



WORLD BANK GROUP

# From Isolation to Integration

*The Borderlands of the Horn of Africa*








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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

AKDN	Aga Khan Development Network	LAPSSET	Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Rapid Response Mechanism	OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
COMESA	Common Market for East and Southern Africa	PARIMA	Pastoral Risk Management Project
ENSO	El Niño–Southern Oscillation	SALW	Small arms and light weapons
EU	European Union	SAPARM	Satellite Assisted Pastoral Resource Management
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
ICPAC	Climate Change Prediction and Applications Centre	SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
ICPALD	IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development	SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition
IDDRSI	IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
		USAID	United States Agency for International Development





# Overview

*The World Bank Group's Horn of Africa Regional Initiative promotes resilience and economic opportunity in one of the world's most challenging regions for security and development. Within the region, extreme poverty, vulnerability, fragility, and food insecurity are disproportionately concentrated in the arid and remote border regions.*





Development policy makers and social scientists often suffer from “borderland blindness,” treating the territorially bounded nation-state as both the central unit of analysis and as the primary site of development intervention. Underpinning such a state-centric approach to policy making are three key assumptions: (1) that the state wields sovereignty over its entire territory; (2) that the domestic and international spheres can be clearly delineated; and (3) that group identity is coterminous with the geographical boundaries of a state (see Goodhand 2014: 13). In the Horn of Africa,<sup>1</sup> with its long history of colonial rule, separatism, territorial conflicts within and among states, fluid identities, mobility, and multiple overlapping hybrid governance institutions, *each of these assumptions is demonstrably false*.

A “borderlands” perspective challenges policy makers to reconsider the nature of conflict, development, and state building. By foregrounding the particularities of border regions and the communities that live in them, this perspective reinforces the need to take context and history seriously and to understand power as it actually exists on the ground. It does not yield simple policy prescriptions, but it does offer an analytical lens that complements others, such as the need to explicitly consider the gendered nature of—and responses to—each of these phenomena, as well as the need to foreground environmental concerns. In sum, it can help policy makers craft better-targeted policies.

The borderlands of the Horn of Africa have long been synonymous with economic, social, and

political marginalization; entrenched poverty; conflict and violence; forced displacement; and environmental degradation, spilling across national boundaries. The reach of the state is weak, and livelihoods rely on a combination of informal, illicit, and criminal strategies. In Goodhand's words (2014): “these regions seem immune to the development successes celebrated at national and international levels.”

But despite its challenges, there are areas in the borderlands with real economic potential. For example, the region's international borders have long allowed communities to benefit from price differentials through licit and illicit trade (Scott-Villiers 2015). Pastoralism and trade, the dominant livelihoods in the Horn of Africa, require the easy movement of people and goods within and across borders—and continue to heavily rely on cross-country clan and ethnic affiliations. Local institutions therefore still play a key role in regulating and facilitating economic activity and managing conflict, especially as the formal institutions are often weak or absent. Even in areas at the periphery of state control, the borderlands remain highly connected to circuits of global capital and exchange.

Increasing stability and improving the welfare of the people in the borderlands requires a fresh approach unconstrained by international borders. Actions by individual countries to support development in their respective borderland regions could help. But given the importance of transnational mobility to local livelihood patterns and the prevalence of external shocks that straddle international boundaries, including conflicts and natural disasters, development cannot take hold in the absence of a spatial approach. Regional

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1. The countries in the Horn of Africa are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.



collaboration is essential to the joint management of access to grazing lands and water, trade, and security. Cooperation is also needed to harmonize policies on mobility and economic integration. Regional institutions and programs are beginning to show what is possible when countries work together, but much remains to be done.

## Developing a Borderlands Approach

The World Bank first discussed the idea of the borderlands serving as potential conflict triggers in a 2014 report entitled *Regional Initiative in Support of the Horn of Africa*, noting the extent to which these areas are contested and fought over. The report cites resource scarcity combined with rapid population growth, poverty, and underdevelopment as exacerbators of communal conflict and civil war in border areas. In the prevalent discourse, borderlands are not regarded as economically or politically important; they are usually inhabited by groups that lack representation in central power structures and are viewed by others as offering limited economic potential. Borderland communities frequently rely on traditional conflict management mechanisms and tools to resolve competition over resources, such as rangeland or water, as well as to manage violence. In many cases, these communities have been overwhelmed by well-financed criminal networks and by armed groups that appeal to the historical grievances of marginalized groups in their recruitment strategies. Border areas are becoming increasingly militarized, with an increase in the circulation of weapons as well as in the number of people who use violence in pursuit of their goals (World Bank 2014a).

To unpack these observations and examine the analytical and policy implications of a borderlands perspective for the World Bank and other national and international policy makers, the World Bank commissioned five background papers, which are being published along with this overview. The remainder of this overview introduces each of the background papers; summarizes some of the drivers of fragility and sources of resilience in the region; discusses key themes that run across the papers, namely, livelihoods, mobility, and gender; sets out recommendations for action; and concludes by touching on some current World Bank initiatives that are relevant to issues identified in the background papers.

Jonathan Goodhand's 2014 paper on the political economy of development in borderlands provides an overarching background to the borderlands approach. His approach is predicated on an understanding of three interconnected elements: (1) power, especially material interests and power relations as mediated by formal and informal institutions; (2) space, particularly the ways in which the flows of people and commodities across space unsettles the orderliness of states; and (3) time and history, or the ways in which neither borderlands nor states develop in a smooth or linear way. When considered in this light, borders are not merely lines demarcating territorial boundaries—they are institutions underpinned by specific interests and power relations and they represent mentalities or ways of thinking about the world bolstered by particular worldviews and ideologies. For instance, labor markets and systems of production may be oriented around borders, and the protection of borders may be the basis on which violence is mobilized.

Goodhand warns against considering the borderlands merely as “lagging regions” that their respective states and development processes will inevitably absorb through improved infrastructure, better connectivity, and investments in people. Instead, borderlands must be understood as political and social spaces, created by the interplay of power, geography, and specific historical context. A borderlands approach does not yield simple policy prescriptions. Take the example of infrastructure development. From a national development angle, roads, railways, communications, and irrigation projects are often rightly seen as necessary public goods that allow “lagging areas” to catch up with the rest of their respective country. However, a borderlands approach demands policy makers consider concerns such as the extent to which political and security objectives of national capitals drive the specific configuration of these infrastructure projects and the manner in which they affect communities residing in borderlands whose livelihoods and trading relationships may be more closely connected to communities across national borders (Goodhand 2014).


The other papers commissioned by this project cover thematic areas and geographically specific borderland regions.<sup>2</sup> As their point of departure, these papers build on the notion of cross-border “clusters” identified by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These clusters represent regions of the Horn of Africa that have historically suffered from underinvestment and whose challenges and vulnerabilities cannot be

2. Because the papers were commissioned over an extended period of time, they have been lightly updated to account for specific empirical changes that have occurred in the interim, such as the addition of detailed information regarding recent South Sudanese displacement, which has had significant impacts on the region.

tackled by national action alone. All of the clusters are identified based on physical and social factors as well as with their demonstrated importance in terms of human and animal cross-border movement. The four delineated IGAD clusters are Karamoja, Borana, Somali/Mandera, and Dikhil; an additional four clusters are being considered. The papers do not seek to endorse a specific institutional mechanism for dealing with cross-border challenges but instead to analyze the challenges in and identify lessons from areas that have been identified by an existing intergovernmental initiative.

The background papers build off one another. Laura Hammond’s 2017 paper on livelihoods and mobility in the border regions of the Horn of Africa provides a conceptual framework for the study of borderlands. Dereje Feyissa Dori’s paper takes up the discussion of resilience and development assistance in the Horn of Africa. By doing so, they each draw heavily on two rich empirical case studies of IGAD clusters: Patta Scott-Villiers’ paper, which covers the borderland regions from Lake Turkana in the west to the Mandera triangle of Kenya in the east, and Kristen Bushby and Elizabeth Stites’ 2015 study, which encompasses the Karamoja cluster, including the borderlands of northeastern and northwestern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, southeastern South Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia. All of the papers assess the interactions between livelihood, mobility, and resilience in the border regions of the Horn of Africa with a view toward informing the design of development interventions that address the drivers of fragility while building on the region’s sources of resilience.

## Map O.1. IGAD Clusters



Note: The four IGAD clusters are Karamoja, Borana, Somali/Mandera and Dikhil while a further four clusters are under consideration. All clusters are mainly based on physical and social factors, but also with demonstrated importance for human-animal cross-border movement.

Hammond (2017) also introduces the three analytical frameworks used across the subsequent papers: the Sustainable Livelihood Framework, the Drivers of Migration Framework, and the Household Economy Approach. The analysis generated through the application of these frameworks provides decision makers with actionable data on livelihood patterns, information on the economic welfare of households within the livelihood zones, and an understanding of mobility as a response

to external shocks and in relation to livelihoods. Such approaches can inform decisions on how to minimize forced displacement and distress migration and how to facilitate the kind of mobility that generates income.

The Sustainable Livelihood Framework assesses people's command over a range of assets: physical, financial, natural, human, and social. The degree to which an individual, household, or community

has access to these assets determines the quality of their livelihood and, in turn, their resilience to shocks and crises, such as conflict and drought. The Household Economy Approach analyzes livelihood zones and provides a detailed rundown of the income, expenditure, and consumption patterns of the people living there. Livelihood zones can then be disaggregated based on wealth group to examine the varying levels of control that people have over assets and the various ways they respond to shocks. Finally, the Drivers of Migration Framework complements the other frameworks by shedding light on how people in different livelihood and wealth groups respond to shocks and how they make decisions about mobility. Understanding these dynamics is crucial in a region where mobility is central to livelihood and crisis response. A borderlands approach combines the three frameworks to provide a detailed understanding of livelihood, welfare, and mobility. Examples abound in the papers by Dereje Feyissa Dori, Patta Scott-Villiers, and Kristen Bushby and Elizabeth Stites.

This approach can serve as a powerful tool for preparedness and adaptation. If drought hits, how will agropastoralists respond? Will they move within or across borders to access water? If violent conflict breaks out, will people flee en masse, or will only the wealthy be able to move to a city? If climatic conditions are favorable to agriculture, can an influx of migrants be expected? Will tightening borders improve security or increase crime and violence by forcing people into “maladaptive” livelihood choices? The answers to such questions can help governments and development agencies identify interventions to protect and promote essential forms of mobility and provide meaningful alternatives to forced migration.

## Drivers of Fragility and Sources of Resilience in the Borderlands

### Challenges and Drivers of Fragility

High levels of poverty are entrenched in the Horn of Africa despite the existence of natural resource wealth and some of the world’s rapidly growing economies. Existing on the periphery of state control, the borderlands face major development challenges including violent conflict, forced displacement, low agricultural productivity, food insecurity, environmental degradation, climate change vulnerability, natural hazard risks, poor public health, and high levels of illicit money flows as well as human and small-arms trafficking. Violent extremism is an increasing threat. Combined with the other challenges, high rates of population growth have led to stresses on finite land and natural resources. In particular, a large youth cohort is demanding improved social services and increased livelihood opportunities, and most institutions in the region lack the capacity to deal with such stresses. It is important to note, however, that some drivers of fragility can also be sources of resilience; these are discussed in greater detail below.

The geopolitical context in the Horn of Africa has changed markedly since the background papers were commissioned. A tentative peace deal has been agreed between the rival political groups led by President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in South Sudan, while in Sudan a transitional civilian-led government has replaced the regime led by former President Omar al-Bashir (after nearly 30 years in power). Ethiopia remains in transition, but Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali has made



wide-ranging changes after being elected as prime minister by the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in April 2018. He began a rapprochement with Eritrea after nearly two decades of stalemate and regional proxy warfare, released political prisoners, pardoned and welcomed back armed groups and opposition members, apologized for human rights violations, and announced his intention to open up the Ethiopian economy. Finally, in Somalia, the federal government has taken notable steps to consolidate its control over regional governments, has undertaken economic reforms, and has also taken concrete steps toward debt relief. The longer-term impact of these geopolitical changes remains to be seen, but the broader structural challenges identified by the background papers continue to remain relevant to the region.


### Insecurity and conflict

Insecurity, conflict, displacement, poverty, and underdevelopment are closely related, although the precise relationship depends on context. The Horn of Africa is affected by a number of major conflicts. Bandits and armed groups, including the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab, are active in some areas. The state's absence is an oft-cited cause of violence, but a heavy-handed state presence that views the borderlands through the prism of security or terrorism can also exacerbate instability and a sense of marginalization. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has made conflict deadly, regularly triggering the mass displacement of thousands of people fleeing violence. Communal conflict is present in some areas, as are high levels of gender-based violence. Government efforts to control the proliferation of small and light weapons in some areas, such as the Karamoja

triangle, appear to have resulted in knock-on improvements in women's safety, and on existing livestock-based livelihoods—which have been quite dangerous due to cattle-raiding practices, as an example. The impacts of insecurity are heavily gendered across the region. In Karamoja triangle, young men are the most affected by traditional practices around cattle raiding as those who take part in raids and protect the cattle. Women and children have primarily been affected by spill-over effects on their security, such as when they travel outside their villages to collect firewood, water, and food. Women, of course, are disproportionately affected by gender-based violence in general, as well as by forms of structural patriarchy, such as male control over productive assets (Bushby and Stites 2015).

### Demography

The population of the Horn of Africa is young and rapidly growing. The “youth bulge” is a significant demographic trend offering opportunities and posing challenges. In Kenya, over 60 percent of the population is under the age of 25; in South Sudan and Somalia, an estimated 70 percent is under the age of 30. Most youth in the region are either unemployed or—more worryingly—underemployed or in highly vulnerable employment. Given that the population is expected to double over the next 23 years, none of the countries across the region is creating jobs quickly enough for the expanding workforce, and young women tend to be particularly disadvantaged in the region's labor markets. High rates of youth unemployment may increase young people's susceptibility to illicit activities and high-risk behavior, especially in political contexts marked by political grievances and perceptions of exclusion from political and economic development.

**Map 0.2. Food Insecurity in the Horn of Africa**

### Environmental factors

Risks related to natural hazards, such as floods, drought, and climate change effects, are increasing across the broader Horn of Africa. In the borderlands, environmental hazards typically include erratic and decreasing rainfall, land degradation, and changes to the flood seasons (Hammond 2017). Such events affect soil quality and drive down agricultural productivity, which contributes to widespread food insecurity (see map 0.2). In turn, food insecurity and conflict are major drivers

of displacement in the Horn of Africa. They are also interrelated. In South Sudan, for instance, the declaration of famine in 2017 was closely related to conflict in the country. Further, climate change vulnerability not only affects those pursuing rural livelihoods, but in a region undergoing rapid urbanization, it can also lead to a reduction in available drinking water, affect urban agriculture, and increase the likelihood of floods and other weather-related events.

### Socioeconomic factors

Most countries in the Horn of Africa are poor, but extreme poverty is more common in the border regions. Furthermore, while poverty has declined in Africa over the last 20 years, the same is not true for the borderlands. Food insecurity is a significant proxy for a wider range of vulnerabilities, and as map O.2 illustrates, millions of people in the Horn of Africa remain undernourished and at risk of famine. Chronic food crises, a rising number of people living with HIV/AIDS,<sup>3</sup> and an increasing incidence of other infectious diseases contribute to high levels of morbidity and mortality. Poverty in the borderlands is deeply gendered, especially where women do not have full control of or access to property or incomes.

Livelihood options are limited; and both public and private investments are minimal. Most people earn a living through pastoralism and/or agropastoralism. Trade across borders, mostly in livestock and consumer goods, also represents a vital source of income. Much trade activity is informal, operating outside of governmental regulation. There has been scant public or private investment to support trade or pastoralism. In fact, public policy has at times been inimical to the interest of pastoralists by supporting commercial agriculture and by tightening borders in response to international security threats.

### Displacement

Both mobility and displacement can be drivers of and reactions to development challenges, conflicts, violence, and political persecution. The Horn of Africa is one of the world's main sites of displacement: at the close of 2018 (the latest year for

3. HIV/AIDS = Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.

which statistics are available from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), the countries in the region were hosting 3.9 million refugees or people living in refugee-like situations; and another 120,000 people were seeking asylum.<sup>4</sup> And given the difficulty of counting displaced persons, these probably underestimate actual numbers. Further, the region continues to receive refugees and asylum seekers from countries in the region as well as from neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Yemen. Internal displacement is also a major issue: at the end 2018, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that there were 8.95 million internally displaced persons living in the region.<sup>5</sup> Refugee camps and informal settlements located in the region's borderlands shape the economy in significant ways by creating market opportunities and attracting development and humanitarian resources into the region, but can also trigger competition between the displaced and other residents, lead to environmental degradation, and produce changes in livelihood patterns (Hammond 2017; Waters 1999; Whitaker 2002).

### Political and governance factors

The capacity of borderlands to cope with vulnerability and fragility risks is becoming increasingly limited for two reasons: (1) the region's formal institutions—including social service delivery, economic and financial systems, law and order,

4. Data are available at [http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons\\_of\\_concern](http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern).

5. Data are from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>. These numbers may have changed because, as an example, many of the internally displaced in Ethiopia (a significant contributor to the overall number for the region) have since been resettled or have returned to where they had been displaced from. In addition, the total number does not include internally displaced persons in Eritrea (for which no data were available) but does include 31,000 from the disputed region of Abiyei between Sudan and South Sudan.

and justice and safety—remain weak and inconsistent. (2) At the same time, informal institutions have been eroded over time, greatly undermining social, economic, and climate resilience among local populations. It is not always clear who enjoys legitimacy and exercises authority over the borderlands, making a nuanced understanding of governance crucial. As Conciliation Resources (2017) observes, “navigating diverse governance structures and sources of authority in borderlands is vital to more effective peace and development interventions.”

### A Zone of Potential: Opportunities and Sources of Resilience

Despite the challenges, opportunities exist for building resilience to cycles of conflict, insecurity, and poverty. For example, border areas offer a “spatial discount,” where buyers, sellers, and employers can take advantage of different prices, wage rates, levels of security, degree of regulation and enforcement, availability of natural resources, quality of health or education systems, and access to markets—*across national borders*. As Goodhand (2014: 19) has argued,

“These dynamics take place not just in the border *but because of the border*. The intensity of economic flows and relations may be greater across the border than with the metropolitan center within the state” (emphasis added).

A good example of this comes from the border regions between Somaliland and the Somali Regional State (Abdi and Hagmann 2020). Borderlands can provide trade corridors for landlocked countries, labor for seasonal agriculture, and increased animal production for export.

### Robust trade, especially in livestock

The livestock trade is robust, even in times of conflict. Livestock exports from the Horn of Africa exceed US\$1 billion per year, tapping markets in Egypt and the Middle East even as they remain vulnerable to climate crises and external market shocks (FAO 2018). There is potential for expansion as “the largest part of the borderland economy—the livestock economy—has received hardly any useful investment inside the borderlands themselves” (Scott-Villiers 2015). In particular, the prevalence of pastoralism (or agropastoralism) as the primary livelihood across the borderland region helps sustain this trade, as described in greater detail below.

### Mobility for livelihoods and survival

Mobility is a major source of resilience. While recent global attention is focused on forced displacement and mixed migration as a response to external shocks, mobility is and has long been an effective strategy for maintaining livelihoods as people travel in search of employment or better conditions for farming and pastoralism.

### Traditional institutions

In an area where state institutions are weak and inefficient, traditional, and informal institutions retain legitimacy. However, the authority of traditional leaders has been diminished by urbanization and by the proliferation of young men with guns making their own rules. Community-based institutions do continue to regulate the livestock trade, manage trade relations, solve problems, and resolve disputes. Many of these institutions are clan-based and cut across artificially imposed international borders.



## Urbanization

The rapid urbanization that has taken place across the region has brought development challenges and opportunities. Urbanization affects major as well as secondary cities, although it is the latter that has witnessed the most rapid growth. Some countries have responded to such changes by investing in infrastructure and employment opportunities. Ethiopia, for example, has an ambitious plan to develop industrial parks—which will also employ refugee labor. This has made it necessary for Ethiopia to engage with much broader questions of decentralized service delivery and macroeconomic policy and to balance the needs of the vast majority of its citizens who earn their livelihoods from agriculture or pastoralism with the much smaller group whose livelihood comes from manufacturing (Ronnas and Sarkar 2019). Urbanization has had a major impact on livelihoods: many of the jobs in the newly urbanized and peri-urban areas are informal and precarious, including quarrying, construction, domestic work, and selling mobile phone credits. However, urban populations tend to have better access to services, notably education and health.

## The emergence of extractives

The recent expansion of the extractive industries, primarily oil, gas, and mining, represent an opportunity for local economic development. The 2012 discovery of as much as 1 billion barrels of oil in Turkana County in the northwest of Kenya, which shares borders with Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda, has increased the potential for economic development in one of the country's most impoverished areas. Exploration was announced in 2015, and export was scheduled to commence in 2017 but was since delayed to 2021. If well

managed, oil revenues could spur employment and development.

The entrance of extractive industries can attract government attention as well as public and private investment. For example, there are plans for a road network and oil pipeline known as the LAPSET<sup>6</sup> (Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport) corridor to connect Kenya's coast with South Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia. This corridor would link South Sudan's oil to Kenya and open up the potential for additional foreign investment. However, like many such large projects, it is unclear if and how quickly this one will proceed due to security concerns and other geopolitical tensions among the countries of the region. If completed, the LAPSET corridor could potentially demonstrate how investment in neglected borderland areas can spark local development and reduce vulnerability.

Any potential benefits achieved through the extractive industries can be undone by the "resource curse." Tensions arose in Turkana as soon as exploration began. Oil operations blocked off land, denying pastoralists the ability to access to grazing land and local residents to access water. Armed groups launched multiple attacks, seeking extortion payments for personnel and property from the Tullow Oil Corporation to the extent that the company has threatened to withdraw its investment (Achuka 2017). Many of the jobs created have reportedly been allocated to outsiders, with only menial work available to locals. There are fears of rising inequality. Ensuring that locals benefit from oil industry activities requires careful planning, local consultations, and the mitigation

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6. For more on LAPSET, see [www.lapsset.go.ke/](http://www.lapsset.go.ke/).

Table O.1. Challenges and Opportunities in the Horn of Africa

Challenges and Drivers of Fragility	Opportunities and Sources of Resilience
<b>Isolation.</b> The borderlands are at the margins of the state and are largely neglected.	<b>Spatial discounts.</b> Differences across borders can create opportunities for people to profit from transnational pricing, knowledge and service differentials, and labor opportunities.
<b>Conflict and governance.</b> In addition to the region's major interstate conflicts, there are communal conflicts—often over land or natural resources. These regions are also marked by a higher incidence of gender-based violence and rising violent extremism. Formal institutions generally lack the capacity to manage these stresses; informal institutions can do so but have been eroded over time and are under pressure.	<b>Traditional institutions.</b> Despite challenges, traditional institutions retain legitimacy and influence. Often based on clan or ethnic affiliations, they can cut across borders and play significant roles in providing social stability, regulating trade, and managing conflict.
<b>Displacement.</b> Conflict and climate-induced disasters, including droughts and floods, are causing mass forced displacement. There are around 3.9 million refugees and almost 9 million internally displaced persons living in the region.	<b>Trade and mobility.</b> Trade is robust and resilient, mostly in livestock and consumer goods, continuing even in times of high conflict and in the absence of supporting investment. Trade is facilitated by mobility—the primary resilience strategy as people move in search of better livelihood opportunities or better conditions for farming and livestock.
<b>Poverty.</b> The proportion of people living in poverty has declined slightly, but the absolute number of poor is increasing. Poverty remains highly gendered.	<b>Extractive industries.</b> Emerging industries, including oil and small-scale mining, carry social risks but also offer the potential for local economic development, including connective infrastructure.
<b>Demography.</b> The population is very young and is expected to double in 23 years. This can be seen as both a challenge and an opportunity.	<b>Regional institutions.</b> Approaches are being piloted to promote greater cross-border collaboration and policy harmonization on trade and freedom of movement. However, some regional institutions have been more successful at resolving conflicts than with developmental matters.

of environmental and social impacts, such as land acquisition and involuntary resettlement.

### Artisanal and small-scale mining

The artisanal and small-scale mining sector has long been influential in the Karamoja cluster as a source of livelihood and cross-border trade. Although it has generated economic benefits, the work is hazardous and can damage the environment. Furthermore, 62 percent of the 27,000 square kilometers of land in the cluster is now subject to mining licenses, displacing indigenous populations who often lack registered titles. The sector has also

reduced the amount of land available for agropastoralism. Improving occupational health and safety and more inclusively managing land issues could support responsible small-scale mining.

### Summary of Challenges and Opportunity

Table O.1 provides a summary overview of the key challenges and drivers of fragility as well as opportunities and sources of resilience in the Horn of Africa.

## Some Key Themes

### Livelihoods

Livelihood systems in the borderlands cross, defy, and exploit international borders. Drawing on the Sustainable Livelihood Framework, Hammond (2017) maps out livelihood zones for the entirety of the Horn of Africa, demonstrating that while pastoralism and trade stand out as the main livelihoods, some inhabitants engage in agrarian activities, labor, and self-employment. The common thread across the region is that *livelihoods are intrinsically transnational*. The example of the Hawd grazing area is illustrative: Somalis graze their camels in Ethiopia during the dry season, and Ethiopians of the Somali Regional State take advantage of common kinship and language ties to sell their herds in markets across the border in Somalia. Many people and households hold a portfolio of jobs, requiring seasonal movement from rural to urban areas. Gender remains a crucial determinant of livelihood. Women are often responsible for herding smaller animals, maintaining homestead gardens, and marketing agricultural products; men usually do the plowing, sowing, and harvesting.

### Pastoralism

In 2015, UNECA (2017: 6) estimated that over 38 million people in the Horn of Africa were pastoralists.<sup>7</sup> As Feyissa (2016) explains, “Other livelihoods are barely viable.” In areas where land is more fertile and rainfall more abundant, such as in the southern tip of the Horn, many people pursue

agropastoralism as a dual subsistence strategy to balance the risk of pursuing either livestock or farming alone.

Pastoral communities rely on shared livestock management practices, use of grassland and water resources, trade links, and access to information about weather, prices, and the availability of water. Many agricultural communities take advantage of borders by marketing produce in towns and cities across their border. Others attract seasonal labor from bordering countries.

Decisions regarding livestock mobility—where to go and when—are based on local knowledge and traditional systems of governance. However, pastoralists are increasingly using technology, such as mobile phones, to access information about market prices and trade opportunities. Satellite imagery can provide information on vegetation, informing better migration decisions and thereby reducing livestock mortality rates.

### Trade

Trade in livestock and consumer goods is vibrant in the borderland region. While systematic and up-to-date data are extremely difficult to obtain, the extent of the livestock trade can be estimated using multiple sources. For example, one authoritative study estimates that the total value of Ethiopian cattle, goats, sheep, and camels sold across the border in Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti in 2009 was US\$250–300 million (Aklilu and Catley 2009; Hammond 2017). In 2005, turnover at a single market on the Ethiopia–Somalia border was US\$50 million; more recently, the value of the livestock trade on the Somaliland border was an estimated US\$ 200–300 million—about four or five

7. [www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/18/world-bank-pastoralists-horn-africa](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/18/world-bank-pastoralists-horn-africa). This should be considered a very broad estimate. It is difficult to accurately count pastoralists in the Horn of Africa because of (1) major data constraints in the region and (2) difficulties of classification.

times the officially recorded level (World Bank and DFID 2019). Livestock exports—particularly those to Gulf countries—play an outsized role in some countries' economies. In 2015, the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that Somalia had exported 5.3 million animals (World Bank and FAO 2018). However, the outsized importance of the livestock trade also means that countries remain extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change and the outbreaks of disease, as illustrated by the livestock exports from Somalia in 2016 and 2017. A combination of a Saudi ban on Somali livestock imposed at the end of 2016 due to an outbreak of disease (temporarily lifted for the haj season of July–September 2017) and the impact of the drought on the health of animals and on herd losses led to a sharp fall in exports from 5.3 million animals in 2015 to 1.3 million in 2017 (Sarkar and Serriere 2019).

Small traders, including many women, transport kerosene, cooking oil, grain, pasta, cloth, and even luxury items—such as electronics from ports on the Indian Ocean—to and through the borderlands. Illicit trade in weapons is also a lucrative industry, albeit a major challenge to security. In communities living in border areas, most opportunities come from the informal sector, particularly for women. Informal trade outweighs formal trade by a factor of 30 in some areas. Important sources of income for people living in border communities include trade in livestock, khat (a local stimulant), cereals, second-hand clothing, and consumer goods that are either produced in the region or imported (usually from Gulf states) and then

moved farther inland.<sup>8</sup> Over half of the informal cross-border traders in the region are women.

Clan and kinship ties are crucial to cross-border trade. Most transactions cover relatively short spans. Traded goods are handed over to other actors in the value chain, who in turn pass them to others higher up the chain. Clan affiliations are central to trust and connections across borders, and they provide a form of protection against rent-seeking officials, warlords, and armed groups seeking to disrupt trade. Traditional customary institutions therefore play a crucial role in managing trade activities and resolving disputes. These institutions are often clan-based, so they can cut across international boundaries and at times clash with state authorities.

A range of factors hampers intraregional trade. Intraregional exports among the IGAD countries was estimated at US\$1.9 billion in 2011 (more recent figures are difficult to find). While this is an increase in real terms, it is a four percent decline in the share of overall intraregional export since 2000 due to: (1) a lack of infrastructure connecting the countries of the subregion; (2) the fact that countries in the region tend to produce similar commodities, which limits trade complementarities; (3) the economic imbalance among members; (4) ineffective taxation systems and tariff barriers; and (5) overlapping memberships in regional groupings that duplicates efforts and makes institutions compete with one another.

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8. Not all border regions are on land—the Red Sea is a critical “borderland” to communities living in the region, with livelihoods, trade, mobility, and conflict playing out across the sea-border in many of the same ways that they do on land.

### Box O.1. Trade, Pastoralism, and Mobility in the Horn of Africa: The Karamoja Cluster

The Karamoja cluster includes northeastern Uganda, northwestern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, southeastern South Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia. While diverse, many of the groups in the area share a similar language, livelihood patterns, and cultural practices.

Most people in the cluster are agropastoralists, combining a nomadic livestock-based livelihood with sedentary agriculture. Mobility, including the crossing of international boundaries, is central to agropastoralism in terms of accessing grazing land, water, and markets.

Security in the cluster has improved, but challenges persist. South Sudan remains unstable. Bandits operate in the Turkana region of Kenya, extorting money from local people. Cattle raiding, which has become violent, is frequently used as a means of redistributing wealth. Communal conflicts have been triggered by the presence of the extractive industry and have arisen between pastoralists and farmers over communal land. Fluid migratory patterns support pastoralism but also contribute to cross-border conflicts.

Livestock-based livelihoods are the predominant source of income because they are well adapted to minimal and variable rainfall. Livestock also provides social and cultural capital as they are an indicator of wealth. Government policies, poverty, and conflict are pushing people out of pastoralism and into agrarian or urban livelihoods, especially in Uganda. Some households make this shift permanently; others move seasonally or split households. In urban areas, many people have a portfolio of jobs, engag-

ing in activities like informal trading or manual labor. The extractive industries are emerging as a potential source of employment in various parts of the cluster, but not without social risk.

Social and family networks are essential to livelihoods in the cluster; and community-based institutions and traditional alliances are crucial to accessing grazing land and to the sophisticated networks that underpin the exchange of goods and services, such as livestock; consumer goods; and illicit trade; including small arms and light weapons.

As government policies favoring sedentary agriculture makes pastoralism more difficult, a variety of “maladaptive” livelihood practices have emerged, including cattle raiding, trading in firewood and charcoal, engaging in banditry, and joining armed groups. Limitations on mobility also hinder pastoralism in the cluster. Restrictions have been imposed for reasons of security, the gazetting of land as national parks, the growth of private investment, and private land titling. Poor infrastructure also negatively impacts mobility.

The Karamoja cluster functions through hybrid systems of governance that rely on formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions of the state are generally weak and inefficient. And while violence has undermined their authority, traditional institutions continue to have legitimacy and power within societies, including customary justice institutions, which play a crucial role in settling disputes.

States have been taking measures to formalize informal trade. Ethiopia and Sudan have agreed that small traders are allowed to make 48 cross-border trips per year with goods valued at a maximum of US\$117 per trip. Ethiopia has also placed value and movement limits on trade with Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia.

The formalization of trade protects licensed traders and generates revenue for the government, but it hinders traders who cannot secure licenses. Unlicensed traders tend to come from marginalized groups, such as women and the very poor; and licensing regimes create rent-seeking opportunities. Movement restrictions impact pastoralists dramatically, sometimes forcing them to overgraze, which degrades the land and depletes the water table. Pastoralists then can feel forced to engage in maladaptive livelihoods. The example of the Karamoja cluster vividly illustrates the intersection of spatial aspects, livelihoods, and mobility in the Horn of Africa (see box O.1).

Despite these challenges, the prospects for greater regional economic integration through trade and mobility are considerable. Improving transport links, including corridors to the major seaports; developing secondary seaports and the Ethiopian power sector; and proceeding with the LAPSET project could accelerate regional economic linkages and trade. Efforts in the border regions to improve the management of shared water resources, enhance the common management of pastoral rangelands, and promote the free movement of people could also increase cross-border trade.

Finally, it is worth noting that policy makers can draw on the experiences of other regions as they try to leverage the importance of cross-border

trade in the pursuit of greater cooperation and integration. For instance, small-scale cross-border trade (dominated by women) is an important issue driving a greater dialogue on trade between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Some monitoring systems have been developed to capture data on the extent and the nature of small-scale trade to further remove barriers and facilitate such commerce. Facilitation of cross-border trade has been mainstreamed into the national trade policies of some countries; and with World Bank assistance, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a regional economic community, has developed and adopted a charter to help normalize the processing of small-scale trade at the border. This, in turn, has reduced harassment and bribe-seeking, and has facilitated border crossings. COMESA and the East African Community, another regional economic community, have also developed simplified trading regimes to facilitate the formalization of trading businesses without imposing insurmountable regulatory and tax burdens.

### **Diversification and maladaptive livelihoods**

While pastoralism and trade remain dominant, livelihood patterns continue to evolve. Many people in the Horn of Africa have had to diversify their livelihoods in the face of increasing populations and a depletion of the natural resource base due to environmental changes, large-scale infrastructure projects, and restrictions on cross-border mobility. Some have moved into urban areas or are engaged in agrarian activities, either permanently or seasonally. The extractive industries are creating some job opportunities as well.

Where diversification is not possible, people can fall out of pastoralism and take up high-risk livelihoods such as:



“various and potentially damaging livelihood strategies, including unsustainable use of natural resources, such as cutting trees for charcoal production and sale, sending daughters to work as house servants in towns, thereby exposing them to risk of abuse; engaging in illegal contraband trade; and criminal activity such as ‘organized livestock raiding’ or banditry.” (Feyissa 2016)

Across the region, technical initiatives to increase food production or reduce pressure on natural resources have been elusive, largely because of environmental and social constraints. Alternate nontechnical operations focused on human capacity building may hold the key to future efforts toward livelihood diversification and improving risk management (Coppock et al. 2011). One such initiative targeted the Borana, who were once considered a model of sustainable pastoralism in East Africa but who had grown progressively poorer and more vulnerable due to a combination of population growth and development investment, a trend exacerbated by repeated droughts. A participatory process was implemented that involved the pastoral community in problem diagnosis, charting pathways for change and ultimately the implementation of interventions. The process, which involved collective action, microfinancing, and participatory education, resulted in women taking on leadership roles, major improvements in the quality of life, accumulation of wealth, reduction of hunger, and management of risk (Coppock et al. 2011: 395). Interventions like this can be models for borderlands programming. In other words, development policy makers need to build elements of human capacity building into their programmatic interventions in addition to the spatial element of borderlands programming.

## Mobility

Given the importance of trade and pastoralism to the livelihoods and resilience of the people of the borderlands, freedom of movement is crucial. Such freedom allows a trader from Somalia to buy cheap livestock in Ethiopia and then sell it in Kenya, where the prices are higher. Even small price differentials can mean the difference between survival and extreme poverty. Furthermore, where movement is restricted, the effect on trade disadvantages both the people living in the border zones as well as people relying on goods further along the value chain. For example, vegetables grown in the agropastoral zones of Ethiopia are traded in border-area markets for ultimate distribution in southern Somalia. Blocking borders can impact markets as far away as Mogadishu. In the western borderlands, along the Ethiopia–Sudan border, agricultural production also depends on the mobility of agricultural labor, domestically and across borders.

Mobility is particularly essential for pastoralism because in areas where it is the dominant livelihood, people must be able to move around a wide area to access essential resources for themselves and for their herds. Constraining pastoralist movement leads to overgrazing, depletion of the surface water table, and long-term degradation of rangeland resources (Hammond 2017). While agropastoralism and irrigated agriculture is possible in some border areas, this is not the case for most of the border regions in the eastern part of the Horn of Africa, where the land is not suitable for sedentary agriculture, making the transhumant livelihood practice necessary.

The key to understanding the role of mobility in resilience and vulnerability is an analysis of how

mobility influences daily livelihood practices and adaptation to shocks. Most forms of mobility in the Horn of Africa are driven by multiple overlapping drivers, including migration to sustain specific types of livelihoods; longer-term movement for economic gain or to find employment; involuntary movement due to violence, conflict, or persecution; or displacement caused by environmental changes such as drought, flood, deforestation, or other extreme weather events—which are increasingly common in the Horn of Africa. Mobility is, of course, regulated by multiple legal regimes, but decisions about who migrates, where to, and when, are both gendered and generational. For instance, in erstwhile northern Bahr el-Ghazal state (on the border regions between South Sudan and Sudan)—civil war has led to profound changes in livelihood patterns and an increasing reliance on market economies in societies previously dependent on cattle ownership. Young men have begun to migrate, either to join armed groups or in search of paid wage labor in Sudan; young women have taken jobs marketing produce and, if able to, have migrated to Sudan in search of paid work, profoundly restructuring family and intergenerational relationships (Majok 2019).

## Gender

As previously mentioned, like the other phenomena discussed in the background papers, livelihood strategies, migration, and mobility are deeply gendered. In pastoral communities, culturally defined divisions of labor mean that women are usually responsible for herding smaller animals, such as sheep, goats, and sometimes cattle, remaining close to their homes, while men take their camels farther in search of grazing areas during the dry season.<sup>9</sup> This pattern weakens the

overall food security of households as husbands and wives can be separated for several months per year, and women and children providing for themselves while the men are away. In agricultural areas, women are normally responsible for homestead gardens and for weeding larger plots; men plow, sow, and harvest. Women are often also responsible for marketing the agricultural products, which makes them effective managers of the household economy (Hammond 2017). Climate change, economic crises, conflict, and insecurity therefore have very different impacts on men and women across the region—leading to a re-shaping of these culturally defined gender roles and, in many cases, driving the decisions of young men and women to migrate (Feyissa 2016). Many traders engaged in small-scale, cross-border, and informal trade are women. Compared with men, they have lower profit margins, face greater security risks, and are less able to protect themselves against exploitation.

As previously noted, gender influences people's decisions about movement. During times of food insecurity and economic hardship, women may move into cities or stay with relatives, while men move farther afield for labor migration, to graze camels or other large animals, or to find work in other countries. There is a higher proportion of women to men in refugee camps than in society more generally because women are more likely to seek assistance for their children while men are more likely to be engaged in employment, business, military activity, or maintaining the family's property in the area of origin. Another major form of gendered migration is the movement of young women from the Horn of Africa to Gulf countries

9. In other words, women frequently engage in the production and marketing of small livestock, as well as in the processing

and marketing of livestock products, while men are more engaged in the production and marketing of larger livestock, such as camels, cattle, and donkeys (World Bank and DFID 2019).

to find employment as domestic workers. In 2013, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Consular Monitoring and Support Directorate estimated that 1,500 Ethiopian women were leaving the country every day, and unlike men who leave the country for the Gulf or another destination, the women usually travel with the assistance of a private employment agency, which secures them an offer of employment—or at least claims to—prior to departure (Hammond 2017). Once at their destination, many women work under precarious conditions; and reports of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse by employers are common. The borderlands play a critical role in many of these journeys: while some women travel to Gulf countries by plane, many others travel over land to one of the numerous ports that dot the Horn of Africa's coast. Border crossings are risky. If a woman lacks the necessary documentation and permission to cross the border, or if they are traveling using smuggling networks, she is at risk of being extorted and sexually assaulted (RMMS 2014).

## Operational Implications

Livelihood and mobility patterns in the borderlands highlight the need to support pastoralists and small-scale traders. In practical terms, this would entail infrastructure investments, including roads and electricity, as well as mobile phone and Internet coverage to enhance communications and access to market and climate information. Extension services could expand to serve pastoralists, including mobile phones. Policy makers in the region could draw on lessons from other regions and countries (specifically COMESA) that have been helpful in facilitating cross-border small-scale traders. In turn, cross-border trade can act as a “hook” for closer cross-border cooperation and integration.

Enhancing livelihoods in the borderlands goes hand-in-hand with building resilience. Localized cross-border collaboration and the integration of formal and informal institutions and civil society could help capitalize on thriving informal trade routes and the versatility and interconnectedness of its business communities. As such, opportunities and entry points exist to soften borders, promote public safety, build capacity for cross-border government collaboration, deregulate trade, and develop cross-border livelihoods. Further, policy makers should draw on existing success stories, such as interventions aimed at building human capacity in pastoralist communities, which may hold the key to future livelihood diversification and improving risk management (Coppock et al. 2011).

At the policy level, decisions that limit trade and access to pastoral lands should be carefully reviewed. Issues of concern include the expansion of commercial agriculture, extractive industries, and even national parks. In addition, an assessment is needed regarding the implications of tightening borders and converting trade from informal to formal.

Informal clan- and ethnic-based institutions can act as a bulwark against cross-border mobility risks. Given their prevailing legitimacy and authority, support should be extended to such institutions to strengthen their capacity to govern economic activity and resolve disputes.

Finally, the absence of robust and reliable data compounds borderland blindness. Datasets and strategies of social inquiry are bound to the nation state. Statistics are largely based on national, aggregated datasets. There is an urgent need to collect better and more borderlands-focused data.

## Institutional and Policy Context for Regional Action

### Regional Initiatives

There is an increasing recognition among countries and regional organizations in the Horn of Africa that the borderlands require regional action. Despite the challenges of its weak economies, political instability, violent conflict, and economic imbalances between countries, analysts still conclude that “the prospects for regional integration [in the Horn of Africa] ... look good” (Feyissa 2016: 13). Important building blocks underpin deeper regional collaboration. In 2015, under the auspices of IGAD, the countries of the Horn of Africa, international development partners, and financial institutions instituted a “borderlands partnership.” The IGAD’s cross-border cluster approach, referred to earlier, provides an entry point for concrete action (see map O.1). The clusters represent zones that share resources, services, and cultural values, often bound by clan and/or ethnic networks. The clusters also tend to be pastoral or agropastoral in nature. Some basic analysis has been completed: most of the Horn of Africa has been assessed using the Household Economy Approach, and livelihood zone maps have been prepared for each of the member countries (see Hammond 2017).

Bilateral, multilateral, and regional institutions support cross-border initiatives. Kenya and Ethiopia are piloting an integrated cross-border development program to tackle deficits in development and security. The IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative fosters regional collaboration on natural resource management, market access and trade, livelihood support, and conflict prevention. The African Union’s Border Program

aims to promote “peaceful, open and prosperous borders” (AU Peace and Security 2018). The African Union is committed to instituting a system of electronic passports to facilitate visa-free movement in the continent by 2020, although it is unclear whether this will be achievable. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has provided €63 million for cross-border activities, focusing on stability in the four IGAD clusters. The European Union is also supporting research to better understand the dynamics of cross-border economies as zones of common livelihood practice. And finally, the Horn of Africa Regional Resilience Network of the United States Agency for International Development seeks to strengthen regional and cross-border collaboration to expand livelihood opportunities, strengthen governance, and improve human capital.

At the bilateral level, trade, mobility, and cooperation agreements impact cross-border dynamics. In 2013, Kenya and Uganda signed a memorandum of understanding that harmonized the assessment and control of transboundary animal diseases. They have also established a harmonized regulatory and customs system for trade.

Despite the number of regional and donor-supported initiatives, tensions between regional and national action persist. National agricultural policies tend to favor sedentary agriculture and commercialization, often at the expense of pastoralism. The expansion of extractive industries—and even national parks for conservation purposes—reduces the land available to pastoralists, forcing many into less sustainable livelihood choices, including participation in armed groups. Further, national security policies often result in the tightening of borders, which restricts trade and pastoralist activities.

In the absence of a focused approach to the borderlands, national and regional initiatives remain mostly uncoordinated. A clear opening therefore exists to strengthen regional cooperation through a dedicated borderlands approach. The precise institutional configuration for engaging in the borderlands also remains open for discussion.

### Relevant Initiatives within the World Bank

Some recent World Bank initiatives have taken up the issues identified in the background papers presented here, including an updated regional integration strategy for Africa; a World Bank strategy on fragility, conflict, and violence that is the process of being finalized; and a new Horn of Africa initiative. The findings of these papers are relevant to all of these initiatives. For example, the draft fragility, conflict, and violence strategy builds on the joint United Nations/World Bank report, *Pathways for Peace* (2018), which emphasizes inclusion as a key value to mitigate the drivers of conflict (UN and World Bank 2018). The findings of the papers presented here can help influence how the strategy is operationalized on the ground, especially in terms of preventing violent conflict and/or interpersonal violence, helping countries transition out of fragility, and mitigating spillover effects. In particular, both the draft World Bank strategy and the background papers recognize the need to take a spatial approach in addressing fragility at the community, subnational, and regional levels and in tackling cross-border challenges.

The World Bank's new Horn of Africa Initiative has four pillars of engagement. The first focuses on regional infrastructure networks covering

economic corridors, energy transmission, and steps toward the formation of a single digital market. The second focuses on trade and economic integration and aims to facilitate trade in priority corridors, develop regional value chains, and improve the investment climate. The third pillar, which focuses on resilience and climate change, is aimed at building resilience to climatic shocks. And the focus of the fourth pillar is the development of human capital. The borderlands papers can provide useful programmatic insights for each of the four pillars as the initiative progresses.

### Recommendations for Action

Addressing the security and development deficits in the borderlands will require integrated action on three fronts (summarized table O.2). First, regional collaboration at the policy and institutional levels is needed to ease the flow of capital, labor, goods, and services. Second, to mitigate the impact of geographic isolation and neglect, investments are needed in basic infrastructure and social services, such as roads, energy, education, health, water, information and communications technology, and access to finance. Finally, given the quality of governance and presence of conflict, there is a risk that investments will not be sustained. Hence, formal and informal institutions should be supported to strengthen collaborative border management and their capacity for conflict management and violence prevention. Needless to say, all interventions need to be extremely sensitive to the gendered nature of livelihood and resilience strategies across the Horn of Africa, as well as the gendered impact of conflict, insecurity, and violence.

**Table O.2. Supporting Development and Stability in the Borderlands**

Strategic development challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Borderlands are isolated, poor, and insecure.</li> <li>• Access is limited to infrastructure, social services, and livelihoods.</li> <li>• Freedom of movement for people and goods is essential to livelihoods and survival but is restricted by some states for security reasons, creating the need for regional collaboration to deal with cross-border issues.</li> <li>• Governance systems are hybrid and often weak.</li> </ul>	
<b>Programmatic response</b>	<b>Short-Term</b>	<b>Medium to Long-Term</b>
Regional integration and collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support regional dialogue through IGAD and the African Union for cross-border management of natural resources, including water and grazing land.</li> <li>• Provide technical support to IGAD to manage the regional dialogue.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expand regional dialogue to harmonize policies on trade and freedom of movement.</li> <li>• Build capacity for collaborative border management of the movement of people and livestock and of security threats.</li> </ul>
Strengthening social contracts through infrastructure and social and economic services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Invest in basic services—health, education, and water—including through cross-border planning and sharing of resources in identified livelihood zones.</li> <li>• Support community-based projects for climate change adaptation.</li> <li>• Expand investment in transport, energy, and mobile phone coverage for market linkages and to promote private sector development.</li> <li>• Provide livelihood assistance, particularly focused on agropastoralism and informal cross-border trade.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expand Internet connectivity.</li> <li>• Expand skills-based livelihood programs for youth.</li> <li>• Support access to finance, including through e-banking.</li> </ul>
Strengthening local institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build the capacity of formal and informal institutions to manage economic activity and conflict.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support cross-border collaboration for development planning and shared investments in infrastructure and basic services.</li> </ul>
Coordination and partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partner with IGAD Secretariat and African Union for regional dialogue and collaboration.</li> <li>• Conduct joint analytical and operational work with Horn of Africa Initiative development partners.</li> <li>• Establish private sector reference group to advise on investments and job creation.</li> </ul>	

IGAD = Intergovernmental Authority on Development.



The borderlands approach seeks to address the drivers of fragility in the Horn of Africa based on the following principles:

- Facilitate mobility and trade as central to livelihoods in the region;
- Prioritize the poor and vulnerable, particularly youths and women;
- Support preparedness to minimize mixed migration; and
- Follow a community-driven approach to promote participation and transparency.

Cross-border initiatives need to be multisectoral and must address livelihoods, institutions, and stability/security in the following areas:

- Regional cooperation to strengthen and harmonize policies for the movement of people and goods that builds on the draft Protocol on the Free Movement of People and to promote the joint management of resources and development planning;
- Establishment and strengthening of social contracts between states and borderland communities by investing in infrastructure and social and economic services;
- Local and community-based climate change adaptation;
- Local livelihood opportunities, focused on at-risk youths and women; and
- Support to formal and informal institutions for social cohesion and conflict prevention.

## Regional Cooperation and Integration

Additional support to existing development initiatives is needed, including those formulated by IGAD and the African Union on borderlands, to strengthen platforms for dialogue as well as technical capacities aimed at: (1) harmonizing policies on trade and freedom of movement, including by building on lessons from other countries and regional economic communities; (2) promoting the shared management of water and land resources; and (3) facilitating cross-border development planning for shared investments in infrastructure and social and economic services.

## Infrastructure and Social and Economic Services

Regional transport and energy infrastructure are poor in the Horn of Africa, which exacerbates the impact of isolation and hinders trade and investment. Transportation links could facilitate private investment, connect smaller markets, and support livestock routes. Access to power is limited and needs to be expanded in rural areas and secondary cities. Expanding information and communications technology services, such as mobile phone coverage and Internet connectivity, would reduce isolation and improve access to information on markets and climate.

Shared investments in health and education require cross-border planning and resource sharing among local governments. Many children from Somalia and Ethiopia, for example, attend school in Kenya, where the quality of education is thought to be higher. Greater use of shared services could maximize limited resources.

## Adaptation to Climate Change

Because of the region's vulnerability, all activities under a borderlands approach must be climate-informed. Community-based projects are a viable means of supporting climate change adaptation, and many local civil society organizations have the capacity to support communities. Local government capacity for cross-border collaboration on climate change adaptation could be enhanced.

## Supporting Livelihood Opportunities

Agriculture and pastoralism are the bedrock livelihoods of the Horn of Africa and must be the focus of livelihood assistance to the region. Support could include the following:

- **Informal cross-border trading to help small traders and to build the private sector base for future growth and development.** This could also act as a hook for greater regional integration or cross-border cooperation, as the example of COMESA illustrates.
- **Alternative cross-border, market-based livelihood projects, including for youth.** Projects should seek to improve livelihoods, strengthen livelihood resilience, and increase incomes, primarily through skills that support wage employment and self-employment in the traditional agropastoralism sectors and that respond to market demand. There should be a focus on youth, given the high levels of unemployment and the risk of their being pulled into crime and violence.
- **Access to finance.** This effort could include e-banking to harness the growing levels of mobile phone ownership.

## Strengthening Institutions

Community-based institutions continue to play an important role in managing economic activity and dispute resolution. While the traditional leaders' authority is being eroded by youths in armed and criminal groups, they still retain considerable sociocultural capital. Supporting local leaders by enhancing their mediation and conflict resolution skills can help manage conflict in this fragile region, including economic disputes and gender-based violence.

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Five background papers were commissioned by the World Bank to examine the analytical and policy implications of a borderlands perspective for the World Bank and other national and international policy makers. Since these papers were commissioned over an extended period, they have been lightly updated by a World Bank editorial team to account for specific empirical changes that may have taken place in the interim.

The five papers are:

1. Laura Hammond (2017). "Livelihood and Mobility in the Border Regions of the Horn of Africa."
  2. Dereje Feyissa Dori (2016). "Resilience and Development Assistance in the Horn of Africa's Borderlands and Lagging Regions."
  3. Patta Scott-Villiers (2015). "Cross-Border Dynamics in the Kenya–Ethiopia Borderlands Cluster."
  4. Kristin Bushby and Elizabeth Stites (2015). "Cross-Border Dynamics in the Uganda–Kenya–South Sudan Borderlands Cluster."
  5. Jonathan Goodhand (2014). "Fragility and Resilience Analysis: The Political Economy of Development in Borderlands."
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# **Background Paper 1.**

## Livelihoods and Mobility in the Border Regions of the Horn of Africa

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*July 2017*



Photo: Flore de Preneuf | World Bank



## 1.1. Introduction

### 1.1.1. Rationale

This paper provides a risk and resilience-based diagnostic designed to better understand the determinants of human mobility and movements of people in the Horn of Africa. Special focus is given to analyzing how environmental and demographic factors interact with the drivers of migration in border regions, especially with respect to youth and women, as well as their economic activities, including cross-border trade.

The rationale for the paper is to develop an approach to targeted analysis and programming in border areas to more explicitly identify the drivers of different types of mobility, including displacement, environment-induced migration, economic migration, and urbanization. All of these forms of mobility are closely tied to the social and economic dynamics of border regions. Migration can be an indicator of distress, vulnerability, and a livelihood crisis, but can also be a valuable feature of livelihood systems well-suited to the environment.

The diagnostic developed here approaches mobility as a continuum. It recognizes that, in many instances, mobility is an essential coping strategy but that it can also be problematic and undermine resilience. Sometimes, mobility initiated as a positive coping strategy can become unsafe, such as when economic migrants fall victim to trafficking networks en route. What is key in programming in areas where mobility takes place is to focus on facilitating conditions that will improve protection and open up greater possibilities for choice. If people have the resources and

freedom to choose for themselves whether to move or remain in place, they will be less vulnerable and will be able to make safer, more resilient choices. Moreover, even when people are forced to move, facilitating conditions that improve their protection can open up new choices, such as around their ability to work, that could increase their resilience.

The paper builds on the available data and research on borderlands, mobility, livelihoods, resilience, and vulnerability, especially that focused on the Horn of Africa. It draws on recent work commissioned by the World Bank (see *Approach and Methodology* below) in addition to other sources. The diagnostic offered here is adapted from the Drivers of Migration Framework from the 2011 Foresight project, which seeks to explain the basis on which decisions about mobility are made. This paper considers the ways in which prevalent livelihood practices in border regions and factors such as demographic and environmental change, macroeconomic volatility, trade dynamics, and conflict shape mobility patterns. Available data on livelihoods and mobility, as well as on demographics are considered in the context of the diagnostic. The analysis considers how these factors impact youth and women's livelihoods, including their engagement in cross-border trade.

Borderland areas are often the visible manifestation of economic, social, and political marginality, where vulnerability and insecurity are greatest. Governance is often weakest in these regions and where evident is often in the form of security or immigration control rather than service provision or protection of personal or economic freedoms.

Extending engagement to these areas through economic integration and inclusion is a major challenge for states and for their regional and international partners. Creating linkages with neighboring states could promote resilience in borderland regions, but actualizing such a plan would be difficult.

The growing body of literature and analysis of the political economy and livelihood conditions in borderland areas (e.g., Goodhand 2014 and Hagmann and Stepputat 2016), has yet to focus on the role of mobility—within the borderlands and across borders—as a source of vulnerability and resilience. The approach presented here addresses this gap by putting borderlands at the center of the analysis and by incorporating mobility as a key feature of livelihoods and coping strategies.

### 1.1.2. The World Bank's Horn of Africa Initiative

This paper comes at a time when the international community is focused on finding more effective approaches to borderland and marginal areas. The 2014 Horn of Africa Initiative, which involves the World Bank Group, the Islamic Development Bank, the African Union, the European Union (EU), the African Development Bank, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), aims at improving resilience in marginal areas through calibrated development initiatives in borderland and lagging regions. The initiative identified key issues for consideration, including insecurity, trafficking of arms, growing populations in protracted displacement, conflict over natural and mineral resources, neglect of periphery

areas, and growing pressure on host communities and border landscapes. It was built on two inter-related pillars to address key drivers of instability and promote development in the Horn of Africa : (1) vulnerability and resilience; and (2) economic opportunity and integration.

Recently, the World Bank began holding discussions with the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to address the root causes of irregular migration, displacement, and conflict in the borderlands of the Horn of Africa. This collaboration represents an early application of joined-up thinking that may apply to other countries and regions.

The Horn of Africa Initiative is the largest component in a move toward enhancing regional collaboration to focus development policies and investments in community, institutional, and economic resilience into cross-border clusters. As part of the initiative, the World Bank and its partners are engaged in work on places they call “lagging lands” (regions which are economically isolated and continue to witness high levels of violence), which seeks to create opportunities for narrowing the economic distance between more prosperous areas and populations and those that are situated at the margins (see the discussion in Baare et al 2017). IGAD is currently implementing a €63 million project funded by the EU Trust Fund for Africa that will create linkages for greater resilience in the borderlands of the Horn of Africa.

### 1.1.3. Structure of the Paper

In this paper, the interactions between livelihoods, mobility, and resilience in the border regions of the Horn of Africa are examined in

detail, with a view toward developing a practical conceptual model that can be used for early warning and resilience programming and for disaster risk reduction. The diagnostic takes the mobility of resident populations, as well as those who might not normally be residents but who might sometimes rely on border regions, such as internally displaced people and refugees, as major features of the socioeconomic landscape of border regions rather than as aberrations of the status quo.

The paper considers border regions from the perspective of livelihood zones, in which common livelihood activities and access to shared or complementary resources are central organizing themes of people's lives. These commonalities help determine the movement of people within, into, and out of the border zones. To a large extent, they also shape their social relations and interactions with the environment, which in turn determine the degree of economic integration and resilience that people are able to achieve. The document reviews relevant theoretical and empirical literature relating to sustainable livelihoods and household economies, mobility decision making, and disaster resilience.

This diagnostic is developed with a firm eye toward providing project managers and policy makers with a tool to help guide their engagement in border areas. It considers the ways in which an understanding of livelihoods and mobility can apply to programming for climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and resilience, and provision of support to mobile populations and those affected by mobility.

#### 1.1.4. Approach and Methodology

This paper refers to available literature on borderlands and mobility in the Horn of Africa, including the other World Bank-commissioned papers presented in this report: "Resilience and Development Assistance in the Horn of Africa's Borderlands and Lagging Regions," which examines why a borderlands approach to development matters for the Horn of Africa (Feyissa 2016); and "Cross-Border Dynamics in the Kenya–Ethiopia Borderlands Cluster" (Scott-Villiers 2015b) and "Cross-Border Dynamics in the Uganda–Kenya–South Sudan Borderlands Cluster" (Bushby and Stites 2015), which provide rich empirical cases for the North Turkana (Kenya)–South Omo (Ethiopia) and the Karamoja clusters, respectively.

The paper also considers other academic and policy-oriented literature relating to borderland dynamics, livelihood security, and resilience, as well as livelihood-related data from the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), trade flow information, and data on mobility available from International Organization for Migration, the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

### 1.2. Regional Context

Before focusing on the specific dynamics of borderlands in the Horn of Africa, it is necessary to consider some of the wider characteristics of the region.

**Poverty is pervasive and gendered.** Seventy percent of the region's population live in rural areas. The countries of the region sit at the bottom of the


Human Development Index. Kenya is ranked 142 and South Sudan 187 out of 189 countries (Somalia is not included).<sup>1</sup> Forty-one percent of the region's pastoralist population lives in poverty (World Bank 2014; see for comparison Feyissa 2016: 3). Poverty is highly gendered, particularly in places where women do not have full control or access to property and income.

**Population growth and high fertility rates contribute to the youth bulge.** Population growth in the region, as throughout much of the rest of Africa, has been rising in recent years. The average population growth rate for the region is 3 percent, and the population doubles every 23 years, complicating efforts to reduce absolute poverty rates (World Bank 2014: 7). Figure 1.1 shows the sharp population growth since 1960.

The youth bulge poses challenges to education, employment, and service sectors throughout the region (Agbor et al. 2016). Large numbers of unemployed young people are commonly associated with increased mobility and with insecurity, as they move from areas where opportunities are scarce to places where they expect to access resources (RMMS 2016; Feyissa 2016). Many of the region's countries are plagued by conflict, and those dynamics spill across borders and affect neighboring countries, causing instability, economic decline, and population displacement. As Goodhand (2014) argues, "borderland blindness" and "methodological nationalism" prevents a complete understanding of conflict dynamics and impedes the engagement with the drivers of conflict and its implications.

1. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>.


**Figure 1.1. Population Growth in the Horn of Africa since 1960 (Actual and Projected)**



Source: <http://na.unep.net/geas/get> (cited in Feyissa 2016).

Mobility and displacement are drivers of and reactions to development challenges, conflict, political violence, and political persecution. The Horn of Africa is one of the world's main sites of displacement. As of mid-2018, more than 3.7 million refugees and asylum seekers have been displaced in the region, and its countries continued to receive refugees and asylum seekers in 2019—both from the region and from neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Yemen. Refugee camps and informal settlements tend to be located in the region's borderlands. Camps are effectively urban settlements and as such they shape the local economy of the border regions in significant ways, creating market opportunities as well as competition for resources with local host populations.

### Map 1.1. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Horn of Africa



Sources: UNHCR and IDMC databases. IDMC data is from end 2017 and differs from the data produced by UNHCR as to internal displacement. UNHCR's data on internal displacement, as of mid-2018, for the countries in the Horn of Africa are: Djibouti—n.a.; Eritrea—n.a.; Ethiopia—1,204,577; Kenya—n.a.; Somalia—2,648,000; South Sudan—1,849,835; Sudan—1,997,022; Uganda—n.a. UNHCR's data was used in the text, but IDMC data on internally displaced persons was used to generate the maps. The difference in numbers reflects the broader differences among methodologies used to count displaced persons.

Food insecurity and conflict are major drivers of displacement in the Horn of Africa, and they are interrelated. Famine was declared in South Sudan in 2017. At that time, according to the World Food Programme (WFP 2017a) an estimated 5 million people needed emergency food assistance. Parts of South Sudan, including areas falling within or bordering the Karamoja cluster,

continue to experience great food insecurity to the present (Bushby and Stites 2015). In March 2017, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 2,800 refugees were crossing the border from South Sudan into Uganda every day (OCHA 2017a); since July 2016, Uganda has been hosting more than 1 million refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo and



South Sudan.<sup>2</sup> In 2017 famine seemed imminent in Somalia as well: at the time, 6.2 million people were thought to be in need of emergency assistance and 2.9 million were considered highly food insecure. In April 2017 the World Food Programme reported that 363,000 children in the country under five years old were acutely malnourished (WFP 2017b), and over 600,000 people had been displaced in the five months between November 2016 and April 2017 (OCHA 2017b; ACTED 2017). Although famine was averted through concerted humanitarian and international interventions, the drought devastated Somalia's economy and livelihoods and caused the widespread internal displacement of people who moved into cities where they could probably access humanitarian aid and support (see Sarkar and Serrière 2019; Randa and Musuku 2018; Hagmann et al. 2018).

**While these emergencies have been exacerbated by repeated failures of the rains, famine and extreme food insecurity are also tied to insecurity and unrest in both South Sudan and Somalia.** Both emergencies were exacerbated by generalized violence, lack of humanitarian access, and weak governance as demonstrated by local authorities—factors that make prevention and response extremely difficult and that spread suffering.

**Environmental hazards and degradation are linked to poverty and mobility.** Such changes generate mobility within a region, as people move—generally across short distances due to their levels of destitution—in search of a more sustainable resource base. The African Development Bank estimates that, between 2016 and 2020, 60 million

people are likely to migrate within the Sahel and the Horn of Africa as a result of land degradation (African Development Bank, OECD, and UNDP 2016). These numbers are difficult to verify because environmental change results in a variety of outcomes that influence access to resources and thereby contribute to mobility and displacement in myriad ways. Tracking a clear path of causation between a particular form of movement and environmental drivers is usually difficult.

**Environmental hazards in the borderlands typically involve erratic and decreasing rainfall, land degradation, and changes in flood seasons.** Bushby and Stites (2015) discuss the impact that unpredictable rainfall has had on the Karamoja cluster, even in areas where pastoralist livelihoods—which have developed to make most efficient use of scarce water resources—are prevalent.

“Frequent drought and the erosion of long-standing coping strategies have increased community level conflict. This is true in the case of the Turkana and Merille of Ethiopia, among whom tensions have arisen over access to fisheries in Lake Turkana.” (Bushby and Stites 2015: 13)

In the face of environmental change, supplementary resources like fisheries are increasingly vital to pastoral and agropastoral communities.

**Climate change has knock-on effects on urbanization.** The effects of declining rainfall have also been linked to urbanization. Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl (2006: 367) estimate that a 1 percent fall in precipitation is linked to a 0.45 percent increase in Sub-Saharan urbanization rates, resulting from a

2. See [http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/5129#\\_ga=2.75538453.1005375567.1555005246-825903876.1554680914](http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/5129#_ga=2.75538453.1005375567.1555005246-825903876.1554680914).

loss of productivity in rural areas. But while urbanization can lead to greater urban productivity if there is an adequate industrial base, most countries in the Horn of Africa, like much of Sub-Saharan Africa, do not have a sufficiently industrialized export base to effectively benefit from increasing urban populations (ADB, OECD, and UNDP 2016: 17; Henderson, Storeygard, and Deichman 2014).

**Climate change vulnerability is not only associated with those pursuing rural livelihoods.** Environmental changes and degradation also negatively impact urban areas so moving into a city does not mean an escape from the impacts of climate change. Urban residents may experience a decline in the availability of drinking water, the conditions for urban agriculture may degrade and some settlements could be vulnerable to floods and other weather-related events. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the anticipated increases in urban populations in the Horn of Africa countries.


**Table 1.1. Projected Increases in Urban Populations in the Countries of the Horn of Africa**

Country	Urban Population 2015 (thousands)	Projected Urban Population 2050 (thousands)
Djibouti	718	1,107
Eritrea	1,852	5776
Ethiopia	19,403	74,537
Kenya	12,180	44,185
Somalia	6,015	22,865
South Sudan	2,240	9,132
Sudan	13,099	42,261
Uganda	8,856	46,664

Source: UN DESA 2018.

**Urbanization affects both major and secondary cities.** Much of the trend toward urbanization involves people moving into secondary cities rather than large capital cities. In 2014, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs reported that “the fastest-growing agglomerations are medium-sized cities and cities with 500,000 to 1 million inhabitants located in Asia and Africa” (UN DESA 2014). Large cities—cities of 5–10 million inhabitants—accounted for only 6 percent of the world’s urban population in 2014, and are expected to grow to 9 percent by 2030 (UN DESA 2014). Figure 1.2 shows the relative significance of large cities as compared with small- and medium-sized cities in Africa and other regions of the world.

**Some countries in the Horn of Africa are responding to the increasing pressure on secondary cities with investments in infrastructure and employment opportunities.** Ethiopia is embarking on an ambitious plan to develop industrial parks in several of its secondary cities to provide employment for people in and around the urban areas. Some of the parks include plans to hire refugee labor—the first time for such scheme. However, in many places, urban governance structures are poorly equipped to respond to the challenges of the rapid expansion of secondary cities. In Ethiopia, where resources are allocated and local administrations formed on the basis of population strength under a federal system, the rapid urbanization of secondary cities is deeply political; leaders of rival ethnic groups have encouraged migration into cities such as Dire Dawa in an attempt to consolidate their control over the city (Feyissa, Midega, and Wakjira 2018; Midega 2017). In borderland towns like Moyale, this has led to outright conflict and internal displacement (Scott-Villiers 2015a).

**Figure 1.2. Population Distribution by Size of City in 2014**

Source: UN DESA 2014

In addition to focusing on larger cities, most urban development in newer cities caters to higher-income residents instead of the poor. This creates what the African Development Bank calls “a periphery of low-income neighborhoods.” UN-Habitat (2014) attributes this to inappropriate urban development strategies and a lack of governance capacity in secondary cities (see for comparison ADB, OECD, and UNDP 2016).

**Pastoralism, a major feature of livelihood systems in many border regions, depends on access to grazing and markets across borders in addition to a stable natural resource base.** Feyissa (2016) estimates the total pastoral population of the region to be more than 155 million. For many pastoralists, increasing population and challenges to the natural resource base brought on by environmental changes, development interventions such as large-scale infrastructure projects, and restrictions to cross-border mobility spur them to find ways of diversifying their livelihoods. Such diversification may involve moving into urban

areas, either permanently or temporarily if conditions permit engaging in agricultural activities. Says Feyissa (2016: 4):

“The push factors in pastoral areas can combine with pull factors from urban centres, which may offer alternative and less risky or easier lifestyles and job opportunities, as well as better education and health services.”

Where such diversification is not possible, people may:

“... fall out of pastoralism [and] use various and potentially damaging livelihood strategies, including nonsustainable use of natural resources, such as cutting trees for charcoal production and sale, sending daughters to work as house servants in towns, thereby exposing them to risk of abuse; engaging in illegal contraband trade; and criminal activity such as ‘organised livestock raiding’ or banditry.”

**The impact of urbanization in pastoral areas is transforming the historically rural character of poverty.** Scott-Villiers notes that “some of the fastest growing towns in Kenya and Ethiopia are in its pastoral districts (Scott-Villiers 2015a). In the Somali Region of Ethiopia, for example, the annual rate of urban growth between 2006 and 2008 was 4.69 percent, compared with the rural growth rate in Somali Region of 2.25 percent and to an average national urban growth rate of 4.4 percent. Similar rates are reported for Oromia and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region (HPG 2010: 18).

**Official trade relations between individual countries within the region range from officially nonexistent (Eritrea and Ethiopia) to close and integrated (Kenya and Uganda).** Ethiopia is pursuing stronger trade links with Somalia and Somaliland, including a joint venture with the latter to develop the port of Berbera with the private company DP World. Unofficial trade is widely believed to be more significant in terms of value and numbers of people involved than formal trade; and it exists even where formal trade links are weak or nonexistent.

### 1.3. Borderlands in the Horn

**Livelihood systems in the Horn of Africa cross, defy, and exploit international borders.** Pastoral communities rely on shared livestock management practices; the shared use of grassland and water resources; mobility patterns that respond to seasonal variations in resource use; trade links; and the spread of information about weather, prices, and the availability of water (Pavanello 2009). Many agricultural communities take advantage of their proximity to the border by marketing

their produce in the towns and cities on the other side of it or by attracting cross-border seasonal labor (see section 1.4: *Trade*).

**The environment of the border regions is generally characterized by pronounced vulnerability to degradation and poverty.** Environmental hazards are often spatially concentrated in border regions. It is here that droughts and floods provide the gravest threat to livelihood systems.

**The borderlands generally feature institutions that provide poor or uneven coverage of social services and weak engagement with development.** These vulnerabilities make promoting economic inclusion more difficult and complicates efforts at addressing the root causes of involuntary mobility and migration.

**Border regions are not particularly well understood in terms of development and resilience frameworks.** Frequently the opportunities and resources that do exist are not fully exploited because joined-up communication and coordination of services and approaches by states on both sides of a border is lacking. There is a resulting unevenness of opportunity that can negatively impact the livelihood outcomes of communities on both sides.

**Marginalization of areas in the periphery of states is commonly associated with development deficiencies, higher rates of violence, and sub-national conflicts (UNDP 2011; OECD 2015; World Bank 2016).** Marginalization and violence have a cyclical relationship: heightened insecurity complicates development work just as it disrupts trade links, mobility within and through border regions, and labor markets.

Border-area insecurity provides opportunities to actors who are intent on destabilization to infiltrate the borderlands and hinterlands of the targeted country. However, national security policies usually dictate how border issues are dealt with, and they do not often account for the perceptions of insecurity or the priorities of the local community (Goodhand 2014). Livelihood vulnerability can translate into additional physical insecurity, but these linkages are often not considered.

Despite these limitations, borderlands offer opportunities. The discovery of oil and other minerals such as gold has created the possibility of new extractive industries and the development of water resources in Ethiopia for export of electricity throughout the region has brought border areas into focus as sites of opportunity.

Borders can generate what Goodhand calls a “spatial discount,” where buyers, sellers, and employers can take advantage of the disparity in economic conditions that the differences among state regulatory regimes creates. In this way, “fields of opportunity” are created. Goodhand (2014: 9) observes: “These dynamics take place not just in the border but because of the border. The intensity of economic flows and relations may be greater across the border than with the metropolitan center within the state.”

Differing prices, wage rates, levels of security, degree of regulation and enforcement, availability of natural resources, quality of health or education systems, and access to markets in areas farther from the border also represent opportunities. As people navigate the borderlands and as they ultimately make decisions about mobility, all of these considerations come into play. For states,

borderlands become the focus of political and economic interest when they provide trade corridors for landlocked countries, available manpower for seasonal agricultural activities, and increased qualitative animal production for exports. What happens in border areas thus influences engagement by national and international policymakers on mobility, trade, security, resource development, and resilience work more broadly. Development and vulnerability reduction become key elements of a broader-based strategy.

The emphasis of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on inclusive growth demands that attention be given to borderlands. SDGs 1 and 13 address the need to promote resilience to climatic and environmental shocks. SDG 3 addresses the need for universal health coverage. And SDG 11 focuses on urbanization and promoting integration. These goals can be directly linked to borderland dynamics. It can be argued that inclusive growth is not possible without addressing the extreme inequalities that exist in the border areas, and extending the reach of governance and service provision to these areas will help countries chart successes in terms of the goals. The SDGs also directly mention migration in ways that are relevant to borderlands. Better management of migration is referenced in SDG 10 and SDGs 5, 8, and 16, which are focused on combatting trafficking. These provisions underscore the need to have a borderland-oriented development approach.

## 1.4. Trade

One main benefit of correctly managed borders is the enhancement of regional trade. This section briefly reviews the state of trade relations in the region and the role of informal trade, particularly their impact on border regions.



**Intraregional trade is growing but is hampered by a range of factors.** Intraregional exports among the IGAD countries was estimated at US\$1.9 billion in 2011, a 4 percent decline in the share of overall intraregional export since 2000 (Seid 2013). Reasons for this decline include a lack of infrastructure to connect the countries of the subregion and the fact that the countries tend to produce similar commodities.<sup>3</sup> Kenya was the largest exporter in the region; Uganda was the largest importer (Feyissa 2016). Intraregional trade has been hampered by weak economies; political instability; conflict; limited trade complementarities among competing countries; and overlapping memberships in regional groups, resulting in duplication of efforts, unnecessary competition among institutions, economic imbalances among members, and losses from inefficient or ineffective taxation systems and tariff barriers (Feyissa 2016).

**Despite these challenges, the prospect for greater regional economic integration through trade and regularized mobility is considerable.** Accelerators of regional economic linkages and trade could include improving and expanding transport links, including corridors to the major seaports and secondary seaports; the power sector in Ethiopia; and LAPSET (Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport), a major regional transportation infrastructure project. Efforts likely to increase cross-border trading include improving the management of shared water resources and the common management of pastoral rangelands and promoting the free movement of people in the borderlands. Such logic underlies the ongoing process of finalizing and ratifying the Protocol on

3. See "The IGAD Region" at <https://igad.int/index.php/about-us/the-igad-region>.

the Free Movement of People.<sup>4</sup> In fact, a regional integration index produced by the African Union, the African Development Bank, and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa found that, compared with other regional economic communities in Africa, IGAD's regional infrastructure was better integrated and that trade integration was about the same as the average level of trade integration but lagged behind others in facilitating the free movement of people across the region and in terms of financial and macroeconomic integration (AU, ADB, and UNECA 2016).

**As significant as these formal and large-scale developments are, it is the informal sector that provides the most opportunities for communities in border areas.** Informal trade far outweighs the significance of formal trade in most of the region's corridors. Trade in livestock, khat, cereals, second-hand clothing and consumer goods either produced in the region or imported from outside the region (particularly the Gulf states) and then moved farther inland constitute essential sources of income for people who live in border communities.

**Informal cross-border trade is particularly important to women. IGAD claims that more than half of the region's informal cross-border traders are women.**<sup>5</sup> According to Feyissa (2016), "in Kenya 80 percent of women cross-border traders rely on that trade as their sole source of income." Aklilu et al.'s (2013) work on pastoral economies shows that

4. The finalization of this protocol is the focus of a €10 million EU Trust Fund project run by the Better Migration Management Programme. See [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf05-hoa-reg-19-igad-towards-free-movement-of-persons-and-transhumance\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf05-hoa-reg-19-igad-towards-free-movement-of-persons-and-transhumance_en.pdf).

5. See "The IGAD Region" at <https://igad.int/index.php/about-us/the-igad-region>.

milk sales in Kenya's border communities represented 34–57 percent of total household incomes, much more than actual livestock sales at 8–20 percent (variations of estimates related to herd size). Because it is perishable, the market for milk is local, with women typically controlling production and sales. However, milk supply depends on the availability of pasture and water so “herders will pursue strategies, such as mobility, that enhance herd (milk) production and reproduction rather than livestock sales, unless there is a significant change in the returns to these activities and/or increased demand for cash for expenditure purposes” (Little, Dejene, and Waktole 2014: 390).

The work of Bushby and Stites (2015) in the Karamoja cluster explores the role of women in service-oriented occupations like domestic work and cleaning in addition to higher-risk occupations such as sex work. Also discussed is the growing role of women in firewood sales, an activity primarily done for household consumption a generation ago, due to the diminishing viability of pastoral and agropastoral activities.

As Feyissa (2016) notes, “a critical indicator for food security in the border areas is the terms of trade between what herders receive for their products (livestock) and what they must pay to purchase needed grains (such as maize flour and sorghum)”. New tools available through World Bank-supported initiatives in South Sudan and Somalia provide real-time price information help to inform early warning of food insecurity. They may also inform projections of in what directions and at what times mobility may occur. Widening gaps in terms of trade such as those seen in 2017, particularly between livestock and cereals,

is a reliable indicator of increased risk of food insecurity.<sup>6</sup>

**Mobility is essential to the circulation of goods through regional trade.** Little (2013), Mahmoud (2010), and Hagmann and Stepputat (2016) all stress the significance of cross-border trade to the regional distribution of food and other essential resources, and for the export of cash crops, livestock, and other commodities. The estimated value of cattle, goats, sheep, and camels from Ethiopia sold across the border in Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti is US\$?250–300 million in 2009 (Pavanello 2009 citing COMESA 2009). Extremely restrictive border management can threaten the circulation of key economic resources, disadvantaging people living in the border zones as well as people further down the market chain who depend on the goods. Vegetables grown in the agropastoral zones of Ethiopia, for example, are traded at borderland markets for ultimate distribution in Southern Somalia. Border blockages can sever the market chains that deliver goods to as far away as Mogadishu.

**When states seek to block avenues for informal trade in an attempt to boost revenues from the formal sector, cross-border trade is hampered.** Feyissa (2016) discusses the efforts of the Ethiopian government to clamp down on “unofficial trade” in livestock, which was estimated to be “up to ten times the value of officially recorded trade.” This has been done through securitization of the borders, seizure of tradable goods and livestock, and other controls.

6. For South Sudan, see World Bank 2016. For Somalia, see World Bank 2017. Additional market information is available through the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in most countries of the region.

Recently, states in the region have been introducing measures to convert informal trade to more formal trade. Ethiopia and Sudan have agreed that small traders can make 48 cross-border trips per year with goods valued at a maximum of US\$117 per trip. Ethiopia has also taken steps to allow small-scale cross-border trade with Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia by specifying an upper limit for some goods, as well as the number of crossings and the distance from border posts where trade is permitted. Ethiopia views this mechanism as effective for settling conflicts, and has made strengthening cross-border trade a major part of its second growth and transformation plan (2015–20) (Feyissa 2016: 18).

**Such steps will benefit traders able to obtain licenses but could squeeze out others who cannot, particularly women.** Scott-Villiers' study of the Kenya–Ethiopia cluster notes that women are disproportionately affected by government efforts at formalizing trade routes, because they cannot operate at sufficient scale to take advantage of the formalization and because their profit margins are too small to cover the costs associated with working through formal channels (Scott-Villiers 2015a: 6) (see section 5.2 on women's informal cross-border trade).

**The significance of trade to borderland livelihoods is highly dependent on security conditions and on the extent to which states regulate border crossings.** Along the Ethiopia–Somali border,

“Tougher restrictions on unlicensed cross-border trade in recent years, the volatile security situation in Somalia with the growth of Al-Shabaab, and the development of an asphalt road between Jigjiga and Gode town have changed the trade routes for imported food and non-food items in

the southern zones. Five years ago, most goods were coming across what was—at the time—a highly porous border with Somalia; but today most goods come through a single route (Wajale-Jigjiga) via licensed traders and associations. From Gode market goods are distributed onward throughout the southern livelihood zones. On the Somalia side, products which used to flow smoothly across the border to markets like Beletweyne and Mogadishu are now less likely to be transported due to the changing security situation at the border. Trade routes for livestock have shifted to Gode-Degahbur, from which most are exported to Somaliland through Wajale or taken directly to Hargeisa” (FEG 2015: 5).

**Trade relations also depend on broader regional dynamics.** Little, Debsu and Tiki 2014: 392) note that, following the devastating drought of 2011, demand for livestock increased in Kenya, creating opportunities for the Ethiopian livestock market. At the same time, the development of meat processing facilities in Ethiopia for export to the Middle East created demand for Kenyan livestock in Ethiopia.

**Cross-border trade networks involve complex networks of kin, clan, and occupational specialists.** Scott-Villiers (2015a), citing work by Umar and Baulch (2005), notes that:

“... most trade links cover relatively short spans, after which the stock or goods are handed over to another actor in the marketing chain. This, they explain, is because local relations are essential in handling dealings with officials, warlords, and other authorities, which might otherwise disrupt the passage of goods.”

Such localized trade links create a web of what Scott-Villiers calls “low-paid but vital opportunities for informal employment and profit in the facilitation, brokerage and arbitrage of transactions” (Scott-Villiers 2015a: 5).

Throughout the region, women traders are often disadvantaged in negotiations with men. However, women may have an advantage when negotiating with kin in patrilineal societies where women form the links between clans or ethnic groups.

### 1.5. Mobility in Border Regions

Population mobility is a key livelihood strategy in **borderlands**. Where pastoralism is the dominant livelihood, people must be able to move over a wide area to access essential resources for themselves and for their herds. Constraining pastoralist movement leads to overgrazing, depletion of the surface water table, and long-term degradation of rangeland resources. While agropastoralism and irrigated agriculture is possible in some border areas, this is not the case for most of the border regions in the eastern part of the Horn of Africa, where the land is not suitable for sedentary agriculture, making their transhumant livelihood practice necessary. In the western regions along the Ethiopia–Sudan border, agricultural production depends on the mobility of agricultural labor, domestically and across borders.

The landmark 2011 Foresight report *Migration and Global Environmental Change* stresses that environmental change impacts livelihoods in ways that can lead to greater mobility as a form of adaptation to a challenged resource base. But these impacts can equally lead to less mobility if people cannot afford to move or pursue livelihood activities featuring mobility, such as pastoralism.

For them, a form of forced immobility may result, making them even more destitute and limiting their options for adaption. A clear understanding of livelihood resilience suggests that some kinds of migration and mobility are essential, and that they represent a positive feature of livelihood systems. Mobility that may be seen as more problematic is that which is undertaken at high cost or in the absence of any other viable options for meeting basic needs.

The key to understanding how mobility affects resilience and vulnerability is primarily the analysis of how mobility influences daily livelihood practices and in adaptations to shocks. It is less about tracking the flow of people on the move, although this is also important. If the role of different kinds of mobility in securing incomes or responding to shocks can be determined, it would then be possible to anticipate the movements that people may make when they are under livelihood-related stress.

A simple example illustrates the point. In the pastoral livelihood zones of Ethiopia’s Somali Region near the Kenya border, households derive 60–70 percent of their incomes from milk and ghee sales and 20–40 percent from livestock sales (amounts vary depending on the wealth group—those who are better off derive more of their income from livestock sales because their herds are larger). All of these activities depend on favorable rains and the ability to move livestock to available pasture and to be able to bring animals to market (milk sales are more local). Milk sales are not as significant among agropastoral groups, but still make up approximately 10 percent of total incomes, with livestock sales accounting for up to 40 percent. Mobility is more localized but is still needed for grazing and marketing. Agropastoral groups

depend on casual labor and self-employment, for which they require access to markets and towns, often across borders (Boudreau 2015). For each of these groups, mobility features differently as a livelihood strategy.

Such information can be useful in forming a picture of the likely impact of drought, the tightening (or opening) of borders for trade and transport, and the impact of future development projects, such as the proposed oil pipeline through the Somali Region of Ethiopia or the development of geothermal power around Lake Turkana.

**Movements of people can impact mobility.** For example, a large number of refugees in a given border area could influence the scale and direction of labor migration, just as displacement may be directed toward available centers of employment. Ethiopia's introduction of special economic zones—large industrial parks in Awassa, Dire Dawa, and Mekele—some of which have committed to employing refugee labor in addition to local recruiting, could become significant attractions for people, influencing their decisions around mobility.

Current international attention on population mobility focuses on the problem of “irregular” migration—people engaged in movement without adequate legal documentation. Border areas serve as key links for the routes of irregular migrants and displaced persons, and they are often places where smuggling and trafficking networks are active.

### 1.5.1. Typology of Mobility

**Mobility is usually a function of multiple drivers; it can be a challenge to categorize them.** This analysis uses a typology of mobility that shows “ideal” types aimed at enhancing understanding and targeting policies in particular ways. While such a typology can elucidate specific characteristics of the experience of mobility or the relevant policy response, it is important to realize that most migration is a function of multiple, overlapping drivers. The types provided below are commonly identified by public policy and in popular discourse. While they can be useful in framing policy options, examining the influence of multiple drivers and the overall protection context that influences people's movement choices, routes, and experiences of mobility is crucial.

*Livelihood mobility* refers to movement necessary to sustain a particular type of livelihood, such as pastoralism, shifting cultivation, or trade. This kind of mobility is a key form of resilience and, as such, policy and programming interventions that protect and support these are desirable. Development interventions frequently impose restrictions on the range of livelihood mobility options open to people. In the Horn of Africa, the establishment of commercial agriculture schemes, hydropower, and road construction have each had a major impact on livelihood mobility.

*Irregular migration* (sometimes erroneously referred to as *illegal migration*) usually refers to migration undertaken without legal documentation or right. It is a problematic term because migrants do not normally use it to refer to themselves or their movement. Moreover, even when people move without documentation, it can be



argued that their right to move is protected by international human rights law. *Irregular migration* and *irregular migrant* are terms used by states and development actors who are particularly concerned with controlling movement and migration.

Irregular migration and mobility can be useful to refer to the potential for protection weaknesses or needs that often accompany those who are on the move without legal documentation to prove their identity or to show that they have permission to move. In other words, often, people referred to as *irregular migrants* are actually *forced migrants* who were compelled to leave their homes in a rush or without full documentation. Lacking a safe and legal route, they might resort to smuggling and trafficking networks.

*Labor migration* refers to long-term movement for economic gain, to find a better job, or for an income-generating opportunity, as well as to seasonal movement to obtain temporary employment for supplemental income. Labor migration and mobility can be a regular feature of a livelihood system or could be adopted or intensified when the need arises, such as in response to environmental shocks.

The dynamics of labor migration are particularly evident among youth, as young people venture from their home areas in search of education, skills, and employment. The vast majority of young people migrating out of the Horn of Africa toward Europe and other international destinations are under 30 years old.

Labor migration can be highly feminized. While the flow of migrants into Europe, is predominately

young men, significant numbers of young women move to Gulf states to find employment as domestic workers (see section 5.2 below). The protection risks that they face—both from exploitative employers and immigration officials—are enormous.

*Population displacement, or forced migration*, refers to the involuntary movement of people as a result of violence, conflict, persecution, or other force. Such movement is often sudden and is the response to a crisis or a shock. People have likely been forced to move into uncertain host areas without taking their belongings, savings, or documentation with them. There are two categories of displaced people:

1. *Refugees*. Refugees are people who were forced to move across an international border in search of protection and adequate resources to survive. As of mid-2018 there were an estimated 3.7 million refugees living in the Horn of Africa.<sup>7</sup> Some receive assistance from their host country, UNHCR, and nongovernmental organizations, but many are unregistered and unassisted, which makes it difficult to estimate their numbers. Refugees displaced in the Horn are recognized in the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in the Horn of Africa (OAU 1969). If they leave the continent of Africa, they are recognized in the somewhat more restrictive United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol (UN 1951).

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7. UNHCR figures.

2. Internally displaced persons *fleeing violence or persecution*. This group may be displaced for reasons similar to those of refugees except they have not crossed an international border. UNHCR estimates that as of mid-2018, there were approximately 7.7 million internally displaced people in the region. Protection for the internally displaced is problematic; this population does not share the same level of protection as refugees because different legal instruments apply to them. However, the 1999 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and in some cases national legislation relating to internally displaced people does provide some protection.<sup>8</sup>

As of mid-2018, Uganda hosted the largest number of refugees—around 1.2 million, followed by Ethiopia with 0.9 million. Table 1.2 shows the breakdown in some of the region's largest refugee-hosting countries.

*Environmental displacement*—displacement caused by environmental changes such as drought, flood, deforestation, and extreme weather events—is an increasingly common phenomenon in the Horn of Africa, particularly in its border regions. It is difficult to estimate the impact of such changes on population mobility, especially given the wide array of dynamics at play.

The most prevalent and pronounced forms of environmental change in the Horn of Africa's borderlands are droughts, deforestation, and floods. While the latter may result in short-term relocation followed by return, the first two tend

**Table 1.2. Refugees Hosted in the Horn of Africa, by Country**

Country	Refugee Population	Number of Internally Displaced Persons
Ethiopia	920,961	1,204,577 <sup>a</sup>
Eritrea	2,215	n/a
Uganda	1,131,545	n/a
Kenya	410,732	n/a
Djibouti	17,302	n/a
Somalia	15,426	2,648,000
South Sudan	297,150	1,849,835
Sudan	908,692	1,997,022

Source: UNHCR Data Portal: [data.unhcr.org](http://data.unhcr.org).

a. This increased to about 2.6 million in 2018, see [www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201809-mid-year-figures.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201809-mid-year-figures.pdf).

to involve longer-term or permanent relocation. If the land is not rehabilitated, people who have relocated will likely not be able to return. These events contribute to urbanization and further degrade the environment because the displaced often lack secure access to resources and therefore must eke out a living on marginal land with scant resources.

Environmental displacement typically affects the most vulnerable and destitute but that does not mean the vulnerable will necessarily move. In fact, vulnerability could result in people not moving. The 2011 Foresight report showed that in Ethiopia, an increase in the frequency of drought led to increased male labor migration, but at the same time there was a reduction in the migration of women for marriage because women could not afford to marry.

8. See Brookings-Bern (1999); for an example of national legislation in the region, see Uganda's National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons (2004).

For these reasons, people tend not to move very far; they often look for the nearest possible place to settle where they can have access to the resources they need to survive. Therefore, “environmental refugees” in the Horn of Africa are unlikely to move out of the region, and contrary to the alarmist rhetoric sometimes found in the popular press, they are unlikely to increase the number of migrants moving into Europe or North America.<sup>9</sup> According to the Foresight report,

“Environmental change can affect household wealth and income. This is likely to lead to an increase in short term, rural-rural migration as households look to diversify incomes and secure livelihoods. It is also likely to reduce longer-distance migration, which requires economic assets.” (Foresight 2011: 71)

### 1.5.2. Gendered Aspects of Migration and Mobility

**Migration and mobility are highly gendered, just like the livelihood strategies with which they are frequently associated.** Where women move, the factors that influence their decisions to move or stay in place, and the experience of displaced or labor migrants are all functions of particular drivers of mobility and overall levels of vulnerability and resilience that men and women face in “normal” times and during periods of shock.

**Decisions about where and when to migrate are often gendered.** During times of food insecurity and economic hardship, women may move into cities or stay with relatives, while men move farther afield for labor migration, to graze larger

animals such as camels, or to find work in other countries. Refugee camp populations typically have a higher proportion of women than in society more generally because women are more likely to seek assistance for their children while men are more likely engaged in employment, business, military activity, or maintaining the family’s property in the area of origin.

**As noted above, the majority of women traders in the region are engaged in informal trade.** They have low profit margins, face greater security risks, and are less able to protect themselves against exploitation than men. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) policy brief “Women in Cross-Border Agricultural Trade” notes:

“While men tend to dominate the trucking sector carrying large cargo loads over long distances, women are more likely to face time, mobility, and asset constraints that limit their trade participation to the transport of small cargo loads via foot, bicycle, cart, or small vehicle.” (USAID 2012)

**Another major form of gendered migration is in the move of young women to Gulf countries to find employment as domestic workers.** In 2013, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Consular Monitoring and Support Directorate estimated that 1,500 Ethiopian women were leaving the country every day (Woldemichael 2013: 1). Unlike a man who leaves the country for the Gulf or another destination, a woman usually travels with the assistance of a private employment agency, which secures for her an offer of employment—or at least claims to—prior to departure. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat reported that, in the

9. For an example of such alarmist media coverage, see Carrington (2016).

first half of 2012, 160,000 Ethiopian women traveled to Saudi Arabia using a private employment agency; between November 2013 and April 2014, 52,119 of them had been deported. Many work under precarious conditions, and reports of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse by employers are common, as are accounts of women working in conditions of slavery (Woldemichael 2013; Austrian Red Cross 2016; RMMS 2014: 19).

Some women travel to Gulf countries by plane, but many others travel over land to one of the numerous ports that dot the Horn of Africa's coast. (The Obock port in Djibouti and the Bossaso port of Somalia are the largest exit points for migrants). Borderland areas are key features of their journey, as they pass through international borders to arrive at the ports. Such crossings are risky; if they lack the necessary documentation and permission to cross the border, or if they are traveling using smuggling networks, women risk being extorted and sexually assaulted (RMMS 2014).

### 1.5.3. Youth Mobility

**Just as mobility is highly gendered, it is also generational.** Many people who are on the move in the region are youths aged 15–24.<sup>10</sup> A precise estimate of their numbers is difficult because they tend to be undocumented and travel using irregular channels, but the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat estimates that almost half of all international migrants in the Horn of Africa are under 20 years old and that the proportion of children and youth on the move is rising. Within the Horn of Africa's displaced population, 90,000 children

are reportedly unaccompanied or separated from their families. An estimated 20 percent of migrants moving to Yemen prior to the outbreak of the most recent phase of fighting were children or youth (RMMS 2016: 10).

Economic vulnerability is a key driver behind the increase in the numbers of young men and women leaving their rural livelihoods and seeking employment in nearby and remote cities in the region or making plans for migration farther onward. The most vulnerable are likely to travel shorter distances; they cannot afford to go any farther. Those with more economic and social capital (for example, those with relatives living abroad) might aspire to and be able to travel farther.

Migration can offer opportunities to youth, including opening up access to education, providing access to new or better-paying jobs, and paving the way for greater professional and personal development (UN DESA 2016). It can also be an indicator of economic resilience. Where migration requires a significant outlay of resources, only those who have enough cash of their own or through their families can. Sometimes, however, young people can begin their migration journeys with only a small portion of the cash that they will ultimately need to reach their destinations. Agents or smugglers facilitating the travel sometimes wait until they are en route before contacting the family of a youth, demanding a larger payment in exchange for their child's safety.

Migration can pose other risks to youth as well. Youths may face discrimination or exploitation in the workplace or when accessing services, and they may lack the power to protect themselves

10. Youths are defined in different ways by different sources, but the United Nations defines youth as being between the ages of 15–24.

because of their age and because they are far from their social support networks (UN DESA 2016).

Rates of youth unemployment in border regions are among the region's highest<sup>11</sup> and posing an economic challenge not only for those border areas, but also at the national and regional levels. The countries of the region are struggling to find ways of creating employment opportunities, including for youth; coping with dramatic increases in urban populations; and dealing with the accompanying pressure on urban infrastructure.

Youth are consistently associated with contributing to conflict dynamics—not so much through their ideological commitment (although that is sometimes present) but through their willingness to provide military service for any reason. The lack of alternative income-generating options is a risk factor that encourages youth to join up with conflict actors who might offer them or their family money in exchange for service.

## 1.6. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework

The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework examines in detail the interactions between livelihoods, mobility, and resilience in the Horn of Africa's border regions, with a view toward developing a practical tool for early warning, resilience

programming, and disaster risk reduction. This diagnostic framework gives project managers and policy makers a tool to guide their engagement in border areas. It considers the ways in which livelihoods and mobility can be applied to programming for climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and resilience, as well as for the provision of support to mobile populations and those affected by mobility.

**The model provides a mobility- and livelihoods-based approach to addressing vulnerability.** It considers the mobility of the borderland residents as well as that of people who while not normally resident in border areas rely on them at times, such as displaced persons and refugees, to be major features of the socioeconomic landscape rather than as aberrations of the status quo. It considers border regions from the perspective of livelihood zones, in which common livelihood activities and access to shared or complementary resources are central organizing themes in people's lives. These commonalities help determine people's movements within, into, and out of the border zones. To a large extent, they also shape social relations and interactions with the environment.

**A principle feature of many border areas in the Horn of Africa is a pastoralist population, which utilises the particular features of the region's ecology for rangeland, watering, and trade.**<sup>12</sup> Rangelands cross international borders, and people living on one side or the other rely on more or less the same kinds of economic activities to survive. In some cases, border crossing is an

11. There may be something of a conceptual trap here, as Richard Black (personal communication) has pointed out, since youth may be only counted as unemployed if they are above a certain age (typically the age of leaving secondary school). However, this "error" would be applied to all areas, so the distinction of youth in border areas having higher rates of unemployment would still be true.

12. For further discussion of the dynamics of the pastoral economy in borderlands of the Horn of Africa, see Feyissa 2016.



essential feature of livelihood systems, such as *in the Hawd grazing area of Somalia and Ethiopia*, in which people from Somalia travel into Ethiopia during the dry season to graze their camels, and Ethiopian Somalis rely on marketing links inside Somalia to sell their herds for both domestic and export consumption.

However, this is a *very broad understanding of livelihood systems*, and we know that if we dig deeper into their dynamics within these livelihood zones, we will find other ways in which communities resemble and rely on each other, as well as ways in which livelihood systems diversify and engage with other activities, such as waged labor, seasonal labor migration, informal trade, and other activities.

**Livelihood practices—in whatever form they take—are highly gendered.** In pastoral communities, culturally-defined divisions of labor mean that women are usually responsible for herding smaller animals, such as sheep, goats, and sometimes cattle, close to their homes, while in the dry season men take their camels farther distances. This pattern weakens the overall food security of households as husbands and wives can be separated for several months per year, with women and children providing for themselves while the men are away.


In agricultural areas, women are normally responsible for homestead gardens and for weeding larger plots; men plow, sow, and harvest. Women are often responsible for marketing the agricultural products as well, making them effective managers of the household economy.

The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, developed and adapted over the past two decades, is a method for analyzing how people make ends meet with the resources available to them (Conway and Chambers 1992, Scoones 1998, Carney 2002). The framework has already formed the basis of a great deal of livelihood and poverty-eradication programming led by the U.K. Department for International Development, and it is now being used by many other development actors as well.

**The framework elucidates the factors that make some people more vulnerable than others, even in communities where poverty is pervasive.**

Vulnerability is a function of a person's level of command over different kinds of assets—physical, financial, natural, human, and social. To a great extent, the degree to which an individual, household, or community is well endowed in terms of these assets determines their level of vulnerability and ability to adapt to shocks and crises, or more generally to changes in their environment over time. Resilience is also determined by formal structural factors, including development strategies; the level of services provided to communities; land-tenure regimes; and informal structural factors, such as patterns of discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, religion, and political opinion or class-based stratification (DFID 2000).

Figure 1.3 presents a basic schema of the framework, illustrating the interactions between vulnerability; structure—policies, institutions, and processes; and coping mechanisms. From a borderlands perspective, one might consider elements of the vulnerability context to include an area's carrying capacity in terms of livestock

**Figure 1.3. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework**

Source: DFID 2000.

production per unit of land or size and number of land parcels in agricultural areas; the amount of environmental exposure to shocks and hazards; and the degree to which communities or their sub-groups are stratified in terms of class, ethnicity, clan, or other differentiations. Box 1.1 offers a few examples of capital or asset types in border areas.

*Policies, institutions, and processes* refer to the structural influences on resource access. In borderlands, these may involve the particular border management strategies that are in place. Is it easy or difficult—and often expensive—to travel, trade, work, invest, and access services across borders? Are passports or travel documents required to cross borders? Are traded commodities taxed, and if so are the rates high when they cross borders?

Are some commodities given favorable trade status in cross-border trade? Are refugees permitted free movement and the right to work in their country of asylum? The answers to such questions shed light on the influence of policies and legislation on people's ability to access key resources.

Finally, the strategies that people use to make ends meet in borderlands regularly involve practices that depend on ties with and movement across borders. Dry season grazing areas, livestock markets, labor markets, urban centers where occasional employment may be found—these livelihood strategies often involve crossing borders and maintaining close ties with people who live, work, and do business on the other side of a border.

However, while the Sustainable Livelihood Framework helps us understand how and why people are or are not able to make ends meet during normal times, it does not tell us much about how people adapt to shocks or how they make decisions about mobility. To better understand these dynamics, we need to consider the means by which migration and mobility decisions are made, and how shocks affect decision-making processes.

### Box 1.1. Capital in the Borderlands

**Physical capital.** Vehicles for human and/or livestock transport that are able to operate across borders, plowshares, farm tools, and shop fronts.

**Financial capital.** Access to extension or safety net programs; remittances; electronic money transfer and payment systems such as MPesa, Zaad, E-Dahab, and Western Union; and cross-border markets.

**Natural capital.** Private landholdings, access to communal land resources for agriculture or grazing, access to water resources, and access to fisheries that may be situated across borders.


**Human capital.** Access to education, vocational training, or other skills development, labor power within a household that may be used to access labor migration opportunities or seasonal work.

**Social capital.** Kinship or clan structures, religious associations, informal ties, and savings associations on both sides of a border; practices of gift exchange or mutual assistance that transect borders.

## 1.7. Drivers of Migration Framework

The Drivers of Migration Framework, developed by the 2011 Foresight project, is an analytical method for studying how mobility-related decisions are made (Foresight 2011). The framework does not try to predict the decision a person will make. Instead, it considers the factors that go into a person's decision to stay or to go, and if the latter, where to. If the perceived or actual conditions of the potential destination are much better—environmentally, politically, demographically, economically, and socially—then most would consider it more desirable (see figure 1.4). If the advantages are unclear, or if the differences between the origin and potential destinations is not discernible, then a person is less likely to move. The estimates of anticipated benefits will vary according to the personal or household characteristics and criteria often associated with the *Vulnerability Context in the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework*. The category of *policies, institutions, and processes* in the Sustainable Livelihood Framework also appear in the Drivers of Migration Framework as *intervening obstacles*. Facilitators can include both formal and structural factors, such as specific migration policies, and more informal, meso-level influences, such as the influence of the diaspora. Ultimately, these influences result in decisions about whether or not to migrate.

The Drivers of Migration Framework can be used to evaluate the decision-making nexus associated with myriad types of mobility. The influence of political factors, including persecution, discrimination, direct coercion, and the violation of civic and political rights, may have more of an impact on the decision-making process of refugees than other

**Figure 1.4. Drivers of Migration Framework**

Source: Foresight 2011.

variables, although, importantly, *all* variables can contribute to a person's decision of whether and where to move. Similarly, even with mobility that is somewhat routine, such as pastoral transhumance, the framework can be applied, in a way such that the goal of maximizing environmental resources is foregrounded. Factors such as the ease with which people can cross borders, restrictions placed on marketing activities, and clan or ethnic ties affect pastoral mobility.

## 1.8. Applying the Household Economy Approach in the Borderland Context

As helpful as the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework and the Drivers of Migration Framework are, their application to borderlands and their usefulness to programming are limited because

neither explicitly provides a means for relating livelihood groups to particular decision-making processes. This is because there is no clear way of knowing whose livelihoods or decisions are being mapped or over what geographic area a particular livelihood picture is prevalent? Other questions include: How do the strategies of different groups vary in the area? How do border dynamics at the local, meso, and macro levels influence different decisions within the same border area?

Some of the techniques developed through the Household Economy Approach can help unpack these questions and ultimately better target assistance. The approach is widely used in the Horn of Africa, including by the Famine Early Warning System, ECHO, the Ethiopian Livelihoods Integration Unit, and the Food and Agricultural Organization's Food Security and Nutrition

Analysis Unit for Somalia. The approach examines livelihood-defined geographic areas—referred to as livelihood zones—and provides a detailed analysis of the income, expenditure, and consumption patterns of people living in those areas to ultimately arrive at an approach that better understands livelihoods in border areas.

Unlike the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, the Household Economy Approach focuses on examining how people respond to one or more shocks rather than on how they make ends meet under “normal” circumstances. It considers the impact of a shock or shocks on people’s access to cash and food.<sup>13</sup> Shocks can be introduced by environmental, political, or economic drivers, as further explored below.

The Household Economy Approach can be used for national-level analysis, regardless of whether it is led by a government, a donor, or a nongovernmental organization. It can inform national-level early warning and preparedness and response activities. Some work has been done in select border regions to consider the ways in which communities and resources interact across national borders, but it has not been systematically done for all areas in the border region (Crosskey and Ismail 2009).

**Just as the Household Economy Approach has not yet been applied to the borderlands**

13. The Household Economy Approach compares the coping strategies of households after a shock with two thresholds: (1) survival level, at which it is impossible to access minimum levels of food and essential nonfood items; and (2) livelihood protection level, at which people can manage over the long term without sacrificing crucial resources, such as shelter, education, health care, food, and productive assets. This paper does not explore this aspect in depth. It focuses on analyzing mobility decisions within livelihood zones rather than targeting specific humanitarian assistance.

in a comprehensive way, little attention has been given to the ways in which mobility, and responses to it, might feature in the livelihood systems of the areas. The proposed modification to the Drivers of Migration Framework helps to bring these considerations forward. It also considers the ways that livelihood practices operate during “normal” times and as a response to shocks.

In this way, it is possible to link the Drivers of Migration Framework with particular livelihood and wealth groups, and to understand how these groups’ mobility decisions are affected by the variable interplay of the drivers identified in the framework. This type of analysis helps us consider such questions as: In what ways does mobility constitute a vital livelihood practice? What factors influence the direction, scale, duration, and motivations of mobility? And what factors restrict people’s options for viable livelihoods such that they may have to move in an unsafe or unsustainable manner? These questions are key to identifying intervention areas that either protect and expand essential forms of mobility, or that provide meaningful alternatives so people do not feel forced to take the risks associated with unsafe mobility.

The Household Economy Approach uses livelihood zones to identify geographic areas that rely on similar livelihood practices to meet basic needs. Within these zones, further disaggregation is made on the basis of wealth groups to examine the varying levels of command that people have over essential resources and the different ways that they respond to shocks. Most of the Horn of Africa has been assessed using the approach, and there are livelihood zone maps for each individual country. Most livelihood zones are situated in border areas that cut across international boundaries.



Livelihood practices transect international boundaries, and it is possible to delineate border zones on the basis of *shared livelihood practices*. Pastoralists use grazing areas on both sides of the border between Sudan and South Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya, and Somalia and Ethiopia, as examples. Each type of livelihood zone includes some level of mobility, whether it be for grazing livestock, practicing agropastoralism, or seasonal migration as a regular coping strategy. In the border regions that connect Ethiopia and Sudan, agricultural production of sorghum, cotton, and sesame create seasonal wage labor opportunities for people on both sides of the border, attracting labor migrants to work for several months a year to supplement the income they derived from agricultural production.

In the next step of the Household Economy Approach, profiles are compiled based on differences in wealth among the people living in a given livelihood zone. Three wealth groups—very poor, poor, and better off—are defined in relative terms using criteria identified by the local communities themselves.

In some areas, the size of the landholding is the main determinant of wealth, but in others, the size of one's livestock herd might be of more consequence. Profiles also consider market opportunities and practices, mobility patterns, the use of social networks, and other ties that provide support to people in times of crisis.

**Wealth groups respond to shocks in similar ways—and these may differ from the strategies of groups that are better off or poorer. It is hardly ever the case that people do not have ways of mitigating the impact of shock through economic diversification and/or intensification of some**


**livelihood strategies.** Livelihood profiles consider these coping strategies and their effectiveness at mitigating the impact of the shock. This is possible because most shocks are recurrent, and we can learn from how people have responded to them in the past in order to predict what their impact is likely to be in the future.

In the context of the borderlands of the Horn of Africa, the Household Economy Approach profiles from neighboring sides of an international border provide key data for developing a nuanced understanding of resilience and the nexus of decision making that drives mobility patterns and economic choices throughout the entire livelihood zone, including across the border.

**Ultimately, an analysis that brings together targeted information about livelihoods and data on the drivers of migration can facilitate the production of actionable reports on the conditions under which decisions about mobility are made and the population to whom they apply.** Such a detailed understanding of the dynamics of people's decision making could lead to concrete recommendations about ways to respond.

In an adaptation of the Drivers of Migration Framework, figure 1.5 illustrates how mobility decisions are impacted by different kinds of shocks. Border area dynamics are reflected in it, as are livelihood zone and wealth group distinctions.

This adapted framework broadens the emphasis of environmental hazards, allowing the drivers of displacement and mobility to come from any one of the five perspectives. Drivers listed in figure 1.5 with an asterisk are known to exert significant influence on mobility-related decision making in the Horn of Africa context. Broadening the

**Figure 1.5. Drivers of Migration Framework Adapted to the Borderlands Context**

\*Indicates potential significant driver of mobility in the Horn of Africa.  
Source: Adapted from Foresight 2011.

framework in this way allows for the possibility that the *primary* driver of mobility may be from one or more of the following:

- *Political persecution or conflict*, such as with cases of internally displaced persons or refugees fleeing generalized or specific security threats;
- *Economic shocks or opportunities* created by shifting employment or trade prospects or dramatic changes in economic conditions caused by local or global factors
- *Environmental threats*, particularly those related to droughts and floods in the region, but also severe weather events and other environmental factors; and
- *Demographic transitions*, such as the burgeoning number of unemployed youth or the population pressure in a given area.

In practice, as noted above, people do not usually frame mobility decisions in reaction to a single driver; rather, some drivers are more determinative than others, but even the latter are

contributing factors. In addition, while the focus of this diagnostic is on drivers that push migration and mobility, it is also worthwhile to consider the potential significance of pull factors such as the desire to reunite a family or to send remittances to facilitate travel for family members/others.

**This model introduces another major change to the Drivers of Migration Framework to explicitly target specific livelihood zones and wealth groups within the livelihood zones.** Such an approach ensures that the consideration of how mobility decisions are made is rooted in the specifics of livelihood practices. By considering the strategies of different wealth groups in each livelihood zone, the analysis takes into consideration the different capacities of resilience and vulnerabilities of the very poor, the poor, and the better off. This can impact decisions made about mobility even within the same livelihood zone.

### 1.9. Case Study: Ethiopia–Kenya Borderlands

The application of the modified Drivers of Migration Framework described above can be seen when applied to specific livelihood zones, such as the clusters discussed below. A useful case study can be gleaned from an analysis of livelihoods and mobility patterns in IGAD clusters 2 and 3—Borana and Somali/Mandera, respectively, extend from Lake Turkana in the west to the Mandera Triangle connecting Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia in the east. While Scott-Villiers’ 2015a paper treats the clusters as a single area, in fact, there are essentially two different major livelihood zones in this cluster. The first is the pastoral/agropastoral/marginal agriculture zone, which runs from Lake Turkana to Moyale

in the east. From Moyale to the northeastern corner of Kenya, the zone is closer to a purely pastoral livelihood zone, where rearing and marketing of livestock plays a more significant role.

**In the west, extreme cultural heterogeneity corresponds somewhat with livelihood diversity.** Lake Turkana and the rivers of Ethiopia’s South Omo zone create agricultural opportunities related to fishing and flood plains, and additional agriculture-related prospects exist farther east. As many as 200,000 people derive some economic benefit from fishing along the shores of Lake Turkana and along the Omo River delta (REF 2016: 9); and the numbers of people engaged in fishing has reportedly increased in recent years as pastoralism has become less viable as a primary livelihood practice.

Migration and mobility choices in the South Omo and North Turkana areas are influenced by considerations such as the availability of water, grazing land, and arable land. According to a study of the border by the EU Trust Fund’s Research and Evidence Facility,

“Major livelihood decisions on the part of members of the local community are made considering the availability of water. Agropastoralists make decisions to engage in seasonal migration with their herd and to engage in retreat agriculture are made with considerations of river water.” (REF 2016)

**Conflict dynamics, the availability of employment, and government programs such as “villagization” or resettlement can also influence choices.** Government programs encourage mobile

populations to adopt more sedentary livelihood strategies, particularly as the viability of mobile pastoralism is curtailed by the development of hydroelectric dams along the Omo and Gibe rivers and as large irrigated farms have been established on land previously used for grazing.

**In the west of the cluster area, the drivers of migration and displacement are both natural and human-made.** Mobility can be attributed to environmental changes: diminishing rainfall, overgrazing, infrastructure development; and current efforts to harness water power with the construction of hydroelectric infrastructure in Ethiopia and to conduct geothermal exploration in Kenya (REF 2016: 13).

**For some, the opportunity for school-aged Ethiopian children to pursue an education in Kenya influences their decision to move.** For others, it is the international assistance and funding available from the devolved budgets of Kenya's North Eastern Province in the counties Wajir, Garissa, and Mandera as well as, to a lesser extent, in some parts of Ethiopia. Such assistance can also stimulate an area economically, including the creation of attractive job opportunities.

**Unemployment is not a major problem in the west of this cluster, unlike the other areas.** The 2007 Population and Housing Census estimated that only 2,892 people were unemployed out of an economically active population of 306,162. The development of large-scale sugar production is expected to provide employment to local residents, as well as attract workers from other parts of Ethiopia and from Kenya. However, sugar plantations are controversial because their

establishment has previously resulted in the resettlement of thousands of people from their agropastoral livelihoods.

**In the east of the cluster, where pastoralism is more pronounced, the dynamics are quite different.** In fully pastoral households, wealth is determined by the size of livestock holdings, but in agropastoral households, it is a function of both livestock and land holdings (Boudreau 2015: 8).

**Data recorded on wealth groups in the eastern pastoral zone identified by Save the Children<sup>14</sup> indicates that commercialization of the livestock economy has resulted in a widening gap between richer and poorer households.** Poorer households tend to produce lower-quality livestock to sell at local markets or to brokers who consolidate the stocks of small traders into larger units for onward trading (Scott-Villiers 2015a: 5). The opening of large export markets for livestock, which Ethiopia has been strenuously pursuing since 2004, tends to benefit only the largest and most wealthy livestock traders.

Research by the EU Trust Fund for Africa's Research and Evidence Facility in the far east of the cluster points to international borders as opportunities for trade and other economic relationships:

"Economic activities across the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster have been facilitated by a rise of small border towns and settlements on both sides of the border, most visible along the Somali-Kenyan border. In this light, the cluster

14. Scott-Villiers (2015a) cites the work of Catley and Aklilu (2013) who use this data.

constitutes an integrated cross-border economy, with a critical set of corridors for commerce and livestock sales for the entire region. Cross-border business partnerships exist and, while these can be a source of competition, have, for the most part helped to build resilience to conflict as both sides have a vested interest in maintaining peaceful and secure trade arteries" (REF 2016).

Such cross-border linkages are particularly strong in areas where people share ethnic or kinship ties.

**A deeper analysis of the livelihood strategies of the different wealth groups suggests that there are a variety of mobility strategies in place.**

Poorer households rely more on cash than better-off households, partly because the wealthier ones can produce more milk for consumption. Milk represents 50 percent of the income of middle and better-off wealth groups; it represents a smaller proportion of total income in poorer households. As Scott-Villiers observes: "Given the level of importance of milk to the household economy, herders will put emphasis on maintaining the productivity of female animals, and will be as flexible and mobile as they can manage" (Scott-Villiers 2015a: 7 citing Little, Debsu, and Tiki 2014). Only the wealthiest households can afford to travel to the farthest and best grazing areas, often located across an international border. Access requires a conducive regulatory regime, the absence of serious conflict, and resource management systems that grant them access to pasture and water.

The significant variation in livelihood activities among different wealth groups is described in Boudreau's analysis of livelihoods in Ethiopia's Somali Region:

"... being richer means that you can derive all the cash you need from your livestock herd, in the form of milk/ghee sales and livestock sales. Being poorer means you are forced to look for a number of options outside your own herd, since your livestock numbers aren't sufficient to cover food and cash needs. The most important of these options is self-employment, a category that includes collecting and selling bush products, such as construction poles, firewood and making and selling charcoal. In some areas, where *Acacia*, *Boswellia*, and *Commiphora* trees are present, collecting and selling gum Arabic and incense is an option. Casual employment, some of it in the form of construction jobs found in local towns and some in salt mining areas, fills another part of the gap." (Boudreau 2015: 15)

In areas around the refugee camps of Eastern Ethiopia, the local economy is influenced by the demand for firewood and grazing land, as the areas around the camps has been subject to extensive clearing and deforestation (see Carver, Gebresenbet, and Naish 2018). This has become the locus of conflict between residents and refugees, and has become a particular source of insecurity for women, as they are the ones usually tasked with the collection of firewood.

**There are key border market towns that support the livelihoods of small traders, including many women within the pastoral livelihood zone.** These traders bring imported goods from Indian Ocean ports as well as food commodities through these border markets. This activity is threatened when "cross border trade is shut down by officials or by closure of transport links, creating local shortages" (Scott-Villiers 2015a: 6, citing Little 2003).



**Mobility of people through the border zone, particularly in the east, is also influenced by the permeability of the border.** Horwood (2009) reports that as many as 7,000 Ethiopian migrants were passing through the Moyale border crossing each day in 2009, comprising at least 60 percent of the town's overall economy (Frouws and Horwood 2017).

Using the data about livelihood zones, wealth groups, and drivers of mobility and migration described above, the adapted Drivers of Migration Framework can be used to show the ways in which drivers come together and are used in borderland contexts by different groups of people to make choices about mobility.

**If these choices are well understood, a number of intervention possibilities could be more clearly evaluated.** One entry point may be to shore up people's livelihood options so that they are less vulnerable generally, before a specific shock occurs. Another may be to provide support to people who are affected by shock so that they do not lose all of their productive assets, thereby becoming vulnerable to making forced decisions about migration and mobility, which is risky and can incur high costs over the long term. Yet another entry point could involve providing support to help people diversify their incomes to mitigate how severely affected they would be if they suffer the loss of a particular income source.

The adapted framework can also be used as a basis for empirical research, providing a structure for the collection of data so as to better understand how and why people make the choices they

do regarding migration and mobility (or about staying put). The case study considered here provides an indication of how data concerning livelihoods, wealth groups, and coping strategies may contribute to thinking about mobility within an area for employment, labor migration, or to take advantage of natural resources; or out of an area, when livelihoods lose their viability.

## 1.10. Stakeholder Analysis—The Institutional Context

As previously mentioned, borderlands are increasingly the focus of programming and policy attention. This section provides an overview of national and regional initiatives in IGAD member states that are specifically focused on legal frameworks, including the movement of people and the right to work. It considers available information on existing legal and policy arrangements that have a direct impact on the range of options available to border communities. For a full analysis of national legislation and regional initiatives, see Feyissa (2016).

### 1.10.1. IGAD Activities

**IGAD has created a cross-border "cluster approach," defining clusters as:**

"... a geographic space that cuts across multiple political/administrative units within the country, and international borders, where a range of resources, services, cultural values are shared by pastoral and agropastoral communities, and in which stakeholders aim to develop and implement coordinated investments to enhance resilience and sustainable development." (IGAD 2015: 7 cited in Feyissa 2016: 19)

IGAD's involvement seeks to promote dialogue among stakeholders to enable the coordination of mutually beneficial investments across borders. Other clusters are being considered but have yet to be delineated.

IGAD is also active in the borderlands through its work with the Conflict Early Warning and Rapid Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which provides a platform for cross-border cooperation on conflict prevention and mitigation. CEWARN has been particularly active in the Karamoja cluster area, where it has enabled disarmament. Another initiative, the Climate Change Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) has a mandate to provide timely early warning information to help countries in the region prepare for climate variability and change. It monitors the El Niño–Southern Oscillation phenomena and the sea surface temperature anomalies over the Indian and Atlantic oceans. It also works with local communities to tap their knowledge, integrating it with scientific data.

The IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD) is working on developing livelihoods in pastoral areas by promoting pastoral development and by supporting diversification strategies that complement existing livelihood practices. It has also been involved in preventing the spread of communicable veterinary diseases.

Finally, the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), created in response to the 2010/11 regional drought, seeks to foster regional collaboration to build resilience. The IDDRSI strategy is contained in

country programming papers and in a regional programming paper focused on natural resources management; market access and trade; support for livelihoods and basic social services; disaster risk management for pastoral communities, preparedness and effective response; research and knowledge management; technology transfer; conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding; coordination; institutional strengthening; partnerships; and resource mobilization. Coordination is further strengthened with a regional drought resilience platform that convenes stakeholders to work in concert to increase their preparedness and resilience. IDDRSI is in the process of developing cross-border pastoral organizations and cross-border conflict resolution mechanisms.

### 1.10.2. EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

The EU's Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has provided over €63 million (in addition to €400,000 from UNDP) to IDDRSI to fund efforts to support collaboration in cross-border areas. Focusing on IGAD's four border-cluster areas, the project seeks to identify innovative approaches to making borderlands more stable and prosperous. It will support livelihood diversification and the development of mechanisms for sharing natural resources. Support to displaced persons and other vulnerable people living in border areas is an explicit part of the initiative (see European Commission 2017). Through its Better Migration Management program, the trust fund is meant to facilitate the finalization of the IGAD Protocol on the Free Movement of People (see section 4).

The trust fund also works in border regions through its **Research and Evidence Facility on Migration and Conflict in the Horn of Africa**.<sup>15</sup> A consortium from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; Oxford University's International Migration Institute; and Sahan Research is implementing the facility. In 2016, the facility conducted assessments in four cluster areas in preparation for the program specification that went into the formulation of the IGAD Collaboration in Cross Border Areas project. Detailed analyses of each of the clusters were prepared, as well as a synthesis report.<sup>16</sup>

**The Research and Evidence Facility's work centers around five research themes, including the dynamics of cross-border economies and center-periphery relations.** This research will consider cross-border economies as zones of common livelihood practices, with similar vulnerabilities and areas of resilience, and with social and political ties that bind their members together. The research examined the characteristic political economy of these cross-border areas with the goal of understanding the opportunities and barriers to building community resilience; enhancing security and stability; and reducing irregular migration, conflict, and displacement. The research focused on four main border areas: (1) Karamoja-Turkana (Uganda-South Sudan-Kenya), Gulu (Uganda-South Sudan), Moyale (Kenya-Ethiopia), and the Somaliland-Ethiopia-Djibouti corridor (REF 2017). This research is directly aimed at identifying programming

opportunities and informing a contextual understanding of programming that is going on in borderlands of the Horn of Africa Region.

### 1.10.3. USAID Regional Resilience Network

**The Horn of Africa Regional Resilience Network brings together USAID-funded programs in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda to strengthen regional and cross-border collaboration and to improve evidence-based learning.** The Regional Resilience Framework 2.0, introduced in November 2016, continues work conducted from 2012 and 2016. It has three intermediate objectives: (1) expand economic opportunities and make them more viable; (2) strengthen institutions, systems, and governance; and (3) improve and sustain human capital (USAID 2016). Although its strategic vision does not directly speak to the issues of mobility and migration, its focus on promoting resilience and reducing vulnerability are directly linked to the objectives of the World Bank's borderlands interests.

### 1.10.4. Bilateral Border Agreements

**In 2013, Kenya and Ethiopia embarked on a joint Turkana-Omo basin management plan, facilitated by the United Nations Environment Programme.** However, it has stalled, and therefore has not addressed the question of the impact of the new hydroelectric dams in Ethiopia on Lake Turkana (Feyissa 2016: 25).

**Ethiopia and Somalia/Somaliland have a series of border agreements that involve trade (see section on Trade above).** These ties have been deepened recently with the signing of an

15. See "Research and Evidence Facility on Migration in the Horn of Africa" at the [www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/](http://www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/).

16. See "Research Papers" at [www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/research-papers/](http://www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/research-papers/)

agreement between the Somaliland government and the United Arab Emirates' DP World to develop the infrastructure at Berbera port. This will open up the way for Ethiopia to use Berbera as a major port. It has emerged that Ethiopia also has a 19 percent financial claim to revenues from the agreement.

### 1.10.5. Regional Initiatives

The borderlands are the focus of several other regional initiatives, briefly discussed here. First, as previously noted, the Horn of Africa Initiative was launched in 2014 as a commitment by the World Bank Group, the EU, the African Union, the Islamic Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and IGAD to promote stability and development in the region. It expects to deliver US\$8 billion in development assistance to the region over several years. One of its first activities was the commitment of US\$1.8 billion for cross-border activities to boost economic growth and opportunity, reduce poverty, and spur business activity. The EU has further pledged to provide approximately US\$370 million under the initiative for cross-border activities. The present paper offers guidance for the programming of some of these funds.

The Danish Demining Group has recently established the Borderlands Knowledge Hub, which gathers information about border security and management in East Africa—defined as Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda. It hosts a website (currently a beta version with restricted access format) that includes interactive GIS (global information system) maps visualizing data on conflict patterns, actors, drivers, and contexts. The hub also

serves as a library of secondary literature, policy recommendations, and “lessons learned” reports.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, Borderland Dynamics in East Africa, a research initiative initiated by the Norwegian Norad is a collaboration between Bergen University, Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia), University of Khartoum (Sudan) and Makerere University (Uganda).<sup>18</sup>

### 1.10.6. Trade and Mobility Agreements

Regional trade, mobility, and cooperation agreements also have a significant impact on cross-border dynamics. In 2015, a Tripartite Free Trade Area was agreed by the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community in 2008. All countries in the Horn of Africa, except Somalia and South Sudan, are among the 26 countries who are party to the initiative. Once fully implemented, the agreement aims to boost intra-African trade, currently valued at US\$180 billion (40 percent of which is informal), by one third (Financial Times 2016).

In addition, in June 2016, the African Union committed to instituting a system of electronic passports to facilitate visa-free movement within the continent for nationals of African Union member states by 2020. This would have a major impact on border regions.

17. For the beta version of the borderlands hub see: [www.borderlandsknowledgehub.com](http://www.borderlandsknowledgehub.com).

18. See “Borderland Dynamics in East Africa” at [www.norad.no/en/front/funding/norhed/projects/borderland-dynamics-in-east-africa/](http://www.norad.no/en/front/funding/norhed/projects/borderland-dynamics-in-east-africa/).

### 1.11. The Way Forward: Coordination, Policy, and Cooperation

Despite such a wide array of initiatives focused on regional cooperation and borderlands, coordination among efforts is lacking. Without communication and some amount of joined-up programming, the overall effectiveness of borderlands work may be limited. Meetings held in the region and among donors in Washington, DC, and Brussels, particularly the management team of the EU Trust Fund and the Research and Evidence Facility, have begun to pave the way for greater collaboration and harmonization of approaches, but more is needed in this respect. Ultimately, the analysis of livelihoods in border regions, and an understanding of the drivers of different types of mobility, has a direct impact on the ability of programmers to have an impact on early warning systems, disaster preparedness, resilience promotion, response, and longer-term development planning.

**Being able to break down the various factors that influence people's decisions about whether to move or to stay helps pave the way for a mobility- and livelihood-focused approach to borderlands.** Whether the interventions are targeted at the local level, such as youth employment programs or drought-resilience activities, or at the wider structural level, such as policy interventions or facilitation of trade agreements among states, the diagnostic may be used to focus in on the ways in which different individual drivers ultimately impact options and conditions for mobility.

While the diagnostic shows how people make decisions, it does not tell us exactly what decisions they will make. While it can help ascertain what the mobility drivers are, it can also improve understanding of why people remain in place. To enhance resilience, rather than focusing on preventing mobility, the diagnostic aims to increase the space for people to freely decide whether to move or to stay, making it less likely that they will feel forced to move or that they will compromise their safety.

**Enhancing choice for border communities involves creating economic opportunities for them, building stronger linkages between communities on both sides of a border, and better integrating them with political and economic governance from the state centers.** Such work brings in a diverse arena of engagement, including migration management systems, trade agreements, development cooperation agreements, and cross-border negotiation platforms. Such instruments could influence people's access to resources by enabling or blocking their movement, or by widening or constraining their range of options in terms of whether or not they should move and whether and in what ways they should diversify their incomes. At the local level, direct engagement with border communities—through employment and training schemes, water development, agricultural and pastoral development initiatives, education programs, and health care enhancement—could bolster resilience and reduce the need for unsafe movement.



## Annex. Availability of Data

The utility of the framework outlined in this paper relies on the availability of data related to livelihood zoning, wealth disaggregation, coping strategies, trade, wide-scale policy, and other structural influences. The data sources are identified below, including some details about the type of information available from the sources.

### Livelihood Zoning Data

Livelihood zoning information is available through the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) project as well as country-driven early warning systems in Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan. The data includes the kinds of resources people utilize to survive, where their incomes come from, how much money they spend, and how able they are to meet their basic food and nonfood needs. The data is available countrywide, but in most cases has not been joined up; where two countries meet, the analysis has not been comprehensively applied to consider livelihood systems that transect international boundaries.<sup>19</sup>

In some cases, government offices or the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations collects and disseminates individual country information on livelihood zones and wealth groups; in some instances, this is done at the offices of FEWS NET. Ethiopia's National Disaster Risk Management Commission also has a searchable database of livelihood profile information that allows users to obtain detailed information down to the *woreda* (district) level.<sup>20</sup> In Somalia, household economy data is collected along with data on market prices,

rainfall, and other food security indicators by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit within the Food and Agricultural Organization.<sup>21</sup>

In some areas, specific analyses of livelihood zones and border crossing regions are available. The Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (PACAPS) program, a USAID-funded project aimed at considering livelihoods in border areas compiles some of these data in a regional analysis.

### Cross-Border Mobility

There is useful information about cross-border mobility through several regional data collection systems. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat—a project funded by the governments of Germany, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom and by IGAD—tracks movement across borders, especially irregular migration (migration without documentation) and mixed migration (migration undertaken for more than one motive, such as economic and forced, among others). Data from the secretariat includes demographic information on migrants, their origins, their intended destinations, and usually the main reason why they are moving. In addition, the secretariat conducts in-depth research on specific themes relevant to understanding migration dynamics in the Horn of Africa.<sup>22</sup> A subproject called Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative—4Mi, tracks migration out of the Horn of Africa using a network of field-based monitors.<sup>23</sup>

19. See [www.fews.net](http://www.fews.net).

20. See <http://profile.dppc.gov.et/>.

21. See [www.fsnau.org](http://www.fsnau.org).

22. See [www.regionalmms.org/](http://www.regionalmms.org/).

23. See <http://4mi.regionalmms.org/>.

## Displacement Tracking Matrix

The International Organization for Migration runs a system called the Displacement Tracking Matrix, which tracks and monitors displacement and population mobility. In the Horn of Africa, the matrix operates in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. It includes data collected through interviews with migrants at border crossings, as well as targeted surveys with internally displaced people, refugees, and others. Although the matrix reports some crossings, its figures are admittedly not fully representative of all crossings because the project lacks the capacity to monitor all border crossings at all times. Nevertheless, it is useful for identifying the routes that people take when they move, as well as their intended destinations. The matrix regularly and systematically captures, processes, and disseminates information to provide a better understanding of the movements and evolving needs of displaced populations, whether onsite or en route.<sup>24</sup>

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24. See [www.globaldtm.info/](http://www.globaldtm.info/).

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# Background Paper 2.

## Resilience and Development Assistance in the Horn of Africa's Borderlands and Lagging Regions

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Photo: Stephan Bacheneimer | World Bank

## 2.1. Introduction

Extreme poverty and vulnerability are spatially concentrated in the Horn of Africa's borderlands. The converging risks caused by environmental vulnerability, land degradation, climate change, demographic drivers, social and political factors, conflict, and violence create spaces known as "hot spots" and "blind spots" of vulnerability, including pockets of "trapped populations" (Foresight 2011). In a region characterized by cyclical drought-related crises, the drylands are often at the margin of states and experience lower levels of government investment. Large numbers of unemployed and unskilled young people grow increasingly frustrated, resulting in net outmigration for many drylands areas.

As of mid-2018, the Horn of Africa was hosting over 11.4 million displaced persons, including nearly 7.7 million internally displaced people and about 3.7 million refugees. Most of the displacement situations have lasted for over 20 years. Refugee camps continued to see new arrivals in 2019, primarily driven by conflict and food insecurity in South Sudan, but also due to refugees from Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Yemen.<sup>1</sup> Displacement is a complex and pressing regional challenge and is a significant obstacle to reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development with peace and security. It has been compounded by migration within and outside the region, driven by natural and human made causes, and by a youth population facing unemployment and alienation (World Bank 2015).

Promoting resilience in border regions with elevated fragility and vulnerability risk profiles is therefore imperative; and using calibrated development initiatives in the borderlands and lagging regions is gaining momentum as an approach to increasing resilience, such as the World Bank's Horn of Africa Initiative of 2014. This paper aims to answer the following questions: Why does the development of borderlands matter for the Horn of Africa? What is the regional umbrella policy that facilitates this conversation? And how might this policy translate into action and cooperation between the countries involved—with specific reference to the established borderlands clusters?

The paper includes five sections. The first provides an overview of the peoples of the borderlands. The second section examines the demographic, economic, environmental, and sociopolitical sources of resilience in borderland communities. Section three discusses the economies of the borderlands with a focus on informal and formal cross-border trade and the mode of interaction between the two. In section four, we map out and critically examine the policies, programs, and instruments of the relevant regional agencies and national governments; development investments in the borderlands by donors; and their alignment with each other. The final section synthesizes the arguments for development investment in the borderlands; the regional umbrella policy that facilitates this conversation; and how this policy and its impacts would translate into conversations between the countries involved.

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1. See <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/38>.



## 2.2. A Brief Introduction to the Horn of Africa and the Peoples of the Borderlands

The Horn of Africa is defined in multiple ways. This paper adopts the definition of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which includes eight countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda. There are over 250 million living in the region, including around 20 million pastoralists; and the population is growing rapidly. Ethiopia, the most populous of the countries in the region, has a unique position in that it shares borders with all of its fellow IGAD member countries, except Uganda.

This paper makes references to other borderland areas, but its focus is on two border clusters: (1) the Karamoja cluster (southeastern Sudan, southwestern Ethiopia, northwestern Kenya, and northeastern Uganda) and (2) the former Somali cluster (northeastern Kenya, southeastern Ethiopia, and Southern Somalia).<sup>2</sup> The Karamoja cluster (cluster 1), is one of IGAD's four well-established border clusters. In Ethiopia, it comprises the political-administrative units of Bench Maji Zone (the districts of Bero and Surma) and South Omo Zone (the districts of Dasenech and Nyangatom). In Kenya, it includes the counties of Turkana, West Pokot, Samburu, and Trans Nzoia. In South Sudan, it encompasses Kapoeta, Budi County, Ikwoto County, Naia, and Naurus in Eastern Equatoria State. And in Uganda, it consists of the districts Kaabong, Moroto, Amuda, Nakapiripirit, Napa, Abim, and Kotido in Karamoja-Region. The former Somali cluster was redefined by IGAD and two

separate clusters demarcated from the borders of Lake Turkana in the east to the Gedo region in Somalia in the West.<sup>3</sup> Cluster 2—the Borena cluster—extends from the banks of Lake Turkana to Moyale, while the former cluster 3—the Somali (or Mandera) cluster extends from Moyale to the northeastern corner of Kenya, which is known as the Mandera triangle (CEWARN 2015: 4; CEWARN 2012). On the Somali side, the geographic coverage of the cluster has not yet been defined but is expected to include the Gedo region.

Aridity is a major feature of the borderlands of the Horn of Africa, which encompass a land area of 5.2 million square kilometers, 60–70 percent of which receive less than 600 millimeter in annual rainfall. Recurrent droughts and unpredictable rainfall patterns are characteristic of the borderlands (IGAD 2014). The borderlands represent the heartland of the arid and semiarid lands of the Horn of Africa. Its population has adopted mobile pastoralism as a major system of food production, perhaps with the exception of the highland part of the Ethiopia–Eritrea and Ethiopia–Sudan borders. The Horn of Africa is home to one of the world's largest groups of pastoralists; other livelihoods are barely viable there. Livelihood diversification, however, is the current trend, including trading, particularly the cross-border livestock trade; small-scale agriculture, such as flood-retreat farming along the banks of rivers; and small-scale artisanal mining.

Like elsewhere in Africa, the borders of the Horn of Africa were artificially drawn by colonial powers, who partitioned single cultural communities and ethnic groups and undermined a livelihood system based on pastoral mobility made possible by the

2. IGAD has since redivided the former Somali cluster into two different clusters.

3. The article by Scott-Villiers (background paper 3) treats this as a single cluster.

dynamic exploitation of ecological variations. The ethnicity of many pastoralist groups spans across national borders. In the tri-borderlands of the Karamoja cluster, we find around 14 pastoralist groups who share a common language, culture, and way of life.<sup>4</sup> The tri-border of the Somali cluster is relatively more homogeneous, consisting of multiple Somali and Oromo clans.<sup>5</sup> There are Somali clans found in the borderland between Ethiopia and the de facto independent state of Somaliland.<sup>6</sup> In the tri-border between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, we find the Afar triangle inhabited by Afar people. And along the border between Ethiopia and South Sudan, we find the three major Nilotic groups of Nuer (Lou and Jikany), Anuak, and Murle (see Feyissa 2015).

### 2.2.1. Resilience in Borderland Communities

This section examines the factors affecting resilience to better understand how development actors can nurture and strengthen them. Resilience is “the ability of countries, communities, and households to anticipate, mitigate, adapt to, and/or recover from the effects of shocks and stresses in a manner that protects livelihoods, accelerates and sustains recovery, and supports economic and social development” (Fahrenhorst 2012: 1). In other words, resilience is the capacity to withstand shocks (de Waal 2017a). The emphasis of this paper is on local bases of resilience, which have been progressively undermined by the convergence of myriad risks generated by internal

and external factors. This paper is organized into demographic, economic, environmental, and sociopolitical factors affecting resilience.<sup>7</sup>

#### Demographic factors

The average population growth rate for the Horn of Africa is 3 percent, doubling every 23 years (see figure 2.1), compounding the challenge of reducing absolute poverty rates (World Bank 2015: 7). Recent population estimates of pastoralist communities by country are difficult to find, but table 2.1, while outdated, provides some basic demographics of the region’s pastoralist communities.

Population growth rates are slower in the pastoral (border) areas than in the agricultural areas in the Horn of Africa, but the size of the borderlands population has still increased. In general, population growth in pastoral areas is estimated at 2.5 to 3.5 percent per year, which equates to a doubling of the population every 25 to 35 years (AU 2010). The population has remained pastoralist to a large extent, although as Scott-Villiers discusses in her 2015 paper, many have made some changes to the ways in which they remain associated with pastoralism in the face of increasing challenges. There are many good ecological, economic, social, and cultural reasons for this shift, but it raises the obvious question: how can pastoralism be sustained when the human population is growing against a shrinking resource base. Historical analyses indicate that pastoral areas are unable to absorb or sustain growing human populations and that as the population grows, at some point “excess”

4. The major groups are the Nyangatom and the Dassenech in Ethiopia; the Turkana, the Samburu, and the Pokot in Kenya; the Toposa in South Sudan; and the Bokora, the Dodoth, the Jie, and the Matheniko in Uganda.

5. The major clans are the Garre, the Ogaden, the Degodia, the Boran, and the Gabra.

6. These clans are predominantly Issaq, but there are also sizeable populations of Ogaden and Issa.

7. This division is inspired by the analytical framework of the Foresight project and its “drivers of migration framework” (Foresight 2011); however, that framework is developed for a different analytical purpose and is not directly used in this background paper.



**Table 2.1. Pastoralist Demographics in the Horn of Africa**

Country	Total Population	Pastoralist Population	
		Number of Pastoralists	Percent of Total Population
Djibouti	466,900–650,000	93,000–130,000	20
Eritrea	4,500,000	1,000,000–1,500,000	33
Ethiopia	70,500,000	7,000,000–8,000,000	10–12
Kenya	30,000,000	6,000,000	20
Somalia	9,600,000	6,700,000	70
Sudan	40,200,000	n.a	60 (nonurban areas)

Source: USAID 2005b.

people move away from pastoralism as a way of life and a means of livelihood.

The push factors in pastoral areas can combine with pull factors from urban centers, which may offer alternative and less risky or easier lifestyles and job opportunities, as well as better education and health services. Among those who remain, many continue to engage in pastoralism because there are few alternative livelihoods. But in areas of relatively higher rainfall level and therefore where crop production is possible, pastoralists face pressure from farmers as they travel through the regions, and in accessing pasture and water. In the absence of land tenure, when they do try and settle down, many lose their land and way of life (Helland 2015; Lind, Sabates-Wheeler, and Kohnstamm 2016). Those who fall out of pastoralism use various and potentially damaging livelihood strategies, including the non-sustainable use of natural resources, such as cutting trees for charcoal production and sale; sending their daughters to work as house servants in town, which exposes them to risk of abuse; trading in contraband; and other criminal activity, including organized livestock raiding and banditry (AU 2010).

Urbanization also influences pastoralists, as in Ethiopia, where a rapid process of urbanization is taking place in pastoralist regions. Policy implications include urban growth encroaching on land and further constraining the mobility of pastoralists, which, in turn, risks driving up urban poverty. Shrinking land, a growing population, and the negative impact that territorial ethnicization has on rangeland management increasingly intersect and hamper the ability of the pastoralist to engage in adaptive migration—a primary coping strategy during times of drought and other climate variability. Together, these factors create a “trapped population.”

The pastoral areas of the borderlands are experiencing demographic stress due to a “youth bulge,” which is when a disproportionate percentage of a population is young. Northeastern Kenya, for example, has the country’s highest fertility rate at 5.9 with a dependency ratio far higher as well. Among the Turkana, whose population has grown dramatically over the last two decades (HRW 2015), 59 percent of households include seven or more members, and almost half of the total population is 14 years old and younger (KNBS 2009). Youth bulges are generally, but not

always, associated with the risk of criminality, political instability, and armed conflict, especially when paired with low levels of education and training opportunities and a polarized political context. This means border areas are at higher risk (Menkhaus 2015).

The transition from mobile pastoralism to agro-pastoralism in some border areas has induced demographic shifts, such as a rise in the birth rate and a fall in the death rate among Somalis in some parts of eastern Ethiopia. Conflict-induced displacement and the effects of climate change have also affected regional and local demographics, disrupting established social and natural resource governance systems (HPG 2009).

Urbanization is associated with both problems and opportunities for pastoralists. Urban centers pull people, especially youths, away from pastoral areas, thereby reducing the available work force. For those continuing with the pastoralist way of life, however, especially relatively wealthier pastoralists with larger herds, the growth of cities and towns also offers economic opportunities (AU 2010). When people from pastoral backgrounds find work, the remittances they send back to their families represent a principal source of income. Nevertheless, with their low levels of education and literacy, urban migrants are more likely to find employment in low paying jobs or in the informal sector. And pastoralists have particularly low levels of education and training. For example, according to Kaduuli (2008: 7), 90 percent of street children in Kampala under five years old are from Karamoja, and the Kampala City Council estimates that 80 percent of all beggars are from the same region. Of course, urbanization is also a

consequence of pastoralists “dropping out” of pastoralist livelihoods, especially in times of climatic stress and food insecurity, such as the recent droughts experienced in some parts of the region (Hagmann et al. 2018).

This pattern of the demographic transformation of pastoralist societies has several policy implications related to resilience building. If populations grow rapidly as pastoralists settle, development policies can accommodate such growth and respond with the provision of education, health, and infrastructure. For those remaining, resilience building efforts must include the wider economic processes and developments rather than only considering pastoral system (Helland 2015).

Another major demographic factor affecting resilience is the high number of displaced people in the region. As of February- 2019, Uganda was host to 1,205,913 refugees, the highest number in the country’s history, and the largest number of refugees in Africa (UNHCR 2019). It continues to receive simultaneous arrivals from the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Burundi. Ethiopia currently hosts more than 900,000 refugees from countries that include Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen. In addition, an estimated 2.8 million people are internally displaced, with a significant number expected to require humanitarian assistance throughout 2019.<sup>8</sup> In addition, Kenya and Sudan host over 400,000 and 900,000 refugees, respectively. Djibouti also hosts refugees and transit migrants from the Horn of Africa and Yemen, while Bidi Bidi settlement in Uganda and Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya are among the largest in the world (World

8. <http://reporting.unhcr.org/ethiopia>.

Bank 2015). It is not only the sheer magnitude of displacement but also its geography that necessitates a development response. Nearly all the refugee camps are located in border areas, which are already relatively underdeveloped and marginalized compared with rest of the host countries. Accommodating displaced people imposes costs on already marginal host communities in precarious socioeconomic situations plagued by food insecurity, limited access to basic social services and economic infrastructure, poor livelihood opportunities, and a degraded natural resource base. Failure to assist host communities could lead to further friction, tension, and conflict. As such, displacement is among the major drivers of fragility of the border areas. The region also hosts over 7.7 million internally displaced people due to multiple conflicts, including those resulting from political transition in Ethiopia and the impact of drought.

### Economic factors

Export of livestock and livestock products from Horn of Africa annually exceeds US\$1 billion, and an estimated 90 percent or more of this derives from production based on mobile pastoralism (Little, Debsu, and Tiki 2014: 389–97). This estimate is much larger than government figures, which consistently underestimate the contribution of pastoralism to the national economy (Wellard-Dyer 2012). Although pastoralists supply very substantial numbers of livestock to domestic, regional, and international markets, their contribution is often undervalued. These exports are largely to a few markets—both within Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East. As a result, they are particularly susceptible to demand shocks and climatic fluctuations. As an example, a combination

of the Saudi ban on Somali livestock imposed at the end of 2016 (and lifted temporarily for the haj season of July–September 2017), and the impact of the drought on animals' health and herd losses, led to a sharp fall in exports—from 5.3 million animals in 2015 to 1.3 million in 2017 (Sarkar and Serrière 2019).

Pastoralism is an ecologically sound and economically viable system of food production in the arid and semiarid borderlands, and as such constitutes a major source of resilience. It is generally portrayed as a livelihood strategy, successfully meeting the challenges of low overall biomass productivity and environmental variability (Bollig, Schnegg, and Wotzka 2013: 1). When effectively managed, rangelands support not only livestock but also biodiversity, and this combination offers the best option for sustainable and resilient livelihoods.

Pastoralists rely heavily on strategic mobility to ensure access to grazing land and water in areas where seasonal weather patterns make it so that such resources are not available year-round. Such movements are highly strategic and draw on local information gathering and risk analysis supported by traditional systems of governance and decision-making (AU 2010). By migrating across borders, pastoralists can access regional and international markets, and mobile pastoralism is an effective mode of existence, not only supporting local subsistence but also the regional economy. Pastoral public goods—grazing lands and water points—have a resource border that is not necessarily congruent with the state border. A key factor affecting economic resilience is therefore mobility. In more recent times, many pastoralists have

grasped the opportunities offered by new technologies; some now use mobile phones to help manage their mobility, including accessing information about conditions in other areas, and to give them easier and quicker access to market-related information (Scoones and Adwera 2009; Yohannes and Mebratu 2009).

Restrictions placed on pastoral mobility by both colonial and postcolonial governments have put pastoralism under immense pressure. The same can be said of the sedentarization agenda, which informs government development policies in pastoral areas. Another related driver undermining resilience in border areas is the encroachment by state and private interest groups into the pastoral commons, such as the establishment of conservation areas—national parks, game reserves, and other wildlife conservation sanctuaries and schemes—within pastoralist ranges, drastically decreasing grazing space—often at the expense of prime grazing lands—and game meat supplements for pastoralist groups. For example, there are several parks and game sanctuaries within 500 square kilometers of the Ilemi Triangle (Amutabi 2010), the Karimojong lost an estimated 5,000 square kilometers as a result (Mamdani, Kasoma, and Katende 1992). The reduction of pastureland has led to a deterioration in livestock quality; and prohibition from hunting in protected game sanctuaries has eliminated the traditional supplements of game meat, resulting in an intensification of cross-border raiding (Amutabi 2010; Oba 1998). The situation has accentuated competition among communities that hitherto coexisted peacefully through carefully crafted local institutions of sharing. Armed and violent confrontations have occurred between pastoralists and the

conservation establishments. Another form of encroachment is large-scale commercial farming in the pastoral areas erroneously viewed as “empty lands.” Ethiopia’s western periphery along the border with South Sudan (Gambella region) is the epicenter of this phenomenon, driven by new global economic processes (demand for food and fuel), and abetted by the opportunistic response of national governments (Feyissa 2016).

Livelihood diversification is yet another major aspect of resilience. Within pastoralist production, keeping a range of livestock species reinforces the multifunctionality of livestock. Small ruminants may be useful for frequent sales and for providing appropriate amounts of meat to be eaten by a family, whereas larger species, such as cattle or camels, may be sold when larger amounts of money are needed and may be kept for milk production. Camels and donkeys are useful for transport. Camels and goats are usually more drought-resistant than cattle and sheep, but the latter may do better in a year that is wetter than usual. Notwithstanding the conventional image of pastoralists as conservatives, the empirical record clearly shows that pastoralists adapt to market demands and opportunities, evident in the switch of herd composition, such as pastoralists in Somalia and Ethiopia boosting camel exports in view of a boom in the price of camels.

Despite the image of pastoralists solely as cattle herders, they have always made use of nonpastoral livelihood sources, at least as supplementary income. For some, small-scale farming is a strategy of restocking. However, pastoralists may lack crop-farming skills and may be subsidized by relatives who still practice mobile pastoralism. Some

who have begun engaging in small-scale irrigation regard their new occupations as temporary, and aim to reenter pastoralism; they therefore invest their income from crop farming into livestock in an attempt to regain some degree of resilience (Yohannes and Mebratu 2009). Traditional seasonal farming along riverbanks (e.g., flood-retreat cropping in the Southern Region of Ethiopia) is often done with planting sticks, a traditional method for zero tillage (Yohannes 2002, Taffese 2005). This sustainable farming practice can also be part of the traditional land-use system in seasonally dry areas.

Another supplementary livelihood is artisanal mining. Mining of gold, limestone, and marble has been carried out in many areas of the Karamoja region, however, in conflict with more powerful entrepreneurs (Baleke 2015). The Afar have traditionally been active in the long-distance salt trade, but the sector is currently dominated by members of the dominant highland communities and the Ethiopian state, with near monopoly over the lucrative salt mining (Feyissa 2011). Resilience therefore depends on the protection of the interests of the pastoralists in this regard. Protecting pastoralists will in turn reduce competition for the meager natural resources that has been a cause of violent conflict in the region.

From a gender perspective, the growing livelihood diversification in pastoral areas has improved the status of pastoral women. In Ethiopia, for example, increasing diversification is enhancing the economic status of some pastoral women and challenging the status of men: as livestock become less important to the household economy, particularly in peri-urban and/or more sedentarized

households, women engage in income-generating activities (e.g., selling firewood or handicrafts and engaging in petty trade). In Somali and the Afar Region of Ethiopia, cultural norms enable this gender shift, because some pastoralist men view productive activities not related to livestock as low-status. In Borana, women are increasingly involved in agriculture but without a corresponding increase in their control of the income derived from cultivation. To overcome this challenge, gender issues must be mainstreamed into all stages of policy development and implementation (Watson 2010).

### Environmental factors

Because pastoralists have a long history of exposure to climatic variability, they have—out of necessity—developed mechanisms to cope with it. They often keep different animal species and categories as a strategy to reduce risk and exploit a wider range of ecological niches, using both grazing and browsing animals. They make reciprocal arrangements with other pastoralist groups for access to pasture and water, developing water-conservation techniques, observing early-warning signs of impending drought, and practicing complementary livelihood activities (e.g., trade or, where possible, cultivation). Such adaptations and practices were developed long before the concept of “climate change” became known (McKee 2008). Pastoral areas are usually arid and semiarid lands with low and erratic rainfall that vary in space and time. Thus, uncertainty and risk are the rule, not the exception. This variability requires flexibility and a high degree of adaptability to constantly changing conditions. By maintaining a high degree of mobility, pastoralists take their animals to “follow the rains” and



thus to available forage. Mobility allows them to avoid pests (e.g., ticks) and diseases that arise when conditions become wetter; it may serve as a means of avoiding conflict with other groups who use the same resources for part of the year; and it might reduce the risk of being the victim of livestock raiding. Mobility also helps conserve biodiversity.

In recent years, the most significant challenge to pastoralism is the widespread fragmentation of rangelands through processes of excision, privatization (often taking the form of enclosures), and commodification of rangeland resources. Such fragmentation directly threatens adaptive processes in customary pastoralist systems, as it becomes more difficult to move livestock across the land and as key resource areas are fenced off and set aside for nonlivestock uses. Rangelands have been carved up by newly established private enclosures, water points and cisterns, “farmlands” excised from large riverine areas for irrigation schemes, ranches, and conservation areas. A related trend, sedentarization and the uptake of land also contributes to fragmentation, as do resource-dependent activities such as dryland farming, charcoal burning, and harvesting wood for fuel (Lind, Sabates-Wheeler, and Krohnstamm 2016).

In the rural development field, there is growing evidence of how local adaptation capacities can be supported by building on the knowledge, interest, and innovativeness of local actors (e.g., Waters-Bayer et al. 2009). Sometimes referred to as *participatory innovation* development, this approach brings together locals with external actors, such as researchers and nongovernmental

organizations, to accelerate the innovative process. The external actors play a facilitative—rather than a leading—role, leaving the local land users in the “driver’s seat.”

Strengthening environmental resilience in pastoral areas should go beyond local resources. Project Concern International’s initiative—Satellite Assisted Pastoral Resource Management (SAPARM)—is a case in point. In partnership with the World Food Programme and the Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS) of the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture, Project Concern International has piloted the use of a custom grazing maps platform in the Afar region of Ethiopia. Most pastoralists in Africa rely on three methods to make critical decisions on where to migrate with their herds during the dry season: relying on previous experience or indigenous knowledge, by sending out scouts, and through oral communication. The accuracy of these methods can mean the difference between survival and devastation in drought and nondrought years alike. The process is slow, costing valuable time when food for livestock is scarce and some grazing areas are as large as 21,000 square kilometers. The satellite-assisted program provides pastoralists with maps showing them which areas are better than others, helping them make better migration decisions in the face of increasing drought risks. The project leverages existing early warning channels, which were primarily set up for the upward flow of information from communities to the regional and national authorities. Reversing this flow, SAPARM returns information downward to the community. A year into the project, results are encouraging: pastoralists not only use and trust the vegetation maps, it also seems that

these maps are helping them reduce their live-stock losses. This makes a strong case for other development partners to consider new technology-based resilience in the arid and semiarid lands of the IGAD region. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Google have recently joined the initiative.

Contrary to earlier predictions, recent studies have shown that the Horn of Africa is getting drier, especially its drier areas. Given their dependence on climatic factors, pastoralists around the world are likely to be uniquely affected by climate change. Of course, as global warming proceeds, the topographical and climatic complexity of the Horn of Africa make it an especially challenging location for predicting the climate over the long term. No single effect dominates the region; the consequences of ocean warming and greenhouse gases operate in different ways; different locations have different trajectories; and the impacts on livelihoods, economies, and conflict vary.

According to earlier theories, global temperatures were expected to boost rainfall in the region and restore greenery to arid landscapes. But new research suggests that land is drying out at an unusually fast pace—the result of soaring greenhouse gas emissions (Tierney et al. 2015). For Ethiopia and Somalia, some modelers have predicted that warming will lead to greater drying, others to increased rainfall. These discrepancies may be partly due to the fact that the late season short rains in Somalia and the eastern highlands of Ethiopia may follow a different pattern than the main summer rains in Eritrea and northern Ethiopia. The most recent models suggest that Eritrea and northern Ethiopia are drying out overall with

anthropogenic warming leading to lower rainfall during the long rains; and at the same time, the eastern part of the subregion is becoming significantly wetter, with increased rainfall and higher risks of floods (Tierney et al. 2015).

These findings have dire implications for a region already grappling with decades of drought, extreme hunger, and rising political instability. Some studies on the specific border clusters indicate the severity of the risk posed by climate change. The biophysical complex arising from long-term environmental changes in the Ugandan side of the Karamoja cluster, characterized by worsening climatic conditions (such as low and erratic rainfall and prevalent prolonged drought), has increased competition over already scarce and diminishing resources.

Dwindling resources increase conflict and competition among pastoralist communities (USAID 2005a: 12). We find a similar effect of climate change on the Kenyan side of the Karamoja cluster. Minimum air temperatures in Turkana County have increased, and rainfall patterns have changed: the long rainy season has become shorter and dryer and the short rainy season has become longer and wetter, while overall annual rainfall remains at low levels (HRW 2015: 3). Insecurity resulting from climate-change-induced migration across the Horn of Africa is unleashing humanitarian consequences for over 8 million affected pastoralists (SIM 2010). The effect of climate change also has a gender component—it puts an additional burden on pastoral women as drought forces men farther afield with herds in search of water, and women remain behind managing the household. Women's knowledge of the environment is crucial during

such times, and yet this knowledge, along with the plight of many women, often goes ignored in strategies for drought mitigation or countering food insecurity (Kipuri and Ridgewell 2008; de Waal 2017b).

### Sociopolitical factors

An obvious sociopolitical factor affecting resilience is the political fragility throughout the region. In 1991, after many years of being a failed state, the state of Somalia collapsed. The Al-Shabab militancy that threatens the region at large is a more recent manifestation of a failed state, albeit somewhat reduced. South Sudan has failed to institute a functioning state system, evident in recurrent civil wars since independence. Eritrea has steadily degenerated into a rogue state that poses a security threat to its neighbors in the region. Sudan is beset with civil wars in almost all of its regions. Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya appear to be relatively more stable, but they too demonstrate measurable degree of political fragility, including dozens of low-intensity armed conflicts. The recent political transition in Ethiopia has been accompanied by the outbreak of conflict among political groups. Even Djibouti has struggled with protracted ethnic tension between its two major ethnic groups: the Afar and the Issa. There are also cross-border dimensions to most of these instances of state fragility and conflict.

Under this context of state fragility, a main source of resilience in the borderlands is the traditional governance structure, which is seen as a more legitimate and participatory political order than the state structures. Muhereza et al. (2008) suggest that one of the main areas of difference between traditional and formal systems is around

the defense of individual rights. A central tenet of the traditional system is the pursuit of social justice and the recognition that the rights of the collective, rather than the individual, are central. Hence, the rights of an individual are respected only to the extent that they do not impact on social justice, “defined by the common needs of furthering the survival of the community” (Muhereza et al. 2008: 83). For example, under traditional justice, a kraal member cannot sell a bull if doing so will “undermine the survival of the collective” (Muhereza et al. 2008: 83). Pastoralist families associated with strong clans and subclans are less vulnerable than those associated with weaker ones because their internal safety net tends to be more intact. The traditional governance system has “no faith” in modern public administration systems (Muhereza et al. 2008: 15). Stites et al. (2007: 19) discuss the tensions that often exist between local council “leaders” and elders due to the former being of a lower status than the latter, in the community, which creates a “fragmented and inefficient system of power.”

There are clear, usually hierarchical governance structures in pastoral societies that lead community decision-making processes, for example, regarding access to land and rangeland resources. These structures have developed differently in different areas, influenced by the demands of the communities they serve, the natural environment, and political forces. For centuries, the social organization and traditional resource management systems of pastoral communities have greatly contributed to the continuity of social and ecological systems (Tigistu et al. 2016: 8–9). In some cases, there may be specific governance structures for a particular resource, such as water,

but in other cases, decisions about all resources are made by a central group of community members. If governance structures give other groups decision-making responsibilities over resources, such as water or grazing land, they are expected to work together to prevent the over-exploitation of any resource. This layered approach of governance, with strong horizontal and vertical linkages, is typical of common property regimes.

There is a common perception among policy makers that pastoralists do not plan, particularly not over the long term. However, in reality, land-use planning is a lifelong practice among pastoralists, who must adapt to constantly changing environmental conditions and other factors. Pastoralists tend to make verbal rather than written plans, making it difficult to share them with nonpastoralists. The plans tend to be more short-term in nature due to the vagaries and unpredictability of the environment in which they are created (Tefera et al. 2016).

Government policies regarding natural resources, such as Uganda's Land Sector Strategic Plan of 2001, aim to improve land services and strengthen land rights, emphasizing privatization and sedentary development rather than the interests of mobile pastoralists. Forestry policies have also been criticized for denying access to the Karamojong, who sell wood for their livelihoods during times of resource scarcity (Powel 2010: 8).

The social assets of pastoralist groups also include the indigenous social support systems (safety nets) that, to varying degrees, assist the poorer members of the community. These systems may target households with relatively few animals or

those which have suddenly lost animals due to disease, flooding, or other causes. Female-headed households may also be targeted. These local systems are based on loans or gifts of livestock or livestock products; for Muslim pastoralist communities, it is based on the giving of alms. However, not all pastoralist communities subscribe equally to a pro-poor social system. For some, pastoralism is a moral and existential universe tying together humans and herds, a self-contained egalitarian system that has historically excluded the poor, rendering them unable to sustain their pastoralist lifestyle and eventually forcing them to abandon it. A case study on the Turkana confirms that, "dislocation of the destitute, both spatially and economically, results in the identity of the poor person being remade into that of an ethnic "other"—a non-Turkana" (Anderson and Broch-Due 2000). The aim is to ensure the community's survival. As such, experts suggest that structural poverty has not existed in pastoralists' social system in eastern Africa, but conjectural poverty has. The Turkana believe poverty is the result of choices and decisions and that the prudent will either not fall into the poverty trap or will recover, while the imprudent will drop out.

A coping strategy constituting a major factor for resilience among pastoralists is their pervasive cross-border practices. Porous borders allow pastoralists to pursue traditional patterns of migration, crossing many state borders despite the restrictions imposed by national governments. Borders are also used as a "resource" to negotiate socioeconomic marginality by tapping into the opportunities offered by each one (Feyissa and Hohene 2010). This is enabled by the cross-border settlement pattern, such as the Somali

settlements in four countries. The Nuer along the Ethiopia–South Sudan border have practiced alternative citizenship, orienting their movement depending on the fluctuating opportunity structure (Feyissa 2013a; 2015). They have passed as Sudanese when refugee camps were more attractive throughout the 1980s. When the opportunity structure changed in favor of Ethiopia in the 1990s, many of the “Sudanese” Nuer became Ethiopian citizens. However, this is not an opportunity equally accessed by all. For example, the growing securitization of borders with Somalia due to the Al-Shabab militancy has constrained cross-border movements.

Traditional governance systems change as the power of the elders diminishes. Mirzeler and Young (2000: 425) stressed that an increasing number of educated young Karamojong have entered local government service or are occupying posts in Kampala, providing crucial “intermediary links” that undermine the relevance of elders and their traditional authorities. Muhereza et al. (2008: 84) express concern that the traditional system in the Karamajong cluster may be at risk due to the increasing difficulty faced by the elders in punishing the karachuna—male youth. Mutengesa and Hendrickson (2008: 55) note that in recent years the balance of power has shifted toward the karachuna who, with modern weapons, view themselves as independent agents and not just implementers of the community’s will. Elders can still influence decisions, particularly in enforcing traditional punishments, such as ameto, to preserve interclan peace agreements. Knighton (2003: 26) suggests that traditional justice institutions (akiriket—sacred assembly) still function and anticipates that the “persistence of culture

held dear will endure much longer.” He also notes that the akiriket retain some control over gun use as a way of maintaining autonomy among the Karamojong.

The role of the gun in catalyzing change has provoked much debate. In the past, community members only used guns during encounters with enemies from outside the ethnic group (as spears were prior to the 1970s), but are now regularly deployed in intragroup disputes (Gray 2000: 408). Guns have also changed the dynamics within families, as sons with weapons are less likely to obey their parents, who had previously exerted some control (Oxfam 2008: 32). The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has undermined the role of elders in restraining youth violence. Pastoralist youth is now engaged in predatory form of cattle raiding carried out for commercial purposes, creating the phenomena of what the Kenyan Commission for Human Rights calls “cattle warlords” and a “raiding economy.”

Tensions between the customary and state justice systems in the pastoral areas are also present. Muhereza et al. (2008: 1) argue that formal justice systems have been largely ineffective in Karamoja due to the challenges posed by “significant structural, financial and logistical constraints and insecurity due to armed conflicts.” In this context, the majority of Karamojong who live outside towns (almost 95 percent) rely on traditional systems. Traditional justice institutions, such as the akiriket, consist of elders, who decide on declarations of war and peace and the movement of herds, in consultation with the community and seers. The elders’ orders are then carried out by the karachuna (Mutengesa and Hendrickson 2008: 55).



Muhereza et al. (2008) argue that, under current conditions, the justice needs of the Karamojong are not being adequately served by either the formal or traditional systems and that traditional justice institutions should be streamlined into the national system. There are particular concerns that some of the traditional rulings “bordered on criminality” because they were contrary to the fundamental principles of the laws of Uganda (Muhereza et al. 2008: 1). Ethiopia’s constitutionally backed legal pluralism promises a lot in terms of strengthening the role that the customary justice system can play in the areas of peace and security. However, the mandate of the customary justice system is limited to areas of civil matters, although the government has demonstrated increasing tolerance as most criminal cases are also handled by the customary justice system (Pankhurst and Getachew 2008).

Another factor undermining the sociopolitical factors of resilience in pastoral areas is an increase in the co-opting of traditional authorities. As the state’s presence gets stronger in the borderlands, governments seek to co-opt traditional authorities instead of creating a more sensible partnership that recognizes alternative bases of legitimacy (Feyissa and Kirchmann 2009). On the one hand, it is self-defeating as the very appeal of traditional authorities is because they operate on a different basis of legitimacy. In Ethiopia’s Somali border, local communities elected new elders as soon as the government co-opted the one before them, calling them “government elders” (Hagmann 2007). Such an approach engenders institutional erosion, as traditional authorities risk losing their credibility among the local constituency, creating an institutional void and weaker local capacity

for peacemaking. In other border areas, such as Kenya and Somalia, the trend is toward more hybrid forms of governance instancing a mediated state phenomenon, one that allows, or at least tolerates, different centers of power in the provision of public goods (Menkhaus 2015). Of course, “traditional” governance structures do not exist independent of political systems and may become imbricated in forms of governance that seek to exploit ethnic and communal divisions. A good example of this is the process of governance in Somalia prior to state collapse, where Siyad Barre exploited and intensified clan divisions to deflect challenges to his power (de Waal 2018b). A more recent example is that of the process of political transition in Ethiopia (de Waal 2018a). Menkhaus 2015

A glaring weakness of the traditional governance systems in pastoral areas is gender inequality. Women are marginalized by the patriarchal system with regard to access to resources, excluded from decision-making institutions; and subjected to severe forms of gender-based violence, such as female genital mutilation. However, pastoralist women wield subtle forms of power, which are often ignored. Understanding the access and control that pastoral women have over livestock—a key financial asset for the group—requires moving beyond the concept of “ownership” to a more complex set of rights and responsibilities, often overlooked by planners. While in most pastoral societies, the final decision to dispose of an animal by sale, gift, or slaughter rests with the male head of household, his wives and even his daughters may need to be consulted and can exert a considerable amount of influence over the decision. Disposal rights are therefore complex and connected

to women's access rights to the products of any particular animal. Even customary pastoral inheritance law, which in most pastoralist groups automatically passes livestock along the male line, may entitle a widow to keep the livestock given to her as gifts by her husband during their marriage. Development actors should pay attention to and build on women's "informal power" rather than pursue an approach that privileges victimhood (Watson 2010).

## 2.3. The Economies of the Borderlands

This section discusses the economies of the borderlands with a focus on informal and formal cross-border trade and the possibilities of integration between the two.

### 2.3.1. Formal Cross-Border Trade and the Process of Regional Integration

The Horn of Africa lags far behind other regions of Africa in terms of regional integration, despite the strong economic incentives toward it, not least because one-third of its countries are landlocked. Notwithstanding its potential, IGAD's efforts, particularly with regard to trade integration, have lagged behind those of other African regional economic communities (Healy 2011: 11). Much of the official international trade in the region is to and from markets in Europe, Asia, China, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. The total intraregional exports among the IGAD subregion amounted to US\$1.9 billion in 2011, which was only 5.8 percent of the region's global exports. Kenya ranked first in IGAD intracommunity exports, followed by Uganda and Djibouti; Uganda ranked first in IGAD intracommunity imports, followed by Somalia and Kenya (Abdi and Seid 2013: 12–13). Conditions

in the region are not especially favorable for the achievement of trade-led regional economic integration due to a variety of factors (Healy 2011), discussed below.

- **Weak economies.** The subregion has one of the continent's weakest economies, with low economic growth for many years compounded by recurrent drought, famine, pervasive political instability, military conflict, and scant direct foreign investment. However, for the last decade, the region as a whole has recorded impressive economic performance, generating hope for regional economic integration.
- **Political instability and military conflicts.** The process of regional integration has been severely undermined by political instability within and between the states.
- **Competitive economies.** There is similarity of composition of imports and exports in the region, with limited trade complementarities in the formal sector. Countries rely on a narrow range of products to export and are heavily dependent on imports from outside the region. However, the general noncomplementarity of intra-African trade in general hides the huge potential for trade in agricultural commodities such as grain (UNECA 2010).
- **Overlapping membership.** All IGAD countries are also members of Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA); Kenya and Uganda also belong to the East African Community. Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia belong to the regional groupings of CEN-SAD (the Community of Sahel-Saharan

States). These multiple membership arrangements can lead to duplication of efforts, unwarranted competition among institutions, system incompatibility, and divergent and often conflicting expectations. The region has yet to experience the harmonization of policies among the various regional economic communities and associations (Healy 2011). Ethiopia planned to initiate an alternative regional economic community comprising the smaller Horn of Africa—Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan—excluding Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan, which did not materialize.<sup>9</sup>

- **Economic imbalance between members.** Relatively less developed member states fear the potentially fierce competition from relatively strong economies. The efficient Kenyan manufacturing sector could displace domestic producers in other member countries. Ethiopia might rival Kenya as the strongest economy in the region. A negotiated protection to infant economies could raise the comfort level of the weaker countries with regional integration (Abdi and Seid 2013).
- **Tax revenue losses.** Like most developing countries, the IGAD member countries rely on trade taxes for the majority of their revenues, which has constrained regional integration as members are reluctant to remove tax and tariff barriers for fear of revenue loss (Abdi and Seid 2013).

Despite these challenges, the prospect for regional integration looks good, spurred by the

Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement and Ethiopia's big push to diversify the use of regional ports. There are great possibilities for enhancing regional economic interdependence through the development of transport corridors to seaports, management of shared water resources (given the transboundary nature of most of the rivers in the region), common management of pastoral rangelands, and improved energy security. Major regional infrastructure projects, such as LAPSET (Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport) and Ethiopia's export-driven mega-hydroelectric dam projects, are cases in point, even if none of these projects are free from political competition among the largest countries in the region. For example, Ethiopia's proposed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the Blue Nile has exacerbated tensions between it and Egypt, which fears that the dam could jeopardize its primary water supplies (Reid and Bassiouni 2018).

Foreign direct investment in East Africa held steady in 2018 at US\$9 billion (out of the US\$32 billion flow to sub-Saharan Africa). East Africa is the fastest-growing region on the continent.

### 2.3.2. Informal Cross-Border Trade

Informal cross-border trade in the Horn of Africa is much more robust than the formal regional economy. Major trading items are livestock, khat, second-hand cloth, and consumer goods. Livestock and livestock products are of considerable importance. The most active site for the informal cross-border trade in livestock is in the Mandera triangle (Somali cluster), through which livestock from southern Somalia and southern Ethiopia pass, ultimately destined for the major cities of Kenya. Cross-border trading is also active in Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Djibouti, although the

9. This is based on the author's discussion with officials at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2016.

formal livestock trade with Persian Gulf countries is increasingly overtaking it (Little 2005; Hagmann and Stepputat 2016).

The prolonged collapse of the Somali state has reoriented the livestock trade. Although the country's state collapse created insecurity along its borders, informal traders have managed to create a more robust regional livestock trade thanks to the cross-border settlement pattern and the social capital associated with it. "State collapse has brought an entire national economy into the informal sector and has given Somali kinship and cross-border ties renewed significance" (Little 2005: 7). It has also helped create informal financial markets. There are vital "trust" relations based on kinship and other social relations that serve market and finance functions. This may help to explain the predominance of strong ethnic-based trading coalitions. No wonder then that the Somali have dominated the informal cross-border trade in the region, as they are straddled across the borders between Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, as well as between Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Djibouti. Available evidence indicates that more than 95 percent of cross-border commerce is financed through the trader's own resources or from funds obtained informally from kinsmen, friends, and associates. These trade patterns are reinforced by unattractive, highly regulated domestic prices that are lower than parallel market prices in neighboring countries (Little, Tegegne, and Alemayehu 2001).

The informal cross-border trade has significant effects on regional food security. Revenues from cross-border trade in livestock are used to finance grain and other food imports. The links between livestock and grain trade are important, particularly along the Somalia–Somaliland border,

including direct commodity barter trade and livestock traders financing grain and other imports from their profits (Little, Tegegne, and Alemayehu 2001). Little (2005: 2) further argues that informal cross-border trade is "essential especially for pastoralist communities of the borderlands as they are weakly integrated with most areas of their countries and official channels hardly provide adequate outlets for the sale of their livestock and livestock products." Marketing patterns and incomes from livestock trade provide good indications of the conditions of the pastoral sector and of local food security. A critical indicator for food security in the border areas is the terms of trade between what herders receive for their products (livestock) and what they must pay to purchase needed grains, such as maize flour and sorghum. The terms of trade for herders has deteriorated, as increases in grain prices have generally outpaced livestock prices, introducing a new line of vulnerability to the peoples of the borderlands (FEWS NET 2005). This has an important policy implication: improving the food security situation in the area requires a broadening of market access for both sales and purchases (Teka and Azeze 2002).

The informal cross-border trade is also important because it creates an economic space for women or reorients their livelihood strategies. As Little (2005: 10) noted, "in many cases, informal trade is highly gendered with high levels of female participation, especially women who often pursue petty trade as a survival strategy to feed their families." In some cases, women take on roles connecting newly formed urban centers with pastoralist communities (Nori 2010). In Kenya, 80 percent of female cross-border traders rely on that trade as their sole source of income (USAID Kenya). However, trade policies in the continent

are not necessarily favorable to women, because men have better access to resources while women are discriminated, subjected to gender-based violence and greater extortion. Strong legal and institutional reforms are needed to improve the experience of women engaged in cross-border trade (Ityavvar 2013).

### 2.2.3. Interaction Between the Formal and Informal Economies of the Borderlands

The unofficial cross-border trade in the borderlands of the Horn of Africa is a vital part of people's lives in the borderlands and beyond. The nexus between the cross-border livestock trade and regional food security has already been mentioned. The robust cross-border trade has also shown what market-based regional economic integration looks like, well ahead of the process of integration through formal channels. Nonetheless, the governments of the region, with few exceptions, are hostile toward the informal cross-border trade, so their normal response emphasizes control measures to curb the commerce. Ethiopia is often at the forefront of cracking down on the informal cross-border trade, particularly in livestock. The 2002 clampdown resulted in traders moving location. The government announced in 2009 that it wished to double its earnings from the livestock sector by curbing illegal trade and opening new market centers. The scale of this "unofficial" trade is estimated at up to ten times the value of officially recorded trade. Control of the trade has passed in recent years from the customs authorities to the military. As such, "any movement of goods or livestock across the Ethiopian border is considered "contraband" unless accompanied by official paperwork, and is subject to varying degrees of control" (Majid 2010: 17).

As part of its counterinsurgency strategy, Ethiopia has securitized informal cross-border trade. During the major crackdown of 2007, for example, the Ethiopian government enforced a trade blockade against the commercial activities of Somali clans who supported the secessionist Ogaden National Liberation Front rebels of the Somali Regional State. These types of measures can have a considerable impact on existing informal cross-border trade, eventually tying the livestock economy of Ethiopia's Somali Region more firmly to the national economy (Majid 2010). Since the mid-2000s, the Ethiopian state, and then elements of the security forces, supported the Somali Region's leader Abdi Mohammad Omar (also known as *Abdi Iley* or "one eyed"), by allowing him to accumulate unprecedented power. This involved the creation of an extraordinarily powerful local security police and a patronage network that allowed him to control all trade on the Ethiopia-Somalia border (see Gardner 2018). Since his replacement in late 2018, the political configuration of the Somali Region remains in flux, which could significantly impact the livestock trade. Kenya is on the opposite side of the continuum, actively encouraging the informal cross-border livestock trade from Somalia and southern Ethiopia to meet the growing demand for meat in its major cities (Eid 2014).

There are some encouraging developments toward legalization of the informal cross-border trade, albeit on a limited scale. Ethiopia, for example, has introduced a licensing system. A bilateral agreement with Sudan allows traders to make 48 trips per year with goods valued up to US\$117 per trip. Ethiopia has taken unilateral action to liberalize small-scale border trade with Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia by specifying the upper-limit value



and type of goods that can be traded, as well as the frequency of crossings and the distance from border posts up to which trade is authorized. This is a step forward, reversing the previous policy of actively undermining cross-border trade. Although it does not include the livestock trade, the adoption of the informal cross-border trade policy framework by IGAD in 2018 is expected to significantly boost the resilience of borderland communities.

In its second growth and transformation plan for the period 2015–20, Ethiopia prioritizes boosting its economic cooperation with neighboring countries, centered on strengthening cross-border trade.

## 2.4. Regional, National, and International Policy and Development Initiatives

This section discusses major policies and development initiatives in the border areas, including examples from regional bodies, national governments, and development partners.

### 2.4.1. IGAD's Policy Frameworks and Regional Development Initiatives

IGAD is the major institutional framework for regional integration and related development investments in the Horn of Africa. The initial mandate of IGAD as conceived in 1986 was limited to the narrow objectives of combating desertification and enhancing regional efforts to ease the effects of drought. As such, its priority programs focused on providing institutional and technical assistance to its member states, particularly in the areas of early warning and food security systems, desertification and drought control, natural resource

management, and environmental protection, as well as other emerging regional challenges (Abdi and Seid 2013). This limited mandate was necessitated by the then prevailing interstate conflict among member countries, making increased cooperation in the area of peace and security politically sensitive. IGAD expanded its mandate in 1996 to political and economic issues. The refocusing and reengineering of IGAD covered three areas of cooperation: (1) food security and environmental protection; (2) conflict prevention, management, and resolution; and (3) economic cooperation and integration, including the creation of an enabling environment for cross-border investment and a gradual harmonization of investment policies. As a result of this refocusing and reengineering, IGAD was recognized as a strong and viable regional economic community by the 2006 Assembly of the African Union held in 2006 (Abdi and Seid 2013).

In general, IGAD's greatest achievement is in the area of institution building. Social, political, and economic integration has yet to materialize. For example, an economic integration program was scheduled to begin in 2009 with the creation of a free-trade area in 2009 but has not been put in place due to a variety of problems. IGAD's four regional institutions that seek to enhance resilience and sustainable development in the arid and semiarid lands of the Horn of Africa are examined below.

To further operationalize and concretize its regional integration vision, IGAD has developed a cross-border cluster approach. A "cluster" is "a geographic space that cuts across multiple political-administrative units within the country and international borders, where a range of resources, services, and cultural values are shared by pastoral and agropastoral communities, and in which

stakeholders aim to develop and implement coordinated investments to enhance resilience and sustainable development" (IGAD 2015a: 7). According to IGAD's vision for regional integration,

"the cross-border cluster approach helps to promote practical roadmaps to foster a dialogue between stakeholders in order to enable the coordination of mutually beneficial investments across borders. The approach will provide a framework for addressing the common context-specific challenges while harnessing the development potential and opportunities across the borders." (IGAD 2015a: 6)

It further specified macro clusters. Thus far, four clusters have been identified with another four in development.

IGAD has organized a series of studies for each cluster to generate evidence-based knowledge that informs appropriate regional policies and associated development initiatives. In 2010, it conducted comprehensive studies on peace, security, and development in the Karamoja cluster. The member states held a validation workshop in 2011 and agreed on IGAD's action plan to treat the Karamoja cluster as one ecological, economic, sociocultural, and also conflict zone; to draft and implement a comprehensive ecological-socioeconomic development plan; to introduce a harmonized regional pastoral policy and strategy; to support and introduce peace and security and build up the institutions most strongly focused on implementation. In a 2012 study, 100 percent of the 114 interview participants, comprising government officials, local community members and civil society organizations, agreed on a regional development approach (Fahrenhorst 2012). This is commendable showing a degree

of desecuritization of the inter-state borders in the Karamoja cluster even though some border disputes between Kenya and South Sudan persist in the Ilemi Triangle.

### Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is among the most visible institutional expressions of IGAD in the borderlands. Set up in 2002, it remains a principal platform for regional cooperation on conflict prevention and mitigation through data-based early warning and response in the Horn of Africa region. CEWARN's mandate is to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region; to undertake and share analyses of that information; to develop case scenarios and formulate options for response; to share and communicate information analyses and response options; and to carry out studies on specific types and areas of conflict in the region. Compared with similar initiatives by ECOWAS, the African Union, and Southern African Development Community, CEWARN is the longest functioning mechanism on the African continent.<sup>10</sup> The collected information focuses on pastoral conflicts across borders. Included in CEWARN is the Rapid Response Fund, a multidonor basket fund that provides a flexible and rapid response capacity for pastoral and related conflicts. The fund, strictly supporting project-based activities, "is crafted to urgently respond to violent conflicts as well as to catalyze a response process that complements long-term development interventions for vulnerable communities" (CEWARN 2013). It primarily supports conflict prevention, management, and resolution activities, as well

10. See [www.cewarn.org/index.php](http://www.cewarn.org/index.php).

as capacity-building projects emanating from the local level.

CEWARN has been most active in the Karamoja cluster where it has not only managed to prevent conflict through its early warning system but has also initiated the conversation on a more comprehensive, regionally coordinated disarmament program.<sup>11</sup> Like other early warning and response systems, one of the major challenges CEWARN has faced is the question of how to link early warning systems and policy response to effectively prevent present and future conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Various studies have indicated that the following factors could enhance an effective linkage between CEWARN's early warning system and policy responses: inclusion of local stakeholders, collaboration between civil society and governments, regional and cross-border cooperation, the Rapid Response Fund, and capacity building as ways of effectively linking early warning and response measures (Christensen 2009). However, CEWARN has received criticism for its limited coverage of the entire region and for its inability to prevent other pastoralist conflicts (Adetula, Bereketeab, and Jaiyebo 2016: 32).

### IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre

In response to the vulnerability of the region to climate change, IGAD has developed a regional climate change strategy; engaged in a drought and disaster resilience and sustainability initiative; and established centers of excellence, such as the Climate Change Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC). ICPAC is a regionally mandated climate information provider, established with the

mission of providing timely early warning information to enable the region to cope with various risks associated with climate variability and change. Droughts are expected to become more severe and frequent with climate change, hence the need for drought monitoring and an early warning system.<sup>12</sup> The major climatic events monitored by ICPAC are the El Niño–Southern Oscillation phenomena, and sea surface temperature anomalies over the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, which is the main cause of climate variability in the Horn of Africa. The center hopes to reduce climate-related risks in the agriculture and food security sectors by strengthening ICPAC's capacity to provide downscaled, demand-driven climate information, which is crucial to increasing resilience in these sectors. Advances in modern climate science have improved forecasting accuracy over time-spans ranging from a single season to more than a year, extremely useful for early warning and for managing climate risks; yet, these modern forecasts have so far had little impact in rural areas.

ICPAC has carried out various projects, including one with a direct bearing on resilience that seeks to integrate indigenous and scientific knowledge to enhance the climate-change-related adaptive capacity of local communities in western Kenya. In many parts of rural Africa, there are elders who hold seemingly mystical powers of weather forecasting, often called “rainmakers.” Behind the mystique lies a body of knowledge passed down through the generations, based on close observation and understanding of weather patterns and the behavior of local plant and animal life. In western Kenya, the Nganyi clan is renowned for these

11. CEWARN Baseline Studies for the Ugandan and Kenyan side of the Karamoja.

12. See “Early Warning Signs of Global Warming: Droughts and Fires” at Union of Concerned Scientists website at: [www.ucsusa.org/global\\_warming/science\\_and\\_impacts/impacts/early-warning-signs-of-global-4.html](http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/impacts/early-warning-signs-of-global-4.html)

abilities. ICPAC is leading a project among the Nganyi rainmakers to link scientific and traditional knowledge. It is hoped that traditional knowledge will be better understood and valued, scientific knowledge will be increased, and communities at risk from climate change will have more reliable information in local languages to help them protect their health and livelihoods. To ensure trust between the two knowledge systems, the intellectual property rights of indigenous communities over specimens of local flora and fauna was recognized.<sup>13</sup>

In its efforts to tap into traditional ecological knowledge and integrate indigenous knowledge and scientific evidence, ICPAC is indeed at the cutting age, integrating indigenous knowledge with scientific data and analysis so that this rich body of knowledge can inform science and indigenous peoples can use the tools and methods of science for the benefit of their communities, if they choose to do so. Improving ways of understanding such connections is critical to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which has largely relied on scientific data and excluded local sources of information. ICPAC should work on the reverse side—building the technological capability of local communities to enhance their adaptive capacity, like the efforts of Project Concern International's Satellite Assisted Pastoral Resource Management interventions, described earlier.

### Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development

Established in 2012, the IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD) aims to be the premier center of excellence for

promoting livestock and complementary livelihood resources development in the region's arid and semiarid areas. Its stated mission is to “complement efforts of IGAD member states to sustainably generate wealth and employment through livestock and complementary livelihood resources development in arid and semiarid areas of the IGAD Region.” It has identified and benchmarked priority interventions for alternative livelihoods in arid and semiarid lands, development strategies, service provision endeavors, and policy areas using evidence-based research in nonwood forest products and artisanal mining, animal health and marketing, climate change adaptation, community-based eco, and wildlife and cultural tourism.<sup>14</sup> Such efforts build on local sources of resilience. Rational and regulated exploitation of nonwood forest products and artisanal mining would be much more economically valuable than opportunistic farming done by pastoralists during seasonal rains.

Through its partnerships with the African Union Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and others partners, ICPALD supports ongoing activities related to transboundary animal disease surveillance, the setting of sanitary and phytosanitary standards, building trade partnership with the Middle East and North African net importers of meat, and exploring export opportunities within the African continent. All efforts seek to maximize the net benefits accrued to pastoralists and agropastoralists. Among ICPALD's most significant projects is the Standard Methods and Procedures in Animal Health (SMP-AH) project in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda,

13. [www.idrc.ca/en/article/linking-traditional-and-modern-forecasting-western-kenya](http://www.idrc.ca/en/article/linking-traditional-and-modern-forecasting-western-kenya).

14. See <http://icpald.org>.

implemented in partnership with the African Union, with financial support from USAID. The project seeks to support the harmonization and coordination of disease control efforts in the region by addressing the common challenge of trade-related transboundary animal diseases in the Horn of Africa, including foot and mouth disease, rinderpest (cattle plague), and Rift Valley fever, which has repeatedly and seriously undermined the pastoral economy through mortality, production losses, and export trade restrictions. Examples include the import ban by Saudi Arabia in 2000 on livestock and livestock products from the Horn of Africa to increase herd sizes in the region; the proliferation of berkads (water reservoirs), which are associated with environmental degradation; a large disparity between the farm gate value and consumer prices in importing countries; and the purchase of livestock on credit from producers with the producers having to wait for long periods for payment (FEWS NET 2010). The regional livestock trade is also vital to the food security of pastoral communities.

### **IGAD Drought, Disaster, Resilience and Sustainability Initiative**

IGAD's most comprehensive regional initiative is IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), a regional response to the 2010/11 droughts that revealed the fragility of the local and national economies of the member states. The initiative's importance is reemphasized by the droughts and food insecurity of 2016–17. It builds on the "Nairobi Strategy," which solidly established a regional approach for sustainable development in the arid and semiarid lands of the Horn of Africa (IGAD 2013a). IDDRSI is operationalized in the form of country programming papers and a regional programming paper. While

recognizing the specificity of the issues in each member state, the country programming papers suggest regional and cross-border priorities, introduced in a common regional programming paper to guide the programs at the regional level. Both the country programming papers and the regional programming paper are fundamental elements of the current IDDRSI strategy; they are integral to its action plan and programs (IGAD 2015a). Investments to promote resilience are framed along seven priority intervention areas: (1) natural resource management; (2) market access and trade; (3) livelihood support and basic social services; (4) pastoral disaster risk management, preparedness, and effective response; (5) research and knowledge management and technology transfer; (6) conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding; and (7) coordination, institutional strengthening, partnerships, and resource mobilization.

To ensure dialogue and coordination on IDDRSI-related interventions, IGAD member states, the IGAD secretariat, and their development partners formed the Regional Drought Resilience Platform. As part of its institutional arrangements, the platform comprises a general assembly of participating stakeholders, a steering committee, and a coordinating unit. The platform provides the modalities through which the region's priorities and possibilities for intervention by affected countries and development partners in support of the Drought Resilience Initiative are discussed—and provides the most effective mechanism by which the implementation of the Initiative can be coordinated (IGAD 2014: 3). Furthermore, the IGAD secretariat initiated a consultative, participatory process to develop a strategic plan that now guides the region's interventions to end drought



emergencies, build drought resilience, and attain sustainable development. Coordination mechanisms at the national and regional levels, required for the effective implementation of the Drought Resilience Initiative, have been established.

IDDRSI's flagship project is a regional integrated development plan for the Karamoja cluster, adapted to the needs of the pastoralists and their production system. The plan adopts the findings and recommendations of the African Union's Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa, which recognized mobile pastoralism as a legitimate way of life and as a rational and viable livelihood strategy; and it accepts the internationally agreed concept of human security aimed at improving the livelihood of the pastoralists. Among the underlying concepts is the introduction of spatial or land-use planning. Applying such an approach is expected to improve coordination and create a more uniform distribution of services. It will also help protect and improve the natural resource base and could foster peace by securing the tenure rights of the pastoralists. In terms of specific projects, regional and comprehensive disarmament programs are planned, as well as efforts aimed at: (1) strengthening the cross-border cooperation at the local level to support the forming of cross-border pastoral organizations (e.g., associations and cooperatives) and to further their participation in decision making and monitoring; and (2) furthering cross-border activities for the strengthening of a culture of peace and culture of respect and to integrate (indigenous) scientists into the accompanying research. IGAD's similar initiative in the Somali cluster under the wider IDDRSI framework is also noteworthy, particularly the joint development of the Dawa River by the governments of

Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, in close cooperation with local communities.

### 2.4.2. Tension Between National Sovereignty and Regional Initiatives

As the following discussion shows, there is some dissonance between regional institutions and national-level policies, which draws attention to tension between regional initiatives and national sovereignty. IGAD member states in the Karamoja cluster, for example, endorsed a commission created in connection with the regional integrated development plan for the Karamoja cluster as a regional coordinating body, with national task forces operating as core units to guide the local implementation process. In a study conducted to assess its traction among member states (Fahrenhorst 2012: 24), some government officials expressed concerns that transferring planning and decision-making power over to a regional body could lead to a loss at the national level. It remains to be seen how far the member states will be willing to compromise their sovereignty over border areas, which are becoming increasingly valued due to the discovery of strategic resources. National interests, particularly in Kenya and Ethiopia, are likely to take precedence over developing a regional public good, sometimes colliding and sometimes colluding at the expense of local public goods.

### 2.4.3. The Tension Between Regional Integration and Local Public Goods

The new momentum for regional integration is impressive, but in some instances, it is being pursued at the expense of local public goods. An example is the growing regional integration of

the energy sectors of Ethiopia and Kenya. In 2012, the Kenyan government signed a deal to import electricity from Ethiopia, the majority of which would be produced by the Gibe III Dam on the Omo River. Some studies by international human rights organizations warn of the potential harm that this hydroelectric dam could do to the associated 150,000 hectares of irrigated commercial farmland in the pastoral communities of South Omo and across the border in Kenya's Turkana basin. Lake Turkana, the world's largest desert lake, which gets more than 80 percent of its fresh water from the Omo River is expected to be most negatively affected (HRW 2015). Apart from its abundant fish resources, which are crucial to supplementing pastoral livelihoods, Lake Turkana plays a vital ecological role through its regional cooling effect. However, neither the Kenyan government nor the government of the Turkana County have yet given any attention to the threat that Ethiopia's big push on its water resources might have on local community livelihoods on both sides of the border. The fact that local governments in South Omo are silent on the issue throws some light on the limits of the Ethiopian federal political order. And a joint process to develop a Turkana-Omo basin management plan, initiated in 2013 between the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia and facilitated by the United Nations Environment Programme, has yet to address any potential impact on the lake; the efforts is currently stalled.

It is high time that the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya avail themselves of the good diplomatic ties between them and engage the issue of protecting local public goods as part of the wider conversation on regional integration. The alternative is investment in regional integration that results

in growing discontent among the local population that ultimately subverts developmental and peace dividends. Member states must address the issue of protecting local public goods while promoting national interests and regional integration within the IDDRSI framework.

In July 2015, IGAD, in collaboration with the World Bank, launched a regional partners workshop on borderlands development in the context of the Horn of Africa Initiative with the objective of deepening the regional perspective. The workshop declared:

"Borderlands development across the Horn is demanding more ambitious, urgent and coordinated action. It does so in the context of concerns regarding security issues in these areas and recognizing that there are important links between sustainable development and the achievement of security. Border areas often are home to the most poor and vulnerable populations, with poverty rates exceeding 80 percent. Women and children are affected disproportionately more severely, and often fall victims to violence and trafficking. Comprehensive data analysis enabled representatives to view the issues through a spatial lens, identify areas of high humanitarian crises and discussed possible priority areas for intervention and collaboration" (IGAD 2015b).

The statement also makes note of issues relating to the political economy: "Any borderlands development interventions in the IGAD region should be an integral part of IDDRSI and should build on existing national and regional institutional and policy frameworks" (IGAD 2015b).

## 2.5. National Policy Frameworks and Processes

This subsection explores country policy frameworks and development interventions in the border areas and their alignment with regional frameworks, with a focus on three of the IGAD member states of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya—countries with relatively more coherent and articulated strategies for the region in their national development plans.

### 2.5.1. Political Reform and Affirmative Action

In recent years, governments in the Horn of Africa have taken some noteworthy affirmative actions regarding political reform to redress the historic imbalance between their respective peripheries and national centers. For example, what happened in Ethiopia in 1991 involved a fundamental restructuring of the Ethiopian state from the a historically entrenched unitarian one with rigid political centralization into a federation that embraces the ethnic diversity of the nation. Contrary to the dominant trend in Africa at large, the Ethiopian federation recognizes ethnic identity as a primary basis of social identity and a main unit of political action (Feyissa 2013b). In principle, all ethnic groups—big and small, historically dominant or peripheral—are considered sovereign, with equal political and cultural rights. Four of the nine regional states—Somali, Afar, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz—are home to the country's historic peripheral communities, which also constitute the country's borderlands with the neighboring countries with Somalia/Kenya, Eritrea/Djibouti, and South Sudan, respectively. Ethiopia's new political order also extends affirmative action to pastoralist pockets

in the Oromia (Borena Zone) and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region (South Omo and Bench-Maji Zone), bordering Kenya (part of the Somali cluster) and South Sudan (part of the Karamoja cluster), respectively. The 2015 renaming of what is now the Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Affairs signals the special attention the government has given to pastoral areas.

Although the new federal political order gives greater political voice to marginalized communities in the peripheries (borderlands), multiple factors have undermined this right. Much remains when it comes to the autonomy of the regional states, particularly in the peripheries, which have come under the stronger grip of the federal government—control justified by the weaker institutional capacity of these regions as well as their vulnerability to geopolitical pressures (Kefale 2013). Lower educational levels compared with more developed regions in the country also undermines their political voice. Thus, despite the constitutionally backed right for self-determination, these groups have come under intense pressure, not least of which is the transformational urge from mobile pastoralism to an irrigation-based sedentarization program. Ethiopia's extensive developmental push in its peripheries, particularly the large-scale irrigated commercial agriculture in Gambella and South Omo, is a classic example of a top-down development approach that does not consider local needs, interests, and capabilities. Finally, the recent political transition in Ethiopia has occurred in the context of various political tensions that challenge existing constitutional arrangements. There are several conflicts over boundaries between regions (e.g., between Amhara and Tigray and between Somali and Oromo). Conflicts over rights of residence in

localities may translate into demands to divide existing regions, with the possibility of creating new states (southern region). Places such as Gambella and Beni Shangul are also experiencing conflict over the status of indigenous peoples and settlers in other locations. There is a proposal that Ethiopia's House of Federation should develop criteria for "equitably" allocating federal projects among regions; if adopted, it would change the role of the federal government to an allocator of wealth among regions rather than the engine that builds a common economic and political community—a formula that could result in never-ending disputes (de Waal 2018a). Amid a proliferation of inter-ethnic tensions and regional boundary disputes, parliament voted last December to establish the Administrative Boundaries and Identity Issues Commission.

Kenya has also promised to redress historic grievances in the peripheral areas. Devolution in Kenya is designed to address decades of political marginalization of the country's historic minorities and the underdevelopment of their communities. Conceived in the wake of the 2007 electoral violence and backed by the new 2010 constitution, devolution has been hailed as the birth of "the second republic," which will significantly change the way power and resources are managed in Kenya (Gachanga 2014). Executive power had previously been largely vested in the central government headquartered in Nairobi, resulting in a "strong feeling of exclusion" (Gachanga 2014). According to the new devolutionary political order, 47 new county governments oversee functions, including agriculture, health facilities, sanitation, transport, and trade licenses. In turn, these county governments will receive a 15 percent share of national

revenues and will be expected to mobilize revenue from other sources within their counties (Kimenyi 2013). Devolution has proved to be a turning point for the marginalized in Kenya. It has created a sense of identity and self-worth and inspired new hope for a prosperous future. The change is visible in the former North Eastern Province, now restructured into the three new counties of Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa—all in IGAD's Somali cluster. These new counties are among the 14 identified by the Commission on Revenue Allocation as the nation's most marginalized and are therefore among the leading recipients of devolved funds. Devolution has significantly reduced the grievance narratives in these regions that had allowed Al-Shabaab to operate in them (ICG 2018).

Kenya's promising devolution has, however, experienced some setbacks. Most clans and counties are in conflict. Despite constitutional safeguards, minority clans remain and in some cases are more vulnerable to the politics of exclusion by the majority clans, with a monopolistic closure on distribution of power and resources within counties. The 2013 postelection implementation of devolved county government ushered in violent conflict among clans, most acutely in Mandera county, where constituency and county boundary changes served as flash point, reigniting a long-standing feud between the Garre and the Degodia. Security concerns posed by Al-Shabaab militancy and its regional capability complicates the smooth operation of devolved government, particularly in the border areas. Al-Shabaab has been taking advantage of the new interclan and intercounty rivalry, forging alliances with the discontented, while Kenya's heavy-handed security response has

led to the steadily growing securitization of the country's Somali ethnic minority.

### 2.5.2. National Development Plans

Ethiopia's national development policy framework is premised on the vision of rapid and sustained economic growth. Toward that end, it developed three Growth and Transformation Plans. The first plan (2010–15), focused on agriculture-led industrial development. It set the target of an eightfold increase in earnings from live animals and meat exports combined. Burgeoning livestock exports over the past decade from Ethiopia to the Arabian Peninsula and beyond have already catalyzed investments in roads, transport, feedlots, veterinary care, and marketing facilities. The pull of this trade extends all the way to northern Kenya, where the border town of Moyale has emerged as major gateway for Kenyan camels into Ethiopia (Future Agricultures 2014). Also within the infrastructure sector, Ethiopia's national development plans have strong regional dimensions. Ethiopia has embarked on constructing mega-hydroelectric dams on its transboundary rivers, mostly planned for export to the neighboring countries; and it has heavily invested in regional infrastructure. A standard railway gage built between Ethiopia and Djibouti is expected to deepen economic and political ties between the two countries more. Major infrastructure projects between Ethiopia and Kenya include LAPSET and standard road transportation between Ethiopia and Sudan linking the border towns of Metemma and Gedarif. Although Ethiopia experienced rapid economic growth during its first Growth and Transformation Plan, averaged at 8 percent per year, it has failed, by the government's own admission, to achieve most of

its developmental targets. And despite the political reforms and affirmative political actions, federal projects have faced setbacks, evident in the current proliferation of identity-based protests.

Uganda has prepared multiple national development plans, including some with regional outreach components. Introduced by the government in 2007, the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda was the country's first comprehensive development policy and set of interventions for pastoral areas. It envisaged rapid catch-up of development in Northern Uganda, including the Karamoja region. It sought to "consolidate state authority" and revitalize the economy (MFPED 2007: 6). The three-year effort identified Karamoja as a region in a state of "lawlessness and underdevelopment." The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, which was supported by the World Bank, sought to empower communities in the North of Uganda so they could catch up with the state of development in the rest of the country. In Karamoja, the fund focused on an opportunities program for youth as well as water and community development initiatives (OPM 2008: 45). The 2007–12 Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme is an integrated approach to security and development, intended to enhance security for the Karamojong and create the conditions for development through a disarmament strategy whereby the "removal of illegal weapons is seen not as an end in itself but as a means to an end" (Powel 2010: 6). The program's broad goals include: establishing law and order; supporting the provision and delivery of basic social services; supporting the development of alternative livelihoods; undertaking stakeholder mobilization, sensitization,



and education; and enhancing the coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of interventions. Several studies have examined the effectiveness of these interventions. Kaduuli (2008: 6) suggests that some Karamojong view government officials and development partners as “rural tourists,” who appear for brief meetings and then retreat back to their towns and mission compounds. Stites et al. (2007: 6) agree that “Karamoja receives little attention from international donors, agencies and organizations in comparison to the northcentral region of the country.” Muhereza (1999: 6) believes “numerous organizations ... have pumped in resources to develop these areas with very little impact.”

Published in 2007, Kenya’s national development plan—Vision 2030—considers the historically marginalized drylands as the “new frontier” for development. The plan does not formulate a clear statement on pastoralism as such and when using the term livestock, does not differentiate between pastoralism and livestock husbandry on farms. In the arid and semiarid lands, new lands for cultivation should be prepared by strategically developing more irrigable areas for crops and livestock and by improving access to markets for small landholders through better marketing. The mid-term plan calls for special attention to be given to projects that improve livelihoods of the poor in pastoralist communities.

IGAD member states have designed national policy frameworks that specifically advance the resilience agenda. In 2013, Ethiopia unveiled the revised National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management, with a shift in paradigm from one focused on reactive crises management

to one on proactive risk management. In 2010, Uganda adopted the National Policy on Disaster Preparedness and Management, which seeks to integrate disaster risk management with development planning and programming by “establishing institutions and mechanisms that reduce vulnerability of people, livestock, plants and wildlife to disasters” (Republic of Uganda 2010). Kenya has yet to ratify a comprehensive policy or to pass legislation on disaster risk management. However, the new constitution (written in 2010 and in effect since 2013) underscores the significance of disaster risk management at the national and county levels, and has made provisions for legislation on disaster management. The institutional framework for risk and disaster management characterizes the 2006 Djibouti national strategy for disaster risk reduction. Sudan’s functions regarding disaster risk management are contained in several policies and laws, including a national legislative framework on risk reduction. And South Sudan has taken encouraging steps to draft a national disaster management policy, that would be “aligned with all humanitarian laws, protocols and treaties that are rooted in the UN and Regional Charters.”

### 2.5.3. Sedentarization Agenda

Regional- and national-level policy dissonance surrounds the question of if mobile pastoralism should be recognized as a legitimate lifestyle and viable system of food production. IGAD, drawing on the African Union’s Framework for Pastoral Development, has clearly articulated a policy in favor of the practice, but Ethiopia and Uganda have pushed a sedentarization agenda to facilitate the provision of social services. Knighton

(2003: 20) criticizes the Ugandan government for ignoring the advice of ecologists, instead submitted to "U.S.-driven pressures to establish individual property rights in the middle of common pastures." This initiative is part of a developmental discourse on modernization, which is "too often a cover for genocidal animosity" (Knighton 2003: 21). The 1980 famine in Karamoja is a prime example of failed governance and economic and political isolation, according to Gray (2000: 410), who also suggests that Kampala ignored the famine, perhaps in the hope that it would prove to be a "final solution" to the region's problems instead of having to invest in reinforcing pastoralism's viability.

Ethiopia's attitude toward mobile pastoralism is similar. Despite the constitutionally protected right of ethnic groups to pursue a lifestyle of their choosing, a strong agrarian bias remains in Ethiopia's development thinking. But while Kampala played the politics of neglect, Addis Ababa actively engaged, pushing its sedentarization agenda to transform pastoral areas. This engagement is evident, above all, in the "voluntary" resettlement program in practice since 2010, with plans to resettle over three million people in the four "developing regional states" with higher concentrations of pastoralists. The government defends the resettlement program as an effective means of increasing resilience to drought, and it actively exploits natural disasters as "evidence" of the failings of mobile pastoralism, as Prime Minister Meles Zenawi did after the 2010 flood in South Omo. He represented himself as the new developmental patron determined to save pastoralists from themselves in what advocacy groups referred to as the infamous "Jinka speech":

"There are some people who say they are concerned for the pastoralists, but really they want the pastoralists and their lifestyle to remain as a tourist attraction forever. The pastoralists don't want to live as a tourist attraction. They want a stable, improved life [...] I promise you that, even though this area is known as backward in terms of civilization, it will become an example of rapid development [through state owned large scale commercial agriculture]."

Critics note that alleviating the land scarcity and degradation problems of the existing sedentary communities is not among the objectives of the resettlement plan. Instead, the plan is primarily guided by the modernist vision that settlement is a more desirable form of life, livelihood strategy, and effective means of service provision (Berihun 2016). According to a government official who coordinates the World Bank-funded Pastoral Community Development Project, "for the long term, the government wants to support pastoralists to pursue sedentary lives along the banks of primary rivers." The official further explains that the pressures of land degradation, conflict, climate change, and population spikes mean that this is "the only option, as the hinterlands are too vast for the government to provide services to dispersed herders" (Berhane 2011).

Pessimism around pastoralism continues to grow despite the well-established evidence of the viability of mobile pastoralism as a system of food production in arid and semiarid lands. According to the International Institute for Environment and Development, for example, past settlement approaches failed—they undermined pastoral production, exacerbated poverty, degraded the

environment, and incited conflict in many of Africa's pastoral areas.<sup>15</sup> With the appropriate support, pastoralism is actually the most cost-effective and climate-resilient livelihood system for drylands. Even with a legacy of antagonistic policies, pastoralists are not just surviving but are creating substantial economic value. When measured per hectare, pastoralism outperforms ranching and sedentary livestock-keeping in similar environments. In 2019, Ethiopia drafted a new pastoralist policy that recognizes and accommodates extensive mobility.

#### 2.5.4. National-Level Approaches to Regional Disarmament

One of the development projects identified by the IGAD studies in the Karamoja cluster involved regional and comprehensive disarmament. As previously noted, Karamoja is among the most violent areas in the world, with an enormous concentration of small arms and light weapons. Responding to this challenge, member states have initiated projects in alignment with the regional integrated development plan for the Karamoja cluster. The buy-in among the four member countries is substantial, but each follows a different approach (Fahrenhorst 2012). Uganda has enforced disarmament—mostly forcibly but gradually more voluntarily—by controlling the international trafficking of small arms and ammunition into Karamoja; facilitating joint cross-border interventions; safeguarding human rights and dignity; operationalizing a conflict early warning mechanism; establishing law and order by strengthening institutions; restoring justice, providing social services; and enhancing governance (See Stites and Bushby 2015).

Kenya decided on a softer approach, which banks on the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons while strengthening peace-building efforts and reconciliation of all communities. It has curbed small arms trafficking and proliferation by reducing demand and has built up the capacity of the law enforcement and security agencies and committees. The Firearms Act was also reviewed by the government and a transnational organized crime bill passed to more effectively control borders (Zadock 2012).

Ethiopia only requires that firearms be registered. It established the Directorate for Conflict Early Warning and Early Response within the Ministry of Federal Affairs with the aim of ending violent conflict in pastoral areas. It has carried out occasional unilateral disarmament programs that have inadvertently made communities on the Ethiopian side of the border more vulnerable to cattle raids from South Sudan. The massive Murle attack from South Sudan on Nuer villages in Ethiopia's Gambella region in April 2016 was somewhat related to this asymmetrical disarmament and the associated security vacuum.

South Sudan has not implemented any effective disarmament programs. It had planned a disarmament program and early warning and response mechanisms for natural or man-made disasters and had drafted strategies to address and reduce community conflict issues such as use of grazing, water or cattle-rustling. But the civil war put many such initiatives on hold, and recent peace agreements have not created any incentives for nor generated any political will toward enacting any such program.

15. See "Misconceptions on Drylands and Pastoralism" at [www.iiid.org/misconceptions-drylands-pastoralism](http://www.iiid.org/misconceptions-drylands-pastoralism).

### 2.5.5. Land-Use Planning

Kenya and Uganda recognize the need for land-use planning (physical and spatial) in order to peacefully regulate various allocative claims; and Uganda has begun the process of establishing initial structures. Both countries are planning to introduce computer-based land-information systems to improve security of tenure. Uganda developed a 2007 National Land Use Policy which made attempts to harmonize regulations around land use and also tried to put in place standards and guidelines for the sustainable management of land resources. This was replaced by a 2013 National Land Policy which was more in consonance with the Ugandan constitution and better able to deal with issues around land-tenure which had proved to be the major stumbling block in the implementation of the 2007 policy (Republic of Uganda 2013). The establishment of a land-use commission in the Ethiopian Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region is crucial to avoiding future conflicts over land and natural resources. In 2014, the government of Ethiopia embarked on developing a process of local-level, participatory land-use planning in pastoral areas, called *woreda participatory land use planning*. The process has now been piloted in two regions of Ethiopia led by government land experts and with support of development partners (Tigistu et al. 2016). In partnership with GIZ, the government is replicating the process in other districts with the ultimate objective of scaling it up across the pastoral areas of Ethiopia, a noteworthy exception to the sedentarization agenda.

### 2.5.6. Donor Alignment with Regional and National Policies and Initiatives

The paradigm for donor-funded development projects has shifted in recent years toward development and disaster prevention and away from a focus on managing and reducing the risks that result from a disaster—such as drought. Another significant change in development thinking among the donor community is greater recognition of the importance of regional and cross-border cooperation, particularly for pastoralist-related activities. Donors such as the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and USAID have already developed regional frameworks. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation is in the process of formulating its own regional approach to pastoral-related activities. Many organizations, including the Japan International Cooperation Agency, support relevant projects in several member states. Examples of such donor initiatives are described below.

#### Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project

The World Bank has engaged with pastoral area development for a long time, but most of its initiatives had been country-focused. As part of the greater focus on a regional approach in pastoralist development, the Bank launched the Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project for 2015–19 with funding of almost US\$200 million. It is premised on the idea that livelihood systems in the drought-prone, arid lands of the Horn of Africa have been under-resourced, which has left their populations vulnerable to external stressors such as drought as well as recognizing that the ecosystems from which pastoralists derive their

livelihoods often transcend national borders. The project seeks to develop regional solutions to the challenges faced by pastoralists residing in the arid and semiarid lands of Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, and to enhance their opportunities for livelihood development. Project components include sustainable management of natural resources; market access to the intraregional and international markets of livestock and livestock products; livelihood support; pastoral risk management, and project management and institutional support. The sub-projects for each of the three countries operate independently from each other but are connected at level of IGAD, which provides regional context. IGAD's project coordination staff is housed in ICPALD–Nairobi.<sup>16</sup> The Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project closely aligns with the country programming papers for ending drought emergencies and the subsequent regional programming framework coordinated by IGAD. In general, it embodies the first attempt in the Horn of Africa to deliver country-specific outputs directly linked to region-driven goals (for more detail see IGAD 2013b).

### Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project

In 2014, The World Bank launched the Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project, a regional development effort targeting Ethiopia, Uganda, and Djibouti. It was based on the rationale that displacement has emerged as a regional phenomenon in the Horn of Africa, with spillover effects in the countries neighboring the ones experiencing conflict. It acknowledges this as a major impediment to reducing poverty and

achieving sustainable development with peace and security. The project's innovative design focuses on assisting governments in building long-term resilience and self-reliance of communities affected by displacement. As a development response, the project seeks to improve access to basic social services, expand economic opportunities, and enhance environmental management for refugee-hosting communities in the targeted areas of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda. It includes five interrelated components: (1) social and economic services and infrastructure; (2) sustainable environmental management; (3) a livelihoods program; (4) project management and monitoring and evaluation; and (5) regional support for coordination, capacity, and knowledge. Kenya's declared intention to close Daadab—the largest refugee camp in the world—initially planned by the end of 2016 due to security concerns, signals how important such regional approaches are.<sup>17</sup>

### Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Program

Responding to the 2011 drought that affected the entire IGAD region, the African Development Bank launched the Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Program—a three-phase, US\$300 million regional development intervention to enhance drought resilience and sustainable livelihoods among pastoral and agropastoral communities in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia. Expected impacts are improved livelihood and rural incomes; improved resilience of pastoral production systems; strengthened

16. See <https://resilience.igad.int/index.php/functions-test/programming/rpp/projects/rplrp>.

17. The status of the camp remains controversial: the Kenyan government ordered it closed in 2016, arguing that Somalia-based Al-Shabaab militants were using it as a base to plan attacks in Kenya, but the high court blocked the closure. A renewed push in 2019 seeks to close the camp by the middle of the year.



regional economic and institutional integration; increased adaptive capacity to environmental risks, and lessened intra- and intercommunal conflicts arising from competition over scarce resources. The program plans to incorporate lessons learned into its programming. For example, it recognizes multiple drivers of fragility in the region, including political, economic, social, and environmental. It similarly recognizes that poverty and conflict exacerbate vulnerability to drought-related hazards. The program appreciates the need to support cultural systems that facilitate social resilience. Aligned with the regional approach, the Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Program seeks to build effective and strategic partnerships where IGAD coordinates the regional approach (IGAD 2015a).

### Regional Development Initiatives of the European Union

Over the past decade, European Union (EU) has increasingly considered issues of fragility and security as crucial to its development policy agenda. It has adopted a strategic framework for the countries of the Horn of Africa in the areas of governance, democracy, human rights, conflict resolution and prevention, security, inclusive economic growth, and regional cooperation.<sup>18</sup> A framework to link relief, rehabilitation, and development is becoming more operational. Major initiatives include pastoral initiatives, a regional learning and advocacy program, a regional drought preparedness program, a regional initiative for sustainable pastoralism, and a pastoralist livelihood program.

EU' pastoral initiatives operate on both sides of the southern Ethiopia–northern Kenya border (part of the former Somali cluster), under the umbrella of humanitarian aid. The European Commission for Humanitarian Aid Coordination supports vulnerable populations through livelihood diversification; asset protection, including cattle vaccination, and drought mitigation, and preparedness; and the rehabilitation and construction of water systems. The regional learning and advocacy program aims to reduce vulnerability among pastoral communities through policy and practice reforms in the Horn and East Africa and to promote the integration of humanitarian assistance and development interventions related to disaster risk reduction by governments, donors, and national and international civil society organizations. The project's third cycle, primarily focused on Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, has been operating since July 2010. Implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, its focus is on providing technical support for, coordination and information sharing on, and facilitation of policy dialogue around drought risk management as well as on supporting drought preparedness activities in cross-border areas—some aspects of which are recognized under the disaster preparedness program. It also supports cross-border cooperation among nongovernmental organizations.

The Regional Initiative for Sustainable Pastoralism has four modules to help pastoralists improve their drought preparedness: (1) community management disaster risk reduction, (2) pastoralist field schools, (3) village community banks, and (4) early warning systems. The pastoralist livelihood program covers the border areas of southern Ethiopia, northern Kenya, and northeastern

18. European Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 3124th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, "A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa," 1658/11, 14.11.2011.

Uganda (most of the Karamoja cluster). Its specific objective is to strengthen the institutional and policy framework which can help promote resilience among pastoral and agropastoral communities and to support the diversification of their livelihoods.

In 2016, the EU launched a program worth €63.5 million (funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa), focused on the cross-border areas of the Horn of Africa with the overall objective to:

“... prevent and mitigate the impact of local conflict in these borderland areas, and to promote economic development and greater resilience. This will include investments in conflict management and resolution capacities; enhancing and diversifying livelihoods, including livestock, agriculture and fisheries; strengthening basic service delivery; natural resource management; and promoting cross-border trade and private sector development.”<sup>19</sup>

The EU’s latest projects have received criticism because they are designed to bring about “socioeconomic transformation” in the hopes of deterring migration to Europe (Landau, Kihato, and Postel 2018).

These and other development interventions have strong regional components, but most development partners still follow a national approach due to their organizational structure. Although donor organizations have integrated some cross-border initiatives into their projects, their formal rules

require them to maintain a focus at the national level and on bilateral agreements. The term regional is primarily used when referring to projects being implemented in several of the region’s countries, which does not automatically lead to a regional cooperation, interlinkages, or joint planning. A lot remains to be done, however, for a more robust regional approach to emerge—one that clearly articulates IGAD’s regional vision and interventions.

## 2.6. Synthesis

This final section provides a synthesis of the findings based on the exposition on resilience and development investments presented in the previous sections. It is organized along four broad and interrelated issues: (1) why borderlands development matters; (2) elements of successful borderlands development interventions; (3) how a regional umbrella facilitates the conversation on borderlands development; and (4) key talking points for further dialogue around borderlands development investment.

### 2.6.1. Why Borderlands Development Matters

This paper presents numerous arguments as to why borderlands development is crucial in the Horn of Africa. They are summarized in brief below.

#### The marginality argument

The Horn of Africa contains some of the world’s poorest countries. It hosts only 3 percent of the world’s population but is the recipient of 40 percent of global food aid. Regional disparities abound. The geography and depth of poverty

19. [https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/regional/collaboration-cross-border-areas-horn-africa-region\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/regional/collaboration-cross-border-areas-horn-africa-region_en).

skew toward the region's arid and semiarid lands, largely inhabited by mobile pastoralists. These areas also constitute the majority of the state peripheries with lower political voice in local, national, and regional affairs. In an already marginalized region, borderlands are the most marginalized spaces, neglected by national governments and faced with the convergence of myriad risks.

### The political fragility argument

The Horn of Africa has the highest concentration of failed, failing, or fragile states. The recent political reforms and affirmative actions by governments of the region have raised hopes that development interventions could be more successful in helping the region's countries attain greater political stability, which would in turn create conditions for more growth. Such efforts must include the borderlands, particularly because the root causes of political instability have strong cross-border dimensions and because borderlands are more susceptible to violent extremism.

### The argument for inclusive development

With the discovery of strategic resources—including arable land, water, oil, gas, gold, potash, and aquifer—the borderlands of the Horn of Africa are emerging as new economic centers that are crucial to national and global economies. These resources should be exploited in a way that includes the peoples of the periphery—not only for reasons of entitlement and fairness, but also because the population is poised to be affected most adversely by the resource extraction if not it is not done in socially and environmentally sound ways and if it does not put mitigating measures into place. A failure to take such measures would

introduce a new line of vulnerability to the already impoverished populace, ultimately adding a new layer of conflict to the region. The moment is ripe to promote inclusive development that is sustainable and sensitive to conflict, with a human and local face.

### The environmental argument

The Horn of Africa is highly vulnerable to the vagaries of climate change. It experiences frequent climate variability, which leads to extreme food insecurity and deterioration of livelihoods, particularly in arid and semiarid lands, as evidenced by the 2010/11 and the 2015/16 droughts. As the region tries to cope with alternating period of El Niño-induced droughts and extreme floods—climatic events affecting over 20 million people—local sources of resilience must be strengthened and others built, especially technology-enabled adaptive capacities. Well-designed development interventions could also mitigate environmental degradation in arid and semiarid lands.

### The demographic argument

The Horn of Africa has one of the highest population growth rates and a youth bulge that, if not backed by appropriate and timely development interventions, could be a catalyst for further political instability and conflict resulting from overexploitation of existing natural and livestock resources. If properly supported by development interventions such as job creation, what is currently a liability could transform into a potential asset, where the youth bulge can fuel and sustain economic growth.

### The regional integration argument

Regional integration has gained traction in Africa and elsewhere in recent years. Mobile pastoralist populations in borderland areas have already become de facto regional citizens by utilizing an ecologically necessitated migration pattern that spans state borders, and by engaging in cross-border trade that is much more attuned than national economies to market forces. As such, development investments in border areas offers immediate regional dividends.

### The state-building argument

The borderlands of the Horn of Africa are among the least-governed spaces in the region (and the world), where state formation in the institutional sense of the term is the weakest. Given the cross-border settlement pattern and accumulation of local grievances generated by political and economic exclusions, borderland communities can be conduits of the spillover effects of instability and civil wars in neighboring countries or provide a haven for extremist organizations like Al-Shabab. Inclusive development could help win the hearts and minds of people at risk of being recruited to an extremist organization.

## 2.6.2. Elements of Successful Development Interventions in the Borderlands

The following issues are of key importance to the success of development efforts in the border areas:

### A regional approach adds value

There is growing consensus on the need to adopt a regional approach for development interventions in the border areas. Not only do same cultural communities inhabit these areas, they also

share marginality. On the other hand, with their pervasive border-crossing practices, pastoralists are pioneers of regional integration and demonstrate a de facto regional citizenship. Although the regional approach has gained greater traction among development actors it is still a long way to deepen the regional imagination, one that goes beyond the national frames of development plan or country strategies. Building on IGAD's existing and emerging regional platforms and policy frameworks, development actors need greater coordination of their development interventions through the cross-border imaginary.

### Development investments geared toward social and spatial inclusion

Poverty in the Horn of Africa is spatially defined; the border areas constituting the poorest of the poor with very marginal access to basic social services if there is access at all. As peripheries of their respective national centers, borderlands are also the weakest in political voice, making them vulnerable to much more powerful external interest groups at the national and global levels. Although the borderlands are increasingly valued for the strategic resources they contain, national governments have allocated the least in development investment. A growing sense of exclusion on the other hand make the border regions susceptible to extremist ideologies posing security challenge not just to national governments and the region but also on a global scale, as the Al-Shabab militancy has shown. There are some commendable political reforms such as Ethiopia's federal project and Kenya's devolution, but a lot remains to be done to bridge regional inequality through an inclusive and locally appropriate development investment.

### Active engagement with the traditional governance structures

One of the main sources of resilience of pastoralists is their participatory governance structure with much more legitimacy at the local level than state structures. The viability of traditional governance structures varies from place to place, depending on the degree of institutional encroachment by the state and nonstate actors. Where they are still viable such as among the Somali communities there is a strong need to actively engage with them as development partners; one that differs from governments' drive for co-option of traditional authorities and instead nurtures a sensible partnership. One comparative advantage of the traditional governance systems is their greater capacity for peace making at the local level. In some areas where there is a decline of traditional form of governance institutional rehabilitation should be explored.

### Livelihood diversification

The point of departure for development interventions at the border in arid and semiarid lands should be an explicit recognition of mobile pastoralism as a legitimate lifestyle, efficient system of food production and a sound and sustainable adaptive strategy in the arid and semiarid lands. This does not mean, however, that pastoralists are entirely dependent on livestock. Other forms of livelihoods such as flood recession farming, artisanal mining, wage labor and fishing have always constituted essential sources of income with a positive feedback loop with the pastoral system. These grassroots strategies of livelihood diversification need to be supported, which will also add value in terms of women empowerment, and other sources of livelihood diversification must be introduced.

### Supplementing local adaptive capacities with new technology

The Horn of Africa is one of the most vulnerable to the detrimental effects of climate change. Responding to natural climate variability, pastoralists have already crafted various adaptive strategies. Development interventions to mitigate the effect of climate change should build on these local adaptive capacities, but supplemented through new bases of resilience, particularly the use of appropriate and new technologies.

### Youth issues

Population growth and the accompanying increase in its working age population may create a window of opportunity, which if properly harnessed, can translate into higher growth and yield a demographic dividend. This dividend will vary across countries and it is critical to ensure that the right supportive policies, including those fostering human capital accumulation and job creation, are in place to translate this opportunity into economic growth. As the region contains some of the poorest countries on earth, it is still not clear how it will sustain such massive population, with much of the population boom occurring in the most marginal spaces. The recent growth trajectory has, however, raised hope. Development actors should focus on job creation for the youth but prioritize increasing the productivity of the informal sector containing almost 80 per cent of the workforce.

### Urbanization

Accompanying the high population growth rate and the youth bulge is a rapid rate of urbanization. There is an obvious question how continued pastoralism can be sustained with a human population growing against a shrinking resource



base and historical analyses indicate that as population grows, at some point “excess” people move away from pastoralism as a way of life and a means of livelihood. Migration, especially to urban areas, may render population density a positive factor (human capital) if the average educational attainment is high, but also the unprecedented rate of urban growth in the region also presents daunting challenges for development in terms of land access, and in infrastructure and basic services. In addition, urban growth encroaches on land and could put further constraints on pastoralists’ mobility, which in turn risks driving up urban poverty. Large population of educated, yet frustrated, youth in urban areas creates a greater impetus for current measures to promote stability and youth productivity. Development actors and service providers therefore need to take continued urbanization into account.

### Cross-border trade

Formal economic integration has lagged in the Horn of Africa but informal cross-border trading is robust and vibrant in the regions. The informal trading alleviates poverty and enhances food security, such as the exchange of livestock and grain. Such cross-border trading also creates an economic space for women and produces other positive socioeconomic impacts. Development actors should therefore seek to enhance data collection and analytical capabilities for the informal sector to design appropriate policy responses. Most importantly, informal cross-border trading should not be criminalized. Instead, it should be streamlined into national and regional trade strategies.

### 2.6.3. How a Regional Umbrella Facilitates the Conversation on Borderlands Development

IGAD is the major regional institutional framework that coordinates development investment by national governments and donors, particularly in the border areas. IGAD might not have delivered as much results in the process of regional integration in comparison with other regional blocks, partly because for long it had a very limited mandate with a focus on humanitarian issues. This has changed with the expansion of IGAD’s mandate since 1996. In the area of peace and security it has engaged at the local (through CEWARN) and regional levels (peace mediation efforts in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan). In the area of economic integration, it has designed elaborate policy frameworks backed by proposal for concrete interventions. IDDRSI is a case in point. Drawing on the African Union’s Framework for Pastoral Development, it has made a compelling case for mobile pastoralism recognizing it as a legitimate lifestyle, a rational livelihood strategy, and an ecologically sound adaptive strategy. This is a welcoming antidote to the sedentarization agenda pursued by some member states. By promoting land-use planning it activates for the land rights of pastoralists who have been subjected to encroachment into the pastoral commons by state and private business interests.

IGAD promoted the regional agenda through its cluster approach, as well as adding value in terms of coordination and synergies for resource mobilization between member states and the donor community. The Regional Integrated and Comprehensive Development Plan for the Karamoja cluster (ICDP-KC) is IDDRSI’s most visible initiative

to coordinate development investment through a regional approach. Member States have endorsed the initiative and have taken some measures to align with this new regional framework. Similarly, donors have also sought to align existing and new development projects with the cluster-based regional framework. Still, IGAD needs to do more to harmonize the local, national, and regional public goods, as Member States still jealously promote their respective national interests. Where national and regional public goods are aligned, such as the regional integration between Ethiopia and Kenya through the energy sector, it often comes at the expense of local public goods, as Ethiopia's developmental push in the Omo Valley indicate.

#### 2.6.4. Key Talking Points for Further Dialogue Around Development Investment in the Borderlands

Following are brief descriptions of talking points that can foster conversations among countries and donors around borderlands development.

##### **The viability of mobile pastoralism**

The livestock sector, which pastoralism supports, has consistently provided more than 60 percent of the estimated value addition to the agricultural sector, and is a more substantial contributor to regional GDP than governments are willing to admit. Despite this vitality, member states, particularly Ethiopia and Uganda, have pushed the sedentarization agenda. IGAD should facilitate policy dialogue on this issue. The terms of the policy dialogue should not be construed in binary terms—endorsing mobile pastoralism at the exclusion of other livelihood strategies, or promoting alternative livelihoods at the expense of mobile

pastoralism; there are plausible arguments for all perspectives.

##### **Normative and legal commitments to and empowerment of regional institutions**

Member states have fully endorsed regional frameworks and cluster-specific development initiatives, such as the intergovernmental commission for the Karamoja cluster. However, there is still a need for deepening regional cooperation and empowering institutions, which continues to be trumped by the language of national sovereignty at times. Also, development partners, organized in ways that still follow a national approach, should address the need for a more robust regional approach to emerge.

##### **Integrating local concerns into the regional equation**

As the developmental experience in the Omo Valley has shown, advancing national and regional public goods does not necessarily promote local public goods. Some areas are facing an existential threat due to Ethiopia's mega hydroelectric dams and associated large-scale irrigated commercial agriculture on land that had previously been prime grazing areas for local communities. Available information suggests that industrial development projects environmentally threaten Lake Turkana, whose fisheries provide supplementary livelihoods to hundreds of thousands of pastoralists—a crucial source of resilience (Avery 2012). The lake is also a major ecological stabilizer for the microclimate. Although Addis Ababa and Nairobi are “on the same page” regarding these projects, local discontent could ultimately translate into conflict and subversive counter-projects.

### Enforcing a comprehensive and coordinated regional disarmament program

Despite their formal commitments to comprehensive regional disarmament, member states have not yet coordinated their fragmented and partial disarmament initiatives, which may otherwise result in exacerbating local conflicts. As the recent cross-border attack on Nuer villages in Ethiopia showed, unilateral and differential disarmament programs can make communities more vulnerable, further incentivizing raiding and instigating a local arms race. This type of disarmament is also a pressing issue in the Karamoja cluster.

### Recognizing informal cross-border trade

In the Horn of Africa, informal cross-border trade is significantly more robust than formal economic integration. The informal trade is the mainstay of the economies of the borderlands, and its contribution to the national economies of the region is enormous. There is also a nexus between cross-border trade—particularly in livestock—and regional food security. Because many in borderland communities live beyond the reach of their respective government in terms of social service provision, informal cross-border trade is crucial to their access to basic necessities. Governments must shift away from their hostile approach toward informal cross-border trade and move toward greater recognition and legalization. Ethiopia's policy reform in this regard is commendable. This issue is particularly acute in the Somali cluster with a robust trade in livestock at the borders of Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia.

### Protracted violent conflicts

The pastoralist belt is one of the most violent areas in the Horn of Africa. Some of these conflicts are brief in duration; others involve a dynamic system of shifting alliances. Sometimes the parties to the conflict remain the same and the conflict evolves over a longer historical timeframe. This is certainly the case for the protracted conflict between the Afar and the Issa in the Dikhil cluster along the Ethiopia–Djibouti border. The drivers of this conflict include competition over pastoral resources, particularly access to and control over the Awash River; the new premium that Ethiopia's identity-based federal political order puts on territoriality; geopolitical factors, such as the cross-border political and military mobilizations, and the Ethiopian government's security-based approach regarding the conflict zone which is an economic lifeline due to international trade through the port of Djibouti. A recent regional approach to resolve the conflict involves a wide range of actors—from the governments of Ethiopia and Djibouti to the regional governments of Afar and Somali—in a context of the growing economic and political ties between the two countries. The inclusion of traditional authorities and other actors might contribute greatly to building peace.

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# Background Paper 3.

## Cross-Border Dynamics in the Kenya–Ethiopia Borderlands Cluster

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Photo: Flore de Preneuf | World Bank



### 3.1. Introduction

Cluster 2 of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initially spanned the Kenya–Ethiopia border, comprising a territory stretching west to east from Lake Turkana to Mandera in Kenya, and from Borana to Liban in Ethiopia, with the Kenya–Somalia border marking its eastern limit. It has since been divided into two separate clusters. The new cluster 2 covers the cross-border areas of Kenya in Ileret, Dukana, and Maikona; and of Ethiopia from Hamer to Miyo Woredas. The new cluster 3 stretches west to east from Moyale to Dolow Ado in Ethiopia's Somali Region, and from Moyale to Mandera in Kenya;<sup>1</sup> and a large section of Gedo region in Somalia is proposed for inclusion (EU Trust Fund 2016). This paper focuses on the original cluster 2 (as demarcated at the time of this research); references to “cluster 2” and “the cluster” throughout the paper should be read accordingly. Initially defined by IGAD as a conflict cluster for the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), the area is a region of uncertain security, unreliable government services, and inadequate infrastructure; but it is also a zone of productive pastoralism and flourishing cross-border trade. The peoples of the cluster speak multiple languages, including Somali, Degodia, Garre, Burji, Guji, Borana, Gabra, Rendille, Samburu, Ariaal, Turkana, and Dassenech. While the Rendille, Samburu, and Turkana are found mostly in Kenya, and the Guji in Ethiopia, all other groups can be found on both sides of the international border.

The cluster is defined by its international border, which, like other frontiers in the Horn of Africa,

has long offered advantages to those who live on either side of it, including opportunities to profit from price, knowledge, and service differentials; affordances of protection from or engagement with competing resource and security regimes; and different but overlapping qualities of recognition and social order (Feyissa and Hoehne 2010: 135). Following an initial brief description of demographic changes, this paper presents three successive sections covering: the borderland economy, cross-border security, and, finally, democratic representation/voice and society.

Drawing on existing literature, a summary of relevant sources and an analysis of their significance is offered for borderlands programming. Local perspectives on key issues of security and productivity are highlighted; these will be vital to predicting local responses to policy and program interventions. Also pointed out are borderland mythologies that can be usefully called into question when thinking about policy interventions aimed at treating the borderlands as zones of potential in their own right as opposed to attenuated, dangerous, or unproductive spaces. Such myths often include imprecise claims about the role of climate, terrain, or tradition in fomenting insecurity, conflict, and poverty in the cluster.

IGAD has highlighted the need for dialogue its initial paper on the “Cluster Approach for Cross-Border Co-operation and Investment to Strengthen Drought Resilience in the IGAD region,” (2015) and continues to emphasize the need for cross-border dialogue and cooperation in its current initiatives (see IGAD 2019). It recognizes that such an innovative approach to development and security in territories that come under different state jurisdictions requires, above all, an ability to implement investments that are mutually beneficial and governed

1. See [http://geonode.igad.int/layers/geonode:igad\\_cluster\\_2\\_1#/](http://geonode.igad.int/layers/geonode:igad_cluster_2_1#/); [http://geonode.igad.int/layers/geonode:igad\\_cluster\\_2#/](http://geonode.igad.int/layers/geonode:igad_cluster_2#/); and CEWARN 2015.

by clear agreements. Mutuality, however, is not just between states but also between social and economic groups. Thus, this paper takes particular care to identify areas where mutuality may be best fostered and made obvious, and where it may need to preempt the tendency for elite capture to turn well-intended interventions into sources of tension and inequality.

### 3.2. Demographic Changes

While overall population growth in the cluster appears comparable to or lower than their respective national averages, some of the fastest growing towns in Kenya and Ethiopia are in their pastoral districts (Little 2013). In the Somali Region of Ethiopia, for example, the annual urban growth rate between 2006 and 2008 was 4.69 percent compared with a rural growth rate of 2.25 percent and an average national urban growth rate of 4.4 percent. Oromia and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region of Ethiopia report similar rates (HPG 2010: 18). As resources are limited, these growing populations are responding in a range of ways. Recent research, for example, shows young people doing four things: (1) staying put in the pastoral areas and looking for ways to intensify their production and sales by maintaining mobility across the borderland zone; (2) moving into the growing towns and centers of the borderland and struggling to create livelihoods out of very little; (3) moving further afield to seek opportunities, particularly in the informal sectors in the capitals of Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Mogadishu, and in rapidly urbanizing secondary cities; and (4) migrating to join an ever-growing diaspora in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.

Refugees and population movements into and across borders has long been a feature of the

cluster 2 borderlands. During the wars between Ethiopia and Somalia and the shifta wars in Kenya, many people crossed borders to escape the violence. Many then stayed on and later claimed territories inside the different states, some within the borderlands themselves. In recent decades, access to social services, including education and health, and to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resettlement programs, greatly influenced the demography of the cluster and beyond (Feyissa and Hoehne 2010). Figures are hard to come by, especially for population numbers within the borderlands zone. The 2009 population census for Kenya's northeastern counties, as an example, is still disputed (ICG 2015).

The greatest proportion of the population is rural and pastoralist; they move across borders without undue difficulty, except in the many areas that have become “no-man's lands” due to violent conflict between two groups. These flames of conflict are seldom generated by the pastoralists but rather by the development of political constituencies on both sides of the border, which can create surges of population movement from one administration to another (Watson 2010, Scott-Villiers et al. 2011, Scott-Villiers et al. 2014). Further complicating matters in towns such as Moyale in Ethiopia, which is divided between the Oromo and Somali federal regions, migration is deeply political because it affects the power-sharing arrangements between the Somali and Oromo ethnic groups.<sup>2</sup> With regard to primary livelihoods, a 2011 study of 11 communities in the cluster—six in Kenya and five in Ethiopia—found that “non or ex-pastoralists and pastoralists exiting pastoralism outnumbered active pastoralists—those

2. For more on similar towns, such as Dire Dawa, see Feyissa, Midega, and Wakjira 2018; Midega 2017. For more on Moyale, see Endeshaw 2018; OCHA 2018.

who mainly focus on livestock rearing—both in the aggregate and on a site-specific bases in a majority of the 11 sites” (McPeak, Little, and Doss 2012). On the other hand, most rural people claim pastoralism to be the livelihood of the majority of the population (Scott-Villiers et al. 2015).

In absorbing a rising population, the average herd size among pastoralists has reduced over the years, and rate of sales has increased. As commercialization of the livestock economy has spread, in part due to increased opportunities for livestock sales to urban centers and export markets, and in part in response to a rising need for cash to invest in schooling and urban diversification, an increasing asset gap has become evident between richer and poorer households, along with an increase in absolute numbers of poor people, most of whom live in towns and small centers (Catley and Aklilu 2013). Using SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances) data, Catley and Aklilu (2013: 90–91) estimate that between 1996 and 2005 there was a 2.5 percent increase in the number of wealthy households in the Somali Region of Ethiopia and a 0.8 percent increase in the number of middle wealth households but a 4.1 percent increase in the number of poor households. Traditional systems of social welfare based on redistribution of livestock to poorer members of the clan are under pressure (Tache 2008) but are still significant, especially in rural areas; they have yet to be effectively replaced by state-administered alternatives (Musembi and Scott-Villiers 2015). Studies suggest that nutrition levels in the centers and towns are lower than in the surrounding rural areas (see for example Fratkin and Roth 2005).

Arguably the most significant trend that is redefining pastoralism in eastern Africa and in the cluster

is the fragmentation of rangelands through processes of excision, privatization (often in the form of enclosures), and commodification of rangeland resources (Lind, Sabates-Wheeler, and Kohnstamm 2016: 1). Rangeland fragmentation directly threatens adaptive processes in customary pastoralist systems as it becomes more difficult to move livestock across the land, and key resource areas are fenced off and set aside for nonlivestock uses. Rangelands have been carved up through the establishment of private enclosures, water points, cisterns, “farmlands” excised from large riverine areas for irrigation schemes, ranches, and conservation areas. A related trend also contributing to fragmentation is sedentarization and the uptake of land and resource-dependent activities, such as dryland farming, charcoal burning, and harvesting wood for fuel. Many pastoral households have either “dropped out” of pastoralism entirely, or “moved out,” choosing to pursue alternative livelihoods, many of them based in cities. Areas and people with adequate access to natural resources and markets are “moving up” because they can maintain and sell livestock as a successful business enterprise, commercializing the milk and livestock trade, selling in and exporting to local and regional markets, creating private abattoirs, and finding lucrative opportunities along the livestock value chain. Finally, others are merely “hanging in,” attempting to practice customary forms of pastoralism based on high mobility, extended social ties for trade, and the opportunistic use of natural resources (Lind, Sabates-Wheeler, and Kohnstamm 2016: 15).

In general, data are sparse; and available data are often not comparable with those from the other side of a border. The trustworthiness and temporariness of the data are also in question: many of

the population figures, for example, are so variable as to suggest either inaccuracy or significant swings in migration from one side of the border to the other, or from one political constituency to another, as is the case for Moyale (HPG 2010). It is safe to say, at least, that the population in the cluster is increasing and that towns and small centers are growing faster than their hinterlands, accompanied by rising levels of poverty.

### 3.3. Cluster 2's Borderland Economy

International borders mark the limits of British, Abyssinian, and Italian interests (and powers) in the 19th and early 20th centuries. They run through vast arid plains, which appeared, and still appear, to be largely empty and hostile spaces that act as buffers between powers rather than as zones of economic opportunity.

“Part of the process of constructing colonial states and economies in the Horn involved the construction of their borderlands, not only as geographical spaces to be administered separately from the core agricultural districts, but also as conceptual spaces whose residents and resources were thought of as outliers in every sense.” (Cassanelli 2010: 135)

This separation and sense of secondary importance has underpinned government policy toward and public understanding of the arid borderlands ever since, affecting interventions in trade, production, infrastructure, and the urban formal and informal sector.

#### 3.3.1. Trade

Foundational patterns of economic interaction underpinning the economy today were established in precolonial times and consolidated thereafter. Since at least the time of Ibn Batuta in the 13th century, caravans have been recorded reaching into the interior from the Indian Ocean ports and the Ethiopian highland kingdoms to source high-value items, including ivory, animal skins, ostrich feathers, and rhino horn (Cassanelli 2010). These same trading routes across difficult and often-dangerous terrain consolidated into robust trading networks that facilitated a growing livestock economy. The roads today are still largely unimproved, facilities in the trading posts are still limited, and borders are still porous; but the informal systems that underwrite the trade, including contracting, brokerage, exchange, insurance, and credit, are elaborate and robust. These exclusive systems cannot be transferred to just anyone. They are unwritten customary laws, including those regarding trade.

For many people living in the borderlands, their most accessible market is often on or over the border. Cross-border trade is almost all informal, avoiding tax and other official and unofficial fees and impositions, and relying on local relations for smooth operation. For commodities such as livestock and grain, unofficial exports to neighboring countries can exceed officially licensed trade by a factor of 30 or more (Little 2005).

#### Livestock trade

Over the closing decades of the 20th century, movement of stock shifted from trekking to trucking, although even now not exclusively, and market information that was once transmitted person

to person along an extended trekking route began to move by mobile phone. A study by Umar and Baulch (2005) found that livestock markets along the routes running from the Somali Region in Ethiopia through Somaliland to Bosaso and Berbera were not well integrated—the temporary closure of one market did not result in the movement of its goods and traders into a neighboring one. This is because specific clan and kin relations provide the insurance, credit, and brokerage that keep the markets and their connecting routes running smoothly and securely, as has been the case for generations (Umar and Baulch 2005). Later studies have pointed out the role played by the livestock trade in driving processes of urbanization as well as the development of roads and other transport infrastructure (see Hagmann et al. 2018; Carrier and Lochery 2013; Ciabbarri 2017). Peter Little has pointed out that between 1988 and 2001 transport costs of moving livestock from Somalia to Kenya were stable even after the civil war and the collapse of law and order in Somalia in 1991 (Little 2005; see also Cassanelli 2010: 145). Umar and Baulch (2005) also pointed out that middlemen were not taking huge profits, as has often been assumed; instead the margins at each stage of trade were small.

While there have been significant shifts in the direction of trade and substantial growth in its quantity generated by growing demand, as well as imposed demand shocks, from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa, the routes and chains have remained resistant to formalization or liberalization, but have also resisted the negative effects of war, insecurity, and failures of infrastructural investment. Livestock exports from the Horn of Africa are estimated to exceed US\$1 billion in foreign exchange, and five or six times that amount in local currency (Aklilu et al. 2013). For

example, Umar and Baulch (2005) find that one market on the Ethiopia–Somaliland border turned over US\$50 million in a single year. Livestock exports are critical to Somalia's economy and, as a result, demand fluctuations from external markets can have significant implications for the cluster. For example, the combination of a Saudi ban on Somali livestock imposed at the end of 2016 (and lifted temporarily for the haj season of July–September 2017) and the impact of the drought on animals' health and herd losses led to a sharp fall in exports—from 5.3 million animals in 2015 to 1.3 million in 2017 (Sarkar and Serrière 2019).

The livestock economy of the borderlands has contributed to the development of ports and markets far from the borderlands themselves, including in enriching the ports at Kismayo, Berbera, and Bosaso; livestock holding grounds at Mojo (near Addis Ababa); and fattening ranches at Tsavo (near Mombasa) and Laikipia (for the Nairobi market). While some traders cover large distances, Umar and Baulch (2005) point out that most trade links cover relatively short spans, after which the stock or goods are handed over to another actor in the marketing chain. This, they explain, is because local relations are essential in dealings with officials, warlords, and other authorities, which might otherwise disrupt the passage of goods. The illicit sugar trade between Somalia and Kenya (largely through the Mandera triangle) illustrates the hybrid forms of governance that shape these borderlands. Rasmussen (2017: 3) has argued that “local sugar producers, militant networks, government officials, soldiers from the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF), the Bureau of Standards, and local drivers and businessmen comprise the complex blend of actors involved in cross-border smuggling.”



At each stage of the journey, traders negotiate official and unofficial tariff and nontariff barriers, often using local arrangements and bribes to speed up processes and, in many cases, to evade the full extent of excessive and repeated legal and illicit fees and taxes. These short-span trading links provide for a plethora of low-paid but vital opportunities for informal employment and profit in the facilitation, brokerage, and arbitrage of transactions. Truckers and traders explain that, on the way from local markets to the capital cities, they must negotiate multiple different legal and sublegal tariff barriers, where they may be expected to unload the animals unless a suitable payment is made (Scott-Villiers 2005; Little, Tiki, and Debsu 2015).

There are three levels of market for livestock sales (Little, Debsu, and Tiki 2014). The first level supplies butcheries located in the borderlands; they accept older, lower-quality stock, and are accessible to poorer pastoralists. These markets also supply low-quality stock to lower-income consumers in cities such as Nairobi and Addis Ababa via long distance traders who truck the stock south or north. Second, there are informal cross-border markets that use trekking and trucking as means of transport. The demand and market specifications of these markets vary with situations across the borders and in the places from which the demand originates. Finally, there are the formal, high-value markets.

Since 2004, the Ethiopian government has made significant efforts to generate trading contracts with the Middle East and Egypt, the results of which has been the growth of considerable cross-border trade from Kenya to Ethiopia and from Ethiopia to onward markets. New feedlots, holding grounds, and abattoirs now ensure that

the requisite quarantine and other conditions can be met without loss of condition. The livestock trade has boomed as a result. The overseas export trade demands particular ages and weights of animal. For example, bulls that are 3–7 years old and 320–380 kilograms in live weight or male goats that are 18–24 months old and 12–24 kilograms in live weight are preferred. It is mostly the richer livestock producers and the larger-capacity trading operations that can access these markets. Recently, however there has been an increase in the number of “bush traders” who buy up a specific quality and type of animal from local markets and sell them to the bigger traders in the larger centers (Little, Debsu, and Tiki 2014: 392). Other innovations include the formation of women’s trading units, which collect small stock from primary bush markets and consolidate them into large shipments (Aklilu et al. 2013). Such bush markets are increasing in size, with many becoming important secondary markets; in turn, these drive processes of secondary urbanization. In general, better-off livestock owners get higher prices for the same quality of animals because they can draw on profitable connections and greater bargaining power and can time their sales more strategically. Individual sellers have little bargaining power, and their ability to wait for a good price is limited. Smaller traders who buy from smaller markets tend to have less access to credit than larger traders; they may therefore take animals on credit from owners, resulting in problems later when repayments are not made (Aklilu et al. 2013; Hagmann and Stepputat 2016). International agencies have made numerous attempts to upgrade markets by installing concrete bays, loading ramps, and wire fencing, but these efforts often fail. The real upgrading in the markets has come about simply when they are used more and when the risks of long-distance trade are reduced.

### Petty trade

Small traders, many of them women, move essential goods from the Indian Ocean ports and grain surplus areas to and through the borderlands. These goods include a vast quantity of small shipments of kerosene, cooking oil, grain, pasta, and cloth, as well as luxury items—such as electronics. Moyale, Mandera-Suftu, and Garissa—all key entrepôts—host vibrant markets where a wide range of goods are available to suit various budgets. Analyses of prices for essential foods such as wheat flour and maize show that prices rise rapidly when unofficial cross-border trade is shut down by officials or due to the closure of transport links, creating local shortages (Little 2003).

Although there are no data for the cluster itself, the anxieties expressed by women cross-border traders in other parts of East Africa likely apply to any new cross-border protocols. In a study of the Uganda–Kenya cross-border trade in relation to the Protocol on the Free Movement of People, small-scale women traders claimed that if trade was subject to formal protocols, it would most likely suffer due to their small margins, and that it would likely diminish further if they had to increase their dealings with officials. These women want to cross the border legally, without being harassed and without the need for paperwork but indicated that customs officials would probably take advantage of clauses to overcharge small traders compared with larger ones (Masinjila 2009). Women are often disadvantaged when dealing with male officials, although they are often at an advantage when operating across clan divides. At present, many women rely on middlemen and brokers to handle business with customs, security, or administration, for which bribes are required. On the other hand, women have established a robust role in long-distance petty trade

across the borderlands because their clan connections through marriage facilitate movement into what might otherwise be hostile territory.

### Smuggling

Moyale and Mandera are key crossing points for migrants leaving Ethiopia and heading toward South Africa and other large economies, although recent studies suggest that the numbers of migrants travelling to South Africa may have decreased, possibly “because of the attractiveness of other destinations (such as Europe), low rates of recognition of asylum applications in South Africa, and finally, intolerance toward foreigners and xenophobic violence in South Africa” (Hovhannysyan et al. 2018). A large number of such migrants coming from areas outside the borderlands are guided by smugglers. A study by the International Organization for Migration estimated that, in 2009, about 20 migrants per day—over than 7,000 per year—were paying smugglers to help them pass through the Moyale border crossing (Horwood 2009: 119). Although Ethiopians should be able to enter Kenya without payment, they require a stamp for their passport. The study reported that it was not uncommon for smugglers to pay an official sitting in a local bar to stamp 50 migrant passports at a time, each at a cost of US\$300 (Horwood 2009: 98–101). Officials in Moyale may have been sharing an estimated US\$144,000 per month from passport stamps alone. Moyale and Mandera are also known to gain significant income through the smuggling of many varied illegal commodities, including electronics, drugs, and arms. A number of interviewees in the International Organization for Migration study, including officials, suggested that the illegal smuggling market represents at least 60 percent of the town’s economy (Horwood 2009: 119). An updated version of the same study reiterates this estimate (Frouws and Horwood

2017). It is clear that smuggling is a business in which almost everyone in officialdom and business has a stake, and it would be a mistake to overestimate the degree to which local authorities have an interest in curtailing it.

### 3.3.2. Production

Pastoralism is a form of livestock husbandry that uses mobility to maximize production from an arid, low-biomass environment with unpredictable rainfall in time and space (Scoones 1996, Bollig, Schnegg, and Wotzka 2013). Pastoralism in the IGAD cluster 2 has not remained static since time immemorial. Rather, it is a system that has developed along with changing technology, ecology, and infrastructure, and has responded to contemporary struggles over productive resources and governance.

Two longitudinal household studies allow us to see how different kinds of pastoralist households are making a living.<sup>3</sup> As part of the Pastoral Risk Management Project (PARIMA) study, McPeak, Little, and Doss (2012) found that poorer pastoralists sell a greater percentage of their herd than richer ones but that sales of livestock as a percentage of total income is similar, ranging from 14 to 17 percent for wealthier and less wealthy categories alike. Poorer households depend more on cash than wealthier ones, particularly because wealthier households produce more of their own milk and because milk represents a substantial proportion of the rural diet. Milk production accounts for 50 percent or more of the income

for the two wealthiest ownership groups (Little, Debsu, and Tiki 2014). Given the level of importance of milk to the household economy, herders emphasize maintaining the productivity of female animals and are as flexible and mobile as they can be. This is somewhat at odds with the needs of the market, which prefers male animals that are not too far afield. The best grazing sites tend to be far from the markets (the largest markets are usually encircled by overgrazed zones), and less wealthy herders will be less capable of holding out for good prices after trekking long distances to get to the market.

The pastoral production system in the arid Kenya–Ethiopia borderlands requires a relatively high degree of mobility to ensure access to good-quality grazing in different seasons and under varying climatic conditions. While pastoralist families generally return to a home area during the rainy season, they separate from one another during the dry season, with youths bringing the animals to the more distant grazing around seasonal water points, including across the international boundaries, as long as conflict does not prevent it. This way of production requires skilled herders; effective negotiations; seasonal (but not exclusive) boundary management; and impartial rule-bound regulation of pasture and water use. The production system has seen two contradictory forces in recent years. On one hand, there are innovations that have added value and consolidated systems of regulation. For example, new holding grounds and fodder production systems have reduced risk by increasing the ability of a mobile producer or intermediate trader to sell without loss of condition (Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2013). Camel production has experienced significant growth due to increased demand from Saudi Arabia. These livestock are better able to cope with intermittent

3. The PARIMA study consisted of household interviews at six sites in Kenya and five in Ethiopia, twice yearly over five years between 2000 and 2004; and the CHAINS Study (Climate-Induced Vulnerability and Pastoralist Livestock Marketing Chains in southern Ethiopia and Northeastern Kenya), which involved household and trader interviews at two of the same sites in Ethiopia between 2011 and 2015.

rainfall and long distances. Customary institutions and pastoralist leaders have developed new protocols for ensuring the control of grazing areas and water, including through formal agreements with the state. These advances notwithstanding, the production system is also under increasing pressure from politicization of regulation and boundaries such that dry season grazing is no longer protected from incursions by other land users—who are often protected by powerful elites—or by out-of-season grazing; and access to large tracts is often restricted due to political violence or elite enclosure. It is also widely reported that new boreholes are being sunk and settlements established, causing damage to surrounding pastures (Brocklesby, Hobley, and Scott-Villiers 2010; Scott-Villiers et al. 2015). In general, it appears that the greatest risk to the value chain between livestock production and eventual sale of meat or milk to consumers rests with the producers. It is they who suffer the greatest levels of boom and bust, especially as their systems of mobility, intergroup negotiation, customary justice, and environmental regulation are attacked in contemporary political conditions.

### 3.3.3. Infrastructure and Economic Services

The road from Addis Ababa to Moyale has been tarmac for many years, but the road from Nairobi to Moyale has only just been upgraded (financed by the African Development Bank). All other main roads in the cluster are murrum or simple gravel tracks graded at rare intervals. Movement overland is slow, especially during the rains, and travel is often perilous, prone to banditry and breakdown. At the same time, local people claim that the number of deaths and injuries from road accidents has increased significantly with the coming of the tarmac road. Numerous police and military roadblocks hinder ease of movement as well. The

military must organize frequent convoys for travelling along key routes, an expensive proposition that also slows commerce.

Mobile phone masts provide a remarkable level of coverage in remote situations. Increasingly numbers of people, including pastoralists, are using mobile phones for social and business purposes. However, large swaths of rangeland do not receive coverage, and pastoralists often go to great lengths to find a patch of network so they can send information to various sections of their herding operation. Most of the smaller centers have little or no electricity. Investments in energy production are underway, including a large wind farm on the eastern side of Lake Turkana and a highly controversial dam on the Omo River.

Few traders make use of formal credit facilities. Many use kin networks and other connections to arrange insurance, currency exchange, and subcontracting. Somali traders use hawala as a money transfer system. Small traders in Kenya are increasingly using Mpesa and other mobile money systems (Bollig, Schnegg, and Wotzka 2013: 403).

Many children from Ethiopia and Somalia attend primary schools in Kenya. The schools are thought to be better there than in their home countries; and enrollment provides a pathway to citizenship and the possibility of future employment through the learning of Kiswahili, obtaining an identity card, and developing a network of peers (Scott-Villiers et al. 2015). Across the borderlands, however, school enrollment rates are very low. In 2014, the net enrollment for primary education in Wajir was 27 percent; for secondary education, 9 percent (Republic of Kenya 2015). In Mandera, the primary education enrollment rate was 42.4 percent and the secondary education rate was 5.2 percent. Both

sets of rates compare unfavorably with Kenya's national enrollment rates of 77.2 percent for primary and 24 percent for secondary education (see EU Trust Fund 2016). Further, far fewer girls than boys enroll in both primary and secondary school. In a recent study of impacts on education in northern Kenya, parents and young people expressed their concern that school fails to teach skills relevant to the livestock and cross-border economy, aside from the language, literacy, and numeracy skills that they can acquire in the early years of primary school (Scott-Villiers et al. 2015). Parents and youth are calling for a more relevant and high-quality school education that is better linked to home life and that adds value to the existing economy. The borderlands also need relevant and quality tertiary education to teach young people the higher-level economic, social, and political skills they will need to work in the growing towns and centers.

### 3.3.4. The Urban Formal and Informal Sector

The employment situation for young school leavers on the Kenya side of the border is a cause for significant anxiety among young people, parents, and community leaders. While most young people become pastoralists or agropastoralists, they do so without going to school. Those who do attend school are most likely to find themselves unemployed when they leave. The study (Scott-Villiers et al. 2015) found that 65–80 percent of standard 8 to form 4 leavers were jobless in May 2014.<sup>4</sup> Others had low-paying jobs or had started micro-businesses in the informal sector of the small

towns and centers. Opportunities are competitive and precarious, including quarry work; collecting firewood; making and selling charcoal; construction work; domestic work; producing and selling snacks and local brews; selling mobile phone credits; and operating motorcycle taxis. Some young people, especially girls, participate in their parents' businesses, including helping in shops and small restaurants or joining trading businesses. Only a small proportion of school leavers (less than 2 percent) are able to access salaried jobs in the police, army, or local government, most of which are bought with bribes or patronage relations, rather than through qualifications alone (Scott-Villiers et al. 2015).

Over more than four decades, large numbers of refugees have moved across the cluster borders, most recently including huge flows of people from Somalia, many now in the Dadaab refugee camp. The status of the camp remains controversial: the Kenyan government ordered it closed in 2016, arguing that Somalia-based Al-Shabaab militants were using it as a base to plan attacks in Kenya, but the high court blocked the closure. A renewed push in 2019 seeks to close the camp by the middle of the year (Bhalla 2019). The substantial amount of aid that has flowed since 1991 when Dadaab refugee camp was set-up into Kenya's North Eastern Province (currently comprising Wajir, Garissa, and Mandera counties) has significantly contributed to the local economy. Aid money not only pays for basic construction and services, but more importantly underpins many a salaried livelihood as well as substantial trade and transport—both large-scale smuggling and small-scale services and basic commodities (Cassanelli 2010: 137). Food aid has been a persistent attraction for people to small centers across the pastoralist rangelands. It supports vulnerable groups in the settlements but

4. Formal schooling in Kenya begins at age 6, with compulsory and free basic education until age 14. The education cycle is divided into lower (standards 1–3), middle (standards 4–5) and upper primary (standards 6–8). Students attend secondary school for four years before taking the school-leaving exam at the end of their fourth year. The first class or year of secondary school is called “form 1” and the final year is called “form 4.”



is intermittent, is a source of deplorable corruption, and adds to long-term vulnerability (Brocklesby, Hopley, and Scott-Villiers 2010).

As previously noted, small-town populations are growing rapidly. The money released by devolved budgets on the Kenya side is having a visible effect on construction, feeder roads, schools, and other “contractible” infrastructure (from which rents can be derived). Ethiopian government expenditures have made an impact in the cluster, including, for example, a large water point construction project. However, it is evident in both countries that the economic base lacks value added, as it comprises public sector (wages and infrastructure investment), livestock production and trade (including smuggling), and the potential of delivering minor services to these two sectors (Aklilu et al. 2013). In particular, the largest part of the economy of the borderlands—the livestock industry—has received hardly any useful investment inside the borderlands themselves.

### 3.4. Cross-Border Insecurity

Insecurity in the cluster takes a number of interrelated forms, most significantly ethnopolitics and insurgency/terrorism. The institutions tasked with controlling these sources of insecurity are largely ineffective at eradicating them, in many cases because they benefit from the direct and indirect rents and power that they generate.

#### 3.4.1. Ethnopolitics

The town of Moyale provides a helpful example of ethnopolitics in action. It straddles the Ethiopia–Kenya border and was originally established as an Ethiopian military post on the country’s boundary with British Kenya. Today, it has two

administrations on the Ethiopian side, one for the part of the town located in the Somali National Regional State, which is dominated by the Garre, and another for the part located in the Oromia National Regional State, which is dominated by the Borana. The two groups have been in conflict over political power and access to resources for more than a decade (Adugna 2011). On the Kenya side, there is a single administration because Moyale is a Borana political constituency, but the levels of violent political dispute are the same, although in this case, it is the Borana versus the Gabra in alliance with the Burji (Scott-Villiers et al. 2014). The violence is somewhat related to immediate political interests—winning elections by fostering ethnic divisions—but is also more complex. It is also about the intensely valuable cross-border illegal trade and the geopolitics of insurgency. Moyale has acquired symbolic importance due to the operations of both Oromo and Somali nationalist insurgencies, as a senior official of the Somali national regional state explains:

“In our meeting in Addis Ababa Oromia’s president Juyinedin said, ‘Moyale is a lifeline of the Oromo. We can compromise on any of the contested places but not Moyale. We are already living under the pressure of Oromo nationalism being led by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). If we lose Moyale, OPDO [the ruling party in Oromia] as a party will no longer exist. The OLF would evoke this case to undermine our party. No Oromo would accept the decision.’ Then, our president, Abdulahi, responded by saying, ‘we are also under similar pressure [from the Somali rebel organizations] thus if we cancel the claim over Moyale, we would collapse as a party [SPDP] and as a state. Any Somali would not accept such a decision too.’ Thus, the meeting dispersed without agreement.” (Adugna 2010)

The question is further complicated by the fact that the OLF operates from bases inside Kenya in ways that are closely bound with the local politics of the Kenyan border. Thus, Moyale represents a strategic point for both local powers and for the Federal Democratic Government of Ethiopia and for the Republic of Kenya. This was marked in 2015, for example, by a series of incursions by Ethiopian troops across the border into Kenyan settlements in and around the town and along the borderline (see Golicha and Abdi 2015 and Abdi 2013).

Conflicts over access to resources relating to pastoralist production that were once handled by robust customary institutions have become increasingly politicized over recent decades, resulting in a hardening of ethnic identities, an increase in the associated claims for specific pieces of territory, and the creation of politically ethnicized constituencies (Adugna 2010, 2011; Watson 2010; Scott-Villiers et al. 2014). In Ethiopia, conflict has flared between clans living on both sides of the Somali and Oromo regional state border—and Moyale has been a flashpoint. In 2018, such conflict displaced large numbers of people and contributed to the huge increase of internally displaced people in Ethiopia.<sup>5</sup> Battles are ongoing between the Borana and the Guji inside Oromia. And in Marsabit County, a war between the Borana and the Gabra lasted for more than seven years, including incursions across the international border, until a peace was declared in 2008 (Wilson 2009). This peace did not hold in the main urban centers, however, where politics fanned the flames of animosity. Since devolution in 2013, intense competition along ethnic lines among vying political leaders reignited tensions and led to severe clashes in Moyale and surrounding

areas that continue today (Scott-Villiers et al. 2014; Endeshaw 2018). Recent news reports indicate that the clashes are beginning to spread again into some of the smaller centers along the border, areas that had been free of violence for several years. Speeches by local politicians suggest that there is little real appetite for peace at present.<sup>6</sup> In the counties of Mandera and Wajir, local politicians are widely suspected of catalyzing a long and deadly conflict between the Garre and the Degodia over political dominance in the two counties. Like the conflicts between the Borana and the Gabra, the Guji and the Borana, the Garre and the Borana, and the Turkana and the Samburu, among others, these small wars, widely understood to be provoked by politicians, have blocked roads, cut off valuable grazing pastures, and created festering animosities. This has become the normal way of doing politics in the cluster (Scott-Villiers et al. 2014; Endeshaw 2018).

One electioneering tactic involves the movement of populations. The Moyale clashes on the Kenyan side in 2013 and 2014 resulted in reported movements of as many as 70,000 across the border into Ethiopia in search of security (Scott-Villiers et al. 2014; Endeshaw 2018). Local people felt that political candidates who benefited from this movement of voters were implicated in the clashes. In the run-up to the 2004 referendum between Oromia and Somali national regional states in Ethiopia that was to set the border and resolve the conflict between the Borana and the Garre, tens of thousands of Garre from Kenya came to Ethiopia to register to vote (Adugna 2010). Equally, over the decades, many thousands of Ethiopian inhabitants of Moyale acquired Kenyan identity cards, in part

5. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website at [www.internal-displacement.org/countries/ethiopia](http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/ethiopia).

6. See, for example, [www.standardmedia.co.ke/ktnnews/video/watch/2000096478/-jaramandia-moyale-clashes](http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ktnnews/video/watch/2000096478/-jaramandia-moyale-clashes)

to enable them to access the better-quality education and health services on the Kenyan side, but also as they benefited from social and monetary inducements to vote.

### 3.4.2. Insurgencies and Terrorism

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has maintained mobile bases inside Kenyan territory for many years. The governments of Ethiopia and Kenya have collaborated on joint operations to eradicate the movement, but without significant success. As one Ethiopian official explains, the fighters “just melt into society and one cannot identify them; because they are the same” (Adugna 2010: 52). Inside Marsabit County, the Gabra and others have accused OLF of providing military support to the Kenyan Borana, who are engaged in local struggles for political power. In a recent study in Marsabit, young people accused the insurgents of being guns for hire, paid by shadowy elite persons to undertake assassinations (Scott-Villiers et al. 2014). The recent rapprochement with Eritrea, which hosted multiple Ethiopian armed opposition groups, however, has given new impetus to resolving several long-running rebellions. The government signed a peace agreement in August 2018 with most of the OLF, and in October with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ICG 2019).

Across the Somali border, the Al-Shabaab Islamist militia is the latest incarnation of a movement that began with Al Itihad in the early days of the Somali civil war. More recently, with Kenya's entry into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its involvement in the Somali war, including its capture of the highly lucrative port of Kismayo from Al-Shabaab, the militia has developed a new tactic of direct incursion into Kenya as well as support for indigenous Kenyan terrorist groups

(Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens 2014, Anderson and McKnight 2014, 2015). Between 2012 and 2014, Al-Shabaab conducted over 80 terrorist attacks in Kenya, many of them in the borderlands, including in cluster 2 (Anderson and McKnight 2014: 15). While there were numerous attacks on local residents in Mandera County, the attacks that caught media attention targeted nonlocal workers and students. In November 2014, a bus carrying teachers, civil servants, and others from various parts of Kenya that was traveling from Mandera for the Christmas holiday was targeted, resulting in 28 people being killed. After the Christmas break, many teachers refused to return, marking the beginning of an education provision crisis in the northeast. In December 2014, 26 quarry workers were murdered in an attack at their camp outside Mandera town (Maichuhie 2019). Another attack, this time on a gated compound housing the workers inside Mandera town, occurred in July 2015, killing 14; the remaining workers fled (Ombati 2015). An attack on Garissa University on April 2, 2015, militants separated out Christians and Muslims before targeting the former in a horrific attack on students. Each of these incidents aimed to intensify the growing rift between north and central Kenya; harden the difference between their ethnic, cultural, economic, and religious identities; and increase the sense of grievance felt by northern Kenyans at their marginalization. The initial response of the Kenyan authorities was not an unequivocal success, and Kenyan Muslims—particularly Kenyan Somalis, felt they were indiscriminately targeted as potential terrorists with efforts such as Operation Usalama Watch (Anderson and McKnight 2014: 18–21). Al-Shabaab and its affiliates have responded with further attacks and intensified ideological campaigns.

More recently however, and since 2015, Al-Shabaab's recruitment and popular support in the northeast have subsided (ICG 2018) for a combination of reasons: (1) the effects of devolution, which by spreading power and resources to the local level has helped undercut the narrative of marginalization and exclusion exploited by Al-Shabaab in its propaganda; (2) an improved security situation driven by the deployment of local, Muslim, and ethnic Somali officials to lead operations in the region, and increased recruitment by the Kenyan reserve police forces; and (3) greater local anger at the group itself, particularly its disruption of the local economy, destruction of communication infrastructure, and the targeting of nonlocal teachers and health workers (ICG 2018: 13).

### 3.4.3. Justice and Security Institutions

Ethiopia maintains a border commission for all its borders. Kenya's cross-border arrangements are created on an as-needed basis. Both states appear to offer a fair level of cooperation with one another. The border districts and woredas on both sides, have security committees comprised local security agencies and administrators, often include local nongovernmental organizations, and sometimes include religious leaders. Local CEWARN monitors have been feeding information about security-related incidents into a database that has been in operation for over a decade. The data are not publicly available, but are considered by state security chiefs at meetings hosted by IGAD, and excerpts are available to local security personnel who could be in a position to respond. Local people are unable to judge what difference it may have made to the resolution of chronic insecurity on the borders (Scott-Villiers et al. 2014).

In 2005/6 in an initiative from Borana and Gabra elders, a meeting was called by the leader of Yabello Woreda in Borana involving Kenyan officials, to initiate a formal peace process between the two ethnic groups. A group of Ethiopian government officials paid a visit to Embu, the provincial headquarters at the time, to escalate the level of involvement of the Kenyan government. The resulting peace declaration, which held the peace for several years across many rural locations and large areas of mutually essential grazing, was witnessed and implicitly accepted by the local government administrations of both countries. However, the resolutions, like many other working institutions in the borderlands, do not have the full force of constitutional law or government resourcing behind them (Chopra 2008a, Scott-Villiers et al. 2011). In 2007, Ethiopian officials from Borana visited Sololo—an OLF stronghold in Kenya, holding talks with counterparts in a process that has been ongoing for several years. When the president of Oromia celebrated the Ethiopian millennium in Moyale, Ethiopia, many Kenyan ministers of parliament, officials, and business people were invited to attend (Adugna 2010).

A significant proportion of the local insecurity that derives from local crime or territorial disputes is effectively managed through customary institutions (Chopra 2008a; Scott-Villiers et al. 2011). While outsiders have tended to dismiss these institutions as dying and ineffective, they retain considerable powers and legitimacy. Recently, state bodies (e.g., district/zonal commissioners and district security committees) have actively collaborated with committees formed of senior customary leaders. However such efforts have mostly had limited effect as they are neither an official resource nor always able to control the

antics of politicians and elite criminals whose wealth allows them considerable maneuvering room outside the reach of both state and customary law. The old pastoralist justice system, once all-powerful, can be evaded if the subject lives in town rather than in a rural area, and the new state justice system is flexible if money can be paid. There are also numerous instances of clan leadership coming behind particular candidates for political office, a process that elders describe as a pragmatic attempt to control these powerful individuals. Representational arrangements are thus hybrid and not always clear to outsiders.

Formal courts are hard to access on either side of the border. There is no permanent court in the cluster, and when a court comes to a town, whether in Ethiopia or Kenya, it is costly to bring a case. The lengthiness of court cases, the lack of public defense or private lawyers, and the lack of legal aid undermine the potential contribution of the state judiciary (Chopra 2008b). It is also widely believed that courts will favor those who can pay the most (Brocklesby, Hobley, and Scott-Villiers 2010). Most justice in the cluster is provided through the customary system and Khadi's courts, both of which reportedly work well. Other security and regulatory services, such as police, military, customs, and immigration, are widely distrusted.

Differences around the concept of justice presents a profound difficulty (Chopra 2008b). What local populations understand as legitimate and illegitimate in terms of crime and punishment is often different than the constitutional or legal understanding. For example, in many localities, most do not consider the brewing of alcohol or possession of firearms without a government license to be a crime. Pastoralists often raise the important point

that their system of justice tends to be restorative while the state tends to be punitive, particularly regarding murder. According to customary leaders, failure to correctly manage compensation and justice will directly lead to an escalation of violent conflict. Where perpetrators are able to evade justice or receive only a limited sentence, justice is not seen to be done, and further violence will ensue. Deliberate killings are known to be part of political repertoires on both sides of the border (Scott-Villiers et al. 2014). On the other hand, magistrates visiting northern Kenya have offered examples of domestic violence or rape not being treated with sufficient seriousness in customary systems (Chopra 2008b). Neither the customary nor the state system of justice is currently able to fully control political leaders, yet the presence of effective justice is crucial to forging and maintaining peace; dealing with crime and insurgencies; creating accountability for political and other decisions; and maintaining regulation of land use, markets, and services, such as education.

### 3.5. Voice and Society

Most people in the borderlands of cluster 2 feel they have a profound lack of power and information relating to formal politics and governance (Brocklesby, Hobley, and Scott-Villiers 2010; Scott-Villiers et al. 2014). Neither Ethiopia's democratic federalism nor Kenya's democratic representation system has given sufficient voice or influence to ordinary citizens in the borderlands a result in both countries of a history of marginalization, the concentration of elite power in a few hands, a corrupt political system, and undermining of the justice system. The disempowerment of ordinary people is particularly acute for groups who are discriminated against: people without



wealth, informal sector workers, rural dwellers, particular ethnicities, women, youth, and people without identity papers. While the precise manifestations are different on either side of the border, the patterns are similar and the numbers of people feeling a degree of disempowerment are significant.

In Ethiopia, political representation through members of parliament is thin at best; members tend to act as conveyors of messages from the center rather than the other way around. The influence of the “masses” on centralized decision-making is not strong, despite the existence of party structures at every level of society (Lister 2004). In every kebele in Ethiopia and location in Kenya, there is a government-appointed leader or chief supported by a group of elders and other local luminaries. People do not feel represented by these individuals. Rather, they suggest that they absorb government and development resources or act as conduits of government campaigns (Brocklesby, Hobley, and Scott-Villiers 2010). This is a result of Ethiopia’s particular model of state-led development, which is predicated on the central capture of “rents” to fund massive expansion, especially in communications, education, and hydroelectricity. In its early years, this led to high rates of economic growth and impressive expansion of social protection programs, but the political transition in Ethiopia means that the outcome of this developmental model remains to be seen (see Clapham 2018; de Waal 2018; ICG 2019). Furthermore, since the mid-2000s, the Ethiopian state, followed by elements of the security forces, has supported the Somali Region’s leader Abdi Mohammad Omar—also known as “*Abdi Iley*” (“one-eyed”)—by allowing him to accumulate unprecedented power. This involved the creation of an extraordinarily

powerful local security police and a patronage network that allowed him to control all trade on the Ethiopia–Somalia border (see Gardner 2018). Since his replacement in late 2018, the political configuration of the Somali Region remains in flux. In Kenya, members of parliament and of the county assemblies have considerable capabilities due to their ability to amass wealth, but they seldom use it for the general benefit. Wealthy elites are widely believed to be controlling substantial patronage networks through their ability to influence jobs, contracts, and resource allocations in the public and private sector alike.

Social divisions are deepening with increasing commercialization, intensification of political competition, and the hardening of constituency boundaries along ethnic lines (Watson 2010). Universal education provision is unwittingly adding to social division by creating a small wealthy urban elite along with a growing urban underclass, and by failing to provide for a large number of rural youths. These processes are contributing to increasing levels of crime, drug use, and in some cases, the growth of insurgency (Scott-Villiers et al. 2015).

### 3.6. Conclusions

The largest political and criminal opportunities in the borderlands of cluster 2 derive from illegal rents derived from movement of goods and from the substantial amounts of official and unofficial money that can be gleaned from political office. There are important positive border processes too, including the protection that tens of thousands of people are able to seek in times of violence and the positive engagement between customary leaders, as well as between the two

governments on security issues. However, it might be that conflict is so common in the borderlands precisely because large numbers of people can be displaced to a neighboring country, while state justice consistently fails to be done and political representation consistently acts as a source of violence rather than peace.

The cluster's economic opportunities derive largely from informal and illegal activities that are built through failures of politics and governance, but also from substantial legal livestock production and trade. These opportunities disproportionately benefit rich and well-connected actors, but that does not mean another system would do better. The rich and well-connected preside over systems that incorporate many poorer people in a web of patronage and co-operation, as well as keeping many in positions of poverty and in fear of violence.

Four aspects of the economy directly benefit from lax border controls:

1. The large and vital trade in consumer essentials is a vital livelihood source among urban-based women traders, who point out that any increase in trade regulation levels will affect them disproportionately and lead to further empowerment of the corrupt over those who are merely trying to make a fair living.
2. The low, middle, and high value livestock markets are increasingly effective and growing in size, although they are slowed down by unofficial tariffs and barriers and by infrastructure failures.

3. Wealthy elites, in collaboration with various official agents, organize the opaque trade in luxury goods, drugs, and arms. This group will be extremely interested in ensuring that they make maximum benefit from any new borderlands programs.
4. Young unemployed people are making what living they can from sublegal political activities, financed by political candidates and from the demand for services and labor generated by the distribution of government contracts or profits from cross-border trading.

Two groups find the illegal border management to be a hindrance:

1. Pastoralists, both asset rich and asset poor, though largely able to cross the international, district, and constituency borders without passports and without official hindrance, are severely hindered by the unofficial political ethnicization of territory and regulatory failures. They fear that if their own trustworthy institutions for regulating production systems are adversely incorporated into state arrangements, they will see their industry decline.
2. Migrants crossing the border are required to pay large sums in bribes, even though they have the right to cross.

In terms of borderlands programming, every proposal should be accompanied by a comprehensive political economy and power analysis to map out who will benefit and how, and who will likely succeed in manipulating and how. The ideal of mutually beneficial borderlands programs, governed by clear agreements, will be achieved if

the mutual benefits and risks to the governments involved and to the various social and economic groups are accounted for.

- Production strength can be built by increasing transparent and trustworthy regulation of production resources (land, water, and mobility) with leadership from customary institutions and the inclusion of young herders and new technologies.
- Trade can be strengthened by reducing risk to market actors through investment and innovation in the market chain. It can also be boosted by reducing tariffs specifically on petty trade and by ensuring that information is widely disseminated.
- Economic strength can be built in small towns by promoting connectivity, reducing taxes on and licensing regimes that impact small businesses, and increasing the relevance and originality of technical education.
- Security can be strengthened by legitimizing and financing more inclusive processes of justice; recognizing the crucial role that customary institutions and state justice systems play, and encouraging them to influence the activities of border commissions, security committees, nongovernmental organizations, and the media.
- Borderlands programming would benefit from an investigative and analytical capability that seeks to continuously understand the less visible elements of the economy and politics of these vibrant but tricky zones.

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# Background Paper 4.

## Cross-Border Dynamics in the Uganda–Kenya–South Sudan Borderlands Cluster

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## 4.1. Overview

As both state power and territorial control often diffuse from the center of a state to its periphery, the borderlands at the edges of sovereign nations are inherently marginal. Because of this, they are often viewed as disconnected and dangerous. They suffer from “pathologies of the margins, which are the results of a failure to integrate into the state or an inability to engage with or profit from neoliberal development” (Goodhand 2013: 249). Historically, state-centered narratives have characterized borderlands as ungoverned spaces and political and regulatory vacuums, yet this narrative is simplistic, often ignoring the complexity of informal arrangements and the sophisticated institutions that underpin society in such regions.

The borderlands approach provides an opportunity to appreciate this complexity in context and to better understand how to address chronic poverty, conflict, and development challenges for some of the world’s most vulnerable populations. Borderlands provide a unique lens through which to analyze the interplay of formal and informal institutions and their impact on society. Studying the borderlands also provides an opportunity to explore themes of agency; community- and network-based notions of sufficiency and resilience; and innovative responses and adaptations in an environment of protracted uncertainty. For the World Bank, this necessitates a new analytical framework through which to apply global development policy in these regions.

A borderlands lens is especially appropriate for the Karamoja cluster, where overlapping sets of institutions—formal, informal, military, and

commercial—blur notions of dominant forms of governance, with customary and informal practices operating in a shared space with expanding commercialization and private-sector interests, especially in the extractive industries, all underpinned by expanded proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and illicit markets.

Throughout history in the Karamoja cluster, ethnic and local communities have often been “partners rather than subjects of the state” in that they have exercised power and agency in local, cross-border, and even regional affairs (Eulenberger 2013: 69). This paper discusses how the cluster’s history and culture have contributed to the predominant cross-border community and economic dynamics underpinning the region today. While cluster-specific insights are the focal point of this paper, the Karamoja cluster offers crucial insights, opportunities, and challenges for regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

The following dynamics and their economic, cultural, and social impacts are analyzed: (1) regional alliances and conflict; (2) migration, mobility, and livelihoods; (3) trade, commercialization, and inequality, including the nexus of the illicit and informal economies; (4) the extractive industries; (5) small arms and light weapons; and (6) disarmament policies. Following this, a qualitative mapping of institutions throughout the Karamoja cluster and implications for the broader Horn of Africa region are discussed. Gaps in the research have been identified and elaborated on.

## 4.2. The Karamoja Cluster

The Karamoja cluster encompasses northeastern Uganda (Karamoja), northwestern Kenya (Turkana and West Pokot), southeastern South Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia (South Omo Zone in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region). In December 2015, President Salva Kiir of South Sudan issued a declaration creating 28 states out of the existing ten: Eastern Equatoria was divided into Imatong and Namoronyang states (ICG 2016: 1).<sup>1</sup> This region includes the hotly contested Ilemi Triangle, claimed by South Sudan, Kenya, and Ethiopia (Mburu 2003). While the region's inhabitants have myriad tribes and ethnic groups, the Karamoja cluster's shared Nilotic past means that many groups share similar dialects, livelihoods, and broader cultural trends.

The cluster's population represents myriad peoples and identities. The Karamoja region of Uganda is home to three main ethnic groups—the Jie, the Dodoth, and the Karimojong—as well as numerous other minority groups with smaller populations (Stites 2013). The former Eastern Equatoria State of South Sudan is inhabited by approximately 17 tribes, all vulnerable to interethnic rivalries, including the Toposa, the Acholi, the Didinga, and the Nyangatom (Small Arms Survey 2014; AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan 2015). Turkana and West Pokot in Kenya are primarily inhabited by the Turkana and Pokot peoples, respectively. The cluster's tribes have often been marginalized and discriminated against by their governments, and even within their respective countries, the inhabitants of the cluster are among the poorest

populations with some of the lowest human development indicators (Johannes, Zulu, and Kalipeni 2015). Consequently, areas in the cluster have demanded greater devolution of powers from their central governments, including the former Eastern Equatoria State; Turkana, although demands have been somewhat satisfied by the new Kenyan constitution; and most recently, in Ethiopia's Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region (ICG 2019a, b).

While the Karamoja cluster is home to some who practice truly nomadic forms of pastoralism, especially in Turkana and parts of the South Omo region, many more engage in agropastoralism, a dual subsistence strategy that attempts to balance the risks associated with livestock and agrarian activities (Burns, Bekele, and Akabwai 2013). Agropastoralism is most likely to be successful in areas with access to fertile land and better rainfall. For many, engaging in diversified livelihoods while simultaneously making heavy investments in livestock-based livelihoods has proven to be the most stable and effective livelihood strategy in the region (Walker 2002; Ellis 1995). Pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods require mobility to access grazing lands, water, and other resources; hence, mobility is key to their survival, including the occasional crossing of international borders (Lambroschini 2011).

Cattle raiding has long been a practice to redistribute wealth throughout society. It also serves as a form of insurance for the regional ecological uncertainty (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns 1998). Raiding is deeply embedded in the culture of the broader region and is a part of people's political identity (Gray 2000). Raiding practices

1. This paper refers to these two states as former Eastern Equatoria State.

have been identified as an adaptive response to sociopolitical uncertainty that peripheral populations faced by repressive governments, which is an important consideration given the history of neglect followed by repression of groups in the Karamoja cluster (Gray et al. 2003). Raiding's impacts on the Karamoja cluster have been deleterious; it has both directly and indirectly stripped assets from populations. The insecurity resulting from raiding has led to a collapse in markets, a lack of investment, underdevelopment, a breakdown in local governance, and limited access to health care and education, among other factors, reducing security for local populations (Young et al. 2007). While such violence has had long standing impacts on all populations, young men were normally the most affected by traditional raids due to their roles as protectors of animals and as those doing the raiding (Gray et al. 2003). Women and children were primarily impacted by spillover effects on their security as they traveled outside of their villages to collect firewood, water, and wild food (Stites and Akabwai 2010).

However, large-scale violent raids have decreased over the past decade, especially in Karamoja, Uganda. During research conducted in 2015 by the Feinstein International Center and Mercy Corps, respondents at multiple locations in northern Karamoja reported that security has drastically improved, leading to advances in household livelihoods and mobility. The study found that women were able to freely move outside their villages and have improved access to cultivation regions, while men are more secure when grazing and watering their animals. Both men and women reported increased freedom of movement to markets (Howe, Stites, and Akabwai 2015). Communities

in both northern and southern Karamoja credit these improvements primarily to the government-led disarmament campaign that began in 2006. Although in its early years, this campaign has been beset by major human rights abuses and initially had negative impacts on livelihoods (HRW 2007; Stites and Akabwai 2010). More recently, so-called "two-for-one" policies, known as the *Nabilatuk Resolution* in southern Karamoja and the *Moruitit Resolution* in northern Karamoja, have been extremely effective. They require alleged thieves to pay back double the number of animals stolen plus one. These resolutions are enforced by a combination of customary mechanisms and, according to local Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) officials, are supported by the legal system. Notably, recent studies suggest that as government policies on disarmament affect both the presence of weapons in the region and the existing livestock-based livelihood practices, women are experiencing a dramatically improved sense of security: a majority of younger women report feeling more secure and empowered, even as the incidence of gender-based violence is still reportedly high across the region, and forms of structural patriarchy, manifest in men's control over productive assets, remain resilient (Stites and Howe 2019; Hopwood, Porter, and Saum 2018).

This trend of improved security is not echoed throughout the cluster. In Turkana, Kenya, local bandit groups still operate in the bush, on remote roads, and in communities, readily extorting local populations. Recent developments in the extractive industries have exacerbated conflict in the region, including between the Turkana and Pokot communities. In South Sudan, security challenges persist due to the ongoing civil war and political



dysfunction throughout the country, significantly impacting broader livelihoods, as many people from the states of Jonglei and Unity fled to the former Eastern Equatoria State prior to the most recent outbreak of fighting in 2016. This has exacerbated tensions with host communities, specifically with the agrarian community, although between 2012 and 2015, raids by the Lord's Resistance Army decreased notably, leading to a limited but still significant increase in local security, especially in the primarily agrarian area of Magwi County (South Sudan BCSSAC, SSPRC, and UNDP 2012 ; AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan 2015).

Renewed fighting broke out in South Sudan in 2013, and although there was a peace agreement between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) in August 2015, the conflict fragmented and expanded. This conflict was the proximate cause of famine and widespread food insecurity; displacement caused by conflict prevented farming; and looting and cattle-rustling destroyed people's assets, resulting in more displacement (ICG 2017). The Karamoja cluster was spared the worst of the conflict, but has been affected by widespread food insecurity and displacement (REACH Initiative 2018). As of February 2019, Uganda is hosting 801,555 South Sudanese refugees; Kenya is hosting 113,858.<sup>2</sup> The former Eastern Equatoria State remains highly food insecure and is not expected to recover until September 2019 at the earliest (FEWS NET 2019).

2. See "Regional Overview of the South Sudanese Refugee Population" at <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/dataviz/62?sv=5&-geo=0>.

Cattle ownership has become more inequitable over time, with wealthier people owning large herds and poorer people owning fewer or no animals (Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2013). These practices have been linked directly to the increased proliferation of arms in the region, which will be elaborated on later in this paper. Policies in disarmament—such as the protected *kraal*<sup>3</sup> system in Karamoja—exacerbated these shifts in livestock ownership (Stites and Akabwai 2010). Those with smaller herds have more difficulty recovering from shocks, including rebuilding their herds and recovering from losses, thereby increasing their vulnerability. Increased privatization of communal resources has further exacerbated trends in inequality, as poorer populations have difficulty making payments for the water and grassland enclosures that are crucial to livestock-based livelihoods (Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2013).

During the colonial era, the Karamoja cluster was largely used as a buffer area to separate hostile tribes and foreign powers from the highland where British settlers maintained their interests; exploitative regional infrastructure was also developed to take advantage of local resources (Kareithi 2015). Today, populations in the cluster face continued marginalization.

The tactics that inhabitants straddling the borderlands have employed to navigate the region have resulted in a number of contextually unique trends, patterns, and dynamics. While some of these have evolved as strategies for resilience, many others have emerged out of self-interest, often fueling conflict and tension across communities.

3. A kraal is group of huts or residences protected by a fence.

### 4.3. Regional Alliances and Conflict

Alliances have developed within and across the Karamoja cluster due to cooperation over scarce resources; shared customs; trade benefits; and, in some cases, migration patterns. Important alliances include the Dodoth of northern Karamoja and the Toposa of South Sudan, the Jie (Karamoja) and Turkana, and the Turkana-Matheniko (Karamoja) alliance. Many nongovernmental organizations have also sought to strengthen alliances or improve relations between groups by facilitating community meetings and dialogues between customary leaders (Mkutu and Wandera 2015).

Historically, various factors have caused conflict in the Karamoja cluster, including cattle raiding and more recent patterns of opportunistic theft, conflict over scarce resources or in response to environmental pressures, tensions between agropastoralists and farmers, politicized ethnic tensions, conflict with state-sponsored militias, and conflicts over communal land ownership. In Karamoja today, security has improved overall, but opportunistic theft conducted by young men (lonetia) is widespread and problematic (Stites and Marshak 2014). In the former Eastern Equatoria State of South Sudan, tensions between the Toposa and the Dinka, among others reflect longer running tensions about the place of the Equatoria region within South Sudan as well as tensions around the representation in government of the region's ethnic groups (Walraet 2013; ICG 2016). During the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) displaced populations from the states of Jonglei and Unity, including cattle herders, sought refuge in the former Eastern Equatoria State, exacerbating tensions by fueling competition over

livelihood-related resources. More recently, the primary political conglomerations in South Sudan have tried recruiting in the region, further fueling the conflict. In Kenya, rivalries and deadly disputes have taken place along the Turkana–Pokot border, fueled by developments in the extractive industries (Mkutu and Wandera 2015). In recent years, there have been sieges of villages in this area, high levels of banditry and theft between communities, and destabilization of roads. Political incitement remains a major issue, especially around general elections, and conflicts have been reported around the extent to which central resources are allocated to the Turkana region under the devolved administration created by Kenya's 2010 constitutional arrangement.<sup>4</sup>

Fluid migratory patterns in the borderlands have allowed for the success of livestock-based livelihoods but have at times also contributed to cross-border conflict. For example, pastoralists from West Pokot benefit from access to grazing areas in Karamoja, but have historically also had to navigate threats from neighboring groups in Karamoja (Mkutu 2008). Various groups in the region complain of raids at the end of the grazing season when neighboring “guests” return home. The Pokot's location between Karamoja and Turkana has rendered its people vulnerable on all sides, including frequent clashes with the Marakwet, the Sebei, the Karimojong, and the Toposa. Territorial conflict between the Turkana and the Toposa across the South Sudan–Kenya border has at times been severe. For example, in 2009, Toposa warriors launched 15 attacks against Turkana herding communities in a span of five weeks, leaving

4. This constitutional arrangement came into effect in March 2013.

many dead and seizing approximately 6,000 cattle, sheep, goats, camels, and donkeys (Eulenberger 2013). The Toposa continue raiding the Turkana today through the Nadapal-Mogila corridor, made feasible by their ready access to weapons from the continued conflict in South Sudan.<sup>5</sup> Turkana's border with Uganda is largely peaceful, owing in part to community-level peace agreements, to a disarmament process that took place from 2004 to 2010, and the ongoing heavy security presence along the border. Conflict persists between the Pokot and the Turkana (it was particularly severe in 2014–15), involving livestock raiding and a long-term border dispute intensified by the construction of the Turkwell Dam (Mkutu 2017a).

Exploration of the oil in Turkana, discovered in 2012, could further destabilize the volatile region absent the establishment of a consensual international border and demarcation lines (Johannes, Zulu, and Kalipeni 2015). This has recently ignited conflict between the Turkana and the Dassenech of Ethiopia along the Kenya–Ethiopia border as well as around Lake Turkana, and has exacerbated the existing conflict around access to grazing lands and other issues (Mkutu and Wandera 2015; Mkutu 2017b).

## 4.4. Migration, Mobility, and Livelihoods

Migration throughout the Karamoja cluster happens within countries, including and increasingly to urban and peri-urban areas as well as across international borders. Push and pull factors for migration overlap and are not mutually exclusive;

in many cases, the confluence of multiple factors causes people to migrate. In some cases, one trigger event in the form of a covariate or idiosyncratic shock is the final push factor in a decision to migrate. Such trigger events include the death or sickness of a family member (especially the primary breadwinner), scarcity of resources due to environmental pressures, and large-scale violence or raids, which often also entail major asset loss (Stites and Akabwai 2012). Pressure from national governments on pastoralists also represent significant push factors. Pull factors include new opportunities and proactive efforts at livelihood diversification that minimize exposure to risk.

### 4.4.1. Livelihoods in the Karamoja Cluster

#### Pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods

Livestock-based livelihoods have emerged as the predominant livelihood strategy throughout the cluster due to their ability to adapt to variable rainfall, making them less susceptible to climate variations than traditional farming (Levine 2010). Research in Karamoja has shown that livestock-based livelihoods are less susceptible to rainfall variations and frequent droughts than traditional farming livelihoods. Additionally, livestock provide cultural and financial capital, serve as indicators of wealth and status, have great ceremonial and symbolic value, are used to pay bridewealth, and are exchanged for goods and services. However, in recent decades, shifts due to conflicts, climate, and state and economic policies have placed growing pressure on livestock-based production systems.

5. This is based on an interview with Darlington Akabwai in 2015.

### Shifts to agrarian livelihoods

Government pressure, rural poverty, international interventions, conflicts, and fewer overall numbers of livestock have pushed individuals to leave the livestock sector for agrarian livelihoods, especially in Karamoja. Like those who move to urban locations, some households make this shift completely, while others keep one foot in pastoral production by splitting up their households or by leaving herds in someone else's care. Local markets are increasingly connected to national and regional markets throughout the cluster.

Commoditization has allowed for further promotion of cash crops in some areas, particularly in Karamoja, including cereals, pulses, oilseeds, groundnuts, and fruit trees (Burns, Bekele, and Akabwai 2013). However, the region's variable climate makes this a high-risk strategy—at the personal and environmental level. While less data is available for the former Eastern Equatoria State or Turkana, we can assume that there may be similar patterns due to the similarities in ethnicity and culture.

### Urban livelihoods

Data show that in the urban areas of Karamoja, many people simultaneously engage in two to four types of livelihoods. The practice of participating in multiple small jobs is so common that it has become known as *leji-leja*. Just as in rural areas, urban livelihoods in the Karamoja cluster are highly gendered. For women, prominent urban livelihoods include selling charcoal, bartending, fetching water and firewood, selling tobacco, sweeping maize and other cereals from warehouse and shop floors, the production and selling of local brews, and a range of domestic

tasks. Men, on the other hand, engage in heavier but unskilled manual labor, such as making bricks, construction, pushing wheelbarrows at local markets, unloading buses, slashing grasses, carrying stones at quarries, working as a butchers, and serving as night watchmen (Stites and Akabwai 2012).

Based on urban growth patterns elsewhere in the region, we can assume that the informal economies in other cities look relatively similar. In Kapoeta and Narus in South Sudan, for example, urban land plots have restricted the ability of residents to farm or raise cattle, and hence wage labor livelihood strategies are also dominant, including brewing alcohol; producing petty commodities; owning local businesses; and engaging in the cross-border trade of food and beverages, livestock, and construction materials (Walraet 2013).

### Other livelihoods

Patterns of commercialization, expansion of trade, and greater regional commodification and integration of markets have generated livelihood opportunities, discussed in more detail in section 4.5 on trade, commercialization, and inequality on page 146. Regional livelihoods in the extractive industries, including the mining sector, have also increased in recent years. In South Sudan particularly, the prospecting of natural resources and mining complements the region's major reliance on subsistence agriculture, although livelihoods have been devastated by the most recent round of conflict in the country (IPSTC 2015; ICG 2017).<sup>6</sup>

6. There is notable skepticism among commentators about the likelihood of success of the most recent peace agreement (signed in 2018)—see Jok Madut Jok 2019; de Waal 2019.

### Maladaptive livelihoods

In the Karamoja cluster as in the Horn of Africa overall, various livelihoods have emerged that can be categorized as *maladaptive*. These strategies may meet short-term needs but are unsustainable over time and are often linked to violence, coercion, or exploitation (Young 1980). Raiding has historically been the predominant maladaptive livelihood in the cluster, in addition to heavy trade in firewood and charcoal and the destruction of protective fences to enabling the selling of wood.<sup>7</sup> Attacks by lonetia have emerged as a prevalent form of maladaptive livelihoods in Karamoja in recent years. These acts of opportunistic theft often offset food insecurity but perpetuate household vulnerability and contribute to mistrust within and among communities (Stites and Marshak 2014). While it is challenging to quantify direct causality, research has shown that lonetia crimes increased in the years following the start of disarmament, supporting the idea that youths engaged in the practice because they had lost other productive livestock-based livelihood opportunities and knew that households lacked weapons for self-defense.<sup>8</sup>

The lack of security in the North Rift Valley of Kenya led to a transformation in the activities of self-appointed defense forces into banditry. This group of bandits, or *ngoroko*, targets local communities for their livestock, engages in criminal activities in towns and trading centers, and extorts people along trading routes (Kareithi 2015). The *ngoroko* have become increasingly organized and better equipped at handling more sophisticated weapons, largely acquired through markets in

Uganda and South Sudan. The bandits disproportionately target isolated homesteads, vehicles on remote roads, and women in the bush collecting resources (Lind 2013). Opportunistic raids and banditry are also happening in the former Eastern Equatoria State, often along major trucking routes. These raids are carried out by small criminal gangs, including some from Cairo, who loot the trucks for cash and food, and attack people at gunpoint who are traveling between villages (South Sudan BCSSAC, SSPRC, and UNDP 2012; IPSTC 2015).

In the past, raiding was primarily governed by informal societal institutions, but the livelihood strategies of lonetia and *ngoroko* are mainly carried out by young men acting alone (Kareithi 2015; Stites and Howe 2019). This trend has undermined traditional authority and conflict resolution structures throughout the cluster, as discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

A less violent but perhaps equally unsustainable livelihood strategy is an overreliance on humanitarian aid. The many nongovernmental organizations and international organizations working in the region has led to aid dependence; and participation in interventions such as cash-for-work programs have, in some cases, become a significant aspect of livelihood strategies. In Turkana, for example, international actors have been providing relief assistance in the form of food aid for almost 80 years, starting with the colonial “paupers’ camps” of the 1980s. Humanitarian interventions have been criticized for focusing on the short-term needs of populations and for their overreliance on food aid as opposed to livelihood strategies that promote self-sufficiency. In an influential study,

7. Feinstein International Center qualitative data, 2009.

8. Feinstein International Center qualitative data, 2009.



Eugenie Reidy (2012) discusses the concept of “aid waiting.” One family from Northern Turkana described how aid enables them to survive, but that they are resentful of how their reliance on aid prevents them from living a pastoralist life, which they call the “true life.” In some cases, the opaque nature and imbalances involved in the distribution of aid, such as when it is co-opted for private benefit by the families of aid workers, tribal leaders, local administration, police, or others, fuel local resentment and made the strategy unsustainable for dependent populations.

#### 4.4.2. Migration Patterns in the Karamoja Cluster

##### Migration to urban and periurban areas

Many shifts in migration patterns have taken place in recent years in the Karamoja cluster as people move from rural to urban or peri-urban contexts, including to large towns. Some of this movement crosses borders, as evidenced by settled and itinerant Kenyan merchants in Karamoja, although exact numbers are extremely difficult to quantify. Some movement is within borders, such as to urban areas in search of more lucrative livelihoods. This pattern is common among youth in the former Eastern Equatoria State who were orphaned by the conflict and sought opportunity in South Sudanese towns following the 2011 independence referendum (Newhouse 2015). Many people migrate within the Karamoja cluster districts, while others move to towns or cities elsewhere in their native countries. Migrants who pursue urban livelihoods can be divided into three main groups: those who move to urban or peri-urban areas while also cultivating or keeping herds in rural areas; those who migrate seasonally between urban and rural areas, and those who move permanently into urban livelihoods.

##### Seasonal rural-urban migration

Throughout the Karamoja cluster, many individuals have a bifurcated existence between rural and urban areas. As is the case in many other parts of the world, seasonal migration is viewed as the best way to smooth risks and withstand shocks or, for the more well off, as the best way to take advantage of economic opportunities. This pattern is evident in the tale of a 50-year-old man in Moroto (Uganda) who, “makes bricks during the dry season and returns to his gardens in the wet season to grow maize, *simsim* [sesame], and sorghum” (Stites and Akabwai 2012). There is often a symbiotic relationship between urban and rural zones, demonstrated by trends in remittances sent to rural areas and the flow of agricultural products to urban centers. However, maintaining this dual subsistence strategy also requires a good deal of financial and social capital in their home areas, and those who lack the latter, such as widows, are often at a disadvantage.

##### Decision-making factors for migration

People living in rural areas generally believe that more lucrative livelihood opportunities exist in towns. Some respondents of one 2012 study reported migrating because they thought urban areas offered more security and personal safety, while others wanted to acquire new skills or an education (Stites and Akabwai 2012). In the former Eastern Equatoria State, many former refugees of the Kakuma camp in Kenya who had received access to education there, particularly those living in urban areas, have higher expectations than their uneducated peers regarding livelihoods (Newhouse 2015). Some take advantage of economic opportunities offered through migration for highly specific purposes, such as covering school fees or paying bridewealth.

However, respondents of the Stites and Akabwai (2012) study in urban areas also report having extremely limited access to financial services, which is a serious challenge for low-income individuals, especially because they need cash for lodging and purchases at the market. Jobs that provide lodging are hence very attractive, such as a nighttime security guard, domestic cleaner, or worker at a lodge (Stites and Akabwai 2012; Newhouse 2015). Other major challenges include obtaining water, paying to use latrines, paying for school fees for children, and having to pay for all food sources instead of relying on subsistence agriculture to meet most food-related needs (Stites, Burns, and Akabwai 2015).

Female-headed households and single women who have migrated to urban areas and do not maintain ties with rural areas face disproportionate risks. They have left behind their former social networks and therefore must reestablish themselves in challenging economic and often discriminatory contexts. Women who migrate between towns and rural areas every day to take advantage of economic opportunities without having to pay the high cost of in-town lodging also face specific risks resulting from their extensive travel at night and their frequent reliance on over-stretched social networks for long hours of childcare. In Torit and Kapoeta, orphans face greater impediments in urban areas due to their lack of family networks. In such circumstances, friendship networks become increasingly important and can serve as a resource for developing social capital (Newhouse 2015). Overall, well-off populations are able to navigate the balance of maintaining ties in both urban and rural areas, but the most vulnerable populations find this much more difficult. The less affluent also find it more difficult to acclimate to urban contexts

in the absence of social networks; and they also must deal with more discrimination with the potential of making it more difficult for them to obtain employment (Stites, Burns, and Akabwai 2015).

#### 4.4.3. Push and Pull Factors

Various push and pull factors influence patterns of change in migration and livelihoods throughout the Karamoja cluster. Many of these factors operate in simultaneous and overlapping spheres, described in turn below.

##### Opportunity

While many factors push people to diversify their livelihoods or migrate, many in the Karamoja cluster have adapted their livelihoods in pursuit of better opportunities. Pull factors to urban areas include the perception of more safety and security, the opportunity to acquire new skills, increased food security, more lucrative wages, and the opportunity for children to be better educated (Stites and Akabwai 2012). Pull factors to agrarian sectors include opportunities to promote cash crops, commercialization, government and international aid assistance, and increased opportunities to engage in trade in national and regional markets. Factors pulling people from pastoralism into agropastoralism include many of the same perceived opportunities to agrarian sectors plus increased animal health and the desire to spread risk across a more diversified system.

In some areas, particularly Karamoja, the improved security in recent years functions as a significant pull factor across different livelihoods. In Kenya, recent negotiations between Tullow Oil and the Turkana and Pokot communities to establish six community-run natural resource conservancies could also function as a pull factor if the conservancies

ultimately lead to better natural resource management (Kaimuki 2015). Better access to fields, markets, towns, grazing areas, and services means that people are able to intensify existing livelihoods or to branch out into new areas.

### Seeking refuge

Many in the Karamoja cluster migrate within regions and across borders in search of refuge during conflict or upheaval. These movements may be to avoid insecurity, to dodge disarmament, to hide weapons or stolen goods, or to stay out of the range of animal diseases in a given area. Moving out of rural areas or crossing borders are particularly crucial strategies in times of heightened conflict. During the Second Sudanese Civil War, many sought refuge in the border towns of Narus (after 1988), and Kapoeta (after 2002) (Walraet 2013). Across the Kenyan border, Lokichoggio became a major hub for humanitarian operations, as goods, services, and people began flowing across the Kenya–Sudan border. While many refugees from Sudan found new livelihoods in Lokichoggio, the economic boom favored those with military and political connections to Sudanese networks. Many people and businesses stayed in the area following the signing of the 2005 comprehensive peace agreement. This exemplifies how a booming but unregulated complex economic system—fueled by the influx of humanitarian assistance as well as illicit goods and services—provides both short-term refuge and livelihood options while also transitioning towns like Lokichoggio into a lasting economic centers in the borderlands. In recent years, as previously noted, conflict and severe food insecurity has also driven migration from South Sudan into neighboring countries.

### Limitations on mobility

Successful pastoral production depends on the mobility of herds to access grazing and water points, as well as to reach markets and veterinary services. National and subnational policy restrictions on mobility are possibly the most influential contributors to shifts away from livestock-based livelihoods. These restrictions arise out of border controls, the growth of urban and agrarian populations, security restrictions, the gazettement of land for national parks and reserves, political decisions limiting rangeland access, and the growth of private sector investment and private land titling, among other factors. In Uganda, the protected kraal system implemented by the UPDF in 2006 severely limited herd movement and was responsible for an increase in livestock mortality and morbidity resulting from overcrowding (Burns, Bekele, and Akabwai 2013). Many respondents in Karamoja cite these losses as their final push away from pastoral production. Poor national infrastructure can compound mobility issues by hindering reliable access to livestock markets and the trade of animals and animal products. In the South Omo zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region of Ethiopia, "villagization" schemes have been implemented by the Ethiopian government to better "secure livelihoods" (Tefera 2015; REF 2016).

### Social and familial allegiances

Social and kinship networks are essential to both traditional and adaptive livelihoods throughout the Karamoja cluster border region. A symbiotic system of "stock associates" allows for access to dry season grazing in farming areas, a refuge for herds to avoid disease or raids, and created networks of social and economic exchange (Guliver 1955). These relations often cross borders

and pass from one generation to the next. While eroded by insecurity and lack of access in some areas, including from Karamoja into other parts of Uganda, they remain vital institutions for horizontal exchange among elders and in cross-border areas, particularly with traditional alliances such as that of the Matheniko (Karamoja) with the Turkana, and the Jie (Karamoja) with the Turkana.<sup>9</sup> Social networks are also critical to the expansion of urban livelihoods in recent years, as people often move to towns to follow family or rely on family members back home to care for children, the elderly, herds, or property. Crucial cross-border social links persist between populations in Kenya and South Sudan due to the presence of South Sudanese refugees in camps located in Turkana.

### Variable climate and environmental degradation

The region's unpredictable climate causes distinctive challenges for crop production, including significant variations within the cluster. For example, Karamoja experiences the most rainfall and is considered semiarid, while Turkana is largely arid (Ellis and Swift 1988). Crop failures are common, and the negative impacts of poor harvests in areas better suited for pastoral production are exacerbated by pro-settlement government policies and overreliance on dryland farming, particularly in Karamoja.

Environmental push factors such as frequent drought and the erosion of long-standing coping strategies have increased community-level conflicts, such as with the Turkana and the Merille of Ethiopia, between whom tensions have arisen over access to fisheries in Lake Turkana (Ruto, Adan, and Masinde 2003). Overall, there are major concerns about the viability of livelihoods surrounding Lake Turkana, Kenya, as climate change has caused shifting precipitation patterns and rising temperatures. As the health and human rights director of Human Rights Watch reported in October 2015: "Lake Turkana is in danger of disappearing, and the health and livelihood of the indigenous peoples of the region along with it" (HRW 2015).

The damming of the Turkwel and Omo Rivers which feed Lake Turkana also risk exacerbating the already fragile interethnic relations in the region (Johannes, Zulu, and Kalipeni 2015). The dams are predicted to displace groups in Kenya and Ethiopia by reducing water levels by approximately 30 feet, causing a collapse of livelihoods dependent on fishing, livestock production, and flood-plain cultivation. This may affect the communities of the Turkana, the Nyangatom, and the Dassanech, who will likely move farther inland to the already fragile Ilemi Triangle. The livelihood and settlement repercussions from the dams may ultimately intensify the existing conflict between these groups and flame tensions among other groups in the Ilemi Triangle.

In South Sudan, the effects of conflict and conflict-induced famine have been exacerbated by erratic rainfall (both above and below average), which have negatively affected farming but also made it extremely difficult for humanitarian organizations to deliver basic services.

9. This is based on a telephone conversation with Karol Czuba of the International Organization for Migration in Moroto on May 23, 2012. Czuba was seeking to understand the process of out-migration among children from the region and had been investigating, at the author's suggestion, the change in the patterns of sending children to stock associates. His field team found that only elderly informants could describe the stock associate system.

Some research indicates that pastoral communities are better at negotiating access to shared natural resources in times of scarcity (Lind 2013). This coexistence born out of necessity is most likely to be successful if policies seek to limit additional external livelihood shocks, such as through the creation of dams or prohibitions on mobility.

### Disputed and arbitrary borders

The international borders designated by colonial powers in the Karamoja cluster have never carried the weight intended to from a state-centric perspective. While these borders have become less porous overall due to increased government regulation in recent years, in many places, including the Ilelmi Triangle, they are still not demarcated (Eulenberger 2013). These porous borders have allowed local residents access to economic opportunities, natural resources, and social systems but also result in overlapping territorial claims between tribes over areas such as the Ilelmi Triangle, which causes some to migrate farther.

### Food insecurity

Food insecurity is a chronic concern among many populations in the Karamoja cluster due to a combination of political, economic, and ecological factors. Household strategies to improve food security include patterns of diversification, adaptation, and migration, which were discussed earlier. Additional and specific household-level actions entail acquiring cash or replacements for dietary items; decreasing reliance on specific foods such as milk and blood; and adopting new livelihoods, including exploiting natural resources, engaging in casual labor, selling traditional brews, selling livestock and household items to buy other food, selling surplus crops, and acquiring items

through illicit or illegal means (Stites and Mitchard 2011). Many of these strategies entail either a gradual or abrupt move away from an animal-based livelihood to a more agrarian one or migration to urban centers.

The influx of trade and traders—which we turn to next—is contributing to the expansion and growth of major market centers. However, the decrease in raids is accompanied by the rise of a new form of criminality as a form of livelihood—one that is characterized by opportunistic theft and banditry throughout the region.

## 4.5. Trade, Commercialization, and Inequality

Trade is closely linked with livelihoods, migration, and mobility; it serves as both a push and pull factor in the aforementioned patterns. Cross-border trade is of particular interest given the advantages that arbitrage offers to make and sustain profits. In the Karamoja cluster, the complex system of trade has adapted to the hybrid model of governance and regulation through both traditional and formal trade networks. In South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya, the commercial sector has been militarized and securitized, as armed groups such as the Sudan People's Liberation Army accompany traders and as raiders and racketeers (such as the ngoroko) often become the most profitable livestock owners. This section will discuss the exchange of licit and illicit goods and services. Small arms and light weapons are a major component of this practice, yet they have distinct impacts on society, which will be discussed in more depth in a later section.



Contrary to narratives about the borderlands being backward and unorganized, the political economy of cross-border trade reveals the sophisticated networks that underpin the exchange of goods and services across South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda. Given the lack of transportation infrastructure to the capital cities, trade has developed with neighbors in the Karamoja cluster rather than internally. The trade in weapons in the Karamoja cluster has long been linked to licit and illicit goods. This is not a new phenomenon in the region; hunters and ivory traders introduced weapons into Turkana and Karamoja in the mid-19th century (Mirzeler and Young 2000).

### Separating the illegal from the illicit

The distinction between *illicit* and *illegal* is important when discussing overland trade in the Karamoja cluster. Legal refers to practices sanctioned by law and subject to tax and customs regulations. Illicit refers to practices that are not necessarily illegal, but may not be considered socially acceptable. Much of the cross-border trade in the region is informal and hence technically not legal, yet is widely socially accepted and often overlooked by authorities. Illegal and illicit practices and institutions of governance vary from state to state, and hence borderland trade offers an opportunity for individuals to maximize profit by exploiting these differences (van Schendel and Abraham 2005).

Economic actors in the cluster engage in both formal and informal trade, yet the vast majority of trade across borders is both unregulated and informal. The formal sector offers regulatory protections and greater insurance, while the latter offers more flexibility and innovative profit maximization (Oka 2011). A central commodity in the formal trade

system is the movement of humanitarian aid, a trade largely controlled by state-owned companies. Interestingly, the Ugandan government recognizes the importance of informal trade to the country and has sought to measure the sector since 2005 through its bureau of statistics. However, the border crossings through Karamoja are not monitored so their data does not include these major points of entry and exit (IOM 2016).

Patterns of movement of illegality and illicit goods have flourished across the Kenya–South Sudan border in particular, especially during and after the Second Sudanese Civil War. Since 1989, the United Nations program *Operation Lifeline Sudan* established a humanitarian assistance hub in Lokichogio, Kenya, to transport aid to Southern Sudan. On the Sudanese side of the border, because SPLM/A fighters were unpaid during the war, they often depended on donations, voluntary or forced, from the Sudanese population. While some traded goods were technically legal—such as produce, tobacco, gold, timber, and livestock—these commodities were also a valuable part of the war economy and were exchanged at predatory rates. The goods were often procured through extortion, blurring the lines between what was legal and licit. Since the comprehensive peace agreement was signed in 2005, the Nadapal border post in Turkana County became an even more vital trade route between South Sudan and Kenya. However, even in 2010, the regulation of the post remained a grey area; crossing the border at the time was still negotiable, a factor of having the right connections and subject to bribery (Walraet 2013). Illicit businesses—such as timber logging—still persist today in this hub of activity, especially in Lokichogio (IPSTC 2015).

### Beneficiaries

Who benefits from trade in this environment? The majority of cross-border traders are individuals engaged in small-scale transactions. According to one such individual interviewed by Eaton (2010) from Karamoja in a 2008 interview, who regularly crossed into Kenya to exchange goats for *waragi* (local alcohol), the goats commanded a higher price in Kenya and the alcohol sold for a profit back in Uganda. Recent literature has discussed the evolution of “traiders,” in the Karamoja cluster—individuals who engage in both raiding and trading networks and who are able to purchase animals for lower prices than they would pay in established markets (Eaton 2010). Another key trend is the demarcation of trade along ethnic lines, as occurs in Kapoeta, South Sudan. Dinka businesses located in town have maintained relations with SPLM/A actors who help them navigate cross-border trade (Walraet 2013). Another United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) survey with youth in Kapoeta revealed that tribal affiliations helped many obtain livelihoods (Newhouse 2015). This means that tribal allegiances—both within and across borders—are critical to remaining competitive.

Notably, the cross-border region is growing increasingly vital due to the development of a road that will potentially provide an alternative to the current Mombasa–Uganda highway through Tororo, Mbale, and Bungoma (Walraet 2013). If successfully completed, it could increase the range of goods and volume traded in the region, with possible implications for the scale and reach of government regulations. New economies—formal and informal—are likely to emerge to take advantage of the new infrastructure, and new alliances will likely become essential.

### Commercialization and commodification of markets

A dynamic and complex market exists in the Karamoja cluster, with major hubs in district headquarters linked to smaller market towns and other regional centers. In a system initially based on barter and exchange, in recent years, the market network has penetrated more deeply into north-eastern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, and south-eastern South Sudan (Burns, Bekele, and Akabwai 2013; Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2013). The region as a whole has become more commoditized, with larger markets, more cash, and more goods for sale and purchase. While the illicit trade in cattle from raiding is the most prominent cross-border activity, other trade patterns have developed in sophisticated ways, such as illegal timber logging (IPSTC 2015).

Commodification of goods results in different livelihood opportunities in the Karamoja cluster. Security-related improvements in Karamoja, particularly along roads, have brought more and new traders into the region, generating greater diversity and availability of food and nonfood items at markets. The cessation of the conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan government has resulted in an increase in trade across the Uganda–South Sudan border as well as between Karamoja and the neighboring districts to the west, revitalizing critical trade routes for imports and exports. As discussed below, these shifts have also diversified trade away from weapons in the region.

Commercial trade involves gendered impacts. Women living in the region are working in the service sector at increasing rates as domestic servants, cleaners, brewers, and sex workers. The role

of women in the exchange of natural resources is pronounced. A generation ago, most people collected firewood solely for their household use, and only the poorest residents of Karamoja sold it. But the erosion of animal-based livelihoods in many areas has shifted household responsibilities and power structures, and the exploitation of natural resources has become widespread and gender-specific. Research by the Feinstein International Center finds that, currently, women in Karamoja are often the main providers of food for their families through the sale of natural resources, including firewood (Stites and Akabwai 2012; Stites and Marshak 2014). Commercialization also brings new tensions along gender lines, with many women in Karamoja expressing dismay at the increase of purchases and consumption of store-bought alcohol by men (Stites and Akabwai 2012).

#### Trade in animals and parallel markets

The growth of the livestock market leads to increased demand for animal transport, fattening lots, abattoirs, and sale yards. Input markets include fodder and veterinary supplies; outputs include milk, hides, and dried meat (Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2013). As East African livestock markets become internationalized, commercialization and expansion could profoundly impact pastoralists and agropastoralists. However, to meet market demand, supply from the Karamoja cluster must increase. As one 2013 study notes, “the commercial potential of the livestock sector remains untapped, yet is contingent on security and herd growth that could be achieved through investments in animal health and the availability of livestock credit” (Burns, Bekele, and Akabwai 2013). Links to international markets are not always positive for net sellers of animals (as well

as goods) in Karamoja; with this comes increased regulation and standards that may not be feasible for smaller pastoralists and agropastoralists (Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2013).

Illicit markets in the region reinforce one another, as most clearly evidenced in the exchange of cattle for weapons and vice versa. Racketeers exchange cattle for guns, use the guns to equip more raiders, and then capture more cattle, thus fueling a vicious cycle of racketeering and raiding (Mkutu 2008). Raided cattle are sold in parallel and hidden markets for much lower prices, then transported back into towns such as Mbale and Soroti in Uganda and Kitale in Kenya. This may partially explain why cattle are now more concentrated in the hands of wealthier herders.

#### Ethnicity and business networks

Market interactions and opportunities throughout the Karamoja cluster are a function of ethnicity, allegiances, and connectivity. For example, Toposa residents in the former Eastern Equatoria State argue that while they are too poor to start up small businesses or engage in trade, “Dinka businesses” are able to navigate barriers to entry through their connection with the military apparatus (Walraet 2013). Many Dinka businesses in the former Eastern Equatoria State towns of Narus and Kapoeta allegedly have links to military commanders. Due to the underdeveloped business sector in South Sudan, credit provision or cash payments are necessary, which renders collaboration between businesses and security actors to accompany business transactions critical, especially cross-border transactions. Family networks also receive strong support in the form of remittances from Dinka diaspora populations.

While some of the opinions expressed by Toposa residents likely reflect past grievances, the perceived inequality between the Dinka and Toposa have exacerbated tensions in the former Eastern Equatoria State. While there is a small Toposa business class, this too is a function of networks operating in association with Kenyans who share business expertise and technical advice. Prominent actors today—such as the Jonglei Traders Association—have had to engage with military actors to navigate their position in the regional trading order (Walraet 2013).

Ultimately, these examples demonstrate the importance of personal connections to conducting business in the Karamoja cluster, particularly connections to local security actors. Livelihoods are inextricably linked with social networks, ethnicity, and security and informal institutions, especially given the limited reach of the state in the region.

## 4.6. The Future of the Borderlands: Extractive Industries in the Karamoja Cluster

The recent expansion of the extractive industries in the Karamoja cluster has impacted regional livelihoods. However, the oil industry has not managed to create many jobs for local populations because many positions require technical skills. The social and environmental impacts of extractive industries can be negative—or even fatal (Mkutu and Wandera 2015). If not responsibly overseen, and absent sensitivity to the local context, extractive industry activities can result in the crowding out of manufacturing and agricultural sectors, heightened inequality, greater

tensions and violent conflict, economic volatility, and the undermining of democratic processes. Any generated local livelihood sectors are usually service-oriented, low-paying, and dominated by women in positions subject to easy exploitation, including domestic work and sex work (Kelly, King-Close, and Perks 2014). Two very different streams of extractive industries currently exist in the Karamoja cluster: formal private and normally multinational investments and artisanal and small-scale mining.

### 4.6.1. Oil in Turkana and Karamoja

The prospects and potential for economic growth in Turkana, Kenya, have improved significantly since the 2012 announcement of the discovery of commercially viable quantities of oil. In late September 2015, the Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development announced that it would soon initiate oil exploration in the Moroto-Kadam basin in Karamoja (Ssekika 2015). These developments have renewed private investment and attention in the region.

The case of Turkana is illustrative. There, people were initially cautiously optimistic that the oil would provide viable livelihood opportunities. One study revealed that upon hearing the news of the discovery, some Turkana, “broke into song and dance, their hopes higher than ever before, some of their worst fears allayed” (Hauser 2012). However, interviews with Turkana residents reveal more nuanced perspectives. Some had been promised high-level jobs at Tullow Oil operations, only to be given jobs in menial positions (Johannes, Zulu, and Kalipeni 2015). Many feel they were exploited by government officials aiming to benefit from oil at their expense. Yet

they also acknowledge that the discovery of oil has brought with it unprecedented attention from the government, indicating that this once marginalized region is now a major prospect for Kenyan economic development as a whole.

In the three years since the discovery of oil in Turkana, some negative impacts are already evident. The potential for wealth from oil has exacerbated divides between elites and the rest of population, aggravating existing inequality and tensions (Mkutu and Wandera 2015). Land has been allocated to oil blocks for investors, displacing agro-pastoralists and pastoralists from critical grazing sites and migration routes. Although the Kenyan legal framework offers *de jure* protection to communities looking to protect their lands, the legal process has been criticized for being rigorous and overly complex, thus making it challenging for local communities to protect their property.

From 2012 through April 2015, there were 14 demonstrations, attacks, and road blockages against Tullow in Lokichar town alone (Mkutu and Wandera 2015; Mkutu 2017c). The oil blocks have already begun to displace some communities from water sources and from rangelands, and may have negative environmental impacts even if less severe than in other oil producing regions on the continent (e.g., the Niger delta) (Orr 2019). Local populations have also experienced negative impacts including a sharp rise in the price of hotel rooms and land leasing; title deeds being issued through opaque processes; an increase in alcohol consumption throughout the region; and men and women have started to stay away from home and in oil camps, which may cause health implications for instance, due to increased incidence

of sexually transmitted infections. For some pastoralists, the increase in demand for meat has boosted their income; for others, it has led to their abandoning a livestock-based livelihood in search of more lucrative opportunities related to the oil sector, which may be both illusory and unsustainable.

The discovery of oil affects Turkana's place within the devolved constitutional arrangements in Kenya, which came into effect in March 2013. Turkana has been transported to the forefront of central state policy as a result of the discovery. This has exacerbated intergovernmental conflict between the county administration and the central government. For example, disputes have emerged around the revenue-sharing arrangements included in the legislation governing the exploration, development, and production of oil (see Orr 2019; Mkutu 2017a). Because the discovery of oil and devolution emerged at the same time, the production of oil and the rents from such production will likely be the focus of contests among political elites in Kenya.

#### 4.6.2. Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining

The artisanal and small-scale mining sector has become influential in Karamoja, and there is some speculation that the region is on the cusp of a mining boom (HRW 2014). Mineral exploration licenses are reportedly granted to 62 percent of the 27,000 square kilometers in the region (Ssekika 2015). Given that there is no formal register of customary land titles in Uganda as of yet, although the government has recently been working to develop one, local inhabitants have been displaced from their lands.



"This is a very bad situation for us, bad for my people," one Dodoth elder in Kaabong told Human Rights Watch. "No one consults us, and no one has told us what will happen next. Someone comes and occupies your land or takes your soil; it is something we haven't really experienced before. People will die. People will die for this land and this gold. We cannot survive without them." (HRW 2014)

In the former Eastern Equatoria State, gold mining has provided a valuable income source for households for generations, and although not well documented, has been a major cross-border good throughout the Karamoja cluster (Deng, Mertenskoetter, and van de Vondervoort 2013). Ultimately, while the informal sector can offer high profits, these opportunities—such as working in an unregulated mine with hazardous working conditions, a lack of planning, and the absence of formal miners' organizations—can carry great personal risk, in addition to being highly gendered and causing generational issues.

#### 4.6.3. A Regional Oil Pipeline and Road Network

On the regional level, a planned road network and oil pipeline known as the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor has been planned to connect Kenya's coast with South Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia through Turkana and Lokichoggio (Mkutu and Wandera 2015). The Kenyan government has long been interested in South Sudan's oil, and the network would not only facilitate connectivity of the extractive industries but would also encourage foreign direct investment given its potential as a major connecting transit route across the region (Anderson and Browne

2011). With ongoing conflict in South Sudan and strong-handed negotiation tactics by Uganda, including a recent move in October 2015 to explore the potential for an oil pipeline with Tanzania, the completion of the LAPSSET corridor is in question. (Warigi 2015). If the project does go forward, planning and implementation will determine who benefits, including which local actors are consulted, the level of funding that will be invested back into the local communities, environmental impacts, and potential displacement of populations. If the corridor project comes to fruition, the governments of Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda will have a unique opportunity to engage around meaningful and sustainable development in the marginalized and neglected Karamoja cluster.

The growth of the extractive industries has also led to the privatization of local security forces, many members of which find that protecting extractive sites is more lucrative to them. Members of the Kenya Police Reserve in Turkana, are being deployed more frequently to provide protection for oil exploration and drilling sites, leaving communities vulnerable to violence and contributing to greater insecurity, which is especially problematic along the conflict-ridden Turkana–West Pokot border (Mkutu and Wandera 2015). In Karamoja, the UPDF has begun protecting mining sites, causing confusion among the population (HRW 2014) and leaving a security vacuum in communities, especially around the common property resources that local security forces were previously protecting.

## 4.7. Small Arms and Light Weapons

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) have had deleterious impacts on lives and livelihoods throughout the Karamoja cluster. Trade and dissemination of arms throughout the area have resulted in an increase in deaths and accidents, indirect impacts linked to reduced human security, negative impacts on social development, and barriers to economic development.

### 4.7.1. SALW in the Karamoja Cluster

Firearms have been prevalent in the Karamoja cluster since being introduced by traders from Ethiopia, Zanzibar, and Khartoum in the second half of the 19th century in exchange for ivory (Mirzeler and Young 2000). The postcolonial internal conflicts in the area increased their spread and use. Instability in the region throughout the 1970s, brought about by Idi Amin and Milton Obote in Uganda and by the ongoing civil upheaval in Sudan, among other factors, created a regional vacuum that allowed the arms trade to proliferate (Kareithi 2015). This trend continued into the 1990s (Stites and Akabwai 2009). Pastoral populations had long had access to weapons but demand increased as ethnic allegiances unraveled, as cattle raiding increased and became increasingly controlled by young men, and as regional instability meant that accessing grazing and water areas required increased protection. Due to the high demand and absence of law and order, policies had little impact on the rapid proliferation. As Kennedy Mkutu, an expert in SALW in the Horn of Africa notes, “Kenya has one of the best examples of arms legislation in the Horn of Africa, yet it still has major problems with illegal and legal small

arms proliferation” (Mkutu and Wandera 2015). Continued fighting in Sudan in the early 2000s, in South Sudan since 2011, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia have meant that there is no shortage of weapons available in the region.

Technologically more advanced weapons have increasingly replaced homemade guns, spears, and other traditional weapons, resulting in increased casualties (Small Arms Survey 2014). These dynamics have been extremely damaging to the well-being of people in the Karamoja cluster. For example, the widespread dispersion and availability of automatic weapons transformed traditional processes of cattle raiding. In Karamoja, people saw the use of AK-47s as a means by which to get by. The easier access to firearms enabled some to conduct raids, providing them with access to scarce resources in a context of consistently deteriorating environmental conditions and regular drought (Gray et al. 2003). Young men who steal firearms from others are given an almost heroic status by their local communities, replete with bragging rights and social capital (Small Arms Survey 2014).

Communities in the Karamoja cluster have cited the protection of property—specifically cattle—and self-protection as the two primary reasons for maintaining arms. When one ethnic group obtains many firearms, others feel pressured to do the same as a matter of self-defense. Such was the case with the Pokot, who joined the arms race only after frequent attacks by the Karimojong and the Turkana (Mkutu 2008). While the theft of firearms from rival communities is generally accepted, and even honored, within communities, the high price

of firearms and their status as convertible currency render their theft within groups to be a severe, punishable crime (Small Arms Survey 2014).

#### 4.7.2. Illegal, Yet Licit

Individual ownership of small arms is not permitted in the countries discussed here.<sup>10</sup> Far from reducing SALW ownership and trade, the illegal status of firearms has driven up prices in local markets, fueled the theft of weapons, and exacerbated local conflicts (Small Arms Survey 2014). In Kenya, the price of an AK-47 can be over US\$800; in Uganda, a less sophisticated Kalashnikov cost between US\$250–310 in 2008. However, although illegal, trade in SALW and the use of the weapons is widespread and widely accepted by local communities, including among traditional authorities. While authorities tolerated their presence and use, trading and owning SALW was still illegal.

#### 4.7.3. Trade Routes

Firearms are exchanged through various trade routes throughout the region, including the South Sudan–Kenya border route described earlier, as well as directly from South Sudan to Karamoja, passing into Kotido, then to Pokot and Samburu in Kenya, and later back to Nakapiripirit and Moroto in Southern Karamoja (Mkutu 2008). In South Sudan, the serial numbers and factory marks on weapons are intentionally removed so their origins cannot be sourced or uniquely identified (Bevan 2008a). Women actively serve in the region as conduits in arms trafficking because they are less likely to attract the attention of or be searched by security forces (Mkutu 2007a).

10. South Sudan's 2008 penal code outlawed the ownership of small arms. These weapons are also not allowed in Uganda or in Kenya's pastoralist communities.

#### Increased fatality rates

As SALW become more advanced, conflicts throughout the region have become increasingly lethal compared with a half a century ago. Lethal violence has increased during incursions and raids, as well as in households and in the private sphere (Mkutu 2008). There has been a measurable increase in accidental deaths, but these are rarely reported because the individual responsible for the accident does not want to incriminate themselves and are mistrustful of the formal justice system (Carlson et al. 2012).

#### Human security impacts

Indirect violence also has deleterious effects on human security. The high death rates among men creates many more widows and female-headed households. These families must navigate new power relationships, possibly amid discrimination from their communities, impoverishment, and challenges maintaining personal security and obtaining livelihoods.<sup>11</sup> Spillover impacts of raids and insecurity include limits on access to health care, intensifying food insecurity, nutritional deficiencies, and a reduction in population mobility. These factors often compound on another and develop into long-term problems for vulnerable populations. As an example, insecurity has prevented women and children from traveling to cattle camps, a long-standing method of ensuring their adequate nutritional intake. Road ambushes, a form of spillover violence, sometimes target vehicles carrying pharmaceuticals, and looters also attacked health units. Such patterns negatively impact available medical supplies and

11. Raiding has largely subsided in Karamoja, but it remains ongoing in South Sudan and Kenya (Mkutu 2008); we therefore use the present tense throughout this paper when discussing the impacts of raiding.

further restrict the already limited access to life-saving medicine in Karamoja (Gray et al. 2003). The increase in maternal and child mortality, which is linked to the limited access to health care during periods of insecurity, reveal how gendered inadequate access to health care can be.

### Impacts on social development

The widespread proliferation of SALW has negatively impacted the maintenance of social capital and networks throughout the region. Many argue that the influx and dispersion of SALW have eroded traditional systems of authority and customary justice mechanisms. In the Karamoja cluster, male elders have historically wielded authority over economic and political affairs, including raiding. As Mkutu posits, “The elders not only select the time and target of the intended raids, but also make peace with the raided through cleansing ceremonies and the provision of compensation. The authority of the elders derives from their power to curse” (Mkutu 2008). Diviners and medicine men play central roles during raids as well, traditionally being entitled to a share of the captured animals for their role in blessing a successful raid.

While the situation varies from one group or community to the next, research indicates that much of the political and economic power in Karamoja society has shifted to younger men who are actively engaged in raiding and who use arms to maintain security (Kareithi 2015). The low cost and ready availability of SALW make it feasible for young men to own their own guns—rather than using the “family gun”—and raids can be conducted with less planning and without widespread community support, undermining the need for guidance and direction from elders (Stites et

al. 2007). Some aspects of authority therefore become more linked to wealth than seniority, and wealth is easily attained through raiding. Armed youths gain influence in their societies (Mkutu 2008). This undermines the role of elders, not only in directing raids, but also in making peace. Today, the conflict resolution practices used by elders to mitigate violence have eroded, leading to increased conflict in some areas. Even in areas where large-scale raids have waned (such as Karamoja), many respondents bemoan the limited authority of the elders in controlling the opportunistic theft and banditry carried out by groups like the lonetia in Uganda and the ngoroko in Kenya.

The proliferation of SALW in Karamoja has contributed to an increase in violence and the erosion of ethnic allegiances. One of the most pronounced social changes in recent times is the split in the late 1970s of the previously unified Karimojong ethnic group in southern Karamoja into the distinct territorial groups of the Bokora, the Pian, and the Matheniko. Disproportionate access to modern weapons enabled the Matheniko to mount a series of raids against the Pian and the Bokora, who suffered major economic, territorial, and cultural asset losses (Gray 2000).

SALW proliferation has also impacted traditional marriage systems. By facilitating an inequitable distribution of livestock, raiding has led to unaffordable bridewealth levels. Coupled with widespread poverty and the erosion of pastoral livelihood systems, young men struggle to complete bridewealth transfers. A successful raid provides a quick answer to some of these challenges, furthering the use of weapons and the cyclically associated problems. Some argue that

the higher mortality rates of young men resulted in demographic changes in terms of a decline in the proportion of marriageable men to women (Gray et al. 2003). Others argue that polygamy and the relative greater wealth of older men leaves few women for men to marry within their own age cohort. These trends have led to more unofficial marriages, which lack status and protections for women and children. Higher death rates among men due to violence, and the marriage of older men to younger women, combine to produce more young widows, which contributes to the reduction of reproduction rates in society.

### Impacts on economic development

As noted, violence and raiding, facilitated by the ready availability of SALW, have had disastrous impacts on livelihoods. While the situation in Karamoja has improved in recent years, large-scale raiding still persists throughout South Sudan and Turkana, causing severe restrictions on the mobility of people and livestock; limited access to natural resources; collapsed social networks and long-standing stock associate relationships, many of which had previously crossed borders; and collapsed horizontal methods of acquiring cattle from friends and others in similar age groups (Stites 2013; Young et al. 2007). The subsequent collapse and asset loss experienced leaves communities more vulnerable to future conflict, and ignites a vicious cycle that ultimately makes engaging in maladaptive livelihood strategies attractive for survival. The situation is also a push factor toward a change in livelihood from a more productive agropastoral one to an agrarian—and thus unsustainable, one. The violence has generated awasia—“no-go zones”—in raided areas that were once used for productive purposes. In these zones, food insecurity has skyrocketed,

market prices have increased or markets have collapsed entirely, and traditional livelihoods have been eroded (Mkutu 2008). The environment has suffered accelerated degradation and natural resource exploitation—directly due to the conflict and as a result of decreased mobility—stressing livelihoods (Nangiro 2005). Insecurity and violence also restricts access to education, which hampers workforce development and skilled labor forces, and provides a greater challenge to economic development over the long-term.

## 4.8. Disarmament

Throughout recent history, a variety of programs have sought to reduce or completely eliminate illicit firearms from civilian possession, especially in pastoral and agropastoral areas. Specific experiences and regional trends around state-supported disarmament activities are discussed below.

Since the 1940s, colonial and then postcolonial disarmament campaigns have been conducted almost every decade in Uganda (Bevan 2008b). The most recent campaigns of 2001 and 2006, the latter of which began in May under the auspices of the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme, had a pronounced impact on livelihoods. The early years of the campaign were marked by myriad documented human rights abuses committed by the UPDF (HRW 2007; Stites and Akabwai 2010). Moreover, the campaigns were uncoordinated and uneven, which had disastrous security impacts as communities that gave up their arms would often be attacked, sometimes within a matter of days (Stites and Akabwai 2010). This led groups to rearm, as they no longer trusted that the state would provide adequate security if they gave up their arms, further perpetuating



cycles of violence in Karamoja. While many residents of the region were initially vehemently opposed to the disarmament campaign from 2001 to 2006, more recently the majority of those surveyed credited disarmament with overall improvements in security and positive livelihood impacts. In fact, as the sustained presence of security forces has accompanied disarmament programs, insecurity has decreased markedly. One study noted that “(t)oday, male and female residents in both rural and urban areas express overall support for the outcomes of disarmament. This is the case even in some areas that had markedly negative experiences with the UPDF and the disarmament process” (Stites and Howe 2019).

The two most recent disarmament campaigns in Kenya have been controversial, eliciting concerns over human rights violations, the opaque and selective process for targeting groups for disarmament, and an overall failure to address root causes of conflict and insecurity (Small Arms Survey 2014). In 2005, even local MPs in Kenya remarked that the strategy revealed the government’s limited understanding of SALW dynamics in northern Kenya (Mkutu 2008).

Disarmament measures have not been successful in South Sudan due to the scale of the proliferation, the existing supply of weapons, and the ad hoc attempts made to collect them. From June to November 2008, a nationwide attempt at disarmament followed a presidential decree (Small Arms Survey 2014). However, the campaign was highly decentralized, poorly planned, and received inadequate government support, rendering it completely ineffective. In South Sudan, in particular, previous waves of forced cantonment connected to peace initiatives, forced unification, and

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) provisions have led to: (1) a massive expansion of troop numbers (for military preparedness, political patronage, and corruption, as large numbers of young men are “cantonned” in preparation for either integration into a new national army or to become the beneficiaries of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program funded by foreign donors); (2) increased pressure on political processes overshadowed by armed groups; and (3) very high levels of organized violence when agreements break down (see de Waal 2017, 2019; ICG 2019b).

Ultimately, these disarmament programs, many of which have been designed by international actors, fail to address the underlying factors that contribute to the large numbers of SALW in these areas and do not acknowledge the cultural, political, and economic practices behind heavily armed pastoral societies. As governments throughout the region have also discovered, pastoralists in the Karamoja cluster have been extremely reluctant to give up their arms. As one local politician told his constituency at a public rally:

“Never surrender your guns to anybody, by doing so you will be surrendering your wealth (livestock) to your enemies like Karamojong, Marakwet, Turkana and Sebei. With guns your livestock are safe. Without them you are no more. Instead of surrendering guns buy more guns for your safety. There are no police officers to take care of your security. Nobody should ask you to surrender your walking stick and if you do, he will use it to beat you up.” (Khaemba 2014)

The recent disarmament program in Karamoja stands out as an exception in the region, partly

due to the extent and sustained nature of the brutality used to extract arms from people in its early phases. More recently, the continuing presence and direct involvement of the UPDF in maintaining law and order, including helping communities track stolen animals, and the benefits it brings with improved security, may have enabled residents in Karamoja to recognize the positive benefits of disarmament. It remains to be seen whether or not such security gains will continue if and when the UPDF demobilizes in the region, particularly given the upheaval in South Sudan and the presumably ready supply of weapons.

## 4.9. Institutions

As discussed throughout this paper, the Karamoja cluster functions through hybrid forms of governance that rely on formal and informal institutions. Authority is contested and shared between different spheres of power—such as military and civil, nonindigenous and indigenous—which have dynamic effects on one another (Walraet 2013). We discuss five types of major institutions operating throughout the Karamoja cluster: (1) formal governance institutions, including state and local officials; (2) traditional authorities and customary leaders; (3) the military and security sector; (4) private sector and commercial interests; and (5) humanitarian and development actors. Due to institutional overlap, these institutions sometimes compete with one another or blur the lines that distinguish their authority from each other. In other words, and as Goodhand (2014) points out, borderlands “are places of extreme institutional hybridity and illustrative of the twilight nature of institutions, in which private actors assume public

functions, where the boundaries between the external and internal are blurred.”<sup>12</sup>

### 4.9.1. Formal Governance Institutions

State governance is among the weakest and most inefficient institutions in the region. The Karamoja cluster is situated on the periphery of three countries and, as discussed, has historically been neglected by central governments. However, as the examples related to the extractive industries in Karamoja and Turkana show, governments are paying increased attention to the Karamoja cluster as they recognize the potential for nationwide economic growth. While governance institutions in the capital city are not always influential, many local and state government actors have significant influence throughout the cluster, especially in Kenya, where its 2010 constitution mandates a devolved system of government that gives county governors greater responsibility over community planning, spending, and overseeing community policing. In South Sudan, as one representative of Kapoeta aptly summarizes when asked about governance structures, “We govern ourselves” (Walraet 2013). Conflict has resulted in overall lower levels of human capital in the region, reducing the labor force qualified to serve in positions of local governance or even in district offices. This then widens the gap between formal and informal authorities. This trend can also be attributed to discriminatory government policies toward and neglect of the peripheral and pastoral regions throughout the cluster’s history. Ultimately, while they do not always act on it, formal

12. These were famously characterized as “twilight” institutions by Christian Lund in an extremely influential article (Lund 2006).

governance actors have recognized the potential of a borderlands approach. Notably, a cross-border animal health program has been operational since 2013, working across the governments of Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan to synchronize animal health policies and better coordinate programs in the recognition that negative impacts—such as animal diseases—in one country could readily spill over into others in the cluster. If successful, this initiative could demonstrate the utility of governments coordinating with a borderlands approach, and potentially underscore further coordination especially for livestock-related livelihoods.

#### 4.9.2. Traditional Institutions

Although the erosion of traditional leaders has been significant due to modern forms of violence, customary leaders still retain legitimate power and authority within their societies. Customary justice mechanisms exist and are in use, although they vary by group and by area, partly depending on the extent and reach of other forms of arbitration and power (Mkutu 2008). The success of the Moruitit Resolution and Nabilatuk Resolution in Karamoja, as well as the overall decreases in violence, have led some to declare that customary authority is restoring its power and prominence as an institution responsible for meeting out justice and maintaining balanced relationships between communities. At a cross-border level, traditional leaders have reverent and legitimate power with other leaders and communities, serving as conduits for negotiating and facilitating group access to resources, grazing routes, information, and other goods and services.

#### 4.9.3. Military and Security Institutions

On many occasions, state-armed military actors have engaged in economic and political spheres, particularly demonstrating their might by controlling private sector activities, whether illicit or licit.<sup>13</sup> In the past, armed groups formed links to traditional authorities, as illustrated by the joint implementation of the UPDF and local elders in the Moruitit and Nabilatuk resolutions. As discussed in the extractives section, military and security institutions have provided substantial support to private sector institutions, particularly well-illustrated by the trend toward the privatization of local security forces, such as the Kenya Police Reserve in Turkana. However, the influence of this sector varies over time and by location. For example, in Karamoja, the military currently has a significant amount of power, while the police remain weak and underfunded. In Turkana, the state has an increasingly weak hold on its reservists, but security institutions could increase their power as they reap the benefits of working more closely with the extractives industries. In South Sudan, ongoing conflict has rendered collaboration and coordination with security actors essential, and the influence of the military is clearly manifest in the increased SALW in the former Eastern Equatoria State and in the country overall since independence.

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13. While we discussed the influence of the SPLM/A on private institutions and commercial interests in the former Eastern Equatoria State in detail earlier in this paper, this trend is observed throughout the region.

#### 4.9.4. Private Sector Commercial Institutions

The private sector is increasingly influential institution in the Karamoja cluster, from its direct work with formal and informal governance structures, involvement in the extractives sector, and even its coordination with humanitarian actors. While much of this work is informal and unrecorded, we can assume that the sector is strong, dynamic, and growing throughout the cluster. Because much informal trade is unregulated, international borders do not constrain private sector actors but instead offers them profit opportunities. Private sector activities are subject to security fluctuations, which can create challenges in times of increased conflict and instability. Yet in the cluster overall, this bodes well in Karamoja, given the improved environment of personal mobility and security in recent years.

#### 4.9.5. Humanitarian and Development Institutions

Humanitarian and development assistance is an important institution in the region due to its reach and economic influence, specific conditions required for participation, and multiple layers of processes. Actors in this realm rose in prominence following the failure of formal governance mechanisms, which according to Dave Eaton provided room for “big business along the Kenya-Uganda border,” as the nongovernmental organizations received generous funding from donors (Eaton 2008). However, throughout history insecurity has prevented some of these efforts from succeeding or reaching populations in times of conflict, which opens up space for military or private sector actors to fill this void. The institution is bifurcated between international and local actors with varied

funding streams, capacities, and security, but it still exerts disproportionate influence over international actors.

### 4.10. Regional Implications

As detailed in this paper, hybrid forms of governance and overlapping centers of power in the Karamoja cluster are not confined by state boundaries, but rather often operate across them (Eaton 2008). Thus, a regional perspective yields unique insights in addition to the traditional transnational perspective of the political, economic, and cultural dynamics in societies.

One of the most significant regional implications of such hybrid forms of governance and overlapping centers of power is the demand for SALW and the associated impacts for the broader market for them—with upstream and downstream linkages throughout the Horn of Africa. Periods of insecurity in the Karamoja cluster have also affected international policy and debates, such as border disputes between South Sudan and Kenya (Eulenberger 2013). Trends in insecurity in the Karamoja cluster have at times necessitated a coordinated, regional perspective on security, although such efforts do not frequently materialize as policies on the ground, for example, the 2001 United Nations-level conference convened on the proliferation of SALW, as well as the expanded mandates of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (Mkutu 2008). In 2003, IGAD identified the Karamoja cluster as the pilot for its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), with the specific focus of mitigating cross-border pastoral conflicts (CEWARN 2006).

As discussed above, there may be more interaction between military and security forces at the local level in response to issues such as raids and cross-border migration. These are examples of dialogue and exchange with potentially positive repercussions for the livelihood systems of local populations.

The regional economy, particularly many of its untapped aspects, already have important implications for the region, and they will likely increase over time. Like the movement of commodities, the movement of people has critical regional implications. Mobility has long been central to livestock-based livelihoods in the Karamoja cluster, and the importance of movement continues even with the emergence of new and diversified livelihoods. People are moving to urban areas, to smaller trading centers, to new rural communities, and to border hubs on a daily, seasonal, and permanent basis. Financial exchanges, in the form of credit and remittances, are moving throughout the region through established and new routes. Infrastructure development in the form of technology, electricity, and transport will only increase the importance and centrality of free movement as a key facet underpinning the economic and social systems of the broader region. A regional approach and perspective, along with proactive and evidence-based planning to support population movements and associated economic growth, remain central to supporting and ensuring benefits of cross-border and dynamic opportunities.

### 4.11. Gaps in Research

Gaps remain in our understanding of local-level processes and dynamics in the Karamoja cluster, particularly their cross-border and informal nature. Many studies have focused on one region, group, or case study. There is a dearth of recent literature that applies a wider borderlands framework to the Karamoja cluster. As a result, there is often little information regarding the broader picture on issues we have identified as important to a given area. For example, how widespread are patterns in the growth of opportunistic theft as opposed to large-scale raiding (such as is visible in Karamoja)? What would trends in the erosion of traditional authority, increased commercialization, and growing wealth inequality look like if we had regional data? Given the overlap of institutions and systems in the Karamoja cluster, research investigating how recent findings from Karamoja, Uganda apply to other countries could be valuable. Research analyzing the impact of inequality across the Karamoja cluster, and how it relates to maladaptive livelihoods or migration, would also be a worthwhile contribution to the literature.

Another general trend is the lack of data from South Sudan following its independence in 2011. Many articles provided qualitative data regarding the impacts of the Second Sudanese Civil War, but since independence, the literature from the former Eastern Equatoria State is notably sparse. Although the current security conditions make new research difficult, effective planning and development will likely be hindered by the lack of analyses on migration, livelihoods, and civil society's efforts to promote peace in recent years. Very limited data are available on populations in



South Sudan's borderlands overall, making actual population and migration trends uncertain (Walraet 2013).

## 4.12. Conclusion

Throughout the Karamoja cluster, cycles of conflict have caused shifts in livelihoods and exacerbated environmental degradation, further destabilizing the fragile relations between groups and leading to maladaptive livelihood strategies. Many of these strategies then reinforce conflict dynamics. However, recent security improvements, specifically in Karamoja, and enhanced economic potential for the cluster overall could result in new opportunities, especially if the sophisticated informal market dynamics in the region receive additional support.

The structure of the borderlands—overlapping spheres of governance at informal, formal, military, and private levels; connectivity and commercialization of markets; and systems of movement for illicit and informal goods across borders—perpetuates a livelihoods-conflict cycle that is difficult to address through policy. Moreover, the benefits that governments reap from maintaining illegality at the peripheries, including access to illicit goods, humanitarian aid, and profit for personal gain through patronage networks, reduce the incentives and political will needed to address these issues. Instead, many government policies promote sedentarization in the region, which may contribute to vulnerability, maladaptive responses, and cycles of instability.

With the recent discovery of oil in Turkana and Karamoja and advances in the extractive industries

across the cluster, there is heightened government interest in and attention being given to these border zones. The extractive sector's growing role is an example of regional economic development with the potential of offering positive change at multiple levels—if done correctly, transparently, and in a participatory way with communities. The region's expansive commercial sector has economic potential but has caused spillover effects on populations, possibly leading to heightened inequality. We see inequality growing throughout the Karamoja cluster for many of the reasons discussed: push factors, erosion of livestock-based livelihoods, limited access to rangelands, and—perhaps most importantly—the inability of smaller herd owners and poorer households to withstand shocks. However, the effect that this inequality will have on the region's livelihoods over the long term remains to be seen.

Demographic trends demonstrate that people in the Karamoja cluster are on the move—largely to urban areas, which has strengthened the connectivity and networks between urban and rural areas. Cross-border agglomerations—such as between the former Eastern Equatoria State and Nadapal, Kenya, and secondary towns—have also gained economic and cultural importance due to increased migration and livelihood diversification. Livelihood opportunities in urban and peri-urban environments are more lucrative, but the trend toward urbanization poses new challenges, especially for more vulnerable populations such as single mothers and female-headed households. If such a trend persists, issues such as natural resource management will become more critical given the expansive and exploitative impacts of increased populations in urban areas.

This paper, and a borderlands approach in particular, reveals the various challenges, lessons, and opportunities for research on the Karamoja cluster. Throughout the region, opportunistic theft is likely to continue in the absence of viable livelihood alternatives for young men. The continued flow of weapons as a result of ongoing conflict in South Sudan only adds to this problem, and threatens long-term security gains. Another major challenge in the coming years will be the capacity of urban and peri-urban areas to handle increased migration flows, with regard to livelihoods, goods and services, hygiene, health risks, poor infrastructure, and environmental degradation.

Yet the experiences of the Karamoja cluster also yield interesting lessons for the broader Horn of Africa region. The cluster's myriad experiences with impacts of disarmament and SALW are important lessons for any society seeking to disarm populations, especially near borders where other groups may perceive disarmament as an opportunity for personal gain.

Despite ongoing challenges, several opportunities are emerging that could reduce instability and promote more sustainable economic development in the region. Given the widespread evidence that pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods are more appropriate and productive than agrarian ones, efforts to work with regional governments to reduce policies promoting sedentarization would yield important benefits. Such an approach would also reduce the increasing environmental degradation and exploitation of natural resources that have occurred as a result of such livelihoods shifts, including in areas with both agrarian and agropastoral livelihoods as well as in urban environments.

Another major opportunity relates to the region's developing extractive industry, specifically in Turkana and pertaining to the development of the LAPSET corridor. From a policy perspective, there is a current window of opportunity to expand the benefits of these initiatives to vulnerable and local populations, including using funds to promote balanced social, economic, and infrastructural development in the Karamoja cluster. If this opportunity passes, however, recent trends of escalating conflict and increasing tensions among populations and elites could lead to greater instability—a troublesome prospect given the region's history of cyclical instability.

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# **Background Paper 5.**

## Fragility and Resilience Analysis: The Political Economy of Development in Borderlands

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## 5.1. Introduction

Global trends in the reduction of armed conflict and poverty have been broadly positive, although geographically uneven. However, national-level success masks subnational “black spots” of protracted conflict and extreme poverty. Borderland regions are frequently such areas. The most widespread, enduring, and deadly forms of conflict in South Asia and Southeast Asia are subnational conflicts with strong trans-border dimensions; they affect half of the countries in the region. In otherwise stable states ostensibly “at peace,” their borderland regions may be chronically violent places, with homicide rates and human rights abuses higher than in many war zones. These marginal spaces are frequently zones of extreme and chronic poverty, where livelihoods depend on the informal, illicit, or criminal economies, and where the imprint of the state is weak or fitful. These regions seem to be largely immune to the development successes celebrated at the national and international levels. As the 2011 World Development Report notes, fragile and conflict-affected states experience “repeated and interlinked violence across borders” and that “excessive focus on assistance to the individual nation state is mismatched with the challenges of transnational and cyclical violence.” (World Bank 2011.)

This paper explores the implications of a borderlands perspective for the World Bank’s work in conflict-affected environments. It addresses the following two research questions:

1. How can research on borderlands help illuminate understanding of state building, violent contestation, and development?

2. What are the analytical and policy implications of a borderlands perspective for the World Bank?

The paper builds on three related propositions: (1) borderlands and frontier regions are frequently central to the dynamics of conflict, state building, and development; (2) policy makers tend to view borderlands as marginal, partly due to their state-centric analytical frameworks and ways of working and partly because of the failure of border studies scholars to translate a “borderlands perspective” into operationalizable policies; and (3) taking borderlands seriously would challenge mainstream approaches and necessitate significant changes to development and peacebuilding policies and practices.

In the next section, we define key terms, including *borderlands*, *borders*, and *frontiers*; and the political economy approach to borderlands as adopted in this paper is explained. We then address the first research question, drawing on existing borderlands research to show how this body of work generates novel insights on violent conflict, state building, and development. In the penultimate section, some of the implications for policy and practice will be outlined, followed in the final section by a set of conclusions.

## 5.2. Rethinking Policy Narratives and “Borderland Blindness”

Development policy makers tend to suffer from “borderland blindness.” Because the nation state remains the central unit of analysis and intervention, there is a policy gap related to questions of borders and borderlands. The social science



field developed in parallel with the emergence of modern western states and grew up in awe of the state (van Schendel 2005a). Methodological nationalism is the norm, and the default position is to accept a world of fixity, stasis, and boundedness. Development donors, like social scientists, tend to see the world in statist terms. Donors' mental maps and consequently their starting assumptions are shaped by the "national order of things." This is most evident in bilateral donors who are representatives of particular states and whose policies are formulated in the context of state-to-state relations. Partnerships between donors and recipient governments stand at the heart of development policy and practice. It is usually only in the context of humanitarian or disaster programming that such development principles are waived in favor of working with nonstate or even antistate actors. It would be surprising, therefore, if development donors, whose primary point of contact with a country is with state officials, usually in the capital city, did not absorb, to some extent, the world views, narratives, and biases of the central government. The top-down, high modern, centrist tendencies of state planning has been highlighted by Scott (1998) and others, and while this perspective perhaps overstates the coherence and hegemony of states (Murray Li 2007; Mitchell, 1991; Sharma and Gupta 2006) national officials in most cases do not begin from the perspective of the border region itself but rather make proposals that negotiate national interests.

This bias is reinforced by the way the development industry organizes itself, including the division of the world into country teams, the national planning and budgeting processes, the location of country offices in capital cities, and so forth. The prioritization of relationships with central

government officials, the clustering of international personnel in the capital, communication in English or national languages, the dependence on nonvernacular media for information, the increased focus on security procedures, and bunkering in conflicted environments (Duffield 2013) all contribute to capital-city biases and a filtering out of the borderlands perspectives.


Institutional incentives reinforce these biases. For example, the prioritization of relationships with the state may encourage a reluctance to raise contentious conflict-related issues, which the domestic government frames as an internal domestic concern (Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013). Disbursement pressures may work against the need to release funding more slowly, calibrated to local conflict dynamics. A low tolerance of security-related risks may prevent field visits to unruly borderlands. And bias toward the formal and licit economies contributes to a lack of understanding and willingness to engage with illicit or illegal borderland economies.

The absence of robust and reliable data compounds this borderland blindness. Datasets and strategies of social inquiry are bound to the nation state. Statistics are largely based on national, aggregated datasets. Subnational and transnational data on conflict for example are extremely rare, with the exception of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), which records violence spatially and temporally. Subnational conflicts are underreported or misreported (Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013).<sup>1</sup>

1. One example of robust subnational analysis of security is the data compiled in Afghanistan by the Afghan nongovernmental organization Security Office, however this does not extend to data on transnational incidents and patterns of violence.



**Figure 5.1. Political Economy Approach to Studying Borders and Borderlands Based on Three Analytical Pillars**



### 5.3. A Political Economy Approach to Borderlands

We adopt here a political economy approach to studying borders and borderlands based on three analytical pillars (see figure 5.1). The first involves thinking about power. The political economy approach puts at the foreground material interests and power relations, mediated by formal and informal institutions. The body of work, which heavily influences the 2011 World Development Report, stresses the need to analyze the state as an empirical reality rather than as an ideal type model to focus on the political settlements and coalitions that underpin the formal structures of the state and to avoid the dualistic thinking that produces simplistic binaries between state and nonstate, public and private, licit and illicit (see for comparison Abrams 1988; Di John and Putzel 2009; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Although this literature usefully deconstructs the state, it

has for the most part been blind to the spatial and territorial dynamics of elite negotiations and rent-sharing agreements. State building is the diffusion of power outward from center to the periphery, and the borderlands are unruly spaces that need to be incorporated and pacified.

The second pillar involves thinking about *space*, and in so doing, seeks to go beyond state centrism (Brenner 1999) and methodological nationalism. Geography rather than the nation state may be the most appropriate framing device for analysis. There is a need to think beyond and below the state and to appreciate how flows of people and commodities across space unsettle the orderliness of states. The 2009 World Development Report exemplifies the spatial turn in development thinking. From this perspective, borderlands are treated as “lagging regions” that need to be integrated through improved infrastructure, better connectivity, and investments in people. However, questions of power and history are largely avoided, ignoring the fact that borderlands are political and social spaces as well as economic spaces.

The third pillar involves thinking about *time and history*. This means moving beyond teleological narratives. Processes of change in the borderlands are rarely smooth and linear; they are discontinuous, involving moments of rupture or punctuated equilibrium (Cramer and Goodhand 2002). Institutions and processes of territorialization are the product of particular historical moments and relations, which means thinking more explicitly about the historicity of territory and the territorialization of history (Poultansas, cited in Watts 2004). Borderlands are exemplars of the temporal hybridity of institutions, with the sedimentation of new institutions atop older ones (Nugent 2002).

Therefore, the borderlands are a particularly interesting vantage point to study processes of conflict, state building, and development. They are places of extreme institutional hybridity and illustrative of the twilight nature of institutions, in which private actors assume public functions, where the boundaries between the external and internal are blurred (Lund 2006). When the means of coercion are diffused and no single actor has a monopoly of legitimacy or the means of resource extraction or taxation, then the role of brokers becomes key. Borderland brokers play a crucial role in mediating between different scales, jurisdictions, and policy domains; and they exploit the gaps or synapses between national and local, public and private, center and periphery, formal and informal (Goodhand 2012; Roitman 2005; Wolfe 1956).

## 5.4. Defining Key Terms

### 5.4.1. Borders and Boundaries

Borders perform various functions—at their most basic they divide friend from foe, the familiar here from the unfamiliar there. Borders are primarily about power—they territorialize differences, and these differences are exploited to assert control over space (Popescu 2011).<sup>2</sup> We live spatially ordered lives within a nested hierarchy of territorial borders—the neighborhood, city, county, region, and state (Popescu 2011). We also live in a world of invisible boundaries in which, as Migdal (2004a) notes, we learn to read, navigate, and negotiate through “mental maps” and “check-points.” Learning to read boundaries and not inadvertently step on them may be crucial to the

inhabitants of Karachi or wartime eastern Sri Lanka for whom it is literally a matter of life and death.

Therefore, we need to differentiate between borders as territorial lines on the edges of states, which are concrete and visible, and symbolic boundaries. While most borders are physical and symbolic at the same time, territorial boundaries, particularly those demarking the edges of states, and social boundaries often do not coincide. Borders can be thought of as both *institutions*, underpinned by sets of interests and power relations, and as *mentalities*, bolstered by particular world-views and ideologies.

Borders are not so much a line as a relation; they epitomize contradictory forces—they are something that simultaneously divides and connects, a source of security, a barrier that protects, and a site of friction and conflict. As Charles Tilly (2009) argues, boundary activation is central to the dynamics of collective violence. Mobilizing around certain forms of identity, and making specific boundaries more salient than others, is something about which conflict entrepreneurs are highly attuned. Central to processes of conflict management and de-escalation is brokerage—the transgression of or mediation across boundaries, which thereby connects various social and political fields. Brokerage may involve the purposive blurring or softening of boundaries in an effort to manage or mediate violent conflict or opportunistic arbitrage, exploiting the opportunities that boundaries provide in the form of price differences or relative scarcities. Differences across boundaries create a gradient, and the higher the gradient, the higher the risks and possible pays-offs for brokers.

2. Most of the world's territorial boundaries were set between 1870 and 1925, mostly drawn by British and French imperial powers (Harvey 2011: 208).

### 5.4.2. Frontiers and Borderlands

This paper aims to combine and reconcile two different vocabularies on the margins of the state: borderlands and frontiers (Korf and Raeymaekers 2013). Borderlands are classically understood as zones straddling an international border, while frontiers are more fuzzy political spaces, marking zones of transition among varying centers of power and regulation. Both are liminal spaces of cultural overlap and hybridity.

Frontiers are fault lines—spaces of encounter and transition among different geographies of settlement, political organization, and economic surplus generation.<sup>3</sup> Frontiers can also be seen as ideological projects, spaces where state power is territorialized, with specific characteristics of violence and disorder. Many assume that frontiers will be swallowed up by state-building processes that turn jagged edges or zones of transition into sharply inscribed international borders. Therefore, while empires thrive on fluctuating frontiers, nation states can only survive with tightly demarcated borders. However, in practice, the legacy of empires and their frontier zones and cities live on beneath the mosaic of nation states (O'Dowd 2012: 159). In many of today's borderlands there are traces of earlier frontier dynamics. Conversely, in Israel, there has been a shift from borders to frontiers, according to Weizman (2002). After the expansion of its borders following the 1967 war, these borders have been dissolved and transformed from fixed fortified lines on the edges of the state's territory to scattered and fragmented inner frontiers.

3. Frontiers can be further differentiated as advancing *tidal* frontiers, such as the Turnerian American frontier and *interstitial* frontiers—the liminal spaces located between consolidating states popularized by Kopytoff (1987).

As already noted, *borderlands* are classically understood as regions that straddle an international border. The presence of a borderline generates political, economic, and social adaptation—or *border effects*, which gives the borderland its unique character. As Baud and van Schendel (1997) note, the borderland region needs to be studied as a trans-border zone, a geographic unit linking two or more state margins.

## 5.5. Borderlands Research: The State of the Art

### 5.5.1. Borderlands and Violence

There is an accumulated body of research that shows that globally there has been an historic decline of war—both interstate and intrastate (Goldstein 2011; Human Security Centre 2010, Morris 2014; Pinker 2011). However, celebratory accounts of a more war-averse world should be treated with caution. First, as previously noted, there are problems with data and coding: other than the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), most data collected are aggregated at the national level and fail to capture or quantify violence at the subnational level.

Second, there remain persistent trouble spots, and some of the longest-running conflicts are those linked to regional conflict systems—"bad" neighborhoods where conflicts have spillover and diffusion effects, linking one neuralgia point to another (Pugh and Cooper 2004). Classic examples of this are the Horn of Africa, the Central African Great Lakes conflict system, and the current regionalized civil war in Iraq and Syria. A mapping of the level of violence in these conflict systems reveals that it tends to be clustered around borderland regions.

Clusters of fragility persist even in relatively strong, middle-income countries (World Bank 2012). More than half of the countries of South Asia and Southeast Asia, for example, are affected by subnational conflicts that have a transnational dimension.

Third, while increasingly more wars are ending, postwar countries are not necessarily peaceful. Many countries “at peace” continue to experience high levels of social and criminal violence, often clustered in borderland regions. The Guatemala–Honduras border area, for example, has one of the highest murder rates in the world; and, until recently, Ciudad Juarez on the United States–Mexico border had a higher homicide rate than most war zones (UNODC 2011).

### 5.5.2. Violent Histories

State formation has historically been a violent process. As Charles Tilly (1990) reminds us, this violence played a foundational role in the emergence of modern states. Frontier regions were often central to these processes of war making and state making. Men of violence on the fringes of emerging states, whose banditry and challenges to central power and authority, served as a catalyst for state expansion into frontier regions (Galant 1999). Expanding empires deployed strategies of exemplary violence and indirect rule to pacify unruly peripheries. War making was exported to the fringes of empire; frontiers were the outposts of military power and authority.<sup>4</sup>

4. In the 19th century, on today's Afghanistan–Pakistan border, the British deployed a brutal policy of “butcher and bolt” to punish and pacify the tribes, which then evolved into the Sandeman system of tribal policing in the early 20th century. The postcolonial state of Pakistan inherited borderlands that were never fully incorporated into the central state, subject

Border delineation can often be either the outcome or the cause of violent conflict. The most intense episodes of border drawing in the 20th century occurred at the end of World War I, the end of World War II, and after the break-up the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup> War making forges strong, effective ties and a commitment to shared borders, such as with the decolonization struggles after the Second World War. Few cases of partition or secession have not been extremely violent; the creation of borders can leave baleful legacies, the most evident and deadly of which is the Middle East, although there are over 150 border disputes occurring in the world today.<sup>6</sup>

Postcolonial states inherited and deployed many of the coercive strategies of their imperial predecessors—following a trajectory of coercion-intensive state building and a reliance on despotic rather than infrastructural forms of power (Mann 1984; Tilly 1990). This was largely a function of state weakness and, in Africa, Herbst (2000) notes, unconsolidated states were unable to exert control over inhospitable, sparsely populated borderland regions. Durable conditions of topography and social structure have long constrained states in Africa; James Scott (2009) makes a similar point about the resistance of the upland hill tribes in Southeast Asia to the civilizational project of expanding lowland states.

to differing laws and administrative structures and inhabited by borderland groups with conflicting loyalties and a strong tradition of insurrection (Marsden and Hopkins 2012).

5. The United Nations originally had 51 member states but now boasts 192.

6. See the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's “The World Factbook” at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>.

Many states failed to concentrate the means of violence. In fact, far from aspiring to be monopolists, they maintained stability by brokering or negotiating “violence rights” between a plurality of violence wielders (Ahram 2011). Barkey (2008), for example, shows how in the 19th century, the Ottomans extended their rule through complex brokering arrangements with local powerholders at the empire’s periphery. While there is no necessary and straightforward relationship between dispersion of the means of violence and the outbreak of violent conflict—as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) argue, many limited access orders are relatively stable because of the inclusive political settlements and rent-sharing agreements. In borderland areas, it is arguably more difficult for centralized state elites to sustain enduring political settlements due to the plurality of violence wielders and politico-military networks with cross-border orientations. The stakes are much higher in these borderland zones because the state’s ability to control the opening or closing of borders is an essential foundation for the construction of limited access orders (Meehan 2014). It is only through the creation of a territorially enclosed state that the incentive for nonstate actors to cooperate with the center is likely to be strong enough to generate enduring political coalitions (Meehan 2014).

Clearly not all borderlands are violent or troublesome. Many are well integrated and prosperous, such as those of Canada and the United States and the internal ones of Europe. In late developing states, many borderlands remain poor but passive. Furthermore, the idea that borderlands have a structural propensity to become hotbeds of terrorism and violent criminality is not borne out by empirical evidence. Terrorists do not gravitate to

anarchic borderlands—they need the stability that functioning states can provide, including access to banking facilities, businesses, and communications. This is why international terrorists prefer to situate themselves in Kenya rather than Somalia, and in Pakistan rather than Afghanistan. Similarly, although borderlands do have a comparative advantage in illegality, this does not mean that criminal economies are inherently violent. Instability and unpredictable violence are bad for business. In fact, external policies may be key vectors of violence, such as liberal peacebuilding efforts, the wars on terror and drugs, and the associated securitization and militarization of borders, inflame and catalyze cycles of violence in border regions.

### 5.5.3. Violence during Times of War

With the outbreak of war, borderland regions frequently become the epicenters of conflict. In situations of asymmetric conflict between a central government and nonstate insurgents, borderlands become a strategic resource, a place of sanctuary for rebel groups. Cross-border safe havens and refugee warrior communities provide a base or springboard for rebel incursions. States are somewhat caged by sovereignty; repertoires of violence therefore shift as governments seek to undermine rebels by deploying surrogate forces at or across borders (Ron 2003). The counterinsurgency strategy of the Burmese state involved the widespread creation of militias to fracture and erode the capacity of the rebel groups located in the borderlands. The government of Pakistan—particularly its military and intelligence arms—has similarly deployed asymmetric warfare to undermine Indian control of Kashmir.



The types and geographic distribution of resources mobilized by warring groups also shape repertoires and patterns of violence. Diffuse resources that can be looted and that are located on the periphery of the state—such as drugs—can provide the tax base for rebel groups; while centrally located point resources such as oil and minerals are easier for the state to monopolize (Le Billon 2001). Political ecology approaches draw out the convoluted relationships between conflict, resources, territory, and governance. Michael Watts (2004), for example, examines the impacts of petro-capitalism on Nigeria's governance system, arguing that oil has become the central "idiom" of Nigerian politics. However, its effects on governance are uneven and context specific, producing a variety of governable and ungovernable spaces.<sup>7</sup>

Insurgency and counterinsurgency actions may lead to the proliferation of violence specialists and to processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Regional conflict systems develop, connecting borderland regions such as Kashmir, the region previously known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,<sup>8</sup> and the Ferghana Valley. There may be strong continuities between the wartime and peacetime political economy. A history of regional interference and meddling may impede the forging of a new and stable, domestically brokered political settlements.

Relations between the center and the periphery may be recalibrated as borderlands, particularly

frontier cities, become vibrant political and economic centers. Borderland groups may advance their position in wartime, which is manifest in stronger bargaining power in the postwar settlement, such as with the minorities in post-2002 Afghanistan.

During a protracted conflict, new internal borders are drawn and policed, and space is privatized as nonstate actors seek to establish control over territory, resources, and populations. Traveling from the metropolitan center to the periphery may involve crossing multiple governable and ungovernable spaces (Watts 2004). Violence is frequently at its most intense and indiscriminate in the grey areas between these different regulatory regimes, where the loyalty of populations is most in doubt (Goodhand, Hulme, and Lewer 2000; Kalyvas 2006; Korf, Engeler, and Hagmann 2010).

#### 5.5.4. Postwar Violence

States respond to unruly and strategically important border areas with more troops and police. The physical landscape can become dominated by military structures and symbols: the army and police barracks, the guard towers, check posts, and barbed-wire fences. In many borderlands, the leviathan is the stranger, as the frontier is populated with military personnel from outside the region, turning the border strip into a security buffer zone (Eilenberg 2014). Counterinsurgency and state territorialization go hand-in-hand. Loyal groups may be moved in to dilute the local population—the Sinhala peasantry, for example, acted as the frontiersmen of the Sri Lankan state in the land colonization schemes of the Tamil-dominated north and east during the postindependence era (Thangarajah 2002). International peacekeeping missions may inadvertently destabilize fragile

7. Watts (2004) identifies three different types of spaces: one of nationalism, one of indigeneity, and one of chieftainship.

8. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas was a semi-autonomous tribal region in northwestern Pakistan that existed from 1947 until being merged with neighboring province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018.

borderland regions either because they are drawn into military confrontations or because they funnel resources that distort the local political marketplace (de Waal 2009). However, the level of borderland securitization varies according to how threats are identified and defined. In marginal peripheries, the state presence may be limited, and policing functions may be delegated to local defenses forces, such as the “arrow boys” on the western borderlands of South Sudan (Schomerus and de Vrie 2014).

As explored in more depth below, processes of development in the borderlands may themselves be extremely violent, involving continued military surveillance, human rights abuses, land grabs, and forced displacement. Wartime violence frequently mutates into other forms of everyday, symbolic, or structural violence, although its salience, intensity, and scale varies according to the nature of the postwar settlement (Bourgeois 2004; Suhrke and Berdhal 2011). Traces of violence linger in postwar institutions and in the public memory.

## 5.6. Borderlands and the State

The nation state is the basis for the division of political space. The bundling of state, nation, sovereignty, and territory is a defining feature of the modern state system. Territory provides a locus for the exercise of political authority, and the state border defines political belonging (Sack 1986). For the nation state concept to take root, state rulers need to develop practices to instill a sense of national identity—the creation of myths and symbols, state discourses and education—characterized by Newman and Paissi (1998) as a process of territorial socialization. Nationalism builds an

intimate connection between people and territory. It must give people a stake in the territorial state—something that is important enough to be willing to kill and die for. The construction of out-groups and the margin is central to the dynamic of building in-group solidarity and national sensibilities (Das and Poole 2004). Borders are where the state’s existential insecurities may be most acute, and they are frequently sites for the theatrical display and performance of state sovereignty. Discourses of purification and ultranationalism may be more evident at the border than in the center—such as in Sri Lanka, where Sinhalese nationalism emerged from the periphery as a counter-elite political movement that attacked the mainstream parties dominated by an Anglicized metropolitan elite (Rampton 2011; Uyangoda 2003).

However, state discourses cannot be taken at face value. To treat states as natural entities, part of the normative order of things, is to fall into the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994)—the geographic assumption that the state wields sovereignty over its entire territorial jurisdiction, that the “domestic” and “international” spheres can be clearly delineated, and that the state is the “container” of society and the territorial boundaries of the state and group identity are congruent. In practice, many states of the developing world diverge from the Weberian ideal. Exclusive power over territory and subjects, a monopoly over the means of coercion, taxation, and legitimacy/representation, may remain an aspiration.

Insights derived from the literature on political economy and anthropology of the state highlight the need to study states as they actually exist rather than the extent to which they conform to or

diverge from an ideal type Weberian model. These perspectives focus attention on:

- Power relations, material interests and negotiation processes that shape and underpin formal state structures. its own “alter ego” in the form of embedded networks—“shadow states” (Reno 1995) or “rhizome states” (Bayart 1993)—and how sovereignty is worked out, negotiated, or shared where there is a plurality of powerholders. Sovereignty may be fragmented or segmented (Migdal 2004b).
- Primary and secondary political settlements that shape the division of rents and access to the means of violence and how these influence the stability of the state (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Khan 1995; Di John and Putzel 2009; Parks and Cole 2010). A state may have uneven control over its territory, and political order might be maintained through brokering arrangements for which the state is one political institution among many.
- The blurring of simplistic state versus non-state, public versus private binaries, recognizing the hybridity or twilight nature of governance (Lund 2006; Meagher 2012; MacGinty 2010; Raeymaekers 2013).
- The uneven and contested processes of territorialization within the borders of the state. How states are frequently forced to work with the grain of existing structures of authority and local economies in the borderlands (Boone 2003; Meehan 2014; Nugent 2002).
- The everyday practices and subjectivities of borderland groups and individuals in their daily encounters with the state (Das and Poole 2004; Sharma and Gupta 2006 Roitmann 2005);
- How the assemblages of transnational governance influence domestic political settlements, the structure of the economy, the policy environment, and consequently the state’s authority and capacity to rule at the border (Barnett and Zuercher 2009; Chandler 2010; Chalfin 2010; Duffield 2001, 2007; Heathershaw 2008; Murray Li 2007). Sovereignty between nations is less a right than a responsibility; it is contingent and provisional, dependent on the extent to which a state meets external measures of “good governance” (Chandler 2010; Eldon 2009). An increasingly internationalized political economy poses new challenges to familiar forms of state spatialization (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 982).

In borderlands, the complex political topography and institutional patchiness of “the state” appear in sharp relief. Studying borderlands as “extreme sites” offers a lens for “reading the state at its limits” (Harris 2009: 5). A multitude of state agents cluster around the border, including different levels and arms of government, including customs systems, border police officers, border guard military units, and health inspectors, among others. Neoliberal restructuring of the state has further pluralized institutional arrangements at the border (Chalfin 2010; Roitman 2005).

Rather than seeing state building as the steady diffusion of power from the center outward toward

the periphery, flowing through the bureaucratic and hierarchical structures of the state, we see a more contested oscillation of power backwards and forward between a complex assemblage of institutions and actors located at the center and at the periphery. The margins are not just reflective of power relations at the center; they also play a role in constituting or coproducing national-level power relations and political settlements.

Borderlands are a space of encounter between different forms and logics of rule—between center and periphery and across borders. The horizontal reach of the state into outlying regions varies in space and time, linked to its vertical reach, manifest in shifting intensities and forms of state-society relations.<sup>9</sup> The imprint of the state in its varying borderland areas is never uniform—some borderlands are more valuable and some more troublesome to the state than others. The state-borderland “conversation” is shaped by the particular attributes of the borderlands, including population density, political leadership, development potential, and geostrategic importance (Boone 2003). Various kinds of state-borderlands social contracts are forged, varying from coercive and imposed to collaborative and negotiated (Nugent 2010). These processes are also shaped by institutions and events across the border. Successful state building in one country may impede or actively sabotage its neighbor’s strategies for state building and development of the borderlands, such as Uganda’s exploitation of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s eastern borderlands and Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan.

9. Ferguson and Gupta (2002) identify two principles that are key to state spatialization: (1) *verticality*—the state is above society; and (2) *encompassment*—the state encompasses its localities.

Borderlands can be zones of legal pluralism and jurisdictional complexity. Populations living in the border areas might tactically draw on different legal codes—customary, religious, or state-based—on both sides of a border. Borderland communities with sources of belonging and loyalty that transcend state boundaries<sup>10</sup> threaten the homogenizing projects of states. Attempts by state to incorporate their borderland regions may be less about extending the rule of law than suspending it. Borderlands, like the Somali Region in Ethiopia may be treated as a “state of exception,” subject to exemplary forms of violence, with the population having few of the rights enjoyed by citizens living in the center (Hagmann and Korf 2012). Borderland regions may therefore suffer from a democratic deficit, in addition to economic marginalization.

While borderlands may be sites of nationalist mobilization, they are also places of movement, fluidity, and hybridity—they are both containers of nationalism and conduits of transnationalism, unsettling the orderliness of states. A growing body of anthropological literature focuses on the subjectivities, agency, and fluid identities of borderland communities, and how residents understand themselves in relation to broader notions of community and the state (van Schendel 2002; Donnan and Wilson 1999). Though Scott (2009) conceptualizes borderlands as nonstate or anti-state spaces, others view the people and the state not in opposition but as part of the same domain. Several studies of borderland groups show how they collude and cooperate with the state to tilt

10. Regarding citizenship in postpartition South Asia, Van Schendel (2002: 255) writes about “proxy citizenship,” referring to the ambiguous loyalties of Muslims in India or Hindus in Pakistan—where citizenship was based on territorial location and proxy citizenship of religious community.

the border to their advantage; and far from resisting the state, they encourage its expansion into the margins (Nugent 2002; Sahlins 1988, Tagglicozza 2005).

## 5.7. Borderlands and Development

### 5.7.1. Capital, States, and Frontiers

Capitalism and borders are frequently seen as being in opposition. At the heart of that opposition is the tension between two different logics of power—one territorial and the other capitalist (Harvey 2011). These two logics are not reducible to each other but are closely entwined (Harvey 2011: 205). Centrifugal economics, many assume, works against the centripetal, territorializing thrust of state building. Open borders act as a brake on the state's ability to tax its citizens and mobilize resources. Similarly, borders are treated by neoclassical economics as a cost, acting as barriers to free trade or the free flow of goods, labor, and skills.<sup>11</sup> Borders are where the inherently transnational expansionism of capitalism comes up against the conventional territorial delimitation of political community (Anderson 2001). Yet capitalists need borders. States have provided the framework for the organization of stable, large-scale wealth accumulation strategies. Borders have historically provided the protection for national capital from outside competition and a national market for consumption. Managed borders were essential for enabling the generation

of revenue for the state through the collection of taxes. Late developmental states were successful, not because they had open borders and free trade but because they, like the early developers, selectively filtered the movement of commodities, financial flows, and people across their borders to protect the interests of emerging capitalist elites and to nurture nascent industries and productive capacities (Chang 2005). In the era of globalization, borders and capitalism continue to have a symbiotic relationship. Borders allow market actors to play states against states, cities and communities against other cities and communities; and markets exploit the economic inequalities of people and goods in space and time (Popescu 2011). Geographic differentiation is an increasingly vital condition for capital accumulation to begin, even as the friction of distance plays less of a constraining role on capital. As Harvey (2011: 161–62) notes, “highly mobile capital pays close attention to even slight differences in costs because these yield high profits.” And capitalist development is itself an engine for generating difference—the industrial capitalist city can be understood as “a machine for the manufacturing and maintenance of distributional inequalities,” what Harvey characterizes as “territorial injustice” (Harvey 1973, cited in Soja 2010: 49). While in recent years there has been some convergence of incomes across countries, income disparities within countries are widening (World Bank 2009). The global distribution of poverty has changed, with most of the world's poor now living in middle-income countries and as growing spatial inequalities within countries threaten social cohesion and stability. Households located in more prosperous metropolitan areas in countries like Indonesia and Sri Lanka have an average consumption almost 75 percent higher

11. And as Marx wrote, capital must “strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse i.e. to exchange and conquer the whole earth for its market.” Innovations throughout the history of capitalism have been driven by the need to overcome the friction of distance and speed up capital accumulation (Harvey 2011: 158).



than those of similar households in lagging areas within the same country (World Bank 2009).

Frontier zones have long played an important role in the dynamics of capitalist development. The opening up of the American frontier and then the new colonial frontiers in Africa and Asia were central to processes of capital accumulation in the imperial centers. Frontier expansion frequently involved violent conquests and colonial occupation. And the violent dynamics of primitive accumulation continue in many of today's frontier zones. Rather than withering away, frontiers wax and wane according to the shifting value of frontier resources in regional and international commodity markets (Eilenberg 2014). In Afghanistan, increased farm gate prices for opium pushed cultivation out into the marginal desert lands of the southwest (Mansfield 2014). Spontaneous settlement of these areas by landless peasants, investment in irrigation, and the construction of houses and roads, have together exerted a gravitational pull on the state and its competitors—in the form of the Taliban—who, in a dynamic familiar to many frontier regions, seek to control and tax these activities.<sup>12</sup>

Frontier regions and weakly regulated borderlands situated far from the gaze of the state may have a comparative advantage in illegibility and illegality. Such zones, like the Amazon basin or the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo lend themselves to adventure capitalism and the capturing of windfall profits based on high

risk-high return activities, such as illegal logging, coltan mining, and drug trafficking. Frontier zones constitute a resource for neighboring states as well as global capital. The Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, provides a zone of demographic expansion and resource extraction for the Ugandan and Rwandan states.

Rather than being autarkic and marginal, frontier zones are highly connected to the global circuits of capital and exchange. Borderland communities and brokers learn to adapt to, manage, and exploit this extreme extroversion—they act locally but think globally. In the absence of a mediating state, such brokers, “jump scales.” Examples include the Sri Lankan Tamil businessman building hotels in Jaffna using diaspora funding or the Kachin entrepreneur doing deals with Chinese financiers to run casinos in Burma's northeastern borderlands.

But it is not only the illicit or grey economy that links the frontier zones with the metropolitan centers of the global north. This symbiotic relationship extends to the licit economy as well. As already highlighted, capitalism depends on and exploits geographic and socioeconomic differences. Frontiers zones are sources of surplus populations who can be imported to the core or, conversely, are cheap labor outlets for investment, providing a short-term answer to crises in the capitalist core. The borderlands of southern Africa have historically acted and continue to act as labor reserves for commercial farming, the service sector, South African industries. Frontiers are regions of durable precariousness, where the bargaining power of labor is weak. Underemployment, unemployment, and low standards of living in sending countries ensure a surplus pool of

12. In a similar vein, Truett (2006: 4), writing about the history of the borderlands of the United States and Mexico, describes how the copper mines “remade a formerly isolated region at the ragged edges of states and markets into an industrial crossroads fed by circuits of capital, labor, and transnational collaboration that extended deep into both nations.”

potential workers. As Coplan (2010a: 58–59) notes in the cases of Lesotho and Mexico, male migrants cross the border, while wives and family members remain at “home.” In this way, employers benefit from immigrant labor while avoiding the costs of reproduction and maintenance, which are borne by the source community. Therefore, the economic pathologies of borderlands are more about adverse incorporation than the failure to integrate. Just as the European Union requires cheap labor peripheries, so the United States outsources production to Mexican factories (*maquiladoras*) clustered along the borderline.

### 5.7.2. Dynamics of Borderlands and Trade

Borders generate a “spatial discount,” or the opportunity for those who are buying, selling, or employing to make a profit by exploiting the difference between regulatory regimes on both sides of a border. Rents are created by differences. Borders are, in this sense, less constraints than fields of opportunity. These dynamics take place not just in the border but because of the border. The intensity of economic flows and relations may be greater across the border than with the metropolitan center of the state. Smugglers violate state laws so they can obey those of economics (Anderson 2001). This does not mean that smugglers are necessarily antistate—in fact they are rarely revolutionaries. They have a symbiotic relationship with states, often colluding with or actively collaborating with state officials—the game is about outwitting rather than overthrowing the state.

Therefore, borderlands have their own particular ecosystems, linked to their specific histories and geographies. But two factors are critical in

structuring the dynamics of borderlands trade: the type and level of state presence and the depth or degree of inequality at the border (Zartman 2010). The United States–Canada border, for example, is a shallow border, while the United States–Mexico border has great depth. The United States–Mexico border is where the third world grates against the first and bleeds (Anzaldúa, 1987: 12). According to More (2011), “extreme borders,” characterized by great economic asymmetries, exhibit particular pathologies, including securitization or militarization and high levels of violence, drugs, and human trafficking. In other words, there is a high “gradient,” wherein the more powerful state, rather than trying to promote convergence and integration, does the opposite and has the paradoxical effect of steepening the gradient further, which in turn increases the stakes, incentives, and risk premium associated with border crossings. Border control is therefore the business of the dominant partner, while border taxation is the business of the weaker (Coplan 2010a: 61).

In contexts where the authority and economy of the two bordering states are equally weak, the emphasis is on performance, gatekeeping, and taxation. Governments may therefore show little enthusiasm for investing in effective monitoring and evaluation of the border, which would basically kill off “border business.”

For smugglers and state agents, the key is less about administering territory than controlling the corridors and choke points. For example, Goma is a crucial node in the network of East African trading corridors (Brenton et al. 2011; Lamarque 2014). On the Guatemala–Honduras border, there are 15 formal crossing points but more than 100 informal

ones. These “blind spots” (*puntos ciegos*) are unofficial border crossings that governments have little capacity to control (ICG 2014).

The distinction between formal and informal or legal and illegal trade may be meaningless in the borderlands. Borders are a nexus between combat, shadow, and coping economies (Goodhand 2005). For example, the Afghan–Tajikistan border was a key crossing point for weapons and drugs during the Afghanistan war years. In the postwar period, drugs, along with a range of licit commodities, including cigarettes, precious stones, four-wheel-drive vehicles, and food staples, continued to cross the border untaxed, with the connivance of state officials on both sides. Rents generated by the drug economy are invested in consumption, housing, and infrastructure, and consequently feed into and support the coping economy (Goodhand 2012). Cross-border interdependencies emerge where there are different fields of opportunity on each side. For example, on the Goma–Gisenyi border, Goma is an unregulated, high-risk, high opportunity environment where people do business but the generated profits tend to be invested on the other side of the border, where Congolese businessmen build their houses in the more secure and regulated state space of Rwanda (Lamarque 2014). As Coplan (2010a: 62) notes in an insightful comparison of the borderlands of Lesotho and South Africa with those of the United States and Mexico:

“A kind ‘border culture’ develops as legal, logistical and even social problems are worked out cooperatively on site between officials of the two countries. While on the one hand national government officials seek to maintain the fiction of the border as a legal boundary, local level officials

find ways of coping with, and profiting from central government over-regulation.”

Therefore, the border constitutes a resource both for borderlands populations and state officials. Government positions at the border, such as police chiefs and border guards, are extremely lucrative and cost a lot of money to purchase. To recoup the initial outlay, officials extract as much as they can from the movement of commodities and people across the border.

Trading routes are often grafted onto long-standing regional networks and connections that precede state building, such as the Silk Route in Central Asia and the ancient trade routes crisscrossing the Sahara (McDougall and Scheele 2012). Border delineation did not so much interrupt these regional networks of interdependence as restructure them, leading to smuggling networks, semi-licit trade, and new regional power centers dependent on borders.<sup>13</sup>

Borderlands are defined not so much by barriers as by movement, flux, and hybridity. Frontiers are “fugitive landscapes” (Truett 2006), places of influx and outflux. In the past, people moved to the frontiers to evade state-building projects, wars, and persecution (Scott 2009). Imperial powers and modern states settled the frontiers with loyal subjects who could secure and more productively develop the frontier. There is a persistent tension in frontier regions between the territorial pretensions of states and borderlands populations

13. Another example of the continuity of institutions and networks that subvert borders is the hawala system in South Asia, which has been crucial to the survival of licit and illicit businesses throughout the war years in Afghanistan and continues to be more important than the formal banking sector for populations of the borderlands (Thompson 2011).

who have hyphenated identities and whose livelihoods depend on movement and arbitrage.

Although states depend on the movement of people and capital, the process must be managed and controlled. A striking example is the labor regime based around the asymmetrical border between Burma and Thailand. The Thai economy heavily depends on cheap Burmese labor, particularly in the construction and fishing industries—maintaining a semi-legal, and liminal workforce that can be returned to Burma at any point provides a flexible and extremely cheap labor reserve who will work under conditions of slavery (Hodal, Kelly, and Lawrence 2014).

### 5.7.3. Borderlands Development

As noted earlier, many frontier regions and borderlands were once remote and sparsely populated and could not be profitably administered by the state. After being incorporated into expanding states, these areas remained “lagging” regions (Farole 2013; World Bank 2009). Borderland areas suffer from common endemic weaknesses, including a failure to achieve economies of scale and wasteful duplication of investments—“border-induced deficits.” Often sites of chronic poverty, they suffer from long-term neglect and low levels of “geographic capital”—a clustering of disadvantages that include remoteness, poor infrastructure and services, weak institutions, a sparse population, a lack of resources, and challenging terrain. These regions constitute spatial poverty traps. Metropolitan centers, by contrast, benefit from positive neighborhood effects, including agglomeration, connectivity, and strong institutions (World Bank 2011). Centripetal forces

that reinforce concentration in core areas, lead to greater in-country disparities.

In some borderlands, inequalities between lagging regions and other parts of the country coincide with linguistic, ethnic, or religious identities—and enduring horizontal inequalities became a potent rallying cry for political mobilization, which in many contexts turn violent—separatist movements have emerged in northeastern Sri Lanka; southern Thailand; the borderlands of Burma; Mindanao, Philippines; and the Uyghurs in Western China (Stewart 2008).

Clearly not all borderland regions are poor, undeveloped, and unruly. Some states have dealt productively with these regions through political inclusion and development. Italy, for example, granted its disputed Tyrolean region a considerable degree of political autonomy and a fiscal regime that allows the region to retain close to 90 percent of its levied taxes.

However, it is more common to see flawed or failed attempts by states to incorporate and develop borderlands, particularly in the developing world.<sup>14</sup> States may deploy securitized development in response to the grievances of populations living in borderlands as an alternative to or to obviate the need for political reform. The Chinese government’s economic development policies in Tibet, for example, are geared toward

14. One example is the Helmand Valley Authority, implemented in southern Afghanistan, funded by the U.S. government, and based on the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The attempt to sedentarize unruly Pashtuns and turn the deserts of Helmand into a food basket absorbed huge amounts of money but failed to bring about development or security (Cullather 2002). The “muscular teleology” powering this dream of modernization did not survive its encounter with the reality of a fluid, conflictual, and fiercely independent frontier zone.

bringing about irreversible changes to undermine demands for independence. The building of infrastructure to overcome the friction of topography and distance is a case in point, of development initiatives being shaped by an underlying military and strategic logic. Similarly, the Sri Lankan government's reconstruction efforts in the north and east, following its military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were partly about blunting the secessionist impulse. Roads and other frontier infrastructure, including military camps and police barracks, are physical expressions of the government's coercive reterritorialization of a previously nonstate or antistate space (ICG 2012).

Unlike Sri Lanka, Burma's northeastern frontier zones, including the teak forests of Shan state, are resource-rich, but protracted conflict denied the state access to these areas. The signing of ceasefire agreements with insurgent groups in the early 1990s had the effect of opening up the borderlands. These agreements have unleashed a process of "ceasefire capitalism" (Woods 2011) involving an extension of the state's presence into the borderlands through development projects funded through Chinese capital and laundered drugs money (Meehan 2011; Woods 2011). The borderlands have been turned into productive spaces for pipelines, commercial agriculture, and logging—the result of violent processes of primitive accumulation, enclosure, and settlement. Similarly, in the Malaysia–Indonesia borderlands, national discourses of sovereignty, security, and agrarian expansion intersect. Counterinsurgency, border militarization, and large-scale development in the form of palm oil monocropping are creating

new frontiers of land control (Eilenberg 2014; Hall 2013; Peluso and Lund 2011). Chinese–Malaysian entrepreneurs have been central to these processes, acting as brokers between the Malaysian state and borderland communities, first gaining a foothold in the border through their involvement in the illegal timber trade and then shifting to engagement in legal cross-border palm oil plantation development (Eilenberg 2014).

#### 5.7.4. Borderland Cities and Frontier Towns

However, borderlands are not simply the passive receptors of external development programs. They can be understood less as residual, marginal places than active laboratories of political, social, and economic change, in which there are emergent hybridized forms of development and political order. Though some borderlands are lagging regions, others are zones of rapid urbanization and industrialization. In many ways, these places exemplify the three drivers of change identified in the 2009 World Development Report: agglomeration, migration, and specialization. The Maridā–Katsina–Kano "development corridor" on the Niger–Nigeria border, for example, is one of the most densely populated areas in West Africa. The Nigerian side of the 1,500-kilometer common border contains four major cities and is an industrial center. Frontier boomtowns growing on both sides of the border are playing catalytic roles in regional development. Two examples of rapid urbanization and economic growth are Jalalabad and Peshawar at the Afghanistan–Pakistan border and Herat and Mashad at the Afghanistan–Iran border, with each center feeding into the success of the



other.<sup>15</sup> These cities are spaces of cross-border flows and engines of capital accumulation (Dobler 2009; O'Dowd 2012; Nugent 2012). Licit and illicit activities are closely entwined in a relationship of co-production rather than competition. Labor markets in the two cities become increasingly connected, with the constant movement back and forth and families spreading economic and political risks by living on both sides of the border—for example an Afghan family may have a son who is employed in the Afghan National Army or police force, another stays on the farm to cultivate poppy, another finds laboring jobs in Peshawar, one may be fighting with the Taliban and some of the women in the family may be living in Peshawar where they can get better access to education and health care (Marsden and Hopkins 2012; Mansfield 2011). In the case of unequal borders, the subaltern side's towns act as labor *entrepôts* and on the dominant side's towns act as transportation depots for arriving workers and as mercantile centers (Coplan 2010a: 57).

Development in such contexts has little to do with national planning or international projects and has everything to do with self-organized merchant communities. This phenomenon resembles the long-distance, city-based trading networks of the Middle Ages. Over time, the contribution of these merchant communities to the public administration of the cities increased (Braudel 2002). To what extent are the arbitrage economies in today's borderlands contributing to long-term development

and poverty eradication? Boom towns frequently “go bust”—as Truett's (2006) compelling history of the borderlands of the United States and Mexico shows. The ruins of earlier efforts to populate and profit from the frontier are scattered along the border in the form of abandoned cities, mines, and homesteads. Today's rapidly urbanizing border regions bring their own forms of maldevelopment, including violence, crime, the absence of planning, environmental impacts, and health costs.

Clearly, there are profits to be made in boom towns, but where and how are these profits invested? For example, are drug rents generated in the Afghan borderlands reinvested locally? Or are they recycled into the construction sector in Kabul? Or do they disappear into bank accounts in Dubai? Similarly, if Congolese businessmen involved in cross-border trade invest in real estate in Rwanda, how much benefit does Goma gain from the “Chorachora” trade? More research is needed to look at the processes through which borderland entrepreneurs graduate from speculative, illicit, or grey activities into investment in the licit and productive economy. To what extent do the “Grand Barons” of the Goma–Gisenyi border or the cross-border trading mafia in Peshawar constitute an emergent capitalist class? Raeymaekers (2010) and Goodhand (2012) point to a Tillyan trajectory in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and northeastern Afghanistan borderlands, where processes of violent accumulation lay the foundation for the emergence of new hybrid forms of authority and investments in public goods, such as security and welfare. Yet, as Meagher (2012) argues, while political settlements based on neopatrimonial arrangements may be

15. Examples include the South Africa (Free State)–Lesotho border regions of Fouriesburg/Batha Buthe and Clocolan/Teyateyaneng and the United States–Mexico border regions of Brownsville/Matamoros and El Paso–Santa Teresa/Ciudad Juárez (Coplan 2010a: 57).

stabilizing, they are not necessarily legitimate or developmental.

In the age of globalization, regionalization, and supra-national bodies, economic integration is frequently viewed as the optimal policy option for lagging borderlands. Policymakers point to success stories in the developed world, such as the border regions of Canada and the United States. The economies of Ontario and Michigan, as an example, are highly interdependent and part of one large economic region at the core of which

are the cities of Detroit–Windsor and Sarnia–Port Huron. Ontario trades three times more with the rest of the world than with the rest of Canada. However, as explored in more detail below, the costs and benefits of integration are never evenly distributed. The effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the Mexican economy, particularly its borderlands, have been documented extensively. On one hand, Mexico's border regions grew by 36 percent in terms of real gross value added, more than three times faster than the average growth of other regions (Baylis

**Table 5.1. Key Features and Determinates of Change in Borderlands**

Coercion	Representation and Legitimacy	Capital
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>History of violence; tradition of insurrection</li> <li>State reliance on despotic power, exemplary violence</li> <li>Plurality of violence wielders—democratization of “violence rights”</li> <li>Transnational military networks, base areas, refugee warrior communities</li> <li>Diffusion and spillover effects—regional conflict systems and neuralgia points</li> <li>Militarized or securitized borders and borderlands</li> <li>Counterinsurgency policies, policing</li> <li>Mutation of wartime violence into social and criminal violence</li> <li>Presence or absence of international peacekeepers and peacebuilders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political settlements—national and subnational—and the “fit” between formal and informal power structures</li> <li>Stability or fragility of limited access orders and the continuity of brokers</li> <li>Vertical and horizontal reach of the state</li> <li>Distance and connectivity between center and periphery</li> <li>Level of state provision and services</li> <li>Level of institutional and legal pluralism</li> <li>Access to justice</li> <li>Social contracts—continuum from imposed and coercive to negotiated and consensual</li> <li>Level of political and social cohesion</li> <li>Political voice and loyalties of borderland groups</li> <li>Perceptions of state legitimacy and existence of alternative forms of legitimacy and representation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Level of development in the borderland—urbanization, industrialization, population density, household incomes</li> <li>Spatial inequalities—across the border (depth), and between center-periphery</li> <li>Presence of horizontal inequalities</li> <li>Level of economic integration across the border and between center and periphery</li> <li>Proportion of the economic activities that are licit, illicit, or illegal</li> <li>Presence of border towns and twin cities</li> <li>Fiscal capacity of the state in the border areas—customs and excise, income tax</li> <li>State redistributive policies and investments in border areas</li> <li>Extent to which flows of commodities and people are regulated at the border</li> <li>The level and spatial distribution of donor funding and programs</li> </ul>

et al 2009, cited in Farole 2013: 3). But at the same time, the trade agreement had a devastating impact on Mexican agriculture, which increased rural urban gaps, created the labor reserves for the maquiladoras on the border, and fueled the search for alternative livelihoods in the drug economy.

In Burma, increased economic integration has had mixed developmental outcomes, particularly for borderlands populations. The tea industry in northern Shan State, for example, has been undermined by cheaper imports, while the remaining tea production has been increasingly monopolized by an alliance of the military, borderland brokers, and cross-border investors (Meehan 2011).

Table 5.1 provides a summary of key points covered in the paper, divided according to Tilly's (1990) trinity of capital, coercion, and legitimacy. A borderlands perspective means thinking carefully about changes within and interconnections between these three pillars, while still considering the underlying questions of power, space, and time. Seeming advances in one sphere—such as economic development—should not be viewed in isolation from what is happening in other spheres. For example, investments in Sri Lanka's peripheries may induce accelerated growth rates and an extension of the state's presence into formerly war-torn areas. But absent political reforms, a growing centralization of power, and a militarization of the northeast, this form of "development" will likely lead to renewed conflict. A borderlands perspective would encourage a careful consideration of how the costs and benefits of particular policy interventions are spatially distributed.

## 5.8. A Typology of Borderlands

As this review has demonstrated, there has been a renaissance in the field of border studies. The growth of this field has broadly moved in two directions. First is the empirical studies of individual borderlands throughout history and in contemporary settings in Latin America (e.g., Martinez, 1994; Truett 2006), Asia (e.g., van Schendel 2005b), Africa (e.g., Feyissa and Hoehne 2010; Nugent 2002), the Middle East (e.g., Amir 2011; Bornstein 2002; Ron 2003; Weizman 2002), the former Soviet Union (e.g., Reeves 2005) and Europe (e.g., Donnan and Wilson 1999; Sahlins 1988). Second is the growth of theorizing around processes of bordering, which involves moving beyond a narrow focus on the study of territorial borders to thinking more broadly about the meaning and representation of difference. Reflecting the post-modern turn in the social sciences, there has been a widening of the ontology and epistemology of borders (van Houtum 2005: 673).

Less systematic work has been done combining the systematic comparison of borders and bordering processes across time and space with broader theorization. As Coplan (2010b: 1) notes, there has been "a rather myopic empirical focus on one's 'own' border as a case, to the detriment of comparative or more broadly conceptual and theoretical studies." There is therefore room for comparative research that is genuinely multidisciplinary. Although there have been some attempts to develop typologies of borderlands that allow for comparative analysis, they have rarely been developed or applied in a systematic or convincing way.

Several typologies concentrate on differences at the borderline. Based on his research at the United States–Mexico border Martinez (1994) developed a typology focused on the quality and dynamics of cross-border interactions, the level of cross-border integration, and porosity of the border, resulting in the categorization of four types of borderlands, broadly following a continuum of hard, soft, or “virtual”: (1) alienated, (2) coexistent, (3) interdependent, and (4) integrated.<sup>16</sup> Zartman’s (2010) typology examines the level of difference at the border in terms of political organization and social identity, also resulting in four types: (1) black and white—marked by sharp differentiations, clear borderlines, and closed borders, such as the Iron Curtain; (2) grey—an integrated, hybrid culture and permeable border; (3) buffered—a third weaker group located between two main cultures to insulate and keep them apart; (4) spotty (islands of one culture living in ghettos or enclaves); and (5) layered, which imposes a dominant population group over another, such as a settler colony. More’s (2011) classification of borders is based on a ranking in terms of the level of economic inequalities at the border. His quantitative study provides a ranking of more or less “extreme” borders, his thesis being that highly unequal borders produce particular political, economic, and social pathologies in borderlands.

These typologies have the virtue of being parsimonious and of providing a useful heuristic tool for comparing differing dynamics and relationships in borderlands. But the political economy of borderland zones and their relationships to metropolitan centers are a blind spot for such

typologies. Another approach has been to develop typologies of common features and variables within and across borderlands. For example, Brunet-Jailly (2004), drawing on research on the Canada–United States border, lists the following key variables: market forces and trade flows, policy activities among multiple levels of government, the political clout of borderland communities, and the specific culture of these communities.<sup>17</sup> Goodhand (2013) similarly identifies a range of structural and dynamic factors that influence borderland regions including: the depth and breadth of the borderland, the porosity of the borderline, the strategic importance of the border, the resource profile and demographic features of the borderland, and the dynamics of elite politics and power structures at the center and periphery. These typologies perhaps suffer from the opposite problem of being too expansive—by trying to cover everything they may explain very little.

Therefore, as with all typologies, there is a danger of reductionism and simplification or of a long “shopping list” of factors with no weighting or prioritization. However, as a heuristic device they may aid further theorization about borders. And in relation to development policy and practice they may sensitize policy makers to borderland issues and provide guidance for appropriate interventions. Most of the borderland typologies offered here are largely descriptive—they address the “what” questions but are less useful in relation to the “hows” and the “whys” of borderlands. Furthermore, none have been developed with

16. Vogler (2010), in a similar fashion, differentiates between soft (open or regulated) borders and hard (fenced or walled).


17. Payan (2014), similarly develops an extensive list of critical variables: historical baggage, cultural bonds, resource claims, demographic trends, degree of institutionalization, economic development gaps, domestic environment, global context, and technological differentials.

the practitioner in mind and therefore give few pointers about whether and how to intervene in such contexts.

Figure 5.2 provides a starting point for comparative analysis of borderland dynamics and intervention strategies focused on development, governance, and conflict. Various borderlands can be mapped along two key axes: (1) the level of

stability or conflict, and (2) the level of development and integration. Borderlands at the top left hand of the diagram are stable, developed, and integrated, which is characteristic of the United States–Canada border and most of the internal borders within the European Union. At the opposite bottom right hand side of the diagram is the archetypal “troublesome borderland” characterized by high levels of violence, chronic instability,

**Figure 5.2. A Comparative Framework for Studying Conflict and Development in Borderlands**





disconnectedness in terms of formal institutions and licit economic activities, limited state presence and welfare provision, and poor economic and social indicators that frequently coincide with horizontal inequalities. The other two quadrants in the diagram: “stable but poor/disconnected” and “conflictual and developed/ing”—provide further scope to examine and reflect on the reasons why some borderlands forge stable but conservative and antidevelopmental political settlements while others undergoing rapid transitions may experience high levels and different forms of violence. The diagram should also encourage reflection on power, space, and time. First, how do changing power arrangements between the center and the periphery and across borders affect the stability and development potential of such areas? Second, how are these processes spatialized, recalibrating center-periphery relations in terms of distance, density, and division (World Bank 2009)? Third, how do borderland arrangements change over time? For example, the Afghanistan–Tajikistan borderlands were located in the bottom right quadrant during the 1980s and early 1990s when there were civil wars on both sides of the border, but since the peace settlements in both countries, it has migrated to its present position as a relatively stable but poor and marginal borderland.

### 5.9. Incorporating a Borderlands Perspective

Like many development agencies, the World Bank has become increasingly aware of the need to think beyond the nation state and to deploy regional frameworks and ways of working. “Regional integration,” conceptualized as a mix of connectivity projects, including transport and

information and communications technology; energy projects; and trade facilitation largely reflect the fact that the problem is conceptualized in terms of “planning gaps” or regional strategy gaps. Borderland issues are quite commonly viewed through the lens of “lagging regions” (Farole 2013; World Bank 2009). There is also increasing attention to horizontal border dynamics, including among small traders (Brenton et al. 2011). But the borderlands arguably pose a more profound challenge to policy makers, which cannot be addressed simply by attempting to add a borderlands perspective to current state-based ways of working. It demands a more substantive change, analytically and methodologically. Taking borderlands seriously does not mean focusing exclusively on the borderland spaces in the developing world. It involves considering how marginality is actively produced—how regions are “lagging” not just because of inherent deficiencies but due to the effects of embedded power relations. It demands a strategic approach, which requires changes in policies at the systemic level (Uvin 2002). This has implications for global policy regimes related to trade agreements, counter-terrorism, international migration, and consumer habits, among other issues.

### 5.10. State Building and Governance in Borderlands

A borderlands perspective raises fundamental questions about the nature of the state and state-societal relations. On the one hand, there are questions about the formal structures and institutions of the state, including choices related to constitutional design: the level of centralization of power, the balance between

executive and legislature, the election system, the role of local government, the justice system, and the rule of law. On the other hand, there are what are essentially first-order questions related to national-level and secondary political settlements, the distribution and power and resources between elites and their networks, the regional political economy, and the security environment. The two sets of questions are interrelated—the choice of election system, for example, plays a role in shaping elite incentives and mobilization strategies, as recent elections in Afghanistan show. A winner-takes-all presidential election system reduced the scope for power sharing and increased the potential for a violent contestation of power.

A political economy approach means thinking explicitly about the extent to which formal structures and institutional arrangements align with existing configurations of power; a borderlands perspective focuses explicitly on the spatialization of power and how political settlements have subnational and transnational dimensions.

Although international actors have neither the capacity nor the legitimacy to micromanage political settlements or empower borderland elites, they do need to better appreciate underlying power relations, their spatial dynamics, and the vernacular expressions and idioms of local politics (de Waal 2009; World Bank 2012). This provides a more convincing platform for “behind border reforms” (World Bank 2009). The notion that institutions should be “spatially blind,” as advocated by the 2009 World Development Report ignores the fact that institutions are culturally and politically embedded and have their own specific histories that need to be accounted for in institutional

designs (World Bank 2009b). In Sri Lanka, for example, many argue that sustainable conflict resolution requires a form of asymmetrical devolution to account for the specific history of grievances among the population of the country’s northeast. Interventions can perhaps create the conditions for more productive “conversations” between states and borderlands—or at the very least not create disincentives for such conversations. This could mean engaging with borderland brokers with unsavory pasts and hybrid institutions that are less than inclusive. As noted in the 2011 World Development Report, there is a need to think carefully about the political and policy signaling that can induce “inclusive enough” political settlements. But accepting hybridity as a feature of the borderland context is not the same thing as reifying or romanticizing it. For example, tribal policing—arbaki—on the Afghanistan–Pakistan frontier is not the solution to security challenges on the periphery and cannot simply be replicated throughout the country as some donors and foreign military forces hoped (Goodhand and Hakimi 2014).

Although development donors do not have the policy levers to directly shape political settlements, their interventions in the area of governance and development have the potential to influence these processes. The kinds of governance capacities promoted by donors are not necessarily the capacities that count in late developing and conflict-ridden countries (Khan, 1995; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). While the goals of good governance are surely desirable, they may be too ambitious given the limited fiscal and reform capacities of such states, and their pursuit can have de-stabilizing effects.

There is a need to look carefully at what kinds of borderland actors, institutions, and processes may bring about security and lead to longer-term developmental and progressive outcomes. Under what conditions would the Grand Barons of Goma invest in longer-term productive activities? How can such processes of graduation be encouraged? For development donors, this could mean rethinking good governance or at least relaxing certain criteria related to it. In the Burmese case, for example, drug money was laundered through state-supported banks and provided the startup capital for development activities in the borderlands (problematic though these are). What kinds of transitional arrangements would enable drug traffickers to become legitimate businessmen or warlords to become state officials (Mukhopadhyay 2014). It is likely in many of these cases, particularly for borderland brokers, that the governance environment would have to change on both sides of the border zone, thus necessitating subnational cooperation across the border. This is what the 2009 World Development Report refers to as “beyond border reforms”—investing in regional cooperation and shared cross-border institutional arrangements, for example, law courts in the Caribbean or central banking in West Africa (World Bank 2009b).

One entry point for tackling governance and state-society relations may be through local service delivery and shared community-level infrastructure. Eldon and Cummins (2012), for example, suggest that in Baluchistan, community management of local health facilities can be an avenue for helping rebuild peoples’ trust in the state. This is in line with the 2011 World Development Report’s advocacy of a bottom-up approach to strengthen

state-society relations. The Afghan National Solidarity Programme, which emerged largely out of the experience of the Kecamatan Development Programme in Indonesia, is another example of a program that seeks to address state-society relations and local governance through service delivery.

### 5.11. Development and Economic Policy

The 2011 World Development Report argues that aid programs need to “build confidence,” “transform institutions,” leading to “transformational outcomes,” and as already noted, it highlights the role of strong leadership and domestic ownership (World Bank 2011). But how exactly do such aspirations translate in a borderland context? Can development interventions nurture trans-border ownership, leadership, and confidence in the state?

As already noted, although the rate of prosperity has been rising globally, it has been accompanied by growing spatial inequalities within countries, particularly between metropolitan hubs and lagging peripheral regions. Economic growth, according to the 2009 World Development Report, has been driven primarily by national and regional centers, which benefit from positive neighborhood effects, including agglomeration, connectivity, and supportive institutions. These characteristics exert a centripetal pull on capital and people, leading to a virtuous cycle of further investment, growth, and innovation. The key development issue is how to respond to growing spatial inequalities and lagging regions, given their implications for social cohesion and state-society relations.

To what extent do economic policies lead to greater economic divergence or convergence at the border? Do they increase or decrease power asymmetries and the depth or gradient at the border? Do they enhance growth across borders or concentrate it on one side? Do they lead to the further extraction of resources from borderlands and funnel them to the metropolitan centers? Or do they generate revenues that are reinvested back into borderland services and infrastructure? To what extent does conventional development assistance in border regions mitigate or exacerbate conflict dynamics?

The 2009 World Development Report distinguishes between inequality of growth and inequality of income, arguing that the former should actually be encouraged and accelerated while the time taken for welfare convergence should be reduced. Some argue that efforts directed at developing lagging regions through targeting economic growth—including area-based development programs, infrastructure programs, tax breaks and incentives for investors, and special economic zones—have a poor track-record. The authors here argue that the state needs to take a more active role in redistributing the fruits of growth to lagging regions through its fiscal and social welfare policies and to focus on improving connectivity and strengthening the capacity of populations in peripheral regions to compete in the national regional and global market places through investments in education and training. This approach is summarized in the report as one of “investing in places” in the growth hubs and “investing in people” in the lagging regions. However, perhaps by looking at development through the lens of economic geography, this analysis

underplays the fact that so-called *lagging* regions are also political and social spaces. Politics, rather than being merely a barrier to efficient spatial interactions, is central to the spatial transformations that development brings. First, as already noted, much of the economic activity going on in these zones falls below the radar of the state and of its enumerators yet has significant economic implications in the borderlands and beyond. In many ways, borderlands are hyperconnected rather than disconnected to global markets, although a distinction should be made between market integration and institutional integration. The economic players in many border regions derive their wealth from their ability to bypass existing institutions through illegal transactions and/or agreements with representatives of these institutions (Walther 2009: 3). Second, by looking at borderlands as political spaces as well as economic zones, it is clear that development policy makers must be cognizant of the cost and benefit distribution of development and its implications for political and social stability. Therefore, in addition to being conflict-sensitive, the World Bank needs to be “border sensitive” because the impact of development efforts on state-society relations, political settlements, and conflict dynamics in borderland zones are likely to be magnified.

There are examples of development efforts that have helped reconnect the populations of borderlands to the state through the extension of state services. Harris (2009) provides an account of how in Turkey the extension of irrigation delivery had positive impacts on notions of citizenship and belonging in the eastern borderland region. And with regard to Colombia–Ecuador–Peru border development programs, the president

of Colombia's 2011 "Borders for Prosperity" plan involved US\$31 million for infrastructure, education, agricultural development, and governance. The Peru–Ecuador joint plan focused on providing infrastructure, education, and health care in communities within 40 kilometers of the border (ICG 2014).

Such efforts are more complicated than simply extending state services or generating peace dividends in borderlands through area-based development and the rehabilitation of marginal areas. On whose terms is reintegration occurring? How are the costs and benefits of new developments distributed? For example, in Burma and Sri Lanka, borderlands development has undermined the political autonomy and voice of borderlands populations. Economic development has been used as a strategy to "blunt the secessionist impulse" and to obviate the need for a more inclusive political settlement. In both places, development has been shaped and driven by a military-commercial nexus, reflected in the militarization around investments and the economic concessions to armed groups.

Borderlands development in Burma has included processes of state territorialization and enclosure; the creation of special economic zones in border regions, economic corridors, infrastructure such as roads and pipelines, mining, and logging. Remote border regions are increasingly being linked to regional transport infrastructure and communications through, for example, the Greater Mekong Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation program. This has been associated with various negative "side effects," including land grabbing, the impoverishment of communities, ecological damage, and insecurity leading to passive and

active resistance to the effects of adverse incorporation in the borderlands (Meehan 2014; TNI 2013; Woods 2011).

Infrastructure development is often at the forefront of efforts to incorporate and settle the borderlands. From a development angle, roads, railways, communications, and irrigation may be seen as necessary public goods that will enable lagging areas to catch up with the rest of the country. However, as the Burmese example shows, the development of transport and communications are rarely linked to the needs and concerns of the borderlands and are frequently shaped by the military and political priorities of the center.

The economic fruits of growing connectivity and investment may be captured by groups other than the populations of the borderlands. Development programs must therefore more explicitly focus on horizontal inequalities—particularly spatial ones. As already noted, this calls into question the assumed desirability of spatially blind institutions in divided societies since targeted political, economic, and social measures may be needed to address horizontal inequalities. To what extent can development overcome spatial poverty traps and rebuild confidence in the state? One example of a spatially targeted development program in the borderlands is the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) program in the Afghanistan–Tajikistan border areas. This involved a multisectoral approach, starting in the 1990s with the provision of humanitarian aid in response to civil wars on both sides of the border and then expanding as security improved into cross-border infrastructure: roads, bridges, markets, and energy; poverty eradication; and food security through a range of services, including health and education,



employment creation, trade promotion, business development, and microenterprises. Some of this program's features may be difficult to replicate. Most significant are the religious connections between the Aga Khan and the Ismaili population, which gave the AKDN a unique entry point into the borderlands. Other features that are potentially more replicable include long-term engagement that spans over two decades; the very significant infusion of resources, such as the investment of about US\$25 million in rehabilitating electrical infrastructure; the strong focus on cross-border initiatives and the emphasis placed on institution building from the start, including cultural and developmental institutions.

Yet success is fragile and wider political events on both sides of the border threaten the gains that have been made, including an outbreak of violence in Khorog in 2012 on the Tajik side of the border as well as declining security in Afghanistan as the insurgency spread to districts close to Ismaili areas. In addition, the AKDN has depended on an unspoken bargain between the Aga Khan and host governments. This involved giving political space to the AKDN to pursue economic development in the borderlands, as long as it steers clear of politics. But many interpreted the violence in Khorog as the unravelling of this bargain, with the Tajik government attempting to reassert its direct control in the borderlands. Within sections of the Pamiri elite, particularly the youth, there is growing dissatisfaction with the notion of economic development at the expense of political voice (Kucera 2013). In some respects, the AKDN has adopted the approach advocated by the 2009 World Development Report (World Bank 2009b) of investing in people in lagging areas—education at all levels has been a major plank of

its work. However, as an area-based development program, in most other ways, it fundamentally diverges from the prescriptions of this report. The fact that it has been a qualified success highlights the primacy of the politics of place—borderlands development is not only about efficient spatial interaction and integration (Rigg et al. 2009). Moreover, recent conflict in the region demonstrates that any advances made are not done so without a struggle; there are interests that benefit from regional inequalities and their perpetuation, and these interests are overrepresented in prevailing institutional arrangements (Rigg et al. 2009: 134).

The AKDN is one of several examples of programs that have attempted to work with and facilitate the mobility of borderlands populations. Education is a good example of how the mobility of students and teachers can be facilitated, whether it is Afghans studying in Khorog and Peshawar or Mexicans studying across the border in the United States. More research into the specific characteristics of cross-border labor markets is needed (see for comparison Brenton et al. 2011) and how policies on one side of the border affect coping and survival strategies on the other. There is a need to think carefully about the balance between market and institutional integration, and to recognize the trade-off between regulation, which aims to manage or mitigate exploitative practices related to cross-border trade and employment, while not undermining the economic niches that are central to the coping economy. Small-scale trade in the borderlands is central to the survival of large sections of its population, but long-term development depends on the emergence of productive, job-creating enterprises in the area. Infrastructure and communications are an important

precondition for this; for example, agricultural commodities in Afghanistan have to cross over the border into Pakistan for further processing due to a lack of power and infrastructure.

A borderlands perspective also means thinking carefully about trade regimes, tariffs, and protection. The default position for regional programs is to encourage the deregulation of trade, simplify the management of cross-border flows, soften borders, and encourage cross-border livelihoods. One example of this orientation is the creation of one-stop border posts meant to reduce transaction costs and border-crossing times. This effort is supported by the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency through regional development programs in Africa. There have been some investments made at the border in hard infrastructure such as ports, railways, and roads in addition to soft infrastructure such as transport-related laws and regulations, custom clearance, and quarantine. However, opening up and integrating borderlands may have damaging effects on the region and could be more broadly destabilizing for the state (Meehan 2014).

Developing markets are not necessarily the same thing as developing states. Successful late developers selectively hardened their borders to protect nascent industries and businesses, prior to opening up border regions to wider competition.

There may be strong incentives for states to cooperate across borders regarding the environment and shared natural resources, such as biodiversity, ecological degradation, pollution, resource management, and drought control—issues that

demand a cross-border approach. As already noted, borderlands may be exporters of “public bads,” but, conversely, could they help create international or regional public goods? In some cases, environmental concerns may be less politically charged than many other border issues and constitute productive entry points for cross-border collaboration. For example, collaboration between Pakistani and Afghan scientists over shared water resources along the Durand Line has the potential to be track-three diplomacy, which paves the way for more contentious issues to be addressed.<sup>18</sup> Environmental social movements and nongovernmental organizations have also become essential agents in tackling trans-border environmental issues. However, while there are technical dimensions to these issues, there is no avoiding their political core—as various efforts to develop agreements in the Middle East over shared water sources show. This relates to the international and regional politics, as well as domestic tussles over the types of fiscal and social contracts negotiated between states and borderlands, the nature of the political coalitions, and the extent to which resource flows and rents are shared with elites and the wider population of the borderlands. In Burma, for example, land-use laws negotiated between the state and elites in the borderlands systematically undermine farmers’ traditional land-use rights (TNI 2013).

Some of the most rapidly urbanizing places in the world are located in borderlands, and border towns generate their own unique development opportunities and challenges. They are important

18. Similarly, Indian and Pakistani water experts, climate change specialists, economists, and former ambassadors have been involved in developing a road map for shared research and water resource management in the Indus Basin.

growth hubs, but they raise difficult questions about how this growth is managed and how boom-and-bust dynamics can be transformed into longer term, productive trajectories of development. There is scope for, and some experience of, cross-border collaboration between urban councils, municipalities, local politicians, chambers of commerce, private business associations, and others, on dealing with the challenges of providing services and stimulating and managing growth in border towns. Frontier towns are also magnets for refugees and internally displaced people. They tend to have highly fluid and mobile populations. On one level, these groups may be seen as a drain on resources and services and as competitors in labor markets, but research also shows that they make significant contributions to the economy and are a source of the economic dynamism as well as a new market for goods and services. Rigid visa and migration policies may undermine the potential pay offs that regions can derive from movement between growth poles. And uncoordinated policies on both sides of the border can have perverse effects, which doubly undermine the coping strategies of borderlands populations. For example, counter-narcotics policies in eastern Afghanistan in the mid 2000s occurred at a time when the Pakistani authorities were clamping down on Afghans who were working illegally in Peshawar—the simultaneous closing down of two critical economic niches sent many Afghan households into indebtedness and destitution, leading to the forced sale of assets and perversely creating the conditions for a rebound in poppy cultivation, which provided the only avenue for repaying debts (Mansfield 2011).

## 5.12. Conclusions

A borderlands perspective presents challenges to how conflict, development, and statebuilding are conceptualized and responded to. This paper has been critical of the tendency among policy makers to view borderlands as marginal, disconnected, and ungoverned zones that need to be pacified, incorporated, and developed. This state-centric perspective, which views borderlands as passive receptors of state policies and initiatives, misses the role that the margins play in constituting power at the center. A borderlands perspective renders visible processes that are obscured in state-centric modes of analysis. While some borderlands may be lagging regions, others are laboratories of political and economic change. In these marginal spaces, the battles over the mobilization of coercion, capital, and representation are particularly intense and contested. The outcomes of these battles have broader significance because they could shape the trajectory of statebuilding and development processes within countries and wider regions.

A political economy lens of borderlands which involves thinking about the interconnections between power, space, and time, does not generate a simple set of policy prescriptions. To some extent, it reinforces what is already known to be good practice—taking context seriously, understanding power relations, having long-term perspectives, and appreciating history, as examples. And perhaps its chief value to policy makers is to provide another analytical lens—along gender, conflict, and the environment—that can be deployed in contexts where the dynamics of the borderlands are a significant factor. This should

lead to more targeted, contextually attuned policies that are cognizant of processes on both sides of the border.

However, a borderlands perspective could have more radical implications than this. By exposing the linkages between insecurity and poverty in borderland regions and the metropolitan centers, it shows that many of the “pathologies” of the margins are generated by policy regimes and initiatives emanating from the putative center.

A borderland lens may therefore point toward the need for a more systemic reappraisal of current policies directed at peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development. At the very least, it calls into question several mainstream assumptions, including: statebuilding and peacebuilding are synonymous, extending the state footprint into borderlands will bring peace and stability, economic integration will reduce insecurity and poverty in border regions, and promoting good governance will help stabilize borderlands.

A borderlands perspective encourages a more systematic analysis of the trade-offs of different sets of policy goals and interventions. It also means being more spatially attuned to who bears the costs of these various interventions.

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