Nigeria: Boko Haram Insurgency

Need for international assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Significant</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>X</td>
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Expected impact

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Major</th>
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<td>Over 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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Crisis Overview

- Boko Haram (BH), meaning Western education is forbidden, an Islamist militant insurgent group based in northeastern Nigeria, has been carrying out armed attacks on civilian populations since 2011. In May 2013, the Government of Nigeria declared a state of emergency (SoE) in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, which has been extended until November 2014. The security crisis continues to worsen, with growing numbers of victims, and the destruction of social and economic infrastructure, including the disruption of education services.

- Over 2014, Boko Haram has seized large swathes of territory in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states and there has been an increase in number and scale of attacks on villages, cities, schools and military bases. Some reports indicate that Boko Haram has taken control of 40%, or even 70%, of Borno state, though it is difficult to verify. Although attacks have been concentrated in the northeast, attacks have also taken place in other parts of the country, including Lagos and Abuja.

- 7,711 deaths due to Boko Haram-related violence were reported by media sources in 2014, representing over half of BH-related deaths in the country since May 2011. Over 1–11 January 2015, Boko Haram killed 2,146 people. ACLED estimates Boko Haram fatalities may be over 1,000 per month over 2015–2016.

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- 9 million people are affected by violence in the northeast, with three million acutely needing humanitarian assistance.

- As of September 2014, the Presidential Initiative for the North-East reports 1.5 million IDPs due to the insurgency in the three SoE states. Besides the SoE states, IDPs can also be found in Gombe, Bauchi, Jigawa, Taraba, Kano, Kaduna, and Plateau states, as well as limited numbers in the Federal Capital Territory.

- 135,000 people have fled to neighbouring countries. An estimated 35,000 refugees are in northern Cameroon. Chad is hosting 10,000 Nigerian refugees. Around 90,000 people (refugees, returnees and third-country nationals) have been displaced to Diffa region in Niger.

- Over 2014, the conflict’s spread to northern Cameroon intensified, and isolated incidents were recorded in Niger and Chad. In December 2014, Boko Haram launched several large-scale attacks in the Far North region of Cameroon, including one in late December involving up to 1,000 fighters.

Key Findings

Anticipated scope and scale

The insurgency affects mainly the northeast, but attacks have taken place in other states and the conflict has spilled over the Cameroon and Niger borders. Elections in February 2015 are expected to lead to further escalation of violence. The refugee and IDP caseloads are expected to continue growing rapidly.

Priorities for humanitarian intervention

- Food security, particularly in conflict-affected areas
- Health: basic services, nutrition, psychosocial support for IDPs.
- WASH (particularly in IDP camps and IDP host communities)
- Protection and education in conflict-affected areas
- Shelter

Humanitarian constraints

- Volatile security environment in the northeast
- Poor infrastructure and narrow openings for dialogue with armed non-state actors
- Remoteness of communities
- Limited information sharing; few and non-harmonised needs assessments
- Funding gap of almost 90%
**Crisis Impact**

**Protection**
- Over 2014, 7,711 deaths due to Boko Haram-related violence were reported by media sources, representing over half of BH-related deaths in the country since May 2011 (ACLED, 11/01/2014). Over 1–11 January, Boko Haram killed 2,146 people (ACLED, 12/01/2015). ACLED estimates Boko Haram fatalities may be at least over 1,000 per month over 2015–2016 (ACLED, 12/01/2015).
- Accounts from towns captured by BH, such as Gwoza, indicate that males over 18 years are being killed, while women are forcibly married to fighters and converted to Islam (Reuters 10/09/2014).
- Nigeria’s military is accused of human rights abuses in the fight against the extremists, including the deaths of thousands of illegally detained people (The Guardian 13/02/2014).
- Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is prevalent, although rarely reported. Early marriage is widespread, with attendant health and maternal complications (OCHA 30/06/2014).
- Boko Haram regularly uses child fighters (AllAfrica, 07/01/2015). Recent attacks have seen increasing instrumentalisation of female children (BBC, 10/01/2015; The Guardian, 12/01/2015).

**Health**
- Populations in northeastern Nigeria lack adequate access to health services. Only 37% of health facilities in the SoE states are functional (OCHA 31/03/2014). Assessments in Borno’s Chibok community found that armed groups had destroyed all health facilities, while some organisations have reported limited to no medical prescription stocks available in Adamawa (USAID 30/07/2014).
- Health services in some areas charge fees, limiting access for poorer people (PI 30/10/2014).
- Most IDPs in host communities have limited access to health services due to various constraints such as lack of information on services and transportation costs (OCHA, 02/10/2014).
- **Cholera**: 35,909 cholera cases, including 753 deaths (2.1% case fatality rate) were reported January–November 2014. Reported numbers decreased from 792 cases in the last week of October 2014 to 35 in the last week of November 2014 (UNICEF, 12/01/2015).
- **Polio**: In 2014, 29 cases of vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) were reported, and six cases of wild poliovirus type 1. Kano is the only state to have reported WPV cases since April. In 2013, 53 cases were reported, and in 2012, 102 (Global Polio Eradication Initiative, 12/01/2014). 72% of cases in 2013 were recorded in Borno, Yobe, and Kano states.

**Nutrition**
- Malnutrition rates in conflict-affected areas are high. GAM is 15.5% in Yobe state and 13.6% in Borno state (FEWSNET 01/08/2014). As of September 2014, 628,000 children nationwide under five suffer from severe acute malnutrition (OCHA, 30/09/2014). A February–May SMART survey revealed poorer nutritional status among the population of the SoE states (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics & UNICEF, 06/2014).
- In the absence of humanitarian support, it is expected that up to three million people will face food consumption gaps in Nigeria by July 2015, primarily in the northeast (FEWSNET, 07/01/2015). Severe acute malnutrition is responsible for more than a third of all child deaths in Nigeria; 350,000 children die from malnutrition every year (ECHO, 08/2014).

**WASH**
- Of the 2,500 boreholes in the SoE states, only 1,000 are functional (OCHA 20/03/2014).
- **IDP camps**: Water, sanitation and hygiene condition in the IDP camps are very poor. IDP camps in government-controlled areas are mostly in public schools; there are approximately five latrines for 5,000–6,000 people in each school (PI 29/10/2014). People defecate in the open, and use water from open wells which are highly likely to be contaminated by faeces (ACF 29/10/2014; PI 30/10/2014). In Maiduguri, assessments in October indicated a ratio of 1,300 IDPs per latrine in informal settlements (PI 18/01/2015).
- **Conditions among host families**: 10 families typically share a house, one latrine, and one borehole or well. In Maiduguri (population approx. 2 million) National Emergency Management Agency has identified more than 60 homes where IDPs have sought refuge. In each of these houses, between 50 and 200 people are sheltered with relatives, friends, or community leaders (AllAfrica 28/09/2014).

**Food Security**
- Conflict-affected households will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity until at least September 2015. Most of the up to 1.5 million IDPs continue to need assistance to meet their food needs (FEWSNET, 07/01/2015).
- The northeast is a food-producing region as well as a passing point for livestock, and the BH insurgency has contributed to greatly reducing household capacity to continue typical livelihoods, as well as decreased market function and trade flows.
Trade routes between the northeast and the south are disrupted (FEWSNET 01/08/2014).

- The 2013/14 agricultural season has been severely impeded. Vast areas of southern Yobe and Borno and northern Adamawa were undercultivated or not harvested during the main farming season of May–December. Off-season farming and fishing in the first half of 2015 are also expected to be reduced (FEWSNET, 07/01/2015).
- A number of factors make market purchase difficult for households that would typically offset low production with increased market purchase: supplies of locally produced commodities are low, physical access is limited for traders from outside the region, and functioning markets continue to report high prices for staple foods. Retail millet and sorghum prices for Maiduguri in December were about 30% higher than in neighbouring Kano (FEWSNET, 07/01/2015).
- Inter-communal conflicts in Bauchi, Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba states are disrupting agricultural activities as well as some markets (FEWSNET 01/08/2014).

**Education**

Persistent attacks on schools and communities have severely impacted education in the northeastern states. Since 2012, Boko Haram has burned more than 300 schools in the north (AllAfrica, 07/01/2015).

Nearly 6.3 million, or 60%, of the 10.5 million out-of-school children in all Nigeria are in the north of the country. One-third of primary-school children and one-quarter of junior secondary-school children are out of school (OCHA 24/07/2014). Girls have limited opportunities to access education and livelihoods outside of the home or marketplace (OCHA 30/06/2014).

Universities are also affected. After students were killed by BH, Adamawa State University in Mubi closed indefinitely (AFP 10/09/2014).

**Critical Infrastructure**

The disruption of trade routes between the northeast and the south means nearly all trade now has to move through Kano to the west (FEWSNET 01/08/2014).

**Vulnerable Groups Affected**

- Conflict-affected populations in the northeast, particularly IDPs.
- Women and girls are subject to SGBV and forced marriage.
- Children/students are particularly targeted by BH (AFP 17/09/2014).

**Humanitarian and Operational Constraints**

- Poor infrastructure in the northeast, and the remoteness of communities, where access to mobile phones and radio communications is limited (particularly in Borno state), is a problem (OCHA 30/06/2014). All commercial flights to Maiduguri have been suspended (OCHA 24/07/2014).
- All roads leading to and out of Maiduguri are subject to attack. As of December 2014, there have been 56 attacks on aid workers since 2009, killing 18 and injuring 38 (AidWorkerSecurity 18/01/2015). Humanitarian actors require travel permits and have been asked to coordinate their activity with security forces (PI 18/01/2015). Narrow openings for dialogue with non-state actor further constrain access.
- All commercial and humanitarian flights to Maiduguri have been suspended (OCHA 24/07/2014; PI 18/01/2015).

**Potential Aggravating Factors**

**Elections**

Presidential elections are scheduled for February 2015, with President Goodluck Jonathan seeking re-election as representative of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Political tensions around the rivalry between the predominantly Muslim north and the largely Christian south are fuelling the BH insurgency (Reuters 10/09/2014). Violence in the aftermath of the 2011 elections suggests that similar scenarios could occur in 2015: clashes could erupt in some northern states if the All Progressives Congress, the main opposition party, whose frontrunners are all northerners, loses the polls; there is similarly a high risk of violence if the PDP loses the presidency, particularly in the Niger Delta, home region of President Jonathan (ICG, 24/11/2014). An electoral loss for President Jonathan could trigger former Niger Delta militants to resume violence (local media, 07/01/2015; 10/01/2015).

**Parallel Conflicts**

Inter-communal violence, stoked by competition between local farming communities and nomadic herdsmen, has plagued Nigeria’s Middle Belt (Benue, Kaduna, Plateau, Nassarawa, and Taraba states) for many years and is spreading to other states in northern Nigeria (local media 15/04/2014). It is led in large part by the Fulani ethnic militia (ACLED 13/01/2015). Over 2014, around 1,700 people died in inter-communal violence (ACLED, 2014). In September, inter-communal violence in the Middle Belt killed 200 people (International Crisis Group 01/10/2014).
Contextual Information

Relevant Stakeholders

**Boko Haram**: Boko Haram is seeking to establish an Islamic state with strict adherence to Shariah (Islamic law) in the economically marginalised northeastern states. In August, BH announced it had established a caliphate in the captured town of Gwoza. (Reuters 10/09/2014).

Founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno state, Boko Haram has shifted from a non-violent group to an armed organisation. After an armed insurrection was crushed in 2009, in 2010 BH began carrying out revenge attacks on police officers, police stations and military barracks, widening its geographic reach into Kano state and the Middle Belt (ICG, 04/2014; Stratfor, 04/2014). BH has since carried out targeted attacks on security forces, civilians, students attending secular state schools, polio campaign health workers, and the 2011 attack on the UN compound in Abuja (ACLED, 04/2013; ICG, 04/2014). At the beginning of 2013, BH folded back into the SoE states (Stratfor, 04/2014). In May 2013, BH took control of part of Borno state. This was followed by a large military deployment band the declaration of an SoE in mid-May in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states (ACAPS, 04/2014). The SoE was subsequently extended until November 2014. BH has become a dispersed factional movement of different cells. The group’s operational links to outside groups are most likely quite limited, although BH was designated an Al Qaeda-linked terror group earlier in 2014 (AFP 11/09/2014).

2014 saw an evolution in BH strategy and tactics. Violence has intensified dramatically: Nigeria witnessed a 40% increase in conflict events in 2014 over 2013, and reported fatalities increased by almost 150%. The frequency and intensity of anti-civilian violence grew, with high-profile attacks on villages and the killing of inhabitants characterising mid-2014 in particular. This change seems to be driven, in part, by a reaction to the increase in local vigilante militias throughout the north-east (ACLED, 01/2015).

Another strategic evolution has been the seizure of territory; BH has increasingly sought to consolidate its rule over captured areas (ACLED, 01/2015, 09/2014). Isolated populations in rural areas are even more vulnerable to attack since the military campaign in 2014 to oust Boko Haram from Maiduguri and its surroundings pushed militants into rural areas, which are far more difficult to secure (ACLED, 01/2015). In early January, BH captured Baga, one of the last remaining towns in Borno under federal government control. The capture of Baga and the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) now means BH controls all of Borno state's borders with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. BH is estimated to be in a better position to launch fresh attacks both within Nigeria, including against the key city of Maiduguri, and across borders (AFP, 06/01/2015). Over 2014, and particularly since December, BH has intensified cross-border attacks in Cameroon, leading to massive displacement (ECHO, 06/01/2015).

**Nigerian Government**: Over the past decade, the Government has been facing the militant BH insurgency, ethno-religious conflict, and piracy. Following the SoE declaration in May 2013, military activity surged, leading to the deployment of a Joint Task Force in the SoE states. Local groups have formed vigilante armed opposition groups to BH, reportedly with tacit government approval (AFP 13/09/2014).

**International and Neighbouring Countries’ Relationship to the Conflict**

**Cameroon**: Conflict between BH and the Cameroonian military has increased as of late December 2014 and the beginning of the dry season, and BH leader Shekau has since announced an intensification of attacks (ECHO 06/01/2015, VOA 07/01/2015). In late December 2014, Cameroon launched its first airstrike against BH, after 1,000 BH captured a military base in Achiacha and five villages in Cameroon’s Far North region (BBC 29/12/2014). Violence has continued with BH attacks on military camps on 3, 11, and 12 January.

BH attacks in Cameroon have destroyed homes and schools in Maya-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari departments (IRIN 17/09/2014). There have also been reports of BH conscripting young men from Cameroonian border areas (AFP 11/09/2014). Despite the presence of Cameroonian security forces, humanitarian actors have been forced to suspend activities near the border, and the precarious security situation in the Far North region constrains refugee relocation efforts (UNHCR 16/09/2014). At least 35,000 refugees are in Cameroon (PI, 16/01/2015), with other reports indicating up to 50,000 Nigerian refugees and tens of thousands internally displaced in northern Cameroon (UNHCR, 30/12/2014). 24,500 refugees are in Minawao Camp, in the Far North region (ECHO, 06/01/2015).

**Regional**: In April 2012, the MJTF base in Baga, manned with forces from Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to interdict criminal activity in the Lake Chad Basin, was expanded in its mandate to include the fight against terrorism (Sahara Reporters 07/05/2013). Since Chad has announced it will militarily support Cameroon against BH in January, there have been calls for a viable and effective operationalization of the MJTF (Reuters 13/01/2015; Daily Mail 14/01/2014; Al Jazeera 20/01/2015).
Response Capacity

Local and National Response Capacity
- NEMA is leading the humanitarian response, in partnership with the UN, the Red Cross and other international partners (OCHA 30/06/2014). However, constrained access due to insecurity is a major challenge.
- The Nigerian military is struggling to retake control of affected territories. There are frequent reports of Nigerian soldiers refusing to be deployed to BH strongholds and demanding better equipment, despite such refusals being punished by death penalty (AFP 30/09/2014). In August, Nigerian soldiers refused to deploy to Gwoza without adequate military equipment (AFP 22/08/2014).
- Households displaced to neighbouring states (including Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, and Taraba) are being resettled with the assistance of local State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMA) and NEMA. Many difficulties in the coordination of resettling activities mean that the capacity for assistance varies by region (FEWSNET 01/08/2014).

International Response Capacity
UN agencies, ICRC and Nigerian Red Cross Society, and NGOs are operating in Nigeria. Northeastern areas remain inaccessible due to security constraints, impeding relief efforts. The Nigeria Strategic Response Plan, launched in May 2014, is funded only at 16%, or USD 15.3 million, of a USD 93 million requirement (OCHA 26/12/2014).

Population Coping Mechanisms
The coping mechanisms of vulnerable households and IDPs in SoE states are declining and not able to withstand further shocks. Negative coping mechanisms, including sale of assets, meal reduction, and debt accumulation have been reported (OCHA 24/07/2014). Displaced households in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states appear to be moving towards urban centres (including Maiduguri, Damaturu, and Mubi). Most of these households are transitioning from agricultural/agropastoral livelihoods to more urban livelihoods. While access to official assistance remains difficult, community assistance remains very important for displaced households in meeting their food needs (FEWSNET 01/08/2014).

Information Gaps and Needs
- Updated information on WASH in conflict-affected areas.
- Updated information on assistance provided to IDPs.
- Information on IDP locations and needs.

Lessons Learned
- The April 2011 elections were considered the most credible elections to date, especially due to improvements in the Independent National Electoral Commission, which created a new voters' register and improved transparency in voting results. Despite this, few had anticipated the scale of the post-election violence and bomb blasts in the north by Boko Haram. More than 1,000 people were killed, making it the highest casualties ever recorded in election violence in Nigerian history (International Crisis Group, 09/2011; Human Rights Watch, 04/2011).
- The provision of educational services is critical. Children and young people who have been deprived of education are more vulnerable to BH recruitment, in Nigeria and across borders, which could in turn contribute to further regional destabilisation and an even greater use of child fighters by Boko Haram. The interruption of educational services also increases the risk of sexual violence and forced marriages for girls (Save the Children, 2013).
Key Characteristics of Host Population and Area

Half of the population in the northeast lives below the poverty line. Poverty in rural areas is much higher than in urban areas (World Bank, 07/2014). 35% have access to improved sanitation and 50% to improved drinking water. Under-five mortality is 160 per 1,000 live births.

<table>
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<th>Key indicators</th>
<th>Borno</th>
<th>Yobe</th>
<th>Adamawa</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total population (2006)</td>
<td>4,171,000</td>
<td>2,321,000</td>
<td>3,179,000</td>
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<td>Gender and age distribution of population</td>
<td>Male: 51.8%</td>
<td>Male: 51.9%</td>
<td>Male: 50.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 48.1%</td>
<td>Female: 48.1%</td>
<td>Female: 49.4%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0 to 14: 46.3%</td>
<td>0 to 14: 61.1%</td>
<td>0 to 14: 34.1%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>15 to 19: 9.8%</td>
<td>15 to 19: 14.1%</td>
<td>15 to 19: 7.5%</td>
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<td>20 to 59: 39.3%</td>
<td>20 to 59: 54.5%</td>
<td>20 to 59: 28.1%</td>
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<td>60+: 4.7%</td>
<td>60+: 7.0%</td>
<td>60+: 3.3%</td>
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<td>State capital</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Damaturu</td>
<td>Yola</td>
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<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Shuwa Arabs, Kanuri, Margui, Hara, and Fulani</td>
<td>Fulani (major); others Kanuri, Kare-Kare, Bolewa, Ngizim, Bade, Hausa, Ngamo and Shuwa</td>
<td>Fulani, Bwatiye, Chamba, Higgi, Mbula, Margi, Kilia, Ga’a’anda, Longuda, Kanakuru, Bille, Bura, Yandang,</td>
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<td>Cooking sources</td>
<td>Firewood: 78.1%</td>
<td>Firewood: 77.2%</td>
<td>Firewood: 79.1%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kerosene: 11.1%</td>
<td>Kerosene: 9.9%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Electricity: 5.8%</td>
<td>Electricity: 6.0%</td>
<td>Electricity: 6.3%</td>
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<td>Vaccination coverage (percentage of children 12–23 months)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<td>Nutrition: chronic malnutrition for children under-five</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
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<td>Literacy rates</td>
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<td>Male: 62.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 73.0%</td>
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Impact of Boko Haram violence in Nigeria over 2014 and January 2015
(as of 20 January 2015)

Niger
Around 90,000 refugees, returnees and third-country nationals have been displaced to Diffa region in Niger.

Chad
11,320 refugees in Chad, including 7,300 newly displaced from Baga and surrounding villages in January 2015.

Cameroon
At least 35,000 refugees are in northern Cameroon.

Map created by MapAction (2015)

Data Sources: Basemap data: GADM, SALB, OCHA, NGA, OSM. Situational data: IDMC, ACLED