WHAT IS THE VISION FOR SHELTERING AND HOUSING IN HAITI?

Summary Observations of Reconstruction Progress following the Haiti Earthquake of January 12th 2010

Ian Davis

MAIN REPORT
“Where there is no vision, the people perish”
Proverbs 29:18

“Vision without action is a daydream. Action without vision is a nightmare”
Japanese Proverb

“As long as Haitians’ Number One Dream is ‘a visa and leave’, no effective recovery is possible”
José Magloire van der Vossen

1 David Alexander notes that after the Calabrian earthquakes of 1783-5 the newly-founded United States set up Emigration Offices in the devastated villages and creamed off the able-bodied labour, thus setting back the reconstruction.
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MAIN REPORT
DEDICATION

Consultancy reports are rarely dedicated to anyone, but since this is not a commissioned text I can ignore conventions and dedicate it to all the courageous individuals and communities, many of whom I met during my visit, who are working to rebuild Haiti and its institutions. The vision that is needed will have to be created and pursued by them and it will provide support to those who are still sheltering after the earthquake in flimsy tents, as well as those who seek better and safer housing and for those who believe that a much better and far safer Haiti must emerge from the debris.

“In the wake of the January 12, 2010, earthquake, Haiti’s history of unrelenting struggle for justice is its greatest resource. This history, as Haitians remind us, is what makes Haiti mighty: mighty without material wealth, without natural resources, without arable land, without arms..... we must stand with Haiti, a country whose spirit and people will never be broken and work in solidarity toward the future that Haitian people deserve.”

Joi S. Mukherjee (2010)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This independent assessment reflects on the earthquake recovery process in Haiti, with emphasis on shelter, housing and settlement reconstruction during the initial 22 months following the disaster. However, given the holistic nature of the recovery process there is added discussion concerning the varied sectors of recovery, disaster risk reduction, urban development etc. The author, an architect with international experience of shelter provision, risk reduction and disaster recovery from 1972 - 2012, in over forty situations, has included some relevant experiences in the text.

Two reports have been written, a Summary Report - already published, and this Main Report. The reports can be downloaded from www.onuhabitat.org/haiti.

To expand and enrich his own perceptions, Ian Davis consulted a number of experienced colleagues, many with detailed knowledge of the Haiti context. Their rich insights are reproduced throughout the reports.

The observations begin with a discussion concerning the aim of reconstruction by using a new disaster recovery model that places emphasis on the need for recovery to move beyond replicating the vulnerable status quo: described as a 'Replacement Recovery Scenario' with 'Development Recovery' that 'builds back both better and safer'. This is followed with a series of observations concerning positive aspects of recovery in Haiti, by noting positive and negative aspects and finally a series of negative reflections. Chapter 5 looks in to the complex dimensions of shelter and housing in Haiti, which is followed by nine models of disaster recovery in chapter 6. The final section of the report, chapter 7, contains the author's suggested 'Actions needed to promote full recovery'.

Among the twelve proposed actions, specific attention and advice is given to the controversial issue of building additional T-Shelters in lieu of rebuilding permanent safe dwellings. There is also a call to support economic recovery, secure legal tenure, attend to the pressing issue of rental housing and deal with urgent urban planning concerns. Safety is strongly emphasised in relation to safe critical facilities and safe user-driven housing construction.

The reports end with a summary of the demanding agenda to realise the vision for reconstruction. The author notes the urgent need for visionaries within the Government of Haiti and assisting groups to grasp unique opportunities. These will rely on the commitment of resilient communities of Haiti, with external financial and technical support to achieve effective recovery, despite the legion of obstacles to progress.
8. SUMMARY: THE VISION FOR RECONSTRUCTION

APPENDICES:

Appendix 1  Priorities for Recovery -
Anshu Sharma
Jo da Silva
Maggie Stephenson
José Magloire van der Vossen

Appendix 2  Haiti Interim Recovery Commission Housing Sector Background Report Perceptions of Recovery Priorities - Priscilla Phelps (October 2011)

Appendix 3  Principles of Shelter, Housing and Reconstruction
1. CONTEXT

FOCUS OF REPORT
This report emerges from my visit to Haiti in November 2011 to examine progress with reconstruction approximately twenty-two months after the earthquake. My visit lasted a mere three weeks, but the reflections relate to almost 40 years researching and writing about post-disaster sheltering and housing in about 30 different recovery situations.

My report explores the ‘big picture’, posing questions about the vision that is needed for future sheltering and housing in Haiti. Therefore, this is not a mission report, nor a policy assessment and no attempt has been made to comment on detailed matters, others in Haiti are far better qualified to engage in specific aspects of shelter and housing policies. However, the broad focus on the ‘shelter continuum’ has not been rigid, since I recognise that T-Shelters and Dwellings closely relate to livelihoods, public health, planning, land ownership etc. - in fact to virtually all aspects of society and governance.

This report is based on visits between October 23 - November 11th 2011 to a spectrum of camp sites, affected neighbourhoods and reconstruction sites and is informed from the writings and comments made by a diverse range of national and international informants who are thanked in the acknowledgements.

CREDENTIALS
My comments on the Haiti recovery relate to personal experiences as well as to my background qualifications. As I have walked around Port-au-Prince noticing the sea of lively children in every viewpoint, the sight vividly reminded that I, as a small child, had once been a disaster survivor. I recall the bombing of our house during WW2. Our home, in the north of England, was overflowing with relatives who had come to escape the dense bombing of London by the Luftwaffe. But our relatives, as well as our own family, were further displaced when our town was bombed, destroying our house. The next day our extended family were evacuated - first into Government T-Shelters and later into the crowded houses of rural host families with all the consequent pressures of overcrowding that thousands of families must still be experiencing in Haiti. Later we returned to our home town to search for a new home to rent amid the bomb sites, including the wreckage of our own house. Thus back in 1943 my family had to face rather similar problems of resettlement as thousands of Haitian families currently experience.

Later, I became an architect, and for the last forty years I have worked in the linked fields of Disaster Shelter/ Housing Reconstruction/ Disaster Recovery/ Risk Management and Reduction and more recently Adaptation to Climate Change. During that time I have written extensively on shelter and reconstruction. I was the coordinator of the first set of UN Guidelines on ‘Shelter after Disaster’ that were published in 1982 and are currently being ‘refreshed’ with new material covering the period: 1982-2012 being inserted by the original authors.

STANDPOINT
As an academic/ consultant/ researcher, there is an inherent risk of not being able to grasp the day to day problems faced by practitioners. But my career has not been confined to the ‘dreaming spires’ or ivory towers of academia, having been a board member of four NGO’s, also having worked for private sector companies, managed a small consultancy and been engaged as a consultant to NGO’s, at least five Governments, eight UN agencies and the IFRC.

CONTENT OF REPORT
The report contains personal impressions of progress, suggests some models to assist officials, defines a possible agenda for action in both Haiti and internationally and calls for visionaries to lead and inspire the recovery process. Throughout the text I have added, where appropriate, some past experiences of similar problems to those being faced in Haiti. These are set in blue type. My findings are totally independent viewpoints, since I was not employed by any agency operating in Haiti.
THE REPORT IS STRUCTURED AS FOLLOWS:

- **Chapter 3** explores the ‘Aims of Reconstruction’ through a series of scenarios set within the main recovery sectors.

- **Chapter 4** ‘Observations of Recovery in Haiti’ consider three sets of reactions: positive, negative and mixed positive and negative impressions of the recovery process.

- **Chapter 5** develops the general observations of Chapter 4 in closer detail, with a concluding section proposing a policy review ‘Managing the Intractable Shelter Problem’ in Haiti.

- **Chapter 6** contains a series of ‘Models of Recovery’. Some of these models are used for the first time, to assist in setting out certain ideas in graphic terms. Inevitably, as with all models, they may not exactly fit the situation in Haiti and inevitably they can over-simplify the complexity of the situation.

- **Chapter 7** identifies ‘Actions Needed to Promote Full Recovery’.

- **Chapter 8** contains a summary check-list of the requirements for effective reconstruction under the heading ‘The Vision for Reconstruction’.

- The ‘Appendices’ contain perceptions of recovery priorities, the Haiti Interim Recovery Commission Housing Sector Background Report and sets of shelter and reconstruction principles.

The Main Report and the linked Summary Report can be downloaded from www.onuhabitat.org/haiti

2. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During my visit I was able to visit various sites and interview a spectrum of informants that included NGO, UN and Government officials as well as earthquake survivors, consultants, private sector representatives and academics. Following my visit I was able to consult with many experts in this field. I gratefully acknowledge all who generously gave their time and valued insights to this report. The principal informants, listed below, came from the following organisations:

Architecture for Humanity; Arup: International Development; Build Change; CARE; Centre de Competences Reconstruction, Confederation Suisse; CORDAID; DIGICEL; E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster; EU, ECHO, GoH Housing Director, Habitat for Humanity, HAVEN; IFRC, IOM; UN-HABITAT; UNOPS; UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the WORLD BANK.

I wish to thanks the following officials for their valued support:
Jean-Christophe Adrian, UN-HABITAT
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Sandra Berberi, Canadian Government
Damien Berrendorf, ECHO
Cecilia Braedt, UNOPS
Leslie Buckley, DIGICEL
Giovanni Cassani, IASC Emergency Shelter and CCCM Cluster / IOM
Britt Christiaens, IFRC
Luca Dall’Oglio, IOM
Sylvie Debomy, The World Bank
Nigel Fisher, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
EXPERT COMMENTARY
To further expand my limited perceptions of reconstruction and specifically of the Haiti context, I asked a number of colleagues with extensive experience of the Haiti Reconstruction for their insights.

In chapter 5, expert opinion was provided by Joseph Ashdown (Independent Consultant on Shelter and Housing); Terry Jeggle (Independent Consultant, previously Senior Advisor to UNISDR, Babar Mumtaz (Independent Consultant on Shelter and Urban Planning) and Maggie Stephenson (UN-HABITAT Haiti).

In chapters 4 & 7, David Alexander, (Global Risk Forum), provided a commentary on the proposed actions.

In Appendix 1, the priorities for recovery are noted from the following experts: Anshu Sharma, (Independent Consultant), Jo da Silva, (Director, International Development, Arup), Maggie Stephenson, (UN-HABITAT) and José Magloire van der Vossen (Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response).

An early draft of the summary of this report was helpfully reviewed by members of the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster.

Finally, special thanks are also due to Conor Gallagher for professional support in the design of the summary and this main report.
3. AIMS OF RECONSTRUCTION

The history of disaster reconstruction is a gallery of frequent failures and rare success stories. Recovery fits into four broad categories: Scenario 1 being the worst solution, while Scenario 4 is clearly the target to aim for:

- **In Scenario 1**, there are numerous examples of *no recovery*, where years after the disaster, there is still abundant evidence of ruined buildings, half finished projects and the failure to deliver the early promises;
- **In Scenario 2**, there are examples of *insufficient or erratic recovery*, where buildings may have been rebuilt, but there are not enough jobs, society remains fragmented and trees have not been replanted;
- **In Scenario 3**, - the ‘status-quo’ option, *replacement recovery*, there are examples of attempts to recover the pre-disaster situation, but alas, that ‘normality’ was also the ‘vulnerability’ that gave rise to the disaster…;
- **But in Scenario 4, development recovery**, there are rare examples of recovery where positive development has taken place to produce a better and safer environment.

In the following diagram four key elements are noted in this scenario:
- Build back both better and safer
- Complete all sectors
- Inspired Vision
- Strong, persistent and wise leadership

This scenario must be the only aim and vision for Haiti’s Recovery Plans.

These stages can be seen on the following model, where recovery has been broken down into its four essential strands: vision and leadership, resources, participation and ownership and organisation.
This model of Disaster Recovery can be expanded in scope to break the process down into five sectors:

- psycho-social recovery,
- environmental recovery,
- institutional and governmental recovery,
- physical recovery,
- economic/ livelihood recovery.

Since each of these sectors is dependent on the others - needing close integration, the aim must be to move each sector, in a balanced manner, towards Scenario 4 ‘Development Recovery’. Close multi-sectoral integration must be the only way forward for Haiti’s Recovery Plans to avoid the risk of neglecting one sector at the expense of another.

Thus the underlying assumption of this report is that full ‘Development Recovery’ is needed in Haiti that moves beyond replicating the dangerous pre-disaster status-quo and that this recovery integrates all the key sectors in a balanced approach through an agreed policy framework.
4. OBSERVATIONS OF RECOVERY IN HAITI

4.1 Positive Reactions

4.1.1 ROLE OF HOST FAMILIES
The value and scale of the host families’ contribution to displaced families was remarkable. It is estimated, from a landmark piece of research, as the first recorded example of mobile phone-call analysis following a disaster, that initially 570,000 (22% of the population of Port au-Prince) migrated from the devastated city to receive some form of support when it was most needed. The value of survivors being accommodated in host families in the immediate aftermath of a disaster is insufficiently recognised by authorities as a key coping strategy, with an important double value:

Firstly, as an asset to the authorities in reducing their emergency accommodation burden.

Secondly, for the traumatised families, there was a clear benefit in being accommodated with friends and relatives, since their temporary stay probably provided them with vital ‘comfort and security’, far beyond the scope of any other form of emergency accommodation.

Innovative agency programmes were undertaken to provide support to host families as they accommodated displaced survivors and there are records of families rebuilding new dwellings adjacent to the families of host families.

The Kobe earthquake of 1995 resulted in approximately 350,000 displaced persons. Between 40,000 and 60,000 left the city to stay with host families in various Japanese towns and cities. However, no Government Agency sought to determine how long they stayed away, who they stayed with or where they went. Such information on patterns of survival would have been useful to the authorities in managing the sheltering process following the Earthquake and Tsunami and Nuclear Disaster of March 2011. Web sites were set up throughout Japan and also internationally offering to coordinate families needing host family accommodation.

4.1.2 CAMP CREATION
The survivors are highly motivated in their reaction to occupy vacant lands in spontaneously created camps. In the way they have survived in these makeshift settlements they have demonstrated well developed improvisation skills in building, communal living and general survival.

4.1.3 EXTERNAL GLOBAL SOLIDARITY
This has been expressed through massive bilateral support, as well as support from the Haitian diaspora. At the Haiti Earthquake International Donor’s Conference on March 31st 2010 it was announced that 140 countries (out of the global total of 196) had already provided humanitarian assistance to Haiti and almost 50 countries made pledges of support that totaled $9.8 billion (US). This was for $5.3 up to March 2013 and up to $9.0 billion over the coming decade. However not all these generous pledges have been realised.

There has been widespread support from the Haitian diaspora in North America and Europe. This has been expressed in remittances as well as by all forms of tangible support. It is estimated that there are over 3.5 million Haitians living outside the country. This compares with the estimated internal population of between 7.2 - 9.7 million, thus the ratio of diaspora to residents may be one of the highest in the world.

In 2008 the Haitian diaspora contributed $1.4 billion (US) in remittances and it was


2 Estimates vary, but one source puts the main Haitian diaspora as 2 million in the Dominican Republic, 1.2 million in the US, 200,000 in Canada, 90,000 in France and 80,000 in the Bahamas.
estimated that this sum would rise to $2.0 billion (US) in the year following the disaster. Precise figures are not available but it is possible that the vast scale of personal remittances may have resulted in a similar total to all bilateral or multilateral aid in the two years since the earthquake. Thus at the Global Diaspora Forum held in the spring of 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was right to note that “Diaspora communities have the potential to be the most powerful people-to-people asset we can bring to the world’s table.”

A key factor in the role of the Haitian diaspora in providing rapid assistance was undoubtedly the role of Mobile Phones, thus enabling disaster survivors to contact their friends and families. DIGICEL claim that 80% of the population of Haiti now have mobile phone access.

4.1.4 PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORT
This has been strong, with exceptional support from DIGICEL in rebuilding the Iron Market as well as for the reconstruction of schools and infrastructure. The rapid reconstruction of the much loved Iron Market to the design of British Architect John McAslan, fulfilled a vital practical function, but it was also an inspired symbolic act in giving hope to the population that the downtown area of their city would be rebuilt.

“Do we really know or understand the importance of symbolic reconstruction? Should we play devil’s advocate, or can we assume that it is vitally important? Is the Iron Market symbolic or is it strategic - or both?”

David Alexander

4.1.5 INTERNATIONAL NGO SUPPORT
This is still present after 22 months. In many contexts there would be minimal presence of NGO’s at this stage.

4.1.6 RUBBLE CLEARANCE
Despite initial fears that this would impede reconstruction, earthquake rubble clearance appears to be progressing well, with delivery to sites that will not become unsafe new building sites with unconsolidated soils. The recycling of rubble to form new concrete blocks was a sensible labour intensive move, even though it is of doubtful whether such blocks end up being cheaper to manufacture than newly produced blocks, but simply disposing of rubble may have environmental and economic costs, so perhaps it is economically justifiable.
Some of the rubble cleared from the 1906 San Francisco earthquake became the unconsolidated soils that formed the site of major earthquake damage on the Loma-Prieta earthquake of 1989 due to rapid ground acceleration. But the reconstruction also contributed since sand and debris had been laid down in preparation for the 1915 Panama-Pacific International Exposition, which was intended as a celebration of San Francisco’s ability to rebound after its terrible catastrophe. After the Exposition, apartment buildings were erected on the filled land and in the 1989 earthquake, the water-saturated unconsolidated mud and sand suffered liquefaction, and the earthquake’s vertical shock waves rippled the ground more severely than in consolidated soils.

### 4.1.7 THE REPAIR STRATEGY
This has been a key approach in preventing the wasteful demolition of houses that are repairable, although it was evidently late in starting.

### 4.1.8 HOUSING EXPO OF PROTOTYPE DESIGNS
This initiative was an excellent way to enable the housing/shelter private sector to display their wares in a comparative setting.

*Proposed Innovative House designed by ‘Design and Architecture Service’ Cost $12,000 (US) constructed of ‘catch, mortier et bouteil’ with a manufacturers guarantee of 50-70 years  (Credit: Ian Davis)*

*Advertising Poster for Post-Disaster ‘Pronto-Housing’ Steel Frame Housing in Haiti  (Credit: Joseph Ashmore)*
4.1.9 COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES
These have been effective and will be increasingly important during reconstruction. Measures to promote communication with camp residents have been effective (suggestion boxes/information newspaper/radio and TV etc.). In many disaster recovery contexts, the lack of communication between officials and displaced communities has been the subject of severe criticism. Communication is also a key consideration for reconstruction and needs to be conceived to reach a broad public which will bring new challenges beyond the more controlled camp conditions.

4.2 Positive and Negative Reactions

4.2.1 LAND INVASIONS IN CANAAN
These indicate enterprise, and must be regarded as an asset in reducing the population pressure on the congested periphery of the urban centre and through the gradual establishment of micro-enterprises such as concrete block-making, car repairs, tailoring, laundry services etc. But there is a negative side, since most houses, set in unplanned settlements, have been built with a lack of quality construction, and many were not built safely.

These houses were built in a spontaneous land invasion in an area named ‘Canaan’, after the Biblical promised land. This name had been given to the area long before the earthquake and land invasion. (Credit: Maggie Stephenson)

Since it has been established that a significant proportion of those living in the city camps are not earthquake victims, these residents can be classified as ‘invaders’ of camps in order to secure the range of support services being offered to genuine earthquake survivors. Many have also been affected by rent increases and pushed from rental housing they can no longer afford, due to the increased demand after the EQ. It would appear that they are coming to camps as enterprising opportunists or due to changes in their own circumstances. It is possible that some of them can thereby save rent money, and that they realise that conditions are not ideal in the longer term.

This is a familiar problem in many global disaster situations where poor families who are ‘victims of life, if not the disaster’ adopt an enterprising approach to capitalize on the aid context in order to secure a ‘better lot in life’. In these situations the free services they receive are regarded by them as being preferable to the alternative open to them – expensive rental accommodation. Authorities are best advised to take a tolerant approach to such poor families, since while they are not earthquake victims, they are victims of another continual ‘disaster situation’ - the continuous everyday threat of grinding poverty and deprivation. After the Colombian Popayán, earthquake of 31 March 1983, the International NGO - World Vision, working with a Government Training Ministry SENA instigated a reconstruction programme. Families were grouped in twenty
family communities who then built their own houses, using all their family members as labourers and masons. However, during the course of building it became apparent that the majority of the families were not earthquake victims, and that they were not even from the earthquake affected areas. They had come to Popayán, attracted by the possibility of securing a house, support services and new building skills during the ‘reconstruction bonanza’. The organisers reflected on the situation and magnanimously accepted them as poor families who needed support and since there were sufficient resources available for earthquake survivors, then they should regard the project as a development opportunity to reduce poverty. This flexible approach was not difficult, since both organizing agencies had a broad ‘development’ as opposed to ‘welfare’ motivation.

4.2.2 COMMUNITY LEVEL ACTIONS
These exercises were most impressive. The mapping process as well as the community enumeration processes paved the way for vital subsequent neighbourhood upgrading programmes.

But negative concerns relate to the inexperienced persons who are undertaking some of these exercises as well as the serious risk of raising community expectations to address the priorities that communities have identified through these studies, since there is no certainty of implementation given the absence of allocated funds. However, some of the issues identified can be undertaken at low or no cost by the communities themselves.

4.2.3 HABITAT FOR HUMANITY AND HAVEN PROJECT
This joint two week house building initiative in Léogâne in November 2011, that involved the active involvement of Jimmy Carter (aged 87) and his wife Rosalind, was of mixed value. Positively it involved ‘community to community’ volunteer assistance on a heroic scale and there is no reason to doubt that the Carters’ contribution to the building work was a sincere gesture of support.

Visit of Jimmy and Rosalind Carter to contribute to the building of permanent houses in Léogâne (Credit: Ian Davis)

But negatively, the project was very expensive, and gained wide publicity that was misleading. This relates to the suggestion to the armies of volunteers as well as their supporters in Europe and the US, that this is the best way to reconstruct, when clearly far better ‘user-build’ alternatives are available. There was also the criticism that bringing in planeloads of volunteers from Ireland and the USA, for just one week of building and exposure to Haiti’s plight was a superficial form of ‘poverty and disaster tourism’.

4.2.4 YOUNG INTERNATIONAL STAFF
The presence of these officials within NGO and UN projects presents a mixed blessing. Positively such young persons are enthusiastic, energetic, learn fast and engage easily with the predominant local population of young people and children. But, many I met clearly lacked previous exposure to a developing country and lacked an understanding of disaster or development practice. Some also lacked essential qualifications and experience and remain for inefficiently short periods. Thus, the risk is that many are making decisions far
beyond their capacity or competency. One way forward is for better staff selection, induction training as well as ‘on-the-job’ training, perhaps undertaken on a joint inter-agency basis.

“Do we need more support mechanisms to enable them to make better decisions (as well as better training so they don’t need support)? Time for training is very short after disaster, political will to prepare for recovery before disaster strikes is lacking.”

David Alexander

The issue of hiring young inexperienced staff from donor countries has to be considered in relation to a much more sensible alternative approach. Kevin McKemey reminds me that it is essential to look within the country for qualified staff. By adopting this approach local capacities are strengthened by providing vital work opportunities for locals. The developmental and cultural advantages in adopting such an approach are immense.

After the 1976 Guatemala Earthquake, Reggie Norton, the director of the OXFAM/World Neighbors Housing Reconstruction Programme decided that their young inexperienced staff lacked essential skills for the highly innovative user-build, seismic safety reconstruction tasks, so he set up ‘on the job’ training. This involved drawing all their field staff together for two or three evenings a week from about 1600 hrs onwards where they would review the days work with older more experienced staff, including Fred Cuny from INTERTECH, and extract improved approaches from the review.

Each training session turned into a social gathering that was useful in team building. They needed technical training, but they also needed wider training and mentoring.

4.2.5 CO-ORDINATION
At the project level, coordination appeared to be working well when several agencies collaborated on the same integrated project. But there is serious criticism of a lack of coherent well coordinated donor activity. There was also repeated criticism of the Government of Haiti for failing to get a tight grip on recovery activities. But this may be changing (see item 7.1).

The clusters seem to have improved coordination and information sharing in contrast to the pattern in many disaster recovery situations. However, during the many interviews I attended, there were reports of uncoordinated donor activity. One experienced source commented that donors “…are not coherent, or coordinated, rather they are focused on their own projects rather than programme needs and policy development.”

Thus, unless the Government of Haiti get a strong grip on the recovery there is a risk that the Haiti recovery may be following a familiar stalemate dilemma observed in so many disaster recovery operations where “everyone believes in the value of coordination, but nobody has any desire to be coordinated.”

4.2.6 THE 16/6 NEIGHBOURHOOD RETURN POLICY
This approach has a positive value to rehabilitate existing settlements rather than attempt unrealistic relocation projects that have occurred with dire negative consequences in many disaster recovery situations. The underlying intention to symbolically clear key public spaces to provide hope and confidence to the population is also an excellent idea.

But, there are unresolved negative risks implicit in the programme. Given the high proportion of renters who are to be relocated to their original locations, there is a clear need to rapidly regenerate a large stock of affordable rental accommodation, ranging from a single room to a full dwelling, and at present that does not appear to exist. In addition the programme for the selected camps will not be replicable to all sites since at present there is insufficient capital available.

On the issue of declining capital for reconstruction - David Alexander writes: “In the Italian 2009 L’Aquila earthquake there wasn’t enough money to rebuild
or even repair the city. I rather felt that the best strategy would have been to do it neighbourhood by neighbourhood. The result would be very partial, admittedly, but it would restore functionality progressively to the city, area by area. This could be done strategically to maximise functionality by starting with the area most relevant to the functionality of the city. If funds increased, the programme could be accelerated. The idea would be that reconstruction spreads across the city, rather than being ‘spotty’ and potentially unconnected. Naturally, this wasn’t the strategy adopted.”

4.3 Negative Reactions

4.3.1 LEADERSHIP VACUUM
There appears to be a gap in the Government concerning leadership, strategic management, policy directives and co-ordination of actions concerned with permanent housing reconstruction. To emphasise this gap, I quote from a pungent critique of inaction by the GoH as well as the international community. An experienced informant in the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster notes:

“…the damaging effects on progress of the lack of a reconstruction policy and strategy and thus to hold those who have failed Haiti accountable. No agreement has been reached up to today (January 18th 2012) on size, possible designs, costs, and detailed methodology (installments: how many? supervision? by whom?) of P-Housing reconstruction.

No policy on who is entitled to a permanent house has also been established. Also, no overall estimation of the needs, costing and timing of the reconstruction process, study on the availability of skilled / unskilled human resources and materials availability has been undertaken.

Additionally, no clear understanding of how much money has actually been set aside for reconstruction has been reached. The GoH has repeatedly asked for support to develop these parameters cast light on this information. But the international community has, so far, failed to deliver on these requests. Donors have not invested in P-Housing reconstruction mostly due to the above mentioned lack of clarity in the approach.”

E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster member’s comments/feedback

4.3.1 ALLOCATION OF CONTRACTS
It appears that major contracts have primarily gone to US Government contractors. The reconstruction phase in Haiti raises the familiar issue if ‘tied-aid’ - a process where disaster aid money from a donor country travels in a ‘hairpin bed’ route straight back to the donating country’s contractors and consultants. The Associated Press reported on December 12 2010 that for every $100 (USD) a mere $1.60 (USD) went to Haitian Companies. In these initial 11 months since the earthquake a total of 20 contracts had been allocated to Haitian Companies, totalling $4.3 million dollars while 1,563 contracts had been allocated to US based companies, totalling $267 million dollars.

I raised this issue with the Government Official with responsibility for reconstruction, and he said he was not surprised, since that was what he would expect in Haiti - since “the US taxpayer would expect that their contribution would assist US business”. He also explained that the contract procedures, and complex tender documents made it particularly difficult for Haitian companies to bid for large scale contracts.

4.3.3 T-SHELTERS
While the creation of over 100,000 T-Shelters has provided superior accommodation to improvised tent structures, the results have been mainly negative, for five reasons:
1. They have absorbed approximately $500 million USD\textsuperscript{3}. This vast sum could have been far better used to build permanent dwellings. They could have been built for little more money than T-Shelters (average costs of T-Shelters: $138.8 USD per sq m compared to average costs of permanent dwellings $166.00 USD per sq m (HAVEN). However, the World Bank (PREKAD) and the Bureau of Monetisation are anticipating the cost of permanent dwellings to total $7,000 per unit of 18 sq. m or $388 USD per sq m.

![Matrix demonstrating the escalating costs of reconstruction over time.](image1.png)

This Matrix demonstrates the escalating costs of reconstruction over time. Thus, in relation to the Haiti Reconstruction, the high cost of the T-Shelters would be assigned to the two initial peaks of Relief and Rehabilitation, while still awaiting the major expense of reconstruction, represented in the third peak on the chart. The chart does not indicate a further dynamic, that of declining political and financial support over time, just when it is most needed for the expensive reconstruction phase (Credit: David Alexander)

![Transitional Shelters in Port-au-Prince. Note-in the right hand picture the T-Shelter has been constructed inside partially constructed permanent dwelling, enclosing rubble from the original demolished house.](image2.png)

Transitional Shelters in Port-au-Prince. Note-in the right hand picture the T-Shelter has been constructed inside partially constructed permanent dwelling, enclosing rubble from the original demolished house. (Credit: Ian Davis)

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\textsuperscript{3} “An enormous sum has been spent on temporary housing (easily $500 million when all is completed), which has gone largely to existing landowners in non-urban settings. A conservative estimate is that reconstruction could cost $1.6 billion. Less than $400 million is now available, and it is committed to a disproportionately small number of beneficiaries. More funding is needed, but it should be allocated more equitably and spent more efficiently.”

Priscilla Phelps (2011) Haiti Interim Recovery Commission Housing Sector Background Report Item 4 (see Appendix 2)
2. They frequently occupy land in densely populated urban that is needed for dwelling reconstruction, thus blocking the construction of permanent reconstruction.

3. They are not easily demolished to be recycled into permanent dwellings. (This is on account of the lightweight timber technology of T-Shelters in comparison with the heavy concrete block infill within reinforced concrete frame construction of permanent houses).

4. If international experience is anything to go by, these shelters will not be demolished, rather they will remain as sub-standard dwellings for years to come as a dismal legacy.

5. They failed to generate extensive much needed local employment. I did not hear of any skill training attached to construction programmes of T-Shelters.

The debate about the necessity of transitional shelters has a long history. For example, prefabricated ‘temporary’ housing still exists in Messina, Italy following the 1908 earthquake and after the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake.
After the Mexico City earthquake of 1985 the authorities rapidly requisitioned the tenement apartment dwellings that collapsed in the disaster. Then, using World Bank loans and grants they decided to embark on a rapid reconstruction programme. The first apartments were completed in under a year. Meanwhile, they provided rudimentary shelters for the survivors in adjacent streets with contractor toilet/shower portable units. They deliberately selected streets for the shelter sites since they knew that they would not become permanent slums as there would be a powerful local demand to reclaim the streets for traffic. The authorities also wished to keep the survivors as close as possible to their livelihoods, where these were still functioning. The result was that the authorities persuaded the survivors that with rapid reconstruction and extended use of emergency standard accommodation for a limited period it would be possible to avoid the additional cost of T-Shelters. Thus the cost of savings from the absence of T-Shelters, were applied to reconstruction.

Emergency Shelters in Mexico City made from hardboard, sited in blocked-off side roads adjacent to the apartment reconstruction sites with owners cars adjacent to shelters as secure storage areas.

(Credit: Mexican Govt. Reconstruction Agency)

Reconstructed Apartment Blocks in Mexico City. All reconstructed apartments were completed within 15 months of the earthquake using World Bank loans. (Credit: Mexican Government Reconstruction Agency)
In the Van Earthquake in Turkey of November 22, 2011 more than 50% of the displaced survivors took up the temporary shelter option, either as tents or by moving into prefabs (The standard Turkish Government Transitional Shelter Option). This ratio was much higher than in previous Turkish earthquakes as everybody wanted a tent or a prefab and to remain in the area. But then there was a second major earthquake that destroyed many more houses. This happened after houses undamaged by the first earthquake were declared as safe to live in. But when a second major earthquake destroyed so many more houses and more people died, people started to panic with the fear of aftershocks and new earthquakes and more people were then interested in leaving. Other cities arranged accommodation for those who wanted to leave, but not with host families but within existing free accommodation.

In summary, initially people wanted to stay in Van and wanted more tents and temporary shelters but a second earthquake increased fear and more opted to leave.

It is important to remember that Van earthquake happened just as the winter was setting in. In the first days of January 2012 the temperature was minus 7 Celcius. The majority of the affected people are urban middle class (within Van standards) and lived in multi storey apartment blocks. Thus the situation is not at all comparable with Haiti. Haiti enjoys a mild climate and as a low income country people never had good services and infrastructure and the majority lived in sub-standard houses. A flimsy house is not a big problem in Haiti. But in Van a durable house is essential as the winters are extremely cold and peoples’ normal living standard is much higher.4

The following pair of scenarios indicate alternative recovery options. Scenario 1 has been the prevailing pattern adopted in Haiti.

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4 I am grateful to Dr Yasemin Aysan, an international shelter and recovery consultant working in Van, Turkey for this information.
Response to the above five point critique of T-Shelters from the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster:

“The idea that T-Shelter is a physical obstacle to construction is ludicrous. Not only there exist many examples of the transformation of the timber frame into (part of the) permanent construction (not furniture) but there are vast areas damaged where the coverage with T-Shelter is minimal or non-existing. Coordination on permanent housing programming which has been very poor throughout the response, would ensure that those areas with no coverage would be served with permanent housing. There are many areas which can be served still by T-Shelter and permanent programming without conflicts.”

E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster member’s comments/feedback

4.3.4 DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
Three important safety concerns emerged during my visit:

1. Individual engineers, employed by NGO’s appear to be checking repairs and reconstruction projects for seismic safety. However, given the scale of building repairs/retrofit or reconstruction, the limited numbers of qualified engineers will not be able to respond to the potential massive demand for such advice. Therefore, engineers need to apply a ‘strategic cascade approach’ to teach a community the principles and practice of ‘seismic safety compliance’.

2. Retrofitting is more appropriate for critical facilities than individual dwellings. Thus, schools/churches - buildings of multiple assembly are appropriate as they require enhanced protection.

3. When agencies are assigned individual neighbourhoods for upgrading, overall safety should be a key part of their mandate - so that they check all structures, and offer training to all local builders, masons etc in safe construction.

4.3.5 EVICTION CONCERNS
The evictions of camp dwellers have caused acute hardship to surviving families who have already suffered enough over the past two years. I am informed that according to the latest eviction report (November 2011), a total of 63,109 people living in camps have been evicted since July 2010. An additional 99,098 are currently facing threats of eviction. Overall this figure represents 19% of current IDPs. Evictions remain for almost one out of five IDPs a daily threat.

“…..why were the camp dwellers evicted? It is difficult to ascertain what the alternatives might be and what the rationale is. Forced relocation and forced migration is a somewhat neglected aspect of disasters. Philip Fearnside has studied it in Indonesia; Tony Oliver-Smith detected it in Louisiana after Katrina.”

David Alexander

4.3.6 THE RELOCATION TO CORAIL
The relocation of surviving families to the only ‘official’ disaster relief camp in Corail, is generally acknowledged as an ill-considered decision. There appear to be a host of problems with Corail:

• The uprooting of the occupants to move them to this site;
• The highly exposed site, without shade and a long distant from most residents work place in Port-au-Prince;
• The unimaginative, regimented military style layout;
• The inadequate design of the T-Shelters;
• The lack of infrastructure, and dependency of services to maintain water and sanitation;
• Dissatisfaction of the settlement by the occupants;
• The lack of any plan for its future development.
5. MANAGING THE ‘INTRACTABLE SHELTER PROBLEM’ IN HAITI

5.1 The Wider Context

In 2011, the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) investigated Humanitarian Assistance to identify strengths and weaknesses in the international framework. The committee, chaired by Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, identified the shelter/housing sector as one of the most serious problem areas in disaster assistance:

“Providing adequate shelter is one of the most intractable problems in international humanitarian response. Tents are too costly and do not last long enough. Plastic sheeting can be good but most often is low quality and falls apart immediately.

Rebuilding houses takes years, even when land issues are not major obstacles. To solve this issue, agencies have increasingly used ‘transitional shelter’, a wide range of alternative solutions including cash, communal buildings and temporary shelters. Typically a compromise between a tent and a full house, transitional shelter can last for three years until proper reconstruction is achieved. At best it uses low cost local materials and is based on a simple design. Materials can be used afterwards too, when people move to their new home.

Whilst this approach shows promise, there are also challenges. Transitional shelters cost more than a few bits of plastic sheeting, and in emergencies that are not well funded ‘transitional’ can quickly become ‘permanent’. Arguments between experts over design, quality and cost can slow the process, and weak coordination in the sector often leads to a wide variance in what is provided. That can mean affected communities getting different levels of provision depending on the agency allocated to build their shelter.”

DFID (2011) page 25

The evidence for the DFID Humanitarian Review came from many sources, but clearly the authors were well aware of the results from the 2007 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) that had noted the problems associated with shelter and housing reconstruction: unfulfilled promises, land rights, availability of building materials and critically-missing links between building construction and livelihoods. Cosgrave (2007)

Therefore, given the broad international difficulties in the sector, identified in this review and in the Indian Ocean Tsunami tsunami evaluations, it was not surprising to find their negative assessment echoed in the Haiti shelter/housing reconstruction setting.

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5 In writing this section of the report I consulted some experienced colleagues who have generously shared their insights of the Haiti situation and disaster recovery: Joseph Ashdown (Independent Consultant on Shelter and Housing); Terry Jeggle (Independent Consultant, previously Senior Advisor to UNISDR; Babar Mumtaz (Independent Consultant on Shelter and Urban Planning) and Maggie Stephenson (UN-HABITAT Haiti).


In concluding this report in February 2012, I read with concern the ‘Update on the T-Shelter and other housing solution progresses’ that emerged in February 2012 from the Cluster Meeting of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Haiti E-Shelter / CCCM. http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info

The progress report arrived while finalising this report, and usefully clarified my thoughts as I attempt to distil this complex experience. I will quote from the data it contains when considering a key unresolved question:

“Why has such a vast national and international effort had such a generally poor impact in the sheltering and housing of disaster survivors in Haiti?”

In a similar manner to the reactions to the impact of the 2004 Tsunami, the Haiti earthquake provoked a ‘maximum aid profile’ through a ‘maximum international agency presence’. An estimated $6.5 (US) Billion was pledged by the international community, and it is possible that a similar sum was contributed from the Haiti diaspora. Agency presence has now reduced in scale, but there are still many active NGO’s and International Donors present more than two years after the disaster.

The Haiti ‘sheltering’ experience, which can be sub-divided into various categories that for convenience I will use in this section: (Immediate Shelter, Transition Shelter, Repair, Support for Rental Families, Urban Environment and Housing Reconstruction), has suffered by being fragmented for administrative reasons. However, this is an artificial perception of the subject- a false understanding of a seamless process of shelter and housing that starts with a disaster and ends when permanent housing set within rebuilt settlements is occupied. Maggie Stephenson has extensive international experience of disaster recovery and has been working for UN-HABITAT in Haiti. She believes that T-Shelter and housing are part of a continuum, that must be considered in a fully integrated manner:

“it is the role of the Government to consider shelter needs within the overall housing sector context and determine strategies which address various needs and recommendations in a coherent manner which will help to optimise the limited resources available. It is sub-optimal to consider camp and shelter needs in isolation particularly in terms of proposing solutions limited to the palette of short term activities with no clear path to more durable solutions.”

Maggie Stephenson

In relation to the primary focus of this report: meeting the pressing shelter and housing needs of hundreds of thousands of people and by consequence the additional attendant recovery problems, there is little doubt that there have been serious structural and systemic failures. Despite all the good intentions of the Government of Haiti and the many assisting groups drawn from NGO’s and International Agencies, numerous critical issues remain unresolved. There is no doubt that there have been tremendous efforts and energy that lie within the focal group of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee: the Haiti E-Shelter /CCCM Cluster, and all the bodies it includes. However, their contributions have been mixed, with some successes but with many weak results. The evidence can be seen clearly in the Progress Report of February 2012.

Therefore, the aim in writing this section is to be constructive in suggesting some areas where critical modifications and further emphasis need to be made. This will require a reconfiguration of abilities and resources for additional efforts in the very near term, without further piecemeal, uncertain, or temporary “fixes”. I list below both the intentions and results to date in February 22 2012 with some concluding observations about their realisation.

(The progress data is taken from Update on the T-Shelter and other housing IASC, Feb 2012)
5.2 Immediate Shelter
(with the intention to provide safe shelters and later safe dwellings)

Results:
In January 2012, on the second anniversary of the disaster there are still an estimated 520,000 people, (or 118,298 families) still living in the camps. Thus in two years, despite the best efforts by the authorities, one in three of the original total of 1,500,000 displaced persons still remain in the camps they improvised to provide themselves with immediate shelter after the earthquake.

This presents the authorities with a massive challenge, but there are positive aspects of this shelter situation that need to be both recognised and applauded:

• By February 2012, six times the population of my home town Oxford UK, (153,700) have found more durable shelter solutions than they found in the camps. Put another way, a population the size of Oxford has been resettled every four months since the earthquake;

• Within the first four months of the earthquake a vast quantity of relief goods were distributed by over 80 organisations: (560,000 tarpaulins were distributed in the four months after the earthquake, but the figure has now risen to a million tarpaulins - that would cover an area of 21.6 km². 62,000 tents and 130,000 kits containing tools and fixings were also delivered in time before the annual rainy season).

While such logistical achievements deserve recognition, there are severe concerns about the future. The projection of the Cluster is that by the end of November 2012, a total of 343,000 people (or 78,067 families) will still be living (a rather more accurate term would be ‘existing’) in a dependency world of plastic sheets and improvised canvas. These ‘tents’ will in all probability evolve into the future slums of Port-au-Prince. The total camp occupancy in February 2012, is approximately one in sixteen of the entire population of the country. They are still living in insecure and substandard conditions, that would be condemned in most countries as being unfit for human accommodation. This has to be regarded as an enormous international policy failure and an unacceptable situation.

But what is the short and long-term future of these 758 camps? The recent cluster statistics indicate that 4,132 families are projected to leave the camps every month, or a total of 49,591 families over a twelve month period from November 2011- November 2012. If that rate of decline continues it will take about 18 months from November 2012 to clear all the camps. This takes us up to about May 2014 for complete camp closure and raises the question whether it is reasonable, or acceptable, for displaced families to have been left in this form of accommodation for almost four and a half years? Another question is whether any creative thought has been given to the possibility that the camps will not be closed due to a lack of money or political resolve, raising the question how they can be managed to avoid them evolving into the new slums of Port-au-Prince.

“**There is no taxonomy of camps. Is the CCCM intending to analyse the differences between camps on public lands and private, those which are evolving into spontaneous settlements, or other processes. The total numbers are useful, but the analysis of the different conditions is needed to find ways forward in the different contexts. The extensive capacity and experience of IOM, IFRC and others would be very helpful in this regard.**”

Maggie Stephenson UN-HABITAT

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8 However, I am reminded that when commenting on the inadequate environmental standards of the camps, it is necessary to reflect on the similarly inadequate conditions that prevailed in the slums of Port-au-Prince, such as Cité Soleil, Martissant etc. before the earthquake.
5.3 Transitional Shelters:
(with the intention to provide T-Shelters as an interim measure)

Results:
The cluster calculates that by December 31 2011, a total of 102,750 T-Shelters had been completed, and that an additional 12,165 units are still planned to be built in the coming months. As noted in this report, the Haiti Interim Recovery Commission Report of 2011 estimated that $500 million (US) had been spent on these T-Shelters, out of a projected total cost of housing reconstruction of $1.6 billion at an average cost that ranges between $2,000 and $4,866 (US) per unit. Thus, there is a startling awareness that about one third of the entire reconstruction budget has been spent on purely interim measures. The limited reconstruction budget will be further eroded by the building of these 12,000 additional T-Shelters at a total cost that may range between about $24 and $59 million USD.

But it has to be recognised that much of the money spent on the T-Shelters was not transferable to the creation of permanent dwellings due to restrictions in the mandates of key donors. This is another area where flexibility in mandates is needed to avoid restricting officials from building permanent houses when they have the opportunity.

What is the future plan for the T-Shelters?
Maggie Stephenson raises some key questions for the Cluster to resolve:

1. Is it the cluster’s position to promote the ‘upgrading’ of T-Shelter in urban areas?
2. Is this a technically or financially optimum route to permanent construction?
3. Do the plans for upgrading meet required building codes?
4. Will the T-Shelter upgrading accommodate anticipated additional stories?
5. Will upgrading optimise the use of the site or the provision of services?

“We believe this position needs discussion with MTPTC, MICT and others and a review of the concerns from past experience and current field conditions.”

5.4 Repair:
(with the intention to repair, ‘repairable’ houses, rather than engage in wasteful and unnecessary demolition).

Results:
The estimated number of houses destroyed and damaged is around 200,000. 175,000 were identified in the Ministry of Public Works (MTPTC) survey. Of the 400,000 surveyed, the proportion of the 400,000 surveyed was as follows: 46% green, (safe for use) 29% yellow, (minor repairs needed) 25% red (unstable, needing major repairs or to be demolished and rebuilt).

However, it is important to note that many buildings were occupied by multiple households, therefore the number of ‘homes’ destroyed is higher than the above total of 200,000. It is projected that the population of Port Au Prince is expected to double in less than 20 years.

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9 In March 2010, an estimate was made by the Government of Haiti that the total cost of reconstruction would amount to $11.5 (US) billion, so it is not clear how this total relates to the $1.6 billion (US) cited in the Interim Recovery Commission’s report of 2011.

while the household size is diminishing. These two factors increase the number of homes required. Therefore the challenge is not the simple replacement of previous numbers, but planning for more.

5.5 **Support for Rental Families:**
(with the intention to support the estimated 78% of the disaster survivors who do not own a house, and depend on rented accommodation).

**Results:**
Rental subsidies had been provided to 13,609 families by January 2012 with plans to provide support to a further 3,645 in coming months. It is not known how many new rental rooms or new rental apartments had been constructed by January 2012 or how many were planned for the future.

However, cash grants are only one aspect of the rental housing problem.

Maggie Stephenson notes that:
“....... rental subsidies alone do not represent a strategy for rental reconstruction, condition quality or resolve rental sector bottlenecks. We agree rental reconstruction and development is critical to address the needs of many in camps, but this should be addressed through appropriate instruments including durable legal and financial mechanisms and within a wider housing policy.”

5.6 **Urban Environment:**
(with the intention to upgrade the dangerous and totally substandard neighbourhoods with improved infrastructure and services).

**A Question:**
Professor Babar Mumtaz, an internationally recognized expert on low-cost T-Shelter and settlement planning has suggested that the priority of international support must be focused on this sector:

“It is a pity that after all of this time, the one thing we as a community have failed to do is to recognize the basic truth to involve the people, think development. Just as it is important to get people off the “temporary shelter” paradigm, it is important to start not from housing but from settlement considerations. People will, one way or the other, rebuild their homes, perhaps even their lives, but it would all be that much easier if more thought was given from the outset to settlement planning, infrastructure provision and livelihood generation - these are the areas that need institutional support.”

Babar Mumtaz, Independent Consultant

5.7 **Housing Reconstruction:**
(with the intention to rebuild permanent affordable safe dwellings that would not collapse in future floods, hurricanes, landslides or earthquakes, with secure titles).

**Results:**
By June 2012 it is estimated that 5,189 new houses have been constructed but this total does not include the large projects being built by the World Bank (16/6 AFD) However their planned numbers were not available when writing this report. It is necessary to note that the total of 5,189 houses does not include houses built, under construction or planned by people themselves.

ONU HABITAT estimate that in Canaan/ Jerusalem over 9,000 permanent houses were under construction by assisting bodies at the end of 2011. They also estimate that within the overall affected area 50,000 houses are under construction or built by people themselves.
The reality that 28 months after the earthquake, such a relatively small number of houses have been rebuilt by all assisting bodies, in comparison to the need, indicates that the priorities of the Government of Haiti as well as the international community must have been elsewhere. Or an alternative explanation may indicate that the challenge in building new houses in Haiti has been impeded by the complex legal ownership complications.

Why have so few houses been built in the two years since the disaster? In the following quote, Joseph Ashmore an independent consultant who was shelter cluster technical advisor in the initial period after the Haiti earthquake suggests that the explanation may lie in four areas:

1. Housing reconstruction takes a long time, beyond an agency’s mandate¹¹, whereby the use of the funds are limited to the first years of a response.
2. Housing is perceived to be expensive, in comparison to the supply of other relief items.
3. Most agency staff lack skills in the housing field.
4. Within agencies there lurks a fear of them becoming legally liable in the event of future building failures. But this is also a humanitarian concern, not just a question of liability, since obviously no agency has any desire for their houses to collapse and kill the occupants.

The lack of skills in housing construction noted above, relates both to the assisting agencies as well as to the local population where their lack of construction skills contributed to the destruction of the houses in the first place. With an absence of these skills in the community, vulnerabilities could have been rebuilt, to await the next earthquake or hurricane forces.

“From early in the Haiti response it became evident that housing reconstruction would take many years during which further earthquakes, flooding (with accompanying poor sanitation) and hurricanes would continue to remain as significant threats to lives. Due to a lack of both skills and suitable quality of building materials, large scale and rapid reconstruction in reinforced concrete and cement blocks would severely risk the lives of a population recently hit by a major earthquake. As a result, a move to more rapidly build timber structures was made with the understanding that even if poorly built they would lead to few fatalities in an earthquake (or a hurricane)¹². The aim was to provide significant numbers prior to the arrival of the rains in 2011. These simple structures became known as transitional or T-Shelters.

However, perceptions of the nature of T-Shelters began to change. Costs of emergency T-Shelters began to escalate from initial target estimates of less than one thousand dollars to many thousands of dollars. In many countries the resulting T-Shelters would certainly be regarded as permanent houses.

Many international humanitarian organisations remain averse to becoming involved in permanent housing construction. In part this is due to donor funds being strictly time limited and in part it is due to the different levels of skill in construction and management. (The skills to build 30,000 plus, seismic resistant houses per annum in Haiti do not exist). There is also the issue of the liability of agencies involved in building in reinforced concrete within a seismic zone. In part it also concerns what else an organisation could do with such resources elsewhere.

In Haiti, many organizations decided to build ‘transitional shelters’ costing many thousands of dollars that were designed against category 4 storms.”

Joseph Ashmore, Independent Consultant

¹¹ One of the 12 international bodies with an ‘in house’ shelter and housing specialist, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID is developing “A Description of Humanitarian Shelter and Settlements Assistance” (2012) The paper states: “…humanitarian Shelter and Settlements assistance does not address longer-term needs mainly because those are well beyond the mandates, expertise, institutional memories, organizational protocols, and skill sets of most humanitarian actors. Thus humanitarian shelter and settlements assistance does not include, for example, permanent housing reconstruction…”

¹² “But it is important to note that construction in blocks would also have been hurricane resistant” Maggie Stephenson
5.8 Conclusions

These issues and demands result in an extensive ‘wish-list’ of needs to be satisfied. Four seem to be the most pressing and they need to be met to advance the Haiti recovery, as well as to make certain that T-Sheltering and housing are dealt with far more effectively in future disaster contexts:

5.8.1 THE NEED FOR QUALIFIED AGENCIES

Evidence for the above suggestion that a lack of house design and construction skills in the donors or assisting groups might account for the very limited number of houses that have been rebuilt can be found in a recent study by Graham Saunders, who leads the IFRC Shelter after Disaster Cluster. He calculated that globally, a mere 12 international humanitarian organizations out of the 492 agencies that were signatories of the Red Cross Disaster Code of Conduct have fully qualified individual full time staff members who specifically devote their time to disaster shelter and housing concerns. These 12 include NGO’s, International Finance Institutions, UN Agencies and Donor Bodies. For example, only one international NGO specifically devotes its work to housing, ‘Habitat for Humanity’. Similarly, there is a single UN Agency with a specific shelter and settlement focus: UN-HABITAT.

This limited commitment when compared to other well supported sectors such as health, or water/sanitation, indicates an alarming neglect of the disaster shelter and housing reconstruction sector. This is fundamentally inconsistent with the importance accorded to the crucial role of shelter and housing in recovery. The severe inadequacy is only compounded by the magnitude of the needs., that were never more evident than after the Haiti disaster.

5.8.2. THE NEED FOR EXPERT DECISION MAKING

Since the mid 1970’s Terry Jeggle has worked in numerous disaster situations in a variety of NGO and UN agency roles both in the field and in matters of policy design and execution.

His first observation concerns the weaknesses in the Haiti recovery. He suggests that policies:

“..... do not derive from bad people, making ill-advised decisions so much as the much more pervasive issue that no one authority or entity was seriously or single-mindedly courting the enormity of the problems and many complicated issues. These required “vision” but also recognition of the essential nature of informed professional knowledge, and truly authoritative expertise to “plan, decide, authorize, and then set-up the means and abilities of myriad others with their various talents and resources to implement.”

There are also crucial areas of staff qualifications, general competency and the contentious issue of ‘who decides’:

“This necessarily also implies the need to exclude others who were incapacitated, poorly suited, less able or unwilling. Popular participation is wonderful and needs to be capitalized upon to the extent that it is feasible in extreme circumstances, but there also the reality of one captain, and one chief engineer on every single ship that sails the seas, and this is for a reason. The ship’s course is not set by deckhands nor for that matter is its destination even determined by the captain, but by a wider system that determines which ship is to carry which cargo to what destination.

Depending on the circumstances similar crucial capacities may rest either within the structures of a government or alternatively, in extreme cases, by an accepted decision to vest the responsibility in a recognized international body or authority working closely with national bodies or individual efforts. In Haiti it seems that there were way too many well-meaning individual efforts, or let’s also be frank, perhaps some self-serving interests too in a significant vacuum of strategic
determination or authoritative responsibility. These failings are not attributed solely to either Haitian or international endeavors, but the tragedy must be acknowledged as a collective one. This is why new strategic approaches to crisis management and better structured systems must be created, as our previous means and expectations have failed us all.”

Terry Jeggle

5.8.3 THE NEED TO BECOME ACCOUNTABLE

Thus, a fundamental question emerges: Given the massive scale of housing and shelter loss and the consequent need for immediate shelter and housing after disasters, and more specifically in Haiti, why do agencies not respond to this need in terms of their individual staffing, training, priorities, policies and resulting commitments? Despite all their frequent public assertions that they are ‘accountable to victims or beneficiaries of their assistance’, most Humanitarian Agencies in the shelter and housing sectors appear to be supply-driven rather than demand-driven. Since T-Shelters avoid long term commitment, do not require detailed housing skills and experience, and avoid liability risks they have become a highly popular operational ‘default option’.

5.8.4 THE NEED FOR A POLICY REVIEW

The issues surrounding the Haiti recovery convince us that the policies and practices that may have been suited for earlier or much more modest emergency needs are no longer adequate for the frequency, severity and types of growing disaster consequences being experienced in today’s world. These conditions, and even demands, will become ever more common in the future. For this reason there is an urgent and pressing need, as identified in the DFID review noted at the outset of this chapter. This is for the international assistance bodies concerned in donor countries and within the United Nations, as well as within individual NGOs to reassess and retool their approaches with some precision. They need to enquire what their capabilities, and limitations are to respond cogently and effectively to critical recovery shelter requirements. This will require nothing less than an urgent and far reaching review of their approaches to both disaster risk reduction and response. Such a radical review could usefully include key tasks:

Brainstorm the Shelter/Housing Problem/Opportunities

Request that UN-HABITAT and the IASC Shelter Cluster led by IFRC and UNHCR bring together a varied assembly of experts and practitioners for a two day intensive exploration of the subject in the light of recent disaster recovery experiences, (including Haiti) and produce some guidance notes to support the following four tasks.

1. Review Roles

A review of the role of international agencies (Governments/ Donors/ IFI’s/ NGO’s) in future short and long term disaster recovery operations. In the light of major recent disasters, such as the Haiti Earthquake, there is an impetus to define the likely future needs that can lead towards a projection of distributed and appropriate agency capabilities.

2. Reconsider Agency Mandates

A review of the mandates of funding bodies that may have been inflexible in requiring the spending of money too rapidly in prescribed approaches, thus forcing decisions on short term approaches (such as adopting T-Shelters) when longer term solutions (such as building permanent safe dwellings) may be the priority need.

3. Examine Shelter and Housing Capacity

A study is required of ways to expand agency commitments to the neglected shelter and housing sector to meet current and future needs.

4. Conduct Applied Research into Shelter and Housing Needs and Performance

This will also require the commissioning of applied research in a spectrum of disaster situations where knowledge is limited or unknown, into such questions as the:
• shelter preferences of disaster survivor?
• varied functions of shelter?
• occupancy levels in varied shelter options over specific time frames?
• capacities and constraints of host families in providing shelter?
• understanding of the variable needs where T-Shelters are essential and where rapid Permanent Housing can be undertaken?
• way people adapt T-Shelters into more permanent dwellings, or fail to do so?
• needs for rental accommodation?
• most appropriate ways to provide technical advice on safety and good building practice to individual families as they rebuild their homes?
• balance between the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ factors in shelter and housing?
6. MODELS OF RECOVERY

The issues surrounding the Haiti recovery convince us that the policies and practices that may have been suited for earlier or much more modest emergency needs are no longer adequate for the frequency, severity and types of growing disaster consequences being experienced in today’s world. These conditions, and even demands, will become ever more common in the future.

For this reason there is an urgent and pressing need, as identified in the DFID review noted at the end of chapter 5. This is for the international assistance bodies concerned in donor countries and within the United Nations, as well as within individual NGOs to reassess and retool their approaches with some precision. They need to enquire what their capabilities, and limitations are to respond cogently and effectively to critical recovery shelter requirements.

This will require nothing less than an urgent and far reaching review of their approaches to both disaster risk reduction and response. Such a radical review could usefully include five key tasks:

6.1 Progress with Recovery Model (see chapter 3)

The purpose of this model is described in chapter 3.
Various tools are needed to monitor reconstruction progress, but to achieve effective assessments indicators are needed to measure performance. For example, if the model below is to be useful to determine progress in the four strands of recovery there are well developed quantifiable ways to monitor performance with the flow of various forms of resources, but the qualitative measurement of ‘vision’ and ‘leadership’ or ‘participation’ present many challenges. The result is that monitoring of performance tends to be biased towards quantifiable data with the result that critical, qualitative aspects such as the ‘vision and leadership’ and ‘participation’ strands are left unmeasured with consequent neglect.

But such difficulties should not obscure the need to devise appropriate indicators for all strands of recovery to suit the Haiti context, in order to measure the relative progress of both qualitative and quantitative elements.
6.3 Building a Safety Culture during Reconstruction Model

A further strand could be added to the ‘Progress with Recovery Model’ concerning the building of ‘safety’, since a risk in any recovery strategy is to avoid rebuilding vulnerability. This model suggests that the growth of a safety culture proceeds during the recovery process through certain rather predictable stages: public and media outcry, political rhetoric, logical arguments/developments such as cost benefit assessments and definitions of required levels of protection followed by the development of laws and codes of practice that cumulatively lead to the establishment of a safety culture.

In Model 6.1, at each of the four Scenario Stages, safety indicators are noted.
The purpose of this model is described in chapter 3.
6.5 Progress in Haiti in the Five Recovery Sectors

If suitable indicators of recovery progress can be devised for each of the five recovery sectors (see discussion on this topic after Model 6.2) Then the shape of progress, across the five sectors will be able to be displayed in a powerful manner on this diagram.

Progress in Haiti in the five Recovery Sectors  (with thanks to Professor David Alexander for his partnership in developing this model)
6.6 Scenarios for the Shelter/Housing Continuum

The purpose of this model is described in chapter 4.3.3. The model indicates that if the initial relief phase can be extended by various means, and rapid reconstruction can be undertaken - as occurs in many disaster situations, the costly need for T-Shelters can be avoided.

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**SCENARIO 1: THREE STAGE RECOVERY**

**Stage 1**
- Dwelling Collapse
- Tent/Host Family etc

**Stage 2**
- Transition Shelter

**Stage 3**
- Permanent House

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**SCENARIO 2: TWO STAGE RECOVERY**

**Stage 1**
- Dwelling Collapse
- Tent/Host Family etc

**Stage 3**
- **CLOSE GAP**

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Scenarios for the Shelter/Housing Continuum (with thanks to Dr. Fred Kringsdol in developing this model)

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13 In draft guidelines for Humanitarian Shelter and Settlements Assistance USAID had indicated various strategies to improve immediate sheltering, and thereby extend its effectiveness. One is to provide support to host families who accommodate survivors by such means as: ‘creation of new shelter space, improvement of existing space and livelihoods and other forms of assistance’

The Management Expert Charles Handy has developed this model to show the relationship between Trust and Control. In essence this can be seen as a pendulum to indicate the level of trust or control that authorities exercise. Handy’s essential argument is that the more trust that is exercised by managers and leaders the less control they need, and conversely the more control mechanisms that they devise will erode trust. This balance is particularly relevant to the disaster recovery context, in relation to the relationship between recovery managers and beneficiaries. The issue also relates closely to the question of ‘downward accountability’ to beneficiaries.
This pyramid model was devised to indicate the sequence or hierarchy of management decision making that can be easily related to recovery planning. The basis of this model is that disaster recovery has to stand on a basis of underlying ethical values, such as the need for equity, concern for the most vulnerable, stewardship of the environment etc. From this platform of ‘core values’, strategic decisions can be made that in turn support tactical decision making. The sequence can be extended to implementation and the final apex of the pyramid would be evaluation of the results.
John Kotler, a well known professor and author from the Harvard Business School has developed a model that indicates that effective change can be broken down into eight progressive stages. His model has been adapted here in relation to the main focus of this report, the need to maintain a Vision for Recovery. The stages are significant as they indicate ways to clear obstacles and build strong alliances.
7. ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROMOTE FULL RECOVERY

7.1 Establishing, at the highest level, effective management and leadership of construction within government

The closure of the Haiti Interim Recovery Housing Sector on October 24 2011 was a major source of concern. The Background Report on Perceptions of Recovery Priorities by Priscilla Phelps, (See Appendix 2), indicates six key issues that urgently need to be addressed. I trust that the commission's existence and mandate will be renewed, or be replaced by a similar body since it is crucial that all sectors of disaster recovery/reconstruction need a focal point at the centre of the Government of Haiti to give direction and coordinate these complex tasks.

However, as I write there are encouraging signs that the Government of Haiti is beginning to move forward, since in January 2012 the Haitian Government’s Ministry of Public Works is now working closely with the Unit for Reconstruction, UCLBP that is well placed under the Prime Minister's Office. It is to be hoped that the main donors will support the Government as it lays down the foundations of a reconstruction management structure to establish governmental machinery that can supervise the varied sectors of reconstruction.

Accountable management and leadership are essential, but a clear vision for recovery is also needed with ‘champions’ who will inspire the entire process, work through the host of obstacles and provide the public and all the assisting groups with direction and confidence. The coordination model for recovery needs to be one with multiple linked nodes in a devolved model, (rather like a network of wire netting) rather than a centralized, cumbersome and unwieldy ‘command and control’ model (rather like a bicycle wheel with all spokes leading to a central hub).

“Governance and democracy in reconstruction might involve having some ‘approved models’ (antiseismic, financially and logistically viable, that sustain livelihoods, etc.). These could then be chosen and adapted as needed by the local protagonists, thus guaranteeing quality control, safety and some homogeneity. I don’t like the idea of stitching micro-plans together. It sounds too much like a patchwork quilt of ‘make do and mend’ approaches.

Do we understand - more appositely, do we have a model for - change in the reconstruction process over the years after a major disaster? Things that change:-
- knowledge and expertise
- politics and politicians
- available wealth (e.g. ‘boom and bust’)
- indebtedness
- inflation
- the physical landscape - chiefly the built environment and the opportunities it offers
- other...

Do we properly understand why some reconstruction situations reinforce power structures while others overthrow them? Can international organisations, including the UN, influence these processes, or must they stand weakly on the sidelines of political processes?”

David Alexander

* Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti

14 Throughout this section I am grateful to Professor David Alexander for his insights, as a result of his thirty years of experience of reconstruction policy and practice. His observations are set in a series of quotes that have been provoked by his consideration of the proposed actions contained in this chapter.
7.2 Mobilising National Resources

Given the massive challenge of reconstruction that will take many years to accomplish, support from the full range of civil society is essential. The government will need to find appropriate ways to engage with locally based bodies that will include institutions/ academic courses in reconstruction and virtually all aspects of society eg architecture/ planning/ engineering / finance/ legal/ religious bodies/ chambers of commerce/ private sector/ media etc.

* Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors
* Will require the full resources of civil society to be mobilised
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti

7.3 Managing the Expectation of Survivors

Evidently there is a widespread expectation among the survivors that they will each be provided with a new house (see Haiti Interim Housing Sector Report, item 3 in Appendix 2). Therefore, the government must dispel such assumptions and explain their overall policy for the future of homeless families.

* Will require very urgent actions to be taken
* Will not require extensive further financial investment
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti and IOM

7.4 Defining Housing Reconstruction Policy

The government need to urgently define the ‘rule-book’ for housing reconstruction to avoid different standards being adopted in a piece-meal manner. Facing such key questions as: what to build, where, when, how safe, how large, for whom and at what costing level?

“In rich countries, the cost of the house may be only 40 per cent of the cost of reconstructing a dwelling, with the rest spent on land acquisition, urbanisation and services. However, this may be equally true for temporary shelter as for permanent dwellings. Moreover, the former leave behind redundant urban forms”

David Alexander

* Will require very urgent actions to be taken
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti and the Department of Public Works
* Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors

7.5 Advising on the Future of Transitional Shelters

There is a strong case to cease building T-Shelters immediately, and using remaining available funds for permanent dwelling reconstruction. Advice needs to be provided to the occupants of T-Shelters concerning their rights to demolish or modify/ upgrade them into permanent houses, or how they demolish and recycle the building materials to enable them to build permanent dwellings on the T-Shelter sites.

* Will require very urgent actions to be taken
* Will not require extensive further financial investment
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti
### 7.6 Supporting Economic Recovery

A policy is needed to use local materials and labour wherever possible in reconstruction. In addition, a policy and programme is also needed to enable survivors to secure sustainable livelihoods that can assist them in financing their own recovery. The development of micro credit facilities and small loans to business enterprises will be a pre-requisite to economic recovery at the neighbourhood level.

* Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors
* Will benefit from technical support from ILO and International Finance Institutions
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti

### 7.7 Securing Legal Tenure

Building from the community enumeration work, for the government to provide legal tenure title deeds for the owners of individual land and dwellings. Building from the community enumeration work, the government needs to grasp the opportunity to provide legal tenure.

“Probably, reconstruction planning ought to start with a meticulous study of land ownership and availability. In Haiti, as in Bangladesh (not to say Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, etc.), massive safeguards are needed.”

David Alexander

* Will require very urgent actions to be taken
* Will require further financial investment
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti

### 7.8 Building Public Safety and Creating Safe Critical Facilities

The aim is to provide protection from threats to lives, livelihoods and property (Natural disasters such as hurricanes/ landslides/ flooding and earthquakes) and giving priority attention to the reconstruction and protection of all critical facilities in each neighbourhood. These could include all buildings of multiple occupancy such as schools/ churches/ cinemas/ government buildings as well as basic water/ electricity/ telephone services.

David Alexander asks whether there a risk of reconstructing to resist earthquakes and then finding it is all vulnerable to floods?

* Will require very urgent actions to be taken (safety demands priority attention to avoid rebuilding vulnerability)
* Will require further financial international investment and technical support
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti
7.9 Recognising that to achieve successful outcomes decisions on reconstruction must involve the survivors

In the words of the GFDRR Reconstruction Guidelines:
“...empowering communities to carry out reconstruction allows their members to realize their aspirations and contribute their knowledge and skills. It also assist their psycho-social recovery, helps establish community cohesion, and increases the likelihood of satisfaction with the results.”

GFDRR (2010) ‘Safer Homes, Stronger Communities’ Guiding Principle 3 page 1

* Will require the full resources of civil society to be mobilised
* Will require the support of NGO’s and the voluntary sector
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti

7.10 Supporting Owner-driven Housing Construction and an Associated Programme to Develop Building Skills

Owner-driven housing has many advantages over private sector driven housing in reconstruction. This approach is particularly appropriate for Haiti in view of the massive housing need. A key component of these programmes is the development of useful building skills, with the ability to build safe quality dwellings and the capacity to market such skills after reconstruction is complete.

In January 2012 the Ministry of Works of the Government of Haiti launched a Communication Strategy. This is a comprehensive approach to the training of engineers, families, builders, masons etc. in safer construction. Of all the positive indications of progress I observed, this key initiative is a most encouraging sign that the Government, as well as other concerned parties are taking safe reconstruction seriously, and are using training and capacity building as the means to achieve this aim.

* Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors
* Will benefit from technical support from UN-HABITAT and International Finance Institutions
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti

7.11 Facilitating the Building of Rental Housing

In order to clear the camps it is essential for there to be a ‘pull factor’ that will encourage the estimated 78% occupants who were formally renters of dwellings to move back into safe new multi-family rentable housing in their original neighbourhoods. Initially financial support will be needed to enable occupants to pay their rent.

“Is post-disaster rental housing an investment, a public service, or what?”

David Alexander

* Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors
* Will benefit from technical support from UN-HABITAT and International Finance Institutions
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti
7.12 Promoting Urban Planning and Urban Improvement

Within each congested low-income settlements there is a need to develop a well integrated reconstruction strategy. This will need to include:

- Rubble clearance
- Community enumeration to clarify legal titles to property
- Community mapping of capacities and gaps
- Urban Planning
- Risk assessment
- Environmental upgrading
- Identifying safe access routes
- Water, sanitation, electrical and telephone services
- Waste collection and disposal
- Ban on plastic bags that block culverts and cause localized flooding
- Local flood protection measures to ravines and water courses

"The heart of Port-au-Prince" was already run down before the earthquake...” – I think that disasters usually tend to accelerate or exacerbate pre-existing trends. Why should we assume that changes in the situation after disaster (which are always at least partly negative) are going to change that for the better? Underlying (negative) trends are almost bound to be accelerated, unless there are specific, strong processes that reverse the trends. Do we understand this predicament enough? Do we have “evidence-based practice” - i.e. have we reviewed the evidence?

Regenerate the environment - sometimes strategies seem impossible precisely because they are so simple and effective!

The focus on housing at the expense of other aspects of reconstruction is common, The tacit assumption that housing is absolutely the most important element of reconstruction is never tested.”

David Alexander

* Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors
* Will benefit from technical support from International Finance Institutions
* Will require action by the Government of Haiti
For effective reconstruction to occur in Haiti, to reach the stage of Scenario 4 ‘Development Recovery’ (see chapter 3) the following are needed:

1. An effective organisational structure within Government;
2. Leadership in Government with a ‘champion(s)’ to inspire the entire enterprise and provide a public face’ for reconstruction;
3. Sustained cross-party political support;
4. Survivor involvement and acceptance;
5. Adequate funding, with controls in place to avoid corruption;
6. Long-term commitment by all supporting groups, to cover both the short-term period when families remain in camps, and to cover long-term rebuilding;
8. ‘Building back better’ with disaster resistant construction, technology and siting;
9. Land and property tenure issues resolved and communicated to land owners and house owners;
10. Adaptable, climatically and culturally appropriate shelter designs;
11. Support from civil society: (locally based institutions/ academia/ religious bodies/ chambers of commerce/ private sector/ a free press )
12. Environmentally sustainable;
13. A recovery strategy that strengthens the livelihoods of survivors and that builds the community’s economic base.

FINALLY….

The twelve ‘actions needed’ in chapter 7 and the thirteen ‘essentials’ listed above are an exceedingly tough agenda. They would be demanding within a wealthy country, let alone in one as poor as Haiti. This is a reminder that all disaster recovery situations are beset by severe problems. But Haiti seems to have the full range in abundance, and more….political/ social/ educational/ ethical/ legal/ technical/ technological/ environmental/ economic/ financial/ developmental/ governmental/ staffing/ tactical/ strategic etc.

But the situation is far from hopeless, there is a tremendous resilience within the population and the determination of so many people in the large community of ‘assisting groups’ to make recovery ‘work well’, and in the process build a stronger and better Haiti. Thus the need is for visionaries….
“A visionary - regards difficult situations, not just as problems to solve, but as opportunities for creation and collaboration. To present a challenge that calls forth the best in people and brings them together around a shared sense of purpose, leading to a united community aligned around an inspiring goal.”

Anon
APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1.
Priorities for Recovery

CONTRIBUTION BY ANSHU SHARMA, (INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT, DELHI)

A few thoughts, which you may like to consider:

1. Perceptions are a major issue - both at community level, and as understood by agencies. While a number of local house-owners are rebuilding vulnerabilities in the absence of any opportunities, I also took a number of pictures of INGO managed reconstruction projects that were hugely over-engineered.

2. Retrofitting is still not being talked about - perhaps it is too big a luxury in the present context?

3. You mention lack of vision. This is very evident even at the micro level. In the absence of credible master planning processes, the best option available is perhaps creation of smaller plans wherever work is being carried out, and then stitching them together. Unfortunately, comprehensive visions were not easily found even at this small scale.

4. There has been talk of improving technical competence in the areas of architecture and engineering, and of improving the codal provisions for structures. I felt that raising awareness of home owners and training of masons will bring more benefits. The only credible mason training initiative I found when I was there was one that had been in the planning pipeline for months, and was to be carried out by american consultants, targeting 25 masons for a one day training. The plan left me depressed.

5. To lift my spirits up I tried to list out local innovations that I had come across. And there were some very interesting ones:

   a) Toilets built on drains in camps where there was no space for building them.

   b) Rubble being reused for permanent house reconstruction (intriguingly though the machines were being imported from Lesotho..!). The fun part was the way it had been worked out that large lumps will be used for foundation, aggregate for concrete, and finer particles stabilised compressed block making.

   c) Digicel’s information on how users moved across the country in the weeks after the earthquake was used to create a migration map.

   d) Faith was a great support. While outsiders may often look down upon the voodoo part, local artists used the faith and opportunities such as the day of the dead to recharge the vibrancy of the local culture and engage people.
1. **Lack of Vision and Leadership**

Re-construction relies on the cumulative and collective action by a wide range of actors (various government departments, UN, NGOs, local institutions, civil society). They need to unite behind a clear and realistic vision of what reconstruction can achieve set out by the GoH. A vision statement is necessarily high level, and is more useful if supported by more specific goals (or objectives). Both could be developed quite quickly through a professional facilitated 1-2 day workshop involving key stakeholders. The greater challenge perhaps is who should participate in that workshop, and who comprises the leadership group (or individual) who will take ownership of the vision and goals, and has the mandate to develop a strategy that responds to this. A government entity needs to be established urgently to take on the leadership and co-ordination of reconstruction. A key question is whether this should integral to government or a more distinct entity as BRR in Aceh. Secondly, how this entity will be effectively supported by the UN and other international organisations.

2. **Lack of Reconstruction Strategy**

A strategy simply sets out the big picture in terms of what needs to be done, and the inter-relationships (dependencies) between different elements. Policies can then be developed which relate to specific aspects of the strategy (eg. land tenure, T-Shelters, compensation etc). It is perhaps helpful to consider key components of a reconstruction strategy for Haiti in 2 categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY ENABLERS/CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES</th>
<th>KEY ELEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Land Certification</td>
<td>Rural Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Planning zones (incl. hazard assessment)</td>
<td>Urban Housing and Neighbourhood Renewal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Building codes, standards, and best practice (even standard designs)</td>
<td>Public buildings (schools, hospitals, markets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Skills developments livelihoods (eg masons, carpenters etc)</td>
<td>Provision of basic services (drainage, water, sanitation, roads, telecoms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Partnership with national institutions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Master-planning</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A strategy is critical to achieve co-ordinated effort and action, and ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, and that opportunities are not overlooked. At present, a key challenge is that those contributing to reconstruction are doing so in isolation. The limited successes to date tend to be one-off, one-time projects in more rural areas where integrated approach is less critical.

3. **Managing Expectations**

An extensive communications strategy is needed to project the vision, publicise emerging policy and place GoH in the driving seat. The current expectation that everyone will be provided a home needs to be dispelled, and the GoH need to re-position themselves as a facilitator of recovery rather than a provider. There needs to be a marked threshold between the last two years of ‘aid’ and the next period of reconstruction.

4. **Damage Assessment**

Kubilay Hicyilmaz (Arup) spent several weeks in Haiti in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, and expressed two key reservations about the approach to damage assessment which remain a challenge

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a) It is not clear to occupants (or others) that the red-amber-green classification relates to
the condition of the building in relation to its pre-earthquake state, i.e. is it habitable now?
not is it safe? Many buildings classified as green are unsafe either due to a brittle structure
or because they are located on land prone to flooding, for example. The matrix Victoria
developed for UNOPS seeks to address this.\(^{16}\)

b) The FEMA assessment method followed was developed in the US. There, it links to a
follow up process for support, advice, compensation. In Haiti it was done in isolation.
There is still a vacuum in terms of policy for damaged houses, as well as know-how on
how to retro-fit houses.

5. Land Tenure/Certification
Those agencies (eg. Haven) who have built ‘permanent’ houses have only managed to do
so because they acquired land. Why have the WB not established a land-titling programme
similar to RALAS in Aceh which aimed to provide a legal basis for community-driven land
adjudication? Is individual land titling appropriate in Haiti given the density, numbers of
renters/squatters, multiple occupancy households in PoP, tendency for the most poor and
vulnerable to be excluded. Is community level land certification a possibility?

6. Urban Context
The urban environment in PoP is hugely varied as our analysis and classification of the
16/6 sites shows. Reconstruction provides a unique window of opportunity for providing
services, improving drainage, demarking open-spaces, densification, as well improved
quality of housing. The terminology of reconstruction and ‘permanent houses’ needs to be
replaced by an emphasis on neighbourhood renewal and upgrading (which might have a
rural parallel in village renewal and upgrading as distinct from resettlement or new-town/
village construction) Neighbourhood masterplans need to be developed by experience urban
planners in consultation with those living there as well as the government, and specific action
plans developed.

International technical support is needed but could be done cost effectively thorough
workshops and mentoring which supports and builds the capacity of local planners/engineers/
architects. We envision a central programme management office would act as a resource
centre providing a centre of excellence/knowledge/advice. In this way the learning from the
upgrading of one neighbourhood would feed into the next. The challenge is how to involve
international expertise in this process, both strategically and operationally; even with a pre-
existing framework with UNOPS it has proved virtually impossible for us to find an entry
point. (We have provided advice to UNOPS on rubble clearance and 16/6)\(^{17}\).

7. Infrastructure
There is too much focus on housing and not enough on infrastructure. This is an important
element to improve quality of life in Port-au-Prince and it much easier and more cost
effective to introduce now as part of reconstruction than integrate it into a pre-existing urban
fabric. Investment in such public services provides confidence and motivation for families to
invest themselves in re-building or repairing their houses. It is suggested that priority should
be given to developing drainage, road, sewage and potable water networks followed by
power, telcomms, and solid waste management.

8. Local Capacity
The lack of local skills ranging from skilled tradesman to engineers and project managers is a
critical issue. At the same time the greatest opportunity reconstruction affords is to build this
capacity in-country; and opportunity which was largely missed in Aceh. The starting point
is a comprehensive assessment of the capacity in Haiti and targeted training programmes. A
key challenge at present is that most of the NGOs implementing programmes in Haiti also
suffer from limited technical and program/project management capacity. New partnerships
are needed (probably with the private sector) to develop and deliver training materials,

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14 & 17 Arup International Development (2011) “Rénovation de 16 quartiers et retour volontaire des familles de 6
camps associés” Arup International Development Inception Report
and construction of public buildings should be used as opportunities to demonstrate best practice. This is something Arup have discussed with Tradewinds (a developer-contractor) who have a network of 200+ Haitian construction workers, and experience of building construction capacity on remote Caribbean islands in order to build resorts. The challenge is that we have no means to access funds for this.

9. **Funding/Costs**
Funding is limited and there needs to be greater transparency as to how much is available and what is being budgeted (links closely to 3.) and who holds the purse strings. Expenditure needs to be perceived as investment rather than aid/compensation, based on at least a qualitative cost-benefit analysis. (This approach might have prevented so many T-Shelters being built!). The cost of technical expertise is currently perceived as expensive as it is related to the capital costs of ‘a project’ (eg. a school, a house); in fact investing £50k in developing a safe school design or retrofitting guidelines is trivial when 100s of schools are being built and houses retro-fitted. Without it, the larger investment in building structures may be wasted if they collapse in a future event.

10. **Partnership**
The complexity of the challenges in Haiti requires unified effort by diverse organisations. Cross-sectoral partnerships are a proven mechanism for combining the strengths of different entities, but are only effectively if there is a shared goal and governance amongst the parties which promotes trust and collaboration. Public procurement processes are an obstacle to this approach as they stipulate a ‘consultant’, a ‘firm’ or a ‘consortium’; and are often focus at transferring risk to others rather than combining strengths to solve a problem.

11. **T-Shelter**
Advice is needed on their status; and the whether the occupants are permitted to re-use/recycle materials; or improve their shelters in-situ. We caution against the notion of ‘upgrading’ to a ‘permanent house’ without there being a clear definition of the later. We note also the inherent conflict between the aspiration for a durable masonry house which unless build correctly is likely to be unsafe in earthquakes, and a lightweight T-Shelter (which is vulnerable to hurricanes).

**Contribution by Maggie Stephenson (Un-Habitat, Haiti)**

**Investing in Haiti’s Recovery and Future:**

1. **Think like investors:**
How can programmes and activities be more strategic, more efficient, more effective and better value for money. How might we leverage multiple impacts and outcomes from resources invested in reconstruction, (invest in training people, invest in strengthening institutions). How will our actions now, supporting reconstruction, ensure Haiti is safer in 20 years time, or otherwise contribute to long term development.

2. **Get the money to the ground:**
There is not enough money available for reconstruction or to address many other basic needs. Haiti more than most disaster affected countries cannot afford to spend remaining funds on poorly justified projects, or in high overheads. A higher proportion of funds needs to reach more affected people more directly, and allow them to decide how it is used to address needs they prioritise themselves.

3. **Consider issues of equity**
The resources available, both financial and technical, have to date been allocated on a quite ad hoc project-based logic. Some areas, communities and families have won the recovery lottery with high levels of support, and others have been less lucky.
The Government of Haiti needs to ensure the distribution of assistance is more balanced, more fair, and more accountable. Likewise the assistance community needs to coordinate and support the Government in managing the optimisation of resources.

4. **Regenerate the environment:**

Haiti is blessed with a year round growing season and plentiful rain that many countries can only envy. Urban and rural areas alike could be green, providing more food, more wood, more shade, cleaner air, stabilising hillsides, securing watersheds. Significant water needs could be met by managing rainwater. A greener Haiti will reduce vulnerability to natural hazards and make the country more resilient. A greener Haiti needs political will and ambitious programmes. Can we find carbon tax investment to plant 10 million trees, one for everyone in the country, one by everyone in the country?

5. **Regenerate the city centre:**

The heart of Port Au Prince was already run down before the earthquake, with many unused buildings and empty plots. There is a risk that the earthquake damage will accelerate this degeneration process, and along with it, the expansion of the city and alternative areas of growth in the suburbs, with implications for infrastructure and transport. This would be a lose lose scenario, including the loss of identity of the capital of the country.

The city centre is strategically located with good potential for livelihoods. The clearance of sites since 2010 provides new scope for redevelopment. It could accommodate several times more people than it currently does and particularly low income rental households. This could be a win win scenario. The regeneration of the city centre needs a vision. It needs to be inclusive, feasible and timely to become a reality. This is a political, economic, social and environmental opportunity not to be missed.

CONTRIBUTION BY JOSÈ MAGLOIRE VAN DER VOSSEN

*HAITI EARTHQUAKE DISASTER RESPONSE*

**What I see as the greatest challenges to effective recovery in Haiti?**

Not so easy and may be long

* Rebuilding is more than construction, it is a mindshift for the better

* Create awareness at community level that earthquakes are a reality and that rebuilding is the responsibility of each community member at all levels. ‘No growth without ownership’.

* Facilitate †home owner-driven reconstruction by teaching owners & construction workers the practical highlights of safe construction (knowledge & practice!)

* Focus mostly on rural support, facilitate good basic infrastructure to attract occupants from the PauPrince area.

* The government should effectively reinforce the registration of landownership, and assure that this ownership is respected

* The government should assure that construction rules and regulations are respected and that contraveners are punished

* All support from local & international organizations should fit in one overall plan to build back better

* As long as Haitians’ Number One Dream is “a visa and leave”, no effective recovery is possible. I am NOT leaving (am still as stubborn as when I arrived 25 years ago in 1986...) : Change is possible and recovery is a challenge for those who remain flexible and positive - so keep trying!
APPENDIX 2.
Haiti Interim Recovery Housing Sector Background Report
Perceptions of Recovery Priorities
Priscilla Phelps, October 2011

The IHRC was closed on Friday, October 24, lacking an extension of its mandate. The future of the IHRC is still being debated in Haiti, but with no clear direction yet defined. In anticipation of the end of the first mandate, each IHRC sector was asked to prepare an “end of mandate” report. This page summarizes some of the key messages from the Housing sector report, entitled “Haiti Housing and Neighborhoods Reconstruction: Building the bridge while we walk on it,” dated October 31, 2011.

KEY ISSUES FROM END OF MANDATE REPORT

1. **Progress is being made but there are still critical bottlenecks and unanswered questions.**
   - Government should sanction the enumeration/census process and capitalize on the data being collected. This process could accelerate proposed policy reforms related to the modernization of land markets.
   - The risks associated with getting access to land with clear title raise the cost of reconstruction and discourage both private and nongovernmental initiatives. Facilitating access to land is a critical role for government.
   - Rules regarding where and how to rebuild must come from government but are still not adequately defined or enforced.

2. **Projects that have funding and are advancing are not replicable; some housing solutions most needed are not being addressed.**
   - A small number of high-end projects may bring credit to individual agencies, but the collective result is costly and cannot be scaled up.
   - High-cost projects represent a disproportionate subsidy to a small number of households; selecting beneficiaries will be extremely difficult.
   - Reconstruction of multifamily rental housing is critical and a separate initiative is needed to target this part of the housing market.

3. **Lack of concrete, realistic housing and neighborhood development goals risks creating social conflicts and challenges to governance.**
   - The impression has been created that everyone (even renters) will get a new house. This is keeping people in camps, and creating expectations that cannot be met. When renters are asked what their intentions are in the IOM registration process, nearly 60% of them answer “move to a new settlement.” This option will not exist for most of them, but they are not informed.
   - There is a risk that the inability to meet unrealistic expectations will undermine confidence in the Martelly administration (especially now that the IHRC is no longer in operation).
   - A firm estimate of reconstruction cost, using realistic assumptions of financial support and number of households to be assisted, must be prepared and reconciled with available funding. Based on these estimates, realistic goals can be set and social expectations can be readjusted.

4. **Funding for reconstruction is very limited and poorly distributed.**
   - An enormous sum has been spent on temporary housing (easily $500 million when all is completed), which has gone largely to existing landowners in non-urban settings.
   - A conservative estimate is that reconstruction could cost $1.6 billion. Less than $400
million is now available, and it is committed to a disproportionately small number of beneficiaries.

More funding is needed, but it should be allocated more equitably and spent more efficiently.
• Public funding should be used to leverage private and family resources—the mechanisms needed to encourage this still need to be designed.

5. **Local institutions are getting neither opportunities to learn from international experience nor resources to address their own problems. The role of international agencies needs to be clarified.**
   • The goal of reconstruction should be defined not as rebuilding housing, but as creating an affordable housing and community development sector; i.e. building local capacity to construct, reconstruct and upgrade housing and neighborhoods that will carry on in the future.
   • With that goal in mind, public and international reconstruction funding should be spent in a way that this capacity is built. Every institution working on reconstruction in Haiti is “learning by doing,” so the lack of experience of local institutions is not a valid reason to exclude them.
   • Post-disaster reconstruction is a critical opportunity to strengthen local governments and for them to build credibility with citizens. This opportunity should not be lost, including supporting the impending local government election cycle.

6. **A strategic policy framework for affordable housing and community development is urgently needed that supports reconstruction, but is focused on longer-term reforms.**
   • As the Haitian government considers creation of a lead housing agency, it should carefully consider which functions to incorporate in the lead agency, and which to delegate to others, whether public or private.
   • The lead agency will need agreements with key ministries regarding their collaboration and expectations, since many sectors contribute to (or can impede) housing and community development (water and sanitation, health, education, environment, risk management, land titling, etc.). The agency’s placement within the government should be done to maximize its ability to collaborate with key partners.
   • Given the large number of impediments to construction and reconstruction, priorities should include strengthening
     (i) the enabling environment,
     (ii) developing policy approaches,
     (iii) reducing impediments for affordable housing development, and
     (iv) providing financial incentives.
   • Two ways in which government can contribute to creating the institutional capacity for local development (mentioned in 5, above) are by creating competitive processes to award public and donor reconstruction funding to local institutions, and by monitoring and evaluating the performance of executing agencies. Central and local government should avoid carrying out functions that are best left to others, and instead learn to regulate what others do, to get the desired results.

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GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON PAGES 3-4

1. **Resources of survivors**
   The primary resource in the provision of post-disaster shelter is the grass-roots motivation of survivors, their friends and families. Assisting groups can help, but they must avoid duplicating anything best undertaken by the survivors themselves.

2. **Allocation of roles for assisting groups**
   The success of a relief and rehabilitation operation depends on the correct and logical distribution of roles. Ideally, this allocation should be undertaken by the local authorities who are best qualified to decide who should do what, when and where. However if the local administration is too weak to assume this responsibility, the priority must be to strengthen it.

3. **The assessment of needs**
   The accurate assessment of survivor's needs is in the short term more important than a detailed assessment of damage to houses and property. Partial or inaccurate assessments of human needs by assisting groups have been a frequent cause of past failure of relief efforts.

4. **Evacuation of survivors**
   The compulsory evacuation of disaster survivors can retard the recovery process and cause resentment. The voluntary movement of survivors, where their choice of venue and return is timed by their own needs, on the other hand, can be a positive asset. (In the normal course of events some surviving families may seek shelter for the emergency period with friends and relations living outside the affected area.)

5. **The role of emergency shelter**
   Assisting groups tend to attribute too high a priority for the imported shelter as a result of mistaken assumptions regarding the nature, and, in some cases relevance of emergency shelter.

6. **Shelter strategies**
   Between emergency shelter provision and permanent reconstruction lies a range of intermediate options. However the earlier the reconstruction process begins, the lower the ultimate social, economic and capital costs of the disaster.

7. **Contingency planning (preparedness)**
   Post-disaster needs, including shelter requirements, can be anticipated with some accuracy. Effective contingency planning can help to reduce distress and homelessness.

8. **Reconstruction: the opportunity for risk reduction and reform**
   A disaster offers opportunities to reduce the risk of future disasters by introducing improved land-use planning, building methods, and building regulations. These preventive methods should be based on hazard, vulnerability and risk analysis, and should be extensively applied to all hazardous areas across the national territory.

9. **Relocation of Settlements**
   Despite frequent intentions to move entire villages, towns and cities to safe locations, such
plans are rarely feasible. However, at the local level a disaster will reveal the most hazardous sites (i.e. earthquake faults, areas subject to repeated flooding, etc.) Partial relocation within the town of city may therefore be both possible and essential.

10. **Land use and land tenure**

   Success in reconstruction is closely linked to the question of land-tenure, government land policy, and all aspects of land-use and infrastructure planning.

11. **Financing Shelter**

   One of the most important components of a post-disaster shelter programme is its financing system. Out-right cash grants are effective in the short-term only, and can create a dependency relationship between survivor and assisting groups. It is far more advantageous for both the individual and the community to participate in financing their own shelter programmes, especially permanent reconstruction.

12. **Rising expectations**

   Apart from the tendency of prefabricated, temporary, housing to become permanent because of its high initial cost, and in spite of its frequent rejection on socio-cultural grounds, temporary shelter, nevertheless, frequently accelerates the desire for permanent modern housing, well beyond reasonable expectations. It is important for assisting groups not to exacerbate social and economic tensions by such provision where there are widespread and chronic housing shortages among low-income and marginal populations.

13. **Accountability of donors to recipients of aid**

   Since the most effective relief and reconstruction policies result from participation of survivors in determining and planning their own needs, the successful performance of assisting groups is dependent on their accountability to the recipients of their aid.

14. **Guidelines for the local level**

   Guidelines on emergency shelter and post-disaster housing for individual communities for individual communities can only be formulated by qualified, local personnel, in the light of the prevailing local traditions (types of hazard), building traditions, economic base, social system etc.) Such guidelines can, however, be modeled on the structure of this study.

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**Key Messages to be included in the ‘Refreshment of the SAD Guidelines of 1982 (Publication Forthcoming 2012)**

**Draft** (Do not quote or cite in any writing prior to publication)

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**KEY MESSAGE OF REFRESHMENT:**

Successful shelter-after-disaster approaches must incorporate a holistic solution to a broad range of challenges, including, but not limited to:

- An effective organisational structure within Government;
- leadership in Government with a ‘champion(s) to provide a public face’ for reconstruction survivor involvement and acceptance;
- adequate funding;
- long-term commitment;
- technical competence;
- ‘building back better’ with disaster resistant construction, technology and siting;
- land tenure issues resolved;
- shelter designs that are adaptable, climatically and culturally appropriate;
- politically supported;
- environmentally sustainable; and provision that
- strengthens the community’s economic base.
1. **Maintain the Survivor/User Standpoint**
   There is a need to maintain the ‘user/ recipient/ survivor standpoint’ in shelter and reconstruction guidelines and policies as emphasised in Principle 1 of the 1982 Shelter Guidelines:
   “The primary resource in the provision of post-disaster shelter is the grass roots motivation of the survivors, their friends and families. Assisting groups can help, but they must avoid duplicating anything best undertaken by survivors themselves.”

2. **Recognise, Respect and Support Housing as a Legitimate Form of Humanitarian Shelter**
   Family and friends often serve as “first providers” of humanitarian shelter to disaster survivors, yet this socially-defined, self-selected, and culturally-appropriate sheltering of people is often dismissed as inappropriate, or not “real” (four-walls-and-a-roof) shelter.

3. **Face the Challenge: Build Capacity in Assisting Groups**
   Shelter and housing reconstruction remains a seriously neglected sector in the NGO/donor community, perhaps due to its complexity and the reluctance of agencies to commit the large-scale human and financial resources, over long periods of time.

4. **Continually redefine the appropriate roles of actors in the sheltering sector**
   The roles of actors in the shelter field change as policies are refined in the light of new knowledge and changing resource flows. International agencies and NGO’s need to work more closely under host governments. The ‘Shelter Clusters’ are an innovative attempt to improve performance in shelter and housing reconstruction and secure enhanced coordination.

5. **Link Strategies with Strategic Communications Plans**
   The cluster or sector strategies are insufficient without strategic communications plans. Aggressive implementation of such plans can be an effective means of promoting core messages AND managing expectations.

6. **Grasp the Opportunities Presented by Urban Disaster Recovery**
   Urban disasters have increased dramatically since 1982 and the inherent problems perplex assisting bodies and slow the rate of reconstruction. Problem areas include: mass debris removal/ land and site availability/ tenure issues/ urban safety/ housing finance and the needs of renters- squatters and owners.

7. **Devis New Solutions for Urban Areas as they become the Focus of Increasing Humanitarian Shelter Activity**
   This challenge will require new solutions to various problems: rental shelter, multi-unit and multi-story story, disaster risk reduction measures, support of social validation of occupancy, rather than the legal validation of ownership and technical training and capacity building.

8. **Develop, Apply and Enforce Standards and Regulations to Improve Shelter and Building Quality and Safety**
   In collaboration with host governments seek to apply relevant minimum standards, building bye-laws and land-use planning controls in order to ‘build back better’. Make certain that effective supervision accompanies all aspects of this regulatory environment.

9. **Firmly Position All Shelter and Housing Programmes and Projects within a Development Rather than Relief Context**
   Shelter provision is attractive to those who invent solutions, sell products or use shelter images in their fund raising. Therefore it always risks being ‘supply’, rather than ‘demand’ driven. Shelter need to be rescued from the welfare tradition that lingers within many external assisting groups, and placed within a development framework.
10. **To Expand the Choice of Users, Appreciate the Value of Cash Grants and Vouchers in lieu of Delivering Standardised Shelters and Housing Units**
Cash grants and vouchers that can be exchanged for building materials and construction services have been a positive development in expanding the choice of beneficiaries and have assisted families. However, the need remains for effective settlement planning and building design and engineering to ensure quality and safety.

11. **Ensure that T-Shelter and Reconstructed Housing are Compatible with the Preservation of Livelihoods and Environment**
Shelters and settlements should not destroy valued environments, neither the sites where settlements are built nor the natural resources harvested to rebuild. The users of housing need to reach their employment sites and carry on their livelihoods without destroying the environment that nurtures and supports such activities.

12. **Recognise and Support the Shelter Continuum from Immediate Provision to a Permanent Dwelling**
There is a false assumption by assisting groups that sheltering can be sub-divided into well defined stages (or products), when the reality is a continual, seamless ‘sheltering process’. Therefore this ‘continuum’ needs to be understood, respected and supported by all assisting groups.

13. **Understand the Value and Limitations of ‘Transition’ Housing**
Since time is necessary for good reconstruction and people have to live somewhere in the meantime, transition houses can perform a useful role. However, in many situations, particularly in rural areas, it is possible to cut this interim stage by extending the life of emergency sheltering and by accelerating reconstruction by pre and post disaster planning.

14. **Apply the Rich Benefits of Technology to the Shelter Sector**
Everyone recognizes that technology has undergone dramatic changes since 1982. And these changes continue to have major impacts on the shelter and housing sector. Examples include: Cell Phones/ GPS and Remote Sensing/ Automated Scanning/ INTERNET/ Social Media/ Digital Cameras.

15. **Recognise Research Gaps and Seek Ways to Fill Them**
The 1982 Research Agenda of the Shelter after Disaster Guidelines remain unfilled despite the vast expansion of disasters, and disaster relief assistance. Without well designed and applied research, myths will be perpetuated, policies will fail, resources will be wasted and disaster survivors will suffer hardship.

16. **Face the Challenge: Expand the Scale of Operations**
Significant progress has been made in Shelter and Housing Reconstruction particularly in the area of user build safe dwelling construction. But generally the sector is failing to respond to the moving target of expanding vulnerability from population growth/ urbanisation/ globalisation.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON PAGES 1-2

1. **A good reconstruction policy helps reactivate communities and empowers people to rebuild their housing, their lives, and their livelihoods.**
   A reconstruction policy should be inclusive, equity-based, and focused on the vulnerable. Housing reconstruction is key to disaster recovery, but it depends on the recovery of markets, livelihoods, institutions, and the environment. Diverse groups need diverse solutions, but biases will creep in, so a system to redress grievances is a must.

2. **Reconstruction begins the day of the disaster.**
   If traditional construction methods need to change to improve building safety, governments must be prepared to act quickly to establish norms and provide training. Otherwise, reconstructed housing will be no less vulnerable to future disasters than what was there before. Adequate transitional shelter solutions can reduce time pressure and should be considered in a reconstruction policy. Owners are almost always the best managers of their own housing reconstruction; they know how they live and what they need. But not all those affected are owners and not all are capable of managing reconstruction; so the reconstruction policy must be designed with all groups in mind: owners, tenants, and landlords, and those with both formal and informal tenancy.

3. **Community members should be partners in policy making and leaders of local implementation**
   People affected by a disaster are not victims; they are the first responders during an emergency and the most critical partners in reconstruction. Organizing communities is hard work, but empowering communities to carry out reconstruction allows their members to realize their aspirations and contribute their knowledge and skills. It also assists with psychosocial recovery, helps reestablish community cohesion, and increases the likelihood of satisfaction with the results. This requires maintaining two-way communication throughout the reconstruction process and may entail the facilitation of community efforts. A real commitment by policy makers and project managers is needed to sustain effective involvement of affected communities in reconstruction policy making and in all aspects of recovery, from assessment to monitoring.

4. **Reconstruction policy and plans should be financially realistic but ambitious with respect to disaster risk reduction**
   People’s expectations may be unrealistic and funding will be limited. Policy makers should plan conservatively to ensure that funds are sufficient to complete reconstruction and that time frames are reasonable. Rebuilding that reduces the vulnerability of housing and communities must be the goal, but this requires both political will and technical support. Housing and community reconstruction should be integrated and closely coordinated with other reconstruction activities, especially the rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure and the restoration of livelihoods.

5. **Institutions matter and coordination among them improves outcomes.**
   Best practice is to have defined a reconstruction policy and designed an institutional response in advance of a disaster. In some cases, this will entail† a new agency. Even so, line ministries should be involved in the reconstruction effort and existing sector policies should apply, whenever possible. The lead agency should coordinate housing policy decisions and ensure that those decisions are communicated to the public. It should also establish mechanisms for coordinating the actions and funding of local, national, and international organizations and for ensuring that information is shared and that projects conform to standards. Funding of
all agencies must be allocated equitably and stay within agreed-upon limits. Using a range of anticorruption mechanisms and careful tracking of all funding sources minimizes fraud.

6. **Reconstruction is an opportunity to plan for the future and to conserve the past.** What has been built over centuries cannot be replaced in a few months. Planning and stakeholder input help to establish local economic and social development goals and to identify cultural assets for conservation. Even a modest amount of time spent designing or updating physical plans can improve the overall result of reconstruction. Reconstruction guidelines help ensure that what is valued is preserved, while encouraging more sustainable post-disaster settlements. Improving land administration systems and updating development regulations reduces vulnerability and improves tenure security.

7. **Resettlement disrupts lives and should be minimized.** Resettlement of affected communities should be avoided unless it is the only feasible approach to disaster risk management. If resettlement is unavoidable, it should be kept to a minimum, affected communities should be involved in site selection, and sufficient budget support should be provided over a sufficient period of time to mitigate all social and economic impacts.

8. **Civil society and the private sector are important parts of the solution.** The contributions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and the private sector to reconstruction are critical. Besides managing core programs, these entities provide technical assistance, advocacy, and financial resources of enormous value. Government should encourage these initiatives; invite NGO, CSO, and private entity involvement in reconstruction planning; and partner in their efforts. Government should also require accountability and make sure that these interventions are consistent with reconstruction policy and goals.

9. **Assessment and monitoring can improve reconstruction outcomes.** Assessment and monitoring improve current (and future) reconstruction efforts. Unnecessary assessments can be minimized if there are policies that require institutions to share assessment data and results. Local communities should participate in conducting assessments, setting objectives, and monitoring projects. Using reliable national data to establish monitoring baselines after the disaster increases the relevance of evaluations. Monitor both the use of funds and immediate physical results on the ground and evaluate the impact of reconstruction over time.

10. **To contribute to long-term development, reconstruction must be sustainable.** Sustainability has many facets. Environmental sustainability requires addressing the impact of the disaster and the reconstruction process itself on the local environment. The desire for speed should not override environmental law or short-circuit coordination when addressing environmental issues. Economic sustainability requires that reconstruction is equitable and that livelihoods are restored. Livelihood opportunities in reconstruction should be maximized. Institutional sustainability means ensuring that local institutions emerge from reconstruction with the capability to maintain the reconstructed infrastructure and to pursue long-term disaster risk reduction. A reliable flow of resources is essential and institutional strengthening may be required.
THE LAST WORD:

Every reconstruction project is unique. The nature and magnitude of the disaster, the country and institutional context, the level of urbanization, and the culture’s values all influence decisions about how to manage reconstruction. Whether government uses special or normal procurement procedures, how it weights the concerns of speed versus quality, and what it considers the proper institutional set-up and division of labor will also vary. History and best practices are simply evidence to be weighed in arriving at the best local approach.