Somalia: A state of male power, insecurity and inequality

Findings from the inception study on the impact of war on Somali men

BY JUDITH GARDNER AND JUDY EL-BUSHRA

Introduction

The Rift Valley Institute's (RVI) study on the impact of war on Somali men looks into a previously under-researched set of questions: What are the enduring effects of more than two decades of war and violent conflict on Somali men and male youth, and what are the consequences of this for peace, stability and Somali society in general?

Key points

• Models of masculinity and the range of options open to men for realizing them, have not only been curtailed and impacted by over two decades of war, but also by the subsequent changes to the nature of the state.

• The centrality of kinship after 1991, as an organizing force for state-building and security, has both entrenched male domination of government and politics—excluding women in the process—and, at the same time, circumscribed male experiences of masculinity.

• Accountability is between the individual male leaders and his close kinsmen who promoted him on the expectation of personal gain, creating a new dominant form of masculinity based on wealth and control of resources.

• In the context of enduring patriarchal domination, the disconnect between what is socially and culturally expected of men and what individuals can deliver is huge.

• Strategies that enable more equitable male access to resources, particularly among the young and the most disadvantaged, could reduce competition between clans for political and economic advantage, as well as the appeal of armed jihadi groups.
The project’s inception phase charted what it means to be male in the Somali regions today. The study’s findings describe power relations between men, notably between younger and older men, men from dominant and from minority ethnicities, wealthy and poorer, settled and displaced, and men within different regions. These gendered male relationships and their management—inextricably linked to and sustained by kinship and clan—are intrinsic to Somalia’s day-to-day politics.

This briefing paper is the second RVI briefing disseminating the research findings to date. Its particular focus is the relationship between male power and its disempowerment since 1991, inequality, and current forms of leadership and governance. The paper highlights the relevance of these findings for policy-makers in Somalia concerned with stabilization, state-building and the momentum behind violent extremism.

Some 400 men from south-central Somalia, Puntland, Somaliland, and Dadaab and Eastleigh in Kenya took part in the inception phase research, contributing their experiences, life histories and reflections. Around 90 women from the same areas also offered their perspectives. Many men told researchers that this was the first time they had been asked to tell their side of the story.

Social expectations of masculinity and manhood in Somali society

Exploring the normative ideals and values associated with manhood

The global war on terror narrative has tended to cast Somali males—and Muslim males more widely—as inherently violent, susceptible to radicalization and a threat to Western security interests. RVI’s inception study findings suggest that for the Somali male this narrative is simplistic and inaccurate. Somali society is not routinely militarized, nor is violence—including domestic violence—a culturally accepted and glorified characteristic of manhood. On the contrary, throughout a man’s life and its milestones such as marriage and elderhood, his masculinity is judged by how well he manages his responsibilities in accordance with well-defined and exacting social norms and standards of behaviour.

There is, however, a disconnect between what is socially and culturally expected of men and what particular individuals can deliver. War and state collapse have expanded unequal power relations between men, creating winners and losers on a wide scale, and affecting men far beyond the traditionally marginalized groups. In Somalia’s political economy there are incentives for the powerful to exploit male vulnerabilities where they exist, which has an impact both on less powerful men and in turn on women, as well as on the dynamics of conflict and peace. The latter will be explored in a subsequent briefing paper.

Clan leadership and male loyalty: The normative situation

Leadership and, paradoxically, compliance are high on the list of gender-specific responsibilities and expectations of Somali men. Recalling an age of so-called pastoral democracy, respondents across the regions noted: ‘In the past men were two types: those who make decisions and those who follow and accept decisions - there was no group in between. Men knew each other. They knew those who could lead. There was order and loyalty.’

The sought after normative (masculine) leadership qualities embody: acumen in managing political relationships, alliance-building, negotiation, clan loyalty, defence strategies, conflict, peace-making and wisdom, as well as physical strength, mental and physical stamina and courage. All these qualities form part of raganimo, meaning manhood or the masculine ideal. Rooted in the Somali pastoral way of life, the evidence collected suggests these skills and qualities remained the social norm for leadership even as urbanization increasingly impacted on pastoralism.

The most respected elders are described as ‘forces to be reckoned with’ and ‘indispensable’. The men chosen by their clansmen to represent them will be of this calibre. Their collective task is to deliberate on matters affecting the lineage, negotiate and build alliances, declare war and peace, and exercise authority based on interpretation of customary law (xeer). The requirements are demanding, including: knowledge of xeer and mastery of jurisprudence; proven mediation skills; powers of persuasion and a good memory for poetry and proverbs.
High value is placed on these characteristics. Respondents pointed out that in the past senior elders enjoyed protected status during times of war.\(^9\) Elders in Erigavo said ‘the real man with *raganimo* was never killed or targeted as he was revered for his ability to mediate among people’. Not just a man’s own reputation, status, and power but the collective power of his lineage group depends on how well he is judged to fulfil his obligations within his family and his clan, and on how far he can demonstrate mastery of the ideal knowledge, skills and qualities of a man. Senior elders can be regarded as emblems of the normative masculinity. As such, they display the most exalted and influential norms of masculinity that can properly be described as hegemonic.

*The normative ideals and values endure*

Though these ideals of manhood have their historical roots in the Somali pastoral and agro-pastoral, rural ways of life, surprisingly the study has found they remain the measure of Somali men today. The findings show that across the country, they are reproduced from older to younger generations, by men and women, educated and illiterate, urban and rural dwellers, refugees, displaced people, majority and minority clans. This still happens despite the changed context the majority of men find themselves in as a result of urbanization and educational developments since the late 1940s and the modernist revolution of the Siyad Barre era.

Respondents’ views summarized in this paper, however, suggest that the majority of men who lead Somalia today, do not demonstrate the past’s ideal qualities and skills of leadership. The contemporary leadership’s power derives from wealth rather than wisdom, in spite of the latter remaining the socially exalted norms against which leadership is measured.

**Manhood and the modernizing state: Historical perspective of masculinity during the Siyad Barre era 1969–1990**

Models of masculinity—those socially accepted ways of being a man and *raganimo*—and the range of options open to men for actualizing these models, have been affected not only by the war and violent conflict but also, and perhaps even more profoundly, by long-term changes in the nature of the state.

Men’s life stories from the late 1960s onwards highlight how the early Siyad Barre era, with the development and expansion of a centralist state structure and bureaucracy, created an unprecedented opening up of new livelihood opportunities for men. Mobilization programmes recruited thousands of men and women into what became an extensive public sector with education and health services, state farms and industries, a national army and national security institutions. This also led to important changes in relationships between men and women. Educated women were fewer than men but also needed to be trained and employed, and were recruited on an unprecedented scale into lower-ranking positions. The Family Law of 1975 introduced, on paper at least, major improvements in gender equality that favoured women’s rights, though it did not translate into significant gains for the majority of women, especially those who lived in the rural areas.

Men and women both benefited from the state-run mass adult literacy programmes of the early 1970s.\(^10\) Male public sector workers also benefited financially from the regime’s ban on tribalism and the associated interventions, including the introduction of a national insurance system, a reduction in the amount of bride-wealth that could be demanded for marriage, state provisions for wedding arrangements and funeral costs.\(^11\)

For many citizens, and especially urban dwellers, during the Siyad Barre–era, the state supplanted kinship as the central organizing force around which social, political and economic life revolved. The state was the major employer, and more men than women were its employees. State employees gained income, status and respect from their employment, especially in the case of senior government figures.

**Post-1991 changes affecting male status and security**

The decay of the Siyad Barre’s regime saw government salary levels fall, though public sector workers still had the status that came with their jobs. Formal state collapse in 1991 saw the loss of these jobs and the status linked to them. This year was the start of a personal catastrophe for many
men, and many appear still not to have recovered. In Somaliland, arguably this started as early as 1988.11

The police-state created by the Barre regime had imposed strict law and order. There was security for citizens, although the state showed total disregard for the rights and security of its opponents. After Siyad Barre’s regime fell in 1991, Somalis experienced profound and prolonged insecurity. Even in areas of the country where peace and stability have since been restored, such as large parts of Somaliland and Puntland, this is seemingly achieved and sustained more by the will of the people, than by the strength of the administrations. Citizens in these regions acknowledge this when they describe themselves as ‘hostages to peace’.

The gendered nature of security

Lack of security and the rule of law are partly responsible for the high levels of sexual and gender based violence (S/GBV) targeting women and girls reported since 1991. Addressing this phenomenon has become the subject of funded interventions, policy level concern and in depth studies.12 To date, however, little or no attention has been paid to the gendered nature of (in)security in the Somali context.

It is typically assumed that women and girls are physically the most vulnerable, yet male on male GBV has become a significant issue since 1991. For example in the form of forced recruitment of boys and young men into armed groups, male-sex-selective massacres and the re-emergence of revenge killing, a practice that targets only men.13 RVI’s study found many men fearing for their lives in Las Canood and Sool, Mogadishu, Baidoa and Dadaab. The reasons vary from clan-related revenge killing to targeted assassinations and territorial encroachment by al-Shabaab. Common to all feelings of insecurity is that the rule of law is either lacking or unable to offer men, regardless of their clan identity, adequate protection.

Male insecurity has a double impact: on the individual man, his mobility, agency and his sense of self-worth; and on the physical and economic security of his dependents, primarily his wife and children.14 The study demonstrates how creating, sustaining and exploiting male insecurity is a powerful weapon, and source of power, especially in the battle for hearts and minds.

Centrality of clan membership and identity post-1991

Men’s life stories tell how, by the late 1970s, the regime was adopting increasingly brutal methods to maintain control. This included controlling men’s mobility, restricting it based on where and what clan they were from.15 After the Somali state collapsed, however, clan became the defining discourse and framework for interaction between men, to a degree that had not been seen since before the Siyad Barre regime.16

Many respondents talk about how a man’s relationship with his clan has a bearing on every sphere of their social life, and how this offers opportunities and poses challenges.17 For example, young men in Las Canood spoke in terms such as ‘I am the clan, the clan is me’ and ‘you must wear your clan like your shoes’—you do not go out without it. Elders in Mogadishu noted that along with a man’s other (normative) gender responsibilities, he should ‘defend and fight for the interests of the clan … protect [its] dignity and promote its reputation’.

How law and order—including human rights—natural resources, and moral and social order are managed varies widely across Somalia and Somaliland. In spite of the presence or absence of established or contested authority, there is still reference to, and in many places dependence on, clan-based traditional systems of governance.

The centrality of kinship and clanship, for post-1991 state-building and security has not only entrenched female exclusion from government, law and politics, but it has also circumscribed male experiences, and socially accepted forms of masculinity. Male capacities and vulnerabilities are closely aligned with and determined by the relative power or weakness of an individual’s clan to an extent unparalleled during the Siyad Barre era. State machinery, designed explicitly to undermine the centrality of clan identity, is no longer there to provide an alternative welfare and security system.

A crucial measure of manhood is a man’s compliance, that is, how well he upholds his obligations to his clan. In this sense, personal and clan interests inextricably converge. Mobilizing
socially, financially, politically or militarily, to further one’s clan’s position in the constant contest for clan supremacy, is both an obligation and an opportunity, as well as being an act of personal and collective interest.

Clan-based leadership: Developments since 1991

A new form of dominant masculinity

The collapse of the Somali state, the violence of the wars since its collapse, globalisation, the diaspora, and the internal and external attempts at state-building since the early 1990s, have been instrumental in the emergence of a new form of masculinity, reported by men everywhere. This new and commanding form of masculinity is able to negotiate Somalia’s unstable and insecure political, social and economic landscape. It succeeds, not by upholding the culturally esteemed leadership values of the past, but mainly through guile, force of arms, criminality and the exploitation of male youth.

State-building and masculinity

In their approaches to re-establishing the state-like authority, Somalis have struggled to deal with clan competition for supremacy by fusing state and clan through forms of proportional representation such as the 4.5 formula, or, as in Somaliland by incorporating an upper house of elders in the government structures. Rightly or wrongly, a perception or observation voiced by traditional elders in most regions is that internal and external attempts to rebuild central government has, albeit inadvertently, raised the stakes. This has exacerbated competition between clan groups for control of state resources and contributed to the proliferation of so-called titled elders.

In the words of one respondent, ‘every [part of the clan] wants their own Suldaan (hereditary clan leadership position) because [once in position] he can create job opportunities’. Appointment does not guarantee any security of tenure. According to a young respondent in Mogadishu, under the Federal Government, ‘men can become leaders of sub-clans if they bring resources for the clan … if they stop fulfilling this role or do not distribute the resources to the satisfaction of their fellow clan members, the clan can ask the President to appoint a different clan member in place of him.’

This contest between clans and sub-clans to secure the lion’s share of resources, job opportunities, political decision-making, and ultimately prestige, appears more clearly in some regions than others. But findings show it is in the minds of men everywhere and to varying degrees their fates depend on it.

Males identified as traditional senior and titled elders—the traditional hegemonic males—appear marginalized and disempowered because they have no intrinsic means to generate resources for their clansmen. Some become dispensable or viewed as an obstacle to be removed.

The study’s findings show that though many traditional elders remain in position, their clansmen nominate new, influential men alongside or above them. These new men typically come from the diaspora or business community, or have gained their resources as warlords. Unlike the traditional titled elders, these new leaders bring economic capital and promise to use their position to harvest resources for the clan. Respondents explain that such manoeuvrings have not only resulted in the proliferation of titled elders but a dilution of respect for elder-authority. Those in power may have positions but they lack the credentials to make them effective Suldaans or Malaqis.

Respondents’ reflections on these changes

This new form of commanding masculinity cannot be described as hegemonic, since, although it confers egregious power and is linked to institutions of governance in complex ways, it is not culturally exalted. It is still the normative framework that endures in men’s and women’s minds, which has not yet been replaced or reconstructed. The social values that the normative framework represents are still felt to be relevant in spite of changed contexts.

What concerns many men is what they perceive to be the misuse of the traditional governance system, and the side-lining of senior elders with knowledge of customary law, mediation and conflict prevention and the accompanying respect of their clansmen. According to respondents, as a consequence the actual authority imbued in
eldership has lost its currency, there is a deficit in local law and order, and insecurity prevails.

Rightly or wrongly, respondents identified that external engagement with Somali society—via state-building and peacekeeping interventions as well as through the diaspora—has introduced or encouraged these developments. This has had an impact on the values and hegemonic practices attached to masculinity—an unwelcome change for many.

However, due to the lack of alternative ways to find work, it has become important to have fellow clansmen in leadership positions. As a consequence, the majority of the population have accommodated the changes to leadership, though it has not yet gained moral or philosophical acceptance. In any case, in the absence of a major and sustained injection of alternative opportunities for men and youth, it seems likely that the post-1991 male leaders—hegemonic or not—have little to fear, except perhaps from the challenge that has been posed by the reformist Islamist movements for the last decade or more.

Life for Somali men since 1991

Despite some significant contextual and chronological differences, the study finds remarkable similarity among the changes and challenges in the lives of men across the country (including Somaliland). The overall picture painted by respondents from all regions is strikingly uniform: ‘raganimo has ended’.22

With the inter-clan nature of war, and the loss of employment with the collapse of the state, male gender roles and responsibilities at the family level have proven extremely hard if not impossible for a majority of men to fulfil, or sustain. As a result, many men—not just displaced traditional senior elders—report feeling ‘disempowered’ and ‘disposable’.

Life-stories from such men show this process of disempowerment has been for most a difficult, contested process. The men most affected seem to be typically men in their 40s and above, often once married with children but now maybe divorced or separated. A common experience seems to be that of unexpected, almost overnight, shocking and sustained loss.

Men from the wrong side of the clan divide after the civil war, who were former state employees and or residents in the capital Mogadishu, are one group among whom many are affected in this way. For example, when the state collapsed and war ensued, they had to flee the city, often losing property and other assets, their employment or business. Some even fled without their wives and children. Many have yet to be able to return to Mogadishu, or recover their material and social losses.33

Former Somaliland National Movement (SNM) combatants who joined up as teenage camel herders comprise another group interviewed by the study, among whom many report long-term feelings of hopelessness and dejection. As combatants in an armed struggle they survived traumatic events, lost friends and endured tremendous hardship and fear only to find that victory and peace brought them no peace of mind and no employment.

Findings show that typically, men in both groups in the first years exercised whatever agency they could muster to find a way to make a living and rebuild their lives. But adversities thwarted them and after successive set-backs they gave up, identifying themselves as broken men. Many report they have suffered from despair, depression and other forms of mental illness. Often their solace comes from khat24 and their survival is due to dependence on their wives and children, and shaxaad (hand-outs) from kinsmen.

Younger men

Young men from all backgrounds expressed concern with the hypocrisy they experience from or witness in older men. All spoke of the pressure they are under to comply with the expectations of their clan and older kinsmen, which include showing respect for the clan by obeying clan orders and showing inter-dependence with other clansmen.

Youth’s experience of clan membership and—theoretically voluntary—compliance differ in some significant ways from that of older men. Across all regions, conversations with youth respondents reveal these clan expectations are sources of stress and frustration, and may lead to high-risk-taking decisions. For example, all youth spoke with keen
awareness of the importance of acting in ways that show they are close to their clan, through demonstrating loyalty and compliance. At the same time, many expressed their strong dislike of older clansmen’s moral corruption but felt they had no option but to go along with it if they wanted to succeed in life. Youth respondents could not see easy solutions to their situation other than empowering oneself through acquiring wealth, legally or illegally, or to leave the country (tahrib), or even to join al-Shabaab for which they would receive a salary.

At the same time, life stories from younger men indicate that age may be a relevant factor in male resilience. The stories of younger males (those under 35 today) are accounts of individuals growing up in war-affected communities in the absence of a state—or a recognized state in the case of Somalilanders. Their accounts not only detail layers of personal and family catastrophe but also illustrate adaptation to fast-changing and adverse circumstances.

Youth resilience through adaptation typically depends on finding employment. For some, seeking education is a means to this, though not always a successful one. The work they find tends to be below their educational level and depending on where they live it may involve armed violence. Their options to move location are severely limited by security considerations affecting men specifically. Self-employment is sometimes an option. Sometimes marriage secures helpful kinship support. Mothers and other relatives in the diaspora are most commonly the ones who provide financial assistance. Some young men have adapted by giving up armed violence and successfully rehabilitating their lives with the help of interventions as part of NGO projects.

Common to all the young male life stories is that their end goals are simple: income and a better life. In one-to-one interviews, almost all express determination and hope. This suggests there is much good to be gained for the future of the country if their resilience—and that of young women too—can be sustained and enhanced. Nurturing the optimism and fervour of youth and responding to their quest for work and fulfilment is still not a leading priority for any Somali government’s agenda. By contrast, youth and children, male and female, have been and continue to be the primary target of reformist Islamist teaching.

**Conclusion: Disempowerment and inequality**

The study reveals a gendered social order or hierarchy in which not all men are born equal or have an equal status. The portrayal of Somalia as a homogenous society has become a little less common, nevertheless in international policy and practice there is a persistent assumption that being male equals being powerful. This study’s findings do not challenge the basic, structural and cultural inequality between men and women in Somalia. What it does evidence, however, is that unequal power relations between men have expanded since 1991, creating winners and losers on a wide scale and affecting men far beyond the traditionally marginalized groups.

Men—and women—from the traditionally marginalized groups are socially and politically powerless and vulnerable to exploitation and brutality, to a far greater degree than they were during the Siyad Barre state. The study highlights the lower position that even non-minority group men occupy within their own clan family when they fail to live up to expectations or fail to successfully navigate the normative male trajectory. Nevertheless, the study also shows men from so-called majority clans, can gain status if their economic productivity is restored, unlike men from marginalized groups, whose subordinate position is for life.

While inequalities between men and women may be stark, the study has illustrated how inequalities between men are also key shapers of lives of both men and women. Inequalities described by respondents were first and foremost those between adult men (so-called elders) and younger men. They also included inequalities between clans, between main clans and minorities, between the able-bodied and those with disabilities (including mental illnesses), between those Somalis who remained in the country, and the diaspora, and between those in settled locations in Somalia and those internally displaced. It is also clear that access to economic resources and to the skills and kinship links that provide that access largely determine difference.
The study also shows how a man’s relative power is linked to that of his clan’s position and that not all clans are equally powerful. Young men in Baidoa, for whom this is an everyday reality, pointed out: ‘powerful clans are those that have warlords, politicians and better opportunities of employment’. Other respondents explained how it may be advantageous to appoint men as leaders who are warlords with ‘the ability to shoot, kill and create conflict [as] that gives … access to resources’. This connection between relative male powerlessness and violence and insecurity is not unique to the Somali context.

Since 1991, when the state ceased to provide employment, security and welfare, men have depended on their kinship connections and clan for survival, as well as to acquire status and power. This has meant that positions of leadership within the clan tend towards those who can accumulate wealth, and control material and financial resources, often from positions within government or, as potential spoilers outside of it.

Respondents in all regions reported frustration with the corruption of clan-based authority in their areas. According to respondents, when power based on a man’s real or perceived access to wealth rather than his qualities as a leader, it devalues the credibility and nature of actual clan authority. In this case, wider accountability between clan representatives and their whole lineage group declines, replaced by a much narrower and exclusive relationship between the individual whose status has been elevated to leader and his close kinsmen who promoted him on the expectation of personal gain.

These general findings lead to some tentative conclusions. First, the clan still provides the primary mechanisms for managing and mitigating conflict. Second, while equality is still held up as a principle of Somali social organization and a key component of peace, this does not represent the current reality in Somalia. Traditional norms of clan leadership and traits of masculinity or raganimo are increasingly irrelevant in present day clan politics despite still carrying cultural weight. Third, there is an increasing need to reconcile the growing material and political inequality between men and the perception of an overwhelmingly patriarchal society, not least since this has implications on the relative position of women and families. It would seem that the problem of structural male disempowerment and inequality may be of equal importance to the drive towards female empowerment, in working towards peace, stability and development.
Notes

1 This paper disseminates the findings from the Impact of War on Somali Men Inception Study fieldwork conducted between December 2013 and April 2014. The study was funded by Learning on Gender in Conflict in Africa (LOGiCA), a World Bank trust fund. The authors of this paper are Judith Gardner and Judy El-Bushra.


6 Use of the term raganimo varies across the regions and sub-cultures. Especially among northern Somali nomadic pastoralist society, raganimo refers to all aspects of being what translates as a ‘real man’. In the north-east and in the south, and among non-pastoral cultures such as the Bantu and Reer Hamar, it is used differently. In Puntland it refers specifically to a man’s physical virility and sexual prowess.

7 Urbanization mostly dates from the late 1940s as schools and urban-based livelihood opportunities developed. See for example, Academy for Peace and Development, ‘Impact of the War on the Family’, Draft Report, July 2002. (http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/APD_Family_23july02.pdf). This study, from Somaliland, found that urban-living had impacted on domestic life before changes brought by the civil war, with many men in urban settings no longer fulfilling traditional male roles within the family.


9 Along with religious leaders, women, children, the elderly and guests. See Spared from the Spear – Traditional Somali Behaviour in Warfare, Somali Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (1997)

10 A standard Somali orthography was introduced in 1972 and with it came a national literacy campaign to address the very low levels of adult literacy. This hugely increased literacy at the time but by 1985 adult literacy rates were still among the lowest in the world. Female adult literacy was 14 per cent and male adult literacy 36 per cent. By 1989, just 10 per cent of children were enrolled in secondary school. See UNDP, ‘Human Development Report Somalia 2001’, Nairobi: UNDP Somalia Country Office, 2001. (http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/somalia_2001_en.pdf)


12 APD, ‘Impact of the War on the Family’.


14 Likewise, links between male vulnerability and those women and girls (or men and boys) who are targeted by perpetrators of sexual violence have yet to be explored.

15 See Gardner and Bushra, ‘Impact of War’.


17 Tribalism or ‘clanism’ was officially rejected during the height of Scientific Socialism and nationalism in the 1970s whereby clan identity became a taboo subject.

18 The study has yet to explore in depth the life of diaspora men, but based on interviews in Eastleigh, Kenya, the conceptual reach and relevance of clan is seemingly trans-national.

19 In Somaliland, for example, it is somewhat muted through the political party system.

20 Two examples of the various titles given to clan lineage heads, positions that are customarily inherited, within some clan families.

21 Notably almost all men but very few women raised the issue.

22 During the validation processes a few men, notably from among the successful ranks of the diaspora in Kenya, but also in Hargeysa, challenged the negative nature of the study findings and strongly criticized the study for posing what they regarded as biased questions. Their concerns were not shared by the majority of participants who agreed with the findings, but they will be considered and if necessary addressed in the main study.


24 A mild narcotic plant widely consumed in the Horn of Africa.

25 Older men too may well experience the same dilemma but did not describe it to the researchers.

Credits

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