Policy Briefing

Africa Briefing №93
Nairobi/Brussels, 19 December 2012

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (Forces démocratiques alliées-Armée nationale de libération de l’Ouganda, ADF-NALU) is one of the oldest but least known armed groups in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the only one in the area to be considered an Islamist terrorist organisation. Although it does not represent the same destabilising threat as the 23 March Movement (M23), it has managed to stand its ground against the Congolese army since 2010. Created in the DRC in 1995 and located in the mountainous DRC-Uganda border area, this Congolese-Ugandan armed group has shown remarkable resilience attributable to its geostrategic position, its successful integration into the cross-border economy and corruption in the security forces. Therefore, before considering any further military action against the ADF-NALU, it would be wise to separate fiction from fact and instead pursue a course of weakening its socio-economic base while at the same time offering a demobilisation and reintegration program to its combatants.

Formed of an alliance of several armed groups supported by external actors (Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaïre and Hassan al-Turabi’s Sudan), the ADF-NALU initially fought the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni. However, despite its Ugandan origins, it never managed to gain a foothold in its own country and instead settled in eastern Congo, particularly in the remote mountainous border areas. There it became integrated into local communities, participated in cross-border trade and forged relationships with various armed groups in eastern Congo as well as with both Congolese and Ugandan civilian and military authorities. Given their location in this “grey zone”, the ADF-NALU’s lost combatants have been able to survive despite not winning a battle in over fifteen years and having been defeated several times, but never neutralised.

Due to the ADF-NALU’s leader, Jamil Mukulu, a Christian convert to Islam, the group has transformed from a purely Congolese-Ugandan problem into one with regional dimensions, as a component of the trend of radical Islamism in East Africa. However, little is known about such purported links between ADF-NALU and radical Islamist organisations in the region and the group’s allegiance to Islamism seems rather superficial.

The fight against armed groups in eastern Congo continues to be viewed through a military lens, but it would be wise to avoid another ineffective military operation. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the UN, the DRC and Uganda should therefore adopt a different approach that seeks to:

- Formulate an intelligence-based strategy to neutralise the ADF-NALU’s cross-border economic and logistical networks. The officers of the Joint Verification Mechanism deployed by the ICGLR in 2012 should work with the UN group of experts to produce a detailed study of these networks and use it to define an appropriate strategy for undermining the armed group’s economic and logistical base.
- Include the leaders of ADF-NALU’s support networks, inside and outside the DRC, on the list of individuals subject to UN sanctions for their support of armed groups. Congolese and Ugandan military personnel colluding with these networks should be dealt with appropriately by the authorities of their country.
- Rotate on a regular basis Congolese and Ugandan officers deployed in this region.
- Introduce a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for Congolese and Ugandan combatants who after investigation are found not to be responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. MONUSCO should appeal to donors to fund the program for Congolese ADF-NALU combatants.
- Authorise villagers in the Erengeti and Oicha areas to resume work on their farms, which was suspended by the military authorities.
II. AN ARMED GROUP ALMOST LIKE ANY OTHER

The ADF-NALU was created in 1995 as a product of internal Ugandan struggles and regional geopolitics. It united two armed movements opposed to Yoweri Museveni’s government. Driven back by the Ugandan army, they found refuge in their welcoming Congolese neighbour, where they merged and formed a hybrid rebellion that, having been unable to gain a foothold in Uganda, set down roots in the DRC. Contained by the Ugandan army but ensconced in a remote mountainous border area, the ADF-NALU found a way of surviving in Eastern Congo’s “grey zone”. In the context of the collapse of the DRC state, it was able to blend in with the many armed groups that characterise the region’s rebellious, convulsive and violent geopolitics and it has remained there until today.

A. BIRTH OF A FOREIGN-BACKED, FAILED REBELLION

In September 1995, Yusuf Kabanda, one of the leaders of the Islamic opposition to the Ugandan army, sealed an alliance with Commander Ali Ngaimoko of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), in Beni, in the Congolese province of North Kivu. They founded the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU). Agreed outside of Uganda with the help of the Sudanese and Congolese secret services, this alliance brought together two movements defeated by the Ugandan army. With no previous ideological or operational links, these two movements were nevertheless united in their opposition to the Ugandan government, their presence on Congolese soil and their links with Kampala’s enemies: the Sudanese al-Turabi and the Congolese Mobutu.

1. The National Army for the Liberation of Uganda

The ADF-NALU’s historical roots can be found in the first Rwenzururu independence movement, formed in the ethnic crucible of the Bakonzo community, a minority tribe in western Uganda. The historical precedent of the Rwenzururu armed movement, one of the secessionist movements that emerged when Uganda became independent, facilitated NALU’s creation and development. From 1967 the Rwenzururu movement conducted a low-intensity guerrilla war in an attempt to gain the Ugandan government’s recognition of the Kingdom of Rwenzururu. The struggle officially ended on 15 August 1982, when Charles Wesley Irema-Ngoma, the Bakonzo’s Omusinga, joined Milton Obote’s government, which granted autonomy to the Kingdom of Rwenzururu rather than independence.


With their Nande cousins, who live on the other side of the DRC border, the Bakonzo form the Bayira cross-border ethnic group. The Bakonzo and the Nande maintain close relations (they recognise the same traditional authorities, they hold an annual meeting of leaders of the two groups, etc.) and have taken advantage of their cross-border position to build a trading network. The Bakonzo have opposed the central government in Kampala since the colonial period. In 1950, following the British administration’s refusal to create a Bakonzo district, the Rwenzururu armi movement appeared. Opposed to the new post-independence government, the Bakonzo then created the Kingdom of Rwenzururu on 30 June 1962. It unilaterally proclaimed independence on 15 August 1962 and Isaya Mukiriana became king. The Ugandan army violently repressed this first insurrection. In 1964, Kampala retook control of this part of the country while the Rwenzururu combatants fled into the Rwenzori Mountains, on the border with the DRC, a remote area where the movement established an independent kingdom. In September 1967, the army destroyed the camp where the king of Rwenzururu was living and dispersed the population. Cecilia Pennacini, Herman Wittenberg, Rwenzori, Histories and Culture of an African Mountain (Kampala, 2008). For more details on the Rwenzururu movement, see Mahamood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, 1996).

See Appendix D for a chronology of armed movements in the region.

Omusinga is the title of the king of Uganda’s Bakonzo and DRC’s Nande.

On 15 August 1982, Charles Wesley Irema-Ngoma joined Milton Obote’s government as chief elder of the Kasese district. The local administration was thus dominated by the Bakonzo
Nevertheless, only four years later, an armed group opposed to Kampala, the NALU, established itself in the area where the Rwenzururu movement had been active and contacted its leaders and ex-combatants.

After Milton Obote’s government fell in 1986 and Yoweri Museveni came to power, the deposed regime’s head of intelligence services, Amon Bazira, created the NALU, a group that brought together supporters of both Milton Obote and Idi Amin Dada. Looking for support and thanks to his contacts in the Rwenzururu, Bazira appealed to Charles Wesley Irema-Ngoma, but failed to attract the support of all the movement’s ex-combatants. He was joined by Richard Tinyamussuti, the Rwenzururu’s military commander, but only in an individual capacity. However, Charles Wesley Irema-Ngoma’s support for NALU did not last very long and in 1988 he declared his support for Museveni.

On its creation, NALU received financial and military support from the Congolese and Kenyan governments, which did not trust Museveni. In 1988, the Ugandan army chased it out of the country and the group established itself in the Congolese territories of Beni and Lubero. There, in addition to former Rwenzururu combatants, it attracted Congolese fighters such as the Kasindi Mai-Mai. Established around the border town of Kasindi between Uganda and the DRC, at the foot of the Rwenzori Mountains, this group was led by Enoch Nyamwisi. Former members of the 1964 Simba rebellion led by Gaston Soumialot also joined, turning the NALU into a Congolese-Ugandan movement.

In 1990, the NALU began its first large-scale military operation carrying out 43 grenade attacks in Kampala and Jinda. On 5 July 1991, the Ugandan army killed a Rwenzururu leader during a clash with NALU fighters, eliminating the head of NALU’s Rwenzururu branch, though this did not prevent it from continuing operations. In 1992, the group attacked the capital of Kasese district, but the offensive was quickly contained by the Ugandan army, which retook control of Kasese within a few days. The August 1993 assassination of NALU’s founder, Amon Bazira, in Nakuru, Kenya, marked the end of the movement’s activities.

2. The Islamic component of the ADF-NALU: The Allied Democratic Forces

After the fall of Amin Dada in 1979, the Milton Obote and Yoweri Museveni governments cracked down on Ugandan Muslims. In the 1980s, the religious Tabligh Muslim movement used this oppression and financial support from the Sudanese government to recruit Ugandan youth and become a major player in the local Muslim community.

people and the autonomous Kingdom of Rwenzururu was finally recognised by the Ugandan government in 2008. On 19 October 2009, Charles Wesley Mumbere, son of Charles Wesley Irema-Ngoma, was officially crowned Omusinga of the Kingdom of Rwenzururu.

Born in 1944, Amon Bazira joined the opposition to Amin Dada. On the latter’s fall in 1979, he was named assistant director of the second Obote government’s intelligence services. Between 1980 and 1982, he led negotiations with the Rwenzururu secessionists. In 1986, on Obote’s fall, he created the NALU. For more details, see Tom Stacey, Tribe: The Hidden History of Mountains of the Moon (London, 2003).

The Rwenzururu movement supported Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army in 1986 at the time of the formation of the second front in western Uganda. The movement did not therefore officially join Bazira’s NALU to fight the Museveni government. However, after Museveni came to power, the combatants were left free to join the NALU on an individual basis. Crisis Group interviews, former Rwenzururu movement combatants, Kasese, 3 May 2012.

Crisis Group interviews, former Rwenzururu movement combatants, Kasese, 3 May 2012.

Crisis Group interview, local authority officials, Beni, 18 April 2012.


Enoch Nyamwisi Musingi, one of the founders of the Kasindi Mai-Mai, was a prominent leader of the Nande ethnic group. From 1976 to 1987, he was adviser to several politicians, ministers and the governor of Kinshasa city. From 1987 to 1990, he was executive secretary for youth and sports in the Mobutu government and then youth and sports minister in 1991-1992. He was assassinated in Butembo on 5 January 1993. Crisis Group interviews, local authority officials, Beni, 18 April 2012.

In 1964, the Simba rebellion led by Gaston Soumialot took control of the east of the country and, in Stanleyville (now Kisangani), it formed a rival government to Kampala. The rebellion was defeated with foreign military aid, especially Belgian. For more details, see Alphonse Makengo Nkutu, Les institutions politiques de la RDC: De l’état indépendant du Congo à la république du Zaïre (1885-1990) (Paris, 2010).


However, the struggle for the domination of the religious sphere that ensued was to turn violent.\textsuperscript{19}

On 22 March 1991, Tabligh members clashed with members of the Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC)\textsuperscript{20} in Kampala, leaving five dead, including four police officers.\textsuperscript{21} Following this violence, Tabligh leaders, including Jamil Mukulu, who was head of the youth movement, were imprisoned between 1991 and 1993. After their release, the group’s members, led by Sheikh Sulaiman Kakeeto, established themselves in Hoima, western Uganda, where in 1994, they created the Movement of Ugandan Combatants for Freedom (Mouvement des combattants ougandais pour la liberté, UFFM),\textsuperscript{22} which immediately received support from Khartoum.\textsuperscript{23} Kampala reacted by destroying the movement’s training camp in 1995.

Following the destruction of their base, the members of the UFFM took refuge in the Congolese town of Bunia, near the Ugandan border, where they continued to receive support from Sudan,\textsuperscript{24} whereas the leaders of the Tabligh movement in Uganda, including Sheikh Sulaiman Kakeeto, and Jamil Mukulu, fled to Kenya and Tanzania.\textsuperscript{25} In September 1995, Commander Ngaimoko, a NALU leader, and Yusuf Kabanda, a comrade of Jamil Mukulu, formed an alliance between their two movements, which they named the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU). The Muslim combatants stationed in Bunia were subsequently flown to Beni, where they joined the NALU personnel. They were received and trained by Colonel Ebamba and Major Mayala.\textsuperscript{26} During this period, the ADF-NALU openly recruited with the support of the Congolese government, mainly among the Muslim community in Beni.\textsuperscript{27} At around the same time, according to the Ugandan intelligence services, Jamil Mukulu settled in Khartoum.\textsuperscript{28}

The ADF-NALU quickly relocated to Rugeti, within Beni territory, North Kivu, where they built ties with the local population. Thus, when the troops of Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation (Alliance des forces démocratiques de libération, AFDL) moved into Beni territory, the ADF-NALU, allied with the Mobutu government, withdrew to the Rwenzori Mountains, together with a large part of the population.\textsuperscript{29}

It was in 1996 that this alliance against the Yoweri Museveni government began to attract attention on the Congolese-Ugandan border. According to the Ugandan security services, in May that year, some combatants were taken to Khartoum for three months training together with members of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).\textsuperscript{30} On 13 November, the ADF-NALU launched its first military operation, attacking a border post at Mpondwe and taking control of the town of Mbwera.\textsuperscript{31} From Congolese territory, it infiltrated the Ugandan districts of Kabarole, Bundibugyo and Kasese, where it attacked police stations and administrative buildings.

\section*{B. DEFEATED BUT NOT VANQUISHED}

In the absence of a popular support base, the ADF-NALU’s history against the Ugandan regime has been one of repeated failure. Stuck in the DRC, the movement became “Congolese” and oscillated between cross-border trade, predation on the local population and demotivation. In 2007...

\textsuperscript{19} The election of a mufti from a movement opposed to the Tabligh to the head of the Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) in 1989 was interpreted by Sheikh Sulaiman Kakeeto, the Tabligh’s leader in Uganda, as an interference in Muslim affairs. “Islamic Fundamentalism in Uganda. A Case Study of the Tabligh Youth Movement”, Centre for Basic Research, 1993.

\textsuperscript{20} The UMSC was created in 1971. It is an administrative organ representing the Muslim community. Since it was created during the government of Idi Amin Dada, himself a Muslim, the UMSC is seen as a political organisation.

\textsuperscript{21} Crisis Group interview, UMSC member, Kampala, 10 March 2012.

\textsuperscript{22} The UFMM is also known as the Muslim Liberation Army of Uganda (MULA). The Ugandan government only recognises the MULA and uses the name of UFMM to describe members of the ADF-NALU. “Uganda: Benz spills ADF secrets”, The New Vision, 31 December 2000; “Uganda: The Allied Defence Forces (ADF) in Uganda including leaders, goals, objectives, and whether or not members and supporters are harassed by the government (1995-2002)”, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 25 January 2002; “Opportunities and constraints for the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the cases of the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU”, Conflict and Transition Consultancies, World Bank Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, June 2007.

\textsuperscript{23} “Uganda: Country plots to counter Sudanese support to rebels”, the declassified files, The Independent, 6 January 2012.


\textsuperscript{25} Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan army veterans, Kampala, 2 May 2012.

\textsuperscript{26} Crisis Group interviews, local officials, Beni, 18 April 2012.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{28} “Uganda: Country plots to counter Sudanese support to rebels”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{29} Crisis Group interviews, local officials, Beni, 18 April 2012.

\textsuperscript{30} “Uganda: Country plots to counter Sudanese support to rebels”, op. cit.

it lost its NALU component and, after being ignored for several years, became active again in 2010 following a Congolese army offensive. The focus of its struggle then moved from Ugandan to Congolese territory.

1. ADF-NALU vs. Uganda: A history of repeated failure

In 1996, ADF-NALU forces numbered an estimated 4,000-5,000 combatants. Its operations were concentrated in Kasese and Bundibugo districts, along the border with the DRC. In this period, Yusuf Kabanda led the movement from Lubero in the DRC, with Jamil Mukulu as second-in-command. Chris Munyangongo Tushabe, known as Commander Benz, a sergeant who had deserted from the Ugandan army and had received training in Sudan, led cross-border operations from the DRC.

In June 1997, the ADF-NALU conducted its first major operation seeking to take control of the town of Bundibuyo, but Ugandan forces successfully repelled their attack. The ADF-NALU went on to forcibly recruit children from schools in 1998 and attacked Katojo prison in 1999.

The ADF-NALU increased the number of its attacks on villages not protected by the Ugandan army and police. They carried out summary executions, mutilated and abducted villagers and laid anti-personnel mines in the fields and along the main rural roads. For more details, see “Opportunities and constraints for the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, op. cit., p. 82.

In 1997, the ADF-NALU’s first attack on Kampala failed. A home-made bomb exploded prematurely where it was being stored. “Sudan government trains ADF rebels”, The classified files, The Independent, 7 April 2009.

In June 1997, the ADF-NALU conducted its first major operation seeking to take control of the town of Bundibuyo, but Ugandan forces successfully repelled their attack. The ADF-NALU went on to forcibly recruit children from schools in 1998 and attacked Katojo prison in 1999.

After repeated military failures and unable to gain a foothold in Uganda, the ADF-NALU attacked the civilian population to force it to cooperate. The ADF-NALU also successfully hit the centre of power, Kampala, where on 14 February 1999 they launched an urban terrorist campaign, bombing two restaurants in the Ugandan capital.

Between April and June 1999, the group organised seven attacks in Kampala using grenades and home-made bombs.

The Ugandan government responded by deploying troops in towns and along the road between Fort-Portal and Kasese. This had little effect, as the ADF-NALU had retreated to the Rwenzori Mountains and Ugandan forces were neither equipped or prepared to fight in such terrain. With the agreement of the then Congolese president, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, Uganda deployed troops in the north of North Kivu province in 1997. This deployment was formalised on 27 April 1998 by an agreement on border security.

On 9 November 1999, with the help of former Rwenzururu combatants, the Ugandan army launched a major search operation in the Rwenzori mountains, Operation Mountain Sweep, during which many ADF-NALU combatants, but also some of their commanders, were captured or killed.

Meanwhile, the Ugandan government attacked alleged funding sources of the group and, on 1 April 1999, the Greenland Bank, which Kampala accused of having links with the ADF-NALU, was closed down by the Ugandan Central Bank on the grounds of insolvency and debt. However, the director of Greenland Bank has always insisted that this decision was political and he denies any links with the rebel group.

On 14 January 2000, General Kazini announced that the army had succeeded in cutting off the ADF-NALU from Sudanese logistical support in the DRC. Between 1998 and 2000, the attacks carried out by the group killed 1,000 people, displaced 150,000, including 85 per cent of the population in Bundibugo dis-
trict, and reduced tax revenues from Kasese district by 75 per cent.45

Having been cut off from their Sudanese support, the ADF-NALU reorganised and made contact with other armed groups operating on Congolese territory: the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma, RCD-Goma) in North Kivu and the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais, MRC) in Ituri, two allies of Rwanda.46 It funded its activities by resorting to crime and moving some of its troops towards Ituri.47 It also made contact with the Democratic Forces of Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, FDLR), a rebel group opposed to Paul Kagame’s government.48

The ADF-NALU continued its terrorist campaign in Kampala49 but suffered many setbacks in the Rwenzori Mountains.50 In 2001, it failed in an attempt to negotiate with the Ugandan government, which had passed an amnesty law for the combatants of armed groups in 2000.51 From that year on, the army estimated that the ADF-NALU only had about 100 combatants and no longer represented a significant threat.52

2. From ADF-NALU to ADF: From fighting Uganda to fighting the DRC

End of operations against Uganda: NALU lays down its arms

In December 2005, the UN and the DRC armed forces (FARDC) launched operation North Night Final against ADF-NALU bases. The operation succeeded in destroying the group’s main camps and killed about 90 combatants,53 but its leaders escaped and disappeared into the Rwenzori Mountains following a tip-off.54 This was the first time that Kinshasa turned on the movement it helped to create ten years previously. Two years later, the ADF-NALU was reduced to just the ADF.55

In 2007, ADF-NALU’s activities once again reached a climax, but the army successfully countered all its attempts to infiltrate Uganda.56 In light of this renewed activity, Kampala accused the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) and the Congolese government of doing nothing to prevent the ADF-NALU from reforming. Meanwhile, Kinshasa accused the Ugandan army of making incursions into its territory.57 That same year, several border incidents resulted in clashes between the armies of the two countries.58

In March 2007, the ADF-NALU approached MONUC in order to negotiate its surrender. Although these negotiations failed, military setbacks in March and April and the amnesty extended to seven prisoners from the group in November49 had a major impact on combatants and 200

45 “Opportunities and constraints for the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, op. cit., p. 73.
46 “Intelligence analyses Rwanda role on ADF”, the declassified files, The Independent, 11 February 2009.
47 Ibid.
48 “CMI fears attacks from Rwanda-backed rebels part 1 and 2”, the declassified files, The Independent, 3 February 2012.
51 “Intelligence analyses Rwanda role on ADF”, op. cit., paragraph 3, p. 6.
53 Crisis Group interviews, MONUSCO personnel, April 2012.
54 Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan army veterans and former ADF-NALU combatants, Kampala and Beni, April 2012.
55 From 2007, it was no longer appropriate to use the name ADF-NALU even though it still appeared in some press articles.
56 On 15 March 2007, the Ugandan army killed two ADF-NALU combatants in the district of Mubende. On 23 March, it killed another two in the district of Bundibuyo. Four days later, it killed 34 and captured five commanders, including three very senior officers. Among the commanders killed was Balao Isiko, second in command of the group.
57 In reply, on 31 March 2007, the Ugandan government officially protested against the ADF-NALU’s presence in eastern Congo and reaffirmed its right to self-defence and hot pursuit. “Government demands action against Ugandan rebels in Congo”, U.S. embassy in Uganda cable, 4 March 2007, as revealed by WikiLeaks.
58 In August 2007, the Congolese army captured four Ugandan soldiers. Two soldiers were killed later in a clash between the Ugandan and Congolese armies. These incidents took place on the border around Lake Albert. For more details, see Crisis Group Report, Black Gold in the Congo, op. cit.
of them surrendered on 4 December.\(^{60}\) Seven members of the group who claimed to be the last leaders of the NALU component were among those who surrendered and benefited from MONUC’s Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration Programme (DDRRR).\(^{61}\) From then on, Jamil Mukulu, who was already ADF’s military chief, became the group’s only leader, along with a traditional doctor who is a former member of the Rwenzururu movement. Thus, the ADF-NALU ceased to exist as an alliance.\(^{62}\) On 17 March 2008, the Ugandan president recognised the Kingdom of Rwenzururu,\(^{63}\) meeting a key demand of the ex-Rwenzururu combatants in the NALU.

Beginning in July 2008, the ADF tried to relaunch negotiations with the Ugandan government, which said it was ready to begin a dialogue and release funds.\(^{64}\) However, the rebellion of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès national pour la défense du peuple, CNDP) caused these discussions to be suspended until the second quarter of 2009. The negotiations finally started in August 2009\(^{65}\) but were unsuccessful as the Ugandan government believed that the ADF members were using the talks only to seek their own profit.\(^{66}\)

The ADF in the DRC: Operations Rwenzori and Radi Strike

On 25 April 2010, an ADF/Mai-Mai joint attack on Niya-leke military camp, near Beni, led to further operations against the ADF in Beni and Lubero territories.\(^{67}\) On 25 April 2010, an ADF/Mai-Mai joint attack on Niya-leke military camp, near Beni, led to further operations.\(^{68}\) From then on, Jamil Mukulu, who was already ADF’s military chief, became the group’s only leader, along with a traditional doctor who is a former member of the Rwenzururu movement. Thus, the ADF-NALU ceased to exist as an alliance.\(^{62}\) On 17 March 2008, the Ugandan president recognised the Kingdom of Rwenzururu,\(^{63}\) meeting a key demand of the ex-Rwenzururu combatants in the NALU.

The ADF in the DRC: Operations Rwenzori and Radi Strike

On 25 April 2010, an ADF/Mai-Mai joint attack on Niya-leke military camp, near Beni, led to further operations against the ADF in Beni and Lubero territories.\(^{67}\) On 25 April 2010, an ADF/Mai-Mai joint attack on Niya-leke military camp, near Beni, led to further operations.\(^{68}\) From then on, Jamil Mukulu, who was already ADF’s military chief, became the group’s only leader, along with a traditional doctor who is a former member of the Rwenzururu movement. Thus, the ADF-NALU ceased to exist as an alliance.\(^{62}\) On 17 March 2008, the Ugandan president recognised the Kingdom of Rwenzururu,\(^{63}\) meeting a key demand of the ex-Rwenzururu combatants in the NALU.

The clashes between the FARDC and the ADF were accompanied by human rights abuses by both parties and the displacement of nearly 100,000 people.\(^{72}\) On 31 July 2010, on the eve of a visit to Beni by the defence minister,\(^{73}\) the ADF distributed pamphlets denouncing FARDC atrocities.\(^{74}\) It also accused President Joseph Kabila of not respecting agreements with the ADF that allegedly authorised its members to stay in the DRC as long as they did not interfere in Congolese affairs.

Although the Congolese government spokesman Lambert Mende announced victory over the ADF,\(^{75}\) Operation Rwenzori continued in 2011. In fact, despite some military coordination between the FARDC, MONUSCO and the Ugandan army in Beni, the anti-ADF operations got bogged down, with the Congolese army suffering setbacks and the ADF counter-attacking.\(^{76}\) At the end of 2011, the ADF, still undefeated and seeking to reinforce itself, established links with several armed groups.

\(^{60}\) Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan amnesty commission personnel, 7 April and 10 May 2012.
\(^{61}\) Crisis Group interviews, former ADF-NALU combatants, Beni, 15 April 2012.
\(^{69}\) Crisis Group interviews, local authority officials and member of MONUSCO, Beni and Goma, 18 and 22 April 2012.
\(^{70}\) “Beni: les Fardc récupèrent les positions des ADF-NALU après affrontements”, Radio Okapi, 10 July 2010.
\(^{71}\) Crisis Group interview, Congolese army spokesperson, Goma, 22 April 2012.
\(^{72}\) Crisis Group interviews, OCHA representative, Beni, 16 April 2012.
\(^{73}\) “Traque contre l’ADF-NALU: Mwondo Nsimba à Beni”, Radio Okapi, 1 August 2010.
\(^{74}\) “ADF/Congo relation”, pamphlet attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces, 23 July 2010.
\(^{76}\) Despite the Ugandan army’s support, Congolese soldiers suffered heavy losses when they attacked the villages of Nadui, Makoyova 1 and 2, in Banande-Kainama. Crisis Group interview, MONUSCO personnel, Goma, 12 April 2012. On 1 July 2011, the ADF attacked the FARDC at Chuchubo and Makembi and on 29 July, they attacked the FARDC’s position at Bili mani. “Letter dated 29 November 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council”, S/2011/738, UN Security Council, 2 December 2011, paragraph 51, p. 27. According to the FARDC spokesperson, on 6 July 2011, the ADF launched coordinated offensives on three Congolese army positions at Makembi, Tsutsubo and Abyalos. “Attaque des positions FARDC d’Abyalos/Beni”, Beni Lubero online (www. benilubero.com), 7 July 2011; “Face à des éventuelles attaques des ADF-NALU à Beni: Le colonel Célestin Ngeleka rassure la population”, L’Avenir, 22 July 2011.
At the beginning of 2012, the group made an unsuccessful attack against Congolese army positions at Mukoko, near Oicha, in Beni territory, and on 20 March, the FARDC and the MONUSCO announced Operation Radi Strike. This new action proved problematic from the outset and it was too short to make a real impact. It aimed to dislodge the ADF from its strongholds but actually it was the ADF who took the initiative. Within MONUSCO, cooperation between Indian officers and Nepalese troops was allegedly difficult. The operation was halted on 11 April 2012 when Joseph Kabila suspended all military operations in North Kivu following the outbreak of the M23 rebellion.

At the end of 2011, the resistance displayed by the ADF, the November elections in the DRC and the discovery of hydrocarbons in western Uganda led Kampala to deploy 1,500 special forces on the DRC border, close to the installations of the oil companies.

### III. LOST SOLDIERS, A CONVENIENT POLITICAL TOOL

Although the ADF has not launched an attack on Ugandan soil since 2007, the Museveni government has presented the group as an Islamist threat with links to regional terrorist networks and denounced an Al-Shabaab/ADF axis. However, for Kinshasa, the ADF had never been a real threat, only a nuisance because of its proximity to armed groups opposed to the government. Operation Ruwenzori, launched by the Congolese government in 2010, allowed the army to take control of certain trade networks connecting the DRC and Uganda, but did not manage to finish off the ADF completely. Thus, though the lost soldiers of the ADF pose no real danger, Kinshasa and Kampala have found it politically and financially useful to present them as such.

#### A. An Islamist Threat in Central Africa?

Through Jamil Mukulu the ADF-NALU ceased to be a purely Congolese-Ugandan issue, gaining an international dimension through its connection with the radical Islamist trend in East Africa. However, little is known about Mukulu’s past nor his links with radical Islamist movements in the region. In addition, the ADF’s Islamist tendencies are also questionable, even though the Ugandan authorities have, since 1995, regularly claimed it has links with various Islamist groups.

1. **Jamil Mukulu and radical Islam**

Since 2001, the U.S. has included the ADF-NALU in its list of terrorist organisations. However, it was only in 2007 with the departure of NALU’s last leaders that conversion to Islam became obligatory for combatants. As undisputed leader of the ADF since 1998, Jamil Mukulu was in contact with the government in Khartoum and he has since been suspected of establishing links with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab movement.

---

77 Crisis Group interviews, members of MONUSCO and the FARDC, Beni and Goma, 10 and 22 April 2012.
79 Relations between Indian and Nepalese military personnel are alleged to have rapidly deteriorated to such an extent that the Nepalese commander directed UN civilian personnel in Beni not to communicate directly with the Indian officers. Crisis Group interviews, MONUSCO personnel and members of the humanitarian community, Beni and Goma, 14 and 23 April 2012.
80 For more details, see Crisis Group Briefing N°91, Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed, 4 October 2012.
81 For more details, see Crisis Group Reports, Black Gold in the Congo, op. cit., and Uganda: No Resolution to Growing Tensions, op. cit.
82 “WAR: Army on red alert as ADF braces for attack”, Chimpreports, 9 November 2011 and “ADF rebels surround oil wells, 1,500 special forces deployed”, Chimpreports, 16 December 2011.
85 A video seized during a Kenyan police raid on his home in Nairobi showed him in the Rwenzori Mountains in 2007. Crisis Group interviews, MONUSCO personnel, Beni and Goma, 14 and 22 April 2012.
During the bombing campaign in Kampala in 1998, the Ugandan authorities accused Jamil Mukulu of receiving financial support from the Sudanese intelligence services. In 1999, based on alleged links between Greenland Bank Sudanese shareholders and the Khartoum government, they accused the bank of belonging to ADF-NALU’s financial networks.

In addition to pointing out its links with Khartoum, the Ugandan government highlighted the ADF’s links with new Islamist threats in the region: first, al-Qaeda, then, since 2010, Al-Shabaab. According to Kampala, Jamil Mukulu was al-Qaeda’s number two in East Africa – an assertion that has not been confirmed by experts on Islamist movements in Somalia. Mukulu is also allegedly involved in several bombings and attempted bombings.

Following the 2010 bombings by Al-Shabaab in Kampala, many UN and Ugandan intelligence services reports noted the presence of Somalis in the ADF. For example, the National Congolese Intelligence Agency (Agence nationale de renseignement congolaise, ANR) reported the arrival in Erengeti, on the Uganda-DRC border, of eighteen men resembling Somalis to join the ADF. The UN group of experts on the DRC noted the dispatch of Somali trainers by Al-Shabaab to the ADF. However, this was never confirmed by any source other than the Ugandan security services. According to the latter, the ADF are trying to recruit among Somalian communities in eastern Uganda, but missions in 2010 and 2011 to investigate these communities, conducted by the Ugandan amnesty commission, met no success. Furthermore, in 2012, Kampala accused the ADF of having links with Pakistani militants before retracting the accusation for lack of evidence.

The arrest of Jamil Mukulu’s son in Nairobi in 2011 allegedly revealed links with radical Kenyan Islamist circles, notably the Kenyan Muslim Youth Council (MYC). However, the existence of direct cooperation between Al-

---

87 The Ugandan intelligence services suspected a Sudanese official of having carried financial aid to the ADF when they were preparing their bombing campaign in 1998. “Uganda plots to counter Sudanese support to rebels”, The Independent, the declassified files, 6 January 2012. On 28 May 1998, 30 suspects, including some Sudanese nationals, were arrested on charges of helping to finance the ADF-NALU bombing campaign in Kampala in April 1998. “Uganda: Security arrest 30 over bomb blasts”, The New Vision, 1 June 1999.

88 “Costly war may be justified – Kiggundu”, The New Vision, 28 July 2004. However, the director of the Greenland Bank and former director of the Ugandan Central Bank, Dr Suleiman Kiggundu, has always rejected the accusations concerning the use of his establishment to finance the ADF-NALU. “Dr Kiggundu: why my bank was closed”, The Observer, 25 June 2008.


90 Crisis Group interviews, MONUSCO personnel, Beni and Goma, 14 and 22 April 2012. However, no expert on Islamist movements in Somalia consulted could confirm this information. Crisis Group email correspondence, researcher, December 2012; Crisis Group interview, former member of the Somali transition government, October 2012.

91 In 2008, the Ugandan intelligence services announced that they had uncovered an ADF plot against the Commonwealth summit in Kampala. “Al-Qa’eda plot to kill Queen foiled”, The Telegraph, 13 January 2008. In 2010, the ADF were accused of having provided logistical support to Al-Shabaab at the time of the July 2010 bombings. “Uganda army says ADF rebels have expanded links with Somali militants”, The Wall Street Journal, 3 August 2010.

92 Organised during the football world cup, these bombings, which killed 70 people, targeted establishments frequented by Westerners and were reprisals against the Ugandan government for its involvement in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). “Al-Shabab claim Uganda bombing”, Al Jazeera, 13 July 2010. For more details, see Crisis Group Report, Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support, op. cit.

93 Crisis Group interviews, member of MONUSCO, Beni, 21 May 2012.

94 “Letter dated 29 November 2011”, op. cit., paragraph 49, p. 27.

95 Crisis Group interview, member of the Ugandan amnesty commission, April 2012.

96 In June 2012, the Ugandan authorities arrested five Pakistani citizens on suspicion of being in contact with the ADF. “Uganda arrests five Pakistani terror suspects”, The Wall Street Journal, 26 June 2012. However, the Ugandan authorities acknowledged they had no evidence and handed them over to the Kenyan police. “Uganda hands suspects Pakistan militants to Kenya”, Chimpreports, 26 June 2012.


98 After his arrest in 2011, Hassan Mukulu’s bail was paid by individuals whom the Kenyan authorities suspected of being members of the MYC. Crisis Group interviews, member of the UN group of experts on Somalia, Nairobi, 6 April 2012. The Kenyan group al-Hijra, or MYC, which was founded in December 2008 as a forum for Muslim youth in Mombasa, is accused of being one of Al-Shabaab’s main sources of support in Kenya. “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010)”, S/2011/433, 18 July 2011, pp. 140-179.
Shabaab and the ADF remains only a hypothesis, especially as the Ugandan government uses the terrorist threat for both domestic and external policy reasons.

Kampala regularly raises the spectre of terrorism against the Ugandan Muslim community, which feels ostracised and mainly supports the opposition due to the Ugandan government’s fight against the ADF-NALU and its behaviour following the 2010 bombings. In addition, the Ugandan army’s involvement in Somalia made Kampala eligible for financial aid that covered 17.3 per cent of its defence budget for 2012. This exploitation of the ADF threat in its dealings with foreign partners and national public opinion is an integral part of the Kampala government’s policies.

2. The light footprint of Islam in the ADF

Although the founders of the ADF (Jamil Mukulu, Yusuf Kabanda and Sheik Kamoga) were Muslims fighting Kampala, the movement does not have the characteristics of a terrorist Islamist organisation as described by the Ugandan authorities.

First, the ADF’s immediate environment does not show signs of religious radicalisation. The Muslim communities of Beni and Bunia in the DRC, among which the movement has recruited, have long had relations with Sudan and Kenya without the radical Muslim organisations in these two countries establishing themselves in the two Congolese towns. Created in 1972, the Islamic Commission in the DRC (COMICO) established links with the International Islamic University of Africa in Khartoum in the mid-1990s, but it has no contact with the Tabligh.

Second, the ADF does not declare itself to be a fundamentalist organisation. Although its members openly attend mosques in Erengeti and Beni, recent recruitment in the DRC has not focused particularly on Muslims. Most of the former ADF combatants that have signed up to MONUSCO’s DDRRR program seem to have been recruited by force or during indiscriminate abductions. In Goma, the group’s combatants have relations with two individuals at Birere mosque who are implicated in the transfer of arms, ammunition, activists and recruits from Rwanda. However, as in Bunia and Beni, radical Islam such as that of the ADF seems to involve a very small minority of the population. According to the COMICO branch in Goma, radical preachers sometimes come to the DRC, mainly via Rwanda, but without having any relations with that Muslim organisation.

In addition, the ADF was not noted for trying to convert its NALU comrades-in-arms to Islam or the Congolese population among which it was based for years. In its demands, the ADF makes no mention of establishing a caliphate or introducing Islam as the state religion and its pamphlets rarely refer to Islam.

B. A PROFITABLE AND THEREFORE LASTING THREAT

Despite losing its initial support and seeing its nuisance capacity in Uganda reduced to naught since 2007, the ADF remained dormant in the DRC until Operation Ruwenzori.

99 Following the July 2010 bombings, an ADF representative, Ismael Rukwago, denied taking part in the attacks. “Suicide vest is vital clue after Uganda blasts”, Agence France-Presse, 14 July 2010.
101 “Why is Museveni building region’s strongest army?”, The Independent, 9 April 2012.
103 Crisis Group interviews, COMICO representatives, Bunia and Beni, April 2012.
104 Crisis Group interview, COMICO representative, Goma, 22 April 2012.
105 Crisis Group interview, COMICO representative, Goma, 23 April 2012
106 Crisis Group interviews, MONUSCO personnel, Beni and Goma, 14 and 22 April 2012.
107 Crisis Group interview, MONUSCO personnel, Goma, 22 April 2012.
108 The COMICO branch in Goma mainly has links with the Rwanda Muslims Association (Association des musulmans rwandais, AMUR) and the Turkish Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet işleri Başkanlığı), which helps it during Ramadan and religious festivals. It also has relations with Saudi Arabia so it can benefit from Islamic Bank Development programs. Crisis Group interview, COMICO representative, Goma, 23 April 2012.
109 Ibid.
110 Only a pamphlet distributed in 2012 makes explicit reference to the Quran.
in 2010. Its presence in the DRC proved to be durable not because of the number of combatants or its military superiority but because of its integration into the local society and economy and the ambiguous nature of the military operations that were supposed to dislodge it. In fact, the longer the operations, the more time army officers have to get involved in the local economy and its profitable trafficking networks.

1. The ADF’s socio-economic anchoring

Like its predecessors, the ADF-NALU managed to integrate itself in the border economy from the start thanks to its composition and presence in a resource-rich territory.\(^\text{111}\) NALU had developed trading relations with the Rwenzururu movement, notably with Enoch Nyamwisi.\(^\text{112}\) So when the ADF-NALU was formed, these relations continued. During Operation Mountain Sweep, some Ugandan officers were also suspected of trading with the group\(^\text{113}\) through their Congolese allies, particularly elements of the RCD/KML.\(^\text{114}\) The ADF currently has a large funding network in the Beni and Butembo region of the DRC thanks to the links it has forged with the local population and the cross-border trade of timber and minerals at the beginning of the northern corridor.\(^\text{115}\) Documents found during the search of Jamil Mukulu’s home in Nairobi in August 2011\(^\text{116}\) appear to show that the ADF is allegedly involved in the trade of timber and gold – the two main resources of the area where it operates.\(^\text{117}\) In addition, according to the UN, a Congolese national who commercialised the gold for them was killed in Erengeti on 13 November 2011.\(^\text{118}\) In the area under its control, the ADF imposes a $300 tax on all chainsaws used for felling timber and fines of up to $500 on those who do not pay. Information gathered by Crisis Group shows that all those who exploit timber in this area pay the tax, including officers of the Congolese army.\(^\text{119}\)

Arrests in 2011 revealed the extent of the ADF’s financial networks and the benefit it derives from its integration into the local environment. In July, the Congolese security services arrested a Congolese national from Beni who was married to someone close to one of the ADF commanders and acted as a contact for money transfers from the UK.\(^\text{120}\) In October, two Ugandans travelling from the UK and suspected of being in contact with the ADF were arrested.\(^\text{121}\) Following these setbacks, the ADF reportedly relocated its money transfer channels to Kampala.\(^\text{122}\)

Until Operation Rwenzori in 2010, the ADF developed trading links with the local population. This coexistence was facilitated by its tendency to avoid looting – unlike the FARDC – and to buy commodities at a fixed price below market price.\(^\text{123}\) Thanks to its revenues, it was also able to set up shops in Beni, Erengeti and Butembo\(^\text{124}\) and

---

\(^{111}\) See Appendix B for the location of ADF camps.  
\(^{112}\) Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan army veterans and former Rwenzururu combatants, Kampala and Kasese, 26 and 28 April 2012.  
\(^{113}\) Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan army veteran and academic, Kampala, 28 April 2012.  
\(^{114}\) Crisis Group interviews, members of civil society and the humanitarian community, former ADF-NALU combatants and Ugandan army veterans, Beni and Kampala, 13 April and 25 May 2012. The Congolese Rally for Democracy/Kisangani Liberation Movement (Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Kisangani-mouvement de libération, RCD/KML) is an armed group that appeared following the splits within the DRC at Kisangani in 2000. It is led by Mbuba Nyamwisi, a Nande and brother of Enoch Nyamwisi, who joined the transition government in 2003. Nyamwisi was a minister in Joseph Kabila’s 2006 and 2011 governments and, since the last election, he is a parliamentarian and vocal critic of the government. The group has a strong Nande ethnic base and is currently the main political party in Beni and Lubero in North Kivu. For more details, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°91, *The Congo Transition is Failing*, 30 March 2005.  
\(^{115}\) In the East African communication network, the northern corridor is the road that stretches from eastern DRC to Mombasa via Kampala. www.eac.int/trade/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113&Itemid=126.  
\(^{116}\) “Top Ugandan ADF collaborators arrested”, *Chimpreports*, 23 June 2012.
obtain supplies of manufactured goods through intermediaries who made purchases on their behalf. However, the buyers were not always willing to contribute: the ADF sometimes threatened them with abduction or retaliation against their families in order to force them to play this role. In eastern Congo, this trading system allows all armed groups to obtain supplies and reinvest and some local economic actors to profit from their presence.

Nevertheless, Operation Radi Strike has made coexistence with the population difficult. The ADF has become more distrustful and violent toward individuals suspected of collaborating with the FARDC. An investigation by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) showed that the ADF alone was responsible for the abduction of 40 people in the first half of 2012. On the road between Erengeti and Nadui, the ADF only authorises travel between 9am and 4pm. Only known individuals and suppliers are authorised to use the road outside these hours and the group does not hesitate to kill anybody who violates this curfew.

2. The FARDC: when military operations mean business

In a pattern reproduced throughout eastern Congo, the Congolese army used the operation against the ADF as an opportunity for predation. Congolese officers are regularly accused of making trade deals with the ADF and so are the local Ugandan authorities.

In 2010, Operation Rwenzori was allegedly used by senior officers of the FARDC in Butembo to intimidate Nande traders of the town and take control of the timber trade. While the FARDC are trying to take back the villages in which the ADF is entrenched, attacks against Butembo traders, which the army attributes to the Mai-Mai and the ADF, are multiplying. For civil society representatives, these attacks against commercial vehicles transporting large sums of money are carried out by the FARDC and local authorities. They also accuse the FARDC of extorting money from the population during anti-ADF operations.

Like the ADF, soldiers engaged in Operation Rwenzori are regularly accused of having turned to one of the major economic activities between the DRC and Uganda: the timber trade. Under the pretext of protecting local populations, the FARDC are suspected of exploiting timber in the territory of Mambasa, in the eastern province, and of extorting money from local farmers and companies based in Beni. Congolese military authorities are routinely accused of colluding with the ADF in the region. In 2010, General Kakolele, the FARDC chief of staff at Butembo, is said to have been to Nairobi, where he reportedly met members of Mai-Mai groups and the ADF. Several ADF members arrested in Beni and transferred to Kinshasa were released after a few months on military orders. Accusations of collusion between the FARDC, the ADF and Ugandan authorities in Kasese are frequent, stemming from the fact that the timber trade between the DRC and Uganda cannot escape the Ugandan authorities’ surveillance.

129 Crisis Group interviews, member of civil society and UNHCR, Goma, 13 July 2012.
130 Crisis Group interview, local authority officials, Beni, 19 April 2012.
131 Crisis Group interview, member of civil society, Beni, 14 and 16 April 2012.
133 Crisis Group interviews, member of civil society, Beni, 13 April 2012.
134 Crisis Group interview, member of civil society, member of the humanitarian community, member of the FARDC, Beni, 13 and 15 April 2012.
135 Crisis Group Briefing, Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed, op. cit.
136 Crisis Group interview, member of civil society, member of the humanitarian community, Beni, 19 April 2012.
137 Crisis Group interviews, members of civil society and civil society organisations, Beni and Goma, 13 and 15 April 2012.
138 Crisis Group interviews, members of civil society and the humanitarian community, Beni, 19 April 2012.
139 Crisis Group interview, member of civil society and the humanitarian community, Beni and Goma, 13 and 12 April 2012.
140 Crisis Group telephone interview, economic operator, Beni, October 2012.
141 Crisis Group interview, member of civil society, Beni, 17 April 2012.
C. IN SEARCH OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE-BASED STRATEGY

In the summer of 2012, after two years of failed military operations by the Congolese army, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) passed a series of resolutions on the crisis in North Kivu and proposed deploying 4,000 men “to eradicate the M23, the FDLR and all negative forces operating in eastern Congo and ensure the control and security of borders”. Until the M23 rebel movement took Goma in November 2012, this military approach to the issue of armed groups also applied to the ADF. Another military operation could succeed in the short term if it is well coordinated with the Ugandan and Congolese armies, but in the long term it would be doomed to fail given the ADF’s integration in the local environment, the mountainous landscape and the group’s habit of going underground, as the 2010 and 2012 offensives showed.

While the ICGLR abandoned the idea of sending a force to fight all armed groups in eastern DRC following the evolution of the situation on the ground, the fight against the ADF should no longer be seen as a military campaign but rather as an intelligence-based operation. The officers of the Joint Verification Mechanism deployed by the ICGLR in Goma should focus on the ADF’s cross-border economic and logistical networks and work with the UN group of experts to produce a detailed study of these networks, upon which a strategy to fight the group should be based.

This joint intelligence work should lead to the identification of individuals involved in the ADF’s support networks inside and outside the DRC, and their inclusion in the list of individuals supporting armed groups and subject to UN sanctions. Freezing their assets and banning them from travel will hamper their capacity to transfer money, collect funds from abroad and mobilise members of the diaspora in Africa and the West. This work should also help identify members of the Congolese and Ugandan military personnel colluding with these networks, and their names should be communicated to the authorities of these two countries for adequate sanctions.

Meanwhile, Kampala and Kinshasa should regularly rotate their officers deployed in the region. As long as this intelligence work has not been carried out, no military operation should be launched. In addition, villagers in the Erengeti and Oïcha areas should be authorised to resume work on their farms. In an attempt to cut off food supplies from the ADF, the military authorities arbitrarily denied the villagers access to their fields in 2010, to no avail.

While awaiting the formulation of a detailed strategy to fight the ADF, the combatants who wish to surrender should be able to take part in a DDRRR program. However, MONUSCO ended such programs for Congolese fighters due to a lack of funds. Given the small number of combatants concerned, the UN mission should seek a donor to finance it in order to provide ADF members who have not committed war crimes or crimes against humanity with an opportunity for demobilisation and reintegration.

IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the ADF, cornered in the Rwenzori Mountains, appears to be more of a politically convenient threat for both the FARDC and the Ugandan government than an Islamist threat lurking at the heart of Central Africa. Far from defending the cause of Ugandan Muslims, the ADF is a rebel group lost on the edge of the DRC and Uganda, trying to survive while conducting a residual guerrilla war in a remote border zone. Manipulated time and again, vanquished, forgotten, and deprived of any popular support or real political agenda, the lost soldiers of the ADF show that armed groups in eastern DRC carry on their fight because of the area’s overwhelming poverty and state deficiencies, not because they are particularly combative and ingenious. Their strength and modus operandi requires a new approach based on law enforcement rather than military action.

Nairobi/Brussels, 19 December 2012

---

142 Decision 12.iii, report of the extraordinary session of the ICGLR inter-ministerial committee on the security situation in Eastern Congo, Addis Ababa, 11 July 2012.
144 Individuals and organisations that support armed groups in the DRC may be subject to UN targeted sanctions (freezing of assets and travel ban). See Resolution 1533, Security Council, S/RES1533, 12 March 2004 and Resolution 1596, Security Council, S/RES/1596, 18 April 2005, paragraphs 13-16, pp. 4-5.
145 Crisis Group interviews, members of the MONUSCO DDRRR program, Kampala, Beni and Goma, 12 March, 13 April and 25 April 2012.
APPENDIX C

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADF  Allied Democratic Forces
AFDL  Alliance des forces démocratiques de libération, Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation
AMISOM  African Union Mission in Somalia
AMUR  Rwanda Muslims Association, Association des musulmans rwandais
ANR  National Intelligence Agency, Agence national de renseignement (DRC)
APR  Popular Resistance Army, Armée populaire de résistance
ICGLR  International Conference for the Great Lakes Region
CNPD  National Congress for the Defence of the People, Congrès national pour la défense du peuple
COMICO  Islamic Commission of Congo, Commission islamique du Congo
DDRRR  Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reinsertion
FARDC  DRC Armed Forces, Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo
FDLR  Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
UNHCR  UN High Commissioner for Refugees
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army
M23  March 23 movement
MONUC  UN Mission in the Congo
MONUSCO  UN Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo
MRC  Congolese Revolutionary Movement, Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais
MULA  Muslim Uganda Liberation Army
MYC Kenya  Muslim Youth Council Kenya, also named al-Hijra
NALU  National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NRA  National Resistance Army
RCD-KML  Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani-Liberation Movement, Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Kisangani-mouvement de libération
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
UFFM  Uganda Freedom Fighters Movement
UIC  Union of Islamic Courts (Somalia)
UPDF  Ugandan People’s Defence Force
UMSC  Ugandan Muslim Superior Council
WNBF  West Nile Bank Front
APPENDIX D

CHRONOLOGY OF ARMED MOVEMENTS ON THE DRC-UGANDA BORDER 1962-2012


30 June 1963 – The Kingdom of Ruwenzururu is created and Isaya Mukirana is crowned.


19 October 1972 – Charles Wesley Mumbere Irema-Ngoma, in exile in the U.S., is appointed king of the Bakonzo.

15 August 1982 – The Ruwenzururu puts an end to its hostile activities and Charles Wesley Irema-Ngoma is appointed chief elder of Kasese district.

1986 – Amon Bazira creates the NALU.

5 July 1991 – A Rwenzururu leader dies in a clash between the NALU and the Ugandan army.

22 March 1991 – The police clash with Tabligh members in Kampala. The latter, led by Mukulu, are imprisoned.

1992 – NALU attack Kasese and control the town for a few days.

21 August 1993 – Amon Bazira is assassinated in Nakuru.

1993 – The authorities release Tabligh leaders in Hoima, western Uganda.

1994 – Tabligh members create the Uganda Freedom Fighters Movement (UFFM). Khartoum supports them through the Sudanese embassy in Kampala.

February 1995 – Ugandan army destroys the UFFM camp in Hoima and the movement goes into exile in Bunia, in the DRC.

September 1995 – ADF-NALU is created.

13 November 1996 – The ADF-NALU attacks the border post at Mponwe and makes incursions in the districts of Kabarole, Bundibugyio and Kasese.

February-November 1997 – The ADF-NALU attacks Ugandan settlements near the border (Mwenge, Kabereere, Nyamugasana, Kasese, Kijura, Butama, Bushenyi).

4 April 1998 – A bomb attack in Kampala kills five people.

8 June 1998 – Attack on Kitchamba technical school, in the district of Kabarole; 100 schoolchildren abducted in the district of Hoima; grenade attack in Kampala.

1 April 1999 – The Greenland Bank is closed down.

27 October 1998 – Jamil Mukulu is appointed ADF-NALU leader.

9 November 1999 – Operation Mountain Sweep begins.

9 December 1999 – The ADF-NALU attacks Katojo prison and frees 360 prisoners accused of terrorism by the Ugandan authorities.

6 April 2001 – The Ugandan army captures the ADF-NALU headquarters in the DRC.

June-October 2001 – The ADF-NALU creates an alliance with Kakole’s Armée populaire de résistance (APR) and Mbusa Nyamwisi’s Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Kisangani-mouvement de libération (RCD-KML).

December 2005 – The Congolese army, supported by MONUC, carries out Operation North Night Final against ADF-NALU bases.

March 2007 – The Congolese army and MONUSCO launch a joint operation Radi Strike.

11 April 2007 – The ADF attack the Congolese army at Mukoko, north of Oicha.

16 December 2011 – Ugandan forces deploy near the country’s oil fields to protect them against ADF attacks.

18 January 2012 – The Congolese army attacks the ADF at Mukoko, north of Oicha.

20 March 2012 – The Congolese army and MONUSCO launch a joint operation Radi Strike.

11 April 2012 – End of Operation Radi Strike.
APPENDIX E

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices or representation in 34 locations: Abuja, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogotá, Bujumbura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Dubai, Gaza, Guatemala City, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Port-au-Prince, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington DC. Crisis Group currently covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.


December 2012