “establish an industrial roadmap and plan investments so that the further deployment of EUROSUR and the others surveillance systems at European level can be better supported”. And, of course, it also wants more funding, for example “using the ISF [Internal Security Fund, see next chapter] also to support pilots and Pre Commercial Procurement (PCP)”. It claims to work together with the European Commission on a regular basis concerning EUROSUR, maritime security and other border surveillance issues.

EOS has organised several meetings between industry and EU officials and politicians on border security and issued some papers with recommendations. Quite a few proposals of EOS during the last years have eventually, mostly in...
a trickled-down version, been reflected in EU policy. The mutual influence between industry and EU bodies in developing policies forms one of the cornerstones of the border security industrial complex.

In September 2010 EOS proposed the creation of “an EU level Border Guards capability able of supporting MS interventions, providing resources in case of crisis with a capability for basin-wide monitoring, directly operated by Frontex and using, where appropriate, aerial visualization.” That sounds a lot like the European Border and Coast Guard discussed above.

At the conference ‘A new partnership for European security’, organized by SDA and EOS in February 2011, Jean-Louis De Brouwer (Director for Migration and Borders, Directorate General for Home Affairs of the EU) already raised the idea that Frontex be charged with global procurement and equipping member states in the future. Earlier, EOS had proposed for Frontex to be “a relevant interlocutor for the supply industry sector.”

While this approach has not been completely adopted, the direction of it can be found back in the proposal for the new agency, that gives it the possibility to buy its own equipment and to interfere with which equipment member states purchase.

The same goes for another recommendation of EOS, from a paper of May 2010, that focuses on “interoperability and information sharing across countries and stakeholders of different sectors (defence, border control, customs, marine pollution, fisheries control, maritime safety and security, vessel traffic management, accident and disaster response, search and rescue as well as law enforcement) for an improved situational awareness within the EU and the Member States [...]”

Similarly the proposal for regulation for a European Border and Coast Guard suggests the new agency should strengthen its cooperation with the European Fisheries Control Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency and national authorities carrying out coast guard functions.

EOS also continuously lobbied for the establishment of an “EU Internal Security Fund”, which was already foreseen in the EU Stockholm Programme and indeed was set up for the period 2014-2020 (see next chapter). They also proposed several other measures supporting or creating profit opportunities for industry support, including EU support for “the deployment of EU competitive solutions in a wider external approach for EU borders surveillance.”

In a letter to the European Council and European Commission, in November 2013, EOS blames a perceived lack of investments on EU level for “hampering Europeans’ ability to address crises and to develop responses to mounting security challenges”, including “irregular migration”. It concludes that “more should be done to increase the protection of our citizens and assets”, especially measures to improve “the competitiveness of the European Security Industry at global level” and more funding. Furthermore, it wants the private sector to get access to maritime surveillance data gathered under the EU’s Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE).

EOS puts a lot of emphasis on EUROSUR, and data sharing in general, with harmonisation between member states and expansion being core objectives to get more funding. The role in EUROSUR the industry envisions for itself was echoed by Cecilia Malmström, then European Commissioner for Home Affairs, during a roundtable organised by EOS in February 2011: “In EUROSUR the industry plays an important role. Its technical expertise is extremely valid to detect needed technologies. We still need more P-P [public-private] cooperation to better detail the systems.”

MEP Christian Ehler (European’s People Party), a staunch supporter of the military and security industry, wanted to go even further, using ‘border control’ as the showcase to promote EU industry on a global level.
Thinktank SDA hosted roundtables on border security in 2006 (‘Borders & People: The liberty and security balance’) and 2010 (‘Fine-tuning EU border security’). Typically, speakers at these roundtables were (EU) officials rather than industry representatives.

In 2006 Jacques Vermorel, then Head of the Research Technology and Industrial Outreach Section of NATO, already predicted the occasional use of military forces for border security. Industry lobbyist and then MEP Karl von Wogau (European People’s Party) argued for increased funding for ‘integrated border management’ and asked for more industry input. Ilkka Laitinen, then Executive Director of Frontex, and Kristian Bartholin, of DG JUST of the European Commission, also promoted ‘integrated border management’, with ‘common systems and procedures’ as the ultimate aim of EU border security policies.

**TABLE 4
INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS IN EOS AND SDA ROUNDTABLES AND CONFERENCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>EU bodies represented**</th>
<th>Member States Authorities represented</th>
<th>Airbus</th>
<th>Avio</th>
<th>Ales &amp; MF Syst</th>
<th>Engineering</th>
<th>Finmeccanica</th>
<th>Fraunhofer</th>
<th>GEC</th>
<th>Indra</th>
<th>Saab</th>
<th>Safran</th>
<th>Siemens</th>
<th>Smiths</th>
<th>Thales</th>
<th>TNO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDA Roundtable ‘Borders &amp; People’ 24 April 2006</td>
<td>EC, EDA, EUMS, Frontex, 1 MEP</td>
<td>Germany UK</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDA Roundtable ‘Fine-tuning EU border security’ 29 September 2010</td>
<td>CoE, EC, (3 Comm), EDA, EP</td>
<td>Belgium France Luxembourg Malta The Netherlands UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOS High Level Security Roundtable 9 February 2011</td>
<td>CoE, EC, EDA, Europol, 1 MEP</td>
<td>France Hungary Italy The Netherlands UK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOS-SDA Conference ‘New partnership for European Security’ 10 February 2011</td>
<td>CoE, ENISA, EC, EC-JRC, ECo, EDA, EP, EUMS, 3 MEPs</td>
<td>Austria Belgium Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Poland Romania Sweden UK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOS High Level Security Roundtable 21 March 2012</td>
<td>CoE, EC, (4 Comm), EDA, Europol, Frontex, 5 MEPs</td>
<td>France Germany UK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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* See Annex 1 for full list of industrial participants

** CoE = Council of the EU, EC = European Commission, EC-JRC = EC Joint Research Centre, ECo = European Council, EDA = European Defence Agency, EP = European Parliament, EUMS = EU Military Staff, MEP = Member of European Parliament / Comm = European Commissioners

Companies also have their own lobbyists in Brussels. Although there are no specific figures available on their efforts on the topic of border security and border control, the EU Transparency Register gives some insight into the overall lobbying carried out by companies and lobby organisations. Participation in the register is not obligatory, although the main players in the border security field do participate. Over the last five years (see Annex 2), Airbus has spent at least 7.5 million euros on lobbying, Finmeccanica and Thales each have spent over 1 million euros, Indra almost 1.5 million euros and Safran over 2 million euros. Lobby organisation ASD has spent about 3.5 million euros, while EOS has spent at least 1.2 million euros.
FRONTEX AND INDUSTRY

Frontex has a close connection with the military and security industry. While the lobby to influence or create new policies and funding is aimed at the decision makers in the EU bureaucracy (and national administrations), as exemplified by EOS, Frontex as an actor in the field is constantly contacted by industry representatives with all kinds of proposals, often suggesting a meeting to discuss them further. In recent years, a lot of these proposals focus on offering surveillance and/or detection equipment. UAVs are also promoted regularly, although Frontex recently said, mainly because of legal restrictions, that it doesn't foresee their use in the near future for its operations. Prior to this, it had shown a keen interest in their possibilities for border security applications.

In the last few years, Frontex has declined most requests for one-on-one meetings, referring companies to its biannual industry days or letting them know they would be contacted when Frontex identifies “any need in the scope of the products of your company”.

This general answer is also given in reply to proposals that should have been dismissed immediately. German company Wiesel Defence offered “non-lethal solutions” to deal with “problems with refugees on land and on water”. Bulgarian company Prono, fully owned by the Bulgarian state, went further and suggested the use of a “system for amplification of state border protection”, “recording and reporting attempts for illegal penetration across the state border.” Its offer scarly includes “manageable or automatic non-lethal impact and manageable lethal influence on offenders without requiring constant monitoring by qualified personnel”. The proposal also says that “if requested ammo with non-lethal effects could be replaced by ammunition with lethal effects”.

Frontex is asked regularly to be a partner in EU-funded R&T projects (see next chapter). It denies all those requests though, because it is sometimes “part in the evaluation committee as evaluators of the European funded project proposals”. Once a project is selected for funding, however, “Frontex could potentially participate [...] as advisor or as (representative of) end-user(s).” Frontex indeed is frequently involved in R&T projects on border security.

While there is a close relationship between them, it becomes clear from email exchanges that Frontex isn't always a willing plaything for industry. It is quite strict in adhering to procedures and deadlines. And it doesn't seem eager to facilitate industry requests beyond the scopes it has decided upon.

In general Frontex and industry are in some kind of perpetual dance, sometimes with objectives going the same way, other times with a subtle battle on whose interests come first. It remains to be seen how relations between industry and the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency will evolve. With more opportunities to purchase its own equipment, and to urge member states to buy additional equipment, the agency is likely to become an even bigger target for lobbying and marketing than Frontex is now.

MEETINGS BETWEEN FRONTEX AND INDUSTRY

In March 2014 Frontex announced a new procedure for meetings with industry, concentrating those meetings into biannual industry days and ad hoc workshops on special subjects. In a mail to German company OHB System, a Frontex official explains that “due to the fact that we have an important number of requests for meetings from the industry's side, we decided to group them in 2–3 yearly events, based on topics relevant for border control and the interest of our experts.”

Before this a lot of meetings were organised on a case-by-case basis, with company representatives visiting the Frontex headquarters in Warsaw. Since the start of the new procedure, the only company that was granted a separate meeting, as far as email traffic shows, was DCNS, which in 2015 was invited to present the results of the EU-funded FP7 I2C and PERSEUS border security R&T-projects.
For the industry days, “selection of the submitted proposals [...] take[s] place taking due account of the novelty and potential impact of the company’s products and services for the border guard community”. Both large companies and SMEs get invitations. Apart from Frontex representatives, “[e]xperts from the Member States Border Guard Authorities [are] also invited to take part.”

In 2014 and 2015 at least seven coordinated meetings between Frontex and industry took place (see Annex 3 for an overview with participating companies). Important players in the border security market, such as Airbus, Finmeccanica, Indra, Safran and Thales, were regular participants.

For 2016 Frontex planned four workshops for industry and academia:

- “on a Frontex consultation on the potential for industry provision of ‘deployable support to external border crossing registration’”
- “on highly innovative/cutting edge technologies, applications, products for border security”
- “on projects/ideas for developing border security products/technologies/solutions”
- “on methodologies/methods, procedures, best practices on investigating/testing/evaluating border security technologies”

With such wide-ranging open invitations, Frontex essentially wants companies to showcase their products and services in a way that suggests border security has become very much a supply-driven market.

**SECURITY FAIRS AS MEETING POINTS**

Denying a meeting request from Safran, a Frontex official noted that “ED [Executive Director Leggeri] visited the Safran Hall in Paris Le Bourget exhibition in 2015”, as requested by Safran earlier. Frontex presence at such events is quite common. In general, industry representatives, government officials and military and security personnel meet around the year at conferences, fairs and round tables. According to International Security Professor Nick Vaughan-Williams (University of Warwick): “At these events it is possible to identify a cyclical culture whereby the presentation of new technologies not only responds to, but also enables and drives the formulation of new policies and practices in the field of border security and migration management.”

In March 2016 the UK Government hosted the annual ‘Security and Policing’ event at Farnborough, a secretive fair aimed at law enforcement, police and security professionals. Airbus, BAE Systems and Finmeccanica were present as exhibitors. Attendees must be vetted by the UK Home Office, with the fair organisers claiming that “the event enables exhibitors to display products which would be too sensitive to show in a more open environment.”

The British Government shows little restraint in its invitation policies. For this event it invited official delegations from dozens of countries, including many which are involved in war, conflicts and repression in the Middle-East: Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. According to Andrew Smith of the British Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT): “By continuing to arm and support dictatorships and human rights abusers, the UK government is only helping to fuel and facilitate this oppression.”

And thereby fuelling the refugee tragedy as well. Ironically, for the companies present at the fair that means just another profit opportunity. Many of them emphasised their ‘solutions’ for border security, with the fair providing a special arena for them to demonstrate their equipment in this field.

Another important European fair, the Border Security Conference and Expo, had its ninth edition in Rome in February 2016. Speakers included Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri, several representatives of EU (member states’) border security authorities and some from the industry. The European Association for Biometrics organized a workshop on the use of
biometrics for border security as a side event.\textsuperscript{122} Industrial attendees at the editions of 2014 and 2015 included Airbus, Fraunhofer, Indra, Safran and Thales, as well as American arms giants Northrop Grumman and Rockwell Collins.\textsuperscript{123}

In May 2016 the fourth edition of the Border Management & Technologies Summit took place in Ankara in Turkey. It focuses on security at the South-eastern European borders, with “government officials from Turkey, Hungary, Croatia, Kosovo, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia” present. Airbus is one of the sponsors of the summit, which also has an exhibition for officials to “network with key border security vendors”.

In December the World Borderpol Congress takes places for the fifth time, in Athens, Greece. In its last gathering in December 2015 in The Hague (The Netherlands) the Congress described itself as “the only multi-jurisdictional transnational platform where the border protection, management and security industry policy-makers and practitioners convene annually to discuss the international challenges faced in protecting borders, received over 150 delegates from more than 47 countries for the most successful Congress to date.”\textsuperscript{124} The congress consists of both an exhibition and a conference, with speakers from border security authorities and security industry from all over the world.\textsuperscript{125}

These special fairs and congresses on border security are relatively new; they all started within the last decade. In general, border security plays an increasingly important role in general military and security fairs and other meetings, providing a meeting place for an upcoming, developing and expanding market.
EU FUNDING FOR BORDER SECURITY AND BORDER CONTROL
The importance the EU attaches to control at its external borders is echoed in its funding of border security measures by both member states and third countries. Using several funding instruments, billions of euros are dispersed to buy equipment, services and training. EU-funded research and technology (R&T) programmes also spend substantial amounts of money on border security-related projects.

It is impossible to determine what the total EU, and individual member states’, financing for border security amounts to. Of a total planned six-year budget of 960 billion euros for the EU from 2014 to 2020 the field ‘security and citizenship’, which includes border security, accounts for roughly 1.5%. What is clear, however, is that the budget for border security is increasing very rapidly, including extra funding announced on an ad hoc-basis.

**FUNDING FOR (CANDIDATE) MEMBER STATES**

Since 2004 the EU has financed a huge amount of projects from one or more member states, aimed at reinforcing border security and border control or other measures to stop irregular immigration. While far from being the only ways through which such funding takes place, there were three major funding instruments for these goals:

The Schengen Facility (total budget: 1.46 billion euros) was a temporary instrument (2004–2006) that funded border security measures in seven new EU member states with external borders, to make them comply with Schengen requirements. Such measures included purchasing operating equipment (patrol vehicles, IT systems, radio equipment). Border surveillance and IT systems accounted for 74% of total spending.126

Bulgaria and Romania had their own programmes from 2007 to 2009. For Bulgaria this included “the purchase of three helicopters, nine vessels and [...] the setting-up of an integrated system for the control and surveillance of the Black Sea border consisting of fixed and mobile observation posts equipped with radars, cameras and communication equipment.” Romania “purchased 33 vessels, 1278 vehicles and equipment for border surveillance and border checks”.128

The Schengen Facility for Croatia started in 2013 and will run to July 2016. As of January 2016 Croatia had used it to buy 240 vehicles, ten vessels and two helicopters as well as to upgrade its communication and IT system.129

The External Borders Fund (EBF; total budget: 1.70 billion euros) ran from 2007 to 2013. It was aimed at working towards a “common integrated border management system”, with an emphasis on “development and implementation of the national components” of EUROSUR, and “tackling illegal immigration”.130

Member state ‘actions’ eligible for funding included those relating to “surveillance infrastructures at external borders and at border crossing points, surveillance equipment, means of transport, investments in state-of-the-art technology, personnel training and exchanges
and data-exchange equipment and systems.” Non-member states Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, which are part of the Schengen Area, also got funding from the EBF, while Ireland and the UK, which opted-out of Schengen, didn’t.

The Internal Security Fund – Borders and Visa (ISF; total budget: 1.32 billion euros) runs from 2014 to 2020. Its objective concerning borders is “achieving a uniform and high level of control of the external borders by supporting integrated borders management, harmonising border management measures within the Union and sharing information among EU States, and between EU States and Frontex, in order to halt irregular migration and ensure the smooth crossing of the external borders.” ‘Actions’ up for funding include “setting up and running IT systems” and “acquisition of operational equipment”. Funding goes to the same countries as mentioned for the EBF.

Total EU funding for member state border security measures under these three instruments adds up to almost 4.5 billion euros from 2004 on:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Schengen Facility</th>
<th>EBF</th>
<th>ISF-Borders</th>
<th>Total (millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>207.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>195.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>34.5</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>14.4</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>125.9</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>51.8</td>
<td>127.9</td>
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<td>166.8</td>
<td>374.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>59.3</td>
<td>253.8</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>406.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15.5</td>
<td>111.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>24.7</td>
<td>206.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>124.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>283.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>397</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>301.2</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>421.9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>73.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>30.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td>484.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community / Specific Actions</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>106.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union actions and emergency assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1461.5</td>
<td>1701.3</td>
<td>4482.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Several candidate-EU member states also received funding for migration-related activities, under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA (2007–2003) and IPA II (2014–2020). The total funding so far has been 604.9 million euros, with Turkey getting over three-quarters of this (469 million euros). Other recipients are Serbia (54 million euros), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (24 million euros), Bosnia & Herzegovina (16.8 million euros), Montenegro (22.6 million euros), Albania (16.8 million euros) and Kosovo (1.7 million euros).137

As of yet there is no current overview of what the member states spend the EU-funding on. An ‘Ex-post evaluation of the External Borders Fund for the period 2007–2010’ gives some indication of both spending and the importance of the Fund. According to this report, 13 member states stated they have “no alternative to the EBF as a funding source for their external border management” and in general “many actions would have been impossible or less effective without the EBF.”

Spending on measures related to the surveillance of EU external borders constitutes 42% of the total spending of 546 million euros during these years. Equipment purchased or upgraded with EBF funding includes 545 border surveillance systems, 22,347 items of operating equipment for border surveillance and 212,881 items of operating equipment for border checks. Also purchased were 3,153 ‘means of transport, including “cars, mostly in Italy and Greece (2,629), motorcycles (172, of which 148 in Greece), boats (61), patrol vessels (43), helicopters (34) and aeroplanes (5). Norway used the EBF to modernise its entire fleet of snowmobiles (8), all-terrain vehicles (7) and trailers (3). Lithuania bought 100 bicycles and Romania 12 tractors for maintenance of the external border.”138

Recently several EU member states have published their plans for ‘actions’ to be funded by the ISF. Those plans include purchasing transport means, surveillance equipment, UAVs, IT systems, other technological equipment (including for biometric checks) and spending on integrating in the EUROSUR network.139 The ‘National Programme’ of Greece, for instance, mentions planned spending on integrated surveillance systems for land and maritime borders, modern technological equipments (mobile scan units, CCTV camera systems), UAVs, six Coastal Patrol Vessels and equipment for use in Frontex joint operations, including a ‘Thermal Vision Vehicle’.140

Belgium, as an example of a country not on the external borders of the EU, named “the development of EUROSUR and the upgrading and maintenance of modern technologies at the border” as some of the key issues in its plans for ISF-funded actions.141

FUNDING THIRD COUNTRIES’ BORDER SECURITY

Connected to the externalization of the borders of the EU, the Commission also funds border security measures in third countries, notably in North Africa and Eastern Europe. There is a vast array of bilateral and multilateral agreements, support and cooperation programmes and projects providing the frameworks for these fundings. Funding either goes to those countries directly or to EU countries setting up programmes in third countries.

A prominent example is the funding, split between the EU and the Italian government, for a border security deal between Libya and Finmeccanica.142 Libya has been a hotspot for EU border externalisation programmes for years. In October 2009, Selex Sistemi Integrati, a subsidiary of Finmeccanica, announced a 300 million euros contract with Libya for a large Border Security and Control System, including “the training of operators and maintenance staff as well as the completion of all the civil infrastructures required.” Finmeccanica called it
“one of the most important achievements by a Finmeccanica company in the Large Systems for Homeland Security domain.”

The system had yet to be installed when Gadhafi was overthrown. In 2012, the new Libyan government resumed talks with Finmeccanica, but the project as originally planned didn’t seem to be an option. However, a year later Selex was contacted to supply a satellite-based surveillance system for monitoring the whole of Libya’s border. And in 2015 the original contract was resumed after all, only this time it focused on the northern instead of the southern border.

In addition to this contract, in December 2010 the European Commission decided to grant Libya 10 million euros to support the country in managing its borders and migration flows. In 2013 the Council of the EU started EUBAM Libya, a “civilian mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy” to “support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders”. The budget for EUBAM Libya was 56.5 million euros for its two-year run. A few months later, press reports challenging the ‘civil’ character of the mission appeared. They claimed the EU was training ‘paramilitary forces’, including Libya’s Border Guards and Naval Coast Guard (NCG), which both fall under the defence ministry. The mission ultimately became a failure, mainly due to the very unstable security situation in Libya. In January 2016, however, Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, stated that the EU was again ready to support Libya’s future Government of National Accord, prioritising the “focus on border management”.

A few years ago migration to the Canary Islands came into the spotlight, as migrants tried to reach the EU in a dangerous journey there to avoid the Mediterranean. Mauritania was one of the starting points for these attempts. Between 2006 and 2012 the EU through various instruments gave Mauritania over 16 million euros to counter irregular migration. This included funding for the construction and equipment of several border crossings and for the construction, renovation, equipment and training at the 45 priority border crossing points (both projects received 1.2 million euros).

The EU funds the six-year (2012-2018) programme ‘Integrated Border Management in Lebanon’, focused on technical assistance. It has a total budget of approximately 14 million euros. As part of the programme, the EU donated equipment, mostly for document examination, to Lebanese border security authorities in the summer of 2014 and the fall of 2015. In November 2015, the EU also gave 23 million euros to Tunisia for security sector reform, including strengthening “the technical and operational capacities of land border security services.”

The ‘AENEAS Programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum’ ran from 2004 to 2006 and had as one of its objectives “the establishment in the third countries concerned of an effective and preventive policy in the fight against illegal migration”. Under the complete programme, 107 projects were funded with a total of 120 million euros. These included a 1.1 million euros grant to enhance border control in Mali, including the purchase of motorcycles and a car. Similarly 1.2 million euros were granted for strengthening border control in Niger, once again including the purchase of motorcycles. “Purchase of document control equipment for Border Guards” in Ukraine was part of a 800,000 euros grant.

There was also a two million euros grant for ‘Project Seahorse’ of the Spanish Guardia Civil, which included joint border control patrols with Moroccan services, and a follow-up grant of again two million euros to build a network between police forces of Spain, Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal and Cape Verde to coordinate the “fight against […] illegal immigration”.

From 2007 to 2013 the EU had a ‘Thematic Programme of Cooperation with Third Countries in the Areas of Asylum and Migration’, as part of the Development Cooperation Instrument.
It was presented as a funding mechanism to support third countries in migration management, but with a clear final objective of “reducing the migratory pressure on the EU”.\(^{157}\)

That is the deal with most of the support programmes that don’t exclusively focus on border security, border control and/or irregular immigration. Arguably their main aim comes down to keeping or getting migrants out of the EU (except those wanted for labour), be it through border enforcement, assistance for sheltering in third countries, readmission agreements, warning refugees against irregular migration to Europe or something else.

This makes it hard to say what some funding really is about and if it should be shared under ‘externalisation of border security’. What the EU might call assistance for sheltering refugees might as well be regarded as a project to keep refugees outside EU borders, with dire consequences, as the example of the Ukraine shows. Trying to cut off the ‘eastern route’, Ukraine has been funded with 30 million euros to keep migrants from entering the EU. The Ukrainian authorities used part of this money to build and renovate migrant detention centers. The Arup Group, a British engineering and technology company, and Eurasylum, a research and consulting firm (also from the UK), received 2.9 million euros to set up custody centres and Temporary Holding Facilities in Ukraine and for technical support. In December 2010, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a damning account of the way Ukraine treated refugees, concluding: “Not only has Ukraine been unable or unwilling to provide effective protection to refugees and asylum seekers, it has also subjected some migrants returned from neighboring EU countries to torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment.” HRW described the EU as an accomplice, pointing to “the money the EU has poured into re-enforcing Ukrainian border controls and boosting its capacity to apprehend, detain, and deport irregular migrants.”\(^{158}\) A 2015 report by German magazine *Der Spiegel* showed that the situation for migrants in Ukraine remained the same, with the EU refusing to comment.\(^{159}\)

The examples described above by no means comprise a complete list of EU-funded projects for border security and border control in third countries. They merely give an impression of the way the EU pressures neighbouring countries into playing their part in securing and heightening the walls of Fortress Europe. And, once again, part of the measures funded provide profit opportunities for the military and security industry.

**EU RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY FUNDING\(^{160}\)**

Through various funding programmes the EU financially supports research & technology (R&T)-projects by industry and institutions. The so-called Framework Programmes (FP) are the most well-known. Up until the now running Horizon 2020 (FP8) military research is excluded from these funding, but if the European Commission gets its way this will change with the next programme, starting in 2021 with preparations already on their way.\(^{161}\) For now, military companies have already found their niche in security-related research.

According to researcher Ben Hayes “[t]he story of the EU Security Research Programme is one of ‘Big Brother’ meets market fundamentalism.” The basis was laid by a so-called ‘Group of Personalities’ (GoP) comprised of EU officials and eight of Europe’s biggest arms and IT companies (including Airbus (then EADS), BAE Systems, Finmeccanica, Indra and Thales).\(^{162}\)

Border security and border control are focal points in the research programmes, with many projects explicitly aimed at strengthening EUROSUR. Since 2002, through Framework Programmes 6 and 7, Horizon 2020, the Preparatory Action for Security Research (PASR), the GMES-Programme (satellite observation) and the European Space Agency (ESA), the EU has funded 56 projects in the field of border security and border control with over 316 million euros, roughly 4% of the total budget of these programmes.\(^{163}\) The fifteen largest corporate or institutional profiteers account for at least 94 million euros, coordinating 32 of the projects.
Not surprisingly, those companies prominent in EOS, which heavily lobbied for the establishment of EU R&T-funding for security (Airbus, Finmeccanica, Indra, Safran, Thales), turned out to be among its largest profiteers. Other regular participants are several (semi governmental) research agencies:

Totalforsvarets Forskningsinstitut (FOI), the Swedish Defence Research Agency;

CEA, Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission) is a French research organization;

TNO, the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research. It also developed a research programme on border control with the Dutch border control authority Royal Marechaussee, a part of the military. Its product included the @MIGO-system “that reads the licence plates of [...] cars [passing the border] using laser-activated cameras”. The system was criticised for violation of privacy laws. TNO supports EASP Air, another Dutch company, in preparing maritime surveillance missions for Frontex through the use of the ‘SURPASS’ (surface picture assessment)-tool;

AIT, the Austrian Institute of Technology, which is co-owned by the Austrian government and the Federation of Austrian Industries. Together with ATOS and Gunnebo it also worked on the ‘Future Border Concept’-project, aimed at the development of an automated border control system for the airport of Vienna. In 2015 AIT was co-organiser of an international workshop on Identification and Surveillance for Border Control (ISBC).

In the Work Programmes 2014-2015 and 2016-2017 for Horizon 2020 another estimated 60 to 77 million euros is announced for several new border security-related projects (see annex 5 for an overview). These focus on more advanced surveillance technologies (including ‘autonomous systems’) and contributions to so-called ‘Smart borders’, speeding up processes for EU citizens and other wanted travellers, enabling border control authorities “to dedicate more time and resources to identify those who may pose a threat.”

At the end of November 2014, several ongoing EU-funded security R&T projects gathered on Crete, for the ‘European Symposium on Border Surveillance and SaR operations technology’, organised by the Greek government. Airbus and

### MAJOR INDUSTRY BENEFICIARIES OF EU-FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Coordinated projects</th>
<th>EU funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airbus</td>
<td>pan-European</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€9,784,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalforsvarets Forskningsinstitut</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>€8,455,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indra Sistemas</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€8,106,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isidefe</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>€8,055,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thales</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>€6,966,736</td>
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<td>CEA</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>€6,865,132</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fraunhofer</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>€6,748,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finmeccanica</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>€6,744,657</td>
</tr>
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<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€6,691,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safran</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>€5,638,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finmeccanica - Thales</td>
<td>Italy - France</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>€4,795,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€4,577,486</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMT Group</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€4,495,685</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smiths Detection</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>€3,524,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCNS</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>€3,509,592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: cordis.europa.eu*
Thales were among the so-called ‘Friends of the Symposium’. Delivering the keynote speech at the symposium, Georgios Vourekas (head of the Sea Border Sector of Frontex) named “industry driven solutions” as one of the directions to go.

Apart from the Framework Programmes, the European Commission funded two studies by Unisys Belgium. The first one, done in 2006, describes the legal possibilities of giving (limited) executive powers, including the right to use surveillance equipment and the right to carry service weapons, to border guards of one EU country to operate in other member states of the EU. It concluded that, while member states themselves were quite happy organising this on a bilateral basis, a common procedure was possible, and a larger coordinating role for Frontex was needed.

The second study, “on the feasibility of the creation of a European system of border guards to control the external borders of the Union”, earned Unisys 289,358 euros. The study, which was published in October 2014, sketched three possible models for the future of EU border security. All models had some degree of deeper EU cooperation, based on “the idea of further integration and shared responsibility” in the field of border security. The final aim would be that “external border control becomes a competence of the EU” instead of of Member States. Taking a less gradual approach than Unisys proposed, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency fits perfectly into this model. Co-ownership of equipment between Frontex and member states is one of the ideas in the study that is also part of the proposal for the new Agency.

**FRONTEX FUNDING FOR RESEARCH**

Frontex itself funded some smaller research and demonstration projects. At the moment of writing, one such study, “on the set-up and management of border security-related research in and outside Europe”, is about to be awarded. It is aimed at improving (the outcomes of) EU-funded research.

Edgar Beugels, Director of Research and Development at Frontex, explained the role of Frontex in R&T as a lubricant: “We do not do any research ourselves. We rely on research done by others […], we try to find out what they are doing and pass this to our end users (national border authorities and the Commission). Meanwhile, we collect a wish list from end users and transfer that back to the research community.”

**TABLE 7
STUDIES FUNDED BY FRONTEX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Study of risk analysis models or similar instruments in use in EU and Schengen associated countries by border guard services</td>
<td>RAND Europe (UK)</td>
<td>€48,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Study on MALE UAVs and their potential use in border surveillance</td>
<td>Isdefe (Spain)</td>
<td>€74,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Study on methods and guidelines to assess operational capabilities, in services countering identity and document fraud and assessing risk at the first line of border checks</td>
<td>RAND Europe (UK)</td>
<td>€54,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Study on advanced technological integration for solutions for under-foliage detection and their potential impact on border surveillance</td>
<td>Isdefe (Spain)</td>
<td>€75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Study on deployable technology for land border surveillance</td>
<td>Isdefe (Spain)</td>
<td>€59,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Concept development study for risk-based facilitated border check process</td>
<td>Proodos (The Netherlands)</td>
<td>€25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Frontex also paid companies for field demonstrations. Lockheed Martin, FAST Protect AG, L-3 Communications, FLIR Systems, SCOTTY Group Austria, Diamond Airborne Sensing and Inmarsat were paid 30,000 euros to show their drones in Greece in October 2011. Thirteen companies (Israel Aerospace Industries, Lockheed Martin, FAST Protect AG, L-3 Communications, FLIR Systems, SCOTTY Group Austria, Diamond Airborne Sensing, Inmarsat, Thales, AeroVision, AeroVironment, Altus, BlueBird) demonstrated technological solutions for maritime surveillance, winning reimbursements ranging from 10,000 euros to 198,000 euros.*\(^{188}\)

**FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY RESEARCH**

EU funding for security research, (which could soon also include outright military research), is one of the success stories of the military and security industry, its allies and their common powerful lobby. Border security and border control-related projects became a central focus of the funding programmes, mirroring both the increasing importance the EU attaches to these policy areas and the interconnected importance the industry places on this. Security research has become the cornerstone of the military-security-industrial complex, providing direct opportunities to profit but also helping drive an agenda that continually seeks to expand border security, providing the promise of ever more profits in the future.

For the industry, though, this is not enough. In February 2016 a so-called Group of Personalities issued a report on ‘European defence research’. The group, initiated by the European Commission, had more than half of its representatives coming from military companies (Indra, MBDA, Saab, TNO, Airbus, BAE Systems, Finmeccanica, Fraunhofer and Liebherr-Aerospace Lindenberg). They recommended setting up a European Defence Research Programme as part of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (2021-27), with a budget of at least 3.5 billion euros and an industry-dominated Advisory Board, which also has to play “an active part in the definition of a long-term European military capabilities blueprint”, with “direct access to the highest level of the EU institutions.”*\(^{189}\)
WHICH COMPANIES PROFIT FROM BORDER SECURITY?

In examining who benefits from the growing border security market, the same companies pop up again and again, both as the largest receivers of EU R&T funding and as major players in the influential lobby on EU border security. Moreover, what stands out is that many of these companies are also important suppliers of arms to the Middle East and North Africa.

GLOBAL BORDER SECURITY MARKET

After the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War, the military industry struggled with decreasing defence budgets, especially in western nations, although the downward trend reversed in the late 1990s. Since 2008, the increasing tensions between Russia and the EU/NATO, increased military spending in the Middle-East, Latin America and Asia, and a larger military role of China in the international theatre, all helped push global military spending up to and above Cold War levels. The rise of the border security market is closely connected to these developments. Framing migration as a security threat, sometimes arousing a caricatural fear of terrorist invaders, opened the door for all kinds of security products. Corporations have been eager to talk governments and politicians into believing they ‘need’ the products and services on offer to counter the imagined ‘threat’ of (irregular) migration. And government representatives have been happy to buy the arguments and the products. Illka Laitinen, former executive director of Frontex, said in 2013: “Our experience with the co-operation with industry is very positive - they have a lot of good ideas and they brought many new innovations.”

The ‘products’ consist partly of ‘traditional’ military goods (for instance vehicles and helicopters), but more and more of ‘new’ technologies, drones, surveillance tools, biometrics, information technology and physical barriers (fences and walls). Apart from the major arms producers, which have incorporated border security technologies into their core
business, there are thousands of smaller (new) companies specialising in this segment. Western firms, especially from North America and Europe, dominate the market as they do in the general arms and security market.

The size of the border security market is difficult to determine, since it is not all that transparent and it is not always clear whether certain products will be used for border security purposes. Consultancy company Visiongain estimated the global market at some 15 billion euros in 2015, while Frost and Sullivan in early 2014 predicted the revenues would grow to over 29 billion euros in 2022.\textsuperscript{194}

Major, and often controversial, deals in the border security field include the Finmecannica-deal with Libya, as well as the US Secure Borders Initiative. This initiative included a billion-dollar contract with Boeing, to build a border security network along the northern and southern borders of the United States. The project was plagued by severe (technological and legal) problems and was finally cancelled. It was partially replaced by a smaller project ($145 million), for which Israeli arms producer Elbit built a network of surveillance towers on the border between Mexico and Arizona.\textsuperscript{195} As in Europe, the militarisation of the US border with Mexico has been criticised by human rights organisations because of its negative impacts on refugees rights and the way it forces refugees to use more dangerous routes to avoid border enforcement.

Airbus got a contract for another important project: the development of a complete border security system for Saudi Arabia. Under this contract, worth around 2 billion euros, the German police worked together with Airbus employees in training Saudi border police in using the system. Dozens of German police officers were deployed in Saudi Arabia for this, with controversy caused by the fact they were paid from Germany’s international development aid budget.\textsuperscript{196} Moreover, the deal has been dogged with allegations of corruption and bribery.\textsuperscript{197}

FRONTEX CONTRACTS

Most of Frontex’s budget is spent on grants to reimburse and support member states. As mentioned earlier, Frontex in 2011 got the right to buy its own equipment. This never really passed the stage of trials. It did some pilot projects in the field of aerial surveillance, but those generally weren’t successful, with one being cancelled when Greek authorities didn’t give a flight license to the company awarded the contract, Scotty Group from Austria. Another, for surveillance of the land border between Greece and Turkey, never even started, with the procedure being aborted because there were no suitable tenders offered.\textsuperscript{198}

\textbf{TABLE 8}

\textbf{CONTRACTS WORTH MORE THAN 100,000 EUROS AWARDED BY FRONTEX (BORDER SECURITY/BORDER CONTROL)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Aerial border surveillance trial of manned aircraft with optionally piloted aircraft capability equipped with multi-intelligence sensors (cancelled)\textsuperscript{199}</td>
<td>Scotty Group (Austria)</td>
<td>€118,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purchase of annotated satellite imagery\textsuperscript{200}</td>
<td>GAF (Germany)</td>
<td>€224,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Framework contract for maintenance and evolution of the Eurosur network\textsuperscript{201}</td>
<td>GMV Aerospace and Defence (Spain)</td>
<td>€12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pilot project on purchasing of aerial surveillance service for Frontex coordinated operational activities 2014 - provision of technical equipment and staff to perform aerial surveillance at the south-eastern external EU land border\textsuperscript{202}</td>
<td>Diamond-Executive Aviation (UK)</td>
<td>€270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frontex positioning system (FPS) concept to create a single, integrated, real-time automated system for tracking assets deployed in the joint operations (JOs)\textsuperscript{203}</td>
<td>Atos (Spain)</td>
<td>€578,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Framework contract for aerial surveillance services assets and expert support\textsuperscript{204}</td>
<td>CAE Aviation (Luxembourg)</td>
<td>€10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diamond Executive Aviation (UK)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Défense Conseil International (France)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EASP Air (The Netherlands)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vigilance (The Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indra Sistemas (Spain)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SIA ‘Meža īpašnieku konsultatīvais centrs’ (Latvia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement of a nautical chart Web map service that can be integrated into Frontex applications\textsuperscript{205}</td>
<td>Carmenta (Sweden)</td>
<td>€112,795</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Frontex doesn’t use an open tender procedure for most ‘low value contracts’, not exceeding 135,000 euros. Usually these are advertised only on the Frontex website and concluded through a negotiated procedure with at least three to five candidates. From 2010 to 2015 eleven of such contracts in the field of border security and control have been awarded (see Annex 6 for an overview). Atos and GMV Aerospace and Defence are among the awarded companies.

MAJOR PROFITING COMPANIES

There is no complete overview of companies supplying equipment and services for border security. Research shows that those European companies most active in lobbying on EU border security policies are also some of the biggest beneficiaries of spending connected to those policies. The key companies profiting from border security includes Airbus, Finmeccanica and Thales, which, as we’ve seen, also are providing arms to the Middle East and North Africa that contribute to fuel the conflicts and chaos in the region, one of the major causes of recent migration flows. Other important players are Indra and Safran, also top receivers of EU funding for border security R&T.

AIRBUS

Robert Havas, Vice President of Security Business Development at Airbus, wrote in 2008: “With the growth of the European Union by gaining new member states, border security is a huge area for R&D developments and a promising market.”

Airbus is indeed one of the major recipients of EU funding for R&T (Table 6) and also profits from border security purchases new EU member states have to do to comply with Schengen requirements. Annual revenues earned for border security are around 200 million euros.

Airbus’ products in the field of border security range from helicopters to communication systems to radar. In 2004, Romania awarded the company a contract for a complete ‘Integrated System for Border Security’ for monitoring, securing and communicating. The system had everything to do with EU border security requirements, as Romania had to meet these before becoming an EU member in 2007. This deal, worth 734 million euros, prompted a corruption investigation after allegations of bribes paid to Romanian officials surfaced.

Signalis, a joint venture of Airbus and Atlas Elektronik (Germany), was also responsible for the Spationav program for French coastal border surveillance. The project integrates the coastal surveillance systems of the French Navy, Maritime Affairs, and Customs. Data collected through radar from several sources is combined into a common operational picture. Signalis sold a similar system to Bulgaria, once again because of Schengen obligations connected to becoming an EU member. The Spanish Guardia Civil is another customer, focusing on irregular migration to the Canaries and Baleares islands and Gibraltar.

Airbus helicopters are used by several European border security authorities (see map 2). The Airborne Unit of the German Federal Police, the former Federal Border Guard, operates 79 Airbus helicopters. While the border patrol activities at the German borders have diminished, with Germany no longer bordering Non-Schengen Area countries, they are still used for border security over the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, and for Frontex missions.

The border guard of Belarus also has four Airbus helicopters in use. Four pilots from the authoritarian-ruled state, widely criticised for its human rights violations, got a training in flying the Eurocopter (the former name of Airbus Helicopters) at a training centre in France. Bulgarian Navy pilots were trained in France as well, to operate three helicopters for border control missions, delivered in 2011. The Bulgarian Border Police earlier purchased a TETRA communications network and thousands of radios from Airbus. Airbus also supplied radar for an Offshore Patrol Vessel for the Finnish Border Guard.

Together with Israel Aerospace Industries, Airbus developed and markets the ‘Harfang’ UAV, which it promotes for border surveillance. Criticised for promoting a drone, ‘tested’ by Israel in Gaza, for tracking refugees, Airbus stated that what “technology partners choose to do with their own developments in their own countries, […] is their own business.”

In 2013 Airbus co-hosted an International Border Security Workshop in Finland, together with Frontex, the US National Center for Border Security and Immigration and the Finnish Laurea University.
BORDER SECURITY HELICOPTERS: AIRBUS AND FINMECCANICA

Airbus: Bulgaria, Finland (EU-funded), Germany, Lithuania, Romania (EU-funded), Slovenia

Finmeccanica: Bulgaria (EU-funded), Croatia (EU-funded), Cyprus (EU-funded), Estonia (EU-funded), Finland, Italia (EU-funded), Latvia (EU-funded), Libya, Malta (EU-funded), Mauritania, Slovenia
FINMECCANICA

Already in 2009 Finmeccanica identified “border control and security systems” as one of the primary drivers for increase in orders and revenues.223 This was followed, in the same year, by the already discussed deal with Libya, which was partly funded by the EU. In general, Finmeccanica and its subsidiaries supply a broad range of equipment for border security and border control applications, in the fields of surveillance, detection, (biometric-based) access control, perimeter security, communications and command and control systems.224

Helicopters from Finmeccanica’s AgustaWestland-division are used by many EU-member states and neighbouring countries. Purchases are often (partly) funded by the EU (see map). In 2007 Roland Peets, director general of the Estonian Border Guard, called the procurement of three AW139 helicopters “one of the biggest projects to have been accomplished utilising Schengen Facility funds”.225

Some deals were dogged by problems. In 2009 a deal for 15 A-109 helicopters for the Algerian Border Patrol was finalised.226 This contract is one of those being examined by Italy’s tax police in a broader anti-corruption investigation.227 And in June 2015 Bulgarian press reported that all three AW-helicopters of the Bulgarian Border Police had been grounded since December 2014 because of lack of aviation insurance.228

In 2005 Poland awarded Selex a 30 million euros contract for building a coastal surveillance system (ZSRN) for the Polish Border Guard.229 Selex also installed radar on maritime patrol aircraft of the Finnish Border Guard.230

In December 2015, Selex presented surveillance technologies, which were chosen by NATO for its Alliance Ground Surveillance Program, which has assistance in border control as one of its main aims. The system should start operating in Italy in 2017.231 Finmeccanica and its subsidiaries are also very active in EU-funded R&T. Selex coordinated the SEABILLA project, aimed at the development of European Sea Border Surveillance systems.232

In December 2014, Selex announced that it “will contribute its technology to the CLOSEYE […] project for Mediterranean surveillance. This monitoring system was conceived in response to the increasing pressure of migration from the North-African coasts to improve the border surveillance capabilities of the responsible authorities.”233

During the writing of this report, Finmeccanica renamed itself Leonardo, possibly in an attempt to improve its reputation after a number of corruption scandals.

THALES

Thales claims that it has delivered “[m]ore than 50 turnkey systems or subsystems in service worldwide related to homeland security and border surveillance (Latvia, France, Estonia, ...”)234 Thales’ business report in 2011 mentioned a strong growth in revenues from the border protection business.

Thales has deployed a complete, integrated system for border security at the Eastern Latvian border, combining command and control software with optronics, sensors and a communication network.235 In 2015 it won a contract to supply the Spanish Guardia Civil with two mobile thermal units integrated into 4x4 vehicles for border surveillance. Earlier it delivered “fixed surveillance thermal optronic systems” for the same purposes.236

In November 2015, several media outlets reported rumours that Thales is building a wall on the border with Libya for the Tunisian government, though the company declined to comment. Tunisia has covered the first five million dollars for the project, but would be trying to get funding from EU countries for the next steps of the project.237

In 2014 the dictatorial government of Turkmenistan issued a tender for a satellite-based monitoring system for its whole border with Afghanistan. Thales was one of the companies that responded, but it wasn’t disclosed which company won the contract.238
Thales works with Aerovisión, a Spanish company, on the international marketing of its Fulmar UAV, operated for border surveillance in the Malacca Straits, and on developing applications for it. In January 2012 they gave a real flight demonstration of the Fulmar for Frontex.

Thales' radar is installed on many ships around the world, some of which no doubt are used for border patrols.

Thales also produces electronic ID-management systems. In 2013, as a subcontractor for Oberthur Technologies (France), it supplied Uzbekistan with a border control system, consisting of “411 biometric data acquisition stations at locations throughout Uzbekistan and at its embassies around the world” and a centralised system that monitors passport applications and manages passport issuance. France purchased a “biometric enrolment and data transmission system”, while Morocco and Kenya are clients for Thales-produced identity cards.

Under a £3.8 million contract with the UK Home Office Thales provided a public key infrastructure shared service system for the encryption of biometric and biographic data for Biometric Residence Permit (BRP) cards for non-EU foreigners.

**INDRA**

Spanish technology and consulting firm Indra has ‘Security & Defense’ as one of its core markets, which accounted for 19% (0.54 billion euros) of total revenues in 2015. Border security is an important part of this, with Indra claiming that its “systems protect more than 5,000 km of land and sea borders in several countries across various continents.” Already in 2008 it noted that “growth in both contracts and revenue remain high in this business area.”

Indra’s Integrated System for Surveillance (SIVE: Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia) combines maritime traffic control, monitoring and surveillance. It is in use on most of the maritime borders of Spain, built up through several million-euro-contracts, as well as in Latvia, Portugal and Romania. Under a 25.5 million euros contract with Portugal, Indra started “deploying a stations network to detect the movement of ships within its field of influence”.

In Romania, SIVE consists of “sensor stations equipped with radar systems and electro-optics vision, a radio-link network and a control and command centre” to “integrate all the information collected by the sensor stations to create a common and unified scenario of the Romanian [Black Sea] coast to provide alerts to operators about possible threats”, including “illegal immigration”. The contract was worth 18 million euros.

According to Indra, “[b]order surveillance offers a great growth potential in the international market for Indra since SIVE’s effectiveness has already been proved. In addition there is a growing demand of this type of systems due to the increasing concern of governments to control their borders.”

Indra was awarded a contract worth 1.4 million euros by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior to “include Morocco, The Gambia and Guinea Bissau in the Sea Horse Network cooperation programme”, by expanding and enhancing its “secure communication channels”.

Indra is also supplying biometrics-based automated border control (ABC) systems, for example for airports and ports. Spain’s Smart Border-program, which is partly funded by the EU, has, since 2010, seen the gradual expanding use of Indra’s ABC-systems at airports. They are “comprised of a kiosk where passengers show their digital passport or other electronic ID”. Also using “digital fingerprint sensor[s] and facial recognition cameras”, “biometric information” is checked against “police databases” and the authenticity of “digital passports” is verified.

On EU-level Indra is very active in lobbying and one of the major profiteers of R&T-funding for border security projects. It coordinates the high-profile projects ‘ABC4EU’, which aims to
update and integrate current ABC systems, and ‘PERSEUS’. PERSEUS, which ran from 2011 to 2014, was closely connected to the development of EUROSUR, its “purpose [...] to build and demonstrate an EU maritime surveillance system integrating existing national and communitarian installations and enhancing them with innovative technologies.”

SAFRAN

A large French aerospace and defence company, Safran has most of its border security work carried out by its subsidiary Morpho (formerly named Sagem Sécurité). Morpho specializes in electronic security solutions, with a focus on (biometric) identification systems. It is known for high spending on R&T, and is also a major player in EU funded research (see previous chapter). In 2015 9.2% (1.6 billion euros) of the total revenues of Safran came from its ‘identity and security’ business.

In February 2013, the European Commission awarded Morpho, in a consortium with Accenture and HP, a contract worth 70 million euros, for the maintenance of the European Vision Information System (VIS). This system is used to store and exchange (biometric) data relating to visa applications of third-country citizens. A few months later, Morpho signed a partnership agreement with Interpol, including “collaboration on the subject of border security” through the use of biometrics. Ronald Noble, Secretary General of Interpol, said working together with the private sector is essential.

In 2009, Morpho signed a contract with IBM to supply multibiometric facial and fingerprint recognition technology to the British Home Office’s Identity and Passport Service, with the purpose of upgrading to biometric passports. Fingerprint recognition technology of Morpho is also in use in automated border control gates at French airports, while iris recognition systems have been deployed at UK airports. In 2015 Estonia contracted Morpho to supply an Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record (API-PNR) system, based on data collected by airlines from passengers. This was co-financed by the EU.

Morpho delivered fingerprint scanners to Lithuania to process all visa requests at Lithuanian embassies. This system became part of VIS, with the biometric data stored in a database “available to border control authorities in countries that are part of the Schengen Area”, and was partly financed through the External Borders Fund.

In the field of identity documents, Morpho is the sole supplier for Slovakia since 2015. In a consortium with Oberthur Technologies it is also the supplier of ePassports for Finland. Albania and The Netherlands are other European clients for Morpho ID documents.

It’s not just biometrics for border security though. Safran supplied the Slovenian border police with infrared imagers, once again funded by the EU. And in 2010 Sagem and Kazakhstan Engineering started a joint venture to produce and market UAVs, for amongst others, border patrol missions.

OTHER COMPANIES

Airbus, Finmeccanica, Indra, Safran and Thales each have a large share in the European border security market. There are of course dozens of other companies that have also supplied equipment and services to border security authorities.

BAE Systems in 2002 won a £7.6 million contract from Romania, to equip its border security authorities with Mobile Surveillance Vehicles (MSVs), hand-held thermal imagers and night vision binoculars. The contract also included training for Romanian patrol staff. In 2010, BAE Systems was working with Kent Police and the UK Border Agency on a project to develop drones for border monitoring, to the dismay of civil liberties organisations. For unknown reasons BAE terminated the project.
Swedish company Saab produces coastal and airborne surveillance systems and border management systems. It sold border security systems to Estonia, France, Greece, Sweden and the UK. These include radar-based surveillance systems for aircraft and ground use.\textsuperscript{268} In January 2016, Croatia awarded Saab a contract for a coastal surveillance and border protection system, to be operational in June.\textsuperscript{269}

Siemens from Germany implemented a ‘National Border Management Information System’ for Croatia, co-financed by the European Commission.\textsuperscript{270} It also developed biometric-based electronic ID documents for Switzerland and Spain. A special Siemens Biometrics Center in Graz, partly funded by the Austrian government, played an important role in this work.\textsuperscript{271}

Atos, a Spanish company, did some work for Frontex, as mentioned before. In 2014, in a consortium with Accenture and HP, it won a three to four-year contract from the European Agency for Large-Scale IT System (eu-LISA) to maintain and enhance the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II).\textsuperscript{272} It also developed a Homeland Security Suite (HSS)-eGate, which is used in Switzerland and for border control in Bulgaria, and provided IT services to the UK Border Agency.\textsuperscript{273} In December 2015, it was awarded a contract by the Spanish Guardia Civil to supply licence plate recognition for border control. This system is also installed on the borders of Ceuta and Mellila, the Spanish enclaves in Morocco.\textsuperscript{274}

Unisys, already mentioned for two reports it wrote for the European Commission, was part of another consortium providing services to eu-LISA. A contract, worth approximately 47 million euros, was awarded in October 2015, for the offering of “services to the agency to fulfil its mandate to provide operational management and evolve critical IT systems for internal security, border management and asylum management in EU.”\textsuperscript{275} Unisys is also responsible for the facial recognition system for the passport application process in the UK.\textsuperscript{276}

Defendec, a surveillance technology company from the USA and Estonia, claims that its “main product, Smartdec [a remote monitoring system], is securing NATO’s and European Union’s external borders.”\textsuperscript{277} In 2011, the US Embassy in Albania donated Smartdec systems to the Albanian Border Guard.\textsuperscript{278} Apparently, it was a ‘successful’ donation. “[I]mages of SMARTDEC cameras installed at green border (railway) with Montenegro enabled Albanian Border Police to detect four migrants who were attempting illegal border-crossing” reads the Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2014 of Frontex. Estonia and Ukraine are also customers of Defendec.\textsuperscript{279}

The Turkish Coast Guard purchased one Beechcraft King Air 350ER aircraft from Textron (USA) for border patrol missions.\textsuperscript{280} In 2015 the Slovakian border guard tested binoculars and night vision equipment from British company Thermoteknix.\textsuperscript{281}

**ISRAELI COMPANIES**

Israel has a special place as the only non-European country from which companies are eligible for EU R&T funding under the Framework Programmes.\textsuperscript{282} The companies also have a unique selling strategy, capitalising on their involvement in Israeli border security, including the Separation wall on the West Bank and the fence on the border with Egypt. In general, equipment and technology of Israeli arms and security companies are internationally acclaimed because they are considered ‘battlefield proven’.\textsuperscript{283}

RB Tec Electronic Security Systems from Israel, which was selected by Frontex to participate in its April 2014 workshop on ‘Border Surveillance Sensors and Platforms’, boasted in its application mail that its “technologies, solutions and products are installed on Israeli-Palestinian border”.

At the end of the summer of 2015 Bulgaria and Hungary indicated they were looking into the possibility of buying Israeli-designed border fences. Those would be based on the fence on
the border with Egypt, with a cost of up to $1.9 million per kilometre. “I cannot give you any details right now, but I think that we have taken from the Israeli experiences as much as we can”, said Bulgaria’s deputy ambassador in Israel, Rayko Pepelanov.284

Elta, a subsidiary of the state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries, at the end of 2015 was in contact with several European governments on its ‘Virtual Border Patrol’-system, based on social media monitoring and intercepting mobile phone communications. Amnon Sofrin, homeland security projects manager of Elta and former head of the Intelligence Branch of the Mossad said that the balance between individual rights and national security needs to be shifted to the latter.285

In 2015, Switzerland ordered six UAVs from Elbit for surveillance missions by border guards, for approximately 230 million euros.286 The deal was criticised because the same model, the Hermes 900, is used by Israel for attacking Palestinians.287 Without naming specific countries, Elbit writes it also performs “programs relating to border security projects, coastal surveillance systems and integrated airport security systems for European and other governments.”288

**DETENTION AND DEPORTATION**

Detention in and forced returns from the EU of refugees go beyond the scope of this report. It is good to understand however that those practices also provide business opportunities for industry. Multinational security company G4S is a notorious profiteer. It used to carry out deportations in the UK, until three of its security guards were accused of killing Jimmy Mubenga on a flight to Angola. They were later cleared of manslaughter in a verdict that was criticised by several human rights groups. Oliver Sprague from Amnesty International UK, said: “Ill-trained and unaccountable staff should not be carrying out enforced removals and it is little wonder there are so many reports of improper treatment.”289 G4S still runs detention and removal prisons in the UK however and provides prison guards and other services for such centres in Austria, Estonia and Norway (and formerly also The Netherlands).290 “G4S’s success in this market shows that deportation, detention and border control have become big business”, according to Danish researcher Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (Danish Institute for Human Rights).291
CONCLUSION
The European military and security industry profits on both sides of the refugee tragedy. It delivers arms and other equipment that fuel conflicts, human rights violations and repression in parts of the world most refugees originate from. And it sells border security and control equipment to keep them out of the EU.

Some of Europe’s largest arms producers, notably Airbus, Finmeccanica and Thales, are prominent examples of this cynical business. Extensive lobbying by them and others, including Indra and Safran, gained them an influential voice in the development of EU policies on and responses to immigration, focusing on border security and border control, and funding connected to these fields. They then have profited from the lucrative contracts that have resulted from the increasing militarisation of Europe’s borders.

The EU disregards its role in creating and maintaining an unjust global economic system and the role of its foreign policies as well as its prominent arms dealers in fuelling conflict and repression. Its primary answer to the recent refugee tragedy has been to invest in border security with more military involvement. Europe’s burgeoning military and security industry, already booming on the back of the war on terror, have been all too glad to profit. And with bitter irony, the profiteers have even included the same companies that are part of the problem, those that sell arms and security equipment to the Middle East and North Africa.

The people who suffer from this racket are the refugees who experience the horrifying consequences of these policies and practices. They are stopped at borders, forcing them to either stay in inhumane circumstances in transit countries, return to even more difficult situations in their countries of origin or try more dangerous routes to find their way into Europe. While some refugees indeed are granted licenses to stay and the possibility of building a safe future, a great number end up in terrible conditions in transit countries, dead in the Mediterranean, in a permanent state of illegality (suffering insecurity and exploitation), or facing detention or deportation.

The EU has been severely criticised for its border security policy, and especially its ongoing militarisation, by the UN, human rights and refugee support organisations. Its treatment of refugees violates human rights, including the fundamental right to seek asylum, and is contrary to international law. Yet it keeps moving forward on the same inhumane, violent path.

The EU needs to change its course and put the lives and fundamental rights of refugees first. It needs to acknowledge its part in fuelling the drivers for migration, and work on taking them away. Important steps in this context would be to establish and maintain an embargo on arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa and to end military involvement in this region, changing to a focus on diplomacy, support for democratic opposition forces, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Money wasted on heightening the walls of Fortress Europe, which serve mainly military and security companies’ profits, could be better invested on efforts in this field.

Refugees trying to find safety and a liveable future should be welcomed to the EU and find assistance here. The EU needs to set up safe routes for them, instead of forcing them on dangerous journeys to avoid border security. The increase and militarisation of border security should be halted and reversed, as well as the pressure on third countries to function as border guards for Europe. Instead of listening to the military and security industry’s lobbying for ever more monstrous border security projects, the EU needs to honour its human rights and international law obligations and provide refugees with the support they need.
ANNEX 1

PARTICIPANTS IN EOS AND SDA MEETINGS ON BORDER SECURITY AND BORDER CONTROL

PARTICIPANTS IN EOS ORGANIZED MEETINGS

High Level Security Roundtable – Brussels, 9 February 2011

EU: Council of the EU, European Commission (including three Commissioners), European Defence Agency, Europol, one MEP

Member States authorities: France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, UK

Industry: Airbus, ASD, Avio, Atos, BAE Systems, CEA, Conceptivity, CORTE, Diehl, Engineering Ingegneria Informatica, EOS, Finmeccanica, Fraunhofer, G4S, IBM, Indra, KEMEA, Raytheon, SAAB, Safran, Siemens, Smiths Detection, STM, Thales, TNO, Vitec

EOS – SDA Conference ‘A new partnership for European Security’ – Brussels, 10 February 2011


Member States authorities: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Sweden, UK


High Level Security Roundtable – Brussels, 21 March 2012

EU: Council of the EU, European Commission (including four Commissioners), European Defence Agency, European Parliament (including 5 MEPs), Europol, Frontex

Member States authorities: France, Germany, UK

Industry: ASD, Airbus, Altran, Amper, Atos, Avio, BAE Systems, CEA, CORTE, Conceptivity, DCNS, Edisoft, Engineering Ingegneria Informatica, EOS, Finmeccanica, FOI, Fraunhofer, G4S, IABG, IBM, Indra, L-3 Communications, Multix, Rapiscan, SAAB, Safran, Securitas, Siemens, Smiths Detection, Thales, TNO, UTRC Europe

PARTICIPANTS IN SDA ORGANISED MEETINGS


EU: European Commission, European Defence Agency, European Union Military Staff, Frontex, one MEP

Member States authorities: Germany, UK


Roundtable ‘Fine-tuning EU border security’ – Brussels, 29 September 2010

EU: Council of the EU, European Commission, European Defence Agency, European Parliament

Member States authorities: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, UK

## ANNEX 2

**LOBBYING INFORMATION AS DECLARED TO THE EU TRANSPARENCY REGISTER**

(information compiled by Corporate Europe Observatory)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name company / organisation</th>
<th>Updated on</th>
<th>Lobby costs</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lobbyists declared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airbus</td>
<td>20-04-2016</td>
<td>1.75mn-2mn</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6.5fte (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airbus</td>
<td>29-04-2015</td>
<td>400,000-500,000</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>10fte (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airbus</td>
<td>04-12-2014</td>
<td>450,000-500,000</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airbus</td>
<td>09-07-2013</td>
<td>4.25mn-4.5mn</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airbus</td>
<td>26-06-2012</td>
<td>500,000-600,000</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finmeccanica</td>
<td>30-03-2016</td>
<td>200,000-300,000</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4fte (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finmeccanica</td>
<td>29-04-2015</td>
<td>&lt;10,000</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.25fte (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finmeccanica</td>
<td>16-06-2014</td>
<td>250,000-300,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finmeccanica</td>
<td>22-09-2013</td>
<td>250,000-300,000</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finmeccanica</td>
<td>17-02-2012</td>
<td>250,000-300,000</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thales</td>
<td>25-03-2016</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.5fte (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thales</td>
<td>29-04-2015</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.5fte (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thales</td>
<td>08-02-2013</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thales</td>
<td>17-02-2012</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indra</td>
<td>16-03-2016</td>
<td>900,000-1mn</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5fte (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indra</td>
<td>29-04-2015</td>
<td>100,000-200,000</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.5fte (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indra²⁹⁴</td>
<td>17-09-2013</td>
<td>250,000-300,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safran</td>
<td>25-03-2016</td>
<td>495,000</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5.5fte (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safran</td>
<td>29-04-2015</td>
<td>495,000</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5.5fte (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safran</td>
<td>04-03-2014</td>
<td>495,000</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safran</td>
<td>28-02-2013</td>
<td>372,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safran</td>
<td>07-03-2012</td>
<td>277,000</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safran</td>
<td>17-02-2012</td>
<td>277,000</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Organisation for Security</td>
<td>09-04-2016</td>
<td>200,000-300,000</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>8fte (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Organisation for Security</td>
<td>02-04-2016</td>
<td>200,000-300,000</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>8fte (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Organisation for Security</td>
<td>06-03-2014</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Organisation for Security</td>
<td>06-04-2013</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Organisation for Security</td>
<td>20-02-2013</td>
<td>350,000-400,000</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Organisation for Security</td>
<td>19-03-2012</td>
<td>350,000-400,000</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe</td>
<td>04-09-2015</td>
<td>298,000</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.75fte (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe</td>
<td>24-02-2014</td>
<td>150,000-200,000</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe</td>
<td>08-02-2013</td>
<td>1.5mn-1.75mn</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe</td>
<td>17-02-2012</td>
<td>1.5mn-1.75mn</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEX 3
PARTICIPANTS IN MEETINGS BETWEEN FRONTEX AND INDUSTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Participating companies and institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 December 2013</td>
<td>Technology Showroom</td>
<td>ATERMES (France), Cassidian Optronics (Airbus, Germany), George Mason University (USA), IABG (Germany), Indra Sistemas (Spain), Immarsat Global Government (UK), NetBio (USA), Palantir Technologies (UK), Palantir (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 April 2014</td>
<td>Border Surveillance Sensors and Platforms Workshop</td>
<td>BATS (Belgium), Cassidian (Airbus, Germany), Eltrac System Spółka (Poland, observers), IABG (Germany), Plais (Israel, observers), RBitc Electronic Security Systems (Israel, observers), Selex ES (Finmeccanica, Italy), Sky Sapience (Israel)296, Textron (USA), Thales (France), Unitronex Poland (Poland), Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (Spain), URMtec (Poland, observers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/23 May 2014</td>
<td>European Day For Border Guards</td>
<td>Airbus Defence and Space (UK), AIT Austrian Institute of Technology (Austria), Alfa Imaging (Spain), CEA (France), Da Vinci Laboratory Solutions (Netherlands), DCNS (France), GMV (Spain), Indra Sistemas (Spain), Istuto Superiore Mario Boella (Italy), Morpho (Safran, France), pXiLogic (USA)297, Queen's University Belfast (UK), SAAB (Sweden), Selex ES (Finmeccanica, Italy), University of Brescia (Italy), VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (Finland)298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October and 3 November 2014</td>
<td>Meeting with industry</td>
<td>Analytical Graphics AGI (UK), Avincis Mission Critical Services (Babcock, UK), Defendec (Estonia), Elbit (Israel), Group 2000 (Netherlands), HGH Infrared Systems (France), IABG (Germany), Indra Sistemas (Spain), MDA (Canada), Optimal Aircraft Design (Belgium), SAS (UK), SES (Luxembourg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 2014</td>
<td>Workshop on R&amp;D projects run and financed by industry and academia for developing solutions, technologies and products for border security</td>
<td>Eskadra (Poland), Fraunhofer (Germany), Furono Finland (Finland), IABG (Germany), National Center for Scientific Research Demokritos (Greece), Polus Europe (Slovakia), Technical University of Catalonia (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March and 9 April 2015</td>
<td>Meeting with industry</td>
<td>Airbus Defence and Space (Germany), Luciad (Belgium), S2 Global (USA), Sysnav (France), Transas Marine International (Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 2015</td>
<td>Workshop on the use of border security technologies and the implications on the privacy, ethics and data protection / fundamental rights of people crossing the borders</td>
<td>Eticas Research and Consulting (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 November 2015</td>
<td>Workshop on research and development projects aimed at developing new products, technologies, solutions for border security, using financial sources other than EU financing</td>
<td>DFRC (Switzerland), FTL Secure Solutions (UK), Indra Sistemas (Spain), Vecara (Germany)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ANNEX 4
LIST OF BORDER SECURITY AND CONTROL PROJECTS WITH EU FUNDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3D FACE</td>
<td>DOLPHIN</td>
<td>LOBOS</td>
<td>SNIFFLES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC4EU</td>
<td>EFFISEC</td>
<td>MARISS</td>
<td>SNOOPY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACXIS</td>
<td>ESSTR</td>
<td>MOBILEPASS</td>
<td>SOBCAH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEROCEPTOR</td>
<td>EWISA</td>
<td>NEREIDS</td>
<td>STABORSEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMASS</td>
<td>FASTPASS</td>
<td>OPERUS</td>
<td>STRAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGUS 3D</td>
<td>FIDELITY</td>
<td>OPERAMAR</td>
<td>SUNNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BODEGA</td>
<td>GLOBE</td>
<td>ORIGINS</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS-UAV</td>
<td>GMOSAIC</td>
<td>PERSEUS</td>
<td>TALOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-BORD</td>
<td>GMOS</td>
<td>SAGRES</td>
<td>TANGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASSANDRA</td>
<td>HANDHOLD</td>
<td>SEABILLA</td>
<td>TERASCREEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLOSEYE</td>
<td>HUMBOLDT</td>
<td>SECCONDD</td>
<td>TRITON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSORTIS</td>
<td>I2C</td>
<td>SECTRONIC</td>
<td>VIRTUOSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTAIN</td>
<td>INGRESS</td>
<td>SIMTISYS</td>
<td>WIMAAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOGGIES</td>
<td>LIMES</td>
<td>SNIFFER</td>
<td>XP-DITE</td>
</tr>
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</table>
ANNEX 5
HORIZON 2020 BORDER SECURITY PROJECTS (2014–2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Indicative budget (mln €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radar systems for the surveillance of coastal and pre-frontier areas and in support of search and rescue operations</td>
<td>4–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordable and easily deployable technologies for EU coastal border surveillance with reduced impact on the environment</td>
<td>3–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light optionally piloted vehicles (and sensors) for maritime surveillance</td>
<td>5–12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novel mobility concepts for land border security</td>
<td>2–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploring new modalities in biometric-based border checks</td>
<td>3–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimization of border control processes and planning</td>
<td>1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human factors in border control</td>
<td>2–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards reducing the cost of technologies in land border security applications</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk-based screening at border crossing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through-foliage detection, including in the outermost regions of the EU</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of “no gate crossing point solutions”</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data fusion for maritime security applications</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border security: autonomous systems and control systems</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX 6
FRONTEX’ LOW VALUE CONTRACTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Document forgery detection equipment</td>
<td>Foster &amp; Freeman (UK)</td>
<td>€45,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Implementation of the Border-TechNet application</td>
<td>GMV Aerospace and Defence (Spain)</td>
<td>€28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>EU satellite training for Frontex</td>
<td>European Union Satellite Centre (Spain)</td>
<td>€20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frontex Positioning System phase II</td>
<td>Atos (Spain)</td>
<td>€22,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Media training for officers taking part in Joint Operations coordinated by Frontex</td>
<td>Cameron Communications (UK)</td>
<td>€15,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Consultancy - utilization of internet and social media for predictive analysis of migration to the EU</td>
<td>IHS Global (UK)</td>
<td>€44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schengen borders e-learning tool</td>
<td>XRC Services (The Netherlands)</td>
<td>€54,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Consultancy on scenario development in the field of border management.</td>
<td>Scenario Management International (Germany)</td>
<td>€54,980</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purchase of Stabilised NVG and Daylight Binoculars</td>
<td>MSS Advanced Technologies (The Netherlands)</td>
<td>€57,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rental of vehicles for Frontex operational activities in Bulgaria, Hungary and Greece</td>
<td>BJ’S (UK)</td>
<td>€27,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purchase of the Digital Surface Model along the EU borders</td>
<td>Geosystems Polska (Poland)</td>
<td>€58,995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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This report highlights how there is one group of interests that have benefited from the refugee tragedy within Europe and in particular from the European Union’s investment in ‘securing’ its borders. They are the military and security companies that provide the equipment to border guards, the surveillance technology to monitor frontiers, and the IT infrastructure to track population movements. Taking advantage of an expected €29 billion yearly budget by 2022, some of the largest winners of border security contracts are perversely the arms companies that sell the most arms to the Middle East.