On the Basis of Nationality
Access to Assistance for Iraqi and Other Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in Jordan

Mennonite Central Committee
2017 | Jordan
Cover photo by Lindsey Leger showing Sudanese beneficiaries of a Collateral Repair Project food voucher program. Name withheld for privacy.
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## Acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARDD</td>
<td>Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPRM</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Cash Assistance</td>
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<td>CCG</td>
<td>Child Cash Grant</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
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<td>IRD</td>
<td>International Relief and Development (Blumont)</td>
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<td>JD</td>
<td>Jordanian Dinar</td>
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<td>JHAS</td>
<td>Jordan Health Aid Society</td>
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<td>MOH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Person of Concern</td>
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<td>RAIS</td>
<td>Refugee Assistance Information System</td>
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<td>RSD</td>
<td>Refugee Status Determination</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>VAF</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment Framework</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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I. Executive Summary

Syrians constitute the largest and most visible population of persons of concern (POCs) registered with UNHCR in Jordan. However, there are also 65,120 Iraqi POCs in Jordan and 14,850 “Other” POCs, most of whom are from Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. Like Syrians, Iraqi and Other POCs came to Jordan seeking refuge from conflict, but compared to Syrians, these other, less visible POCs enjoy limited access to assistance. While the humanitarian community espouses the principle that assistance should be provided on the basis of need alone, in Jordan access to assistance is often conditioned on nationality.

The main findings of this report are summarized as follows:

- Iraqi and Other asylum-seekers (not refugees), who constitute almost half of all Iraqi and Other POCs, have only limited access to UNHCR assistance. Since Iraqis and Others have little access to assistance outside of UNHCR, Iraqi and Other asylum-seekers constitute a vulnerable community with almost no access to assistance.

- On average, Iraqi POCs are somewhat less vulnerable than Syrian POCs while Other POCs are similar in vulnerability to Syrians. However, Iraqi and Other POCs who experience high levels of vulnerability appear to be more vulnerable than Syrians who experience high levels of vulnerability.

- Unlike Syrians who are able to obtain work permits under the Jordan Compact, Iraqi and Other POCs have no opportunities for legal employment under the Jordan Compact.

1 “Other,” when capitalized, will be used to signify non-Syrian/non-Iraqi. For example, Other POCs will mean non-Syrian/non-Iraqi POCs.


3 Or, as is the case for Yemenis who were in Jordan before the beginning of the war in Yemen are unable to return home because of war.

• Iraqi and Other POCs have to pay the foreigners’ rate to access Ministry of Health (MOH) services, a rate so high that it is considered unaffordable. Syrians, by comparison, enjoy access to MOH services at highly subsidized rates.

Iraqi and Other POCs enjoy limited access to assistance compared to Syrian refugees at similar levels of vulnerability.

• The most vulnerable Iraqi and Other refugees, namely those that fall below the vulnerability threshold to receive UNHCR cash assistance, receive much less cash/voucher assistance from UN agencies than Syrians who fall below the same vulnerability threshold.5 This is because in addition to UNHCR cash assistance, Syrians also receive either a 10 or 20 JD voucher from WFP and many Syrians receive a 20 JD per child cash grant from UNICEF. Iraqis and Other POCs are excluded from these programs. UNHCR attempts to compensate for this by providing Iraqi and Other refugees a higher amount of cash assistance than Syrians but in most cases Iraqi and Other refugees still receive less total assistance.

• Iraqi and Other POCs that fall just above the UNHCR vulnerability threshold for monthly cash assistance receive significantly less assistance than Syrians that fall just above the same threshold. Syrians at this level of vulnerability would likely receive a 20 JD voucher from WFP (as opposed to the 10 JD voucher). So a Syrian household of five in this position would likely receive 100 JD in voucher assistance whereas an Iraqi or Other household in this position would receive no comparable assistance.

• UNHCR is the primary provider of assistance to Other POCs but its ability to fill gaps in assistance for Other POCs is severely constrained because most funders earmark contributions for the Syrian Situation Response to the exclusion of the Iraq Situation Response, which also includes Other POCs. Consequently, during the years 2015 and 2016, UNHCR reached more than 90 percent of its target beneficiary goal for Syrians for cash assistance but only 33 percent of its target beneficiary goal for non-Syrians.6

• NGOs have not filled the gap in assistance to Other POCs in significant ways. Many projects are restricted to Syrian (and Jordanian) beneficiaries, and even when projects are not restricted in this way, they tend to include only small numbers of Other POCs as beneficiaries.7 This might be explained by that fact that Other POCs are largely invisible within the humanitarian coordination structure, which focuses on Syrian refugees, and by the fact that there is little quantitative data on the needs of Other POCs. As a consequence, NGOs are largely unaware of the needs of Other POCs. Some NGOs are even unaware that Other POCs are included in the Refugee Assistance Information System (RAIS), and most NGOs are unaware that Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) scores for some Other POCs are available through RAIS.

5 A notable exception is Syrians who are on the waitlist for UNHCR cash assistance.
6 See Appendix D for sources and calculations. Also see the subsection on UNHCR funding under section five.
7 The notable exception is UNHCR partners like JHAS, ARDD, and IRD, who implement projects for UNHCR that target Other POCs.
• Additionally, racism and the perception that African POCs are not “real” refugees may bias the decisions of case workers who are responsible for screening potential beneficiaries.

These findings lead to the conclusion that Iraqi and Other POCs enjoy limited access to assistance compared to Syrian refugees at similar levels of vulnerability, a conclusion that suggests the humanitarian community in Jordan is not fulfilling its obligation to provide aid on the basis of need alone. The following recommendations for the Government of Jordan, UN agencies, donors, and NGOs envision concrete steps to decrease the adverse effect of nationality on access to assistance.

Recommendations:

• That the Government of Jordan provide access for Iraqis and Other POCs to MOH facilities at the uninsured Jordan rate.

• That UN agencies advocate against the earmarking of funds on the basis of nationality.

• That WFP open its food voucher program to Iraqi and Other POCs.

• That UNICEF open its Child Cash Grant program to Iraqi and Other POCs.

• That UNHCR share more information on Other POCs to facilitate the engagement of NGOs with Other POCs.

• That NGOs increase their engagement with Other POCs by working with donors to include targets for Other POCs within ongoing programs and to develop programs specifically targeting Other POCs and their unique needs.
II. Background

Methodology

This report explores the effect of nationality on Iraqi, Yemeni, Sudanese, and Somali refugees’ and asylum-seekers’ access to assistance in Jordan. The primary research method employed was a desk review of relevant sources. Sources reviewed included news articles, academic articles, research published by other NGOs, information published by the Government of Jordan, and information published by UN agencies particularly UNHCR. UNHCR sources reviewed included fact sheets, operational updates, cash assistance dashboards, data on POCs available through UNHCR’s population statistics portal, reporting on UNHCR’s comprehensive response plan for Jordan, and several UNHCR needs assessments that have included Iraqi and Other POCs.

This desk review was supplemented by key informant interviews conducted between February 2017 and May 2017 with 12 NGO staff, four UN staff, and one donor. MCC also hosted a roundtable in March 2017 that was attended by staff from eight NGOs that provide services to Other POCs. In addition, the authors benefited from email communication with other sources that were not interviewed in person.

Limitations

Quantitative data on Iraqi and Other refugees and asylum-seekers is limited. In some cases, available data was not up to date and, in some cases, when the precise data needed was not available, it was necessary to extrapolate. This is noted and explained in footnotes and appendices. These factors constrain the findings of this report and limit the applicability of these findings.

The effect of nationality on Iraqis’ access to assistance emerged during the course of this research but was not a topic in key informant interviews. So while Iraqis are included in this report, they are not included in the section on assistance provided by NGOs.

Unfortunately, the authors were unable to include Palestinian refugees within the scope of this research project despite the fact that nationality (or statelessness) affects Palestinian refugees’ access to assistance, especially Palestinian refugees from Syria. In this report, reference to Syrian refugees should be taken to include only Syrians registered with UNHCR.

Persons of Concern

POCs are primarily comprised by two groups, refugees and asylum seekers. Refugees are persons who are recognized as having a well-founded fear of persecution if they return to their home country. In most cases, they have been forced to flee from their home “country because of persecution, war, or violence,” but in some cases, they may have left their home country for some other reason but are now unable to return because of persecution, war, or violence. Asylum-

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8 UNHCR’s use of the term ‘persons of concern’ includes refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, returned refugees, returned internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and others of concern (special cases in which individuals are deemed eligible for UNHCR protection and/or assistance despite not falling under any of the above-mentioned categories). “Population Statistics.” UNHCR. Accessed August 23, 2017. http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview However, within the scope of this report, the vast majority of those referenced by the term ‘persons of concern’ will be either refugees or asylum-seekers.

seekers are persons who claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution if they return to their home country, but whose claim has not yet been adjudicated.

There are currently over 650,000 Syrian POCs registered with UNHCR in Jordan. Technically, the vast majority of Syrian POCs are asylum-seekers because Syrians are not actually considered *prima facie* refugees in Jordan. However, for purposes of assistance, UNHCR treats Syrian POCs as refugees. In official reporting, UNHCR includes Syrians in the category “Refugees (incl. refugee-like situations),” and, in other publications, UNHCR consistently refers to Syrian POCs as “refugees.” This report follows the convention of referring to all Syrian POCs as “refugees.”

At times, this report refers to all non-Syrian refugees and asylum-seekers in Jordan by the term “non-Syrian POCs” but more frequently this report refers to Iraqi refugees and asylum-seekers as “Iraqi POCs” and refers to all non-Syrian/ non-Iraqi refugees and asylum-seekers by the term “Other POCs.” This group of Other POCs is composed primarily by Yemeni, Sudanese, and Somali POCs in that order. Unless otherwise noted, the term Iraqis and Others is used as short-hand for Iraqi and Other POCs.

**Vulnerability**

This report frequently uses the term vulnerability, particularly when comparisons are made between Iraqi and Other POCs and Syrian refugees. Vulnerability can be measured in many different ways, and different ways of measuring vulnerability produce different results. This report indexes the term “vulnerability” against VAF. Designed by UNHCR and widely utilized by other UN agencies and NGOs in Jordan, VAF includes sector specific vulnerability scores as well as vulnerability scores for universal indicators, notably predicted welfare which is based on predicted expenditures. Vulnerability in VAF is scored as “low,” “moderate,” “high,” and “severe.”

Refugees have a well-founded fear of persecution if they return to their home country.

When this report discusses Iraqi and Other POCs who are “as vulnerable” as certain Syrian refugees but receive less assistance, this should be understood in reference to VAF vulnerability scores and, by extension, to eligibility for UNHCR monthly cash assistance. Eligibility for UNHCR monthly cash assistance, which is based on VAF, functions as a vulnerability threshold. Cases that are assessed as severely vulnerable are eligible for monthly cash assistance while cases that are assessed as highly vulnerable are reviewed by a committee that determines which of the highly vulnerable cases are most vulnerable and, consequently, eligible for cash assistance.

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Ibid.

Personal communication with UNHCR March 23, 2017.
III. Iraqi and Other POCs in Jordan

POCs in Jordan are essentially comprised by two groups: asylum-seekers and refugees. However, the distinction between these groups is often elided by referring to all POCs as “refugees.” In fact, even UNHCR reports sometimes refer to all POCs as refugees. However, for Iraqi and Other POCs, the distinction between asylum-seekers and refugees is crucially important.

For Iraqi and Other POCs, the distinction between asylum-seekers and refugees is crucially important.

While Syrian POCs are treated as refugees without completing a refugee status determination (RSD), and therefore have access to all forms of UNHCR assistance, Iraqi and Other POCs are not eligible for monthly cash assistance from UNHCR until they complete the RSD process and are recognized as refugees. While recognition rates are high (over 90 percent last year for Iraqis, Yemenis, Sudanese, and Somalis), UNHCR does not have adequate resources to process RSD decisions for all Iraqi and Other asylum-seekers in a timely manner. This means that there is a significant backlog. At one point in 2015, Sudanese and Somali asylum-seekers could wait up to nineteen months for an RSD interview. Subsequently, UNHCR processed a large number of Sudanese and Somali asylum-seekers. However, there is still a significant backlog of Iraqi and Yemeni asylum-seekers.

In response to the backlog, UNHCR initiated a new system in March 2015 for Iraqi asylum-seekers. Instead of attempting to conduct RSD for all Iraqi cases, UNHCR moved to conduct RSD only for cases designated as urgent or emergency, a designation which is made on the basis of vulnerability. As a consequence, the number of Iraqi asylum-seekers who completed RSD and were recognized as refugees fell from 4,629 in 2015 to only 697 in 2016.

It appears that UNHCR has adopted a similar system for conducting RSD for Yemeni cases. Only thirty-two Yemenis were recognized as refugees during 2015 while 3,183 cases were still pending at the end of the year. During 2016, 135 Yemenis received RSD, but 5,745 cases remained pending pending

15 See Appendix A for yearly RSD rates since 2012.
16 Personal communication with UNHCR May 4, 2017.
17 Ibid.
18 “Population Statistics: Asylum-Seekers (Refugee Status Determination).” UNHCR.
19 Ibid.
at year’s end.\(^{20}\) By the end of 2016, a total of only 180 Yemenis had refugee status in Jordan.\(^ {21}\)

This system of prioritizing some cases for RSD and not processing any other cases may be justified given UNHCR’s lack of resources, but it is not a perfect system. Inevitably, as UNHCR attempts to conduct RSD for the most vulnerable cases from the 35,615 asylum-seekers in Jordan, some of the most vulnerable cases will be overlooked.\(^ {22}\)

Additionally, even if a case is prioritized for RSD, in some instances it may take months (or even more than a year) for the case to be recognized or not. Even severely vulnerable individuals will not receive UNHCR monthly cash assistance until they are recognized as refugees. As explained below, Iraqis and Other POCs have very limited access to assistance outside of UNHCR. This means that Iraqi and Other asylum-seekers constitute a vulnerable group with very little access to assistance.

**Iraqis**

As a result of the ongoing conflict in Iraq, the number of Iraqi POCs has increased significantly since 2014. At that time, 45,325 Iraqis were registered with UNHCR in Jordan. By the end of 2015, there were 53,019 Iraqi POCs, and by the end of 2016, there were 60,904 registered Iraqis in Jordan.\(^ {23}\) This represents an increase of more than 30 percent in two years. However, as of 2016, 45 percent of Iraqis registered in Jordan (more than 27,000) were still asylum-seekers (see graph 1).\(^ {24}\)

By October 2017, the number of Iraqi POCs registered in Jordan had risen to 65,120.\(^ {25}\)

\(^{20}\) Ibid.


\(^{22}\) See table in Appendix B for source.

\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Graphs 1 through 4 show the numbers of Iraqis, Yemenis, Sudanese, and Somalis registered with UNHCR in Jordan as of December 2016. "Population Statistics: Persons of Concern." UNHCR. Although recent figures for the total number of POCs have been published, a recent breakdown of the refugees/asylum-seekers has not been published.

\(^{25}\) “External Statistical Report: Registered Iraqis in Jordan.” UNHCR.
Yemenis

Next to Syrians and Iraqis, Yemenis now constitute the third largest group of POCs in Jordan, numbering more than all remaining nationalities combined. Just over 8,500 Yemeni POCs were registered with UNHCR in Jordan according to the September 2017 Jordan Factsheet. This represents a massive increase in registrations since 2014 when only 308 Yemenis were registered with UNHCR.

Since the start of the Yemeni conflict in March 2015, over 60,000 Yemenis have sought refuge outside of Yemen, and some of these Yemenis have found their way to Jordan. However, the massive increase in registration is, at least in part, driven by Yemenis who were in Jordan before the beginning of the conflict. A new registration requirement implemented by the Jordanian government in late 2015 required Yemenis to obtain residency permits or risk deportation. Additionally, new arrivals from Yemen are now required to obtain visas to enter Jordan.

Sudanese

UNHCR reported in September that over 3,800 Sudanese were registered POCs in Jordan. In March 2017, nearly 70 percent of Sudanese POCs were male. Approximately two-thirds of Sudanese POCs are recognized as refugees. Most Sudanese POCs are from the Darfur region in Sudan where conflict has been ongoing between

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26 “Jordan Factsheet September 2017.” UNHCR. (p. 1)
government forces and other armed groups since 2003. However, significant numbers of Sudanese asylum-seekers did not arrive in Jordan until 2013 and 2014 when many Sudanese came to Jordan on medical visas. In December 2015, Jordan deported hundreds of Sudanese POCs back to Sudan. UN reporting puts the number of deportees from this one event somewhere between five and six hundred. Jordan also tightened restrictions for issuing medical visas, and the rate of Sudanese registrations with UNHCR slowed. However, new registrations have continued, and the total number of Sudanese POCs in Jordan has surpassed the pre-December 2015 high.

Somalis

At the end of 2016, there were 773 Somali POCs in Jordan, and 80 percent were recognized as refugees. Though some Somalis are reported to have left Yemen after the conflict began in 2015 and subsequently to have sought asylum in Jordan, the total number of Somali POCs in Jordan has been relatively stable since 2015. The largest single-year growth of registrations of Somalis was in 2013 when the total number of POCs grew from 462 at the end of 2012 to 726 at the end of 2013. This would indicate that many of the Somalis in Jordan are relatively recent arrivals since 40 percent have registered with UNHCR in the last five years.

34 “Population Statistics: Persons of Concern” UNHCR.
35 “Displaced Minorities: Part I: Migration and Displacement Trends of Somali, Sudanese and Yemeni Refugees and Other Migrants in Jordan.” Mixed Migration Platform. (p. 4)
IV. Vulnerability of Iraqi and Other POCs

Since 2011, a tremendous amount of information has been published on the needs of Syrian refugees. Far less information has been published on the needs of non-Syrian POCs, and most of that information is qualitative. This section analyzes available quantitative information on the comparative income of Syrian and non-Syrian POCs, the comparative vulnerability of Syrian and non-Syrian POCs as assessed by UNHCR for purposes of monthly cash assistance, and information from CARE’s most recent needs assessment of urban refugees in Jordan. The former two suggest that Other POCs are, as a group, more vulnerable than Iraqis and similar in vulnerability to Syrian refugees. The latter suggests that highly vulnerable Iraqis and Others are more vulnerable than highly vulnerable Syrians.

Comparative Vulnerability

Some evidence suggests that Iraqi POCs have significantly higher incomes than Other POCs who, in turn, have somewhat higher incomes than Syrian refugees. In 2016, UNHCR conducted a survey assessing access to health services through a randomized survey of 400 Syrian households, 300 Iraqi households, and 306 Other households, comprised primarily of Sudanese, Yemeni, and Somalia households.37 Iraqis reported an average household incomes of 367 JD per month, significantly higher than the 273 JD average for non-Syrian/non-Iraqi households and the 233 JD average for Syrian households.38 These averages surely obscure large variations in income, but if the averages are taken as proxy indicators of vulnerability, Iraqis, as a group, are least vulnerable, Others are more vulnerable, and Syrians are most vulnerable.

A second approximation of the comparative welfare of refugees can be made by reference to the proportion of refugees receiving UNHCR monthly cash assistance. UNHCR provides monthly cash assistance to refugees who, based

38 It’s worth noting that the average household size of those surveyed was different for Syrians (six members) than it was for Iraqis and Others (four members). Thus, the per-capita monthly household income for these three groups will be: Iraqis 92 JD, Others 68 JD, and Syrians 38 JD. This doesn’t change the comparative ranking of the income level for these groups, but it does increase the range of the difference. However, this effect is somewhat negated by the fact that the monthly survival minimum expenditure basket figure decreases by 11 JD per capita when household size increases from four to six. “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Syrians). UNHCR (pp. 7, 40); “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Iraqis). UNHCR (pp. 7, 38); “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Others). UNHCR (pp. 7, 38); “Monthly Survival MEB (In JOD) – Abject Poverty Line.” UNHCR. Accessed August 17, 2017. https://goo.gl/Db88ij
on UNHCR assessments, fall below a certain vulnerability threshold. UNHCR claims that these assessments are made without reference to nationality and that the same vulnerability standard is used for refugees of all nationalities.\(^\text{39}\) Therefore, in theory, the proportion of Iraqi refugees deemed eligible to receive monthly cash assistance from UNHCR can be compared to the proportion of other refugees deemed eligible to receive monthly cash assistance from UNHCR to determine the relative vulnerability of Iraqi refugees compared to Syrian refugees or Other refugees.

At the end of 2016, 34 percent of out of camp Syrian refugees were eligible for UNHCR cash assistance (that is, they were either receiving cash assistance or were on the waitlist to receive cash assistance).\(^\text{40}\) By comparison, 22 percent of Iraqi refugees were receiving monthly cash assistance.\(^\text{41}\)

However, it is important to note that Iraqi refugees are not a truly representative sample of all Iraqi POCs since refugee status determination is prioritized for the most vulnerable cases. This would suggest that Iraqi refugees are more vulnerable, on average, than the population of Iraqi POCs as a whole. Repeating the calculation for all Iraqi POCs, shows that 12 percent of Iraqi POCs were receiving monthly cash assistance from UNHCR at the end of 2016.

However, since asylum-seekers are not eligible for UNHCR cash assistance, and there are surely some asylum-seekers who would receive cash assistance if they were recognized as refugees, this percentage is skewed in a way that deflates the comparative vulnerability of Iraqis. So the actual measure of vulnerability, probably lies somewhere between 12 percent (the proportion of Iraqi POCs receiving cash assistance) and 22 percent (the proportion of Iraqi refugees receiving cash assistance).

By contrast, during the same time period, 46 percent of Other refugees were receiving UNHCR cash assistance and 24 percent of Other POCs (excluding Yemenis) were receiving cash assistance.\(^\text{42}\) Again, as in the case for Iraqis, the actual indicator of vulnerability probably lies somewhere between 24 percent and 46 percent.

**Iraqis and Others were significantly more likely to accept high-risk work to meet food needs.**

These results suggest that Iraqi POCs in Jordan, as a group, are less vulnerable than Syrian refugees since a higher percentage of Syrians fall below the UN cash assistance threshold. On the other hand, Other POCs are, as a group, either more vulnerable or similar in vulnerability to Syrians.

However, these numbers, like the average incomes from the UNHCR Health Access Surveys, cannot be extrapolated to any subgroup of Iraqi or Other POCs. In fact, because of their limited access to assistance compared to other POCs, the subgroup of Iraqi and Other POCs who meet or almost meet UNHCR’s vulnerability criteria for monthly cash assistance are likely more vulnerable (on average) than Syrians who meet or almost meet this same vulnerability criteria.

A recent CARE needs assessment of urban Syrian refugees, vulnerable Jordanians, and other

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\(^\text{39}\) Personal communication with UNHCR March 23, 2017.

\(^\text{40}\) See Appendix B for calculations. In-camp refugees are not eligible for monthly cash assistance.

\(^\text{41}\) There were no Iraqi refugees on the waitlist at the end of December 2016.

\(^\text{42}\) The calculated value of 24 percent for the proportion of Other POCs receiving UN cash assistance excludes Yemenis because so many Yemeni RSD applications are still pending and including them may deflate the resulting vulnerability indicator. See appendix B for calculations and a more detailed explanation.
refugees, supports this conclusion. Since the sample population, CARE beneficiaries, are screened for vulnerability, the results of this assessment are reflective of more vulnerable Syrian, Iraqi, and Other POCs. Additionally, of the Iraqis and Others in CARE’s survey, only half were Iraqis and a full quarter were Sudanese. This means that Sudanese constituted a disproportionately large part of the sample and Iraqis constituted a disproportionately small part of the sample compared to the proportion of Iraqi, Sudanese, and other POCs registered with UNHCR.

In the survey, urban Syrian refugee households reported slightly higher average monthly incomes, 176 JD per month, compared to Iraqi and Other POCs who reported average incomes of 169 JD per month per household. Syrians also reported higher expenditures, 222 JD during the previous month, compared to 204 JD for Iraqi and Other POCs.

Iraqis and Others reported average debts that were almost twice as high as Syrians – 1,329 JD compared to 694 JD – and Iraqis and Others reported using coping strategies more often than Syrians to meet food needs, with Iraqis and Others significantly more likely to accept high-risk work than Syrians and more than twice as likely to resort to begging to meet food needs.

So, while on the whole, Iraqi POCs may be less vulnerable than Syrians and Other POCs may be as vulnerable as Syrians, these results support the conclusion that the most vulnerable Iraqis and Other POCs are somewhat more vulnerable than the most vulnerable Syrians.

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44 Ibid. (p. 11)

45 Ibid. (pp. 44, 46)

46 The 1,329 JD and 694 JD debt levels of Syrians and Iraqis and Others, are average debt levels only for those people who actually have debt. It is worth noting that about 10 percent more Syrians have debt than do Iraqis and Others. Ibid. (pp. 46, 47)
V. Assistance Provided by the Government of Jordan

Although Iraqi and Other POCs demonstrate high levels of vulnerability, the Government of Jordan provides less support to Iraqi and Other POCs than to Syrians. First, Iraqi and Other POCs are not eligible for work permits under the Jordan Compact. Second, Iraqi and Other POC’s access to Ministry of Health services is restricted by high costs compared to the subsidized rate available to Syrian refugees.

Access to Work Permits

The Jordan Compact was an agreement reached at the February 2016 London donor conference in which Jordan agreed to loosen restrictions on the acquisition of work permits by Syrian refugees within certain sectors of Jordan’s job market. In exchange, Jordan was to receive financial assistance and more inclusive rules of origin regulations to open Jordan’s manufacturing industry’s access to European markets. Prior to the Jordan Compact, refugees were not technically barred from acquiring work permits, but quotas on foreign workers and prohibitive requirements such as high fees, which in practice were often paid by employees rather than by employers, limited the number of Syrians who actually received permits.47 In 2015, only slightly more than 5,000 Syrians had work permits. By contrast, in 2016, 33,800 work permits were granted to Syrians under the Jordan Compact.48

However, the Jordan Compact does not include Iraqi or Other POCs. So while Syrians have a viable path to legal employment, Iraqi and Other POCs are, for most practical purposes, barred from legal employment. Additionally, if Iraqis and Others are apprehended for working without a permit they are subject to greater penalties than Syrians who, if apprehended for working without permits, can avoid repercussions by (retroactively) applying for a permit.49

In 2015, only 883 Iraqis, 380 Sudanese, and 2,943 Yemenis were granted work permits.50 Many of these may not have been POCs.51 The numbers of

51 The 2015 Jordan population census reported over 10,000 Sudanese living in Jordan despite the fact that fewer than half this number were registered with UNHCR during that year. “General Results of Census: Characteristics of Non-Jordanians: Table 8.1: Distribution of Non-Jordanian Population Living in Jordan by Sex, Nationality, Urban/ Rural and Governorate.” The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics. 2015. Accessed June 7, 2017.
work permits granted per nationality represent slight declines from 2014 even though the number of Iraqi, Yemeni, and Sudanese POCs in Jordan has increased since 2014 (see graph 5).\textsuperscript{52}

### Access to Health Care

There are considerable unmet health needs among Iraqi and Other POCs in Jordan. The Iraqi population in Jordan is significantly older than the Syrian population, and Iraqis were accustomed to relatively high levels of care in their home country.\textsuperscript{53} Currently, 10.7 percent of Iraqi POCs\textsuperscript{54} have a serious medical condition compared to 6.9 percent of Syrians.\textsuperscript{55}

On the other hand, among those who suffer from some disability or impairment, the cause is far more likely to be violence or war (at 37 percent) among Other POCs than among either Syrians or Iraqis who attributed disabilities and impairments to violence/war at rates of 18 percent and 15 percent respectively.\textsuperscript{56} However, Iraqi and Other POCs have limited access to MOH facilities compared to Syrians.

From 2011 to 2014, Syrians refugees in Jordan (who had proper documentation) received free health care at MOH facilities “and were treated like insured Jordanians.”\textsuperscript{57} Then in November of 2014, the Government began to require Syrians to pay


\textsuperscript{56} “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Others) UNHCR. (p. 32); “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Syrians) UNHCR (p. 34); “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Iraqis) UNHCR. (p. 32)

the rate that uninsured Jordanians pay to access MOH facilities as the costs incurred by the Government became increasingly prohibitive. Although more expensive than the insured Jordanian rate, the uninsured Jordanian rate is still highly subsidized. The World Bank financially assists the Government of Jordan in providing Syrians with subsidized healthcare rates at MOH facilities.

Other POCs have always been required to pay the foreigners’ rate at MOH facilities, which is approximately five times what registered Syrians pay.

From 2007 until the middle of 2015, Iraqis were able to access MOH facilities at the uninsured Jordanian rate after which time the Government began requiring Iraqis to pay the foreigners’ rate to access MOH facilities. In 2017, the Government restored access to Iraqis with residency permits to primary care through MOH facilities at the uninsured Jordanian rate, but most Iraqi POCs do not have residency permits.

Other POCs have always been required to pay the foreigners’ rate at MOH facilities, which is approximately five times what registered Syrians pay. This rate is so high that MOH facilities are generally unaffordable for Iraqi and Other POCs, “render[ing] access to essential and life-saving healthcare services unaffordable without support.”

UNHCR currently provides primary and some secondary health services through JHAS to the most vulnerable Syrian refugees (those deemed to meet the vulnerability criteria for monthly cash assistance) and also to Syrians who lack valid UNHCR certificates and/or MOI cards, necessary for subsidized access to MOH facilities. Iraqi and Other POCs are able to access JHAS services regardless of vulnerability.

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http://projects.worldbank.org/P163387/?lang=en&tab=overview

http://reporting.unhcr.org/objectives-group/2984%2B2989

61 Personal communication with UNHCR April 12, 2017.

62 This figure is based on a recent World Bank project appraisal reporting that Syrians pay the uninsured Jordanian rate for health care (except for some free services) and that this rate is approximately 20 percent of the actual cost. This means that the actual cost (i.e. the foreigners’ rate) will be approximately five times as much. “International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Project Appraisal Document on Proposed Financing in the Amount of US$50 Million (Including an IBRD Loan and Support from the Concessional Financing Facility).” The World Bank. (pp. 9, 11)


64 Personal communication with UNHCR April 12, 2017.

https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=1&view=grid&Country%5B%5D=107&Search=%23servi ce+guide%23

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However, there is only one JHAS clinic in Amman and the hours for services are limited. With the introduction of health care fees for Syrians in 2014, more Syrians sought the services of JHAS.\textsuperscript{66} At the time, JHAS admitted that they often have “300 patients knocking on our door but we can only service 120 patients.”\textsuperscript{67} In 2016, JHAS services were restricted for several months because of budget constraints.\textsuperscript{68} Such budget constraints may affect Iraqi and Other POCs differently than Syrians since UNHCR has separate budgets for Syrian POCs and non-Syrian POCs. Perhaps this explains why, according to one NGO that works closely with Iraqi and Other POCs, JHAS is more likely to accept referrals of Syrian cases than Iraq and Other cases.\textsuperscript{69} In any case, whether related to scheduling constraints or budget constraints, difficulty in accessing JHAS services disproportionately affects Other POCs, because Other POCs depend upon and utilize JHAS services at a higher rate than Syrians, who enjoy subsidized access to MOH facilities, and at a higher rate than Iraqis, who are more likely to use a private hospital.\textsuperscript{70}

Two additional concerns should be noted. First, UNHCR is only able to provide support for high cost, tertiary care in a limited number of cases, and asylum-seekers are not eligible for tertiary care except in emergency cases.\textsuperscript{71} Cases costing in excess of 750 JD per year must be approved by the Exceptional Care Committee (ECC), or in emergency cases by the UNHCR health unit.\textsuperscript{72} In practice, the ECC approves only a small number of cases. In 2015, the ECC approved only 77 cases for Iraqi refugees and 36 cases for Other refugees. During the same time period, the UNHCR health unit approved tertiary care for 150 emergency cases for Iraqis and 73 cases for Others.\textsuperscript{73}

Second, Syrians have access to free emergency services in government hospitals, provided that they hold valid UNHCR certificates and MOI cards.\textsuperscript{74} Iraqis and Other POCs do not have access to free emergency services at government hospitals, though UNHCR will cover the cost of emergency care in government hospitals if certain conditions are met.\textsuperscript{75} According to some observers, Other POCs sometimes believe that a visit to a government hospital for what they consider an emergency will be covered by UNHCR, only to learn after the fact that they themselves will have to cover the cost of the service and that the service will be charged at the foreigners’ rate.

Taken together all of this adds up to a system in which Iraqis and Others experience limited access to health care. UNHCR attempts to fill this critical gap but is not able to do so completely. The limited number of tertiary care cases that UNHCR is able to support, the situation of asylum-seekers who are excluded from tertiary care except in emergency cases, and the situation of Iraqis and Others who visit government hospitals for emergencies are of particular concern.

\textsuperscript{66} “Living on the Margins: Syrian Refugees in Jordan Struggle to Access Health Care.” Amnesty International. (p. 6)
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} “Jordan Medical Referrals at a Glance: Year End Report: January – December 2016.” UNHCR, JHAS. (p. 4)
\textsuperscript{69} Personal communication with Jesuit Refugee Service 11 September 2017.
\textsuperscript{70} Based on a comparison of graphs illustrating the frequency of use of various categories of health care facilities for first and second facilities visited based on nationality. (Sources: “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Others) (pp. 36, 37); “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Syrians) (pp. 38, 39); “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Iraqis) UNHCR. (pp. 36, 37))
\textsuperscript{71} It should, however, be noted that UNHCR would attempt to prioritize for RSD a case with a significant health problem requiring tertiary care.
\textsuperscript{72} “Jordan Medical Referrals at a Glance: Year End Report: January – December, 2016.” UNHCR, JHAS. (p. 3)
\textsuperscript{74} “Service Guide for Refugees.” UNHCR. (p. 13)
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid. (p. 21)
VI. Assistance Provided by UN Agencies

This section examines disparities in assistance provided to Syrian refugees and Iraqi and Other POCs under the three largest cash and voucher assistance programs in Jordan, WFP vouchers, UNICEF Child Cash Grants, and UNHCR monthly cash assistance. After providing an overview of these three programs, this section compares the assistance received by Syrian refugees to the assistance received by comparable (meaning similar in vulnerability and case size) Iraqi or Other POCs under five possible scenarios. Finally, this section explores disparities in UNHCR funding in Jordan for the Syria Situation Response and the Iraq Situation Response.

WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR Cash and Voucher Assistance

WFP utilizes information from VAF as well as other sources to target Syrian refugees based on predicted monthly expenditures. All in-camp families, and out-of-camp families with predicted monthly expenditures of 30 JD per capita or less, termed “extremely vulnerable,” receive the highest level of assistance, a 20 JD voucher per person per month. Additional families that meet other criteria also receive a 20 JD voucher per person per month. Families with an estimated monthly expenditure of between 30 JD – 68 JD per capita, termed “vulnerable,” receive a voucher of 10 JD per person per month. WFP also provides 10 JD vouchers to families with estimated expenditures greater than 68 JD who meet other criteria. WFP provides vouchers to over 80 percent of Syrian refugees. In 2016, the value of the vouchers

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78 An appeal process for families receiving the 10 JD rather than the 20 JD voucher is described in the “World Food Programme Beneficiary Targeting for Syrian Refugees in the Community.” World Food Programme. (pp. 2, 3) In addition, many families have been moved from the 10 JD to the 20 JD voucher based on WFP food security monitoring. See “Food Assistance to Vulnerable Syrian Populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt Affected by Conflict in Syria Standard Project Report 2016.” World Food Programme. (p. 14) Accessed October 18, 2017. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/8e372b11831043c481f1446189ef33f3/download/?qa=2.2431856.1932450 69.1507900323-1446579550.1485424243

79 “World Food Programme Beneficiary Targeting for Syrian Refugees in the Community.” World Food Programme. (p. 1)

totaled over USD 100 million.\textsuperscript{81} Iraqi and Other POCs do not receive WFP vouchers.\textsuperscript{82}

UNICEF provides a Child Cash Grant (CCG) of 20 JD per child per case (capped at 75 JD per case per month) to approximately 15,000 cases of Syrian refugees. Cases are targeted that score as severely or highly vulnerable according to VAF. UNICEF also targets a small number of cases that include unaccompanied and separated children and cases that have special protection needs that are not severely or highly vulnerable per VAF.\textsuperscript{83} Iraqi and Other POCs do not receive UNICEF CCGs.\textsuperscript{84}

UNHCR provides monthly cash assistance to refugees regardless of nationality. As noted above, cases are targeted according to VAF scoring and are labeled as severely or highly vulnerable etc.\textsuperscript{85} Cases that are severely vulnerable are eligible and cases that are highly vulnerable are assessed by a committee. In general, all Syrian cases receive the same level of assistance per case size and all Iraqi and Other cases receive the same level of assistance per case size.\textsuperscript{86} UNHCR provides higher levels of cash assistance to Iraqi and Other refugees in an attempt to compensate for the fact that Iraqi and Other POCs do not receive WFP vouchers or UNICEF CCGs and have limited access to other forms of assistance.\textsuperscript{87} Asylum-seekers are not eligible to receive monthly UNHCR cash assistance.

UNHCR typically provides monthly cash assistance to 30,000 Syrian cases. Numbers reported for June 2017 show that monthly cash assistance was provided to 28,757 Syrian cases, 2,180 Iraqi cases, and 583 Other cases.\textsuperscript{88} At the same time, 11,113 Syrian cases were on the waiting list to receive monthly cash assistance while no Iraqi or Other cases were on the UN waiting list.\textsuperscript{89} In 2016, UNHCR distributed almost USD 100 million in cash assistance, though this total also included one-time cash assistance for winterization.\textsuperscript{90}

While 5,807 of the Syrian cases on the waiting list were referred to partner NGOs for assistance, this leaves 5,306 Syrian cases without comparable assistance.\textsuperscript{91} The conclusions below regarding assistance provided to Syrians versus assistance provided to Iraqis and Others do not apply to these cases. Syrian cases that are waitlisted for UNHCR monthly cash assistance and are not assisted by partner NGOs still receive WFP vouchers but, on the whole, receive substantially less assistance that Iraqi and Others who receive UNHCR cash assistance.

\textsuperscript{81} “Food Assistance to Vulnerable Syrian Populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt Affected by Conflict in Syria Standard Project Report 2016.” World Food Programme. 2016. (p. 10)

\textsuperscript{82} Personal communication with WFP April 27, 2017.


\textsuperscript{84} Personal communication with UNICEF May 7, 2017.


\textsuperscript{86} Personal communication with UNHCR May 4, 2017.


\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
Comparative Assistance

When WFP vouchers and UNICEF CCGs are taken into consideration, Syrian refugees that receive UNHCR monthly cash assistance receive significantly more assistance than Iraqi and Other refugees at similar levels of vulnerability. The disparity is even greater between Syrian refugees who fall just above the UNHCR vulnerability threshold and still receive WFP vouchers and Iraqi and Other POCs who receive no comparable assistance.

Scenario One: UNHCR Cash Assistance and 20 JD WFP Vouchers (Graph 6)

On average, Syrian cases that receive UNHCR monthly cash assistance and the 20 JD WFP voucher receive 15 percent more assistance than identical Iraqi or Other cases. However, the disparity in assistance varies by case size. For cases of six, Syrians only receive two percent more assistance than Iraqi or Other refugees, but for cases of two, Syrians receive 27 percent more assistance.

Scenario Two: UNHCR Cash Assistance, 20 JD WFP Vouchers, and UNICEF CCGs (Graph 7)

On average, Syrian cases who receive UNHCR monthly cash assistance, the 20 JD WFP voucher, and UNICEF CCGs receive 38 percent more assistance than identical Iraqi or Other cases. To put this in concrete terms, a Syrian case comprised by one adult and one child would receive 110 JD from UNHCR, a 40 JD voucher from WFP, and 20 JD from UNICEF for a total of 170 JD per month. This is roughly equal to the survival monthly minimum expenditure basket, which is set at 173

Graph 6

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92 Identical in terms of vulnerability, as defined by VAF, and case size. The average is obtained by first calculating the difference in cash assistance levels between non-Syrians receiving UN cash assistance and Syrians receiving UN cash assistance and WFP 20 JD vouchers. This difference is then calculated as a percentage of the non-Syrian cash assistance value. All ten of these numbers are then averaged.

93 Identical in terms of vulnerability, as defined by VAF, and case size. This average assumes that cases of two include one child, cases of three include two children, cases of four include two children, cases of five include three children, and cases of six and above include at least four children.
JD for a household of two. However, a Sudanese case also comprised by one adult and one child at an identical level of vulnerability would receive 110 JD from UNHCR cash assistance and no assistance from WFP.

A Syrian case of five comprised by two adults and three children could receive 290 JD worth of combined assistance from UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP. This exceeds the survival monthly expenditure basket of 256 JD for a household of five. An Iraqi case with the same composition (two adults and three children) and the same level of vulnerability would only receive 220 JD.

**Scenario Three: UNHCR Cash Assistance and 10 JD WFP Vouchers (Graph 8)**

If WFP and UNHCR successfully identify the most vulnerable Syrian refugees, then Syrian cases that receive monthly UNHCR cash assistance would also receive the 20 JD WFP voucher instead of the 10 JD WFP voucher. However, according to WFP, some recipients of UNHCR cash assistance only receive the 10 JD voucher from WFP. Unfortunately, WFP did not know how many Syrians fall into this category, but the number is likely small. On average, Syrian cases in this category that also do not receive UNICEF CCGs receive 13 percent less assistance than Iraqi or Other refugees. For case sizes of one and two, Syrians still receive more assistance, but for cases of three or more, Iraqi and Other refugees receive more assistance (see graph 8).

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94 “Monthly Survival MEB (In JOD) – Abject Poverty Line.” UNHCR.
95 60 JD (UNICEF: 20 JD x 3 children) + 50 JD or 100 JD (WFP: 10 JD x 5 people or 20 JD x 5 people) + 130 (UNHCR: cash assistance for a household of 5) = 240 JD (or 290 JD)
96 “Monthly Survival MEB (In JOD) – Abject Poverty Line.” UNHCR.
97 In June 2017, 131,791 Syrian refugees received monthly cash assistance from UNHCR. “UNHCR Jordan: Cash Assistance Dashboard June 2017.” On the other hand, WFP provides 20 JD vouchers to a much larger number of out-of-camp Syrian refugees, approximately 228,000 (Röth, Hanna, Zina Nimeh, and Jessica Hagen-Zanker. “A Mapping of Social Protection and Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Jordan: What Support are Refugees Eligible for?” Maastricht University: Overseas Development Institute. (p. 7)). If both UNHCR and WFP were correctly identifying the most vulnerable Syrians, then all those receiving UNHCR cash assistance should also receive the WFP vouchers. See also, “World Food Programme Beneficiary Targeting for Syrian Refugees in the Community.” World Food Programme.
98 Personal communication with World Food Programme May 17, 2017.
Scenario Four: UNHCR Cash Assistance and 10 JD WFP Vouchers – Syrian Refugees Compared to Iraqi and Other Asylum-Seekers (Graph 9)

The three scenarios above compare Syrian refugees to Iraqi and Other refugees who fall below the threshold to receive UNHCR monthly cash assistance. However, the greatest disparity is between Syrian refugees who fall below the vulnerability criteria to receive UNHCR cash assistance and Iraqi or Other asylum-seekers at similar levels of vulnerability. As Iraqis or Others, they are not eligible to receive WFP vouchers or UNICEF CCGs, and as asylum-seekers, they are not eligible to receive UNHCR monthly cash assistance. In exceptional cases, UNHCR may provide asylum-seekers with urgent cash assistance of either 100 JD, 150 JD, or 200 JD, but such assistance, intended as a form of one-time assistance, does not compare to the monthly assistance provided by UNHCR’s monthly cash assistance. "Basic Needs Working Group Amman, Jordan." (Meeting Minutes)
between assistance levels for Other asylum-seekers and Syrian refugees receiving UN cash assistance and 10 JD WFP vouchers.

Iraqi and Other asylum-seekers are not eligible to receive WFP vouchers or UNICEF CCGs, and as asylum-seekers, they are not eligible to receive UNHCR monthly cash assistance.

Almost half of Iraqi and Other POCs are asylum-seekers, but it is difficult to estimate how many of these asylum-seekers fall below the threshold to receive UNHCR cash assistance. UNHCR attempts to target RSD on the basis of vulnerability, but this is not a perfect system. The fact, for example, that almost all Yemenis are asylum-seekers suggests that UNHCR is not able to effectively target and conduct RSD for vulnerable Yemeni asylum-seekers.

Scenario Five: 20 JD WFP Vouchers – Syrian Refugees Compared to Iraqi and Other Asylum-Seekers (Graph 10)

The second greatest disparity is between Syrian refugees who fall just above the UNHCR monthly cash assistance vulnerability threshold (i.e. don’t receive UNHCR monthly cash assistance) and Iraqi or Other asylum-seekers at similar levels of vulnerability. Syrians in this position still receive significant assistance from WFP. Iraqi and Other POCs receive no comparable assistance.

A Syrian case of six that was ranked as highly vulnerable on VAF but was not selected for UNHCR cash assistance would likely receive a 20 JD WFP voucher (as opposed to a 10 JD voucher) per person per month. The total value of these vouchers, 120 JD, constitutes 43 percent of the monthly survival minimal expenditure basket. While this still leaves a substantial gap between monthly income and expenditures, Iraqi and Other POCs in a similar position, who would receive no WFP vouchers, would have to fill a gap almost twice as large.

Graph 10


100 120/281 = 0.427 (43%); “Monthly Survival MEB (In JOD) – Abject Poverty Line.” UNHCR.
In summary, with the exception of Syrian refugees on the waiting list, Syrians receive significantly more assistance than identical Iraqi and Other POCs from the three largest cash and voucher assistance programs. Under scenario one, Syrians average 11 percent more assistance than comparable Iraqi and Other refugees. Under scenario two, Syrians average 28 percent more assistance than comparable Iraqi and Other refugees. These two scenarios account for the majority of Syrian refugees who receive monthly UNHCR cash assistance. The small number of Syrian refugees who fall under scenario three and are comprised by cases larger than two are the only Syrians who receive less assistance than comparable Iraqis and Other refugees.

The disparity in assistance under scenario four and five is even greater than the disparity between the first three scenarios and can only be expressed in absolute terms as in these scenarios Syrians receive substantial assistance while Iraqi and Other asylum-seekers (scenario four) and Iraqi and Other POCs who are highly vulnerable but do not qualify for UNHCR cash assistance (scenario five) receive no comparable assistance.

**UNHCR Funding**

In addition to the cash assistance program, UNHCR provides many other forms of support to refugees. However, UNHCR’s assistance to non-Syrian populations is constrained by donor earmarking of funds. UNHCR’s Iraq Situation Response fund, which also includes Other POCs, is perennially underfunded. This has prevented UNHCR from more effectively filling gaps in assistance for Iraqi and Other POCs (see graph 11).  

In 2016, UNHCR Jordan received contributions of less than $1 million for the regular program for Jordan, less than $6 million for the Iraq Situation Response (which includes funding for Other

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Graph 11

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refugees), and over $180 million for the Syria Situation Response. This left the Iraq (and Other) Situation Response funded at only 14 percent while the Syria Situation Response was funded at 65 percent.\footnote{“Jordan: 2016 Funding Update as of 27 January 2017.” UNHCR. Accessed May 22, 2017. http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Jordan%20Funding%20Update%2027%20January%202017.pdf}

UNHCR also receives unrestricted and regional contributions but these contributions are insufficient to compensate for the fact that while non-Syrians constitute over ten percent of the POCs in Jordan, the vast majority of contributions to UNHCR Jordan are restricted to Syrian POCs. Thus, in 2014, “UNHCR acted to meet the needs of all persons of concern regardless of status, but limited funding constrained the level of assistance that could be provided to non-Syrians.”\footnote{“Jordan: 2014: Needs and Response: Unmet Needs.” UNHCR. 2014. Accessed May 22, 2017. http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2549?y=2014#year}


UNHCR explained that, “[w]hereas the Syrian programme received considerable funding in 2015, funding shortfalls continued to affect the non-Syrian refugee population in Jordan” and that these shortfalls “resulted in inevitable gaps in the level of assistance available for this caseload.”\footnote{“Operations: Middle East and North Africa: Middle East: Jordan: 2015: Year-End Report: Needs and Response: Unmet Needs.” UNHCR. n.d. Accessed October 19, 2017. http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2549?y=2015#year} In addition to unmet targets for cash assistance and winterization assistance, UNHCR reported that “the scope of other necessary interventions remained constricted simply due to funding

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\caption{Graph 12: Gap Between Actual and Targeted Cases to Receive Monthly CA}
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shortfall” pointing, in particular, to emergency cash assistance for non-Syrians with disabilities and non-Syrians with psychosocial needs.\textsuperscript{106}

In 2016, UNHCR increased its target in the comprehensive plan for cash assistance from 5,000 to 15,000 non-Syrian households but were only able to provide cash assistance to 2,800 households, less than twenty percent of the number of households targeted.

Unfortunately, this pattern of unmet targets is expected to continue. As UNHCR explains in the 2017 comprehensive plan,

As has been the trend in recent years, the amount of funds available for the non-Syrian caseload in 2017 will be less than what was available in 2016. While UNHCR will strive to meet the needs of its people of concern to the best of its ability, the continuous decrease in funds will inevitably impact the level of support UNHCR can provide. The Office will prioritize the same objectives in 2017 as 2016 but will not be able to have the same desired impact.\textsuperscript{107}

Shortfalls also constrict health services. According to the 2017 comprehensive plan, unmet health needs for Iraqi and Other POCs include high cost, tertiary treatment for thalassemia, haemophilia, multiple sclerosis, and hepatitis B and C. Under the comprehensive response, UNHCR would begin providing these treatments to Iraqi and Other refugees, but because of budget constraints, UNHCR does not expect to be able to implement the comprehensive response. Under the priority plan, treatment for these diseases will remain uncovered.\textsuperscript{108} The impact of UNHCR’s funding shortfalls for non-Syrians is exacerbated by the fact that UNHCR is the primary source of assistance for non-Syrians, particularly Yemeni, Sudanese, and Somali POCs.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
VII. Assistance Provided to Other POCs by NGOs

Although Other POCs receive less support from UN agencies than Syrian refugees at comparative levels of vulnerability, NGOs are not filling this gap in significant ways. Instead, much of the assistance provided by NGOs is restricted to Syrians (and vulnerable Jordanians). Some programs target Iraqis, but almost no programs target Yemenis, Sudanese, or Somalis.

In our attempt to map access to assistance for Other POCs, interviews were conducted with over ten NGOs that provide assistance to Other POCs. However, with the exception of programming implemented by UNHCR partners, no NGO had significant external funding for a program targeting Other POCs. According to the Ministry of Social Development, only one NGO (IRD) has had a project approved that targets Yemenis, Sudanese, and Somalis. This is a project that IRD implements for UNHCR.

Apart from this IRD project, only three NGOs included Other POCs in cash assistance programming, and the numbers assisted were low, around a hundred Other POC households. Some NGOs explained that their cash assistance programs were restricted to Syrian and Jordanian or Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian beneficiaries.

Collateral Repair Project provides food vouchers to around 40 Sudanese households. ARDD and INTERSOS had, in the past, collaborated to provide winterization NFIs to Sudanese and Somalis.

Most NGOs that were able to include Other POCs in programming were able to do so through psychosocial or social cohesion programming where donor mandated criteria for beneficiaries was most flexible.

However, while donor earmarking of funds helps explain the lack of NGO programming for Other POCs, earmarking does not fully explain the lack of programming. At least two major donors,

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109 IRD, ARDD, and JHAS also implement social support, legal assistance, and medical projects respectively for UNHCR that are open to all refugees, including non-Syrian/non-Iraqi refugees.
110 Personal communication with Ministry of Social Development August 23, 2017.
111 According to a 2016 mapping of mental health and psychosocial support, Sudanese, Somalis, Yemenis, and Palestinians, together, were the targets of 14 percent of these activities. The way in which Palestinians are included with Others makes it difficult to draw conclusions about Others’ access to these activities. “Who is Doing What, Where and When (4Ws) in Mental Health & Psychosocial Support: 2015/2016 Interventions Mapping Exercise.” Department for International Development, UK-AID. February 2016. (p. 19) Accessed August 23, 2017. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4ws_mapping_final_report_2015-2016_0.pdf
BPRM\textsuperscript{112} and ECHO\textsuperscript{113} are open to providing support to refugees without regard to nationality. In its most recent request for concepts, BPRM explained that "projects are strongly encouraged to allow for support of other local refugee populations, including Palestinian refugees and vulnerable host community members."\textsuperscript{114} BPRM allows for up to half of beneficiaries to be non-Syrian.\textsuperscript{115} While the Jordanian government typically requires that 30 percent of beneficiaries be Jordanian, that still leaves room for significant programming for Other POCs.

Humanitarian Coordination Structure

Four other factors might explain the lack of programming for Other POCs. First, Other POCs, and even Iraqis, are largely invisible within the humanitarian coordination structure which focuses almost exclusively on Syrian refugees. Iraqi and Other POCs are not included in the Jordan Response Plan, and while the Inter-Sector Working Group and the Protection Working Group explicitly mention Iraqis and Other POCs in their TORs, the TORs of most sectorial working groups only indirectly acknowledge the existence of Iraqi and Other POCs, or, in the case of the Livelihoods Working Group and the WASH Working Group, limit the focus of the working group to Syrian refugees.\textsuperscript{116} However, whether they are acknowledged in TORs or not, in practice, the needs of Iraqi and Other POCs are rarely discussed in working groups.

Similarly, the vast majority of needs assessments target Syrians and, to a lesser extent, Jordanians. While the UNHCR needs assessment registry lists 137 published needs assessments, only a handful of these assessments include Iraqi or Other POCs.\textsuperscript{117} In fact, the only quantitative assessments that target Other POCs are the UNHCR health access surveys and the recent CARE report.

Perhaps as a consequence of the above, many NGOs are not aware of the needs of Other POCs. Furthermore, many NGOs either did not know that

\textsuperscript{113} "Displaced Minorities: Part II Experiences and Needs of Somali, Sudanese and Yemeni Refugees and Other Migrants in Jordan." Mixed Migration Platform. (p. 6)
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.; Personal communication with Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration May 9, 2017.

The goal of the WASH working group is to “[b]ring together agencies that are active in the WASH sector i.e. are either working or have an interest to work for the Syrian Refugees as well as the Jordanian population both as part of humanitarian response and development activities.” “Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Jordan Working Group Terms of Reference.” n.d. (p. 2) Accessed October 23, 2017. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12340
RAIS includes Other POCs or incorrectly believed that RAIS does not include Other POCs. Most NGOs were unaware that VAF scores are available for some Other POCs; only one NGO used VAF scores to target Other POCs.\textsuperscript{118}

### Racial Discrimination

Beyond the way in which the humanitarian coordination structure focuses on Syrians, a second, more pernicious factor may help explain the lack of programming for Other POCs, particularly Sudanese and Somali POCs. In most cases, NGOs rely on Jordanian case workers or Syrian volunteers to identify and/or screen potential beneficiaries. The judgements of these caseworkers and volunteers may be influenced by negative perceptions of African refugees and by racism.

Sudanese and Somalis who enter Jordan typically do so with a valid visa. This can cause them to be looked at “as people who overstay their visas, rather than as refugees.”\textsuperscript{119} The fact that the conflicts in Darfur and Somalia receive much less media attention than the conflicts in Syria and Iraq may also contribute to the perception of Sudanese and Somalis as economic migrants.

In addition to being perceived as people who are cheating the system by overstaying visas, Sudanese and Somalis have to contend with significant levels of racism.\textsuperscript{120} In one forthcoming report, all Sudanese the authors spoke with “had encountered racism and harassment from neighbours, landlords, employers or aid workers...”\textsuperscript{121} According to UNHCR’s most recent consultation with refugees, “what set the Sudanese feedback apart were widespread reports of discrimination on the basis of their colour.”\textsuperscript{122} This is not surprising. According to data from the 2014 World Values Survey, 27 percent of Jordanians would not want to have neighbors of a different race.\textsuperscript{123} This is significantly higher than

\textsuperscript{118} Regarding VAF, it should be noted that the predicted welfare score uses proxy means testing that is modeled on the Syrian refugee population, so the predicted welfare score is not reliable for Iraqi and Other POCs. However, sector specific scores of vulnerability and other universal indicators of vulnerability are based on enumerator observations about the quality of housing, questions about expenditures, etc. and tools like Food Consumption Scores and the Livelihood Coping Strategies which are just as reliable for Iraqi and Other POCs as for Syrians. For information on sector scores and universal indicators see, “Vulnerability Assessment Framework Questionnaire Validation Workshop.” UNHCR. December 2016. (pp. 56-61) Accessed August 15, 2017. [https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53635](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53635)

\textsuperscript{119} Davis, Rochelle, Abbie Taylor, Will Todman, and Emma Murphy. “Sudanese and Somali Refugees in Jordan: Hierarchies of Aid in Protracted Displacement Crises.” Middle East Research and Information Project. 2016. (p. 2)

\textsuperscript{120} Racial discrimination against Africans is widespread in North Africa and the Middle East. For example, a recent IOM/UNICEF report on the experience of youth migrating to Europe through North Africa and the Middle East found that youth from sub-Saharan Africa were much more likely, in some cases over four times more likely, to have been exploited on their journey than youth from other regions. “Harrowing Journeys: Children and Youth on the Move Across the Mediterranean Sea, at Risk of Trafficking and Exploitation.” UNICEF and IOM. September 2017. (pp. 38, 39) Accessed October 22, 2017.

\textsuperscript{121} Baslan D, Kvittingen A, and Perlmann M. “Sheltering in Amman: Sudanese experiences and practice.” Mixed Migration Platform, Guest Author Series. 2017. (Forthcoming). (p. 3)


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the global average of 19 percent. At the same time, almost 76 percent of Jordanians believed that racist behavior was “not at all frequent” in their neighborhoods. These numbers suggest both that there are high levels of racism in Jordan and that Jordanians are largely oblivious to racism, a situation that can compound the impact of racism upon minorities.

While the impact of racism on Sudanese and Somali POC’s access to assistance has not been studied in Jordan, at least some evidence suggests that racism does affect access to assistance. According to results from UNHCR’s health access survey, Sudanese and Somalis are much more likely to encounter rude treatment from staff than Syrians or Iraqis. Other POCs, the majority of whom were Sudanese or Somali, were six times more likely than either Syrians or Iraqis to identify “rude staff” as the reason for their difficulty in accessing medicine for someone with a chronic health condition and nine times more likely to identify “rude staff” as the source of their difficulty in accessing medical services for someone with a chronic health condition. These results suggest that staff do not show Sudanese and Somalis the same level of respect as Syrians and Iraqis.

**Yemeni Asylum-Seekers**

Yemenis, who constitute the majority of Other POCs are a relatively recent group. While some may have been in Jordan before the beginning of the crisis, Yemenis only began to register with UNHCR in large numbers in late 2015. Consequently, the needs of Yemeni are even less understood than the needs of Sudanese and Somalis. Yemenis also seem to be quite mobile and to live outside of areas that include high concentrations of Syrians or Iraqis, which makes it more difficult to find and effectively target Yemenis.

**Language Barrier**

Finally, the language barrier for Somali POCs may also constitute a barrier to accessing assistance. Most Somali heads of households do not speak Arabic and female Somalis are even less likely to be able to communicate in Arabic than males. This means that Somalis are more isolated from the communities in which they live, may be unaware of available assistance, and may have difficulty communicating with case workers.

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http://www.ifn.se/vfiles/wp/wp918.pdf


125 “WV6_Results: Jordan 2014: Technical Record v.2016.01.01.” World Values Survey. (p. 90)

126 “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” ( Others) UNHCR. (p. 30); “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Syrians) UNHCR. (p. 32); “Health Access and Utilization Survey.” (Iraqis) UNHCR. (p. 30)

127 Some informants indicated that many Yemenis appear to be moving to the south of Jordan.


129 Personal communication with Center for Victims of Torture March 15, 2017.
VIII. Conclusion

This report documents significant inequalities in access to assistance for Iraqi and Other POCs compared to Syrian refugees. Iraqis and Others are required to pay approximately five times as much as Syrians to access Ministry of Health services, and, unlike Syrians, Iraqis, and Others don’t have access to legal employment under the Jordan Compact.¹³⁰ Iraqis and Others, in most cases, receive less assistance from UN direct assistance programs than Syrians at comparable levels of vulnerability, as much as 35 percent less assistance.¹³¹ Furthermore, UNHCR, which works to limit this gap in assistance and also provides other types of key assistance to Iraqis and Others, is constrained by insufficient funding. Finally, NGOs are not meeting the gap in government and UN assistance to Others. In part, this is because of donor earmarking of funds, but other possible explanations include the way in which Iraqis and Others are largely excluded from the humanitarian coordination structure, the lack of information on Yemenis, negative stereotypes of Africans and racism that could bias caseworkers, and language barriers that could affect Somalis who do not speak Arabic.

The above may explain why, according to the CARE report, Iraqi and Other refugees and asylum-seekers have lower incomes, lower expenditures, and higher debts than Syrian refugees. However, the more important point is that the current system, because of the way in which it conditions assistance on nationality, falls short of the principle of impartiality and, consequently, is unable to effectively target the most vulnerable, whoever they may be.¹³²

Impartiality, along with humanity, neutrality, and independence, is commonly understood as one of the four key humanitarian principles. As expressed in the International Red Cross Code of Conduct,¹³³ impartiality means that, “[a]id is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.”¹³⁴ In similar terms, this principle is enshrined in the Core Humanitarian Standard and the Sphere Project’s humanitarian charter.

In practice, the commitment to provide assistance on the basis of need alone means that humanitarian actors must attempt to target the most vulnerable even if they are among the least visible. In the context of the principle of impartiality, the Sphere Project warns that, “[h]umanitarian agencies should not focus uniquely on a particular group (e.g. displaced people in camps) if this focus is at the detriment

¹³⁰ See footnote 62 regarding the cost of accessing Ministry of Health services.
¹³¹ This scenario assumes a case size of two and is comparing Others receiving UN cash assistance (110 JD) with Syrians receiving UN CA, 20 JD WFP vouchers and the UNICEF CCG (total of 170 JD) (see case size of two (2) in the table in Appendix C for the source of these numbers). (170 JD-110 JD)/170 JD = 0.353 (35%)
¹³² Syrians who fall below the threshold to receive UNHCR cash assistance but are waitlisted constitute a particularly vulnerable group.
¹³³ Formally titled, “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.”
of another section of the affected population.\textsuperscript{135} This also applies to groups defined by nationality or ethnicity. In a recent example from Iraq, the Protection Cluster in Iraq argued in a guidance note that targeting the population (primarily Yazidis) on Sinjar Mountain for material assistance would violate the principle of impartiality because the population on Sinjar Mountain demonstrated less need for material assistance than other affected populations.\textsuperscript{136}

The current system is unable to effectively target the most vulnerable, whoever they may be.

When nationality is strongly correlated to vulnerability, it may be appropriate to take nationality into consideration when targeting beneficiaries for humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{137} However, in Jordan, there is no reason to believe that Syrians refugees constitute a uniquely vulnerable group compared to Iraqi and Other refugees and asylum seekers. Rather than excluding Iraqis and Others as a group on the basis of nationality, individual Iraqis and Others should be included in humanitarian assistance programming on the basis of need.

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations for the Government of Jordan, UN agencies, donors, and NGOs suggest concrete steps toward fulfilling the commitment to impartiality, and, in so doing to ensure that the most vulnerable are effectively targeted.

- The Government of Jordan should open opportunities for Iraqi and Other POCs to obtain work permits.

Most Iraqi and Other POCs will not be resettled.\textsuperscript{138} For many, legal employment in Jordan may be their best hope for a secure livelihood. Under the terms of the Jordan Compact, the Government of Jordan has determined to see the Syrian refugee crisis as an opportunity for economic development. Iraqi and Other POCs could also be seen as potential contributors to economic development. Many Iraqi and Other POCs are already working in the informal economy. Providing them a pathway to the formal economy,


\textsuperscript{137} Urban Syrian refugees in Jordan, for example, are more likely to require assistance than Jordanians. CARE’s vulnerability assessment of its program participants notes that the average Jordanian family’s monthly income was higher than the average urban Syrian family’s monthly income, by about 10 percent. “7 Years into Exile: How Urban Syrian Refugees, Vulnerable Jordanians and Other Refugees in Jordan are Being Impacted by the Syrian Crisis.” CARE (Prepared by Riyada Consulting and Training). June 2017. (p. 4) However, as acknowledged under the Jordan Response Plan, the war in Syria and the resulting influx of refugees from Syria has affected Jordanians and, per a requirement from the Government of Jordan, most humanitarian actors include Jordanians in their programming.

\textsuperscript{138} For detailed resettlement numbers, see “Resettlement Data Finder.” UNHCR. Accessed June 7, 2017. \url{http://rsq.unhcr.org/#UUr2}
which would involve them making payments into social security, etc. could benefit Jordan.

- The Government of Jordan should provide access for Iraqi and Other POCs to Ministry of Health facilities at the uninsured Jordanian rate. Iraqis enjoyed access to MOH facilities at the uninsured Jordanian rate for over eight years, and Syrians, who constitute almost 90 percent of the POCs in Jordan, continue to enjoy such access. While reinstating Iraqis’ access and offering access to Other POCs for the first time would be costly, it would only cost a fraction of what it already costs the MOH to provide such access to Syrians.

Not only would this remove a significant inequality between POCs of different nationality, but it would also end the inefficiency of a system in which there is one healthcare system for Syrians and a duplicate healthcare system for Iraqi and Other POCs.

- UN agencies should advocate with donors against the earmarking of funds on the basis of nationality. In Jordan, UNHCR has struggled to provide equitable assistance to Iraqis and Others because funding is disproportionately earmarked for the Syria response compared to the Iraq response. Similarly, WFP and UNICEF exclude Iraqis and Others from key assistance programs, presumably because of donor earmarks. Removing these earmarks would give UN agencies the autonomy they need to provide assistance on the basis of need alone.

- WFP should open its food voucher program to Iraqi and Other POCs. WFP is currently reviewing its targeting criteria. If WFP, in coordination with its donors, opens its food voucher program to Iraqi and Other POCs, this will significantly decrease inequality, especially between Syrians and Iraqis and Others who fall above the UNHCR threshold for monthly cash assistance.

- UNICEF should open its CCG program to Iraqi and Other POCs. Apart from the UNICEF CCGs, the difference in levels of assistance between Syrian refugees receiving WFP vouchers and UNHCR cash assistance on the one hand, and Iraqi and Other POCs receiving UNHCR cash assistance on the other hand, is not so large. If UNICEF opened its CCG program to Iraqi and Other POCs, this would significantly decrease the current inequalities that exist between refugees with children who meet the criteria for UNHCR cash assistance.

- UNHCR should share more information on Other POCs to facilitate the engagement of NGOs with Other POCs. UNHCR shares extensive information on Syrian and Iraqi POCs through regular statistical reports. These statistical reports include age/gender demographic breakdowns, region of origin, date of arrival, and information on medical and protection needs. UNHCR does not regularly publish similar information on Yemeni, Sudanese, or Somali POCs. While it may not be possible to produce monthly statistical reports on Yemenis, Sudanese, and Somalis, even occasional reports would help NGOs better understand and engage these populations.

Perhaps more importantly, UNHCR has conducted and published extensive data on the welfare of Syrian refugees, but has published very little data on the welfare of Iraqi or Other POCs.

Finally, although VAF was designed specifically for Syrians, it can still be useful for assessing Iraqis and Others. VAF’s broader applicability to Iraqis and Others is not widely understood and various actors would benefit from a more informed understanding of VAF’s usefulness.

- NGOs should increase their engagement with Other POCs by working with donors to include targets for Other POCs within ongoing programs and to develop programs
specifically targeting Other POCs and their unique needs.

As long as NGOs continue to design programs with 70 percent Syrian beneficiaries and 30 percent Jordanian beneficiaries, Other POCs will continue to be marginalized. Where appropriate, NGOs should work to include Other POCs within existing programs. This requires an awareness of the high levels of racism in Jordan and the way in which racism could prejudice NGO staff against Sudanese and Somali POCs.

In some cases, including targets for Other POCs in larger programs may not be feasible. The vast majority of Other POCs live in Amman, so programs that target geographic regions outside of Amman will not include significant numbers of Other POCs.

Since Other POCs are small populations who are likely to be overlooked in larger programs and whose needs are, in some ways, unique, NGOs should also develop programs to target the gaps in assistance available to these groups.

Developing such programs will require better data on the needs of these groups. As a first step, and as a means of raising awareness among the broader humanitarian community, NGOs should pursue opportunities to conduct needs assessments of Other POCs.
Appendices

Appendix A – Calculation of Recognition Rates of Refugee Status Determinations

1. Sudanese RSD

Calculation of the RSD recognition rate of Sudanese in Jordan between 2012 and 2016.\(^\text{139}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sudanese RSD Decisions(^\text{140})</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Recognized</th>
<th>Sudanese RSD Recognition Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>95.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>2,532</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the overall success rate of Sudanese RSD decisions made by UNHCR between 2012 and 2016 is:

\[
\frac{2,532}{(2,532 + 297)} = 89.5\%
\]


\(^{140}\) “Population Statistics: Asylum-Seekers (Refugee Status Determination).” UNHCR. Note that since 2014, UNHCR’s reported values for the number of cases of RSD decisions, applications, etc. has been broken down into three categories (first instance applications, repeat/reopened applications, and cases of administrative review). For the purposes of the tables in this appendix these three categories of applications were added together to yield a single value for each year (e.g. a total number of recognized Sudanese cases for each year, a total number of rejected Sudanese cases for each year etc.).
2. Somali RSD

Calculation of the RSD recognition rate of Somalis in Jordan between 2012 and 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Somali RSD Decisions 140</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Recognized</th>
<th>Somali RSD Recognition Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>96.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>88.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the overall success rate of Somali RSD decisions made by UNHCR between 2012 and 2016 is:

\[
\frac{600}{(600 + 64)} = 90.4\%
\]

[Graph 14] Decisions recognized by UNHCR as a percentage of decisions recognized plus decisions rejected (Somalis)
3. Yemeni RSD


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yemeni RSD Decisions</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Recognized</th>
<th>Yemeni RSD Recognition Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the overall success rate of Yemeni RSD decisions made by UNHCR between 2012 and 2016 is: \[
\frac{186}{186 + 145} = 56.2\%\
\]

This rate is very low. However, the more recent numbers show a higher rate, 100 percent since 2015.

![Graph 15](image-url)
4. Iraqi RSD

Calculation of the RSD recognition rate of Iraqis in Jordan between 2012 and 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iraqi RSD Decisions</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Recognized</th>
<th>Iraqi RSD Recognition Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7,479</td>
<td>99.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4,629</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>697*</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>15,602</td>
<td>95.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These values have been increased by two (2) each since the UNHCR Population Statistics showed that each had two (2) contributing entries marked with an asterisk indicating a small value (between one and four) redacted to protect anonymity. Thus, each of these entries should be increased by at least one (1) to make it more accurate.

Thus, the overall success rate of Iraqi RSD decisions made by UNHCR between 2012 and 2016 is

\[
\frac{15,602}{(15,602 + 765)} = 95.3\%
\]
Appendix B – Calculation of Rates of UNHCR Cash Assistance

Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Jordan: 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Asylum-seekers 2016</th>
<th>Refugees 2016</th>
<th>Total persons of concern</th>
<th>Households/individuals receiving cash assistance plus those on the waitlist (December 2016)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>648,836</td>
<td>648,836</td>
<td>39,923 Households/175,932 Individuals*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>27,786</td>
<td>33,118</td>
<td>60,904</td>
<td>2,292 Households/7,238 Individuals**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>509 Households/1,480 Individuals**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>2,222</td>
<td>3,260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>5,524</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>5,704</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>35,615</td>
<td>685,197</td>
<td>720,812</td>
<td>42,724 Households/184,650 Individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 175,932 = 136,240 + (4 x 9,923). 136,240 is the number of individuals receiving UN cash assistance in December 2016 and 9,923 is the number of cases of Syrians who were on the waitlist to receive UN cash assistance in December 2016. 175,932 is an estimate then of the total number of Syrians eligible to receive UN cash assistance assuming that ‘four’ is a good approximation of average case size.

** No non-Syrian individuals were on the waitlist to receive UN cash assistance in December 2016.

Using the numbers in this table, we can calculate the percentage of individuals receiving UN cash assistance.

**Syrians:**

\[
\frac{175,932 \text{ receiving UN CA}}{0.8 \times 648,836 \text{ refugees}} = 34\% 
\]

The vulnerability of out of camp Syrian refugees is such that 34 percent of them are assessed to be in need of UN cash assistance. Note that the factor of 0.8 in the denominator is to include only out-of-camp refugees since in-camp refugees are not eligible for UN CA. The UNHCR Factsheet for Jordan January 2017 reports that 80 percent of Syrians refugees live out of camp.

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https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwjP4tDkkIPUAhUCVxQKHaDzDMsQFggIMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdata.unhcr.org%2Fsyrainrefugees%2Fdownload.php%3Fid%3D13046&usg=AFQjCNFUBHIhXj5E_fCDNyUyvqMVC7wowA8sig2=X2Yiku6WYJzF-cqNRVJysq&cad=rja

Figures for the numbers of Iraqi and other households and individuals receiving UN cash assistance are from personal communication with UNHCR May 11, 2017.
Iraqis:

\[
\frac{7,238 \text{ receiving UN CA}}{33,118 \text{ refugees}} = 22\%
\]

The vulnerability of Iraqi refugees is such that 22 percent of them are assessed to be in need of UN cash assistance. We can repeat this calculation for all POCs (not just refugees).

\[
\frac{7,238 \text{ Receiving UN CA}}{60,904 \text{ POCs}} = 12\%
\]

Thus, the vulnerability of Iraqi POCs is such that 12 percent of cases are assessed to be in need of UN cash assistance.

Others:

\[
\frac{1,480 \text{ receiving UN CA}}{626 + 2,222 + 215 + 180 \text{ refugees}} = 46\%
\]

Thus, the vulnerability of Other refugees is such that 46 percent of them are assessed to be in need of UN cash assistance. We can repeat this calculation for all POCs (not just refugees). However, we will exclude Yemenis from the calculation since such a large proportion of them have yet to receive RSD decisions from UNHCR and there is significant backlog in processing applications. In 2016, only 135 Yemeni asylum-seekers received refugee status leaving (at the end of 2016) nearly 6,000 pending Yemeni applications. If many Yemeni asylum-seekers are sufficiently vulnerable as to be eligible for UN cash assistance, including them in the calculation would skew the results in a way that would suggest that Other POCs are less vulnerable than they actually are. To justify the validity of the resulting calculation we will also make the conservative estimate that all 180 Yemeni refugees are receiving UN cash assistance and so will subtract 180 from the 1,480 non-Syrian/non-Iraqi refugees receiving UN cash assistance. The result of this should be a conservative calculation of a proxy indicator of the vulnerability of non-Syrian/non-Iraqi/non-Yemeni POCs.

\[
\frac{1,480 - 180 \text{ receiving UN CA}}{773 + 3,260 + 1,335} = 24\%
\]

Thus, the vulnerability of Other POCs (not including Yemenis) is such that 24 percent of them are assessed to be in need of UN cash assistance.
Appendix C – Sources of Cash Assistance Available to Refugees by Nationality

UN, WFP, and UNICEF, Cash/Voucher Assistance Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Size</th>
<th>2016 Monthly UN Cash Assistance for Syrians (JD)</th>
<th>WFP Vouchers 10/20 (JD)</th>
<th>UNICEF CCG (JD)</th>
<th>UN Cash Assistance + WFP20 + UNICEF CCG (JD)</th>
<th>2017 Monthly UN Cash Assistance for Non-Syrians (JD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10/20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>20/40</td>
<td>20 (1 child)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>30/60</td>
<td>40 (2 children)</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>40/80</td>
<td>40 (2 children)</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>50/100</td>
<td>60 (3 children)</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>60/120</td>
<td>75 (4+ children)</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>70/140</td>
<td>75 (4+ children)</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>80/160</td>
<td>75 (4+ children)</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>90/180</td>
<td>75 (4+ children)</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>100/200</td>
<td>75 (4+ children)</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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143 “World Food Programme Jordan: Situation Report #17.” WFP. (p. 2)
144 This level of funding held at least between February and August 2015. “A Window of Hope: UNICEF Child Cash Grant Programme in Jordan.” UNICEF. (p. 2)
145 Personal communication with UNHCR July 26, 2017.

Mennonite Central Committee | On the Basis of Nationality
Appendix D – UNHCR Cash Assistance Target Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Households Receiving Cash Grants</th>
<th>Targeted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrians (2015)146</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Syrians (2015)147</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrians (2016)148</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Syrians (2016)149</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can calculate how many Syrian cases received funding during the years 2015 and 2016 as a percentage of the targeted values.

\[
\frac{30,000/30,000 + 30,000/35,000}{2} = 0.93
\]

This means that UNHCR’s monthly cash assistance efforts for Syrians during the years 2015 and 2016 were funded to an average level of 93 percent of targeted levels.

Similarly, we can calculate how many non-Syrian cases received funding during the years 2015 and 2016 as a percentage of the targeted values.

\[
\frac{2,400/5,000 + 2,800/15,000}{2} = 0.33
\]

Thus, UNHCR’s monthly cash assistance efforts for non-Syrians during the years 2015 and 2016 were funded to only 33 percent.

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147 “2015: Jordan: Refugees and Asylum-Seekers: Year-End Report: Key Performance Targets.” UNHCR.
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