MIGRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN: CURRENT TRENDS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas
Belize
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society.

As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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Presentation

This working paper provides an overview of the migration situation in the Caribbean. The document shows migration related facts, highlights migration trends, and discusses current and future challenges for migration governance in the region. The countries included in this study are all major countries of origin, transit and destination of important migration flows.

Due to its enormous geographic and demographic diversity, the Caribbean is a challenging region to study when focusing on migration. The region is comprised of states with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, countries of over 10 million, small and large islands, and inland territories, and countries that range from low income to very high income. Language, ethnic composition, and political systems vary, but, despite this diversity, the region is connected through a common history that was shaped by the very process of migration itself: an interconnectedness that is sustained and reinforced by a modern transnational culture, which is facilitated by modern communications and transport technology as well as regional integration initiatives.

The Caribbean is both a region of origin, transit, and destination of extra-regional and intraregional migration flows, and experiences considerable return migration. Furthermore, as it is situated between North and South America, the Caribbean serves as a transit point for irregular migrants from South America and elsewhere trying to reach the United States which consistently attracts large numbers of Caribbean migrants – both regular and irregular – from most of its different islands and territories. In short, migration in the region is anything but linear, rather characterised by complex, reciprocal flows.

The findings of this research have shown some of the main current and future migration governance challenges in the Caribbean. Some of the most important are:

- The integration of deported and returned migrants. Return — voluntary and forced — of Caribbean migrants to the region is signalled as a growing trend (Thomas-Hope, 2005). The United States, Caribbean countries and others, deport convicted criminal irregular migrants, and others in irregular status, back to their country of origin. These returnees often find themselves with no social network in the country they left years prior, increasing the risk of repetition of criminal behaviour. It is necessary to develop social programs aimed at integrating returned migrants and preventing future irregular emigration of those who have been returned.

List of acronyms

- CARICOM: Caribbean Community
- CSME: Caribbean Single Market and Economy
- ECLAC/CEPAL: Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean
- FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
- GDP: Gross Domestic Product
- HDI: Human Development Index
- IDP: Internally Displaced Person
- ILO: International Labour Organisation
- IOM/OIM: International Organisation for Migration
- OAS: Organisation of American States
- ODA: Official Development Aid
- OECD: Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
- OCS: Organisation of East Caribbean States
- UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
- UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Countering/coping the loss of human capital. Some developed countries have liberalized their policies for the admission of skilled professionals with tertiary education, such as nurses. The demand is largely met by professionals from developing countries. In the Caribbean, at least Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago are negatively affected by the emigration of nurses, and Haiti by skilled emigration in general. It is important for these countries to analyse the impacts of the so-called “brain drain”, weighing if they are balanced by remittances or immigration of replacement professionals, and to analyse what policies can be developed to address the negative effects of this loss of human capital.

Capturing the benefits of migration and encouraging return migration. Much can be gained by engaging the diaspora community, for example by offering incentives for the investment of remittances in social projects or by offering incentives for migrants and their descendants to return to the home country after capturing social remittances.

Environmentally induced migration. Several Caribbean islands are especially vulnerable to climate and environmental risks, both extreme weather events and the depletion of local natural resources. This may spur internal displacement, and ultimately, international migration. Caribbean states are recommended to strengthen cooperation across the different policy domains, as well as inter-state cooperation, to develop the implementation of early warning systems and disaster risk reduction strategies.

Countering irregular migration. Irregular migration, facilitated by porous borders and advanced smuggling networks, has negative implications for both the migrant as well as the recipient country: the migrant is vulnerable to exploitation, the recipient country’s laws are violated, and due taxes may not be collected. Irregular migration can be countered not only by increasing border security, but also by expanding regular migration opportunities to migrants that currently cannot enter or work legally, or face significant difficulties obtaining legal permits.

The human rights situation of irregular migrants, and especially trafficking victims. The public perception of irregular migrants is often negative, while they are entitled to fundamental human rights, regardless of their migratory status. Often irregular migrants are perceived by employers and hosting communities as persons with inferior rights and frequently suffer abuses and violations to their actual rights. A rights based policy approach to irregular migration is recommended. Highly recommended is the ratification of international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, which has not been ratified by a majority of Caribbean countries, and the adaptation and implementation of anti-trafficking legislation. Specifically, the human rights situation of Haitian migrants in many of the countries of destination is one of the main challenges and concerns in the Caribbean.

IOM believes that it is crucial to address all these challenges, in order to achieve IOM’s vision for a world in which migration is well-governed. Well-governed migration is also vital to ensure a safe, orderly and regular migration. Good migration governance should be, hence, a high priority for all Caribbean countries. IOM remains ready to support Caribbean countries to face their migration governance challenges as well as to achieve this vision and objective.

Marcelo Pisani
Regional Director for Central and North America and the Caribbean

Note: Ratified by Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
1. Introduction

1.1 Executive Summary

Main Findings of this Working Paper

- In 2007, the Caribbean emigration rate was four times higher than Latin America’s overall emigration rate. The Caribbean emigration rate has somewhat slowed, but the region nevertheless remains an area of net emigration. Guyana and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines show the strongest emigration movements: 9.65 and 9.6 per 1000 people respectively were emigrating in 2013. Of the countries included in this study, the only confirmed net recipients of migrants are Antigua and Barbuda and Suriname, with immigration rates of 2.23 and 0.57 per 1,000 respectively for 2013 (CIA World Factbook, 2015).

- In absolute terms, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti have the largest diaspora communities: over a million emigrants each, with most living in the United States (World Bank, 2015). Guyana and Haiti are, in absolute terms, the primary countries of origin of intraregional migrants. In relative terms, Guyana and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have the most emigrants. Respectively, the emigrant population is 58.2 per cent and 55.5 per cent the size of the population living at home (World Bank, 2015).

- Over half of total Caribbean migrants to the US, Europe, and Canada are women. Furthermore, migrants are predominantly of productive and reproductive age. Cubans form an exception — the largest group of Cuban migrants is aged 45 and over (Thom- as-Hope, 2000).

- Most Caribbean States grant citizenship at birth (jus soli), but this right is restricted in the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, and Suriname.

- The Caribbean islands are especially vulnerable to extreme weather events and global climate change — events and processes that can cause internal displacement and set in motion emigration processes. Haiti and the Dominican Republic are amongst the world’s countries most vulnerable to climate change: they occupy the third and eighth place on the Global Climate Risk Index (Kreft et al. 2015).
In 2001, 59.5 per cent of Dominican Republic migrants in Spain were classified as unskilled. By 2010, this percentage had dropped to 44.6 per cent (CEPAL, 2011, p. 53). The drop represents both stricter selection (IOM, 2012), as well as the increase of skilled migrants from the Dominican Republic. By 2009, there were 129,669 Dominicans living regularly in Spain (CEPAL, 2011).

The number of work permits awarded by Spain decreased by 463 per cent between 2008 and 2010 (IOM, 2012); however, the number of Dominican Republic migrants travelling to the EU — mostly to Spain — only dropped by 38 per cent in the same period.

A total of 64.7 per cent of the total diaspora community of the countries included in this study is registered as living in the United States, representing 9.3 per cent of the total US immigrant community. Suriname is an outlier with only 3 per cent of Surinamese emigrants living in the United States (World Bank, 2015).

In 2000, Dominican Republic migrants in the United States were found to be twice as likely to be unemployed as United States citizens, to be earning 65 per cent of the average US income, and 28.3 per cent of them living in conditions of poverty (CEPAL, 2007). These figures may signal the existence of a significant gap in economic opportunities between migrants and US-born population in the United States.

Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago are unique in that the proportion of immigrant workers in high-end positions is higher than the proportion of local born. In Barbados 25.8 per cent of the local workforce holds a high-end position, against 28.4 per cent of immigrant workers. In Trinidad and Tobago, these figures are 21.7 per cent and 26.9 per cent respectively (Fraser and Uche, 2010).

High immigration flows, together with high emigration flows, has radically changed the ethnic composition of Belize. In 1980, the Mestizo population represented 33.4 per cent of the population, with 40 per cent of the population being Creole. In 2000, the Mestizo population had increased to 50 per cent and the Creole population had diminished to 25 per cent (ILO et al., p. 16).

Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic contradicts a general tendency that Caribbean intra-regional migrants possess secondary or even tertiary education (Fraser and Uche 2010).

37 per cent of female Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic is economically active, and over 50 per cent of Haitian immigrants has less than four years of formal education (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p. 16).

Key Trends Identified in this Working Paper

- Migration patterns from Latin America to Europe have always been driven by linguistic and colonial ties, but migration to Europe is no longer as significant as it once was. The exception is Spain, as it continues receiving immigrants from Latin America — including the Dominican Republic. In general, Europe has become the place for return migration, mostly of retirees and to a lesser extent of second generation migrants.

- In the 1960s the United States replaced Europe as main migrant destination, and remains the main destination for Caribbean migrants. Suriname forms an exception as it does not have a significant diaspora community or current migratory flows to the US. Canada is becoming increasingly popular for migrants from the English speaking Caribbean, and currently houses around 143,000 Jamaicans, 101,000 Guyanese, 76,000 Trinidadians and 11,000 Vincentians.

- Brazil has become a new destination for Haitian migrants. In 2013, the number of refugee applications increased by 600 per cent (Marcel and Stochero, 2013). The leading Brazilian presence in the UN mission in Haiti might be a reason (ibid).

- Historically, large economic projects or industry booms, such as the construction of the Panama Canal and the growing tourist or petrol industries in certain islands, have attracted Caribbean migrants overseas. It is expected that such future developments will continue to have similar pull-effects, especially impacting the smaller islands of the region (Thomas-Hope 2015).
Although a number of Caribbean nations are evidently affected by epidemic amounts of violence — the Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago all have murder rates of between 25 and 42/100,000 people (UNODC 2014) — its relation to migration has not been sufficiently investigated. Violence might play a significant part as a push factor.

There is also a growing presence of extra-regional immigrants, mostly Asian and African, into the region, both regular and irregular. Approximately 200,000 Chinese nationals are smuggled into the region every year, accompanying the increasing economic relationships between CARICOM and China (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p.15). Some extra-regional migrants intend to use the Caribbean as a transit region, while others intend to stay. There is a lack of in-depth studies on the topic.

Return migration of retirees to the Caribbean is a trend that has gained force in recent years, with the return of a large number of migrants who left in the 1960s (CEPAL, 2012). Some Caribbean emigrants also return to the Caribbean for private education for their children, or are second-generation migrants. However, migrants from Cuba and Haiti tend to become long-term stay or permanent migrants, not opting for return.

Environmental vulnerability, related to the depletion of local natural resources, extreme weather events, and global climate change, will play an ever increasing role in internal displacement and international migration in the Caribbean.

Although unskilled labour migration still exceeds skilled migration, the proportion of skilled labour migration is increasing. There is a higher intensity of qualified migration in the Caribbean than in Latin America (IOM, 2012).

There are three major irregular migration movements in the Caribbean:

- transit region for South Americans, and to an ever increasing extent Africans and Asians;
- intraregional irregular migration toward richer countries; and
- irregular migration from the Caribbean to the United States.

It is suspected that the total size of irregular migration is exceeding the size of regular migration flows.

There is great concern for the trafficking of especially minors and young women to islands with a large tourism industry (Thomas-Hope, 2005). This irregular migration flow is expected to continue for as long as anti-trafficking laws are not sufficiently implemented and enforced, and for as long as conditions in countries of origin do not improve.

1.2 Caribbean migration outlook

It is impossible to understand the Caribbean region without considering migration. The region’s different nations, composed of both large and small islands as well as mainland countries located in South America (Suriname and Guyana) and Central America (Belize), were themselves created by the first major waves of global migration, starting with European colonization in the 16th century and followed by the massive forced migration of African slaves to create and feed the colonial plantation economies. Although the Haitian revolution of 1804 started the almost century-long decline and eventual abolishment of slave trade and slave-labour based model of production across the Caribbean, it did not end the significance of migration. Quite to the contrary, migration became a fact of life for those looking for work and opportunities for a better life.

In the first decade of the 20th century, over one hundred thousand people from across the Caribbean left for Panama to build the Panama Canal. In the 20th century, “even before independence reached most of the region’s territories, people from the Caribbean were migrating in large numbers in search of work, a better life, and to escape from small and constricting island societies” (Ferguson 2003, p.6).

The petrol boom in the 1970s motivated many from the region’s smaller and less developed islands to work in the refineries in the US Virgin Islands, Aruba, the Dutch Antilles, and Trinidad and Tobago (CEPAL 2012, p. 390). The blooming tourist industry in the Bahamas attracted other migrants in the same period. Others, mainly from the English-speaking Caribbean, began migrating to the United States and the United Kingdom as these countries launched targeted recruitment programmes for sectors that experienced a domestic labour shortage, such as nurses. Hence, the Caribbean has been deeply embedded in the globalised economy of labour surpluses and labour demands. But like labour migration, political developments have created considerable diasporas: the Cuban revolution of 1959 pushed many Cubans to emigrate to the United States, and the independence of Suriname in the 1970s led many Surinamese to resettle in the former colonial occupier, the Netherlands.

At the individual and household level, migration in the Caribbean can be seen as a quest for upward mobility through the accumulation of financial and social capital. Many families have a history of migration and are of a transnational nature: family ties remain strong despite physical distance. The livelihoods of migrants and their families are not necessarily bound to one location and it is not unusual to move back and forth between the destination country and the home country. Transnationalism, facilitated by electronic communications and fast transportation, sustains migration as an essential aspect of the Caribbean. “The migrations reinforce and extend the scope of the transnational networks involving migrants and non-migrants (…) this has the effect of facilitating future migration and perpetuating the high propensity for migration that exists in the region” (Thomas-Hope, 2002, p. 10).
The globalised economy, the outward and transnational orientation of the inhabitants of the Caribbean, and its external dependency, have had the effect of a steady out-flow of migrants to North America and the former colonizers of Western Europe (Thomas-Hope, 2002). In the words of Thomas-Hope (2002, p.16) “migration has traditionally been viewed in the Caribbean as the proverbial “safety valve” that allows any surplus of people in the labour force to leave the country in search of work rather than cause an unbearable build-up of societal tensions”.

It is estimated that in the last 50 years, at least 5 million people have emigrated from the Caribbean, a region currently home to 37 million people (CEPAL, 2012, p.394). This makes the Caribbean one of the heaviest emigration areas of the world. Generally, Caribbean people have a positive outlook on emigration. Rios and Crabtree (2006a) found that at least 40 per cent of the people in Guyana and the Dominican Republic would migrate permanently if they had the opportunity (IOM, 2012, p.20). Nevertheless, despite a strong continuing flow from the Caribbean to North America and to a lesser extent Western Europe, intraregional migration and other South-South movements are increasing, not least due to increasing intraregional cooperation. Belize and Trinidad and Tobago are seeing increasing intraregional immigration due to their relative economic success, and Haitians form a significant part of the population of the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic. Increased cooperation and trade between Caribbean countries and China has led to an increased influx of Chinese migrants.

Irregular migration in the region occurs on a large scale. Irregular migrants from the Dominican Republic and Haiti try to reach Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, and ultimately the United States. About 200,000 people in the Dominican Republic born to irregular Haitian migrants cannot prove their place of birth and have citizenship issues (Van Selm, 2015, p.18). The scale of irregular migration is worrisome particularly given its causes: the continued need for low wage workers in receiving countries has increasingly become an incentive for smuggling in human beings and for unregulated and illegal employment and exploitation. A growing number of these undocumented migrants from the Caribbean are said to have suffered a denial of their basic human rights (ECLAC, 2006), denying these migrants their opportunities for upward social mobility. Irregular migrants, especially trafficked migrants, are vulnerable to discrimination, abuse, extortion, kidnapping, and sexual violence. It is estimated that some 10 per cent of human trafficking victims worldwide are from the Latin America and Caribbean region.

Instead of clearly visible, one-way movements, Caribbean international migration is characterised by complex, reciprocal flows (Nurse, 2004, p. 4), which are not always visible to the statistician, the media and the populations of the respective countries. Migration dynamics reflect the interplay of a number of dimensions (economic, political, legal, social, cultural, and environmental) at different levels (international, national, familial, and personal). It is the aim of this literature study to provide a more thorough overview of migration trends and challenges in the Caribbean, taking into consideration the myriad factors that constitute Caribbean migration.

1.3 Outline of the report

Chapter 1
The remainder of this introduction chapter is divided into three sections:
1. Theoretical section, focussing on the relation between migration and development.
2. Short note on the data used for this report.
3. Overview of the general socio-economic context of the Caribbean region.

Chapter 2
Focuses on the mapping of migration flows. It contains six sub-chapters:
1. The demographics of migration in the Caribbean
2. Migration towards North America and Western Europe
3. Intraregional migration
4. North-South migration
5. South-South extra regional migration
6. Irregular migration

Chapter 3
Discusses migration related challenges and opportunities for development, divided into four sections:
1. Migration and human rights
2. Migration and the natural environment
3. Brain drain and brain replacement
4. Remittances and diaspora organisations

Chapter 4
Outlines the institutional and legal context of migration:
1. International institutions and treaties
2. National policies and regulations

Chapter 5
Provides country specific information, focussing on migration and remittance flows.

Chapter 6
Is a concluding chapter, divided into three sections:
1. Discussion summarising the findings of this report
2. Recommendations for migration policy
3. Recommendations for further research to fill knowledge gaps
1.4. Theoretical perspectives on migration

Most theory on migration deals with the relationship between migration and economic growth. World-system theory (Wallerstein, 1973) argues that uneven socio-economic world development drives migration. The forces of capitalism penetrate into underdeveloped regions and distort socio-economic relations. As the capitalist economy grows outward from its core into the periphery, migration flows are inevitable because the forces of the capitalist economy interfere with material bases of survival (land, labour, wages, etc.). Although World System theory provides for a unique perspective on early modern colonisation of the Caribbean starting from the 16th century, its current applicability is less clear. Changes in global development have called the distinction between “North” and “South” or “core” and “periphery” into question. The old distinction between developed and less developed countries is not as clear as it once was (ACP Observatory on Migration 2013, p.15), and the Caribbean region already has a long history of being embedded into the capitalist system (with the exception of Cuba), which makes this theory inadequate to explain modern-day migration. However, the theory signals the existence of a dependency relationship that is overlooked by other theories.

Neoclassical economic theory explains migration as the result from a rational decision making process, in which the individual looks for maximisation of salary – differences in salaries between countries should explain migration movements. A person would invest in migration, as he/she would in education, as a means to maximise income, if the cost-benefit calculation is deemed positive (Chiswick in Castles and Miller, 2009). However, the theory fails to explain why certain migration flows are sustained between specific countries (and not between others with similar or greater salary differences), why the poorest do not migrate, and does not give the tools to explain current migration flows and predict future flows (Castles & Miller, 2009).

Economics has produced other theories that give more adequate insights. The new economics of labour migration approach looks beyond the individual to the household and community as a decision making unit (see Taylor, 1991; Stark & Bloom, 1985). This theory sees migration as a collective strategy to ensure the economic viability of the domestic unit through the strategic allocation of labour and investment (Faist, 2000, p. 10; Goss & Lindquist, 1993). Another addition, the theory of dual labour markets, emphasises structural conditions in the labour market that give incentives to stay or migrate.

However, to understand migration it is important to look beyond economic factors and also include political, social, cultural, and religious dimensions. The literature on “migratory systems”, provides a more holistic and multidisciplinary approach. The migratory system is constituted by two or more countries that exchange migrants, due to the existence of earlier links between these countries, based on factors such as colonisation, political influence, commerce, investment, and cultural ties (Castles and Miller 2009).

The basic principle of the “migratory systems” approach is that migration movements are the result of both macro- and micro-structures that influence each other. Macro-structures include the political economy of the global market, economic and political ties and agreements between countries, and laws and regulations that govern migration. Micro-structures are the informal social networks between migrants, their kin, community and friends.

To understand migration in terms of the migratory systems approach, it is useful to consider push and pull factors beyond economic factors, and to take a closer look the nature of these informal social networks.

Push-pull factors: perhaps the most well-known explanation of migration is the analysis of push and pull factors that form motivations to emigrate. Although difficult to determine which factors outweigh others, it is a useful tool to generate a general explanation. For the push-pull factors analysis to be effective, it is important to consider that the conditional factors of migration are not merely material (expressed in HDI, GDP per capita, etc.). The propensity to migrate also has to do with perception rather than “observable” push and pulls factors: for example, existing patterns of emigration increase the lack of confidence in the system at home, putting in motion a chain of further migration. In the words of Thomas-Hope (2002, p.10) “the propensity for the migration of skilled personnel is highest at times when there is a lack of confidence in the economic or social stability of their country”. Therefore, push and pull factors are not necessarily “objective” but based on perception.

A (non-exhaustive) list of push and pull factors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Push Factors</th>
<th>Pull Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low salaries</td>
<td>High salaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informality</td>
<td>Formality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of land</td>
<td>Available land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No career perspective</td>
<td>Ability to build a career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political or economic crisis</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal conflict</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive political regime</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of social security programs</td>
<td>Presence of social security programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Push and pull factors
The propensity to migrate is further influenced by factors such as: the costs and (perceived) risks of travel—a factor that often excludes the poor from (documented) migration, cultural and language differences, geographical proximity, laws and regulation, environmental factors, and the existence of migrant networks.

Transnationalism: According to Thomas-Hope (2005, p.54), it is misleading to describe migration merely in terms of pushes and pulls. To see migration as a passive response to exogenous forces and as a displacement from the household from a negative to a more positive location is inaccurate. Thomas-Hope argues that this ignores the importance of the specific historical culture surrounding migration that evolved in the Caribbean region. Instead, we ought to understand migration as a transnational set of interactions and linkages associated with the movement of people, ideas, money, and goods. The household does not come to an end when a member migrates, but becomes a transnational one: contact is maintained, information, goods and money are exchanged, and members of the household may migrate back and forth.

It is important to underline that the perspective and interests of the migrant and the household do not necessarily add up with the interest of the nation. While people—individually or as part of a household or transnational family—migrate in search of well-being, on a large scale it may have detrimental effects for the nation when not managed properly.

Migration and development: There is no consensus in academia and politics on the relationship between development and migration, but it is agreed that they are part of the same process and continually interactive. In the Caribbean region, like many others, the discourse on migration and development impacts is characterised by mixed perceptions. Available information also suggests that migration can have both positive and negative impacts. This makes it all the more important to establish a multilateral cooperative migration policy, in which both sending and receiving countries, as well as the migrants themselves, can optimise benefits while minimizing negative outcomes or risks.

But what is development? There seems to be a consensus on the need of the fulfilment of these most basic needs, there is less agreement. One tendency is to perceive development, cultural and language differences, geographical proximity, laws and regulation, environmental factors, and the existence of migrant networks.

According to ECLAC (CEPAL, 2007, p.95) a report reasoning along the lines of neoclassical macroeconomic theory, migration is an endeavour generally undertaken by risk-taking people, which should lead to the establishment of companies and innovation in the host country. However, the positive effects for the country of origin are less clear: the report warns that the emigration of qualified professionals may have a negative effect on economic growth. Yet, this macroeconomic theory prophecizes that the exchange of migrants may lead to the convergence of the income gap between sending and receiving country, as the sending country loses its "abundant" population and as a result becomes more competitive. However, the same process may lead to salaries becoming more divergent within the receiving country as the country is flooded by cheap labour that has a downward pressure on the minimum wage. To sum up the vision of ECLAC, "in general, it is expected that migrations increase income disparities between work and capital in the receiving countries (as the factor labour becomes more abundant) and they decrease in the origin countries (as labour becomes more scarce)" (ibid, p.95).

In the recipient country, migration is linked to several issues. Particularly in countries with small populations, racism and xenophobia can have negative repercussions, creating social tensions within the host community. Xenophobia usually rises in periods of economic downturn and social or political instability, or when there is a dominant perception that the immigrant population has a higher birth-rate (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013).

In the country of origin, emigration can have impacts on tax income, on the labour force (specifically brain drain, which will be discussed in more detail), and agriculture, effects that may (partially) be offset by remittances. As pointed out by Thomas-Hope et.al. (2013, p.48) in predominantly rural societies emigration can have a profound impact on local agriculture. It impacts the rural labour force, the commitment and sustainability of farming, and remittances may be used to either invest in agricultural tools or technologies at home, or to finding alternatives and abandon agriculture altogether. Regarding taxes, there is little known about the revenue forgone through the non-payment of taxes by migrants while they are away, and the extent to which this is compensated by immigrants in the labour force (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012, p.46).

The IOM report "routes and dynamics between the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and between LAC and the European Union" (2012, p.23) sums up a number of possible effects of migration on development. The following table, based on the report, pays specific attention to the diverse positive and negative effects of remittances, and the issue of brain drain, two important issues that require further clarification.
Table 2 Positive and negative effects of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive effects</th>
<th>Negative effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of global efficiency</td>
<td>Loss of qualified workers and a reduction of essential services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration is good for people who migrate to countries that offer new opportunities</td>
<td>Reduction of economic growth and productivity, due to the loss of qualified workers in the job market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A remittance flow that aids receiving individuals and countries</td>
<td>Less returns of public investments in education due to emigration of qualified people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of unemployment in country of origin</td>
<td>Selective migration may generate disparities in countries of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diasporas import new technology and capital</td>
<td>The country of origin loses tax income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce between receiving and sending countries may get a boost due to an increased demand for diasporas’ products (Nurie 2002) (music, food products)</td>
<td>Creation of an economy based on remittances and the dependency of receivers, a problem that exacerbates when remittances diminish over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration may stimulate investment in education and human capital</td>
<td>Remittances may cause inflations, especially in the real estate sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philanthropy by diasporas contribute to community development and diminish the impact of natural disasters</td>
<td>Migration can increase official unemployment in the host country due to migrants accepting lower wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration can stimulate economic and welfare gains by supplying existing labour needs, which increases employment, productivity and GDP</td>
<td>Irregular immigrants, unable to access social benefits and formal employment, are vulnerable to abuse and may be forced to irregular means of receiving an income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular immigrants, unable to access social benefits and formal employment, are vulnerable to abuse and may be forced to irregular means of receiving an income</td>
<td>Immigration may be responded to with xenophobia and/or racism, causing social exclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Positive and negative effects of remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive effects</th>
<th>Negative effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Covering of daily costs</td>
<td>* Declining work ethic and dependency culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* May decrease child labour</td>
<td>* Inflation of local prices, notably real estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* As a countercyclical source of finance, it decreases vulnerability to shocks and disasters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Source: IOM, 2012
Table 3 Source: CEPAL, 2007

Brain drain: the high cost of international migration is an important factor that helps explain why poor, less educated people migrate less internationally. The proportion of highly educated emigrants is usually higher than the proportion of highly educated people in the workforce of the countries of origin. This potentially translates into a net emigration of human capital in countries of origin, or so-called brain-drain. It is recognised that brain drain due to migration may have particularly adverse effects on certain sectors, such as education and health care.

However, one has to be careful not to exaggerate the impact of brain-drain, as pointed out by the ACP Observatory on Migration (2013, p.35). The report states that a “remarkably resilient idea, despite scholars providing a more nuanced approach, is the concept of ‘brain drain’, which refers to the outflow of large numbers of high-skilled migrants, a phenomenon considered detrimental to the development of origin countries”. The report shows that in some cases, internal brain drain from the public to the private sector is greater than external brain drain caused by migration: migration is therefore not always the most significant cause of brain drain. Furthermore, the negative effects of brain drain may (at least partially) be balanced with monetary and social remittance flows.

Remittances: remittances refer to the transfer of capital (monetary as well as social), and goods from migrants back to their home country, usually sent to the household. Financial remittances are composed of two components as included by the World Bank: compensations of employees, and personal transfers (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p.5).

Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Grenada and Dominican Republic rank among the top 30 remittances receiving countries worldwide in relative terms (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p.5). The UNDP Human Development Report (2013, p.15) found that nearly half of remittances sent home by emigrants from the South come from workers living in other developing countries. Ties between sending and receiving countries are growing closer, influenced by the transmission of remittances. In Latin America and the Caribbean, women are found to remit more (ibid). The incentives for the sending of remittances are varied, and include altruism and solidarity, self-interest (savings), payment of debts, and the diversification of household income and security (CEPAL, 2007, p.27).

The main focus of debate by opposing schools is whether remittances lead to development of the local economy or contribute to its demise (Reynolds, 2008, p.9). CEPAL (2007) calculated that a 1 per cent increase in remittances as proportion of the nation’s GDP, corresponds with 0.6 per cent GDP growth due to private investments — showing there is a link. However, an IMF study of 2003 indicated that remittances merely compensate the negative effects of emigration (CEPAL, 2007, p.6). On the effect of monetary remittances, the following effects are regularly mentioned (ibid):

Table 3 Positive and negative effects of remittances

<table>
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<th>Positive effects</th>
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<tr>
<td>* Covering of daily costs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>* As a countercyclical source of finance, it decreases vulnerability to shocks and disasters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEPAL, 2007
Empirical studies have positioned themselves between the two opposing schools of thought. They show that remittances, although they may support local livelihoods, are not the solution to development. They can complement ODA, FDI, and development policy, but not replace them. The impact of remittances on human development also greatly depends on the enabling political, economic and legal environment, migration patterns and individual situations (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2011, p.14).

A study carried out by the Inter-American Development Bank in five Latin American countries, shows that 72 per cent of remittances are used to cover daily costs, savings 7 per cent, education 6 per cent, and the acquisition of housing 1.8 per cent. A study from Mexico shows that on average, children from families receiving remittances complete between 0.7 and 1.6 more years of schooling. In this sense, remittances have a clear positive effect on the wellbeing of recipient families: money is not mainly spent on unnecessary expenses. But the relationship between poverty and remittances is ambiguous. On the one hand, remittances help families escape poverty and cover their basic costs of living. A study carried out by the World Bank (2006, mentioned in CEPAL, 2007) showed that a 10 per cent increase in remittances as part of the GDP reduces poverty by 3.5 per cent. However, as mentioned before, emigrants often come from the groups of society that already live above the poverty line.

Next to financial remittances, “social remittances” may be transferred. The concept of “social remittance” refers to the “ideas, practices, identities and social capital that flow from sending to receiving communities” (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p.59). These intangible transfers by migrants include new forms of music, better hygiene practices, language skills and new ideas on gender equality in community associations and in school attendance (ACP Observatory on Migration 2013, 33), and can therefore have a significant positive effect in the receiving country.

### 1.5 Data

This report is a desk review of available literature, and does not contain data from primary sources. The countries selected to be highlighted in this study were based on a selection of prioritized countries by IOM. Any translations from Spanish, French or Dutch are carried out by the authors. All statistics were taken from international bodies such as the World Bank, UNDP, CEPAL, and IOM. This data is not always accurate and in some occasions, serious contradictions were found.

Hence, before turning to an analysis of migration and remittance patterns in the Caribbean region, it is important to highlight that the data presented is above all indicative. Irregular migration flows, which may constitute for the majority of certain migration patterns, is not represented in the statistical data given in this report — only estimations can be made on the size of irregular migration flows. Its analysis is complex, due to the fact that the available information has important limitations, referring to the inherent difficulties to the registry of migratory movements. Data may not include those national groups that, due to their citizenship, require no permits for entry or residence.

There are several explanations for the lack of data and its contradictions: the quality of data (e.g. on remittance flows) may be insufficient, due to lack of migration census data or lack of coordination among agencies (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013, p. 20); the exact amount of remittances is extremely difficult to calculate as many migrants do not have bank accounts (they may send cash), have sent bank cards to the receiving country, or bring non-monetary items; also, different countries use different classifications of migrants and residency (CECLAC, 2006).

### 1.6 Regional socio-economic context

This section provides a brief outlook of the region as a whole and the variation among the different countries. A common discussion of Caribbean development and migration is difficult because of the disparities within the islands and territories in terms of population size, geography, economy, GDP per capita, HDI, and social as well as political factors. However, these countries are linked in historical, colonial and cultural consciousness (Fraser and Uche, 2010, p.25).

The Caribbean reaches from North America (Bahamas) to mainland States such as Belize in Central America, and Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana in South America. Due to its history of colonization by different European nations, it compromises a series of linguistic areas: Spanish, French, English, and Dutch; as well as Creole languages that were created by the very process of colonization and migration such as Papiamento. Over the course of the last two centuries, most Caribbean nations gained independence, starting with Haiti’s slave uprising (1805) up to the independence of Suriname from the Netherlands (1975). Many states have only become independent in the past 50 years, and retain the legal footprint of their previous governments. Some islands and territories, such as the former Netherlands Antilles and French Guiana, remain connected to their former colonizers, either as overseas territories or as semi-independent states.

The rate of urbanisation in the Caribbean is very high, with 61.8 per cent the region’s population living in urban settlements in 2010 (UNPD, 2009). This process of increasing urbanization is ongoing. However, this rate is not representative for the whole region. The Bahamas, Cuba and the Dominican Republic are mostly urbanized, but in contrast Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago are mostly rural. Haiti, of which just over half of the population (57.4%) already lives in urban zones, is most rapidly urbanizing with an urban population growth rate of 3.78 per cent per year.
The larger island nations of Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic dominate the region in terms of population, each having a population of over 10 million. They are followed by Jamaica (2.77 million) and Trinidad and Tobago (1.34 million), while the population of the remaining countries is less than a million, with Antigua and Barbuda only housing approximately 90,000 people.

The following table shows the GDP of the countries included in this study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP (Billion USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>71.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>58.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>28.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Half of the Caribbean population, above all the urban population, lives within 1.5 kilometres of the coast — where important infrastructure and economic activities are located (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p.32). In the Caribbean region, tourism accounts for a quarter of all jobs. In Jamaica for example, tourism made up over 45 per cent of all export earnings in Jamaica in the year 2000 (IOM, 2005, p.5). Tourism may have brought a steady source of income to the region, but evidence suggests potential negative effects such as the relation between tourism and HIV/AIDS (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012, p50).

The following figure shows just how varied the region is in terms of population:

Figure 1: Population size

![Figure 1: Population size](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.jpg)

Source: UN, (2015)

Just as the region is highly varied in population, so it is in GDP. Cuba is leading, with a GDP of USD 71 billion in 2013, closely followed by the Dominican Republic, having a GDP of USD 58.9 billion in 2013. Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica are next. The remaining countries all have a Gross Domestic Product of less than USD 10 billion. When comparing this table with the former, it becomes clear that it does not necessarily correlate, as shown in the following table on GDP/capita:
This table reveals large disparities in income between the eleven countries under study. The Bahamas leads, with a GDP per capita of USD 22,312 in 2013, closely followed by Trinidad and Tobago (USD 18,373). Also striking is the difference between Haiti (USD 819) and the Dominican Republic (USD 5,879), two countries with a similar population number that share the same island. While the Bahamas is classified by UNDP as a “very high income” country, Haiti is one of the world’s poorest countries and the poorest country of the Western Hemisphere.

Economic growth figures over the past four years are given in the following table:

As many Caribbean islands are, for a large part of their income, dependent on the tourism sector, they are heavily affected by global economic crises. This can be seen in the 2010 growth figures for Antigua and Barbuda, Jamaica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The Dominican Republic’s sudden economic growth of over 8 per cent in 2010 is mostly explained by the opening of an industrial gold mine. Haiti’s sharp drop in 2010 is mostly explained by the earthquake that devastated the country. Since 2011, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago (the small island states) seem stagnated, while most growth is seen in Guyana, Suriname, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.

It would be too reductionist to reduce a country’s standard of living to income and economic growth alone. Other factors such as life expectancy, access to healthcare, and mean years of schooling play a key role. The UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) measures the combination of these components, classifying a country’s achievement of Human Development on a scale from 0–1.
Other factors that affect human well-being, are not taken into account by the Human Development Index, are factors such as corruption, freedom, and violence. The following table summarises the score of the countries of this study in the Perceived Corruption Index by Transparency International⁷, the World Freedom Index by Freedom House (measuring civic and political liberties)⁸, and murder rates as summarised by the UNODC⁹.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>No info</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>No info</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transparency International, Freedom House, and UNODC

According to the perceived corruption index, only the Bahamas and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are perceived to have lower levels of corruption. Haiti again comes last, with the lowest score of the Americas. Cuba and Haiti are classified as "not free" and "partially free" respectively, while the other countries in the region are all classified as free by Freedom House. The Latin America and Caribbean region is known for its elevated murder rates, due to various reasons such as the proliferation of firearms and the drug smuggling towards the United States — most Caribbean countries of this study are no exception. The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago all have alarmingly high murder rates. The case of Jamaica is especially worrisome, being the sixth most violent country in the world.

The statistics on GDP per capita, HDI, freedom, perceived corruption, and murder rates may help explain migration movements. Cuba has the highest Human Development achievements of the region, for example, and yet has high migration outflows. However, in civic and political freedom it ranks lowest. Therefore, it is plausible that some Cubans emigrate, for example, with the perception that living standards are higher in democratic or capitalist societies. Guyana, and to a greater extent Haiti, rank low on both HDI and GDP, both of them push factors. Small islands such as Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are extremely vulnerable to global economic changes, affecting migration patterns. The high HDI and per capita income characterising the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, may act as pull factors. A number of Caribbean countries experience high murder rates — a potential push factor, as has been documented about emigration from the Northern Triangle of Central America. However, in the Caribbean this topic has received little research attention thus far.

We have chosen to include in this study the Global Climate Risk Index of 2015, by the research institute Germanwatch (Kreft et al. 2015). It constructed a climate risk index based on the occurrence and effects of extreme weather events in a 20 year period, between 1993 and 2013. Note that the index is based on past data and does not include factors such as rising sea levels and glacier melts. The higher the rank (ranging from 1–135), the higher climate vulnerability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Climate Vulnerability Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kreft et al. (2015)

As shown, the island of Hispaniola, shared by the Dominican Republic and Haiti, is especially vulnerable to climate risks: they are ranked the eighth and third most vulnerable countries respectively.
2. Migratory flows and trends in the Caribbean

This chapter discusses in detail the major migration trends characterizing the Caribbean. It first provides a brief overview of the general demographics of migration: how many and who are migrating? It addresses important migration trends:

- Majority of Caribbean migrants towards North America — the United States and to a lesser extent Canada;
- Smaller migration waves towards Western Europe, especially to the former colonizers (UK, the Netherlands, France and Spain) due mainly to linguistic or (former) political ties (IOM, 2012);
- The occurrence of return migration; and
- The persistence of irregular migration patterns and their implications.

2.1 The Demographics of Migration

According to the Bilateral Migration Matrix 2013, (World Bank, 2014) emigration from the Caribbean region as a whole was an estimated 7.01 million people in 2013 — counting both intraregional and extra-regional emigrants. In 2007, ECLAC established that the emigration rate of the Caribbean was 15.5 per cent. This emigration rate is four times as high as in Latin America. In recent years, the Caribbean remains a net emigration area, although no longer as strongly as in 2007 (see graph).
In 2013, only Antigua and Barbuda and Suriname had a positive net migration rate, with 2.23 and 0.57 people entering per 1000 of the population, respectively. All other countries have a negative net migration rate, with higher rates for Guyana (-9.65) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (-9.60).

The main sending countries in absolute terms are Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Haiti, with over one million emigrants each. However, in relative terms the migration picture looks quite different. The following table shows each country’s total emigrant population relative to its population “at home”, in comparison to each country’s immigrant population as percentage of the total population.

The graph shows the number of emigrants far exceeding the number of immigrants, overall. In Guyana, the emigrant population is 58.2 per cent the size of the population in the country of origin, while immigrants only constitute 1.8 per cent and of its population. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname follow with their diaspora populations being 55.6 per cent and 49.2 per cent the size of the population number at home, but unlike Guyana these countries have a significant proportion of immigrants: 9.4 per cent and 7.7 per cent of their respective populations. In Antigua and Barbuda and the Bahamas – both being high HDI and high income per capita countries – the proportion of emigrants is similar to the proportion of immigrants. Belize’s immigrant population also balances emigration – as Belizeans are heading for the United States, the country attracts large numbers of Central American immigrants. In the case of Antigua and Barbuda, these figures are quite high: its immigrants make up 31.9 per cent of the island’s total population, while its diaspora is 39.6 per cent the size of the population of the island. These figures illustrate the high human mobility characterising Antigua and Barbuda, a country that attracts intraregional migrants due to its high standard of living. At the same time, as it consists of merely 90,000 inhabitants, is too small to provide for all the opportunities sought by its citizens.
According to CEPAL (2007, p.9) emigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean share three socio-demographic characteristics: a) an elevated participation of feminine migration, b) migrants are predominantly of the most productive working age, and c) the emigrants are more highly educated than their domestic-born who do not migrate.

More specific to the Caribbean, over half of the total migrants heading for the United States and Canada are women (Thomas-Hope, 2005, p.36). CEPAL (2007) reports that 54 per cent of Dominicans heading to the United States, and 67 per cent of the Dominicans migrating to Spain, are women (CEPAL, 2007). However, a newer CEPAL report (2014) based on information from 2010, signals that male emigration from the Dominican Republic is rising – although the majority of Dominican migrants remains female. Increased empowerment of women is given as a reason for the feminization of migration. It is also suggested that migration, in turn, allows women to improve their quality of life and to change traditional gender roles. Return migration however may lead to women regaining their primary role within the household (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2010).

As a result of the Cuban revolution of 1959, many Cubans chose to leave their home country. Most went to the United States. Other Caribbean people entered under a guest worker scheme: an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 male Caribbean workers entered the US in the 1980s, chiefly Jamaicans employed to harvest sugar cane. From Jamaica the United States also
Migration in the Caribbean: current trends, opportunities and challenges

The United Kingdom was very much seen as a country of economic opportunities, and the British military actively recruited from the Commonwealth Caribbean. France also incentivised educated migrants to settle in France. The movement of Surinamese to the Netherlands however, was overwhelmingly prompted by panic of the prospect of Surinamese independence in 1975, when Surinamese would lose Dutch citizenship. Further flights happened after the 1980 military coup and the 1980s internal war.

Currently, nine out of ten emigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean in Europe reside in Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and France. While migration to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France dwindled, since the 1990s Spain has become an important destination for Latin American migrants, including Dominicans.

In 2002, there were 873,056 Dominicans residing in the European Union (IOM, 2021, p. 10). The majority of whom were in Spain. The country received six out of ten migrants from the LAC region that migrated to Europe (IOM, 2012, p. 7). According to statistics by CEPAL (2011, p. 53) 44.6 per cent of Dominican migrants in Spain is classified as “unskilled” in 2010, from 59.5 per cent in 2001. Although the average income in Spain is much lower than in the United States, cultural affinity and the existence of language barriers turn Spain into an attractive destination (CEPAL 2007, p. 24). However, economic crisis has left a profound impact in Spain, causing a drastic fall in migration flows and a worsening of conditions of life for many immigrants (IOM 2012, p. 55). The number of Dominicans going to Europe has decreased by 12 per cent between 2008 and 2010 (IOM 2012, p. 49). To compare, the number of work permits given by Spain decreased from 3,849 in 2008 to 2,203 in 2010, a decrease of 43.3 per cent.

Another recent development is that the number of CARICOM students in tertiary education in the European Union has increased from 5,865 in 2004 to 9,984 in 2007, the majority being from Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2010, p.12). Not all migratory waves to Europe are that positive: estimates from 2009 suggest that as many as 50,000 women from the Dominican Republic are victims of human trafficking and are working in the sex industry in Europe (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2010, p.14).

The economic crisis in Europe has set in motion three processes:

- First, although the immigration rate from Latin America and the Caribbean is decreasing, migrants already there are not massively returning. Instead, they are waiting out the crisis in hope of renewed opportunities as the region slowly recovers.
- Second, a number of countries have started implementing policies that encourage (jobless) migrants to return, and that make it harder for immigrants to enter.
- Last, Spanish and Portuguese migration to Latin America, including the Dominican Republic, is increasing (OIM, 2012a).

Migration to Europe

Migration patterns to Europe mostly follow colonial and linguistic ties. Britain used to be a major destination for the Anglophone Caribbean, whereas France and the Netherlands represent uniquely important destinations from the Dutch and Francophone islands and territories. The reasons for migration were different; from economic opportunities, to political flight (from Suriname to the Netherlands), to government incentives (Peach, 1991). Although transnational bonds between Western European countries and the Caribbean remain, already in the 1960s a shift occurred from Caribbean migration towards Europe into migration to North America (Thomas-Hope, 2002, p.4; CEPAL, 2012, p.393).

In the case of the UK, as written by Thomas-Hope (2000, p.7), “the movement of Caribbean people to the UK has been of a low volume since the 1970s following the removal in 1962 of open entry regulations for Caribbean Commonwealth citizens”. Similar endings to open entry regulations occurred elsewhere in the course of the 1970s and 1980s.
### 2.3 Intra-regional migration

The importance of intra-regional migration was first recognised with the CARICOM Free Movement Protocol. It was established in 1989 and enables the free movement of skilled labour in particular (see Chapter 4). This protocol aims to provide a framework for enhancing the social and economic development potential of human mobility within the region. Indeed, intra-regional migration constitutes an important trend in terms of human development potential for migrants and societies in the Caribbean (ACP Observatory on Migration 2010, p.12).

According to the 1991 CARICOM census, most international immigrants in the Caribbean region were from within the region. 70 per cent of CARICOM intra-regional migration was concentrated in Trinidad and Tobago, the US Virgin Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, and Barbados (CEPAL 2001, p.392). Nowadays, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Antigua and Barbuda still house the greatest proportion of intra-Caribbean migrants while the main sending countries — in relative terms — are Guyana, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Grenada. In absolute terms, both Guyana and Haiti are major emigration countries at the regional level. The absolute number of intra-regional migrants is increasing (Fraser and Uche 2010, 20), and half of immigrants residing in the Caribbean region come from other Caribbean countries.

Intra-regional migration in the Caribbean is usually associated with specific development projects or periods of peak economic growth based on a particular industry (Thomas-Hope, 2000). The Bahamas, Barbados, as well as Antigua and Barbuda were dominated by the sugar industry up to the 1950s, attracting foreign plantation workers. The development of the tourism sector in the latter half of the century replaced sugar and has turned the Bahamas into a high income country. In Trinidad and Tobago, development of the oil industry in the 1970s attracted the first migrants from other Caribbean countries.

Emigrants from Guyana have been settling throughout the eastern Caribbean. Jamaicans, a mobile community, commonly migrate to tourism development areas, such as Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, and the British Virgin Islands (Thomas-Hope, 2005). Caribbean immigrants in Jamaica often occupy managerial and technical positions, to a large extent a replacement for the Jamaicans who migrated to North America (Thomas-Hope, 2000, p.42). Similarly, in Barbados as well as Trinidad and Tobago, the proportion of immigrants in high-end positions is higher than the proportion of local-born (Fraser and Uche, 2010, p.44).

On average, the educational level of intra-regional migrants is higher than the population from where they leave and to where they enter, reflecting the selective nature of the migration process. Non-nationals in Caribbean countries are an important category of replacement for the nationals that leave. The figures for Jamaica show that the majority of immigrants work in the professional, managerial and technical skill categories (Thomas-Hope 2000, p.44). Apart from being more highly educated, recent Caribbean immigrants are commonly younger than the mean age of the recipient population (Fraser and Uche, 2010, p.48). Fraser and Uche (ibid) write that “the youthfulness of the immigrant population has many benefits for the destination countries providing a reasonably young labour force”. Being of productive age, they are also unlikely to bear high health costs. Information on the age and sex is not available for many countries, but it is evident that females generally outnumber males in all the professional and skilled categories (Thomas-Hope, 2000, p.8), revealing gendered labour demands.

Haitian migrants are an exception to the rule that intra-Caribbean migrants are predominantly female and more highly educated than the recipient population. In both the Bahamas and Dominican Republic, women are mostly involved in unskilled work. According to CEPAL (2012), the number of Haitians residing in the Dominican Republic has multiplied by 404.3 per cent. However, as many Haitians find that they cannot find suitable employment and living conditions in the Dominican Republic, they (face return (ACP Observatory on Migration 2014, 16). The number of male immigrants is 1.6 times higher than female immigrants — another break with the general trend that women migrate more. Furthermore, while 81 per cent of male migrants in the Dominican Republic are economically active, only 37 per cent of female immigrants appear to be so. Over 50 per cent of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic are said to have less than four years of formal education.

Intra-regional migration, like extra-regional migration, has its risks for recipient countries. Immigrants, especially undocumented, may accept jobs for a lower wage in the informal sector, disturbing local job markets in the long term. Irregular migrants within the Caribbean are also subject to discrimination and abuse, well documented in cases of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. However, whether in the formal or informal sector, immigrants complement and are often indispensable to the labour force in the destination countries.

### 2.4 North-South migration

There are different types of north-south migration toward the Caribbean: return migration of retirees, return migration of economically active people, and immigration from a diverse group of non-Caribbean nationals such as children of Caribbean migrants, investors, job seekers, and foreign retirees. Return migration of retirees is one of the particular characteristics of Caribbean migration that has gained force in recent years, with the return of an important number of migrants who left in the 1950s and 1960s (CEPAL, 2012, p.395).
There is a strong tendency of the return of migrants that left, to the UK in particular, who have formed a number of associations of returning residents which provide the returnees themselves with a social network with which they share a common history. While return is not limited to the group, elderly and retired returnees do make up the bulk of return migration. “Retirees become a part of the dependent population and thus impact on the economic situation” write Fraser and Uché (2010, p.59). Many of these returnees receive pensions from their countries of origin, to be spent in the Caribbean. As written by Reynolds (2012, p.8).

“The family narrative centred on the ‘myth of return’ operates as an alternative form of capital through which Caribbean ethnic identity is maintained cross the generations ... it is central to the Caribbean migrant experience in the UK regardless of whether or not this dream is realised”.

Of the Dutch emigrants to Latin America and the Caribbean, 6 out of 10 migrate to the Caribbean region (IOM, 2012, p.62). It stands to reason that these are not only ethnic Dutch who choose to migrate there for linguistic reasons, but also returnees and second-generation migrants who head back to the “homeland” in the Antilles or Suriname. Return migration is produced and sustained by transnational family networks (Reynolds 2008, p.4). These same transnational family networks also facilitate the “return to the homeland” of children of migrants. Some countries have programs and legal frameworks that facilitate return migration, such as the Jamaican Returning Residents and Return of Talent Programmes, and the Surinamese diaspora law that allows descendants of Surinamese migrants to settle and work in Suriname without a permit. In the case of Jamaica, returnees are predominantly from the United Kingdom. Together with returnees from the United States and Canada, they form 88.7 per cent of returnees.

In the United Kingdom, “following on the 7/7 and 21/7 terrorist attacks in London much of the policy concerns have been expressed on the apparent unwillingness of some of the second generation of migrant groups to fully integrate into the nation” (Reynolds 2012, p.13). There is the sense that the second generation in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have not progressed as well as their counterparts in the United States. Indeed, second generation migrants in the United Kingdom are affected by high rates of youth unemployment, overrepresentation in the criminal justice system and in mental institutions, educational underachievement, and street violence (ibid). Young people with low levels of skills and educational attainment are prevented from returning, but return migration exists as a survival strategy for the privileged minority with access to social and economic resources. People also return because back in the Caribbean because they can afford private education for their children.

In the Caribbean, colour is still widely perceived as an indicator of socioeconomic status. Informally, social class is still correlated to colour, although increased opportunity and accessibility have facilitated upward social mobility in recent years. Return-migrants, regardless of their colour, often benefit from a British accent, which according to Reynolds (2012, p.19) translate into power and racialized privilege in the workplace and other professional settings over native-born residents. Nevertheless, there is much to gain from the fresh input of skilled immigrants and the commitment of returnees. It has a positive effect on social capital: “professional and skilled migrants that return to the Caribbean, take back work habits, experiences and attitudes that have benefited from the wider international professional exposure” (Thomas-Hope 2002, p.19).

North-south migration from the United States includes deportation of convicted criminals, notably young men with no legal status, some of whom left the Caribbean as a child and no longer have strong ties with the home country (Thomas-Hope, 2005). Rather than solving the problem, this simply shifts the burden.

The number of Spanish migrants towards the Dominican Republic rose from 2,430 in 2000 to 6,691 in 2010 (CEPAL 2014, p.24). Similarly, the number of United States born migrants in the Dominican Republic has risen from 3,012 to 2,4457 in 2010 (CEPAL, 2014, p.25) – it is unknown what percentage of these are second generation Dominicans. There is no information readily available on the number of foreign pensioners residing in the Caribbean region, and their contribution to development is debatable: although they spend their pension money, they do not pay taxes while enjoying public (health) infrastructure. More research is needed to gain more insight on the effect of foreign pensioners in the Caribbean.

2.5 South-South extra-regional migration

There are two types of regular and irregular south-south extra-regional migration: migration movements in which the Caribbean serves as a transit point towards North America, and migration flows with the Caribbean as its destination. The Caribbean has become an important transit point for migration flows from other parts of the world, in particular South America, and to a lesser but emerging extent, West African countries (International Observatory on Migration, 2010, p.7).

The region can be a stepping stone for irregular migrants trying to reach the United States given its location at the crossroads between North and South America, mostly for South Americans, but increasingly so for migrants coming from Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. More information is needed about the legal frameworks and operating agencies that deal with this type of migration in the different countries in the region. Irregular migrants in transit through the region are extremely vulnerable. The majority of irregular migrants moving to the Caribbean are Chinese nationals. Approximately 200,000 Chinese are smuggled to Central American and the Caribbean attempting to reach the United States (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p.6).
There is also growing presence of extra-regional immigrants in the Caribbean. The growing presence of Chinese must be understood in the framework of increasing economic interaction between China and the Caribbean Community “CARICOM”. An IOM study on migration in Trinidad and Tobago, one of the richer Caribbean countries, signals the presence of undocumented migration flows from both South America (Colombia, Venezuela) as well as Sub-Saharan Africa. Latin American and Caribbean countries are often considered less xenophobic and more receptive societies, especially for African citizens, although discrimination and exclusion are often reported (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014b, p.6). The exact size of Asian and African irregular migration is unknown as there is a lack of research on the topic.

There are significant Caribbean migrant outflows towards Asia. It is estimated that Pakistan ranks eighth among the top destination for Caribbean migrants — numbering 60,000 migrants, with around 10,000 Cubans Dominicans, Haitians and Jamaicans. The Philippines and Kuwait rank twelfth and thirteenth respectively (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013d, p.24).

2.6 Irregular migration
Too little attention has been given to irregular migration within the south. However, irregular migration is an important aspect of South-South migration. It is a sensitive topic as it undermines the legitimate functioning of government authority to regulate entry and stay of non-nationals. However, the irregular migrants are in vulnerable conditions, often denied rights and subject to many forms of mistreatment. The true depth of this phenomenon is difficult assess. The growing need for cheap labour both in the North and Latin America and the Caribbean is a driver of irregular migration. “Both sending and receiving countries have a stake in continuing the stream of undocumented migration”, writes Ferguson (2003, p.8). Within the region, irregular undocumented migration is probably much larger in size than regular, documented migration. It normally involves relatively short journeys, both illegal and dangerous, such as from Haiti to the Bahamas or from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico.

There are three movements of irregular migration in the Caribbean: extra-regional (the Caribbean as a transit region for South Americans, Asians, and Africans), intraregional from less developed to more developed countries, and irregular migration from the Caribbean to the United States and Western Europe. Irregular migration can come in three forms: overstay, human smuggling, and human trafficking. Overstay refers to entry by legal means, but overstaying the maximum period of legal stay. Human smuggling refers to irregular border crossing with the help of a paid smuggler, while human trafficking is most worrisome. Smuggling is not the cause of irregular migration, but rather a consequence of the lack of legal migration opportunities and restrictive policies. Seelke (2015) of the United States based congressional research service, writes that “smuggling is a crime against the state” (it is a violation of the migratory law) while trafficking is a “crime against a person”. Trafficking is a serious crime, a violation of human rights (Petit, 2004, p.6). Violation of human rights is often both a cause and a consequence of human trafficking.
Trafficking in persons is considered to be one of today’s leading criminal activities and is believed to affect virtually all countries across the globe (Seelke, 2015). Traffickers utilise both legal and illegal means to transport their victims, in collaboration with local networks and corrupt government officials. Internal trafficking exists as well. According to info of the OAS (IOM, 2012), over 250 thousand individuals from Latin America and the Caribbean are victims of human trafficking. 80 per cent of these are women and children. The ACP Observatory on Migration (2013, p.10) reports much higher numbers, stating that 550,000 children are trafficking victims. The Dominican Republic is mentioned as one of the five Latin American countries with major problems in relation to human trafficking. According to the Walk Free Foundation’s 2014 Global Slavery Index, the Caribbean countries with the largest number of their population subject to “modern slavery”, a practice associated with human trafficking, are Haiti, Suriname, and Guyana, but it is unknown what variables were used (Seelke, 2015). In Jamaica, being conveniently located on routes between supply and demand of drugs – drug trafficking may be entwined with human trafficking, as the narcotics trade has created a transnational trafficking network.

There is great concern for the trafficking of minors and women to islands with a huge tourist sector (Thomas-Hope, 2005), to be employed in the sex industry. There are strong indications of violence against these women and minors. Prosecution for these crimes remains patchy. Human trafficking may through prostitution also be linked to the spread of the AIDS virus (Seelke, 2015, p.7). For example, the trafficking in persons in Trinidad and Tobago, especially of females, is motivated by a high demand for sex workers and poor enforcement of existing laws. Rural mining communities in Suriname and Guyana rely upon a great deal of migrant labour, which include women offering sexual services. It is signalled as a common form of exploitation in the Caribbean (Waldrop-Bonair et al., 2013).

The US government released the Trafficking in Persons Report (2014), categorizing 187 countries into four tiers according to their efforts to combat human trafficking: Tier 1, Tier 2 (making significant efforts), Tier 2 Watch List (high number of victims, few convictions), and Tier 3 (worst, no efforts to comply with minimum standards). The results for the countries of this study are the following:

- Tier 2: Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago
- Tier 2 Watch List: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname
- Tier 3: Cuba

Another main preoccupation of irregular migration, in the last years, has been the situation of vulnerability of the migrants in transit who try to reach the United States by ship (CEPAL, 2012, p.409). The larger trajectories are carried out in large ships, while the last part is carried out in small boats to prevent detection and interception, often from the archipelago of the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands. The large part of these migrants hail from Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Recent years have seen increases in Cuban boat departures to the United States (Van Selm, 2015). Unlike irregular Cuban migrants, other nationalities cannot expect to gain US citizenship. The Bahamas stopped 9000 people in 2000 and the first 8 months of 2001, averaging 450 people per month. In the same period, Turks and Caicos Islands stopped an average of 119 people per month (Thomas-Hope, 2005).

Approximately 200,000 Chinese nationals are smuggled into the region every year in the framework of the increasing economic interaction between CARICOM and China (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p.15), and thousands of overstaying Brazilians work in illegal gold mines in the south of Suriname. Hundreds of Haitians cross the border with the Dominican Republic on a daily basis, irregularly hired. Estimates of Haitians crossing the border vary between 500,000 and 700,000 people in the past decade, of which only 4,000 held a visa or work permit (ACP Observatory on Migration 2014, p.15). Although the Dominican Republic deploys irregular Haitians and their descendants, there is no information available with regard to the Dominican Republic preventing the irregular emigration of its own nationals Ferguson, 2003).

New irregular migration routes are also signalled. For example, in 2013, the number of refugee demands in Brazil increased in 600 per cent and the number Haitian migrants to Brazil tripled (Marcel & Stochero, 2013). Today, the Brazilian government estimates that 21,000 Haitians live illegally in Brazil. They enter one of the Andean countries and travel via smugglers through Amazonia. Expenses range from USD 2,000 to 4,500, not including the bribes they have to pay to local officials (Harumi Miura, 2014). A possible explanation of increased Haitian migration to Brazil could be the leading Brazilian presence in the UN peacekeeping mission stationed in Haiti.
3. Migration and development in the Caribbean — Challenges and opportunities

3.1 Human rights violations

Today, citizenship is based on the understanding that rights and political membership are linked to being a member of a nation-state, which may exclude immigrants. Irregular migrants commonly have very few rights under domestic law, and this often goes combined with stereotyping and the framing newcomers as threats to the national identity — especially when the host country suffers from conditions of social stress such as real or imagined competition for jobs. Reconciling these disparate elements of human rights of migrants and sovereignty has not been very successful so far (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013, p. 5).

Nevertheless, migrants, just as ordinary citizens, are entitled to fundamental rights as human beings. These rights are recorded in a number of international treaties that protect certain subgroups of migrants such as women, children, IDPs, refugees, and victims of trafficking. A key issue in international migration law is ratification versus implementation of treaties. If a law is ratified, national laws must be amended if necessary to meet the obligations of the international law. Even if this happens, the political will or capacity may lack to implement it. As a consequence, migrants — especially irregular migrants — are vulnerable and their rights often violated.

The Caribbean region is no exception to this situation. Intra-regional migration in the Caribbean is characterised by some cases of discrimination and xenophobia, with “the receiving societies perceiving immigrants as poor and inferior — demonstrating similar prejudices to societies in other parts of the world” (Ferguson 2003, p.2). Due to their vulnerable condition, many migrants end up getting involved in the informal sectors of the economy where they face abuse and violation of their rights as a result of their irregular status (ACP Observatory on Migration 2013a, p.9). The contribution of these migrants to the societies of origin and adoption needs to be recognized, as well as the protection and realization of their human rights as established by national and international legislation, in order to ensure that the individual migrant has a secure and productive life, and to respect the rule of law and a well-functioning society. Without the protection of human rights the human development potential of migration will be hampered. The regional level of adaptation of a rights-based approach is of particular importance.
Studies on the topic stress the importance of a "rights-based" policy approach to migration. Education, healthcare, and the right to work are to be seen as entitlements of all inhabitants, including migrants. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights also considered that undocumented workers cannot be discriminated against in the enjoyment of their labour and social security rights (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013a, p.8). However, this is at tension with the fact that many migrants work abroad in the first place because they are a cheaper workforce (companies do not pay taxes or benefits for unregistered workers for example). As described by Taran (2009), there is "a tension between the protection of migrant’s rights and the inherent logic of the neoliberal profit-maximisation dictum". This tension is observable both in industrialized states in the North as well as in Caribbean countries.

The international convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) suffers from a lack of implementation, and it is recommended to ratify this convention given the migration issues faced by the region. The law covers the entire migration process of migrant workers and their families: preparation, recruitment, departure and transit, employment, return, and resettlement (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p.i). Currently, of the countries included in this study, the convention is only ratified by Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

A human rights-based approach to trafficking is also needed, which includes protection and assistance to victims. Trafficking can also be countered by promoting regular migration channels and the rights of migrant workers. Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Suriname have passed counter-trafficking legislations (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2014, p.133). Trinidad and Tobago approved the Policy Framework laying the ground for legislation in 2010. The OAS is organizing, facilitating and implementing training programs, anti-trafficking policies, and exchange of best practices to assist member states in anti-trafficking efforts.

Particularly worrisome is the human rights situation of Haitian migrants (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013), who bear the brunt of discrimination in the Caribbean. Although they are employed in many Caribbean countries as a cheap source of labour, they are reports of them being framed as "uncivilized" and "inferior" (Ferguson, 2003). In September 2013, the Dominican Constitutional Court determined that individuals who are unable to prove their parents’ regular migration status can be retroactively stripped of their Dominican citizenship (AFL-CIO 2014, p.3). By the country’s own calculations, 244,151 people in the country were born to foreign parents, and approximately 86 per cent of them are of Haitian descent. Children born to Haitian immigrants faced illegality and statelessness, although Haitian descendants have lived in the Dominican Republic for decades. This denial of nationality has brought many conflicts, as it is denying the right to equality before the law, to a name, to recognition of their legal personality — rights which are set out in the American Convention on Human Rights (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013a, p.13). In 2014, the Government of the Dominican Republic crafted legislation to reverse a previous decision which rendered people born in the Dominican Republic of Haitian parents stateless. However, the situation remains problematic. About 200,000 people cannot prove their place of birth (Van Selm 2015, p.18), and regular large-scale deportation exercises have regularly been observed.

The precarious human rights situation of many Haitians abroad is not limited to the Caribbean: an investigation in Brazil found Haitians working in conditions of exploitation in a mining site controlled by the multinational company Anglo American (Wrobleski, 2014, from Harumi Miura, 2014). Many Haitian immigrants are unemployed, and Brazil’s social security is not ready to cover unemployed migrants. In the Bahamas as well as other Caribbean destinations of Haitian migrants, the situation is presumably similar.

### 3.2 Brain drain & replacement

A number of developed countries have liberalized their policies for the admission of highly skilled professionals. This demand is largely met by developing countries, triggering an exodus of skilled personnel (Thomas-Hope, 2002). Some authors have stated that recruitment campaigns in countries such as Jamaica appear to have fuelled senses of ‘mass hysteria’ or negative feelings on the availability of opportunities in countries of origin and encouraged persons to be part of the migrant movement (Thomas-Hope 2002, p.28). As such, the Caribbean is currently experiencing a new wave of recruitment of both skilled personnel and students. No official data is available on these migrations. The United Kingdom and United States are recruiting skilled personnel (teachers, nurses) as well as recruiting students. Thomas-Hope (2000, p.1) points out that the departure of a large number of migrants is likely to create deficits in the reservoir of human resources, which has potential negative effects for national development.

There are several factors that affect the impact of skilled labour emigration (Thomas-Hope, 2002, p.1). Caribbean nations need to be conscious of these factors to maintain a balance. These factors include:

- the scale of the movement,
- the process of migrant selectivity,
- size of source countries (small countries are more vulnerable to the effects of brain drain),
- the costs of public education (emigration of recently graduated highly skilled people means a loss of investment in education),
- the country’s ability to replace the loss of qualified workforce through skill replacement by educated immigrants, and the ability of the country to compensate for through the inflow of other sources of capital (financial and social),
- the opportunities foregone (capacity building based on human resources).

There are several factors that affect the impact of skilled labour emigration (Thomas-Hope, 2002, p.1). Caribbean nations need to be conscious of these factors to maintain a balance. These factors include:
Brain-drain is signalled to have an especially significant impact on countries such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Santa Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Guyana (Thomas-Hope, 2005). The shock that these small countries have to absorb, by suddenly losing a part of their skilled workforce, is considerable. When the system is not able to cope with the “brain drain effect” this may have a disproportionate negative impact upon the poor.

Thomas-Hope (2002, p. 18) gives the example of nurses in Jamaica: while the country had over 3000 in 1970s, by 1988 fewer than 1000 remained. The majority of nurses – who left after targeted recruiting by the US – did not return to work in Jamaica. The outflow of nurses had a high impact on Jamaica, but was eventually partially filled with recruitment of nurses from Trinidad & Tobago – a country with an excess of nurses. ECLAC (2006) presents a case study of emigration of nurses from Trinidad & Tobago. It mentions how a series of push factors (unfavourable working conditions, lack of recognition, etc.) combined with the growing shortage of qualified nurses in the North – along with the benefits of working in the UK or the US – led to a massive emigration of nurses. The exodus of nurses is worrisome: the health systems of the Caribbean countries are already under pressure by an ageing population and a continuing spread of the HIV/AIDS virus.

As written by Thomas-Hope (2000, p.10)

"The loss of skilled persons from any Caribbean country results in the need to fill high level occupational vacancies from other migrants, either from other parts of the region or outside. The pattern that emerges appears to reflect movement between countries in a developmental hierarchy to be sure, but this must not be interpreted in a simplistic way to suggest mono-causal explanations for the pattern of movement. The issue is whether the overall migration process produces a net loss or net gain for the countries affected”.

Transit countries, in response to evolving policies in the North, can often become final destination countries (ACP Observatory on Migration 2013, p.i). A report of the ACP Observatory on Migration (2013) mentions the example of African health professionals who migrate to the Caribbean to replace Caribbean doctors who have migrated to the United States. While many migrants to the North end up carrying out jobs under their educational level, their potential is fully recognised within the South, making high the development potential of diasporas in the South.

Migration of professionals to the North, whether their knowledge is used or not in their destination (the image of the engineer becoming a taxi driver), spurs intraregional migration and other South-South migration movements to fill the gaps. The sending country has a poor negotiating position at the national level, even though its migrants are valued for their labour at their destinations. The prospects for the migration of skilled human resources from the Caribbean must be taken into account in development plan-

3.3 Natural Environment and Migration

Human society and therefore human migration cannot be seen in isolation from the natural world. Environmental factors have always influenced human migration, and will continue to do so. In this section we give attention to three separate processes and events that may spur migration or impact migration patterns: natural disasters (a local event with local impacts), local depletion of natural resources (a local process with local impacts), and climate change (a global process with local impacts). On a whole, it is recognised that environmental change – whether caused by global climate change or the local depletion of resources – does not directly displace people, but the impact of environmental degradation on rural livelihoods is expected to cause higher volumes or internal rural-rural and ultimately rural-urban population movements (ACP Observatory on Migration 2013, p.5). Natural disasters, on the other hand, are abrupt and may cause instant displacements and spur immediate migration movements.

The Caribbean is a region home to the risk of natural disasters such as floods, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes and earthquakes. These events cause both internally displaces persons (IDP) and may provoke international migration. It is possible that these occurrences link to the decrease of employment in agricultural activities, contributing to urbanization (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2010, p.16). The impact of extreme weather events or seismic activities on small and/or impoverished Caribbean nations can be devastating. In 2009, Grenada was still suffering from the aftermath of the hurricane of 2005, even though the country had been considered to be below the hurricane belt (IOM 2009, p.43). No natural disaster in the Caribbean history can match the impact that the January 2010 earthquake had on Haiti. It provoked the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of people into refugee camps, creating long-term vulnerabilities due to the lack of employment, access to resources and health (ACP Observatory on Migration 2013, p.53). The disaster left half a million injured, more than a million homeless, with the official death toll being as high as 230,000. The earthquake became an instant push factor, causing a sharp increase in emigration from Haiti. The effects of the earthquake will continue to resonate years after the event.

Research on the local depletion of resources has predominantly been focused on Haiti and the island of Hispaniola. As agriculture is the main economic activity in the rural areas of the island, it has become the main driver of spatial differentiation. Agricultural activity has expanded to the slopes of the mountains, without using practices that con-
serve the soil (Wooding & Morales 2014, p. 14). A study by Wooding and Morales in the Nalga de Maco National Park in the Dominican Republic has shown that environmental degradation (deforestation, lack of potable water) has compromised the livelihood of rural households. Wooding and Morales show that migrants are blamed, although they work on lands they do not own. In Haiti, the extent of environmental degradation is considerably worse than in the Dominican Republic — vast tracts of once fertile land have been reduced to desert by tree felling for charcoal and by the farming — and exhausting — of marginal land (Ferguson 2003, 9). A link between environmental degradation and migration in Haiti is plausible: rural population pressures on arable land are the cause of a rural-urban migration flow, which in turn leads to outward migration (Wooding & Morales 2014, p. 14).

Climate change is a long term phenomenon but its effects will be felt worldwide. By 2100 it may displace between 25 million and 1 billion people, unreasonably many of them from developing countries. 9 out of 10 extreme environmental events are argued to be related to climate change (IOM, 2009, p. 30): extreme meteorological events such as hurricanes, cyclones and floods will occur more often in the Caribbean (IOM, 2008, p.12). Other extreme weather events, including droughts and heat waves, are expected to arise more often as well (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013, p.13). Mayor rainfalls may cause landslides in hilly areas. A study commissioned by IOM (2008, p.28) draws on three speculative scenarios of global sustainability, created by IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). In the best case scenario, about 10 million people will be affected by coastal floods worldwide. In the worst case scenario, sea levels will rise between 29 and 59 centimetres: the number of people affected by floods will rise from 160 million per year in 2050 to 420 million per year in 2100, while desertification will render other areas inhabitable. In the Caribbean, where over half of the population lives within 1.5 kilometres from the coast, it is undeniable that the effects of rising sea levels will be felt. As many Caribbean countries are small island states, depending on the scale of the disaster people may not be able to seek refuge in their own country.

Caribbean states are recommended to strengthen cooperation across the different policy domains in the development and implementation of early warning systems as well as disaster risk reduction strategies. It is vital that the human security challenge is addressed and linked to climate change and local environmental degradation; and Caribbean states are recommended to strengthen interstate and multi-stakeholder cooperation (involving relevant civil society organisations such as the Red Cross) in order to cope with these processes.

3.4 Remittance flows and diaspora organisations

Remittances

According to CEPAL (2007, p. 42) an increasing percentage of GDP of the Caribbean countries is represented by remittances: the proportion went up from 3 per cent in 1990 to 2 per cent in 2002. Jamaica and Haiti are amongst the countries that benefit most from remittances worldwide. Haiti’s percentage of GDP by remittances was 16 per cent in 2009 (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2011, p.5), now it has risen to 21 per cent. Considering the low monthly income in some countries, such as Haiti, the receipt of remittances can easily double one’s income. In Jamaica, many receive remittances not only from family members, but also significant amount from friends. Remittances inflows are much higher than ODA (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2011, 5; World Bank 2015). The following table shows the amount of remittances proportionate to each country’s GDP, demonstrating that Jamaica (57%), Guyana (41%) and the Dominican Republic (37%) also receive considerable amounts of remittances relative to their GDP. On the Bahamas and Cuba, no data is available.

In absolute amounts, the total inflow and outflow of remittances is given in the following table:
Migration in the Caribbean: current trends, opportunities and challenges

As shown in this table, Caribbean countries are predominantly receiving countries of remittances. The Dominican Republic receives most remittances by far: USD 4.65 billion in 2014; then Jamaica, receives USD 2.26 billion, followed by Haiti (USD 1.9 billion). The United States is the main source of remittances, while in Europe Spain (23%) and Italy (28%) are the main European sources of remittances heading to Latin American and the Caribbean (World Bank, 2015) – in the Caribbean region mostly destined for the Dominican Republic.

The ACP countries, remittance outflows have increased tenfold over the past decade, which is a direct result of greater intraregional migration. However, remittance inflows still exceed outflows, with a few notable exceptions such as Suriname and the Bahamas. The Dominican Republic is the main regional source of remittances, of which USD 4.28 million (52%) goes toward Haiti. Belize is a net sender of remittances, mostly to Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. The Bahamas also sends a considerable amount of remittances – USD 92 million, of which 48 million is remitted to Haiti.

Remittances come in prior to, or with, the return migration. Return migrants who wish to retire in their home country typically repatriate savings, and continue receiving pensions from abroad. Contracts between governments allow recipient countries to benefit from the remittances sent by their emigrants: for example, the Ministry of Labour in Jamaica had a periodic agreement with the US, that 23 per cent of short term worker earnings in US sugar cane industry were automatically transferred to a bank in Jamaica as part of a mandatory savings plan (Thomas-Hope, 2000, p.9).

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### Table 10: Remittance inflow and outflow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remittances Received in 2014 (USD millions)</th>
<th>Remittances sent in 2014 (USD millions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>4650</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2264</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is believed that remittance flows toward the Caribbean could be up to 50 per cent higher if the money sent through unofficial channels would be accounted for in the official statistics. The high transfer costs remain an obstacle for migrants sending money through official channels: in the Latin America and Caribbean region, the average costs of sending money via money transfer operations is 8 per cent (WB 2015). In-kind transfers are especially feasible with migrants from Haiti working seasonally in the Dominican Republic.

The World Bank (2015, p. 4) expects a growth of remittances by 2.3 per cent for 2015 for Latin America and the Caribbean, and 3.9 per cent for the two subsequent years. With the recent depreciation of the Euro, remittances sent from Europe are expected to be of less worth in dollars. However, most remittances are sent from the United States, while the Dollar is experiencing a strong recovery (ibid, p.8).

### Diaspora Organisations

In countries with a large enough diaspora community, it is not uncommon to find diaspora organizations: initiatives and gatherings of the diaspora community that run charity projects in their homeland. These collective remittances help public infrastructure and social projects. Such philanthropy is widely practiced by diaspora members, although these activities are not always organized or systematically planned. For the United States, estimations of the amount of money channelled through charity vary from 1.9 per cent to 5.4 per cent of income. For other countries, no information is available. There is little information available on the size or the impact of social projects run by diaspora organisations. Orozco (2003:5) signals that about 183 Guyanese diaspora organisations exist in the United States and Canada, concentrated on charitable work. They tend to have a small economic base, which fundraise under USD 20,000 a year. However, they continue to operate and grow in the future. Reynolds (2012:10) is critical about the role diaspora organisations may play in the Caribbean:

“My own analysis of the interview data points to a general feeling by respondents that it is the responsibility of the government to develop the country’s infrastructure and generate productive investments opportunities (…) individuals or hometown associations overseas, as well as migrants who have returned, ‘should not be relied upon to generate productive investment towards collective economic development’.”

However, it remains an under-researched topic that requires more attention. In those countries where migrants are engaged in such activities, it may be interesting for governments to channel collective remittances through programs that offer matching funding (World Bank, 2015, p.15).
4. Institutional and Legal context

In this section we discuss the national and international legislative framework concerning migration. We begin this section by taking a look at the interstate organisations and treaties that affect migration in the Caribbean, of which CARICOM is the most important one. We move on by providing an overview of the international conventions signed by the Caribbean states of this study. In the last part of this chapter an analysis of national legislation, on topics regarding migration, is provided.

4.1. Interstate organisations

The most relevant regional collaboration initiative is CARICOM: the Caribbean Community, established in 1973 with the Treaty of Chaguaramas in Trinidad and Tobago, with the purpose of facilitating increased cooperation and economic integration between its member states. It has 15 member states in total and 5 associate members: of the countries in this study, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago are member states. Haiti’s membership was shortly suspended following the political crisis of 2004, while the Dominican Republic is one of the observers. The Caribbean Single Market Economy (CSME) went into effect in 2005, an initiative aiming at further integration of assets, services, capital, and job markets.

Article 45 of the revised Free Movement Protocol, part of the CSME, establishes the compromise of its member states to allow the free movement of its nationals within the community. Article 46 restricts this to eleven categories of skilled migrants: university graduates, artists, musicians, media workers, sportspersons, teachers, nurses, those who hold associate degrees or equivalent qualifications, artisans with a Caribbean Vocational Qualification, and household domestics with a CVQ or equivalent qualification. Thomas-Hope (2005) observes that its member states are reluctant to allow for free passage of all its inhabitants. The implementation of the CMSE has generated some degree of anxiety about the potential negative impacts of population mobility. For example, Haitians require a visa to travel to other CARICOM states because of the fear of an influx of Haitians. More recently, there has been an increased requirement for Jamaicans to obtain visas for the purpose of intra-Caribbean travel. Some member states have been deporting irregular Caribbean Community nationals (Fraser and Uche, 2010). There are no in-depth studies available that analyse and evaluate the recent situation of the application of the treaty.
Another relevant organisation is the Organisation of East Caribbean States, composed of 7 full members, including Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as three associate members (countries lacking complete sovereignty). It was established in 1981, with the intention of being complementary to CARICOM. Its member states use a common currency, the East Caribbean Dollar, and allow the free movement of its nationals and their labour. The last regional initiative is the Association of Caribbean States: it has 25 full members, including all the countries taken into account in this study, and 7 associate members. Its aim is to be a platform for increased regional cooperation on a number of issues such as security, disaster risk reduction and environment, and economic integration. However, its initiatives are not binding and its success is debated. Another interstate platform of dialogue and cooperation is the Commonwealth of Nations, mainly composed of Great Britain and its former colonies. Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago are members. Some migration benefits exist between Commonwealth states. With respect to regional challenges such as disaster risk management and human trafficking, IOM (2005, p.43) recommends the creation and strengthening of regional taskforces to perform monitoring and assistance functions in the regions, and to ensure the implementation of model laws.

4.2 International Conventions
This section provides an overview of the international treaties and conventions, signed by the countries of this study, which protect essential migrant rights. The most relevant treaty body is the International Convention for the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families. However, it has only been ratified by four countries: Belize (2001), Guyana (2010), Jamaica (2008) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2010) (CEPAL, 2012). Another important convention, the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949), important to address human trafficking, is only ratified by Cuba and Haiti. It is recommended that all Caribbean states ratify this treaty to prevent and to be able to adequately deal with human rights violations. Other treaty bodies, such as ILO Convention No. iii, against discrimination in employment and occupation, could be invoked by those facing discrimination in the workplace, or by victims of human trafficking and forced labour, and those migrants who identify themselves as minorities can claim rights set out in the UN Declaration on Minorities (Ferguson, 2003, p.2). Additionally, Declaration of the Third Summit of the Americas established the commitment of governments to “strengthen mechanisms for hemispheric cooperation to address the legitimate needs of migrants and take effective measures against trafficking in human beings” (IOM, 2005, p.13). A full list of international treaty bodies relevant to the different aspects of migration (labour, discrimination, smuggling, exploitation, etc.) can be found in the following table. See [Pag 62-66]

4.3 National policies and legislations
According to ECLAC (2006a) “Caribbean countries seem to be generally rather reluctant to integrate foreign migrants into their societies”, seeking to avoid permanent immigration. In particular, many countries legislate against the entry of certain persons such as prostitutes. However, it is difficult to see how an immigrant officer might be able to determine with certainty which entrants are intending to become prostitutes or “engaging in immoral sexual acts” (IOM, 2005). Meanwhile, “tax breaks and investment opportunities along with economic citizenship programmes are used as incentives to attract foreign investment capital either through returning retirees or business people from the region” (ECLAC, 2006, p.93), which means that not all types of immigration are discouraged.

Some countries have arrangements with foreign governments regarding migration. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are supporting recruitment dries by the British government for the enlistment of young males into the armed forces. Jamaica and Santa Lucia have agreements with the US and Canada on a temporary basis. The Bahamas, Guyana and Jamaica all regulate the recruitment of foreign workers (IOM, 2005, p.22), and prohibit recruiting people under 18.

Countries deal differently with irregular migration and human rights issues. Once authorized to work, all the employments laws in the state protect the migrant worker, but this is certainly not the case for unauthorized migrant workers and victims of trafficking or abuse. In the Bahamas, an employer may face charges of up to USD 5000 for using child labour; in Guyana the fee is only USD 30 for a first offence. Relatively new are the deportations of irregular migrants, and the call for the establishment of policies to cope with those who were deported back to their home country and have no social network to count on — a potential risk for the country of origin. Some examples of good practices include the creation of shelters in the Dominican Republic for returned women who were trafficked for sexual exploitation purposes, and language training programs in the Bahamas. Antigua and Barbuda, and Suriname, for health and social workers in order to communicate with migrants from non-English/Dutch speaking countries (ECLAC, 2006, p.10).

In the following section we compare national laws of the selected countries on a number of migration related topics: Fundamental rights, citizenship, entry requirements and deportation, residency, recruitment of labour, work permits, legislation on trafficking and refugees, and return migrant benefits. Not every country is treated in every section, because a) some countries lack specific regulations and b) we were unable to access a limited number of laws. The researchers have been unable to acquire copies of the Vincentian “Recruitment of Workers Act” (which presumably is similar to the act under the same name of Antigua and Barbuda), “Immigration (restriction) Act” and “Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens (Employment) Act”. However, it is likely that these acts have in general terms the same content as other Caribbean Commonwealth nations
### Table II: Ratification of International Conventions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention/Country</th>
<th>Antigua and Barbuda</th>
<th>The Bahamas</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavery Convention (1956)</td>
<td>Ratified 29th of October 1986</td>
<td>Signed 16th of June 1996</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ratified 28th of June 1996</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Guayana
- Signed 19th of July 1980
- Ratified 20th of June 1980

### Haiti
- Signed 19th of July 1980
- Ratified 17th of June 1981

### Jamaica
- Signed 19th of July 1980
- Ratified 17th of June 1981

### Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
- Signed 19th of July 1980
- Ratified 17th of June 1981

### Suriname
- Signed 19th of July 1980
- Ratified 17th of June 1981

### Trinidad and Tobago
- Signed 19th of July 1980
- Ratified 17th of June 1981

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Migration in the Caribbean: current trends, opportunities and challenges
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention/Country</th>
<th>Antigua and Barbuda</th>
<th>The Bahamas</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ratified 4th of September 1952</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified 27th of November 1956</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ratified 4th of January 1952</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed 9th of April 2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified 6th of September 2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2003)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed 9th of April 2001</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Ratified 26th of September 2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed 16th of May 1995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed 16th of December 1995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992)</td>
<td>Ratified</td>
<td>Ratified</td>
<td>Ratified</td>
<td>Ratified</td>
<td>Ratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: ILO, UN, OAS.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ratification Dates

**Guyana**
- Ratified 26th of August 1953
- Ratified 26th of September 1953
- Ratified 30th of October 1950
- Ratified 30th of July 1944
- Ratified 27th of November 1978
- Ratified 6th of November 2007

**Haiti**
- Ratified 27th of September 1953
- Ratified 30th of September 1953
- Ratified 3rd of November 2003
- Ratified 27th of November 1978
- Ratified 6th of November 2007

**Jamaica**
- Ratified 27th of September 1953
- Ratified 30th of September 1953
- Ratified 3rd of November 2003
- Ratified 27th of November 1978
- Ratified 6th of November 2007

**Saint Vincent and the Grenadines**
- Ratified 27th of September 1953
- Ratified 30th of September 1953
- Ratified 3rd of November 2003
- Ratified 27th of November 1978
- Ratified 6th of November 2007

**Suriname**
- Ratified 27th of September 1953
- Ratified 30th of September 1953
- Ratified 3rd of November 2003
- Ratified 27th of November 1978
- Ratified 6th of November 2007

**Trinidad and Tobago**
- Ratified 27th of September 1953
- Ratified 30th of September 1953
- Ratified 3rd of November 2003
- Ratified 27th of November 1978
- Ratified 6th of November 2007

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**Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949)**
- Ratified 4th of September 1952
- Ratified 4th of January 1952

**Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)**
- Ratified 4th of September 1952
- Ratified 4th of January 1952

**Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Status of Refugees (1967)**
- Ratified 4th of September 1952
- Ratified 4th of January 1952

- Ratified 4th of September 1952
- Ratified 4th of January 1952

**Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2003)**
- Ratified 4th of September 1952
- Ratified 4th of January 1952

- Ratified 4th of September 1952
- Ratified 4th of January 1952

**UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992)**
- Ratified 4th of September 1952
- Ratified 4th of January 1952
Acts under the same names, such as Jamaica’s. Also, we have been unable to obtain a migration or equivalent law for Haiti. Excerpts from the laws analysed (Constitutions, migration laws, etc.) can be found in annex B. Where applicable, their translation into English was made by the authors of this report.

**Equaliity and Freedom from Discrimination**

The constitutions of all countries, except for Haiti and Cuba, grant the following fundamental rights and freedoms to every individual on national territory: equality before the law and freedom from discrimination based on nationality, colour, race, or origin. The constitutions of Belize, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname also explicitly prohibit servitude and forced labour. The Haitian constitution however grants such rights only to its citizens, and Cuba’s constitution — based on collective values — makes no mention of such individual rights.

**Citizenship**

Citizenship is relevant in the context of migration because it is not always guaranteed that who is born in a certain country, gains its nationality. Immigrants’ children therefore may be considered immigrants as well — not citizens. The attainment of citizenship is generally divided along two principles: the jus soli principle, which refers to citizenship based on birth on national soil; and the jus sanguinis principle, which refers to citizenship based on heritage. Combinations of the two principles are also possible. In most countries under study — that is Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Cuba, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago — both principles apply. This is so that every person (with exceptions such as diplomatic staff) who is born on these countries’ territories is a citizen of the respective country, as well as persons born abroad to these country’s citizens.

The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic have similar — but slightly different — systems. In the Bahamas, children born to foreigners do not automatically receive Bahamian citizenship. However, they can apply for citizenship at the age of 18. Concerning children born abroad, Bahamian citizenship is only automatically granted to children born to a Bahamian father — those born to a Bahamian mother can apply when turning 18.

Citizenship in the Dominican Republic is ambiguous. Although people born abroad to Dominican parents, as well as children born in the Dominican Republic, are constitutionally Dominicans, the Constitution was amended in 2010 to redefine irregular migrants as being in transit. Following the amendment, a court ruling judged that any person born to "migrants in transit", retroactively up to 1929, would be stripped of his/her citizenship rights. This affected some 200,000 children of Haitian migrants born in the Dominican Republic. These "Haitian Dominicans" can apply for residency — requiring them to give up their Dominican citizenship demand, but their children can in turn apply for naturalisation.

In Suriname and Haiti, citizenship is granted to persons born to Surinamese parents, regardless of place of birth. The jus soli principle does not apply at all, nevertheless in Suriname the principle is applied to children who would otherwise be stateless (e.g. foundlings).

Dual citizenship is recognised by Belize, the Dominican Republic, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname (however not officially). All countries allow a foreigner to obtain citizenship through marriage with a citizen, and other nationalisation procedures exist. Generally, Commonwealth citizens, after spending a number of years as a resident, are able to apply for citizenship in other Commonwealth nations, and Antigua and Barbuda offers everyone who has been a resident for at least 7 years the possibility to apply for citizenship. Citizenship by naturalisation can in all cases be revoked under certain circumstances (severe crimes, war with country of origin), and in the case of Cuba the state regains the right to revoke the citizenship of all that “conspire and act against the people of Cuba and its socialist and revolutionary institutions (…)” (Constitution, art. 32c).

The following table summarises citizenship per country:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Jus Sanguinis</th>
<th>Jus Soli</th>
<th>Dual Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Constitutions of all countries of this report

**Residency**

In all countries, potential immigrants have to apply for a residency permit — temporal and renewable — as explained in each country’s migration law. This permit does not automatically grant the right to work. However, specific rules exist for each country, including the length of the permit (usually valid for one to two years). In all cases it will work in the resident’s favour to be married to someone with legal residency or a citizen; in the Bahamas, a resident who is married to a Bahamian citizen automatically has the right to work. However, specific rules exist for each country, including the length of the permit (usually valid for one to two years). In all cases it will work in the resident’s favour to be married to someone with legal residency or a citizen; in the Bahamas, a resident who is married to a Bahamian citizen automatically has the right to work as well. In Trinidad and Tobago, the Immigration Act (art. 6A) permits residency to highly skilled and entrepreneurial potential immigrants.
Entry Requirements and Deportation

Normally, foreigners wishing to enter any country require at least a passport—or identification cards within the CSME zone. Additional visa requirements depend upon bilateral agreements. Commonwealth citizens and CARICOM citizens, as a general rule, do not require a visa to travel within the region. Every country places additional restraints on the entry of foreigners. To begin, in all cases, those wishing to enter have to have sufficient means to sustain their stay, cannot be a charge on public funds, should not be part of a terrorist organisation, have a criminal record, or be a threat to public order and stability. The commonwealth nations have additional entry requirements—their immigration laws are largely the same. All commonwealth countries—as well as the Dominican Republic—forget the entry of mentally ill, prostitutes, and those living off the proceeds of prostitution. The immigration law of Trinidad and Tobago is most extensive in this respect, and determines that “idiots”, “imbeciles”, “insane”, “demented”, “feebleminded”, “disease-afflicted”, “dumb”, “blind”, “deaf”, “physically defective or handicapped”, “prostitutes”, “homosexuals”, “those living off the proceeds of prostitutes and homosexuals”, “beggars and vagrants”, “drug addicts”, and “drug traffickers” are prohibited migrants. In all cases, definitions are lacking—it is the immigration officer’s task to determine who might be a prostitute, beggar, homosexual, or drug dealer—something which can be impossible to determine on sight. With prostitution being illegal in most countries, and drug use and trafficking in all countries for understandable reasons, these entry requirements are justifiable. However, homosexuality as such is no prostitution and whether or not someone is homosexual is a private concern. These laws seem to be discriminatory towards physically or mentally disabled people.

Particularities also exist. In Suriname, Guyana and Jamaica, all persons entering the country must thereafter register themselves at a migration or police office. In Guyana, this excludes US residents and those entering by land wishing to stay for a maximum of 2 weeks in the country. Cuba is the only country that has placed restrictions on the ability of Cubans to exit the country. In recent years, a series of modifications to the Migration Law have made it more difficult for Cuban nationals to obtain a passport and travel abroad legally. Possibly, this lack of legal options of travelling abroad is an explanation of the increase of irregular boat departures to the US.

Irregular status and deportation

Migrants in the Commonwealth nations, Suriname and the Dominican Republic are often seen as “prohibited” or “unwanted” migrants. This includes those who have entered the country irregularly, have overstayed their permitted period of stay, or have committed acts that render them a prohibited migrant (e.g., prostitution, drug trade, homosexual behaviour). Irregular status is considered an offence under all migration laws. Every state retains the right to deport irregular, “unwanted” or “prohibited migrants”. In Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas and Guyana, all migrants facing a deportation order have the right to appeal. In the Dominican Republic only “legal foreigners” may appeal; in Suriname only those claiming to be a refugee; in Trinidad and Tobago only citizens and residents. In Belize and Jamaica no appeals can be made; for Cuba and Haiti we were unable to determine whether or not an appeal can be made. The Haitian constitution specifically mentions that foreigners meddling with Haitian political issues can be expelled.

Recruitment of labour

In Antigua and Barbuda, the emigrant protection law, from 1929, gives the country an important degree of control over the recruitment of its nationals for foreign labour—however, in the digital age it may need updating to account for online recruiting. The Bahamas and Jamaica have a Recruiting of Workers Act (1901 and 1940 respectively) that serves the same goal. However, the law has not been enacted in recent memory (Thom-as-Hope et al. 2012). It is unknown if the law is enacted in Antigua and Barbuda and the Bahamas.

The other countries included in this study do not have a law for this purpose.

Work permits

Although we did not obtain information from Cuba and Haiti, all other countries issue (temporary) work permits for (temporary) resident migrants, which usually have to be requested by the employer together with the potential employee. These permits are sometimes regulated by migration law, sometimes by labour law, and in the case of Guyana, there is no formalised work permit policy. Within the CARICOM region, work permits are not required for skilled professionals—with the exception of Haitian professionals. In the Bahamas and Suriname, work permits are only issued when it is concluded that there is not a sufficient domestic supply of skills for the labour in question. Similarly, in the Dominican Republic a “Migration Council” decides which sectors of the economy need what amount of migrant labour.

Legislation on human trafficking

Of the countries considered in this study, only the constitutions of Belize, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname explicitly outlaw slavery, forced labour and servitude. Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago have anti-trafficking laws. In these laws trafficking is punished regardless of whether the country is source, transit, or destination country, regardless of the consent and background of the victim, and trafficking victims are offered measures of protection. The anti-trafficking law of Trinidad and Tobago does not grant to trafficking victims immunity from crimes committed as part of their trafficked status, and in the Dominican Republic trafficking victims may only be granted immunity if he/she is willing to provide sufficient information to the authorities.
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has no anti-trafficking legislation. However, the Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act (Cap 148) could be invoked in case of trafficking and exploitation of women and minors. In 2004, Haiti ratified a decree law to prevent and punish the trafficking of minors, which takes into account any abuse of vulnerability and exploitation, not limited to sexual exploitation. However, an encompassing law that punishes the trafficking of adults in conditions of vulnerability is still lacking. In the Bahamas, with no anti-trafficking law, its criminal code only prohibits the abduction of minors – there is no mention of men or women (IOM, 2005, p. 23). In Jamaica, only the forced procurement of women is criminalised. There is a ten-year penalty for trafficking in children, and a maximum term for abduction of three years, but a definition of trafficking is lacking (IOM, 2005, p. 23).

In Suriname, prostitution is not illegal and sex workers are required to undergo frequent health checks. However, tolerating the sex industry does not resolve many of the trafficking issues (IOM, 2005, p. 17). Criminalization of rape is limited to that of women and girls, excluding the possibility that the victim may be male. Only the procurement of minors is criminalized (IOM, 2005, p. 20). The criminal code in trafficking in persons (former article 307) has been revised in order to comply with the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. A working group on counter-trafficking was established in 2003.

The lack of anti-trafficking laws has other repercussions on trafficking victims, apart from possible impunity for the traffickers. Under all migration laws, irregular border crossing is criminalized a priori – this implies that the weight of punishment lies with the irregular migrant – not on the individual that smuggles or traffics this person. Victims of human trafficking may therefore also be punished by the juridical system.

Legislation on refugees

The Caribbean region lacks an international legal framework on refugees. The UNHCR highlights that there is a need for establishing a legal framework for the management of refugees and asylum seekers in many Caribbean countries (UNHCR, 2007). The only countries that have clauses in their constitution or migration laws are Cuba, Haiti and Suriname. The Cuban constitution (art. 13) affirms that Cuba concedes asylum to those persecuted “in virtue of the struggle for the democratic rights of the many; for national liberation; against imperialism; fascism, colonialism and neo-colonialism; for the suppression of racial discrimination; for the rights and claims of the workers, peasants and students; for their activities politically, scientifically, artistically and literary progressive; for socialism and for peace”. The Haitian constitution is briefer, stating that “the right to asylum for political refugees is recognised” (art. 57). In Suriname, the migration law has incorporated articles (art. 10, 16 and 24) that permit the entry and residence of people who have grounded reasons of persecution for racial, religious, or political reasons.

Return migrant benefits

Only Haiti and Suriname have passed similar laws that award benefits to return migrants and their descendants: the “Act on the privileges granted to the original Haitians enjoying another nationality to their descendants” (1983) and the “Law Persons of Surinamese Descent”. The Haitian law grants its target group the right to reside and work in Haiti without a permit, the fundamental rights of Haitian citizens, and the right to acquire real estate under favourable conditions. The Surinamese law grants its target group the right to reside and work in Suriname up to 12 months without the need for permits, and to call upon the help of Surinamese consular services in any country in the world.

Other policies

Belize is the only Caribbean country reviewed that has a tailor-made law for foreign retirees (the Qualified Retired Persons (Incentives) Act). The law allows pensioners from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, who enjoy a monthly pension of at least USD 2000, to settle in Belize and import their belongings. It has yet to be researched how many people make use of this law and what benefits it brings to Belize, in addition to pension money being spent there.
5. Country overviews

In this penultimate section, we provide a series of country specific overviews, focusing on emigration destinations, immigrant origins and remittances. Where more relevant information is available, these overviews may include a brief history and detailed information. Specifically, in-depth information on migration in Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Cuba, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is scarce. Belize, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad on the Tobago, however, have been subject to detailed country studies by IOM and other institutions, which allow us to provide more in-depth information. At all overviews we present a series of graphs on immigration, emigration, and remittance flows. We produced these graphs based on data from two sources: the World Bank Bilateral Migration Index 2013 (2015) and the World Bank Bilateral Remittance Index 2014 (2015) — nevertheless, as the countries’ overviews will discuss, the data from these sources does not always coincide with other sources.

5.1 Antigua and Barbuda

A small country dependent upon the sugar industry until 1950s, the development of its tourism sector in the latter half of the 20th century has helped Antigua and Barbuda evolve into a high-income country (a GDP/capita of USD 13,342 in 2013). Being one of the smallest islands of the region — it is home to about 90,000 inhabitants — Antigua and Barbuda is very vulnerable to global economic boom and bust cycles: in 2010, in the midst of the economic crisis, economic growth of the country was about -7 per cent. By 2013, the country seems to have recovered.

As shown in the following graph, most Antiguan emigrants reside in the United States, with another significant population living in the US Virgin Islands and Canada. The remainder of migrants are living in other Caribbean islands, and surprisingly, Vietnam. The World Bank also mentions over 20,000 Antiguans living in Bangladesh — however, we cannot find any evidence supporting this and left Bangladesh out of the table.
Antigua and Barbuda is a popular destination country for other Caribbean nationals, who fill up the labour gaps created by the emigration of highly educated nationals. Fraser & Uche (2010) find that immigrants are on average younger and more highly educated than the local born population. Guyanese account for the largest number of immigrants, followed by Haitians, Jamaicans, and nationals from Dominica. The following table, based on World Bank data, gives us a different picture:

As shown, immigrants come from a wide range of different countries, mostly Guyana, Dominica and Jamaica. Haitians only account for 33 migrants. It is possible that Fraser & Uche included undocumented migrants, while World Bank data is based on official records only. In total, Antigua and Barbuda has 28,733 registered immigrants, against 35,578 registered emigrants.

Although Antigua and Barbuda has more emigrants than immigrants, it is a net sender of remittances. This could be explained by the fact that in recent years, Antigua and Barbuda has become a net recipient of immigrants, while many emigrants may have migrated years ago and no longer send regular remittances back to their country of origin.

5.2 Bahamas

The Bahamas has always been oriented towards the United States, and acts as a bridge between the Caribbean and the US. It is one of the few Caribbean countries with more immigrants than emigrants: as Bahamians left and continue to leave for the United States, Haitian immigrants alone are the primary replacement.

Remittances sent from Bahamas (Million USD, 2014)

- Haiti
- USA
- Jamaica
- Bertrand
- India
- Nigeria
- Other
In 1991, a CARICOM census found that that 76 per cent of immigrants in the Bahamas came from outside of the Caribbean region — predominantly North America and Europe (Thomas-Hope, 2000). 24 years later, the picture is quite different, with Haitians forming the main immigrant group, making up about two-thirds of all immigrants. Haitians may constitute – if taking into account the undocumented migrants – up to 25 per cent of the total population of the Bahamas, creating issues of discrimination and deportation. Children born in the Bahamas to Haitian parents may request Bahamian citizenship at the age of 18. Bennet (2006) reports an “escalating amount of animosity towards Haitians and resistance toward Haitian migration” (p.3). Bahamians predominantly migrate to the United States – a destination for over 75 per cent of its emigrants. The high rate of unemployment affecting the Bahamas (15%) may be an important push factor.

5.3 Belize

Belize is a unique Caribbean country within Central America, being sparsely populated, with English as its national language, and as the only country in the Caribbean which has developed a social security system (Petit, 2004). The country is characterized by both high rates of emigration and high rates of immigration, a considerable change in the last 30 years. According to the World Bank migration factsheet (2015), in 2013 Belize had 61,806 emigrants, most in the United States, and 50,850 immigrants, mostly from Central America. As written by ILO et al. (2012), “the Belizean scenario embodies an interaction of several migratory processes: the departure of local population toward the United States and England (…) migratory movements of both intraregional and extra-regional migrant population heading to the North of the continent; and the reception of a migrant population for countries within the region, especially from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador”. For the government of Belize, migration represents a growing challenge due to its limited capacity to establish a coordinated response to manage the existing immigrant population and deal with increasing numbers of temporary, permanent, regular and irregular migrants.
Belize continues to be a destination for migrants, with the majority emigrating from Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and El Salvador in search of work. Immigrants from developed countries are commonly investors, professionals and retirees, and other extra-continental immigrants (mostly from Asia and the Middle East) typically set up small companies such as restaurants. In addition to being a destination country, it is also a country of transit for irregular migrants from both Central America and other countries such as Colombia, Peru, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Ghana— who try to reach the United States (Petit 2004). In total, 13.75 per cent of the Belizean national population consists of immigrants. The following figure displays immigrant populations by origin:

As can be seen, over three quarters of immigrants hail from Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico. The first Central American immigrants came as refugees during the 1980s and 1990s, but migration has sustained after the end of civil wars. As written by ILO et al. (2012:42) “recent studies indicate that nearly 10 per cent of the population of Central America was living outside their native country, and a majority is motivated by economic reasons”. Migration has become a survival strategy for many Central American families. For most Central American immigrants surveyed for the ILO report, lack of employment and low salaries at home were mentioned as the main reasons influencing their decision to migrate. Feelings of insecurity and little support to the poor were also mentioned by the migrants as reasons for coming to Belize.

The first big waves of immigrants created the necessary social capital to sustain subsequent movements (ibid. p.30). Regularized immigrants, being in touch with family and friends left at home, spread information about the destination country, encouraging more to come. Belize’s GDP per capita of USD 8,486 in 2013 (World Bank, 2015) is significantly higher than the GDP per capita in the rest of the region, making it an attractive migrant destination. Immigration is further sustained by the growth of the Belizean agro-exports and processing sector — most permanent workers in banana, sugar cane, and citrus industry are Central Americans. Belizean employers that responded in research carried out for ILO et al. (2012), unanimously agreed that the reason why they contract immigrant workers is because “natives are not used to working hard”. These immigrants have together sent a total of USD 149 million to their countries of origin, as shown in figure 17.

The sustained influx of Central Americans has impacted the economic, political and cultural aspects of Belizean society (ILO et al., 2012, p.16). Some speak of the ‘Latinization’ of Belize: a drastic change in the ethnic composition of the country due to the large number of Afro-Belizeans migrating to the United States and the great number of Hispanic migrants arriving to Belize. In 1980, the mestizo population represented 33.4 per cent of the population, with 40 per cent of the population being Creole. In 2000, the Mestizo population has increased to 50 per cent and the Creole population decreased to 25 per cent (ibid, p.16).

In 1993, Palacio observed that the emigration of skilled Belizeans combined with the immigration of unskilled Central American has put an economic burden on Belizean society and has led to social problems. Simultaneously, migration has been beneficial, shoring up the population size and bringing sources of labour for the agricultural industry. The drastic shift in ethnic composition has led to some tensions with the local born population. He reports that native Belizeans have feelings of superiority toward Central Americans, and that the different groups rarely interact. Further impacts are noted: in 2000, 47 per cent of Belizean emigrants had at least a secondary or higher level of education (Petit 2014), while the majority of immigrants has a low level of education. In their survey, ILO et al. (2012, p.33) found that 19 per cent of Central American immigrants did not have any education, and 45 per cent had not completed primary education. Unsurprisingly, given these numbers, illiteracy rates were high. Furthermore, the high level of Spanish speaking families creates problems within the educational system, which is in English.
In terms of migrant’s rights, there are two main issues at play: labour rights violations, and human trafficking. In 2001, an investigation found that many immigrants working in the plantations were homeless and irregular. They were offered minimal wages, and any benefits were eliminated. ILO et al. (2012, p.75) established that most migrant workers were not fully aware of their labour rights, and/or that many were afraid to report labour right violations, out of fear of losing their job and being deported. This stems from employer-based permits – if they are documented, they are obliged to stay with their employer to retain their permit and avoid deportation.

Belize lies in a strategic geographic position between Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras, and border areas lack immigration officers and police presence (Petit, 2004), making Belize an important transit country for human smugglers and traffickers. As tourism is Belize’s primary industry, human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation takes place as well. Indeed, a UNICEF study found that prostitution and prostitution of minors is widespread in Belize (Petit 2004, p.30). As noted by Petit (2004:32) “the national anti-trafficking law contains commendable victim protection policies (de-criminalization of victims, residency status for victims), but implementation is hindered by a lack of resources”. The current status of implementation of the anti-trafficking law has been scarcely studied by researchers.

The absence of labour migration programmes and systems to support labour mobility prevents Belize from better benefiting from the socio-economic contributions of labour migration and its implications on development (ILO et al., 2012). The government and national authorities recognize the urgency to initiate dialogue with migration actors and stakeholders to sensitize relevant migration actors and to move forward an agenda for developing comprehensive migration policies. An initiative was proposed to assist in the process of sensitising and initiating discussions on the topic of migration and its implications for the country. In the process, these actors could find a common understanding of migration management, formulating a national strategy for developing comprehensive migration policies.

5.4 Cuba

Cuba is predominantly a sending country of irregular migrants. Although scoring well on the Human Development Index – an index based on an average of education attainment, life expectancy and income per capita – the limitations placed by the government on individual civil and political rights ensure that Cuba remains an emigration country that does not attract significant groups of immigrants. The following table shows the main migrant destinations for Cubans, totalling 1.49 million abroad: the largest diaspora community of any Caribbean nation.

5.5 Dominican Republic

In the Dominican Republic, migration is commonplace. A survey held by Massey and Sana (2003) found that only 18.1 per cent of Dominicans had never migrated, while 45.5 per cent of the surveyed households included migrants. The average duration of a migrant’s stay abroad – as found in their study – was 8.3 years (2003:25). By 2007, 9.3 per cent of Dominicans lived abroad (CEPAL, 2007), in relative terms the fourth largest diaspora population of Latin America. CEPAL (2007) wrote that there is a continuous outflow of Dominicans, despite a “respectable rhythm of growth in comparison to other countries of Latin America since the end of the decade of the 80s” (CEPAL, 2007, p.18). Due to this continuous outflow, the percentage has risen since then: the Dominican Republic’s total (legal) emigrant population numbers 1,375,512 in 2013 (against a total population of just over a million) which makes Dominicans the second largest Caribbean diaspora community. Dominicans migrate overwhelmingly to the north-eastern United States (mainly the New York area). Almost a million (991,000) Dominicans live legally in the United States. The second largest diaspora community lives in Spain, totalling 155 thousand. The following table, based on World Bank data, provides a picture of the main receiving countries of Dominicans.

![Figure 18: Emigration from Cuba 2013 (in thousands)](image-url)
However, the extent of undocumented Dominican migration is not clear. The Migration Policy Institute reports 100,000 undocumented Dominicans in the United States in 2003 (Ferguson 2003, p. 27). Undocumented Dominicans in the Netherlands, Spain and Argentina are mostly women, and there have been persistent allegations of illicit trafficking in connection with the sex industry in these receiving countries (Ferguson 2003, 27).

In 2007, CEPAL found that the average age of the Dominican migrant was 30 years, with 57 per cent being male. 72 per cent were classified as skilled migrants. According to information by ECLAC (2007), 54.7 per cent of emigrants to United States, and 67.1 per cent of emigrants to Spain are women — a high percentage when compared to Central American countries.

As shown, the Dominican Republic receives a considerable amount of remittances, totaling around USD 4.65 billion in 2014 — contributing to 7.3 per cent of the country's GDP. Around 3/4th of remittances were sent from the United States, with other significant amounts having been sent from Spain and Italy. In the same year, a total of 808 million dollars in measurable remittances were sent from the Dominican Republic, which has a considerable immigrant population, as shown in figure 20.

The Dominican Republic, according to the World Bank, has over 60,000 immigrants. When we specify this by nationality, it is shown that 75 per cent of immigrants in the Dominican Republic are Haitians. Together, they remitted USD 428 million in 2014, accounting for over half of total money remitted from the Dominican Republic. In contrast with the World Bank, The UN Migration Wall Chart (2013) speaks of 402,000 immigrants in the Dominican Republic. The explanation for this discrepancy can be found in the Dominican definition of migrant: after the Dominican Supreme Court ruling of September 2013, about 200,000 people of Haitian descent, born in the Dominican Republic, were retroactively stripped of their citizenship.
Apart from this, it is unknown how many Haitians and Haitian descendants are living and working in the Dominican Republic. In 2003, the Haitian embassy guessed the number to be 'around one million' (Ferguson, 2003). Some Dominican media have guessed the number at 1.5 million. Any figure is estimated, as only a tiny fraction of Haitian migrants is registered and has a work permit. As the Dominican economy has diversified, so has the demand for cheap labour. According to the UN (2015) only 39.5 per cent of migrants in the Dominican Republic is female, while the average Haitian migrant in the Dominican Republic has had some years of formal education, meaning it is mostly male agricultural and other manual labour that crosses the Haiti-Dominican Republic border. In the words of Ferguson (2003, p.16) 'sectors of the Dominican economy are as dependent on cheap Haitian labour as poor Haitians are on working in the Dominican Republic'. For example, 50 per cent of domestic workers are Haitian or Haitian descended women (ibid).

The Dominican Republic and Haiti have a long shared and conflictive history. Relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic have always been difficult since the Haitian occupation of the Dominican Republic in the early nineteenth century. Although the era of hostilities is long gone, the concept of "invasion" still recurs in Dominican political discourse; and some people still see blackness as a negative attribute (Ferguson, 2003, p.17).

During the sixties, bilateral agreements between the heads of state of both countries, Trujillo and Duvalier "Papa Doc", facilitated the entry of temporary Haitian migrants to work on the sugar plantations, of which many ultimately remained behind. Both ruling families benefited greatly by the exchange of labour (Ferguson, 2003, p.11). Recruitment officers were employed to convince Haitian potential workers of good pay and working conditions. However, a fact-finding mission sent by the ILO in 1991 condemned what is described as "nearly slavery" on the plantations. Gradually, the state owned sugar company CEA, became indebted due to mismanagement and corruption and had to be privatized, depriving the migrant communities of work and pensions. In private hands, the industry is still facing the situation of recruiting labour that most Dominicans refuse to do. A visit of the OAS' Inter-American Commission of Human Rights to four sugar cane industry compounds (bateyes) in 1999 confirmed the lack of adequate living conditions (CIDH, 2003). In February 2000, the governments of the Dominican Republic and Haiti signed a declaration that was meant to suppress clandestine recruitment and irregular migration. However, Ferguson reports that in 2003 the practice of irregular recruitment for the plantations still takes place. He signals that around 250,000 people still live in the bateyes, in conditions of poverty, where female cane cutters could earn half of what men earn. It is unknown to the researchers if these conditions have significantly changed since then.

In September 2013, the Dominican Constitutional Court determined that individuals who are unable to prove their parent's regular migration status can be retroactively stripped of their Dominican citizenship (AFL-CIO 2014, p.3). By the country's own calculations, 224,151 people in the country were born to foreign parents, with approximately 86 per cent of them of Haitian descent. Many Dominican born children of Haitian parents face deportation, as their citizenship is stripped retroactively because their Haitian parents are considered to be "in transit". Accordingly, as of June 2015, around 14,000 Haitians and people of Haitian descent have been deported from the Dominican Republic to Haiti. NGOs such as Amnesty International have condemned the deportations of people to a country they have never set foot to. In any case, the people under this situation have found themselves in a situation of extreme vulnerability.

5.6 Guyana

After the Amerindians who had settled in what is now known as Guyana thousands of years ago, the Dutch were the first Europeans to colonise the area. They, and later the English, began a plantation economy based on slave labour. With the slave emancipation in the nineteenth century, many African descendants migrated from the plantations to village settlements, urban areas, and to other destinations within the Caribbean. In response to a labour vacuum, the European sugar planters imported thousands of Portuguese, African, European and Asian indentured contract labourers to replace the loss of African slave labour. A majority of these contract labourers stayed on in Guyana after their contracts expired, adding to a fledgling multicultural, multi-religious and multi-lingual society (Roopnarine, 2003.

Starting with the latter half of the 20th century, Guyana became predominantly an emigration country. Guyanese migrated predominantly to the United Kingdom up to the 1960s, but as incentives to migrate to the UK diminished, the US and Canada became more receptive. Between 1980 and 1991, the Guyanese population diminished by 35,894 people, due to emigration (ibid, 22). From 1992 to the current period, Guyanese out-migration averaged about 10,000 people a year. The CARICOM Single Market Economy (CSME) treaty region has contributed to this steady outflow of people from Guyana. In 2013, Guyana had a negative net migration of -9.65 per 1000 inhabitants, making Guyana the Caribbean nation most affected by emigration. According to Roopnarine (2003, 4) "it is most probable that no less than 500,000 to 500,000 Guyanese live in western developed countries". Indeed, according to the World Bank, by 2013 Guyana had a total emigrant population of 463,000. Over half live in the United States, with another significant part living in Canada. The remainder of emigrants is found in the United Kingdom and in other Caribbean nations, as well as nearby Venezuela.
This continuous migratory movement has a profound impact on Guyana in terms of development and societal change. According to Roopnarine (2013:4) "the country has experienced (…) the loss of skilled and educated personnel such as doctors, lawyers, nurses, teachers and technicians". This brain drain is partly offset by return migration and remittances. A small number of migrants return after having accomplished what they migrated for: enough economic and educational success to have a satisfactory lifestyle in their homeland. Others returned due to the global recession of 2008 or due to criminal convictions in the United States. The positive aspects of returnees are referred to as inadvertent innovators or carriers of change. However, Roopnarine (2013) signals that the home government does not meet the expectation of returnees. Remittances are significant: a total of 314 million US dollars in 2014, constituting 11 per cent of Guyanese GDP. 87 per cent is sent from the US and Canada, the remainder being sent from the UK and other Caribbean nations.

Figure 22: Emigration from Guyana by 2013 (x1000)

Guatemala's total registered immigrant population, in 2013, numbered 14,770. Of these, Surinamese were the largest group, counting 4622, followed by Brazilians (2166) and Venezuelans (2132). Since the 1990s, due to stricter mining policies in Brazil to safeguard the environment and the way of life of indigenous Brazilians, Guyana attracts many Brazilian Garimpeiros (artisanal miners) (ibid. p.22). Some sources estimate the total number of Brazilians as 10,000 — far above the official number. Brazilians dominate small scale mining activities, and large quantities of gold are smuggled out of the country. The prognosis is that Brazilians will continue to come to Guyana, mainly because of the porous border, strict mining policies in Brazil, high prices of gold and weak regulatory policies in Guyana (21).

Figure 23: Remittances received by Guyana in 2014 (USD millions)

5.7 Haiti

After Cuba and the Dominican Republic, Haiti is the Caribbean country with the largest emigrant stock, totalling around 1 million 38 thousand documented emigrants in 2013. However, estimations of the total number of Haitians in diaspora vary from 1.5 million to four million (Observatoire ACP sur les migrations, 2013). Slightly less than half of all documented Haitian migrants are found in the United States, with another 1/3rd living in the Dominican Republic. Other countries with significant Haitian immigrant populations are France, Canada, the Bahamas, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Although most Haitian emigrants are unqualified, Haiti is one of the largest exporters of a qualified workforce in the world. The number of Haitian university students abroad is also steadily increasing. This clearly represents a brain drain, while the extent to which the Haitian diaspora is contributing to development in Haiti is something that requires further investigation.

No other country in the region is as dependent on remittances —for 2010, the total amount was estimated at 1.499 billion, over twice the amount of development aid received by the country (Observatoire ACP sur les migrations, 2010, p.10). In 2014, Haiti received 154 million dollars of remittances, accounting for 21 per cent of the nation’s GDP. Studies show that Haitian families depending on remittances can easily fall into poverty when these flows are interrupted (Observatoire ACP sur les migrations, 2013, p.6). It will be essential for Haiti to capture, next to financial remittances, other contributions of migrants: human and social capital, technologies, as well as notions of good governance and accountability towards its citizens (p.8).
The Dominican Republic is, according to World Bank Data, home to almost half a million Haitians (Observatoire ACP sur les migrations, 2013). However, the main irregular migrant flow is headed for the Dominican Republic.

Irregular migrants from Haiti are commonly imprisoned in the Bahamas: their asylum requests are regularly refused as they are considered economic migrants, not political refugees. Haitian communities have formed ghettos, referred to locally as “the Haitian problem” (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013). For as long as Haiti is perceived of as a demographic threat, the respect of migrants’ rights will be eroded. None of these Haitian migrant populations has attracted the amount of international attention like those in the Dominican Republic, but they all face discrimination, marginalization, and legal status problems (Ferguson, 2003, p.23). The Haitian Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad is advised to create a task force to address the issue of public perception of Haitians in the region (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013, p.43).

Aggravated by existing poverty and instability, environmental and natural factors contribute to internal migration and exodus of Haitians. World Bank consultants doubt that Haiti can ever return to being a viable agricultural economy due to its extent of soil erosion (Ferguson 2003). This phenomenon has contributed to the rapid urbanisation of Haiti — from 28.5 per cent of the population in 1990 to 52.1 per cent of the population in 2010. Rapid and uncontrolled urbanisation — the spread of shanty towns — has aggravated the impacts of the earthquake of January 2010, which left around 230,000 dead, 300,000 wounded, and 1.5 million people internally displaced. Three years after the earthquake, 337,000 people still remained in 450 refugee camps (Observatoire ACP sur les migrations, 2013, p.xv).

Since 1990, the immigrant stock is in constant growth. In 2010, 35,000 immigrants were registered. A very small number, but it is noteworthy that half of its immigrants are from other Caribbean countries. The total immigrant population in 2013 numbered 38,061, slightly less than 3 per cent the size of Haiti’s emigrant population. Immigrants hail mostly from Venezuela (5,005), the Dominican Republic (4,699), the United States (3,205), Puerto Rico (3,082), Spain (2,585), Italy (2,477), and Cuba (2,399). These include Haitian descendants, foreign expats and other professionals.

In 2000, Haitians represented 1.1 per cent of irregular migrants in the United States (Seelke, 2015). They numbered around 76,000, and represented the largest stock of Caribbean irregular migrants. Valid data on the number of Haitians in the Caribbean is scarce, but the accumulated number of migrants and their descendants could easily pass a million (Observatoire ACP sur les migrations, 2013). However, the main irregular migrant flow is headed for the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican Republic is, according to World Bank Data, home to almost half a million immigrants from Haiti and their Dominican born descendants, whose Dominican citizenship was withdrawn in 2014. However, the total number of Haitians in the Dominican Republic is estimated at between 500,000 and 800,000 by the Observatoire ACP sur les migrations (2010-13). The second largest Haitian diaspora community in the Caribbean lives in the Bahamas, on the island of Nassau, where there are more Haitians than Bahamas in total. They represent around 9 per cent of the total Bahamian population. Like in the Dominican Republic, over 60 per cent of immigrants are male. In Dominica, Haitians are also the main migrant population. In 2011 they numbered 1054, of which 57.7 per cent was male. The irregular number is estimated at 3 to 4000 (ibid). Dominica and the Bahamas are destinations as well as transit points to reach the US or the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, French overseas territories. In Cuba, only 320 immigrants were registered in 2012. However, between 1911 and 1923 over a quarter a million Haitians entered Cuba to work on the sugar plantations (Observatoire ACP sur les migrations, p.xv).

When the 1929 global economic crisis set in, they were forcibly returned to Haiti. Some of their descendants remained and now form part of Cuba’s current population.

5.8 Jamaica

Historically, Jamaica has been dependent on emigrant labour. Over the course of many decades, constraints at home and opportunities abroad have resulted in an enduring high propensity for emigration (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012). Jamaica’s poverty increased from the global economic downturn of the 2008-2009 financial crisis and its aftermath. Furthermore, Jamaica has a troublesome murder rate of 36/100,000 inhabitants, indicating that insecurity may be an important and so far overlooked push factor. Not surprisingly, Jamaica remains predominantly an emigration country, in 2013 having — according to World Bank data — an official diaspora population of 1.098 million people. A relatively low income per capita of USD 5,291 in 2013 and a long standing tradition of migration and transnationalism maintain a continuous emigration. Although short-term migrant labour contracts are generally for a maximum of six months, the associated circulation of workers between Jamaica and North American destinations is an important aspect of Jamaican migration (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012, p.5).
Up to the 1960s, many Jamaicans chose to migrate to the United Kingdom. However, as recruitment from the UK dwindled, the United States began actively recruiting Jamaicans in the 1970s. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the United States accounted for 80 per cent of Jamaica’s overall recorded emigration (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012). Nowadays, 70 per cent of the Jamaican diaspora lives in the United States, with 13 per cent living in both Canada and the United Kingdom. In 2010, 33.4 per cent of Caribbean nationals who were granted permanent resident status in the United States came from Jamaica (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012). Data provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade suggest that there may be between 500,000 and 600,000 Jamaicans in the Southwest United States alone (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012). Fewer than 3,000 Jamaicans migrated to Canada per year from 2001 to 2010; a total of 6,392 skilled migrants obtained residency there between 2000 and 2010 (ibid). Migrants from the Cayman Islands (9,236), the Bahamas (5,762), and Antigua and Barbuda (3,889) are the main Caribbean destinations for Jamaican emigrants.

Figure 25: Emigration from Jamaica by 2013 (in thousands)

Taking data for the years 1993-1999, a total of 15,380 voluntary return migrants was recorded, of which 43.4 per cent came from the United Kingdom, 38.4 per cent from the United States, and 12.1 per cent from Canada (ibid). From 2000 to 2010, there was a total flow of 109,102 persons to Jamaica – over one third were commonwealth citizens. Deportees represented another 33,155 persons (ibid, p.13). In 2013, Jamaica’s official immigrant population numbered 34,907 people. Main source countries were the United States (9,462) and the United Kingdom (7,139). The remainder of immigrants is predominantly from the Caribbean, notably Trinidad and Tobago (5,464) and Cuba (2,697). Haitians and Cubans were the two dominant groups of foreign nationals applying for asylum and refugee status in Jamaica, with the number of Haitian nationals seeking asylum numbering 1,155 from 2001 to 2010, and Cubans numbering 54 (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012). Interestingly, in 2013, Jamaica had 1,698 immigrants from India—an example of extra-regional south-south migration. Indeed, data from Thomas-Hope et al. (2012, p.20) shows that China and India were the top source countries of labour immigrants during the last 11 years in Jamaica. Of all immigrants into Jamaica, 69.5 per cent were labour immigrants (ibid). The Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens (Employment) Act gives authority to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to grant work permits to persons migrating to Jamaica for employment purposes. A total of 29,978 persons were granted exemption from the procedure, another 27,694 work permits were granted. The immigrant population is characterised as having high educational levels, but do not remain for the long term (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012).

According to World Bank’s data from 2014 these immigrants in Jamaica remitted, USD 38 million. In the same year, Jamaica received about 60 times this amount in remittances: USD 2,264 billion, mostly sent from the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. This equals 15 per cent of Jamaica’s GDP, making Jamaica one of the countries in the world most dependent on remittances. To compare, remittances had gone up from USD 892 million in 2000 (Thomas-Hope, 2012, p.34). Studies have shown that these remittances are largely used for household expenses. Richer households receive more remittances, but the causal relation is unclear. On the other hand, the relative lack of remittances received by Jamaica’s rural areas has contributed to them remaining the poorest (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012).

Figure 26: Remittances Received by Jamaica in 2014 (USD millions)

Brain drain is recognised as a serious issue for Jamaica. Although starting with the 1990s the number of Jamaican emigrants declined (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012), emigration of especially nurses and teachers remained high. There is a continuing trend of high emigration among the young, skilled, working-age population (specifically nurses and teachers), as well as of young university educated and persons under the age of 20. This has negative effects on the labour force, and not surprisingly skill shortages in the Jamaican labour market are still most acutely felt in the health and education sectors (ibid). Replacement nurses immigrate from Nigeria and Cuba, but access to Cuban health workers has declined after the change of president in Cuba in 2009.
Human trafficking also remains problematic. The Ministry of National Security is responsible for the implementation of the Trafficking in Persons Act. The anti-trafficking task force meets monthly and consists of government ministries, agencies and NGOs which maintain a close working relationship. Despite increased efforts to tackle human trafficking, “persistent economic, social and educational deficiencies continue to be the basis of the vulnerability of young persons to exploitation by traffickers” (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012, p.x). Trafficked persons usually enter legally but overstay. At the demand side of trafficking is the profitability of sex tourism and night clubs (ibid).

Jamaica has addressed the problem of brain drain by bonding, increased training output and the recruitment of workers from overseas (ibid, p.57). Other steps to improve migration policy remain to be done. As explained by Thomas-Hope et al. (2012), policies addressing social problems involving children and youth of absentee parents have not been put into practice. Furthermore, they signal that there is a need for the creation of an integrated and common computerized system for the collection of migration, as well as other data relating to development variables, of which all relevant agencies would be part of. Bonding of professionals could be improved by assuring more efficiency in the system for the establishment and conduct of entrepreneurial activities; and brain drain could be further countered by engaging in bilateral agreements with recipient countries and determining compensation or limited contracts abroad.

5.9 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is predominantly an emigration country, both due to its small size (around 100,000 inhabitants) and its low economic performance: the average GDP per capita was USD 6,468 in 2013. Insecurity — murder rates were at 25.6/100,000 in 2013 — may also play a role as a push factor. Emigration rates are extremely high in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: in 2013 the net migration rate was -9.6/1000 inhabitants. Over half the number of inhabitants of the main island lives abroad. However, as shown in the following table, the island has a considerable number of immigrants, which accounts for around 10 per cent of its total population.

As can be seen, while almost three-quarters of Vincentians migrate to the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, another significant part travels to Caribbean destinations — mostly Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Antigua and Barbuda. The majority of immigrants to the island are other Caribbean people such as Trinidadians, Guyanese, and Barbadians. While these immigrants remitted around USD 5 million from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in 2014, the country received USD 33 million in remittances, equalling 4.5 per cent of the country’s GDP.
5.10 Suriname

Suriname has a considerable diaspora living in the Netherlands, but at the turn of the 21st century it became a net immigration country itself. Starting with colonization in 1630, Suriname saw migrants from Europe and almost half a million forced migrants from Africa. Upon the abolition of slavery in 1863, indentured labourers were brought into the country to replace the slave labour: 34,000 Indians, 33,000 Javanese and 2600 Chinese (Heemskerk & Duijves, 2014, p.2). Other groups, such as European Jews, settled after World War II. In the 1970s the population was divided along ethnic lines, and political instability and imminent independence made many leave: around 7000 in 1970, and 10,000 between 1971 and 1973. The turbulent period of dictatorship and civil war further increased outmigration, mostly to the Netherlands. However, many Maroons (escaped slaves that settled in Suriname) went to French Guiana.

The migration of Surinamese may be characterised as chain migration, because in many cases relatives in the destination country sponsor the passage and/or help with initial adaption and housing (ibid, p.89). As a result, 347,621 people of Surinamese descent are registered as living in the Netherlands (Heemskerk and Duijves, 2014), and the bulk of Surinamese emigrants continue to migrate there. However, the Surinamese General Bureau of Statistics suggests that in the past decade, the annual number of Surinamese who had emigrated decreased from 3,517 persons in 2002 to 1,960 persons in 2012. The Central Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands registered 23,926 immigrants. In 2012 only 1.8 per cent of the people of Surinamese descent in the Netherlands still had the Surinamese nationality.

The World Bank (2013) maintains other figures, with statistics implying that the Netherlands is home to 191,000 Surinamese. The reasons for this disparity in figures are unknown, but it is likely that the World Bank information is based on Surinamese figures, while the number maintained by Heemskerk & Duijves originates from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics.

Similarly, while the World Bank mentions 23,549 Surinamese migrants in France, Heemskerk and Duijves (ibid) report 51,169 (with the majority in French Guiana). It is unclear how these numbers can be so different. The French Government only has registered 8,369 Surinamese in 2012, possibly explained by the fact that the French Government excludes children, only referring to Surinamese adult residents. However, the French immigration police estimate that there may be up to 10,000 irregular Surinamese living in French Guiana, greatly surpassing the number of registered Surinamese (Heemskerk & Duijves, 2014, p.95).

In Suriname, brain drain is considered a valid concern: “there is evidence that emigration has long-term negative effects on secondary and tertiary school attendance, and this is negatively correlated to university graduation rates” (Heemskerk & Duijves, 2014). Prospective students and skilled professionals leave the country while primarily low-skilled migrants enter. The need for high-skilled workers can partly be resolved by recruiting foreign specialists. It is recommended that the Surinamese government actively recruits young professionals and graduates abroad, especially from the Netherlands. According to World Bank data, Suriname received USD 9 million of remittances, of which 7 million were sent from the Netherlands. This number is a severe underestimation, as in 2012, the Multilateral Investment Fund estimated that in the previous year, Suriname received USD 114 million in remittances from abroad (ibid, p.17). This concurs with the information from remittances sent from the Netherlands. Heemskerk & Duijves (2014) maintain that in the past few years, around EUR 100-114 million remittances were annually sent to Suriname, with an estimated 85 per cent of this money coming from the Netherlands. Another significant share of the remittances consists of in-kind remittances, perhaps 10-15 per cent of total value of remittances. According to World Bank data, USD 102 million worth of remittances were sent from Suriname in 2013, of which 41 to France (French Guiana), 26 to China, 17 to the Netherlands, 9 to Brazil, and 7 to Guyana.

As mentioned, in recent years Surinamese emigration has slowed down, while the country starts receiving immigrants. In 2013, Suriname had a slight positive migratory balance of 0.57. The amount and origin of immigrants is shown in the following tables:
According to the World Bank, the total number of immigrants is 41,670. However, according to Duijves & Heemskerk (2014), Suriname hosts 35,040 foreign born registered residents, mostly Guyanese, Dutch (including of Surinamese descent), Brazilians and Chinese. Duijves & Heemskerk (2014) suspect that migrants from France are Surinamese who moved to French Guiana and some point and acquired French citizenship. Dutch, Chinese and Brazilians each account for about a 25 per cent of stay permit applications, followed by Guyanese (10.9%) and Haitians (3%). Most immigrants are low-skilled labourers who enter the informal sector; however, Filipinos and Cubans are recruited to fill labour gaps, especially in the health sector. The influx of workers is mostly male, on the long term leading to a gender imbalance in the country.

Available studies and informed estimates suggest that the largest migrant groups in the informal sectors are Brazilians, Guyanese, and Chinese. The Ambassador of Guyana to Suriname estimates that about 40,000 Guyanese may be living in Suriname, about four times the registered number. Guyanese dominate the artisanal fisheries, and can be found in construction, police, transportation, domestic jobs, gold mining and the sex industry. Most bypass the immigration services: it is estimated that about three quarters of Guyanese in Suriname are staying in the country without proper residency papers. Similarly, the Brazilian foreign Ministry estimates some 20,000 Brazilians to be living in Suriname. Nowadays, Brazilians do not need a visa for Suriname if their stay does not surpass three months. However, many overstay, others enter illegally at the borders with French Guiana and Guyana, working in the artisanal gold mining sector (estimates of the total linger around 20,000-25,000 persons). Chinese commonly overstay, and often own formal and informal restaurants, market and food stalls working their way up to formal economic participation.

The 2016 edition for the Global Slavery Index places Suriname at number 26, estimating that almost 0.45 per cent of the population lives in slavery-like conditions, an improvement of 0.5 per cent from 2014. The number of investigated cases and arrests on human trafficking increased from four arrests in 2009, to 20 in 2013. This does not necessarily mean an increase in trafficking but may instead be an indication of increased efforts by the Police Division of Trafficking in Persons (ibid., p.84).

5.11 Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago is an island republic which covers an area of 5,128 km2 with a population of approximately 1.3 million based on the last national census (IOM, 2011). The country is characterised by both intraregional and extra-regional migration flows. Like most Caribbean countries, Trinidad and Tobago is predominantly an emigration country: in 2015, it had a negative migratory balance of -6.42 per 1,000 inhabitants. Emigration of Trinidadian nurses is one of the most recognizable trends within labour migration (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2010). According to the World Bank, Trinidad and Tobago has a total diaspora population of 374,492 people. As shown in the following table, based on this data, 66.5 per cent of Trinidadian migrants lives in the United States, and another 20.4 per cent in Canada.

Migrants from Trinidad and Tobago do not regularly send remittances back home. A survey found that 84 per cent of Trinidadians and 90 per cent of people from Tobago did not send remittances back in the past 12 months (Anatol et al., 2013). Still, the country received USD 131 million in remittances in 2014 (World Bank, 2015) as specified in the following table.
Trinidad and Tobago is also a popular destination country for other Caribbean and extra-regional migrants. As described by Anatol et al. (2013, p.13) “there is an increasing diversity of countries of origin, as well as a greater diversity of migrants, who hail from a broad spectrum of economic and cultural backgrounds”. This inflow seems to partially compensate for the brain drain caused by emigration to Canada and the United States, and certain types of labour in the low income market are also filled by migrants. Many migrate to Trinidad and Tobago for employment purposes, but also for attaining education and certifications. Available data suggest a strong increase in the total number of work permits issued by the Trinidadian government, including extra-regional immigrants: Anatol et al. (2013, p. 13) mention Chinese migrant labour as one of the major components of the workforce. Indian migrants include doctors, nurses, pharmacists, university professors and even construction workers.

Evidence indicates that the country is receiving regional irregular migration flows from neighbouring countries such as Guyana, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica. Increasingly, African asylum seekers are finding Trinidad and Tobago. The country is also a transit point for migrants en route to the United States, Canada and United Kingdom (ibid, p.10). According to the World Bank, the total immigrant population in 2013 was 32,488 people. This figure, by country of origin, in the next table, does not include irregular migrants, nor is there any mention of Chinese migrants.

There is also an inflow of irregular — smuggled and trafficked — migrants into Trinidad and Tobago. Irregular migration and migrant smuggling appear to be a more common occurrence in Trinidad and Tobago, as opposed to human trafficking which seems to occur on a much smaller scale (Waldropt-Bonair et al., 2013, v). Irregular migrants are mainly economic migrants between the age of 20 and 30, who are drawn to Trinidad and Tobago because of the availability of jobs and the attractiveness of wages. Existing reports of trafficking in persons are based on qualitative data and anecdotal evidence. A study commissioned by the ACP Observatory on Migration (Waldropt-Bonair et al., 2013) mentions smuggled Colombian immigrants, as well as presence of nationals from Cuba and the Dominican Republic. The report indicates that many Colombian immigrants are women engaged in work in the sex industry. Poverty, political and social violence, and gender attitudes at home contribute to trafficking for sexual exploitation. Victims are often lured with promises of employment, but run into debts by coming to Trinidad and Tobago and become dependent. The research found that it was likely that some high-end persons, with political connections as well as knowledge of applicable legislation, were involved in the trafficking scheme. Based on the findings of this study, irregular migration appears to have mainly negative effects (p. 47). It causes competition for local jobs, a fiscal drain on the economy, crime, exploitation, and increased corruption.

Another study commissioned by the ACP observatory on Migration (Anatol et al. 2013) finds that “the majority of respondents (44%) indicated they thought life was negatively impacted by emigration”. The majority of respondents thought that emigration negatively affects the country, due to skills deficits and a loss of state expenditure on education, and breakdown of families. However, most migrants themselves were positive about their experience. On immigration, there is a strong perception that migrant smuggling in Trinidad and Tobago is closely linked to organized criminal networks that smuggle other contraband such as guns and drugs. 41 per cent of respondents thought that immigration in general had a negative effect on local life, while 27 per cent thought it positive. Negative reasons mentioned were a perceived growth of crime and the loss of local jobs; for positive reasons people mentioned “new ways of doing things”. Nevertheless, people seem to stress the negative impacts.
There is no legislative framework in place to criminalize migrant smuggling, but a Trafficking in Persons Act was passed in 2011. There are other legislations in place that can convict traffickers: Sexual Offences Act, Summary Offences Act, Proceeds of Crime Act, Kidnapping Act, and Forgery Act (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2011, p.36). IOM (2011, p.25) also stated that “the existing labour laws insufficiently address the issue of migrant labourers and fail to advocate for their protection in accordance with international conventions and best practices”. It is concluded that a legislative gap exists within the enforcement of other laws, such as the Immigration Act and Sexual Offences Act. The root causes of irregular migration can be addressed by expansion of legal channels for migration. Consideration should be given to expanding legal channels for both skilled and unskilled migrants, since there appears to be a demand for such workers. Furthermore, legislation for the protection and treatment of asylum seekers and refugees needs to be adopted. This would reduce the fiscal drain and reduce the instances of abuse and exploitation. Regulation and monitoring of workplaces is important to guard against the exploitation of workers. Finally, Trinidad and Tobago is recommended to begin bilateral dialogue and agreements with major source countries of undocumented migrant workers, to inform potential migrants about the dangers of clandestine entry and work (IOM, 2011).

6. Conclusions

6.1 Discussion

In this report we have laid out the main migration trends in the Caribbean region: continuing outmigration, especially to North America, and an increase of intraregional mobility, both regular and irregular. There exist myriad factors that, taken together, explain Caribbean mobility. Region wide, economic stagnation, limited job opportunities, and the existence of established diaspora communities and transnational networks, facilitate continuing migration. Sudden events, whether natural disasters such as earthquakes, or the construction of large infrastructure projects, have been important push and pull factors in the Caribbean, able to cause large and unforeseen migration flows. Ever more restrictive immigration policies and, in recent years, a stagnated economic climate in Western Europe have decreased emigration to Europe — with the exception of Dominican migration to Spain. With the exception of Surinamese, the United States stands out as the main recipient country of Caribbean immigrants. Canada is an ever more attractive immigration country for Jamaicans and other commonwealth Caribbean peoples. Within the region, CARICOM and CARICOM Single Market and Economy agreements facilitate the exchange of qualified professionals. These intraregional agreements, by facilitating intraregional integration, play an important role in countering extraregional brain drain.

It is impossible to establish the size of the irregular migration flow, but it is of considerable importance. Lacking legal means to migrate, such as provided by the CARICOM free movement treaty of skilled nationals, many lower skilled Caribbean individuals are forced to refrain to irregular migration. Despite the standard of living being the one of the highest of the region, irregular Cuban migrants continue to try the United States. They are joined by Dominicans, and notably Haitians trying to find an alternative to the persistent poverty characterising their nation. We have also argued that the human rights situation of irregular migrants and their descendants, notably those of Haitian origin, remains precarious. Outdated legislation, the lack of counter-trafficking laws and the lack of the implementation thereof, combined with the introduction of policies that criminalise irregular migration, are counter-productive to the improvement of their human rights situation.
Remittances flows sent by Caribbean diasporas are of particular importance to countries such as Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana, with remittances representing as much as 20 per cent of national GDP in the case of Haiti. Recipients of remittances are able to improve their standard of living, but on a macro-level these countries find themselves in a dependency situation. Remittances can probably only partially compensate for the brain-dain caused by massive emigration of skilled professionals.

What do these trends tell about the migration outlook for the near future, and how will this impact the Caribbean region? Most Caribbean countries have well-established diasporas in the United States and Canada, and the transnational household has become a fact of life. For as long as there is a demand for migrant workers (cheap labour), as well as home-based incentives to leave, these transnational networks will continue to facilitate continuous emigration. For most countries, these conditions are not expected to radically change in the near future. However, we should expect to see new migration patterns arising: as mentioned in this report, irregular Haitian migrants are already crossing into Brazil via the Andean countries. Extra-regional immigrants, such as Chinese, are increasingly finding their way to the Caribbean itself, either with the intention to stay or to move on to the North. Last but not least, global warming and (related) extreme weather events are signalled to increasingly affect the Caribbean, creating future spontaneous migration flows as well as long term migration processes.

6.2 Policy Recommendations

The free movement of people has potential value and it is imperative for development in a globalizing world. However, it is often labelled as a problem, while its opportunities are underemphasized: there is a need for a paradigm shift. The focus should not be on skilled, unskilled migration, preventing or encouraging migration per se, but on improving the environment within which the migration occurs. This includes expanding the options for legal migration or cancelling restrictions on free movement —measures that not only improve the human rights situation of migrants, but also impede the growth of corruption and transnational crime. However, as signalled by the ACP Observatory on Migration, (2016b, p.20) “there is a fundamental discrepancy between the official discourses of "combating irregular migration", and the sustained demand for cheap irregular migrant labour”.

Human rights of migrants should be at the top of the agenda, and migrants themselves need to be educated about their rights. Martínez-Pizarro & Villa (2005) highlight the importance of signing and ratifying international instruments on the protection of migrants and of taking steps to ensure that the provisions of those instruments are effectively fulfilled, especially the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. It is also important for those Caribbean states that have not yet done so, to create anti-trafficking legislations that penalize human trafficking but do not criminalise the victim. Caribbean states are also encouraged to establish clearer refugee status determination procedures (most have no such legislation) and enhance their role in refugee protection (Van Selm 2015, p.19). Furthermore, Caribbean nations are advised to:

• Acknowledge the social and economic presence and contribution of undocumented migrants;
• Recognise they are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse;
• Destigmatise irregular migration in public discourse;
• Implement capacity building activities for front line officers to identify and support vulnerable migrants;
• Implement regularisation programmes or voluntary return programmes;
• Prioritise policies aimed at combating social exclusion and gender inequality of undocumented women.

According to Thomas-Hope (2005), policies meant to manage the effects of migration should not merely focus on push and pull factors, but take into account the migratory culture and transnational personal identities of migrants. As written by Thomas-Hope (ibid, p.53):

“Paradoxically, migration itself could be a major part of the solution, especially if the social capital that has been created through migration networks could be effectively trans-nationalised to benefit the Caribbean, and if the diaspora were to become a greater resource for the region” (Thomas-Hope, 2002, p.29).

The traditional approach to migration is, as carried out by some countries, to try to manage the recruitment of migrants by foreign nations, to prevent mass exodus of skilled professionals and students of tertiary institutions, e.g. by issuing permits to recruit. Bilateral agreements are used to establish agreements on the duration of a contract, after which the skilled worker would be required to return. These strategies may be useful but need complementary strategic policies aimed at more effective management of human capital abroad.

Brain drain becomes a problem if, from the outflow, a) the inflow of skilled people through immigration is insufficient to compensate, b) the inflow of other sources of capital (financial and social) do not compensate, or c) the potential for skill replacement is too low (Thomas-Hope, 2002, p.1). Caribbean nations need to be conscious of these factors to try to balance the negative effects of brain drain, and make use of the propensity for return migration or “sense of belonging” of their diaspora, in order to reap its benefits. Such policy may include:

...
• Encouraging the return of migrants. According to Thomas-Hope (2002:25) this is very feasible, given the transnational bonds of the Caribbean migrant. A five year period of living abroad is estimated to be optimal for the return of skilled persons to the Caribbean. It is important to persuade them to return by building trust in public institutions and making efforts to improve the socio-economic environment. Information on human resource needs at home need to be easily accessible to the migrant (Thomas-Hope, 2002, p.25).

• Supporting expatriates in the diaspora. Maintaining a tie with expatriates—a source of social capital—is important to increase the prospect of a movement back to the Caribbean. Supporting expatriate communities in the diaspora is also a way to build the potential market for Caribbean goods and services abroad, both fostering exportation and tourism.

• Creating incentives for the immigration of migrant’s descendants. Suriname provides a recent example of a country that provides incentives for Surinamese descendants to “try their luck” back in Suriname. These people may bring new economic, social and cultural capital into the country.

• In some cases, dual citizenship can be encouraged, as it is already done by some countries in the region such as Belize and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

6.3 Suggestions for further research

• There is little information available on irregular migration flows. Qualitative in-depth studies should be carried out in major destination, transit and origin countries—inside and outside of the Caribbean—to gain more insight in the mechanics and scale of the movement. More specifically, it is necessary to identify the mechanisms of human smuggling and human trafficking, and to identify specific policy gaps.

• Social remittances are often mentioned in the literature as being an important contributor to local development, but few cases are available to illustrate this statement. Qualitative field research with communities and households with a high number of return migrants could shed more insight on the potential of social remittances.

• A study could be done to map and evaluate regional disaster risk and response programs, taking into consideration that climate-related disasters cause both internal displacement and international migration.

• Comprehensive, detailed studies on migratory movements, legislation, policy, and other issues is lacking for Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Cuba, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Guyana.

• A number of Caribbean countries have murder rates that are classified by the UN as ‘epidemic’. Belize and Jamaica stand out as especially violent countries, with murder rates around 40/100,000 people (UNOCD 2014). However, information on the relation between violence and migration is unavailable. To what extent do feelings of insecurity contribute to emigration, and to what extent is the immigration or return migration linked to violence?

• There is no available information on the linkage between tourism and migration in the Caribbean. Research could establish whether tourists are more inclined to migrate to the Caribbean (either as entrepreneurs or pensioners) and whether or not the immigration of pensioners has development benefits. Among others, a review of the effects of Belize’s Retired Persons (Incentive) Act on development in Belize would be useful in the analysis of this topic.
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Annex

A. Glossary

Asylum seeker: A person seeking to be admitted into a country as refugee and awaiting decision on their application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, they must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any alien in an irregular situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012).

Brain drain: Emigration of trained and talented individuals from the country of origin to another country resulting in a depletion of skills resources in the former (IOM 2015).

Diaspora: IOM uses the following working definition, also used in this report: “emigrants and their descendants, who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin’ (IOM 2015).

Documented migrant: In line with IOM (2011b) a migrant is considered “documented” when he or she “entered a country lawfully and remains in the country in accordance with his or her admission criteria”. Documented migrants can be divided into groups of those with the intention to stay for a relatively short period (on a visa) and those who stay for long (those with a residency permit).

Irregular migrant: In line with IOM (2011, p. 54) irregular migrant is defined as "a person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The definition covers inter alia those persons who have entered a transit or host country lawfully but have stayed for a longer period than authorized or subsequently taken up unauthorized employment".
Human trafficking is defined by the UN as: “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.

Migrant: There is no universally accepted definition of “migrant”. It is important to take into account that “migrant” is also a legal definition: state law defines who is classified a migrant in any given country. The United Nations defines migrant as “an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate” (ACP Observatory on Migration 2014). For the purposes of this research we will use this definition. Nevertheless, it has its shortcomings. It leaves out of scope those people who migrate on a seasonal basis for work, trafficking victims who spend less than a year abroad, as well as tourists and pensioners who spend most, but not all of the year in their country of destination.

Migration: The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification (IOM 2015).

Mixed migration flows: This concept is defined as “complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants” (ACP Observatory on Migration 2014, p. 139).

Refugee: A person who “owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (Art. 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol).

Skilled/unskilled migrant: For the purposes of this research, we consider unskilled a migrant that has not completed secondary education; semi-skilled those who have completed secondary education; skilled those who have completed additional qualifications, such as university degrees, that allow them to carry out specialised or high-end jobs. It is recognised that the migrant’s economic success in the host country is significantly determined by his or her educational background, the transferability of skills to the host country’s labour market, and the investment made in further skills acquisition after arrival in the host country.

Trafficking in persons: “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (Art. 3(a), UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Trafficking in persons can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character (IOM 2015).

Transnationalism: “Having multiple ties and interactions that link people and their institutions across the borders of nation-states (...) transnational groups are those that are globally dispersed but still identify in terms of their original ethnicity and relate to both the host states in which they reside as well as the home countries from which they or their ancestors originated. They are tied together trans-globally through a variety of social relationships or networks” (Plaza 2008).
8. National Legislation

Table 12: Legislation of Antigua and Barbuda, selected articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Antigua and Barbuda Constitution Order 1981</td>
<td>Chapter II, 3</td>
<td>Every person in Antigua and Barbuda is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual (…) regardless of race, place of origin, political opinions or affiliations, colour, creed or sex (…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter II, 5</td>
<td>No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may be authorised by law in any of the following cases: (…) for the purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of that person into Antigua and Barbuda, or for the purpose of effecting the expulsion, extradition or other lawful removal of that person from Antigua and Barbuda (…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter II, 8</td>
<td>A person shall not be deprived of his freedom of movement (…) provision (…) for the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement of any person who is not a citizen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter VIII, 113</td>
<td>The following persons shall become citizens at the date of their birth on or after 1st November, 1981 (…) every person born in Antigua and Barbuda (…) every person born outside Antigua and Barbuda if at the date of his birth either of his parents is would have been but for that parent's death, a citizen in virtue of section 112 of this Constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Emigrants Protection Act, Chapter 15, 1949</td>
<td>§ 4</td>
<td>No person shall proceed from Antigua and Barbuda to the country or place named in such notice without a permit granted under the provisions of this act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§ 9 (3)</td>
<td>No person shall act as a recruiting agent in Antigua and Barbuda unless he is registered under this act as a person entitled to do so in Antigua and Barbuda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Antigua and Barbuda Citizenship Act, Chapter 22, 1982</td>
<td>Part II, 3, (3)</td>
<td>Subject to subsections (4), (5) and (6) of this section, a citizen of any country mentioned in the First Schedule to this act (…) may (…) on making application (…) be registered at the discretion of the Minister as a citizen of Antigua and Barbuda if he satisfies the minister that he (…) has been an ordinary resident or has been in the service of the Government (…) for a period of not less than seven years (…).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Immigration and Passport Act, Chapter 208, 1946, with amendments</td>
<td>§ 7, a, b, e</td>
<td>The following persons, not being citizens of Antigua and Barbuda, are prohibited immigrants — any person who is likely if he entered Antigua and Barbuda to become a public charge by reason of infirmity of body or mind (…) any idiot or epileptic or any person who is insane or mentally deficient or any person who is deaf and dumb or deaf and blind or blind and dumb (…) any person who is reasonably believed to have come to Antigua and Barbuda for any immoral purpose, or who being a woman or girl, is reasonably believed to be a prostitute or to have come to Antigua and Barbuda for the purpose of prostitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§ 8</td>
<td>The entry of any of the following into Antigua and Barbuda is hereby prohibited — (a) any person who is not a citizen (…) whose entry into Antigua and Barbuda is deemed to be (…) on economic grounds (…) or on account of the standard or habit of life of such person to be undesirable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§ 40, a</td>
<td>Any prohibited immigrant who knowingly and wilfully lands or suffers himself to be landed and any person who knowingly (…) aids or assists in landing any prohibited migrant contrary to the provisions of this act shall be guilty of an offence against this act.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13: Legislation of the Bahamas, selected articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas, Independence Order 1973, No. 1060, The Constitution</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>A person born in The Bahamas after 9th July 1973, neither of whose parents is a citizen of The Bahamas shall be entitled, upon making application of his attaining the age of eighteen years or with- in twelve months thereafter, in such manner as may be prescribed, to be registered as a citizen of The Bahamas (…) provided (…) he renounces his citizenship of that other country (…).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>A person born outside the Bahamas after 9th July 1973 shall be- come a citizen of The Bahamas at the date of his birth if at that date his father is a citizen of The Bahamas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>A person born legitimately outside The Bahamas after 9th of July 1973, whose mother is a citizen of The Bahamas, shall be entitled, upon making application of his attaining age of eighteen years and before he attains the age of twenty-one years, in such man- ner as may be prescribed, to be registered as a citizen of The Bahamas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Every person in The Bahamas is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, has the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Act, Chapter 191, 2010</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>The board may revoke a permanent residence certificate on the ground that the person to whom it granted (…) has shown him- self by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards The Bahamas (…) has within five years of the grant of the certificate been imprisoned in any country for a criminal offence for a peri- od of one year or more (…).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>An immigration officer may grant leave to any person to land (…) upon being satisfied that the person (…) is not suffering from a mental disorder nor is a mental defec- tive; (f) is not a person reasonably believed to have come to The Bahamas for any immoral purpose, or who being a woman or a girl, is not reasonably believed to be a prostitute or to have come to The Bahamas for the purpose of prostitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Any person who, whether on his own behalf or on behalf of an- other, employs any person who, under the provisions of subsec- tion (1) of this section, is prohibited from engaging in any gainful occupation, shall be guilty of an offence against this act.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Legislation of Belize, selected articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitution of Belize, 1983</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Every person in Belize is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex (…).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(a) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>No person shall be required to perform forced labour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>A person born outside Belize on or after Independence Day shall become a citizen of Belize at the date of his birth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>The following persons may, upon making application at any time after Independence Day, be registered as citizens of Belize:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. any persons who is married to a citizen of Belize;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. any person who has been a resident continuously for a peri- od of five years immediately before the date of his application;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. any person who makes a substantial contribution to the economy and/or well-being of Belize who has rendered dis- tinguished service to Belize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>A citizen of Belize by birth or descent who acquires the citizen- ship of any other country may, if the laws of the other country so permit and at his option, retain his citizenship of Belize.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Law | Articles | Content
--- | --- | ---
Belize Immigration Act, Chapter 56, Revised Edition 2000 | 5 | Subject to section 2 (5), the following persons are prohibited immigrants:
(a) any person who is likely if he enters Belize to become a charge on public funds (…)
(b) any idiot or any person who is insane or mentally deficient or any person who is deaf and dumb or deaf and blind, or dumb and blind, unless in any such case he or a person accompanying him or some other person gives security to the satisfaction of the Director of Immigration and National Services (…)
(c) any prostitute or homosexual or any person who may be living on or receiving or may have been living or receiving the proceeds of prostitution or homosexual behaviour;
(d) persons who are engaged or at any time have been engaged or are suspected on reasonable grounds of being likely to engage in any unlawful giving, using or introducing other persons to use, distributing, offering to sell or exposing for sale, buying, trading or trafficking in drugs;
(e) notwithstanding anything contained in this act, the Minister may prohibit or permit the entry of any immigrant in Belize.

16 | (1) A temporary employment permit may be issued by the Director of Immigration and Nationality Services to any person who satisfies the Director of Immigration of Nationality Services that he wishes to enter Belize for the purpose of employment there and is the person described in a current voucher issued for the purposes of this section by or on behalf of the Minister responsible for Labour.

27 | An immigration officer who decides that a person is a prohibited immigrant may—
(a) order him to leave Belize and proceed immediately in the same vessel in which he arrived, or
(b) order him to leave Belize within sixty days of entering Belize, and, if the immigration officer thinks fit, by a specified vessel; or
(c) cause him to be arrested and brought before a magistrate’s court with a view to an order being made for his removal
(d) no prohibited immigrant shall have any right of appeal against an order under subsection (1) (a) or (b).

Belize Immigration Act, Chapter 56, Revised Edition 2000 | 32 | Any person who knowingly lands or procures to be landed or who aids or assists in landing any prohibited immigrant contrary to the provisions of this Act commits an offence.

Retired Persons (Incentives) Act, 1999 | 3 | Any retired person may apply to be designated as a Qualified Retired Person if he—
(a) is a citizen or legal permanent resident of one of the countries listed in Schedule B (Canada, USA, UK, Belize);
(b) is the beneficial owner of a pension or annuity;
(c) gives a written undertaking to deposit for his own use in a bank, building society, credit union, or other licensed financial institution in Belize: (i) by the 15th day of each month, the sum of two thousand dollars in an approved foreign currency, or (ii) by the 1st day of April of each year, the annual sum of twenty-four thousand dollars in an approved foreign currency; and
(d) satisfies such requirements as the Minister may be regulations specify.

4 | (1) A person who has been designated a Qualified Retired Person shall be entitled—
(a) to enter and remain in Belize along with his dependents from time to time and for such time as he remains a Qualified Retired Person;
(b) on first entering Belize, to import into Belize his personal effects and approved means of transportation for his personal use free of all import duties and taxes;
(c) every five years thereafter upon proof that his has properly disposed of the means of transportation he previously imported into Belize, to import new improved means of transportation for his personal use into Belize (…)
(d) notwithstanding anything contained in the Income and Business Tax Act or any other law, a Qualified Retired Person shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes and levies on all income or receipts which accrue to him from a source outside of Belize or from a person resident outside of Belize and in respect of work performed or investment made outside of Belize, whether such income is earned or passive income and whether or not such income is remitted to him in Belize.
Table 15: Legislation of Cuba, selected articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitution of 1976</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>The Republic of Cuba concedes asylum to those persecuted in virtue for the struggle for the democratic rights of the many; for national liberation; against imperialism; fascism; colonialism and neo-colonialism; for the suppression of racial discrimination; for the rights and claims of the workers, peasants and students; for their activities politically, scientifically, artistically and literary progressive for socialism and for peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28, 29, 30</td>
<td>The Cuban nationality is acquired by birth or naturalisation: Cuban citizens by birth are those born in the territory, with the exception of the children of foreigners who are working in the service of their government or international organisations (…) Those born abroad to a Cuban father or mother.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>The Cuban nationality is lost: (a) to those who acquire a foreign citizenship; (b) to those who, without permission of the Government, serve foreign nations (…) (c) Those that conspire and act against the people of Cuba and its socialist and revolutionary institutions (…) (d) Those Cubans by naturalisation who reside in their country of birth, who (…) do not express every three years their will to conserve their Cuban citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law No 1312 'Migration Law', 1976, with modifications</td>
<td>9(1)</td>
<td>It is considered that a Cuban has emigrated, when he travels abroad for personal reasons and remains there uninterrupted for a period of at least 24 months without corresponding authorisation, as well as when he resides abroad without meeting the applicable migratory regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23/25 c. f</td>
<td>Cuban citizens residing in the national territory cannot obtain a passport/leave the country when they (…) have obligations with the Cuban State or civil responsibility (…) lack established authorisation, under the rules aimed at the preservation of the qualified workforce for the economic, social, scientific-technical development of the country, as well as security and protection of official information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Legislation of the Dominican Republic, selected articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>They are Dominicans: (1) the persons born in national territory, with the exception of children of foreign members of consular and diplomatic delegations, and of foreigners who are in transit or reside illegally in Dominican territory. A person considered in transit is every foreigners defined as such in the Dominican laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Right to equality. All persons are born free and equal to the law, receive the same protection and treatment of the institutions, authorities and other persons and enjoy the same rights, freedoms and opportunities, without any discrimination for reasons of gender, colour, age, disability, nationality, family ties, language, religion, political or philosophical opinion, social and personal condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law No. 285-04, General Migration Law, 2004</td>
<td>16, (2), (3), (4), (5)</td>
<td>They will not be admitted in national territory those foreigners understood in one of the following impairments: (1) Enduring a mental illness in whatever form, to the grade that it alters the state of conduct (…) (2) Having a chronic physical, psychic limitation (…) profiting from prostitution, illegal trafficking of people or their organs, illegal trafficking of drugs or being an addict or promoting its use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>In those cases where will be proceeded to deportation of expulsions of foreigners, this will be realized with respect to human rights, in conformity with that established by active laws and the agreements ratified by the Dominican Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>The foreigners allowed to work according to their category or subcategory of entry, will enjoy the protection of labour and social laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Admitted as Not Residents are those foreigners that quality to one of the following subcategories: (1) passengers in transit towards other destinations abroad (3) temporal workers who enter the national territory to lend their labour services (or a determined period, under contract (…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>The national Council of Migration, whenever the needs of the job market require it to, will establish a quota or amount of temporal workers to be admitted in the country yearly (…) those workers will realize their labour activities in the areas of the economy of which the National Council of Migration recognizes the necessity of its contract, and defines the annual admission quotas per sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>To every foreigner who has stayed legally in the country for a period of 10 years or more as a permanent resident, will be given a license of definitive residence (…)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Law Articles Content
Supreme Court Declaration, Sep-tember 23 2003

3 It is considered treatable as trafficking of persons, the act that through capture, transport, transfer, the hosting and receiving of persons, children, adolescents, women, recurring to threats, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deceit, abuse of power, situations of vulnerability, concession or receipt of payment or benefits, seeks to obtain the consent of a person who has authority over another, to exert begging, any class of sexual exploitation, pornography, forced work or service, servitude for debts, servitude marriage, irregular adoption, slavery or its analogue practices, servitude or extraction of organs, even with the consent of the victim, and will be condemned with penalties of 15 to 20 years of reclusion and a fine of 153 minimum wages.

5 The victims of human trafficking will receive physical, psychological and social attention, as well as assessment and information with respect to their rights. This assistance will be provided by competent governmental entities, in coordination with non-governmental organisations and other sectors of civil society.

8 If the victim or person object of illicit smuggling of migrants or human trafficking, collaborates or provides the definite identity of the organisers of this activity or provides information upon capture, can, by a motivated order of the public ministry, be excluded from persecution or penal action.

10 The victims of human trafficking will receive physical, psychological and social attention, as well as assessment and information with respect to their rights. This assistance will be provided by competent governmental entities, in coordination with non-governmental organisations and other sectors of civil society.

Law No. 69-94, which establishes a special regime for persons born in the national territory irregularly subscribed in the Dominican civil registry, and about naturalization.
6 Every person, child of foreign parents in a situation of irregular migration, born national territory, and not inscribed in the Dominican Civil Registry, will be able to register in the book for foreigners contemplated in the General Migration law No. 285-94, as long as he reliably accredits the fact of birth through the media established in the regulations of this law.
8 The children of foreigners born in the Dominican Republic, regularized in conformity with that established in the National Plan of Regularization of foreigners in a situation of irregular migration, will be able to opt for ordinary naturalization (…) as long as he accredits through certification the inexistence of penal antecedents.

Decree 327-19, National Plan of Regularization of Foreigners
4 The foreigner located irregularly, who in the time established for this plan does not qualify or does not avail to the established provisions of regularization, will remain subject to deportation in conformity with the Constitution and its laws.

Table 17 Legislation of Guyana, selected articles
Law Articles Content
Constitution of the Co-operative Repub-lic of Guyana Act, Chapter 1:01. Act 2 of 1986, with amendments
41 It is the duty of the State to protect the just rights and interests of citizens resident abroad.
42 Every person born in Guyana after the commencement of this Constitution shall become a citizen of Guyana at the date of his or her birth.
43 Any person born outside Guyana after the commencement of this Constitution shall become a citizen of Guyana at the date of his or her birth if at that date his or her father or his or her mother is a citizen of Guyana otherwise than by virtue of this article.
Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act. Chapter 10:06. Act 2 of 2005
2 Trafficking in persons means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person by means of the threat or use of force or other means of coercion, by abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or by the giving or receiving of benefits or payments to agree the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation.

Aliens (immigration and registration) Act, Chapter 14:03. Act 39 of 1967, with amendments.
46 Subject to and save as otherwise provided in this Act, every alien in Guyana shall register with a registration officer under this Act as alien.
Immigration Act, Chapter 10:06. Act 42 of 1947, with amendments.
46 Except as otherwise provided in this section, every person who is (a) an idiot, or an epileptic, or of unsound mind, or mentally deficient, or deaf and dumb, or deaf and blind, or dumb or blind, or (b) is suffering from any variety of leprosy, or from a communicable disease (…);
(b) is a prostitute; or
(c) is a prostitute; or
(d) lives on, or receives, or has lived on, or has received, the proceeds of prostitution (…);
shall be a prohibited immigrant for the purposes of this act.
47 Except as otherwise provided in this Act, an immigration officer shall cause to be removed from Guyana every prohibited immigrant, and every person deemed to be a prohibited immigrant and dealt with as such.
48 When an order is made under this section for the removal of an immigrant from Guyana, he shall be removed there from at such time and in such manner as the Chief Immigration Officer may direct… the Chief Immigration Officer shall have regard to the place from which the migrant came (…) the country of which he is a subject or citizen (…) the place therein to which he is alleged to belong, the country which is willing to receive him, and the wishes and the means of the immigrant.
49 Any person who (…) (b) having entered Guyana by crossing a land frontier of Guyana, does not forthwith present himself in person to the nearest immigration officer; or (…) aids, assists or procures a prohibited immigrant (…) shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than thirty thousand dollars nor more than sixty thousand dollars and to imprisonment for twelve months.

Table 17 Legislation of Guyana, selected articles
Law Articles Content
Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana Act, Chapter 1:01. Act 2 of 1986, with amendments
41 It is the duty of the State to protect the just rights and interests of citizens resident abroad.
42 Every person born in Guyana after the commencement of this Constitution shall become a citizen of Guyana at the date of his or her birth.
43 Any person born outside Guyana after the commencement of this Constitution shall become a citizen of Guyana at the date of his or her birth if at that date his or her father or his or her mother is a citizen of Guyana otherwise than by virtue of this article.
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2 Trafficking in persons means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person by means of the threat or use of force or other means of coercion, by abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or by the giving or receiving of benefits or payments to agree the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation.

Aliens (immigration and registration) Act, Chapter 14:03. Act 39 of 1967, with amendments.
46 Subject to and save as otherwise provided in this Act, every alien in Guyana shall register with a registration officer under this Act as alien.
Immigration Act, Chapter 10:06. Act 42 of 1947, with amendments.
46 Except as otherwise provided in this section, every person who is (a) an idiot, or an epileptic, or of unsound mind, or mentally deficient, or deaf and dumb, or deaf and blind, or dumb or blind, or (b) is suffering from any variety of leprosy, or from a communicable disease (…);
(b) is a prostitute; or
(c) is a prostitute; or
(d) lives on, or receives, or has lived on, or has received, the proceeds of prostitution (…);
shall be a prohibited immigrant for the purposes of this act.
47 Except as otherwise provided in this Act, an immigration officer shall cause to be removed from Guyana every prohibited immigrant, and every person deemed to be a prohibited immigrant and dealt with as such.
48 When an order is made under this section for the removal of an immigrant from Guyana, he shall be removed there from at such time and in such manner as the Chief Immigration Officer may direct… the Chief Immigration Officer shall have regard to the place from which the migrant came (…) the country of which he is a subject or citizen (…) the place therein to which he is alleged to belong, the country which is willing to receive him, and the wishes and the means of the immigrant.
49 Any person who (…) (b) having entered Guyana by crossing a land frontier of Guyana, does not forthwith present himself in person to the nearest immigration officer; or (…) aids, assists or procures a prohibited immigrant (…) shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than thirty thousand dollars nor more than sixty thousand dollars and to imprisonment for twelve months.
Working Papers on Migration

**Table 18: Legislation of Haiti, selected articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti’s Constitution</td>
<td>11 n</td>
<td>Any person born of a Haitian father or Haitian mother who are themselves native-born Haitians and have never renounced their nationality possesses Haitian nationality at the time of birth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of 1987 with amend-</td>
<td>10 n</td>
<td>No Haitian can make their foreign nationality prevail on the territory of the Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ments to through 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 n</td>
<td>The State has the absolute obligation to guarantee the right to life, health, and respect of the human person for all citizens without distinct, in conformity with the universal Declaration of the Rights of Man.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54-1</td>
<td>Aliens enjoy civil, economic and social rights subject to legal provisions on the right to own real property, the practice of a profession, engaging in wholesale trade, serving as a commercial representative, and engaging in import and export operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act on the privileg-</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>An Alien may be expelled from the territory of the Republic if he becomes involved in the political life of the country, or in cases determined by law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>es granted to the</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>The right to asylum for political refugees is recognised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>descendants, 1987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Decree about the ratification of the American Convention on Trafficking of Minors, 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>This Convention has the objective to organize, for the protection of the fundamental rights of minors and their best interests, the prevention and punishment of international trafficking of minors, and the regulation of the civil and penal aspects of trafficking. To this end, States Parties to this Convention undertake: a. to ensure the protection of minors, taking into account their best interests; b. to establish, among others, a legal cooperation system which enshrines the prevention and punishment of international trafficking of minors, and to adopt the juridical and administrative rules necessary for this purpose; c. to ensure the prompt return of the minor, victim of international trafficking, to the State of habitual residence, taking into account his best interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act on the privileges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All Haitians of origin enjoying another nationality and their descendants are: a) exempted from visa to enter or leave Haiti; b) exempted from the of formalities of a resident permit and its payment of taxes and afferents; c) exemption from the formalities of the Work Permit, permit the use and payment of related taxes; d) exempted from the formalities related to the Foreigners license and the payment of related taxes; e) eligible both in the civil service and the labour market, except in cases expressly prohibited by the Constitution; f) exempted from the permit of the Department of Justice to acquire any real estate; g) authorised to acquire in an urban zone any real estate on a surface that does not pass 3 hectares by.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>granted to the original</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitians enjoying another</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationality to their</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>descendants, 1987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 19: Legislation of Jamaica, selected articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council, 1962</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>A person may, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, become a citizen of Jamaica by — a) birth; b) descent; or c) registration as a citizen of Jamaica based on marriage to a citizen of Jamaica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Every person born in Jamaica shall become a citizen of Jamaica (…).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3c</td>
<td>Every person born outside Jamaica shall become a citizen of Jamaica (…) this father or mother is a citizen of Jamaica by birth, descent or registration by virtue of marriage to a citizen of Jamaica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Immigration Restriction (Commonwealth Citizens) Act, 1945</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The following Commonwealth citizens (…) are prohibited migrants: a) Any person who is likely (…) to become a charge on public funds by reason of infirmity of body or mind or of (health (…)); b) any idiot or epileptic or any person who is insane or mentally deficient or any person who is deaf and dumb or deaf and blind, or dumb and blind, unless in any such case he or a person accompanying him or some other person give security to the satisfaction of the Chief immigration officer (…); (d) any person over sixteen years of age who by reason of deficient education is unable to fill up the prescribed form of declaration (for immigrants in his own handwriting (…); (e) Any prostitute or any person who may be living on or receiving or may have lived on or received the proceeds of prostitution (…);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Every person in Jamaica is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, has the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Aliens Act, 1946</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Leave shall not be given to an alien to land in the island unless he complies with the following conditions, that is to say— a) he is in a position to support himself and his dependents; b) if desirous of entering the service of an employer in the island, he produces a permit in writing issued to him (…); c) he is not a person of sound mind or a mentally deficient person; d) he is in possession of a visa (unless he is a national of a country with which there is an agreement for the mutual abolition of visas is in force).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>The Minister may, if he finds fit, in any of the cases mentioned in subsection (6) make an order (deportation order) requiring an alien to leave and to remain thereafter out of the island. (2) a deportation order may be made subject to any condition which the Minister may think proper.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### The Jamaican Nationality Act, 1962

3. A citizen of any country mentioned in the First Schedule (Commonwealth), or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, being a person of full age and capacity may, on making application therefore to the Minister in the prescribed manner, be registered at the discretion of the Minister as a citizen of Jamaica if he satisfies the Minister that he has been (a) ordinarily resident in Jamaica, (b) in Crown service under the Government of Jamaica, (c) partly the one and partly the other.

### The Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens (Employment) Act

3 (2) Subject to the provisions of the Act, no person shall have in his employment in Jamaica a foreign national or a Commonwealth citizen without there being in force a valid work permit in relation to that employment.

Any foreign national or Commonwealth citizen (…) any person who has in his employment in Jamaica (…) shall be liable on summary conviction before a Resident Magistrate to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding six months or both such fine and imprisonment.

4. An application for the grant of a work permit shall be addressed to the Minister, who may in his absolute discretion grant the permit either conditionally or without conditions or may refuse to grant it.

7. The Minister may in writing at any time vary or cancel a work permit.

### Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Constitution Act, 2009

25. (…) every person in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex (…)

28. No person shall be held in slavery or servitude; no person shall be required to perform forced labour.

298. Every person born in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on or after the appointed day shall become a citizen at the date of his birth.

299 (1) A person born outside Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on or after the appointed day shall become a citizen at the date of his birth if, at date, his father or mother is or was, but for his parent’s death, a citizen otherwise than by descent.

242 (1) The following persons shall, upon making application, be entitled to be registered as citizens – (a) any person who, being a Commonwealth citizen is ordinarily resident in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on the appointed day, and has been so resident for the period of seven years immediately preceding that day (…)

243 (1) A person who is a citizen of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines may also be a citizen of another country or other countries and thus hold dual or multiple citizenship (…)

245. ‘Alien’ means a person who is neither a citizen of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, nor a citizen of another CARICOM or OECS country, nor a Commonwealth citizen, nor a British protected person nor a citizen of the Republic of Ireland.

### The Recruitment of Workers Act (Cap. 151)

### The Immigration (Restriction) Act (Cap. 78)

### Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens (Employment) Act, 1973

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**Table 20: Legislation of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, selected articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Constitution Act, 2009 | 25 | (…) every person in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex (…)
| | 28 | No person shall be held in slavery or servitude; no person shall be required to perform forced labour.
| | 298 | Every person born in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on or after the appointed day shall become a citizen at the date of his birth.
| | 299 (1) | A person born outside Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on or after the appointed day shall become a citizen at the date of his birth if, at date, his father or mother is or was, but for his parent’s death, a citizen otherwise than by descent.
| | 242 (1) | The following persons shall, upon making application, be entitled to be registered as citizens – (a) any person who, being a Commonwealth citizen is ordinarily resident in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on the appointed day, and has been so resident for the period of seven years immediately preceding that day (…)
| | 243 (1) | A person who is a citizen of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines may also be a citizen of another country or other countries and thus hold dual or multiple citizenship (…)
| | 245 | ‘Alien’ means a person who is neither a citizen of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, nor a citizen of another CARICOM or OECS country, nor a Commonwealth citizen, nor a British protected person nor a citizen of the Republic of Ireland.

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**The Jamaican Nationality Act, 1962**

3. A citizen of any country mentioned in the First Schedule (Commonwealth), or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, being a person of full age and capacity may, on making application therefore to the Minister in the prescribed manner, be registered at the discretion of the Minister as a citizen of Jamaica if he satisfies the Minister that he has been (a) ordinarily resident in Jamaica, (b) in Crown service under the Government of Jamaica, (c) partly the one and partly the other.

### The Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens (Employment) Act

3 (2) Subject to the provisions of the Act, no person shall have in his employment in Jamaica a foreign national or a Commonwealth citizen without there being in force a valid work permit in relation to that employment.

Any foreign national or Commonwealth citizen (…) any person who has in his employment in Jamaica (…) shall be liable on summary conviction before a Resident Magistrate to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding six months or both such fine and imprisonment.

4. An application for the grant of a work permit shall be addressed to the Minister, who may in his absolute discretion grant the permit either conditionally or without conditions or may refuse to grant it.

7. The Minister may in writing at any time vary or cancel a work permit.
Table 2: Legislation of Suriname, selected articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitution of the Republic of Suriname, 1991</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Who is Surinamese and resident, is determined by law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>The admittance and expulsion of foreigners is determined by law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1. All who find themselves on the territory of Suriname have equal claims on the protection of person and property. 2. Nobody can be discriminated against on basis of birth, gender, race, language, religion, descent, education, political beliefs, economic position or any other status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>No one shall be obliged to do forced or compulsory labour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law of 10th of November 2014, on regulation of Surinamese descent and residency</td>
<td>8: 3</td>
<td>Surinamer by birth is: a) the child, of whom at birth the father or mother possesses the Surinamese nationality. b) the child born in Suriname, unless it appears, that it has the nationality of another State, in which case it is deemed never to have had the Surinamese nationality. c) the underage child adopted by a non-Surinamer that obtains Suriname descent status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>The underage child adopted by a non-Surinamer that obtains another nationality, does not lose the Surinamese nationality. the child can within one year of reaching adulthood point out not to retain the Surinamese nationality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Persons of Surinamese descent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Every person who (…) 2. Was not born in Suriname, but has at least one parent who, on basis of clause 1 of this article, is of Surinamese descent [born in Suriname] (…) 3. Was not born in Suriname, but has at least one grandparent who, on basis of clause 1 of this article, is of Surinamese descent (…) has right to PSA (Persons of Surinamese Descent Status).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Persons of PSA status, who are no inhabitants of Suriname, have the following rights other foreigners do not have: a) they can always leave for Suriname (…) without necessity of a tourist card of any other document. Other travel documents, such as passports remain obligatory. b) they may stay up to six months in Suriname and can extend their stay with maximum six months at the foreigner’s service, without subscribing as resident, under (…) the guarantee that they can provide in provision and shelter. c) they may on any moment after arrival in Suriname within six months, though last within twelve months (…) subscribe as resident. d) they may during their stay in Suriname work without the work permit that is required of foreigners, under the conditions that are established in this law and other legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners Law, 1991</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 22: Legislation of Trinidad and Tobago, selected articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>It is hereby recognised and declared that in Trinidad and Tobago there have existed and shall continue to exist, without discrimination by reason of race, origin, colour, religion or sex, the following fundamental human rights and freedoms (…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Act, Act 49 of 1969, with amendments</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(Etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Act, Act 49 of 1969, with amendments</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Subject to this Act and Regulations, persons who come within the following classes may on application (…) be granted permission (…) to become residents, that is to say: a) a permitted entrant who – by reason of his education, occupational qualifications, personal history, employment record, training, skills or other special qualifications has established or is likely to be able to establish himself successfully in Trinidad and Tobago in a profession, trade, self-operating business or agricultural enterprise and who has sufficient means to maintain himself and his immediate family in Trinidad and Tobago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration (Children) Act, Act 2 of 1918, with amendments</td>
<td>56 (3)</td>
<td>Any person who knowingly and wilfully lands or suffers himself to be landed, or a person who knowingly lands or procures to be landed or who aids or assists in landing another person, contrary to the provisions of this Act is guilty of an offence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>