CRISIS OVERVIEW 2016
HUMANITARIAN TRENDS AND RISKS FOR 2017
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IRAQ
Displacement drives needs as government forces recapture IS areas

YEMEN
Access worsens while humanitarian needs persist

SOMALIA
Drought worsened through 2016; Dadaab returnees in need of assistance

SOUTH SUDAN
Conflict spreading; food security reaches catastrophic levels

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Election-related violence as conflict in eastern DRC continues

ZIMBABWE
Growing popular unrest amid political and economic turmoil; food insecurity

BURUNDI
Insecurity heightens food needs and human rights violations make protection a priority

AFGHANISTAN
More than 600,000 Afghans return to intensifying violence

MALI
Flare in conflict constrains humanitarian access

NIGERIA
Catastrophic food and nutrition crisis revealed with improved access

LIBYA
Access extremely challenging; severe lack of information

SYRIA
Worsening conflict further increases humanitarian needs

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Conflict sparks again in the last six months; access worsens

VENEZUELA
Political and economic crises lead to humanitarian needs

NORTHERN TRIANGLE
Gang violence creating devastating humanitarian impact

LIBYA
Access extremely challenging; severe lack of information
The Crisis Overview 2016: Humanitarian Trends and Risks for 2017 takes advantage of four years of daily monitoring of humanitarian needs to identify long-term trends and indicate potential risks for the coming year.

This year, we have focused on providing a more concise picture of overall trends in need. We have slightly altered our approach when selecting which countries to include, to pay more attention to the potential worsening of the situation. So you will find that Sudan is not in the report, but Zimbabwe and Venezuela are. We also consider the countries of Latin America’s Northern Triangle, where gang violence is having an increasingly severe humanitarian impact.

The aim of the report is to deepen collective understanding of how needs have evolved over time in some of the most severe humanitarian crises in the world. It is our hope that we can contribute towards a more robust shared situation awareness across the humanitarian sector and inspire thinking that will ultimately help to improve support to crisis-affected populations.

The numbers help, but the limitations of a quantitative approach must be recognised. As the data and our approach are not strong enough to enable meaningful comparative analysis by numbers, so the accompanying qualitative analysis is vital.

I hope you will find the report both informative and useful. Our work is only strengthened by your feedback, so please let us know what you think.

Lars Peter Nissen
Director
Geneva, 30 November 2016
The Crisis Overview 2016: Humanitarian Trends and Risks for 2017, outlines the countries where needs are greatest, and growing, as we approach the end of 2016.

Based on our weekly Global Emergency Overview (GEO), and four years of data on humanitarian needs across 150 countries, we have identified ten countries where humanitarian needs are likely to be highest in 2017, as well as four that merit attention as they face a potential spike in needs. We also consider the humanitarian situation in the northern triangle region of Latin America, where the wide-ranging humanitarian impact of pervasive gang violence is chronically underreported.

**COUNTRY SELECTION**

The ten countries identified to be in highest humanitarian need in this report are those that have consistently been at Level 3 (Severe Humanitarian Crisis) in the ACAPS GEO for the 12 weeks preceding the report (mid-July to early October), and that we consider likely to be facing worse situations in the coming year.

The GEO measures underlying vulnerability, access constraints, and current needs to determine overall need for humanitarian assistance. It ranks countries according to three levels: situation of concern, humanitarian crisis, and severe humanitarian crisis.

The second list adds four countries, and one region that our monitoring and analysis determines to be at significant risk of a new or increased humanitarian crisis within the coming six months.

Our overview does not attempt to predict sudden-onset disasters, rather to analyse the broad evolution of the situation in countries hit by longer-term, more complex crises. Despite the regional nature of many crises, we focus on countries because data collection and response is generally country-focused.

Comparing disasters is an intricate and controversial endeavour, and we cannot fully account for the complexity and diversity of the many crises around the world. This report is not therefore intended to rank or compare the humanitarian situation in different countries directly, but simply to summarise the evolution in the most pressing humanitarian needs.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

We would like to thank the contributions of the external reviewers, whose feedback was invaluable to our analysis. Thanks also to MapAction for map production.
COUNTRY REPORTS
For each country, we provide an overview, outlining trends in needs and access since 2013, and identifying the humanitarian priorities in 2016.

We then summarise the key events, and for most countries, the main displacement dynamics over the year, accompanied by data for the past four years.

READING THE INFOGRAPHICS
Our infographics use the onion model (see methodology section) to show the population reached, targeted, and in need. For each country, the circles are proportionate, with the largest population in need as reference. They should not therefore be used to make comparisons across countries.

Displacement graphs show the numbers of IDPs and the number of refugees in the country.

RISKS
Each country report ends with potential risks of negative developments over the next six months and how they may impact the humanitarian situation.

The probability scale indicates the likelihood of the scenario taking place, in five stages. The impact scale starts from the continuation of the current level of need, with steps from a slight deterioration (up to 5% increase in the number affected OR a slight increase in the severity of need) to a major deterioration (more than 5% increase in the number affected OR a large increase in the severity of needs). Precise figures are not used to describe impact, because these are estimates.
METHODOLOGY NOTE

HUMANITARIAN POPULATION MODEL

In order to obtain comparable data across countries, each variable was normalised by the population. We used the humanitarian population model below to ensure each variable was as exclusive as possible. Data has been collected for end 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

TERMS USED IN THIS REPORT

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS to and within the affected areas includes information on relief actors’ ability to reach the affected population, the affected population’s ability to access assistance, as well as security and physical constraints affecting both humanitarian actors and the affected population.

DISPLACEMENT: Displacement is divided into internally displaced persons, refugees, and returnees. The graphs in this report focus on the caseload per country and therefore measure IDPs and refugees in-country. However, both the number of refugees who have fled the country and returnees are important to understanding the humanitarian situation, and are discussed in the displacement section of the report.

FOOD SECURITY: Crisis, Emergency, and Catastrophe are used throughout this report and equate to IPC Phases 3, 4, and 5, respectively.

NUTRITION: 15% GAM is used as the Critical threshold.

SOURCES OF DATA

For the overall population figure, we have used the latest projection by Geohive. The population in need, targeted, and reached were based on existing available information such as Humanitarian Dashboard, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Humanitarian Response Plans or other relevant organisations or initiatives. Where total figures were not available, estimates were established based on sectoral information available and previous information, combined with expert judgement, and always using the most conservative approach, to avoid inflation and double counting. Data on displacement is taken from IOM, UNHCR, and IDMC. Any exceptions to these principles are noted.

LIMITATIONS

• Population estimation techniques are often not discussed or agreed. As multiple partners collect population data, coordination, standardisation, harmonisation, and analysis is complex. In some cases, differences of more than 20% have been found between available estimates.

• Definitions and reference models for calculating humanitarian caseload figures vary greatly – as do the way those definitions and models are used and interpreted. In some cases, changes in methodology and definitions have had a significant impact on figures.

• Comprehensive geographical coverage is a problem: Agencies/organisations collecting population statistics might only work in specific locations or only have access to certain parts of the country, or irregular access, making population estimates very weak.

• In very dynamic crises where access is poor, data is largely unavailable for long periods, meaning the accuracy of estimations is uncertain.

• Where data was not available on displacement, we have explored other drivers of need, such as financial indicators.

• It is not possible to obtain or estimate comparable figures of populations most in need. Only a few countries, sectors, or initiatives differentiate needs by their severity.
More than 600,000 Afghans returned to intensifying violence

Refugees have returned to Afghanistan after spending decades – even their entire lives – in neighbouring countries. Pakistan has pushed hard to repatriate Afghans this year, and thousands more have returned from Iran. In October, the Afghan government and the European Union reached an agreement to accelerate the return of Afghans who have not been granted asylum in Europe.

Meanwhile, Taliban attacks within Afghanistan have intensified in 2016, with greater determination to capture provincial capitals and urban centres across the country. The government remains in control of around 70% of the territory. In the east, Islamic State (IS) continues to kidnap and kill civilians, targeting members of minority groups in particular. Over 1.6 million people are internally displaced by conflict.

In addition to lack of resources and poor living conditions, returnees face insecurity. Access to healthcare and WASH facilities is limited for millions of Afghans. Humanitarian access is limited in many locations, particularly Taliban-controlled areas.

**RISKS FOR 2017**

**CONTINUED INSECURITY**

**PROBABILITY:**

**IMPACT:** STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

**RETURNNEES OVERWHELM ASSISTANCE CAPACITY**

**PROBABILITY:**

**IMPACT:** STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION
KEY EVENTS

TALIBAN OFFENSIVE
62% of 8,397 conflict-related civilian casualties recorded in the first nine months of the year – 5,166 – occurred between 1 January and 31 March. The majority were a result of Taliban attacks UNAMA 25/07/2016. Fighting in densely populated areas has become more frequent this year, and this has impacted access. Attacks by both sides have targeted health and humanitarian organisations as well as government structures. The Taliban have again tried to take Kunduz city this year.

However, the number of incidents relating to NGOs, UN and international organisations fell to 147, 30% fewer than in 2015, most likely due to the decreased presence of such organisations in the country OCHA 30/09/2016.

ISLAMIC STATE ATTACKS IN KABUL
On 23 July, Islamic State carried out the deadliest single incident in Afghanistan since 2001: 85 people were killed and 413 injured in a suicide attack targeting Hazara demonstrators in Kabul UNAMA 19/10/2016. On 12 October, 18 people were killed and 54 wounded in an attack on the Hazara community at Kabul’s Sakhi shrine, on the eve of the Shia mourning day UNAMA 12/10/2016. IS continues targeted killings, abductions, and suicide attacks on civilians.

DISPLACEMENT
31 out of 34 provinces have recorded some level of displacement this year OCHA 16/10/2016. Between January and October, 323,500 Afghans became internally displaced, bringing the total number of people displaced by conflict to more than 1.1 million OCHA 07/09/2016, UNHCR 20/10/2016.

For the most part, displaced Afghans find refuge with host families in neighbouring communities who themselves are living in severe poverty. Food, adequate shelter, and healthcare are priority needs, particularly in the coming winter months.

The number of displaced in need has grown enormously this year with the arrival of Afghan returnees. Since the beginning of the year, IOM recorded 603,094 undocumented Afghan returnees from Pakistan and Iran IOM 05/11/2016. Another 80,000 Afghans face deportation back into Afghanistan from the EU in the coming six months. The size of the influx will present challenges to humanitarian response capacity.

Moreover, most returnees from Pakistan and Iran head for Kabul, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Herat, Balkh, Ghazni, Baghlan and Kunduz provinces. The majority of these locations are high-risk areas subject to frequent armed group attacks.
CONTINUED INSECURITY

PROBABILITY: [Colorful bars indicating probability levels]

Intense fighting between Afghan National Security Forces and the Taliban is likely to continue as the Taliban push to add to their territorial control. Other insurgent groups, such as Islamic State (IS) and the Haqqani Network, may seek to take advantage of increasingly overstretched government forces, and increase their attacks. The IDP population is likely to exceed current estimations, as ground engagements continue to be the leading cause of civilian casualties. In consequence, and compounded by economic challenges, the Afghan government is at risk of breaking down. Should this happen, it is unlikely that the various insurgencies will be contained. Growing instability could be exacerbated by political instability in Pakistan, which could lead to an increase in armed group activity, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with potentially dire humanitarian consequences.

IMPACT: [Static, Moderate, Major Deterioration]

Civilian casualties are expected to rise, and minority groups will be in particular need of protection. The kidnapping of civilians and aid workers is likely to continue. Conflict-induced displacements are likely to continue, and the conflict will result in heightened food insecurity. Access to healthcare will diminish.

RETURNEE FLOW OVERWELMS RESPONSE CAPACITY

PROBABILITY: [Colorful bars indicating probability levels]

UNHCR and IOM estimate that by the 15 March 2017 deadline imposed by the government of Pakistan for voluntary return and repatriation, Afghanistan will have received 1–1.5 million returnees. Most have limited social and economic prospects. In addition, over 1 million returnees are expected from Iran within the same time frame. Repatriations from the EU are also likely to increase in the coming months, following the signature of the agreement between the EU and the Afghan government in October 2016. Many people are returning to areas of insecurity, and such a massive influx is likely to put excessive pressure on the government. Absorption of these new populations into the population will be challenging, both socially and economically.

IMPACT: [Static, Moderate, Major Deterioration]

Returnees to insecure areas face protection risks. The high number of child returnees risk recruitment into armed groups, fuelled by lack of schooling. Shelter and WASH will be massive needs for returnees, as will food and livelihoods assistance. The approaching winter increases health risks for vulnerable returnees.
Insecurity heightens food needs and human rights violations make protection a high priority

Burundi’s humanitarian crisis has deteriorated in 2016. Both government forces and opposition groups continue to carry out human rights violations, perpetuating insecurity and provoking a steady stream of displacement, both within Burundi and to neighbouring countries. Food security and economic conditions have worsened dramatically amid the disruptive political environment, despite relatively good agricultural conditions: at least 2.1 million people need food assistance, including over 606,000 facing severe food insecurity. Malaria and cholera epidemics are being compounded by the fragile health system and inadequate care.

* Data is only available for 2015 and 2016.
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

NO POLITICAL AGREEMENT IN SIGHT
Rights abuses and the discovery of mass graves led to renewed efforts to broker peace in late 2015 and early 2016. However, President Nkurunziza has refused to compromise. CNARED – the main opposition umbrella group – was barred from inter-Burundian dialogue in May, tempering hopes for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In October, Burundi isolated itself further, as it announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court.

GROWING ETHNIC RHETORIC
Attempts to fracture the population along ethnic lines increased in 2016. High-level officials have reportedly incited ethnic hatred; anti-Tutsi chants were heard at youth rallies; and the armed forces are reportedly dividing. As a result, tensions between Hutu-led Burundi and Tutsi-led Rwanda have increased. Burundi has accused its neighbour of backing opposition armed groups, and banned exports to Rwanda; Rwanda has expelled thousands of Burundian workers.

FLOODS AND LANDSLIDES COMPOUND CRISIS
Heavy El Niño rains until May triggered flooding and landslides in 15 of 18 provinces, affecting 4 million people. Malaria cases are double those of 2015. The 2015–2016 rainy season in Burundi was particularly severe, and 5,000 homes were destroyed by floods and landslides between November 2015 and May 2016. Cashi and Gitaza sites were set up for displaced flood victims in Rumonge province, and hosted a large proportion of women and children.

DISPLACEMENT
Displacement grew steadily in Burundi in 2016, with over 94,000 Burundian refugees fleeing the country, bringing the total to 324,000 since April 2015. IDP tracking expanded: almost 60,000 IDPs were identified in seven provinces in September, compared to 25,000 in three provinces in January.

The 2015–2016 rainy season in Burundi was particularly severe, and 5,000 homes were destroyed by floods and landslides between November 2015 and May 2016. Cashi and Gitaza sites were set up for displaced flood victims in Rumonge province, and hosted a large proportion of women and children.
RISKS FOR 2017

ECONOMIC MALAISE AGGRAVATES FOOD INSECURITY

PROBABILITY: □ □ □ □

Burundi’s economy shrank 7.2% in 2015. Despite predictions of growth, the most recent indicators suggest GDP has shrunk by 0.5% in 2016. With international relations continuing to sour, economic improvements driven by trade, aid, investment or tourism remain unlikely, while tax revenues and support from new donors, including China, are unlikely to be sufficient to spark a rapid recovery. Already crippled service delivery will remain underfunded. Popular support for President Nkurunziza will likely wane, despite efforts to silence the press. The political alternative offered by armed opposition groups will grow more attractive, and these groups will likely perpetuate instability through sporadic attacks, limiting humanitarian access and deepening the crisis.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

A significant number of people are vulnerable to falling into severe food insecurity. Cases of cholera and malaria will likely rise as health services deteriorate. Both effects will contribute to increasing malnutrition. Political unrest will increase the risk of human rights violations.

ETHNIC POLARISATION AND ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE

PROBABILITY: □ □ □ □

Ethnic polarisation is only likely to persist, deepening divisions in the country and involving more of the population. This escalation of the conflict will bring more widespread human rights abuse and loss of life. Conflict based on ethnic divisions could harden the resolve for international intervention; however, the lack of unity between the East African Community, African Union, and UN has so far impeded various efforts. As international and regional blocks remain ineffective, the likelihood of unilateral Rwandan involvement is growing. Relations between the two neighbours, already poor, have soured further: Burundian migrants have been expelled from Rwanda and trade between the two states has halted. Rwanda denies accusations of backing opposition groups in an attempt to destabilise Nkurunziza. If Kagame wins a third-term in 2017, however, he may push for bolder involvement in Burundian affairs.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

Conflict escalation will put far more of the civilian population in danger, provoke further displacement, and negatively impact food security, which is already critical. As access and living conditions worsen, health and nutrition needs will grow but services diminish.
Conflict sparked again in the last six months; access worsened

Whereas CAR experienced a lull in fighting in early 2016 with relatively peaceful presidential elections, violence resumed in June RFI 29/09/2016. In 2016, conflict has concentrated in north-central and western provinces of Bamingui-Bangoran, Nana-Grebizi, Ouham, Ouham-Pende, and Ouaka where anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka armed groups continue to fight and provoke displacement.

In transhumance areas, notably Nana-Mambere and Ouham-Pende, clashes between cattle herders and farmers, also called intercommunal conflict, occur on a regular basis, comparable to 2015 Jeune Afrique 08/07/2016.

In eastern CAR, the LRA has exploited the security vacuum across Haute-Kotto, Mbomou, and Haut-Mbomou provinces. 2016 has already seen more than 2.5 times the number of abductions and almost three times as many murders as 2015 LRA Crisis Tracker 10/2016.

Recurrent attacks against humanitarian workers, convoys and offices have severely constrained operations INSO 08/10/2016. Nearly three years after crisis first deepened with Seleka’s rise to power, one-half of health facilities are still not functioning OCHA 30/09/2016.

RISK FOR 2017

FAILURE OF DDR AND REUNIFICATION OF EX-SELEKA

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<td>IMPACT:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STATIC</td>
<td>MAJOR Deterioration</td>
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FOOD SECURITY  HEALTH  PROTECTION
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

PERVasive INSECURITY
The security situation has taken a more criminal turn. Among the thousands of armed fighters, more than 500 mercenaries, mainly from Chad and Sudan, are involved in criminal activities in CAR OHCHR 19/10/2016.

The withdrawal of French Sangaris troops in October 2016 leaves security in the hands of MINUSCA, which is too small to cope with both the presence of numerous armed groups in wide parts of the country and with the volatile security situation in Bangui.

THREAT OF SELEKA REUNIFYING
Dialogue initiated by CAR President Touadera has been limited, with no sign of progress GR2P 19/10/2016. The return of ex-Seleka leader Noureddine Adam in April has raised concerns of a possible reunification: an assembly was held and new political and military leadership was agreed in October Radio Ndeke Luka 21/10/2016.

INCREASED TARGETING OF HUMANITARIAN ACTORS
45% of 242 incidents recorded between January and September occurred in the third quarter, mostly armed robbery and extortion along routes where state and international forces do not have the capacity to respond rapidly INSO 08/10/2016. In Ouham, humanitarian activities have only resumed with the support of MINUSCA patrols OCHA 30/09/2016. In Kaga-Bandoro, attacks resulted in the disruption of activities RFI 01/10/2016.

DISPLACEMENT
As of September 2016, over 420,000 people were displaced throughout CAR: 45,500 are in Bangui UNHCR 31/10/2016. The overall figures are similar to March 2016, but as the security situation has changed, so has the displaced population, with new people displaced and others returning.

In April, 16,000 people were displaced by fighting between armed groups and Central African military forces around Koui and Bocaranga, Ouham-Pende OCHA 11/05/2016. In September, increased violence between armed groups displaced another 15,000 around Koui. 3,500 people were also displaced near Kouango, Ouaka province OCHA 30/09/2016. On 12 October, fighting displaced around 20,000 in Kaga-Bandoro, Nana-Grebizi HRW 01/11/2016.

As of 31 October, 453,664 refugees from CAR were spread across Cameroon, Congo, DRC and Chad UNHCR. 10,000 new refugees have been registered since January 2016, as insecurity in northern CAR has driven people across the border.

As of September 2016, CAR hosts 12,473 refugees, mostly from Chad, DRC, South Sudan and Sudan, against 7,348 in December 2015 UNHCR 31/10/2016. The increase is due to hundreds of arrivals from South Sudan to Bambouti, Haut-Mbomou, fleeing violence in Western Equatoria UNHCR 31/10/2015; UNHCR 15/09/2016, UNHCR 31/08/2016.
FAILUR OF THE DDR PROGRAMME AND REUNIFICATION OF EX-SELEKA

PROBABILITY: [Image]

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

Newly elected President Touadera is pushing for a demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program. However, ex-Seleka Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) leader, Nourredine Adam, has returned to CAR and aims to reunite ex-Seleka factions.

FPRC was absent from the pre-DDR meeting in October, and later in the month, ex-Seleka leaders met and established a new military and political leadership, dominated by the FPRC. Ex-Seleka are demanding concessions that the government is extremely unlikely to make, and in turn the government is opposed to ex-Seleka taking up a role in government. There is, in sum, little incentive for the ex-Seleka to disarm: Adam has economic interests in the north and across the border in Chad, and has received support from Chad’s President Deby. He remains focused on re-forming Seleka and the partition of the country. Fighting is therefore likely to escalate and provoke large-scale displacement. Humanitarian access will become extremely constrained.

Populations in Kaga-Bandoro and Bambari are at greatest risk from the fighting. Access, already limited by attacks on humanitarian workers, is likely to shrink further. Displacement will prevent farming, and education. Shelter needs will increase while armed groups render health facilities inaccessible.
Election-related violence surges as conflict in eastern DRC continues

Political violence related to the scheduling of elections has increased instability across the country in 2016. Since the beginning of the year, election-related violence and protests have flared in Kinshasa and in opposition strongholds, such as Lubumbashi and Goma. The clashes between opposition supporters and security forces have intensified since April, increasing protection concerns.

In eastern DRC, particularly in Nord-Kivu, Kasai-Central, and Tanganyika, the security situation has been volatile throughout the year. Attacks on civilians by ADF-NALU have intensified in Beni, Nord-Kivu, with the deadliest attack in recent months carried out in mid-August. Other armed groups, such as Mayi-Mayi Raiya Mutomboki and Ituri-based FRPI, have carried out attacks in Sud-Kivu and Ituri. Inter-ethnic clashes between Twa and Bantu communities have escalated in Tanganyika.

Cholera transmission has been high all year, and has worsened with the rainy season. Yellow fever has also significantly increased, with approximately 3,000 cases, and epidemics declared in several provinces.
KEY EVENTS

ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE IN URBAN CENTRES
President Kabila’s attempts to remain in power beyond his two-term limit in December 2016 have met widespread opposition. Protests in Kinshasa as well as in opposition strongholds, including Lubumbashi and Goma, began to intensify in April, after police fired tear gas at a rally in Lubumbashi. Crackdowns on the political opposition include arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly. However, in October Kabila’s efforts appeared to have succeeded, with regional powers and opposition members accepting the postponement of elections until April 2018.

RESURGENCE OF ADF ACTIVITY IN NORD-KIVU
The security environment has been particularly volatile in Nord-Kivu this year. Attacks on civilians by ADF-NALU have intensified in Beni territory in retaliation against DRC armed forces and UN peacekeeping operations in the area. 50 were killed in the worst attack, in mid-August.

ARMED CLASHES IN TANGANYIKA
The security environment in Tanganyika and Kasai-Central has also deteriorated, as intercommunal clashes between Luba and Twa have intensified in Nyunzu (Tanganyika), displacing more than 12,000 people.

DISPLACEMENT
1.9 million IDPs have been reported in 2016. The primary causes of displacement are armed attacks and inter-communal clashes, which have primarily taken place in Nord-Kivu, Kasai-Central, and Tanganyika. Since January, 187,000 people have reportedly been displaced in Beni alone due to ADF activity.

437,000 refugees are hosted in DRC.

Over 4,000 Burundian refugees arrived between July and mid-September, bringing the total to some 33,000. Most Burundian refugees are women and children, in need of food and shelter.

CAR refugee numbers have fallen from 108,000 to 96,000 so far in 2016. The majority are in Equateur, Nord-Ubangi, Sud-Ubangi, and Bas-Uele.

DISPLACEMENT Table

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RESURGENCE OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE ‘TRIANGLE OF DEATH’

**Probability:**

President Kabila is likely to remain in power until 2018 at least, but his grip has been weakened by opposition to the extension of his presidency. Powerful elites in Katanga are keen to exploit the opportunity to improve their standing. Some are likely to mobilise armed groups to gain bargaining power, and take advantage of existing violent conflicts. Longstanding inter-ethnic conflict between the Twa and Luba has already intensified in Tanganyika in 2016. Since October, people have been fleeing Kabalo and Nyunzu territories, and have sought refuge in Kongolo-centre. The Bakata Katanga have been active in Mitwaba, burning down Twa villages. In 2017, opposition groups will likely encourage Bakata Katanga to further aggravate inter-ethnic clashes in the ‘triangle of death,’ the territory bounded by the towns of Manono, Mitwaba, and Pweto.

**Impact:**

Armed clashes will likely lead to civilian casualties as well as grave human rights violations such as rape and mutilation, while large waves of displacement are expected. Civilians may be unable or unwilling to seek medical care at hospital or clinics, and humanitarian access in Tanganyika is likely to be further constrained.

INCREASE IN SOUTH SUDANESE AND BURUNDIAN REFUGEE ARRIVALS

**Probability:**

Persistent insecurity in South Sudan and Burundi will likely bring more refugees to DRC, putting a strain on humanitarian resources. The influx of refugees in Ituri and Haut-Uele has been registered since June: some 33,000 were recorded between 1 September and 20 October, bringing the total to 60,171. New arrivals in Ituri receive very little assistance. Most are women and children. They are being relocated to a site with a capacity for 40,000 in Bindi (Ituri) due to persistent insecurity at the border, but if the influx continues, the site will most likely be overwhelmed.

Between July and mid-September, approximately 4,000 new Burundian refugees were registered, compared to 1,773 from April to June. Lusenda camp is well above its capacity of 18,000, with 21,000 refugees.

**Impact:**

Given the current high level need, more arrivals will likely overwhelm shelter provision. Health needs will grow, as will needs for food assistance.
Massive displacement drives high needs as government forces recapture IS-held areas.

Military operations across Iraq in 2016 have displaced more than 260,000 people since April in Ninewa, Erbil, Salah al Din and Kirkuk governorates. The Iraqi government and Kurdish forces have retaken key cities and made significant gains, but security remains volatile in large portions of the country, with clashes persisting around some recaptured areas.

The presence of ERW, retaliation against Sunni populations in recaptured areas, and abuses of IDPs during screening in displacement sites are major protection concerns. In areas where government-allied forces have pushed out IS, infrastructure is often damaged, jeopardising basic services. Access to WASH and health services in displacement sites are often limited, particularly due to overcrowding. Over 6 million people in Iraq are in need of WASH assistance and over 8 million lack proper access to healthcare.

**Priority Concerns**
- Health
- Protection
- WASH

**Risks for 2017**

**Inadequate Humanitarian Response**
- Probability: Static
- Impact: Moderate
- Outcome: Major deterioration

**Further Fragmentation and Militarisation**
- Probability: Static
- Impact: Moderate
- Outcome: Major deterioration
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

INSTABILITY IN BAGHDAD
The announcement of a cabinet reshuffle by Prime Minister al Abadi in February resulted in protests by MPs and the population, with opposition supporters storming the parliament AlJazeera 20/05/2016. Failure to approve a new cabinet resulted in political deadlock. In addition, security in Baghdad remains volatile, largely due to IS attacks. Bombings commonly target Shia areas and shrines. The deadliest attack resulted in over 500 civilian casualties The Independent 08/07/2016.

TERRITORY RETAKEN IN ANBAR, NINEWA, SALAH AL DIN
2016 was marked by largely successful ISF operations against IS targets. Falluja in Anbar, Qayyara in Ninewa, and Shirqat in Salah al Din are among key cities to have been recaptured. The operations have caused large-scale displacement and destruction, aggravated protection, health and WASH needs, and revealed severe gaps in humanitarian preparedness and response, particularly in Falluja.

MOSUL OFFENSIVE
In October an operation was launched to recapture Mosul. It involves the Iraqi army, Kurdish Peshmerga, Shia Popular Mobilisation Units, Sunni tribal fighters and the US-led coalition. Intense fighting in urban areas is expected to result in severe protection needs and displacement, as well as aggravate shelter, WASH and health needs OCHA 14/10/2016.

DISPLACEMENT
As of 20 November 2016, 225,445 Syrian and 47,431 non-Syrian refugees are registered in Iraq UNHCR 20/11/2016. The deterioration in security over the past two years has meant virtually no new refugees have been recorded in Iraq, as people have sought safety in Jordan or Turkey instead.

Over 3 million people are internally displaced. Although the bulk of displacement occurred in 2014, when IS took over large territories, operations to recapture IS-held areas in subsequent years have pushed more people to flee their homes and caused secondary displacement.

In 2016, population movement in Anbar governorate peaked with the offensive on Falluja, which displaced 85,000 civilians between May and June alone OCHA 01/07/2016. In Salah al Din and Ninewa governorates, military operations along the so-called Mosul Corridor displaced 94,000 people in Shirqat, Qayyara and surrounding areas between June and October UNHCR 11/10/2016.

The Mosul offensive that began in October is expected to displace up to one million people. In the lead-up to the operation, 64,000 people were displaced between March and October. 72,000 people have been displaced from Mosul district between 17 October and 27 November UNHCR 27/11/2016.

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DISPLACEMENT

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INADEQUATE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

PROBABILITY: 

With all eyes turned to the Mosul operation, the humanitarian impact of other ongoing conflicts across Iraq has been under-reported and the needs emerging remain severely under-assessed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that people in IS-held Hawija as well as those displaced from the city have severe health needs and fatal lack of access to food and water. In Qayyara, south of Mosul, security incidents, including civilian casualties, are ongoing despite government forces having regained control of the city.

Needs remain under-assessed in the Mosul area as well, including in recaptured areas, due to insecurity. Access is extremely limited in areas south and west of Mosul, particularly in Tal Afar. Insecurity coupled with short-distance, short-term, and non-camp displacement is likely to hinder adequate aid delivery.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

Inability to adequately assess needs and deliver aid in villages around Mosul, compounded by the needs among people affected by conflict elsewhere, is likely to result in severe shelter, WASH and food security needs.

FURTHER FRAGMENTATION AND MILITARISATION

PROBABILITY: 

Lack of agreement on a political framework for governing Mosul after the joint offensive means disputes over structures, distribution of power, and allocation of resources are extremely likely. Sunni groups are likely to strive for increased autonomy in Mosul, which Baghdad is unlikely to accept. Shia militias are likely to push for control of Tal Afar, west of Mosul. Local conflict and attacks along ethnic lines have already been reported, and as each of these players is supported by both local armed groups and international forces, armed clashes can be expected. Turkey, backing Sunni groups, and Iran, backing Shia militias, are both vying for regional dominance, and will exploit local grievances in the battle for influence.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

 Armed clashes are expected to cause displacement, raise protection concerns, and increase access constraints for aid agencies. In addition, political divisions may also cause opposing groups to politicise humanitarian access and discriminate in the delivery of aid.
Access extremely challenging, severe lack of information

As hostilities continue, the humanitarian situation remains critical. Three rival governments and numerous militia groups are fighting for control of the country. Battles in urban areas during 2016 generated new displacement, followed by returns as conflict calmed. Among the worst-hit areas are Sirte, where militias allied with the Government of National Accord (GNA) have been fighting IS since May, and the Benghazi neighbourhood of Ganfouda, where the Libyan National Army (LNA) is fighting a coalition of Islamist militias OCHA 15/09/2016. Around 600 civilians remain trapped in Ganfouda, and unable to evacuate Libyan Gazette 09/10/2016. More generally, the disruption of supply routes, damage to infrastructure, limited availability of cash, and rising prices all affect access to food OCHA 25/10/2016.

Instability, as well as the closure of alternative routes, has made Libya an even more frequently used transit point for people seeking to reach Europe: 12% more people attempted to get to Italy via Libya in 2016 than in 2015 IOM 28/10/2016. Trafficking and other exploitative practices targeting migrants on the Central Mediterranean route happen most frequently in Libya IOM 20/10/2016.
KEY EVENTS

FAILURE OF THE UN-BACKED PEACE DEAL
As some representatives of the General National Congress (GNC) and the House of Representatives (HoR) did not support the UN-backed peace deal in December 2015, Libya has been left with three competing governments, none of which has significant control over territory. The GNA is based in Tripoli, as is the GNC, with the HoR in Tobruk. Reuters 30/03/2016.

SCALING UP OF LNA OPERATIONS
2016 saw a scaling up of LNA operations. Allied with the HoR, the LNA has been a major player in two of the three main battles, for Derna and Benghazi. In September, the LNA seized key oil terminals in eastern Libya, further strengthening its position. BBC 15/09/2016. The LNA enjoys overt and covert support from various international actors, such as Egypt, the UAE, and France. NZZ 11/07/2016.

THE BATTLE FOR SIRTE
As of October 2016, IS has been almost entirely driven out of Sirte, mainly by Misratan militias allied with the GNA. The US has backed the operation with more than 400 airstrikes. Libya Herald 22/11/2016. Fighting has left dire humanitarian conditions in the city, with high health needs. Reuters 04/10/2016. While most have fled, an estimated 48,000 people remain in the city. OCHA 16/09/2016.

DISPLACEMENT
The most significant displacement dynamic in 2016 has been that of IDPs returning home as conflict calmed in certain parts of the country, including areas of Benghazi. The number of returns grew from 250,000 in 2015 to about 463,000 in September 2016. Returnees, have protection needs and lack access to basic services.

IDPs come from the most conflict-affected areas, including Benghazi and Sirte, and number around 313,000. In 2015, the estimated number was 435,000. However, total IDP numbers have not fallen in line with the rise in returns, as new displacement has also occurred. The highest priority needs among IDPs are for NFIs, health services, and shelter support.

In addition, Libya hosts as many as 1 million migrants. Some 256,000 have been identified, and UNHCR has registered some 37,700 refugees and asylum seekers. UNHCR 31/08/2016. Migrants in Libya are at high risk of exploitation and human rights violations.
RISKS FOR 2017

IMPLOSION OF THE GNA

PROBABILITY: 

Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the October 2016 coup attempt, its mere occurrence exposes the weakness of the GNA. The coup has received support or at least non-condemnation from members of the presidential guard as well as militias. Fighting between pro- and anti-GNA forces could break out in Tripoli, degrading the humanitarian situation, and making a new wave of displacement likely. The conflict could spread and destabilise western Libya, where the GNA’s control depends on the support of local militias, which is not guaranteed. Loss of control could be accelerated by the GNA’s reduced bargaining power as oil infrastructure was taken by the LNA earlier this year. Should the GNA collapse, so too would the influence of its international supporters, leaving room for Egypt, Russia and the UAE. Conflict escalation will expose the population to harm, with migrants and IDPs at particular risk.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

Protection needs resulting from active conflict and ERW will be high. Healthcare services may be overwhelmed and access compromised. Supply routes and markets would likely be negatively impacted.

IS REGROUPS

PROBABILITY: 

IS is likely to lose Sirte to a US-backed military operation that began in May. However, IS fighters have demonstrated considerable resilience, and it is likely that those who escape Sirte will try to regroup. Should the GNA collapse, a destabilised western Libya could be fertile ground for a re-emergence of IS. Sabratha, where IS still has a presence, could represent a valuable revenue source given its position as a hub for migrants headed to Europe. A similar opportunity could emerge in southern Libya: IS is rumoured to have operations around Sebha, another major migrant crossroad. Southern and western Libya could represent bases for attacking neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia, where the popular discontent appears to be growing, or Algeria, where IS recently claimed responsibility for the murder of a police officer. The reemergence of IS would likely trigger new displacement, deteriorate access, and expose the affected population to human rights violations.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

IS presence in any area will heighten insecurity and impact access. IS is known for committing gross human rights violations, and women and children are particularly vulnerable. Migrants are also likely to be at greater risk. Displaced people fleeing IS will be in need of assistance.
Flare in conflict constrains humanitarian access

Clashes between signatories to the Algiers peace deal spiked between July and September 2016 in northern Mali, especially in Kidal. The greatest impact for the population is access: Mali continues to be one of the most dangerous places in the world for humanitarian workers. 85 humanitarian incidents have been recorded in 2016; most have been theft. Nonetheless, a number of areas, such as Timbuktu and Gao, have become safer, and IDPs have been returning home. The IDP population, concentrated in northern Mali, fell from 62,000 in January to 37,000 in October. Refugees have also returned.

The rainy season brought the worst floods in three years. Sikasso, Kolikoro, Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, and Menaka were the most affected. Between 12 and 27 July, 14 people were killed. 2,400 houses were destroyed, and 18,000 people were affected, mainly by loss of livelihoods.

RISKS FOR 2017

PEACE DEAL COLLAPSES

PROBABILITY: STATIC MODERATE
IMPACT: MAJOR DETERIORATION

ISLAMIST ARMED GROUPS EXPLOIT INSTABILITY

PROBABILITY: STATIC MODERATE
IMPACT: MAJOR DETERIORATION
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

RENEWED CLASHES IN KIDAL
Clashes between signatories of the Algiers peace agreement, the Azawad Coordination Movement (CMA) and GATIA, increased in Kidal between July and September 2016; at least 30 people were killed ACLED 15/10/2016. The establishment of interim authorities in the northern provinces of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, which is key to the peace agreement, has been hindered by the fighting. The conflict has also led to an increase in explosive remnants of war. Very few humanitarian organisations are now present in Kidal, as fighting further impedes access MSF 04/08/2016.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS CONSTRAINTS HINDER RESPONSE
Mali continues to be one of the most dangerous places in the world for humanitarian workers, although looting and criminality is a bigger risk overall than attacks that aim to kill or injure humanitarian workers. The MINUSMA peacekeeping mission is a target, and the mixed humanitarian and political mandate of the UN leads to humanitarians also being targeted NGO Safety 21/10/2016, al Jazeera 01/06/2016.

WORST FLOODS IN THREE YEARS
The rainy season brought the worst floods in three years, impacting on livelihoods. Between 12 and 27 July, 14 people were killed, and close to 10,000 were made temporarily homeless OCHA 22/08/2016.

DISPLACEMENT
The number of IDPs in Mali has fallen throughout the year, as many people returned to areas that have become safer in Timbuktu and Gao regions UNHCR 31/08/2016. 10,000 IDPs returned in August alone. Refugees have also returned – from 17,500 returnees in January to 25,000 in September UNHCR 30/09/2016.

55% of IDPs say they wish to return home, but insecurity in their home city of Kidal is still preventing the majority from doing so IOM 08/09/2016. In June and July, fighting in Kidal, as well as localised floods, brought an increase in IDPs, though the total has since fallen again IOM 04/08/2016. Overall IDP numbers fell from 62,000 in January to 37,000 in October IOM 10/11/2016.
RISKS FOR 2017

PEACE DEAL COLLAPSES

PROBABILITY: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

The 2015 peace deal between the Malian government and prominent armed groups remains fragile, and implementation is very slow. The two rival coalitions of signatory armed groups have clashed numerous times since the agreement.

The establishment of interim authorities in the north is the next step of the peace deal. However, negotiations are drawn-out and both groups are still competing for territorial control. The situation around Kidal remains tense after a series of clashes between July and September.

The continual high level of tension means the peace deal is very likely to collapse and cause conflict across the north, resulting in large-scale displacement.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

Hundreds of thousands could be displaced in the case of a generalised conflict in the north. Schools are likely to close due to the insecurity, and food access will be affected.

ISLAMIST ARMED GROUPS EXPLOIT INSTABILITY

PROBABILITY: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

Insecurity in the northern and central regions provides space for armed Islamist groups to attack: these groups have claimed more than twice as many attacks in 2016 than in 2015. Most have targeted the military. The likely growth in insecurity in Mali can be expected to lead to more attacks by Islamist groups.

Ansar Dine, a predominantly Tuareg Islamist group, is likely to continue to strengthen, having extended its presence to central regions in 2016. Western regions, previously considered to be secure, have also been hit. In central Mali, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), a Fulani group, was set up by Ansar Dine in 2015, and has carried out attacks. Ansar Dine has targeted schools and displacement camps in the past.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

Islamist armed groups have frequently used mines and IEDs, and committed human rights violations. Civilian populations are likely to be targeted, and displacement is likely. Schools are likely to close.
Catastrophic food and nutrition crisis revealed in northeast with improved access

Boko Haram (BH) has been forced to cede considerable territory to the Nigerian army in 2016. As humanitarians have gained access, they have discovered much worse food security and nutrition conditions than anticipated: 4.67 million people in the northeast were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or above by the end of October, including over 55,000 in Famine. Across the country, 8.08 million were severely food insecure.

Many local government areas (LGAs) in Borno were experiencing critical malnutrition levels, with SAM rates of over 10% in a number of LGAs. Crude mortality rates exceeding the emergency threshold of 2 per 10,000 per day were recorded in some areas. Most IDPs in Borno and Yobe states have no regular access to food or drinking water. Camps continue to be tightly controlled by the military. In the Niger Delta, the situation has deteriorated, with numerous insurgent groups carrying out attacks. Inter-communal violence persists in central Nigeria.
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

MILITARY ADVANCE IN THE NORTHEAST
Access to Yobe, Adamawa, and Borno states improved significantly over the year as the military advanced and conflict subsided in some areas. As of October, eight of 27 LGAs in Borno remained inaccessible to humanitarians. However, BH attacks continue despite the Nigerian military’s claim to have wiped out all BH camps in September.

MALNUTRITION CRISIS
In September, an estimated 184 children were dying of malnutrition every day and SAM rates were greater than 10% in at least four Borno LGAs. Estimates in October showed no improvement, with GAM ranging between 20% and 60% in at least six Borno LGAs and three in Yobe.

NO FOOD PRODUCTION FOR THREE YEARS
Food security is catastrophic as conflict has prevented food production in the region for three years. By end October, 18.6 million people in the country were food insecure and 8.08 million people severely food insecure, more than double the January estimate of 3.9 million.

DISPLACEMENT
Internal displacement numbers remained reasonably constant throughout 2016, with 2.15 million IDPs recorded in February, 2.07 million in June, and 2.09 million in October, the latest round of assessment. 1.39 million IDPs are in Borno, 170,000 in Adamawa, 125,000 in Yobe, 59,000 in Bauchi, 47,500 in Taraba, and 28,000 in Gombe.

However, the number of IDP returns rose considerably, from 332,000 in January to 958,500 in October. The steady IDP figures despite rising returns is most likely due to revised IDP population estimates as access increased.

As of October, approximately 178,600 Nigerian refugees were in neighbouring countries; 96,950 in Niger, 73,750 in Cameroon, and 7,900 in Chad. This is a sizeable decrease from 214,500 at the beginning of the year, largely due to a steady return of Nigerian refugees from Niger, as security improved in Yobe state.

There were about 33,800 returnees from Chad and Cameroon in August. Given low registration rates, the number of returnees is likely much higher.

Only 7,337 refugees are registered in Nigeria.
RISKS FOR 2017

FAMINE AS INSECURITY PERSISTS

PROBABILITY: 

Nigeria’s army may have to pull a sizeable portion of its forces from the northeast to combat Niger Delta insurgencies, attacking oil pipelines. The attacks have halved production, severely straining public finances, as 70% of government revenue comes from the oil sector. The country is receiving increasing international pressure, including from the US and EU, to address the attacks. Peace talks have repeatedly failed, making a military response more likely. Additional security concerns include intercommunal violence, unrest in Biafra, and protests by the Shia-majority Islamic Movement of Nigeria.

Reduced military capacity in the northeast could allow Boko Haram to recapture territory and re-establish itself in the area, heightening insecurity and reducing access again. This would prevent any improvement of the food security and nutrition situation.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

Famine is likely given the already catastrophic conditions in much of Borno state. IDPs and returnees are likely to be displaced again, and malnutrition and poor health will be exacerbated by overcrowding and poor WASH conditions in camps. Homes are likely to be destroyed in BH attacks.

CONFLICT BETWEEN BOKO HARAM FACTIONS

PROBABILITY: 

A leadership dispute within Boko Haram has already led to internal fighting, and while the division of the group could weaken BH’s capacity and facilitate the restoration of government control in the northeast, there is a chance that the split may worsen the humanitarian situation. Abubakar Shekau, leader of BH since 2009, is being challenged by a faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, who is supported by IS. Conflict would result in an increase in attacks on civilians as the faction compete for recruits and resources. It is also likely that insecurity will spread beyond northern Borno, as factions try to set up their own zones of influence.

In the event of a large-scale ‘war’ between BH factions, military strategy may change. Should the army choose to avoid intervention, large areas of the region are likely to become inaccessible, with civilians trapped and vulnerable to attack.

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

IDPs and returnees are likely to suffer secondary displacement, with attacks on IDP camps. Access to food would likely dwindle, as humanitarian access becomes more dangerous. Nutrition outcomes for trapped civilians would worsen dramatically.
Drought worsened throughout 2016; Dadaab returnees in need of assistance due to insecurity

The population in need of humanitarian assistance has risen to 5 million people, or 40% of the total population UN 20/09/2016. The number of severely food insecure has grown by more than 20%, while critical GAM levels were recorded in one-half of populations assessed, up from one-third in February FEWSNET 05/10/2016.

In May, flooding in Beledweyne displaced more than 70,000 people, as the Shabelle River level rose and more than 60% of the town was flooded OCHA 28/05/2016.

Clashes continued between Al Shabaab and the military, IS claimed its first attacks in the country, and inter-clan conflict increased. Fighting spread from south-central Somalia to areas of Puntland. There were 4,293 deaths between January and September, compared to 4,096 in 2015 ACLED 08/10/2016; ACLED 10/2016. The situation is expected to worsen: elections due in December are already aggravating tensions.

The closure of Dadaab’s refugee camps in Kenya has brought an increase in returnees, and to some of the most insecure areas of the country.
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

DROUGHT
The impact of drought worsened throughout Somalia in 2016, provoking displacement. 1.1 million people are in Crisis and Emergency food security, a 20% increase from March, with Puntland and Somaliland particularly hard hit OCHA 07/10/2016. Short deyr rains are highly likely to exacerbate food insecurity and malnutrition in 2017 FEWSNET 05/10/2016.

VIOLENT CONFLICT
Al Shabaab violence against civilians, humanitarian workers, and government officials continued. Since January, Al Shabaab has recaptured territory across south-central Somalia and in Puntland Long War Journal 21/09/2016; All Africa 07/09/2016. From January–September, 735 violent incidents involving Al Shabaab were recorded, with 2,758 deaths; fewer than in the same period of 2015 ACLED 08/10/2016.

Al Shabaab-related violence amounts to just over half of all violent incidents in Somalia since January 2015 ACLED 10/2016. Throughout Somalia, competition for local and regional power has led to violence, particularly between forces in Puntland and Galguduud, which displaced 75,000 people in September and October ACLED 10/2016, OCHA 24/10/2016.

DISPLACEMENT
The number of IDPs reported in Somalia – 1.1 million – has not changed since 2013, although it is difficult to make accurate estimates given access limitations, and a high number have been displaced for many years OCHA 07/10/2016.

Most IDPs are in south-central Somalia, with 400,000 in Mogadishu UNHCR 06/06/2016. Forced eviction is a significant threat, particularly in Mogadishu: 90,000 IDPs were evicted in the first half of 2016 OCHA 30/06/2016. Many IDPs experience inadequate living standards with limited access to services including education, healthcare and WASH UNHCR 06/06/2016. The 1.1 million IDPs represent 58% of the population in Crisis or Emergency food security. More than half of IDP camps have critical GAM levels FSNAU 05/10/2016.

CLOSURE OF DADAAB
In May, the Kenyan government announced that the Dadaab refugee camps would be closed. This has led to a large increase in returns – from 6,000 in all 2015 to 6,000 a month since August this year OCHA 07/10/2016. More than 50% of returnees are in Kismayo, Lower Juba, where Al Shabaab has a strong presence. Authorities state that there is no access to basic healthcare, hygiene, shelter or safe water Somalia Newsroom 03/10/2016.

The potential return of 260,000 refugees is likely to have a significant impact on needs and may aggravate conflict.
RISKS FOR 2017

UNMET NEEDS AMONG RETURNEES

PROBABILITY:  

The closure of the Dadaab refugee camps is a central part of the 2017 election campaign of the Jubilee party in Kenya, and returns to Somalia are therefore likely to continue. Returnees are heading to south-central Somalia, mostly to locations where Al Shabaab has a strong presence and humanitarian access is limited: Kismayo in Lower Juba, Baidoa in Baay, Luuq in Gedo, and Mogadishu. Returnees are living on a one-off stipend of USD 400, but regional authorities have stated that healthcare, hygiene, shelter, and potable water are already scarce, and returnees are often competing for resources: there are more than 450,000 IDPs present in the four regions. These resources are unlikely to increase, with drought conditions forecast to worsen in 2017.

Al Shabaab will seek to exploit these vulnerabilities: the increase in population will facilitate recruitment, as will the need for an income. Conflict with AMISOM forces is likely to increase in frequency and intensity.

IMPACT:  STATIC  MODERATE  MAJOR DETERIORATION

CLAN VIOLENCE INTENSIFIES

PROBABILITY:  

Clan violence accounts for around 25% of all violent incidents, but tensions are particularly heightened in election periods. The federalisation process and the changing of boundaries compounds this. So far in 2016, election-related grievances have led to violent incidents in the newly formed Hir-Shabelle state, as well as in Galmudug, Somaliland, Puntland, Banadir, Baay and Lower Juba. Tens of thousands have been displaced.

Significant inter-clan conflict related to electoral power struggles should be expected in 2017. This will be aggravated by the arrival of large numbers of returnees from the Dadaab camps in Kenya changing the composition of populations in some areas, clans’ opportunistic alliances with Al Shabaab, and the clan-based organisation of the Somali National Army. In Lower Shabelle, Hiiraan, and Mudug, troops have been accused of perpetuating, rather than preventing, inter-clan conflicts.

IMPACT:  STATIC  MODERATE  MAJOR DETERIORATION

A stronger Al Shabaab will increase protection concerns, as will tensions within the population over resources. Food security, already at Crisis level among IDPs, is likely to worsen. Health conditions will deteriorate due to lack of WASH and health structures.

Civilians will be targeted in attacks, and roadblocks and extortion will become more prevalent. Access will worsen. Shelter needs will reach high levels as populations are displaced.
Conflict has spread; food security is reaching catastrophic levels

While the Greater Equatoria region was relatively unaffected by the conflict before July 2016, violence has since spread and targeted attacks on ethnic groups by armed forces have since been reported there. The government is threatening to conduct military operations. It holds the town of Yei, in Central Equatoria, but opposition forces hold the surrounding area.

In the Greater Upper Nile region, where conflict has been concentrated until now, fighting continues between government and opposition forces, predominantly around Nasir and Malakal.

The displaced population continues to grow, and food insecurity remains a priority, with 4.8 million people estimated severely food insecure this year compared to 2.8 million in January 2016 [IPI 14/10/2016]. The situation has deteriorated in 2016 as a result of fighting [IPC 29/06/2016]. Emergency levels are reported in Unity, Upper Nile, and Western Bahr el Ghazal and could even reach Catastrophe [FEWSNET 17/09/2016]. Coping mechanisms are insufficient. Economic crisis is also contributing to the worsening situation.

**RISKS FOR 2017**

**FIGHTING ESCALATES ACROSS GREATER EQUATORIA**

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**SECURITY DETERIORATES ACROSS GREATER UPPER NILE**

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OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

FIGHTING IN JUBA

Heavy fighting broke out in the capital in July, between forces loyal to Machar and those loyal to Kiir. Over 300 people died and nearly 40,000 were displaced. A ceasefire was agreed within days, and has been holding in the capital, partly because Riek Machar left Juba with many of his fighters. Another opposition leader was appointed vice president.

Fighting spread across the country, including to Central and Eastern Equatoria, areas previously relatively unaffected by the conflict. This has caused large-scale displacement and aggravated food insecurity. While fighting in Unity and Upper Nile has been less intense than in 2015, it has also escalated.

FOOD CRISIS WORSENS

4.8 million people are severely food insecure. The highest levels of food insecurity are in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Unity, which are in Emergency, with some households likely to be in Catastrophe. The spread of fighting and increased insecurity has led to loss of livelihoods and market failure: food insecurity has spread to areas most recently affected by the conflict, such as Greater Equatoria, where large areas are in Crisis, and some pockets in Emergency.

DISPLACEMENT

There are 1.7 million IDPs in South Sudan, 200,000 more than in July 2015. The population in UNMISS Protection of Civilians sites fluctuated over the year, as people left to tend crops or returned in need of assistance. However, the population was 204,920 in October 2016, 20,000 more than October 2015.

The spread of fighting in Greater Equatoria resulted in large-scale displacement. In Eastern Equatoria, 72,000 people were initially displaced, although lack of access makes estimation difficult. Around 30,000 people are estimated to have been displaced from Yei in Central Equatoria, while 100,000 people are unable to leave the town.

As of 31 October, South Sudan hosts 261,000 refugees. Most are in Unity and Upper Nile, and 92% originate from Sudan. Since May, insecurity and food shortages have discouraged arrivals, and the number of refugees has fallen below 2015 levels.

In contrast, the number of South Sudanese refugees has grown from 774,000 in November 2015, to 1,160,000 a year later. The rate of departure has steadily risen. Between January and June 2016, 92,670 South Sudanese fled to Sudan. In September, 32,000 fled to Ethiopia alone, and influx to DRC means the South Sudanese refugee population has nearly doubled to about 54,000.

In Uganda, 331,883 South Sudanese refugees have arrived since July.
RISKS FOR 2017

FIGHTING ESCALATES AND SPREADS ACROSS GREATER EQUATORIA

PROBABILITY:  

Since July, conflict has spread to Greater Equatoria. Heavy fighting has occurred in Torit and Magwi in Eastern Equatoria; around Yei, Morobo, and Lainya in Central Equatoria; and Mundri East in Western Equatoria.

Equatorian-based resistance is rooted in local communities, who are vulnerable to abuse from government forces. Non-Dinka populations have been increasingly marginalised by the government, but Dinka have also been targeted by violence.

The government, however, appears increasingly set on removing political opposition, and has threatened further military operations in the region. The political uncertainty may spur armed groups to organise and cooperate with the SPLA-IO in order to intensify attacks on the government.

IMPACT:  

The civilian population will remain at high risk of SGBV violence. Violence is also likely to become increasingly ethnicised. Food security will significantly deteriorate, as insecurity affects both trade and harvests. Health facilities in the region are dire and overwhelmed, and displacement will further add to the strain.

SECURITY DETERIORATES FURTHER ACROSS GREATER UPPER NILE

PROBABILITY:  

After the July outbreak of violence in Juba, violence intensified in Greater Upper Nile, notably in Leer, Koch and Rubkona counties in Unity, in Malakal in Upper Nile and Pibor in Jonglei. The beginning of the dry season in October could lead to larger-scale fighting.

The opposition remains highly divided and clashes between opposition and unidentified armed groups are still being reported. At the end of September, members of the Cobra faction defected, while others led by David Yau Yau reaffirmed their loyalty to the government. This is likely to further destabilise the security situation in Pibor, Jonglei, where both forces are present.

IMPACT:  

Food security is already at Emergency level in Greater Upper Nile, with some facing Catastrophe in Unity. Heavier fighting could lead to famine. The Nuer are likely to be increasingly targeted by government forces. An increasing IDP population will increase health needs, with more disease outbreaks.
FORCED RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN NORTH SYRIA

PROBABILITY:

IMPACT:

STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

CRISIS OVERVIEW 2016 — SYRIA

POPULATION: 18 MILLION

Worsening conflict further increases humanitarian needs

There are now 5.5 million people in hard-to-reach or besieged areas, one million more than at the beginning of the year. Out of those, 860,000 are in 18 besieged areas OCHA 2016. Despite ceasefire attempts, fighting has continued and humanitarian access has not improved. The situation in Aleppo has worsened since the intensification of Russian airstrikes, especially for the 250,000–275,000 people trapped in the east of the city. Aleppo has become a focal point in the conflict for both Syrian and international forces. More than 10,000 civilians have been killed in the conflict so far this year SOHR 01/11/2016.

Attacks on humanitarian workers have continued in 2016. 34 people died during an airstrike that directly hit a humanitarian convoy in the Aleppo governorate. Across the country, hospitals and other health centres have been damaged by airstrikes, making some of them non-functional OCHA 03/10/2016.

More than 425,000 people have been newly internally displaced in 2016, half of them in Aleppo governorate UNHCR 12/10/2016. 200,000 have fled the country.

PRIORITY CONCERNS

PROTECTION FOOD SECURITY HEALTH

RISKS FOR 2017

FORCED RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN NORTH SYRIA

PROBABILITY:

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION

SIEGE OF AR RAQQA

PROBABILITY:

IMPACT: STATIC MODERATE MAJOR DETERIORATION
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

GRAVE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN ALEPPO
Increased fighting between armed groups and Syrian government forces, supported by Russian airstrikes, have occurred in Aleppo. Eastern Aleppo was completely cut off from humanitarian assistance in July, and by November no hospitals were functioning. There are around 30 doctors for a population of 250,000–275,000. Food, medical supplies, and basic NFI items have become scarce. OCHA 09/10/2016.

HOSPITALS REPEATEDLY HIT BY AIRSTRIKES
Airstrikes have hit hospitals in numerous governorates. 36 hospitals were hit countrywide between January and June, and facilities in Eastern Aleppo were hit between July and October. PHR 28/10/2016, MSF 07/10/2016. Some attacks are suspected to have been intentional, and the frequency is so high that people are afraid to go to hospital or for hospitals to be set up close to their homes. At least 184 attacks against NGO workers have been reported so far in 2016. NGO Safety 28/10/2016. On 19 September, airstrikes directly hit a humanitarian convoy in Aleppo, killing 34 people. OCHA 03/10/2016.

INCREASE IN BESIEGED AND HARD-TO-REACH AREAS
At the beginning of 2016, 4.5 million people were in hard-to-reach or besieged areas; this had risen to 5.5 million people by October. The population under siege doubled to more than 800,000. Many are in Homs, where the Syrian army is attempting to take more territory. OCHA 28/10/2016.

DISPLACEMENT
The number of IDPs as a result of conflict increased throughout 2016. More than 425,000 were displaced between February and October, more than half in Aleppo governorate. Internal displacement was also recorded in Idlib (73,000), Al Hasakeh (57,000), and Hama (55,000), with lower numbers of displaced in Homs, Ar Raqqa, Lat-takia, and Deir-ez-Zor. UNHCR 12/10/2016. Attacks on IDP camps, some attributed to Syrian and Russian airstrikes, and others to IS, have been recorded in 2016 in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. al Jazeera 06/05/2016, Guardian 14/04/2016.

Movement is impossible for the large population under siege, or for whom safe passage is not guaranteed. Independent 21/10/2016.

Protection concerns have grown for the 450,000 Palestinian refugees living in camps in Syria, as there have been armed clashes in these camps in 2016. UNRWA 30/09/2016.

200,000 Syrian refugees were registered in neighbouring countries in 2016, bringing the total to 4.8 million. UNHCR 23/10/2016. This year’s decline in registration is mainly due to movement restrictions. Over 75,000 people are stuck at the berm, on the border with Jordan, unable to cross. UNHCR 24/10/2016.
**RISKS FOR 2017**

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**FORCED RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN KURDISH AREAS OF SYRIA**

**PROBABILITY:**

Turkey is seeking to create a buffer zone in northern Aleppo governorate, driving the YPG out and settling 2.7 million Syrian refugees there.

Several Turkey-allied factions of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) have already made advances in northern Aleppo and seized territories from IS in northern Syria, and the YPG withdrew from Manbij in mid-November. This will likely allow the FSA to control all area west of the Euphrates in northern Aleppo.

The arrival of millions of mostly Sunni Arab Syrian returnees in a Kurdish area already in need of humanitarian assistance is likely to result in unrest due to pressure on resources as well as pre-existing ethnic tensions.

**IMPACT:**

2.7 million refugees face being forcibly resettled in Syria, and both this population as well as the existing Kurdish population are vulnerable to abuse by armed forces present in the area. Resources will be strained by the arrivals, particularly impacting food security.

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**SIEGE OF AR RAQQA**

**PROBABILITY:**

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced on 6 November they would launch an offensive on Ar Raqqa, IS’s de facto capital, besieging the city. The US has previously used bridge destruction by airstrikes as a war strategy in Syria, and is likely to do so in the upcoming offensive.

IS is likely to be well prepared, unless it deploys additional resources to Mosul, meaning that the operation could go on for months. Food, medicine, WASH, and NFIs would likely become scarce, leading to severe humanitarian needs, as in many other besieged locations in Syria.

**IMPACT:**

A siege is likely have a double impact: medical supplies would become scarcer while needs increase. Food supplies could fall. Protection concerns would be high - the use of human shields is likely, as is forced recruitment, including of children.
**VENEZUELA**

**POPULATION: 31 MILLION**

**Political and economic crises lead to humanitarian needs**

A sharp decrease in oil revenue since 2014, as well as high government spending, have contributed to an economic crisis, which worsened dramatically in 2016. As falling revenues have meant a cut in imports, shortages in essential goods have become widespread. For those goods that are available, rising inflation means poor Venezuelans have little means to purchase them.

Political deadlock since the beginning of 2016 has compounded the humanitarian situation. The opposition controls parliament but is virtually unable to pass new laws as the Supreme Court, controlled by President Maduro, can veto legislation. In a bid to oust Maduro, attempts have been made to hold a referendum on the continuation of Maduro’s presidency, but the government has successfully prevented it from taking place.

Frustration and anger over the shortages, the economic crisis, and the delay of the referendum led to protests and looting throughout 2016.

**Households in extreme poverty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data on need is not available for Venezuela.*

**Priority Concerns**

- **Food Security**
- **Health**
- **Protection**

**Risks for 2017**

**Violence incited by delayed referendum and economic crisis**

**Probability:**

- Low
- Moderate
- High

**Impact:**

- Static
- Moderate
- Major deterioration
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

INCREASING FRUSTRATION AT POLITICAL DEADLOCK
The opposition has been locked in a battle for power with the governing party of President Maduro since the beginning of 2016. The opposition’s attempts to resolve the deadlock have failed so far. The supreme court and National Electoral Council have taken measures to ensure that any referendum on Maduro’s presidency is not likely to take place in 2016. Any later will be within the last two years of his term, meaning his party will retain the presidency, even if Maduro is forced to step down.

GROWING POPULAR PROTESTS
Urban protests against the government and shortages of goods increased in 2016, as did incidents of looting ICG 13/10/2016, BBC 16/06/2016. Security forces have broken up demonstrations, sometimes violently.

Crime rates are increasing, with the estimated number of homicides at the end of 2016 expected to be among the highest in the world, at 24,000–26,000, compared to 14,300–21,700 in 2015 OVV 17/10/2016.

DROUGHT IMPACTS POWER SUPPLY
Drought began in Venezuela in late 2015 and its impact peaked in mid-2016. The Guri hydroelectric dam, which supplies 60% of the population with power, fell to critical levels, causing water and electricity shortages. The president shortened government working days and announced four-day weekends between April and July The New Yorker 17/05/2016.

ECONOMIC CRISIS
Oil makes up 95% of Venezuela’s exports, and the drop in prices and in Venezuela’s production are major contributors to the economic crisis, which began in 2014 Oil & Gas 10/05/2016. Despite increasing needs, and inflation expected to rise about 700% at the end of 2016, the government has not requested foreign aid, and has been accused of blocking assistance LA Herald Tribune 06/2016.

As Venezuela concentrates on paying off its debts, it has had to cut imports heavily, leading to shortages in basic goods ranging from medicines to food. Many poor Venezuelans rely on purchasing food in price-controlled supermarkets, yet queues have become so long that it can take an entire day to get in, affecting livelihoods. Even when people do reach a store, shortages mean that households may still not have access.

Medicine shortages have crippled the health system New York Times 11/10/2016. According to the Venezuelan health observatory, fewer than 10% of operating theatres, emergency rooms, and intensive care units are fully operational, and 76% of hospitals lack medicines The Guardian 19/10/2016.

People have broken through the closed border with Colombia in order to buy food there, and in response, some crossing-points with Colombia were officially opened in July. However, with the depreciation of the Venezuelan bolivar, purchases abroad are expensive Al Jazeera 16/10/2016, Wall Street Journal 13/08/2016, PanAm Post 13/10/2016.
RISKS FOR 2017

VIOLENCE INCITED BY DELAYED REFERENDUM AND ECONOMIC CRISIS

PROBABILITY: ⬤ ⬤ ⬤ ⬤ ⬤

IMPACT: STATIC  MODERATE  MAJOR DETERIORATION

Facing a severe economic crisis, Venezuela has shortages of basic goods ranging from food to medicine. Inflation is predicted to reach 1,500% in 2017. The opposition's attempts to hold a referendum to cut President Maduro's term short have been repeatedly stalled, until the process was suspended altogether in October. In early November, the Vatican took up the role of mediator between the government and the opposition in an attempt to resolve the political deadlock. It is now likely that the referendum will be held, but after January 2017, when the government will have the right to appoint a new president, should Maduro lose. This will deepen the rift between both sides and a collaborative effort to resolve the economic crisis will be less likely. The government has already bypassed the opposition-dominated parliament to pass 2017's budgets, which is six times larger than in 2016 despite shrinking GDP.

The health system is failing; previously eradicated diseases are likely to reappear as vaccination rates fall. Food and goods shortages will increase, as will poverty, worsening food security. Humanitarian access is likely to be hampered by the government's rejection of aid. A violent crackdown on expressions of dissent will raise protection concerns. The deteriorating situation will push more people to flee the country.

The population, frustrated by the economic crisis, shortages, and the absence of proposals to improve the situation, may be prompted to resume demonstrations and protests. The government, which has not taken steps to address the underlying dynamics of the crisis, may start to rely more on force in the absence of popular support.
Access worsens while humanitarian needs persist

The humanitarian situation in Yemen, which has left almost half the population in need, has not significantly improved in 2016.

Houthi forces continue to fight the Hadi government, who are supported by a Saudi-led coalition. The situation is further compounded by Al Qaeda and IS, who exploit the security vacuum. Some estimates put the death toll since the escalation of the conflict at 10,000, an increase of 4,000 since the end of 2015.

Heavy fighting continues in over six governorates. Taiz is still under siege by the Houthis, but heavily contested. Aden, officially under Hadi government control, has seen no effective security established. Southern Resistance forces in the governorate are increasingly discontent with their alliance to the Hadi government, and are trying to create their own political council. In the southern governorates, Al Qaeda and IS frequently carry out attacks on political and military targets.

RISKS FOR 2017

WORSENING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH

PROBABILITY: STATIC
IMPACT: MODERATE

COLLAPSE OF CENTRAL BANK

PROBABILITY: STATIC
IMPACT: MODERATE

FOOD SECURITY
HEALTH
PROTECTION
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

FAILURE OF CEASEFIRE AND PEACE TALKS
Fighting between the Houthis and Hadi government continued in 2016. A ceasefire concluded on 10 April has barely been adhered to, and several months of peace talks ended in August without agreement USAID 23/09/2016; AFP 21/04/2016.

Saudi airstrikes resumed after the end of peace talks on 6 August, mostly hitting Houthi-held territory. From 6 August until 23 September, at least 329 civilians were killed and 426 injured in airstrikes New York Times 23/09/2016. More than one-third of 8,600 airstrikes between March 2015 and August 2016 hit civilian sites Al Jazeera 17/09/2016.

FOOD SECURITY REMAINS A PRIORITY
7 million people are facing Emergency food security outcomes FAO, IPC & GoY 14/06/2016. Heavily reliant on imports before conflict escalated, the Saudi blockade on air, land, and sea traffic; a locust infestation; and the near collapse of the economy, have all aggravated the situation FAO 02/09/2016, Human Rights Watch 26/08/2016, WFP 30/06/2016.

Severe malnutrition cases stand at 462,000 a 44% increase since late 2015 OCHA 23/11/2016. Health facilities are unable to cope: over 50% are only partially functioning or not at all USAID 23/09/2016, WHO 17/03/2016.

DISPLACEMENT
Over 3.2 million people, including 2.2 million IDPs, are affected by internal displacement across 21 governorates, compared to 2.3 million in 2015. 67% of the displaced are in five governorates. It is difficult to estimate the full scale of displacement as the situation is dynamic, with secondary displacement and returns.

85% of IDPs have been displaced for more than one year IOM, UNHCR & Protection Cluster 31/10/2016. An estimated 62% of displaced live with host families, and the pressure on host communities is building tensions OCHA 30/06/2016.

As of late October, around 1.01 million people had returned to their areas of origin, and their main needs include food, financial support, psychosocial support and access to income IOM, UNHCR & Protection Cluster 31/10/2016.

As of 31 July over 268,600 refugees were registered in Yemen, compared to 264,000 at the end of 2015 UNHCR 15/09/2015, UNHCR 31/07/2016. Refugees are mainly Somali, but the proportion of Ethiopians has grown in 2016.

The number of monthly arrivals peaked in June, at 14,400. From July–September, over 10,000 people arrived each month. If arrivals continue at this rate, 2016 will see more new refugees than the number of arrivals recorded in 2015 (92,500).
RISKS FOR 2017

COLLAPSE OF CENTRAL BANK

PROBABILITY: 🟢🟦🟦🟦

The Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) is one of the only organs to have kept a relatively neutral stance in the conflict. It has tried to continue paying around 1.2 million public civil servants, protect the value of the Yemeni rial, and provide credit lines to foreign suppliers, as well as importers who need access to foreign currency reserves. On 19 September, the Hadi government moved the bank from Sanaa to Aden, although staff, archives, and payroll registries were not transferred, making it incapable of continuing to function. 1.2 million civil servants have not received their wages since August. Imports of basic commodities that were supported by the CBY have come to a halt, and foreign suppliers have begun to annul contracts, putting future imports at risk. A fall in food imports will be devastating for a country importing 90% of its staple foods and where half the population in food insecure. Supplies are expected to run out by the end of the year.

IMPACT: 🌧️Statics  🍔Moderate  🤚Major Deterioration

WORSENING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH

PROBABILITY: 🟢🟦🟦🟦

The frontlines of the current conflict roughly follow the former border between North and South Yemen. In July 2015, the Hadi government, supported by the UAE and Southern Movement forces, took Aden, which has become their de facto capital. However, the Yemeni allies do not share the same goals – the Southern Movement ultimately seeks secession – and divisions appear to be deepening, with the movement setting up its own political council in the south.

A battle for control of the south is likely, given that some southern governorates are currently ruled by tribal militias, others by military commanders, and still others remain fiercely contested. Power struggles between factions of the Southern Movement itself are also likely, and the power vacuum will allow more space for extremist groups such as Al Qaeda. In sum, the absence of effective state structures and the large number of stakeholders with competing agendas all increase the likelihood of continued conflict in the south.

IMPACT: 🌧️Statics  🍔Moderate  🤚Major Deterioration

The descent into famine in parts of the country is likely to be accelerated, and with rising severe food insecurity, malnutrition rates will also increase. 1.2 million people are likely to lose their livelihoods, directly impacting up to 6 million people.

IMPACT: 🌧️Statics  🍔Moderate  🤚Major Deterioration

Civilians will be caught in fighting between a multitude of actors. Livelihoods and food security in the north will be impacted, as oil revenues will no longer reach the area. Access will become more difficult to negotiate.
Popular unrest growing amid political and economic turmoil, severe food insecurity

2016 has so far been the driest year since 1981. El Niño has caused prolonged drought, severe food insecurity and increased WASH needs, particularly in the southeastern and western parts of the country. Fews.net 31/08/2016.

In addition to these food and WASH needs, a plunging economy and formal unemployment rate of over 90% have resulted in increased popular dissatisfaction with the current government, whose term expires in 2018. Statalist, accessed on 14/10/2016, Bloomberg 06/07/2016, CNN 13/09/2016, Cash shortages have impacted on food imports and salary payments, sparking protests primarily in the capital, Harare. Anti-government demonstrations have been met with force by the police, and opposition supporters have reported physical abuse and persecution. All Africa 27/09/2016, IOL 04/10/2016.

* Data is only available for 2016.
OVERVIEW 2016

KEY EVENTS

DRIEST RAINY SEASON IN 35 YEARS
2016 has seen Zimbabwe's driest rainy season in the past 35 years. The El Niño-induced drought resulted in 2.8 million food insecure in the first quarter of 2016, and a state of national emergency was declared in February. Though increased humanitarian response improved food security outcomes for most affected areas in September, over 4 million people are expected to be food insecure between January and March. The number of people in need of WASH assistance increased from 2.8 million in April to 4.3 million in September.

POPULAR DISCONTENT AND POLITICAL TURMOIL
Protests began in July 2016. Primarily, popular dissatisfaction stemmed from unpaid wages of civil servants and restrictions on food imports from South Africa - an attempt to stimulate economic growth. Demonstrations were met with police violence, and 300 people were arrested in the first two weeks of July. Protests, and the repressive response, continued throughout August and September, with reports of physical abuse of opposition supporters. The number of people in need of protection increased from 500,000 to 200,000 more in April 2016.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS
Foreign currencies, such as the American dollar (USD) and South African rand (ZAR), were introduced as legal tender in 2009 in response to hyperinflation. However, as the USD has strengthened against other currencies, imports have become cheaper, impacting on local manufacturing. The introduction of bond notes is unlikely to resolve underlying economic difficulties.

Food insecurity is increasing, and popular protests are widely supported by President Mugabe's opposition, which hopes to replace Mugabe and use the 2018 elections to push for change. Food assistance may be used by politicians in their attempts to gain support, impacting access to aid: in the lead-up to elections in 2005 and March 2008, the government reportedly attempted to buy voters with food, and threatened to cut off aid to people who supported the opposition. Food assistance may be used by politicians in their attempts to gain support, impacting access to aid: in the lead-up to elections in 2005 and March 2008, the government reportedly attempted to buy voters with food, and threatened to cut off aid to people who supported the opposition.
EMERGENCY LEVELS OF FOOD INSECURITY

According to the latest government assessment, in July 2016, an estimated 50%–79% of households will be food insecure in 20 districts of the country in January–March 2017, due to a poor 2014/15 agricultural season and the continuing El Niño-induced drought. 4.4 million people, including 4.1 million people in rural areas, are expected to be food insecure. The population is likely to increasingly turn to negative coping strategies, such as reducing food intake and quality of food. Such strategies are highly likely to impact on nutrition. The national prevalence of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) is already at 1.9%, with some districts three or four times higher, such as Kariba (8.3%), Gweru (8.1%), Shamva (6.3%), and Chegutu (6%). In addition, negative coping strategies in response to drought are likely to compound the already high caseload of acute diarrhoea and facilitate disease outbreak. Children and pregnant women are especially vulnerable.

IMPACT: STATIC  MODERATE  MAJOR DETERIORATION

The prolonged drought is expected to heavily impact on food security and access to water. Along with a crippled health system, these factors are likely to result in severely elevated malnutrition levels and health needs.

POLITICAL CONFLICT OVER MUGABE’S SUCCESSOR

Public dissatisfaction with President Mugabe’s government and its inability to tackle the economic crisis has increased, with protests and calls for the president to step down. Despite Mugabe showing no sign of leaving the presidency, fierce disagreement over his successor has already begun. One faction, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), has threatened war if Vice President Mnangagwa does not succeed Mugabe. Mugabe himself, however, maintains that Mnangagwa will not be his successor. Discontent within the army appears to be growing, not least because of delays in salary payments in 2016. Should the army – or factions within the army – side with war veterans and Mnangagwa, widespread political violence is likely.

IMPACT: STATIC  MODERATE  MAJOR DETERIORATION

Increased unrest is likely to motivate displacement to South Africa, as observed in the previous phases of political and economic turmoil. Detention, physical abuse and persecution are likely to increase, as is partisan distribution of food aid.
Gang violence creating a devastating humanitarian impact in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras

Homicide rates in the Northern Triangle are among the highest worldwide, but gang violence also includes sexual and gender-based violence, torture, and extortion. Repressive responses by the government also raise concerns over the extrajudicial and indiscriminate killings of civilians. Amnesty International 14/10/2016.

Where the government is unable to ensure safety, access to education and health services is affected. Public services are frequently the target of extortion.

The direct and indirect effects of gang violence cause displacement, but citizens from the three countries are rarely recognised as refugees. They are frequently deported back to a situation of insecurity with poor access to basic services. Amnesty International 14/10/2016.
VIOLENCE AND ORGANISED CRIME
The impact of crime is not just injury and death, but disrupted access to services as extortion has an economic impact and children fear attending school.

EL SALVADOR
At the start of 2016, El Salvador had the highest homicide rate for a country not at war. Rates have since been declining, however, which the government accredits to its ‘iron fist’ policies, while gangs attribute it to their order to stop killing. 2016 has recorded an estimated 5,500 violent deaths making it the second most violent year since 1999.

HONDURAS
President Hernandez said that as much as 80% of violence in Honduras can be attributed to gangs. Urban areas, where the two main gangs are concentrated, are especially affected. The homicide rate in 2015 was 60 per 100,000 people, one of the highest in the world.

GUATEMALA
Gang-related drug-trafficking, violence, and a heavily armed population contribute to high crime rates. Areas of Guatemala City are essentially controlled by gangs. Some communities have resorted to vigilantism. An estimated 12,000 people are victims of sex trafficking every year. Nearly 60% are estimated to be children.

DISPLACEMENT
Estimates indicate 174,000 IDPs in Honduras, 251,000 in Guatemala and 289,000 in El Salvador at the beginning of 2016. However, numbers are likely to be higher as IDPs deliberately keep a low profile for fear of being tracked by those they are fleeing.

Internal displacement is considered a predictor of international displacement. Migrants have indicated that displacement is the result of gang violence as well as economic factors, and that they flee despite being aware of the risks of sexual violence, human trafficking, extortion, and abuse. Information is limited, but an estimated 400,000 irregular migrants cross from Central America into Mexico each year. Asylum seekers and deportations make up a fraction of total numbers, but they suggest significant increases in the number of people fleeing. Between 2012 and 2015, the annual number of asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle increased fivefold, to 110,000. Between October 2014 and September 2015, Mexico and the US deported 241,000 Central Americans. High violence and homicide rates, as well as limited work and educational opportunities, have led to a sharp increase in migration of unaccompanied minors, with 35,000 detained in 2015, nine times more than in 2011.
RISKS FOR 2017

JOINT FORCE AGGRAVATES PROTECTION NEEDS

PROBABILITY:  

The three countries launched a joint regional Elite Security Task Force in November to combat gang violence, after El Salvador’s hardline (mano dura) policies sparked concerns in Honduras and Guatemala that gang members were fleeing from El Salvador to their countries. The task force, consisting of police and army units from each country, will cooperate on intelligence to halt organised crime and drugs and arms trafficking in border areas.

However, such enhanced authority for security forces, coupled with weak monitoring and accountability, pose a serious protection threat. Similar initiatives in the past have led to thousands of civilian deaths, as well as torture and disappearances. In El Salvador, police implementing mano dura policies have been implicated in extrajudicial killings, human rights abuses, and murder-for-hire networks, all committed with impunity. The police have killed at least 424 alleged gang members over 2016.

Despite a potential decline in homicide rates, evidence suggests hardline policies have little impact on the factors that drive displacement: access to education opportunities and livelihoods, and overall fear. Moreover, reports suggest that gangs actively expand their spheres of influence in response to crackdowns.

IMPACT: Static  Moderate  Major deterioration

More extrajudicial killings and indiscriminate targeting will increase protection needs. Displacement will increase, both in-country and across borders.