Summary

- The SMM recorded 13 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and two in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and 63 in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, SMM unmanned aerial vehicles observed people inside the latter two disengagement areas.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at the entry-exit checkpoint and its corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at checkpoints of the armed formations near Shevchenko and Nova Marivka, both in Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of recorded ceasefire violations</th>
<th>Number of recorded explosions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Report 03.09.2020</td>
<td>previous 7 days average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 2 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
2 For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.
3 Including explosions.
4 Including from unidentified weapons.
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
2 September 2020

Map showing ceasefire violations in the Ukraine, with locations such as Luhansk, Donetsk, Mariupol, Sievierodonetsk, and Kramatorsk. The map illustrates the violated areas with different colors indicating the level of violation, from high to low.

Legend:
- High
- Medium
- Low

Sources:
- Administrative Boundaries - OCHA
- Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap
- Sea - VLIZ (2005)
- IHO Sea Areas
- Other - OSCE

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

© OSCE SMM 2019. Use, copy, reproduction, transmission, broadcasting, sale, license, or exploitation not permitted without OSCE prior written authorization.

Created: 03/09/2020
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 13 ceasefire violations: 12 shots of small-arms fire at south-easterly directions of non-government-controlled Donetsk city and an undetermined explosion in an area west-south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). During the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded two undetermined explosions in areas east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (see below). During the previous reporting period, it recorded 63 ceasefire violations in the same areas.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 908 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 152 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 741 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

During the day on 2 September, inside the disengagement area near Stanitsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the new span of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 1 September, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three people near former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – two in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), about 1km east-south-east of the area’s north-western corner, as well as one near the area’s north-eastern corner. Also inside the area, the same UAV spotted a person near former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of the area’s south-eastern corner.

During the same evening, the Mission recorded two undetermined explosions in areas 3-5km east of Popasna, assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

On 2 September, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw seven members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom walked inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned, accompanied by four people wearing protective garments.

On the same day, also outside the disengagement area, about 200m and 450m south of its southern edge, the SMM saw workers laying asphalt on both sides of road T-1316, reportedly to prepare the area for the construction of a bus stop.

On the evening of 1 September, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted two people near a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

On 2 September, while positioned at three locations close to the disengagement area, the Mission observed a calm situation.
Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The SMM observed armored combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further details, see the table below).

Anti-tank mines at destroyed Donetsk international airport and demining near Lebedynske

On 1 September, at the destroyed Donetsk international airport, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 23 anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, laid across a taxiway.

On 2 September, the Mission observed 12 people in clothing bearing the logo of an international organization, conducting demining activities north-west of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway track inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk) and Sloviansoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk); maintenance of and repairs to power lines in government-controlled Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk) and Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), and near non-government-controlled Vesela Hora; and demining activities in areas near Heivka (government-controlled, 27km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 30 August of a probable military-type truck in a field about 2.5km north-west of Astakhove (81km south of Luhansk), in an area about 2.8km north of the border with the Russian Federation, where there are no border crossing facilities.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

5 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska, as well as the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, were operational.

While at the EECP at about 08:45 and 11:15, the Mission observed in total 440 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 230 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

Throughout the day, the SMM saw two golf carts transporting people between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 1 September 2020). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

**Denials:**

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards Hryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), citing demining activities in the area.

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) denied the SMM passage, citing demining activities in the area and risks to the SMM’s safety.

**Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:**

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

**Other impediments:**

- During the evening of 1 September, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas
between government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and Troitske (69km west of Donetsk), and between Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The same UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east Donetsk) and Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). ⁶

- Medial staff at hospital no.6 in Donetsk city refused to provide information to SMM about civilian casualties, stating that the Mission should address those in control of the area.

⁶ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.
# Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>01/09/2020</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2)</td>
<td>In a compound on the southern edge of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)</td>
<td>Near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)</td>
<td>Near Zoloti Pisky (12km north-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>02/09/2020</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)</td>
<td>Near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)</td>
<td>Near Yurivka (35km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Armoured personal carrier (BTR-70)</td>
<td>Near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured personal carrier (MT-LB)</td>
<td>Near Lebedynske (99km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table of ceasefire violations as of 2 September 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled 57km NE of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-5km WSW</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>2-Sep, 01:52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk city centre (non-government-controlled)</td>
<td>0.5-1km SSE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>1-Sep, 22:01-22:05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N edge of Popasna (government-controlled 69km W of Luhansk)</td>
<td>3-5km E</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>1-Sep, 20:41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.*
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)