Foreword

On behalf of UN-Habitat Lebanon, I’m pleased to present the Tyre City Profile, which comes as the 2nd of a series (after Tripoli) of urban profiles that highlights the impact of the crisis on Lebanon’s key cities. For a country like Lebanon where more than 88% of its population is urbanized, and for a country that is suffering from one of the largest refugee crisis in recent history, and for a country that lacks proper national policies and operates with already ill-equipped municipalities and sector ministries in terms of technical and financial resources, there is a crucial need for innovative tools and frameworks that can help respond to the impacts of the protracted Syrian crisis.

UN-Habitat City Profiles are multi-sectoral spatial tools that aim to enhance the understanding of vulnerabilities in urban settings, and to help local and regional actors make proper decisions and take appropriate actions in relation to the urban crisis response.

We look forward to receiving your feedback in order to maximize in the near future, the use of City Profiles by different stakeholders.

Tarek Osseiran
UN-Habitat Lebanon Programme Manager

The City of Tyre is considered the principal city of the district of Tyre. It hosts a rich and diverse Lebanese social fabric, as well as a dense Palestinian population present within its two Palestine Refugee Camps of El-Buss, and Al-Rachidiyeh, and in other gatherings around the city. This has caused huge pressure on the city on various sectors especially on basic services. Further, the Syrian refugee crisis and its subsequent implications, caused for a mass displacement of Syrian refugees, in an uncontrolled manner into the city placing further pressure on already strained infrastructure. Henceforth, the necessity to implement a new assessment which investigates the size and intensity of the rising problems along with their associated findings, became a priority. While it is not possible for the Municipality, who is lacking the required resources, to conduct such an assessment by itself, UN-Habitat initiative has come to shed light on the current issues pertinent to the city as part of the City Profiling project. It identifies current problems, places priorities, and provides with attainable solutions, then programs them according to the available resources in a timely manner. This aims to reduce the detrimental impacts of the Syrian displacement on the various social, environmental, health, and humanitarian aspects and helps rebalance the state of the Lebanese host communities in a way that prevents negative coping mechanisms in dealing with our Syrian brothers. In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention the importance of constantly updating and following up on this project on both the short and medium terms. We also hope for the findings to, not only remain on publication or in print, but also to be implemented; it is rather important to instrument the recommendations and proposals of this report especially when it comes to dealing with the marginalized and vulnerable neighbourhoods.

Finally, we must thank all those who contributed to the preparation, financing and implementation of this project, as we are looking forward to witness its positive outcomes soon.

Hassan Dbouk
Head of Union of Tyre Municipalities

“Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” is the objective of the Sustainable Development Goal #11. Whereas globally, more than half of the world’s population is living in cities, the World Bank recently estimated the share of urban population in Lebanon at an astounding 88%. Faced with rapid urban growth in combination with increasing demands on public services, sustainable urban planning and development has become an enormous challenge. With the City Profile, UN-Habitat has developed a meaningful instrument to address this challenge. Together with the Neighbourhood Profile and the Neighbourhood Strategy, an in-depth analysis of a specific urban area of relevance to the further development of a city, is now at hand. The strength of this instrument is the combination of social, technical and infrastructural aspects, resulting in a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Besides the holistic and cross-sectoral projection, the specificity of the instrument also lies in the participative involvement of all stakeholders and in its alignment to evidence-based data. That way it can unfold the unique character of a neighbourhood in all its many facets and realities; be it that of a Lebanese citizen, a Palestinian or a Syrian Refugees, a South-Asian migrant worker or any other person bringing it to life.

The City and Neighbourhood Profile and the Neighbourhood Strategy together form a comprehensive tool for local authorities, implementers, donors and investors alike. It promotes a genuinely participatory approach by engaging with all stakeholders. For a fact, it is only when doing exactly this that the development of cities and neighbourhoods can indeed become resilient and sustainable.

Philipp Beutler
Head Swiss Cooperation Office
Embassy of Switzerland in Lebanon
Swiss Cooperation Office
UN-Habitat Mandate

UN-Habitat, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, is mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities, and adequate housing for all, and is the lead agency within the United Nations system for coordinating activities in the field of human settlements. It is mandated through the Habitat Agenda\(^1\) to take the lead in disaster mitigation, and post-crisis rehabilitation capabilities in human settlements.

UN-Habitat’s global responsibilities in emergencies, humanitarian, and post-crisis response are to support national governments, local authorities, and civil society in strengthening their capacity for managing human-made and natural disasters affecting human settlements. Experience has shown that the potential for development gain is high in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, and this is a key principle underlying UN-Habitat’s efforts to deploy at the earliest opportunity following a disaster. UN-Habitat’s added value is that it is the UN agency specialised in working in cities and human settlements.

Since 2006, the agency has been present in Lebanon, first involved in recovery and reconstruction efforts in South Lebanon, Beirut and Northern Lebanon (particularly in the Nahr el Bared Camp crisis response in 2007), and in efforts to improve the living conditions in the 43 Palestinian out-of-camp concentrations. Since 2013, UN-Habitat has been involved in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis.

Credits & Acknowledgements

UN-Habitat Lebanon gratefully acknowledges the donors Embassy of Switzerland, Swiss Cooperation Office, and Cities Alliance. The generous cooperation, advice and information provided by the Tyre Union of Municipalities as well as the municipalities of Tyre, Abbasiye, Bourj El-Chamali and Ain Baal is recognised. Other UN agencies and humanitarian partners kindly gave their advice and time to the process of developing the profile. The assistance of the South sector leads in providing input on profile sections is also acknowledged.

This report was led by Suzanne Maguire, reviewed by Synne Bergby, researched and written by Maya Majzoub with input from Christelle Khalil, Sawsan Saad, Bassam Abdel Samad, with GIS input from Ali Saad and Racha Serhal, and graphically designed by Made for Brands and Rena Abou Chawareb with input from Georges Abi Sleiman, and with contribution from all of UN-Habitat Lebanon.

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Introduction

Purpose
UN-Habitat City Profiles are formulated to offer a cross-sectoral perspective on urban vulnerabilities that will inform holistic and inclusive interventions by local authorities, humanitarian partners and others to respond to needs and alleviate poverty amongst host and displaced populations. They also aim at contributing to an analytical knowledge base that will facilitate nuanced medium to long term public sector planning and investment agendas.

Thematic scope
Concerned with the status of urban infrastructure and services and how these interplay with the distribution and socio-economic characteristics of host and refugee populations across the city, UN-Habitat City Profiles are structured around the five themes of space, governance, population, services and social stability. National and city-specific data is presented against each theme followed by identification of gaps and challenges.

In the fourth and fifth themes, services (divided into economy, basic urban services and social services) and social stability, relevant activities reported by partners to the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan in the online portal ActivityInfo is included, forming part of the evidence base against which gaps and challenges are suggested. Three reporting years are currently included, covering 2014 until end of 2016.

Methodological outline
Data collection is primarily desk-based, with supplementary primary data collection and surveying where necessary. In defining the study area, continuous built-up area is used as an imperfect morphological proxy for the functional urban area. This methodological choice is aimed at facilitating analysis of the city in terms of its active spatial interactions as opposed to historic administrative boundaries. To illustrate, topics optimally addressed at this scale elsewhere typically include economic development, mobility including public transport infrastructure, spatial planning including housing, and implementation structures. Delimiting the study unit in this transparent, replicable way allows for comparison between cities on a like-for-like basis.

UN-Habitat City Profiles are characterisable not only as geographical and multi-sectoral but also participative, developed through a collaborative and consultative process that engages from the outset local authorities (unions of municipalities and municipalities), NGOs and other UN agencies. ‘Round tables’ facilitated by UN-Habitat are convened by the local authorities at key profile development stages for consultation and endorsement purposes. Information and validation is gained from services providers as well as the humanitarian sector leads for the relevant territory.

UN-Habitat promotes an ‘area-based’ approach for urban response, with urban profiles as one of the key features, followed by formulation of multi-sector and multi-stakeholder strategies, project implementation, as well as capacity support of local authorities and local communities.

Structure
Following an outline of the city’s historic and developmental context, the five themes (Space, Governance, Population, Services and Social Stability) are addressed in turn. Each begins with key summary points, followed by discussion in terms of their national and functional urban area dimensions. Conclusions are then drawn, focussing first on resounding findings and second on policy and research implications. The latter incorporates a set of suggested projects of potential strategic impact which may respond to some of the challenges identified.

Terminology
The term ‘city’ is henceforth used to refer to the multi-municipality urban area focussed on Tyre, defined by the extent of the continuous built up area.

Whilst the terms Tyre and Sour are used interchangeably by some, here the term Tyre refers to the multi-municipality city and the term Sour is reserved for the Municipality of Sour.

Related UN-Habitat Lebanon publications
Tripoli City Profile
Haddadine (Tripoli) Neighbourhood Profile & Strategy
Nabaa (Bourj Hammoud, Beirut) Neighbourhood Profile & Strategy
Maachouk (Tyre) Neighbourhood Profile & Strategy

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2 A tailored selection of ActivityInfo indicators was selected for the purpose of City Profiles. Short-term impact interventions such as multi-purpose cash were omitted, with medium to longer-term impact projects included.

3 Ideally functional urban areas are defined not only on morphological parameters but also on direct functional ones, particularly travel-to-work trips for mapping economic integration across the urban margin. Such functional data does not exist in Lebanon.
TYRE
CITY PROFILE

Tyre, often referred to by its Arabic name of Sour, is a harbour city well recognized for its mercantile activity throughout the Mediterranean since ancient Phoenician times. Located in Lebanon’s South Governorate 83km south of the capital Beirut and 26km north of the country’s southern border, Tyre is considered Lebanon’s fourth largest coastal city, and is characterised by its wealth of sites of archaeological and natural significance.

History

- Tyre has hosted diverse civilisations throughout history, resulting in different layers of built and cultural heritage, including some ruins now submerged. Tyre was included on on UNESCO’s World Heritage list in 1984 (Nahhas 2013).
- Tyre developed over two distinct cores – one on the mainland, the old city known as Ushu, which was founded in the late 3rd Millennium BC; and the other on an island less than a kilometre offshore. which subsequently developed as the trade centre.
- In ancient times, the island city was heavily fortified. The mainland core, which in effect became a suburb of the island, was used as the island’s source of water and timber.
- The island-city originally had two harbours, located on its north and south sides. These were instrumental in Tyre’s historic rise to maritime trading success. Whilst the south port has silted up, the north port remains operational today.
- Tyre experienced it’s ‘golden age’ during the 10th Century BC. Through to the 8th Century BC its traders founded colonies in North Africa and around the Mediterranean and Atlantic, expanding markets.
- A particularly prized commodity in Tyre’s commerce was a locally produced, expensive purple dye used for the textiles of royalty. With Phoenician expansion from around 815 BC, maritime trade flourished (Nahhas 2013).
- In the early 6th Century BC, Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon laid siege to the city for 13 years, likely to have prompted the movement of population from the mainland to the fortified island city.
- As part of Alexander the Great’s Siege of Tyre in 332BC - aimed at conquering this strategic coastal base - he dismantled much of the mainland city and used its fallen debris rock to fill in the sea between the mainland and the island to create a land bridge for his war machines. This man-made bridge has been reinforced over time by heavy sedimentation to form today’s promontory.
- The area became a Roman province in 64BC. During this era, the Arch of Hadrian was built as well as a hippodrome.
- After the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 AD, Tyre continued on as a port city under the Byzantine Empire until the 7th century AD when it was taken in the Muslim conquest of the region.
- Tyre was captured during the first Venetian Crusade in 1124.
- In 1291, Tyre was taken by the Mamluk Sultanate. This was followed by Ottoman rule from 1516 up until the fall of the Empire in 1918.
- With the end of World War I Tyre was integrated into the modern state of Lebanon under the French Mandate.
- Tyre was subject to the influx of Armenian refugees in the 1930s, and the subsequent influx of refugees from Palestine from 1948.
- In 1936 the French authorities established refugee camps in Tyre for Armenian refugees. Later, with the influx of Palestinian refugees, these already established refugee camps were denoted as Palestinian Refugee Camps. Tyre has been subject to an ongoing rural exodus since the 1960s, superimposing on natural population increase in the city. This rural-to-urban movement not only influenced the Lebanese population, but also the movement of Palestinian refugees from Bekaa to the city’s refugee camps.
- During the civil war, Tyre’s urban development progressed both horizontally and vertically in an uncontrolled manner. This has included haphazard development within proximity to major archaeological sites and historical properties.
- In 1978, during the Lebanese civil war, the persistent violence between PLO and Israel lead to heavy

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4 French control of Lebanon became formalised by the League of Nations mandate system, and France was assigned the mandate of Lebanon on September 29, 1923, including Tyre.
6 The Lebanese Civil War lasted from 1975-1990.
detections in Tyre. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created after the incursion, following the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 425/246 in 1978 to oversee the withdrawal of Israeli Forces, restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area.

- Following the 2006 Lebanese War, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 was adopted, increasing UNIFIL presence from 2000 to up to 15000 troops throughout the South to monitor the cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel and monitoring of the Blue Line. UNIFIL has currently 10500 uniformed personnel; deployed covering south of Litani River, including Tyre.8

- Since the outbreak of the war in Syria in 2011, Tyre is hosting both Palestinian and Syrian refugees from Syria. This has further aggravated political and socio-economic instability in the city, and placed further strain on stability.


Figure 2: Event Timeline of Tyre. Source: UN-Habitat 2017
THEME 1
Space
Key points

> Tyre is a southern Lebanon coastal urban agglomeration 83km south of Beirut.

> The Tyre urban area, defined by its continuous built-up morphology, covers 16.8km².

> Its geography comprises parts of the four municipalities of Tyre, Ain Baal, Abbassieh and Burj El Chamali. Each municipality is also one cadastre.

> 53 distinct neighbourhoods have been identified within the Tyre urban area.

> Based on approximate remote land cover analysis, the Urban area is (40%) built-up. Agriculture constitutes the largest category (44%) within the urban complex. This contributes to the low built-up area average statistic for the city.

> The urban morphology is characterised by relatively dense built-up fabric occupying the whole of Tyre municipality’s promontory, the site of the old island-city, and another focus of density in Bourj El Chamali municipality at the eastern extent of the adopted urban area boundary. Almost continuous medium-to-high density strip development is anchored along the main east-west highway connecting these two areas.

> This main spine is surrounded by dispersed pockets of coastal and harbour functions, in addition to minor formal and informal industrial activities towards the north-eastern edge.

> There are three official Palestinian camps: two in Tyre Municipality - including one on the site of the ancient mainland city at Rashidiyyeh - and one in Burj El Chamali. There are also two informal out-of-camp Palestinian concentrations.
Tyre urban area

4 municipalities, 4 cadastres, part of Tyre Union of Municipalities
38% built-up area

16.7km²

Location in Lebanon
Tyre city is located on the Mediterranean shore 83km south of Beirut and 26km north of the international border with Palestine/Israel (Figure 1), within the operational area of the UN’s Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (See Theme 5 Social Stability).

Four municipalities contribute to Tyre city’s 16.7km² continuously built-up area, though none are included in their entirety.

Tyre urban area lies on a fertile coastal plain not exceeding 50m above sea level (Figure 3), underpinning its agricultural potential (see Agriculture Section; Economy).

Governorate & Districts
Lebanon is territorially divided into eight ‘mohafazah’ or governorates containing a total of 2610 ‘caza’ or districts including Beirut. Tyre urban area (Figure 4) falls within the 60-municipality district of Tyre, which in turn is part of South Lebanon Governorates which comprises the three districts Jezzine, Saida and Tyre (Figure 5). Sour municipality is the administrative centre of Sour district.

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9 - For Sour municipality, containing the heart of the city, the excluded part is mainly Tyre’s Natural and Coastal Reserve.
- For Burj El-Chamali, the omitted part is agricultural/unbuilt land.
- For Abbasiyet Sour, the excluded area - the majority of the municipality - includes agricultural lands, but also a village that is fully dislocated from the continuously built-up area.
- For Ain Baal, the omitted majority of the municipality/cadastre comprises agricultural lands and dislocated settlements.

The excluded tracts of each cadastre are mostly unpopulated. This means that population data for the four cadastres may be taken to approximate to that of the adopted urban area. However, population calculations (see section ‘Tyre Urban Area’ under Theme 3 Population) are further refined to discount from cadastral totals any populated areas outside the urban boundary identified from satellite imagery.

10 Beirut is a governorate, it is not considered a district.
Figure 4: Boundary of the continuously built-up Tyre urban area. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016
**Union of Municipalities**

The Tyre Union of Municipalities includes 60 ‘baladiyeh’ or municipalities and 3 localities without municipal councils, represented by their moukhtars (Figure 5). The Tyre urban area spans a fraction of the union, covering all or part of just four of the 60 municipalities. Each of these four municipalities is also a cadastre.  

**Municipal Areas**

The spatial area that each municipality contributes to the Tyre urban area are shown in Table 1. Burj El-Chamall and Tyre are the major components within these boundaries (6.8km² and 5.4km² respectively), while Aabbassiyet-Sour and Ain Baal are smaller (3.3km² and 1.3 km² respectively). These figures feed into population density calculations in Table 7.

**Neighbourhoods**

At the sub-cadastral level, UN-Habitat has with the municipalities and through community-based field work identified 46 neighbourhoods within Tyre urban area (Figure 8, Table 2).

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11 In Lebanon and elsewhere, land registration, real estate rights and related information are ordered by territorial units known as cadastres. In Lebanon, a cadastre may correspond to a municipality, it may alternatively comprise multiple municipalities or indeed make up only part of one municipality. The cadastral framework is important for the current purpose because certain demographic data is available at this level.

13 Neighbourhoods are currently mapped as points only, with comprehensive boundary definition being a longer-term endeavour.

15 Sub-cadastral ‘localities’ maintained by UNHCR for refugee registration and activity reporting purposes currently only count four localities in Tyre urban area and does not capture neighbourhood granularity.
Table 2: Neighbourhoods by Municipality across Tyre urban area. Source: UN Habitat, 2016.
Land Cover

Remote analysis via satellite imagery was undertaken to give a broadbrush assessment of the relative distribution of main land use categories across the urban area (Figure 8). Whilst policy-making or action on the ground would require validatory fieldwork, some patterns can be elicited.

A defining characteristic of the city is its intra-urban agriculture, the single highest land use occupying 44% of the city’s territory. The sector’s reported underperformance in productivity terms (see Agriculture Section; Economy) combined with its distribution across strategically significant urban land would suggest the need for considered policy attention for economic sectoral and/or land use optimisation.

Built-up land constitutes over 40% of the city, forming a land use category – albeit a heterogeneous one – that is the second largest behind agriculture. The main concentration of built-up land is on the promontory but also stretches eastward inland to Burj El-Chamali. Industrial uses are dispersed to the north and to a lesser extent the south of the connecting east-west highway between these points, in Burj El-Chamali municipality. Whilst the built up area is compacted to the west side where it is constrained by the coastline, the density wanes with movement to the east, giving way to a spatially fragmented development pattern. Nuanced understanding of the relationship between built-up and agricultural uses in the city is needed to consider whether new development could be compacted in brownfield/infill sites as opposed to in sprawling edge-of-city locations. The nature and effectiveness of existing zoning policy designations are starting points for consideration of such spatial development agendas. The city’s most diverse land use mix is to be found within Tyre municipality. Here uses include residential, commercial, military, educational and health facilities, gardens/playgrounds, agricultural areas and cemeteries. Sour is the only Municipality within the urban area that holds major cultural/heritage sites.

There are three official Palestinian refugees camps in Tyre urban area: El-Buss (1.5km south-east of the core city of Tyre), Burj El-Chamali (3km east of Tyre) and Rashidieh (on the seashore 5km south of Tyre) (UNRWA n.d.) They are located along or in close proximity to the main north-south mainland highway.

There are several tracts of unused land north and south of El Buss Palestinian Camp as well as on the shoreline of Sour municipality south of the promontory. The land use analysis highlights the significant scale of the city’s coastal resource, a semi-natural endowment likely to warrant strategic exploration in terms of its touristic and amenity value.

In Abbassieh-Sour municipality, a large green space called ‘Horsh Abbasieh’ is being upgraded and will soon be opened to the public (Mayor Khalil Hershi). This is located just south of one of the city’s two main heritage sites the Hippodrome and the Necropolis of El-Buss. Together these suggest a heritage/amenity feature complex of strategic significance.

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Old city core

A distinguishing feature of the city of Tyre is its charming old core composed of two quarters, or ‘haras’, extending over an area of around 45,000km². The quarters are locally known as ‘Haret el Masihiyeh’ (Christian quarter) and Haret el Jalaji’ (Muslim quarter) (Figure 8).

- The Christian hara located on the northern peninsula is considered characterful with low density surrounded by courtyards and proximity to the sea.
- The Muslim hara adjacent to the old souk includes a higher density area

The Muslim and the Christian haras are also characterised by some social divides, with various sectarian parties influencing each neighbourhood. Inhabitants in the Christian hara have been noted to enjoy better access to education and livelihoods, coupled with the sectarian divide these factors hinders the haras’ development and change into neighbouring communities with a united core.

However, despite the division, the old core remains the main administrative hub in Tyre including major governmental and public buildings such as the Serail, the municipality, the local police force, the prison, the tribunal, and the technical office for urbanism, in addition to local meat, vegetable and fish markets and souks(Nahhas 2001).
Palestinian refugees in Tyre’s three main camps (Table 3) have a combined population of around 73,515 inhabitants; 69,724 of which are Palestinian refugees from Lebanon, and 3,791 Palestinian refugees from Syria.

- Rashidieh, a camp located in agricultural land (CRI et al, 2005:51), accommodates around 31,500 registered refugees. It comprises old and newly constructed sections. In 1936 the government developed the original part for Armenian refugees. UNRWA later in 1963 developed a new section to house Palestine refugees evacuated from Baalbeck. The Lebanese Civil War led to rapid deterioration of the camp, especially in the 1982 – 1987 period, resulting in the destruction of nearly 600 shelters. The main economic activity of residents is seasonal work in agriculture and construction. Main problems include major need for shelter rehabilitation, lack of employment opportunities, and the absence of a sewerage system. With respect to basic community facilities, the camp includes four schools and one health centre (UNRWA n.d.).

- Burj El-Chamali camp was initially established in 1948 to provide tented shelter for refugees from northern Palestine. It also houses Palestinian refugees from other parts of Lebanon. In 1955, UNRWA started operating in the camp. Around 22,800 registered refugees inhabit the camp. Infrastructure was severely affected as a result of the civil war. The camp is characterised by a high rate of unemployment. Of the economically active, the men usually find work in seasonal agriculture and construction while the women work as house cleaners and in agriculture. The camp has undergone some improvements, including the development of a water supply network and a sewerage system. Also, a four year project was initiated in 2007 for rehabilitating 450 shelters. Major problems include high unemployment rates and deteriorated infrastructure. Main facilities include four schools and one health centre (UNRWA n.d.).

- El Buss Camp, located next to a main highway, was established in 1939 by the French government for Armenian refugees. Around 11,300 registered refugees inhabit the camp. In the 1950s Palestinians arrived at el-Buss. The camp was not affected by the civil war like the other two because of its relatively small scale and location. Dwellers mainly work in seasonal agriculture and construction, but is characterised by high levels of unemployment. They generally inhabit concrete block shelters. Between 2007 and 2008, water, sewerage, and storm water systems were rehabilitated. It includes four schools and one health care centre (UNRWA n.d.).
Gaps & Challenges

- In the context of a protracted refugee/humanitarian crisis with a significant urban dimension in a country with already 88% urbanised (World Bank 2015) population, the lack of institutionalised urban boundaries undermines the measuring of urban crisis impact and the monitoring of intervention impacts.

- The long-term strategic planning dilemma presented by the co-existence of intra-urban agricultural land low density urban sprawl requires consideration. The merits of urban densification and the associated efficiency of land use need to be weighed in policy terms against the imperative of capitalising on the sectoral strength in agriculture in the context of a high migrant/refugee worker presence.

- Challenges associated with the relatively high presence of Palestinian camps (three) and out-of-camp concentrations (two) are relevant for Tyre urban area.

- There is a valuable reserve of green public space, Horsh Abbassieh, well located close to the main built-up area of the promontory and adjacent to one of the city’s world-class archaeological sites. Together these offer a strategic opportunity for anchoring or enhancing amenity and tourism activity.

- The location of Tyre close to Lebanon’s southern border has historic and ongoing implications for the political-sectarian mix of residents on one hand and, linked to that, the reverberations of international political conflicts in the city on the other.

Palestinian concentrations outside camps

Another spatial feature of the Tyre Urban area are Palestinian settlements outside camps. The term ‘gathering’ has been used (UN-Habitat & UNDP, 2015) to reference concentrations of Palestinians living outside camps. Some such communities originated soon after the 1948 Palestinian exodus. Nationally, 42 have been identified, accommodated in 25 municipalities.

As detailed in an interview (2016) with the Mayor of Tyre, the population residing in these ‘gatherings’ are settled illegally on either public or private lands. Mostly, gatherings are governed by popular committees or ‘Al Lajnee al Shaabiyah’.

The term ‘gathering’ has, however, weaknesses in descriptive and analytical terms. First, Palestinians are also to be found living outside of both camps and ‘gatherings’, integrated less visibly in the host community’s residential fabric. Second, the term ‘gathering’ focuses attention on one vulnerable group in the out-of-camp urban fabric which is accommodated in poor, often mixed-nationality residential neighbourhoods, which also include host populations and other displaced and migrant groups. The implied cohort-based focus is increasingly partial following the recent influx of Syrian refugees. The current profile instead assumes an area-based approach which aims to understand cross-population vulnerabilities within defined geographical boundaries.

The two out-of-camp concentrations in Tyre urban area (Table 3) are shown in Figure 12.

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15 The commonly used definition of gathering is that of Fafo (2003, in UNDP [2015 Aug] “Improving living conditions in Palestinian gatherings and Host Communities”. Gatherings are defined as a minimum of 25 Palestinian households living in proximity and identifying as a distinct social group in a geographically defined area. (Chaaban et al, 2016:35).

16 Municipalities however often do not provide basic urban services to ‘gatherings’ seeing them outside their area of mandate. UNWRA, which provides services within the 12 official Palestinian camps, is not mandated to extend services to ‘gatherings’. (UNDP, 2015 Aug)

17 Hassan Dbouk
Governance

Key points

> Tyre urban area takes in parts of four municipalities, each also a cadastre. These are Sour, Bourj El-Chemali, Aabbassiet-Sour, and Ain Baal.

> Collectively, the four municipalities are locally represented by 66 municipal councillors and 27 moukhtars.

> Female representation is low with only 6 female representatives out of 66 municipal councillors and, 2 female out of 27 moukhtars.

> Tyre Union of Municipalities operates a Regional Technical Office (RTO)\(^{18}\), a permanently staffed special assistance unit supporting the inter-municipality work of the union.

> Through the RTO, Tyre Union actively engage in coordination with the NGOs in Sour district.

> The Union of Tyre Municipalities is an expansive confederation of 60 municipalities and 3 localities covering the entire district of Tyre. There is no municipality grouping or other institutional structure focussed on the distinct needs of the urban core.

> Human and capital resourcing of municipalities and unions is low. Devolution of authority from central government in master planning, tax-raising powers, and service and project delivery is severely limited. The municipalities occupy a tense position, legally assigned broad general duties but with limited specific powers.

> Despite the presence of the RTO, both the municipalities and the union require capacity building and technical training to gain more autonomy and participate more effectively in the strategic and spatial planning process.

> Surging NGO engagement in Tyre Urban area presents valuable opportunities for mitigating urban vulnerabilities. Capitalizing on this will depend on developing more sophisticated communication and coordination structures between state and non-state governance entities.

> Coordination between dominant political parties is critical for implementation of strategic spatial planning policies.

\(^{18}\) The RTO was established by UN-Habitat following the 2006 war to support reconstruction in Sour, and later reactivated in 2014.
Governance encompasses the formal and informal institutions and norms for making and implementing decisions in society. It highlights questions of administrative efficiency, power distribution and asymmetries and democratic accountability. At a national scale, institutions and government play a core role in a country’s development\(^\text{19}\). In the city, “Urban governance is the software that enables the urban hardware to function”\(^\text{20}\). At the Urban level, governance is challenged with addressing needs across the territory’s diverse spaces, institutions and demographics and, moreover, coordinating responses. Governance efficacy is directly implicated in outcomes for cities and their residents (OECD 2015)\(^\text{21}\).

**State governance**

While state governance is represented through governors, Qaimmaqams and Municipalities, the influence of the central government is relatively weak in the South (UN-OCHA 2017). Political instability along with weak governance have allowed the prominence of non-state and informal governance networks in Tyre which are highly involved in informal/non-state service provision.

**Governorates ‘Muhafazah’**

Tyre Urban Area belongs to the administrative division of the Governorate of South Lebanon, along with Saida and Jezzine (Figure 5). Saida is however the administrative centre of South Lebanon, where public services are present under the authority of the Governor ‘Muhafez’. The governor, who is appointed by an executive decree by the President with two-thirds of the cabinet’s approval, is the highest-ranking official in each governorate. Despite the elaborate infrastructure of the local administration, by virtue of its control over the purse strings, the Ministry of Interior exercised considerable authority as per the law 116/59\(^\text{22}\).

**Distincts ‘Qaza’**

Tyre Urban Area falls within the administrative division of Tyre Qaza (Figure 5). The municipality of Tyre (Sour) is the administrative centre of its District. Each District is chaired by a Qaimmaqam, which is an executive officer appointed by the Cabinet (the Ministry of Interior) to supervise and control the activities of the municipal councils in each district as well as several other administrations where possible. The Qaimmaqam is hierarchically subordinate to the Governor and is responsible towards him/her in implementing the government’s policy.

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\(^{20}\) UN-Habitat URL: http://unhabitat.org/urban-themes/governance/


In Tyre, a Federation of Municipalities was established as a local authority within the district of Tyre on March 11, 2003 by Decree No. 9761, encompassing 60 municipalities and three localities. This grouping together constitutes an administrative division of the south Lebanon governorate (Figure 6).

The union boundary ‘enclaves’ three localities which are also part of the union, yet without municipal councils. These localities are Al Nafakhihyeh; Wadi Jilo, and Bistian. They are represented at the Union Board through their elected moukhtars; which play the role of the municipal council in small localities with no municipality as entailed by the Law on Mukhtars and Mukhtar Councils, issued on 1947/11/27.

REGIONAL TECHNICAL OFFICES (RTOS)

A Regional Technical Office (RTOS) have been set up to function under the mandate of the union. Article 122 of Decree-Law No. 118/1977 that provides for RTOs states that this engineering unit can be in charge of certain task on behalf of the municipalities, especially relating to approval of construction permits, technical studies, preparing specifications for supplies, works and services, and developing plans (UN-Habitat n.d.). Employing local technical staff, RTOs have a potentially major role to play in promoting development of technical competences at the union level. They also aim at mobilising stakeholders (civil and public local actors) in inclusive decision-making processes to attune policies to local needs.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Lebanese law contains provisions for adjoining municipalities to confederate into ‘unions’. The municipal union is created by a decree from the Council of Ministers based on the request of municipalities. The union is composed of two main entities (LCPS 2012); An authority responsible for undertaking major decisions, including presidents of the municipal council and presidents of municipalities who are members of the union and an executive authority led by the president of the council of the union that is elected by the union council members. The union council is led by one of the elected mayors or council members of the participating municipalities. At national level, there are 53 unions covering 776 of the country’s 1,108 municipalities, and around 1550 localities or 70% of all municipalities.

ROLE OF UNIONS

Unions are mandated by decree no. 118/77 to provide meso-level coordination of municipal functions and resources. This is with regards to responsibilities better addressed at a cross-boundary strategic scale rather than at municipality level. Unions are authorised to implement public projects benefitting member municipalities including road network/transportation, sewage, garbage/solid-waste, co-operatives, and markets (Article 126).

Inter-municipal collaboration at union level on public interest issues may help areas define distinctive regional visions for development. Significantly, some have viewed unions as institutions of decentralized power. This is in the context of a heavily centralized investments and governmental power distribution. Constraints however, undermine the potential of unions as strategic entities and forces for decentralization. These include:

- High dependence on central government’s Independent Municipal Fund for revenues
- Inability to collect membership fees
- Weak administrative capabilities
- Overlapping competencies with municipalities resulting in conflict
- Performance impedances caused by sectarian politics
- Spatial non-contiguity of many unions, curbing potential for collaborative development planning
- Finally, unions are supervised by several agencies which decreases their efficiency.

Unions are composed of two main entities (LCPS 2012).

23 The Legislative Decree No. 118 of 30 June 1977, on municipalities, authorizes the creation of federations to allow them to undertake projects that exceed the financial possibilities of a municipality. (LCPS 2012)
24 Articles 118 and 119 of Decree-Law 118/1977
26 ibid.
27 Ministry of Interior and Municipalities(2015)
29 The moukhtar is the representative of the smallest State body at the local level. The latter can have several moukhtars according to its population. The Mukhtar as an administrative officer is responsible for assuming some official functions, such as registration for national registers, natalites, deaths and marriages established among the people of his community.
30 Part of the RTO scope of work based on the UoM mandate is to ‘Create firm relationships and links between municipalities and key local public and civil society actors (eg Ministry of Social Affairs, Social Development Centres, Water Establishment Regional Offices, public schools and health centres, Community-Based Organizations, private sector, local committees, and others.’ (Paraphrased, (UN-Habitat n.d.)
**Municipalities & Moukhtars**

According to the Lebanese decree no. 118/1977, municipalities have the authority to perform several duties. However, a range of factors hamper the proper functioning and effectiveness of municipal bodies (see ANNEX 4 on mandate). Factors maintaining this status quo correspond to the constraints of unions, including:

- Low municipal budgets
- Dependence on central government for infrastructure project funding
- Bureaucracy
- Central government retention of authority to incentivise investment\(^\text{31}\)
- Monitoring and control of municipalities by multiple ministries and agencies\(^\text{32}\).

Table 4 shows the distribution of councillors and moukhtars across the municipalities that contribute part of their territory to the Tyre urban area. There are 66 municipal councillors (MoIM 2016b)\(^\text{33}\) and 27 moukhtars (MoIM 2016a)\(^\text{34}\). Amongst municipal councillors, only six are female (9%), which shows an under-representation of women that is common to other Lebanese municipal councils. There are only two female moukhtars.

In order to understand internal governance patterns of each municipality within the Tyre urban area, interviews were conducted with the mayor of each municipality, 14 and 15 November 2016\(^\text{35}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipalities &amp; Moukhtars</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th># Cadaster</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th># Municipal councillors</th>
<th># Moukhtars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourj El Chamali</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aabbassiet-Sour</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ain Baal</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Number of municipal councillors and moukhtars by municipality (UN-Habitat 2017) based on 2016 municipal and moukhtars official election results (MoIM 2016a) (MoIM 2016b).

**SOUR MUNICIPALITY**

- The municipality handles projects for its own territory only, while the union is conditioned by minimum of 3 municipalities when undertaking projects.
- The municipality provides financial support to the union to support the latter’s functionality. 10% of municipality profits are transferred to the union.
- Meetings with neighbouring municipalities including Aabbassiet-Sour and Bourj El-Chemali occur on an as-needed basis. Meetings with other municipalities in the union are not conducted regularly as it is not deemed necessary.
- The mayor initiated in the post-2006 war period a routine of bringing together all donor/international agencies and NGO active in the area with the union municipalities to share updates. Shortly after, municipalities left the floor to NGOs to meet without municipal participation unless needed. The mayor’s interaction with donor agencies takes two forms:
  1. Responding agencies approach the municipality to propose projects. The municipalities assess whether or not there is a need for the proposed intervention.
  2. The mayor approaches NGOs/UN Agencies if specific projects are required.
- The municipality is not directly involved in addressing the Syrian Crisis as stated by the Mayor of Sour. Original inhabitants in Tyre cannot afford to live in Sour nowadays so Syrians surely cannot rent/buy in the area according to the mayor.

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\(^{31}\) Al-Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy 2020 (2011)

\(^{32}\) Entities responsible for municipal oversight include the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, Court of Audit, Civil Service Board, General Directorate of Urbanism at the Ministry of Public Works, and Ministry of Finance.

\(^{33}\) Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) Municipal Elections Results 2016 URL: elections.gov.lb/Municipality/2016/Elections-Results.aspx

\(^{34}\) Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) Municipal Elections Results 2016

\(^{35}\) Mayor of Sour: Hassan Dbouk; Mayor of Burj El Chamali: Hajj Ali Dib; Mayor of Aabbassieh: Hajj Khalil Hershi; Mayor of Ain Baal: Hatem Basma.
BURJ EL-CHAMALI MUNICIPALITY
- The mayor meets neighbouring municipalities on a bi-monthly basis for updates or for planning possible joint projects.
- There is a dedicated committee within the municipality that is tasked with meeting international/local NGOs and donors.
- The mayor prefers projects that are unified with other municipalities in order to maximize the impact, in preference to separate projects targeting a single municipality.
- Generally there are no conflicts between Syrians and host communities. Minor family disputes only are regularly recorded.

AABBASSIET-SOUR
- Aabbassiet-Sour is the only municipality within the Urban area that is controlled by the Ministry of Interior’s court of audit which monitors the municipality’s spending, as it is the biggest municipality in terms of real estate (34,000m2).
- Communication with other municipalities occurs through the union.
- There are two committees within the municipality which, amongst other roles, meet with NGOs. These are:
  1. Cultural Committee
  2. Education Committee

AIN BAAL
- Communications and meetings with other municipalities and partner organisations occur through the union and the RTO.

Non-state & Informal governance
Non-state entities and multi-actor informal arrangements play increasingly important roles in contemporary national and urban governance. This trend emerged in the Lebanese context with the creation of the modern Lebanese State. The confessional system that governs Lebanon since 1926 was consolidated by the French Mandate, and promoted by the Ta’if Accord (1989). It granted power to non-state actors, and encouraged their interference in the political scene of the country; making of them de-facto political actors (Tatian, 2010; p.3).

This trend was amplified by bureaucratic limitations on the state governance level and gaps in the services they provided, especially during the wars that Lebanon severely suffered from. During the Lebanese Civil war (1975-1990) and the Israel war (2006) public institutions lost their credibility, while armed non-state groups provided security and created ‘micro prototypes of conventional public institutions’ in their respective areas of domination. Even when the wars ended, citizens still kept faith in non-state actors who provided them with “informal legitimacy”. Religion played a vital role in reasserting this trend as religious leaders tended to legitimise actions of non-state actors and promote them by assembling public support. Henceforth, non-state actors coupled with their informal structures managed to supersede public administrative entities and their functions, as they tended to replace, rather than counterpart, state institutions.

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36 In political science terminology, confessionalism is a system of government (political arrangement) that proportionally allocates political power among a country’s communities—whether religious or ethnic—according to their percentage of the population (USIP 2006).
37 The Lebanese constitution of 1926, as amended, is still in force today.
38 Informal governance denotes unregulated practices and institutional arrangements partially or wholly outside the realm of the formal state and regulatory environment. They are endemic to all tiers of governance. Informal governance practices can run in parallel to or in substitute for formal practices.
Having lost their efficacy, public authorities currently struggle to maintain their reliability, while non-state actors gain more influence. Further, the inability of political actors to unify policies towards public interest remains a challenge which would eventually lead to paralysis of any developmental effort.

Conclusively, informal entities are a critical part of city governance generally and of the urban economy in particular. Unofficial supplementary service provision, commercial exchanges, credit-granting, and tacit community leadership structures are elements of how city life may be ordered through the informal sector.

Examples of actors involved informal governance also include community leaders and neighbourhood committees who can either support or impede developmental planning initiatives as well as major and minor interventions across all sectors. In Tyre the main non-governmental stakeholders include:

- Political parties: the dominant Political Parties are Amal Movement and Hezbollah who are represented in the municipal council and union locally and the parliament and cabinet nationally. They have strong influence on the implementation or abolition of projects in Tyre.
- Al-Baqa, the fishermen’s cooperative, and commercial collectives of other trades
- Greek Catholic waqf
- Cultural & educational bodies
- Community organisations
- Religious organisations
- UNIFIL
- Popular Committees and political factions within the Palestine refugee camps
- UNRWA

Furthermore, in relation to city planning, the local property owners are also a key stakeholder.

Palestinian Refugee Camps

The Palestinian camps have their own governance systems mainly comprising popular committees, local committees and political factions. The camp management system involves local and international organisations which provide key services. UNWRA is the main provider of services in Lebanon’s official camps. In the last decade, women’s leagues known as ‘al aljna ansina’iyyah’ have been formed in camps, which mainly contribute to health awareness and education (UN-Habitat & UNDP 2014).

UNRWA

UNRWA is mandated under the United Nations General Assembly resolution nb. 302, to provide to all Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon direct relief and work programmes including upgrading of basic urban services e.g., water, sewage, electricity, and road networks; the delivery of social services e.g., education, health, and social protection, that being exclusively delivered to Palestinians.

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39 The uncodified nature of the informal sector renders it elusive to capture at the city scale. However, detailed field-based analysis at the neighbourhood level instead holds more means for specifying the theme’s specificities. See Maachouk Neighbourhood Profile and Strategy (UN-Habitat 2017).
40 Religious Endowment (Waqf): It refers to ownership of land/property by religious sects in Lebanon. Each sect has freedom to manage its own waqf. (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/lebanon/religious-sects.htm)
41 UNWRA is not however the formal camp administrator. https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon
42 General Assembly resolution 302: UNRWA protects and assists Palestine refugees, seeking to help them achieve their full potential in human development.
to Security Resolution 1701. Logistical support to the Lebanese Armed Forces pursuant to order of the territory through its provision of military and civilian personnel deployed to the south; 600 of which being locals in addition to around 850 civilian personnel deployed to forces from in parallel (Security Council 2006). South while the Government of Israel withdrew all of its UNIFIL as authorized by Security Council Resolution the region. Therefore, the Government of Lebanon and to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli clearing minefields in different locations (Security continue to support the Lebanese Army Forces by civilian populations — while UNIFIL demining teams munitions contamination continue to pose risks to agricultural lands, deforestation, and deserted terrain minefields led to uncultivated and abandoned in 2000, and the subsequent 2006 conflict persist. At the popular level, UNIFIL supports local communities and international agencies engaged in development community leaders, religious figures, civil society groups regional and national level. These include local authorities, UNIFIL liaises with a wide range of actors at the local, and aims to build local goodwill to create a conducive climate for its mandate implementation. Socio-cultural and aims to build local goodwill to create a conducive At the popular level, UNIFIL supports local communities and international agencies engaged in development community leaders, religious figures, civil society groups regional and national level. These include local authorities, UNIFIL liaises with a wide range of actors at the local, and aims to build local goodwill to create a conducive
NGOs

In the context of a constrained state sector on one hand and a globally significant humanitarian crisis layered onto a baseline of pre-existing vulnerability on the other, the channelling of activity and investment into cities through international and local NGOs has been in ascendance nationally. NGOs reporting on their work through the online humanitarian activity reporting portal, ActivityInfo, in the Tyre urban area are shown in Appendix 2.

Spatial development institutions & policies

Spatial Development Actors

Local authorities depend on several planning actors for conducting urban studies and works. Major government entities include:

- Directorate General of Urbanism (DGU)
- Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)
- Ministry of Transport & Public Works
- Directorate General of Antiquities (DGA)
- Ministry of Culture.

Their responsibilities variously include infrastructure and master-planning, rehabilitation, preservation, conservation & restoration (adapted from Nahas, 2001).

In Tyre, the main entity that executes urban works is the Ministry of Public Works through the CDR or the municipality following the approval of the ‘Qaimaqam’, the head of the district. Projects are usually funded by municipalities and international organisations. For the purposes of institutional strengthening, efficiency improvement, and developing projects that are tailored to the local context, NGOs or UN agencies usually refer to the union’s RTO as part of planning spatial development projects and strategies.

Tyre has witnessed efforts from public and private stakeholders to upgrade the city, ranging from minor initiatives to major spatial comprehensive strategies. The city has however experienced rapid urban changes as a result of several factors and events including Israeli invasions, illegal developments mainly affecting the old city’s core, and the growth of densely populated areas surrounding several of Tyre’s archaeological sites. In addition to these factors, the presence of a high number of refugees and the recent Syrian refugee crisis has put immense pressure on provision of services, thus impeding further development.

Policies & Studies

This section details relevant spatial planning policies in Tyre. Table 5 introduces those projects/studies and thereafter the key strategies are detailed individually.

THE NATIONAL PHYSICAL MASTERPLAN OF THE LEBANESE TERRITORY (NPMLT) - (DAR & IAURIF, 2001) The NPMLT promotes the development of Tyre as a main touristic hub. It specifies that Tyre has diversified touristic assets including:

- Monumental heritage sites
- Sandy beaches
- Traditional picturesque port

It lists coastal zones to be preserved and rehabilitated:

- Tyre cape
- Archaeological site, old city and sea facade of Tyre
- Fishing harbour of Tyre
- Sandy beaches in the south of Tyre
- Ras el-Ain Springs

The masterplan advocates that the city’s potential, particularly touristic, should be capitalised on through a sequence of regulations for urban development and for increasing its exposure. Besides the focus on the tourism sector, it identified that activities other than those based on tourism, particularly trade and services, should be enhanced, including those outside the main urban area with potential positive spill-over effects on the city.

The study highlights that in the nearby cities and villages, an irrigation water supply project is expected to increase agricultural income and potentiate upgrading of living conditions.

ELABORATION OF A STRATEGIC SUSTAINABLE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (SSRDP) FOR THE CAZA OF TYRE - (Consultancy Research Institute et al, 2015)

The SSRDP was commissioned by CRI - Habib Debs - ECODIT – IAURIF, in coordination with the Tyre Union of Municipalities, expected to serve as a guide towards an action plan to identify opportunities of sustainable economic and social development for the qada’ of Tyre.

Its key recommendations by theme are:

Urban Component: Preserve archaeological sites by controlling urban sprawl; protect heritage and develop tourism; balance administrative functions.

Mobility Component: Improve accessibility to the city on the regional and national levels by developing a comprehensive road system, promote sustainable urban mobility, and develop public transportation.
Environment Component: Develop an Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan for Tyre district that can be aligned with future Government of Lebanon policies for solid waste management and programmes; protect landscapes and notable green spaces; and promote / sustain ecotourism services in the district.

Water Component: Prepare Tyre for National Water Sector Strategy projects (2012), developing an efficient water production system without depleting the resource base or resorting to groundwater abstraction; and improve wastewater services and the management of future STP facilities.

Social Component: Position greater Tyre as a cultural and social hub on local and national levels; upgrade health services across the district focusing on emergency and primary health care services; and provide recreational services liaising with schools and youth clubs.

Economic Component: Exploit the agricultural sector as the main component and link it with other economic sectors; encourage agro-industry in the district for investing in the agricultural sector and generating job opportunities; enhance marketing of the district’s products and organise the relationship between producers and consumers.

The report highlights the institutional weakness of the Union of Tyre Municipalities and the need to build its capacity as a key actor for implementing the strategy and developing the district. It suggests two main components that would facilitate district interventions:

- Launching a Sour Environment & Development Observatory (SEDO); This would serve as a tool for collecting information, analysis, and planning similar to the TEDO ‘Tripoli Environment & Development Observatory’ (TEDO).

- Distributing the SSRDP document; Dissemination of the document is suggested as may guide ongoing or future strategies across the district.

CULTURAL HERITAGE & URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN SOUR OLD CITY (CHUD TYRE) - (CDR, 2011)
The council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is the commissioner of the CHUD project representing the Lebanese Government. The project is funded by the World Bank, the French Development Agency, and the Italian Cooperation.

Project scope: The historic cores of 5 Lebanese cities: Tripoli, Byblos, Saida, Tyre and Baalbeck.

Project objective: Activating national and international cultural tourism through enhancing local economy in these five cities.

Project Components:
- Managing and maintaining archaeological sites and their surroundings.
- Restoration and preservation of historic city centres and enhancing urban infrastructure complementing existing and planned private conservation initiatives.
- Institutional capacity building for concerned public and private agencies.

The project was launched across targeted cities in 2004 and was initially planned to be completed towards the end of 2009. Total project cost amounted to 62.2m USD funded by the World Bank, the Lebanese Government, the French Development Agency (AFD) and the Italian Cooperation. Renovation of historic centres and development of urban infrastructure constituted around 68.6% of total project cost. Preservation of archaeological
sites constitute 22.2% while the remaining 9.2% is allocated for institutional capacity building and project management. The project was extended twice adding an additional financing of 27 m USD and an extension until the end of 2014 from the World Bank placing remaining work on hold till more financing is available. Additionally, AFD approved financing an addition of 21 m Euros and with a loan close date until the end of 2017.

For Tyre, as elaborated in the Strategic Plan Report for Tyre, the initial socioeconomic and urban studies were completed in 2002, which supported the development of a comprehensive plan for the city in three main areas: the old town, the modern extension and on archaeological sites. The plan for the old city included the implementation of 24 projects that were unspecified in this report, along with new developmental guidelines.

Al Bass Palestinian refugee camp, has over time increasingly encroached onto the adjacent to Al Bass archaeological site and threatening its rich heritage. The CHUD project aims to protect and conserve this site, so that it may provide future opportunities for boosting the economy through touristic activities.

Disaster Risk Management

The systematic process of using administrative decisions, organization, operational skills and capacities to implement policies, strategies and coping capacities of the society and communities to lessen the impacts of natural hazards and related environmental and technological disasters is known as Disaster Risk Management (DRM). This comprises all forms of activities, including structural and non-structural measures to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) adverse effects of hazards (UNISDR 2009).

Lebanon is subject to a wide range of natural and man-made hazards, the biggest threat being earthquake and/or an associated Tsunami. Smaller-scale disasters which the country also faces include floods, forest fires, land-slides and drought. (www.lb.undp.org)

Accordingly, in May 2009, UNDP and the Lebanese Government signed a project document on “Strengthening Disaster Risk Management Capacities in Lebanon”. The project aimed at helping the Government developing its disaster management and corresponding risk reduction strategy (UNDP & Swiss Confederation, 2014). The National Response Plan was finalized in 2013, however integration at the local level was highly demanded, in-line with the national framework, as an implementation tool.

Within this context, the Union of Tyre Municipalities was one of the earliest beneficiaries from the project at the local level; with the development of a crisis operations room, otherwise known by the DRM unit (UNDP & Swiss Confederation, 2014). Specifically, in 2014 the organizational structure of the DRM unit, and distribution of roles and responsibilities during the event of a disaster was set. This entailed that the DRM unit is to administratively report to the president on the union while coordinators from each municipality were assigned to cover the entire district of Tyre. Moreover, the second phase, launched in 2014, is still underway. It aims at attaining equipment for the proper functioning of the unit e.g. ambulances.

The DRM unit currently provides support in strengthening regional and local level risk management and preparedness. However, the response plan of the union is still being developed directly with its president, as per UN-Habitat’s interview with the DRM Unit Manager in Tyre, Mr. Mortada Mhanna.

Main achievements of the unit so far include:

- 2014-2015: 12 Response teams have been established
- 12 of the municipalities within the district have been provided with equipment, e.g. ambulances.
- In coordination with active NGOs in the union and the Red Cross, a pilot project on risk responsiveness has been implemented in ‘al masaken’ area in Sour municipality and expected to be replicated in other areas.
- Currently, a response plan is being developed as a continuation of the disaster risk management project for the next years funded by the Swiss Confederation.

![Figure 13: Disaster Risk Management Unit Governance Structure](image-url)
The following maps, developed by UN-Habitat, are adapted from the Disaster Risk Management unit of the Union of Tyre Municipalities. The first map indicates that the entire urban area of Tyre is prone to coastal flooding, but municipalities that are subject to higher levels of risk within are Sour and Borj El-Chemali due to their proximity to the sea.

Figure 14: Coastal Flooding - Urban area of Tyre, Source: (UN-Habitat 2017) adapted from: DRR unit, UoTM

The emergency response risk map shows that earthquakes area not a severe risk across Tyre caza, the area is mainly at low risk and some at moderate risk. Across the urban area, only Sour and a minor sections of Borj El-Chemali and Abbassiyeh are at risk, the remaining parts of these municipalities are at low risk.

Figure 15: Earthquakes - Urban area of Tyre, Source: (UN-Habitat 2017) adapted from: DRR unit, UoTM.
Tyre caza is mainly at medium erosion risk according to the erosion map below. In Tyre urban area, Sour is the least likely to experience erosion as it can be regarded as completely urban. On the contrary, Ain Baal and Abbassieh have a very high chance of erosion as they are agricultural/hilly areas.

The major natural risk that poses threat to Tyre caza is a Tsunami followed by landslides and floods as shown in the map below. In Tyre urban area major risks include Tsunamis and Floods.
Waste water constitutes the biggest man-made risks in Tyre. All types of man-made risks are visible in the urban area including waste water, solid waste, pollution facilities, and conflicts. In Sour dominant risks are waste water and conflicts. In Bouj El-Chemali, pollution facilities are mostly evident. As for Ain Baal, it is the only municipality within Tyre urban area with a solid waste facility, thus increasing pollution risk. Aabbassiyeh experiences minor risk with respect to this category.

**Figure 18:** Manmade Hazards - Urban area of Tyre, Source: (UN-Habitat 2017) adapted from: DRR unit, UoTM.

**Gaps & Challenges**

- A key governance gap in Tyre is the lack of institutional structures representing the city-based interests of the multi-municipality Tyre urban area. With 60 municipalities and 3 localities in the Tyre Union of Municipalities, the agenda of the 4-municipality Tyre urban area is vulnerable to dilution.

- Mirroring this, there has been no comprehensive strategic spatial planning for the Tyre urban area, with planning projects mostly focussed on its archaeological heritage potential. The more widely-drawn Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan (SSRDP) for the Caza of Tyre does however incorporate an ‘urban component’ which could be an initial material consideration in the formulation of any integrated city development plan.

- The call in the ‘Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan (SSRDP) for the Caza of Tyre’ for establishment of an Environment & Development Observatory warrants support in a national context of data paucity.

- There is a challenge in promoting activities by the Regional Technical Office (RTO) that balances technical capacity-building in the union and municipalities with technical assistance and solution formulation. This is required to sustain and develop the RTO, maximising its direct and indirect impacts going forward.

- The presence of three of Lebanon’s 12 official Palestinian camps within the Tyre urban area means that the imperative for mutually beneficial coordination across the camp/out-of-camp borders between UNWRA and the municipalities is at a premium.

- In common with elsewhere in the country, there is an overwhelming gender imbalance in municipal councillor representation.

- Lack of conservation policies and proper planning of new developments threatens the prosperity of Tyre as a major coastal city (Donnachie 2010) and tourist destination.
THEME 3
Population
Key points

- Accurate population data is critical to the entire humanitarian response effort and to long term mainstream municipal and spatial planning. The lack of recent national census of population necessitates recourse to alternative partial sources with varying levels of robustness.

- The Lebanese-only population figures adopted by all aid agencies party to the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan assume 78,460 Lebanese and Palestinian refugees outside camps living in the Tyre urban area. This is derived from a 1997 government data set with further assumptions made to discount from these cadastre-based figures any population not within the Tyre urban area boundary.

- Calculating this figure forward to 2011 using World Bank annual national growth rates gives a figure of 115,650, an overwhelming 47% difference. This estimation is conservative as the World Bank growth rate does not factor in rural-to-urban migration.

- Approximate calculations suggest that 43% of Lebanese in Tyre urban area are living in poverty.

- Tyre urban area’s population comprises 42% refugees, with a high incidence of official camps for Palestine refugees (three in a 16.7km² urban area) as well as two distinct out-of-camp residential concentrations.

- Tyre urban area contains 15,834 Syrian refugees (SR) and Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) (UNHCR 2015, UNRWA 2016 figures). Expressed as a percentage of the population originating pre-2011 crisis [i.e. Lebanese (2011 figures) and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon [PRL] (2016 figures)], the post-2011 addition (PRS and SR) represents an 8% increment on the pre-2011 cohorts head count.

- Post-crisis PRS incomers have driven a 5% increase in Tyre urban area’s total Palestinian refugee community.

- Spatially, post-2011 refugee cohorts have entrenched pre-crisis population distributions. SR have in majority reinforced the pattern of Lebanese densities in and around the urban core on one hand. PRS have intensified Palestinian camp and out-of-camp concentrations on the other.

- Most refugees are concentrated in Sour and Burj El Chamali municipalities, most likely due to the concentration of affordable accommodation, economic activities and services in those areas. The location of camps also contributes to this pattern.

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47 Tyre urban area is made up of fractions of four cadastres, with majority of the built up area of each within the Tyre urban area.
48 PRS were denied entry to Lebanon as of July 2014, while restrictions were introduced towards Syrian Refugees in 2015 (IRIN, n.d.).
Syrian crisis: 85,262 refugees

9% Syrian, 4% Palestinian refugees from Syria, 87% Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Public service planning and humanitarian aid programming are driven by population data. Accurate demographic statistics are fundamental to matching needs with responses and to identifying gaps. They are also the crucial basis for meaningful demographic and economic monitoring and analysis.

Population data in Lebanon is generally weak. The most recent population census undertaken in Lebanon dates to 1932. Sensitivities surrounding national demographic composition, directly implicated in power distribution in a proportional representation political system, combined with an unclear regulatory approach to citizenship issues including naturalisation rights have long mitigated against a comprehensive re-enumeration. Significant trans-national population fluxes, not least the post-2011 inflow of refugees driven by the Syrian crisis, and the unregistered status of an unquantified proportion of the refugee population, further complicate population estimates.

Against this backdrop, sample studies have since been relied upon. A country population calculation was reported in 2004 as part of a national poverty assessment conducted jointly by UNDP and the Government of Lebanon. The figures were drawn from an earlier national population estimation from 1997, conducted by consultants in collaboration with the government to underpin the National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territories (NPMPLT) published in 2005. This put the 1997 national population at 4,005,020, a figure which includes residents of all territories except Palestinian camps. This dataset, available to cadastre level, is significant as it is the one adopted by all partners to the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), a joint Government of Lebanon - UN plan for coordinating the international and local humanitarian response to the Syria crisis and for ensuring alignment with national policies.

The significance of weaknesses in the statistical base magnifies at decreasing spatial scales, with dynamics such as rural-urban migration and refugee influxes adding complexity. Notwithstanding, the following provides selected figures at a range of sub-national levels.

49 It identified 17 confessional sects and a national population of 1.05m of residents [0.79m resident Lebanese & 0.26m emigrant Lebanese]. The census had far-reaching impacts, becoming the basis for the official personal registration of the population as well as for the country’s political proportional representation from 1943 when independence was declared to 1975 when civil war broke out (Maktabi, R (1999) “The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who are the Lebanese?” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26 (2) 219–241.


52 CDR, Dar Al-Handasah and American University of Beirut

53 This national population figure based on a sample building survey includes by default Palestinians living outside camps. It also differentiates between primary and secondary residents, implying first and second homes, to avoid double-counting.

South Lebanon population (South & Nabatieh Governorates)

According to the NPMPLT, Lebanon’s major agglomerations were projected to require an additional area of between 6,000 and 10,000 hectares each to accommodate their urban expansion to 2030. For the South, the NPMPLT recognises three main agglomerations of which Tyre is one. These together hold around 44% of the resident population of the South’s two governorates. The NPMPLT envisages this percentage to increase up to 48% from a 2001 baseline to 2030 because of industrialisation and other works.

Tyre District population

The population of the district of Tyre, one of three districts of the South Governorate, was estimated at 260,000 in 2010, up from 200,000 in 1997 (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities), based on registered population with the ‘da’irat al noufous’ office within the governorate. Notably, the registration does not necessarily reflect actual number of residents, as Lebanese residents are registered in the area of their ancestors rather than where they live. According to the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), these figures suggest an average annual population growth rate of 2%, higher than the overall national growth rate of 1% (CRI, Debs, ECODIT, & IAURIF, 2005).

Vulnerabilities in Tyre district is heavily concentrated in and around the urban core. As shown in Figure 19, all of the UN-Habitat-defined Tyre urban area falls into the top most vulnerable sub-set of the 251 most vulnerable cadastres nationally, which justifies the current focus on urban cores. The continuum of vulnerabilities across the urban boundary also reinforces the need to treat the cities as integral parts of their wider regions, a concept that is in line with the area-based approach.

Tyre is cited as well as Baalbeck, Nabatiyeh, Zahle-Chtaura, Saida, Jbayl. The others are Saida and Nabatieh. The two governorates are South and Nabatieh.

55 Tyre is cited as well as Baalbeck, Nabatiyeh, Zahle-Chtaura, Saida, Jbayl
56 The NPMPLT states “6,000-1,000” which is assumed to be an error.
57 The others are Saida and Nabatieh
58 The two governorates are South and Nabatieh
Tyre agglomeration as per NPMLPT

Table 6 shows the NPMLPT’s (2005) projected population increase and urban area increase for the Tyre agglomeration (Figure 20) over its 2000-2030 plan period. The boundary formulation method is not elaborated in the report.

Population growth is projected to be concentrated absolutely and proportionally in the suburbs, with minimal inner-urban population densification or in-fill development anticipated.

Whether NPMLPT growth projections are simple historical trend projections or whether the extrapolation is modified to actively reflect spatial policy goals is not clear. This is a valid topic for debate, particularly should the document undergo revision in the future. Notably, whilst the plan-period’s mid-way point has passed, no interim monitoring of the figures to benchmark their accuracy or to re-base growth trajectories has been published.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urbanized surfaces in 2000 (Km2)</th>
<th>Resident population 2000</th>
<th>Urbanized surfaces in 2030 (Km2)</th>
<th>Resident population 2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Urban and demographic growth in the agglomeration of Tyre, Source: (DAR & Iaurif 2001)

Figure 20: Sour agglomeration as shown in NPMLPT (Dar & Iaurif, 2009)

Population estimates for Tyre urban area

As defined by UN-Habitat, the Tyre urban area is made up of parts of four municipalities, with each municipality corresponding to a cadastre. The following discussion considers both the total population for the four cadastres in their entirety and the sum of the cadastral fractions making up the Tyre urban area therein.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leb &amp; PRL Outside camps 1997</td>
<td>Leb &amp; PRL Outside camps 2011</td>
<td>4,342</td>
<td>2193</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leb&lt;4$/day 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2193</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYR 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRL (All)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRL (Outside Camps)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2193</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Population figures for Tyre Urban Area. Grey highlighted rows contribute to the total row (UN-Habitat, 2017)
HOST POPULATION
The official 1997 host community population data adopted in the LCRP, used in the 2005 NPMPLT derived from a national building survey\(^{61}\) dating back to 1997. This include by default Palestinian refugees living outside camps and other non-Lebanese. The lowest level at which this official data is available is the cadastral.

Methodologically, the percentage of each cadastral’s population to be included in the Tyre urban area was estimated based on the cadastral distribution of built-up area determined from satellite imagery. The ratio of built-up area within the Tyre urban area boundary to that outside is then applied to the cadastral population figure to give an approximation of the population split either side of the boundary.

- For Sour and Burj El-Chamali municipalities, land falling outside the boundary is unbuilt, so 100% of their cadastral population figures is included in the urban area.
- For Aain Baal, 61% of the cadastral population is estimated to fall inside the boundary
- For Abbassieh, the fraction is 50.5% (Table 7).

On this percentage division, official figures suggest that Tyre urban area contains 78,460 Lebanese and PRL outside camps\(^{62}\) (Table 7). In terms of how this population is divided amongst the four municipalities, the majority (61%) falls to Sour, followed by Burj El Chamali at 28%, 8% to Aaabassiye and a minimal 3% to Aain Baal (Table 7).

UN-Habitat has however adapted these official cadastral figures to bring them forward from 1997 to 2011. The World Bank’s (WB) annual national growth rate has been applied cumulatively for each year since 1997. This exercise puts the 2011 Lebanese and PRL outside camps population at 115,650, or 47% higher than the figures currently used by the humanitarian response. This is likely a conservative estimate, not least as applying the uniform national growth rate to Tyre urban area does not take into account urbanisation. The WB growth rate is only applied to estimate growth to 2011, as the WB growth rate later than 2011 includes post-2011 refugee influx.

For host community poverty estimates, figures for Lebanese with individual incomes under $4/day are estimated based on 2004 statistics available only at the district level (Table 7). For Tyre district, 36% fall into this category compared to 29% nationally\(^{63}\). This 2004 poor population count was projected forward to 2011\(^{64}\) again using the World Bank general population growth rate. This suggests 33,792 host community members in poverty in that year. Reflecting the overall host community distribution, the municipal distribution of poverty is concentrated on the municipality of Sour, which alone contains 61% of those in Tyre urban area with incomes under $4/day.

However, at least one caveat emerge with this estimation as it assumes no change in Lebanese living under $4/day\(^{65}\) as a percent of all Lebanese. Furthermore, the estimate does not factor in impact on poverty levels following the 2006 war, with its significant impact on the South, including Tyre urban area.

Looking beyond the Lebanese figures adopted in the LCRP, alternative cadastral population figures have been gathered by the Tyre Union of Municipalities. The municipal councils have estimated the number of inhabitants reported as registered with moukhtars\(^{66}\), meaning it counts Lebanese only (with refugees being registered with other agencies). The most recent data is for 2016 with estimates made for summer and winter resident counts (Table 8). The moukhtars registration figures show for 2016:

- A total population for the four full cadastres of between 163,500 (Winter) and 167,500 (Summer), which is dramatically higher than the 1997-based LCRP figure of 86,053, and also significantly higher than the moderate UN-Habitat estimate of 126,812\(^{67}\) for host population, based on expanding forward to 2011 the 1997 LCRP figures (Table 7).
- Totalling up the areas of each cadastral’s population that falls within the Tyre urban area (Table 7) suggests between 145,335 and 147,618 Lebanese in that...
geography. Again the presumed modest UN-Habitat estimate for 2011 of 115,650 is significantly lower, yet not factoring in rural to urban migration and growth up to 2016 (Table 7).

- However, drilling down to the cadastral level, there is significant divergence between the relative distribution of population across the four cadastres, with the mokhtar-derived data\(^{68}\) indicating for instance a lower proportion of the Tyre urban area population in Sour (47% for Summer (Table 8) compared to the UN-Habitat data of 61% (Table 7). Further work is clearly required to identify the sources of divergence between the data sets.

A caveat with this data is that the original moukhtar registration figures (Table 8) are rounded to the nearest 500, suggesting their approximate nature. Moreover, it is not clear whether the data is based on electoral register names only (aged 21 and over) or total population as implied by the electoral register count.

Methodologically, there seems to be value in linking population counts to the season of data-gathering, especially at lower spatial scales. Table 8 suggests that whilst Tyre’s\(^{69}\) urban area’s population flux between the seasons is only 2%, variation at the cadastral level is substantial, ranging between a summer gain of 29% in Ain Baal to a Summer loss of 15% in Bourj El-Chemali.

A further method of population estimation at cadastral level has been trialled in Tyre by the Tyre Union’s Regional Technical Office (RTO) in conjunction with UN-Habitat. Kiloage of solid waste generated per person was determined by UN-Habitat. Based on landfill mass sourced to cadastres, to give a figure that varies between urban and rural areas as well as by population cohort estimated. The analysis show the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cadaster</th>
<th>% pop inside Tyre Urban Area</th>
<th>Whole Cadaster</th>
<th>% by Cadaster</th>
<th>Inside Tyre Urban Area</th>
<th>% by Cadaster</th>
<th>Whole Cadaster</th>
<th>% by Cadaster</th>
<th>Inside Tyre Urban Area</th>
<th>% by Cadaster</th>
<th>Whole Cadaster</th>
<th>% by Cadaster</th>
<th>Inside Tyre Urban Area</th>
<th>% by Cadaster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbassieh</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15,150</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15,908</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ain Baal</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,185</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6,710</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourj El-Chemali</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-10,000</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>163,500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>167,500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>147,618</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Municipal estimates of population registered with moukhtars for summer and winter (Tyre Union of Municipalities, 2016).

- A population of 177,900 was estimated for the four cadastres for 2016.
- With a proportion of 94% of the four-cadastre all-population count estimated to fall inside the Tyre urban area (Table 7), a rough population count for that geography emerges for 2016 of 163,668.
- This figure is 29% higher than the UN-Habitat estimate for 2011 for host population of 115,650\(^70\), yet lower than the estimated total host and refugee population. The difference may be partly accounted for by the inclusion of waste generated from refugee camps in the RTO/UN-Habitat calculation, whilst the 115650 refers to Lebanese (and PRL outside camps) only.

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\(^{68}\) This is taking the moukhtars Summer data for example, though the same applies for the Winter data

\(^{69}\) This point applies equally to the Tyre urban area or the total of the four implicated cadastres as no sub-cadastral host population breakdown is available.

\(^{70}\) The UN-Habitat estimate is based on expanding forward the 1997 LCRP figures to 2011 using the World Bank annual growth rate
REFUGEE POPULATION

In Tyre urban area, there are an estimated 122,260 refugees. This makes up 60% of the urban area population.

Of the registered refugee population (see Table 7 for data sources and years for each cohort),
- 87% (106,426) are Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (PRL)
- 4.2% (5,189) are Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS)
- 8.7% (10,645) are Syrian refugees (SR)

There are three UNWRA refugee camps in Tyre urban area, with a total camp population estimated at 69,724 on the basis of figures in Table 7. This is equivalent to 34.6% of the Tyre urban area’s total population. Focussing on the Palestinian cohorts;
- Amongst PRL, 66% live inside the camps.
- Amongst PRS, 73% live inside the camps.

Moving down to the intra-urban level, the distribution of total refugees across the cadastres, largely driven by the location of Palestinian camps (Figure 21), is:
- Sour 64.8%
- Burj El-Chamali 23.8%
- Aabasiyyeh No data per cadaster
- Aain Baal 0%

Looking at each cohort in turn, Table 4 shows that:
- PRL are overwhelmingly concentrated in Sour (64.36% of a total 106,426)
- SR are even more concentrated in Sour though in smaller absolute numbers (76.53% of a total of 106,45)
- PRS are fairly evenly distributed between Burj El-Chamali (46.56% of a total of 5189) and Sour (50.80% of that total).

The spatiality of refugee groups across the urban area by registration locality is shown in Figure 21, against a backdrop of Lebanese population density by cadastre. Palestinian camp locations are mapped for context. Several points emerge;
- The granularity of intra-urban host population density data is coarse. However, the relatively high concentration in Sour, which contains the urban core, compared to the other three municipalities is apparent.
- Heightening the demographic pressure on Sour municipality, the majority of Tyre urban area’s refugees are registered to Sour.

1. 65% of the urban area’s registered refugees (Figure 21) are registered in Sour, including within the three Palestinian refugee camps.
2. PRS are registered to 8 localities within Tyre, whereby the highest concentration is found in Burj El-Chamali and Tyre.
3. Sour has six of seven UNHCR localities to which Syrian refugees are registered. Indeed, 77% of the 10,645 Syrian refugees are registered to Sour, with 23% in Burj El Chamali (Table 2). The SR localities suggest SR are also located inside or in proximity to the camps.

- Overall, it is fair to state that the geography of the Palestinian camps (Burj El-Chamali, Rashidieh, Al Buss) drives the registered refugee distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbasiyyeh</th>
<th>Ain Baal</th>
<th>Borj-el Chemali</th>
<th>Sour</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRL</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,219</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Refugee cohorts by cadastre in Tyre urban area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In camps</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Out of camps</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRL</td>
<td>69724</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>3791</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>106426</td>
<td>5189</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>3791</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>SYR</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10645</td>
<td>9811</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYR</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74349</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td></td>
<td>47911</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>122260</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Refugee cohorts by cadastre in Tyre urban area
Demographic impact of Syrian crisis

MUNICIPALITY
There is value in understanding the proportional increase in population arising from the Syrian crisis refugee influx at municipal level in order to portray the relative increase in stresses on urban services and infrastructure. A simple albeit imperfect proxy for this is to express the crisis-displaced population (SR, PRS) as a percent of the pre-crisis population (Lebanese, PRL).\(^72\)

There are several caveats to this approach, such as that natural increase and other population dynamics are not factored in; that data used is currently from UNRWA 2016 for PRL and PRS; as well as the other qualifications linked to the assumptions underpinning population data used in Table 7.

Table 6 shows the figures for the whole cadastre, with the figures for the cadastral fractions that are part of the Tyre urban area also shown for comparison.

Figure 22 and 23 charts the cadastral relativities to show that in proportional terms the population pressure increase between the municipalities is broadly comparable. However, there is the dramatically larger absolute pressure experienced by Sour municipality.

Table 11: Post-crisis population as % of pre-crisis population to illustrate demographic impact of crisis. See for data sources/year.

\(^72\) These are several caveats to this approach, such as that natural increase and other population dynamics are not factored in; that data used is currently from UNRWA 2016 for PRL and PRS; as well as the other qualifications linked to the assumptions underpinning population data used in Table 7.
OFFICIAL CAMPS

The available and imputed data for PRL and PRS, in terms of their location by registration inside and outside official camps, allows us to suggest the relative population impact on the camps, as well as other Palestinian out-of-camp concentrations (Table 9). This has implications for service provision pressure, mainly falling to UNWRA as providers of camp services linking with surrounding municipal connections.

The main point emerging is that the scale of additional population pressure and therefore on services demand appears to be greatest in Borj el Chemali, which imputations suggest may have increased its population by 10%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Palestinian camp</th>
<th>PRL</th>
<th>PRS</th>
<th>PRL &amp; PRS</th>
<th>PRS as % of PRL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Buss</td>
<td>11951</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>12509</td>
<td>4.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidieh</td>
<td>33600</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>34417</td>
<td>2.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borj el Chemali</td>
<td>24173</td>
<td>2416</td>
<td>26589</td>
<td>9.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69724</td>
<td>3791</td>
<td>73515</td>
<td>5.44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Post-crisis population (PRS) as % of pre-crisis population (PRL) by Palestinian camp to illustrate demographic impact of Syrian refugee crisis. See Table 6 for data sources/years.

Summary of population estimates

This city profile suggests a newly defined geography of urbanity for Tyre. Table 13 summarises for ease of reference the alternative population estimates for this new spatial entity, aggregating data from Table 7 (Rows 1-3) and from the foregoing discussion (Rows 4-6).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Pop Estimate (year)</th>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Four cadastres contributing to Tyre urban area only (^{74})</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Caveats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>86,053 (1997)</td>
<td>Leb + PRL out of camp</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>CAS 1997, also used in 2005 NPMPLT</td>
<td>-Sample residential survey of primary &amp; secondary households. Vacancy rates factored in. Primary household data extrapolated from sample based on district-specific family size averages.</td>
<td>-Outdated baseline  -Baseline pre-dates Syrian crisis  -Includes non-Lebanese living outside camps in 1997 (mainly PRL) as no active effort to remove out-of-camp refugees from sample or sample extrapolation  -Excludes Palestinian Camps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>78,460 (1997)</td>
<td>Leb + PRL out of camp</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>As above, + -Cadastral data modified by UN-Habitat to discount cadastral fractions outside Tyre urban area</td>
<td>As above, + -Cadastral (here equivalent to municipal) data for 4 Tyre urban municipalities adapted to discount cadastral fractions outside Tyre urban area boundary</td>
<td>As above, + -Method for discounting cadastral population based on imperfect proxy of built up area distribution either side of Tyre urban area boundary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>115,650 (2011)</td>
<td>Leb + PRL out of camp</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>As above, + As for Row 1, + -UN-Habitat (2017)</td>
<td>-Apply national annual growth rate set by World Bank to NPMPLT 1997 figures to project forward to 2011  -Available to cadastral level  -Cadastral (here equivalent to municipal) data for 4 Tyre urban municipalities adapted to discount cadastral fractions outside Tyre urban area boundary</td>
<td>As for Row 1 + -National growth rate likely to be below urban growth rate, probably giving a conservative estimate.  -Projected to 2011 only, as WB growth rate from 2011 includes growth cased by displacement from Syria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>201,208 (2011 Lebanese and PRL out of camp; 2016 for other cohorts)</td>
<td>Leb+ PRL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>As for Row 3, + -PRL &amp; PRS UNRWA 2016 -SR (UNHCR, 2015 Dec 31)</td>
<td>As for Row adding refugee figures (see Table 2). -PRL outside camps are considered to be included in NPMPLT figures (see Row 1) so only those in camps are added for PRL cohort, to avoid doublecounting.</td>
<td>As for Rows 1-2, + -PRS and SR registration localities may not correspond to actual locality of residence(^{75}). -An unknown % of all refugees are unregistered and thus uncounted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>From 163,500 (Winter) to 167,500 (Summer) (2016)</td>
<td>Leb + PRL out of camp</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Tyre Union of Municipalities</td>
<td>-Estimation of municipal council  -Number based on registered inhabitants at the moukhtars only  -Accuracy depends on moukhtars registration data which may not reflect actual resident population</td>
<td>-Accuracy depends on moukhtars registration data which may not reflect actual resident population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{74}\) Whole-cadastre total for Sour, Aabassiyeh, Ain el Baal, Borj Ec-Chemali

\(^{75}\) Discounts cadastral fractions outside Tyre urban area boundary. Discounts cadastral fractions outside Tyre urban area boundary.

\(^{76}\) Based on detailed verification through UNHCR HH questionnaires, the figure for SR residence by locality is unlikely to diverge significantly from that officially recorded. Anecdotal suggestions of a dislocation between place of registration and place of residence has however been encountered in the data gathering for the current profile.
### Table 13: Population estimates for Tyre including methodology and caveats. Main UN-Habitat contribution to figures highlighted yellow for comparison to alternative estimates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Pop Estimate (year)</th>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Caveats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>From 163,500 (Winter) to 167,500 (Summer) (2016)</td>
<td>Leb + PRL out of camp</td>
<td>Tyre urban area only</td>
<td>Tyre Union of Municipalities</td>
<td>- Estimation of municipal council</td>
<td>- As for Row 4, +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Number based on inhabitants registered with moukhtars only</td>
<td>- Method for discounting cadastral population based on imperfect proxy of built up area distribution either side of Tyre urban area boundary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>177,900 (2016)</td>
<td>Leb + PRL</td>
<td>Tyre RTO / UN-Habitat</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Estimation based on RTO/UN-Habitat solid waste information</td>
<td>- Depends on solid waste information accuracy (both total generated, per inhabitant average as denominator, and municipal collection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>160,110 (2016)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tyre RTO / UN-Habitat</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Estimation based on RTO/UN-Habitat solid waste information</td>
<td>- As for Row 4, 6, 7, +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Conflates waste generated by all populations including camp-dwellers</td>
<td>- Method for discounting cadastral population based on imperfect proxy of built up area distribution either side of Tyre urban area boundary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population Density**

Density is a critical factor for urban service and infrastructure provision. High population density, especially in poor and/or informal urban settings, is associated with over-concentration of residences and overcrowding, poor service provision, environmental challenges, and other negative congestion effects like high real estate costs.

In principle, however, densely populated neighbourhoods can also support the case for investment in collective urban services/resources that require a high head count for justification and viability, like public transit or water infrastructure. Indeed, ‘compact development’ is an accepted tenet of sustainable urban development as it can offer opportunities for optimising land use efficiency and energy use, whilst mitigating against urban sprawl. In policy terms, then, one point is that urban vulnerability is therefore not a direct function of density. Another, however, is that the extent to which urban densities are policy-susceptible and over what period is unresolved.

Finally, mechanisms to intervene on densities at the level of dwellings per unit area are different from those concerned with overcrowding; on population densities at the level of:

- Population/area unit: people/ha or people/km²
- Population/dwelling unit: people/house/unit
- Population/living space: people/m²

Using the UN-Habitat population figures highlighted yellow in Table 7 and notwithstanding the caveats noted there, shows a Tyre urban area population density of 11977 persons/km². Amongst the cadastral fractions, the highest density by far is as expected to be found in Sour cadastre, the urban heart. The major contribution of refugees to that density is also apparent, bringing the figure from 12960 Lebanese/km² to 23392 all persons/km². All else being equal, the figures suggest a simple case for prioritising collective urban infrastructure/service/resource investments for Tyre in the Sour municipality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aabbassiyeh</th>
<th>Aain Baal</th>
<th>Borj El-Chemali</th>
<th>Sour</th>
<th>Tyre Urban area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sq Km</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leb</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All (Leb + refugees)</td>
<td>2.693</td>
<td>2.996</td>
<td>4.836</td>
<td>12,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9114</td>
<td>23392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 14:** Population density for the Tyre urban area components of each cadastre and for Tyre urban area overall.

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Gaps & Challenges

- Humanitarian interventions, municipal service planning and investment are undermined by Lebanon’s lack of a good quality statistical base.

- It is commonly acknowledged that the population figures for Lebanese adopted in the LCRP are under-estimates. There is little understanding of how partners are factoring in this caveat.

- The figures for SR and PRS are also under-estimates due to the unquantified presence of unregistered refugees.

- This chapter has triangulated three different sources of population data (UN-Habitat using World Bank growth rates applied the LCRP figures; mokhtar-derived figures from the Tyre Union; UN-Habitat/RTO solid waste generation-based estimate) at the level of Tyre urban area. While the estimates conclude a variation from 160,000 inhabitants (based on solid waste collection) to 201,208 and 233,376 inhabitants (refugee registration data added to 1997 data progressed to 2011 and union registration data respectively), the three estimates all suggest a significant upsurge from currently used population data from 1997 added to refugee registration data of 127,316. However, there is a clear challenge in mobilising additional primary data collection and/or verification in order to arrive at figures that gain cross-stakeholder consensus that can then be used as the basis for efficient, coordinated action and service provision planning.

- The simple calculation for demographic impact of the Syrian refugee crisis showed that whilst in proportional terms there is a similar pressure increase across Aabasiyyet, Borj el-Chemali and Sour, the weight of additional demographic stress in absolute terms is focussed on Sour, the urban heart. Any gap in terms of resource and services pressure is thus likely to gravitate towards this municipality. Sour is also by far the most densely populated. Spatial proximity of vulnerable populations could be construed as an opportunity for efficient return on investment in terms of beneficiary impacts from collective urban service/resource interventions.

- With three official camps in the relatively small Tyre urban area, a challenge emerges related to camp management and administration, and specifically to understanding and responding to the post-crisis population influx (PRS primarily) into already highly stressed environments. The foregoing calculations suggest that Borj El Chamali camp may have experienced the greatest proportional influx, offering a pointer for informing action.

- As noted in Theme 2, there is a governance gap manifested in the lack of a dedicated institutional structure for the Tyre urban area, at which level there is instead an administrative vacuum between the municipalities and the 63 municipality/locality Tyre union. In population terms, the logic for a body which institutionalises joint working across the continuously built up urban area, a geography taking in parts of only four cadastres/municipalities, is supported by the vulnerability ratings for the district, which clearly show the highest vulnerability focussed on this urban core, a pattern shared with other ‘city-regions’ in the country. The gradient of vulnerability, however, radiating out from this urban heart also implies the necessity for urban area institutional structures which take a permeable approach to the urban boundary in terms of joint spatial analysis, planning and working arrangements.

- There is an argument to be made that the Tyre urban area boundary as set out here and as consistently drawn using the same methodology for the other major cities in Lebanon could be adopted in future revision of the NPMPLT or in other spatial development policy documents. Optimally this would be part of an official adoption of these newly drawn urban areas as the formal urban geography of Lebanon as a basis for statistical data generation and monitoring. Such a platform for target-setting and monitoring would be crucial for moving towards a mature, multi-level spatial planning system and a cross-cutting keystone in any suite of integrated national urban policies.

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27 1997 CAS data + refugee registration data. Out-of-camp PRL data has been subtracted from this total as already counted for in the 1997 data set.
THEME 4
Economy And Services
Economy

- The economy in Lebanon is mainly based on the services sector (approximately 75% of GDP in 2010) according to the Lebanese Ministry of Finance (UNHCR 2013).
- Common to all Lebanon, the paucity of city-level economic data undermines capacity to monitor economic trends in Tyre.
- Recurrent political incidents and national instability have resulted in GDP slowdown (UNHCR 2013). The 2006 war had far-reaching negative impacts, including on tourism in particular and on economic activity in general in the South Governorate, of which Tyre is part.
- For Tyre, studies have recurrently stated the need for developing tourism and agriculture as the sectors with most potential but that remain under-exploited.
- The Tyre fishing sector is constrained by political tensions and regulations, lacks a proper management system and would further benefit from technological advancement.
- Unemployment in Tyre urban area is high across all cohorts, with 47% of Syrian refugees active in the labour force, against 42% amongst Palestinians and 43% amongst Lebanese. Employment is dominant in agriculture, construction and service industries – often unskilled occupations against low salaries and income security.
- Post-2011 studies show depleting income amongst refugee and host community households, against high expenditures and rising debt to cover those expenditures.
- Programme for organisation and support of small to medium enterprises development should be explored.
- Food security has seen a negative development since 2013, now with more that 90% of Syrian refugees experiencing food insecurity, and 35% experiencing moderate to severe food insecurity (1.6% & 34% respectively). In Tyre, food insecurity has been determined by worsening food consumption and dietary diversity.
- Common to all Lebanon, there is a lack of city-level data to monitor trends.

Housing, Shelter and Tenure

- The city has experienced a significant increase of population through waves of displacement, adding pressure on the housing market, shelter options, and tenure; increasing the risk of deterioration of housing and shelter conditions.
- High real-estate prices and informal housing are dominant features in Tyre. Rising real-estate prices are caused by added pressure on the housing/shelter...
market, especially in Sour municipality. This pattern forces the economically vulnerable to reside in low-cost and informal housing.

> The proximity of Al Bass camp to a significant archaeological site, coupled with unplanned extensions to the built environment of the camp and elsewhere, asserts the need for protection policies of the heritage sites coupled with sound spatial planning of urban growth.

**Potable Water**

> Tyre is suffering from shortage of adequate and sufficient water supply due to increased demand against insufficient supply, while private wells suffer from high levels of pollution because of improperly installed sewage network; all which poses serious health issues on the community. In Tyre’s old city, water pipes are either improperly connected and/or backfilled, which causes soil intrusion and pollution.

**Waste & Storm Water**

> Waste water discharge in the old city near the fishing port, negatively affects the population as well as two of the key income sectors; tourism and fishing.

> The lack of funding and sound strategies addressing wastewater, is a major factor hindering the development of a robust wastewater infrastructure and management system in Tyre.

> The coastal area, as well as areas adjacent to seasonal water streams, are most prone to flooding during rainfall due to rapid urbanization; currently the waste water system serves storm water drainage, thus a solution is required to release inter-dependency of storm water and waste water networks.

**Solid Waste Management**

> In Tyre, solid waste information is relatively well monitored by the Union. Most significantly, this information serves as an alternative for the traditional, mostly outdated, population census methodology.

> The solid waste sorting and composting plant of Ain Baal is not sufficiently equipped to respond to the district’s needs, which necessitated the continuity of dumping in the Ras al-Ain landfill site as well as in other random dumpsites in and around the City.

**Electricity**

> The majority of thermal power plants in Lebanon, including that of Tyre, operate at high costs; running unfeasibly on Gas Oil (Diesel) rather than the less costly, natural gas.

> In 2010, prior to the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, the GoL recognized the critical need to address Energy sector issues and endorsed a Policy Paper for the Energy Sector in 2010.

> Electricity rationing and reliance on back-up private generators is commonplace all over Lebanon even before the arrival of the Syrian refugees, Tyre is equally dependent on this additional energy provision.

**Transport**

> Tyre lacks a sound transportation plan, and limited financial, human and technical resources to impede any policy making efforts; resulting in a negatively performing transport system that directly hinders social and economic development.

> An existing under-maintained and over-capacitated network, of regional and local roads, provides basic connection between Tyre and it’s hinterlands.

> Tyre’s low-quality/informal public transportation system lacks organization and structure, and does not provide a reasonable alternative to private cars, restricting use to only few passengers who have no choice.

> Soft mobility is not catered for in the city, yet Tyre has both a favourable small size and flat terrain for this type of practice. Facilitated pedestrian routes and cycling would help reduce stress on the road network and promote environmental friendly mobility patterns.

**Social Services**

> In Tyre, the health sector is dominated by the private sector thus placing financial pressure of both host and guest communities

> Since 2011, an increase in demand of healthcare services has been marked putting pressure on the community due to high healthcare costs.

> Unregistered refugees are obliged to resort to private clinics as they are ineligible members; however there is a conflict between host and guest communities as humanitarian aid mostly targets incoming refugees from Syria without supporting poor Lebanese communities.

> Lebanon has to accommodate around 400,000 incoming Syrian child refugees which has put additional strain of the Lebanese public school system.

> Syrian refugees face limitations mainly due to the curriculum type and lack of financial resources.
Economy

National

A middle income country, Lebanon is a free market economy that has experienced moderate economic growth in recent decades. However, ‘growth has been uneven due to large, frequent and mostly political shocks, to which the economy has been relatively resilient’. Real GDP grew by around 4.4% from 1992-2014, an average concealing temporal variations related to unfolding political crises, of which the ongoing conflict in Syria is the most recent. The quality of economic growth has been poor and growth has not been matched by domestic job creation.

According to the World Bank’s (2016) retrospective on 2015, ‘improved security conditions have been more than offset by a deteriorating political environment, leading to a further slowdown in an already sluggish economy’. Further, ‘negative impacts of low oil prices’ are highlighted as a drag on the economy.

Poverty has been widespread nationally since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war, which severely damaged the economy. Spatially, poverty has been higher outside the capital in the north and south of the country, and in dense pockets in the suburbs of large towns, reflecting the unevenness of economic growth.

The Syrian crisis has added to pre-existing strains on public finances and service delivery. The World Bank estimates that Lebanon has incurred losses of US$131 billion since 2012, of which US$5.6 billion pertains to 2015 alone. Furthermore, the protracted refugee crisis is expected to worsen poverty among Lebanese and increase income inequality. According to a World Bank-led ‘Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict’ (2013), the Syrian crisis was responsible between 2012 and 2014 for:

- Pushing 170,000 Lebanese into poverty
- Reducing real GDP growth by 2.9 percentage points per annum
- Doubling unemployment to over 20% (mostly among unskilled youth)
- Depressing government revenue collection by US$1.5 billion

Notwithstanding the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon’s economy, international assistance amounting US$4,889m from 2011-2016, covering humanitarian response as well as stabilisation programmes, has injected significant funds in national and local service delivery systems. Syrian refugee’s consumption – which is fuelled by humanitarian aid – has as well boosted the Lebanese economy where it is estimated that every USD spent by Syrian beneficiaries generates USD2.13 for Lebanon’s GDP (IRC 2014).

Lebanon’s GDP per capita is US$18,500pa at 2016. GDP composition by sector of origin is shown in Table 15. Oriented towards services, the main growth sectors are banking and tourism. Other sectors are food processing, wine, jewellery, cement, textiles, mineral and chemical products, wood and furniture products, oil refining and metal fabricating. The country is remarkably dependent on diaspora remittances (c. US$7 billion/yr.) which are a partial driver of domestic consumption.

Agriculture has fallen from as high as 23 percent of economic output at the end of the last civil war to make up only 4 percent of GDP today, indicating that the sector is being left behind (ESCWA 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the World Bank (2016 Oct) ‘Public finances remain structurally weak and worsening in urgent need of reforms’. Public debt shows continued escalation as an established feature of the macro-economy. Empirically, international research has shown this indicator to be negatively correlated with economic growth, a relationship particularly clear as public debt approaches 100% of GDP. In 2016, Lebanon’s public debt was 161.5% of GDP, up from 146% in 2014.
This already exceeds the IMF\textsuperscript{91} forecast of an increase to 155% by 2019 from a 2013 baseline. Whilst the theoretical existence of causality going from public debt to economic growth is unresolved, this macro-fiscal vulnerability remains an important policy issue and an indicator of the Lebanese context.

**South Governorate**

Tyre is located in the South Governorate which, on several prosperity markers, is the poorest performing or – after the North Governorate – the second poorest performing governorate in the country. For instance, foreign direct investment, an indicator of regional/global market integration, has been lower in the south compared to other governorates in terms of number and scale of investments (IDAL 2010). A major difference between the south and other governorates is its proximity with Israel with whom borders are closed thus eliminating the benefits of trade with a neighbouring country.

In terms of enterprise concentration, Tyre constitutes the second most prominent city in the South Governorate after Saida. To understand the marginalisation of the economy in South Lebanon, an adequate starting point would be to compare the size and number of investment projects in the South compared to the rest of Lebanon (IDAL 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of total investment</th>
<th>Beirut</th>
<th>Mount Lebanon</th>
<th>North Bekaa</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003-2010 Number of investment projects</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2010 Size of investments</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011 Number of investment projects</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011 Size of investments</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011 Value per project</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 16:** Governorate Distribution of Foreign Investment (IDAL 2011)

In the past, the South Governorate was specialised in commerce and hospitality, services, and agriculture in decreasing order of importance (Nahhas, 2002). Relative to the national level, the South governorate exhibited a specialisation in agriculture. Today, agriculture and construction remain the dominant sectors converging with the main livelihood sectors (Mercy Corps & SHEILD, 2015).

For the employment within sectors, and looking at the industrial sector as an example, the South has the lowest number of average workers per industrial establishment at 12 workers/establishment which is considerably lower than the national average of 21 workers/establishment\textsuperscript{92}.

Around 8-10% of industrial establishments are concentrated in the South (Lebanon-industry 2016). On worker productivity, South Lebanon comes in fourth place after North Lebanon, Mount Lebanon and Beirut as the majority of enterprises employ less than 10 workers (Mol 2007). It is evident that small and medium size enterprises face challenges in increasing their business activities\textsuperscript{93}, also supported by the geographic distribution of Kafalat loans\textsuperscript{94}, where the South governorate only attracts around 10% of the total value of loans\textsuperscript{95}.

Moreover, in South governorate, around 60% of enterprises have reported to be competing against informal firms, some 30% identified the activities of informal enterprises as a major constraint.

**Tyre District**

Tyre district economy is based on tourism, agriculture and trade, alongside remittances whose national growth has stagnated since 2009 (Bankmed 2016). Compared to the South governorate including Nabatieh, Tyre district is more specialized in trade and less specialized in agricultural activities.

Enterprises are predominantly low value-added micro-enterprises (CRI et al. 2015). For the 1997-2004 period for which data\textsuperscript{96} is available, the number of economic establishments increased but the proportion of micro-enterprises (<5 employees) had grown. These micro-enterprises tend to be ‘informal’, characterised by low business-to-business exchange, generate a low added value, and typically create a small number of low skill, low wage, informal job opportunities’ (CRI et al. 2015:50). The quality of economic growth is therefore questionable.

**TRADE**

Around 60% of economic establishments are in the trade sector, mainly selling final consumer products, linked to low value activities and low demand for skilled labour (CRI et al. 2015).

**AGRICULTURE**

The main crops produced in Tyre district includes citrus, olives, tobacco, and other medicinal/industrial and exotic fruits produce (Figure 24). Olives and citrus fruit farming occupy about two-thirds of the district’s crop agricultural land by hectares. A limited percentage of livestock farming takes place, with 506 mainly small-scale farms functioning. Organic farming has also been initiated in the area (CRI et a l. 2015).

\textsuperscript{91} IMF, 2014, in World Bank 2016 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/03/09/090224b08416f27b/L/1_O/Rendered/PDF/Lebanon000Prom0c0Country0diagnostic.pdf

\textsuperscript{92} It is worth noting that – in terms of number of employees – whereas around 50% of industrial establishments are classified as micro-enterprises, 73% of total enterprises in Lebanon are considered micro-enterprises (MoET, 2014).

\textsuperscript{93} SME MoET (2014) Lebanon Strategy A Roadmap to 2020. Lebanon: MoET.

\textsuperscript{94} Kafalat-guaranteed loans offer subsidized interest rates to small and medium enterprises


\textsuperscript{96} Data is from the CAS (2004) Census of Establishments.
THEME 4 SERVICES and INFRASTRUCTURE

WHilst Tyre district occupies one of the most fertile coastal areas in the country, there are barriers to capitalising on this natural endowment (CRI et al. 2015).

- Production cost and transition of agricultural products to markets at scale face two major obstacles impeding agricultural production. Traders/wholesalers regulate produce price leaving farmers at risk. Fruits are transported to the ‘hisbeh’ (local market) and the farmer only gets paid if the harvest is sold. There is also no contract between the farmer and the wholesaler verifying the amount sold and the price of sale.

- High land and electricity costs restrict agricultural production and competitiveness in regional and international markets.

- There is a lack of agricultural advisory service or organised lobbying such as a farmers’ union, or logistical/infrastructural support services such as refrigeration warehousing facilities.

In economic development and social mobility terms, there is a tension at the heart of the sector: the intensive labour required within what are often family-owned businesses, can provoke the withdrawal of children from labour required within what are often family-owned businesses.

There is a lack of agricultural advisory service or organised lobbying such as a farmers’ union, or logistical/infrastructural support services such as refrigeration warehousing facilities.

In economic development and social mobility terms, there is a tension at the heart of the sector: the intensive labour required within what are often family-owned businesses, can provoke the withdrawal of children from education for farm work earlier than would have been the case in non-farming familial contexts.

TOURISM

There is potential for developing tourism across the Tyre district, and particularly along the coastline and at various archaeological-cultural sites of Phoenician, Arab, Roman, Christian and Muslim heritage. However, investment in tourism is mainly concentrated in Sour municipality (where 36% of enterprises are tourism-related) (CRI et al. 2015). Sour City contains two exceptional UNESCO World Heritage sites. A recent study (MercyCorps & SHIELD 2015) reported that municipal representatives believe tourism to become the highest employment growth generator in South Lebanon.

Tourism activity and sectoral development is, however, sensitive to security threats (CRI et al. 2015). Security threats in the South tend to direct economic investment from tourism into the real estate sector, considered a safer option. This dynamic may however pertain more to the south of the district towards the national border than to Tyre city. Paradoxically, the various conflicts that have affected the south of Tyre District have protected its natural assets from excess development (CRI et al, 2015:22).

Tyre Urban Area

Across the urban area, the economy is mostly dependent on tourism, contracting services, immigrant remittances and the construction sector. The services sector is most dominant in Tyre Urban Area as it comprises the highest number of industrial units. Within the urban area, concentration of economic/employment activity is limited to Sour municipality (CRI et al. 2015).

SOUR

Employment in Tyre urban area is concentrated in Sour municipality. A majority of enterprises are in the trade and service sector, yet the sector that has the highest share of employment is the industrial sector.

Nevertheless, in Sour, the economy is mostly dependent on tourism - archaeological heritage (500,000m2), restaurants, hotels and beaches. Tyre also has unique underwater ruins that should be protected and used for deep sea tourism activities. In the winter season, the tourism decreases sharply (most active between May 15th and October 15th only) (Dbouk, 2016). The harbour is still important to Sour as it has been throughout history, it is however the smallest in Lebanon, and limited to fishing activities and leisure (BANKMED, 2016).

The city is attracting investments in areas close to its north entrance and along the city outskirts. The mayor of Sour opposes commercial developments at the city’s entrances as they may cause bottlenecks, if they’re not coupled with strategic traffic measures (Dbouk, 2016).

Fishing Industry

Currently around 20% of the 2000 inhabitants in the old city core are engaged in the fishing industry. Economic growth in the industry has been however been impeded by several factors including but not limited to; Israeli occupation (22 years), recurrent military attacks and maritime blockade, as well as lack of effective control of environmentally damaging practices. In the South fishermen also cannot venture beyond 6 nautical miles from shore due to security and safety restrictions. This limitation does not allow them to perform deep sea fishing which creates high pressure on coastal fishing grounds and causes biomass fishing, as fishing activities is concentrated around fish spawning grounds and nurseries (Samaha, 2016). Recurrent incidents also occur along the maritime border, due to disputes between Tyre fishermen and the Israeli army over the delineation lines.

One of the major drawbacks deterring the development of the fishing sector is the lack of proper governance that would set the structure and path required for the sector’s advancement. Primarily, the fishing law was last updated in 1929 thus deemed obsolete to current conditions.
fishermen’s needs and port activities. The fishermen are also deprived from technical and institutional support as the cooperative of Tyre Fishermen is idle. There is a clear need to separate politics from fishing/port activities; several ministries are involved (Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Transport) which increases the risk of conflicting interests (Nahhas, 2013).

Another constraining factor is the lack of proper amenities and technology. In 2011, a storage building was constructed for the fishermen, yet not responding directly to the needs of the fishermen. The storage area does not have proper ventilation. Also, constructed wooden boxes were constructed on the port for storage, but reportedly not sufficient to meet demand. There is no electricity by the port, limiting technological advancement97, currently fishermen lack proper technology (VHF radio, GPS, etc.) (Samaha, 2016).

In addition to the above-mentioned challenges there is a need to control illegal fishing that occurs along the shoreline of Palestine camps/settlements as it threatens marine life. The surveillance and enforcement of fishing laws is applied on the host community only, and not on the camp residents. Illegal fishing activities such as dynamite, spearfishing using surface supplied diving, and the use of illegal small mesh nets are frequent (Samaha, 2016). Consequently, coastal areas don’t include sufficient fish quantities that allow fishing industry prosperity. Over time the fishing industry has struggled with recruitment, but has seen some rise in the number of fishermen over the last decade, however at a cost as youth drop out of school to help improve the livelihood of their families (Nahhas 2013).

BORJ EL-CHEMALI
The main economic sector in the area is contracting services followed by agriculture (which is noticeably decreasing due to construction and increase in built up areas). The mayor of Borj el- Chemali emphasised that environmentally friendly factories need to be developed in order to create industries/job opportunities that will boost the economic sector (Dib, 2016).

ABBASSIEH
The economy in the area depends on diaspora remittances and commercial activities (Hershi, 2016).

AIN BAAL
The area has undergone rapid construction after the 2006 war, as a consequence, agricultural land diminished quickly. Lands that are designated for agricultural purposes are also being re-classified as sites for construction (Basma, 2016).

Summing up sectoral distribution within Tyre urban area, the construction sector appears dominant. However, employment in this sector has witnessed a severe decrease in recent years, with a decrease in both supply and demand in the real estate market all over Lebanon. Moreover, the potential of tourism and fishing industry remains untapped and trade and commercial sectors characterised with micro and informal enterprises. Moreover, the potential of agro-industry is untapped as the industrial sector is underdeveloped with the Urban area failing to attract the required investment.

Livelihoods

Regional
Prior to the Syrian conflict, poverty in South Lebanon governorate was scored second highest in the country, following North Lebanon, with 11.64% of extremely poor living on less than 2.40 USD/day, and 42.21% of poor people living on less than USD 4 USD/day. This high poverty rate was accompanied by high levels of unemployment, as well as unskilled labour occupations in the agricultural and construction sectors, where one out of four workers was reported to be living in poor conditions (WorldBank 2013).

Six years after the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Lebanon hosts more than 1 million Syrian refugees98. This rapid and unforeseen population growth has increased the demand for food and accommodation, as well caused an increase in the number of low skilled workers in a context where the workers’ salaries are lower relative to high prices of basic commodities. Based on available data, in the south, around 23% of households have witnessed a major decrease in income levels (Figure 26), mainly due to increase of livelihood and agricultural material cost (FAO 2015). In 2013, the average monthly income for Lebanese in the South was estimated 450 USD, 50USD below the minimum wage of 500 USD (ILO 2013). This had direct impact on access to food, as 58% of the households were reported to have suffered from deficiency in food availability due to low income. In addition, 32% of the households in the South reported having debt, associated as coping mechanism to securing basic necessities. This is however lower than the average national rate of 51% (FAO 2015).

The vast majority of working youth and children are either employees or casual workers, with half of them having achieved only primary education. More than half of young displaced Syrians in the workforce are employed (around 45%), as daily and/or seasonal workers sectors that have traditionally used Syrian labour, such as agriculture (both males and females, especially in rural areas close to the border with Syria). Although the Lebanese law clearly bans child labour, it is becoming a growing concern especially among Syrian refugees in the agricultural sector (Chahine et al. 2014).99 Based on VASyR 2016, 73 percent of displaced Syrian households had at least one member who worked in the past month, of which 21 percent reported agriculture as a source of income.

97 International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) will provide generators for helping in electricity provision in the near future

99 Save the Children, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF (April 2014), Situation Analysis of Youth in Lebanon Affected by the Syrian Crisis.
According to a labour market assessment for South Lebanon, around 33% of business owners in South Lebanon reported that the Syrian crises didn’t affect their businesses while around 12% reported that the crisis have noticeably affected sales of goods and services. Major sectors affected by the crises include tourism and construction (MercyCorps SHEILD 2015).

South Lebanon governorate hosts 11.73 % (South and Nabatiye Governorates) of Syrian refugees that have fled to Lebanon. Unemployment affects more than half of Syrian households across Lebanon (Figure 31). In Tyre, approximately 18% have no household members active in employment, around 27% have 5 or more dependants per active member, 30% have 3-4 dependents per active member, and 25% have 2 or less dependents per active member (Figure 27)Syrians mainly work in low skilled jobs where 25% of the workers are hired on a monthly basis, and 65% on a daily basis (ILO 2013). This job insecurity coupled with household size and dependency rates places Syrian refugees in vulnerable position.

In 2013, a survey conducted by ILO revealed that, around 47% of Syrian refugees were active in the labour force, against 42% amongst Palestinians and 43% amongst Lebanese. This included a female participation rate at respectively 19% (SR), 15% (PR) and 21% (Leb). This activity rate places Syrian refugees in a similar situation to that of Lebanese and Palestinian refugees reflecting high levels of unemployment (ILO 2013).

SOURCES OF INCOME OF SYRIAN REFUGEES

Average household monthly income of Syrian refugees in Tyre was at 55 USD per capita in 2016 (UNHCR et al. 2016)100, lower than the national household monthly average at 60USD per capita. In Tyre, main livelihood resources for Syrian refugees (UNHCR et al. 2015)101 was food vouchers102 (48%), 24% on non-agricultural wages and 6% on informal credit (Figure 30).

HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE OF SYRIAN REFUGEES

The monthly expenditure of households in the South was the second highest in Lebanon at 95USD/month per capita in 2016 (105USD nationally) (Figure 31). The high level of expenses was largely caused by high costs associated with rent and high water cost. Food constituted the highest expenditure (41%), followed by rent (23%), while other expenses are diversified among (education, health, hygiene, alcohol/tobacco, gas, electricity, telecommunications, transport, water, legal issues, and others)(VASYR 2016). In order to afford those expenses 70% of Syrian refugee households in Tyre have an average debt of more than 200 USD (Figure 32) (UNHCR et al. 2016).

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101 This data is not disaggregated at district level for 2016.
102 Food vouchers from 2016 onwards predominantly reported as multi-purpose cash / e-card.
Figure 27: Household level employment by region and caza (UNHCR et al. 2015)

Figure 29: Average household monthly income per capita at district level (UNHCR et al. 2016)

Figure 30: Main livelihood source (percentage per household) (UNHCR et al. 2015)
Figure 31: Per capita monthly expenditures (UNHCR et al. 2016)

Figure 32: Household average dept and amounts owed by district (UNHCR et al. 2016)
Palestinian refugees from Lebanon
The livelihoods situation of the Palestinian population in Tyre is similar to the vulnerable Lebanese population who are low skilled and typically enrolled in informal jobs, generally requiring long working hours, yet pay low wages in return (ILO 2015).

Poverty amongst Palestinian refugees is highest in Tyre (79%) compared to other regions in the country, while extreme poverty rates were significantly greater in Tyre (9.5%) and Saida (9.8%) compared to other regions. Both cities host more than 81% of the extremely poor Palestine (Figure 33).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>&quot;Palestinian Refugees&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Lebanese Population&quot;</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Lebanon Area</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>167%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>89%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extreme Poverty</th>
<th>&quot;Palestinian Refugees&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Lebanese Population&quot;</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Lebanon Area</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>167%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>600%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>579%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>399%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>288%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 33: Comparison of poverty rates (Chaaban, Ghattas, R.Habib, et al. 2010)

Approximately 42% of the Palestinian working age population are employed. Half of which work in the construction and services sectors (ILO 2015). Compared to the national level, Tyre had the highest rate of low skilled workers (41%) with around 23% of Palestinians working in agriculture pre crisis (Chaaban, Ghattas, Habib, et al. 2010).

Palestinian refugee main livelihood sectors:
- Rashidieh Camp: agricultural sector
- Al Bass Camp: majority technical jobs
- Jal El Bahr gathering: fishing sector (CRI et al. 2015)

Unemployment is however high among Palestinian refugees, where some work part-time for only 10-15 days/month. More specifically, low employment rates were recorded among women who mainly find jobs as teachers at UNRWA schools, in NGOs, or in retail. Young (male) adolescents are involved in technical jobs or recruited by the Palestinian factions (CRI et al. 2015).

Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS)
As a direct consequence of the Syrian crises, Tyre hosts around 17.3% of PRS (UNRWA 2015). The size of PRS households in Tyre is the highest in all Lebanon with an average of 7.2 household members in refugee camps and 8.53 persons out-of-camp compared to the other regions of the country (Figure 34).

105 An average of 2.12 families live in one household (UNRWA 2015).

Figure 34: PRS families and household size inside and outside Palestinian refugee camps by region (UNRWA 2015).

103 The report only provides figures for Rashidieh and Al Bass camps, as well as Jal El Bahr neighbourhood, and not Borj Chemali camp.
### Livelihoods

**2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. PRS - # ind. incr. income generation, employment opportunity, market creation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SyrRef - # ind. incr. income generation, employment opportunity, market creation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. AffLeb - # ind. incr. income generation, employment opportunity, market creation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SyrRef # received vocational or life skills support</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. AffLeb # received vocational or life skills support</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Vocational skills training program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Internship, on-the-job training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Benefit from rapid income generating programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. PRS - # ind. incr. income generation, employment opportunity, market creation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SyrRef - # ind. incr. income generation, employment opportunity, market creation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. AffLeb - # ind. incr. income generation, employment opportunity, market creation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SyrRef # received vocational or life skills support</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. AffLeb # received vocational or life skills support</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Vocational skills training program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Internship, on-the-job training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Benefit from rapid income generating programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>USD $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Individuals working on public infrastructure upgrading</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Entrepreneurs &amp; employees who benefitted from business management training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Individuals benefitting from market-based skills training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Individuals working on public infrastructure upgrading</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Youth benefiting from internship/apprenticeship/placement scheme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. USD value invested in infrastructure rehabilitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 17:** Number of reported activities in Tyre Urban area by cadastral for selected indicators. Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015 and 2016.

### Reported Activities in Livelihoods

Activities reported in ActivityInfo against the Livelihoods sector show\(^{106}\):

- PRS, Syrian Refugees, and Lebanese alike where targeted in 2014, in Sour and Bourj el-Chemali.
- Sour municipality is the most targeted municipality in all three years; 2014, 2015, and 2016.
- No activities have been reported in Ain Baal.
- Abbassieh and Bourj el-Chemali have benefited from vocational/life skills support in 2014 and from rapid income generating programs in 2015.
- Abbassieh and Sour benefited from business management training targeting employees and entrepreneurs.
- In 2016, more activities in livelihood sector were created such as involving PRS and Syrian refugees in working on public infrastructure upgrading.
- Ain Baal and Bourj Chemali were not targeted by the livelihoods working group in 2016.
- Activities and targeted beneficiaries is sustained across all three years, with respectively 188, 116 and 246 individuals benefitting from Livelihoods activities in 2014–16. However, compared against concentration of poverty within Tyre urban area and need for income opportunities, as well an overall underfunding of the livelihoods sector, these figures appears critically low.

\(^{106}\) Partners to the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan report activities within each sector on a monthly basis down to cadastral level.
Food Security

“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. (World Food Summit, 1996)

National

Six years into the conflict, poverty levels are high and the long-term resilience of the country’s vulnerable communities is eroding as they run out of savings and struggle to access income. According to the (World Bank 2013) study, at present, 1 million Lebanese live below the poverty line,\textsuperscript{107} of which 470,000 are children (GoL-UN 2015)\textsuperscript{108}. According to (UNHCR et al. 2015), more than 70 percent of displaced Syrians are living below the poverty line\textsuperscript{109} along with 65 percent of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon and 90 percent of Palestinian Refugees from Syria\textsuperscript{110}. In response to their protracted poverty, which is leading to rising food insecurity (Figure 35: Percentage of household food insecurity (GoL-UN 2017a)), 97% of Syrian displaced households applied a negative coping strategy in 2016 (VASYR 2016), such as reducing their food spending and buying food on credit, reducing essential expenses such as education and health, selling productive assets, taking children out of school, sending children to work, and selling houses or lands (UNHCR et al. 2015)\textsuperscript{111}. The coping strategies have become more irreversible as households’ remaining saving and assets increasingly run out.

A recent survey conducted by the American University of Beirut and UNRWA\textsuperscript{112}, indicates that the majority of Syrian refugee households in Lebanon (58 percent) fall in the mild food insecurity category, whilst 34 percent being moderately food insecure, and 16 percent severely food insecure as shown (Figure 35). The situation is even worse among Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS), 31 percent of whom are moderately food insecure and 63 percent severely food insecure. Two thirds of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (PRL) report dissatisfaction with the food and nutrition (GoL-UN 2017a), 31 percent of whom are moderately food insecure and 34 percent severely food insecure. Two thirds of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (PRL) report dissatisfaction with their diet, more than half (58%) are vulnerable to food insecurity, a third are mildly food insecure, more than a quarter (28%) are moderately food insecure and 15% report severe food insecurity. In addition, 49 percent of the host community have reported being worried about their ability to source enough food, while 31 percent say they were unable to eat healthy and nutritious food over the course of a year (FAO 2015a)\textsuperscript{113}. Nonetheless, the food insecurity of vulnerable families also has a negative impact on the nutrition of their children and infants, particularly as exclusive breastfeeding rates are low among the Lebanese community scoring 25 percent, and 34 percent among displaced Syrians (UNICEF 2015)\textsuperscript{114}. Factors affecting food insecurity are similar to those affecting poverty, and therefore, Palestinian Refugee Camps’ residents are more likely to suffer from food insecurity than Palestinian refugees living in gatherings and adjacent areas (Salti et al. 2015).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{foodsecuritychart.png}
\caption{Percentage of household food insecurity (GoL-UN 2017a)}
\end{figure}

The highest poverty rates are associated with the agriculture sector, with 40 percent of those employed in the sector considered poor (CAS/WorldBank 2015)\textsuperscript{115}, South Lebanon accounts for 14% (nationally) of farmers in need. Specifically adding up to 16700 farmers and small scale farmers in need for assistance as shown in Figure 36.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{farmerschart.png}
\caption{Number of small scale farmers/ farmers in need per Governorate (in thousands) LCRP 2017-2020 (GoL-UN 2017a)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{107} World Bank (2013), Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict. Report No. 81098-LB
\textsuperscript{108} GoL, United Nations, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016: Year Two.
\textsuperscript{110} American University of Beirut, UNRWA (2016), Survey on the Socioeconomic Status of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon: 2015.
\textsuperscript{111} UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP (2016), Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees 2016, Lebanon.
\textsuperscript{112} American University of Beirut, UNRWA (2016), Survey on the Socioeconomic Status of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon: 2015.
\textsuperscript{113} Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture, FAO, REACH (2015), Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment of Lebanese Host Communities: Assessment Report, Lebanon.
\textsuperscript{114} UNICEF (2015), Annual Report, Lebanon.
\textsuperscript{115} Lebanon, Central Administration of Statistics, World Bank (25 May 2016), Snapshot of Poverty and Labor Market Outcomes in Lebanon based on Household Budget Survey 2011/2012.
Tyre Urban Area

To be food secure, a population, a household or an individual must have access to adequate food at all times. They should not risk losing access to food as a consequence of sudden shocks (e.g. an economic or climatic crisis) or cyclical events (e.g. seasonal food insecurity). The concept of stabilisation can therefore refer to the other three pillars of Food Security: the availability, access and utilisation dimensions of food security”(FAO, 2006). Food security includes four main pillars which are: utilisation, access, stability, and availability; as defined by the World Food Summit in 1996.

Figure 37 below portrays differences in the number of meals by Households (HH) divided across the governorates. In the South 1% of respondents in the south informed that they had 1 meal while 11% had 2 meals and the remaining 88% (FAO 2015b).

During the 12 months precedent to the study conducted by FAO, many households reported they lacked the financial ability or other means to access food. The South region was one of the main regions reported to have food insecurity because of the lack of economic resources to obtain food. Referring to Figure 38 below, around 60% of respondents in the South reported that in the past year, accessibility to food was a major problem for them (FAO 2015b).

Mode of Transport and market infrastructure were assessed (Figure 40) in order to determine physical food accessibility117. In the South, the majority of residents reach the market by foot (63%), mostly to local shops. As compared to other regions in Lebanon, it could be synthesised that market accessibility in the south is relatively cheaper where 73% reported that their daily commute costs less than 2,000 LBP (FAO 2015b).

On availability118, Figure 41 shows that the dwellers in the South have the highest percentage of private fields and large gardens. Also, Figure 42 shows that in the South around 90% of the population plant food/vegetables in outdoor spaces.

Studying number of days per week food related coping strategies are used, show the highest values of days (2 days) for the south compared to other areas of the country, where residents eat cheap food, and further amongst the highest scoring for eating less, or adults eating less to let their children eat (Figure 39).

---

116 Food utilisation is the first pillar of food security. It refers to the quantity, type, and food habits of the targeted communities.

117 Food accessibility is the second pillar of food security entailing physical and economic food

118 Food availability, the fourth pillar of food and security is mainly dependent on food production, trade, and stock levels.
Therefore, compared to other regions, residents in the South have the highest percentage of accessibility to outdoor spaces and are most willing to engage in agricultural activities which could be explored for small-scale/urban farming schemes.

Figure 40: Mode of transport to reach market by operational area, Source: (FAO 2015)

Figure 41: Access to outdoor space by operational area, Source: (FAO 2015b)

Figure 42: Planting of fruit/vegetable in outdoor space, Source: (FAO 2015b)

Figure 43: Main source of water for HH and commercial use, Source: (FAO 2015b)
Compared to other cities in Lebanon, Tyre has a relatively acceptable Food Consumption Score where around 5% of residents are on the border line and only around 0.2% are considered poor as shown in Figure 44 (UNHCR et al. 2016).

With respect to the general level of Food Security, similar to other regions the majority of dwellers experience mild food security as shown in Figure 45. The VASYR 2016 however noted that; ‘In Tyre, food insecurity was determined by worsening food consumption and dietary diversity’ (UNHCR et al. 2016).
### Food Security and Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-Cash for food</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-beneficiary from Distribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- Food distribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-Provision of e-cards/vouchers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-Provision of cash for food by ATM: PRS/PRL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6- Provision of food parcels new arri&amp;pend reg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7- Provision of food parcels new arri&amp;pend reg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8- Amount of cash ($) redeemed through ATM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9-cash ($) redeemed through e-cards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-cash ($) redeemed through NPTP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Cadastres</td>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>8,215,616</td>
<td>278,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aabbassiyeh</td>
<td>2,175,192</td>
<td>9,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Burj El-Chamali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aain Baal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,390,808</td>
<td>288,431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Food Security and Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-receiving food assistance through ATM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-receiving food assistance through e-cards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-receiving food assistance through food vouchers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-receiving food assistance through NPTP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-receiving food parcels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6-trained on postharvest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7-Amount of cash ($) redeemed through ATM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8-cash ($) redeemed through e-cards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9-cash ($) redeemed through food vouchers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-cash ($) redeemed through NPTP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Cadastres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>52,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aabbassiyeh</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Burj El-Chamali</td>
<td>27,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aain Baal</td>
<td>52,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 18:** Number of reported activities in Tyre Urban area by cadastre for selected indicators. Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015 and 2016.

### Reported activities in Food Security

Activities reported in ActivityInfo against the Food Security sector show:

- Sour count the biggest share of reported activities in both 2014, 2015, and 2016.
- In 2014, in Sour municipality, provision of e-cards/vouchers was the most recurring activity, while in 2015, provision of cash for food by ATM: targeted PRS/PRL populations and a higher number of individuals.
- Other municipalities have minimal food security interventions, the most noticeable among them is Abbassieh as provision of food parcels amounts to 2,451 individuals in 2014, and an significant increase of targeted people who were receiving food vouchers and food support increased in Bourj el Chemali in 2016.
- Through the 3 years 2014, 2015 and 2016, Ain Baal has never been targeted by food security activities, whereas Sour is the most targeted but with decreased amounts of support in food vouchers in 2016 in comparison with 2015. This can be attributed to the conversion of food voucher programmes into Multi-Purpose Cash now reported under Basic Assistance.

### Gaps and Challenges

While food security is not an immediate problem for Lebanese host communities at national level, several regions nevertheless have a portion of their population affected by food insecurity. If the situation is not addressed and its evolution not monitored, this may lead poor households to becoming increasingly vulnerable to future shocks (Salti et al. 2015).

In order to mitigate the impact of the Syria crisis and other factors on agriculture and on vulnerabilities of farmers, programs need to take into consideration farmers’ main agricultural needs; fertilizers, pesticides and machinery (Salti et al. 2015). In addition to improving the farmers nutritional practices (micro-gardening and food reservation/ transformation), as well as the enrolment of youth in agricultural technical schools, and the capacity building Government staff, are considered of equal importance.

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119 Partners to the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan report activities within each sector on a monthly basis down to cadastre level.
Basic Assistance

In Lebanon, the Basic Assistance sector is led by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) and coordinated by UNHCR and Lebanon Cash Consortium. The main objective of the sector is to ‘prevent socio-economically vulnerable households, including female headed households, from falling deeper into poverty. Populations displaced from Syria and vulnerable Lebanese are the primary people of concern for Basic Assistance sector partners’. In Lebanon, the main modality for assistance by the Basic Assistance partners is multi-purpose cash, providing choice to its recipients, stimulating local markets as well reduce operational costs.

Assistance and Household Assets

ASSISTANCE
Economically vulnerable households have been supported by two main types of assistance: 1) cash assistance in the form of multi-purpose cash grants, seasonal cash assistance and food vouchers; and 2) non-cash assistance in the form of in-kind goods and services (food, household items, education, subsidized healthcare and shelter assistance).

1. Cash Assistance: Food e-vouchers are the main type of assistance provided to vulnerable households. VaSyR 2016 reported that 697,765 refugees was assisted through cash assistance: 678,163 Syrians (e-vouchers) and 19,602 PRS (cash).

2. In-kind assistance: In South governorate, including Tyre urban area, blankets (12%), education (10%) and latrines (6%) were the top-three in-kind assistance items (Figure 46).

ASSETS
Households owned an estimate of 3.19 out of 4 basic assets\(^\text{120}\) in 2016, compared to 3.27 in 2015. Medium assets was reduced from 2.3 out of 6 in 2015 to 2.13 in 2016. However, the number of extended assets owned by households increased (0.48 in 2015 to 0.79 in 2016). In general, asset ownership is decreasing among refugee households.

Tyre Syrian refugees reported to own all basic assets in 2016 was reported at 26% (Figure 47).

\(^{120}\) Household assets were classified into three categories: basic, medium and extended. Basic: mattress, blanket, winter clothes, gas stove; medium: water, heater, bed, table, sofa, fridge, washing machine.
### Basic Assistance

#### 2014 vs 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-ATM cards loaded with cash</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-children receiving winter clothing kit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Hygiene kits/ Voucher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-baby kit/ voucher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Cash distribution multi-purpose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1- total blankets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-children winter clothes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-seasonal cash</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-fuel voucher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-newcomer kit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-assistance with in kind CRI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-total stoves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-fuel vouchers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Seasonal cash</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aabbassiyeh</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burj El-Chamali</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aain Baal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 19:** Number of reported activities in Tyre urban area by cadastre for selected indicators. Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015.

### Reported Activities in Basic Assistance

Activities reported in ActivityInfo against the Basic Assistance sector show:

- Sour is the municipality that has benefited the most from basic assistance in all three years (2014, 2015 & 2016)
- Reliance on seasonal cash is highly evident in Sour as it takes the biggest share of basic assistance.
- Similar to other sectors, Ain Baal receives almost no assistance in comparison with other municipalities in the Tyre urban area i.e., correlating with the lack of registered refugees in the area.
- In 2014, Abbassieh received a significant majority share of cash distribution compared to other municipalities across the urban area.
- For 2016, multi-purpose cash is reported at the governorate level. Syrians Receiving Multi-Purpose Cash assistance (MPC) in the South Governorate amount to 3,022.

### Gaps & Challenges

The political deadlock endemic to Lebanon, as well as the security situation in the South, are key main factors impeding proper economic development in Tyre. The NPMLT\(^{122}\) entailed that in order to pave the way for reviving Tyre economy and repositioning it as a patrimonial touristic city, there is a need for decentralisation and increasing the role of local governments’ (NPMLT, 2009).

Dominant political parties including Hezbollah and Amal exercise considerable authority over social services. Moreover, the informal governance assumed by political entities effects investments in the area as they necessitate their opinion on any proposed project, and themselves stands for 30-50% of investments (IRIN 2013). While political analysts have suggested that the South should be dealt with as any other part of Lebanon, with integration of national policies in complementarity with local level policies and systems, the government remains reluctant to take too strong of a role. In addition to the challenging political situation, security in the South is considered a major concern amongst investors.

The July 2006 war had severe consequences on the livelihoods of the southern dwellers; as it amplified the levels of poverty and added developmental obstacles due to substantial damages to buildings and infrastructure (UNDP & CDR 2010).

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\(^{121}\) Partners to the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan report activities within each sector on a monthly basis down to cadastre level.

\(^{122}\) National Physical Masterplan of the Lebanese Territory, CDR 2009
Basic Urban Services

Housing, Shelter & Tenure

Housing trends in Tyre District
As mentioned in the SSRDP report, a study of residential units in Tyre, between 1997 and 2004, showed that the number of primary residential units has increased. One of the main factors causing this increase was the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, and families returning to their places of origin in Tyre. Furthermore, a change in household occupancy trend was noted, with a notable number of households that used to share a residential unit before 2000, separating into individual homes from 2000–2004 (CRI et al. 2015).

In 2004, the ‘awqaf’ funded several housing projects for households with inadequate income levels. Since the project implementation, 6% of these housing units were registered as secondary while 13% were vacant. The study emphasised that vacancy rates may have increased due to real estate speculation, particularly in Greater Sour. The study further highlighted two major trends in Tyre: increase in real estate prices and a high percentage of informal housing. Primarily, the inflow of emigrant remittances in real estate investment caused an increase in real estate prices especially in Greater Tyre. This assumption is backed by the second phase evaluation of the CHUD project (2001), revealing that the sale prices of housing units in downtown Tyre had increased by 68% across a period of four years (1998-2001). Rental prices increased by around 11% over the same period, though not an equal dramatic upsurge, such rise in the rental market would have significant impact on access to affordable housing amongst urban poor. The informal housing trend noted in the study, was based on data collection from municipalities in Tyre. The informal housing comprised unlicensed construction in areas such as Maarake, Bazouriye and Dhayra. This type of construction was mainly a result of unsettled inheritance disputes within families.

The same trend has been noted in other studies on Tyre District, with the CRI report in 2015 also reporting that in some cases, 20-30% of housing units’ construction occurred on public lands, in areas such as Qlaile, Borj Rahhal, and Naqoura (CRI et al. 2015).

Tyre City

RESIDENTIAL BUILDING QUALITY
Figure 48 shows the result of an assessment of residential stock quality within Tyre urban area. The assessment categorised residential stock within very poor building quality, poor quality and fair to good quality as detailed below.

Very poor building quality
Housing within this category refers to severely deteriorated shelter requiring major reconstruction. Areas that fall within this category also suffer from poor access to basic urban services.

As evident in Figure 48 the areas categorised by very poor building quality strongly correlates with the three Palestinian refugee camps in Tyre, as well as the Jal al Baher out-of-camp Palestinian settlement on the coastline just north of Al Buss camp.

Poor quality
Housing within poor quality housing requires minor repairs and medium to high maintenance.

Poor quality residential buildings are mainly concentrated in the old city in Sour, and the stretch between Al Buss camp and Borj El-Chemali Camp, including Maachouk neighbourhood, also inhabited by almost 50% Palestinian out-of-camp refugees.

Fair to good quality
This category refers to buildings requiring minor maintenance.

Most of the built-up Urban area can be classified as fair to good quality. Buildings across the area of Ain Baal municipality included the Tyre urban area, entirely constitutes fair to good quality buildings, also reflected in higher value and increased real estate prices. Consequently, the area only incudes minor refugee presence (a low number of SYR refugees and no Palestinian refugees), as there are limited affordable housing options in the area.

Palestinian Camps
Three main Palestinian camps can be identified; Al Buss and Al Rashidieh camps in Sour municipality and Burj El Chamali within Burj El Chamali municipality. All camps are associated with very poor quality buildings infrastructure deterioration and overcrowding. Vertical expansion is caused by the fixed camp boundaries, yet with an increasing population size, also causing densification within the existing structures. In Borj el Chemali the municipality has a building height limit of three floors, yet the Borj el Chemali camp inhabitants reportedly tend to build more floors within the camp.

The SSRDP report states that the army is responsible for issuing renovation permits in order for any construction in the camps to take place, and for construction material to be imported to the camp. However, camp inhabitants tend to stretch the use of the limited material (e.g. limited use of cement for concrete) resulting in uncontrolled and unmaintained construction. This further amplifies vulnerability in the camps, increasing deterioration of building quality (CRI et al. 2015).

SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS BY RESIDENTIAL AREA
Figure 49 classifies areas across the city according to Socio-economic groups of all nationalities ranging between upper, middle and poor. Analysed against Figure 48 there is a clear correlation between socio-economic status and quality of housing.

The major section including the highest concentration of poor socio-economic levels can be noticed as a longitudinal stretch from west to east at the core of

123 Religious Endowment (Waqf): It refers to ownership of land/property by religious sects in Lebanon. Each sect has freedom to manage its own waqf. (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/lebanon/religious-sects.htm)

124 The maps were based on a survey developed by the RTO in Tyre Union in 2016.
Figure 48: Map showing building quality in Tyre urban area (UN-Habitat 2016)

Figure 49: Socio-economic groups in Tyre urban area. (UN-Habitat 2016)
the Urban area. It can be directly linked with building quality and presence of Palestinian camps and out-of-camp concentrations. This section includes Al Buss and Burj El Chamali camps, and Jal el Baher and al Maachouk Palestinian predominantly neighbourhoods, where buildings in were classified as very poor quality. Also, housing in the remaining area of this section is of poor building quality. Similarly, where the predominant building type is of fair to good quality, the majority of the residents are classified within the middle socio-economic class, mainly evident in Sour, Aabbassiyeh, and Burj El Chamali municipalities.

Minority of residents enjoy an upper socio-economic status. This category can be noticed towards the upper eastern and southern edge of Burj El Chamali, and the main bulk in Ain Baal. As noted earlier, Ain Baal is the only municipality across the Urban area with no refugee communities as mentioned.

The locational cross-referencing of very poor residential building quality with the most vulnerable socio-economic groups indicates hotspots that may inform the spatiality of the humanitarian response.

One of the most evident findings at this stage is the high number of camps and out-of-camp concentrations as a proportion of the entire Urban area (3 major Palestinian camps and 2 out-of-camp concentrations). With the recent influx of refugees from Syria adding to the existing Palestinian refugees and poor population, interventions should target the most vulnerable areas in order to prevent further degradation of already deteriorated conditions in these camps/neighborhoods, notwithstanding strain on existing infrastructure and economy on both the host and refugee population. This supports multi-cohort interventions of an area-based approach\(^\text{25}\). Thus, neighbourhood-level analysis would be required to supplement the city-level findings here, ahead of programming field interventions.

**BUILDING DENSITY**

Palestinian camps and out-of-camp concentrations have the highest building density across Tyre urban area, followed by the east-west corridor from Bourj el Chemali to the old town. Comparing the density against the distribution of socio-economic groups (Figure 50) asserts a clear correlation of socio-economic vulnerabilities and high-density areas.

In Sour, density is overall high, explained by the densely built old city, and the administrative and commercial city centre, as well as Palestinian camp and out-of-camp concentrations. Ain Baal on the other hand, is formed by significantly less dense constructed areas, again reflecting the higher economic status of the population, coupled with high residential costs that effectively hinders vulnerable refugees/urban poor to settle there.

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\(^{25}\) The area-based approach, is promoted as a tool for urban response by amongst others UN-Habitat, enhances responsiveness and promotes targeted urban response through integrated, multi-sector approach within defined geographical areas, as opposed to cohort-based or single sector-based interventions.

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**Property and Tenure: Tyre**

Several factors have shaped the current property and tenure patterns across Tyre, among others regional and local conflicts, the civil war in Lebanon, poor economic conditions and waves of displacements. Study of the 1968 master plan, showed that only 25% of Tyre residents owned properties in the city, while 75% were tenants. The civil war accentuated this percentage as a high number of property owners left their homes in the old city and moved to the capital Beirut. According to Nahas (2013), municipality and municipal representatives reported that the percentage of tenants had risen to 90%. This altered the socio-demographic profile of the historic core as new populations replaced original dwellers (Nahhas 2013).

The population can be classified into three categories (Nahhas 2013):

1. **Pre-1975 tenants**: the oldest tenants, who pay relatively low rent, have contributed in maintaining a certain social consistency in some areas (old city). Most are low-income households working in the fishing industry. Rent: 14$–20$ per month.

2. **Post-1984**: migrants fleeing to Tyre seeking cheap rents or due to presence of family members. Rent: 50$–150$ per month.

3. **Displaced populations (Lebanese)**: occupy either vacant private homes or precarious structures. For example, war-displaced communities that are still waiting for their compensation from the Ministry of the Displaced occupy structures such as ‘Khan al-Rabou’ – a commercial structure.

Property in Tyre can be divided into three categories (Nahhas 2013):

1. **Private property**: mostly inhabited by old Christian families who settled in Tyre at the turn of the 19th century. This property mostly consists of: Ottoman villas, commercial khans, and other residential structures.

2. **Waqf land**: owned by the Catholic Waqf, who own a major portion of land in the historic core and within its vicinity, in addition to several churches. Commercial and residential buildings are also owned by the waqf. Residential buildings are rented out to tenants who now have lived in the Christian and Muslim quarters of the old city, for the last decades. Also Muslim waqfs are spread across the city.

3. **Public property**: A high proportion of the property is public due to the wealth of archaeological sites in the city core. Most of it is owned by the Directorate general of Urban Planning.
Shelter for Syrian Refugees

The majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in apartment/house (58%), while 24% live in sub-standard shelter and 18% in informal settlements (Figure 51). While the type of housing has not changed significantly over the past years, increased overcrowding and inability to pay rent have been noted amongst refugees living in apartments and houses. In Tyre district (Figure 52) the refugees inhabiting apartments is significantly higher (around 85%), while smaller shares are found to be living in informal settlements (10%) and substandard shelter (5%) (UNHCR 2015).

Figure 50: Building density in Tyre urban area (UN-Habitat 2016)

Figure 51: Type of main housing for refugees (UNHCR et al. 2015)

Figure 52: Shelter type by region or caza (UNHCR et al. 2015)
Shelter Conditions
Poor shelter conditions, overcrowding and insecurity of tenure are the key shelter concerns for Syrian refugees. With the influx of refugees since 2011, already poor urban neighbourhoods suffering from severe deterioration are becoming increasingly overcrowded, while there are limited alternative affordable housing options. The neighbourhoods and camps now hosting new displaced populations, are often confined within certain boundaries not allowing a horizontal expansion, thus neighbourhoods are expanding vertically or by densification within existing structures.

At the national level, UNHCR in 2015 assessed a 16% of households to be living in hazardous conditions. Damaged roofs (90%), unsealed windows (84%), lack of privacy (80%), overcrowding and lack of lighting (73% each) were noted to be the most dominant negative shelter conditions (Figure 53). In the South, damaged roofs and unsealed windows are the most prevalent issues (92% and 80% respectively) followed by lack of access for people with disabilities and overcrowding (65% and 64% respectively). Majority of Syrian refugees (74%) rent unfurnished apartments (Figure 54).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Occupancy</th>
<th>VASyR 2015</th>
<th>VASyR 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfurnished Rental</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furnished Rental</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided by Employer</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosted (for free)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squatting</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance / Charity</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 54: Type of occupancy among Syrian refugees in Lebanon (UNHCR et al. 2015)
Table 20: Number of Reported activities in Tyre Urban area for Shelter. Source: Activity info 2014–2015–2016

Reported Activities in Shelter

Activities reported in ActivityInfo against the Shelter sector show\[26\]:

In 2014, Abbasiyet was the main recipient of interventions, mainly thorough cash for shelter delivered to PRS. This is consistent with two Palestinian out-of-camp concentrations, Jal el Baher and Shabriha, of which the former falls within the Tyre urban area. Also in Bourj el Chemali, PRS were targeted through shelter rehabilitation interventions, while an overall lower number of Syrian refugees were targeted spread across activities and localities.

In 2015, focus of activities shifted to Sour, again through cash for shelter support to PRS. It can be added that this shift could be attributed to UNRWA reporting of distribution to one location, thus reporting attributed to Abbasiyet in 2014 and Sour in 2015 is in fact all cash for shelter distribution in the district – which would be more consistent with PRS distribution data.

In 2016, the majority of activities seems to be focused towards Sour\[27\], with expansion on programmes towards Syrian refugees (weatherproofing and shelter rehabilitation), and with smaller but continued efforts to upgrade shelter facilities for PRL and PRS, as well as neighbourhood upgrades.

Furthermore, in 2016 a drop from main shelter activity to zero beneficiaries was witnessed against cash for shelter, correlating with termination of UNRWA’s cash for shelter programme towards PRS and move towards multi-purpose cash for Syrian refugees.

Ain Baal is the least targeted in shelter activities over the three years, correlating with the limited number of registered refugees within the municipality.

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\[26\] Partners to the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan report activities within each sector on a monthly basis down to cadre level.

\[27\] Data is not entered at cadastre level, but to Sour location/ name. Figures may therefore contain data for other cadastre.
Gaps and Challenges
In Tyre urban area, spatial analysis and mapping have demonstrated that the majority of the built up area contain fair to good quality buildings, correlating with majority-Lebanese, medium socio-economic level inhabitants. However, there is a significant concentration of Palestinian refugees in Tyre, settled within camps and out-of-camp concentrations, where the housing quality is of critical quality correlating with high poverty levels. The growing population, resulted from the return of immigrants after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, coupled with the recent refugee influx from Syria, has added significant pressure to already deprived urban neighbourhoods and camps.

The pressure on the lower cost segment of the housing market, may also accelerate housing costs and market pressure for middle income families as most housing is acquired through market channels. Spatial planning, taking into account the need for production of small-scale, affordable housing options, as well preserving cultural heritage sites and mitigate haphazard densification within already dense neighbourhoods and equally slow down urban sprawl, is much needed.

While 2014 and 2015 showed some shelter activities at scale, 2016 saw an overall reduction of activities related to the termination of cash for shelter programmes. Alternative partners, such as the private sector, should be approached to assess options to enhance production of affordable housing. Meanwhile, stronger advocacy and efforts are needed to address critical housing conditions of Palestine refugees and other urban poor concentrated in the Palestinian camps/out-of-camp concentrations.

Potable Water

National
According to the Law 221/2000, the water sector in Lebanon falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW), which is mandated to: (1) develop strategic planning of the Water and Wastewater (WW) sectors and (2) achieve proper management, development and monitoring of Water Resources.

Currently, the water sector in Lebanon is operated and managed by four Regional Water Establishments (RWEs), that work under the mandate of the MoEW, and cover all regions of the country; Beirut & Mount Lebanon, North, South and Bekaa (FAO 2015). RWEs are responsible for the operation and management of potable water, wastewater, and irrigation water. (MoE/UNDP 2014)

Main actors and their responsibilities:
1. **Ministry of Water and Energy (MoEW):** Strategic Planning of the management of Water and Wastewater sectors and the development and monitoring of Water Resources.
2. **Ministry of Environment (MoE):** Supervising and controlling all environmental activities and monitoring pollution.
3. **Ministry of Public Health (MOPH):** Monitoring Potable water in compliance with local & international standards. Also monitoring the frequency of waterborne diseases (MOE/UNDP/ECODIT 2011)
4. **Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR):** Agency acting on behalf of ministries responsible to plan and execute donor funded water and wastewater infrastructures.

Studies have consequently shown that water resources are scarce in Lebanon. Prior to the Syrian Crisis, water supply was estimated to be slightly above 1,100 m³/capita/year, close to the minimal international benchmark of 1,000 m³/capita/year (World Bank 2009). While projected water demand in 2035 is estimated to be around 1,800 million m³, available water resources including rivers and springs, storage dams and groundwater were estimated in 2012 at nearly 2,000 - 2,700 million m³ per year (WHO USJ MoPH 2012).

**POST-2011**
The Syrian refugee influx to Lebanon has increased demand for water. Through a field survey conducted in 2013, Solidarités International estimated the average daily water consumption of refugees per capita per day ranges between 64 and 104 litres, based on the shelter typology (UNHCR 2014).

In the beginning of 2014, domestic water demand totalled to 33 and 53 MCM, where a projected increase of 43 to 70 MCM was expected towards the end of year. This means that the Syrian refugee crisis has increased the national water demand by around 8 -12%.

Main water sources used by refugees are shown in **Figure 55.** Groundwater amounts the biggest share of sources of the public network and reservoirs/standpipes.
Tyre District and Urban Area

In general, surface water in the South is minimal despite the abundance of rainfall; however, Tyre lies on a large-quantity groundwater basin (approximately 50 million cubic meters/year). While some groundwater layers are being consumed by private wells in the area, others are highly polluted due to constant leakage of wastewater caused either from the existing improper sewage systems, or from septic tanks that are not connected to sewage networks. In addition, while wastewater and industrial wastes are dumped into rivers, causing pollution; seawater is also polluted due to waste water discharge especially in the port area. Despite the measures that have been undertaken to ensure proper water filtration before distribution, the high demand on water compared to the available supply imposes a varied quality of potable water.

Ras El Ain and Rashidiyeh springs are the main sources of water in Tyre (estimated volume of 10,000 to 15,000 m³/day and 6,600 m³/day, respectively). Generally, water supply to inhabitants is secured in a constant manner, except during the summer season when supply drops against higher demands (see Table 13, population estimates in summer/winter). This has resulted in families and even municipalities, drilling private wells, where some are even found next to the Government’s wells of Ouadi Jilo (15,000 to 20,000 m³/day).

Ras El Ain Spring, the most significant water source, feeds 7 main reservoirs:

- 2 are used for irrigation of Tyre’s coastal plains found in the southern parts of the district
- 1 for the distribution of potable water by Tyre Water Treatment Plant (WTP)
- 4 within close proximity of Rashidieh Palestinian Camp, which are not in use.

In the old city of Tyre, the water distribution system is connected to the main supply pipeline, yet with no storage reservoir. Furthermore, some pipes in the old city are either improperly connected and/or backfilled, which causes soil intrusion and pollution.

According to the study conducted by CHUD for Tyre in 2011, it has been estimated that water consumption demand will rise from 100 l/c/d to 260 l/c/d in 2040. Water demand in Tyre for Syrian refugees is reported to be less than 2 million cubic meter/year, which is a minimal increase in comparison to other cities across Lebanon (MOE and UNDP 2014). As verified by UNICEF Lebanon, in Tyre Urban area, most of refugees out of camp (Syrian, PRL, and PRS), have access to the same supply of potable water available for the Lebanese as they reside in apartments and substandard shelters amongst the host communities.

Gaps and Challenges

Prior to the Syrian crises, Lebanon was already suffering from the shortage of adequate and sufficient provision of potable water. This has been further exacerbated due to increased demand against an insufficient supply (CDR 2014a).

Humanitarian agencies who provide health services have noted that the increased water demand, caused by recent steep population influx, poses serious health threats for the entire population.

For example, diarrheal diseases due to the consumption of polluted water are at a rise. Similarly, communicable diseases have also increased because of insufficient water quantity and proper hygiene behaviours (World Bank 2013). According to the Ministry of Public Health, the shortage of water supply to individuals has caused increase of measles cases, 1,700 children/cases were reported in 2013, of whom 88% were Lebanese. Moreover, Leishmaniosis has also spread amongst poor families, with 750 cases reported in 2014 (MoE – UNDP 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Funding Agency</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Rehabilitation and expansion of water purification plants and pumping stations</td>
<td>Several areas on an national scale including Tyre (Al Buss)</td>
<td>Lebanese &amp; French funding</td>
<td>54m USD</td>
<td>August 1996</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rehabilitation and dev. of Sour water supply networks</td>
<td>District level</td>
<td>AFESD</td>
<td>20 million USD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rehabilitation and dev. of Sour rural area water supply networks</td>
<td>District level</td>
<td>AFESD</td>
<td>27 million USD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Execution of works from drinking water and pumping stations in Sour</td>
<td>District level</td>
<td>Local Funding</td>
<td>1 million USD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Execution of water and waste water works in Sour and Nabatiyeh districts</td>
<td>Tyre and Nabatiyeh districts</td>
<td>Kuwait fund for Arab Economic Development</td>
<td>4.8 million USD</td>
<td></td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: Main Potable Water Projects. Source: (CDR 2014b)
Waste Water (WW) / Sewage

National
Wastewater management in Lebanon falls within the scope of several government agencies which apply different methods and have some overlapping functions. The main agencies are the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW), the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) (when delegated by ministries), Water Establishments (WEs) - who are considered legal entities assigned for WW operations and management when delegated by MoEW and sometimes municipalities. The latter normally performs minor WW jobs/projects (MoE and UNDP 2014).

Laws/decrees/decisions for organizing and managing the WW sector include (MOE and UNDP 2014):
- **EIA decree 8633 dated 7/8/2012**: EIA studies should be developed for all sewage treatment plants.
- **Decision 8/1 dated 30/1/2001**: Standards were set by the MoE for treated wastewater discharged into seweraiges and surface waters.
- **Decision 90/1 dated 17/10/2000**: MoE declared a decision to prevent unlicensed developments and authorized discharge in rivers and riverbanks by setting environmental conditions for construction permits situated at river-banks (MOE/UNDP/ECODIT 2011).

In addition, in 2010, FAO in collaboration with MoEW, MoE, MoA and MoPH proposed guidelines for reusing treated wastewater and sewage sludge for agriculture. The proposal is currently being reviewed by the concerned ministries, yet with no actions. Nationally, and prior to the NWSS, Lebanon lacked national wastewater policies where the country relied on ad hoc interventions, undertaken by the various concerned entities.

In 2007, wastewater network coverage was estimated at 66% household coverage. The discharge of unconnected households is disposed haphazardly into open sewers, discharge to water streams, and other forms of disposal in the environment, as well septic tank connections (World Bank 2011). Pollution caused by tanks that further leak into the environment is common, either as households cannot afford tank desludging or repair/maintenance. Estimates show that less than 8% of wastewater generated at the national level is being treated (MoE and UNDP 2014).

The WW management sector, do however receive significant support from international agencies/donors further to the national allocations (ECODIT 2014), providing an opportunity to address service provision as well as environmental impacts of malfunctioning systems.

**POST-2011**
The post-2011 population growth, has contributed to increasing pollution levels resulted from wastewater discharges. Studies conducted in 2014, showed an increased wastewater generation that ranged between 26 and 43 MCM\(^{128}\) in May 2014, expected to reach 34 and 56 MCM by the end of the year. The study estimated that, at that rate, wastewater generated by the Syrian refugee influx would add 40,000 tons of BOD5\(^{129}\) per year, causing significant negative effect on the environment. At the national level, BOD5 load will increase by 34% (MoE and UNDP 2014).

**District and City Assessment**
According to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) conducted in Tyre as part of the CHUD study in 2011, the wastewater discharge from the old city is mainly pumped into an old sea outfall located near the fishing port. North of the fishing port, the wastewater networks, combined with the storm water drainage system, spills into the sea through 5 main outlets. However, a wastewater treatment plant with a sea outfall is being constructed by the CDR in Aabbassiyeh, which and will serve the whole Caza of Tyre upon completion (CHUD 2011).

In Borj el Chemali, within the urban area boundary, 95% of WW networks are found to be satisfactory, likely as a new/renovated WW network was constructed in 2014. The project, a 4,000 m long network upgrade, was funded by UNDP with contributions from the municipality In addition, another network of 1,300 m length was constructed to serve Palestinian camp/gatherings in the area (Dib, 2016).

The Rashidieh Camp is on the other hand not connected to any network, wastewater discharged into the sea is thus causing serious health hazards not only on the camp residents, but affecting the city as a whole, and the marine biodiversity (UNRWA 2011).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Funding Source</th>
<th>Cost (USD)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Emergency rehabilitation of WW networks (NERP1-first year)</td>
<td>European Bank</td>
<td>40m</td>
<td>1992-2013</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Secondary WWTP in coastal Tyre</td>
<td>European Bank</td>
<td>8.88m</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Installation of WW networks</td>
<td>European Bank + local funding</td>
<td>15.4m</td>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Beirut master WW coastal collective project</td>
<td>European investment Bank + Lebanese Gov.</td>
<td>48m</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Maintenance and Rehabilitation of Sewage and Storm water in major cities</td>
<td>Lebanese Gov.</td>
<td>9.25m</td>
<td>Sept. 2015</td>
<td>Aug. 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Additional WW networks in coastal areas</td>
<td>Lebanese Gov.</td>
<td>29.5m</td>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Dec. 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22 Main Waste Water Project. Source: (CDR 2014b).

Gaps and Challenges

Further to challenges mentioned above, associated with increasing pollution levels from wastewater discharges due to haphazard dumping practices, the lack of sound strategies and funding, appears to be a major factor hindering the development of a robust wastewater infrastructure and management system in Tyre (CDR, 2015).

Currently, unmanaged WW poses a health risk at Tyre urban population, but equally negatively affecting the environment and critical livelihood sectors such as farm land, ground water resources as well as marine life.

With added pressure to potable water resources, and with significant water resources used for irrigation purposes, the untapped potential for capitalising on treated WW water for irrigation should be further investigated.
**THEME 4 SERVICES and INFRASTRUCTURE**

**UN-HABITAT LEBANON / CITY PROFILES / TYRE / 2017**

Drainage (Storm water)

The Coastal area in Tyre is proximate to the area within Tyre urban area most prone to flooding during rainfall season. The most critical area lies in the northern part of the district where two seasonal water streams/ rivers coming through the valleys of Wadi Al Izziyeh and Wadi Abou Zeble meet. The problem was exacerbated with increased unplanned constructions of houses at the flood planes, and where the natural flow of these streams was altered to due rapid urbanization. During the winter season, ground floors of houses in the area suffer from flooding as a result of excessive storm water. Other reasons attributed to flooding include blocked channels as a result of accumulation of garbage and waste, thus threatening coastal ecosystems and existing infrastructure (CRI et al. 2015).

The current WW network for the most part also serves storm water drainage. In Sour municipality however, storm water and WW is separated all but a few locations (especially previously mentioned mixed networks by the port), mainly due to a separation/construction of network in 1960 (CHUD and PMU 2011).

**Solid Waste**

**National**

Waste is a broad term that refers to items consumed by the public or materials left behind by a human activity or process, and which, due to their physical and/or chemical and biological properties become of no value and therefore neglected and intended to be recycled or disposed of (CDR 2016). Waste management is considered a particularly challenging issue for most countries, especially where waste generation is steadily on the rise as a result of population increase and economic growth. In Lebanon, several factors have led to the increase in the solid waste burden; namely, population growth exacerbated by the large influx of Syrian refugees since 2011, rapid growth of urban areas, increase in the income per capita, absence of legal framework and poor enforcement of the law, contradiction in environmental policies, social habits that does not encourage waste minimization, and lastly social keenness to use new materials rather than recycled ones (Sweep-Net 2014).

Municipal solid waste (MSW) management services have primarily been provided by municipalities. Foremost, management of MSW has been a chronic problem in Lebanon, particularly in areas with high population density, high production of waste, and low availability of adequate land for landfills. Further, after nearly two decades of civil unrest, the performance of the public sector deteriorated due to physical losses, absence of organizational framework, lack of government supervision, and scarcity of resources. Attempts aiming at administrative reforms did not succeed. Corruption did not cease and the performance of the public sector did not improve. (Massoud et al. 2003)

Henceforth, public–private partnerships in urban environmental services started witnessing increased interest in recent years primarily to reform the weak performance of the public sector; reduce cost, improve efficiency and ensure environmental protection (Massoud et al. 2003).

**Legal Framework**

To date, there is no specific legislative framework that deals directly with SWM in Lebanon. Although there are many legal instruments that bear on SWM, there are only few that address the sector specifically. The remaining elements of the legal framework either provide authority for entities to act with respect to municipal solid waste, or address other types of waste. (Sweep-Net 2014)

Three decrees and two laws that address the sector specifically are:

- **Decree 8735/1974** on pollution from solid waste and wastewater, which designates SWM a municipal responsibility.

- **Decree 9093/2002**, which provides municipalities with a financial incentive to host a waste management facility by offering a 5-fold increase in the budgeted Independent Municipal Fund (IMFU) allocation if the municipality establishes a sanitary landfill or a solid waste processing plant (incinerator/recycling/compost, etc.), within the municipal boundaries, and a 10-fold increase if at least 10 municipalities are allowed to dispose of their waste in the sanitary landfill or use the processing plant.

- **Law 216/1993**, which entrusts the MoE with assessing all sources of solid waste generation.

- **Law 444/2002**, which sets landfill standards and promotes recycling, is a framework law adopted in 1988 and amended in 2002. It defines the basis and norms for environmental protection, but which does not provide details of any regulations for the solid waste management. (Sweep-Net 2014)

- **MoE prepared a draft law in 2005 on Integrated Solid Waste Management, which was approved by the Council**

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130 Waste is a broad term that refers to items consumed by the public or materials left behind by a human activity or process, and which, due to their physical and/or chemical and biological properties become of no value and therefore neglected and intended to be recycled or disposed of (CDR 2016).


133 In current legislations governing waste, the waste management practices and the majority of CDR’s projects and contracts all tackle domestic solid waste commonly known as Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) (CDR 2016). However, Solid Waste Management (SWM) is the term applied to all the activities associated with the control of solid waste reduction, generation, sorting, storage, collection, transfer and transport, processing, and disposal, in accordance with the principles of public health, economics, engineering, and conservation, and taking public attitudes into consideration (Massoud & Merhebi 2016).
of Ministers (CoM) under Decree 8003/2012, and sent to the parliament for final approval (MOE and UNDP 2014).

Roles and responsibilities in the implementation of these laws and decrees has been unclear, and enforcement practically non-existent. Hence, waste collection remains the responsibility of municipalities, under the tutelage of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM), while its treatment and disposal are somewhat vague. Municipal landfills and other treatment facilities have thus been heretofore operated on an ad hoc basis, while major landfills have been taken care of by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) (Massoud & Merhebi 2016).

Institutional Framework
No national consensus was reached on a specific implementable SWM strategy despite the various attempts and efforts put in place by the various stakeholders[134] to set a common SWM plans. Enforcement of these plans is relatively weak and responsibilities are not well-defined. Generally, the policies lack clarity and precision, coordination between authorities is minimal, and enforcement is practically non-existent due mostly to staffing constraints, lack of proper training, low level of fines, and political interferences. Equally important is the lack of awareness of regulations amongst personnel who are supposed to enforce them (SWEEP-Net 2014).

The Syrian Crisis
SW quantities (Pre/Post Syrian Refugee Crises)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National (Pre-crisis) Million Tons</th>
<th>Regional (Pre-crisis) Million Tons</th>
<th>National Incremental daily quantity (crises)</th>
<th>Regional Incremental daily quantity (crises)</th>
<th>National (Projected) Increase in SW, crises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>683 t/d</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>889 t/d or 324,568 (t/y)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>889 t/d or 324,568 (t/y)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>889 t/d or 324,568 (t/y)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23 below reflects the impact of the Syrian refugee crises on the SWM sector. On a national level there is an increase in SW in 2013 compared to the year 2010. Similarly, in the same time period, solid waste quantity also increased on a regional level for the South, as shown in Figure 58. In addition to the quantity of solid waste being generated by the current population, Syrian refugees have further contributed to the increase in the generation of SW as shown in Figure 59 (MOE and UNDP 2014).

Waste Composition in Lebanon
In Lebanon, the composition of the wastes is in majority organic (exceeding 50%, this percentage varying between urban and rural areas, as well as between summer and winter), paper/cardboards and plastics comprise a significant proportion, with glass and metal contributing largely too. Moreover, it is considered that the solid waste generation per capita varies from around 0.7 Kg/p/d in rural areas around the country to around 0.85 to 1.1 Kg/p/d in urban areas such as greater Beirut, with a national weighted average estimated at around 0.95 Kg/p/d (SWEEP-Net 2014).

There is also lack of knowledge from the public about the methods and ways for SWM, with the vast majority of local population still seeing in composting, landfilling...
or incineration the only measures and solutions for SWM. Only few are inclined to consider or abide by the 3Rs principle (Reduce-Reuse-Recycle). It is clear that there is an urgent need for public awareness on both the household and decision making levels in order to develop a good strategy and successfully put it in action (SWEEP-Net 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.5%</th>
<th>Paper/Cardboard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>Metal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>Plastics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16%</td>
<td>Organic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 60: Waste composition in Lebanon. Source: (SWEEP-Net 2014)**

**Tyre Urban Area**

In Tyre, the average solid waste generation rate amounts to 0.7 to 0.9 Kg/capita/day according to the CHUD study where Tyre generates approximately 49 t/d of solid waste that is collected by the municipality (CHUD and PMU 2011). However, the Syrian crisis led to overloading existing SWM infrastructure. The Union of Municipalities of Tyre is suffering from the increased waste quantities, and struggle to manage collection due to shortage in human capital and technical equipment. Furthermore, within the city, newly developed SWM facilities, namely in Ain Baal, were developed to handle capacities of the current population and are no longer adequate given the population increase (MOE and UNDP 2014). In addition to the stress on infrastructure, the increased waste load, poses serious to health and safety risks if not adequately managed, mainly through contamination soil, as well as surface and groundwater.

**Projects serving the City**

CDR reported, in its annual progress report (2016), the ongoing expropriation and rehabilitation of the Ras el Ain waste dumpsite\(^\text{136}\) in Sour under decision No. 99/2014, issued by the Council of Ministers\(^\text{137}\). Later, on 09/09/2015 the Council of Ministers issued decision No.1 regarding the elaboration of the solid waste treatment plan, which mandated the CDR to prepare the necessary studies in partnership with the MoE to rehabilitate the dumpsite. Based on this decision, the CDR commissioned the Consultant MORES to develop an environmental impact assessment and prepare an expropriation file (CDR 2016).

In an attempt to minimize the detrimental effects of the landfill, CDR also initiated the construction of a sorting and composting plant in Ain Baal (Sour) and a medical waste treatment plant in Abbassiyeht as well as procurement equipment, by the Office of State for Administrative reform (OMSAR) with the financial assistance of the European Union provided in 2004 (CDR 2016). The facilities targets the following waste sources: Household, medical, agricultural, construction, industrial, butcher shops, and wastes generated from commercial shops and offices for the entire Caza of Tyre.

The Union of Municipalities of Tyre, is currently in charge of the management and operation of the plant, where about 120 tons are sorted per day. However, does not meet the district needs, as its operational capacity does not exceed 120 tons\(^\text{138}\), while Tyre and the 63 municipalities/localities in the region produce more than 300 tons per week of waste altogether. As a result, this necessitated the continuity of Ras Al-Ain landfill coupled with other informal dumpsites (Mazen Haidar 2015).

Finally, there is a consensus among mayors across municipalities within the Urban area that Ain Baal sorting and composting plant is not sufficiently equipped to respond to the amount of waste being produced across Tyre District. It is only used for sorting and composting, while around 45% of the waste is rejected.

**Solid Waste Generation in Tyre Urban Area**

In reference to **Table 24**, Tyre, followed by Borj el Chemali generate the highest quantity of solid waste in both the summer and winter seasons (summer: 280 and 200 / winter: 260 and 200 respectively). However, the cost per ton is the same across all municipalities in the Urban area. It is noteworthy to mention here, that this table contributes to diversifying population count methodologies\(^\text{139}\).

\(^{136}\) Ras Al Ain waste landfill is located on a piece of land which was rented from one of the residents of the area. Tons of wastes are dumped daily from Tyre, as well as the Palestinian refugees camps, in exchange of a monthly payment from the benefiting municipalities to the owner of the land (Mazen Haidar 2015).

\(^{137}\) Decision No. 99/2014 approved a list of projects suggested by the MoF, among others the expropriation of the Ras el Ain garbage mountain (US$ 2 million).

\(^{138}\) Ain Baal Solid Waste Treatment Facility Sorting & Composting Plant (www.rafikelkhoury.com)

\(^{139}\) Estimation of population from solid waste quantity provides an innovative way for estimating population figures given the lack of up to date population counts in the country.
Solid Waste Generation in Tyre Urban Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAD_Code</th>
<th>62003</th>
<th>62004</th>
<th>62006</th>
<th>62007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAD_Name</td>
<td>Abbasyat</td>
<td>Borj El-Chemali Sour (Tyr)</td>
<td>Ain Baal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average solid waste generated per week (ton/week) - Summer</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average solid waste generated per week (ton/day) - Summer</td>
<td>2714285714</td>
<td>28.57142857</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7142857143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average solid waste generated per week (ton/week) - Winter</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average solid waste generated per week (ton/day) - Winter</td>
<td>25.71428571</td>
<td>28.57142857</td>
<td>37.14285714</td>
<td>7142857143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average solid waste generated per week (ton/day) - Year</td>
<td>26.42857143</td>
<td>28.57142857</td>
<td>38.57142857</td>
<td>7142857143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per $/ton</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid Waste Disposal in percentage per ton</td>
<td>% Sorted</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Landfilled</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Open Dumped</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Burned</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid Waste generation Kg/person/Day</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation of population from Solid Waste quantity</td>
<td>58730</td>
<td>43956</td>
<td>59341</td>
<td>15873</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24: Solid waste generation in Tyre urban area. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016

Gaps and Challenges

- In Lebanon, solid waste management constitutes a great challenge from a financial and legislative perspective, due to the absence of sufficient adequate regulatory legislations (CDR 2016).
- The input and active participation of the local authorities and general population should be sought.
- The legislations on household solid waste management in Lebanon are contradictory and unclear, especially with respect to the role and tasks distribution between the concerned departments and ministries (CDR 2016).
- Proximity principle: waste should be managed as close as possible to the source of its generation.
- Waste management hierarchy: Certain waste management practices should be prioritized over others.
- One of the biggest challenges facing the household waste in Lebanon lies in landfill locations, whether they are ordinary dumps or landfill sites for final dumping following sorting and recycling; another challenge is dealing with waste before reaching the dumps (CDR 2016). Therefore, the emphasis should be moved towards recycling and composting, where there are opportunities for Tyre Union and Municipalities to promote sound inventions and management.
- Management of industrial and hazardous waste: identification of main industrial and hazardous waste producers and quantities, as well as proposals for management, should be sought.
- The lack of supervision and proper management of medical wastes could cause great environmental pollution and infectious diseases (MOE and UNDP 2014). Assessment of the efficiency of existing waste treatment technologies is therefore required.
- The health-related and environmental risks of open dumping and burning are clearly unsettling (Massoud & Merhebi 2016), and calls for implementation of a sound integrated solid waste management plan to prevent or mediate these risks and achieve a more sustainable waste management strategy.

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Electricity

National
The key driver for achieving sustainable development in Lebanon is represented with the provision of energy supply from renewable and non-renewable sources. This key strategic priority serves not only as a feasible solution to meet the growing demand for energy, but also as a strategic option geared at the eradication of poverty and the improvement of opportunities for accessing water, food, health and education services, not to say the least, in the contribution to economic development (CDR 2015).

The implementation of the Government’s 2010 Policy Paper for the Electricity Sector (PPES), prepared by the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) and approval by the Council of Ministers serves as a national energy strategy (World Bank 2014). However, the implementation of the Government’s reform and the associated investment programmes is being hindered by financial and political obstruction (GoL-UN 2017a). The financial and the legislative realities, and the inability to implement the laws has led to the worsening of the many chronic problems that have hampered the core businesses and inflicted damage to the national economy and the environment.

The expenditure by the Lebanese Government of thirteen billion dollars to import fossil fuel material for Electricité du Liban (EDL) from 2005 to 2013 indicates the dependency of the Lebanese economy on traditional ways for producing energy; confined by the orientation towards fossil fuel resource consumption. Hydropower produced from plants does on the other hand not exceed 4.5% from the total generation capacity in the country (CDR 2015).

In accordance with the Ministry of Energy and Water, the demand on electrical energy reached 20,036GWh in 2014 (inclusive of the Syrian refugees demand), which can be approximated at an annual average of 2287MW of peak power demand, equivalent to 3267MW of peak power demand at a load factor of 70%. The electrical energy produced and purchased in year 2014 reached 12,523GWh which accounts for an annual average of 1430MW of produced and purchased power, or the equivalent of an annual peak of 2042MW. The current gap extended to 1225MW, represents 38% at peak power demand, which is equivalent to 9 hours of daily rationing. The main effective peak capacity does not exceed 2042MW whereas the demand surpassed 3260MW in 2014 (CDR 2015). Subsequently, the current power generation is insufficient and fails to meet the need, creating the void for the widespread use and market for local private generation.

In 2010, daily average power supply amounted to 18.4 hours. The electricity sector emitted high quantities of NOx, SO2 and PM, with half of the NOx, and more than half of PM is emitted by private generators, while power plants produced the highest share of SO2 (MOE and UNDP 2014). Further, the Syrian refugee crises exacerbated issues faced by the already weak electricity system and underscored its lack of resilience; leading to an increased dependency on private power generation (GoL-UN 2017a). The use of private generators not only has financial repercussions but also raises environmental and health concerns (heavy carbon dioxide emissions, carcinogen exposure, and air pollution) i.e., highly due to the fact that private power sector runs on diesel generators that are mainly located in dense urban areas; threatening the environment and the health of residents (Blominvest 2013).

The sector is therefore deemed impossible to be tackled, unless a well rooted gradual reform policy capable of lifting all the aspects of the energy sectors including renewable energy and energy conservation is adopted (CDR 2015).

Tyre City
High costs associated with the production of energy along with the inadequacy of electrical power distribution are factors that largely affect the efficiency of all productive sectors in Tyre. These two major obstacles contribute to the deteriorating situation of the local economy; as they are difficult to regulate and would inevitably curb the competitiveness of local agro-industry production in regional and international markets, standing in the way of local economic development (CRI et al. 2015).

The influx of Syrian refugees placed additional stress on infrastructure and services. This sudden population surge representing around 10% of current residents in the city inevitably adds strain on public services which were already stressed and deficient. Based on a study by UNDP, the highest impact of the refugee crisis as rated by the host community falls on electricity amongst others (CRI et al. 2015).

Since 1992, the central administration conducted minor improvements to the national grid that aimed at improving the generation capacity; among which was the construction of a two unit thermal power plant in Tyre, operated by EDL, with a combined capacity of 70 MW in 1996 (Table 25)44. Aiming at better transmission and distribution CDR noted in its annual progress report in 2015 the construction of a 220 kV network which included the installation of 339 km of overhead lines, including the Tyre line. In addition, CDR implemented the construction of several 220 kV substations is Sour between 1999 and 2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit name</th>
<th>Put into service (year)</th>
<th>Installed capacity (MW)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TYR 1</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYR 2</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total TYRE</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25: Tyre Thermal Power Plants. Source: www.edl.gov.lb

---

140 Electricité du Liban (EDL) is a public institution founded by Decree No. 16878/64, mandated to generate, transmit, and distribute electrical energy throw-out Lebanon (www.edl.gov.lb).
141 Gigawatt hours
142 Megawatt
143 UNDP, The Syrian Crises: Implications for Development Indicators and Development Planning in Lebanon
144 Electricité du Liban (EDL) is a public institution founded by Decree No. 16878/64, mandated to generate, transmit, and distribute electrical energy throw-out Lebanon (www.edl.gov.lb).
The president of the Union of Municipalities of Tyre Mr. Ali Dib, reported that, in terms of power generation and besides the provided power by EDL, Tyre city residents rely on 6 privately run generators, Borj El Chemali 6 generators, and Abbassiyeh 7. Municipalities regulate the prices and enforce a unified tariff on private generator owners to mitigate inflation in the prices and ensure affordability for residents (Dib, 2016).

Gaps and Challenges

- Lebanon by virtue of its small size has modest primary energy requirements. This small demand becomes even less appealing for suppliers if split on various types and sources of fuel (UNDP 2015).
- In addition to the deficit in installed generating capacity, the efficiency of the existing system is below normal levels due to poor maintenance, deterioration of facilities, high losses and the need for reinforcement of the transmission and distribution networks (GoL-UN 2015).
- Lebanon’s electricity prices are in the upper bracket compared to those in the region but still fail to cover EDL’s costs. In detail, prices for average consumption in Lebanon are higher than those in Libya, Egypt, Iraq and Bahrain (Blominvest 2013).
- Even before the eruption of the war in Syria, private generators were the Lebaneses go to source for power supply that EDL fails to deliver. In 2010, the MoEW estimated that 61% of Lebanese residences were equipped with a private generator with a total cost of $1.4B compared to $700M paid for EDL (Blominvest 2013).
- Bifurcated between public and private supply and bills for both, it is the least able to pay who suffer from the system’s deficiencies.
- Lebanon still has a long way to go before it supplies environmentally friendly energy. Awareness towards the use of renewable energy amongst consumers and industrialists remains underdeveloped especially compared to international standards (Blominvest 2013).
- Solar power systems (and solar water heating) could offer less dependence on the central network, as well as expensive and polluting generators. Innovative neighbourhood initiatives such as solar-powered street lighting may offer learning for scaling up. In the South lack of structure, management, and public policies are not the only factors leading to the underperformance of this sector, but also the 2006 war had a highly damaging impact on the sector infrastructure.

Transport

National

Transport is fundamental for the social and economic development and inclusion of countries at all spatial scales and levels. This entails a strong policies by authorities i.e., to provide sustainable transport facilities and infrastructure equitably among its regions and residents. The fact that the transport sector is growing quickly brings advantages, such as quick access to any geographical location, yet the transport sector is also associated with a number of health and pollution problems – especially where collective and energy efficient transport means are not in place (IPTEC et al. 2016).

In Lebanon, transport is funded through centrally, often in the form of large scale road projects. Municipalities and unions lack the financial and technical capacities to carry out local level projects Furthermore, numerous studies has noted that the Lebanese transport sector is unsustainable from different perspectives. Foremost, the sector is characterized by a dearth of public transport facilities. Further, core cities are not interlinked via railway or other alternative collective transport means, and the road network is under-maintained and over capacitated in and around the core urban areas. Non-motorized transport or pedestrian provision off or on-street is non-existent.

Lebanon had an operating railway prior to the civil war initiated under the Ottoman Empire. In 1885 the Beirut-Damascus opened, and was later followed by lines to Tripoli and further towards Homs/Aleppo and the Aleppo line through the Bekaa valley. During the Second World War, the British extended the railroad from Beirut to Naqoura and Haifa (the connection to Haifa was. The railroad ceased operation for passenger transport with the outbreak of the civil war in 1975145. Trams and railbuses were also formerly in operation in Beirut, while ferry services so far has been unexploited despite the long cost.

Tyre Urban Area

As per the SSRDP (Strategic Plan for Tyre Caza), there is a common consensus that Tyre Caza is fragmented because of the lack of cross roads that link and integrate villages across the casa of Tyre. The majority of the Regional Traffic passes by the coastal road, thus creating pressure on this main axe especially while commuting through the urban core. Enhancing these roads is mainly constrained by the limited financial resources at the local level i.e., the municipalities, within the Tyre urban area, and the union (CRI et al. 2015).

LAND TRANSPORT

In view of the movement of people and goods in cities as one of the most important determining factors in their ability to sustain inclusive development and growth, Tyre and its environs lack a solid land transportation vision.

ROAD NETWORK
The secondary and tertiary road network within the city is under-maintained and over capacitated by cars while non-motorized transport is not facilitated. Daily (especially weekdays) regional commute from and to Beirut via Saida, is a well-established pattern of mobility, yet the infrastructure to accommodate this commute is underdeveloped.

Mobility patterns within Tyre could be classified into three categories; firstly, the agriculture sector, a sector that typically contribute to early morning transport, benefitting from reduced traffic in the early hours for transport of agricultural products to wholesale markets in Tyre and sometimes Beirut. Secondly, residents of Tyre and persons form nearby villages whom commute to the urban core to work, as well to visit the souk, central market and local shops. Thirdly, residents of the city seeking social services, mainly education, who are contributing to the congestion at peak hours in and around the urban core due to reliance on private vehicles (CRI et al. 2015).

Figure 62 show a schematic map/representation of transportation systems and infrastructure across Tyre. It also show the route of a planned expressway project (further detailed in the spatial development policies section).

TRAFFIC AND ROADWAY CONGESTION
According to the SSRDP traffic jams in Tyre occur mostly due to dysfunctions of the main urban crossroads. This is evident in El Bass where severe traffic jams occur during peak hours. The unorganized informal public transport system in the city, also contributes to roadway congestion as vans and taxis-services park along the streets without a dedicated bus-stops, and pick-up/drop-off is directly done upon request (CRI et al. 2015).

PUBLIC TRANSPORT
In Tyre, the local street network is almost entirely dedicated for cars, while the urban and inter-urban informal public transport systems lack organisation and structure, and does not provide a reasonable alternative to private cars. While there are low cost informal transport in the form of mini vans, the cost of accessing public/informal transport options are too high for some residents146.

Figure 62: Transportation systems and infrastructure across Tyre urban area. Adapted from: source, (CRI et al. 2015)

146 Residents in Maachouk neighbourhood offered they were not able to access livelihood/education due to transport cost during interviews. UN-Habitat 2017, Maachouk Neighbourhood Profile & Strategy
SOFT MOBILITY
There is currently no soft mobility\textsuperscript{147} transport plan for Tyre. However, the structure of the old city, of nature pedestrian friendly, could be promoted as a car-free zone pending planned parking options for its residents in the proximity. Furthermore, with a relatively flat landscape both in the city core and in connections towards the outskirts of the urban area, well planned soft mobility network could increase access for inhabitants, while mitigating car dependency and traffic congestion with attributed negative effects.

PARKING
According to the CHUD project\textsuperscript{148}, many vehicles double park in the city, particularly on the Hiram road, reducing the roadway width, contributing to blockage and congestion (CDR 2009).

MARITIME TRANSPORT: PORT OF TYRE
The fishing port of Tyre is considered part of the cultural heritage of the City. According to the SSRDP it hosted 185 boats and up to 700 fishermen. The commercial port, on the other hand, comprise a single dock and a 120 meters long quay. It hosts very low activity of almost one ship per month. The port does not have any potential for development as a commercial port, with its limited size to accommodate for larger commercial ships. Moreover, its location at the heart of the old city heavily constrains land access and linkage to highway networks (CRI et al. 2015).

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) conducted on Tyre as part of the ongoing CHUD project, indicated that Tyre, mainly in Awqaf square and along Hamra (Hiram) Street, suffers from PM\textsubscript{10} concentrations exceeding the limits (CDR 2009). This is mainly attributed to the high traffic congestion at the square (two way streets) during peak commercial activity time in the morning and noon-time, and during night-time along the Hamra Street. Similarly, the ambient noise level (Leq) readings within the entire CHUD Study Area exceed the Lebanese maximum allowable noise limit standards (CDR 2011).

\textsuperscript{147} Soft mobility includes non-motorized and human powered mobility
\textsuperscript{148} Cultural Heritage and Urban Development Project implemented by the Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR) in 2009 then updated in 2011 to include the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).

Gaps and Challenges
Heavy congestion occurs on a regular basis around schools, due to the lack of organised school transport, thus relying on parents/private cars for transport. However, part of the overcapacity of minibuses (used in public transportation) could be used to organise school transport for children (IPTEC et al. 2016).

The lack of a good transportation policy for Tyre city, is caused by lack of planning, insufficient awareness, limited financial, human and technical resources, resulting in a negatively performing transport system that further directly hinders social and economic development. As an alternative to car-dependency and in the absence of a robust public transportation system, a soft-mobility plan could help promote urban mobility.

Tyre, given its relatively small and flat nature, could be an optimal location for piloting such soft mobility plan in Lebanon. While improving overall traffic, this would also help reduce negative environmental impacts such as noise and air pollution, as well contribute to minimise need for excessive road networks, all of which are contributing to heat island effects.
In 2014, activities under the then called WASH sector (excluding energy related activities) was focused on activities related to Solid Waste management benefitting both host and refugee population in Ain Baal, Sour and Bourj el Chemali. Abbassieh benefitted from communal water upgrades, with Lebanese and Syrian beneficiaries.

Compared to broad targeting of PRS in the shelter sector in 2014, limited activities were reported under WASH targeting either PRS or PRL for water and sanitation interventions (higher targeting under Hygiene Promotion), which seems unbalanced against proportion of population.

In 2015, activities overall reached equal number of beneficiaries as foregoing year, however activities were largely focused on Sour, with some activities in Bour el Chemali. Main activity related to communal upgrade of water network, benefitting all cohorts, as well Lebanese benefitted from upgrades of waste water network and Syrian refugees benefitting from increased access to solid waste disposal in Sour.

In both Abbassieh and Aain Baal close to none activities were reported for 2015.

This trend continues into 2016, with limited activities in Abbassieh and Aain Baal and majority of activities in Sour.

The highest number of beneficiaries in 2016 were witnessed for Lebanese and Syrian refugees in Tyre benefitting from improvements to municipal Solid Waste Management system, and same cohorts benefitting from increased access to water supply, all in Tyre. To note, looking at the population distribution and systems in Tyre, the lack of PRL and PRS beneficiaries to the two main activities in 2016 seems to be underreported.

In 2016, energy interventions was added to the sector work, evident in some – though limited, activities to improve access to improve access to electric current.

Transport/Road enhancement is not included in activities in any of the years.

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### Table 26: Reported activities in the WASH sector for Tyre Urban Area. Source: (Activityinfo 2014-2015-2016).

#### Reported activities in Water & Energy (WASH)\(^{49}\)

Activities reported in ActivityInfo against the Water and Energy sector show\(^{50}\):

- In 2014, activities under the then called WASH sector (excluding energy related activities) was focused on activities related to Solid Waste management benefitting both host and refugee population in Ain Baal, Sour and Bourj el Chemali. Abbassieh benefitted from communal water upgrades, with Lebanese and Syrian beneficiaries.

- Compared to broad targeting of PRS in the shelter sector in 2014, limited activities were reported under WASH targeting either PRS or PRL for water and sanitation interventions (higher targeting under Hygiene Promotion), which seems unbalanced against proportion of population.

- In 2015, activities overall reached equal number of beneficiaries as foregoing year, however activities were

\(^{49}\) In 2014 this was the WASH sector, from 2016 renamed to Energy and Water. In 2017 Energy and Water are separated working groups, and solid waste moved to Social Stability. In this report we use the 2016 Water & Energy naming.

\(^{50}\) Partners to the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan report activities within each sector on a monthly basis down to cadastral level.
Social Services

Health

National

“The Lebanese healthcare system is dominated by the private sector which is geared towards hospital-based curative care (48% of total public health expenditure) rather than primary and preventive health measures. The refugee crisis has exposed the fragile nature of the pre-existing public health system where 50% of the Lebanese population have no formal health insurance, are exposed to very high health care expenditures and lack basic means of social protection such as pensions and unemployment insurance” (Tyler, 2014).

According to the MSNA 2014, the Syrian Refugee Crisis has exacerbated problems in the existing weak public health system. Some 50% of the Lebanese have no formal health insurance, resulting in high health care expenditures. Lebanese citizens without private medical insurance rely on the MOPH and the National Social Security Fund to reimburse a portion of their medical bills. According to the report, the Lebanese healthcare system is dominated by the private sector. Henceforth, patients are left with large bills for their healthcare services. Almost 6.4% of GDP, compared to an average of 5% in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, shows that the private sector accounts for 81% (9,667) of hospital beds in Lebanon, indicating far greater capacity than the public sector.

Tyre Urban Area

For the purpose this report, UN-Habitat conducted an assessment with the union technical office, to assess provision and access to health care within Tyre urban area, following desk studies and key informant interview with representatives from various agencies including the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), UNHCR, WHO and UNRWA. Access to data related to secondary and tertiary health care (hospitals) was inaccessible for this assessment.

PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTERS

The assessment revealed that health care is heavily focused on provision of primary health care through the Primary Health Care (PHC) Centres in Tyre. As shown in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Price for Refugees at a UNHCR partner institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vaccines</td>
<td>Free at all PHC centers and dispensaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>3,000 - 5,000 LBP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acute medications</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic medications (diabetes, cardiac conditions, hypertension, asthma, epilepsy, etc.)</td>
<td>1,000 LBP per visit (handling fee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family planning (Insertion of IUD, pills, condoms)</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ultrasounds for pregnant women</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental care</td>
<td>Subsidized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratory and diagnostic tests</td>
<td>15% of the cost for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Children under 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Persons over 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Persons with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pregnant women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10% of the cost for those refugees with specific needs who cannot afford it. Other refugees will pay 100% of the cost of Laboratory and diagnostic tests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27: UNHCR-subsidised PHC services for the displaced. Source: (MoPH 2015).

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152 Inter-Agency multi-sector needs assessment (MSNA) phase one report secondary data review and analysis May 2014, p.15
Table 28 above, there are 5 Primary health care Centres in Tyre Urban Area. (1) Amel Primary Health Care Centre, (2) Islamic Health Care Centre, (3) Alkayan Tyre, (4) CLMC Tyre, (5) Nabaa Center.

All PHC Centres provide consultation and medication services to patients of all nationalities. Only two of them offer examinations (MRI, CT scan...) and laboratory tests. Payment fees to access the centres is set to 18,000 LBP by the MOPH. Lebanese, PRL and the majority of PRS families, pay however between 5,000 LBP - 18,000 LBP to be able to benefit from services. However, Syrian refugees only pay a fixed fee set agreed with UNHCR between (3,000 LBP - 5,000 LBP). The following sections mainly describe these five Primary Health Centres further, as well as the Social Development Centre of Tyre, and provide a map of health care localities within Tyre urban area.

1. Amel Primary Health Care Center

Amel Centre is a Primary Health Centre under MoPH. It is undertaking a project funded by UNHCR (Primary Health Support for Syrian Refugees in South Lebanon), which aims at improving the healthcare status of this population by subsidising primary healthcare services, including management of acute and chronic diseases, immunisation and reproductive healthcare through community health promotion. General and specialist consultations (Gynaecologists, Paediatricians, Dermatologists, Urologists, Cardiologists etc.) are provided in this centre. Refugees have to pay a minimal fee of 3000 LBP per consultation where medications prescribed are free of charge for the Syrian refugees. For laboratory tests, 85% of the cost is covered for the below vulnerable groups, including:

- Patients under 5 years old
- Patients above 60 years old
- Pregnant women
- People with disability

The Lebanese population and PRL are paying a sum of 18,000 LBP for the medical services provided (consultation, medication, echo, and others). Physiotherapy sessions and dental clinics are provided but unfortunately, this service is not covered by UNHCR for the Syrian population. Patients pay 15,000 LBP per session. A male and a female physiotherapist are present in the Centre.

2. Islamic Health Care center

This center is accredited by the MOPH and is in process of earning Canadian accreditation. It is focused on physical, mental, and social wellness. Consultation fees vary between 8,000 LBP and 18,000 LBP. It hosts projects run by various organizations, such as the ICRC and IMC, such as vaccine and medical donations.

3. Alkayan

In the South, Alkayan includes several primary health care centers that collaborate together. The program provides free consultations and offers essential medical examination machines (MRI, CT Scan).

80% of the patients are Syrian Refugees and UNICEF covers all their expenses. 20% of the patients are Lebanese paying an obligatory fee of 11,000 LBP. This center also offers a mobile clinic including all essential equipment.

4. CLMC

CLMC is funded by the Lebanese Red Cross. It also has a mobile clinic funded by the Danish Red Cross. It has a set schedule, operating two days a week in Bazourie, Abbassieh, Deir Kanoun, Ras el Ein and Al Klayeh. The consultations and the medications are free in the mobile clinic unit. 80% of the mobile clinic patients are Syrian refugees.
The Centre specializes in Mental Health, its staff are comprised of psychologists and doctors. Pediatrics, gynecologists and Chinese alternative medicine doctors charge a 10,000 LBP for all consultations.

5. Nabaa Centre
The Nabaa Centre is located in Al Rashidieh Camp and provides several services including consultation and medication. Consultation fees are limited to 5,000 LBP for all nationalities. This center is funded by the Palestinian Medical Aid and led by UNRWA.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CENTERS (SDC)
Due to the support provided by some agencies to Syrian refugees exclusively to access health services, some tension has occurred as host communities have felt neglected/privileges towards Syrian refugees, being offered access to less costly services. To mitigate this tension, MoSA and MoPH initiated Social Development Centres (SDC). The SDCs operate in a similar way to PHCs, offering access to primary healthcare practitioners, such as doctors, nurses, gynaecologists, and dentists for both Lebanese and Syrian communities. The SDC program is funded by INGOs like the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils. The entrance fee to these centres is minimal at 3,000 LBP for families of all nationalities. In this Centre, two social workers support Syrian refugees to raise awareness on healthcare issues such as hygiene for example.

SECONDARY AND TERTIARY HEALTH CARE CENTER:
Tyre urban area includes five SHC and THC centers as shown Table 29 and figure Figure 64.

Two of the hospitals mentioned in the above table fall within the program of NEXtCARE: (1) Lebanese Italian Hospital and (2) Hiram Hospital-Tyre. The description of NExTCARE as provided by UNHCR is:

- A Third Party Administrator (TPA)
- Ensures the compliance with UNHCR SOP when approving hospital admission
- Case management of patients and management of service utilisation
- Prepare and maintain the refugee database and claims. The NExTCARE data is regularly updated on a monthly basis from UNHCR proGres database
- Quality and efficiency – ensure attending physicians adhere to approved treatment protocols and guidelines as well as the least expensive and most effective treatment procedures
- Conduct financial audit and payment of hospital bills

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155 NExTCARE specializes in health insurance management and third party administrative service provision (URL: http://www.nextcarehealth.com)
In the South, UNHCR pays up to 75% of the total cost of the following hospital services only:
- Life-saving emergencies
- Giving birth
- Care for new born babies

UNHCR also run a program for primary healthcare assistance in the south for Syrian refugees including unregistered ones. Individuals awaiting registration have access to some services and assistance, such as vaccinations for children, care for new born babies, child and maternal acute illnesses, communicable diseases, and ANC/PNC for pregnant women. The agency also have another program in the South for pregnant women, covering consultations and two ultra sounds.

Furthermore, it covers chronic diseases such as diabetes, cardiac conditions, hypertension, asthma and epilepsy.

For Palestinian refugees, ‘UNRWA is the sole ‘official’ provider of humanitarian, educational and health services as well as other forms of support...' (EU, 2013). It has various health programs in the south, including for Palestinian camp and out-of-camp residents within the study area. UNRWA’s programme in Tyre include:

**PRIMARY HEALTH CARE**

- Non-communicable disease program (NCD): diabetes and hypertensions, free of charge analysis, annual tests, and regular follow-up.

### Table 29: Hospitals in Tyre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Name of the Hospitals</th>
<th>Nbr of Doctors</th>
<th>Nbr of Beds</th>
<th>Nbr of Lebanese Patient per month</th>
<th>Nbr of Syrian Patient per month</th>
<th>Nbr of Palestinian Patient per month</th>
<th>Phone Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Gouvernment Hospital</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>07/740293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Lebanese Italian Hospital</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>07/741595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Hiram Hospital-Tyre</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>07/343700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Jabal Amel</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>07/343852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Balsam Hospital</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>03/625228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 64:** Secondary (private and public) Health Centres. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.

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156 ANC/PNC: Ante-Natal and Post-Natal Care
157 South Health Brochure - 2015, p.6
158 EU (2013) “Community conflicts in Northern Lebanon” report
**THEME 4 SERVICES and INFRASTRUCTURE**

- Maternal and child health care (MCH):
  1. Vaccination of new-borns, pregnant women, and children at school
  2. Re-conception care, care for women who want to be pregnant

- Schools health: check-up and vaccination for the new comers.

**SECONDARY HEALTH CARE**

UNRWA has an agreement with various hospitals across the urban area, and covers all the fees for Palestinians accessing the Lebanese Italian Hospital, Balsam.

**TERTIARY HEALTH CARE**

UNRWA has an agreement with Jabal Amel hospital and covers 80% of the fees. Also, there is a Lab in each of the camps for the follow-up and the essential tests, with an X-Ray machine in al-Buss camp.

The RAMOS study (2009) showed a maternal mortality rate of 23 per 100,000 live births in Lebanon (with an uncertainty margin of 15.3 to 30.6). Moreover, a second study carried out jointly by the MOPH and WHO in 2009 on complicated deliveries in Lebanon revealed that maternal death varied from one region to another. The South scored the lowest rate. Main causes for mortality were bleeding and asepsis (MOPH, 2009). \(^{[159]} \)

According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Public Health in 2010-2011, the South has the lowest rate of mortality (31%). \(^{[160]} \)

Poor occupational health and safety has severely affected Syrian refugees. Studies of the shows that many workers suffer from one or more work-related health conditions or are exposed to hazards at the workplace (ILO 3013). One out of two workers reported suffering from back or joint pain or severe fatigue, 60% are exposed to dust and fumes, and 49% to extreme cold or heat. \(^{[161]} \)

The benefits are mainly restricted to paid sick leave and weekends 9%. Health insurance is practically non-existent among Syrian workers with only 1% benefitting. \(^{[162]} \)

Sour counts a sufficient number of hospital beds to cover the needs of the Caza’. Moreover, a new 55-bed public hospital will be developed to serve the city (works set to begin in November 2015). \(^{[163]} \)

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\(^{[159]} \) USJ&WHO&MoPH - National Health Statistics in Lebanon 2012, p.40

\(^{[160]} \) USJ&WHO&MoPH - National Health Statistics in Lebanon 2012, p.51

\(^{[161]} \) ILO 2013 – “Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile”, p.9

\(^{[162]} \) ILO 2013 – “Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile”, p.18


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**Table 29** Hospitals in Tyre. Source: (CRI et al. 2015).
Reported activities in Health

- Compared to 2014, in 2015, public health services and activities have increased among targeted individuals across all municipalities.
- Sour benefits from most of the public health activities and services.
- Provision of PHC consultations is the dominant service in 2015.
- In 2016, the number of consultations decreased dramatically in comparison with the previous years with no PHC consultation activities being reported or involved in this year.
- Public health activities targeted Ain Baal for the first time in 2016.
- In 2016, and for the first time since 2014, mental health was addressed by this sector.
- In 2016, the sector targeted children under 5 years of age.

Gaps and Challenges:
- Data validity and assessment is limited by the lack of accessibility to secondary and tertiary health care hospitals.
- Across the urban area, primary health care and secondary health care centres are only available till 2 p.m. This urges patients to visit Tyre’s hospitals in the afternoon and evening, burdening emergency rooms with non-emergency cases.
- Although the introduction of Social Development Centers (SDCs) ameliorates tension between host and refugee communities through equal health care service provision, other programs are still geared towards the Syrian refugee population assuming that they are more in need. Composition of Tyre population, and vulnerabilities amongst all cohorts, suggest access to affordable health services should be more unified across cohorts to mitigate host/refugee tensions.
- Given the highly privatised and expensive nature of the national healthcare system in Lebanon, the community (refugee and host) tends to rely on primary health care Centers; therefore, there is a need to create / maintain more accessible, quality service provision in such centers.

### Table 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Cadastres</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Primary health care consultations</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. PHC consultations</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Health capacity building</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Emergency conditions treated &amp; maternal care &amp; SAM</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 5303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Provision of nutrition services (out of the total)</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Provision of Health/Nutrition education</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. PHC’s consultation</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. SHC’s consultation</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. ANC out of total Reproductive health</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mental Health consultations</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 2792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. NCDs consultations (out of the total) including cardiovascular and diabetes</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 4674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Children &lt;5 who received routine vaccination as per MoPH vaccination calendar</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>children under 5</td>
<td>Sour 1413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Children US receiving micronutrient supplements</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>children under 5</td>
<td>Sour 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Children US screened for malnutrition</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>children under 5</td>
<td>Sour 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Patients who received medication for acute diseases</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individuals</td>
<td>Sour 8895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Patients who received medication for chronic diseases</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individuals</td>
<td>Sour 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. ANC out of total Reproductive health</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mental Health consultations</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 1428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. NCDs consultations (out of the total) including cardiovascular and diabetes</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>Sour 2792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Children &lt;5 who received routine vaccination as per MoPH vaccination calendar</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>children under 5</td>
<td>Sour 4674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Children US receiving micronutrient supplements</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>children under 5</td>
<td>Sour 3253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Children US screened for malnutrition</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>children under 5</td>
<td>Sour 2163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Patients who received medication for acute diseases</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individuals</td>
<td>Sour 1245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Patients who received medication for chronic diseases</td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td>individuals</td>
<td>Sour 578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Education

National
The Lebanese educational system includes private schools, private free schools (semi-private) and public schools under the auspices of The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE). Prior to the Syrian Crisis, 30% of Lebanese students attended Public schools. Most schools adopt French as the primary language (50.83%), English (25.74%), and (23.44%) embrace a bilingual program. After the Syrian Crisis, the MoEHE, collaborated with UN agencies (UNICEF, UNRWA, UNHCR and UNDP) to provide the Syrian refugees with the right to attend public school.

The Lebanese public school system is designed to accommodate around 300,000 Lebanese children only and faces difficulty in accommodating the additional thousands of Syrian child refugees who are in need of education. Language differences also act as a major barrier to enrolment. Lebanese schools teach maths and sciences in either English or French, which few Syrian children comprehend coming from an Arabic curriculum. According to a study done by Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth covering Lebanon in 2016, 61.5% of Syrian children (age 8 to 17) are going to school, 27.44% are not going, and 12.56% dropped out. The percentage of enrolment in the South was 52.58%.

Due to high poverty levels, children are taken out of school in order to access work and provide income to their families. Other negative coping mechanisms such as early marriage also occur, making children less likely to return to school. Also, families usually prioritize sending boys to schools rather than sending girls. Often, the former is to be granted access to education if a choice has to be made between sending girls or boys to school. Furthermore, families require financial assistance to be able to send their kids to school. Besides school fees, transportation costs put further pressure on families. In total, it can cost between 30-40 US dollars per month to send one child to school. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) facilitated access to education of Syrian refugees to all public schools; and Higher Education (MEHE) facilitated access to education of Syrian refugees to all public schools; however, both students and schools continue to face significant challenges.

FORMAL AND NON-FORMAL EDUCATION
Lebanese regulations require offering the official educational program to both Lebanese and Syrians. In conformity with this law, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education has adopted the education emergency response plan “Reaching All Children with Education” (RACE I) within the framework of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan by the year 2014.

The main goal of the RACE strategy was to provide quality education to all children in Lebanon affected by the Syrian crisis. As per this strategy, the first action that has been undertaken was to eliminate school fees for all Lebanese and non-Lebanese children (including the Syrian refugees) in public primary schools. Furthermore, in line with equity principles, MEHE was proactive in diversifying educational opportunities and providing flexible learning pathways to all students in Lebanon.

A national non-formal educational program has also been introduced to reintegrate students who have skipped several years of education back into the formal system through certified programs. The Accelerated Learning Program (ALP) for the basic education level has been implemented in 2015 in collaboration with UNICEF. It targeted 11,878 children that were unqualified to enter formal public schools. Beneficiaries included almost 9734 Syrian Refugee Children, where 43% were able to shift into formal education. In the RACE strategy, public schools open for a second shift in the afternoon doubled the space for non-Lebanese children. This innovative approach has allowed MEHE and its partners to support enrolment of primary-school age non-Lebanese children (53%), and avoid overcrowded classrooms with difficult teaching conditions. In 2016, under the RACE program, the MEHE provided the opportunity for non-Lebanese children that do not have adequate documentation to present the official exams. This would allow them to transit to the next level of education.

The RACE II, is a new strategy recently adopted by MEHE (2017-2021). The latter focus on a more systematic approach that will guide evidence-based interventions and will develop the capacity of the public sector to deliver higher quality education services to vulnerable children and youth. It will improve the institutional technical capacity, strengthen the policy base, develop durable partnerships, and create a platform to coordinate the delivery of education programming supporting the stabilization and development agenda in the context of the extended Syrian Crisis.

Tyre Urban Area
In Tyre, there are 21 private schools and 5 private free schools (Appendix 1 private free schools name and contact number). However, no data is available on their capacities or attendees. As per a phone survey conducted by UN-Habitat in 2016, there are 10 public schools in Tyre Table 31, eight of which are within Tyre urban area. Education sector focal points in UNRWA informed that there are 11 UNRWA schools inside the Tyre camps.

165 BEMO Banque (2014) “Education in Lebanon Report”
166 “The Cost of Conflict for Children published in March 2016”
167 Analysis of child education survey a study done at the political science institute at USJ-2016”
168 New initiatives was launched beginning 2017 for increasing enrollment of all Syrian refugee children, geographical data was not available at the writing of this report.
169 LCRP, 2017
170 Reaching All Children with Education_ Lebanon’s national education response strategy to the Syria crisis _ World Education Blog
171 LCRP, 2017
172 LCRP, 2017
## UNRWA Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Physical Capacity (per shift)</th>
<th>Total Registered Pupils [All Shifts]</th>
<th>PRL</th>
<th>PRS</th>
<th>Syrian Refugee Pupils</th>
<th>Number of Shifts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Al Chajra Al Ibtidaitya Al Moutawassita Lil Banin</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Nemrin Al Moutawassita Lil Banet</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Deir Yassin Al Thanawiya Al Moukhtalata</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Al Tantoura Al Ibtidaitya Al Moukhtalata</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Al Nakeb Al Moutawassit Al Moukhtalata</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Al Quodissa Al Ibtidaitya Al Moutawassita</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Palestine Al Ibtidaitya Lil Banin</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Al Sarafand Al Ibtidaitya Al Moukhtalata</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Jbalya Al Moutawassita Lil Banat</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Thanawiyat Al Akssa Al Moukhtalata</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Ain Aasal Al Ibtidaitya Al Moutawassita Lil Banin</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- The Palestinian program partners are: TDH-Italy and NRC.
- UNRWA operates a Learning Support Programme funded by UNICEF for Elementary schools.
- The school highlighted in blue is outside our urban area.

**Table 31** UNRWA Schools in Tyre. Source: (UN-Habitat, 2016).

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**Figure 66:** Public & UNRWA schools in Tyre. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.
As shown in Table 31 and Figure 66, UNRWA schools located in various camps and gatherings, only have one shift, including PRS and PRL. The schools are under their capacity, thus can accommodate more students. They provide primary and secondary education for students from grade 01 to grade 12 in coherence with the Lebanese Official Curriculum. UNRWA operates a Learning Support program funded by UNICEF in Elementary Schools as well as providing Summer Learning Activities173.

In Tyre, as shown in Table 32 registration in the listed schools is less than capacity, they include: Thanawiyat Sour Al Rasmia Lil Banat, Thanawiyat Sour Al Rasmia Al Moukhtalata, Takmiliyat Sour Al Moutawassita Al Rasmia Al Thaniya, Takmiliyat Sour Al Moutawassita Al Rasmia Al Oula, Madrassat Al Masaken Al Rasmia Al Moutawassita, Madrassat Burj Al Chamali Al Moutawassita Al Rasmia, Thanawiyat Al Abassiya Al Rasmia.

Figure 67 demonstrates the number of schools by type, number of shifts in public schools, number of Lebanese and Syrians in public schools, and PRS & PRL in UNRWA schools. It can be inferred that private schools in Tyre are the dominant school type, the least prevailing being public schools. The number of second shifts in public schools is 33%. Compared to the total number of Syrian refugees (approximately 15,000)174, out of which 2,207 are students, only 15% were enrolled in public schools when study was conducted.

Syrians have a very low school enrolment rate compared to the Lebanese and Palestinian population. According to UN-Habitat’s survey in 2016, 33% of students enrolled in public schools are Syrian. Additionally, Syrian refugees cannot access private schools, with no NGO programs covering private school fees. In the second shift, two public schools (Takmiliyat Sour Al Moutawassita Al Rasmia Al Thaniya) are adopting the ALP Program. In three of the three public schools (Madrassat Buj Al Chamali Al Moutawassita Al Rasmia, Madrassat Al Masaken Al Rasmia Al Moutawassita) Syrian refugees were able to integrate within the Lebanese curriculum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Name of School</th>
<th>Number of Shifts in Public Schools</th>
<th>PRS &amp; PRL in UNRWA schools</th>
<th>Public Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thanawiyat Sour Al Rasmia Lil Banat</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Thanawiyat Sour Al Rasmia Al Moukhtalata</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Takmiliyat Sour Al Moutawassita Al Rasmia Al Thaniya</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Takmiliyat Sour Al Moutawassita Al Rasmia Al Oula</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>PRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Madrassat Al Masaken Al Rasmia Al Moutawassita</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>PRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Madrassat Burj Al Chamali Al Moutawassita Al Rasmia</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>PRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Thanawiyat Al Abassiya Al Rasmia</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>PRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Madrassat Al Abassiya Al Moutawassita Al Rasmia</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>PRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Thanawiyat Ain Baal Al Rasmia</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>PRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Madrassat Moughtaribin Ain Baal Al Rasmia</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>PRS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
- Our sources of information are from UNHCR, MOE, Regional Technical Office, UN-Habitat phone survey.
- The following services were identified through the study: 8 public schools, 21 private schools, 5 private free schools and 11 UNRWA schools.

Table 32 Public Schools in Tyre. Source: (UN-Habitat, 2016).

173 Educational recreational activities for the newcomers in grade 01 and 02 and teaching English for grade 04 and 05
174 See Theme 3. Population
Reported activities in Education

- The number of beneficiaries decreased from 2014 to 2016.

- Sour and Borj el Chemali were targeted almost equally in 2014. While Abbasiyeh and Ain Baal received a diversity of activities, yet not as much in quantity.

- Among all municipalities, in 2015, Borj el Chemali had the highest number of targeted beneficiaries compared to other municipalities within the Urban area, including Sour.

- Among all municipalities, in 2014, main support provided included formal and non-formal education, while in 2015, the back to learning package (school supplies) was the most prevailing type of activity.

- Enrollment in remedial language education was the most prevailing type of activity in 2016.

Gaps and Challenges

- Syrian students face several learning obstacles, the most prevailing being the language barrier whereby the majority of Syrian students do not speak English or French, the two teaching languages of core materials as per the Lebanese official curriculum.

- These challenges require additional support from teachers, principals and parents. Teachers, parents, and other students are providing educational support to Syrian students in order to ease their integration into school.

- The difficulties faced by Syrian children, as well as the support provided, imply a significant impact on the quality of education for all children as time and effort is diverted from regular school tasks and towards integration.175

- UN-Habitat survey in 2016 showed that public schools have a low enrolment rate. This can be explained by preference towards private schools due to perceived higher quality, or other social dynamics requiring further study.

- Syrian refugee children enrolment in schools was low during study for this report, alluding to challenges in prioritising education for vulnerable households with competing priorities with little means.

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Protection

National

The Government of Lebanon (GoL) estimates that the total displaced Syrian population is 1.5 million in Lebanon, this includes both the displaced who are registered and not registered with UNHCR. As of 31 December 2016: 1,011,366 displaced Syrians refugees were registered with UNHCR, with 34 percent female headed and 66 percent male headed households. Women and children account for 80 percent of the refugee population, with 54 percent below 18 years of age. Girls and boys comprise 26 percent and 27 percent of the refugee population respectively (UNHCR 2017). As of July 2016, 78 percent of Palestine Refugees from Syria are women and children with 57 percent below 18 years of age. The number of female and children refugees raises protection concerns in Lebanon.

Obtaining and maintaining a valid legal residency remains the biggest challenge for persons displaced from Syria. In 2015, new requirements were put in place for Syrian refugees to obtain a visa for stay in Lebanon, including amongst others a US$ 200 fee for each person 15 years of age and above, pledge not to work, UNHCR registration certificate etc. The same year, UNHCR had to stop registration of refugees. Commencing in June 2016, the notarized pledge not to work was replaced by the pledge to abide by Lebanese law, which is signed free of charge at the General Security Office (GSO) once every 12 months. In 2017, some of the requirements to obtain residency was lifted, including the fee per family member. The requirement did however add significant expenses to families in the almost two years of with this requirement (UNHCR 2015), leaving many families unable to formalise stay in Lebanon.

Henceforth, immigration-related offences remain the most common reason for which persons displaced from Syria are arrested and detained, resulting in the issuance of deportation orders that, to date, are not being enforced, in line with the Government’s commitment to the principle of non-refoulement (UNHCR 2015). Due to fear of being arrested because of lack of a valid residency, displaced Syrians are reportedly less willing to approach authorities to report and to seek redress when they are victims of crimes, exploitation and abuse. Measures, either from municipalities or law enforcement agents, such as curfews and checkpoints, can reduce displaced persons’ access to basic rights and services and their sense of safety.

According to the LCRP, only 13 percent of the displaced Syrian population indicated a willingness to notify the authorities if they are victims of assault or harassment compared to 69 percent reporting they are not willing to address it; and 26 percent of displaced Syrians responded that they feel unsafe or relatively unsafe in Lebanon (GoL-UN 2017a). In the case of Palestine Refugees from Syria, 68 percent felt concerned about the safety of their family and 57 percent of these individuals reported feeling insecure due to their physical and social environment. With respect to feeling of fear on behalf of the host community, 33 percent of Lebanese say that they fear displaced Syrians, as per the LCRP.

UNHCR estimates that since the beginning of the crisis, over 100,000 Syrian children have been born in Lebanon and 70 percent of these are without birth registration. Displaced Syrians face barriers to obtaining civil status documentation in Lebanon, most notably birth registration, which may create heightened risks of statelessness, and may restrict access to services although health, education and social services are available to all without distinction.

Vulnerable Lebanese communities also face challenges in registering births when they are not fully aware of the procedures, including the one-year deadline after which late birth registration procedures would be required. If the birth is not registered, the Lebanese father may not be able to pass his nationality to the child, thereby resulting in a risk of statelessness. As a result, these stateless persons have serious limitations with regard to the exercise of their rights to travel documents, higher education degrees, access to health services, and limited ability to work in the formal labour market.

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176 UNHCR (2017), webpage: Registration data, as of 31 December 2016.
177 The practice of not forcing refugees or asylum seekers to return to a country in which they are liable to be subjected to persecution.
178 UNHCR (2015), Profiling of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.
Child Protection
Child exploitation is noticeably increasing in Lebanon where children are engaged in dangerous work and were reported to have experienced abuse from their employers. They are reported to be working on the street in unsafe conditions and involved in the agricultural sector where they are exposed to physical, emotional and sexual exploitation. A study conducted with around 1,510 children across 18 districts in Lebanon, 700 children on the streets were interviewed. They are predominately Syrian, most of them are boys, mainly between 10 and 14 years. The study has revealed that they work in risky conditions and are frequently threatened by their employers.

The 2015 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) revealed that there has been a noticeable increase in negative coping strategies among refugees (28% in 2014 to 67% in 2015). Activities include: reduce food expenditure, reduce essential non-food expenditure, buy food on credit, as well as begging, selling house hold goods, spend saved money, withdraw children from school withdrawal, child labour and marriage as shown in Figure 69.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Akkar</th>
<th>Bekaa</th>
<th>BML</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Tripoli</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selling HH goods</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell productive assets</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce peace expenditures</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce essential non-food expenditures</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spent part or all of savings</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buy food on credit</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sold house</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrew children from school</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child labour</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begging</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults accepting exploitative work</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minors accepting exploitative work</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults travel to work elsewhere</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children travel to work elsewhere</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child marriage</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 69 Reported activities in the Education sector for Tyre Urban Area. Source: (Activityinfo 2014-2015-2016).
**SBGV**

Women and girls in Lebanon are disproportionately affected by sexual and gender-based violence (SBGV), with grave consequences on their physical, emotional, and social well-being. The LCRP (GoL-UN 2017a) outlined that over the past three years, 90 percent of SBGV incidents reported to specialised service providers involved women and girls. Men and boys are also affected, with male survivors constituting 18 percent of all rape cases reported. As of late 2016, 20 percent of reported SBGV incidents involved children (GoL-UN 2017a). All nationalities are affected by SBGV, therefore preventive and response interventions target both Lebanese and non-Lebanese. Data collected through the Gender-Based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS) agency assessments, focus group discussions, and protection monitoring highlight that displacement increases the risk of SBGV (UNFPA 2017). Some 91 percent of incidents reported occurred after arrival in Lebanon. Child mothers, early married girls, unaccompanied and separated boys and girls, women and girls with disabilities, older women, and female heads of households continue to be the most at risk. The most commonly reported type of violence involves physical violence, mainly linked to violence within the family or home, sexual violence, as well as forced and early marriage. Notably, 18 percent of all reported SBGV incidents involve sexual violence, of which seven percent are rape (GoL-UN 2017a). SBGV data is not available for Tyre district or urban area.

**People with Special Needs**

People with Special Needs (PwSN), including older persons, individuals suffering from trauma, and Persons with Disabilities (PwD), are some of the most vulnerable population groups among both displaced and host communities. Based on initial findings from the 2016 Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees, it is estimated that approximately 12 percent of displaced households assessed include persons with physical or mental disabilities (UNHCR et al. 2016). Palestine refugees have been found to cope with mental and physical disabilities (respectively 10% amongst PRL, 8% amongst PRS), with one in four older persons (60+ years) affected (Salti et al. 2015). These individuals’ risks are exacerbated in protracted emergency settings and when there are no targeted interventions in place to aim at reducing inequities for those living with disabilities especially those of which that are youth and children; who are at high risk of violence, discrimination and exclusion.

**Tyre Urban Area**

Socio-economic vulnerabilities exacerbated by a protracted emergency, translated, according to UN reports, into an increase in the levels of violence against children and women and a reliance on harmful practices, such as child marriage and engagement of children in the worst forms of child labour and armed violence, as cop ing mechanisms. Furthermore it increased risk of traffickers preying upon the heightened vulnerability of populations (GoL-UN 2017b). Precisely, the lack of access to basic social services, protection, and livelihood opportunities among displaced population and host communities, has increased the vulnerabilities of already impoverished families. As a result, adolescents, with a higher prevalence of boys, are forced into child labour (such as street work).

According to UNRWA, in the South, many drop out cases can be noticed for the PRS and Syrian Refugees. Several organizations are working in the child protection sector: TBHL, Soumoud, and Al-Najde. They are active in both camps and gatherings in identifying protection cases, protecting the legal status of children with no identification, and raising awareness on physical violence. Additionally, a child protection network composed of members who have each signed an international agreement is present in the area.

In Tyre UNRWA implemented a “women programme” that entailing:

- The establishment of a centre for social services in each of Borj el-Chemali, Al-Buss, and Al-Rashidiye Palestine Refugee Camps. UNRWA dedicated 16 social workers for these centres.
- These centres provide Vocational training (sewing, hairstyling, IT, Languages, photography) for women, youth and men; Psychosocial support for women, youth, and men; Training volunteers to detect protection cases; and capacity building.

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180 LCRP Inter-Agency (2016)
181 The data and analysis presented refers to reported cases as well as protection concerns raised during focus group discussions and activities with communities. The statistical trends are based on data provided by six SBGV service providers as of Q3 2016, using the GBV Information Management System (GBVIMS). The GBVIMS captures information on incidents reported in the course of seeking services and allows to safely collect, store and analyse data related to SBGV. Since only information on reported incidents is recorded, and shared with the informed consent of survivors, it does not represent a comprehensive overview of the incidence of SBGV in Lebanon.
182 GBVIMS covers all populations including Lebanese, displaced Syrians, other refugees, PRS and PRL.
184 Trends of association of children with armed violence or conflict have been reported in the paragraphs on Lebanon of the UN Secretary-General’s Annual Reports on Children and Armed Conflict covering 2009 - 2015
185 Based on evidence collected by UNICEF in conformity with its mandate.
Reported Activities

PROTECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Psychological support</td>
<td>Psychological support (caregivers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>identified and referred through community structure</td>
<td>Participation in community center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2- Participation in SDC activities</td>
<td>3- Receiving legal counseling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4- Training on collective site management</td>
<td>5- Engagement in self-management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6- Protection interventions</td>
<td>7- Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7- Unit</td>
<td>8- Cadastres</td>
<td>9- Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>102,137</td>
<td>51,546</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2 | 6,618 | 932 |
| 3 | 11,908 | 3,438 |
| 4 | 34 | 156 |

| Total | 120,697 | 56,072 |

Table 34 Number of reported activities in Tyre urban area by cadastre for selected indicators in the Protection sector. Source: (Activityinfo 2014-2015-2016).

Reported activities in Protection:

- Number of individuals targeted through psychological support severely decreased since 2014.
- The number of targeted children through psychological support in the protection sector highly increased in 2016.
- Sour has the highest number of reported beneficiaries for 2014, 2015, and 2016.
- Diversity of activities are mainly concentrated in Sour, this diversity is minor in other municipalities where most activities evolve around psychosocial support and protection interventions.
- New and additional activities have been reported as of 2015.
- In the protection sector, children are mostly being targeted in 2016 on the level of structured community-based child protection, PSS and life-skills programs.
- Tyre is the most targeted area from 2014 through 2016.
- Besides SGBV and Child Protection related activities, no further activities were reported in Tyre urban area under Protection throughout 2016.
Reported activities in Child Protection:

- Activities relevant to Child Protection are being reported under this working group as of 2015.
- Children benefitting from community-based child protection, PSS and life-skills programmes is the most reported activity in all the municipalities.
- Sour received the highest diversity and quantity of child protection activities in 2015.

Table 35 Number of reported activities in Tyre urban area by cadastre for selected indicators in the Child Protection sector.
SGBV

SGBV

Table 36 Number of reported activities in Tyre urban area by cadastre for selected indicators in the SGBV sector. Source: (Activityinfo 2014-2015-2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cadastre</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-</td>
<td>1-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>1 044</td>
<td>1 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubbasiyeh</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burj El-Chamali</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1 863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aain Baal</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 548</td>
<td>4 674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 292</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 389</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reported activities in SGBV (analysis):

- Activities relevant to SGBV are being reported under the SGBV task force since 2015.
- All types of SGBV activities were reported in Borj el Chemali while the level of activity varies in other municipalities.
- Most SGBV outreach is done through mobile services
- SGBV activities are concentrated in Sour for both 2015 and 2016.

Gaps and Challenges

- The lack of registration of civil events in Lebanon or Syria certifying birth, marriage, divorce, and death, can have implications regarding legal guardianship over children and inheritance rights. This is particularly problematic in cases of early or forced marriage, in which the minor spouse may be especially vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse.
- The combination of lack of legal residency, limited self-support opportunities, compounded by depletion of resources including savings and assets has led to households resorting to negative coping strategies including instances of begging, protracted debt, engagement of children in worst forms of child labour, and foregoing educational opportunities.
- The social exclusion of children with disabilities is a violation of their human rights and a significant equity gap. Failure to respond will exacerbate the situation and lead to later-stage interventions that will be less effective and more costly.
- A data gap on disability persists in Tyre; limiting targeted interventions aimed at improving the situation for children and youth living with disabilities.
- Strengthening of the core building blocks of the child protection (CP) system in Lebanon to address the fundamental child protection and gender-based violence (GBV) issues affecting children and women prior to the crisis, namely violence in the home, school, institutions, and communities.
- Strengthening the judicial and human rights institutions, improving prison administration, and providing justice for children are crucial for social stability.
Social Stability

Key points

- Lebanon’s resilience has been tested as a result of the impact of the war in Syria and displacement to Lebanon, posing significant threat to peace, stability and development.
- Tyre, the southernmost key city in Lebanon, is as a consequence directly impacted by the ongoing tension with Israel and the waves of previous violence.
- Air space violations by the Israeli Military has been recorded regularly over Tyre since 2014. The dispute over the maritime delineation is also impacting Tyre fishermen, with noted incidents over the past years.
- The city lies within the mandate area of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, with a current deployment of 10,500 troops in the South.
- Reduction in livelihood opportunities, along with increased competition for work, could further depress wages, increase tension at community level.
- The risk of tension is higher within marginalised, dense and confined urban areas, of which the Palestinian camps in Tyre are good examples. Perception of social, economic, political exclusion may lead to risks of recruitment (especially among youth) to criminal activities or violent groups. Policies tackling urban stresses associated with these camps, should be followed by up-scaled initiatives to engage communities, with focus on youth, in change agents-training programmes and activities.
THEME 5 Social Stability

6 years into the Syrian conflict, Lebanon’s resilience is being tested and its stability threatened by a number of factors that pose significant threat to peace, stability and development. Foremost, the political deadlock and paralysis, endemic to Lebanon before the onset of the conflict in Syria, impacted the effective functioning of state institutions and municipalities (GoL-UN 2017b). Furthermore, the displacement caused by the neighbouring conflict, has deepened the already precarious condition impacting Lebanon’s ability to provide adequate services to its people, manage economic challenges, and peacefully resolve political differences (GoL-UN 2017a). The pressure put on host communities due to the crisis is one of the drivers for concerns pertaining social stability, exacerbating constraints faced also before the onset of the Syrian crisis (International Alert 2014). This is best illustrated with the knock-on effect that population pressure has on the already limited ability of municipalities to provide basic services to host and displaced populations, and to manage inter-community relations (Municipalities’ legitimacy was reinforced by the municipal elections held in 2016, making municipalities the only directly elected institutions in the last seven years. However, this trust hinges on the ability to provide public services to their constituency.

Hence, evolving regional dynamics amplified existing tensions in already unstable Lebanese communities, placing further strains on social stability. However, despite these concerns, tensions where they have occurred, have rarely escalated into inter-communal violence (GoL-UN 2017a).

South – Lebanon/Israeli conflict
South Lebanon has since the establishment of Israel endured several events affecting the peace and security of region, from the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1949 and displacement of Palestinian refugees to Tyre, as well the persistent violence between PLO and Israel during the civil war and occupation of land by Israeli forces, to the 2006 war with Israel, lead to heavy destructions in the South as well as in Tyre.

UNIFIL
Tyre lies in the area of operation of the United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a military peacekeeping force, formed by the UN Security Council in March 1978 following an outbreak of aggression across the Israel/Lebanon border. UNIFIL’s mandate was initially to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese government with restoring authority in the area. A demarcation line, the ‘Blue Line’, was published by the UN in 2000 for the purpose of monitoring Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (Figure 70). Tyre is located around 20km from the demarcation line.

UNIFIL’s mandate was adjusted a number of times since, due to the developments in 1982, 2000 and 2006. In 2006, the Security Council, through Resolution 1701 (Security Council 2006), enhanced UNIFIL’s mandate and enhanced the force in numbers, equipment and scope of operations to include:

- Monitoring the cessation of hostilities;
- Accompanying and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the South, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon;
- Coordinating these activities with the governments of Lebanon and Israel;
- Extending its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- Assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area;  
- Assisting the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of arms or relative material.

In addition UNIFIL is still required to carry out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) including on the confirmation of the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon; the restoration of international peace and security; and the assistance the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area.

A unanimous decision was taken by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli

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189 Initially under Security Council Resolutions 425 & 426 of 1978
191 It is one of a number of demarcation lines drawn for similar geopolitical reasons at points across the 20th century.
192 This was in response to an ‘escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel on 12 July 2006’ UN Security Council Resolution 1701 page 1, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement
army withdrew behind the Blue Line and requested the assistance of additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region. Therefore, the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by Security Council Resolution 1701 deployed their forces together throughout the South while the Government of Israel withdrew all of its forces from in parallel (Security Council 2006).

With current authorization for 15,000 troops, UNIFIL currently operates 10,500 uniformed personnel (troops) in addition to around 850 civilian personnel deployed to the south, 600 of which being locals.

Remnants of both the Israeli occupation, which ended in 2000, and the subsequent 2006 conflict persist. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), remaining minefields led to uncultivated and abandoned agricultural lands, deforestation, and deserted terrain and buildings. Anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions contamination continue to pose risks to civilian populations — while UNIFIL demining teams continue to support the Lebanese Army Forces by clearing minefields in different locations (Security Council 2016b).

In terms of governance implications, it could be synthesized that UNIFIL is integrated in the geopolitical order of the territory through its provision of military and logistical support to the Lebanese Armed Forces pursuant to Security Resolution 1701.

UNIFIL liaises with a wide range of actors at the local, regional and national level. These include local authorities, community leaders, religious figures, civil society groups and international agencies engaged in development activities. At the popular level, UNIFIL supports local communities and aims to build local goodwill to create a conducive climate for its mandate implementation. Socio-cultural activities are UNIFIL’s key outreach tool. Although not a humanitarian or development agency, UNIFIL has, from the early years of its deployment in 1978, had a strong humanitarian disposition in addressing the consequences of wars and occupations in south Lebanon. Together with military personnel coming from different countries, organisation of cultural events helps in building relationships and is the key to creating diverse communities. Furthermore, UNIFIL battalions deliver a range of basic services to communities using the skills and technical expertise of peacekeepers, as well as through limited employment of UNIFIL’s engineering and other operational resources in support of the local population.

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184 UNIFIL MAPS: https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-maps
187 The Civil Affairs (civilian) and Civil Military Coordination (military) are the main interface between UNIFIL and the local authorities in which the mission operates.
Tyre Urban Area

Recent displacement from Syria, has as elaborated in Theme 3 on Population, has in its majority affected dense areas within Tyre already inhabited by Palestinian refugees or poor Lebanese, with the largest effect on the Palestinian camps characterised by high poverty levels and limited service provision. The arrival of new refugees from Syria has increased the burden on Municipal and UNRWA service provision, and severely strained the coping strategies of the whole community within the camps. With this extreme vulnerability come inherent risks to social cohesion and stability.¹⁹⁸

Tension in the Tyre urban area has been reported by (UNHCR et al. 2016)¹⁹⁹ mostly over competition for jobs and access to resources/services (as shown in Figure 71 and Figure 72). Furthermore, employment and labour market assessments in Lebanon showed that young males are the ones most likely to report competition over employment opportunities with displaced Syrians, even though youth unemployment was already high pre-crisis (Zusammenarbeit-GIZ 2016)²⁰⁰. This lack of future prospects, combined with the feeling of hopelessness raises concern about the potential of violence among youth (SFCG 2016)²⁰¹.

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¹⁹⁸ UNRWA; No Shelter from the Cold in Lebanon URL: https://www.unrwa.org/content/no-shelter-cold-lebanon
¹⁹⁹ Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon VASyR - 2016
²⁰¹ Search for Common Ground (2016), Case Study: Social Cohesion Programming in the Context of a Major Refugee Influx Crisis
Table 37: Geo-located Mapping of Conflicts in Tyre Urban Area (CSKC 2016)

Table 37 reflects results of the Conflict Analysis Project by the Civil Society Knowledge Centre/Lebanon Support including Tyre Urban area. A geo-located mapping of conflict incidents across Lebanon based on news reports from 27 Jun 2014 till 2016 shows a total of 8,717 conflict incidents across Lebanon, with 128 incidents reported in Tyre. The highest concentrations of incidents in Tyre Urban area were reported in Sour with 89 incidents, followed by 33 in Abbassieh. There is a relatively sharp decline in the number of reported conflicts in the remaining municipalities in Tyre urban area (5 Borj ech-Chemali & 1 in Ain Baal).

Across the entire urban area air space violations constitutes the highest reported incident category. The proximity of the Southern city to the Lebanese/Israeli border makes it more susceptible to violation by Israeli air force. Currently, there is no Israeli military occupation on Lebanese territories; however, air space violation is considered a breach of Lebanese sovereignty reflecting recurrent tensions between Lebanon and Israel. On December 20, 2015, Israeli warplanes were heavily roaming around Tyre area with medium and low altitudes including flare fires.

‘Arrest/Detention’ is also a prevailing conflict type across Sour (25 till date). On October 23, 2015, the military navy patrol halted an operation whereby a Lebanese boat was illegally smuggling 36 individuals to Turkey, 2 miles off Tyre coast. Individuals that were arrested included Lebanese Syrian and Palestinian nationals.

The third dominant conflict type is ‘Collective Action’ (protests, solidarity movements), activities mainly taking place in Sour (17) followed by Borj ech-Chemali (5). On 03 June 15, contractors in EDL organized a sit-in in front of EDL Company in Tyre protesting unpaid salaries.

Other conflicts, mainly in Sour and a few in the other municipalities within the urban area, revolve around Assault (2), bombardment from air space (1), brawl/dispute (3), armed conflict (2), dismantling explosions (1), explosions (4), GBV (2), murder cases (5) raid (3), sea border crossing (1), and shooting (1).

Sour municipality is considered more prone to experiencing tension in comparison with other municipalities across the urban area, due to the concentration of economic and social activities, as well high refugee presence, especially in the two Palestinian refugee camps and gathering.

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### Social Stability

**2015**

1. Support immediate needs of HC & Refugees
2. Conflict mitigation mechanism
3. Youth peace-building initiatives
4. CB of LG institutions to build SS
5. Conflict mitigation mechanism
6. Support the delivery of basic services
7. Support immediate needs of HC & Ref
8. Dispute resolution and conflict prevention mechanisms established

**2016**

1. Support immediate needs of HC & Refugees
2. Conflict mitigation mechanism
3. Youth peace-building initiatives
4. CB of LG institutions to build SS
5. Conflict mitigation mechanism
6. Support the delivery of basic services
7. Support immediate needs of HC & Ref
8. Dispute resolution and conflict prevention mechanisms established

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aabbassiyeh</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>140 805</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aain Baal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 38 Number of reported activities in Tyre urban area by cadastral unit for selected indicators in the Social Stability sector.**

**Source:** (Activityinfo 2014-2015-2016).
**Reported activities in Social Stability**

Activities reported in ActivityInfo against the Social Stability sector show:

- Activities relevant to Social Stability was reported under this working group as of 2015.

- Most activities implemented in the social stability sector in 2015 related to supporting the delivery of basic services. They were mostly concentrated in Sour and Borj el Chemali municipalities.

- While modest in numbers, one of the key activities reported relate to training of youth representatives as change agents as well as youth activities. These activities have in their entirety been implemented in Sour (2015 and 2016), engaging all cohorts and gender for both years, yet not activating more than 5-10 youth representatives per cohort/gender each year.

- In 2015, two conflict mitigation mechanisms were established in Bourj el Chemali.

- A newly engaged activity under social stability in 2016 was the dedication of four staff members to the municipality of Sour and the UoTM to support strategic planning and service delivery.

- Ain Baal is targeted by social stability activities for the first time in 2016 whereas Abbasyeth Sour and Bourj el Chemali have not been targeted throughout 2016.

**Gaps and Challenges**

- Underlying tensions between communities may be exacerbated by occasional acts of terrorism or inter-communal violence, yet Tyre has not witnessed any major such events the past years.

- Local authorities face challenges in terms of capacity for public services delivery as well as in mounting socio-economic, humanitarian and environmental challenges.

- Further reduction in livelihood opportunities, along with increased competition for work, could further depress wages, increase tension at community level.

- Where Municipal police are present, the lack of personnel and equipment negated their performance. In absence of an effective system of local law enforcement, some municipalities have opted for curfews and other restrictions as a tool to address local residents’ security concerns. However, the majority of mayors would prefer to introduce local police forces as a more effective way to address a perceived increase in insecurity incidents, and mediate conflicts/disputes (Dionigi 2013).

- Under-investment in youth risks undermining social cohesion and represents a missed opportunity to build the social capital needed to foster the sustainable development of Tyre.

- The advancement of gender equality, and women and youth empowerment in political, social and economic spheres should be prioritized.

- Sector efforts to implement stabilization projects achieved very limited success with only eight percent of the budget required in 2016 allocated to sector partners (GoL-UN 2017a). In Tyre, only Social Stability activities related to provision of basic services has been noted at scale, activities addressing youth, civil society, conflict mitigation and so forth, has only been implemented at a small scale. These activities has as well focused on Sour, indicating a cap towards i.e. the Bourj Chemali Camp.
CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

Tyre is typically known for its touristic attributes, combining rich archaeological sites with coastal Mediterranean qualities and is mainly considered the prime gateway to the South. The multi-sectoral, in-depth analysis, of four municipalities including Sour, Abbassieh, Bourj El Chamali, and Ain Baal revealed a more vivid representation of the city emphasizing the need for rigorous interventions and research that requires action by both local authorities and international agencies and experts. The National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese territory (DAR & Iaurif 2005) positions Tyre as a “patrimonial city” and a major southern agglomeration with distinctive natural and agricultural features that is cited on the world Heritage list. The Plan emphasizes the development of Tyre into a leading touristic city. In order to promote development and develop both macro and micro plans for the city, efforts need to be more strategic in nature, surged towards enhancing local capacity and more strategic initiatives, promoting cross-cutting socio-economic and urban development frameworks, and balancing response towards all cohorts.

The five-tier thematic approach used in disintegrating and analyzing sectors and elements in the city revealed that many urban and environmental challenges facing development of the city are similar to the ones across other Lebanese cities. However, several factors exclusive to the city of Sour can be annotated. First and foremost, the influence of political parties on planning and decision making in the city. Major projects and investments can only be realized with the approval of dominant political parties in the area. Congruently, the security situation in South is frequently unstable, most recently the 2006 war has left the South in great need for development and has severely damaged infrastructure throughout the city. Despite, the somehow stable situation in the South in the last couple of years, its proximity to the Israeli border place the city in a constant state alertness. On the urban level, according to key informants and mayors in Tyre, the city has been witnessing a rapid urbanization since the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the South in 2000. The increase in resident population figures has led to the rise in construction and real-estate sectors, which severely threatens Tyre’s environment and landscape. Several strategic plans and spatial planning reports indicate the significance of agricultural development in the outer city as it has a unique environment and climate embracing green plains across the district. Uncontrolled urban sprawl highly threatens natural and agricultural features in the city.

Similar to other cities in Lebanon, Tyre lacks concrete population data for both host and refugee communities. There is strong suggestion, however, that the official figures used by all partners to the crisis response and for national planning – totaling just under 78,460 for Lebanese - are grossly below conservative estimates of the real situation, as exemplified for instance by the union’s estimate of about 342,750. UN-Habitat’s own calculation puts the Lebanese population figure at a level approaching 115,650 based on World Bank 2011 figures. The uncertainty undermines the validity of policy and programming decisions by the third sector where poor Lebanese are involved. It also affects the ability of municipalities and the union to align planning to service demand or to monitor critical urban indicators such as employment rates.

Regarding the approximately 122,260 refugees in Tyre, there are data caveats around the number of unregistered individuals, as well as around how point of registration relates to actual place of residence. The majority of refugees in Tyre are Palestinians (PRS/PRL) with minor Syrian Refugee presence, where most refugees settle in either camps or gatherings. The refugee influx as of 2011 due to the war in Syria has added more pressure on basic urban services especially shelter. Current camps in Tyre are already very dense and in need for rehabilitation, as increased camps dwellers have re-enforced haphazard shelter construction which calls for urgent attention towards improved shelter provision policies.

Activities reported against the various sectors by partners to the response often show concentrations on Sour municipality as it includes two major Palestinian camps; EI Bass and AI Rashidieh, in addition to a main gathering, AI Maachouk, all of which mainly house PRS and PRL and some Syrian refugee presence. The current profile targets the support of the current Urban knowledge base in ways that foster the focus on vulnerable and underdeveloped neighbourhoods across both host and refugee communities. Although municipalities seem to be in agreement on the overarching goals that target balanced development of all municipalities within the Union of Tyre, more coordination between municipalities and capacity building is required in order to ensure efficiency in service delivery and coherent spatial planning.

Policy & research implications

Municipalities across Tyre Urban area, being affiliated to the same political group, have a clear advantage to control and inform all activities ongoing/planned for their respective municipalities especially the mayor of Sour municipality. Acting under the umbrella of the union, mayors and councilors appear to be main decision makers that activate plans in the city and monitor activities to deter any illicit actions that would halt proper development in the area.
In order to capitalize on this effort and build on the proactive approach of municipalities, efforts should be focused on tailored capacity building so that municipalities would have the proper tools and know-how in setting context-based spatial strategies in the most resourceful manner. Also, the presence of the RTO (Regional Technical Office) as part of the union is an added value; however, training should be implemented so that members are constantly updated by current development trends and ways by which they can be tailored to local needs.

This profile has contributed to providing city-specific data and findings that were previously scarce and unattainable. One of the major findings of this profile is the population section, particularly in Tyre, as it presents ways of calculating the population given the deficiency in population data on a nation-wide level. It stresses on the significance of finding innovative and alternative methodologies by which such data can be retrieved. In Tyre Urban area, UN-Habitat calculated up to date population data based on Solid waste information received from the RTO in Tyre Union. Empirical investigations at the neighbourhood level would begin to address some data gaps identified in the foregoing, such as on as-built infrastructure network characteristics, housing and shelter conditions, and economic activity in both the formal and informal sector. It is envisaged that such bottom-up analyses, undertaken by UN-Habitat and others in the future, will be reflected in and inform updated versions of the current profile.

Several spatial planning policies have addressed development in the city on a multitude of facets mainly highlighting the need to protect both natural and archaeological features in the city. However, the city would critically benefit from progressing further on the project “Strengthening Disaster Risk Management Capacities in Lebanon” initiated in 2009 by the Lebanese Government and UNDP as it aims to strengthen risk management capacities and develop risk reduction strategies. The project scale is on a national level as Lebanon is threatened by severe natural disasters, therefore the main project outcome is “mainstreaming disaster preparedness and management in national development framework strategies in Lebanon”. Tyre Union has also been involved in a DRM project initiated through funding from the Embassy of Switzerland in Lebanon. The Union has already developed a map for disaster risk management and would be of great value for long-term planning of the city.

**Strategic Interventions and actions**

This profile suggests value in assessing the potential of several catalytic strategic interventions which may offer wider city-level impacts. These include the following, which could be prioritized and phased during Urban-level deliberations:

1. **Protection of land recognized for agriculture, nature conservation, or any other non-urban spaces.** Based on interviews with mayors of municipalities within the Urban area, and reports, it can be deduced that, over the past decade, one of the main trends in Tyre is diminishing of agricultural and rural land by haphazard construction. As stated by one of the mayors; the main problem is that land that is designated ‘zoned’ for agricultural use is being encroached by construction. Investors are being allowed to build in agricultural spaces. This amplifies the issue as no policies are being issued for transforming land designated for construction to agricultural land/open spaces while exceptions are being issued for investors that invade open agricultural spaces. Several steps can be undertaken in order to decrease this trend. In cooperation with stakeholders and activists concerned with the protection of the environment and green spaces the municipality should take direct action. Tyre has ample fertile agricultural lands and a climate that would allow for diverse plantation that would contribute highly to the economic sector. Suggested laws: Incentive zoning\(^{205}\) and Transfer of development rights\(^{206}\).

2. **Connecting the city by providing an efficient transportation system and adequate public transportation means.** Due to the lack of proper transportation policies, the city appears to be fragmented in addition to bottlenecks caused by the lack of traffic policies. Also, the city does not include a space that organizes taxi drivers. Reconsidering the current traffic network should go in parallel with traffic monitoring and measures that would be initiated in order to relief traffic and reconnect the city. This in turn will also promote and encourage use of soft traffic such as cycling. Also, BRT\(^{207}\) system could be introduced as part of the enhanced road network.

3. **Building and capitalizing on the classification of Tyre as a major touristic agglomeration in the south, as**

\(^{205}\) Incentive zoning: This is a mechanism that enables developers to use higher than regulated density in exchange for community improvements, in other words, higher density supports more compact development. In return, developers would be motivated to include some community improvements in their projects.

\(^{206}\) Transfer of Development rights (TDR): is one way to control land-use development through strategic planning for more efficient urban growth control and management and land conservation. Property owners are offered financial incentives or bonuses to preserve part of their land from being developed. It’s mainly used to protect green areas and open spaces or areas with heritage or agricultural values

\(^{207}\) BRT System: Bus Rapid Transit System
CONCLUSIONS

classified by the NPMLT (2005), and in line with many major strategies/studies planned for Tyre, the city should be recognized as a main touristic hub for the south given its unique coastline and archaeological ruins. Innovative strategies for activating open spaces should be introduced. Spaces such as the Hippodrome and other heritage sites could be activated through inserting proper public space furniture, and lighting. In addition possible interventions in these spaces could include hosting festivals and providing designated play spaces for children and cycling tracks.

4. Rehabilitating and upgrading the Port in a way that would ensure its proper functionality and improving the livelihood of fishermen. Despite the fact that Tyre can be classified as coastal city with unique environmental attributes, efforts are rarely directed towards enhancing the port and ensuring its proper functionality. There has been several sporadic attempts for enhancing the livelihood of fishermen and adding some infrastructure to enhance the port. However, the port is in need of a comprehensive plan that would include managing and organizing port activities, providing adequate technology for fishermen activities and provision of proper amenities for fishermen. Together with IUCN\textsuperscript{208} and ADR\textsuperscript{209}, which are some of the proactive stakeholders concerned with this issue, municipalities should work on upgrading the port in addition to taking advantage of underwater archaeological ruins for underwater tourism. This would have positive repercussions on the economy on multiple levels (boosting port activity, improving livelihood of fishermen, and enhancing tourism)

5. Establishing some factories in designated areas without causing ecological damage. Most mayors are at an agreement that the industrial sector is nearly absent in the area. Incorporating factories would be create new industries/job opportunities that will boost the economic sector.

6. Regulating and managing solid waste. Although Tyre includes Ain Baal SWTP, there is a common consensus that its capacity does not meet the needs, and thus 45% of waste is rejected. Main reasons attributed to the lack of efficiency of the process is that waste is not sorted from source, and the absence of adequate equipment and infrastructure. The core problem as part of basic urban service provision across the Urban area is the absence of efficient Solid Waste strategies. The area requires an integrated waste management scheme including: Reducing, reusing, recycling, sorting, pyrolysis technologies, and applying taxes.

7. There is a need to upgrade water infrastructure by separating waste water from storm water networks, as well as protecting key sources of potable water from pollution resulted from dumping sites as well as from leakage of wastewater. While this requires considerable funding that could be secured through soft loans received through the CDR, it also imposes coordinated efforts between municipalities and the Water Establishment Office in Saida to reach and maintain best results.

8. Institutional reform – capacity building for human resources in municipalities. Although mayors and councils have good ties with politicians in the area and the majority are action oriented, they need to be provided with trainings on enhancing local government practices so that they better manage their areas and be able to take more strategic decisions while dealing with NGOs and international agencies. In addition to capacity building, they need to be equipped with proper technology and software that would enhance and accelerate their performance.

9. Adjusting camp/gathering governance systems. The growing number of refugees as of the 2011 Syrian crises that has amplified existing pressure on services in both camps and gatherings. Currently, UNRWA is the main entity ensuring organization of camp matters with some municipal intervention. Lack of intervention by local public authorities leads to informality in infrastructure development and activities. For, example in some camp/gatherings prohibited fishing activities take place due to the lack of regulation which endangers sea species. Also, in some camps residents build higher floors than permitted by the zoning planning. Having more involvement by the municipality or forming a committee including (camp, UNRWA, & municipality representatives) would help to organize camp matters would maximize service provision and ensure balanced distribution of all cohorts.

\textsuperscript{208} IUCN: International Union for Conservation of Nature

\textsuperscript{209} ADR: Association for the Development of Rural Capacities
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Mr. Hassan Dbouk, Mayor of Sour Municipality, Personal Interview, November 14, 2016
Mr. Ali Dib, Mayor of Borj Chemali, Personal Interview, November 15, 2016
Mr. Khalil Hershi, Mayor of Abbassieh, Personal Interview, November 15, 2016
Mr. Ziad Samaha, Programme Manager at IUCN, November 15, 2016
Appendices

Activity Info
Interventions by Sector (pivot)

Activity Info tables showing partners reporting in urban area for 2014, 2015, 2016 (no detail on geography or #beneficiaries/systems reached).

Appendix 1: EDUCATION

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Table 39: Free private schools

Appendix 2: MANDATE OF MUNICIPALITIES AND MOUKHTARS IN LEBANON

Lebanon’s 1,108 municipalities are spatially nested into governorate and district boundaries. An area’s municipality constitutes its local government, charged with responsibilities for its development. A 1977 decree-law sets a range of duties: “…any work having a public character or utility within the area of the municipality falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council”. This includes, amongst other things, providing or coordinating communal services and utilities and otherwise managing environmental quality.

Municipalities are led by mayors on a six year electoral cycle, with no limit to the number of terms an electee can serve. The long electoral period in principle offers political scope for pursuing medium and long-term strategic objectives as well as short-term wins.

The process by which mayors are elected is a step removed from direct popular democracy. Groups of candidates or ‘lists’, each list representing a different political party, stand for popular election in municipalities, with people voting for lists rather than individuals. Those on the winning list become municipal councillors, and nominate from amongst themselves a municipal mayor. Where unions exist, the mayors of the relevant municipalities again nominate from amongst themselves a mayor or councillor to head the union.

On a separate hierarchy, the public also votes on the same electoral cycle for neighbourhood or village representatives known as ‘moukhtars’. Moukhtars are directly answerable to the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities. They are authorised to receive payments for administrating various notary-type functions including public health insurance for members of the public.

Voting rights in Lebanon are determined by an individual’s place of civil registration rather than place of current residence, often not corresponding. In practice this can mean it is not uncommon for the majority of a municipality’s residents to be ineligible to vote there, an obvious democratic dislocation. This cannot but contribute to low turn-outs amongst eligible voters, indicating weak civic engagement.

Turning to municipal practices, municipal service delivery in Lebanon is heavily circumscribed by budget constraints combined with often opaque political dynamics. Regarding public taxes raised on municipal territory, part is retained locally, making up about 30% of municipal income (14 such sources related to taxes and fees including building permit fees, rental value fees etc) and part goes to central government (13 such sources including tax on built property, income tax etc). Municipalities then receive an annual central government grant from the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities’

Article 1 of Legislative Decree No. 118 of 30 June 1977
The councillors and mayors assume voluntary roles, though in some circumstances union mayors receive a central government salary.
Mokhtars receive a salary and other benefits from central government.
Lebanese citizens are registered in the area of their ancestors rather than in the place they live. These may or may not correspond with current residence.
This carries the corollary of individuals voting in their ancestral places of residence, thereby undermining the responsiveness of the electoral system to the needs of the actual residents living in these places.
Municipalities Act in –law decree No. 118 of 1977, as amended
Independent Municipal Fund (making up about 70% of their income). In law\textsuperscript{218}, the formula on which this is calculated factors in (1) geographical location in terms of potential contribution to national balanced development (2) the number of registered voters in the municipality (not the number of actual residents)\textsuperscript{219} (3) area [km\textsuperscript{2}] of the municipality (4) the percentage of tax dues actually collected during the previous period.

The amount granted to a given municipality may however vary unpredictably from year to year, presenting challenges for business planning and public investment. Understaffing is a common municipality issue; indeed, some municipalities are not staffed at all\textsuperscript{220}. Resource constraints limit local autonomy to the extent that municipalities’ democratic mandate to lead strategic city planning and infrastructure policy-making and implementation is curtailed, with projects that are initiated usually reliant on central government funding.

In summary, municipalities and unions of municipalities, the only forms of elected state decentralisation in Lebanon, are weak relative to the central authority, which itself is confessional in make-up.

### Appendix 3

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\textsuperscript{218} Municipalities Act in law decree No. 118 of 1977, as amended
\textsuperscript{219} World Bank 2016: p16 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IIB/2016/03/09/090224b08416f27b/L_0/Rendered/PDF/Lebanon000Prom0c0country0diagnostic.pdf
\textsuperscript{220} Atallah (2012) suggests that 400 municipalities in Lebanon do not have even one staff member. http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=6 It is also the case that not all areas of Lebanon are under the jurisdiction of a municipality.
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## Theme 4: Services and Infrastructure

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