

For the long run

A mapping of migration-related activities in the wider Sahel region

Clingendael Report

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1 The context

Since the start of the migration crisis in 2015, the European Union (EU) has focused its political and financial attention on restricting irregular migration flows to the EU from amongst others the Sahel-Lake Chad-Libya region—Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Libya, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. In 2015 the total influx of irregular migrants into the EU spiked and was dominated by the flow of refugees from in particular Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq fleeing violence and entering via Greece. From the region under review only Nigeria, with 2 percent of the total 2015 Mediterranean arrivals, made it into the top 10.¹ However, after the 18 March 2016 EU-Turkey agreement,² the arrivals via Italy have become by far the most dominant once again. Since 2013 this flow has been comparably stable. After quadrupling to 170 100 in 2014 the numbers were 153 842 in 2015 and 181 436 in 2016. About 40 percent of this flow originates from the countries under review, of which about half emanate from Nigeria. The other roughly 60 percent of the arrivals via Italy in 2016 originate predominantly from Sudan, Eritrea and a number of West African and South Asian countries.³

This paper aims to provide a quick mapping of the crisis management and peace operations as well as the most relevant international and regional actors that deal or may deal with irregular migration-related issues in the Sahel-Lake Chad-Libya region. In addition, it provides a first appreciation of these efforts. For such an assessment, the following contextual issues that complicate European policies to address irregular migration in the region are important background factors:⁴ (1) Most of the irregular migration in the Sahel region (84 percent) is intra-regional, follows a historical pattern and often has a seasonal character.⁵ (2) As Burkina Faso, Gambia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which aspires to become a common market like the EU through 'the removal, between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and to the right of residence and establishment' many of the countries under

1 UNHCR, 2016, *Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2015*, Geneva: UNHCR, 34.

2 EU-Turkey statement, Press Release 144/16, 18 March 2016.

3 Percentage as of October 2016. See: UNHCR, *Refugees/Migrants response: Mediterranean*, <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php> (accessed 10 January 2017); UNHCR, *Italy sea arrivals*, UNHCR update, No. 8, October 2016; and UNHCR, *Italy sea arrivals*, UNHCR update, No. 4, December 2015.

4 See also: Molenaar, F., 2017. *Turning the tide: the politics of irregular migration in the Sahel and Libya*, CRU report, The Hague: Clingendael Institute: The Hague.

5 Altai Consulting, 2015, *Irregular migration between West Africa, North Africa and the Mediterranean*, Abuja, 6.

review do not favour policies to strengthen borders within the region.⁶ (3) A number of the countries in the region have limited political will to restrict or control irregular migration to Europe as they benefit strongly from the remittances that migrants send home. Remittances are a stable source of the GDP in the Gambia (24 percent), Senegal (12 percent), Mali (8 percent) and Nigeria (4 percent), far more important than official development assistance (ODA).⁷ (4) Particularly in some of the transit countries the trafficking networks are deeply embedded in the national and local political economy, and indirectly and sometimes directly sustain governmental actors and institutions. Consequently, strengthening government capacity may increase government activity in combating some trafficking networks, but may not necessarily reduce irregular migration.⁸ (5) Large sections of the trafficking routes run through unstable regions such as northern Mali and Libya, where governments, crisis management and peace operations as well as relevant organizations do not have a firm foothold. In such regions the government is but one of the security actors, and strengthening its capacity is not always considered to be a neutral act. As such it may not always be a conflict-sensitive approach and may even have destabilizing effects in the long run.⁹

On the other hand, throughout the region there is a sense of urgency in dealing with the demographic pressure and particularly the increasing numbers of unemployed and marginalized youth; ungoverned or weakly governed spaces in and around porous borders; underdevelopment; and terrorist organizations.¹⁰ In spite of the above difficulties, these interests open up room for cooperation with the EU and its member states.

6 ECOWAS 1993, Revised treaty, ECOWAS Commission, Abuja, Art 3.

7 African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Development Programme, 2016, *African Economic Outlook 2016: Sustainable cities and structural transformation*; and World Bank, Migration and Remittances Team, 2015, *Development Prospects Group, Migration and Development Brief*, 24, Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook. Special Topic: Financing for Development, 13 April.

8 Lebovich, A., (2016) *Beyond securitization in the Sahel*, *Commentary*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 3 March 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_beyond_securitisation_in_the_sahel; and Tinti, P., and Westcott, 2016, T., *The Niger-Libya corridor: Smugglers' perspectives*, ISS Paper, 299, November.

9 Lebovich, A., *Beyond securitization in the Sahel*, *Commentary*; and IOM, *Migration Flows Europe, transit routes*, <http://migration.iom.int/europe/> (accessed 30 December 2016).

10 Avezov, X., 2016, *The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations II: Dialogue with West Africa*, SIPRI Workshop Report, Abuja, 16-18 September. 2015; and Avezov, X., 2016, *The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations II: Dialogue with Sahel-Saharan Africa*, SIPRI Workshop Report, Bamako, 16-18 November. 2015.

2 Crisis management and peace operations

Table 1 Multilateral peace operations, 2016

Operation	Start	Location	Mil.	Pol.	Civ.
MINUSMA	2013	Mali	10 772	1258	625
UNSMIL	2011	Libya	2	-	116
EUCAP Sahel Niger	2012	Niger	-	-	85
EUTM Mali	2013	Mali	539	-	-
EUCAP Sahel Mali	2015	Mali	-	..	100
EUBAM Libya	2013	Libya	-	-	23
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia	2015	Central Mediterranean Sea	1408	4	8

- = not applicable; .. = information not available; () = SIPRI estimate; Mil. = military personnel (troops and military observers); Pol. = police; Civ.= international civilian personnel.

Note: all figures reflect an operation's most recent known strength

Source: SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>.

EUCAP Sahel Niger

EUCAP Sahel Niger is a mission with a non-executive mandate, which was not originally established as a mission to manage migration. It was a civilian mission mandated to support the capacity building of Nigerien security actors to fight organized crime and terrorism. The mission's tasks focused initially on advising and assisting in the implementation of the security dimension of the Nigerien Strategy for Security and Development and helping to improve control over Nigerien territory, including through the provision of training, mentoring, assistance, advice and expertise to Nigerien security actors. In 2014, it began concentrating its direct assistance on Niger's northern regions, where security threats, including irregular migration, were most prevalent.

For this purpose, the mission established a permanent branch, or antenna, in Agadez, which is an important migration hub in the region.¹¹

According to the European External Action Service (EEAS) some 90 percent of migrants to the EU who originate from West Africa travel through Niger.¹² Therefore in 2016 EUCAP Sahel Niger's focus shifted further to include assisting 'the Nigerien central and local authorities and security forces in developing policies, techniques and procedures to better control and fight irregular migration.'¹³ The mission gathers information on migrant routes and relevant actors, and as such contributes to controlling irregular migration and related trafficking more effectively. In addition, it sets up training courses, informs irregular migrants about the risks of their journey, seeks to provide them with shelter and to facilitate their voluntary return to their countries of origin. In implementing these tasks the mission aims to support the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (see below). This regional multi-purpose centre in Agadez is seen as a pilot case. Additionally, the three CSDP missions in the Sahel (EUCAP Niger, EUCAP Mali and EUTM) are seeking ways to further regionalize their approach (coordinated from Bamako, Mali), with as a first starting point the placement of liaisons in the capitals of the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauretania and Niger, see below).¹⁴

EUCAP Sahel Niger has a difficult task ahead. Top-level Nigerien government officials have been involved in the trafficking business, the commitment of local political actors is limited, and countering irregular migration is not popular among the Agadez population due to the economic importance of migration. Moreover, many security actors are corrupt and often depend on bribes. Consequently, rather than reducing the numbers of migrants, the increased Nigerien attention on irregular migration (e.g. the closing of guest houses, arresting smugglers and increased control) has made it more expensive and has forced it underground, leading to more excesses. The mission also recognizes that if partnerships are not well chosen, there is a risk that by supporting

11 Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L187/48, 17 July 2012; and Council Decision 2014/482/CFSP of 22 July 2014 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L217/31, 23 July 2014.

12 Council of the EU, EUCAP Sahel Niger to help prevent irregular migration, Press release 268/15, 13 May 2016.

13 Council Decision 2016/1172/CFSP of 18 July 2016 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L193/106, 19 July 2016.

14 Council Decision 2016/1172/CFSP of 18 July 2016 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L193/106, 19 July 2016; DE/NL Food for Thought-Paper Tapping the full potential of CSDP in the field of migration, 13 November 2015; Personal interview EU official 1, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 2, 23 November 2016.

the government, one group of traffickers is replaced by another. Additionally, there are indications that the migration route may divert to Gao and northern Mali, and then into Algeria and Libya.¹⁵ Lastly, Nigerien security actors are critical for other reasons. They consider the mission to be unreceptive to local feedback and therefore a 'waste of money.'¹⁶

Despite the formidable challenges, EUCAP Sahel Niger is for the moment generally regarded as a relative success, particularly by most EU officials. The Nigerien government cooperates as the country is only a transit country and the size of its economy means that the EU has leverage over it. Currently, the mission contributes to increased access to data, and smugglers and traffickers are more frequently arrested by the local police. Moreover, its antenna in Agadez shows the EU's commitment to dealing with irregular migration.¹⁷ The main risks are that these results lead to an approach that is too Niger focused, or which is outside the Valletta process,¹⁸ which would be perceived by other African countries as breaking African solidarity. Furthermore, Niger is less appropriate as a model for other countries, as it is a transit country and is therefore less relevant to some of the countries of origin.¹⁹

EUCAP Sahel Mali

Like EUCAP Sahel Niger, the civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Mali has a non-executive mandate and was not established to manage irregular migration. Since January 2015, it has been mandated to support the Government of Mali with reforming its internal security forces (the police and gendarmerie). However, the mission seeks to expand its activities to strengthen border control, and deal with migration issues and associated criminality, while progressively operating outside Bamako. It has for example trained

15 Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 2, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 4, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 5, 22 November 2016.

16 Personal interview, expert 2, 28 October 2016.

17 Personal interview, EU member state diplomat 1, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, expert 1, 26 Oct 2016; Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 2, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 4, 23 November 2016.

18 In Valletta African and European heads of state agreed to strengthen cooperation and to address the current challenges and opportunities of migration by a) addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; b) enhancing cooperation on legal migration and mobility; c) reinforcing the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; d) preventing and fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and e) working more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration.

19 Personal interview, EU official 4, 23 November 2016.

security officers in border security.²⁰ The EU and the Malian government state that: ‘Border control, the fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants are considered priority areas of cooperation between the two sides.’ The Malian government particularly emphasizes the role of border management in the management of migration flows and the fight against terrorism.²¹ The mission is also planning to further regionalize by training personnel from other G5 Sahel countries and setting up liaisons in their capitals. Migration will not be the main issue in this cooperation, but it is the main motivation for the EU.²²

In spite of these developments, access to northern Mali, where the main Malian migration route is located, is limited for the moment. Considering the difficult peace process in Mali, although attention to migration is growing, security is still a priority for the government and most international actors. Specifically, there is not yet enough interest or ownership on behalf of the Malian government to develop EUCAP Sahel Mali further in the field of migration beyond border management capacity building, or expanding it to the north. There has been a proposal for a regional multi-purpose centre in Gao, comparable to the one in Agadez, but for the moment the idea does not seem to be catching on.²³ With its current mandate, limited capacity and the absence of any substantial presence in northern Mali, the mission is not likely to directly reduce irregular migration significantly, but indirectly its contribution to stability in Mali may eventually reduce the push factors.²⁴

20 Council Decision 2015/76/CFSP of 19 January 2015 launching the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L13/5, 20 January 2015; Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on a European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L113/21, 16 April 2014; EU, EEAS, EUCAP Sahel Mali reviews its first year of activity: Mali’s security forces well on the way to modernization, <http://eucap-sahel-mali.eu/en/eucap-sahel-mali-dresse-le-bilan-de-sa-premiere-annee-dactivite-les-forces-de-securite-maliennes-en-bonne-voie-de-modernisation/> (accessed 17 January 2017); and EU, EEAS, EUCAP Sahel Mali are heading to the region of Sikasso, Mobile Training Team and Advisors, <http://eucap-sahel-mali.eu/en/equipe-mobile-de-formation-et-conseil/> (accessed 17 January 2017).

21 EU, EEAS, Mali-EU Joint Communiqué on the High-Level Dialogue on Migration, as part of the follow-up to the Valletta Summit, Bamako, 15 April 2016.

22 Personal interview, EU member state diplomat 1, 23 November 2016.

23 Personal interview, expert 1, 26 Oct 2016; Personal interview, expert 2, 28 October 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016.

24 Personal interview, EU member state diplomat 1, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016.

EUTM Mali

EUTM Mali is mandated to provide military training and advice to the Malian armed forces in order to contribute to the restoration of their military capacity, with the aim of enabling the Malian government to exercise its sovereignty over its whole territory and to combat terrorism. As such it does not have an executive mandate. The most recent amendment of the mission's mandate moved its training activities further north, to include Gao and Timbuktu and added a focus on working with G5 Sahel partners, in order to reduce the threat posed by terrorist groups. Within this context, it has, amongst other things, recently supported training for military officers from G5 Sahel countries in Bamako.²⁵ As a purely military training mission the activities of EUTM Mali are, however, not directly related to irregular migration. Indirectly, its contribution to stability in Mali may eventually reduce push factors for irregular migration from the region.

EUBAM Libya

The EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) was established in May 2013 amongst other things to support the Libyan authorities in strengthening their border services through training and mentoring. However, following the deterioration of the Libyan security situation in July 2014, the mission suspended its activities and evacuated to Tunis, Tunisia. It was downsized but with its limited capacity it continued to support the Libyan Customs and Naval Coast Guard through workshops and seminars. The December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement provided opportunities for the mission to assist and plan a comprehensive civilian security sector reform process. Since its new mandate in February 2016, the mission has been transformed into a planning mission and as of August it is planning for a possible future EU mission providing advice and capacity-building regarding police and criminal justice, including counter-terrorism, and border management. Such a future civilian mission in Libya would therefore possibly work on the law enforcement and border management aspects

25 Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on a European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L113/21, 16 April 2014; Council Decision 2016/446/CFSP of 23 March 2016 amending and extending Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L78/74, 24 March 2016; and EU, EEAS, EUTM, L'EUTM Mali en appui au G5 Sahel, <http://www.eutmmali.eu/leutm-mali-en-appui-au-g5-sahel-2/> (accessed 17 January 2017).

of countering irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking, as part of broader security sector reform support.²⁶

In the absence of a unified Libyan government, cooperating with militia risks providing legitimacy and capacity to parties in a conflict.²⁷ However, once security and governance in Libya have stabilized, the outcome of the mission by EUBAM Libya and the possible future EU mission have great potential. Until their collapse, Libyan institutions were effective in reducing irregular migration to the EU, although at the cost of securitizing and consequently criminalizing it. Moreover, when it was stable Libya was a destination rather than a transit country. According to some EU representatives, the mission's potential support for a future unified Libyan government might therefore make the current mission a 'sleeping beauty'.²⁸ At the same time, even if the security situation allows it to become effectively operational on the ground again, EUBAM Libya will in any case have to manage expectations, because upon return migration is likely to be the least of its worries.²⁹

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia

By far the largest CSDP mission is EUNAVFOR MED which is mandated to disrupt the business model of smugglers and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean by identifying, capturing and disposing of 'vessels and assets used or suspected of being used by smugglers or traffickers.' Its first phase consists of detecting

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- 26 Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013 on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L138/15, 24 May 2013; EU, EEAS, Common Security and Defence Policy: EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), updated November 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eubam_libya_factsheet_en_nov2016_en.pdf; EU, EEAS, Common Security and Defence Policy: EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), updated January 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/pdf/factsheet_eubam_libya_en.pdf; Council of the EU, Council conclusions on Libya, 18 March 2016, Press Release 193/16, 18/04/2016; Council Decision 2016/207/CFSP of 15 February 2016 amending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L39/45, 16 February 2016; Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 3, 23 November 2016; and Written interview, Member state official 2, 13 January 2017.
- 27 Personal interview, EU official 6, 22 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 5, 22 November 2016.
- 28 EEAS, Planning for a possible non-executive Civilian CSDP mission in Libya, Working document of the European External Action Service, EEAS(2016) 436, 1 April 2016; Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 3, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 6, 22 November 2016.
- 29 Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016.

and monitoring migration networks through information gathering and patrolling on the high seas. Its second phase of conducting boarding, searches, seizure and the diversion of vessels suspected of human trafficking or smuggling is comprised of two parts: a) on the high seas in accordance with international law; b) with a UN resolution or the consent of the government also in Libyan territorial waters. Phase three envisions the mission using force and disposing of or rendering vessels and other assets inoperable. Again, for this third phase a UN resolution or host nation consent is required.³⁰

The mission was not able to implement its mandate beyond phase 2a, as it did not gain the support of the internationally recognized Libyan government, nor China and Russia in the Security Council, to capture and dispose of smuggling and trafficking vessels and assets in Libyan territorial waters.³¹ Although, consequently, the mission has not been able to disrupt smuggling and human trafficking networks, by mid-December 2016 it had ensured that 101 suspected smugglers and traffickers were being prosecuted by the Italian authorities and 366 boats were captured on the high seas. Nevertheless, as smugglers' strategies have evolved—they now no longer operate on the high seas, they use rubber dinghies and compel migrants to pilot them—the mission has predominantly engaged in search and rescue activities and has rescued over 30 000 lives at sea.³² Moreover, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia is evolving further, as in June 2016 the Council of the EU mandated it to implement the UN weapons embargo and to train the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and as such to strengthen the capacity of the Libyan authorities to manage their territorial waters more effectively. By the end of October following strict vetting procedures 78 trainees from the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, both from the East and West of Libya, had been trained in basic seamanship, search and rescue, and international law and human rights. At the end of January 2017 a

30 Council Decision 2015/778/CFSP of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L122/31, 19 May 2015.

31 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2240, 9 October 2015; What's in blue: insights on the work of the UN Security Council, 'Vote on resolution on human trafficking and migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean', 8 Oct 2015, <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2015/10/vote-on-a-resolution-on-human-trafficking-and-migrant-smuggling-in-the-mediterranean.php>; What's in blue: insights on the work of the UN Security Council, 'Vote on renewing the provisions of resolution 2240 on human trafficking and migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean', 5 October 2016, <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/10/vote-on-renewing-the-provisions-of-resolution-2240-on-human-trafficking-and-migrant-smuggling-in-the.php#>; and Estrada-Cañamares, M., 'Operation Sophia before and after UN Security Council resolution No 2240 (2015)', *European Papers*, 1(1), 185-191.

32 EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA, The Belgium ship Louise Marie leaves the European Task Force, 19 December 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med/17512/belgium-ship-louise-marie-leaves-european-task-force_en (accessed 17 January 2017); Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 3, 23 November 2016.

second training programme is planned to start with the aim of training up to another 400 trainees.³³

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia has faced criticism. Its search and rescue activities would, amongst other things according to the Libyan Coast Guard and the UK House of Commons, also serve as a magnet for migrants and make the activities of smugglers easier. However, EU officials use two main counter-arguments. Firstly, NGOs operate closer to the Libyan coast and have rescued many more migrants and therefore, if at all, would have been a much larger pull factor. Secondly, any potential pull from search and rescue in the Mediterranean would be irrelevant compared to the push from the countries of origin.³⁴ Another criticism is that the cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy might tolerate human rights violations by these organizations, contribute to the recycling of migrants as both organizations have been reported to hand migrants back to smugglers and traffickers in exchange for bribes, as well as turn a blind eye to the dramatic circumstances in Libyan detention centres.³⁵ A third point of criticism is that the mission's cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy is not conflict-sensitive and might actually contribute to the conflict. However, EU officials point to the strong vetting process and that both institutions are perhaps the most unified of all in Libya.³⁶ Aware of the above challenges, more than aiming to reduce irregular migration in the short term, the main aim of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia is to show the EU's commitment to dealing with irregular migration and to engage with

33 Council Decision 2016/993/CFSP of 20 June 2016 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L162/18, 21 June 2016; United Nations Security Council resolution 2292, 14 June 2016; Personal interview EU official 1, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 3, 23 November 2016; Council of the European Union, EUNAVFOR MED Op SOPHIA - Six Monthly Report 1 January - 31 October 2016, 14978/16, Brussels, 30 November 2016; and Written interview, Member state official 2, 13 January 2017.

34 EUObserver, 'EU boosts migrant smuggling, says Libyan coastguard', 16 June 2016, <https://euobserver.com/tickers/133849>; European Union Committee, Operation Sophia, the EU's naval mission in the Mediterranean: an impossible challenge, 14th report of session 2015-16, HL Paper 144, 13 May 2016; Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 3, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 6, 22 November 2016.

35 Amnesty International, EU risks fuelling horrific abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya, 14 June 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/eu-risks-fuelling-horrific-abuse-of-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya/>; Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 3, 23 November 2016.

36 Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 3, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 6, 22 November 2016.

the Libyan government and guarantee that once the country has stabilized, the EU has a point of entry and can build upon the mission with an incremental approach.³⁷

MINUSMA

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in 2013 and is one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations. It is currently mandated, amongst other things, to: (a) support, monitor and supervise the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements; (b) support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali; (c) protect civilians and, in support of the Malian authorities, stabilize the key population centres and other areas where civilians are at risk; and (d) promote and protect human rights.³⁸ Although trafficking and smuggling are regarded by MINUSMA as a threat to the stability of northern Mali, which is negatively affecting the human rights situation, this involves primarily drugs and arms smuggling and only to a lesser extent human trafficking. In Bamako security and stability are of primary concern to national or international actors.³⁹ Although in 2015 a number of Security Council members tried to include a reference on the link between the stabilization of Mali and the reduction of human trafficking in MINUSMA's mandate renewal, this was deemed to be too controversial by other Council members.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, within the context of its broader security sector reform, MINUSMA has been involved in border security and to a limited extent border management issues. For example, it assists the Malian government with updating and developing its national border policy and, together with the EU, it also aims to strengthen the Malian surveillance of its border between the established border posts. Moreover, MINUSMA's contribution to regional stability might also reduce some of the push factors for irregular migration.⁴¹ However, MINUSMA in general receives mixed evaluations as to how successful its stabilization has been so far.⁴²

37 Personal interview, EU member state diplomat 1, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 6, 22 November 2016.

38 United Nations Security Council resolution 2100, 25 April 2013; and United Nations Security Council resolution 2227, 29 June 2015.

39 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, S/2014/403, 9 June 2014; United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, S/2015/219, 27 March 2015; Personal interview, expert 1, 26 Oct 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016.

40 What's in blue: insights on the work of the UN Security Council, 'Renewal of UN mission in Mali's mandate', 28 June 2015, <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2015/06/renewal-of-un-mission-in-malis-mandate.php#>.

41 IOM, Immigration and Border Management in Mali: IOM Assistance for Security and Sustainable Development, Information sheet, October 2016; and Written interview, MINUSMA official 1, 28 October 2016.

42 Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016.

UNSMIL

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is a special political mission established in 2011 with the intention of supporting the Libyan transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. Its original mandate included tasks such as restoring public security and order, and extending state authority. In its 2012 mandate renewal monitoring and protecting human rights of migrants and detainees, as well as strengthening border security and management, were specifically mentioned. Within this context, amongst other things, training efforts were undertaken. However, due to the deteriorating security situation UNSMIL had to relocate temporarily from Libya. The mission is currently mandated to mediate and provide good offices; to monitor and report on human rights; to support key Libyan institutions in the provision of essential services and humanitarian assistance, and the securing of uncontrolled arms; as well as to co-ordinate international assistance. It is expected to re-establish its presence in Libya once security conditions allow for this. Its mandate is then likely to include some of its earlier migration-related tasks, as it is already involved in, amongst other things, the vetting process for EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia.⁴³

43 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2009, 16 September 2011; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2040, 12 March 2012; United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, S/2014/653, 5 September 2014; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2323, 13 December 2016; and Council of the European Union, EUNAVFOR MED Op SOPHIA - Six Monthly Report 1 January - 31 October 2016, 14978/16, Brussels, 30 November 2016.

3 Other international and regional actors and activities

EU Trust Fund

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration in Africa (EUTF) was set up at the Valletta Summit of November 2015 and is made up of EUR 1.8 billion. In addition to its main stated aim, it also serves as a currency for the African commitment to the prevention of and fight against irregular migration, and particularly migrant return, readmission and reintegration. The EUTF is meant to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement by boosting socio-economic development, addressing instability and crises, supporting state building and reinforcing state capacity. It builds on the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, the Rabat process focusing on West Africa since 2006 and the Khartoum process focusing on the Horn of Africa since 2014. In the Partnership Framework the Valletta principles have been further detailed. Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal are four of the five initial countries for which such a migration compact has been set up aiming to better tie all EU instruments together.⁴⁴

Particularly the first batch of EUTF projects included regular development projects that were not directly linked to migration (see also annex 1). These first contracts were also signed after only a rapid process of a few months, thereby limiting ownership in Africa. Partly due to pressure from EU member states, later batches of projects focus less on 'root causes' and much more on, among other things, security and border management aiming to increase territorial control and to tackle illicit flows and trafficking more effectively. Consequently, projects have moved from classic development assistance towards foreign policy. This forces the EEAS and the EU Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) to cooperate more effectively. Moreover, ownership has improved as later projects were often adopted at

44 Valletta Summit, 11-12 November 2015, Political Declaration and Action Plan; European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Investment Bank on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, Strasbourg, 7 June 2016, COM(2016) 385 final; and European Commission, Migration partnership framework: A new approach to better manage migration, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf.

the request of African partners. It is, however, too early to tell whether EUTF funds are really additional funds, or simply relabelled funds, and whether they will be able to have an impact.⁴⁵

The EUTF projects face five main dilemmas, of which some have a broader relevance. (1) Some argue that EUTF projects reinforcing law enforcement should be complemented with projects providing alternative livelihoods, as is the case currently in Agadez.⁴⁶ Others claim that based on experiences from opium and cocaine production, alternative livelihood projects are unlikely to be successful as they can never compete with incomes generated by trafficking.⁴⁷ (2) The EUTF currently focuses predominantly on the transit countries and not on the main regions of origin, which are often relatively peaceful and rich regions in coastal countries. Including these might, however, water down the effect of the EUTF.⁴⁸ (3) Dealing with the root causes of irregular migration is important, but is unlikely to remove the push factors for migration and may even have reverse effects by creating more inequality, as regions of origin and migrants are generally relatively rich and well educated.⁴⁹ (4) There is a discussion over the extent to which the EUTF should be politicized. Denmark and Hungary are, for example, more pro-conditionality, while Sweden is more in favour of unconditional development assistance. A similar dividing line can be observed between respectively the EEAS and DG DEVCO.⁵⁰ (5) The projects in the EUTF are not likely to halt the irregular migration flows into Europe. The volume of assistance is relatively small, compared to the size of the trafficking-related economy and remittances in several countries, as well as to the gigantic demographic challenges that lie ahead for the region. In order to yield results, much more funding, technical expertise and dialogue would be required within a truly comprehensive approach. At the same time, as the projects within the EUTF depend on local partners, and their absorption capacity is limited, more projects do not necessarily lead to better results.⁵¹

Indeed, biometric identity cards will not stop irregular migration, and military support against Boko Haram and projects in affected areas will not stop Nigerian migrants from coming as these originate elsewhere. The EUTF is a tool in the Valletta process. Its

45 Personal interview, expert 3, 1 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 4, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 8, 1 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016.

46 Personal interview, EU official 8, 1 November 2016.

47 Personal interview, EU official 4, 23 November 2016.

48 Personal interview, EU official 8, 1 November 2016.

49 Personal interview, EU official 5, 22 November 2016.

50 Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016.

51 Personal interview, EU official 8, 1 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 4, 23 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 5, 22 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016.

projects are also seen as bargaining chips in exchange for the return and readmission of migrants. However, EU officials often note that some countries, particularly Mali and Senegal, are not adhering to their side of the bargain. EU member states are increasingly divided on how to respond to this.⁵²

EU Special Representative for the Sahel

Since 2013 the EU has a Special Representative for the Sahel (EUSR), currently Mr Angel LOSADA. The EUSR leads the EU's efforts in the Sahel and coordinates its comprehensive approach towards the regional crisis on the basis of the 2011 EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. His role is political and diplomatic, and although migration is part of his area of responsibility, his role is more to keep the doors open than to negotiate standard operating procedures for the identification and return of persons without an authorization to stay.⁵³

International Organization for Migration

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is a UN agency which is active throughout the region. It aims to manage migration through amongst other things facilitating and regulating migration and promoting international migration law, policy debate and guidance, the protection of migrants' rights, migration health and the gender dimension of migration. Together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) it is also one of the agencies that monitors migrant flows.⁵⁴ For example, in 2014 it opened a transit centre in Agadez, where it provides awareness raising concerning safe migration, monitors flows, and offers vocational training to returning migrants and local communities.⁵⁵ In Libya, the IOM works on monitoring flows, supporting voluntary repatriation, improving conditions in the reception and detention centres and providing information to migrants.⁵⁶ In contrast to the relatively

52 Personal interview, EU official 5, 22 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 4, 23 November 2016.

53 Council Decision 2015/2274/CFSP of 7 December 2015 appointing the European Union Special Representative for the Sahel, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L322/44, 8 December 2015; EEAS, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, Council of the EU, Council conclusions on a European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 3076th Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 21 March 2011; and Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016.

54 IOM website, iom.int (accessed 30 December 2016).

55 IOM Niger website, <https://www.iom.int/countries/niger> (accessed 30 December 2016); and Personal interview, expert 1, 26 October 2016.

56 IOM Libya website, <https://www.iom.int/countries/libya> (accessed 30 December 2016).

securitized approach of the EU to stop migration to Europe, the IOM and the UNHCR recognize the benefits of migration and do not intend to stop it; they rather aim to manage it and make it safer.⁵⁷

The IOM has been criticized by some for not being effective, particularly in the field of awareness raising concerning the dangers of irregular migration. While others are much more supportive of its work. It appears that the IOM's success differs per country, partly depending on its team and the limited local absorption capacity.⁵⁸

UN Office on Drugs and Crime

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is a UN agency which has combating crime as its task and it therefore also has human trafficking on its agenda.⁵⁹ In the region UNODC works together with Interpol on the strengthening of intelligence-led border management, it supports national law enforcement agencies in countering human trafficking and supports national data collection on, amongst other things, financial flows in human trafficking with the aim of disrupting them.⁶⁰ UNODC and the EU have also launched a joint initiative, the Global Action to Prevent and Address Trafficking in Persons and the Smuggling of Migrants, which aims to assist countries in developing policy responses to human trafficking.⁶¹ In spite of its regional programme for West Africa, like the IOM, UNODC's focus on activities and its results is reported to differ per country.⁶²

Interpol

INTERPOL combats irregular migration by targeting the transnational organized crime groups involved in human trafficking and people smuggling through a variety of tools and services in order to reinforce regional border security procedures and to coordinate police actions. For example, it maintains a secure global police communications

57 Wolff, A., 2015, *Migration and Refugee Governance in the Mediterranean: Europe and International Organisations at a Crossroads*, Instituto Affari Internazionali.

58 Personal interview, EU official 1, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016.

59 Personal interview, expert 1, 26 October 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016.

60 UNODC, 2016, *Regional Programme for West Africa 2016-2020*, New York.

61 UNODC, *Global Action to Prevent and Address Trafficking in Persons and the Smuggling of Migrants (2015-2019)*, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/glo-act/index.html> (accessed 30 December 2016).

62 Personal interview, expert 1, 26 October 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016.

system, including a variety of databases. With the aim of breaking up the criminal networks behind trafficking and smuggling, the organization also supports combined tactical national police deployments in the field. Such police operations are preceded by training workshops for specialized tasks, including train-the-trainer sessions. The 2016 INTERPOL-led border security Operations Adwenpa I and II are recent examples. Adwenpa II involved more than 100 frontline officers using INTERPOL global policing capabilities to identify criminals, victims and illicit goods at 28 border control points across 14 West African countries resulting in the arrest of human traffickers, migrant smugglers and the seizure of drugs, stolen vehicles, cash and counterfeit goods. Interpol is also the implementing partner of the EUTF project Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region (WAPIS), which aims to provide law enforcement actors with appropriate tools to better manage police information (i.e. collect, centralize, manage and share police data) and consequently to increase their effectiveness.⁶³

Bilateral cooperation

There is a wide variety of migration-related bilateral activities by predominantly European countries in the region. Besides regular development assistance, often bilateral support involves support to local security forces, counter-terrorism and strengthening international cooperation in the field of border management. Particularly since the Valletta Summit the number of bilateral activities has increased. These have been mapped by DG DEVCO. Projects do not generally address migration directly due to the political sensitivity of the topic, but they aim to strengthen the capacity of the states in question in the hope that this will indirectly reduce migration eventually. Also, some projects are confidential due to political sensitivity, e.g. the deployment of police liaisons is generally not publically advertised.⁶⁴

63 INTERPOL website, trafficking in human beings, <https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/Trafficking-in-human-beings> (accessed 31 December 2016); and INTERPOL, INTERPOL border operation targets organized crime networks across West Africa, 7 December 2016, <https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2016/N2016-162> (accessed 17 January 2017); and European Commission, EU Emergency Trust Fund, Sahel region and Lake Chad area Window, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund/sahel-region-and-lake-chad-area_en (accessed 17 January 2017).

64 Personal interview, expert 2, 28 October 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 5, 22 November 2016.

Non-governmental organizations

Particularly since the migration crisis, NGOs have become involved in a wide variety of migration-related activities. These activities range from advocacy work on and human rights monitoring in detention centres in Libya, such as by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, thereby improving the conditions in these centres, as well as by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) involved in search and rescue off the Libyan coast,⁶⁵ to a wide variety of border management-related activities throughout the Sahel region often focusing on community involvement – International Alert and DRC.⁶⁶ The broad spectrum of these activities requires further mapping, particularly in the field of border management and although some projects have better results than others, projects would generally benefit from increased coordination.⁶⁷

G5 Sahel and ECOWAS

As discussed above, migration is a sensitive topic in the region, and therefore regional activities are limited and are often relevant in indirect ways. Organizations such as the African Union seem to have limited their proactive engagement in many debates and activities, consequently restricting their impact and influence thereon. The most relevant is the G5 Sahel, which was established in 2014 and aims to strengthen development and security, supported by democracy and good governance, in its five member states. In its Bamako Declaration its member states commit themselves to reinforcing decentralized local security structures at borders and to increasing assistance to border communities in the areas of development and conflict prevention. The EU has embraced it since its establishment. G5 Sahel member states are particularly interested in security

65 Particularly the search and rescue operations by NGOs are criticized for having a pull on migration, as these ships operate closer to the Libyan coast than EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and pick up the majority of migrants (see above).

66 Human Rights Watch website, <https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/libya> (accessed 30 December 2016); Amnesty International website, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/> (accessed 30 December 2016); International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Migration, website, <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/migration/> (accessed 30 December 2016); Danish Refugee Council, *The benefits of building trust: Lessons Learned from DRC's protection work in Libya, Evaluation/learning brief*, No. 9, DRC, Copenhagen: September 2015; Medecins sans frontieres, Mediterranean migration, <http://www.msf.org/en/topics/mediterranean-migration> (accessed 11 December 2016); International Alert, Tackling organised crime and conflict in Mali, <http://www.international-alert.org/what-we-do/where-we-work/africa/mali/projects/13552> (accessed 30 December 2016); and Danish Refugee Council website, <https://drc.dk/where-we-work/central-and-west-africa> (accessed 30 December 2016).

67 Personal interview, UNDP official 1, 4 November 2016.

cooperation, especially against terrorism, while the EU and its member states are, according to EU diplomats, eager to link this to migration. Therefore, a roadmap for the Strengthening of Dialogue and Cooperation between the G5 Sahel and the European Union includes cooperation on irregular migration issues. The EUTF supports the G5 Sahel and its member states' security and border management to the tune of some 140 million euros (see annex 1, including the PARSEC Mopti-Gao, PAGIF, AJUSEN and GAR-SI projects). These EUTF contributions intend to increase ownership and the capacity of the G5 Sahel countries for dealing with irregular migration issues.⁶⁸

Although, currently, the G5 Sahel receives a great deal of support and is the hope of many officials in the EU and its member states, the organization is military and counter-terrorism focused, still in its infancy, with limited capacity, and with a great deal of distrust between its members and between the G5 and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Therefore, it is not yet clear what the future will bring.⁶⁹ Moreover, the freedom of movement in the ECOWAS area means that also this organization cannot be ignored.

68 Déclaration de Bamako sur la gestion des frontières et des communautés frontalières dans l'espace G5 Sahel, Bamako, 11 March 2016; EU and G5 Sahel, Feuille de route pour le renforcement du dialogue et de la coopération entre le G5 Sahel et l'Union Européenne: Premier bilan semestriel et perspectives 2016/2017; Personal interview EU member state diplomat 1, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, EU official 4, 23 November 2016.

69 Personal interview, EU official 7, 22 November 2016; Personal interview, EU official 4, 23 November 2016; and Personal interview, expert 2, 28 October 2016.

4 Conclusions and policy implications

Faced by the migration crisis, within a short-term framework the international community has set up a wide range of ad hoc initiatives and adjusted existing instruments to deal with irregular migration including from the Sahel-Lake Chad-Libya region. Only EUNAVFOR MED Libya Operation Sophia's mandate has primarily focused on managing irregular migration from its beginning, while other crisis management and peace operations deal with the issue as an add-on to their existing mandate or indirectly due to political sensitivities in the region. These political sensitivities also mean that regional and other actors are predominantly addressing irregular migration in indirect ways, such as strengthening border management. Consequently, the international approach is not completely coherent, but given the complexity and scope of the challenge the achievements are not insignificant. It would be unrealistic to expect irregular migration to be managed within such a short time span, if ever at all. The above mapping of the crisis management and peace operations and most of the relevant international and regional actors that deal or may deal with irregular migration-related issues in the Sahel-Lake Chad-Libya region generates the following seven policy implications:

1. *Strengthening the strategy*: Irregular migration is a complex phenomenon. Securitizing it will not reduce the numbers of migrants and may even push smuggling and trafficking further underground. Developmentalizing it is not helpful either as migrants often originate from relatively wealthier areas. Expanding the required comprehensive approach needs to include more attention for legal migration, stability, and political and economic inclusion for youths to enable them to build a future in the region. The current approach has been built on ad hoc 'quick fixes' and now a comprehensive strategy is required. A conceptual framework and more cooperation, not only within the EU but also between the different international and local actors working on the topic, are key elements.
2. *Avoiding 'migrationalization'*: Irrespective of the importance of dealing with irregular migration, the main aims of development assistance, and defence and security policy are to deal with respectively development, and national and international security. Both sets of policy instruments should not be entirely 'migrationalized'.
3. *Improving coordination*: Since the migration crisis began, many projects have been set up, for example in the field of border management. Rather than adding new projects, the coordination of existing projects is important.
4. *Going to the source*: Currently much attention is focused on the transit countries (the G5 Sahel and Libya), while the countries of origin on the West African coast require more attention and better developed comprehensive approaches.

5. *Dealing with Libya*: Assistance for the stabilization of Libya needs to continue as it is a key factor in managing irregular migration. Unfortunately, the window of opportunity after the peace agreement is closing rapidly. Its neighbours should also support inclusivity and political solution.
6. *Recognizing the home front*: As migration and remittances also play a large role in developing and stabilizing the region, in order to solve the problems of irregular migration, amongst others legal avenues need to be opened further. This requires work on the debate in the EU, as currently the political climate is not receptive.
7. *Including Africa*: African and sub-regional actors are noticeably absent from the discussion and are rarely proactively taking the initiative to deal with irregular migration. They need to be further stimulated to do so, as only this guarantees their ownership and consequently sustainable solutions.

Annex 1 EU Emergency Trust Fund projects

Projects in Libya and the Sahel and Lake Chad region	Volume in euros	Date of decision
<i>ECOWAS and G5 countries</i>		
Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region (WAPIS)	5,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
<i>G5 Sahel and its member states</i>		
Support for regional cooperation in G5 countries and the Sahel Security College	7,000,000	6 Jun. 2016
<i>G5 Sahel and Senegal</i>		
Rapid Action Groups - Monitoring and Intervention in the Sahel (GAR-SI SAHEL)	41,600,000	13 Jun. 2016
<i>Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia</i>		
DEV-pillar of the Regional Development and Protection Programme in the North of Africa	10,000,000	16 Jun. 2016
<i>Burkina Faso</i>		
Socio-economic integration project for women in the Sahel	5,200,000	18 Apr. 2016
Resilience of the most vulnerable people in Northern Burkina Faso	25,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Support programme for integrated border management in Burkina Faso (PAGIF-BF)	25,000,000	13 Jun. 2016
Programme d'appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entrepreneuriat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso	10,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Burkina Faso	8,300,000	14 Dec. 2016
Programme d'Appui à l'Emploi dans les zones frontalières et périphériques	7,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
<i>Cameroon</i>		
Investment project in support of local economic development in the Far North Region, promoting the employment and integration of young people	10,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Programme to promote employment and strengthen resilience in Northern Cameroon	7,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Response programme to deal with the effects of internal and external population movements in the Far North Region	20,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Cameroun	3,300,000	14 Dec. 2016

Projects in Libya and the Sahel and Lake Chad region	Volume in euros	Date of decision
<i>Chad</i>		
Resilience in Lake Chad	27,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Programme to strengthen resilience and peaceful coexistence in Chad (PRCPT)	18,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Support for the social and occupational integration of young Chadians in vulnerable situations	10,300,000	13 Jun. 2016
Programme d'appui au déminage, à la protection sociale et au développement des personnes vulnérables	23,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
Programme d'appui à la formation et à la sécurité publique au Tchad	10,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
<i>Gambia</i>		
The Gambia youth empowerment scheme	11,000,000	13 Jun. 2016
Programme to strengthen the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in The Gambia	3,900,000	14 Dec. 2016
<i>Libya</i>		
Strengthening protection and resilience of displaced populations in Libya	6,000,000	16 Jun. 2016
<i>Mali</i>		
Support to the peace agreements through resilience and access to basic services in Northern Mali	20,000,000	14 Jan. 2016
Job creation by improving the cashew nut sector to alleviate the causes of emigration	13,576,233	14 Jan. 2016
Support peace agreements through economic regeneration and assistance for local authorities in northern Mali	10,000,000	14 Jan. 2016
Security and Development in northern Mali	13,000,000	18 Jan. 2016
Support the Malian diaspora's investments in regions of origin	6,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Programme of support for enhanced security in the Mopti and Gao regions and for the management of border areas (PARSEC Mopti-Gao)	29,000,000	13 Jun. 2016
Programme l'emploi des jeunes crée des opportunités au Mali	20,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali: appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé	25,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Mali	15,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
<i>Mauretania</i>		
Programme to integrate disadvantaged young people into the building sector (PECOBAT)	3,200,000	18 Apr. 2016
Programme to protect migrant children against exploitation and trafficking	3,000,000	18 Apr. 2016

Projects in Libya and the Sahel and Lake Chad region	Volume in euros	Date of decision
Contribuer au renforcement de la gouvernance et de la gestion des migrations et des frontières, et faciliter la protection, le retour et la réintégration durable de migrants en Mauritanie	8,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
Création d'emplois décents et consolidation de l'emploi existant pour les jeunes et potentiels migrants dans le secteur de la pêche artisanale	14,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
<i>Niger</i>		
Response mechanism and resources for migrants (MRRM)	7,000,000	14 Jan. 2016
Support local development and governance for better management of migratory flows	25,000,000	14 Jan. 2016
Creating jobs in the transit areas of Tahoua and Agadez in Niger	30,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Integrating young people into employment in the transit areas of Zinder and Agadez in Niger	6,900,000	18 Apr. 2016
Setting up a joint investigation team to combat irregular immigration, human trafficking and people smuggling	6,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Support for justice and security in Niger to fight organised crime, smuggling and human trafficking (AJUSEN)	30,000,000	13 Jun. 2016
Soutien à la résilience institutionnelle et communautaire dans la région de Diffa	12,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
Plan d'Actions à Impact Economique Rapide à Agadez (PAIERA)	8,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour durable au Niger (Sustainable Return from Niger – SURENI)	15,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
<i>Nigeria</i>		
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development and promoting the stability and safety of communities in displacement in North East Nigeria	11,600,000	18 Apr. 2016
Investing in the Safety and Integrity of Nigerian Girls (I-SING)	3,500,000	18 Apr. 2016
Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria	21,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Programme 'The Right to Write' in Nigeria	2,400,000	14 Dec. 2016
<i>Senegal</i>		
Resilience of people most vulnerable to food and nutrition crises in departure areas	8,000,000	14 Jan. 2016
Living standards normalization for populations directly affected by the Casamance conflict	4,500,000	14 Jan. 2016
Programme to enhance food and nutrition security in the Matam region, which is a migrant departure area	1,100,000	14 Jan. 2016
Developing employment in Senegal - strengthening businesses competitiveness and employability in departure areas	40,000,000	18 Apr. 2016

Projects in Libya and the Sahel and Lake Chad region	Volume in euros	Date of decision
Programme to support reducing migration through the creation of rural jobs in Senegal by setting up village and small family farms in regions with a high migration potential	20,000,000	18 Apr. 2016
Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal	14,300,000	14 Dec. 2016
Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Emigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués	18,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la création d'un fichier national d'identité biométrique	28,000,000	14 Dec. 2016
Programme de renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations, retour et réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise	27,900,000	14 Dec. 2016

Source: European Commission, EU Emergency Trust Fund, Sahel region and Lake Chad area Window, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund/sahel-region-and-lake-chad-area_en (accessed 28 December 2016); and European Commission, EU Emergency Trust Fund, North of Africa Window, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund/north-africa_en (accessed 28 December 2016).