SUDAN: FREEDOM, PEACE, AND JUSTICE

“we have risen, against those who stole our sweat.”

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**Acronyms**

ACC Anti-Corruption Committee  
ALC Authority, Legitimacy, Capacity  
AU African Union  
CIFP Country Indicators for Foreign Policy  
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement  
CSO Civil Society Organization  
EU European Union  
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment  
FFC Forces for Freedom and Change  
FY Fiscal Year  
GDP Gross Domestic Product  
GEF Global Environment Facility  
HD Human Development  
ICC International Criminal Court  
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons  
IMF International Monetary Fund  
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization  
JEM Justice and Equality Movement  
MFI Microfinance Institution  
NISS National Intelligence and Security Service  
NGO Non-governmental Organization  
RSF Rapid Support Forces  
SLM/AW Sudan Liberation Army faction led by Abdul Wahid  
SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/Army  
SLA-MM Sudan Liberation Movement/Army faction led by Minni Minawi  
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army  
SRF Sudan Revolutionary Front  
TMC Transitional Military Council  
UAE United Arab Emirates  
UN United Nations  
UNAMID The African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur  
UNDP United Nations Development Program  
UNICEF United Nations  
UNIFSA United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and United Nations  
UNSC United Nations Security Council  
USAID United States Agency for International Development  
WHO World Health Organization  
WFP World Food Program
Executive Summary
Sudan has ranked as one of the most fragile states in the world for the past decade. Since the establishment of the interim government in August 2019, international donors such as the EU have expressed renewed commitment to aid after years of sanctions and dwindling aid inflows. Ultimately, however, a successful transition to democratic representation is dependent upon the interim government’s ability to navigate economic and environmental threats while it replaces former corrupt patronage systems and internal conflicts with legitimate governance of the country.

This report identifies weak governance, a fragile economy, and environmental pressures as key drivers of fragility that undermine the functions of the state and contribute to protracted security threats. We also find that the weak legitimacy of the state has been at the center of Sudan’s fragility and adversely affects state authority and capacity. Drawing from these observations, our three targeted policy recommendations are to establish a microfinancing initiative, to set up an independent anti-corruption commission, and to introduce local CSOs as mediators for upcoming peace processes. The implementation of these policies offers the interim government of Sudan the best chance to exit the fragility trap and successfully transition to democracy.

Methods
This report uses CIFP methods to provide an explanation for Sudan’s persistent state of fragility. Indicators of fragility collected from several sources including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Heritage International, among others, were collected and measured through clusters; governance, economic development, human development, demography, environment, and security. The values and recent trends noted in each of these categories are used to determine the primary and secondary drivers of fragility. We proceed to conduct an Authority-Legitimacy-Capacity (ALC) assessment in order to identify the areas of governance that are weakest in Sudan. Using both the cluster analysis and the ALC assessment, we recommend several policies that target both the immediate and deeply rooted causes of fragility in the country. Outdated sources, unreliable and potentially corrupted data collected internally, and the major shifts in governance in recent months pose potential problems in the collection of data. The limitations that result from these flaws in the data have been taken into account in the analysis.

Background
Sudan has been stuck in a cycle of recurring conflict for decades. The country became independent from colonial rule in 1956 and since that time, successive regimes failed to gain acceptance by the entire population. Lack of economic development in the South, along with longstanding ethnic and religious tensions stemming from the imposition of Islamic politics from Northern politicians resulted in a longstanding civil war between the North and the South beginning in 1955. The first Addis Ababa Agreement brought a temporary conclusion to hostilities in 1972 but the conflict was soon reignited in 1983. At the peak of the civil war in 2003, the government militia Janjaweed committed ethnic cleansing in Darfur. After many more attempts at negotiations and broken agreements, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 concluded the warfare, established a new constitution, and led to South Sudan’s independence in January 2011 after a referendum. However, conflict with armed groups is ongoing in Darfur and along the border in South Kordofan, notably in Abyei. In December 2018, protests in Khartoum triggered by deteriorating economic situation and rising food costs rapidly shifted to encompass the population’s deep discontent with the corrupt 30-year regime of President Omar al-Bashir.

In April, after violent efforts to suppress protestors failed, the military arrested Bashir and created the Transitional Military Council (TMC) to rule the country for one year. Protests broke out again because citizens saw the TMC as a vestige of the old regime that failed to meet their demands for legitimate civilian representation. A new agreement, signed on August 19, 2019, established a new interim government- a power-sharing agreement between civilians and the military with a commitment to transition to democratic representation within three years.

Photo credit: [https://www.washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com)

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1 Refer to Annex 1 for measures of Sudan’s fragility from several indices
2 For definitions of italicized terms, see Annex 2
3 Refer to Annex 3 for a timeline of recent events and Annex 4 for more information on Darfur and South Sudan conflict
4 Refer to Annex 3 (timeline) for additional contextual information
End User: Interim Government

We propose to bring this policy brief to the newly formed interim government composed of the Prime Minister and the sovereign council; the council includes five members of the old TMC military establishment and six members of the new civilian-led government. In recent months, Sudan has seen a major shift in the social contract between civilians and the military, resulting in the formation of the interim government and its mandate to ensure a smooth transition to democracy within three years. In the first few months of this new government, it is essential that it establishes itself as more legitimate than the status quo authoritarian government and that it mitigates looming economic and environmental threats. Our policies will engage with specific actors within the new government. Although Sudan receives substantial aid from powerful partners such as EU and Saudi/UAE, we believe that these partners cannot provide legitimacy. Sustainable change must stem from change within the government rather than be imposed from the outside. Despite its history of corrupt rule, Sudan’s recent unprecedented accession of civilian empowerment presents a valuable opportunity to introduce innovative policies that previous governments were not receptive toward.

Stakeholders

**Internal Stakeholders:** These stakeholders represent the political elites who are either in power or competing for power.

*The Rapid Support Force (RSF)* is an elite military institution created in 2013 that recruits heavily from Arabic pastoralists in North Darfur. It is led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo aka ‘Himeidti, the commander of Janjaweed- the government-sponsored militia behind the Darfur Conflict ethnic cleansing. He is also believed to be at the center of a web of patronage, secret security deals, and political payoffs. The RSF, which has been described as a “state within a state” is the main driver of conflict-related deaths and displaced 100,000 people in 2018. From May to October 2019, the force also attacked and killed protestors during sit-ins and at gold mines. Since 2015, it has attacked local populations and rebel militias to gain access to gold mines- the main base of the rentier state. Most of the gold is exported to UAE and Saudi Arabia in exchange for political and financial backing of the military.

*The Transitional Military Council (TMC)* overthrew Bashir’s government in 2018. Protests against the military government from April to July led them to negotiate with the civilian-backed FFC to create a joint interim transitional government in August 2019. Its leader- Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces has also been tied to war crimes in Darfur and is currently the leader of the Sovereign Council for the first 21 months of the interim government. Burhan pledged to make the interim period successful but the TMC is also closely tied to the RSF and threatened to fire government employees for striking and imposed an internet shut-down to end civil disobedience.

The power base of the TMC has also been threatened by foiled internal coups.

*The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)* is a joint rebel force that includes SPLM/A North, JEM, SLM/A and SLA-MM in the Darfur/Blue Nile region. The rebel forces that form the SRF have been fighting the RSF since 2003 under different names and associations. It played a central role with the FFC in the 2019 protests in shaping the transitional government. However, the SRF contains multiple factions with different interests, making it highly unstable and difficult to coordinate peace negotiations that address each faction’s concerns. The SLA/AW under Abdel Wahid al-Nur is still unwilling to negotiate with the interim government. Nevertheless, all factions are interested in resolving the political and economic marginalization at the hands of the ruling regime in Khartoum. The current leader El Hadi Idris is intent on achieving peace with the government through negotiations by 2020.

*The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC)* is a wide political coalition of civilian and rebel coalitions of Sudanese groups, including the SRF. The FFC drafted the declaration that called for the removal of former president Omar al-Bashir and sparked mass civil disobedience action in 2018 and 2019. Since the TMC and the FFC reached power sharing agreement on July 5, the FFC has selected five civilian representatives for the Legislative Assembly. The

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Refer to Annex 3 for a timeline of recent events
Refer to Figure 5.2 Annex 5 for more comprehensive summary of rebel faction relationships
group’s top priority is to achieve sustainable peace instituted through a civil government. They also have a particular focus on capacity-building with a commitment to health and education, especially in IDP camps.  

**Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok** is the 15th Prime Minister of Sudan appointed by the Sovereign Council, backed by the civilian-led FFC and sworn in on the 21st of August 2019. Prior to his appointment, he served as the Deputy Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa from 2011 to 2018. He has vowed to work towards ending the economic crisis and establishing peace.  

Internal Non-Political Stakeholders

**Farmer and Pastoralist ethnic groups** have long-lasting conflicts between nomadic Arabic pastoralists such as the Misseriya and stationary farmers such as the Masalit or Dinka. These types of resource conflicts have been ongoing for decades and the Sudanese government historically sided with and even armed the Misseriya. This enabled the Misseriya to loot and pillage farming communities, leading to mass displacement of Masalit in Darfur. Many of these former looters have yet to be disarmed. Peacebuilding efforts by INGOS have held inter-group conferences in Abyei to sign local peace agreements in 2018.

**IDPs and refugees** fleeing from conflict mainly settle in Darfur and along the South Sudan/Sudan border. The majority of Darfurian refugees belong to the Masalit group who have been displaced through clashes with nomadic Arabic pastoralists since the 1990s. Although IDPs initially rejected the recent power-sharing agreement in government, leaders of displaced camps in Darfur eventually met with Prime Minister Hamdok at the Zamzam and Abu Shouk camps in North Darfur early November 2019. The five demands that were presented to the new government include security stabilization in the Darfur region, disarmament of the Janjaweed, Restoration of land, compensation for displacement, and surrendering Bashir to the ICC. IDPs are also demanding the government to allow humanitarian organizations to return.

**Protestors**: The majority of demonstrators who participated in the protest and social movements did not belong to political parties or active civil society organizations. However, the youth in Sudan have become more organized under the umbrella of the Sudanese Professional Association and have called Bashir to step down.

External Stakeholders

**Saudi Arabia and UAE** have major shares in gold and agricultural land provided by the Sudanese military’s patronage system. Although the level of foreign investment in the military is unknown, UAE and Saudi Arabia play an important role in supporting the RSF’s use of force. Sudan also provides military support for Saudi’s war in Yemen. Although opposition parties and protesters see UAE/Saudi as anti-democratic land grabbers who fuel food insecurity among local population, the current joint government is interested in boosting UAE/Saudi investment. This is because UAE/Saudi have contributed significant aid to Sudan. In April, UAE/Saudi sent Sudan $3 billion worth of food shipment and $500 million to the Central Bank. In October, UAE/Saudi confirmed 540,000 tons of wheat to Sudan.

**The United States’** listing of Sudan on its terror list is one reason why Sudan is unable to diversify its economy and receive loans from the World Bank and the IMF. The US has declared that it could lift this sanction on the conditions that the interim government reach a peace agreement with the rebel groups and prove that it is truly a civilian government. Sudan is an important partner to the US because in the past. Cooperation between security forces from Sudan, US, and EU has been key to preventing the passage of Mediterranean-bound migrants and refugees through Sudan. Through USAID, Sudan’s largest donor, the US has also donated more than $356 million dollars of funding in humanitarian assistance in Sudan for FY2019.

**The EU** is another main funder of the new Sudanese regime. On October 30, 2019. The EU Countries announced that 466 million euros mix of grant and aid will be allocated to support the interim government in the democratic and economic reforms. These projects will focus on the most vulnerable populations including refugees and IDP communities. In November 2019, Hamdok met with EU leaders to secure an additional 55 million euros of financial support for humanitarian aid. The EU is interested in ensuring that the civilian transition remains an inclusive process, including an appropriate role for youth and women.

*Refer to Annex 5 for more information on external stakeholders*

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8 Refer to Figure 11.2 in Annex 11 for breakdown of external funding.
Fragility Risk Assessment

This analysis projects the trends and key events for the six drivers of fragility in Sudan over the next 6-8 months. We identify the three primary drivers of fragility to be governance, economic development, and the environment. These drivers also indirectly affect our three secondary drivers of security, human development, and demography. For each driver, we include important indicators and trends to present an accurate and comprehensive projection of the impact on fragility in Sudan. Each cluster also includes an analysis of relevant events and actors and entry points for our end user.

Table Descriptions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Impact on Fragility</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trend over previous decade</td>
<td>Deteriorating ↓</td>
<td>Stable →</td>
<td>Improving ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or over time period where data is available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Primary Drivers:

Governance: Stabilizing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness[^40]</td>
<td>Score: 30.8/100 stable from 29.4/100 (2008), Rank: 49/54 African countries (2017) Where 100 is the most effective</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Corruption[^41]</td>
<td>Score: 16/100, Rank: 172/180 (2018) Where 100 is the least corrupt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender[^42] includes gender equality, women's political representation, women's labour participation, laws on violence against women</td>
<td>Score 33.8/100 (2017) increased 10.0 from 2008 Where 100 represents complete gender equality</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation[^44] includes political and civil society participations and democratic elections participation</td>
<td>Score 20.3/100 (2017) increased 5.3 from 2008 Where 100 is the most effective</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights[^45] includes civil rights, freedom of expressions, human rights protection</td>
<td>Score 16.2/100 (2017) decreased -3.6 from 2008 Where 100 is the most effective</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law (estimate from 12 sources)[^46]</td>
<td>-1.12 (2018) increased from -1.42 (2008) On a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 where 2.5 is the best governance</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability in Decision-making[^47]</td>
<td>-1.84 (2018) decreased from -1.64 (2008) On a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 where 2.5 is the best governance</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sudan is known to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world according to Transparency International.[^48] Corruption and nepotism are rampant in all government sectors and civilians have been forced to bribe public servants for services to which they would normally be entitled.[^49] However, Sudan has an entrenched tradition of civil society acting to fill gaps in government capacity, especially in rural communities, that can be used as an entry point.[^50] CSOs serve as a local legitimate source of governance based on strong social traditions of ‘nafeer’ which emphasizes customs of communal support and volunteerism. Groups such as the Sudan Journalist Network, The Sudan Doctor’s Committee, and the Darfur Bar Association united diverse groups of the population and grew in legitimacy through membership and merit rather than government approval.[^51] The government historically imposed strict rules and regulations on these groups that served as barriers to entry, operation, and international contact that impeded their work on the ground.[^52] It is vital that the strenuous relationships between the government and these groups are
improved in order to build the legitimacy of the state, boost its service capacity, and bolster its international reputation.

Sudan is a textbook case of ethnic marginalization and state predation as institutional pathways to state fragility. Throughout his three decades as President, Bashir strongly oppressed opposing parties and minority ethnic groups such as the non-Arab groups in Darfur and South Kordofan, spurring ongoing conflict with rebel groups. Although numerous peace agreements were signed, they have repeatedly been violated due to cheating by fighting elites who are unaccountable to vulnerable populations. There is now potential for a sustainable power-sharing agreement between the SRF and the government in upcoming peace negotiations. In large part, this is due to two new agreements, the Addis Ababa and Juba accords. The negotiation of the Political Charter in Addis Ababa in September included the SRF into Sudan’s constitutional framework. The Juba Declaration of Principles signed on September 11, 2019, put confidence-building mechanisms in place between the government and the SRF and paves the way for peace negotiations anticipated to start in December 2019.

Increased support for democracy across all socio-demographic groups creates a change in the social contract which requires the interim government to restructure the old, corrupt autocratic regime into a democratic one that addresses the population’s needs. To shift towards positive political legitimacy, the interim government should address key concerns of managing the economy and corruption that civilian mobilization has emphasized. However, there are many potential spoilers that pose a threat to the stability of the interim government. The tumultuous relationship between the two governing bodies is chief among these risks. Military elites are reluctant to relinquish the rentier benefits that sustained their old regime and security expenditure. The fractures in the government are deepened by external stakeholders such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE who fund the RSF, a major threat to civil and political liberties.

### Economy: Deteriorating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Name</th>
<th>Indicator Description</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth %</td>
<td>-2.321% (2018) down from 4.283% in 2017</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt</td>
<td>56.9% of GNI (2018) up from 19.3% (2017)</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)</td>
<td>2.8% (2018) up from 0.9% (2017)</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation- consumer prices (annual)</td>
<td>32.4% (2019) up from 19.9% (2017)</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Economy – Black Market</td>
<td>47.7/100, Rank: 166/180 (2019) Where 100 is the highest possible score</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance – % of GDP</td>
<td>-11.5% (2018) down from -3.7% (2017)</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment – Total (% of total labour force)</td>
<td>12.9% (2018)</td>
<td>No data for other years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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h Refer to figure 9.4 in Annex 9
i Refer to Figure 6.2 in Annex 6
j Refer to Figure 6.3 in Annex 6
k Refer to Figure 6.1 in Annex 6
Several factors operated concurrently in recent years to trigger an economic crisis. Sudan was put on the US state sponsor of terrorism list due to human rights violations committed under Bashir’s regime. The sanctions imposed by this distinction blocked investments and prevented the country from resolving its large external debt, which has skyrocketed in recent years. Additionally, the succession of South Sudan resulted in Sudan’s loss of 70% of oil reserves and a dramatic drop in the country’s export revenues. In 2011, natural resources made up 20.88% of the GDP but they dropped to 4.62% in 2017. The source of the country’s economic fragility, however, is more deeply rooted than these triggers. A patronage system driven by Bashir’s regime hijacked Sudan’s economy and drove it into a *lethal feedback loop*. Gold replaced oil as a ‘rent’ in the large illicit economy and opaque market with heavy military and security involvement to fund the state apparatus and the political elite. High risks of illicit financial practices characterize the business environment while *grey companies* controlled by the government and the security sector dominated the Sudanese marketplace. Overvalued foreign exchange rates for the import of strategic goods benefited the inner circle of power and drove prices up in the black market. Agriculture also serves as a key driver of fragility as well as an entry point since it is a crucial source of livelihood for rural and vulnerable populations that are excluded from the state’s rentier benefits. Agriculture as a percentage of Sudan’s GDP increased by almost 10% but dropped slightly in 2018 due to poor climate conditions. Bashir introduced economic reforms in 2017 and 2018 in an effort to reform the plummeting economy. But reforms mainly focused on taxing the population to maintain inflated government spending on the security sector and protect patronage networks. In 2018, while inflation was also driving up food prices, the government removed subsidies on fuel and grain. The subsequent economic crisis brought on broader discontent about economic corruption and triggered widespread protests. The newly instated finance minister, Ibrahim Elbadawi, has introduced a reform strategy based on UN Sustainable Development Goals. Though there is hope that the interim government can make conservative improvements, the corruption that underpins the Sudanese economy persists as a blockade to development and a driver of fragility.

### Environment: Deteriorating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value and Trend</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of coping capacities</td>
<td>92.62% (2019) stable from 92.89% (2015) Where 100% is the highest lack of coping capacity</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of adaptive capacities</td>
<td>55.94% (2019) improve from 58.56% (2015) Where 100% is the highest lack of adaptive capacity</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susceptibility</td>
<td>46.04% (2016) improve from 51.38% (2015) Where 100% is the highest level of susceptibility</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF Funding</td>
<td>57 projects: 23 national, 26 regional/global $221.52 million grant funding: $41 M national, $138 M regional/global</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual freshwater withdrawals agriculture (% of freshwater withdrawal)</td>
<td>96.2% (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual freshwater withdrawals total (% of internal resources)</td>
<td>673.3% (2014) stable from 673.3% (2012)</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Refer to Annex 8 for more information
2 Refer to Annex 7
3 Refer to Figure 9.1 and 9.2 in Annex 9 for pattern and trend of protests.
Although Sudan has a wealth of natural resources, the rentier state reserves vast agricultural land and billion-dollar hydropower dams for foreign investment that ultimately benefit the rentier elites. This leaves scarce resources for the rest of the Sudanese population.\(^8\) Climate change and natural disaster coupled by a high lack of coping capacity endanger Sudan’s most vulnerable populations. Floods in Leiba, East Jebel Marra, South Darfur, destroyed housing for refugees and IDPs.\(^4\) Recent flooding in August displaced more than 200,000 people in 15 states.\(^5\) Even if the country manages to avoid major disasters, rising temperatures, rapid desertification, and population pressures deplete water resources at an unsustainable rate, putting resource pressures on the agricultural sector. Despite climbing temperatures, 65\% of the population pursue climate-sensitive livelihoods.\(^6\) The worst crop crisis for small-holder agriculture in 25 years has led farmers to migrate to urban areas which ultimately increased the price of food and sparked the 2018 protests.\(^7\) Resource pressures also exacerbate farmer-herder clashes. For decades, pastoralists and farmers have fought over competing land claims. Although Sudan has a medium susceptibility to environmental risks, 60 to 70\% of the population are still highly vulnerable because of the state’s lack of capacity to cope with environmental shocks such as drought and floods.\(^8\) A National Adaptation Plan was established in 2007 but was largely unimplemented. The interim government currently lacks the administrative capacity required to carry through on the plan or to put forth other rapid intervention and contingency plans. CSOs and international organizations such as GEF and FAO have sought to fill the void but there is a need for more integrated long-term adaptation activities rather than short-term, stand-alone projects.\(^9\) The EU can offer financial support as the government begins to make strides toward sustainable change and environmental capacity building. The survival of the state is dependent on its capacity to mitigate these types of events while simultaneously growing its agricultural economy.

**Secondary Drivers**

**Security:** Improving

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of conflict-related deaths and actor causing death(^{90})</td>
<td>deaths: total= 455 (2018) non-state= 139 state=247 one-sided=69</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Improving from 2013: total deaths=1958</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Safety(^{91})</td>
<td>24.5/100 (2018) -9.1 from 2008</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Where 100 is the highest level of perception of personal safety</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention of other states or external actors(^{92})</td>
<td>2019=8.9 Declining from 2016: 10</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Where 10 is the highest level of intervention</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Grievance(^{93})</td>
<td>10/10 (2019) similar from 2015: 9.8</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Where 10 is the highest level of group grievance</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Apparatus(^{94})</td>
<td>8.4 (2019) declining from 2013 9.8</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Where 10 is the highest level of security apparatus</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability and absence of Violence(^{95})</td>
<td>5.71 (2018) percentile rank: Improving from 1.44 (2008)</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Where 10 is the highest level of political stability</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contestation over governance between the RSF and SRF weakens Sudan’s security. Previous unsuccessful peace agreements lock Sudan in a conflict trap where fighting is often fueled by cleavages that stem from the Darfur civil war.\(^{96}\) In the past year after Bashir was overthrown, intermittent fighting between RSF and rebels declined significantly\(^9\) and has been mostly restricted to the Jebel Mara region in East Darfur.\(^{97}\) The interim government is hopeful that upcoming peace agreements will resolve political and economic grievances and put an end to the violence. But internal group factionalism of armed groups united under the SRF threatens to disrupt the negotiations

\(^{9}\) Refer to figure 9.3 and 9.4 in Annex 9
and drive the country further into violent conflict. Vulnerable populations are most affected by state-sponsored violence. For example, mistrust of state security forces is still a main concern for IDPs seeking to repatriate land. Conflict also exacerbates the use of sexual violence by RSF against women which largely goes unpunished and underreported.\textsuperscript{98} The RSF is also a main threat to protestors exercising their civil rights as demonstrated by the massacre of protestors in the summer of 2019. Environmental degradation and increasing scarcity of resources also drives non-state violence. Fatalities recorded among 22 ethnic groups between 2012 and 2018 mostly involved conflicts over resources between pastoralist and farming communities.\textsuperscript{99}

**Human Development: Improving**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Name</th>
<th>Value and Trend</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to Improved Water (% of population with access)\textsuperscript{100}</td>
<td>60.3% (2017) 51.9% in 2010 53.2%, rural (2017) 44.2% in 2010</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education – Primary Enrolment (% gross)\textsuperscript{101}</td>
<td>76.82% (2018) Steady growth since 69.49% in 2010</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security - Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)\textsuperscript{102}</td>
<td>20.1% (2017) 23.5% in 2012</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Inequality Index (GII)\textsuperscript{103}</td>
<td>0.560, Rank: 177/189 countries (2018) 0.625 in 2010 Where 0.0 is perfect equality</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (HDI)\textsuperscript{104}</td>
<td>0.502, Rank: 167/189 countries (2018) 0.419 in 2011 Where 1.0 is the highest possible performance in HD</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality (per 1,000 live births)\textsuperscript{105}</td>
<td>42.1% (2018) drop from 51.2% in 2019 Where lower percentage represents improvement to mortality rates</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite some growth in recent years, Sudan still consistently scores low in indicators for education and health. Food security has become a particular concern as the economic crisis has increased the cost of consumer goods and as climate change poses a risk to crop yields. Various horizontal inequalities result in risks that are particularly acute for vulnerable populations that include ethnic and religious minorities, the growing population of IDPs, and women. Traditional mechanisms of local governance based on tribal affiliation in Darfur are the prerogative of men and elders and fail to represent women and youth.\textsuperscript{106} Regions also vary for rates of lived poverty. Rural areas have twice as much poverty compared to urban areas, while Darfur five times more poverty than the capital, Khartoum.\textsuperscript{9} Nevertheless, perceptions of living conditions remain similar across all regions, urban/rural areas, and genders.\textsuperscript{9} Civil society operating outside of state regulation filled the gaps in service delivery, particularly to populations in conflict affected areas. For example, the Women’s Cooperative Union protects tea ladies from harassment by police, set up daycare centers, and provides literacy programs.\textsuperscript{107} International donors such as the EU and USAID have also focused their efforts on humanitarian relief, water sanitation and hygiene, and food security.\textsuperscript{7} In order to address the root of poor human development, efforts must be made to move from reactive humanitarian response toward proactive efforts to improve infrastructure and investments in the education and health of the population. It is expected that addressing primary drivers of fragility and engaging with civil society will result in improved human development.

**Demography and population: Improving**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refer to figure 10.1 in Annex 10</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refer to figure 10.2 in Annex 10</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refer to Figure 11.1 in Annex 11</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>42 million estimated, 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth, 2018</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Growth Rate, 2018</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration - Estimated Net</td>
<td>-250,001.0, 2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data for other years</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>22.68 people per square kilometer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.43 people per square kilometer in 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of persons of concern identified in need of resettlement submitted for resettlement</td>
<td>36.1% (2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising according to UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internally displaced population</td>
<td>1,864,195 million (2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropping according to UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Bulge: Population ages 0-14 (% of total population)</td>
<td>40.5% (2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.99% in 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil war, conflicts over climate change-related resource pressures, and natural disasters drive population displacement. The prolonged RSF-SRF conflict spilling over from the Darfur crisis pushed more than two million people into IDP camps in Sudan- 48% of whom are children. In the past five years, there has been a spike in foreign refugees mostly from South Sudan who accounted for more than 750 000 new refugees. The improved security situation in recent years has resulted in a small decrease in the number of people living in displacement camps. The large IDP population still persists as a primary concern because the government has neglected to provide basic services to IDPs camps. This renders INGOs and CSOs incapable of filling these gaps without permanent support. There has also been exponential migration to urban areas and Khartoum, Gezira, and South Darfur. The Youth Bulge is also a concern because a lack of employment and opportunities has sparked discontent across this demographic that leads to unstable political conditions.  

**ALC Analysis**

The ALC model proposed by Carment et al. disaggregates the necessary components of a functioning state through measures of its authority, legitimacy, and capacity. This approach to fragility establishes specific targets for policy within these areas while paying credence to structural features and state-society relations. Sudan ranks poorly in each of these areas, but legitimacy is the greatest concern for Sudan. Weak legitimacy has resulted in several security concerns that weakened the authority of the state, despite an overinflated security regime and repressive tactics. Capacity has also suffered based on weak legitimacy and corrupt practices that prevent the fair distribution of resources and delivery of services. We propose that there is an entry point for the new government to improve legitimacy that will have a carry-over effect on capacity. Additionally, efforts to improve the social-contract of the state will result in the improvement of state authority as citizens will be less likely to resist its rule and accept peace negotiations.

**Authority:** The ability of the state to provide security and exercise control within its territory.

The recent shift away from an authoritarian regime signals a decline in authority which may, in fact, decrease fragility. Former president Bashir used an overinflated security apparatus to silence resistance and to uphold his rule. Although the RSF violently repressed protests in early 2019, the military was ultimately incapable of silencing protestors. The transfer of power to the FFC by including 6 civilians in the 11 members of the Sovereign Council demonstrates a decline in the state’s authoritative capacity which may offer an entry point for reform in legitimacy. By agreeing to negotiate with rebel groups over governance structures, the government is transitioning towards a more inclusive system that replaces the previous imposition of authority through violence. However, RSF’s patronage system still has control over rentier benefits and hinders the rest of the population’s economic development. This would prevent citizens from accepting the authority of the state.

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*a* Refer to Figure 9.7 and 9.8 in Annex 9  
*b* Refer to Figure 9.5 in Annex 9  
*c* Refer to Annex 12
Legitimacy: The population’s allegiance to the state and focuses on state-society relations. The Sudanese government’s legitimacy has historically been low. The RSF’s corrupt patronage system and monopoly over the economy locked the government in a vicious feedback loop that reinforced weak legitimacy. Citizens have low confidence in the old authoritarian government that was coupled with a general mistrust of international forces such as the UNIFSA mission resulting in a weak social contract. Increased support of the joint military-civilian interim government and renewed interest of rebels in negotiating a sustainable peace with the government is a signal that legitimacy may be improving. This fragile new social contract can succeed if immediate concerns of economic stagnation improve and upcoming peace negotiations address security concerns of populations vulnerable to state-sponsored violence. Ultimately, in the long term, legitimacy improvement is heavily dependent on the interim government’s ability to navigate a pathway out of the vicious feedback loop that has been a stonewall for improved legitimacy in the past. The interim government can also improve its legitimacy by ensuring that marginalized groups such as women and youth can exercise their civil rights through CSOs and representation in governance and peace agreements.

Capacity: The potential for the state to respond and provide resources to the population. The state’s capacity to deliver services is low. As a result, public support from civil society and people-driven solutions to socio-economic challenges increases when the government is unaccountable to its citizenry. For example, CSOs and NGOs provide up to 70% of curative health services in North Darfur when public expenditure on health is below 1.8% of the GDP. The restructuring of the government has created an opportunity to re-evaluate the internal functions and capacities of the state. Although the new government has not yet taken any concrete action towards improving its capacity to deliver services, the government can leverage existing networks of locally-entrenched CSOs. This would ensure that policies and services target all segments of the population, including minorities, vulnerable populations, and those in hard to reach regions. In addition, renewed commitment to aid by international donors offers the interim government the opportunity to redefine its relationship with the aid community and engage in international partnerships. Donors, and the EU in particular, can act as powerful safeguards of change through their support to the interim government.

Scenarios
Based on the Fragility Assessment presented above, these are the scenarios for the next six months (December 2019 to May 2020) that our recommended policies will try to achieve and avoid.

Baseline: The agreement signed between TMC and FFC remains very fragile due to internal divisions that render the government inoperable. The government made economic reform a primary priority but internal patronage, gold trade racketeering, and RSF-linked companies are a spoiler for most urgently needed reforms. The economic situation remains the same and the government fails to meet the basic needs of its population, especially those living in rural areas and conflict zones. Additionally, Sudan relies on external stakeholders (Saudis and UAE) to provide Sudan with fuel and aid, deepening their dependence on the patronage system which hinders fair economic development. The delays in removing Sudan from the US list of countries sponsoring terrorism limits donors’ necessary support for economic reform and thus focus only on humanitarian aid. Finally, the negotiation of a successful peace or power sharing agreement fails to meet the demands of the people and empower women. This increases tensions and conflict over scarce resources in rural areas while environmental pressures continue to put a strain on resources and exacerbate food security.

Worst-Case: Internal division between FFC and TMC prevents the transitional government from creating structural change. This division is also fueled by Saudi and UAE who favor military and RSF generals and feed the patronage system. The civilian representatives in the government fail to combat this corruption and subsequently reform the economy. Growing refugee and IDP populations and high unemployment put pressure on the weak services. Moreover, restrictions on CSOs and NGOs by the government also leave millions of vulnerable populations without protection and basic needs. The situation is particularly stark considering the potential for environmental crises such as drought, dust storms from May through July, or flooding beginning in April. Mediators of peace negotiations do not possess the capacity or authority to bring the authoritarian military regime and rebel groups to reach a sustainable peace agreement. Consequently, the conflict in Darfur and South Kordofan escalates. Low perceptions of the legitimacy of the government also result in renewed widespread protests that turn violent. Under these circumstances, it is likely that Hemditi will take power in a military coup. Worse, the circumstances could result in a full-scale civil war with implications for the region if conflict spills over the borders.

Best-Case:

 Refer to Figure 6.4 in Annex 6
Continued protests push the reluctant parties of the interim government into reforming the economy, fighting corruption, and shifting revenues from military expenditure to funding civil service. These efforts, coupled with improved transparency, incentivizes the population to compromise on certain demands in the short term which decreases civil unrest. Carefully mediated and monitored peace negotiations work towards an implementable agreement that addresses governance concerns and IDP security concerns. These efforts satisfy the majority of warring parties and disincentive cheating. Meanwhile, the country enters its dry season with climate resilience plans that also mitigate natural disasters through the onset of the rainy season in May. Short term improvements to Sudan’s legitimacy have a positive impact on its international reputation and result in serious considerations to remove Sudan from the US terror list. International donors shift focus from humanitarian aid to development through strengthening the relationship with the government and CSOs through capacity-building and economic development projects. This increases the voluntary return of displaced people to their villages, which stabilizes this potential fragility trigger. It also enables the government to pursue more long-term projects that will improve environmental infrastructure.

Wild Card Scenarios

Refugee inflow: The unstable situation in South Sudan increase of mass migration from South Sudan which may increase tension and conflict among different ethnic groups over scarce resources. There has been a significant increase of refugees from South Sudan in the past few years which could threaten Sudan’s current stable relationship with South Sudan.

Social Unrest: Slow in reform and economic development leads protesters to challenge the government on the social contract which makes it harder for the government to achieve targets. This could also increase violent protest-security clashes which challenges the legitimacy of the government.

Policy Options*

The policy options presented are designed to address the underlying driver and causes of fragility identified in the analysis. They are presented to the Government of Sudan, taking into account internal limitations, to increase the chance of best case and decrease the chance of worst-case scenarios over the next six to eight months.

Option 1: Community-based microfinance systems to build resilience to climate shocks*

Entry Points for Action: To build climate change coping and adaptive capacities, the interim government can engage the non-profit VisionFund, a microfinance organization that specializes in climate change microloans to support secondary microlenders in the informal sector. Since many of these microloan providers are microloan clients themselves, VisionFund can provide programs where these secondary lenders provide microloans to climate-vulnerable rural populations including IDPs and women. This effective rural financing scheme can preemptively lower climate vulnerability by providing a safety net for rural households who will experience the disadvantages of natural disasters and displacement most severely. Borrowers can make their livelihoods more disaster-proof and diversify to more drought-tolerant activities. For example, micro-loans can support the implementation of small water harvesting projects through the installation of pumps. This program would also embrace the traditional Musharaka system which does not require collateral and shares profits and losses between partners. The microloan program could also modernise delivery of loans through branchless banking by engaging mobile phone companies to set up wireless transfers in rural and low-infrastructure areas.

Agents of change

EU: EU has recently committed to aid amounting to 466 million euros. The interim government would need to convince this major donor to contribute funding towards microloans. The funds can also pay for VisionFund’s administrative duties and mobile phone companies’ partnership fees.

VisionFund: Visionfund is one of the most experienced and successful climate-change microloan organizations that has operated extensively in East Africa. In 2016, using $2 million from the British government, VisionFund's Microloans provided microloans to 14,500 families in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia hit by El Nino-related drought and flood. It also channeled 95% of its Kenyan loan payments and 98% of its Tanzanian ones through mobile wallets. In a similar manner, this organization can use the most recent funding from the EU to lend exceptional training and expertise on how to set up mobile microfinance system through an informal system of lending.

Secondary lenders in informal system: The largest source of microloans is through secondary lenders in the informal sectors. These lenders also have easier access to microloans to lend to harder-to-reach rural populations through existing networks. These lenders are credited for keeping trade links going despite social rupturing caused by displacement and conflict.

* Refer to Annex 13 for additional policy information and an additional policy option

* Refer to Annex 13 for more background on this option
Local mobile companies: While infrastructure is poor in many rural communities, telecommunications services are available in roughly 80% of the country in both rural and urban regions\textsuperscript{137}. Although credit in cash was the most popular form of loans, the increased use of mobile phones can facilitate more efficient transfers of funds in hard to reach areas.

Resistance points and Risks: When microloans were introduced from above in the past, most bank branch staff were reluctant to implement microfinance because they considered this market segment unprofitable.\textsuperscript{138} As such, VisionFund coming in as a non-profit organization rather than a profit-making bank would be best suited to initiate this project. If VisionFund wants to reach the most vulnerable population through informal networks of secondary lending, it must ensure that lenders would not take advantage of or abuse this new system of lending to further marginalize those with little access to microloans.

Cluster/ALC & Expected Impacts: (Capacity, Environment, Economy, Human Development) In the absence of the state, bottom-up microfinancing sustainably builds environmental adaptive and coping capacity outside of state-administered solution. Rather than tackling the well-established patronage systems that drive unequal economic benefits and resource scarcity among the poor, this locally-based initiative creates spillover effect of better land management practices that are resilient to climate shocks and more robust for economic development. Furthermore, emphasizing the Musharaka and Khata order lowers the economic barriers to lending for the most marginalized populations such as women and IDPs who have little collateral to begin with. In addition to addressing the environment as the primary driver of fragility, microfinancing would also alleviate herder-farmer conflicts and human development issues such as food insecurity. This avoids the worst-case scenario of environmental crises and achieves the best case of climate resilience by empowering locally owned networks of trade. It could also address the wild card scenario of refugee inflow by providing them a sustainable means of providing for themselves beyond aid.

Relevance to end user: With its focus on economic reform and peace processes, the interim government would find it more practical to outsource solving environmental drivers of fragility to existing customary networks of informal lending and expert lending organizations. The interim government only needs to engage with VisionFund and the EU to begin this initiative. This hands-off approach also reduces the risk of corruption from a high-level of governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired outcome</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Mode of Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase access to branchless banking among rural population</td>
<td># of mobile phone companies set up with branchless banking</td>
<td>Baseline data collection, with monitoring data collected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of VisionFund’s climate funds through informal networks of lending using the Musharaka system</td>
<td># of Secondary lenders who are engaged in the secondary lending program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of new rural clients receiving climate funds through secondary lenders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide more vulnerable population with microloans</td>
<td>% of secondary borrowers who are women, IDP, and rural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in adaptability for climate shocks among rural populations</td>
<td>Human devpt and economic indicators of displaced people post-disaster (floods, droughts)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Option 2: Anti-corruption Commission

Entry Points For Action: A National Committee for Combating Money laundering and Financing of Terrorism was established during Bashir’s regime in 2014 to make policies, assess risk, monitor international and regional developments and establishing training programs.\textsuperscript{139} It ultimately failed to produce meaningful results, primarily because it was under the supervision of Bashir and corrupt officials. The appointment of new Ministers to the Sovereign Council offers an entry point to reinvigorate anti-corruption efforts. The interim government should take this opportunity to establish an independent anti-corruption commission with prosecutorial powers. This will be a long term reform to address the root causes of fragility in the country. The commission must be independent from the executive branch and separate from the elite network and security apparatus. It will be mandated to initiate financial investigations that target bribery, embezzlement, extortion, the abuse of discretion, and improper political
contributions according to the United Nations convention against corruption, a legally binding anti-corruption multilateral treaty ratified by Sudan in 2014.\textsuperscript{140}

\textbf{Agents of Change}: Finance Minister Elbadawi has articulated a desire to make “broad-based institutional reforms” in order to “ignite and sustain inclusive growth” by dealing with macroeconomic distortions and tackling internal corruption.\textsuperscript{141} Additionally, the new Minister of Justice Nasr al-Din Abdel Bari and Attorney General Taj al-Sir al-Hebir are focused on anti-corruption investigations into Bashir.\textsuperscript{142} Working with the World Bank and the IMF as advisory partners, these ministers work to strengthen these institutions and support the creation of the commission.

\textbf{Resistance Points and Risks}: Internal resistance from those who benefit from the patronage system (security apparatus, elite who still have influence in the government through the power-sharing agreement) has the potential to disincentivize effect anti-corruption efforts and/or create divisions in the government. Additionally, expectations for the ACC should be relatively limited due to institutions that lack capacity and weak rule of law. Failure to meet overly ambitious goals risks the attribution of the failure to the government and having the opposite effect intended by the commission. For this reason, the goals of the commission should be reserved and clearly articulated.

\textbf{Cluster/ALC and Expected Impact: (Legitimacy, capacity, economy)} The wealth of the nation has been hijacked by the ruling Islamist elite based in Khartoum while 21% of the population were found to be undernourished in 2017.\textsuperscript{143} To avoid the worst case scenario, the interim government must consciously work to eradicate corruption associated with patronage networks that threaten to undermine legitimacy, increase factionalism, and result in the failure of power-sharing agreement. Corruption also undermines the social-contract and prevents effective delivery of services, contributing to horizontal inequalities.\textsuperscript{144} Thus, this policy is essential to achieving the best-case scenario. In the long term, corruption must be eradicated from the financial sector so that the country can begin to attract international investment that can be used effectively and reinvested in the country. Once Sudan demonstrates its compliance with the standards set forth by the international community, it will be perceived as a secure place for investment, may be removed from the US sponsor of terrorism, and make legitimate claims for debt relief for the country’s stifling debt burden. This will have a strong impact on economic and governance indicators with a potential carry-over effect on almost all other clusters through capacity building. In the short term, the ACC will establish the government’s commitment to anti-corruption and raise its legitimacy, operating concurrently with institutional reforms and efforts to strengthen the rule of law already being pursued under Prime Minister Hamdok.

\textbf{Relevance to end user}: The ACC offers the most immediate avenue for achieving stability in the next six months at the lowest possible cost. Improving legitimacy will lay the foundation for the interim government to implement policies and reforms in the next six months that will, in turn, ensure its success in its longer-term objective: a successful transition to democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired outcome</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Mode of Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Demonstrates the government’s commitment to anti-corruption and results in increased legitimacy</td>
<td>-Measures/indices such as the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business or Heritage Index of Economic Freedom, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights</td>
<td>-Review by independent investigation committee, Sudanese public’s acceptance of published budget reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Offers more opportunities to a larger portion of the Sudanese population</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Attracts investment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Eases external debt burden</td>
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\textbf{Option 3: Introduce local CSOs as mediators for upcoming peace processes}\textsuperscript{9}

\textbf{Entry points}: The Peace Commission created by the interim government can include a board of local CSOs that represent marginalized populations interests (IDPs, women, youth) as the main negotiators and peacekeepers on the Peace Commission between the sovereign council and SRF. CSOs already engage diverse groups and playing a role in the peace building process\textsuperscript{145} in local contexts. This way, the populations most vulnerable to state-level violence are included in the dialogue for sustainable peace. Elite ownership of peace processes in Sudan normally excludes women and ultimately undermines the sustainability of peace post-settlement.\textsuperscript{146} As well, with the draw-down of UNAMID, local CSOs can take on a more active role during peace negotiations on the ground to monitor parties so that they do not increase the use of violence to bargain for power.

\textsuperscript{9} Refer to Annex 13 for background on this policy
Agents of change:

**Government committee on Peace:** The committee can vet a group of leading CSOs who best represent the interests of vulnerable populations affected by conflict.

**Local CSOs on Peace Commission:** With the representation of local populations, the peace negotiations can hopefully move beyond elite-level cleavages and towards addressing realities created by conflict. Moreover, there are plenty of CSOs that conduct local-level peacebuilding activities with successful results that can lend new expertise.

**UNAMID:** UNAMID can play a secondary role in assisting the government in selecting the most suitable CSOs to serve as negotiators since its operations are coming to an end. After the formation of the Peace Commission, UNAMID could still train CSOs in mediation tasks and building their peacebuilding capacities.

**AU:** Although AU would not play a leading role in peace negotiations, they can lend expertise and lessons learned from past peace agreements so that the upcoming agreements do not repeat the mistakes of the past.

**Resistance points and Risks:** Whether elite RSF and SRF forces perceive these organizations as legitimate mediators remains to be seen. To convince unwilling parties, the Peace Commission can assure negotiators that these new mediators do not demonstrate the disadvantages of past negotiators and offer new perspectives that can create creative resolutions. This initiative does not necessarily guarantee that local CSOs will be apolitical and completely neutral. If they are chosen from within the government, it is likely that they could be biased towards creating results that benefit RSF’s interests of maintaining its rentier state. However, with members of the interim government that are more pro-democratic and less tied to the military, this risk is less likely. CSOs may also face a capacity gap that outside interveners such as the AU and UN Peacekeeping forces can mitigate with the technical support and lessons from past experiences.

**Cluster/ALC & Expected Impacts:** (Legitimacy, Governance, Security, Human Development) Local CSOs would make better mediators because they can stay through the long-term implementation of peacebuilding measures and capture the full benefits and costs of peace agreement for vulnerable populations. As well, training CSOs in peacekeeping tasks helps to assure that negotiators won’t use violence to secure voice and gain resources throughout the negotiations as they have during past negotiations. Therefore, it is important for CSOs to act as peacekeepers to monitor local situations so that violence does not endanger the improving security of civilians nor spill over into spoiling negotiations as described in the worst case scenario. This policy also directs peace agreements in a way that shapes governance beyond an elite-based struggle for political power into one that fully acknowledges the needs and concerns of vulnerable populations who are most affected by conflict as addressed in the best case scenario. CSO mediators can also ensure that rebel groups receive an agreeable share of political and economic benefits that was originally reserved for RSF. Governance and peace agreements shaped by local needs would improve Sudan’s legitimacy since neither elite group: armed rebels nor government military forces are considered legitimate sources of security. Ending violence will pave way for achieving the best case scenario through more sustainable economic and human development for IDPs looking to relocate back home beyond basic humanitarian assistance.

**Relevance to end user:** CSOs are practical actors to introduce as mediators with the draw-down and diminishing trust in past peacekeepers such as UNAMID and AU. This is also consistent with the call for more bottom-up approaches that address the needs and concerns of the most vulnerable populations such as IDP and women. Compared to inviting international mediators, this approach could also be more cost-effective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired outcome</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Mode of Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of CSOs on Peace Commission</td>
<td># of CSOs that work directly with IDPs on the peace commission</td>
<td>Membership in Peace Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address the concerns of vulnerable populations in peace agreements</td>
<td># Implementable actions in peace agreements that address humanitarian and security needs of IDPs and marginalized populations such as women and children</td>
<td>Printable peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of security and humanitarian concerns for vulnerable populations</td>
<td># trends of actions after signing of peace agreements</td>
<td>Baseline data and data collection of indicators outlined in relevant articles in peace agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of violence during negotiations</td>
<td>Monitoring conducted by CSO peacekeepers</td>
<td>Baseline data and data collection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


“Bucks after the bang; Microfinance and cli...” Routledge, 2019.


NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTE FOR SUDAN

Sudan's RSF conducts disarmament operations in gold mines in N. Darfur.

PM Hamdok Hears Five Key Demands From Darfur Displaced. Radio Dabanga, November 07, 2019.


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Yifu Lin, Justin. (2012) “Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or a Demographic Bomb in Developing Countries?”


“2019 Index of Economic Freedom | Sudan,” Heritage Foundation, accessed October 29,
https://www.heritage.org/index/country/sudan.
Annex 1: Fragility in Sudan According to Different Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>2019/2017</th>
<th>2017/2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index</td>
<td>8/178 countries (improving)</td>
<td>22/167 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Systemic Peace, State Fragility Index: Global Report</td>
<td>2/168 countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, Fragility Index: 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td>7/168 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, Word Bank: 2018</td>
<td>2.3/6 (declining)</td>
<td>30.8/100 (improving)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Index of African Governance: 2018</td>
<td>SSA average: 3.1</td>
<td>Average for African Countries: 49.9/100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 2: Definitions and Additional Readings

**Fragility Trap**
States that remain in a state of fragility for a prolonged period despite significant aid inflows are stuck in a ‘fragility trap.’ This can be due to weaknesses in any of the ALC clusters, i.e., an authority trap, a legitimacy trap, or a capacity trap.

**Feedback loop:**
Feedback loops perpetuate/fuel a state’s fragility and ensure that it remains in a fragility trap.
- **Vicious:** Weaknesses in legitimacy structures which rather than being adaptively modified in a positive way are negatively reinforced, with the consequence of increasing instability over the short run.
- **Lethal:** With heavy reliance on a rent economy driving the state’s patronage system, future decisions became ‘bound’, and options more limited.

Further Reading:

**Grey Companies (market/businesses):**
Government owned or semi-public companies tied to patronage networks that are capitalized with public funds. In Sudan, the Bashir’s government gave control of these companies to individuals with ties to the regime who run them on the government’s behalf. This allowed the government to dominate the marketplace in almost every sector.152

**Horizontal Inequalities:**
Horizontal inequality (HI) is inequality based on economic, social, or other factors, between culturally formed groups. They can be caused by overt discrimination, exclusivity of public goods, and/or unequal access to resources. Stewart et al., argue that the probability of conflict occurring rises where socioeconomic HIs are higher, run in the same direction, and are consistent. Inclusive or power-sharing governments tend to reduce the likelihood of conflict based on HIs.

Further Reading:

**Positive Political Legitimacy:**
Rentier states are often characterized by negative political legitimacy- the dependence on providing benefits and services through a patronage system that is not accountable towards its citizens. In contrast, positive political
legitimacy focuses on sources of legitimacy rather than products of legitimacy. It emphasizes choosing government who are more accountable to citizens.

Qualitative Research on the Impact of Climate Change on Fragility:

Rentier State:
Regimes where the majority of non-tax revenues come from without (i.e. foreign makers), goes directly to a government, and constitutes a substantial portion of overall revenue, creating less need to tax the regime’s population. These regimes, although well-equipped to establish negative political legitimacy, are rendered vulnerable when they become semi-rentier due to revenue dips such as oil price fluctuations or when the local population demands a social contract that is different from the one at hand.153

Further Reading:

Social Contract:
The social contract describes the relationship of a population with its government. It highlights the public’s expectations for the regime and how the regime fulfills these expectations. A mismatch between the public and the regime’s stand on an appropriate social contract leads to a crisis of legitimacy and facilitates political instability.

Youth Bulge:
Common phenomenon in the least developed countries when the large share of the population is under the age of 30. When youth enter the workforce in these countries, they often have difficulty finding employment. According to the World Bank, this creates a “demographic bomb” as frustrated youth become a source of political instability.154
Annex 3: Timeline of Major Events in the Last Five Years (Trends and Trajectory)\textsuperscript{155}

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color</th>
<th>Events</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Events showing of RSF or TMC threat and use of force on protesters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Events showing of RSF control over gold mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Events documenting the creation of the interim government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>Events involving rebel groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Civil disobedience events</td>
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</table>

\textbf{2012:} Himeidti killing 800 people from the local Beni Hussein ethnic group in the Jebal Amer area of North Darfur and gains control of gold mines.\textsuperscript{156}

\textbf{2015 October:} 10,000 RSF militiamen disarm gold mines in the Jebal Amer area of North Darfur.\textsuperscript{157}

\textbf{2017 November:} Gold sales account for 40\% Sudan’s exports. The RSF, under Himeidti arrest Hilal (another military elite) and takes over gold mines.

\textbf{2015 April -} President Bashir is re-elected for another five year term. He wins nearly 95 percent of the vote in a poll marked by low turnout and boycotted by most opposition parties.

\textbf{2016 November-December-} Street and stay-at-home protests at IMF-prompted price hikes for basic goods. Government disperses protests, arrests opposition politicians, bans media coverage.

\textbf{2017 October -} US announces partial lifting of sanctions.

\textbf{2018 January} - Bread prices rise after the government removed subsidies, prompting protests in Khartoum

\textbf{2019 April 11} - The military overthrows Bashir and establishes the TMC to rule for a transition period

\textbf{2019 April 17} - Sudan’s Constitutional Document is signed and Sudan’s three year transition to democracy begins

\textbf{2019 April 27} - Official negotiations start between the TMC and the FFC on an interim government.

\textbf{2019 May 13} - RSF troops prevent people from reaching the sit-in in Khartoum. Protestors defy the heavily armed militiamen.

\textbf{2019 May 15} - The TMC and FFC reach an initial agreement on how Sudan should be governed in a three-year transitional period.

\textbf{2019 May 22} - The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) calls for a general strike to pressure the military to cede power (following growing protests)

\textbf{2019 June 3} - RSF militiamen violently disperse Khartoum sit-in, killing more than 100 demonstrators, and wounding hundreds of others.

\textbf{2019 June 10} - The ruling TMC imposes an internet shut-down all over the country.

\textbf{2019 June 24} - FFC accepts Ethiopian mediation proposal for an interim Sudanese government. Demonstrations take place all over Sudan.

\textbf{2019 July 5} - Basic power-sharing agreement reached between FFC and TMC.

\textbf{2019 July 12} - The ruling TMC says a coup has been foiled.

\textbf{2019 July 18} - The Sudan Revolutionary Front declares its categorical rejection of the political deal.

\textbf{2019 July 23} - FFC members and rebel leaders of the SRF discuss the Political Charter in Addis Ababa

\textbf{2019 July 25} - Another coup attempt foiled and a number of generals arrested.

\textbf{2019 August} - Major flooding destroys more than 100,000 homes outside of Khartoum and affected 40,000 people in the disputed Abyei Area –affects 346,300 people in total according to news reports\textsuperscript{158}

\textbf{2019 August 3} - The Addis Ababa document on peace agreed between the SRF and its political allies in the FFC was officially added to the agreed Constitutional Declaration.

\textbf{2019 August 14} - The Constitutional Document gives the FFC the right to select 67 per cent of the Legislative Assembly members. The remaining 33 per cent are allocated to non-sigantary forces.

\textbf{2019 August 17} - A three year transition to democracy begins

\textbf{2019 September -} The Juba Declaration opens negotiations between the government and the SRF.\textsuperscript{159}

\textbf{2019 September 20} - Tens of thousands of Sudanese across the country take to the streets demanding the prosecution of corrupt members of the former regime.

\textbf{2019 November 4-} The FFC announces new formal top structure
Annex 4: History of Recent Conflicts

Darfur
Darfur is a remote and ethnically diverse territory in Sudan home to 80 tribes and ethnic groups that are members of nomadic and sedentary communities. Disputes over land and resources have historically been common and divided along tribal lines. Recurrent droughts resulted in an intensification of conflict after the 1980s that reached a precipice in 2003. That year, the Sudanese government was in the midst of peace processes with the SPLM/A to bring an end to the civil war. Rebel groups that represented non-Arab in Darfur, SLA/M and JEM, felt sidelined by the peace processes and declared arms against the Khartoum government. When conflict escalated, Bashir unleashed the Janjaweed—an elite military institution, whose repressive tactics amounted to ethnic cleansing. The UNSC indicted Bashir to the ICC for war crimes in Darfur for which he has still not been prosecuted. The conflict between the government and rebel groups persisted and was fueled by external stakeholders including Chad, Eritrea, and Libya who supported rebels as a pathway to undermine the Sudanese government. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 eventually ended the 22-year long civil war. Despite a peacekeeping mission initiated by the AU and supported by the UN, Darfur returned into warlordism in 2006. Increased rebel factionalism, another failed peace agreement in 2006, and attacks against aid-workers all worked to unravel the peace promised in the CPA. Consultations with IDPs ordered by the CPA were never held and clashes between armed groups and the government continue to endanger the security of IDPs.

*Despite early explanations of the conflict and media attention that attributed the conflict entirely to ethnic divisions, many scholars now believe that the conflict was rooted in climate change and loss of arable land that intensified conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists.

See:

Sudan/South Sudan Conflict
In 2011, a referendum resulted in the succession of South Sudan years after the CPA called for the border between the North and the semi-autonomous South to be demarcated within six months. Conflict along the border over contested regions, however, still persists. Border conflicts are concentrated in the Heglig and Abyei region. Heglig is an oil rich region that has been under attack between both armies since 2012. Ethiopia mediated an agreement on oil-transition fees in 2012 which effectively decreased the level of violence. But South Sudan has failed to produce oil due to its own internal conflicts. Abyei is another oil-rich contested area between the Sudans. Misseriya pastoralists also often travel here from the north in Sudan to water their cattle despite objections from the permanent Ngok Dinka population. The CPA included an Abyei protocol which divided the oil revenues and gave Abyei residents dual citizenship. The latter was highly contentious because Dinkas did not consider Misseriya as permanent residents. The peace agreement was breached in 2008 and 2011 when the SAF entered to seize control leading to mass displacement and violence. Eventually, the AU negotiations in 2011 produced agreements that were signed by rebel groups but not implemented. Following this agreement, the UN deployed UNISFA which is mostly involved in demilitarization of the area.

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**Figure 4.1 Border disputes after the succession of South Sudan in 2012**

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Annex 5: Further Detail on Stakeholders

External Stakeholders
UN Peacekeeping missions include UNAMID and UNISFA. UNAMID has been overseeing peacekeeping missions in Darfur since 2006. In 2017, UNAMID reconfigured to reduce its forces by half and handed back to the government’s control. As its focus shifts from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, UNAMID is expected to exit in 2020 despite the AU’s warnings that Darfur remains volatile. Currently, its main areas of support include long-term political stabilization and right-based solutions for IDPs.

UNISFA has administered the highly contested Abyei area along the Sudan/South Sudan border since 2011 and extended its mandate for the second time in 2018. In 2017 and early 2018, local populations have protested UNAMID for mainly hiring foreign workers and favouring Misseriya group with road renovations.

China’s diplomatic relations with Sudan started in early 1959, and gradually developed until China was involved in many sectors in the country. In the period between 2000 to 2011, China began work on many projects relating to the infrastructure of Sudan, including building railways and roads, and energy generation. In 2018, China was the only source to provide weapons to Bashir’s regime, and was also the biggest importer in Sudan. After the successful revolution that saw Bashir overthrown, the Chinese FM spokesman Luo Kang stated, “No matter how the situation changes, China will remain committed to maintaining and developing friendly relations and cooperation with Sudan.” However, the U.S may use the ‘terror list’ card with the transitional government, to limit China’s role in Sudan.

UNSC is interested in maintaining international security and has the political weight to pressure Sudan through the imposition of an arms embargo or sanctions. It passed 3 resolutions in 2005: Deployment of UNMIS, referral of perpetrators of human rights abuses to ICC, and issuing a travel ban and asset freeze on HR violators. The UNSC made efforts in 2018 to pressure the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to make progress regarding the status of Abyei, utilize and strengthen existing joint administration mechanisms, and establish joint police forces. On May 1, 2019, the UNSC joined the AU in pressuring Sudan’s junta into creating a civilian-led government.

The African Union is a continental union consisting of 55 member states that make up the continent of Africa. It has overseen ongoing negotiations between warring factions in Sudan and played a role in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. It has also maintained a supervisory presence over the interim government, using its power to threaten suspension of Sudan’s membership as an incentive to include with the civilian representative in governance. It also urged the interim government to increase female representation in the new government.

South Sudan has a contested oil transportation negotiations and border-related issue with Sudan concerning the Abyei and Heglig region. The meeting of the two prime ministers in September signalled a willingness of the two governments to cooperate on finding a solution. South Sudan has also been a recruiting and organizing base for SPLM rebels. Therefore, South Sudan would be an important stakeholder to include in peace talks.

Ethiopia played a major role in mediating the interim government agreement and persuading SRF into accepting the agreement. Ethiopia is also a major economic partner of Sudan and the two countries plan to build a pipeline which could have major environmental consequences.

Figure 5.1: Export to External Stakeholders

![Figure 5.1: Export to External Stakeholders](image-url)

Source: Central Bank of Sudan
Internal Stakeholders

Opposition parties  FFC is also supported by opposition parties including the Popular Congress Party (PCP), the National Consensus Forces (NCF), and the Sudan Call Forces, which comprised the National Umma Party (NUP), the Sudanese Congress Party (SCoP)

CSOs have a long history in Sudan, dating back to the colonial period. Since its independence in 1956, many CSOs established working in different fields such as politics, civil rights, social and culture, but the legal and operating environment of CSOs varied significantly and depended on which government was in power. Throughout the last three decades, Bashir’s regime imposed many laws and regulations that affected the work of the CSO sector. The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) cracked down on many organizations that they considered were not in line with their ideological vision, particularly when it came to women’s organizations. In 2013, the government refused to allow them to observe the election, and in 2014, they were excluded from the national dialogue because they did not share the same values as the National Congress Party (NCP). Since the agreement between the TMC and FFC, there have been no reports of crackdowns on CSOs, but the laws and regulations that affect their work are still in place.

Sudanese Professionals’ Association (SPA) represents more than 13 trade unions and initially called for an increase to the minimum wage at the start of the protest. It currently has 5 members who serve on the central council - the "supreme political" body. SPA has been instrumental during the protests in calling for a general strike to pressure the military into ceding power.

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is a rebel group created in 2000 by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim. It was responsible for an attack on the Khartoum State in 2008 that gained temporary control of Omdurman city and all bridges to Khartoum city. In early 2012, Gibril Ibrahim became the leader of JEM after Ibrahim was killed by the government.

The Sudan Peace and Liberation Movement/ North (SPLM/North) was established in 2011, after the succession of South Sudan. It is mainly operated in South Kurdufan and the Blue Nile and supported by the South Sudanese government. In 2018, SPLM/North supported the peaceful revolution.

The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) was established in 2002 as a Darfur Liberation Front by indigenous ethnic group in Darfur. SLM/A was divided in 2006 when SLM/A - Minnawi (Zaghawa) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement and joined the government. It withdrew from the agreement in 2011. The other SLM/A faction, the SLM/A - Nur (Fur), rejected the 2006 agreement and also has not agreed to the current peace negotiation.

The Popular Congress Party is one of the largest Islamic groups emerged from a split within the ruling National Congress Party in 1999. Founded by Hassan al-Turabi. PCP supported the revolution, however, FFC refused to include them in the FFC declaration. Secretary General, Ali El Haj was arrested on November 20, 2019 and charged with co-organising the military coup on June 30, 1989.

The National Consensus Forces is a coalition of the Popular Congress Party, National Umma Party and other parties established in 2010 with the Democratic Alternative Charter.

The National Umma Party was founded in 1944 by leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, who served twice as Prime Minister of Sudan, and was removed both times by military coup. It is currently represented by the FFC Sovereign Council.

Sudan Call Forces is a political agreement signed in 2014 to dismantle the one-party state regime.
Figure 5.2 Guide to Armed Rebels and Political Group Relationships
Annex 6: Social contract

Figure 6.1: Most Important Problems Government Should Address, Sudan 2015-2018

Figure 6.2: Support for Democracy, by Socio-Demographic Group, Sudan 2018

Respondents were asked: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.

Figure 6.3: Support for Democracy, Sudan 2013-2018

Respondents were asked: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.
Annex 7: Agriculture as Part of the Economy

Annex 8: State Sponsor of Terrorism

The position of Sudan on the US state sponsor of terrorism Terrorist List has significant implications for Sudan’s financial recovery. The IMF and the World Bank pledged to provide technical assistance to Sudan in the implementation of the economic reform project but the terrorist distinction renders Sudan eligible for debt relief and from financing from these groups.  

Sanctions are outlined in the Country Reports on Terrorism released by the US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism:

- Designating countries that repeatedly provide support for acts of international terrorism as state sponsors of terrorism imposes four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions:
  1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.
  2. Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism.
  3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.
  4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including:
     - Requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions;
     - Lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in U.S. courts;
     - Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist-listed countries;
○ Denial of duty-free treatment of goods exported to the United States;
○ Authority to prohibit any U.S. citizen from engaging in a financial transaction with a terrorist-list government without a Treasury Department license; and
○ Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by terrorist-list states.  

Statutory Requirements that must be met for Sudan’s removal from the list include:
(i) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned;
(ii) that government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and
(iii) that government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.
(i) the government concerned has not provided any support for acts of international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period; and
(ii) the government concerned has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.  

Annex 9: Security and Displacement Figures

Figure 9.1 Map of Protests and Violence Against Civilians from 2015 to Present

Figure 9.2: Number of Protests, Battles, and Violence against Civilians Events from 2015 to Present
Figure 9.3: Number of Fatalities 2011-2018

![Number of Fatalities 2011-2018](image)

Figure 9.4: Map of Conflict Fatalities in 2018

![Map of Conflict Fatalities in 2018](image)

Figure 9.5: Annual Conflict Displacement Figure from Conflict

![Annual Conflict Displacement Figure from Conflict](image)
Figure 9.6: Annual Disasters Displacement Figure from Disaster

![Annual conflict and disaster displacement figures](image1)

Figure 9.7: Number of International Migrants and Refugees in Sudan 1990-2019

![Number of International Migrants and Refugees in Sudan](image2)

Figure 9.8: Number of International Migrants in the Sudan by Top Countries of Origin, 2019

![Number of International Migrants in the Sudan by Top Countries of Origin, 2019](image3)
Annex 10: Household Economic Data

Figure 10.1: Lived Poverty by Socio-demographic Group, Sudan 2018

Figure 10.2: Personal Living Conditions, Sudan 2018
On the 30 of October, the EU committed to granting €466 million (512,583,690.00 current USD) in grants and humanitarian aid to Sudan after an EU delegation meeting with Sudan’s foreign minister in Khartoum. The funding will be distributed in three separate grants. The funding is much needed as the country is blocked from funding from the World Bank and the International Monetary fund due to its position on the US state sponsor of terror list.
Annex 12: ALC Assessment Graphic

Annex 13: Additional Policy Information

Policy 1: Community-based microfinance systems to build resilience to climate shocks

Background: Several microfinance projects currently exist in Sudan and is well embedded in customary practices. For example, the WRSM Project in Kordofan was able to leverage the indigenous practice of Khata where pooled savings used as funds managed by women to support female farmers. However, there is a lack of relevant accessible services for rural populations that are most vulnerable to climate shocks. In Khartoum state, 87% of microcredits go to urban lenders compared to 3% towards rural lenders. Furthermore, microcredits usually go towards non-farm activities, higher income enterprises with good credit. Banks have not been a big source of microloans in Darfur, only 2 of 16 branches have microloans. Despite the low supply of bank microloans, 2.3 million of 7.8 million adults could be demanding and able to use microfinance services as breadwinners for their households. Nevertheless, the biggest provider of microfinance lies in informal sector traders. Since customary and NGO-driven arrangements for micro-lending institutions already exist, they provide a good point of entry for enhancing access for climate-vulnerable rural populations where there is a large demand for safety net funds that can help communities overcome climatic challenges.

Policy 3: Introduce local CSOs as mediators for upcoming peace processes

Background: Major peace negotiations in Sudan have been negotiated by third parties in the past. However, these interventions guided by the model ‘liberal internationalism’ based on ideologies of state, economy and society don’t always produce sustainable peace. Mediators often have their separate interests in intervening which can prolong conflict. For example, when Chad mediated between SLM/A and the government, Chad was accused of having a strong bias for the rebels to undermine the Sudanese government and ceasefires were broken multiple times. Similarly, the UNAMID chief had internal disputes with Special Convoys to Sudan which prevented the Doha peace document from creating new narratives. Peace agreements also don’t include reliable public security measures for vulnerable populations. Of the 64 intrastate peace agreements in Sudan, 24 include provisions for gender rights despite the prevalent use of sexual violence by the RSF. Despite CSO involvement at the local level, they have often been excluded from national-level arrangements. For peacebuilding, CSOs foster informal peacebuilding focused on grassroots empowerment and monitoring programs in Darfur. However, they were unable to make a real impact on the 2011 Doha peace agreement. In September, Hamdok announced the formation of a committee of Sovereign Council members and the government to create a Peace Commission that would be central to steering the peace negotiations between SRF and the government.

Addition: Policy Number 4

z see Annex 4 for analysis of past peace agreement failures
Improve the relations between the government and CSOs and establish transparency of aid that is directed towards conflict-affected areas.

This policy is in line with the interim government's aim in ending corruption in all government sectors and civil service to ensure equal distribution of resources and aid to people affected by conflict and disaster. The Ministry of Labour and Social Development (MoLSD) could work with Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to amend previous laws and regulations that restricted work of local civil society and NGOs. Secondly, MoLSD could work with the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) to increase transparency and information accessibility for aid provided by external and internal donors. Removing regulations that stifled the work of CSO’s in areas of human rights, rule of law and corruption will increase public accountability of the government and partnerships with CSO’s will enhance the efficiency of state.

Cluster/ALC: Governance, Human Development; Legitimacy, Capacity

Relevance: The policy aim is to reduce the low capacity of state and factors that undermined the performance of the social sector in delivering basic services, in particular, emergency response to marginalized populations. Lack of transparency and chronic corruption prevented aid from reaching people in need. The policy is highly recommended due to a critical situation of more than 8.5 million people, including 2 million in IDPs who are in need of urgent assistance from the unpredictable crisis of flood, multiple disease outbreaks, and the economic crisis. Strengthening the capacity of the MoLSD and the HAC is line with interim government’s objectives of openness toward the public. These internal improvements will enhance international trust in aid distribution this is noteworthy considering the commitment from donors such as the EU and the US.

Risks: The Sudan Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period stated in article 2 (a.) ‘The Transitional Constitution of Sudan of 2005 and the constitutions of provinces is repealed, while the laws issued thereunder remain in force unless they are repealed or amended.’ However, laws and regulations that govern CSO’s such as the (Voluntary and Humanitarian Work Organization Act, 2006) may affect the work of civil society and international organizations. Misappropriation of international aid is common. Delays in amending laws that prevent civil society and the media to work independently also impede the work of CSOs.

Access Points: MoLSD should work closely with MoF, MoJ, and HAC to improve governance and capacity. Also to foster a strategic partnership with CSO’s to ensure aid reaches the targeted population.

Measuring Points: Policy success can be measured through the ability of the government to enhance laws and regulations affecting the work of CSOs and the ability of CSOs to reach the targeted population.

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<th>Desired Outcome</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Method of Verification</th>
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<td>Independent CSO’s</td>
<td>Reformed/new laws</td>
<td>CSO’s ability to reach the targeted population</td>
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<td>Increase basic health services, education and access to clean water to marginalized population</td>
<td>% of the population to receive new/improved services</td>
<td>Baseline data collection</td>
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<td>Monitoring and evaluation reports conducted by the government, CSO’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Build trust and confidence of marginalized people in government</td>
<td>Service delivery to a population in needs</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation reports from different sources (Government, CSO’s, Media, and independent committee)</td>
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<td>Protection of vulnerable people(women, children)</td>
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Endnotes

8 Ibid, 6.
9 Ibid, 7.
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