Summary

- The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening and night hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people inside the latter two areas.
- The Mission spotted a recent trench extension near Starohnativka, Donetsk region.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at the entry-exit checkpoint and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a border crossing point outside government control near Dovzhanske, Luhansk region.*

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1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 9 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
Ceasefire violations\textsuperscript{2,3}

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. During the previous reporting period, it recorded one ceasefire violation.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. During the previous reporting period, it also recorded none. The Mission last recorded ceasefire violations in Luhansk region on 7 September 2020 (see SMM Daily Report 8 September 2020).

The Mission had previously recorded no ceasefire violations in both regions between the evenings of 18 and 19 August (see SMM Daily Report 22 August 2020).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,001 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 174 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 812 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

During the day on 9 September, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 8 September, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three people inside former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: one in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), about 1km east-south-east of the area’s north-western corner, one near the area’s northern edge, about 500m west-south-west of the its north-eastern corner, and another one near its north-eastern corner. The same UAV also spotted two people inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 9 September, inside the disengagement area, in the south-eastern part of Katerynivka, the Mission saw a stationary armoured personnel carrier (\textit{Kozak}) and two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Cooperation (JCCC) told the Mission that said personnel are members of the National Guard of Ukraine and were present to assist local police.

On the same day, outside the disengagement area, about 500m south of its southern edge, the Mission saw workers from non-government-controlled areas with heavy construction equipment drilling and graveling road T-1316 and the adjacent areas. The SMM also saw workers from non-government-controlled areas with two tractors clearing vegetation on both sides of a road about 400m east of the area’s south-eastern edge.

\textsuperscript{2} During the reporting period, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, therefore the report does not contain the chart presenting trends or the map of ceasefire violations.

\textsuperscript{3} During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.
Also on 9 September, the SMM saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, two of whom walked up to 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

On the night between 8 and 9 September, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted three people inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the area’s southern edge, about 540m east-north-east of its south-western corner. The same UAV also spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

During the day on 9 September, while positioned at three locations near the disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

**Withdrawal of weapons**

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

**Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles, including in a residential area, in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further details, see the table below).

On 7 September, about 2.3km east-north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted three pits dug between both lanes of road H-21, assessed as resembling previously observed vertical chambers located underneath road M-04 near Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), inside which the Mission had also seen an improvised demolition charge (see SMM Daily Report 29 August 2020).

On 8 September, in an uncultivated field about 2km north-north-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted a damaged tractor, assessed as caused by the blast from the detonation of unexploded ordnance (UXO) or an anti-tank mine. Nearby the tractor, the UAV spotted a fresh crater (about 2m in diameter) (not seen in imagery from 1 September 2020).

Additionally, on 9 September, about 7km north-east of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a 50m-long trench extension (running north to south) to an existing trench assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not seen in imagery from 16 August 2020).

**Presence of mines near Shchastia and Vesela Hora, Luhansk region**

On 7 September, about 2km east of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time of two mines, in addition to the previously reported 36 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62), laid in three rows across road H-

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4 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
21, about 150m south-east of the bridge in Shchastia, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report of 2 September 2020).

On the same day, the same SMM mini-UAV again spotted eight anti-tank mines laid in a single row across road H-21, about 1.8km north-east of Vesela Hora, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

**SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora, south of the bridge in Shchastia.

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway maintenance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), and the inspection of gas pipelines between government-controlled Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk) and Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable electricity service inspections in government-controlled Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk) and Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk); repairs to and the inspection and maintenance of power lines near non-government-controlled Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (60km west of Luhansk), Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk) and Polove (55km west of Luhansk); and demining activities near government-controlled Hirsko (63km west of Luhansk), Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk) and Myrina Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

**Border areas outside government control**

On 9 September, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (formerly Sverdlovsk, 60km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two covered cargo trucks entering Ukraine and no traffic in the opposite direction. After about ten minutes, two members of the armed formations told SMM to leave the area.*

While at the pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw that it appeared to be closed, with no personnel present.

**Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak**

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanitsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP on three separate occasions between 09:00 and 13:18, the Mission observed in total 270 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 120 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite
direction. The SMM also observed a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

**Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

**Denial:**

- At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (formerly Sverdlovsk, non-government-controlled, 60km south-east of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

**Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:**

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

**Delay:**

- At a checkpoint west of Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after 28 minutes of waiting.
- At a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after 54 minutes of waiting.

**Other impediments:**

- On the evening of 8 September, an SMM long-range UAV on one occasion experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, and on another experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk) and Dacha (53km north of Donetsk).  

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5 The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.
### Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Trench digger (PZM-2)</td>
<td>Near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/09/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)</td>
<td>Near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)</td>
<td>Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Trench extension (50m long) to an existing trench (not seen in imagery from 16 August 2020)</td>
<td>Near Starohnativka (51km north-east of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned. In the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)