June 2019
towards an improved understanding of vulnerability and resilience in Somalia
report
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive summary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key findings</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How different population groups responded to and survived recurrent shocks</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping strategies</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most efficient coping strategies and why</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key marginalisation and exclusion issues that impact household survivability</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers of marginalisation and how these are maintained</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of selected external actors in shaping coping strategies</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations for managing recurrent shocks and supporting resilience options</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced people</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWD</td>
<td>People with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>V2R</td>
<td>Vulnerability to resilience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

The 2011 famine and 2016 severe drought conditions in Somalia drew the attention of development actors to issues and options for addressing recurrent shocks and the roles that different people can play. This paper summarises the key lessons drawn from a study that examined how different people responded to and survived the recurrent shocks during the 2011–2016 period; the drivers of marginalisation or exclusion and how these are maintained; the influence that external actors had on the coping strategies used by different communities; and the apparent effectiveness of chosen strategies. The study sought to understand how livelihood and coping strategies are changing as a result of the frequency and severity of local conditions in Somalia, and local community perspectives on vulnerability and livelihood objectives. It also explored how access to aid and other external resources influenced livelihood and coping strategies, and how local communities’ resilience and livelihood strategies related to the objectives and practices of humanitarian agencies.

The study reveals that many Somalis became more vulnerable especially during the 2011 famine and different population groups suffered varying negative impacts. Boys as young as 12 years conscripted by Al Shabaab and other militia missed out on education and formative parenting; girls forced into early marriage or used as sex slaves suffered negative health, social and psychological long-term impacts; the socio-economic status of widowed women left as heads of households or single parents declined; and unaccompanied or displaced children, older people, people with disabilities and ethnic minorities were either abandoned or became destitute. However, some already powerful groups, such as the leaders of dominant clans, became even more powerful. They became even more dominant with the access to and control of humanitarian provisions and the limited available resources such as grazing land or water, which they acquired through their influence and their connections with various military factions.

People were displaced for shorter times in 2016 compared to 2011. Internally displaced people (IDPs) primarily suffered the loss of social networks during the famine, making it difficult to navigate unfamiliar environments. The isolation and psychological pressures faced by IDPs differed for men, women, children, older persons, and other subcategories of the population. For example, children’s access to education and health services as well as their right to play were impaired by displacement. Thus, IDPs had to find new ways of accessing basic needs and new strategies for dealing with their emotional and other psychosocial needs; coping strategies most used included: (a) psychological and attitudinal, (b) behavioural, and (c) social and organisational.

Communities changed and recovered from the 2011 famine. Younger women, for instance, did more income generating activities while younger men migrated to urban areas, to other countries or joined the militia and national armed forces. For some women, the income generating activities improved their economic empowerment. This has the potential for constructive long-term outcomes as increased earnings and financial benefits not only mean improved household incomes levels but may also improve gender progression – a problem in Somalia. State and non-state actors after the famine focused on strengthening rural and urban livelihoods, and employment; promoting the establishment of disaster risk management strategies; and developing new skills and capacities among locals, for development. In the latter area, for example, youth – the biggest demographic group in Somalia – are having their skills (re)built in vocational training centres and through non-governmental organisation (NGO) capacity building efforts; drought tolerant crop varieties are being promoted for rural crop farmers; and agropastoral value chains and various infrastructure are being built. Furthermore, strong family connections and social networks, and forging of close links with (and participation in) clan activities also strongly influenced resilience and sharing of critical food and other assets during and after each crisis. Through these social institutions, asset-sharing took place and families managed to protect themselves against attacks. Remittances were critical also for the sustenance and recovery of families and communities via asset building and catering for household expenses. Women who received remittances invested in nutrition, health and education. As a consequence of these positive steps, more diversified skills and education within communities, increased opportunities for employment and alternative
livelihood options, and better community disaster preparedness were observed and reported in 2016 compared with 2011.

**Frequent and severe crises changed rural livelihoods and coping strategies.** Pastoralism (including the rearing of camels, cattle, goats, and sheep), agro-pastoralism, and fishing are the primary livelihoods for rural communities in the study area. Rainfall variability, lack of agricultural inputs, and cost of fishing gear were key impediments to production and food security. Both pastoralists and agro-pastoralists suffered dire weather conditions and diseases that caused considerable loss of both people and animals. Environmental degradation and movement restrictions due to fenced-off land in some areas also affected productivity in some areas.

**After the 2011 famine, drought mitigation efforts increased.** The Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) strategy was developed, seeking more sustainable and holistic drought mitigation approaches in the region. The Somali government working in partnership with donors, and humanitarian and development actors, made improvements to the country’s early warning system; developed more collaborative disaster risk management plans; and expanded implementation of social protection programmes. Thus in 2016, people felt better prepared than they were in 2011, had several mitigation measures in place and local communities better accessed social protection interventions, remittance flows, and shared family resources to cope. However, IDPs and ethnic minorities still struggled to cope.

**Community perception of some external resources changed.** In 2011, many people suffered due to untimely humanitarian assistance and adopted different coping strategies, some harmful, such as the illicit sale of alcohol and miraa (khat) and child marriages. During the 2016 crisis, investments in and appreciation for cash transfer programming and remittances increased. Similarly, the value of remittances increased and these helped communities to overcome the shocks experienced and to invest in continued education and health services. These external resources helped families diversify from farming.

**Humanitarian/resilience agencies and target communities were better aligned.** The practices and strategies used by humanitarian/resilience agencies at times differed from those of local communities. With ineffective local government or institutions to represent local communities, local Somali NGOs are stepping up their efforts but remain weak. Somali NGOs that partnered with international humanitarian agencies to implement certain activities did so on a contractual basis, and thus only focused on delivering programmes as contracted with little or no space to influence these programmes. Some categories of vulnerable groups, such as people with disabilities and ethnic minorities lacked effective representation, signifying a need for deliberate inclusion policies and practices.

Six key factors differentiate the 2011 famine and 2016 drought conditions: (a) poorer security and more restrictions in 2011 due to Al Shabaab; (b) more and faster humanitarian assistance in 2016/17 and district-level disaster risk management strategies; (c) more diversified skills and education within communities, increasing opportunities for employment and alternative livelihood options; (d) better community disaster preparedness in 2016, compared to 2011; (e) better utilisation of cash transfers and remittances in 2016/17 especially, enabling households to purchase foodstuffs and to invest in assets, education and health; and (f) the curbing of large-scale charcoal production after 2012 which prevented its lucrative profits from funding Al-Shabaab and the war during that period.

The loss and displacement suffered by farmers after 2011 led many families to diversify their incomes. Livestock and crop production were still key, but production was hampered by weather and health related risks – made worse when large parcels of land were fenced off by more powerful clans. To survive the dip in production, those who could not farm anymore took on menial jobs while others shifted to other income generation activities using start-up capital from donors and NGOs or remittances from relatives and friends in the diaspora. Also, a new trend began - urban agriculture. The remaining active farmers noted a marked difference in 2016 compared to 2011, whereby in 2011, there was a massive rural to urban migration and a proliferation of IDP camps while less of this was noted in 2016 with many retaining
their land. A few farmers had better irrigation equipment as a result of support from development partners (INGOs) and were thus able to successfully survive the drought.

The 2011-2016 period also saw a growth of social networks. Different people – women, youth, people with disabilities, farmers and traders – were better organised; showed more solidarity and mutual support; had better access to information; and were better at getting loans, grants or business opportunities.

**Three key opportunities for international actors to improve their support of Somali communities:**
(1) Working with the numerous Somali NGOs and CBOs; (2) Engaging with agencies leading cash transfer or income generation programmes; and (3) Working with selected diaspora organisations that are implementing programmes within Somalia. Local NGOs and CBOs, however, have weak capacity which hampers their stability and operation. They tend to focus on narrow clan or ethnic boundaries. Diaspora organisations are, however, often removed from the day-to-day realities of those within the country during crises, their interest and commitment notwithstanding. They too tend to be organised around clan or socio-political agendas. Hence, a hybrid that includes consortium-style programmes such as those by Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS), that have established operations within Somalia and are known to be impartial would offer better options for more effective work with local communities.
Introduction

The long-standing and complex nature of humanitarian crises in Somalia, mostly driven by a combination of climatic shocks, armed conflict and weak governance, is relatively well documented. Despite recent improvements in the country’s food security situation, the gains are fragile and substantial investments are still needed in resilience building to stem the growing humanitarian needs. DFID commissioned the following study with the aim of exploring vulnerability and resilience during shocks and their relationship to international engagement in Somalia. Specifically, the study seeks to understand how livelihood and coping strategies are changing as a result of the frequency and severity of local conditions in Somalia, and local community perspectives on vulnerability and livelihood objectives. The study also explores how access to aid (or lack thereof) influences livelihood and coping strategies of communities and households in the country. Further, the study seeks to better understand how local households and communities have been developing new strategies to enhance their resilience, and how local communities’ resilience and livelihood strategies relate to the objectives and practice of humanitarian/resilience agencies. Based on this enhanced understanding, we make recommendations on effective policy and implementation approaches for responding to humanitarian crises and strengthening community resilience.

A review of literature confirms that in Somalia poverty, vulnerability and conflict are closely interlinked, and that household resilience is a function of social, governance, economic and environmental factors. It also reveals that pastoralism and subsistence farming, which are key livelihood activities in Somalia, are increasingly insecure and highly susceptible to droughts and environmental degradation, and that the government of Somalia has inadequate capacity to promote resilience. Accordingly, during the 2011 and 2016 crises, Somali households adopted different coping strategies depending on their resource endowments, ranging from migration, livelihood diversification and borrowing of money, to reliance on external support. However, some coping strategies had limitations that prevented households from achieving long-term resilience. For instance, while migration enabled households to find food and water for themselves and their livestock, due to separation of people it at the same time led to a weakening of social networks through which households pool resources to respond to shocks. Also, according to literature, remittances to Somalia, estimated at US$1.2 billion annually, promoted household resilience by facilitating access to food and services (such as health care), though these reached only about 20% of Somali households. Marginalisation and exclusion were the other factors which, according to literature, affected household vulnerability to hazards and stresses, with people living with disabilities (PWDs), older people and youths being at a higher risk of being adversely affected. However, while the literature identifies the various coping strategies used in Somalia, there is limited evidence on why and how some Somali households successfully layered and used these coping strategies to survive recurrent shocks, while others failed to do so, thus creating an evidence gap.

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in Eastern Africa. In 2017, 77.4% of the country’s population lived in poverty. Poverty levels vary considerably across the Somali population, with regional differences ranging between 53.3% in urban Jubaland (Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba) and 77.3% in northwest rural areas (Awdal, Sanaag, Sool, Togdheer and Woqooyi). Poverty incidence is highest in IDP settlements where 7 out of 10 people are poor and internally displaced Somalis number about 1.1 million, roughly 9% of the population.

Over the past decade, manmade and natural disasters in the East African region have increased in scale, frequency and complexity causing widespread suffering, economic loss and ruined livelihoods. In Somalia, recurrent droughts, and resulting famines and protracted conflicts underly most losses, damages and displacements experienced. Thus, ensuring more resilient communities is now a key policy concern for the government and those providing humanitarian, development and other support.

Long-term trends observed that undermine household resilience include environmental degradation and high population growth. These trends make the viability of livelihood activities such as pastoralism and the predictability of hazards uncertain. Also noted is a governance challenge. The country’s (governance) environment is characterised by weak systems – both traditional/cultural systems and
political. These lack the capacity to create a secure environment that protects households from violent conflicts and mobilises resources to respond to shocks and crises. The government’s capacity to provide adequate basic services such as healthcare, water and sanitation – key for household well-being and resilience – is also weak.\textsuperscript{16} Low education attainment and limited research and knowledge in key areas such as climate change also limit the capacity of households to identify and understand the possible outcomes of adverse future trends.\textsuperscript{17}

This study sought information to improve the reach and efficiency of resilience and humanitarian programmes. It examined how different population groups responded to and survived the recurrent shocks during the 2011-2016 period – specifically, the 2011 famine and 2016 famine-risk conditions; the drivers of marginalisation or exclusion and how these are maintained; and the influence that external actors had on the coping strategies used by different communities, and the efficacy of chosen strategies. The study employed a participatory approach that integrated knowledge from affected individuals and communities.

In this paper, we adopt the view that vulnerability is inextricably linked to the risks and shocks that the people of Somalia experienced during the two periods (2011 and 2016). We focus on the internal defencelessness that resulted from broken socio-cultural systems and reduced resources due to years of conflict, bad governance, and societal breakdown; and the external defencelessness that resulted from a fragile natural environment, especially recurrent drought. However, while the paper acknowledges the centrality of conflict as a key driver of vulnerability in the country, most of the analysis has been done with natural disasters as the underpinning feature. That notwithstanding, we have considered multi-dimensional vulnerability in the conflict-driven Somali environment, characterised by issues of human insecurity, socio-cultural breakdown, and loss of livelihoods. Given that most vulnerability occurs when there is reduced availability of assets, and that even when they are available, individuals and households may not be able to convert them into well-being, we argue that vulnerability should otherwise be considered in the wider terms of multi-dimensional losses, with focus being put on the root causes and the mechanisms by which such losses are translated into one’s vulnerability.
Methodology

The vulnerability to resilience (V2R) framework was used to help link household resilience to four interrelated factors that influence vulnerability. These factors are exposure to hazards and stresses, fragile livelihoods, future uncertainty and governance. Overall, the research framework was anchored on three key concepts of risk, vulnerability and resilience, and focused on the key research question: “How have different population groups in Somalia survived recurrent shocks?” The study began with a detailed review of published and grey literature on risk, vulnerability and resilience during shocks in humanitarian crises in Somalia and other similar geographical locations. This initial review revealed how resilience and vulnerability are described; what factors affect household and community resilience in Somalia; and what strategies have been successful for resilient households and communities and the constraints faced. To validate the evidence garnered, selected literature samples were tested using criteria guided by the “DFID How to Note 3” on the strength of evidence and the “ODI [Overseas Development Institute] guide on how to do a rigorous literature review”.

Thereafter, detailed field consultations were done in 4 study locations: Kismayo Urban, Kismayo Rural, Baidoa and Beledweyne. These sites were selected to represent diverse livelihoods and experiences of risk, vulnerability and resilience. Sites selected were the most representative in terms of having major agro-ecological zones in the same area; different types of livelihoods; diverse resilience experiences; the presence of humanitarian actors; affectedness by drought and its resulting food insecurity; and conflict, security situation and accessibility. This approach allowed a more thorough critique of respondents’ vulnerability to hazards, and their capacity to cope with or adapt to different stresses, contexts and periods. Each livelihood zone presented different dynamics such as climate, topography, natural resources and local livelihood patterns (livestock rearing, crop production and off-farm income generation). Conflict was noted as the most critical factor affecting all livelihoods in Somalia.

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<tr>
<th>Site name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Other descriptors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kismayo Town</td>
<td>A port city in Lower Jubba Somalia; commercial capital of the autonomous Jubaland region. The town is situated 528 km southwest of Mogadishu, near the mouth of the Jubba River, where the waters empty into the Indian Ocean. Weather is hot year-round, with seasonal monsoon winds and irregular rainfall with recurring droughts.</td>
<td>Mixed population including IDPs, the host community and returnees from Kenya. High rate of youth unemployment due to the collapse of productive sector.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kismayo Rural</td>
<td>Goobwyen: Rural Kismayo, southern part of Lower Juba (Jubbada Hoose) region; riverine gravity irrigation, and southern rainfed and southern inland pastoral livelihood zones</td>
<td>Located where the River Juba empties into the Indian Ocean. Natural floods along the Juba Valley River and crop failures. Insecurity along the fertile land next to the river.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baidoa</td>
<td>The fourth largest town in Somalia. A major conflict-stricken district since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. Famous for sorghum farming and livestock trade.</td>
<td>Has high numbers of IDPs due to droughts and security threats from Al-Shabaab. Also has high number of IDP returnees from other regions and neighbouring countries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beledweyne (Hiiraan)</td>
<td>Southernmost part of the Haws pastoral livelihood zone; the town is situated in the Shebelle River Valley near Ogaden, about 332 km north of Mogadishu. Beledweyne is divided by the Shebelle River into eastern and western sections. Stable, but Al-Shabaab attacks and violence from unknown assailants have been sporadic.</td>
<td>Flooding along the Shabelle River from excessive rains in the Ethiopian highlands (due to El Niño rains). Bordered by Ethiopia to the west and Bakool, Galgaduud and Middle Shabelle provinces. Frequented people come from surrounding villages and all the three neighbouring regions of Somalia during drought and conflict.</td>
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The study employed a wide range of qualitative research methods, including participant observation, focus group discussions (FGDs), household dialogues, livelihood analysis, well-being analysis and gender analysis. Following field consultations, data was analysed using a deductive analytical approach. Information from transcribed daily reports was categorised by subject and topic based on predetermined research questions. Categorised information was then assigned to each research objective before being further summarised into emerging patterns and the data’s consistency clarified, validated and assessed.20

A total of 256 respondents were interviewed – 108 and 68 respondents (respectively for Kismayo and Beledweyne), comprising women, youths, elderly people, PWDs and IDPs – both in groups and as key informants. Baidoa had 66 respondents (27 men, 39 women). There were 14 diaspora respondents (8 men, 6 women) living in Kampala, Uganda interviewed.

A deductive analytical approach was used to analyse the data collected. Transcribed research data (from daily reports) was grouped into categories of subjects and topics using predetermined research questions. Categorised information was then assigned to each research objective before being further condensed into summary statements that revealed informational properties and patterns. This stage focused on clarifying, validating and assessing the consistency of all the data collected.

Study limitations included a short study timeframe; challenges with capacity among the local researchers; difficulty explaining technical terms in local languages; sensitivities among government officials, Al-Shabaab operatives and sympathisers about the research teams conducting investigations in communities; insecurity, especially in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas; and the deep-rooted culture of gender exclusion and clanship. The use of local field researchers ensured in-depth knowledge of the study areas, of key local dialects and of local culture. This familiarity built a good rapport with and eased access to the communities, and helped the teams obtain more in-depth and relevant information.
Key findings

How different population groups responded to and survived recurrent shocks

In this study, population groups were differentiated by type of vulnerability. Vulnerability was used as defined by Wisner B et al (2003) as “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” (an extreme natural event or process). Observing that some groups are more prone to damage, loss and suffering in the context of different hazards, the authors note that the variables that explain variations of impact include class (including differences in wealth), occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability and health status, age, and the nature and extent of social networks. Also described is the risk faced by people most vulnerable to sliding into extreme poverty or exacerbating existing poverty when external shocks occur. In the field, the above categorisation proved a useful guide for community-level respondents to identify the population groups that they considered to be more vulnerable than others. These included: IDPs, ethnic minority groups, women, children, youths and PWDs. However, the degree of vulnerability experienced by each of these groupings depended on inherent factors, the impact of conflict, seasonal dynamics, geographical location (urban or rural) and predominant types of livelihood.

Women and girls

During FGDs, women acknowledged that they still face frequent rights violations including sexual-based violence, illegal arrests and other forms of suppression. In Kismayo and Baidoa, among the main perpetrators of sexual-based violence are security personnel and young men who live in both IDP camps and other community settlements. A weakened traditional justice system and the failure by the state to prosecute offenders has allowed high levels of impunity linked to sexual violence. In addition, sexual violence is a sensitive and taboo subject – one that most women preferred not to talk about.

The continuing crises since 2011 have made some people even more vulnerable, but the impact is different for different groups. For instance, a key informant from Baidoa pointed out that sexual assaults often take place in IDP camps where the victims do not readily have the protection of their clans. FGDs with women also pointed out that there are differences between the perpetrators – in IDP camps they were said to be young “local men” with connections to either authorities or powerful clan leaders. However, it was also reported that while Al-Shabaab operatives were sometimes involved in rape, they were relatively more respectful of women.

Respondents also reported a recent increase in the number of forced marriages, especially in study areas controlled by Al-Shabaab with girls as young as 12 years old being married off to Al-Shabaab officers. To avoid this, many parents resorted to fleeing to the city for the safety of their daughters. After losing their husbands in the country’s recurrent conflicts, widowed women could no longer access land for growing crops, which limited their ability to provide for their children. As a result, many widowed women are in IDP camps where they face a different set of challenges, including isolation.

A survival tactic for women in Beledweyne and Baidoa was to consume less food by limiting portion sizes and sometimes skipping meals altogether, in favour of children and men. They also foraged for wild foods in bushes and forests, putting them at risk of assault. Women in both rural and urban Kismayo also begged or borrowed food from neighbours. In some instances, children were sent away to better-off relatives in distant locations.

In urban Kismayo, prostitution and other forms of transactional sex were common, especially for women whose husbands had either died or migrated to other locations. Another coping strategy for women who lived in IDP camps and in the poorer areas of Kismayo was the illicit sale of alcohol and miraa (khat). These strategies pose long-term health, security and wellbeing risks but are adopted as survival tactics when there is no other choice. However, respondents also report a positive strategy used by women to
minimise social isolation by proactively making connections to larger families or clans, and forming support groups within camps or communities.

Child marriage was used as a coping strategy during the 2011 famine and 2016 drought conditions, attributable to economic desperation. As financial and other resources became depleted, most families found themselves unable to meet their basic needs and hence made the choice to marry off adolescent girls earlier than they would have otherwise. In addition, given that in Somalia’s conflict setting there was a heightened risk of sexual violence, some families felt that marriage offered girls better protection than parents could provide. Also, fearing that girls who have experienced sexual violence would be considered unsuitable for marriage (as they are seen to have shamed their families), some families arranged early marriages to reduce or eliminate the risk. However, there were reports of some girls themselves preferring early marriage to improve their living conditions and to reduce the risk of being kidnapped, face hunger at home or face sexual violence within or outside of their households. Thus, poverty, food insecurity, the fear of sexual and gender-based violence, and conflict emerged as the main causal factors in the increased prevalence of early age at marriage. However, while men stressed that child marriage was a financial coping strategy in the sense that the fathers received ‘bride price,’ women and girls on the other hand saw early marriage as a form of protection from potential sexual and gender-based violence and harassment by men. Regardless of these differing views, both men and women saw child or early marriage as having negative impacts on young girls’ lives.

While women tend to be more affected by gender-based violence, within the context of the 2011 and 2016 crises, some men also faced gender-based challenges. Some boys for instance were raped and although uncommon, some men were abused by their female partners. Largely, young pubescent males (ages 12–17) and young adults (ages 18–22) were targets of radicalisation by militia such as Al-Shabaab. Forced recruitment and chronic insecurity increased the vulnerability of able-bodied male youths.

**Ethnic minority groups**

The 2011 famine and 2016 drought conditions are a sensitive subject, especially among local authorities, and it was difficult to investigate the link between these and ethnicity and vulnerability. Evidence garnered on the vulnerability and coping strategies of ethnic minority groups in Somalia helped deepen the researchers’ understanding of the experiences shared. Writing about the common misconception of Somalia as a ‘homogeneous’ society, Menkhaus (2003) observed that the country was not only ethnically diverse and less egalitarian in culture but also has a pre-colonial history of slavery, in which tens of thousands of East Africans were purchased in the 19th century to work on southern Somali plantations. He further observes that, even into the 1970s and 1980s, ‘low caste’ Somalis suffered discrimination, and weak minority groups were subjected to the worst levels of looting, assault, rape and forced labour by the militia of more powerful Somali clans. Similarly, Hill (2010) observes that the country’s minority groups have so far received inadequate human rights protection and humanitarian assistance, and that information about them is incomplete and not widely known. Furthermore, he argues, “minorities face socially-institutionalised discrimination and severe human rights abuses” and that “the traditional clan structure formed by the majorities continues to exclude minorities from political participation and employment; limits their access to justice where abuse has been perpetrated against them or they stand accused of a crime; denies them their rights to development, education and sustainable livelihoods; and places restrictions on inter-marriage between majorities and minorities”.

Power sharing in Somalia’s political system was also reported to revolve around ‘the 4.5 formula’, an

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**Box 1: A key informant stated the following about Somalia’s minorities**

The narrative among Somalia’s ruling clans is that there are no ethnic or religious minorities in the country, and that, therefore, Somalia is a homogeneous nation.

The rationale for this claim is for the dominant clans to continue to share political power among themselves. Some recognition is given to the Bantu communities, but these are also dismissed as inconsequential in the country’s decision-making structures.

Key informant (diaspora)
arrangement that in recent years further institutionalised marginalisation and exclusion of the country’s minority groups and was blamed by male respondents for some of the continued conflict.

There was confusion among male respondents from Baidoa and Beledweyne about what constituted ‘an ethnic minority’. The confusion was made worse by Somali asylum seekers who prefer to register as minorities to improve their odds of qualifying for humanitarian assistance. Both male and female respondents agreed that the Bantu community (comprising the Gosha, Shabelle, Shidle and Boni) and Bajuni community were perhaps the largest and most prominent ethnic minority groups in southern and central Somalia whose members had experienced various forms of exclusion and marginalisation.

Unlike people from larger ethnicities, these minority groups generally lacked political or military organisation and lacked visibility. Thus, they had limited access to either humanitarian aid or other basic services during the 2011 or 2016 crises. There were several reports of land taken by dominant clan members and cases of physical abuse, including the rape of women. In Kismayo, the minority Reewin and Bantu communities were disproportionally affected during the 2011 famine, and they experienced a direct loss of assets and fluctuations in agricultural production due to violence and targeted looting by some members of the majority clans. This increased their vulnerability.

Minority groups in the diaspora chose to support their kin and leaders via remittances and investment in small businesses. However, local minorities continued to be side-lined by both authorities and development agencies that implement their programmes via the support of dominant clans.

Paradoxically, key informants in the diaspora found that during the 2011 and 2016 crises, Al-Shabaab extremists were seen to be more inclusive and ‘even-handed’, working often with different ethnic groups and minorities - applying equal rules and standards to people from different ethnicities or clans, thus viewed by minority groups as being fair.

Ethnic minorities had various coping strategies in 2011 and 2016. A first response at the household level was food rationing. In the early days of the drought, livestock owners (mostly male) moved their herds to grazing lands that were located around water sources, many of which were far away from their regular grazing lands. They also reduced their herd size by selling animals and using the proceeds to purchase grains for both animals and humans. Women collected wild fruits and plants for food. In urban Kismayo, women also took on odd jobs, such as paid domestic work or diversifying their income through petty trade. As a group, however, ethnic minority groups adopted a range of other survival strategies during the 2011 and 2016 crises. Some accepted the protection of more powerful groups by being assimilated and entering into a formal agreement referred to as ‘gaashaanbuur’ (literal translation: ‘collection of shields’). This worked as a political and socioeconomic alliance and is best described by the Somali proverb: “Ama buur ahaw ama buur ku tirso” (if you are not a mountain yourself then you should get attached to an existing one).32

Box 2: The 4.5 power-sharing formula

The “4.5 formula” was agreed on at the Arta Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta in 2000 by Somali elders as an attempt to find a lasting resolution to the endless power struggle between the country’s various clans. In the transitional Somali Parliament of 275 representatives, each of the four “major” clans (namely the Hawiye, Rahanweyn, Dir – including Isaaq clan – and Darood) has an equal number of seats (61), hence 4 equivalents. The remaining cluster of minority clans takes the remaining 0.5 to make a total of 4.5 equivalents.

Box 3: Ethnic minorities and Al-Shabaab

Ethnic minorities in Kismayo and Baidoa were more positively attracted to Al-Shabaab’s ‘political agenda’ and ‘way of doing things’ than they were to the traditional clan system. During and following the 2011 and 2016 disasters, ways were initiated of working with minority groups that lacked any form of protection. For some minority groups, Al-Shabaab addressed their hitherto ignored and under-represented interests and offered employment to fighters. It was not surprising, therefore, that many people from minority clans or groups found Al-Shabaab attractive.

Key Informant (diaspora)
Others organised themselves into solidarity groups. Similar responses were observed across other study areas, probably pointing to a set of established practices.33

Findings on the vulnerability and exclusion of ethnic minority groups and weak clans reveal the following. First, various form of clan and racialised violence prevail, some by organised militias and groups but also by some existing formal institutions. Perpetuation in Parliament of the ‘4.5 law’, for example, has enabled dominant clans, by sheer number, to exert political and military pressure against the minorities. Secondly, by asserting their power over other groups, the dominant clans have not only gained control over resources but have also strengthened their hold on all other instruments of power in the country (e.g. the military). Thus, it may be argued that violence against ethnic minority groups (and weaker clans) has been used as a weapon for political and material gain, and for dissuading smaller groups from contesting for power or staking their claim to a share of the country’s resources. Urgent recognition is, therefore, needed that even within known vulnerable populations there will be categories that suffer worse discrimination or exclusion, implying a need for disaggregated data on these sub-groups.

Internally displaced people

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) there are about 2.6 million people living in displacement settlements in 2019 (17.1% of the population).34 This study gives an indication of IDP numbers at the subnational level. For example, Baidoa that has seen a steady flow of IDPs over the years, has over 41,325 households spread among 323 sites.35 Similarly, in Kismayo in 2018, 145 IDP sites hosted 15,616 households. Beledweyne was reported to have 35 IDP camps hosting 8,169 households.36 Local authorities in Kismayo and Baidoa confirmed reports from other study respondents, especially women, that the two most common factors behind the displacement of people in 2011 and 2016 were drought and conflict. Displacement was, however, reported to be more complex. On the one hand was the cause–effect link between drought and conflict, and on the other hand mass migration. For example, a group of elders in Beledweyne observed that in a functioning clan system, the clan provided a safety net for all people whose livelihoods and survival were at risk. The elders argued that displacement not only indicated a failure in the clan’s ability to mitigate the impacts of poverty for its members but also that by migrating to faraway lands where the clan’s presence was limited, the migrating groups were progressively losing touch with the clan thereby exposing themselves to greater risk. The exception here, it seems, was with those who as a result of out-migration had found better income-earning opportunities and as a result were better able to make remittances to their respective families and friends.

During the famine crises IDPs biggest loss was of their social networks, making it harder to navigate unfamiliar environments, share problems, or manage the psychological pressures they faced due to isolation and separation from loved ones. The isolation and psychological pressures faced by IDPs were different for men, women, children, older people and other sub-categories of the population. For example, children’s access to education and health services, and their right to play, was hampered by displacement. Thus, IDPs not only had to find new ways of accessing basic needs but also developed new mechanisms for dealing with their emotional and other psychosocial needs. Also, following the dispersal of Somalis due to the 2011 and 2016 drought and conflict, accessing adequate food, shelter and safe drinking water was a recurring problem for some categories of IDPs. In the host communities some of these IDPs, especially those who had not gone to their clan areas, found it difficult to access land or employment, which stretched their economic survival. For this category of IDPs, livelihoods were seriously disrupted making them most dependent on humanitarian aid. However, given that IDPs comprised different sub-categories (ranging from gender, clan, and previous type of livelihood to employment), it may be concluded that the actual experiences varied from one sub-category to another.

People with disabilities

A key challenge faced in this study was the invisibility of PWDs. No reliable estimates are available of the number of PWDs there are in Somalia. It may be assumed that due to over three decades of conflict, a severely disrupted health and social infrastructure and high poverty levels, that the country’s population of PWDs is higher than the global average estimate of 15%. A culture of silence has also made it more
challenging for disability issues to be openly discussed. This study sought to explore Somali community perceptions of disability and to identify the impacts of the 2011 and 2016 crises on disability-related vulnerability, survival and resilience. Three core themes emerged: vulnerabilities faced by PWDs; the impacts of the 2011 and 2016 crises; and future priorities for PWDs. Findings reveal higher vulnerabilities during the crises for PWDs (especially women and children) due to their reduced ability to defend themselves from physical and sexual violence. For example, in both Beledweyne and Kismayo, PWDs reported that foodstuffs and other humanitarian assistance given to them during the 2011 and 2016 crises were sometimes stolen by others. The situation was worse for PWDs who lived in IDP camps or who belonged to minority groups. Displacements meant family ties had been cut, thus limiting their ability to recognise and protect themselves against danger or to seek assistance when attacked. While local leaders attributed this vulnerability to the ‘limitations’ that PWDs themselves had, the study team noted that the vulnerability was a function of the disabling environment itself and that both the social nature of exclusion and the environmental barriers facing PWDs in such crises need to be recognised and addressed. A strong cultural responsibility was noted among Somalis who care and provide for PWDs; a responsibility borne from the belief that disability is God’s will and is thus an obligation for all humans to accept and help those who are disabled.

Yet during the 2011 and 2016 disasters, as reported by a group of disabled male respondents in Baidoa, PWDs were often left behind when others fled to seek assistance elsewhere. Since they could not flee on their own and their families sometimes had neither strength nor means to assist them, PWDs faced risk of abuse and death. Even when humanitarian assistance eventually arrived in south central Somalia, surviving PWDs could still not be reached in a timely manner by responders. Given that many of the caring families had themselves been dispersed, PWDs were left without support. Anecdotal evidence shows that even for PWDs who were evacuated by their families, insecurity along the way and a physically challenging terrain prevented them from travelling unhindered. Furthermore, for the few PWDs who ultimately made it to the IDP camps, the setting of the camps, uneven terrain, lack of disability-friendly sanitary and other facilities, as well as absence of disability-sensitive food distribution posed further challenges. A combination of all these challenges prevented PWDs from reintegrating themselves back into social life and relationships.

PWDs in Somalia were also excluded during the 2011 and 2016 crises by local leaders who withheld information about their food allocation entitlements, for instance. Also reported was that during the 2011 famine, in what appeared to be a paternalistic approach, some fleeing families lied to PWDs who could not be transported easily that they were going to explore ways of organising transport for them.

People with different types of disability adopted differing coping strategies during the crises of 2011 and 2016. For example, those with mental disability were for the most part either hidden from other community members or kept away from stressful events that could upset them. Study findings show that women bore the bulk of responsibility for caring for PWDs. Many carers took to prayer and spirituality as a coping strategy for dealing with disability in a famine and conflict situation. Some PWDs also used religious rituals to manage their problems. However, the establishment of representative groups was the most visible coping strategy for PWDs noted. In Kismayo and Beledweyne, groups were established to represent the interests of PWDs, primarily ensuring that they got humanitarian assistance and that their needs and aspirations were taken care of. The groups were formed to overcome the barriers PWDs faced in accessing information, services and humanitarian assistance.

Children

The long periods of drought between 2011 and 2016 were highlighted as high risk especially for unaccompanied children in Somalia. Four trends of children’s vulnerability for residents of Baidoa and Beledweyne were child abductions, malnutrition, child abandonment and violence (including sexual violence). During this period, reports of kidnappings by Al-Shabaab militants included of children as young as seven years – to use them as child soldiers. The militants regularly entered villages and demanded the children from their families. Parents that tried to resist were executed. The abduction of (male) children led to a serious imbalance in the boy-to-girl ratio, an issue of concern for the region’s elders. To minimise
the risk of losing their children to Al-Shabaab, some parents discontinued their children’s school attendance while others opted to migrate to more secure locations. Female respondents pointed out that children from poorer families were more at risk of abduction as they have limited options and family members spent more time in the fields looking for food.

Food insecurity among children was another issue seen across all study sites. Both the 2011 and 2016 crises exposed hundreds of thousands of young children to severe malnutrition. These children face long-term impacts of malnutrition, such as stunting, poor brain development and a risk to future learning ability. Women in Baidoa estimated that eight out of ten children experienced malnutrition. Few respondents associated poor nutrition with other trends such as poor school performance, disability, reduced future income opportunities or health risks. Despite this lack of awareness, they would likely not be able to deal with the issue due to their limited capacities.

“For our children, hunger is a daily struggle. Because of the recurrent drought, growing crops remains a challenge, and this is made worse by the changing patterns of weather and migration, which mean that our people can no longer rely purely on their cattle. The only other livelihood option is small-scale farming, but in an environment where the rains are sporadic and the soils are poor, it is a precarious existence. These are extremely hard times for most people, especially for those with children”.

Mother in rural Kismayo

Other minorities

Other identified minority groups include Christians and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. An informant in the diaspora asserted that the very small Christian community in the country were found in the major cities of Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa, but they always live in fear and hence rarely reveal who they are or what their religion is.

Due to sensitivities and the short time available for the study, the research team were limited in the information they could gather from the LGBT community. Homosexuality is a taboo subject in Somalia that exposes a person to stigma, isolation and ridicule. Apart from Somali law that criminalises homosexuality, it was revealed by key informants that in the study area those caught practising acts of homosexuality faced punishment by death, administered by Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, the practice attracts state-sanctioned homophobia. A key informant from the diaspora stated: “If during the 2011 or 2016 famines any family member was believed to be gay, then they would be the first to have their supply of food cut off”. Homosexuality is thus one of the least conspicuous but highly emotive subjects when it comes to vulnerable minorities and marginalisation in Somalia. The research team was unable to speak to or confirm any respondent identifying as gay, hence these findings are limited to a group of Somali diaspora women who volunteered information on condition of anonymity, and who acknowledged that gay and lesbian Somalis lived under constant fear of being ostracised, lashed or even killed if found out.

Coping strategies

A typology of coping strategies

The strategies used by Somalis to cope during the 2011 famine and 2016 drought can be understood (and categorised) in many ways. The first challenge to overcome, however, is definitional. In their paper Facing Famine: Somali Experiences in the Famine of 2011, Maxwell D et al. (2015) differentiated between the terms ‘coping’, that is, relatively short-term changes in behaviour to deal with a setback, and ‘adapting’, that is, longer-term changes to deal with a permanently changed contexts. Using these definitions, they developed a typology of ‘coping strategies’. Respondents interviewed in response to the famine of 2011 identified with the following strategies: (a) diversification of livelihood strategies and of risk or exposure to hazards; (b) flexibility, including physical mobility and change of livelihoods; and (c)
social connectedness, referring mostly to the strength of an individual or household’s social networks and the particular ability to call upon others to help in the event of a crisis or shock. In this study, the coping strategies that were used by Somalis during the 2011 famine and 2016 near-famine crises were grouped into four broad categories, namely: (a) social and organisational; (b) divesting of non-essential domestic assets; (c) diversification of income generation and food production strategies; and (d) spiritual and behavioural strategies.

**Social and organisational strategies**

The most prominent of all coping strategies adopted by IDPs and herders was of the social and organisational kind, similar to the social connectedness category espoused by Maxwell D et al. (2015). These strategies were characterised by spatial mobility as a major strategy, especially for herders, and were aimed at providing more stable and accessible grazing pastures for livestock. However, even decisions to migrate were often constrained by other factors, such as the need to keep milking animals near the people who need the milk. A strategy used by some people was to split the animals into smaller units, which also increased the efficiency of herding. Closer social connections were observed among families, friends, gender and youth groups, clan members, acquaintances, professional groupings, and even religious alliances. The connections mostly operated on a reciprocal basis, which enabled participating group members to lean on each other during crisis times. Through various social networks, also, links were regularly established between communities and authorities that provided food, medical or other forms of social assistance. However, these networks were more complex than the categories provided may suggest. Spanning geographical, age, gender, religious, and other lines, it was observed that sharing certain characteristics with others (such as belonging to the same clan or originating from the same neighbourhood) did not necessarily mean that people that shared similar characteristics were connected or networked. Yet, social networks were still reported to have played a vital role in influencing the decisions that IDPs made about a wide range of survival and livelihood issues. For example, they advised on when potential migrants should leave their home areas and where they should go. Even when IDPs arrived in the destination areas, networks were key sources of information and advice on where to find accommodation and food; how to navigate the new environment; and, if necessary, where to register as an IDP. Furthermore, networks also provided emotional support to IDPs in addition to sharing material on how to find critical information on survival strategies. Hence, in the context of the 2011 famine and 2016 near-famine conditions, social and organisational support enabled provision of social backing to IDPs and the establishment of a sense of community cohesion.

Barter-exchange was another coping strategy. In Hawl Wadaag sub-division of Beledweyne District, for example, this involved borrowing grain or other food stuffs from relatives in less famine-affected areas in exchange for small assets such as goats or sheep. Some people also pawned farm animals for food. Those offering the food thus had assets they could use as collateral and were entitled to the offspring of the animals if they calved, while those taking the food not only had increased sustenance, they also increased the chance that their animals would survive the crisis. It is notable, however, that the above exchanges were only made between or among relatives or friends. This implied that during the crisis there was a form of inter-family and inter-community cooperation - a promotion of social connectedness.

**Divestment and disposal of assets**

Male and female respondents from all sites also reported divestment and disposal of assets as coping strategies used during the 2011 famine and 2016 near-famine periods. These distress sales varied from one family to another, often after the famine or drought conditions had intensified and depended on the diversity of assets owned by the household. First, smaller stock such as goats, chicken and sheep were sold, followed by young cattle and as a last resort milking cows, working oxen and camels. Given that most stock was already deteriorating, such sales attracted less than the original value - a loss. On the other hand, the value of inanimate assets such as jewellery, bicycles, building materials and electronic materials (including radios) remained stable. In all instances, it emerged, the decision to sell was mostly influenced by the range of assets that a household had at its disposal; the known or perceived utility of the item or items being offered for sale; and the urgency of needs within the household. For example, in
pastoralist households where most household members depended on milk and milk products for their food, there was reluctance to dispose of milk-producing animals, unless this was a last resort. Another factor that influenced divestment was the extent of collaboration among households and within the affected communities. Where two or more households had agreed to support each other, households adopted asset disposal strategies that led to different but complementary outcomes. In one instance, for example, a group of collaborating households in Baidoa decided to dispose of certain other assets, opting to maintain only one set of working oxen and various other assets for use among themselves.

Diversification of income generation and food production strategies

During the 2011 and 2016 Somali crises, a wide range of diversification strategies were adopted by both pastoralists and agriculturalists. These included the burning of charcoal; gathering and hunting especially for those who lived in rural areas; producing handicrafts; and carrying out domestic work for pay and engagement in petty trade in urban areas. Some families also engaged in livestock trading to generate money for food and to relieve their households of burdensome animal stocks. As a strategy for coping and risk management, therefore, diversification involved the combination of production on their own farm with wage labour earned from others’ farms, engagement in farm and non-farm work, or a combination of all the above strategies. In nearly all instances, this type of diversification was survival-led and had limited returns. The main motivation for engaging in such activities was simply for survival and to reduce household vulnerability.

Spiritual and behavioural coping strategies

In the study, a category of mechanisms was identified that may be deemed spiritual and behavioural in nature. Despite some reluctance amongst women respondents to discuss spiritual or behavioural issues (considered private matters), these strategies were embedded in respondents’ values, faith and cultural beliefs, with many of the hunger-affected people using prayer or seeking comfort in God as a coping mechanism. For example, women respondents in Calanley in Kismayo reported seeking solace from God, noting that they experienced less depression during the famine than those who did not fully submit to God. Being a predominantly Islamic country, it was understood that some of the prayerful strategies were rooted in Muslim spirituality and beliefs. Yet some also believed in the existence of mortal spirits (jinn), considering these to be evil and a source of difficulties, including the famine that was affecting the community. Some male respondents, while accepting the notion of jinn, believed more in ancestral spirits from Somalia’s pre-Islamic traditions, at times identifying these indigenous spirits with jinn. In the context of the 2011 famine, a group of women in Baidoa believed that the famine was a pre-determined occurrence that was best explained by this complex mix of spiritual power. Some male respondents from the diaspora had a related view; a belief that in Islam, suffering from pain, hunger or major accidents is a result of sins committed and that such suffering is a God-given test to erase these sins when forgiveness is sought and given. IDP women in Kismayo felt that their faith in God had ‘healed’ their suffering from the effects of both the famine and the conflict. A key informant from Kismayo revealed that during the 2011 famine, some people practiced spiritualism that went outside the bounds of Islam, involving rituals that predate Islamic teaching. A 1982 US Government publication on Somalia confirms precedence of these practices – that some Somalis practiced pre-Islamic rituals that at times resembled those of other Eastern Cushitic-speaking peoples. Periodic fasting or abstaining from food for religious purposes was also practiced by adults who often engaged in religious fasting rituals conducted to offer special prayers for the crisis to be averted. They also rationed food/beverage provisions during weddings and other events.

Few negative and irregular behavioural coping strategies were mentioned by three key informants. Reports show that in extreme circumstances these included abandonment of children and older people, different forms of mistreatment of weaker members of households (including denial of food), theft of food and animals and engagement in prostitution. In Beledweyne, there were reports by some families of child marriages and engagements of adolescent daughters for dowry. Respondents, especially women, confirmed that they were aware of the potentially high social cost of these strategies, and that their use
was a clear sign of extreme desperation. Unfortunately, the research team was unable to confirm how widespread such acts were.

**Most efficient coping strategies and why**

Settling on the most efficient coping strategy used during the 2011 and 2016 crises presents some challenges. In his work titled *Famine Household Coping Strategies* (1993) and quoting Davies, Patrice Curtis described famine coping strategies as “a set of activities that are undertaken, in a particular sequence, by a household in response to exogenous shocks that lead to declining food availability”. He added: “The objective is to guard against the economic and social demise of the household”.46 He further described adaptive strategies as “a set of tactics that has evolved from a coping strategy in response to changed circumstances of the household”.47

The study revealed that households and communities use a mix of strategies at different stages of a crisis or for different situations. For example, communities in Kismayo adopted strategies depending on whether they lived in the rural or urban area, and if they were involved in agro-pastoral or informal sector livelihoods. Those who lived in urban Kismayo responded to the droughts by carrying out various activities to get money to buy food. They combined finding wage labour with moving livestock to other places to graze, selling firewood and making charcoal. These strategies evolved as the droughts became more severe, at which point there was widespread ‘distress selling’ of livestock and domestic assets. Thus, a deliberate mix of short-term coping mechanisms and long-term adaptation strategies were applied. Similarly, the diversification of sources of livelihood, including diversification of herd composition; building new skills and investing in long-term education; switching to more drought-resistant livestock species and breeds; improving rangeland management; and mitigating resource-based conflicts, became more relevant as coping strategies. To assess which coping mechanism was deemed most efficient by the community, respondents were asked to give their reflections on the value they attached to different coping strategies regarding food insecurity. They were also asked to compare these against any other relevant local strategies that were deemed efficient across different sub-groups in the study community.48 Strategies were deemed to be helpful if they allowed individuals and households adapt to food insecurity without harming their future options (e.g. if seeds for planting were not all eaten or the preservation of a few key livestock). Strategies that protected the social and cultural values and norms of society while supporting personal and community survival and growth were also deemed to be more efficient than those without these qualities. Table 2 reviews the different coping strategies used by the communities; Table 3 summarises broad categories of coping strategies from a previous study.

**Table 2: Summary of coping strategies used by the study community**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coping strategy</th>
<th>Relevance and appropriateness of the strategy</th>
<th>Assessment of efficiency of the coping strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Reduce number of meals eaten in a day</td>
<td>Used most by large households; sometimes exempts children and men in disfavour of women</td>
<td>Partially efficient but more stress for women, compared to other population groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rely on less preferred and less expensive foods</td>
<td>Used most by better-off households</td>
<td>Applicable mostly during early stages of the drought when choice of type of food was a viable option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Borrow food, or rely on help from a friend or relative</td>
<td>Most commonly used strategy; mostly before families, households and communities decide to migrate</td>
<td>Considered to be the most efficient coping strategy by most households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Send household members to eat elsewhere</td>
<td>Relevant for households that have better-off relatives or close friends in locations that are not too far from where they are domiciled</td>
<td>Not always reliable as destination families sometimes faced similar hardships to those of the sending families. Strategy also not usable by those in IDP camps who are cut off from their larger families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping strategy</td>
<td>Relevance and appropriateness of the strategy</td>
<td>Assessment of efficiency of the coping strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults restrict consumption in favour of small children</td>
<td>Only a temporary measure</td>
<td>Challenging to use in situations in households with sick adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase food on credit</td>
<td>Useful where markets are still functioning, and food vendors have faith in the future ability of households to pay</td>
<td>Not used widely as foodstuffs and money were in short supply, diminishing vendors’ faith in households’ ability to pay in future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gather wild foods, hunt or harvest immature crops</td>
<td>Useful to those who lived close to forested and bushy areas</td>
<td>Considered risky for girls and young boys due to likelihood of abduction and sexual assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consume seed stock meant for the next planting season</td>
<td>Useful in the early stages of the drought or famine</td>
<td>Could not go beyond one planting season; depleted seed stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send household members to beg</td>
<td>Useful for those who live in urban areas; considered to be inappropriate</td>
<td>Some household members were too frail to go begging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steal foodstuffs</td>
<td>Considered to be inappropriate</td>
<td>High risk; mostly used by young males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit meal portion sizes</td>
<td>A common strategy especially when there is still some supply of food</td>
<td>Lasts only for as long as food is still available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>Considered inappropriate; used only by the absolutely desperate</td>
<td>Dishonourable for the person/family; used only in urban cash environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid domestic work in other households</td>
<td>Not a preferred choice of a job or work</td>
<td>Inefficient due to the little income earned; consumes a lot of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer and fasting for long continuous periods of time</td>
<td>Not preferred but done when there is no other option</td>
<td>Gave spiritual confidence to affected people; Inefficient; a health risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances from relative in urban areas or diaspora</td>
<td>Considered appropriate; useful for those that had able contacts</td>
<td>Worked for a selected few that were not too badly off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock theft</td>
<td>Risky and not preferred</td>
<td>Only used when in total distress and with no other options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Used when household livelihood support system completely collapsed</td>
<td>a last resort that demonstrates a level of inevitability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Coping strategies by broad category as outlined in a previous study50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad category of coping strategies</th>
<th>Description of the strategies</th>
<th>Examples:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Diversification                   | Relates to broadening and varying the way in which livelihoods are developed, managed and sustained | • Diversifying livelihood sources, including diversifying herd composition  
• Building new skills; investing in long-term education  
• Using drought-resistant livestock species/breeds  
• Improving rangeland management  
• Investing in the urban economy |
| Flexibility                       | Relates to the degree of openness of a household or community to change and to new livelihood approaches or strategies that enhance opportunities for survival and more stable sustenance | • Expanding physical mobility of livestock  
• Labour mobility/employment  
• Out-migration (usually as a last resort)  
• Making use of humanitarian assistance |
| Social connectedness             | Relates to meaningful and supportive relationships between individuals, households and communities. Begins with family or household and then moves up to the community level; understood in terms of mutuality and reciprocity | • Sharing resources among extended relations across long distances  
• Mutual support  
• Remittances (diaspora or urban contacts) |

This study concludes that coping strategies that fall in the broad category of social connectedness were the most efficient for individuals, families and communities in the context of the 2011 and 2016 disasters – especially borrowing food and relying on help from friends, and depending on remittances from people working in urban areas or in the diaspora. This conclusion concurs with findings by Maxwell D et al. (2016), confirming the value of strong social capital in providing effective coping strategies for households and communities in times of crisis.

On Social Connectedness

"Social connectedness, the extent of the social networks of affected populations, and the ability of these networks to mobilize resources …...(are) factors (which) ultimately determined how well people coped with the famine. The nature of reciprocity, the resources available within people’s networks, and the collective risks and hazards faced within networks, all determined people’s individual and household outcomes in the famine, and are related to the social structures and social hierarchies within Somali society”

- Maxwell D et al (Facing famine: Somali experiences in the famine of 2011)

The analysis of coping strategies in response to factors such as livelihoods, health, age, wealth, education, mobility, disability, education and gender, gave no clear reasons for why certain coping strategies were preferred over others. We argue, however, that individuals and households chose certain coping strategies where certain factors - the practice of reciprocity, for instance - were already in play.

Reciprocity and exchange of gifts played an important part in traditional Somali society.51,52 It is practised as an intimate part of the social fabric among nomadic pastoralists and was meant as a form of altruistic
behaviour, the benefits of which outweighed the costs involved. It never operated on a *quid pro quo* basis, and generally was uniformly adhered to in Somali culture. In the context of nomadic pastoralism, therefore, and given the predominance of the practice of reciprocity, we can deduce that pastoralist households and communities by their nature and lifestyle have wide social networks of relatives, fellow herdsmen, friends and others, that add to the social capital of the household. It is therefore important to understand these livelihoods and social networks as an inherent component of crisis management. These networks not only formed the foundation for a household’s social capital but also became a bedrock for coping strategies during the 2011 and 2016 crises. Elders in Beledweyne, for instance, recalled times when clans, sub-clans and families visited one another and exchanged gifts (such as goats or cereals) to signify their friendship and mutual recognition. To fully appreciate the practice of reciprocity in Somali society, one had to understand its objective of strengthening ties through sharing. Among the Bantu, it was a system that bound friends and relatives especially during crisis. They did this to mitigate the effects of shocks experienced and to engender mutual trust among the givers and receivers. In all cases, the gift had no economic value assigned.

**How livelihoods and coping strategies have changed (are changing)**

From the interviews, six key factors differentiate 2011 and 2017 droughts, namely:

i. **Poorer security and more restrictions in 2011**: In 2011, Kismayo and Juba area were under the control of Al Shabaab (AS) who limited humanitarian organisations from accessing the area. Because of this, very limited relief aid was able to get through to the affected communities. Worse still, community movement was also restricted by the security situation and the fighting, making it difficult for people to explore alternative options for food or moving livestock. This led to huge losses in terms of human and animal life.

ii. **More and faster assistance in 2016/2017**: In 2016/17, assistance to the affected communities arrived faster and it was better coordinated. Most local areas had instituted up-to-date Disaster Risk Management strategies and the larger number of humanitarian and development agencies in the area meant more assistance was available. Furthermore, most respondents explained that lessons learned from the 2011 famine meant most households had both dry rations stored “for difficult times” while also diversifying their income sources. For example, a key informant (a stay-at-home widow) revealed that in 2011 famine her family had survived only on fish for food and income, but that in 2017 they had an additional income from a solar business they had successfully set-up. In addition, unlike 2011, there was a lot more assistance provided in 2016/17 by the government and NGOs, especially for water and foodstuffs. Development agencies also supported start-up of small businesses, contributing to more employment opportunities.

iii. **More skills in 2016/17**: In 2016/17, better education and skills within the community increased opportunities for employment and therefore more livelihood options as compared to 2011.

iv. **Lessons learned from 2011**: Lessons from 2011 made for a better prepared community when the 2016 drought struck. For example, those with livestock in 2017 sold them off earlier and saved the money for later use. FGDs with IDPs revealed that after 2011, community pooling of available resources led to the construction of water tanks, reducing distances travelled to find water during droughts.

v. **Better use of cash transfers and remittances**: Cash transfers and remittances were a major factor in ensuring access to food and in some cases in the transformation of livelihoods. Unconditional and regular monthly cash transfers not only enabled households to purchase foodstuffs but also to invest in some assets, such as education and health. After 2011, for example, Save the Children provided unconditional cash transfers, the equivalent of $120 per family; to 11,000 families in Jalaqlaqsi, Buulo Burte, Baladweyn, Maxaas, and Matabaan districts of Hiiraan. These families reported better sustenance. For some, money received from cash transfers was pooled with that from remittances to invest in new livelihood ventures, such as kiosks. Most
women’s FGDs reported sharing their income from both remittances and cash transfers with neighbours, relatives or friends, as per the cultural tradition of sharing. Urban-based recipients of cash transfers and remittances sometimes shared their income with other family members who had remained in the rural countryside to care for remaining livestock or family members.

vi. **Curbed charcoal production:** Prior to 2011, charcoal production was a key livelihood especially for young men, despite also being blamed for environmental degradation in Somalia. Government officials in Kismayo reported that after the 2011 famine, concerted efforts were made to curb both production and trade of charcoal to reduce the lucrative profits from funding Al-Shabaab activities and the war. A UN Security Council Resolution passed in 2012 anchored these efforts. However, another Security Council Resolution passed in July 2013, expressed "concern at the continued violation of the charcoal ban." This challenge notwithstanding, state and non-state actors have continued to call for policies and programmes that will reduce demand for and provide better livelihood and energy alternatives to charcoal. The Federal Government of Somalia and United Nations Joint Programme for Sustainable Charcoal Reduction and Alternative Livelihoods (PROSCAL) launched a joint programme that will develop relevant legal instruments, strengthen enforcement mechanisms, promote alternative sources of energy, and provide alternative livelihoods.

**Key marginalisation and exclusion issues that impact household survivability**

Findings show marginalisation and exclusion as a function of 3 main sets of factors: ethnicity and kinship; gender and other differences; and livelihood and employment status. Below these are discussed in more detail.

(a) **Ethnicity, kinship and clan identity**

Clan identity, power and politics are enduring features in Somalia - evident in all field investigations. Social and economic organisation in the study community was found to be based on clans and lineage, with dominant clans controlling most economic, social and political assets. Within Kismayo, the dominant clans are Darod/Harti, Darod/Marehan and groups that belong mostly to the Hawiye clan. Others include the Darod/Ogaden, Bantu (Jareer), Rahanweyn, Awramleh and the Bajuni. A key informant observed that these clans were at times manipulated by their leadership to control resources and take power. The most popular tactic was to emphasise clan differences and formulation of political or other demands that play on those differences.

(b) **Gender and other differences**

Gender inequality is a long-standing issue in Somalia, and drought and famine aggravate the impacts of gender inequality. Besides being a highly traditional and male-dominated culture, the promotion of gender fairness, reproductive health rights, and women’s sexual autonomy remains difficult. One may argue that this is due to the culture of female subordination and gaps in women’s leadership. The study revealed that women were absent from government and traditional institutions, and were rarely involved in public forums, councils or even social meetings. Some female respondents, backed by research evidence, argued that the 2016 law on a 30% parliamentary quota marked an important step towards women’s equal political representation. However, progress in realising the quota has been limited and having the quota is neither a guarantee of meaningful representation of women nor the effective articulation of issues affecting them. The study also confirmed that in addition to the general trend of inequality, the 2011 and 2016 crises affected women more than men. For example, while men were usually the first to leave homes and travel to other locations, including towns and other places in search of alternative livelihood opportunities, the women stayed at home to find food for the children and to care for older people, the latter task considered more onerous than the former.
Women’s subservience to men increased their vulnerability in times of stress or shocks (drought and famine). Women’s FGDs discussions in IDP camps in Beledweyne and Kismayo, for instance, revealed that women still played marginal roles compared with men. They explained, for example, that in both 2011 and 2016 crises, the responsibility for distributing food and other humanitarian assistance items was mainly given to local leaders, mostly men. These not only had limited understanding of women’s needs but also sometimes marginalised them when it came to allocation of, especially, food assistance. Consequently, women had limited access to humanitarian services and to decision-making processes. Some NGOs tried to address this by prioritising women in their programming. However, this practice did not apply to all organisations.

In Al-Shabaab prone rural Kismayo, various interventions improved access to education (for girls) and health (for both women and girls), promoted by the development agencies. Confidence-building interventions also supported women to become more independent. Some women felt that the 2011 and 2016 crises inspired them to find alternative solutions to the survival challenges they were facing, often taking on roles that were previously relegated to men. Many had lost their husbands in either ensuing conflicts or from starvation.

Many women also shared cases of abuse against them, particularly those in IDP camps. These women faced extortion, rape, assault and other gender-based violations. Unfortunately, explained these women, the cases were handled mostly by male authorities who discouraged action against the perpetrators. However, the gender challenges that are faced by Somali women aren’t limited only to sexual violence and further work is needed to understand these within the complex mix of cultural, religious, livelihood and other trends within protracted crises.

(c) Livelihood and employment

The lack of livelihood and employment opportunities was a key challenge for Somali households in 2011 and 2016. Officials in Beledweyne observed that years of conflict and the protracted humanitarian crisis in the country had depleted the livelihoods of the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist population.

Some households initially resorted to selling charcoal, increasing deforestation. Eventually most adult household members, especially men, migrated to find work further weakening individual and family security. Those left behind, mostly women and children, took on new roles in the households. Where men managed to find something to do, they still complained of exploitation and underpayment, in part blamed on the incompatibility of the agro-pastoral skills they had with the skills’ demands in non-rural settings. The swing from self-reliance and independence to doing menial jobs for mere survival was viewed as humiliating and disempowering, especially since with the limited income the affected people were still unable to send enough money back to their families.

Family separation for survival also meant that more women and children became heads of households, increasing their vulnerability. Similarly, migrating women and girls worked as child minders, laundry workers, construction site attendants, housemaids, hawkers or garbage collectors. They had to travel outside safer zones and thus had a higher risk of sexual and gender-based violence or other humiliation.

Households also had to ‘double up’ during the crises, where family, friends and acquaintances relocating from worse affected areas shared living facilities with destination households. This had severe negative consequences for the hosts’ food security, and social and health status, as most households lacked a steady income.

Unemployment, especially among youth skyrocketed during the 2011 and 2016 crises. UN OCHA (2019) and Dalmar MS et al, (2017) estimated that in 2012 the youth unemployment rate was 67% (14–29 years old); higher for women (74%) than men (61%). During this period, youth unemployment, livelihood security and insurgency in Somalia were inextricably linked. For example, FGDs involving (mostly male) youths in Baidoa and Kismayo stated that the primary motive for youths joining local militia, Al-Shabaab or the Somali national army was to have an assured source of income and to secure their, and their
families’ livelihood. Most were aware of the risks such employment posed, considering such risks worth taking against the alternative of going hungry or worse.

For IDPs, the study observed that people displaced from rural areas especially and forced to flee into IDP camps in urban areas lacked the survival skills or social networks necessary to navigate urban areas. They could neither establish viable economic enterprises nor join social networks in the new urban settings. Over the years, the IDPs also began to lose the agrarian skills that they previously had, implying that displacement had brought about a permanent change in their lives and livelihoods. This suggests that such people needed (and were thus helped) to acquire new skills, such as those deemed necessary for petty trade or other informal sector jobs.

Drivers of marginalisation and how these are maintained

This study has outlined the types of marginalisation that were evident in Somalia during the 2011 and 2016 crises. These mirror the marginalisation/exclusion experienced during normal and settled times. The only difference is the extent, depth and complexity of exclusion and marginalisation exacerbated by famine and conflict. We delve deeper into the underlying factors for this marginalisation. The focus was on categories of people who usually face marginalisation and exclusion such as women or the disabled. However, the underlying changes in agro-pastoralist resource use and access in the country, and the potential role of climate change, were also assessed.

Somalia’s pastoralist livelihoods have for centuries survived on traditional herding of cattle, sheep, goats and camels, mostly in the semi-arid or dryer areas of the country. Historically, the key factor for success of this system was free access to pasture and water. Over the years, however, attempts have been made to replace the indigenous tenure regimes that were previously associated with free access and mobility with state tenure systems that tend to restrict access rights.

“The logic of the pastoral economy is to minimise risk in order to secure preservation of the household. As an adaption to ecosystems in which forage and water resources are critical parameters, transhumant herding largely depends on dry season forage within reach of dry season watering points. When this forage is depleted or access to it and nearby water supplies are interrupted, the result can be land degradation, livestock die-offs, conflict, and rapid sales as pastoralists seek to realign resource access arrangements, utilize already marginal land, and cope with reductions in herd viability” (Unruh JD, 1995).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Underlying cause of poverty and vulnerability</th>
<th>Impacts</th>
<th>Actions and actors that can contribute to resolving the challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender discrimination and bias, culture of patriarchy</td>
<td>Low self-esteem, unfair resource allocation, low productivity, gender-based violence</td>
<td>Equalise educational opportunities, skill-training facilities for women, and legal reforms. Push for change in patriarchal narratives and practices. (Media, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, central and local governments, clan leaders, NGOs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak government</td>
<td>Poor service delivery, injustice and failure of rule of law, limited planning or implementation</td>
<td>Review ways of working, especially between central and local governments; clarify role of clans and other non-state actors (central government, donor agencies and research institutions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource-based conflicts, insecurity of livelihoods and jobs</td>
<td>Violence, limited productivity, further marginalisation of weaker groups</td>
<td>Review higher level development goals and address conflicts between pastoralism and agricultural livelihoods; design and test alternative livelihood strategies that are not land-based.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another underlying factor is rainfall seasonality that affects livestock production and the livelihoods of the people. Rains have been considerably unreliable over the last few years and the recurrence and severity of droughts due mostly to El Niño further compounded an already challenging humanitarian situation. This dramatically reduced the number of livestock and impoverished nomads beyond their capacity to recover.

Marginalisation and exclusion live on through traditions and clan identities – often driven by clan leaders who seek control of resources and power. Clan structures are used to maintain the status quo in governance, politics and resource allocation. Clans also continue to shape women’s participation in mainstream socio-economic activities based on a gendered division of labour. The status of women in Somali society has, therefore, remained subservient with defined roles based on the Xeer, a set of unwritten Somali customary laws that are specific to each clan, and whose standards are variable. Limited or no education is another driver of marginalisation. Denying educational access to already disadvantaged social groups could result in exclusion of these groups from participation in democracy, causing disempowerment and disenfranchisement.

The role of selected external actors in shaping coping strategies

In 2011, many people suffered enormously due to untimely humanitarian assistance. As a result, people adopted other survival or coping strategies, some of which worked against their future wellbeing. The absence of a functioning social protection system or a dependable resilience strategy heightened the impacts of the crisis.

The period after the 2011 famine is characterised by increased external support due to these gaps. In addition to food shortages, for instance, the country lacked drought management systems, had limited

<table>
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<th>Impacts</th>
<th>Actions and actors that can contribute to resolving the challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation of ethnic, religious and other minorities</td>
<td>Polarisation of differences, increased intolerance, increased vulnerability and/or poverty</td>
<td>De-emphasise clan politics and promote nationalism, revisit the 4.5 power-sharing rule, invest in national dialogue, establish social protection nationally (NGOs, private sector, media, central and local governments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
<td>Declining productivity of land, recurrence of droughts</td>
<td>Diversify livelihoods; invest in disaster risk management; improve natural resource management and rehabilitation of degraded lands; leverage green funding to support sustainable livelihoods (all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid population growth</td>
<td>Increased land degradation, higher probability of conflict, unmet health, education and other services</td>
<td>Involve local leaders in dialogue on planned population growth (central and local government and local NGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-emphasise clan politics and promote nationalism, revisit the 4.5 power-sharing rule, invest in national dialogue, establish social protection nationally (NGOs, private sector, media, central and local governments)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
<td>Declining productivity of land, recurrence of droughts</td>
<td>Diversify livelihoods; invest in disaster risk management; improve natural resource management and rehabilitation of degraded lands; leverage green funding to support sustainable livelihoods (all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust social protection (NGOs, private sector, media, central and local governments)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid population growth</td>
<td>Increased land degradation, higher probability of conflict, unmet health, education and other services</td>
<td>Involve local leaders in dialogue on planned population growth (central and local government and local NGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-focus or re-assign roles of traditional institutions, avoid strengthening traditional institutions that do not represent a wide cross-section of community members (donors, central and local government)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households/communities resisting changes and continuing to use inefficient methods of production</td>
<td>Persistently poor production of food and other products.</td>
<td>Design and implement demonstration projects at community level, intensify capacity building at local levels (NGOs, government ministries and donors)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NGOs, ministry responsible for agriculture and livestock, major donors and NGOs)
capacity to distribute humanitarian and development assistance and the fragmented local governance structure made coordination of aid difficult.

One of the more significant aid investments in the post-2011 era was in cash transfer programming. Officials in both Kismayo and Baidoa applauded implementation of the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) consortium-style programme that sought to improve community and household resilience. Through this, NGOs like Norwegian Refugee Council and Concern Worldwide were reported to have given cash transfers to some of the most vulnerable households. An FGD with women in rural Beledweyne, for example, observed that the cash they received helped families get more food, prevented further displacement of people and enhanced the household’s ability to “bounce back” after the crisis. Another investment by Save the Children through their “Empowering Entrepreneurs with Skills Through Income Generation Activities”, helped vulnerable people in IDP camps to diversify their income, thus enhancing their food security. This investment complemented other resources received, such as remittances from friends and relatives. Similarly, Oxfam supported a project on Community Driven Livelihood and Food Security Initiatives that sought to better channel humanitarian services and development assistance through local institutions. Officials in Kismayo explained that this project was being implemented alongside operationalisation of the area’s risk management strategy. Such efforts and a swifter response from various actors (and learning from the 2011 crisis), the impacts of the drought in 2016/17 were lessened.

These positive achievements notwithstanding, the study also noted a few negative impacts in the delivery of aid. For example, delivery of assistance in urban rather than rural areas led to influx of people in towns where social amenities and infrastructure were inadequate. In some instances, reliance on powerful clans to distribute humanitarian assistance and the dominant role some people referred to as ‘mukuel mathow’ or ‘black cats’ played, created gaps in the transparent delivery of aid, including the exclusion of some vulnerable groups. People with disabilities were particularly invisible to programme designers or implementors. Overall, the most vulnerable populations such as PWDs lacked information on humanitarian assistance, which exacerbated existing inequalities and left many unserved.

Table 5: Examples of external actors operating in the study area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Examples of external actors operating in the area</th>
<th>Range of activities in which the actors are involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baidoa</td>
<td>World Vision, Save the Children International, Médecins Sans Frontières, International Organization for Migration (IOM), IMC Worldwide, Somalia’s Ministry of resettlement, disaster management and disability affairs, Ministry of humanitarian affairs, Ministry of planning, Baidoa District Administration, Bay Regional Administration, Gargaar Relief and Development Organization (GREDO), Social-life and Agricultural Development Organization (SADO), Radio Baidoa, Baidoa Specialist Hospital</td>
<td>Child protection, health services, returnees/shelter, regional administration, disaster management, communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beledweyne</td>
<td>UNICEF, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Relief International, World Food Programme (WFP), Mercy, World Health Organisation (WHO), UN OCHA, WARDI, Green Hope, Global Guardian Somalia Security Services, Beledweyne Private School</td>
<td>Children’s education, protection, nutrition and health, food security, humanitarian assistance, cash transfer programming, security and emergency response services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kismayo</td>
<td>Jubaland Chamber of Commerce &amp; Industry (JCCI), American Refugee Committee (ARC), IOM, CARE, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Daaloo Airlines, Kismayo University</td>
<td>Support for induction training from technical vocational education training graduates, livelihood support through food vouchers and WASH activities: livelihood and WASH and shelter,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Households chose coping strategies based on the crisis faced and available options. At the start of the drought, for example, they reduced the amount of food consumed. Later, they borrowed from friends or sent their children to relatives in locations not yet been affected by the drought or ensuing conflict.

External actors had a positive effect on chosen coping strategies. For instance, in 2016, The World Bank joined forces with the Federal Government of Somalia to support the inflow of remittances from the diaspora and to ensure that primary dependants were reached. This came after banks in the United States and Europe closed the bank accounts of Somali-owned remittance companies citing high risks of money laundering and potential links to terrorism. The World Bank, working with Somalia’s Central Bank, developed mechanisms for comprehensively regulating and supervising the money transfer businesses. This is an example of where aid was used to protect and enable viable use of a locally-devised strategy. Both Somali authorities and donors could explore the possibility of establishing a comprehensive cash transfer system (potentially as a national social protection system) and link this to the remittances system.

Another coping strategy that involved external actors was the Drought and Livelihoods Response Project implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in IDP camps in 2012. In 2011, when the famine was underway, external actors were unable to adequately address security problems due to the limited aid the country was receiving at the time. This forced people into IDP camps where living conditions had deteriorated and key livelihoods disappeared. In response, external actors invested in new strategies for better IDP management – to improve the government’s ability to coordinate and manage IDP settlements and to improve the livelihoods of vulnerable IDPs. Through this project, IOM influenced design and implementation of livelihood assistance programmes that sought better household food security and better transitioning of urban IDPs undergoing resettlement and reintegration. This project had similar objectives to Save the Children AND Oxfam projects mentioned above.

How communities perceive external actors

Community perceptions on the role (including usefulness) and effectiveness of external actors during and after the 2011 famine varied – per category of respondents and the context the respondent was in. For example, while a group of people with disabilities in Kismayo applauded international NGOs for including them in their programmes, several other disabled respondents in Beledweyne and Baidoa complained about being excluded from programmes because no one was taking any specific interest in them. Also, despite dismal living conditions in IDP camps, a key informant in a camp in Baidoa felt she and her family owed their lives to the humanitarian assistance they received from NGOs in the form of food, shelter, health and WASH services, and cash.

It is clear from respondents, however, that aid delivered through different external actors had been positive - improving the dire situation most Somalis faced in 2011, and that this was highly appreciated. Informants from at least four Somali NGOs, however, added that the aid could be more efficient and effective if changes were made to how it was delivered. For example, there were concerns about numerous, inflexible and lengthy procedures used by donors and international NGOs. This sometimes led to untimely support or use of negative alternative coping strategies. Such challenges
marred the expected benefits such procedures aimed for and made things more difficult for participating local NGOs and communities.

Respondents from the diaspora questioned the commitment by some international actors, especially International NGOs, to pass on ownership and management of aid delivery to local Somali NGOs. They observed that while in theory most committed to doing so, the necessary capacity building to enable that to happen in the future was not taking place. An example was given of the large number of NGOs that came into the country immediately after the 2011 crisis. Most had a wealth of expertise but left without imparting critical skills to those left behind.

A government official in Kismayo also commented on a trend during the 2011-2016 period by some external actors - competition among themselves either for resources or for recognition - a trend that at times complicated relationships with government officials or confused programme coordination. This indirectly also exacerbated frustration, mistrust and disrespect among some actors. A collegial working relationship was however reported where external actors, such as UNDP, Save the Children, Norwegian Refugee Council and UNICEF directly supported government efforts to develop plans (such as Disaster Risk Management Plans) and relevant policies.

At the village level, several male and female respondents also mentioned the use of cash transfers to alleviate suffering for IDPs and other vulnerable groups. Transfers were reported to be widespread in different districts, such as Baidoa (by the World Food Programme) and in Beledweyne (by the Red Cross). Women respondents and local officials observed that cash transfers are popular and reached many Somalis, not just those in distress; estimating that over 3 million people were reached by different schemes. A result is that several humanitarian sector actors now feel they are better at coordinating their programmes to limit duplication of services.

Assistance providers in south central Somalia faced significant challenges in reaching the most vulnerable populations during the 2011 famine. Different categories of vulnerable populations also faced information gaps that limited their ability to seek for and access humanitarian services, when and where provided. Even where information was available, responses by humanitarian agencies was slow and poorly coordinated. In part, this was due to the prevailing insecurity especially in rural locations, made worse by humanitarian organisations’ inability or unwillingness to collaborate with local organisations in the delivery of services.

Frequent threats to humanitarian workers by Al-Shabaab and the emergence of a ‘middle men’ economy in the delivery of humanitarian assistance worsened the situation. An informant told the research team of several instances where foodstuffs and medical supplies delivered to IDP camps didn’t reach beneficiaries but were instead taken by people who were claiming to be officials. Some investigations confirmed that the intercepted aid was being sold in local markets. As the famine situation intensified, the south-central region experienced growth of an exploitative cadre of people sometimes referred to as mukuel mathow or ‘black cats’ (primarily profit-minded people). They served as gatekeepers to IDP camp occupants and collaborated with government and clan leaders to determine who received or did not receive aid. They were so powerful that they constructed camps, provided water and sanitation services, and provided ‘security’ for the camps – all at a fee. One informant pointed out that the more established ‘black cats’ even organised and brought into ‘their camps’ truckloads of famine victims whom they registered and, on whose behalf, procured food from NGOs and UN agencies. The diversion of such aid

Box 5: Exclusion of certain groups

“IDPs (and refugees) throughout the country also tend to predominantly come from marginalized minority groups. It is increasingly recognized, arguably since the famine of 2011, 23 among international agencies in Somalia that certain population groups have been and continue to be excluded from humanitarian and development interventions and initiatives, despite constituting the majority of IDPs, refugees and famine victims (see Map 4). Furthermore, since 2007, these groups are predominantly located in areas controlled by al-Shabaab, which include large areas of southern and central Somalia”

Majid, et al. 2017
meant it was not efficient or effective for those most in need. The resulting inequality is a socio-economic risk due to resentment among the under-served, who alienated, could join militias thereby worsening the already tenuous conflict. Affected people, findings show, also resort to withdrawing their children from school, postponing health attention or continuing environmentally risky activities like cutting down trees for charcoal trade.

Local NGOs, working in collaboration with international humanitarian agencies, were another channel through which the most vulnerable people expected to be reached during the 2011 and 2016 crises. However, most international agencies tended to limit their involvement with local NGOs that were linked to dominant clans, thus encouraging exclusion of certain groups as explained in earlier sections. This calls for supplementary efforts to include the excluded while at the same time maintaining the positive impacts that NGOs linked to dominant clans may be having.

The examples above reveal three main roles played by other actors, namely: providing direct assistance to households that were affected by the crises of 2011 and 2016; helping design and test approaches that will improve the success of certain coping strategies; and establishing mechanisms for regulating the functioning of some coping strategies. Together, these efforts imply concerted efforts by both Somali and other actors to find durable solutions to a challenge that has persisted for many years. However, there were some categories of vulnerable groups that remained invisible to or difficult to identify by external actors, and hence their access to humanitarian or other services was quite limited. These include PWDs – especially IDPs, Christians and sexual-orientation minorities.

External actors helped raise awareness about the crises in Somalia and drew the attention of the international humanitarian community. They subsequently mobilised resources and participated in the implementation of relief and development programmes in the country. The expertise by actors helped better highlight the different risks and vulnerabilities during the 2011 and 2016 period. This informed priority setting, targeting, implementation, and achievement of results. One of the major changes observed is the gradual shift by external actors from being relief providers to facilitators of planning and institution-building processes. This is seen as a positive outcome of the aid effort in Somalia during the reference period.

However, external actors have been challenged by several issues. First, due to the magnitude and complexity of the crises, there has been a lot of duplication of efforts. The presence of different cash transfer programmes that operate without effective coordination or harmonisation is an example. Similarly, the failure to address extreme vulnerability consistently, such as was the case with the elderly and disabled, has left many people unserved/underserved. The reliance by assistance providers of existing clan structures to reach target communities also led to further exclusion of some intended beneficiaries. Local actors’ capacity to promote ownership and sustainability should be enhanced.

**The diaspora community and remittances**

The role played by remittances in countering poverty, vulnerability and the exposure during the crises was explored. Specifically, discussions with men and women in the four study sites on who they thought the main recipients of remittances were, the average amounts being received, what remittances were used for, and effects/impact of the money. A considerable difference in benefits gained by urban versus rural recipients was noted. Urban recipients got larger sums of money, for instance. Some believed that people who lived in towns had better information, access to diaspora communities, and were more enterprising. One respondent explained that urbanites pitched investment ideas to the diaspora community leading to remittances being made to them.

Findings confirm that IDP households rarely received any remittances from outside or within the country. Information from different study areas confirm that most IDPs in camps come from marginalised communities with limited or no social capital, and with little human assets. Most recipients of remittances were significantly less poor and had more diversified sources of income. Remittances were mostly used to directly supplement household incomes, especially for covering the cost of food and other basic needs.
like healthcare, schooling or funeral costs. A profiling of recipients of remittances revealed that households headed by women and older persons were more likely to receive remittances than households headed by younger men. This suggests that women and older men are more trusted to handle money that is sent as remittances.

Overall, remittances were positive in encouraging economic regeneration through micro-targeting. Many felt the money boosts the economy by improving household consumption, increasing the circulation of cash, and enabling the purchase goods and services. An area that relates to remittances, but that needs more research, is crowdfunding. This was mentioned by an informant who told the study team that it had been used in a few instances by investors in the education and health sectors. Several Somalis in diaspora were regular investors in local businesses. This option may offer an opportunity for co-financing arrangements between government, donors and private sector investors.

The primary challenge noted about the high reliance on remittances is the exposure, especially of poor recipients, to risk in the event of sudden withdrawal of funding due to the volatility of diaspora incomes.

The extensive mobile phone infrastructure and usage of mobile money services facilitated access to remittances. About 75% of Somalis above 16 years old use mobile money services - access rates are 83% (urban areas), 72% (IDP camps) and 55% (rural areas). Mobile technology also supports household coping strategies by strengthening social networks via regular communication, facilitating saving, delivery of cash-based aid, purchase of goods and services and access to information.
Conclusion

This study explored the coping strategies employed by individuals, households and communities, and the factors that influenced resilience outcomes, in Somalia during and in the aftermath of the 2011 famine and 2016 drought. There is a lot of knowledge about what individuals, households and communities did to survive during the two crises, but less is known about how their choices and behaviours affected their wellbeing and livelihoods during the crises and thereafter. More focused and detailed research is required to unravel this. Similarly, while the study revealed remarkable levels of resilience survivors, care should be taken in how the information is used to sustain and improve such resilience. Available evidence suggests that while many managed to survive and bounce back after the crises, many lives were unnecessarily lost, particularly during the 2011 famine.

In addition, many of the survival strategies that were adopted by the affected individuals and households translated into mostly negative long-term consequences (such as more child malnutrition and higher exposure to HIV/AIDS). Specifically, findings revealed that the two crises caused a disruption of livelihoods for individuals, households and communities; increased internal displacement and broken social networks; more tenuous relations between different clans and ethnic groups; and exacerbation of gender inequality and violence against women. Violent and non-violent means were used by some population groups to acquire power and to access resources (including land resources). Agricultural and pastoralist communities contested grazing and farming land leading to conflict and loss of life; clans jostled for space in decision-making processes, and to represent and safeguard certain group interests; and macro-policy goals created tensions on whether to prioritise sedentary agriculture or pastoralist livelihoods. The ensuing conflict and the absence of effective governance systems added fuel to the fire, a conclusion shared by earlier researches. For example, Maxwell D et al. (2017) in their research on resilience and livelihoods in conflict-related crises concluded that while conflict was not the only factor undermining the resilience of crisis-affected households, it nonetheless directly undermined livelihoods and resilience. Even after the 2011 and 2016 crises the ensuing conflicts undermined day-to-day struggles by Somalis to recover. The result, thus, is that humanitarian needs for Somalis are still considerable.

Insecurity negatively impacted agriculture and livestock rearing, caused the displacement of people and movement restrictions, and hampered efforts to effectively distribute humanitarian aid. Where IDP camps existed, they faced violence, acute food insecurity and almost total dependence on food aid. Beyond the direct impacts, conflict also contributed to the transformation of community relationships, undermining trust, social cohesion and support.

The study also identified displacement as one of the primary effects of violent conflict. Displaced people were disconnected from their previous livelihoods/networks, forcing them to adapt to new circumstances and coping strategies. Some of the coping strategies had negative impacts. These challenges notwithstanding, out-migration enabled large numbers of people to find sanctuaries where they could re-start their lives, and during this transition social networks played a key role in enhancing access to livelihoods.

Anecdotal information, and evidence from the field, suggested that women were the most resilient of all the categories of vulnerable groups, an assertion that needs further research beyond this study. This assertion is made based on findings that women did better at building social capital than men and that social connectedness was identified as the most efficient coping mechanism. The study also confirmed that the 2011 and 2016 crises affected men and women in differently. Because of their primary responsibility to care for children or the elderly, to collect firewood for cooking and feed their families, women tended to stay at home while men migrated in search of alternative forms of livelihood. Women, taking on new roles also had to travel longer distances in search of food/water, which made them more vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence.
The study concurred with the categorisation of coping strategies by Maxwell D. et.al. (2015), namely: diversification, flexibility and social connectedness. The strategies that individuals and households adopted also aligned with their well-being status. For instance, the most common coping mechanisms or better-off households was asset liquidation, reducing consumption and diversification of livelihoods while less well-off households offered their labour, sold any land and other assets, or migrated to town or IDP camps.

Overall, the study concludes that coping strategies that fall in the broad category of social connectedness were the most efficient. They enabled socially connected individuals, households and communities to borrow food and rely on help from friends and get remittances from people in urban areas or in the diaspora. Households with greater social and economic interactions with people outside their own clans showed a greater ability to maintain food security during the crises. Social capital among households and communities enhanced the efficacy of coping strategies during the crises and guide policy-makers on what could be done in future to address risk and vulnerability during recurrent shocks or to establish a national social protection system.

Finally, the study suggests that the concept of resilience requires greater scrutiny. More research is needed about what contributes to resilience, especially the understanding of social connectedness and how different groups coped with the famine; how badly people were affected by the same levels of shock; and the implications of this analysis for formal policy and practice.
Recommendations for managing recurrent shocks and supporting resilience options

**Investing in comprehensive social protection:** With support from donors and NGOs the Somali government should provide leadership in driving the social protection agenda. For this to happen, central government should first undertake a comprehensive assessment of the existing social protection interventions targeting the most vulnerable regions in Somalia. Based on this understanding, a flexible, adaptable and linked-up state system that is shock responsive should be developed. A start could be a central registry for the delivery of social protection interventions, which could include registration, intake and beneficiary identification. To serve preventive, promotive and transformative goals, donors and the government should harmonise all existing social protection programmes and develop complementarity between and among different instruments. This system should be shock responsive, for example by increasing (for a short period of time) coverage of benefits to households affected by shocks or by topping up the transfer to identified households. Lessons from the implementation of current social protection programmes, especially cash transfers, should be incorporated in the design. As the systems improve and become more efficient, payments will become faster, which is crucial during disasters. However, this comes with a caveat that the current Government of Somalia does not have full control over certain areas of the country.

**Protecting and promoting social connectedness efforts:** The Somali government ministries with responsibility for finance, planning, community development and social services should jointly develop policy frameworks that enable CBOs, and family and clan structures, to promote social connectedness practices by leveraging social networks. Universities and think tanks in Somalia should also undertake further research on the drivers and maintainers of social connectedness to identify approaches for building alliances across different groups of people (including clans and ethnic and religious groups). The lessons drawn could be used to explore how best to maintain a sense of community and togetherness, as well as to support vulnerable groups such as PWDs in crisis situations and beyond.

**Strengthening disaster risk management planning:** Under the leadership of the ministries responsible for humanitarian affairs and disaster management, agriculture, and the environment, disaster risk management planning should be prioritised as an inter-ministerial focus, and development partners and international NGOs should pilot its implementation and carry out skills training for community and local governments. Such training should focus on improving risk management, prevention, mitigation and contingency planning. Districts that have disaster risk management plans could be used as case studies to expand this work. Meanwhile, the pilot districts could encourage multi-stakeholder involvement in planning activities, including relevant local committees and Somali state agencies to identify major risks and prioritise mitigation options.

**Dealing with the drivers of marginalisation/exclusion and how these are maintained:** Strategies for dealing with marginalisation and exclusion differ between different population groups. For ethnic and other minorities, further assessment of the 4.5 power-sharing formula is needed to explore systems that offer minorities more protection. Inclusive mechanisms that promote consultation, participation and representation of ethnic minorities in local, regional, and national development processes will be useful. In addition, local staff working for humanitarian agencies should be equipped with better negotiation skills to work with local leadership to ensure inclusivity during targeting and registration of aid beneficiaries. Such efforts would ensure more equitable resource allocation and implementation of plans for ethnic and other minorities. Organisations dealing with governance and peace initiatives, such as Safer World, could play a lead or facilitatory role in this process. A long-term dialogue process may target young people who may be more open to explore how to promote equity in new/emerging social, economic and political arenas. This would, however, require the recognition an involvement of youth as primary stakeholders in planning, governance, peace and security processes. Similarly, all factors that relate to the economic challenges they face (such as youth unemployment) should be addressed.
Dealing with external actors: After the 2011 famine, recovery, preparedness activities, and development programming occurred with a significant involvement of external actors. These included donors, humanitarian and development NGOs, private sector, and academic and research institutions. In the context of resilience building, it is recommended that each of these actors plays a specific role, as follows:

The Somali national government should: (a) Improve its strategic leadership and coordination roles, ensuring efficiency in programme implementation and policy coherence. Special attention should be paid to promoting suitable livelihoods in the light of climate variability, the recurrence of droughts, and the need to acquire new skills; (b) Spearhead linkages between the early warning system, food security agencies and social protection programmes to ensure that there is effective humanitarian assistance in the event of another crisis; (c) Mobilise communities to participate in the implementation of social protection programmes and in targeting the most vulnerable among the communities; and (d) Enact policies to safeguard and promote the rights and interests of marginalised populations such as ethnic and religious minorities, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists.

NGOs should: (a) Use their wide experience to test what works (or what doesn’t) in regards to resilience, and to document lessons for policy and programme uptake; (b) Work with academic and research institutions to further learn from communities how to protect and promote the use of social capital in conflict and drought conditions; (c) Link up with central and local governments to promote integrated project planning frameworks; (d) Prioritise the use of cash transfers as the preferred instrument for reaching the most vulnerable communities with social protection interventions; and (e) Use tools to evaluate what ‘climate resilience’ means in practice to ensure food security, such as the framework by Twigg (2007), see Annex V.

Donors should: (a) Support government to conceptualise, design and finance innovative relief-to-development or broader social protection programmes that promote resilience and ensure sustainability; (b) Work with regional bodies, such as IGAD and the African Union, to support cross-border resilience initiatives and to draw lessons from these; (c) Draw from their wider geo-political reach and share lessons in-country from other regions; and (d) Support researchers and academia to undertake a comprehensive political economy analysis on whose basis future planning and implementation of sustainable livelihoods programmes should be based.

Academic and research institutions should: (a) Undertake longitudinal research on vulnerability trends for different categories of the population; (b) Work with local NGOs and communities to identify and document local knowledge on drought and hunger coping strategies, and to explore how such knowledge may inform the country's disaster mitigation strategies; and (c) Carry out regular, and collaborative monitoring and evaluation to ascertain progress in achieving positive livelihood outcomes.

The diaspora community should: (a) Establish coordination mechanisms through which investments (remittances) made by the diaspora community in health, education, public infrastructure, and other sectors can be aligned to public investments and/or priorities; (b) Work with central government and donors to establish a repository of knowledge and skills for sourcing technical skills that diaspora community members are able to provide on a temporary or short-term basis; (c) Liaise with local Somali NGOs and CBOs to develop a better understanding of the practical and political realities of present-day Somalia, and how to best support their efforts to support communities; (d) Communicate with individuals and groups in Somalia to explore recovery and development alternatives, following the 2011 and 2016 crises; (e) Lead advocacy for policy reforms to address issues such as gender-based violence, early marriages and female genital mutilation that affect negatively the society at large; and (f) Support fundraising initiatives and provide technical support, where possible, to facilitate effective response during crises even from abroad.

Private sector actors should: (a) Work with donors, development agencies and the International Labour Organisation to generate employment opportunities for better livelihoods and resilience building for youth;
(b) Support response and recovery programmes by providing services at reduced fees or even for free (where possible) during crises as part of their corporate social responsibility initiatives; and (c) Commit to harmonious development by taking leadership in promoting equitable management of resources such as land that support livelihoods.

**Addressing gender-based violence:** Identify local institutions that can improve awareness on sexual and gender-based violence. Develop partnerships between these, the government, major clans, religious institutions, NGOs, and other development actors. The partnerships should initiate prevention systems and when violations occur, swiftly respond to victims’ needs. Such systems could also provide practical advice to anchor emergency responses and humanitarian assistance programmes, especially for IDPs, and women and girls. Engage clan and religious leaders to reshape perspectives on most harmful gender norms and behaviours. Increase investments in studies on the drivers of sexual and gender-based violence in Somalia, going beyond conflict or drought-prone vulnerability. Use community-based approaches with assistance from local NGOs to address sensitive issues such as sexual and gender-based violence. Such systems are useful also for data collection on such issues and other forms of social oppression, such as ethnicity or sexuality.

**Dealing with livelihoods:** Relief-to-development interventions that incorporate diverse livelihood approaches targeting pastoralists and farming communities should be implemented as a strategy for promoting long-term resilience. To reduce dependence on humanitarian assistance and to support post-crisis recovery, the underlying causes of vulnerability should be addressed. This needs technology, policy and institutional frameworks that support development of sustainable livelihoods, ensuring security, provision of basic services such as health and education, and ensuring more equitable access to resources among communities.

**Accessible, useable and disaggregated data/information:** All actors should invest in collection, analysis, and interpretation of disaggregated data on risk and vulnerability to facilitate better disaster mitigation and long-term resilience building. Strengthen the capacity of existing institutions such as the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) to collect, analyse and disseminate disaggregated and to updated data for better planning and implementation of humanitarian and development programmes. Ensure also that data disaggregation happens for sexual and gender-based violence and for ethnic minorities.
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Endnotes

1 The 2012 youth (14-29 years old) unemployment rate was 67% (UN OCHA, 2019) and (Dalmar MS et al, 2017) - They gain from support provided. Youth in the Somalia National Youth Policy are in the age group 15-40 years old (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Somalia, no date).


3 Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCIS) is a consortium of 5 INGOs that works collaboratively with local actors. https://www.nrc.no/what-we-do/brcis-consortium—building-resilient-communities-in-somalia/.


11 Only 16% of the Somali population has completed primary school compared with 34% in low-income sub-Saharan African countries (World Bank, 2017).


13 The V2R framework is a systems approach to vulnerability analysis that highlights the relationship between different factors in strengthening resilience. It illustrates the interrelationships between community well-being and local drivers of risk; national and global trends that contribute to uncertainty; and the influence of the governance environment. Key to the framework are the assets (e.g. income and food, essential services, agricultural assets, non-agricultural assets, technologies) and capacities (e.g. skills, sensitivity, adaptive capacity) – or capitals – that people draw on to build their livelihoods and to manage disaster risk. The framework is interlinked with the five assets and capacities (capitals) – human, social, financial, natural and physical – against which sustainable wellbeing is assessed. In the analysis these assets are considered in relation to other elements of the framework (such as stresses, uncertainty and governance).

14 Throughout the research validation was undertaken by the research team to ensure that data collected was of the highest quality and reliability.

15 See note 51.


17 The V2R framework is a systems approach to vulnerability analysis that highlights the relationship between different factors in strengthening resilience. It illustrates the interrelationships between community well-being and local drivers of risk; national and global trends that contribute to uncertainty; and the influence of the governance environment. Key to the framework are the assets (e.g. income and food, essential services, agricultural assets, non-agricultural assets, technologies) and capacities (e.g. skills, sensitivity, adaptive capacity) – or capitals – that people draw on to build their livelihoods and to manage disaster risk. The framework is interlinked with the five assets and capacities (capitals) – human, social, financial, natural and physical – against which sustainable wellbeing is assessed. In the analysis these assets are considered in relation to other elements of the framework (such as stresses, uncertainty and governance).

18 In this study the definition will be applied in a broader sense to include conflict and conflict-related impacts on lives and livelihoods.

19 Wisner B et al, 2003. At Risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. Routledge. Second edition 2003. Ibid, Ibid. UN SPIDER defines vulnerability as "the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards".


21 Miraa (Khat) is a plant whose leaves and stem are stimulants used as a recreational drug or medicine when chewed.

22 Bride price refers to payment made in kind or cash as required by custom or culture of a community by a groom or his family to the bride’s family in order to legitimise the union/ marriage.
27 In his PhD research on “The Homogeneity of the Somali People: A Study of the Somali Bantu Ethnic Community”, Mohamed Abdulkadir Eno (2005) writes: “For a long period of time, a general belief has reigned in the academic and non-academic circles that Somalis are an extremely exceptional people, in that there is a homogeneous society composed of men and women from one eponymous father from Arabia, celebrating monoculturalism, monolingualism as well as monotheologicalism”. He, however, argues that “the Somali people have a composition of various communities of distinct ethnic background, with each ethnic community practising its own distinct mode of living and culture in the midst of a conglomeration of multi-ethnic societies”.


29 See note 23.


31 The transitional Somali Parliament has 275 ‘representatives’. Each of the four major clans (namely the Hawiye, Rahanweyn, Dir – including Issaq clan – and Daarood) has an equal number of seats (61), hence four equivalents. The remaining cluster of minority clans comprise a 0.5 equivalent.

32 The implication here is that if you happen to belong to a weak or small clan that cannot stand on its own, then it is best that you join another that is already strong and can offer you protection.


37 Lankarani (2011) estimated that in 2011 half of the population in Somalia were suffering from food insecurity, of which about 10% of these were children, and that there were at least 200,000 severely malnourished children in need of immediate care (Lankarani K.B. 2011). Another study commissioned by the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO) food security and nutrition analysis unit for Somalia (FSNNU) and the famine early warning systems network (Fewsnet), estimated that 258,000 people died in southern and central parts of Somalia between October 2010 and April 2012, including 133,000 children under the age of five.


41 Jinn are believed to be supernatural creatures found in Islamic and Arabic writings, particularly the Quran. They were supposedly created from a “smokeless and scorching fire”, separately from humans or angels. However, they can appear in human or animal form to interact with people. Jinn are often considered the Islamic equivalent of demons.

42 Older respondents in Baidoa reported that jinn were part and parcel of Somali life and spirituality.

43 Most male and female respondents that the study team spoke to still denied the existence of beliefs other than Islam, some confessing that it was an embarrassment for Muslims to have any other beliefs.

44 This study analysed Somalia’s economic, national security, political, and social systems and institutions and examined the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. The authors sought to provide insights into Somali society, focusing on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political, and socio-economic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention in the study was given to the origins and traditions of the Somali people, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided.


47 See note 46

48 To achieve this, the research team used a participatory technique known as Preference Ranking, which enabled identification and analysis of preferred coping strategies based on local people’s perceptions and criteria. Ranking was combined with exploring the reasons why people considered some coping strategies to be more effective and efficient than others.

49 Very few economic activities were mentioned by the community in their response to study questions. It is possible that this was due to the community’s belief that the study’s focus was on the drought and famine situations which, in their view, precluded any productive activities and focused on humanitarian assistance.


54. A 2017 Save the Children report Changing Social Norms in Somalia observed that Somalia was ranked as one of the bottom five countries in terms of gender inequality (see Sulaiman M et al., 2017. Changing Social Norms in Somalia. Save the Children; see, also, Africa’s Voices, 2017. Gender-and-Child-Protection-report-for-UNICEF-Somalia).


56. Key informant in Beledweyne.


58. Some NGOs succeeded in transforming men’s behaviour by engaging them in activities that promote the achievement of gender equality, reduction of inequities and improvement of shared community livelihoods.


62. ‘Black cats’ worked as gatekeepers to occupants of the IDP camps, but also collaborated with some government and clan leaders in determining who received or did not receive aid. They were so powerful that they were reported to be constructing camps, providing water and sanitation services, and providing ‘security’ for the camps – all at a fee. The study team was also informed that the more sophisticated ‘black cats’ even organised and brought into ‘their camps’ truckloads of famine victims who they then registered and started procuring food for from NGOs and UN agencies.

63. Remittances in 2015 were estimated to reach a total of US$1.4 billion in Somalia and support 23% of the GDP.

64. Key informant in Beledweyne.


66. Key informant in Beledweyne.

67. For a more detailed discussion of this see Abdirahman K and Hassan S., 2017. Remittances and Vulnerability in Somalia – Assessing sources, uses and delivery mechanisms. Rift Valley Institute. Evidence from the study found recognised that the probability of being connected to someone who works abroad and can remit money increased with educational attainment – the higher the educational level the higher the probability of having the ‘right connection’.


69. While it was not possible for the research team to verify the authenticity of this claim, there was anecdotal information suggesting that entrepreneurs often pool resources and supplement these with resources from various members of the diaspora community.


73. Including groups and organisations that work with women, youth, people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, workers’ groups, etc.
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