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ACAPS HUMANITARIAN PERSPECTIVES — 2019/2020
Each year we take stock of our work and put together an annual report – you may have noticed we have published a variety of formats and layouts over the years, very much reflecting our own internal learning and evolution.

This year we chose to provide **four different perspectives on the global humanitarian situation**. Within these pages you will find **a comparative analyses of 14 of the major humanitarian situations** with respect to the affected populations, people in need and humanitarian access; **an analysis of three highly complex and evolving regional crises** the sector grappled with over the year; and **a spotlight on three severe crises that did not get sufficient attention in 2019**. Finally, as the year comes to a close, **we have identified a number of risks** that may lead to a significant deterioration of particular crises in 2020.

We hope you will find these perspectives informative and useful in your planning for 2020.

The past year has been important for ACAPS. **December 1, 2019 marks exactly 10 years since the organisation was founded.** It has been a decade of learning and carving out a space for independent humanitarian analysis. This year was also significant as we overhauled our global analysis work and launched **CrisisInSight**. We are already seeing how powerful CrisisInSight is and are excited about the possibilities it presents. Over the coming year we will expand our work analysing contexts in depth and you will see a number of new trends and risk reports that we look forward to sharing with you.

As always, we invite your feedback on how you make use of this report – your comments on what you really liked and what could be better are most welcome.

Yours truly,

Lars Peter Nissen
ACAPS Director
HIGHLIGHTS FROM 2019

A selection of humanitarian crises based on our editorial process
The infographic provides a snapshot of the most severe crises as of October 2019 by comparing the number of people affected to the number of people in need and the level of humanitarian access for each country.

In 7 out of 14 crises the entire population is affected: Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, DPRK, South Sudan, Venezuela, and Somalia. Yemen and Syria have the highest percentage of total population being in need of assistance. These two countries also face the highest access constraints.

**Methodology**

The infographic is based on data from the INFORM Global Crisis Severity Index – a composite index that aggregates data from a range of credible, publicly available sources such as UN agencies, governments, and other multilateral organisations – as well as data collected by ACAPS analysts. The index scores crises on a scale from 0.1 (low severity) to 5.0 (high severity) and is released every month.

All data was collected in October 2019.
Most Severe Humanitarian Crises in 2019

**DPRK 4.1**
- Total Pop.: 25.5M
- People in Need: 10.9M
- Constraints: Very High

**SUDAN 4.1**
- Total Pop.: 44.5M
- People in Need: 8.5M
- Constraints: Very High

**SOUTH SUDAN 4.0**
- Total Pop.: 11.7M
- People in Need: 7.2M
- Constraints: Very High

**CHAD 3.9**
- Total Pop.: 16.2M
- People in Need: 4.3M
- Constraints: High

**IRAQ 3.9**
- Total Pop.: 38.3M
- People in Need: 6.8M
- Constraints: High

**CAMEROON 3.8**
- Total Pop.: 25.6M
- People in Need: 3.5M
- Constraints: Very High
**Libya 3.8**

- 1.6M
- 1.1M
- Total pop: 7M

**Nigeria 3.8**

- 29.7M
- 9.4M
- Total pop: 188M

**Venezuela 3.8**

- 28.9M
- 14.9M
- Total pop: 28.9M

**Somalia 3.7**

- 14.4M
- 2.1M
- Total pop: 14.4M

**Most Severe Humanitarian Crises in 2019**

- Libya
- Nigeria
- Venezuela
- Somalia
This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Boko Haram conflict that began in northeast Nigeria in 2009 and has since spread beyond Nigeria’s Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states to include the border regions of Niger, Chad and Cameroon (ACLED 05/2019). Despite Boko Haram’s retreat following a regional military offensive in 2015 by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – composed of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria — Boko Haram has remained active to this day (ACLED 02/2019). Rural areas of Borno state in particular continue to grapple with Boko Haram-related violence, both insurgent attacks and military operations (Anadolu Agency 07/11/2019).

Since 2016, Boko Haram has split into two factions. The original group led by Abubakar Shekau operates mainly from its stronghold in Sambisa Forest in southern Borno state. Rivalling splinter group “Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP),” endorsed by the Islamic State in Syria, operates from Lake Chad (African Arguments 23/07/2019). Although both groups control less territory overall in 2019 than before the 2015 offensive, they have managed to consolidate their influence in these areas.

In 2019, Nigeria’s northeast has seen an intensification of Boko Haram-related armed violence and deteriorating security, especially in Borno state (Anadolu Agency 07/11/2019). The surge of armed attacks and military operations also affects the Lake Chad Basin (OCHA 06/2019). In February 2019, the MNJTF launched a new regional counter-insurgency operation. Despite their claim that Boko Haram has been overwhelmed (The Punch 12/03/2019), attacks against military targets have not stopped (The DefensePost 19/08/2019), nor have attacks on civilian targets and public gatherings (Washington Post 29/07/2019). Boko Haram launched multiple attacks in Niger’s Diffa region this year (Al Jazeera 24/08/2019) and has attacked villages in Cameroon’s Far North region throughout 2019, especially targeting members of local anti-Boko Haram ‘vigilance committees’ (Institute for...
In Chad, a Boko Haram group recently abducted health staff of a local hospital near the town of Tchoukouliya (The Punch 31/10/2019).

Since August 2019, the Nigerian army has begun to concentrate troops from remote outposts into so-called ‘super camps’ in northeast Nigeria. The military strategy has been criticised for leaving rural parts of Borno unprotected (Nigerian Eye 25/08/2019). Analysts fear that Boko Haram and ISWAP can operate more freely and might seek to expand their influence from the hinterland to urban areas (Council of Foreign Relations 05/10/2019). Media reports indicate that the ‘super camp’ strategy caused local civilians to flee rural areas after troops were withdrawn (Anadolu Agency 04/09/2019). The strategy is expected to affect the humanitarian response, as increasing insecurity would impede access and road transport (OCHA 01/10/2019).

With the conflict persisting, the protracted humanitarian crisis across northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region continues and humanitarian needs remain high (OCHA 08/2019). Around 9.9 million people in the Lake Chad Basin need humanitarian assistance (OCHA 06/2019). Intensified armed violence in 2019 has caused an increase in conflict-related displacement in the region (OCHA 06/2019); as of October 2019, over 2.5 million people are internally displaced, including some 2 million in Nigeria (UNHCR 21/10/2019).

Access to Boko Haram-affected areas in northeast Nigeria is a particular challenge for the humanitarian response. Already in January 2019, OCHA estimated that over 800,000 people in northeast Nigeria could not be reached with humanitarian aid (OCHA 01/2019). This number has likely increased as insecurity and additional operational constraints such as flooding have further reduced humanitarian access (UN RC/HC Nigeria 06/11/2019).
CONFLICT IN THE SAHEL

Violence and displacement in the region bordering Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger

In 2019 the border area shared by Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, known as Liptako Gourma, saw a rise in intercommunal violence and jihadist activities. Across the region, security incidents were recorded on an almost daily basis (UNHCR 28/10/2019), increasingly resulting in civilian casualties (ACLED 23/03/2019). Armed groups have continued to expand their frontlines while authorities struggle to contain the crisis (The Conversation 05/09/2019), including widespread displacement and civil discontent. Across the region, 1.5 million people have been displaced, either within their own countries or abroad (UNHCR accessed 20/11/2019).

From early 2019, jihadist groups consolidated their presence in Burkina Faso’s northern and Mali’s central regions, and violence continues to expand (The Conversation 05/09/2019; ACLED 07/08/2019). Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) continued to be active across the region. Islamic State central attributed an increasing number of attacks to Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP); however it is unclear whether ISWAP cooperates operationally with ISGS (The Defense Post 30/05/2019). ISGS started claiming attacks in eastern Niger targeting Nigerien forces (ACLED 07/08/2019); armed groups more generally have also targeted civilians (The New Humanitarian 28/03/2019). The ISGS has increased its use of improvised explosives along roads used by military units, frequently leading to civilian deaths (Africa Research Bulletin, 10/2019). The Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (known as the JNIM), comprising several jihadist groups, also consolidated its foothold in the region (VOA 19/04/2019).

Weak governance has been a problem in the region (FT 11/2019). The prime ministers of Burkina Faso and Mali resigned in 2019, reportedly in both cases, over their respective government’s incapacity to address crises (RFI 19/01/2019; VOA 19/04/2019). Anti-war protests are frequent across the region (Africa Research Bulletin 10/2019). Additionally, in Mali, progress on the Peace Agreement has been slow. A lack of government control in many of Mali’s crisis areas, and active distrust of national and international forces (RFI 01/08/2019), has left civilians to rely on ethnically-aligned paramilitary groups (RFI 06/11/2019) who often attack other ethnic communities. They have proven difficult to control – an agreement signed between paramilitary groups in Mopti in August failed to ensure peace (France 24 05/11/2019) and operations targeting paramilitary groups led to protests in September (Africa Research Bulletin, 10/2019).

Most of the year’s civilian deaths have been attributed to intercommunal conflict, rather than jihadist attacks (ACLED 07/08/2019). Abuses committed between Peuhl and Dogon groups have resulted in retaliatory attacks:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Access</th>
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<tr>
<td>BURKINA FASO</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIGER*</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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*This applies to the crisis ‘Cross-border violence’. Scale values go from 0 to 5. Source: GCSI October 2019.
in March, Dogon paramilitary groups killed 160 Peuhl civilians (MSF 20/06/2019) near the Burkina Faso border and a retaliatory attack targeting Dogon communities resulted in 75 deaths in June. These figures are not exceptional and deaths from intercommunal violence are underreported (ACLED 07/08/2019).

In Burkina Faso, violence spread into the Centre-Nord and Est regions (Africa Research Bulletin, 10/2019) and took on an increasingly intercommunal character. While jihadist groups targeted Bella, Foulse, and Mossi communities, civilian militias and security forces were accused of targeting Peuhl communities, who are commonly conflated with jihadists (HRW 03/2019). Da Na Ambassagou, a Dogon paramilitary group that has targeted Peuhl in Mali, have been active in Burkina Faso, joining local civilian militias known as Koglweogo ('the guardians of the bush'); ethnic based attacks, blamed on these militias, led to more than 200 deaths in early 2019 (The New Humanitarian 18/04/2019). States of Emergency in the northern regions were renewed mid-year, further limiting civilian livelihoods and access (Le Monde 12/07/2019).

More than 18 million people are estimated to have been exposed to the year’s dramatic events, according to ACAPS’ own calculations – and they may bear the brunt of future violence and displacement, if this year’s trends continue into 2020 (Government of Burkina Faso and OCHA 08/10/2019; UNHCR 31/07/2019; UNHCR 30/09/2019; UN OCHA 07/2019; UN OCHA 12/2018; UN OCHA 08/2019).

IDPs in Liptako Gourma region in 2019

The increase in Burkina Faso’s IDP numbers for the month of October resulted largely from improvements in registration procedures, which allowed for the registration of people who had already been displaced.

At the date of research no October IDP figures were available for Mali or Niger.

Source: UNHCR 2019
The socioeconomic, political, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has led millions of Venezuelans to leave their country. The number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in other Latin American and Caribbean countries has increased from some 123,000 in 2015 to approximately 3.8 million in November 2019 (R4V 08/11/2019; R4V 01/04/2019). Many countries initially allowed easy entry for Venezuelans – with only a national ID card, for example – and created special temporary stay permits so Venezuelans could access formal labour and social services. In September 2018, when the number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the region had already reached 2 million, 11 Latin American and Caribbean countries began the ‘Quito process’, a series of high-level political meetings, recognising the migration from Venezuela as a regional crisis, and committing to strengthen regularisation and socioeconomic integration of Venezuelan migrants and refugees (Plan de Acción 24/11/2018; R4V 25/07/2019). Despite the ‘Quito process’, coherence and coordination of national responses to the crisis have been limited. Particularly since the second half of 2018 and during 2019, individual countries have been tightening entry restrictions against a backdrop of increasing domestic pressure, episodes of xenophobia, and discrimination against Venezuelans (BBC 02/10/2019). New regulations have made it increasingly difficult for Venezuelans to obtain a legal status in other countries.

Peru, Chile, and Ecuador are among the countries that increased requirements for regular entry. Since June 2019, Venezuelans wanting to enter Peru or Chile as a tourist or to take up temporary residence must apply for visas at the respective consulates. The Ecuadorian government had repeatedly attempted to introduce tighter entry restrictions for Venezuelans since August 2018 (subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court), and in August 2019 the country began requiring consular visas as well. In all three countries, visa applications for temporary residence require Venezuelans to present passports and criminal records, with few exceptions (R4V 18/06/2019; BBC 23/08/2018; Gobierno de Chile 06/2019; El Espectador 25/08/2019; Gobierno de Ecuador 21/08/2019; DW 22/06/2019).

The increased requirements for documentation present a significant barrier for many Venezuelan migrants. Fees for new passports and criminal records in Venezuela far exceed monthly minimum wages, with long waiting times and potential bribes posing further obstacles (MMC 09/2019; IRC 10/2019; Wilson Center 13/09/2019). In practice, this means it is impossible for many Venezuelans to regularly enter countries that require these documents, and Venezuelans without the necessary documentation face obstacles to join family members who have already migrated to other countries. Requesting asylum can be an alternative to obtain a regularised status. However, many Venezuelans do not qualify as a refugee under the definition of the 1951 UN Convention, and the broader definition of the
1984 Cartagena Declaration is not universally applied. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some Venezuelans are not aware of asylum regulations. The uncertainty, long delays, and lack of access to certain services during the application process may further discourage them from seeking asylum (RI 06/2019; Gestión 10/10/19).

Barriers to regular entry into transit or destination countries lead to an increase in irregular border crossings, with significant implications for migrants’ safety and access to labour and services. In 2019, irregular border crossings by Venezuelans increased following the introduction of new visa regulations by some countries (RMRP 13/11/2019). Using informal pathways to cross borders puts migrants at risk of abuse by smugglers and armed groups operating in border regions, for example between Colombia and Ecuador (IRC 10/2019; El Tiempo 01/09/2019). Lack of a regular legal status in the host country prevents Venezuelans from accessing the formal labour market, hampering their ability to be self-reliant. The lack of access to formal labour puts Venezuelans at risk of labour exploitation (UNHCR 12/2018; MMC 09/2019). Furthermore, access to basic services such as health is limited without a regularised status (RMRP 13/11/2019; MMC 09/2019). Undocumented Venezuelans may not be inclined to report crimes such as human trafficking, sexual exploitation or assault, out of fear of approaching their host country’s authorities due to their irregular status (RI 05/08/2018; RMRP 13/11/2019). At the border between Peru and Chile, irregular border crossings lead through potentially mined areas, exposing migrants to further protection risks (UNHCR 19/07/2019).
Between January and September 2019, nearly 310,000 people were displaced by natural hazards and conflict in the Philippines’ Mindanao region. At the end of September, 40,000 (13%) had not returned home.

Natural disasters drove more than half (around 60%) of displacement in 2019, forcing 193,000 people from their homes. Two events caused significant episodes of displacement. From June to September, the southwest monsoon brought heavy rainfall; as of October, approximately 7,000 people were still displaced across Mindanao (DSWD 01/10/2019). Three earthquakes between 16-31 October, all registering between 6.3 and 6.6 magnitude, forced more than 80,000 people in Davao region and North Cotabato province to flee their homes (OCHA 07/11/2019).

The remaining 40% of displacements (117,000 individuals) resulted from armed conflict, crime, and clan feuds. Displacements related to armed conflict and violence were particularly high in the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu, where clashes between the Philippine military and armed groups, such as Abu Sayaff Group, occur frequently (UNHCR Displacement Dashboard 2019). This year also marked two years since the siege of Marawi City, a five-month battle between pro-Islamic State fighters and the Philippine military that destroyed much of the city and displaced 400,000 people from Marawi and nearby towns (USAID 28/11/2018). Approximately 130,000 were still in temporary shelters or with relatives on 30 September 2019, unable to return home because much of the city remains in ruins (UNHCR Displacement Dashboard 2019).

The year 2019 began with the prospects of a peace deal, with March bringing the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) (PIA 29/03/2019). The BARMM, and the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) that allowed for its founding, are considered milestones in a decades-long peace process between the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with supporters portraying it as “the antidote to extremism” in the Philippines (IISS 20/05/2019, ICG 27/06/2019). However, violence, especially related to armed groups excluded from the peace process, continued across Mindanao throughout 2019. This armed conflict coupled with natural hazards has resulted in large-scale displacement and exacerbated the precarious humanitarian situation in the BARMM and across Mindanao.

310,000 people displaced between January and September 2019
Anglophone crisis: trends in 2019

Discord between the Anglophone minority and Francophone majority in Cameroon has existed for decades, rooted in the unification of the former British colony, Southern Cameroon, with the former French colony, Republic of Cameroon, in 1961 (International Crisis Group, 2/09/2017). In October 2016, lawyers and teachers took to the streets in Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest (NWSW) regions to protest Anglophone discrimination and marginalisation imposed by the French speaking majority (Accord 21/07/2017; Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack 11/05/2018). In particular, demonstrators opposed the increasing use of French in schools and universities, and the appointment of Francophone judges to the Anglophone regions (The Guardian 13/12/2016; Aljazeera 05/12/2016). Roughly one year later, in October 2017, separatists declared the independent state of Ambazonia, spanning NWSW, sparking a strong retaliation from government forces (DW 30/09/2019).

By the end of 2017, the situation had materialised into full-fledged conflict, characterised by fighting between various factions of Anglophone non-state armed groups (NSAG) and state military forces. The Anglophone crisis has since consumed the NWSW regions, causing economic deterioration, increased food insecurity, stark human rights violations, an estimated 3,000 deaths, and mass displacements (HRW 28/10/2019; International Crisis Group 02/05/2019). The civilians of NWSW have been the primary victims of the conflict. Throughout 2019, attacks carried out by NSAG and state security forces were frequent, including the burning and destruction of villages, abductions, and the excessive use of violence against civilians (UN OCHA 30/09/2019; UN OCHA 31/08/2019; HRW 22/07/2019).

Protests and lockdowns – sometimes lasting weeks – also continued, constricting population movement and disrupting humanitarian access (Refugees International 05/2019). Constant violent episodes, in tandem with critical political decisions, further deepened the divide between the opposing sides. In particular, the delivery of life sentences to 10 prominent separatist leaders on 20 August incited clashes and a three-week lockdown (UN OCHA 31/08/2019; The Guardian 20/08/2019). President Paul Biya’s National Dialogue in late September, seen as an attempt at reconciliation, appears to have missed the mark. Many key actors boycotted the event, and kidnappings and attacks have persisted (UN OCHA 18/11/2019; UN OCHA 30/09/2019).

Since the crisis began, over 580,340 Cameroonians have been displaced due to insecurity. More than 536,100 have been internally displaced within NWSW and to nearby Littoral and Ouest regions (UNHCR 31/10/2019). An additional 44,240 Cameroonians have sought refuge in neighbouring Nigeria, where they have various needs, including protection, food, and shelter (UNHCR 09/2019; UNHCR 31/08/2019). Despite active humanitarian response, addressing the progressing needs of the affected population remains a challenge due to gaps in funding, security concerns, and constrained access.
Upsurge in violence in Daraa governorate

Violence has soared in Daraa governorate in southern Syria amid rising tensions between the local population and Syrian regime forces. Over 2019, assassinations, enforced disappearances, looting, fires, localised clashes, and other security incidents carried out both by regime and opposition forces have wreaked chaos in the region (Middle East Institute 03/07/2019; The New Arab 27/06/2019; The New Arab 06/11/2019).

Daraa was recaptured by the Syrian regime in July 2018, after being held by opposition forces since 2012. As in other areas retaken by the government, people in Daraa were offered Russian-brokered reconciliation deals granting amnesty to those who chose to remain and accept regime rule.

Despite the deals, the regime has cracked down on civilians and people perceived to be part of the opposition. Hundreds have been forcibly conscripted into the army or arrested and detained, including aid workers, media activists and family members, defectors, opposition leaders, and former anti-government fighters (Human Rights Watch 21/05/2019; Syria Direct 27/09/2019).

The violations have fuelled local grievances and prompted resistance from armed opposition groups such as the Daraa Popular Resistance. In the first half of 2019, more than 57 violent incidents involving opposition forces in the area were recorded. A shift toward greater reliance on explosions and remote-controlled attacks has been noted in 2019, indicating an increase in the intensity of violence (ACLED 2019).

While violations have occurred in other areas retaken by the government, the situation in Daraa is particularly unstable as some degree of former opposition structures have remained intact. Many opposition fighters stayed in Daraa and were allowed to keep medium and light weapons under the reconciliation deal. Additionally, regime security forces were not allowed to enter some areas of Daraa. Moreover, unlike other government-controlled parts of Syria, the regime has relied on former opposition fighters as regime proxies to ensure security in Daraa (Arab News 31/08/2019).

The heightened instability across southern Syria impacts a region where basic services were already depleted, jobs are lacking, food and fuel prices are extremely high, and the presence of humanitarian actors is limited. Outbreaks of violence have resulted in the displacement of unknown numbers of people (OCHA 25/08/2019). Although humanitarian conditions in Daraa are dire, the situation remains largely overlooked, with international attention focusing on the north of Syria.

The heightened instability across southern Syria impacts a region where basic services were already depleted, jobs are lacking, food and fuel prices are extremely high, and the presence of humanitarian actors is limited.
RISKS IN 2020

A forward-looking analysis to better support planning and preparedness
This section outlines five key contexts where a notable deterioration may occur within the next six months, leading to a spike in humanitarian needs.

ACAPS analysts conduct daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries to support evidence-based decision-making in the humanitarian sector. For the next six months ACAPS has identified the following five risks:

**HIGH RISK LEVEL**
- CENTRAL AMERICA
- INDIA

**MEDIUM RISK LEVEL**
- BURUNDI/TANZANIA
- HAITI
- INDONESIA

What is a risk?

Risk is a function of impact and probability: i.e. the risk posed by a potential hazard increases as either the expected impact of the hazard increases or the probability that it will occur increases. Risk analysis is not an exact science.

The occurrence of a risk prompts a change from the status quo that leads to a notable deterioration in the humanitarian situation and a higher number of people in need (exposure), or a higher severity of need (intensity). The crises identified in this report are selected because there are certain triggers that may emerge over the coming six months that point towards this potential shift.

A deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same rate is considered a trend rather than a risk. Such crises are not included in the report, as while the humanitarian situation may be deteriorating, the rate of deterioration is not expected to exceed the current trend.

Risk analysis depends on a solid understanding of the context and on investigating the interaction of the variables that cause or resist change. Risk analysis is a process that should be repeated at regular intervals and the change in risk recorded over time. Regular reviews of risks that analyse why previously identified risks did or did not materialise will help strengthen the analyst's ability to create chains of events that point towards the emergence of a hazard and assess probability (see update from previous risks identified).

Objective of risk analysis

The objective of our risk analysis is to enable humanitarian decision makers to understand potential future changes that would likely have humanitarian consequences. By exposing the more probable developments and understanding their impact, they can be included in planning and preparedness which should improve response.

At ACAPS, risk analysis enables us to:

- ensure our monitoring of countries and crises is forward-looking and our consequent analysis more informed;
- gain advance warning about countries and crises on which we ought to report in more depth;
- respond to specific requests for risk reports.

All of which aim to inform the ACAPS audience, and thus the humanitarian community, of likely future events.

Read more about our risk methodology.
**CENTRAL AMERICA**
Ratification of the bilateral Asylum Cooperation Agreements between the US and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras leads to protection concerns and increased humanitarian needs of asylum seekers.

**HAITI**
A worsening economic and political crisis leads to long term protests, causing protracted disruption of aid delivery and rising poverty levels.

**BURUNDI/TANZANIA**
Continued reduction in settlement services and increased pressure from the Tanzanian government results in mass return of Burundian refugees, where they face reintegration and protection challenges.

**INDIA**
Assam National Citizens Registry (NRC) leaves 1.9 million at risk of statelessness, detention, and displacement.

**INDONESIA**
Escalating violence due to protests in Papua and West Papua leads to displacement and increased humanitarian needs.

*The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.*
Continued reduction in settlement services and increased pressure from the Tanzanian government results in mass return of Burundian refugees, where they face reintegration and protection challenges

In 2015, a wave of Burundians fled the country following President Nkurunziza’s announcement of a controversial third term. Political repression and violent unrest led to hundreds of deaths and a mass exodus of over 400,000 citizens, who sought refuge in neighbouring countries, mostly Tanzania (The New Humanitarian 15/10/2019). Although over 76,000 have returned to Burundi from Tanzania since 2017, more than 205,000 remain, living predominately within three refugee camps (UNHCR 30/09/2019 A; UNHCR 30/09/2019 B).

While voluntary repatriation of Burundian refugees has occurred since 2017, a 24 August 2019 agreement between the Tanzanian and Burundian governments indicates a shift towards forceful returns, suggesting that all remaining refugees will be returned to the country by the end of 2019 (Amnesty International 05/09/2019).

While it is unclear to what extent the agreement has materialised, Burundian refugees in Tanzania face mounting pressure from the Tanzanian government, blurring the line between spontaneous, voluntary, and forced return (Reuters 11/10/2019). Those currently in camps face escalating risks as their options become increasingly limited and conditions deteriorate. Refugee freedom of movement and economic activities across the three main camps have been progressively restricted (Refugee Rights 2019). Markets and refugee-run businesses have closed, humanitarian access constrained, and overall safety has diminished (The New Humanitarian 16/10/2019; UNHCR 30/06/2019).

However, the option to return – whether voluntary or not – presents challenges. Ambiguities around the repatriation process, funding, government capacities, and how the needs of returnees will be addressed all pose a series of risks (Refugee Rights 2019). Most significantly, the question remains if Burundi has transitioned from a nation of political repression and violence to one of peace and safety, as the Tanzanian and Burundian governments claim. A recent UN report indicates otherwise, suggesting state security forces still meet presidential opposers with violence and widespread human rights abuses continue (OHCHR 06/08/2019).

Impact

The repatriation of some 205,000 Burundians will impact both the refugees and the four provinces to which they are predominately being returned (UNHCR 21/12/2018; UNHCR 30/09/2019). The influx of returnees could further stretch already strained public services. Discord between those who remained and those who fled is inevitable, and capacity of the government to support effective reintegration is uncertain (The New Humanitarian 16/10/2019). Even communities wishing to assist returnees may be restricted by their own degree of needs (The New Humanitarian 20/08/2019).

Many people who fled in 2015 were enduring a diverse set of needs and high levels of poverty, which played a role in their motivation to leave (Refugee Rights 02/2019). Several of those challenges remain while the country continues to experience economic and political volatility. Upon their return, refugees can expect to encounter issues in accessing healthcare, education, housing, land, and livelihoods (UNHCR 30/09/2019; UNHCR 21/12/2018).

Furthermore, protection risks for those who return remain a concern. Despite claims that Burundi is safe and peaceful, human rights violations continue. Dissidents of the current government, including those who fled in 2015, will likely be confronted with oppressive measures. Elections scheduled for May 2020 are predicted to incite renewed levels of violence (OHCHR 06/08/2019).

The ability of international partners and governments to successfully facilitate the returns and foster genuine reintegration has an impact on the future of the region. Ultimately, if root causes are not addressed the cycle of displacement and conflict can only be expected to continue, contributing to further population movements and persistent instability in Burundi and possibly throughout the region (Refugee Rights 02/2019).
Ratification of the bilateral Asylum Cooperation Agreements between the US and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras leads to protection concerns and increased humanitarian needs of asylum-seekers

According to the US government’s official figures of 2019, 60,891 unaccompanied children, 419,831 families, and 109,153 adults from the ‘Northern Triangle of Central America’ (NTCA) – Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala – have been apprehended at the US-Mexican border (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 23/10/2019), accounting for most apprehensions at the border by region of origin. These figures do not include those who approached designated ports of entry, suggesting the actual number of people from NTCA countries arriving at the border and making asylum claims is much higher.

Most processed asylum claims in the US originate from NTCA claimants (U.S. Department of Justice 2018), who flee some of the most violent countries in the world (Crisis Group 06/04/2017). However, apprehension of migrants coming from the NTCA has steadily increased over recent years, and they have become the target of both increasingly restrictive immigration policy and partisan political discourse.

The US entered into three separate ‘Asylum-Cooperative Agreements’ with Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala in July and September 2019. According to these agreements, all asylum seekers arriving at the US-Mexican border who have transited through third countries would have their claims processed in El Salvador, Honduras, or Guatemala. Although restricting asylum claims along the US-Mexican border targets people from the NTCA, the agreements would apply to any asylum seeker arriving at the US-Mexican border, so long as they transited through third countries.

The agreements have not yet been executed; however if they are, NCTA asylum seekers could be sent back to countries that share many of the features of their country of origin (CFR 01/10/2019): high gang violence, deficits of basic services, and poverty. The agreements however will not send asylum seekers back to their countries of origin, in line nominally with basic norms of “non-refoulement”.

Asylum-seekers, regardless of origin, may be sent to countries they transited - Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. However, some wording in the agreements is so sweeping that asylum seekers may be sent to countries that they never transited through – an Angolan asylum seeker could possibly have their asylum claim transferred to El Salvador even if they never transited through the country (U.S.-El Salvador Agreement; U.S.- Guatemala Agreement; The Intercept 23/09/2019).

US officials openly admitted to using the withholding of USD 550-615 million in development, security and humanitarian aid; threats of taxes on outgoing remittances, and tariffs on Central American imports to pressure the NTCA countries into signing these broad agreements (El Faro 18/10/2019; AP 16/10/2019).

The US-Guatemala and -El Salvador agreements may also prevent migrants from seeking other kinds of protection in the US, such as “withholdings on removals” (stays on deportation), which would be unprecedented. In acting upon these agreements, the US may be ignoring its obligations under the Convention Against Torture to prevent return of people to situations where they may be tortured (OHCHR, accessed 25/10/2019).

The agreements, if implemented, would challenge the legal tenets of “non-refoulement” as vulnerable asylum seekers would be transferred to insecure contexts.

The deals are signed but still need to pass through the parliaments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and it is unclear how many asylum seekers each country would accept. Guatemala’s President Alejandro Giammattei has been openly hostile to the deal, although US officials have warned that the country would not benefit from a regional economic development plan if the agreement is not implemented (Reuters 15/10/2019). They are likely to be passed in El Salvador and Honduras, who were promised asylum infrastructure investment (Vox 25/09/2019). The deals were followed by a spate of border control activities, including Mexico adopting new border security measures along its southern border, reinforcing deportations of migrants (ASCOA 03/10/2019); El Salvador
CENTRAL AMERICA

inaugurating the first Border Control force in its history; and US DHS and Immigration and Customs Enforcement deploying 89 agents in Guatemala as part of bilateral training (Reuters 25/06/2019). The agreements follow the US’ recent adoption of increasingly hostile immigration and asylum-seeking legislation and policies (Think Immigration 05/08/2019).

Impact

Living conditions in the NCTA countries are precarious, characterised by fragile economies and widespread insecurity: 29.2% of Salvadorans, 59.3% of Guatemalans, and 61.9% of Hondurans live below their national poverty lines (World Bank Data 2019) and gang violence is a daily occurrence. From January to May 2019, 1,958 murders were recorded in Guatemala with an average of 13 per day. In El Salvador, 1,236 murders were registered during this period and Honduras sees an average of 10 murders a day (World Bank 2018 data; REDLAC 07/2019). Violence has led to the forced displacement of whole communities and has inhibited access to basic services, medical care, and education. However, it is unclear how these agreements will be executed and when. As a result of this, the risk could manifest in several ways, depending crucially upon whether asylum seekers will be transferred to countries they transited. Ultimately, the US may send varying numbers of potentially vulnerable asylum seekers to inadequately equipped and dangerous contexts.

Scenario 1

If the deals are rejected by Guatemala, El Salvador, or Honduras: the US has threatened to withdraw USD 432 million in projects and grants it has reattributed to NTCA countries as a whole (AP 16/10/2019). US President Donald Trump already cut assistance at the beginning of the year, citing the countries’ lack of control over migrant movement. Cuts to assistance have been detrimental to aid activities in the region, suggesting that similar cuts to assistance could severely impact vulnerable populations dependent upon US funded aid encompassing emergency food programmes, water and nutrition projects, urban violence prevention programmes, and substance abuse counselling (NPR 17/09/2019 quoting Save the Children and Mercy Corps; Reuters 04/10/2019). The US government has also threatened to impose taxes and tariffs on remittances and exports (WSJ 23/07/2019), possibly straining economies that are heavily dependent upon remittances, and for whom the US is a major trading partner (Vice 29/07/2019).

Scenario 2.1

All countries ratify their agreements and asylum seekers are transferred to countries they transited: in this case Guatemala will likely see a very high number of transfers of Salvadoran and Honduran asylum-seekers from the US, as well as of other nationalities who frequently arrive in Guatemala to transit through Mexico. This may strain already limited infrastructure and will force asylum seekers to live in contexts of low food security, restrained access to basic services, and very few public housing opportunities. Very few migrants transit through Honduras and El Salvador, so there may be few transfers to these countries.

Scenario 2.2

All countries ratify their agreements, and asylum seekers are transferred to countries they did not necessarily pass through: In this case the agreements undertaken between the U.S. and the NTCA countries would de facto end asylum on the US’ southern border for poorer asylum seekers who must transit through a third-country. All asylum seekers who have transited through a third country could be sent to Honduras, Guatemala, or El Salvador unless they were nationals of those countries; asylum-seekers may be transferred to countries they are unfamiliar with and have never transited through, making them even more vulnerable.

Scenario 3.1

Guatemala rejects the deal, but El Salvador and Honduras implement theirs and asylum seekers will be transferred to countries they transited: It is unclear whether this would significantly impact most asylum-seekers since very few transit through El Salvador and Honduras. Nicaraguans and other nationalities seeking asylum passing through those countries may be subject to deportations upon arrival at the US border and will be sent to insecure contexts lacking access to basic services.
Scenario 3.2

If Guatemala rejects the deal and asylum seekers are transferred to countries they did not necessarily pass through: in this case both El Salvador and Honduras will see a higher concentration of asylum seekers arriving, further straining their provision of basic services and their asylum infrastructure and forcing asylum seekers to live in contexts of low food security, lack of access to basic services, and few public housing options.

NTCA countries do not have the infrastructure needed to adequately accommodate asylum seekers (Crisis Group 25/10/2017). In NTCA countries, there is a severe lack of support for persons displaced by violence and their needs are mainly addressed by civil society organisations – indicative of how asylum seekers may be treated. There is a lack of shelters for displaced people in both El Salvador and Honduras and in Guatemala there is a severe housing deficit (REDLAC 07/2019). Asylum seekers’ needs shelter, income, and basic services risk not being met in such contexts.

NTCA countries also have severely limited capacity to process asylum cases (UNHCR 2018; Vice 29/07/2019; El Faro 21/09/2019). Relief organisations have already reported a lack of capacity to treat recently returned persons (MSF 25/09/2019), all factors suggesting future transferred asylum seekers may be left for months and perhaps years in insecure and ill-prepared contexts.

Scenario 4

People may stay in Mexico and refuse to be transferred. Mexico’s capacity to process asylum claims is limited (MMC 20/12/2018; REDLAC 07/2019) and since September of this year Mexico has deployed more than 25,000 National Guard personnel to its borders and has increased its deportations of migrants – most of whom come from the NTCA (AS COA 03/10/2019) – suggesting there is an increasingly hostile environment towards migrants. In border towns many Mexican deportees from the US and asylum seekers live in informal settlements or overcrowded shelters (WOLA 07/05/2019). Many border towns have little if any capacity to accommodate for asylum seekers’ needs (MSF 18/10/2019) and foreigners, notably women and children, are a common target for kidnapping and harassment (CEPAL 2018; New Yorker 01/10/2019).
HAITI

A worsening economic and political crisis leads to long term protests, causing protracted disruption of aid delivery and rising poverty levels

Haiti’s economy has faced difficulties related to rising inflation and the depreciation of its national currency, the gourde (HTG), in the last two years. The most recent spike in inflation started around May 2018, while the depreciation of the HTG against the USD has been on the rise since spring 2018 (Banque de la République d’Haiti BRH 07/2019; BRH 2018; BRH 2017).

Protests in reaction to the economic situation have occurred periodically across cities since July 2018, from Port-de-Paix in the north, to Jérémie in the south. Recent protests have caused economic paralysis. In February 2019 and September-October 2019, the functioning of hospitals, schools, and the humanitarian aid system was severely disrupted for weeks at a time (The New Humanitarian 19/02/2019; NYT 20/10/2019). Protests have been taking place from July 2018 through October 2019, making this one of Haiti’s longest periods of continuous unrest. The country is also in political impasse, without a functioning government and without appointed Prime Minister. This exacerbates the negative consequences of the economic crisis.

The government temporarily abolished fuel subsidies in July 2018, with fuel becoming 38% more expensive overnight, sparking protests (Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, Ministère du Commerce et de l’Industrie 06/07/2019 in OCHA 01/2019). Subsidies were rapidly reinstated following the negative reaction from the population. However, in September 2019, outgoing Prime Minister Jean Michel Lapin mentioned that the government was reflecting on possible fuel taxation, with some analysts considering removal of fuel subsidies as probable (AlterPresse 18/09/2019; FEWS NET 27/09/2019). This measure would likely bring more protestors onto the streets, as happened in 2018.

The government has not delivered a robust response to the economic crisis, as an up-to-date state budget law was not ratified (CSIS 21/10/2019). Inflation has grown steadily since May 2018 and the Central Bank of Haiti estimated it would reach an annual rate of 19.3% in October 2019, up from approximately 15% in October 2018 (BRH 07/2019). Correlated to inflation is the increasing depreciation of the gourde (HTG) (FEWS NET 27/09/2019). In October 2018, currency traded at HTG 71.06 for one US dollar; in October 2019, HTG 92.25 were needed for one US dollar (BRH 25/10/2019). This has wide-ranging economic consequences for Haiti, which witnesses a rising local demand for US dollars due to its structural reliance on imports (The Economist 08/02/2019). Although the IMF predicts a slight decrease in the annual percent change of the inflation rate for 2020 (from a 2019 average of 17.6% to a 2020 average of 17.1%), the rate would remain much higher than the 2014-2018 average of 10.48% (IMF 10/2019). The price of the basic food basket had an annual increase of 34% as of June 2019 (Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimenataire 07/2019). Food prices are expected to remain high, given that the agricultural sector is still recovering from a below-average spring harvest, which normally accounts for 50-60% of the annual production (CNSA 07/2019; FEWS NET 27/09/2019).

Recurrent fuel shortages contribute to further economic instability and add to the needs of all Haitians. In 2019, Haiti experienced shortages in February, April, and August affecting core infrastructure including hospitals (Alterpress 03/09/2019). As the government no longer buys subsidised Venezuelan fuel, it has difficulties paying its suppliers at international market prices (The Economist 17/04/2019). Future fuel shortages are probable.

Politically, demonstrators have accused President Jovenel Moïse of corruption and called for his resignation (NYT 20/10/2019), but he confirmed that he intends to remain in charge (The New Humanitarian 07/10/2019). Moïse’s political opponents at the Senate have rejected his new Prime Minister nominee five times (VOA 24/09/2019), and legislative elections planned for 27 October did not take place (TV5 Monde 26/09/2019; AFP 25/09/2019), undermining the legitimacy of current parliamentary sessions. Haiti is expected to remain politically stalled. Without a governmental interlocutor, much-needed fiscal aid of USD 229 million from the IMF is being reassessed and future loans from other international institutions are also at stake (AP 13/06/2019; OCHA 13/08/2019; CSIS 21/10/2019).

There are two additional, unpredictable variables. First, the legal status of around 40,000 Haitians residing in the US under Temporary Protected Status will be reassessed...
in January 2020, threatening the flow of remittances into the island (CSIS 21/10/2019). Remittances from the global diaspora make up 32.5% of Haiti’s GDP (World Bank 2018). Second, as the last UN peacekeepers left on 15 October, some 15,404 overburdened Haitian policemen are now responsible for the safety of Haitian citizens, amid increasing gang violence and heated protests (Haitian Times 15/10/2019; CSIS 21/10/2019).

**Impact**

If the economic situation worsens, the 2.4 million citizens (54% of the total) living below the poverty line (2.41 USD a day) are most likely to quickly deplete their resources (World Bank 15/10/2019). The 1.3 million Haitians targeted by humanitarian aid will also face a critical situation if operations keep being disrupted or halted for weeks at a time and they do not receive food or medical assistance (OCHA 01/2019; Catholic Relief Services 17/10/2019; Miami Herald 02/09/2019; IFRC 10/10/2019). Indigent farmers who had a poor spring harvest are also most likely to quickly deplete their stocks. Like other poor households, they will need to buy produce off the market, where skyrocketing prices will limit their access to food (FEWS NET 31/09/2019). Therefore, the most vulnerable Haitians could enter the 2020 lean season (April-June) with their resources already depleted (OCHA 13/08/2019). Despite positive predictions on food security (FEWS NET 26/10/2019) and good forecasts for the agricultural sector, if unrest continues and humanitarian agencies, including the WFP and FAO, have their operations systematically disrupted, at least 428,000 more Haitians could reach levels of severe acute food insecurity by March-June 2020 (IPC INFO 31/10/2019). An estimated 47% of Haitians have already implemented Crisis and Emergency coping strategies, such as eating fewer meals (IPC INFO 31/10/2019; ACTED 17/10/2019).

The protests contribute to rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation. The blockage of roads, ports and for some days also the airport, along with fuel and electricity shortages, have already affected all 11 million Haitians (ACTED 16/10/2019; OCHA 02/10/2019; France Info 24/09/2019). 480,000 children aged 6-18 were out of school before the protests, and the number reached 2 million in September 2019 due to the unrest (OCHA 01/2019; AP 02/10/2019). This number is likely to remain high in the long term, as parents worry about sending their children to school because of violence, or cannot pay school or transport fees (Alterpress 10/09/2019; RFI 27/08/2019). The predicted impact is large as around 85% of schools are private and impose fees (USAID 01/2016).

The health sector has also been severely affected by the economic and political crisis. Already in 2013 most drugs were inaccessible to the poorest (Chahal, Bero and St Fort 12/2013). With inflation at 19.3% it is likely that more people cannot buy medicines. Hospitals are affected by fuel and drug shortages, operating dysfunctionally or threatening to close (Le Nouvelliste 19/09/2019; Le Nouvelliste 24/10/2019). Blood products are scarce because of disruptions in the supply chain due to the protests (MSF 05/07/2019), with emergency care also difficult to access. For example, IFRC has previously halted field operations due to growing insecurity (IFRC 10/10/2019). Haitians who could afford private healthcare might be unable to access it in future due to decreased savings (DG ECHO 05/07/2019; MSF 05/07/2019). Missed fuel delivery has also interrupted the functioning of water pumps (The New Humanitarian 07/10/2019). Haiti had a recent epidemic of cholera; if people have to resort to unsafe sources of water, the consequences could be dire.

Livelihoods will be more deeply affected if protests continue and humanitarian operations are halted or disrupted. International organisations carry out cash distribution programmes, reaching 37,000 people in the Grand’Anse, Artibonite and North departments alone, but they have been halted or disrupted for six weeks as of end October (OCHA 02/10/2019; WFP 08/10/2019; OCHA 28/10/2019). Recent strikes in the public sector have also affected import/export routines (OCHA 13/08/2019). Investors are scared by the current instability, whereas lootings threaten the livelihood of small shop owners in the cities (CSIS 21/10/2019). The government also has difficulty paying its employees (IFRC 10/10/2019).

As inflation continues, but salaries do not keep up, the purchasing power of all Haitians is plummeting (ACTED 16/10/2019). After the 2010 earthquake and Hurricane Matthew (2016), funding of aid projects has declined (The Economist 24/04/2018) and in 2019 fewer NGOs have been operating in the country compared to 2017 (OCHA 01/2019). A deterioration of the humanitarian situation would overstretch the capacities of the aid sector.
Assam National Register of Citizens (NRC) leaves 1.9 million people at risk of statelessness, detention, and displacement

The Indian state of Assam published the final National Register of Citizens (NRC) on 31 August 2019. The exercise began in 2015 and sought to detect illegal migrants (Assam State 31/08/2019, Independent 10/09/2019). 33 million applications for inclusion were received and 1.9 million were excluded from the final list (Assam State 31/08/2019). Bengali Hindus and Muslims constitute the largest number of exclusions, though more than 100,000 Gorkhas (ethnic Nepalis) were also excluded (Vox 17/09/2019, Quartz India 05/09/2019).

The government is establishing “foreigners tribunals” to determine the status of those excluded. Individuals will be provided a certificate explaining their exclusion and will have 120 days to appeal (India Today 14/09/2019, ORF 27/09/2019). The government set a deadline of 30 October 2019 for all certificates to be published and sent, after which the 120 day petition period begins (NDTV 19/09/2019). Appeals must demonstrate individual presence in Assam before 24 March 1971. If rejected by the foreigners tribunal, appeals can be made in the higher courts of India (News18 02/10/2019).

According to the Indian government, exclusion has no implication on individual rights. Those not in the final NRC will not be detained and will enjoy all rights until all options for appeal have been exhausted (Frontline 27/09/2019).

Despite government assurances, the NRC process has exacerbated an increasingly xenophobic climate in Assam and is likely to fuel discrimination during the appeal process. Record keeping in rural India is poor and proof of citizenship is often unavailable or riddled with misspellings, raising fears that many have been wrongly excluded (Times of India 10/09/2019, Amnesty International 31/08/2019). Women and children are especially likely to face obstacles during the appeal process. Deeply rooted patriarchal structures, such as arranged marriage and non-inheritance of property, have left many women and their children without verifiable documents to prove residency (Amnesty International 31/08/2019).

Impact

The humanitarian impact of the Assam NRC is uncertain, particularly given the lack of clear policy for addressing rejected appeals. However, authorities have stated that no undocumented individuals will remain in India and the construction of large-scale detention centres is ongoing (The Guardian 09/09/2019). Though specific numbers are difficult to speculate, these measures increase the risk that as many as 1.9 million people could become stateless, detained, or displaced.

The Assam NRC is attempting to detect and deport those it considers to be illegal Bangladeshi migrants; this is problematic, given Bangladesh considers those excluded from the NRC to be irregular migrants rather than Bangladeshi citizens (TIME 30/08/2019). India has no agreement with Bangladesh on the return of irregular migrants and the Indian government has not held discussions with Dhaka on the question of deportation (Times of India 28/09/2019).

The limitations on India for deporting individuals to Bangladesh suggests the more critical concern is large-scale detention and deprivation of basic rights and access to public services. Prior to publication of the list on 31 August, there were already plans for the construction of 10 detention centres. Completion of the first is expected by December 2019, with capacity for 3,000 people (Al Jazeera 02/09/2019, Indian Express 08/09/2019).

Additionally, widespread rejection of appeals or a formal decision to detain or expel excluded individuals could trigger mass displacement, internally to other parts of India or into neighbouring countries. The neighbouring states of Manipur and Mizoram have already passed restrictions on the settlement of non-residents in anticipation of an exodus of people from Assam (Economic Times India 19/09/2019).
Escalating violence due to protests in Papua and West Papua leads to displacement and increased humanitarian needs

The provinces of Papua and West Papua are home to a low-level insurgency, ongoing since the establishment of the Free Papua Movement in 1963. Violence escalated after a large-scale attack by militants in December 2018 (The Guardian 05/12/2019). Since 19 August 2019, anti-racism protests have erupted and the independence movement has reignited, causing widespread violence. Protests began in response to the detention and discriminatory treatment of 43 Papuan students on the island of Java and have evolved into riots (TIME 29/08/2019). Indonesia has implemented a heavy-handed response: 6,000 military personnel deployed to the region, an internet slowdown, and the detention of dozens of activists. More than 40 people have been killed (OCHA 02/09/2018; HRW 07/09/2019; Jakarta Post 02/09/2019).

Protests in the Papuan provinces are common; however, current unrest is unprecedented. Historically, protest movements have been orchestrated by exiled Papuan leaders and were limited to the provinces. The current protests originated from directly within West Papua and spread across Indonesia. Since mid-August, protests have occurred in 30 cities in Indonesia and solidarity demonstrations have taken place in Papua New Guinea and Australia (ABC 05/09/2019; RNZ 10/09/2019). Tensions between Papuans and Indonesians have also escalated. Since mid-August, threats have forced more than 2,000 Papuan university students across Indonesia to return home to Papua province, and the government has evacuated 16,000 non-Papuan migrants from Wamena due to safety concerns (RNZ 18 September 2019; Al Jazeera 07/10/2019).

Impact

Access constraints for humanitarian agencies have left the response in the hands of the Indonesian government. However, there is currently no government-coordinated humanitarian response in areas impacted by previous violence or ongoing protests (Inside Indonesia 01/07/2019). The Indonesian government has used the Free Papua Movement as a reason for maintaining strict standards for local and foreign NGOs in the region. Access for human rights organisations has been restricted and international intervention rejected (RNZ 09/09/2019; The Guardian 12/08/2019).

Protection is a major concern given that Indonesian rule in the region has been marked by human rights violations, including torture and extrajudicial killings of activists and protestors (Amnesty International 2018; UNPO 07/08/2019). Widespread unrest has disrupted access to public services. Schools have suffered damages and closures due to the riots (OCHA 02/09/2018; Jakarta Post 08/10/2019). Markets and businesses have been burnt and forced to close, limiting access to goods and services, as well as livelihoods (ICP 26/09/2019; Telegraph 24/09/2019). Reports suggest that power outages caused by damage from the riots have disrupted health services in affected communities in Wamena (ICP 26/09/2019).

IDPs in areas affected by riots are particularly vulnerable to secondary displacement and elevated humanitarian needs as services become disrupted and humanitarian access constrained by insecurity. Clashes between separatist militants and Indonesian forces have displaced as many as 30,000 people in Nduga since December 2018 (RNZ 03/04/2019). Wamena, a town of 31,000 people, has experienced the highest levels of riot-related violence and is already hosting as many as 5,000 IDPs from neighbouring Nduga regency (ICP 26/09/2019; Tapol 14/03/2019). Conditions in IDP camps are poor and access to food, water, and healthcare is limited. In August 2019, a local NGO reported that nearly 200 IDPs have died this year from malnutrition and disease (ICP 23/07/2019).

There exists the potential for an influx of West Papuan refugees to neighbouring Papua New Guinea (PNG). As of 15 October 2019, there are no reports of refugees from West Papua in PNG; however, a contingency plan has been drafted by the PNG government in coordination with the National Disaster Centre, UN agencies, and NGOs in case of refugee arrivals (Post Courier 15/10/2019; The National 15/10/2019).
**BURKINA FASO**

**Medium Risk Level in June 2019**

Government loses control of southwestern and eastern regions, leading to internal displacement and increased food insecurity

Overall security in Burkina Faso has continued to decline since June. In July, the government extended the states of emergency in northern provinces for another six months (North Africa Journal 11/07/2019). Attacks from armed groups have led to a steady increase in displacement particularly in the Sahel, Nord, and Centre-Nord regions. OCHA considers Burkina Faso the fastest-growing humanitarian crisis in Africa in 2019 (OCHA 15/10/2019). Attacks happen primarily in the north but have occurred increasingly in other parts of the country as well. Militants are now considered to be active in one-third of the country (NYT 15/10/2019). Concerns about a potential geographical spread of the violence across coastal West Africa persist, although recent attacks have been concentrated in northern Burkina Faso (BBC 06/20/2019).

**CHAD**

**Low Risk Level in June 2019**

Increased violence between government forces and non-state armed groups in Tibesti leads to worsening of food and protection needs

The risk did not materialise; however, after publication of the last ACAPS Risk Report, the government of Chad declared in August a state of emergency in Tibesti (northern Chad), and in Sila and Ouaddai regions in eastern Chad (Aljazeera 18/08/2019), justified by incomplete disarmament procedures in these provinces (APA 11/09/2019). It was extended for four months in September (Reuters 10/09/2019) and President Idriss Déby announced on 19 August that 5,000 troops would be deployed to the regions. The move is seen as a sign of the government’s growing struggle to prevent insecurity from spreading (The New Humanitarian 07/10/2019). Households in Tibesti region continue to face food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 - Crisis) because trade and market supply is disrupted as a result of persistent conflict (FEWS NET 09/2019).

**DRC**

**Medium Risk Level in June 2019**

Gaps in Ebola response and population movement lead to the spreading of Ebola to new territories and neighbouring countries

Concerns over a geographical extension of the Ebola virus increased since June, after an Ebola case was reported in Goma, capital of North Kivu province, along with an Ebola case detected between DRC and Uganda. The WHO reacted by declaring Ebola in DRC a global public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) in July (WHO 17/07/2019). The risk of Ebola transmission in Goma and from DRC to Uganda has been contained as of now and new infections in DRC have decreased compared to the peak in April 2019. While in April 126 new cases were reported weekly (WHO 10/10/2019), in the week of 14-20
October, 21 new confirmed Ebola cases were reported (WHO Ext Sitrep 64 22/10/2019). The cases were from five health zones across North Kivu and Ituri provinces, especially from Biakato Mine health area, raising hopes that Ebola is now concentrated in a smaller area (Al jazeera 10/10/2019). However, the areas where Ebola is currently transmitting are rural and often insecure, making access for health workers challenging (WHO 10/10/2019). Further response challenges such as low Ebola awareness and the danger of transmission along roads persist (WHO 10/10/2019). On 18 October, the PHEIC status was extended for three more months as the WHO continues to consider the risks on national and regional levels very high (WHO 18/10/2019).

**Mali**

Medium Risk Level in June 2019

Escalation of violence in the northwest leads to large-scale displacement and shelter, protection, and health needs

Intercommunal violence in the centre of the country has persisted since June (WP 10/10/2019). In September, over 180,000 people were internally displaced across Mali due to violent conflicts. The largest group of IDPs (over 60,000 people) is currently registered in Mopti in central Mali (DTM 09/2019). The increase of attacks has led to growing humanitarian needs, especially regarding protection (OCHA 13/09/2019). Particularly in central regions, local populations are facing human rights violations and report summary executions, disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest (UNHCR 09/08/2019). Particularly in Mopti, where crop production was lower during the summer (FEWS NET 08/2019), the conflict in central Mali has increased the risk related to food security and livelihoods. The humanitarian situation has been aggravated by flooding in the northern and central regions in August (IFRC 09/09/2019). Currently, OCHA considers 3.9 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA 14/10/2019) compared to 3.2 million reported in August (OCHA 08/2019).

**Middle East (Iran/US)**

Medium Risk Level in June 2019

Heightened tensions between Iran and the US and their allies spark conflict between regional proxies in the Middle East, leading to new humanitarian needs in the region

Tensions between Iran on one side and the US and their allies on the other remain high. A series of strikes against Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facilities on 14 September, claimed by the Houthis in Yemen but vocally blamed on Iran by the US and its allies, has raised the risk for a wider regional escalation (Reuters 17/09/2019). A possible retaliation from the US and Saudi Arabia, however, will likely avoid an all-out conflict with Iran. Iraq and Yemen remain particularly at risk of an escalation of tensions on the proxy level. Several unclaimed attacks have targeted US military bases in Iraq since June. Military installations operated by Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq have also been targeted by alleged Israeli air attacks. Increased political pressure from both the US and Iran would increase the likelihood of a direct confrontation in Iraq. Continued Houthi-claimed assaults on Saudi infrastructure raises the risk of increased violence in Yemen (ICG 20/09/2019).

**Sudan**

High Risk Level in June 2019

Establishment of military regime leads to increased conflict and spread of violence countrywide

On 21 August 2019, the governing Transitional Military Council (TMC) was disbanded, and an 11-member Sovereign Council was formed as collective head of state, aimed at steering the country toward democratic elections over a period of 39 months (International Crisis Group 21/10/2019). The council consists of five members selected by the TMC, five civilians selected by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance, and one
civilian jointly selected by the TMC and FFC. Although the power-sharing deal between military leaders and the opposition alliance has managed to avoid the establishment of a purely military regime so far, mass protests against the precarious political situation have continued frequently throughout Sudan (BBC 30/06/2019; The Guardian 13/07/2019; VOA 23/09/2019). Additionally, clashes in South Kordofan province disrupted October peace talks between the transitional government and opposition groups, indicating that stability can still be contested (Sudan Tribune 16/10/2019).

SYRIA
High Risk Level in June 2019
Full-scale offensive on northwest Syria leads to displacement of millions, a high number of civilian casualties, and severe humanitarian needs

While a full-scale offensive has not materialised, airstrikes and shelling continue in southern Idlib governorate and in the Kabani area in eastern rural Lattakia, despite the announcement of a ceasefire on 31 August (SOHR 20/10/2019). Since the publication of ACAPS’ June Risk Report, humanitarian conditions in northwest Syria have continued to deteriorate. Increased violence between April and August led to the displacement of large groups. As of 8 October, an estimated 400,000 people have been forced to flee their homes since 1 May; most have sought shelter near the Turkish border in densely populated areas where humanitarian response is overstretched and needs are mounting (OCHA 08/10/2019). Although hostilities are ongoing, the levels of violence are lower compared to the intensification in August when the Syrian regime retook control over Khan Shaykun, a strategic town on the M5 highway that stretches from the capital Damascus to Aleppo city (Reuters 11/08/2019).

YEMEN
High Risk Level in June 2019
Breakdown in the peace process leads to escalation of conflict in Al Hudaydah, exacerbating food insecurity and increasing the spread of cholera

The risk of a major offensive in Al Hudaydah has lessened since June 2019, but economic wrangling between the Houthis and the Government of Yemen (GoY) is likely to continue to hinder efforts to reduce food insecurity and cholera. The probability of a breakdown of the Stockholm Agreement, signed in December 2018, has decreased over the past six months, though the gains are fragile and reversible. In November 2019, Saudi Arabia confirmed they had begun negotiations with the Houthis, who in turn suspended attacks on Saudi territory (FT 11/10/2019; MEMO 7/11/2019).

In October 2019, the UN established five observation points on the outskirts of Al Hudaydah city to monitor the ceasefire (CIMP 25/10/2019). The Houthis and the GoY also released some prisoners between September and November 2019, which could pave the way for further exchanges (XinhuaNet 11/11/2019; Yemen Akhbar 20/10/2019; ICRC 30/09/2019). Signing the Stockholm Agreement reduced violence in Al Hudaydah. Civilian casualties are down 60% compared to 2018. However, Al Hudaydah remains Yemen’s most violent city, with over 714 civilian casualties in 2019 (CIMP 31/10/2019).

Conflict and economic competition continue to disrupt food and fuel supply lines, contributing to stubbornly high levels of food insecurity and cholera. Conflict in Aden in August and September 2019, and bureaucratic fighting over fuel imports to Al Hudaydah in September and October 2019, sparked fuel shortages and price rises, cutting water, sanitation and health services, disrupting livelihoods, pushing up food prices and hampering humanitarian operations. Food insecurity remains stubbornly high, with over a third of households reporting inadequate food consumption and 17 million people reliant on food aid. This could rise further if renewed conflict cuts port operations (FEWSNET 10/2019; WFP VAM 08/2019). There have been 770,000 suspected cholera/acute watery diarrhea cases in 2019, almost triple the rate for 2018 (WHO 09/2019).
# ANNEX

## INFORM GLOBAL CRISIS SEVERITY INDEX (GCSI) - KEY FIGURES

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NA - No data available
< - Figure is less than 100,000

Source: GCSI October 2019.
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