CLEARING THE MINES

REPORT FOR

THE FOURTEENTH MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

November 2015

Norwegian People’s Aid
Acknowledgements

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*Global contamination from mines*
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND KEY TERMS
PREFACE

Mine action has come a long way in the last 25 years. From the earliest, fumbling efforts by the international community, first in Afghanistan and then in Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, together we have constructed a sector that is professional, accountable, and increasingly outward-looking.

As one of the world’s three largest demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs), we bear a special responsibility for the continued success of mine action. The core values of the sector – humanitarianism, impartiality, and non-discrimination – not only suffuse our work, but also spur us on to seek ever-greater efficiencies in land release. We know only too well that high-quality survey, both non-technical and technical, is the backbone of these efficiencies: helping to ensure that we continue to give land back to communities, both safely and swiftly.

In most countries, national authorities have assumed their rightful leadership role of coordination and management of the mine action sector. The international community has a responsibility to identify areas of potential improvement and, in close dialogue with national authorities, to provide relevant and targeted support – not for the benefit of the individual operator but for the sector as a whole. Mature mine action programmes appreciate that constructive criticism is in their interest and that it can be used to their direct benefit.

Thus, this report by Mine Action Monitor should be seen as an independent and transparent reflection on potential areas of improvement that feeds into our collective responsibility to discuss and implement actions that improve the sector. This is the essence of the report and the key motivation for Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to publish it. We hope too that donors will find this publication useful in deciding how to direct their funding appropriately and in a targeted manner.

At NPA we have long understood that advocacy – for the ban on anti-personnel mines, for continued funding of demining, and in support of the mine action sector as a whole – is part and parcel of our work in humanitarian disarmament. The independent oversight that Mine Action Monitor offers is an integral element in this broader initiative. We call on everyone in the mine action sector to read and discuss this report.

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NPA

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Department for Humanitarian Disarmament
NPA
GLOBAL OVERVIEW

SUMMARY OF PROGRESS

The year 2014 matched the largest-ever-recorded mine clearance for a calendar year, rising to just above 200 square kilometres, which equates to an area more than six times the City of Brussels.\(^1\) In addition, in 2015 Mozambique, formerly a significantly affected state, became the twenty-ninth to complete clearance of mined areas on its territory, a further step towards ridding the world of landmine contamination. Collectively, the world destroyed more than 230,000 anti-personnel mines and more than 11,500 anti-vehicle mines in 2014 – in and of itself a major contribution to human security and to broader efforts to promote development. Today, as a result of two decades of clearance, in most affected countries mines are an obstacle to social and economic advancement, but not a public health crisis.

Yet this good news should not mask serious underlying concerns. In short, national targets for completion of clearance are being pushed back – sometimes justifiably, sometimes not – while funding for mine action is subject to ever-greater constraints as austerity bites and donors move on to other issues. Efficiency and effectiveness are not empty rhetoric: they must continue to be the guiding principles that drive mine action forward. To transform these principles into operational reality demands high-quality non-technical survey to confirm or cancel suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), backed by a demining toolbox that comprises an appropriate mix of men and women, dogs, and machines to conduct technical survey and clearance. Otherwise, land release fails to deliver as a meaningful concept. As a community of knowledge and practice, mine action still has room to improve substantially, and it needs to do so quickly.

PROGRESS IN 2014

Global clearance in 2014 was more than 200 square kilometres, equalling a record set twice since systematic monitoring of demining output began a decade ago.\(^2\) The three greatest mine action programmes in terms of clearance output in 2014 were Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Croatia, all states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), as set out in Table 1. Combined, these three programmes accounted for three-quarters of global clearance when measured by square metre; indeed no other state managed to clear even ten square kilometres during the year.\(^3\)

Table 1: The ten largest mine action programmes by clearance of mined area in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine action programme</th>
<th>Area cleared (km(^2))</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>62.87</td>
<td>12,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>54.38</td>
<td>20,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>37.75</td>
<td>1,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>42,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>16,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan (state not party to the APMBC)</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (state not party to the APMBC)</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>32,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>45,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-totals</td>
<td>183.65</td>
<td>172,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other programmes combined</td>
<td>16.95</td>
<td>58,711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL GLOBAL CLEARANCE 200.60 231,708

APM = anti-personnel mines

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1 The City of Brussels is 32.61km\(^2\) in area. [http://www.brussels.be/artdet.cfm/4389](http://www.brussels.be/artdet.cfm/4389).
2 Clearance recorded by Landmine and Mine Action Monitor was: 185km\(^2\) in 2013; in 2012, 200km\(^2\); in 2011, 190km\(^2\); in 2010, 200km\(^2\); and in 2009, 198km\(^2\).
3 Claims of huge clearance in Morocco, for example, are not included in our calculations as Mine Action Monitor does not find the reported figures credible.
Despite the ongoing armed conflict in South Sudan, that nation’s mine action programme managed to maintain significant clearance output, belying claims that armed violence need put an end to effective mine action. Less positively, Azerbaijan’s destruction of only 42 anti-personnel mines during its reported clearance of more than 4.7 square kilometres indicates that land-release approaches have not yet adequately suffused that programme’s operations and suggests that precious clearance assets are being used in a highly inefficient manner. The same comment applies with respect to Sudan, whose ratio of mines destroyed to cleared area is not simply explained by low density of mines. There is also, albeit to a lesser extent, a similar concern with respect to Croatia, which continues to use full clearance where technical survey would be sufficient to release land safely.

**PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 5**

Article 5 of the APMBC requires that each affected state identify all mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and clear all anti-personnel mines from such areas within ten years of becoming party to the Convention. This demands in practice that affected states conduct surveys of all SHAs – such areas are typically identified based on minefield records, local reports of contamination, and casualty information – and then release all areas confirmed to be mined using a combination of technical survey and clearance.

To date, 29 states (28 of which are party to the APMBC) and one other area (Taiwan) have completed clearance of mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, as set out in Table 2. Most recently, Mozambique announced in September 2015 that it had, at last, fulfilled its Article 5 clearance obligations, having destroyed more than 86,000 anti-personnel mines since 2008, but even this excellent news comes with a sting in the tail. Since the Mozambican authorities had, unwisely, elected not to request an additional extension to its deadline of 1 January 2015 (itself already extended for six years), for some eight months of the year Mozambique was in serious violation of the Convention. This is not, though, to suggest that the authorities acted other than in good faith and they liaised regularly with the Implementation Support Unit prior to, during, and following the end of the formal extension period.

**Table 2: States and other areas that have cleared all mined areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State party</th>
<th>State party</th>
<th>State party</th>
<th>State party</th>
<th>State party</th>
<th>State not party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Danmark</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Other area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Information believed correct as of 1 November 2015.

This leaves 60 countries with mined areas to be released, of which 33 are states parties to the APMBC, 24 are states not party, and three are classified as ‘other areas’ [see Table 3].

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4 Lower mine density alone cannot account for this ratio, which means that fewer than nine mines are being found for every one million square metres of cleared land.
5 This terminology is used to describe a defined geographical area and state-like entity that has not been generally accepted as a state.
6 On 5 December 2013, the APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties granted Mozambique’s second extension request, but noted that, while completion was within sight, implementation of Mozambique’s plan, by 31 December 2014, was contingent upon assumptions that might not hold. First, meeting the deadline was subject to the successful conclusion of a cooperation agreement with Zimbabwe. Second, it would require demining to occur throughout 2014, which was not the case in 2013. Third, as “temporary insecurity” had impeded demining in the past, any additional incidents could delay impact completion of clearance. The Meeting noted that, should Mozambique not complete implementation by 31 December 2014, it would find itself in a state of non-compliance with the Convention. Decision of the APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2013. See also Presentation of Analysis of Mozambique’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request by the President of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2013, p. 1.
7 There may also be anti-personnel mine contamination in, among others, Djibouti, Moldova (Transnistria), Namibia and the Philippines, but no specific mined areas have been identified in these states.
Global Overview

Table 3: States and other areas with mined areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State party</th>
<th>State party</th>
<th>State party</th>
<th>State not party</th>
<th>State not party</th>
<th>Other areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Ukraine***</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Oman**</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan****</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Argentina is considered mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.
** Oman has been added to the list as their initial APMBC Article 7 transparency report lists suspected mined areas.
*** Ukraine has been added to the list following new mine contamination in 2014 as a result of the ongoing armed conflicts.
**** The extent to which Kyrgyzstan is still mine-affected is unclear.

Of the ten most contaminated states parties (Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe), not one was on target to meet its Article 5 clearance deadline as of the end of October 2015. This is despite the fact that every state apart from Iraq has already extended its clearance deadline at least once.

Furthermore, despite being three of the ten most mine-contaminated states on the planet, the mine action programmes in Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe managed a total of less than one square kilometre of mine clearance between them in 2014. While there are mitigating factors in the case of Zimbabwe, the same cannot be said for either Thailand or Turkey. Willful failure to clear anti-personnel mines risks a state party being accused of using pre-emplaced mines for its advantage.

Among other, less contaminated states parties the picture is similarly disappointing. Of the remaining 23 affected states parties, only three (Algeria, Chile, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) were on track to meet their Article 5 deadlines, while for three others (Serbia, Somalia, and Tajikistan) it was uncertain whether they would complete clearance in time. Among the remaining states parties, two had already missed their deadlines [Ethiopia and Jordan], three others had requested a further extension to their Article 5 deadlines [Cyprus, Mauritania, and Senegal], and one, Niger, indicated in June 2015 that it would do so. These four extension requests were due to be considered by the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties opening in late November 2015 in Geneva. This leaves ten other states parties all of which, barring little short of a miracle, will fail to finish in time and thus will be constrained to seek an additional extension period.

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8 APMBC Article 7 Report, 2015, pp. 4–5.
9 Zimbabwe’s extension was in fact for survey and limited clearance only, not to complete clearance. It is not clear how this is consistent with the terms of APMBC Article 5[5], which provides that: “If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.”
10 In March 2015, Ethiopia submitted a request for an extension of five years until 1 June 2020 to complete survey and clearance of all remaining mined areas. Since 1 June 2015, Ethiopia has been in serious violation of the APMBC. This will remain the situation unless and until an extension is granted.
11 Jordan has not yet accepted that it still has Article 5 obligations despite finding and destroying 112 anti-personnel mines in 2014 alone while re-clearing mined areas that were not cleared to humanitarian standards.
12 No request appeared to have been made as of end-October 2015.
13 This concerns Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Eritrea, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, the United Kingdom, and Yemen.
Table 4: Progress in implementing Article 5 obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Article 5 deadline</th>
<th>On target?</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Clearance slowing with significant reduction in funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1 April 2017</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Significant increase in clearance means Algeria remains, just, on track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 January 2018</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Angola predicts needing more than ten years beyond 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Argentina does not control the Malvinas but could repeat its offer to the UK to support clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Bosnia says meeting the 2019 deadline is “not possible, though it is the official strategy”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Cambodia lacks a coherent strategic plan based on latest mine action data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Chad’s moribund programme was given a boost at the end of 2014, with the return of Mines Advisory Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Just on track to meet deadline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>The March 2015 agreement on demining should allow faster clearance if bureaucracy can be streamlined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Croatia urgently needs new land-release standards that allow technical survey to release land more efficiently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1 July 2016</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Three-year extension requested; peace negotiations could make this the last one that Cyprus needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>1 January 2021</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DRC could finish well in advance if land release continues efficiently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2017</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Increased national demining capacity in 2014 has given hope of light at the end of the tunnel for Ecuador’s compliance with Article 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Eritrea needs to allow NGOs to return to help the mine action programme out of the hole it has dug for itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2015</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Missed deadline and in serious violation of the Convention. A five-year extension has been requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2018</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>New management is attempting to strengthen the mine action programme but against a background of armed conflict, political tension, and dysfunctional bureaucracy it performs poorly in most areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1 May 2012</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Missed deadline and still needs to request an extension to its deadline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2016</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Five-year extension requested to allow dialogue with Morocco to resolve clearance of border areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1 January 2016</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Preparing an extension request; the problem is small and should be easily tackled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Oman has reported suspected mined areas in the south of the country. It may wish to seek technical assistance from a leading mine action NGO to assist it with non-technical survey of these areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2017</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>As of June 2015, Peru could not even estimate the remaining contamination, despite being a state party since 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party</td>
<td>Article 5 deadline</td>
<td>On target?</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2016</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Senegal had not reported on land release in 2014, as of end-October 2015. A five-year extension was requested that is scarcely warranted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>UNCLEAR</td>
<td>Despite scant clearance, better land-release methodology could make it possible for Serbia to just make the deadline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>UNCLEAR</td>
<td>Somalia’s mine action programme is showing signs of improvement with new international capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2021</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>The mine action programme improved in 2014 despite ongoing armed conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1 April 2019</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Sudan should allow international NGOs to return. This would help it to mobilise the necessary resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1 April 2020</td>
<td>UNCLEAR</td>
<td>Estimates of anti-personnel mine contamination by the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre continue to change without sufficient justification or adequate explanation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 November 2018</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Lack of attention to mine action by political leaders remains a major constraint, leaving the mine action sector without the funding needed to fulfil its Article 5 obligations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 March 2022</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Total mine clearance amounts to less than 1% of overall contamination, and more than 11 years after becoming a state party, Turkey has made very marginal progress in addressing mine contamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2016</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Ukraine’s mine contamination dates back to 2014, meaning that it has little time for clearance and even less prospect of meeting the deadline. It should report as a matter of urgency to the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties on the problem and seek an extension to its Article 5 deadline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Total mined area on the Falkland Islands cleared so far represents 9% of contamination, far less than the 48% the UK pledged to clear after five years in its 2008 extension request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Lack of funds and escalating conflict in the second half of 2014 imposed major constraints on mine action while the extent of the problem has increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 January 2018</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Zimbabwe has continued to progress in the implementation of its Article 5 obligations, but needs to ensure more accurate reporting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No state not party to the Convention, nor any other area, was believed to be close to completing clearance of mined areas on its territory as of 1 November 2015.15

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14 Although, as noted above, Zimbabwe’s extension request foresees that a further request will be submitted in 2017 to enable it, it is hoped, to complete the clearance work.

15 Although not bound by the APMBC, each state and other area has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which demands that mined areas be cleared as soon as possible. This obligation, with respect to states parties to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is explicitly referred to by the Human Rights Committee in its draft General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 (the right to life). See: Draft General Comment No. 36 (Article 6: Right to life), prepared by Yuval Shany and Nigel Rodley, Rapporteurs, UN doc. CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev.2, 7 September 2015.
PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

As in our previous report, *Clearing the Mines*, which was presented to the Third Review Conference of the APMBC in Maputo in June 2014, the performance of national mine action programmes has been given a scoring based on their annual performance. The same scoring system was used in this report, as summarised in Table 5.

Table 5: Criteria and performance indicators for ranking mine action programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Performance indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>Has the extent of the mine threat been identified with a reasonable degree of accuracy? Does the estimate include CMA as well as SHAs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>Has a date been set by the national authorities for completing clearance of all mined areas? Is the target date realistic based on existing capacity? Does it conform with its APMBC Article 5 obligations? Is there a strategic plan in place to meet the target date? Is it sufficiently ambitious?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>Is clearance focused on confirmed mined areas? Are significant areas of land being cleared that have no contamination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>Are costs increasing or decreasing? Are dogs integrated into demining operations [where appropriate]? Are machines integrated into demining operations [where appropriate]? How much does manual clearance cost per square metre?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of the programme</td>
<td>Is national funding covering the cost of the mine action centre? Is national funding covering any survey or clearance costs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>Are contaminated areas prioritized for clearance according to explicit criteria? Are areas of high impact dealt with swiftly? Are there delays to clearing an area for political reasons?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system</td>
<td>Is there a coherent land-release system in place for the programme? Is this system understood and used by all the operators? Is there a functioning non-technical survey capacity? Is there a functioning technical survey capacity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>Do national mine action standards exist? Do they respect the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)? Are they adapted to the local threat and context? How well are they applied?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>Does the state submit regular Article 7 reports on progress in implementing Article 5 of the APMBC? Does it report regularly to donors and civil society? Do these reports detail progress disaggregated by the different methods of land release? Are they accurate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>Has the mine action programme, or key parts of it, improved or deteriorated over the last 12 months?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the ten criteria is given a scoring up to 10 and an average calculated to give the performance score. An average performance score of 0–3.9 is considered Very Poor, 4.0–4.9 is Poor, 5.0–6.9 ranks Average, 7.0–7.9 is considered Good, and anything above 7.9 is Very Good.

Disappointingly, only two mine action programmes worldwide attained the ranking Good in 2014: Algeria and Chile; none ranked as Very Good. All other states parties’ mine action programmes were ranked Average, Poor, or Very Poor. The worst performers among states parties comprised Eritrea, Ethiopia, Peru, and Senegal (all ranked Very Poor), followed by Chad, Iraq, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen (all Poor).

One of the main reasons for poor performance by states parties is that either there is no properly functioning programme to speak of (typically owing to lack of political will), or, which is the case in many programmes, because land-release approaches are still paid little more than lip service in day-to-day operations. In particular, full clearance may often be conducted on suspected mined areas (SMAs) instead of only on areas in which the presence of mines (or other contamination containing
A more general issue of concern is the widespread repression of civil society, a reaction by repressive regimes to events such as the Arab Spring. This penchant for authoritarianism has not left mine action unscathed, as numerous authorities seek to make it difficult for international demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to operate effectively. Delays or refusals of visas for technical personnel, obstruction to the import of demining materials, efforts to foist unqualified staff onto programmes, and even ejection of NGOs altogether (as Eritrea and Sudan have done in the past), all help to explain why global demining is not further advanced today.

In this year’s report, programme performance for all affected states parties in comparison to the previous year has also been noted and commented on in the relevant programme profiles. A total of 11 improved their ranking compared to last year’s report, ten remained consistent, while eight regressed. Progress (and regression) are summarised in Table 6.

### Table 6: Comparative programme performance rankings for affected states parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improved performance</th>
<th>Performance ranking (for 2014)</th>
<th>Performance ranking (for 2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consistent performance</th>
<th>Performance ranking (for 2014)</th>
<th>Performance ranking (for 2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressive performance</th>
<th>Performance ranking (for 2014)</th>
<th>Performance ranking (for 2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 Argentina, Cyprus, and Jordan were not given performance scores for 2014 as Argentina and Cyprus do not have an active programme and Jordan does not accept it has outstanding Article 5 obligations.
REPORTING ON PROGRESS

Finally, it is little short of scandalous that an enterprise that receives more than half a billion dollars a year from international sources, as is the case with mine action, cannot report clearly and accurately on progress that is made using those funds. Yet that continues to be the sad state of affairs in mine action. Information management remains unacceptably poor in most programmes and that manifests itself in poor, or even non-existent, reporting, despite this being an international legal obligation under Article 7 of the APMBC. As of 1 November 2015, Article 7 reports on survey and clearance in 2014 were still awaited from Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, and Yemen. It is, in our view, no coincidence that these recalcitrants include some of the world’s worst mine action programmes.

Any competent mine action programme should be able to report accurately, for each calendar year, on the following:

- The number and size of CMAs at the end of the year (with disaggregation of areas containing only anti-vehicle mines)
- The number and size of SMAs at the end of the year (with disaggregation of areas containing only anti-vehicle mines)
- The number and size of SMAs cancelled by non-technical survey during the year
- The number and size of mined areas confirmed during the year (with disaggregation of areas containing only anti-vehicle mines)
- The number and size of SMAs identified during the year (with disaggregation of areas suspected to contain only anti-vehicle mines)
- The extent of reduction of mined area by technical survey during the year
- The extent of clearance of CMAs during the year (disaggregated from battle area clearance [BAC]), as well as the number of items destroyed during mine clearance (disaggregated by anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, unexploded submunitions, and other unexploded ordnance [UXO])
- The number and size of mined areas released and handed over to the community during the year.

This is a fundamental requirement and inability to report these figures is clear evidence that the mine action programme is not being correctly managed.

TWENTY-TWENTY VISION

The next APMBC Review Conference, the Convention’s fourth, is likely to be held in late-2019. It would be a testament to the determination of the mine action community and the national authorities of all affected states if, at the very least, the following 20 states had completed all mine clearance on territory they control by this time: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Iran, Jordan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia,17 and Tajikistan. In addition, major inroads should have been made into tackling contamination in the remaining contaminated states and other areas. This can be achieved. Globally, competence and funding are up to the task. It is only our individual and collective lack of will that can see us come up short.

17 At least in Somaliland.
THE TEN MOST CONTAMINATED STATES PARTIES
**MINA ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
<th>For 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2014</th>
<th>For 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY**

Afghanistan’s mine action programme performance has dropped from good to average. A sharp fall in donor support for humanitarian demining has resulted in drastic reductions in the capacity of implementing partners, less quality assurance by the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), and a slowdown in the progress of survey and clearance.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- MACCA should present revised milestones for clearance in the light of reduced funding, clarifying the implications for achieving its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 extension request targets.
- MACCA and the Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) should develop a fundraising strategy, building on evidence of the development impact of mine action.
- The government of Afghanistan should include mine action in its National Priority Programmes.

CONTAMINATION

Afghanistan remains one of the countries most affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly the result of the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–96 internal armed conflict, and the United States (US)-led coalition intervention in late 2001 which added considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

At the end of 2014, 253 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts were affected by mines over a total of more than 486 km², according to data provided by MACCA. Of this, almost 231 km² of mined area contained anti-personnel mines. Much of the mined area is concentrated in Kabul, Logar, Maidan Wardak, Pakhtia, and Panjshir provinces.

Survey in 2014 added to the database 619 previously unrecorded suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) over an estimated 69 km², but as a result of clearance operations the net increase in total ERW contamination was 8.6 km² and the area of anti-personnel mine contamination fell by 9.2 km² (see Table 1). Survey teams located more previously unrecorded areas in the first quarter of 2015, raising the estimate of total mine contamination to 498 km² at the end of March 2015.¹

Table 1: Remaining contamination in 2013–2014²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVM</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)*</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW*</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4,328</td>
<td>4,254</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  CHA = confirmed hazardous area  ERW = explosive remnants of war

* Abandoned IEDs only

** Not including the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) firing ranges. In September 2014, MACCA reported 64 ranges covering an estimated 558 km² remained to be released.³

The biggest explosive threat to civilians comes from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed by non-state armed groups. The 3.54 km² that Afghanistan identifies as contaminated by IEDs applies only to abandoned IEDs (AIEDs) left in locations that are no longer considered of military significance, but most casualties are caused by newly laid devices, many of them victim-activated, which puts them in the category of weapons prohibited under the APMBC. Pressure-plate IEDs generally have twice the explosive charge of an anti-vehicle mine but the trigger sensitivity of an anti-personnel mine.

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that IEDs caused 2,978 civilian casualties in 2014 (2,890 in 2013), including 925 people killed (962 in 2013) and 2,053 injured (1,928 in 2013), accounting for more than one quarter of all civilian casualties from the conflict. UNAMA also recorded a 39% increase in the number of casualties from victim-activated, pressure-plate IEDs in 2014, including 417 people killed and 358 injured for an average of 65 casualties every month, compared with 40 casualties caused by mines and other ERW.⁴

2 Data provided by the MACCA, 11 February 2014 and 30 April 2015.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is coordinated by MACCA. From 2001, MAPA was a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and under international management. From 1 April 2012, MACCA came under Afghan management supported by an UNMAS project office. Responding to sharp falls in funding, MACCA has reduced its staff by almost 60% in the past three years, to 161 by the end of the first quarter of 2015, down from 393 in 2012 and 191 at the start of 2014.

MACCA’s restructuring has taken place within the context of a broader transition of mine action from the UN to the government. Until 2008, Afghanistan had “entrusted interim responsibility” for coordinating mine action to the UN. In 2008, a government Interministerial Board assigned the lead role in mine action to the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC), renamed in 2015 the Directorate for Mine Action Coordination, which is a department of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and reports to the Office of the Second Vice President. As of March 2015, it had 12 staff located in the MACCA offices.

Since 2012, discussions have continued among key stakeholders on the best formula for managing mine action. Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request said the aim was to “absorb a reduced MACCA structure into the civil service or to create a new structure within the government for the specific management of mine action.” Debate continued in 2015 but did not appear closer to reaching a conclusion.

Strategic Planning

Afghanistan’s clearance plan for the ten years to March 2023 was set out in the Article 5 deadline extension request it submitted in March 2012 and revised in August of the same year. The request foresees clearance of all anti-vehicle mines and battle areas as well as anti-personnel mines. It consolidated the then 4,442 remaining mine and ERW hazards into 308 projects, an approach intended to facilitate monitoring of progress and resource mobilisation. Projects would be tackled according to their priority as determined by their impact, measured against a set of impact indicators.

In Afghan year 1394 (2015–16), MAPA planned to release 789 hazards totalling 75.4km², in the process freeing 310 communities and 68 districts from all contamination. It also planned to survey 357 ERW-affected villages and more than 6,000 other communities where the contamination status is unknown and conduct post-clearance assessment on around 180 hazards completed the previous year. An evaluation of MAPA, conducted by independent consultants Samuel Hall and commissioned by UNMAS, credited MACCA with: developing staff capacity to a high level, autonomously coordinating the mine action sector; building a “very efficient” integrated information management system that contributed directly to analysis and programming; pursuing a programme of reforms that had increased efficiency, productivity and safety; and demonstrating a high level of flexibility enabling it to adjust plans rapidly to match field reality. Despite these achievements, the assessment concluded that “challenges rise ahead of the MAPA, as a funding crunch and an uncertain legal status weaken the sustainability of the programme as a whole and are likely to impact its ability to deliver a country mine-free in 2023”. The report observed that UNMAS and MACCA had not provided evidence of the humanitarian impact of mine action which, as a result, was not seen as a donor priority.

Legislation

A technical committee comprising concerned ministries and MACCA has drafted a mine action law to be included as an annex to a 2005 law on firearms and explosive materials. As of April 2015, the draft was under review by the Ministry of Justice. The lack of such a law, clarifying the structure of mine action and institutional responsibilities, has weakened representation of mine action within the government and has led to its omission from the government’s National Priority Programme, contributing to a serious downturn in funding.

Operators

Most mine clearance is conducted by five long-established national and three international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Afghan NGOs are: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDDC), and the Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). The most active international NGOs are: Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO Trust. Since 2012, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has had a small operation near the border with Tajikistan. Another humanitarian operator, Agency for Rehabilitation & Energy Conservation for Afghanistan (AREA), received accreditation in 2014.
As a result of funding cuts, implementing partner capacity has fallen by more than half over the last three years to just under 5,400 personnel in Afghan year 1393 (1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015). By September 2015, the number of people employed in mine action for humanitarian purposes had dropped to about 4,000 and the number engaged by Sterling Demining Afghanistan on clearing ERW from ISAF/NATO firing ranges had risen to around 5,000.

**LAND RELEASE**

Despite a squeeze on funding for Afghanistan’s demining programme, MAPA released a total of 77km² of area in 2014, including nearly 63km² of mined area released through clearance, matching the benchmarks set out in its Article 5 extension request. However, the downward trend in funding continued into 2015 dragging down performance and left some national operators unable to field any demining teams. For the 12 months to the end of March 2015, MACCA reported release of a total 67.38km².

**Survey in 2014**

Afghanistan’s Mine and ERW Impact Free Community Survey (MEIFCS), started by MACCA in 2012, continued during 2014, implemented by a total of 28 teams provided mainly by HALO Trust (14 teams) and MCPA. Survey teams visited a total of 7,783 communities, of which 7,519 were found to be free of an explosive threat, but the survey identified 69km² of previously unreported contamination and cancelled 14.5km² for a net addition of 54.5km² to the database.

MACCA had expected the survey to take two years, but in 2014, as in the previous year, more than half the communities were not identified in the official gazetteer, extending the duration of the survey. In 2014, survey teams completed 38 districts, bringing the total surveyed to 173, less than half of Afghanistan’s 398 districts.

**Clearance in 2014**

MACCA reported that implementing partners released almost 63km² of mined area by clearance in 2014 (see Table 2), nearly 5% more than the previous year, but operations are increasingly feeling the pinch of funding constraints. Clearance operations in 1393, the Afghan year ending on 31 March 2015, released 58.5km², well below the results of recent years. At the same time, the progress of clearance has required operators to work on mined areas that are harder to reach and more sparsely contaminated. Despite the increase in area cleared in 2014, the number of anti-personnel mines destroyed was one-third less than the previous year.

National implementing partners [IPs] have borne the brunt of the downturn in funding, forcing them to cut staff and mothball vehicles and equipment, ensuring the downward trend in clearance will be apparent in the results for 2015. Of the five national IPs, DAFA reportedly managed to increase the area manually cleared by more than half to 11.13km². The Mine Clearance and Planning Agency (MCBA) and the Mine Detection Centre (MDC) reportedly raised productivity in 2014, but Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) and the Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR) cleared less land and lower levels of donor support looked likely to result in lower levels of clearance overall in 2015.
Community-based demining (CBD), designed to enable clearance in insecure areas and generate some economic benefits for the local population, also experienced a downturn with a fall in the number of teams from 56 at the start of the year to 24 by the last quarter of 2014. MCPA had 15 CBD teams working in Nangarhar, Paktya, and Parwan, while DAFA had nine teams working in Nimroz. Funding dropped from $15.3 million in 2013 to $2.9 million in 2014.  

Donor support for international IPs has proved more robust but the outlook is uncertain. HALO Trust, the biggest of the IPs, accounted for more than one third of total MAPA funding in 2014 and was able to increase staffing from 2,715 at the start of 2014 to 3,216 at the end of the year, including 86 manual demining teams, 18 mechanical teams, 12 survey and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and 17 weapons and ammunition disposal (WAD) teams. However, funding for the year finished lower than in 2013 and capacity has dropped back to about 2,400 in 2015.  

Of the three international operators, DDG cleared 2.19km² in 2014, almost two-thirds more than the previous year, while FSD, working close to Afghanistan’s northern border with Tajikistan, released one-third less than in 2014. HALO Trust, after a fall in the amount of land cleared in 2013, released 22.53km² in 2014, an increase of 28% on the previous year. This included 19km² cleared manually and almost 3.2km² by mechanical teams. HALO attributed the increase in productivity to a number of factors, including better operations management and increased use of mechanical assets, such as armoured excavators in ground preparation ahead of manual teams. Demining operations resulted in the destruction of 6,209 anti-personnel mines, nearly half the total destroyed by MAPA in 2014, and WAD operations destroyed another 804 anti-personnel mines and 178 anti-vehicle mines.  

Table 2: Mine clearance by humanitarian operators in 2014  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>AIEDs destroyed</th>
<th>No. of UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAFA</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>11.13</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>2,768</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>22.53</td>
<td>6,209</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPA</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>13.43</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAR</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>885</strong></td>
<td><strong>62.87</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,517</strong></td>
<td><strong>510</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>53,011</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines   AVM = anti-vehicle mines   AIED = abandoned improvised explosive devices   UXO = unexploded ordnance

Deminer Safety

Two deminers were killed and 18 injured in demining incidents in 2014. Of the total, HALO Trust reported one of its deminers was killed and seven injured, two of the deminers sustaining only light or superficial injuries. Deteriorating security caused a sharp rise in casualties resulting from insurgency and criminality. A total of 34 deminers were killed, close to the total number of fatalities for the four previous years, and 27 others were injured in security incidents. Insurgents shot dead 11 deminers working for Sterling Demining Afghanistan in one incident in Helmand in December 2016, wounding at least six more. Mine action teams also experienced abductions and loss of equipment, including 17 vehicles and 78 detectors.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Afghanistan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. Afghanistan is not on track to meet this deadline.

Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request, drawn up in collaboration with IPs, provided a detailed timeline and costings for completing clearance of all contamination, including ERW, within the revised deadline. Insecurity poses a significant risk but the biggest immediate challenge is donor fatigue. Afghanistan has long been the best-funded mine action programme but prospects for achieving extension request targets are disappearing because of the downturn in funding.

Donors provided more than US$71 million in Afghan year 1392 [2013–14], about 86% of the $85 million targeted. In 1393, MAPA received $42 million, about 56% of the $78 million targeted. Support for humanitarian mine action appears to have been affected by key donors giving higher priority to ERW clearance. The US Congress approved funding of $250 million in 2014 for subsurface clearance of US firing ranges, while funding for MAPA from the US State Department, its biggest donor, almost halved, falling from nearly $20 million in 1392 to $10.5 million in 1393.

Funding for MAPA channelled through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund dropped from a little over $20 million in 1392 to $11.2 million in 1393.

Operating results are starting to reflect the funding downturn. In 1392 [2013], MAPA set a target of releasing 78km² and reportedly exceeded it, claiming to have released a total of more than 103km², including almost 83km² of mined area and 20.7km² of battle area. In 1393 [2014], MAPA targeted release of 83.8km² and reported that it achieved 58.5km² or 70% of the target.

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2010–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>62.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>60.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>77.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>68.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>64.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>332.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 Ibid.
25 Emails from Farid Homayoun, Country Director, HALO Trust, 9 May 2015; and Abdel Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 30 April 2015; telephone interview with Tim Porter, Afghanistan Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 9 October 2015.
26 Emails from Farid Homayoun, Country Director, HALO Trust, 9 May 2015 and from Abdel Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 30 April 2015.
27 Email from Abdel Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 30 April 2015.
28 HALO Trust reported that it released 395 mined areas covering 22.29km² and destroyed 731 items of UXO. The total of 3,216 UXO items attributed to HALO by the MACCA appears to have included stray ammunition (unfired or undamaged explosive items above 14.7mm). HALO reported it destroyed 2,671 items of stray ammunition as well as 3,666 items of small arms ammunition (below 14.7mm). Emails from Farid Homayoun, HALO Trust, 9 May and 30 October 2015.
29 Emails from Abdel Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 30 April 2015; and Farid Homayoun, HALO Trust, 9 May 2015.
31 US firing ranges accounted for 84 of 102 ISAF/NATO ranges that were not taken over by the Afghan National Army. The US planned to complete surface and where necessary sub-surface clearance by the end of 2015. By mid-January 2015, two remained in active use, eight had yet to be surveyed. Of 74 ranges that had been surveyed, 45 had been surface cleared but not certified, five were undergoing surface clearance, 23 had been surface cleared and certified by MACCA, and one had been subsurface cleared and certified by MACCA.
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2018
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE 5.2 4.9

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Angola’s mine action programme performed slightly better in 2014 than the previous year, with greater efforts made to understand the threat and target clearance more effectively.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Angola should continue efforts to improve the national mine action database so as to be able to plan effectively and to report accurately on land release.
- Angola should allocate and fund national demining assets to clear confirmed mined areas (CMAs) in order to implement its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance obligations.
- Angola should clarify and empower the management structure of the national mine action programme.
- Angola should update its national resource mobilisation strategy to compensate for decreased international funding and ensure timely clearance.

CONTAMINATION

Angola has almost 129km² of CMAs and a further 356km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA) (see Table 1). It also has a significant problem with unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico.

All 18 provinces still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas, as set out in Table 1. However, the precise extent of contamination is still not well understood in most cases. Based on the first results of a nationwide non-technical survey, on which Angola reported in June 2014, nearly half of all remaining contamination is located in the provinces of Moxico (120km² across 447 areas) and Kunene (113km² across 168 areas). In the provinces of Bié, Benguela, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango, all SHAs were transformed into CMAs as a result of survey by HALO Trust. In Bié and Kuando Kubango, much suspected contamination was cancelled by non-technical survey or by eliminating discrepancies in the national mine action database.2

Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 20143

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bié</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinda</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huila</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuando Kubango</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>110.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwanza Norte</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwanza Sul</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda Norte</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda Sul</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malanje</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>112.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uige</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>998</td>
<td>128.81</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>356.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = 500m². CMA = confirmed mined area SHA = suspected hazardous area

1 Email from Gerhard Zank, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014.
2 Presentation “Plano Cartagena v. Art. 5”, document presented during national workshop organised by the government of Angola, CNIDAH, the European Union, and the Implementation Support Unit in support of Cartagena Action Plan in April 2014, provided by email of 6 May 2014 from Joaquim Merca, Assessor of the President, CNIDAH.
Despite significant investment of time and resources over two decades, the precise extent of contamination in Angola remains unclear. A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2005 with the Survey Action Center and intended to serve as a national baseline of the extent of contamination. The LIS delivered an inadequate picture of contamination due to its inherent weaknesses, but also because a number of areas were not accessible and because ongoing demining work and SHAs cancelled by operators were not fully reflected in the National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) database. A follow-up to the LIS, the ’Survey and update of data concerning suspected hazardous areas’ (commonly referred to as LIS II), started in 2011 and was due to be completed before the end of 2014. As of July 2015, survey work was still ongoing.

As described in Angola’s 2012 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, a national non-technical survey and a mapping project designed to identify contamination and map ongoing clearance are intended to clarify the extent of contamination nationwide by 2016. However, both projects have been subject to persistent delays.

There is also a significant problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially UXO. In 2015, during October there were more deaths and injuries from UXO-related incidents than mine incidents in HALO Trust’s area of operations in Angola.

Programme Management

Angola’s national mine action programme is managed by two mine action structures. CNIDAH (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária) serves as the national mine action centre. It reports to the Council of Ministers, or in effect to the President of Angola. Since 2002, CNIDAH has been responsible for coordinating mine action in the country. It also accredits non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and commercial demining companies. Under the vice-governor of each province, CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices determine annual objectives based on priority tasks identified by the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs. The annual operating budget for CNIDAH in 2014 was more than US$18 million.

The other mine action body, the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), was established in 2005 to manage Angola’s national development plan and is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS). It supports mine clearance in areas where development projects are a priority. Its demining budget in 2014 was about $101 million, more than five times that of CNIDAH’s.

There is ongoing tension between the two national authorities over who has the power to represent national demining efforts. All operators under CED remain reluctant to report to CNIDAH according to the agreed Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) format. Part of the problem is that CNIDAH is still only a temporary governmental body. Transforming it into an agency would strengthen CNIDAH’s position but this has been consistently delayed by lack of presidential approval.

Lack of cooperation between the two national entities is visible in poor coordination between developmental and humanitarian demining across Angola. Most developmental clearance targets roads, bridges, airports, electric towers, hydroelectric power plants, and land for major state agriculture projects and new industry investments (such as cement factories), as well as for construction of new housing. In many cases, this demining is not undertaken on the basis of any known or suspected risk. Most demining by NGOs and which is supported – albeit at an ever-decreasing level – by international donors, is determined by the results of the LIS and provincial priorities.

In 2002, in order to separate coordination and operational responsibilities, Angola established the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD), which is responsible for demining and training operations under the auspices of MINARS. In 2014, 23 technical experts from INAD, working in 14 provinces, participated in a one-month training in quality management of demining.

From April 2002 until the end of 2011, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supported capacity development of CNIDAH and later of INAD, including through a Rapid Response Fund, to manage and coordinate mine action. UNDP has admitted that its support to CNIDAH was not very successful, especially in database management. No formal, independent evaluation of the whole programme has ever been conducted.

Strategic Planning

Following a request by the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Angola elaborated a workplan for 2014–17 based on the preliminary results of its national non-technical survey. As of June 2014, 70% of the survey had been completed, with four provinces still to be addressed (Cabinda, Kunene, Luanda, and Namibe) and one other where survey operations were ongoing (Moxico). In March 2015, a CNIDAH official reported to the media that the survey had reached its “final stage.”
Angola’s workplan for 2014–17 projects clearance of 327 CMAs covering about 35.5km² by 2017, proposing the following breakdown of tasks by operators:

- Local NGO APACOMINAS would clear 59 areas covering 5.2km² in Huambo, Kwanza Sul, and Malanje.
- DanChurchAid (DCA) would clear 12 areas covering 1.9km² in Mongo.
- HALO Trust would clear 155 areas covering 12.4km² in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango.
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG) would clear 29 areas covering 7.1km² in Mongo.
- Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) would clear 20 areas covering 2.3km² in Kuando Kubango.
- Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) would clear 52 areas covering 6.8km² in Kwanza Norte, Malanje, Uige, and Zaire.

Angola’s workplan foresees expenditure of approx. US$75 million to conduct clearance operations until 2017.

Operators

Mine clearance in Angola began in 1994 during the UN Angola Verification Mission. International NGOs were the predominant demining operators until 2007, when INAD greatly expanded its operational capacities, and national commercial companies were formed with a view to benefiting from significant government funding for mine action through its reconstruction projects.

In 2014, humanitarian demining operators in Angola included one local NGO (APACOMINAS), and five international NGOs, namely DCA (in Mongo), HALO Trust (in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Kuando Kubango, and Kwanza Sul), MAG (in Mongo), MgM (in Kuando Kubango and Malanje), and NPA (in Malanje and Zaire). In 2014, APOPO’s mine detection rats received operational permission to undertake clearance in Angola. It has since been supporting NPA’s clearance activities in Malanje province.

The four CED Operators – the Angolan Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard of Angola work collectively in all 18 provinces. They are tasked by the government to clear or verify areas prioritised by national development plans.

A number of commercial companies operate in Angola and are accredited by and report to CNIDAH, but are mostly employed by state or private companies to verify areas to be used for investment, whether or not they are known to contain SHAs.

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3 Data presented by Angola at the APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.
4 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.
6 Email from Calvin Ruysen, Southern Africa Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 26 October 2015.
9 Interviews with Eng. Leonardo Seferino Sapalo, INAD, and CED Member, Luanda, 17 June 2011; Susete Fereira, UNDP, Luanda, 14 June 2011; and Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
10 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
12 Interview with Susete Fereira, UNDP, in Luanda, 14 June 2011.
19 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Angola has had persistent difficulties in gathering and managing accurate mine action data, making it difficult to have a comprehensive and accurate understanding of contamination. As a consequence, in 2007 to June 2014, Angola has provided widely different reports on the extent of its mine problem (see Table 2).

Table 2: Contaminated area as reported by CNIDAH in 2007–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
<td>1,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (Dec.)</td>
<td>CNIDAH demining project to complete Article 5 obligations</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 (Dec.)</td>
<td>Article 5 deadline Extension Request</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 (Dec.)</td>
<td>Presentation at Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties</td>
<td>1,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 (April)</td>
<td>Presentation at workshop in Luanda</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are two sides to Angola’s lack of a reliable mine action database: on one side, CNIDAH’s database does not match NGOs’ own records; while on the other, CED operators fail to report to CNIDAH in the IMSMA format. 20 Efforts to improve data quality and reconcile data between operators and CNIDAH have been undertaken at various times. For instance, in 2013, HALO and NPA verified all their entries in the CNIDAH database to eliminate errors and ensure that future entries are accurate. 21 Nevertheless, in June 2014, Angola reported that discrepancies between international operators’ records and CNIDAH’s database still existed, with the level of difference estimated at 10%. 22

An international assessor financed by UNDP and CNIDAH spent two months strengthening the skills of database staff with the result that 300 discrepancies between NGO data and CNIDAH database were eliminated. Other common problems were: new areas not in the CNIDAH database; completion reports not processed; reports missing; overlapping mined area reports; and treatment of a completion report of a road task as if it were a mined area. 23 Unfortunately, CNIDAH staff did not continue the work started by the assessor after the end of his consultancy. 24

While some considerable progress has been made in reducing database discrepancies with NGO operators, Angola still needs to address database and reporting issues with CED operators.

LAND RELEASE

Although Angola reduces the level of contamination each year, the various problems with the national database, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED, make it difficult to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy the extent of land released in Angola. Furthermore, clearance data for 2014 from the CED and commercial companies was not yet available as of July 2015.

Survey in 2014

Between 2012 and April 2014, 192km² was either cancelled by non-technical survey, or released by technical survey, or removed from the national database by eliminating data discrepancies between CNIDAH and other operators. 25

Through non-technical survey activities conducted in Moxico in 2014, MAG cancelled six SHAs totalling 2.1km² and identified ten CMAs covering 0.6km². 26

HALO Trust cancelled 13 areas covering 4.7km² and reduced by technical survey a further 0.37km². HALO also introduced in Huambo province its Mine Free District Methodology, whereby in all 11 municipalities, representatives from 1,541 communities signed survey forms agreeing that no further mined areas exist other than the 42 already identified and recorded on the national database. 27

Clearance in 2014

In 2014, four international NGOs cleared a total of 2.2km² of mined area, destroying 2,665 anti-personnel mines and 461 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 3).

DCA claimed on its website that it had cleared and released 0.37km², destroying 355 items during its operations in 2014, but did not provide additional details or respond to Mine Action Monitor queries. 28
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>933,078</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>905,831</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>216,810</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MgM</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>177,164</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2,232,883</td>
<td>2,665</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  N/R = Not reported

20 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
24 Email from Anthony Connell, Programme Manager, DCA Angola, 24 April 2014.
25 Email from Jessica Riordan, Country Director, MAG, 17 June 2015.
26 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 5 May 2015.
27 Email from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 26 October 2015.
29 Emails from Jessica Riordan, MAG, 17 June 2015, Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 7 July 2015; Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 26 October 2015; Fredrik Holmegaard, Country Director, NPA, 26 June 2015; and Kenneth O’Connell, Technical Director, MgM, 14 July 2015.
30 Email from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 26 October 2015.
31 Emails from Jessica Riordan, MAG, 17 June 2015, Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 7 July 2015; Fredrik Holmegaard, NPA, 26 June 2015.
In addition, during its 173 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations in 2014 HALO Trust destroyed 36 anti-personnel mines and 15 anti-vehicle mines, along with 831 items of UXO and 529 items of abandoned explosive ordnance.

In 2014, three international operators increased demining capacity. MAG reported an increase in its clearance, non-technical survey, and community liaison teams. NPA employed 36 new personnel (including 26 deminers) for its operations in Zaire. HALO’s total capacity went from 300 to 450 employees in the last quarter of 2014.

But despite this improvement (mainly due to allocation of long-awaited European Union (EU) contracts), international funding remains a challenge for demining in Angola. Indeed, before being able to hire new staff and as a result of the lack of timely funding and an eight-month gap in announcing EU tender results, HALO Trust was forced to reduce its staff capacity (from 650 to 300 employees), losing experienced demining staff. Moreover, lack of available funding for 2015 and disengagement of traditional donors foreshadow renewed reductions in demining capacity. MAG anticipated no major changes prior to October 2015 when its operations staff might be reduced by 10%. NPA reported that due to reduced funding it would have about 20 fewer deminers in Malanje in 2015.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2012), Angola is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2018. Angola is not on track to meet this deadline.

Angola’s latest extension request submitted in March 2012 was presented as an “interim period” during which efforts would be undertaken to better estimate the extent of the contamination and sort out database issues through a national survey and a mapping project to geographically represent the extent of contamination. Based on results of surveys and clearance, Angola plans to submit another extension request but has already predicted needing more than ten years beyond 2018.  

The request indicated the size of the country, the different mine-laying techniques used, the fact that the locations and number of mines were not recorded, and lack of resources as the main reasons for Angola’s inability to comply with its initial deadline. The Analysis Group also noted as a significant impeding factor Angola’s information management problems.

In granting the request, the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties requested that Angola provide, to the Third Review Conference, details of its latest knowledge of the size and location of all confirmed and suspected mined areas identified during its non-technical survey project, and that it submit a revised land release plan for the rest of its extension period. As requested, in June 2014, Angola submitted its workplan for 2014–17, which provided an update on progress regarding its national non-technical survey and database clean-up, and set annual clearance targets.

Angola is way behind schedule in completing the tasks planned for its first extension period. The non-technical survey was due to be completed by 2013, and as of March 2015, activities were still in their “final stage.”

The mapping project was supposed to start in 2013, and although preparations have been undertaken (such as acquisition of equipment and technical training), the project has been delayed due to lack of funding, and as of July 2015 it was unclear whether it had finally started. Given considerable delays in completing both projects, Angola still does not have a clear understanding of its contamination, which impacts its capacity to identify its needs, set priorities, and effectively schedule operations, as well as distribute resources in the most efficient way.

Angola has traditionally been one of the largest recipients of international mine action funding. Nevertheless, demining operators and officials have noted a decrease in financial support, and most worrying a disengagement of traditional donors, with the exception of the United States of America and Japan.

The EU has also been a major donor in Angola. In 2010, the EU awarded five international NGOs and one French commercial company €20 million (US$26.5 million) for 2010–12. In 2013, the EU’s office in Angola announced it would provide another €20 million ($25 million) for mine action in 2013–17. After some delays that have slowed down demining operations, €18.9 million ($25.1 million) was finally provided through the 10th European Development Fund. As of June 2015, however, it was unclear if the EU would renew its support to demining in Angola after 2016.

Total national funding for mine action in 2014 totalled $121.4 million, $6 million more than in 2013. A prior and subsequent decrease in international funds available to support demining in Angola is worrying as many communities remain impacted by landmines and also because it makes planning operations difficult for operators, impacting their capacity to conduct clearance at a steady pace.

32 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 7 July 2015.
33 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 23 May 2012.
34 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request Analysis, 30 October 2012.
35 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request Decision, December 2012.
37 “CNIDAH says the complete elimination of mines and remnants of war will take a long time”, ANGOP, 13 March 2015.
39 Information provided by Maria Cruz Cristobal, Mine Action Desk, Security Policy Unit, Directorate-General for External Relations, EU, through David Spence, Minister Counsellor, Delegation of the EU to the UN in Geneva, 20 June 2011.
42 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO, 7 July 2015.
MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

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PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE 5.9 4.7

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

The mine action programme score for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) showed modest improvement in 2014 thanks to an effective response to flooding, and despite continuing and significant structural and governance problems and poor clearance productivity.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- BiH should implement the recommendations of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment. In particular, BiH should continue reforming the governance and management structure of mine action, empowering the Demining Commission to provide political leadership, root out corruption, and begin consultations with a wide range of local and international stakeholders on a new mine action law.
- BiH should review, adopt, and operationalise new methods of land release.
- BiH should empower a high-level effort to seek new local, national, and international sources of funding.

CONTAMINATION

BiH is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of the 1992–95 conflict related to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Most of the minefields are in the zone of separation between BiH’s two political entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS) – which is 1,100km long and up to 4km wide.

The BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) reported total contamination of 1,176km² at the end of 2014, a reduction of about 3.5% on 2013. Contamination is across 9,185 hazardous areas, of which 4,510 totalling 345km² have been included as tasks for technical survey and clearance on the national priority list, even though the presence of mines is not confirmed in all instances. A 2015 UNDP evaluation reported that BHMAC is aware that not all of the suspected hazardous area (SHA) is actually mined, but “without more efficient non-technical survey and technical survey procedures the exact extent of the problem cannot be quantified.”

Some of the affected territory is mountainous or heavily forested, but the fertile agricultural belt in the Posavina region, along with the Doboj region, has the most heavily contaminated areas. According to BHMAC, most mine incidents now occur in forested areas.

BHMAC reports that a general assessment in 2012 identified 538,500 people in 1,417 communities impacted by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). BHMAC estimates that 120,000 mines and items of UXO remain in contaminated areas. Mine action prioritisation and planning is based on an assessment of socio-economic impact. However, a UNDP evaluation recommended that this “prioritisation system be reviewed to reflect” changing circumstances as well the specific impact of particularly dangerous mines like the PROM-1.

BHMAC’s next general assessment is planned for 2015. It will determine high-, medium-, and low-impact SHAs and will be conducted in collaboration with the State Agency for Statistics. As of March 2015, BHMAC was waiting on the release of census data to begin the assessment. BHMAC expects the assessment to be mainly statistical, though some data will be gathered from local communities, coordinated by the eight BHMAC regional offices.

BiH was severely affected by the Balkan flood disaster in May 2014. On 23 May, BHMAC met with the directors of the mine action centres of Serbia and Croatia to coordinate their response to the threat of mines washed into areas previously considered safe. The centres pledged to share information, emphasise risk education in the flood-affected zones, engage in emergency marking once the floods receded, and raise awareness of the impact of the lack of funds for mine action.

BiH authorities estimated that 36 municipalities encompassing 106 communities were affected by the floods and associated landslides. The total affected area was 831km², of which 49km² had previously been defined as suspected mined area. At an ammunition depot in Orasje, some 250 tons of ammunition were reported as being under water on 25 May 2014. There was a mine explosion in Brčko on 21 May 2014, though no casualties were reported.

1 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015.
2 Email from Tarik Serak, Head, Department for Mine Action Management, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
3 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13 May 2015, p. 17; and email from Darvin Lisica, Regional Director for South-east Europe, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 1 November 2015.
5 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
7 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 25.
10 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
In the immediate aftermath of the floods, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) worked with local crisis coordination centres to provide landmine survey and mapping support to the emergency response in Brčko, Orašje, and Samac, and conducted risk education and emergency marking in Domaljevac-Samac. From 1 July 2014 to 28 February 2015, NPA teams operating under BHMAC coordination reassessed the mine situation in the flood- and landslide-affected areas, conducting non-technical survey over 434 SHAs totalling 56km². While earlier reports had suggested as much as 800km² (UN estimate) or 320km² (US Department of State estimate) of SHA was affected by the floods, the NPA/BHMAC assessment found that a total of only 37.8km² had been “flooded or under the influence of water.” The NPA/BHMAC team found that “Migration of mines cannot be considered as massive and did not cause a significant increase of the mine problem” in BiH. 

In local and international media, concern was raised that the floods, landslides, and increased water levels in rivers could lead to widespread redistribution of mines. According to the NPA/BHMAC assessment, the borders of SHAs changed in 32 locations “resulting in minor increasing” of SHA for 0.3km² or 0.56% of the surveyed area. In 37 other locations, mines had moved within the boundaries of the original SHA; in a further five locations, mines had migrated out of the original boundaries of mined areas due to the landslides or river streams. Nevertheless, the floods had changed the “operating conditions” in 363 SHAs, including “additional soil level, mud and other trash”, as well as changes to the landscape that will “require additional intensive non-technical survey and technical survey prior to the mine clearance operations.”

An EU assessment found while “it is apparent” that some mines moved during the floods, careful research “may counter the largely inaccurate assertion that landmines float after floods and indiscriminately contaminate new widespread areas previously considered low risk.”

On 23 May 2014, the US Department of State ordered its Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to deploy three civilian experts to Sarajevo for 21 days to “provide technical assistance and support” to BHMAC and identify “needs in addressing initial emergency response.” The team “concluded that the BiH government responded quickly and effectively to the situation.”

UND P disseminated maps of the flooded mine areas through its Bosnia website. UNDP supported for 25 days an emergency 13-member demining team to help in an effort to re-establish water supply to Sapna, in north-eastern BiH. They also supported a team of four surveyors conducting hazard assessment in the flood-affected region and coordinated a UN Mine Action Recovery Needs Assessment.

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15 Email from Amelia Balic, Operations Manager, NPA Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15 April 2015.
16 Ibid.
21 Email from Amelia Balic, NPA Bosnia, 15 April 2015.
22 Emails from Amelia Balic, NPA Bosnia, 15 April and 25 May 2015.
24 Email from Kaitlyn Coffey, Assistant Program Manager, PM/WRA, US Department of State, 13 April 2015.
Shortly after the floods, the European Union (EU), including its peacekeeping force (EUFOR) in BiH, deployed experts to assess the impact of floods and landslides on the location of mines.25 The EU’s 2014 Flood Recovery Needs Assessment for BiH found that while “minimal mine mitigation is” needed “compared to that expected”, “landmines and UXO remain a risk in human, economic and social terms and should be addressed as a priority.”26 The EU needs assessment recommended that BHMAC consider the possibility that landslides may have buried landmines deeper than the 10 to 20cm currently investigated in clearance efforts.27 The assessment identified key priorities and tasks for mine action to aid the recovery.28

A UN needs assessment found that the “effective response mechanism on the ground and motivated personnel” during the mine action flood recovery meant that the “affected population is less vulnerable and the risks associated with the threat reduced.”29 However, as UNDP said, “The floods in May 2014, reminded the international and local community of the urgency that still remains in Bosnia and Herzegovina for landmine clearance.” But nearly 20 years after the end of the conflicts, BiH is still the most heavily mined country in Europe and within the top ten in the world. “The floods emphasised the need to push for a non-stagnated mine action sector.”30

### PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication, supervises the state-wide BHMAC and represents BiH in its relations with the international community on mine-related issues. The Demining Commission’s three members, representing BiH’s three majority ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs),31 propose the appointment of BHMAC senior staff for approval by the Council of Ministers, report to the council on mine action, approve accreditation of demining organisations, and facilitate cooperation between the FBiH and RS. Whereas the Minister for Civil Affairs “remains ultimately responsible for mine action, the Demining Commission represents the strategic body responsible to set the mine action policies.”32

BHMAC, established by a 2002 Decree of the Council of Ministers, is responsible for regulating mine action and implementing BiH’s demining plan, including accreditation of all mine action organisations.33 BHMAC operates from its headquarters in Sarajevo and through two entity mine action offices – formerly autonomous entity mine action centres – and eight regional offices (Sarajevo, Pale, Travnik, Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Brčko and Bihać). The two main offices in Banja Luka and Sarajevo coordinate the activities of regional offices in planning, survey, and quality control (QC)/quality assurance (QA). QA inspectors are based in the regional offices.34 The 2015 UNDP evaluation found that BHMAC was “doing a good job in operational management and in introducing new and more efficient procedures”; it is carrying out its core activities “effectively, despite not being fully funded.”35

For more than three years, however, BiH mine action governance has received increasingly critical media attention. One investigative news report in 2014 asserted that “The problems that plague mine action are political and financial, rather than technical.”36 In 2012, eight local companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) filed a criminal complaint with the State Prosecutor against the BHMAC Director, Dušan Gavran, alleging irregularities in tendering demining contracts and sale of official vehicles. Reports about the investigation re-emerged in the BiH press in early 2014.

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27 Ibid., p. 118.
28 Ibid., pp. 241–43.
30 Email from Lilliam Palmbach et al., UNDP, 29 May 2015.
31 The principle of organising BiH state-level bodies along ethnic lines has come under increasing scrutiny following the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdic–Finci and Sejdic case that the rights of two Bosnians of Roma and Jewish descent had been violated by being denied the opportunity to run for high-level elected office because they were not of the major ethnic groups. European Court of Human Rights, Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment, 22 December 2009, at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-96491; see also “The Sejdic–Finci question” The Economist, 9 October 2013, at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/10/bosnia.
33 Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, Sarajevo, 17 March 2002.
The Director was arrested by police in April 2014, who, along with the State Investigation and Protection Agency, searched BHMAC premises and the Director’s house. According to a spokesperson of the State Prosecutor’s office: “The suspect is under investigation for activities related to demining and over suspicions that he abused his official position and made illegal profits.”

A BHMAC statement said: “The process of demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a large humanitarian undertaking, because it depends on donors and their grants and, due to that, we have to be completely transparent to the public... We hope that after this, negative media reports about BHMAC will end so that the process of humanitarian demining can be completed.” The Director of BHMAC was conditionally released from custody on 9 May 2014.

As of May 2015, no indictment had been issued by prosecutorial authorities. In a media interview, Ahidin Orahovac, BHMAC Deputy Director, stated that the arrest put BHMAC “under pressure” and that “dark cloud [was] around us.” A BHMAC spokesperson admitted that 2014 had been a “complicated year, politically and technically”, given the management challenges and the floods. A local NGO representative stated that from his perspective, “Things in BiH mine action are not good – the international community is losing interest and politicians are not interested. That’s very important because there’s nobody to be the ‘engine’ of political reform.” He said: “We lost the opportunity to put demining at the top of the agenda because Mr. Gavran had just been arrested.” Another local NGO representative worried that BiH’s “management system, both strategic and operational” for mine action has “proved not to be capable” and “does not have the capacity, to impose an overall mine action framework as a priority.”

When asked what the BiH government was doing to restore public confidence in the mine action programme, BHMAC stated that “The Council of Ministers cannot currently comment on the processes ran by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Prosecution.” However, from May 2014, Mr Gavran went on sick leave and was then suspended by the Demining Commission in September 2014. In October 2014, BHMAC Assistant Director, Milan Rezo, was appointed Acting Director. A representative of the EU said they were encouraged by Rezo’s appointment, remarking “he is very much oriented to making progress.”

Besides this change in personnel, in August 2014, the Demining Commission adopted new regulations on internal reporting of corruption and protection of whistle-blowers. New policies limit the reallocation of funds internally and provide additional controls on tendering. A BHMAC official said: “We want to be open and transparent to solve the problem of corruption. We want to provide a very open system for donors and have them visit the field.” A UNDP evaluation lauded these new policies and recommended BiH establish a more “effective and transparent ... tendering mechanism” for mine action activities. It stated that the “weakness of the governance and strategic management of mine action in BiH could be said to be the direct cause of national funding shortfalls and the lack of commitment towards fulfilling treaty obligations and achieving strategic goals for a mine-free generation.”

Further reforms remain somewhat uncertain; the 2014 elections and negotiations regarding the formation of a government left uncertain, as of March 2015, whether the Demining Commission would be replaced by the new Council of Ministers and what impact that would have. A local NGO representative expressed concern that conflict over management changes within BHMAC could detract from operations. A representative of a major donor country expressed hope that a new Demining Commission, rather than BHMAC as an operational agency, would lead mine action strategy setting, saying: “the Demining


39 In: Jukic, “Bosnia De-Mining Boss Grilled Over Corruption Claims”.


41 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.

42 Interview with Dominika Skubida, Senior Coordinator-Programme Manager, EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015.

43 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.

44 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015; BiH Demining Commission, “Pravilnik o internom prijavljanju korupcije i zaštite lica koja prijave korupciju u BHMAC-u” (“Regulations on internal reporting of corruption and the protection of persons reporting corruption in BHMAC”), adopted on 26 August 2014.
Commission should be at the steering wheel, but they are currently sitting in the trunk.” A local NGO representative agreed, stating that BHMAC “has no meaningful supervision” and that the Demining Commission “can’t be a part-time portfolio.” A representative of the EU agreed, saying: “we want to push for a more active and empowered and also visible Demining Commission to take responsibility.” Nevertheless, she expressed confidence that “at the technical level” of BHMAC “there is a committed, responsible staff who really feel they have a mission.”

An evaluation conducted by UNDP and issued in May 2015 found that the Demining Commission has been “weak” and needed to take a more “proactive role” to ensure that mine action is “firmly” on the BiH “government agenda. It called on the Council of Ministers to “provide improved governance, strategic management and funding for mine action”, particularly by “strengthening and supporting” the Minister of Civil Affairs and Demining Commission.

When asked about these management challenges, an official at the German Embassy said: “We are visiting every site because we do not trust the priority-setting of BHMAC … because it is not transparent.” He said that the “rumours of corruption, nepotism and price-rigging make it difficult to trust” the process and that the German Embassy “know[s] there is some corruption” still going on. He stated this is “the exact opposite of what we want” and that he believed the process needed “local ownership” from local communities and municipalities.

Local mine action authorities have criticised donors for a lack of coordination. As a result, major donors tried to set up a regular donor coordination group, meeting in November 2014 and March 2015. A UNDP evaluation found there has been “weak donor coordination” in “recent years” and recommended that donors take steps to improve coordination.”

In early 2015, UNDP contracted a consultant to “assist in improving the mine action sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina by introducing structural and communication improvements into the practices of the local mine action authorities and partners.”

Strategic Planning

The BiH Mine Action Strategy for 2009–19 sets the target of becoming free of mines by 2019 and identifies seven strategic goals, including the elimination of the mine threat. BHMAC conducted the first of three planned revisions of the strategy in 2012 and 2013 (the other two are due in 2015 and 2017, respectively). The 2012 revision asserted lack of funding as “one of the major reasons” for BiH’s slow progress to completion of its clearance goals. However, the 2012 revision was never formally adopted by the Council of Ministers, indicating the lack of political attention to BiH mine action.

BHMAC reported that its second planned revision would be completed by the end of 2015. While the revision is ongoing, BHMAC stated that it could provisionally report that after six years, only half of the strategy’s “scope … has been implemented, primarily due to lack of funding for the conduct of humanitarian demining operations.”

Local NGO representatives expressed concern in March 2015 that civil society involvement in the strategy revision had so far been limited. One stated that “Bosnia has never had a realistic plan for getting rid of mines – we need drastic change.” A representative of the EU said they “are sceptical” that the 2015 revision will be an effective one, “but there is pressure from the international community” to improve on previous strategic planning processes. A representative of UNDP stated that they will be facilitating “the provision of technical advice and assistance, linking the revision to the requirements of the Maputo Plan” in the 2015 revision process. She stated that the revision “will be based on a thorough analysis, engaging all the stakeholders and so should be more realistic.”

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50 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
52 Ibid., p. 21.
53 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
54 Interview with Radoslav Zivkovic, STOP Mines, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
55 Interview with Lt.-Col. Rupert Steeger, Defence Attaché, Germany Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
56 Interview with Amir Mujanovic, Executive Director, Landmine Survivors Initiative, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
57 Interview with Dominika Skubida, Executive Director, Landmine Survivors Initiative, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015.
59 Interview with Lt.-Col. Rupert Steeger, Germany Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
60 Ibid.; and interview with Dominika Skubida, EU, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015.
66 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
68 Interview with Amir Mujanovic, Landmine Survivors Initiative, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015.
69 Interview with Dominika Skubida, EU, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015.
70 Email from Lilliam Palmbach, Project EXPLODE, Jasmin Porobic, Programme Manager (Human Security) and Belinda Goslin, Mine Action Management Specialist, UNDP, 29 May 2015.
Legislation and Standards

Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine action legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable platform for mine action funding by the government and local authorities.71 However, a draft law prepared by the Ministry of Civil Affairs with support from BHMAC and UNDP, first submitted to parliament in February 2010, failed to gain parliamentary approval in 2012. As of May 2015, the law had still not passed and BHMAC had “no new information on current status of the new Demining Law.”72

A BHMAC official acknowledged that the lack of a new legal framework has contributed to BiH’s repeated failure to meet its funding targets under its own mine action strategy.73 Nevertheless, a UNDP evaluation stated: “Whilst it would be advantageous to establish a more robust legal framework for mine action in BiH, the current Demining Law is adequate to enable mine action activities to be implemented effectively.”74

In 2014, BHMAC developed new drafts of standing operating procedures (SOPs) in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) for non-technical survey, technical survey, and land release, which were expected to accelerate cancelation of SHAs. An additional SOP was drafted for targeted search in technical survey with manual methods. Application of these new methods have started as part of an EU-funded “Land Release” pilot project, which aims to make the process of releasing SHAs more “effective and efficient”. Verification of the process was ongoing, but BHMAC estimates that the project will have released 29km².75 A consultant involved in the SOP revision stated that the results of the pilot project “were very positive” and had the potential for “saving a lot of money”.76 A local NGO representative stated that new “land release methods should improve mine action and speed up the process.”77 A representative of a major donor country similarly said that land release “is the only suitable solution to solve the Bosnian problem”.78 A UNDP evaluation recommended that BiH “support the adoption of efficient survey and clearance processes through approving new standards and SOPs for Land Release.”79

The EU and UNDP are supporting the development of new land release methods.80 The EU floods needs assessment recommended their adoption81 and an EU official in Sarajevo stated that “we are of the opinion that this is the best way forward.”82 Whether these new SOPs will be applied throughout the country remained uncertain as of March 2015; a BHMAC official stated that it was “up to the Demining Commission to decide whether land release will be the concept for the future” of mine action in BiH.83 Current obstacles to full adoption of the draft new SOPs include the liability question of which body would make the final declaration of release of a piece of land.84 A local NGO representative stated that he was “really concerned”, seeing it as “the last chance for Bosnia to keep the attention of the international community.”85 A representative of the EU expressed “doubt” that the new SOPs would “happen quickly.”86

Operators

National demining operators operational in 2014 included: governmental actors (BiH Armed Forces, FBiH Civil Protection Agency, RS Civil Protection, Brčko District Civil Protection Agency); local NGOs (DOK-ING deminiranje, ‘Pazi mine Vitez,’ Pro Vita, EKO DEM, MDDC, STOP Mines, Udruženje za eliminaciju mina, UEM); and commercial companies (Amphibia, Detektor, N&N IVSA, POINT, UEM D.O.O). There are three international demining operators in BiH: two NGOs (Demira and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPAI)) and one commercial company (UXB Balkans).

The governmental operators – Civil Protection teams and the BiH Armed Forces’ Demining Battalion – “constitute about 60% of the real available operational capacity in BiH, although their total output in terms of land released by clearance and technical survey is much less.”88 They have suffered from “little real investment” and are slower than other operators “largely due to logistical reasons and equipment deficits.”89 However, according to the UNDP evaluation, the “general consensus [sic] is that both BHF [BiH Armed Forces] and CP are both good partners and have effective demining capacities.”90 A UN needs assessment recommended exploring the possibility of Civil Protection teams conducting survey tasks.91

NPA is, according to the UNDP evaluation, “well respected and credible in BiH and is treated almost like a national asset, albeit international and independently funded through continual and committed donor support.”92 There have been many donor commentaries that the agency “deserves to gain development support as it has demonstrated good capacities.”93

Since 2010, NPA has increasingly focused on building the capacity of the Demining Battalion. In 2014, NPA supported the Battalion by monitoring and providing logistical support in the operation of mechanical assets loaned by NPA to the Ministry of Defence.94 NPA’s own strategic plan foresaw withdrawal from BiH mine action in March 2015. However, given the slow progress of clearance in BiH and the impact of the floods, NPA reported that it intended to maintain a similar level of capacity in 2015 as in 2014.95 Besides its ongoing support to the Demining Battalion, in 2015 NPA planned to conduct land release (through non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance) of areas contaminated with mines in the regions of Bosanska Posavina, Doboj, and Srebrenica, while release of areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) includes all of BiH. Additionally, NPA planned to support BHMAC with non-technical survey and development of a process and standing operating procedures for targeted technical survey as “missing chain” in BiH land release process. A pilot project on targeted technical survey using specially trained dogs will be conducted in central Bosnia.96

Handicap International (HI) had ended its mine action activities in BiH at the end of 2012 and had closed down its office by March 2013. HI withdrew from BiH as part of an effort to focus on countries with lower human development indices. In 2014, however, following the floods, HI partnered with local organisations in Bratunac, Doboj, Kalesija, Maglai, Olovo, Zavidovici, Žepce, and Zvornik to conduct MRE and aid the process of “mapping contamination and marking or re-marking dangerous areas”.97 There are 23 accredited national demining organisations (both commercial and NGO), but only 12 conducted demining or survey operations in 2014. They are not
independently funded; instead they compete for international tenders. The UNDP evaluation suggested that this left much capacity underused and recommended that "alternative contracting models which are appropriate for land release [either by having longer term contracts or being contracted for the clearance of larger areas] could be more attractive to the demining organisations in terms of security and could also make best use of capacity in the long run."  

According to the UNDP evaluation, operators "lament the cessation of technical working group forums chaired by the BHMAC to discuss technical issues and would like to see that forum revived."  

**Quality Management**

In 2014, quality assurance (QA) inspectors issued two decisions ordering demining to be repeated; one withdrawal of a certificate of land release and one stoppage of demining activities.  

Tests of 1,055 metal detectors found that 43 (4.1%) were not working. Inspectors also tested 98 mine detection dog teams; 14 did not pass the test. They also evaluated 32 machines and the equipment and assets of 21 organisations.  

BHMAC reported one demining accident in 2014, in which a deminer was killed. BHMAC and the operator STOP Mines were involved in a legal dispute over a missed mines issue during technical survey in Cazin, in north-west Bosnia. STOP Mines stated that it had filed suit against BHMAC in October 2014. The UNDP evaluation found that "Quality assurance of demining activities functions well", but warned that as new methods of land release are implemented, QA teams would need to adapt to ensure the quality of the new procedures. The UNDP evaluation also recommended that BHMAC "develop effective quality management mechanisms for the whole organisation to make processes more efficient and transparent."  

**LAND RELEASE**

BiH released a total of 42km² of mined area in 2014, 95% of the amount achieved in 2013 and less than 24% of the amount planned. Of the total, nearly three-quarters (30km²) was cancelled by non-technical survey. A further 10km² was released by technical survey, more than in 2013, while full clearance accounted for almost 1.9km², slightly less than the previous year (see Table 1), but only 17% of what had been planned. This is not an impressive return on more than US$23 million of funding. Moreover, at current rates of output, it may take several decades to clear BiH of mine contamination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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71 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.  
72 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.  
75 Telephone interview with Belinda Goslin, Risors Ltd., 17 March 2015.  
76 Interview with Radosav Zivkovic, STOP Mines, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.  
77 Interview with Lt.-Col. Rupert Steeger, Germany Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.  
78 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 5.  
79 Interview with Dominika Skubida, EU, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015; and telephone interview with Belinda Goslin, Risors Ltd., 17 March 2015.  
81 Interview with Dominika Skubida, EU, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015.  
82 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.  
83 Ibid.; and interview with Lt.-Col. Rupert Steeger, Germany Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.  
84 Interview with Radosav Zivkovic, STOP Mines, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.  
85 Interview with Dominika Skubida, EU, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015.  
86 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 29.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid.  
91 Email from Amela Balic, NPA Bosnia, 15 April 2015.  
92 Interview with Amela Balic, NPA Bosnia, in Vogosca, 17 April 2014, and emails of 15 and 18 April 2015.  
93 Ibid.; and email from Darvin Lisica, NPA, 1 November 2015.  
95 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 31.  
96 Ibid.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid.  
100 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.  
102 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, pp. 6, 27.
Survey in 2014

BHMAC conducted general survey/non-technical survey over a total area of almost 55km² in 2014, about 45% of the target (123km²), releasing 30km² through cancellation by non-technical survey, (See Table 2). BHMAC reported that 15 organisations carried out 191 technical survey tasks over a total area released of 10km² (see Table 3). A total of 44 persons were employed in 22 survey teams in 2014. In 2014, NPA noted that releasing large areas of land through non-technical survey is "becoming more and more difficult" and that applying other methods including targeted technical survey will make possible more efficient land release.

NPA conducted non-technical survey through teams seconded to BHMAC regional offices. In addition, NPA conducted 12 technical survey tasks in 2014. NPA has been developing SOPs for technical survey and planned to submit them to BHMAC by late May 2015. NPA planned to start a targeted technical survey pilot project in Travnik.

A UNDP evaluation recommended better integration of survey and clearance activities so that operators "concurrently ... find the mines and clear them in one operation.”

In response to the floods, BHMAC collaborated with the mine action centres in Croatia and Serbia on the first phase of an aerial survey project, aiming to identify "landslides where the floods destructively impacted mine risk areas and minefields, as well as new areas which might contain potential mine risk.” BHMAC reported that two remotely controlled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and a BiH Army Gazelle helicopter were used to take photographs of minefields along the banks of the River Sava, where landslides had breached SHAs. The two UAVs covered approx. 6km² and the helicopter covered another 86km².

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs confirmed as mined</th>
<th>Area confirmed as mined (m²)</th>
<th>Mined area reduced by technical survey (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BHMAC</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>30,030,000</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>24,720,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,078,220</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAZI MINE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>227,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>535,879</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEMIRA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>553,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO VITA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>694,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOP MINES</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>457,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKO DEM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOKING</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>838,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETEKTOR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>131,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POINT</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEM D.O.O.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>236,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P. FBIH</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>573,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P. RS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>194,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,277,758</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Totals                    | 422            | 30,030,000          | 429                     | 24,720,000                  | 10,127,061                                  |

SHA = suspected hazardous area

Clearance in 2014

At the end of 2014, 26 organisations were accredited with BHMAC for mine action, with a total staff of 1,460, of which 1,110 were deminers. However, only 17 organisations participated in clearance operations in 2014. More than half engaged in small tasks, clearing a total of less than 100,000m² during the year.

Overall, operators cleared a total of 1.85km² in 2014 (see Table 3), well below the 2009–19 mine action strategy target of 9.27km². BHMAC attributed the shortfall to "lack of funding.” It said it had planned mine action expenditure of BAM106.5 million (US$59.3 million), but actual spending had amounted to less than half that figure, reaching only BAM41.9 million ($23.4 million), of which BAM21.5 million ($11.98 million) (51%) came from national sources and the balance from international donors. BHMAC did not anticipate any change in capacity or funding in 2015.

Analysis shows that BiH provides a larger proportion of its national GDP to mine action than many other mine-affected countries. Nevertheless, analysis by both NPA and UNDP shows that in the first five years of the 2009–19 strategy, while international donors maintained their
planned funding commitments, “BiH government funding declined considerably and consequently by 2013, progress was way off target.”119 UNDP’s evaluation showed that low funding levels have a cascading effect in the mine action sector: “Requests for updated, fit-for-purpose equipment are often turned down and financial constraints often limit BHMAC staff’s time in the field, which in turn impacts performance.”120

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2014121

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>139,102</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>130,175</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAZI MINE</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>158,408</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>108</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOKING</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>221,675</td>
<td>286</td>
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<td>89</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>119</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKO DEM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57,443</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEMIRA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>75,391</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOP MINES</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>249,711</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMHIBIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15,130</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>UEM D.O.O.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32,948</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>IVSA</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>69,862</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>91,807</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,851,816</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,901</strong></td>
<td><strong>135</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,342</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance

104 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
106 Email from Amela Balic, NPA Bosnia, 25 May 2015.
107 Email from Amela Balic, NPA Bosnia, 15 April 2015.
108 Email from Amela Balic, NPA Bosnia, 25 May 2015.
109 Email from Amela Balic, NPA Bosnia, 15 April 2015.
111 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
112 Ibid.
113 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
117 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
120 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 22.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (land in accordance with the ten-year extension request granted by states parties in 2008), BiH is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019. There is broad agreement in the BiH mine action community that BiH will not complete clearance by 2019. Indeed a BHMAC representative stated that meeting the 2019 deadline was “not possible, though it is the official strategy”. Government, donor, and NGO officials raised concerns that political problems at state level were preventing the development of an enabling mine action policy framework. In 2014, as in all the years since it received the extension to its initial Article 5 deadline, BiH fell far short of its land release targets. As a result, six years into its extension period, BiH had achieved only 34% of the land release planned for this period and less than a quarter of planned clearance. It is facing decades of work to fulfil its Article 5 obligations.

A major donor country representative expressed concern that BiH had a “lack of political will” in following its strategy and meeting its targets and that the major donors “want to put more political pressure on the new Bosnian government” to meet its obligations. Similarly, a 2014 investigative report asserted that a “crippling combination of political inaction and financial malnourishment has squandered the remarkable technical capacity of Bosnian mine action” and urged the BiH government “to claim greater responsibility for supporting mine action...” A senior expert on mine action in BiH noted that the key problem was a vacuum in mine action policy and legislation due to obstruction of efforts by the Demining Commission to improve the programme. This has led to BHMAC being deprived of effective control of the programme and contributing to an operational and technical stagnation of the national mine action centre, previously recognised as one of the best in the world.

BHMAC reported that it would be able to provide a “more concrete estimation” of BiH’s ability to meet its Article 5 deadline after the 2015 Strategy revision is completed. Nevertheless, a BHMAC representative suggested that if the new methods of land release were adopted and BiH were given an additional five-year extension – to 2024 – then completion “is very realistic”. He admitted however, that this would “depend on donor money, on external stakeholders” being provided in sufficient quantity. Donor representatives expressed scepticism about whether completion by 2024 was possible and observed that many donors are getting “more and more frustrated” but that the BiH government “cannot solve the mine problem by itself in terms of money.” A UNDP evaluation found that at the current pace of survey and clearance it would take more than 30 years to “fully release this land from the threat of mines and explosive remnants of war.”

BHMAC recognised that donors would expect BiH to contribute to the financing of mine action and stated that, following the 2014 elections, “we hope the new parliament and Council of Ministers will provide money but we don’t know.” In previous years, BHMAC had hoped further funds would be made available by municipalities, though this has not materialised in sufficient quantities to make a significant difference in overall clearance rates. However, BHMAC called attention to the other ways municipalities supported mine action, by providing information on SHAs and in planning demining. A BHMAC official predicted that even closer coordination with local communities would be needed if the new land release SOPs go into effect as operators will require more information for survey: “we want to involve more and more people from the local community.”

A representative of the US State Department said that “Donor fatigue appears to be a large factor” in BiH’s slow mine action progress, and argued that “BiH requires financial resources from a larger pool of donors in order to achieve the targets outlined in its strategy.”

121 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
123 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
124 Ibid.; and interview with Lt.-Col. Rupert Steeger, Germany Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015; and email from Amelia Balic, NPA Bosnia, 15 April 2015.
125 Interview with Lt.-Col. Rupert Steeger, Germany Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
127 Comments received from senior mine action expert requesting anonymity.
128 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
129 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
130 Lt.-Col. Rupert Steeger, Germany Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
132 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
133 Ibid.
134 Email from Kaitlyn Coffey, Assistant Program Manager, PM/WRA, US Department of State, 13 April 2015.
136 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
137 Interview with Radosav Zivkovic, STOP Mines, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
A UNDP evaluation found that donors wanted “to see more progress”, were “looking for an end date for their assistance”, and want “more domestic responsibility.” The slow pace of clearance has “resulted in a lack of confidence in the mine action system” from donors but also from people “living in mine-affected communities”, who feel “disillusioned that the mines have not yet been cleared.” A BHMAC representative stated that the American, German, and Swiss embassies were putting pressure on BiH to be more involved in funding mine action. A local NGO representative stated that the Balkan floods “raised awareness among donors that demining is not solved in Bosnia.” However, he believed that “there are few people in the mine action sector who are interested in lobbying, whether of politicians or the media” and so “NGOs must keep the attention of donors as much as possible.” He identified as a challenge that “it is hard to come up with something new and interesting for donors” to maintain their interest. A UNDP evaluation recommended that BiH develop a mine action portfolio document for BiH to assist mobilise resources internationally and place more emphasis on fundraising.
CAMBODIA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2020
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Cambodia continues to define more precisely the extent of its mine problem, but analysis of progress towards fulfilling its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 obligations is hampered by persistent information management weaknesses. Cambodia also lacks a coherent strategic mine action plan based on up-to-date information. Its performance scoring dropped from Good for 2013 to Average for 2014.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Cambodia should provide an assessment of how much land may be released in the remaining five years of its current Article 5 extension period.
- Cambodia should present a national strategic mine action plan, setting out priorities, targets, and clear objectives for humanitarian, commercial, and developmental clearance.
- The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) should work with operators to address information management challenges, including delays and accuracy of reporting survey, clearance, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) results.
- Clearance by the Cambodian army’s National Centre for Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMEC) for government infrastructure or development should be subject to quality control (QC) by the CMAA to address enduring concerns about the quality of its operations and provide a record of areas on which it has worked.

CONTAMINATION

Cambodia is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) left by 30 years of conflict that ended in the 1990s. Its anti-personnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 north-western districts along the border with Thailand that account for the great majority of mine casualties. The number of people killed or injured by mines, after years of decline, jumped by 50% in 2014 to 72. Contamination includes the remains of the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt which was installed along the border with Thailand in the mid-1980s in a bid to block insurgent infiltration, and ranks among the densest contamination in the world with, reportedly, up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometre.

A baseline survey (BLS) of Cambodia’s 139 most mine-affected districts completed in 2013 estimated total mine and ERW contamination at 1,915km². The BLS identified 12,982 polygons or hazardous areas affected to some degree by mines, covering a total of more than 1,111km², of which 1,043km² were affected by anti-personnel mines. This included some 73km² of dense contamination but most, covering 892km², contained “scattered or nuisance” anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. The survey was extended in 2013 to cover another 51 districts contaminated mainly by unexploded ordnance (UXO).

In April 2015, CMAA reported that although total anti-personnel mine contamination in the 124 districts had fallen to less than 983km², the amount of dense anti-personnel mine contamination had increased by more than half to 99.75km² (see Table 1). This is mainly a result of survey of parts of the K5 that were inaccessible during the BLS. No information was available on areas previously identified as affected by anti-vehicle mines.

Table 1: BLS result for 139 districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination classification</th>
<th>Area (m²) May 2013</th>
<th>Area (m²) 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1 Dense APM</td>
<td>63,894,629</td>
<td>99,750,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 Mixed APM and AVM</td>
<td>78,601,787</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.1 Mixed dense APM and AVM</td>
<td>9,154,925</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.2 Mixed scattered APM and AVM</td>
<td>216,840,425</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 Total</td>
<td>304,597,137</td>
<td>255,370,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3 AVM</td>
<td>68,187,332</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4 Scattered or nuisance mines</td>
<td>674,882,897</td>
<td>627,720,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,111,561,995</td>
<td>982,841,427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines    AVM = anti-vehicle mines    N/R = not reported

1 Cambodia Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS) casualty data for 2014, received by email from Nguon Monoketya, CMVIS Officer, CMAA, 14 March 2015.
3 Revised BLS data presented in statement of Cambodia to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 10 April 2014.
4 Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 4 May 2015.
5 Statement of Cambodia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 11 April 2014; Minutes of BLS Phase II meeting, 5 May 2014.
A land reclamation non-technical survey started in March 2015 to determine the extent of BLS polygons for land reclaimed and in use by local residents. By June, the survey had covered almost 264km² across three western provinces, releasing a total of almost 29km² but adding new polygons for contamination covering 49km².

Anti-vehicle mines present a particular problem for Cambodia, killing more people than anti-personnel mines (see Table 2), often on paths or tracks regularly used by local inhabitants for years. The mines are typically detonated by heavier farm vehicles and tractors. A number of incidents have occurred outside BLS polygons. CMAA has called on local mine action planning units to pay attention to areas such as old road alignments that may have anti-vehicle mines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>Killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

CMAA, set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates mine action, responsibilities previously assigned to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC). CMAA's responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparing strategic plans, managing data, conducting quality control, and coordinating risk education and victim assistance. Prime Minister Hun Sen is the CMAA President, and a senior government minister, the Minister of Post and Telecommunication, Prak Sokhonn, who is the CMAA Vice-President, leads dialogue with donors as the Chair of a Joint Government-Development Partners’ Mine Action Technical Working Group.

**Strategic Planning**

A draft national strategic plan produced by a consultant in 2014 observed that Cambodia’s mine action has moved from an emergency phase to a development phase, and proposed that “much of the remaining contamination will be dealt with” within the present Article 5 deadline extension request. It identified casualty reduction as the priority for mine action but stated that most resources should be allocated to supporting development and poverty reduction. As of June 2015, the draft plan was still under review by the CMAA.

The CMAA identifies priority communes for clearance on the basis of casualty data. Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) in the eight most mine-affected western provinces and seven mainly ERW-affected eastern provinces are responsible for preparing annual clearance task lists, working in consultation with operators and local authorities to identify community priorities. The task lists are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMAC) and CMAA. In provinces without MAPUs, mine action is coordinated with provincial authorities. MAPUs also conduct land use checks at least six months after clearance is completed. However, MAPUs continue to be acutely short of resources, from computers to vehicles, which delays the release of land on which survey or clearance has been completed.

**Operators**

Mine clearance is undertaken mainly by the national operator, CMAC, and two international mine action non-governmental organisations (NGOs), HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). CMAC’s Demining Unit 6, based in Siem Reap, came under operational management of APOPO in 2014. A national NGO, Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD), has been active since 2011. At the start of 2014, three commercial companies active on a small scale were BACTEC, Viking, and D&Y. NPMEC had 13 demining platoons and two EOD teams accredited with CMAA in 2014.

UNDP has supported CMAA through a Clearing for Results programme since 2006. The first phase under UNDP management ended in March 2010 and a second phase (CFR II; see Table 3), advised by UNDP but managed by CMAA, started in January 2011 and was due to finish at the end of 2015. The programme introduced a process of awarding contracts for clearance by competitive bidding, although in practice international NGOs have felt unable to compete with the square metre clearance costs bid by national operators – CMAC and NPMEC – that have lower equipment and personnel overheads, and they have largely stayed out of the bidding.

For the period from May 2014 to the end of January 2015, the CFR programme awarded three contracts. Two, with a combined value of $3.2 million, went to CMAC for survey and clearance of 12.1km² in Battambang and for 6.2km² of Banteay Meanchey, respectively. The third contract went to NPMEC for $0.86 million to tackle 4.4km² of contamination in Pailin. Completion of these contracts brought the total area released under the first four years of CFR II to 72.9km², well past the target of 35km². The programme expected to release a further 57.7km² of land in 2015, including 27.7km² through clearance and 30km² cancelled by non-technical survey.
Table 3: CFR II contracts and land release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract period</th>
<th>Contract value (US$)</th>
<th>Land released (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2011 – April 2012</td>
<td>2,381,616</td>
<td>10,349,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2012 – January 2013</td>
<td>2,883,034</td>
<td>15,013,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2013 – April 2014</td>
<td>4,193,647</td>
<td>22,983,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2014 – January 2015</td>
<td>4,056,170</td>
<td>24,579,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,514,467</strong></td>
<td><strong>72,925,366</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LAND RELEASE

In a submission to the Article 5 Implementation Committee in June 2015, CMAA said Cambodia had released a total of 182km² in 2014 through a combination of non-technical and technical survey and full clearance, but provided no details. However, CMAA clarified that its database had recorded only release of 96.2km² representing BLS polygons (see Table 4). The remaining 85.7km² involved land not identified as contaminated by the BLS, including land cleared or verified to support infrastructure development.

Table 4: Land release in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BLS polygons released</th>
<th>Area cancelled by NTS (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>22,209,069</td>
<td>23,767,375</td>
<td>50,238,572</td>
<td>96,215,016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NTS = non-technical survey  
TS = technical survey

Preliminary results of land release in 2013 indicated operators had released about 109km², but data available from CMAA’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database in May 2015 recorded only some 45km². The lack of up-to-date data was partly a result of work in progress uploading and quality assuring historical data into CMAA’s IMSMA New Generation/Version 6 database. However, it also reflected deep-rooted problems with Cambodia’s mine action information management, including incompatibility between the reporting formats of some operators, notably CMAC, and the CMAA database, and delays in some operator reporting. Moreover, in a bid to keep operations focused on evidence-based clearance, CMAA only reports release of polygons identified by the BLS. Discrepancies in results reported by CMAA and some operators, particularly CMAC, may reflect the inclusion in operator data of land outside BLS polygons.

An information management assessment conducted for CMAA in 2015 observed that “data flow from CMAC which is the main national operator to the CMAA Database unit is still a big challenge which hampers the overall performance of the information management in the sector.” CMAA engaged with operators to address information management weaknesses and proposed introducing a one-month deadline for operators to submit reports after task completion.
Survey in 2014

In March 2015, CMAA issued one contract to HALO and two to CMAC to conduct a follow-up non-technical survey of areas covered by the BLS with a view to establishing the extent of BLS polygons cancelled as a result of land reclamation by local inhabitants. The survey was intended to avoid more time-consuming technical survey and default clearance of land already in use. Results of what CMAA called the land reclamation survey were expected in the last quarter of 2015. HALO Trust reported that its resurvey of minefields under this initiative resulted in release of 560 areas covering almost 21.6km². CMAC questions whether non-technical survey provides a sufficiently thorough investigation or safe basis for releasing land and said that it only conducted full technical survey in 2014, releasing 20.5km². CMAA reported that CMAC released 21.5km² through technical survey.

Clearance in 2014

Results compiled by Mine Action Monitor from operator data suggest that more land was released through full clearance in 2014 than the previous year, but substantial inconsistencies with data provided by CMAA prevent a clear determination of the results. Table 5 details the best available information on clearance in 2014.

CMAC, much the biggest operator with around 1,700 staff in 2014, reported releasing almost 35km² of mine-affected land by full clearance in 2014, destroying 13,847 anti-personnel mines, although it did not disaggregate mines tackled through clearance of mined and battle areas. The CMAA’s database, as of May 2015, reported that CMAC had cleared some 28km² and destroyed 5,221 anti-personnel mines, acknowledging that as a result of delays in quality assuring clearance reports its data was not complete.

In addition to humanitarian clearance, CMAC undertook tasks in support of development projects, working on a number of road projects in Battambang with NGOs from Japan, its principal source of funding, and putting greater emphasis on land release linked to broader community engagement. CMAC’s Siem Reap-based Demining Unit 6, under operational management of APOPO since the start of 2014, released 4.85km² through clearance and reduced another 1.67km² through technical survey in 2014, and in 2015 brought in mine detection rats from Mozambique to try to raise productivity. It expected to start testing them around mid-year and to develop standards in cooperation with CMAA.

Of the two international operators, HALO Trust expanded in the second half of 2014, boosted by a three-year grant from the UK Department for International Development, closing the year working with around 1,200 personnel, including 990 deminers. It reported a slight increase in area cleared and items destroyed. In the past two years, HALO committed more assets to tackling anti-vehicle mines, but in 2014 it was also able to return to parts of the K5 mine belt in Banteay Meanchey where it had to suspend operations in 2009. It gained access for the first time to parts of the mine K5 belt in southern Pailin.

MAG started 2014 with 430 staff but experienced a severe drop in its funding in mid-2014 and at year end had a total staff of 108 staff, including 71 deminers. With new funding coming on stream in 2015, MAG expected to bring several teams back into service in 2015 conducting both mine clearance in the north west and cluster munition clearance in north eastern Ratanakiri province.

CMAA recorded clearance by NPMEC that was more than double the area it reported in 2014, partly as a result of work undertaken on government development projects in the eastern provinces of Kratie and Stung Treng, although the number of anti-personnel mines it destroyed was a little over half the previous year’s number. CMAA only reports and quality assures clearance conducted on BLS polygons. NPMEC also cleared areas for the government on government infrastructure or development tasks outside BLS polygons. Details of such operations appear to be unrecorded, and anecdotal accounts of its work raise questions about the quality of clearance. The tasks are not subject to quality management by CMAA; as a result, the substance of such accounts cannot be upheld or discounted.

Table 5: Mine and battle area clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>Submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>34.67</td>
<td>25.41</td>
<td>13,847</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>98,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSHD</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>11.95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,209</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPMEC</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>54.38</td>
<td>25.41</td>
<td>20,479</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>99,927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BAC = battle area clearance  APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2009), Cambodia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020. Cambodia is not on track to meet this deadline.

Cambodia’s revised Article 5 extension request submitted in September 2009 is obsolete as a reference point for assessing the progress of mine action. Its estimate of remaining contamination (almost 649km²) has been overtaken by the results of the BLS and the land reclamation resurvey. Moreover, the extension request’s projected clearance rates (ranging from 38km² in 2009 to 47km² in 2019) have been overtaken by the higher productivity achieved with the land-release methodology applied increasingly since 2012 [see Table 6].

Weaknesses in Cambodia’s mine action information management, however, also complicate attempts to assess progress towards its Article 5 obligations. CMAA reported release of a total of 182km² in 2014 in a submission to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, but acknowledged close to half of this (85.78km²) was on land that had not been identified by survey as contaminated. The Committee observed “that progress in implementation could be significantly clarified if Cambodia presented information in such a way that it could be compared with information previously provided by Cambodia and disaggregated according to land that is cancelled, reduced or cleared.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared</th>
<th>Area cancelled or reduced by survey</th>
<th>Total area released</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>54.38</td>
<td>42.08</td>
<td>96.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>45.59</td>
<td>21.46</td>
<td>67.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>45.96</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>52.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>37.85</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>37.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>29.69</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>29.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>213.47</td>
<td>70.16</td>
<td>283.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cambodia does not expect to complete clearance of 649km² by 2020 and despite the faster pace of land release in the last three years it appears unlikely to finish clearance of the much wider contamination identified by the BLS within its current extension. End-2014 estimates of total anti-personnel mine contamination show a net reduction of 60.5km² from the estimates a year earlier, despite a 56% rise in the estimate of dense (A1) anti-personnel mine contamination. However, the clearance target is shifting as survey continues to add new polygons to the database of contamination.

28 Email from Adam Jasinski, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 28 March 2015.
30 Data provided by CMAA Database Unit, 4 May 2015.
32 Data provided by CMAA Database Unit, 4 May 2015.
33 Interview with Kim Warren, Country Programme Director, APOPO, Siem Reap, 7 May 2015.
34 Email from Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, 28 March 2015, and interview in Siem Reap, 7 May 2015.
35 Interview with Greg Crowther, Regional Director, South and South East Asia, and Nick Guest, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, in Phnom Penh, 6 May 2015, and emails from Greg Crowther, 22 May and 17 August 2015.
36 Data provided by CMAA Database Unit, 4 May 2015; and interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 23 June 2015.
37 Compiled from data provided by the CMAA and operators, May 2015. Operator data shows a higher mined area cleared (54.4km²) than the CMAA (50.2km²) suggesting some operator results include land outside BLS polygons.
39 Email from Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, 28 March 2015.
40 MAG reported releasing a total of 1.53km² through manual clearance and technical survey. Emails from Greg Crowther, MAG, 22 May and 17 August 2015.
42 Compiled by Mine Action Monitor from data provided by the CMAA and operators, May 2015.
43 CMAA data reported release of 96.2km² in 2014, including 50.2km² released by full clearance and 46km² cancelled or reduced by survey.
While Chad’s mine action programme still performed poorly in 2014, it showed signs of improvement over the previous year with the development of a new strategic plan and the return of Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Chad should take the necessary measures to strengthen the effectiveness of its national mine action centre.
- Chad should elaborate a resource mobilisation strategy to secure funding and attract international technical and operational support in order to avoid further interruption in demining operations.
- Chad should complete its nationwide survey, as soon as security allows, to be able to estimate the full extent of its mine threat as well as to revise its mine action strategy accordingly.

CONTAMINATION

Chad has identified 103.5km² of confirmed mined area. However, more contaminated areas could be identified as further survey is still required in four regions (Borkou, Ennedi, Moyen Chari, and Tibesti). It also has a significant problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW); it has so far identified 221 ERW-contaminated areas covering 2.5km².

Five of 22 regions in Chad still contain confirmed mined area, as set out in Table 1. Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti are located in northern Chad at the border with Libya; Sila is located at the border with Sudan; and Moyen-Chari is in southern Chad at the border with the Central African Republic.

Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMA</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borkou</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ennedi</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moyen-Chari</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibesti</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
<td><strong>103.55</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 100m² CMA = confirmed mined area

Chad’s contamination is the result of the 1973 Libyan invasion and 30 years of internal conflict. Chad’s mine action plan for 2014–19 indicated that, based on a nationwide technical survey conducted in 2010–12 and information available as of May 2014, a total of 787 hazardous areas covering 1,236km² were identified, including 123 mined areas across seven regions (104km²) and 664 ERW-contaminated areas across nine regions (1,132km²). Chad reported that it has already addressed ten mined areas and 443 ERW-contaminated areas.

Mines and ERW are obstacles to safe access to housing, roads, pastures, water points, and mining, especially in northern Chad. The contamination constitutes a permanent threat to local populations and considerably hinders socio-economic development. In 2014, Chad registered 70 casualties (14 killed and 56 injured).

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3 Ibid.
4 Third Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 May 2013, p. 7.
6 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form J.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by a national mine action authority, the National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), and a mine action centre, the National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND).

In late 2014, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), which had been Chad’s sole international demining operator in 2013 but had to withdraw from the country due to lack of funding, was contracted as part of a European Union-funded project (Projet d’appui au secteur du déminage au Tchad, PADEMIN) to conduct clearance, especially in the northern regions of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti. MAG resumed its demining operations in late 2014 with new funds allocated by the European Union (EU).

Chad also reported in April 2015 that Handicap International, with funding from the PADEMIN project, provided support to build CND’s capacity in 2014. The operator will also be conducting non-technical survey in the southern region Moyen-Chari.

Strategic Planning

In May 2013, the government of Chad approved a new strategic mine action plan for 2013–17 aimed, among other things, at developing and maintaining an effective data collection and management system, strengthening national mine action capacities, and clearing contaminated areas.

Following the request of the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, CND elaborated, with technical support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a national mine action plan for 2014–19. The plan gave details on the number, location, and size of remaining mined areas, and provided the following timeline:

- In June 2015–June 2019, operations would be conducted in Borkou
- In January 2015–April 2019, operations would be conducted in Ennedi
- In May 2015–December 2015, operations would be conducted in Moyen Chari
- In September 2015–February 2016, operations would be conducted in Sila
- In November 2014–November 2019, operations would be conducted in Tibesti.

Since 2008, Chad’s mine action programme has suffered from a lack of international funding, weak government oversight, and persistent mismanagement within CND, resulting in little or no demining until October 2012 when the EU provided funding to MAG. In 2012, management problems at CND resulted in the dismissal of its director and hundreds of employees. CND reduced its personnel from 720 to 320 and a new director was appointed in 2013. CND demining operations have also been plagued by poor equipment and lack of funding. In an update to states parties in June 2014, Chad acknowledged difficulties faced by its national mine action centre and called for resumption of technical and operational assistance.
**LAND RELEASE**

In its Article 7 transparency report for 2014, Chad reported the destruction of 21 mines (11 anti-personnel mines and ten anti-vehicle mines), compared to 18 mines in 2013 (six anti-personnel mines and 12 anti-vehicle mines).14

Chad did not report on the extent of land release in 2012 and 2013. In 2014, MAG was conducting clearance in Tibesti but has not reported in detail on its survey and clearance operations.15

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) (and in accordance with the six-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), Chad is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020. Chad is highly unlikely to meet this deadline.

Chad’s Article 5 deadline has already been extended three times. Its latest extension request, granted in 2013, noted as circumstances impeding compliance with its Article 5 obligations: lack of financial support; the size of the country and poor road network; information management problems; mismanagement at CND; and lack of transparency in resources management, as well as security issues.

In granting the request, the APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties requested that Chad submit a clear national survey and clearance plan leading to completion of its Article 5 obligations, and provide details on: its remaining mined areas; total area already released; funds mobilised to cover implementation of its national plan; and difficulties that could affect its ability to comply with its clearance obligations.

In May 2014, Chad submitted its mine action plan for the extension period, which provides a more precise idea of its remaining contamination covering 103.5km² and indicates a provisional and general timetable. However, the full extent of the challenge remains unknown, as further survey needs to be conducted. This, combined with the lack of a concrete plan to complete survey and intermittent clearance in previous years, makes it difficult to believe that Chad is capable of meeting its 2020 deadline.

Chad’s mine action plan for 2014–19 foresees expenditure of approx. US$61 million ($40 million for operations and technical assistance, $4.5 million for equipment, and $16.6 million for CND’s running costs). Chad has planned to contribute to about 30% of total funding ($16.6 million). In 2014, Chad reported contributing $2.76 million to CND; no funding was, though, allocated to land release operations.16

In November 2013, the EU decided to contribute €5.4 million (US$7.1 million) to support demining efforts in Chad, of which €3.5 million ($4.6 million) would be allocated to demining and land release operations, and €300,000 (some $400,000 at the time) to information management.17 As of June 2015, this was the only international contribution mobilised for Chad’s extension period, implying that $39 million was still needed.

Chad identified the weather conditions, its capacity to mobilise human, technical and financial resources, and the security situation — especially in border areas — as the main obstacles that could prevent effective implementation of its mine action plan 2014–19.18 Chad has further noted that the good implementation of its mine action plan implies that funding and technical resources have been identified and secured.19 The EU contribution has allowed the resumption of clearance operations in northern Chad and non-technical survey in Moyen-Chari since the end of 2014. However, as of mid-2015, Chad had not mobilised the resources required to carry out its workplan, with only one international contribution received for its six-year extension period and a US$39 million shortfall that must be filled quickly. In order to ensure sustainable results, Chad needs to urgently seek international technical, operational and financial support, as well as concretely strengthening its mine action institution.

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8 Ibid.; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form J.
11 Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 May 2013; and interview with Emmanuel Sauvage, UNDP, in Geneva, 16 April 2013.
12 Interview with Emmanuel Sauvage, UNDP, in Geneva, 16 April 2013.
13 Statement of Chad, APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, June 2014.
14 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Forms G and J; and Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form G.
15 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form G.
19 Ibid., p. 13.
CROATIA

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE

| Score | 6.8 | 7.0 |

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Croatia’s mine action programme performed reasonably well in 2014, with clearance output up on the previous year. However, it needs urgently to develop and implement new land-release standards that use technical survey to reduce and release land more efficiently.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Croatia should secure the initial promises of European Union (EU) funds and maintain or increase the level of Croatian government funding.
- The new mine action law should be passed as soon as possible and used to develop and implement new land release standards.
- Croatia should better regulate the commercial tendering process to discourage fragmentation of the demining market.
- Croatia should consider developing ways for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to engage in technical survey.

CONTAMINATION

Croatia is affected by mines and, to a much lesser extent, explosive remnants of war (ERW); a legacy of four years of armed conflict associated with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. At the end of 2014, total suspected hazardous area (SHA) was estimated to cover 79 municipalities in ten counties; records indicate “more than 70,000 mines and unknown number of UXO [unexploded ordnance] remaining in the ground, mainly along the former lines of confrontation.” The SHA is marked with 12,409 mine warning signs.

Table 1: Contamination at the end of 2014 by county (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>SMA</th>
<th>CMA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brod-Posavina</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karlovac</td>
<td>37.73</td>
<td>17.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lika-Senj</td>
<td>45.24</td>
<td>99.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osijek-Baranja</td>
<td>41.85</td>
<td>29.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Požega-Slavonia</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>25.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split-Dalmacija</td>
<td>10.93</td>
<td>12.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisak-Moslavina</td>
<td>57.89</td>
<td>41.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šibenik-Knin</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>21.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vukovar-Srijem</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>10.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zadar</td>
<td>23.30</td>
<td>20.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>244.82</strong></td>
<td><strong>285.35</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SMA = suspected mined area  CMA = confirmed mined area

In 2014, Croatia conducted new general (non-technical) and technical survey on military facilities, resulting in identified mined area of 32.4km². Almost 31.4km² of the area is on military training sites. This is a much higher figure than the previously reported figure of 2.5km² and is not included in its overall reported SHA. Croatia has also identified areas on its border with Hungary to be cleared as part of a cross-border cooperation programme. The total SHA for this area has not been publicly reported.

Two-thirds of contaminated area (67%) is in forests, 19% in agricultural land, and 14% in karst (rocky limestone areas) and macchia (shrubland). Priorities for clearance are agricultural land, forests with economic potential, and national parks.

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2 Email from Miljenko Vahtaric, CROMAC, 8 May 2014.
3 Emails from Miljenko Vahtaric, CROMAC, 4 July 2013 and 8 May 2014.
4 Interview with Miljenko Vahtaric, CROMAC, Sisak, 14 April 2014, and email, 8 May 2014; Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report, Form C, 10 April 2012.
5 Interview with Miljenko Vahtaric, CROMAC, Sisak, 14 April 2014.
As expected, Croatia completed clearance in two counties (Dubrovnik-Neretva and Virovitica-Podravina) in 2014. The remaining SHA is in ten counties and 79 municipalities and towns; 85% is in forests. Some of this is open for economic use, but the larger area is under protection either as a National Park, ‘Park of Nature’ or a Natura 2000 area. The remaining 15% is agricultural land that the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) describes as a “socio-economic priority.”

Croatia was affected by the Balkan flood disaster in May 2014. However, only 2.2 km² of SHAs in Croatia were affected by the floods, in three municipalities in Vukovar-Srijem County. According to CROMAC, “there was no record of changes in the contamination of the area” because the “breach of the river bank was downstream of the SHA.” After the floods, CROMAC prioritised demining of the flooded areas. The “most critical” SHA, between the river bank and railway line in Gunja municipality, “started immediately after the withdrawal of the water”, funded by the “in-kind donation” of services by Croatian demining companies.

According to CROMAC, some 2 km² of remaining SHA in two areas along the flood-affected border with Serbia, located in Vrbanja and Nijemci municipalities, would be released by the end of 2015 through clearing 0.74 km² of confirmed hazardous area with European Union (EU) funds and the rest through “additional analysis and technical survey”.

A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Mine Action Recovery Needs Assessment for Flooded Areas in Eastern Croatia, completed in late 2014, found “no evidence of mine migration or indication that the boundaries of the SHAs have changed that will pose any immediate threat to local populations in Croatia.” It praised CROMAC’s “good cooperation and coordination” in an “effective mine risk education, survey and marking response during and after the flooding.” Nevertheless, it warned: “Had the problem been larger, there would not be capacity to respond in such a timely and effective way.” It recommended better integration of mine action into disaster response planning and vice versa.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

CROMAC was established on 19 February 1998 as the umbrella organisation for mine action coordination. CROMAC had 126 employees at the end of 2014. The CROMAC Council, an oversight and strategic planning body, consists of a president, appointed by the country’s Prime Minister, and ten members, appointed from the Ministries of Defence, Finance, and Interior, as well as eminent persons. The Council now meets once a month to discuss issues including the Annual Plan, the new Law on Mine Action, changes in the organisation of CROMAC, procurement of new equipment, and reporting on the EU projects.

In April 2012, the government created the Office for Mine Action (OMA), reporting to the Prime Minister’s office, to function as a focal point for mine action, strengthening coordination among stakeholders and funding agencies, and raising public awareness about mine hazards. The OMA includes a Unit for EU Funds tasked with promoting access of the mine action sector to a range of EU funds. The establishment of OMA has elevated the status of mine action as OMA can “politically pressure the government and international actors” in ways that CROMAC, as a technical body, cannot.

Strategic Planning

Croatia’s 2008 Article 5 deadline extension request set out annual demining targets and strategic goals, including elimination of any mine threat: to housing and areas planned for the return of displaced people by 2010; to infrastructure by 2011; to agricultural land by 2013; and to forest areas by 2018. While clearance of the mine threat to housing and infrastructure is now complete, Croatia missed its target on agricultural land; by the end of 2013, 19% of the total SHA was agricultural land.
Legislation and Standards

A Law on Humanitarian Demining was adopted in 2005 and entered into force on 5 January 2006.21 A 2007 amendment to the law elaborated responsibilities and human resource requirements, and a second amendment in 2008 clarified responsibilities for quality control (QC).22 The law assigns the Croatian army responsibility for clearing all military areas.23 In 2016, Croatia was in the process of drafting a new demining law; a public draft was available in March 2015. CROMAC believes the new law will allow it more freedom in technical survey as considerable scope exists for releasing much SHA without the need for full clearance.24

A representative of OMA stated that the benefit of the process of drafting the new law was that “everyone was at the table”, including governmental agencies, trade unions, and the Association of Demining Entrepreneurs, which represents commercial demining companies.25 Nevertheless, an NGO representative called for greater attention to the voices of mine survivors in the drafting of the new law.26 OMA stated that among the priorities is an attempt to align Croatia’s Law on Mine Action with EU Directives and international law. Similarly, UNDP’s flood needs assessment recommended involving the “UN and others in the international community” in “the public consultation ... on the new demining law...”27 However, an international consultant who has been advising Croatia’s mine action programme was concerned that there had not been much engagement with international agencies like the UN and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in the drafting of the law.28

Among the proposed provisions are: the possibility of adopting new standards on land release; the establishment, within OMA, of a new database of every mine survivor; increased insurance for deminers; a stronger role for the Ministry of Interior; and stricter regulations governing the start-up of demining firms and the entry of international firms into Croatia, buttressed by harsher penalties for operators that fail to meet standards.29 UNDP praised the new law’s inclusion of provisions on “release of mine-free land”.30 However, the draft circulated by the Ministry of Interior in March 2015 did face some criticism: it does not include provision for cluster munitions, and an international consultant feared that the new land release provisions were not far reaching enough.31 Similarly, UNDP stated that the “inclusion of a one percent technical check of areas subjected to non-technical (general) survey before they are released” would “imply that the ... process is not trusted, thereby undermining the safety of .... land ... previously released through this method.”32 To introduce this check, stated UNDP’s needs assessment, “would be both time-consuming and costly.”33 CROMAC estimated that the new Law on Mine Action would be adopted by the Croatian parliament in the “second half of 2015”.34
Operators

As a result of conditions for earlier World Bank funding, Croatia has an unusually commercialised mine action sector, with almost all civil clearance conducted by local companies competing for tenders. CROMAC believes this model of privatised clearance is “faster, cheaper and more efficient”. Much of foreign donor funding is tendered by ITF Enhancing Human Security, while CROMAC manages tendering for government and EU money according to the Law on Public Procurement. Croatia without Mines, a trust fund, raises money from private sources.

The exception to the commercial tendering system is the state-owned enterprise MUNGOS, which is directly assigned enough tasks by CROMAC to keep it solvent while it slowly phases down operations.

CROMAC stated that recent restructuring had improved MUNGOS’s efficiency. CROMAC believes that when the new mine action law comes into force, MUNGOS will focus on technical survey, leaving clearance to commercial companies.

A representative of the Association of Demining Entrepreneurs expressed dissatisfaction with the ongoing privileged status of MUNGOS. NGOs are barred from competing for commercial tenders as CROMAC sees their subsidy by other funds as “unfair”.

At the end of 2014, there were 40 demining companies accredited in Croatia (an increase of two on the previous year), employing 650 deminers (an average of just over 16 deminers per company), using 30 mine detection dogs (MDDs), 55 demining machines and 685 detectors. This represents an increase in capacity from 2013; according to CROMAC this is the result of additional EU funding. An increased number of MDDs was, according to CROMAC, required because of the greater number of tasks in “mountain and forest areas”, that are “not suitable for demining machines” and where “dogs can increase productivity”. CROMAC expected these trends of increased capacity to continue in 2015 as they finalise EU pre-accession funds and as new EU money for agricultural projects comes through.

There are relatively low barriers to entry in the mine clearance market and so there is considerable fragmentation. Of the 28 companies operational in 2014, 14 cleared less than one square kilometre and no company cleared more than 14% of the total area cleared. A director of a commercial demining company complained that the fragmentation of the market made it difficult to make money, leaving many companies in “pre-bankruptcy”.

The UNDP needs assessment observed that, “In recent years the number of demining companies in Croatia has grown but capacity overall has decreased.”

The average net price of mine clearance did not change drastically in 2014, increasing (in national currency) to HRK6.73 (approx. US$1.01) per square metre from HRK6.15 (approx. $1.1) in 2013. This makes it difficult for firms to make a profit on clearance. Larger firms claim they are hampered by earlier over-investment in mechanical assets and equipment based on assumptions that funding would match the levels outlined in the 2009–19 mine action strategy.

Some companies have sought to diversify with operations outside Croatia, but given the relatively higher wages of Croatian deminers, lack of international experience, and lack of brand recognition, they have found it difficult to compete for tenders. An NGO representative raised concerns that the “quality of demining” suffers when the price of “demining is low”. A Director of a commercial demining firm echoed this concern, saying that it is “hard to do [demining] safely” when the price is so low. “We are all under pressure,” he said, and “we are transferring the pressure to the deminers – they are aware that we can’t pay salaries without clearing 500 square meters a day.”

In 2013, OMA and trade unions raised concerns of “price dumping” by smaller and less established firms aiming to gain a market share by underbidding on tenders. However, in 2014 CROMAC reported that it started issuing “bigger tenders”. This, according to CROMAC, “allows companies to reduce their cost of operations” and has provided an incentive for companies to do “better planning”
and "cooperate" with each other. CROMAC also stated that "Bigger contracts stabilised prices" and that "there were no cases of 'price-dumping' in 2014." A representative of CROMAC stated that although prices were lower, the bigger tenders allowed "continuation of work", resulted in fewer stoppages, and enabled companies to negotiate on better terms with hotels and services in their project areas. Nevertheless, CROMAC acknowledged that bigger contracts mean disputes over allocation of funds between the companies that have to form consortiums to compete for the new tenders. A representative of OMA said that the bigger projects were "more rational" but remained concerned about fragmentation of the market and possible price dumping. A director of a commercial demining firm said "we wanted bigger tenders but these are too big", requiring large consortia in which "some companies only get bad areas" to clear. The UNDP needs assessment recommended that CROMAC "consider doing longer-term contracting to make maximum use of operational assets in Croatia for both technical survey and mine clearance. The current contracting of defined polygons is suitable for mine clearance but would not be conducive for effective technical survey and a new procedure should be drafted once the law is changed."!

**LAND RELEASE**

Croatia released a total of 83.80km² of mined area in 2014, more than in the previous three years: 71.9km² in 2013, 67.3km² in 2012, 70.4km² in 2011. Land release was 97% of the amount foreseen for the year in the 2009–19 mine action strategy, with clearance achieving 113% of its target and survey 89%.

A total of 37.75km² was released through clearance, considerably higher than in previous years (see Table 2), with 46.05km² cancelled through general/non-technical survey: 39.56km² in 2013, 36.79km² in 2012,.69km² in 2011. Clearance operations destroyed 1,842 anti-personnel mines and 1,507 anti-vehicle mines.

**Table 2: Mine clearance in 2010–14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>160.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SURVEY IN 2014**

In total, 12 SHAs were cancelled by non-technical survey in 2014, covering 46km².

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35 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, Sisak, 14 April 2014.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.; and interview with Amira Savranovic, Director, MUNGOS, Sisak, 14 April 2014.
38 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, Zagreb, 16 March 2015.
39 Interview with Željko Romić, Director, Piper Demining Company, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
40 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, Sisak, 14 April 2014.
41 Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 20 April and 9 June 2015.
42 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 20 April 2015.
43 Interview with Željko Romić, Piper Demining Company, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
45 Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 5 May 2014 and 9 June 2015.
46 Interview with Željko Romić, Piper Demining Company, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
47 Ibid.
48 Email from Marija Breber, Social Worker, Mine Aid, 25 March 2015.
49 Interview with Željko Romić, Piper Demining Company, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
50 In: "Croatia brings minefields to EU soil", Deutsche Welle, 4 April 2013, at: http://www.dw.de/croatia-brings-minefields-to-eu-soil/a-16719803.
51 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 20 April 2015.
52 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, in Zagreb, 16 March 2015.
53 Ibid.
54 Interview with Dijana Pleština, OMA, Zagreb, 16 March 2015.
55 Interview with Željko Romić, Director, Piper Demining Company, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
57 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 20 April 2015.
58 Ibid.
Clearance in 2014

Clearance operations released 37.75 km² and a total of 110 mined areas in 2014, as set out in Table 3. Some 2.1 km² of clearance in 2014 resulted in no mines being found, higher than the 1.5 km² in 2013. According to CROMAC, no demining or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) accidents were reported in 2014.

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bak Unija</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOS-F</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREDO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMIN-KA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETEKTOR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETONATOR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIZ-EKO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOK-ING razminiranje</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSSIO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARPIJA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEKSOGEN</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTRAŽIVAČ</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINA PLUS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKA*DEMING</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNGOS razminiranje</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NITRAT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORKAN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPER</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPER razminiranje</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUMITAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRAFIRMA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TETRAZEN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITAN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORNADO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA razminiranje</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeleni Kvadrat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals: 111, 37.75, 1,842, 1,507, 1,984

APM = anti-personnel mines | AVM = anti-vehicle mines | UXO = unexploded ordnance

59 Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 20 April and 9 June 2015.
60 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 20 April 2015.
61 Ibid. Note: CROMAC states the data in this table is from its database of contracts. Some of the accredited companies were working as subcontractors and as a result are not listed in this table.
62 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 20 April 2015 and interview, 16 March 2015.
63 Interview with Zeljko Romic, Piper Demining Company, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
65 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 20 April 2015.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) (and in accordance with the ten-year extension request granted by states parties in 2008), Croatia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019. Croatia is not on track to meet the deadline.

In previous years, Croatia had reported fears that falling donor funds posed a threat to its capacity to comply with Article 5. The Croatian government is now “cautiously optimistic” that if planned EU funding is received “Croatia will meet its Article 5 deadline.” Nonetheless, there remains scepticism among operators who assert that the programme is operating significantly below capacity. UNDP stated that Croatia “is not currently on target” to fulfil its deadline.

In 2014, a total of some €37 million was spent on demining in Croatia. In 2016, the Croatian state budget for mine action was €21.75 million, which CROMAC reported will remain the same in 2015. CROMAC expected no further funds from international donors (other than the EU) in 2015 (compared with €1.32 million in 2014), and that funds from private investors would decrease from €4.95 million in 2014 to €3 million. In 2014, Croatia received €8.94 million from the EU.

As a result of its accession to the EU, Croatia is no longer on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) list and so “can no longer be a recipient of official development assistance (ODA),” which UNDP has identified as “an impediment to their removal of the mine problem.” However, despite its entry into the EU, in 2013 and 2014, Croatia was still receiving money from the EU under its Instrument of Pre-accession. In 2014, OMA presented a photo exhibit and organised a roundtable in Brussels to raise awareness of the mine situation in Croatia, and succeeded in securing promises of major EU funding for mine action. It is believed that these funds will be “sufficient” to enable Croatia to meet its Article 5 deadline. The agreement streams mine action “horizontally” across other development projects.

In April 2015, Croatia was finalising a variety of new demining programmes to be funded by EU Structural and Cohesion Funds. In late 2015, Croatia will start a project to demine all agricultural land in Croatia by 2017, costing an estimated €50 million and financed largely by EU rural development funds. Conducted in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, the project will clear land that is “fragmented and has not been easy to tender.” CROMAC has stated that the current demining law constrains use of technical survey. CROMAC hopes the new law will enable area reduction according to international standards. For instance, in early 2014 CROMAC estimated that the CHA could be reduced to 80km² with better survey techniques. However, in 2015 CROMAC stated more cautiously: “The figure of 80km² is the approximate size of minefields for which we have minefield records. There are areas that “are confirmed mined but without minefield records.” CROMAC stated that “one of our main goals is to reduce this area to the size of real problem. The new Law on Mine Action will allow us to use technical survey for the reduction purposes and to better define and confirm minefields for which we don’t have minefield records.”

UNDP’s Mine Action Recovery Needs Assessment for Flooded Areas in Eastern Croatia stated that the “ability to release land through technical survey would enhance the capacity to more quickly recover” from disasters and “speed up ongoing land release, making resources go further and enable better targeting of the mine clearance assets.....” However, it raised concerns that CROMAC “does not have sufficient survey capacity to enable the release of land through technical survey once the demining law is changed” and so should “boost” this capacity “to fully implement land-release methodology.”

Croatia’s priorities for 2015 include: completely removing the mine threat from Vukovar-Srijem and Brod-Posavina Counties; clearing the agricultural land in Karlovac, Požega-Slavonia and Osijek-Baranja Counties; starting removal of mine threat from agricultural land from Zadar, Šibenik-Knin, and Split-Dalmatia Counties; and reducing the SHA by 104.5km².

In 2016, as part of the EU-funded Natura Vita project, Croatia will demine the Kopački Rit Park of Nature and protected forest along the river Drava in Baranja. The project will cost an estimated €25 million. An additional project will use €4 million from the EU to clear the remaining flood-affected areas in Vukovar-Srijem County and minefields in Osijek-Baranja County. In 2015, Croatia expected to spend €30 million of EU money on mine action activities. A joint project with Hungary along the shared border – mine clearance on the Croatian side, World War II-era UXO clearance on the Hungarian side – was due to start in 2016 with both states sharing the costs equally.
**IRAQ**

**MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY**

New management of the Department of Mine Action (DMA) is attempting to strengthen Iraq’s mine action programme, but against a background of political tension, dysfunctional bureaucracy and the ongoing armed conflict it performs poorly in most areas.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Iraq should strengthen the authority, management, personnel, and resources of the DMA.
- Iraq should develop the institutional links between the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), DMA, and the Regional Mine Action Centre-South (RMAC-S).
- DMA should recruit international technical assistance to enable it to discharge its sector management responsibilities effectively and transparently.
- DMA and IKMAA should formulate multiyear plans setting out policy, priorities, and objectives for mine clearance.
- DMA and IKMAA should develop information management systems to enable them to collect and share timely mine action data.
- Iraq should develop the capacity and improve operating standards of national demining/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators.

CONTAMINATION

Iraq is believed to be one of the world’s most heavily mined countries, but is still working to produce a comprehensive estimate of the extent of the problem based on consistent survey standards, a task complicated by the escalation of conflict in the past two years.

The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS) was conducted in Iraq’s 18 governorates in two stages. The first, covering 13 governorates in 2004–06, identified 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 1,730km² of land and affecting 1,622 communities and 1.6 million people. Survey of the remaining five governorates was completed in 2010 but the findings have not been released, nor any reason advanced for not doing so. However, a non-technical survey of the northern governorates of Erbil and Dohuk completed in 2011 confirmed hazardous areas totalling 70km², 84% less than the estimated size of the SHAs (450km²) identified in these areas by the ILIS.¹

Latest estimates reported by DMA put total confirmed and suspected mine contamination in Iraq at 1,604km², of which three-quarters was attributed to one governorate, Basrah. The northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulimaniya under the Kurdish Regional Government accounted for 258km² (16%) of confirmed mined areas (CMAs) and SHAs.²

Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 2014¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missan</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassit</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayala</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>35.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninava</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulimaniya</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,251</td>
<td>147.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,169</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,411</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,451</strong></td>
<td><strong>192.99</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area    SHA = suspected hazardous area

However, IKMAA estimated total contamination in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRG) at the end of 2014 at 297km² [see Table 2].³

¹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Siraj Barzani, Director General, IKMAA, 3 August 2011.
² Email from Ahmed A. R. Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, Directorate of Mine Action, Ministry of Environment, 8 July 2015.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, Directorate of Technical Affairs, IKMAA, 25 July 2015.
Table 2: KRG contamination by province as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMA</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>22.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>48.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garmian</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>37.81</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>9.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulimaniya (Slemani)</td>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>140.05</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>38.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td><strong>178.09</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,917</strong></td>
<td><strong>119.37</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area  SHA = suspected hazardous area

Additional anti-personnel mine contamination may have been added in some areas affected by recent conflict, particularly with Islamic State (IS). After operations to recapture Mosul dam, Iraqi forces reported encountering mines laid by IS and four IKMAA deminers were reportedly killed and two injured by victim-activated devices left in properties in the vicinity of the dam in Nineveh governorate. The United Nations (UN) said in October 2014 that an estimated 3,000 explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines remained after IS and affiliated forces withdrew from Jurf al-Sakhr, a town south of Baghdad in Babylon governorate.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. Clearance of ERW, including cluster munition remnants [CMRs], was conducted in 2014 by a small number of international humanitarian operators and a larger group of national and international commercial operators.

**Iraqi Kurdistan region**

Mine action in Iraq’s northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is managed by IKMAA. It coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Slemani).

In the Iraqi Kurdistan region, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) was the only active humanitarian mine clearance agency. Commercial operators included Ararat, ASA, Chamy Razan, EODT, General Safety, Khabat, RONCO, Sardal Company for Demining, Shanica, and Valmara.

**Central and Southern Iraq**

In central and southern Iraq, responsibility for mine action was transferred in 2008 to the Ministry of Environment, which set up the DMA to coordinate and manage the sector. DMA implements policy set by a Higher Council for Mine Action (HCMA) created by, and reporting to, the prime minister, in which the ministries of defence, interior, and oil are major actors. HCMA is supported by a Technical Committee, functioning as its secretariat.

DMA oversees four regional mine action centres (RMACs): for the north (covering the governorates of Anbar, Mosul, Saladin and Kirkuk); the centre (Baghdad, Diyala, and Wasit); an area identified as ‘ME’ (Babylon, Karbala, Najaf, and Qadisiya); and the south (Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar). The extent to which the RMACs were active in 2014 is, however, unclear.

DMA’s role has been weakened in recent years by the lack of any legislation or regulatory framework establishing its mandate and mine action stakeholders continued to report obstacles to management and regulation of the sector arising from the division of responsibilities between different government institutions, poor communication and coordination between ministries, lack of transparency, convoluted bureaucracy, and corruption. Operators cite a litany of obstacles to working in Iraq, from accreditation to importing and registering vehicles and equipment, access to reliable or consolidated data, demolitions, and obtaining official sign-offs for land release.

In central and southern Iraq, the humanitarian agencies operating in 2014 included Danish Demining Group (DDG), Iraq Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Commercial operators, many contracted by oil companies, included Arabian Gulf Company, al-Safsafa, al-WAHA, G4S Ordnance Management, and Green Land. The army and civil defence were also active in conducting EOD and battle area clearance (BAC).

**Information Management**

Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP), a US non-governmental organisation, provided information management technical support to IKMAA in Erbil and DMA in Baghdad and Basrah.
LAND RELEASE

The extent of mine clearance in 2014 could not reliably be determined on the basis of available data, often including major discrepancies between mine action centres (MACs) and operators. Escalating conflict between Iraq and IS in the second half of 2014 severely affected mine action, forcing temporary suspension of operations in some areas, drawing army demining and EOD capacity away from operations in the south, and diverting attention to the immediate needs of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the humanitarian agencies seeking to assist them, particularly in the KRG.

In the KRG, IKMAA reported release of 3.98km² of mined area through clearance in 2014, about one-quarter less than the previous year. MAG, the only international humanitarian operator working in the north in 2014, increased capacity from 245 to around 450 staff in the second half of the year, with the help of short-term funding to undertake emergency tasks related to the humanitarian crisis. It reported release of a total of 7.04km², close to double the area it released in 2013. MAG did not disaggregate mine clearance from BAC and much of the released area appeared to be BAC of proposed camp sites for IDPs. At the same time, MAG reported a fall in funding for clearance of mined areas. IKMAA reported MAG cleared 1.05km² of mined area in 2014.

### Table 3: Mine clearance in the KRG in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IKMAA</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2,923,923</td>
<td>12,048</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,045,822</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,744</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,980,489</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,288</strong></td>
<td><strong>91</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,985</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance

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5 Ibib.
11 Interviews with mine action stakeholders, in Geneva 10 March 2015; and by telephone, 3 June 2015; and information received by email April to July 2015.
12 Email from Isam Ghareeb, Country Representative, iMMAP, 8 July 2015.
14 Email from Nina Seecharan, Country Director, MAG, 11 June 2015.
16 Ibib.
Operators in central and southern Iraq say land release is focused mainly on battle area rather than mined areas, and all operations became increasingly hampered in 2014 by the unavailability of military teams who alone are authorised to conduct demolitions, resulting in accumulation of cleared items on task sites posing a growing security hazard.

DMA reported release of a total of almost 13.1 km² of mined area through clearance in 2014, attributing most of it to DDG and small amounts to civil defence or commercial companies. DDG, however, reported it did not conduct mine clearance, releasing instead 9.18 km² of battle area. DDG closed its Basrah-based programme at the end of 2014, citing lack of donor interest in funding operations in the south, and relocated to the KRG where in early 2015 it started registration and accreditation procedures with IKMAA.

IMCO, among the biggest of the operators working with total staff of 162, said it released 0.09 km² of mined area in 2014 and reduced 0.33 km² through technical survey, clearing a total of 80 anti-personnel mines and 32 anti-vehicle mines, but DMA did not record it as releasing any mined land. IMCO was set up in 2003 with support from the USA which in 2014 amounted to close to US$10 million. However, IMCO was unable to resolve long-running issues over registration and accreditation with DMA. In May 2015, it received a grant termination order from the USA and was due to cease operating at the end of June 2015.

NPA deployed a post-clearance sampling and survey team supporting and tasked by RMAC-South in Basrah governorate, where it reported releasing more than 9 km² in 2014. NPA started clearance operations operating in Missan governorate in mid-2014, but focused on BAC.

### Table 4: Mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMCO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabian Gulf</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>3,582</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Waha Co.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Safsafa Co.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defence</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>Basrah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>171</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.10</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,446</strong></td>
<td><strong>308</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,877</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  
AVM = anti-vehicle mines  
UXO = unexploded ordnance

### ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Iraq is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018. Incomplete and inconsistent reporting on mine clearance makes it impossible to quantify accurately the extent of Iraq’s progress towards fulfilling its treaty obligations, but there is no prospect of Iraq fulfilling its treaty obligations by 2018.

In 2012, Deputy Environment Minister Kamal Latif stated that Iraq would not meet its 2018 clearance deadline. Developments in Iraq since then, including the escalation of conflict with Islamic State and affiliated forces in the second half of 2014, only reinforce that conclusion. Moreover, although Iraq lacks a current strategic plan, operators are clear that the humanitarian priority in central and southern Iraq is not clearing mines but other ERW, including cluster munition remnants (CMR).
17 In addition to release of 7.04km² of mine and battle area, MAG reported destroying 1,089 mines and 18,040 items of unexploded ordnance.
18 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 25 July 2015.
19 Email from Lene Rasmussen, Regional Manager, Middle East and North Africa, DDG, 6 July 2015.
20 Emails from Per Breivik, Chief Operating Officer, IMCO, 5 May and 4 June 2015.
22 Email from Ahmed A. R. Al-Jasim, DMA, 8 July 2015.
**THAILAND**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2018**  
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

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**PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY**

Thailand continued to improve its mine action performance in a number of areas in 2014, maintaining a trend that had begun the previous year.

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**MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE TEN MOST CONTAMINATED STATES PARTIES

THAILAND

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Thailand should recognize the significance of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) commitments and allocate more funds to mine action in order to accelerate completion of its Article 5 obligations.
- The Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) should develop a strategic mine action plan based on an up-to-date assessment of remaining contamination and realistic timelines for survey and clearance.
- TMAC should upgrade information management to allow timely reporting of mine action.

CONTAMINATION

Thailand is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including both abandoned explosive ordnance and unexploded ordnance (UXO), the result of conflicts on its borders with Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and Myanmar. The precise extent is not known, but the estimate of contamination as of end 2014 was 474 km² across 328 areas.¹

A 2001 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 530 communities in 27 of Thailand’s 76 provinces, and more than 500,000 people, as mine-ERW-affected, estimating total mine/ERW contamination at 2,557 km².² Thailand’s revised Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2008, claimed it had released 1,355 km² of this area, leaving a total of 1,202 km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA), including an estimated 528 km² of “real minefield” requiring manual clearance.³ TMAC reported the total confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) had been reduced to 496 km² by the end of 2013, and to 474 km² by the end of 2014.⁴

TMAC’s latest assessment in mid-2015 reported contamination in 16 provinces totalling 461 km².⁵ Seven provinces along Thailand’s 700 km-long border with Cambodia, used as a base for Cambodian non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the 1980s and 1990s, are the worst affected, accounting for 80% (381 km²) of the end-2014 total. TMAC identified another 91 km² of contamination on its northern border with the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and western areas on the border with Myanmar (see Table 1).⁶

TMAC reported that 16 of Thailand’s 77 provinces are still affected by mines. Phayao province was removed from the list of contaminated provinces after the last area in Chiangkham district was released in 2014 and Mae Hong Son province in July 2015 after TMAC had quality assured the last task area in Khunyuam District.⁷

### Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sakeo</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trad</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>91.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chanthaburi</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buriram</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surin</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisaket</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>93.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubonratthani</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>122.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttaratid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitsanuloke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tak</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiangmai</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mae HongSon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiangrai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chumporn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yala</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>328</strong></td>
<td><strong>474.26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHA = confirmed hazardous area

TMAC recorded four mine casualties in 2014, down from 16 casualties in 2013, 13 casualties in 2012, 24 casualties in 2011, and 23 casualties in 2010.¹¹ All four 2014 casualties recorded by TMAC occurred on the Thai-Cambodian border.¹²

Violent conflict in the mainly Muslim southern provinces has continued since 2004, including use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), some of them victim-activated. One villager was reported injured in 2014 after stepping on an IED.¹³

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¹ Information provided by the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC), 5 June 2015.
⁵ Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C. Later Thailand refers to previous CHA as suspected hazardous areas or SHA.
⁶ Data provided by TMAC, 5 June 2015.
⁷ Email from Visavesa Chuaysirint, Information Management and Operations Officer, NPA HD Programme Thailand, 6 May 2014.
⁸ Information provided by TMAC, 5 June 2015.
⁹ Information from the Coordination and Evaluation Division, TMAC, 5 June 2015.
¹⁰ Information provided by TMAC, 5 June 2015.
¹¹ Information provided by TMAC, 30 April 2014 and 6 February 2015.
¹² Information provided by TMAC, Bangkok, 30 April 2014 and 6 February 2015.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC), set up in 2000 and chaired by the Prime Minister, has responsibility for overseeing the national mine action programme but has not met since 2008.

TMAC was established in 1999 under the Armed Forces Supreme Command to coordinate, monitor, and conduct mine/UXO survey, mine clearance, mine/ERW risk education, and victim assistance throughout Thailand. TMAC is also responsible for establishing a programme to meet Thailand’s obligations as a state party to the APMBE. However, TMAC has had to contend with limited funding and, as a military organisation, with regular rotation of personnel at all levels. Lieutenant-General Wittaya Wachirakul took over as Director General in April 2015, becoming the ninth Director since TMAC became operational in 2000 and the fifth in the last five years.

TMAC pressed for a change in its status to a civilian organisation in 2005, prompted by the slow progress of demining and the armed forces’ limited budget for its operations. NMAC agreed in principle to TMAC becoming a foundation in February 2007, but proposed to keep it under the armed forces. A final decision was still pending as of writing. NMAC decided in February 2007 to establish five sub-committees for victim assistance, coordination with foreign organisations, demining, risk education, and also for monitoring and evaluation. The Demining and Monitoring and Evaluation sub-committees met once in 2012 and once in 2013, but not in 2014.

Strategic Planning

TMAC does not have a strategic mine action plan.

Standards

TMAC drafted its first national mine action standards with support from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2010 and formally adopted them in June 2012. A revision of the standards was completed on 1 April 2015, mainly amending chapters on land release and baseline survey.

Operators

TMAC operated with four humanitarian mine action units (HMAUs), employing a total operations staff of around 267 (HMAU1-80, HMAU2-82, HMAU3-86, HMAU4-80), a slight decrease from 287 in 2013. The number of TMAC’s headquarters personnel was 61.

NPA has supported TMAC operations since 2011, initially operating non-technical survey and technical survey teams in Surin province bordering Cambodia before shifting to the Thai-Myanmar border in 2014 and working under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that will run to the end of 2015. NPA has also supported TMAC’s database unit since 2009, providing a data-entry technician to help consolidate data and resolve gaps left by missing clearance reports, assisted by periodic visits from NPA’s regional information management advisor. The number of data gaps fell from 120 to 71 in 2013, and to 67 as of June 2015. NPA discontinued providing a full-time data entry technician in January 2015.

The Peace Road Organization Foundation (PRO), established in August 2006, took over the personnel and equipment of the Japan Alliance for Humanitarian Demining Support (JAHDS), which had operated in Thailand from 2002 until its dissolution in 2006. PRO worked with APOPO conducting non-technical survey and “limited technical survey” in provinces on the Cambodian border until 2013, when APOPO relocated to Cambodia. In February 2015, PRO received funding support from Japan, under its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects Scheme (GGP), to clear landmines and UXO in Nam Yuen district, Ubon Ratchathani province.

Another NGO, Thai Civilian Deminers Association (TDA), started a project due to run from April 2014 to September 2015 to clear 2.42 km² of mine-affected areas in Buached district of Surin province, funded by the JAPAN-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF).

TMAC completed accreditation of operators for the first time in March 2015, accrediting the four HMAUs, one international NGO (NPA), and two national NGOs (TDA and PRO). Operators are now required to renew their accreditations annually.
**LAND RELEASE**

Operators released a total of 25 km² through land release survey and clearance in 2014, nearly a quarter less than the almost 32 km² released the previous year, mainly as a result of a drop in the area cancelled by non-technical survey (see Table 2). A clean-up of TMAC’s data resulted in a further 25,243 m² of contamination being taken off the database.  

**Table 2: Land release in 2012–14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cancelled by NTS (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
<th>Release by clearance (m²)</th>
<th>Totals (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>8,705,226</td>
<td>11,396,212</td>
<td>132,708</td>
<td>20,234,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>22,486,636</td>
<td>9,115,389</td>
<td>312,053</td>
<td>31,914,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>16,200,537</td>
<td>8,609,328</td>
<td>228,911</td>
<td>25,038,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>47,392,399</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,120,929</strong></td>
<td><strong>673,672</strong></td>
<td><strong>77,187,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NTS = non-technical survey  
TS = technical survey

**Survey in 2014**

Operators surveyed a total of 34 hazardous areas in 2014 resulting in release of 24.81 km², including 16.2 km² cancelled by non-technical survey and 8.61 km² reduced by technical survey. TMAC reported that it conducted a mixture of non-technical and technical survey on a total of 22.15 km² and released all but 0.22 km², which was released by clearance.  

NPA, which had initially worked in Surin province with HMAU 3, shifted its team to undertake survey and land release working with HMAU 4 near the Thai-Myanmar border in July 2013. In the first quarter of 2014, NPA adopted a “part-completion initiative”, aiming to complete release of all known hazardous areas on the borders with Lao PDR and Myanmar by September 2015. It started work with two teams but decreased to one team at the end of May 2015 due to a decrease in funding. In 2014, NPA cancelled 1.82 km² by non-technical survey and released 0.55 km² by technical survey.

In May 2015, NPA started work on the last task in its project area covering 9.8 km² of Chiangmai province. It expected to complete the task before 30 September 2015. In July 2015, Mae Hong Son province was removed from list of mine-affected provinces.

PRO did not conduct survey in 2014, but in February 2015 started non-technical survey in Nam Yuen district, Ubon Ratchathani Province, as part of a land-release project funded by Japan under its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects Scheme (GGP), for clearance along the Thai–Cambodia border. TDA started work in April 2014 on a project to release 2.42 km² of Buached district of Surin province, funded by JAIF. The project was due for completion in September 2015.

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16 Document for the Sub-Committee Meetings, Monitor and Evaluation Sub-Committee and Clearance and Demining Sub-Committee on 7 September 2012, at TMAC.

17 Information provided by TMAC, 8 June 2015.

18 Thailand National Mine Action Standards, 1 April 2015.

19 Information provided by TMAC, 12 June 2015.

20 Interviews with Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, Country Director, Humanitarian Disarmament Programme, NPA Thailand, Bangkok, 5 July 2013 and 8 May 2015.

21 Interview with Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 16 March 2014; and email, 2 May 2014; and information provided by Siwaporn Suanyu, Data Entry Officer, NPA, 30 April 2014 and 12 June 2015.

22 Interview with Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA Thailand, Bangkok, 8 May 2015.

23 Email from Kim Warren, Country Programme Director Cambodia (previously Programme Manager Thailand), APOPO, 2 May 2014.


27 Data provided by TMAC, 8 and 12 June 2015.

28 Ibid.

29 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 2 May 2014.

30 Interview with Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 8 May 2015.

31 Information from Shushira Chonhenchob, Programme Manager, NPA, 27 July 2015.

32 Embassy of Japan in Thailand, “The Government of Japan Provides Grant Assistance for the Project for the Clearance of Landmines/UXOs along the Thai – Cambodia border through the Land Release Method”.

Table 3: Survey in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas cancelled by NTS</th>
<th>Area cancelled by NTS (km²)</th>
<th>Mined areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMAU1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAU2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAU3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAU4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.20</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NTS = non-technical survey  
TS = technical survey

TMAC set operators a target of releasing 46.62km² in fiscal year 2015 (ending 30 September 2015). Joint operations between HMAU4 and NPA were expected to account for some 25km² (around 54%) of the total. Targets for other operators included 2.67km² by HMAU1, 5.07km² by HMAU2, 9.22km² by HMAU3, 1.28km² by HMAU4 alone, 1.97km² by TDA, and 1.05km² by PRO. By 31 May 2015, operators had achieved 35% (16.5km² out of 46.6km²) of the target.

Clearance in 2014

Only two of TMAC’s four HMAUs conducted full clearance in 2014, releasing a total of 0.2km² [see Table 4], a slight drop from 0.3km² released by three HMAUs in 2013.

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined areas released</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMAU1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAU2*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAU3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAU4*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.22</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,334</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>831</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* HMAU2 and HMAU4 did not conduct clearance in 2014; items reported destroyed in 2014 were cleared from the ground in 2013.

APM = anti-personnel mines  
AVM = anti-vehicle mines  
UXO = unexploded ordnance

Deminer Safety

One military deminer from Trad province was injured in 2014.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the nine-and-a-half year extension granted by states parties in 2008), Thailand is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2018. At the present rate of progress Thailand will miss this deadline.

Lack of attention to mine action by Thai political leaders remains a major constraint on progress, leaving TMAC and the mine action sector without the funding needed to fulfill its Article 5 obligations. The current Prime Minister, General Prayut Chan-ocha, who came to power after a military coup in May 2014, has been involved in mine action as a former HMAU1 commander, but as of mid-2015 had shown no interest in increasing support for mine action. Thailand’s extension request estimated the area requiring full clearance at 528km². It said Thailand would employ some 900 deminers and clear or release between 40km² and 65km² a year during the plan period, setting a target of 170km² in the first four years. Land release has accelerated in the last three years but consistently falls short of extension request targets. In the last five years, Thailand released less than 95km², barely one-third of the amount of land projected in the extension request. Although land release has accelerated in recent years, it remains far behind the rate needed to release the 254km² foreseen by the extension request projected in the four remaining years until Thailand’s deadline.
Table 5: Land release in 2009–14 compared to extension request targets (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared</th>
<th>Area cancelled/reduced by survey</th>
<th>Total area released</th>
<th>Extension request target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>24.84</td>
<td>25.07</td>
<td>62.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>31.91</td>
<td>32.22</td>
<td>41.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>41.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>41.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>43.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>43.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>54.97</td>
<td>94.66</td>
<td>274.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TMAC’s revised estimates of contamination and the wide gap between land-release targets and results have eroded the relevance of Thailand’s extension request as a realistic reference point for measuring the progress of mine action. Longstanding disagreements with Cambodia on demarcation of their shared border obstruct clearance and release of mined land on both sides of the border, although discussions continue at a number of different levels, including a General Border Committee, and in ASEAN regional cooperation frameworks. A Thai-Cambodian Joint Working Group, established to decide on ways to implement an International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment, agreed in May 2013 to joint demining of the area adjacent to Preah Vihear temple, but no further action has yet been taken.43

Mine action in Thailand is mainly government funded. TMAC’s budget for fiscal 2014 (1 October 2013 to 30 September 2014) amounted to THB 72.65 million (US$2.24 million), and slightly decreased to THB 68.98 million (US$2.13 million) for fiscal year 2015 (1 October 2014 to 30 September 2015).44 Norway contributed NOK3.79 million (almost US$0.5 million) to fund NPA operations in 2014. Japan provided almost US$0.5 million to TDA through the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund for a project in Surin from 1 April 2014 to 30 September 2015.45 In February 2014, Japan also provided THB11.96 million (some US$350,000) to PRO under its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects Scheme (GGP) for mine/UXO clearance along the Thai-Cambodia border.46

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34 Data from TMAC, 5 June 2015.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Information provided by Database Unit, TMAC, 14 May 2014, and data from TMAC, 8 June 2015. HMAU4 conducted only non-technical and technical survey.
38 Data from TMAC, 8 June 2015.
39 Information provided by TMAC, Bangkok, 30 April 2014 and 6 February 2015.
40 Revised APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 August 2008, p. 7.
42 Revised APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 August 2008, p. 23.
44 See previous Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor Reports; and “Landmine, Legacy of War. Finish date is Unknown”, Thairath, accessed 10 June 2015 at: http://www.thairath.co.th/content/415448, information from TMAC, 5 June 2015.
46 “The Government of Japan Provides Grant Assistance for the Project for the Clearance of Landmines/UXOs along the Thai-Cambodia border through the Land Release Method”, accessed 15 June 2015.
In 2015, Turkey established a National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), which is in the process of becoming fully operational, and submitted a plan for mine clearance, although it is not on track to meet its extended Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline.

### MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Turkey should ensure its NMAC is fully operational as soon as possible.
- Turkey should award the tenders for clearance of the eastern borders and move forward, without delay, with the tender process in non-border areas.
- Turkey should provide additional detail of ongoing survey of eastern border areas, and also provide information on how and when it will address the huge contamination in this region that is not specified in its March 2015 workplan.
- Turkey should re-consider its decision not to begin clearance on the Syrian border, especially as civilians fleeing fighting across the border are being killed and injured in minefields under Turkish jurisdiction.
- Turkey should report on plans for clearance of mined areas under its control in northern Cyprus, in order to meet its APMBC obligations.
- Turkey and Cyprus should both heed the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s call for intensified efforts to facilitate access to all remaining mined areas inside and outside the buffer zone to achieve a mine-free Cyprus.

CONTAMINATION

Turkey has almost 173km² of confirmed mined area (CMA) across 3,080 areas, as set out in Table 1. There are a further 701 suspected mined areas (SMAs), but the area they cover and the number of mines within them is unknown.

Table 1: Contamination as of end 2014¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>SMAs</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area of CMA (km²)</th>
<th>Total SMAs and CMAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>28.40</td>
<td>2,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM and AVM</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>144.29</td>
<td>1,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>172.69</td>
<td>3,781</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SMA = suspected mined area  CMA = confirmed mined area  APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines

Eighteen of the 81 provinces in Turkey still contain CMAs or SMAs, as set out in Table 2. The number of mined areas along the Iraqi border, as well as part of the Iranian border, is an estimate, as, according to Turkey, precise calculation is hampered by terrorist activities and the presence of SMAs. Furthermore, the number of mines along the Syrian border is expected to be less than that indicated because of destruction by smugglers and wildfires.²

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¹ APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), “Workplan for mine clearance activities”.
² Ibid.
Table 2: Contamination by province as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>SMAs</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area of CMA (m²)*</th>
<th>APM in CMAs</th>
<th>AVM in CMAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-border areas</td>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>722,000</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ardahan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>169,800</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>187,168</td>
<td>3,353</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>210</td>
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<td>18,595</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Van</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38,483</td>
<td>352</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tunceli</td>
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<td>153</td>
<td>351,277</td>
<td>8,651</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bingol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19,175</td>
<td>275</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>15,250</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian border</td>
<td>Ardahan</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>425,707</td>
<td>9,685</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kars</td>
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<td>30,170</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Iğdır</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>44,366</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iranian border</td>
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<td>116</td>
<td>5,556,400</td>
<td>105,556</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Van</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>12,180,500</td>
<td>41,704</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,080</td>
<td>172,688,003</td>
<td>756,421</td>
<td>194,678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 157,251m² of mined area cleared in 2014, but not yet deducted because mine clearance units of the Turkish Armed Forces had not yet been accredited by the newly established NMAC. 

SMA = suspected mined area  CMA = confirmed mined area  APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines

Turkey is contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The great majority of anti-personnel mines in Turkey are found along the borders, and were laid in 1955–59 along the border with Syria, as well as on some sections of the border with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq, in order to prevent illegal border crossings. According to Turkey, its western borders with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with Georgia, are mine-free. Mines were also laid around military installations. Government forces emplaced landmines during the 1984–99 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the south-east of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998. In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces, non-state armed groups have also employed mines and IEDs, rendering the clearance process more complex. In its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2013, Turkey estimated that a total of 3,520 CMAs and SMAs covered almost 215km². This estimate was provisional as the size of the 346 SMAs was unknown. In March 2015, Turkey submitted an updated workplan for its mine clearance activities, in which it reported a total of 3,080 CMAs and 701 SMAs, of which the CMAs cover more than 172km². The area of contamination and the number of emplaced mines are not known for the 701 SMAs, therefore the total estimated contaminated area is likely to be significantly larger. The greatest mined area is on the border with Syria (144.29km²), with smaller areas on the borders with Iran (21.33km²), Iraq (2.86km²), and Armenia (1.10km²). A further 872 mined areas covering a total of 3.11km² have been identified in non-border areas [referred to by Turkey as “mined areas in areas other than borders”].
Turkey reported that the 157,251m² of mined area it cleared in 2014 had not yet been deducted from the overall mine contamination as of end-2014 (172.69km²), because mine clearance units of the Turkish Armed Forces had not yet been accredited by the newly established NMAC.12

In Annex II to its updated workplan, Turkey provided a comparison between contamination reported at the time of its 2013 APMBC Article 5 extension request and revised contamination data reported in its 2015 workplan.13 The comparison showed that in border areas the number of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) rose by 216, whereas the number of CMAs reduced by 118, corresponding to a 41.39km² reduction in CMA between the 2013 extension request and the 2015 workplan. In non-border areas the number of CMAs increased by 30, with the area of CMA increasing by 0.49km² between the two datasets. In addition, the number of SHAs in non-border areas increased by 139.

Turkey’s explanations for these differences included: mis-registration of some explosions, as revealed by detailed analysis and comparison of mine clearance and incident reports; re-registration of minefields which were initially cleared and de-registered from records, but not duly certified; correction of minefield registers where some of the minefields were found to be registered more than once; improper completion of registration forms, including minefield coordinates; relocation of mines over time due to natural resources; inability to thoroughly check some area for mines due to continuing terrorist activity; and re-registration of some minefields along the borders from "minefields in areas other than borders" to "minefields for the eastern, south-eastern (Iraqi border)", and vice versa, following transfer of responsibility of border areas from the Gendarmerie General Command to the Turkish Land Forces.14

Mine contamination in Turkey has both a humanitarian and economic impact. According to Turkey’s 2013 Article 5 deadline extension request, in the nine years preceding Turkey’s adherence to the APMBC, 316 people were killed and 734 injured from anti-personnel mine blasts. Of this, military personnel accounted for 260 of the dead and 622 of the injured.15 Turkey further reported 26 new casualties, including one fatality, from anti-personnel mines in 2014.16 It is, however, likely that casualties are under-reported, including for 2014. In December 2014, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that landmines had killed at least three civilians, and injured at least nine others, while trying to flee Syria in September 2014. All the incidents documented by HRW occurred within the Tel Shair corridor, which runs along the Turkish side of the border immediately north-west of Kobani.17 According to humanitarian workers who spoke to HRW, at least 70 explosions occurred in the corridor area between 15 September and 15 November 2014.18

Up to 80% of mined areas along the Syrian border are on arable land, which cannot be used. The risk to livestock is widespread, especially where fencing is damaged. Mined areas have also prevented access for development activities.19

Cyprus

Cyprus is also contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, mostly in areas currently under Turkish control. The island has been divided geographically and politically by a heavily mined, 180km-long buffer zone since 1974, when Turkish Armed Forces occupied the north of the island. Minefields were laid within and outside the UN buffer zone by both the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Armed Forces.20 The extent of contamination in areas controlled by Turkish Armed Forces is not known, although Cyprus has claimed in its latest APMBC Article 7 transparency report that 21 minefields laid by Turkey’s occupation forces, mostly next to the buffer zone, “are known not yet to be cleared of anti-personnel mines…. Precise information on their size, on their composition (whether they include mines other than anti-personnel mines) and on how much land can be safely treated as arable when mines have been cleared are unknown.”21

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Statement of Turkey, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 23 May 2012; and APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, p. A-1.
7 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elif Comoglu Ulgen, Head, Disarmament and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 July 2008.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., Form F.
13 Ibid., Annex II to the “Workplan for mine clearance activities”.
14 Ibid.
16 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form J.
18 Ibid.
20 Cyprus APMBC Article 7 Reports (for 2012, 2013, and 2014), Form C.
21 Cyprus APMBC Article 7 Reports (for 2013 and 2014), Form C.
Cyprus further reported that "before and during the invasion of 1974, the Cypriot National Guard laid ... 28 minefields north of Nicosia towards the Pentadaktylos mountain range, which are today located in the Turkish-occupied areas. The latter minefields included 1,006 anti-personnel mines, but the Republic of Cyprus is not aware of the current condition of these minefields and whether they have been cleared by the Turkish Armed Forces or not." According to the APMBMC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Cyprus may be in a position to report, in accordance with APMBMC Article 7, on the location of these mined areas, and include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area. The Greek Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, subsequently provided the president of Northern Cyprus, Mustafa Akinci, with coordinates of the 28 minefields during a meeting on 15 May 2015. This meeting marked the re-launching of negotiations after an almost seven-month hiatus, and the decision to provide information on these minefields was commended by the UN Secretary-General.

On 4 June 2015, the President of Northern Cyprus, Mustafa Akinci, asked for assistance to address the 28 minefields on Turkish-controlled territory in northern Cyprus. In response, and with the view to facilitating future demining, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) worked to refine the data and map out the minefields, which are suspected to contain both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines.

A non-technical survey to assess the scope of the contamination and requirements for subsequent clearance started on 18 June 2015 and was completed on 7 July 2015. The survey was conducted by UNMAS, supported by Turkish Engineering Forces, in conjunction with UNFICYP. UNMAS performed quality assurance (QA).

During the survey a total of 321,363m² were cancelled while 92,963m² were confirmed as mined. This included the 28 minefields referred to above (one of which was subdivided into three minefields), of which 25 were cancelled, totalling 321,363m², and the remaining five areas, totalling 61,633m², were confirmed as mined. An additional 13 minefields were cancelled (area not verified), while nine other SHAs were confirmed as mined, totalling 86,800m². There is no agreed timeline for technical survey and clearance of the CMAs, as negotiations regarding demining continue between the different parties and resource mobilisation efforts are being undertaken by UNFICYP.

As of October 2015, demining of the areas was in a planning process between UNMAS and UNFICYP. (For further details see the separate report on Cyprus.)

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Previously, Turkey had reported that efforts were underway to centralise coordination of clearance activities through efforts by the Ministry of National Defence to establish a national mine action authority (NMAC) and an NMAC. In its 2013 APMBMC Article 5 deadline extension request, Turkey reported that a draft law on the establishment of an NMAC and NMAC had been completed and was awaiting input from other ministries before delivery to the Prime Minister to submit to parliament. The law was expected to pass through parliament in 2014.

On 22 January 2015, Law No. 6586 on the “Establishment of a National Mine Action Centre and Amendment of Some Other Laws” was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and subsequently entered into force on 3 February 2015, following its publication in the Official Gazette by Presidential Approval. The law aims to define the modalities and provide the basis regarding functions, jurisdictions, and responsibilities of NMAC, which will carry out humanitarian clearance of mine and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Turkey. The law entitles NMAC, which was established under the Ministry of National Defence, to: elaborate policies for this clearance; plan and steer related activities; monitor their implementation; and carry out the necessary coordination and cooperation with domestic and foreign institutions. NMAC was reportedly established on 3 February 2015, and as of September 2015, recruitment was taking place and it was in the process of becoming fully operational. Until NMAC becomes fully functional, mine action activities appear to remain largely decentralised and divided between various national authorities in Turkey. The Turkish Armed Forces currently conduct clearance activities in non-border areas and around military installations, while mine clearance along the eastern borders is carried out as part of the European Union (EUI) Integrated Border Management Project, under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior.

Clearance along the south-eastern/Iraqi border is not scheduled to commence until 2019, and clearance along the Syrian border, which formerly fell under the Ministry of Defence, is not expected to take place until after the end of armed conflict in Syria. When it occurs, clearance in both the south-eastern/Iraqi borders and the Syrian border will come under the responsibility of NMAC.

Concerning the Syrian border, prior to the establishment of NMAC, an Interministerial Coordination Board within the Ministry of National Security, which commenced work on 26 October 2010, was said to be meeting regularly and “practically functions as the National Mine Action Authority” to coordinate all government agencies involved in mine clearance activities and related undertakings. Following the adoption of new Law No. 6586 in February 2015, on the establishment of a national mine action centre, the status of this coordination Board is unclear. It is also unclear whether Turkey plans to establish an NMAC.
Strategic Planning

In March 2015, Turkey reported that following the official inauguration of NMAC, a national mine action strategy for 2016–22 would be prepared by NMAC in 2015 and submitted to the Council of Ministers. However, the strategy was likely to be delayed until after the general elections in Turkey, which were due to take place in November 2015. Turkey’s workplan, as of March 2015, is incorporated into the following summaries of planned clearance by region.

Syrian Border

In its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, Turkey gave priority to clearing the Syrian border, which is 911km long and on average 350 metres wide, and estimated to account for two-thirds of the mines and close to 90% of the remaining mined area in the country. Officials observed it is also the easiest border to clear because the terrain is flat and there has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors such as land erosion. Turkey expected to complete clearance of mines along the Syria border by the end of 2019. However, the ongoing Syrian conflict has disrupted clearance plans and Turkey has subsequently stated that clearance will not begin along the Syrian border until after the conflict ends.

Turkey and Syria reportedly agreed in 2003 to demine their common border. Law No. 5903 on the “tender and mine clearance activities along the land border between Turkey and Syria” was adopted by the Turkish parliament and approved by the president on 17 June 2009, giving both the lead role as well as the responsibility for inviting tenders for demining to the Ministry of National Defence. If this process did not work, the Ministry of Finance would have the minefields cleared by means of “service procurement”. If this method also failed, the law said the government would invite companies to tender for demining in exchange for the right to cultivate lands suitable for agriculture for up to 44 years.

The law also provided for the possibility of “requesting the services of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency [NAMSA].” Turkey said in June 2011 that it had concluded a “sales agreement” with NAMSA for quality management and technical support. A NAMSA advisor in Ankara provided technical support on such issues as tendering procedures and contract management. In March 2013, officials reported that NAMSA was no longer involved in the tender process, but it would conduct quality control [QC] and QA after clearance was completed.

Turkey announced in 2011 that tenders would be invited for clearance of the 911km-long Syrian border, divided into six separate areas, with a total mined area of 212km² (larger than the area subsequently reported in its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request). The government had initially planned for a deadline of June 2011 for tenders with a view to starting clearance in 2011.
To facilitate demining, the Ministry of National Defence divided the Syrian border area into two main regions. The first encompassed four sectors, comprising the 527km stretch between Çobanbey and Cizre, and it was expected that clearance of this region would be completed in 2017. Completion of clearance of the second region, comprising the 384km stretch between Çobanbey and Denizgören, was forecast for 2019.\(^5\) The estimated total cost of the SBMC Project was US$550 million, to be financed with national resources.\(^6\) In May 2012, Turkey told the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva that bids would be submitted only by 15 June 2012 for clearance of the first region, and continuing until 2016. Bidding for the second phase was expected to be financed as part of an EU “Pre-accession Financial Assistance Scheme”.\(^7\)

Eastern Borders

Turkey’s 2013 APMBC Article 5 extension request sets out plans for clearance of its eastern borders, beginning with the Armenian border and continuing southwards to the borders with Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq.\(^8\) It was forecast that 13.5km\(^2\) would be cleared in phase one of the project and 2.4km\(^2\) in phase two. Demining for both phases was envisaged to start by the end of 2014, after completion of the tender process with demining companies.\(^9\) Two-thirds of the total cost of the three-stage project, amounting to €30 million, was expected to be financed as part of an EU “Pre-accession Financial Assistance Scheme”.\(^10\)

In 2015, Turkey confirmed that mine clearance operations along the eastern borders are to be carried out as part of the EU Integrated Border Management Project, in two phases, under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior.\(^11\) Tender preparations for the first phase of the clearance activities were reported to be ongoing as at September 2015.\(^12\) Phase one of the project, scheduled for 2015–17, was expected to result in the clearance of 223 mined areas over an area of just less than 11.67km\(^2\) and the destruction of 189,863 anti-personnel mines.\(^13\) Phase two of the project is scheduled for 2017–19, but the number of mined areas and total area to be cleared is yet to be determined, subject to continuing surveys.\(^14\) A budget of €26.4 million (approx. $29 million) has been allocated for the first phase and €13.4 million (approx. $15 million) for the second.\(^15\)

South-Eastern/Iraqi Border

Clearance along the south-eastern/Iraqi border is not scheduled to commence until 2019, after completion of phases one and two of the EU Integrated Border Management Project along the eastern borders. Mined areas along the Iraqi and eastern border will be cleared in accordance with the strategic mine action plan, to be prepared by NMAC once it is operational.\(^16\)

Clearance of the 969 mined areas, totalling just over 2.86km\(^2\), is scheduled to take place in 2019–21, with the destruction of 79,017 anti-personnel mines. This represents all known mine contamination in this region. The resources for the clearance will be determined by NMAC.\(^17\)

Non-Border Areas

In its 2013 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, Turkey reported partial clearance in non-border areas would be conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces, until the establishment of an operational NMAC and NMAC, and a subsequent tendering process. No dedicated budget had been allocated for clearance in these interior regions. To date, mine clearance in non-border areas has been conducted only on a limited scale to clear pathways for urgent need.\(^18\) It was anticipated that clearance would be conducted in 2015–22.\(^19\)

In its 2015 updated workplan, Turkey estimated that all 873 mined areas in non-border areas would be cleared in 2015–21, totalling 3.1km\(^2\), with the destruction of 34,410 anti-personnel mines. This represents all known mine contamination in the region.\(^20\)

Of the total interior contaminated area, the Turkish Armed Forces are forecast to clear 280 mined areas over 1.51km\(^2\) with the destruction of 18,558 anti-personnel mines. Cleared areas will be certified and opened for humanitarian use following the establishment of NMAC.\(^21\) It is forecast that the remaining 593 mined areas, over 1.59km\(^2\), and the destruction of 15,852 anti-personnel mines will be cleared in accordance with the mine action plan, which will be prepared. The budget of Turkish Lira 84,300,000 (approx. $29 million) for clearing these areas will be prepared by NMAC.\(^22\)

In this region, Turkey prioritises its mine clearance activities based on: areas used for military operations; areas with low or no risk of terrorist threat; and areas where the local population may benefit from agriculture and livestock.\(^23\)

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58 APMBC Intersessional Meetings [Standing Committee on Mine Action], Geneva, 23 May 2012.
59 “Turkey cancels tender for demining border with Syria”, 3 July 2013.
60 Bidders for the contract reportedly included a joint venture between the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action and Azairtechservise, Aardvark, Countermine, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, the Croatian Mine Action Centre, Mechem, MineTech, the Olive Group, RONCO Corporation, and UXB International; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), “Workplan for mine clearance activities”, p. 8.
Standards

In March 2013, Turkey reported that an “Interministerial Coordination Board”, which in practice functioned as a NMAA, had been working to develop Turkish Mine Action Standards (TMAS), using the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) as a template.\(^\text{77}\)

At present, all land-release activities are based on the standards and principles outlined in the Syrian Border Mine Clearance Standards (SBMCS), which were prepared by the Ministry of National Defence and which are based on IMAS. According to Turkey, although these standards were developed exclusively for the Syrian border, they are also applicable for clearance of other areas.\(^\text{78}\)

Quality management

Cleared areas are re-checked with mechanical mine clearance systems following the completion of mine clearance operations. Additionally, a few days later, final controls are executed with mine detectors and mine detection dog (MDD) teams.\(^\text{79}\)

At present mine clearance activities relating to the Syrian border are suspended until the conflict ends. Once mine clearance operations do begin, QC and QA of mine clearance along the Syrian border will be executed in accordance with SBMCS.\(^\text{80}\)

Operators

Syrian Border

A bidding process for clearance operations on the Syrian border, initiated on 2 February 2012, was officially cancelled on 20 June 2013 due to armed conflict in Syria. Mine clearance activities along the border are currently on hold and will begin once the conflict ends. The tender process and clearance operations will be coordinated by NMAC.\(^\text{81}\)

Eastern Borders

Mine clearance activities along the eastern borders are to be carried out in two phases as part of the EU Integrated Border Management Project, under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior.\(^\text{82}\) Tender preparations for the first phase of the clearance activities were reported to be “ongoing” in September 2015.\(^\text{83}\)

South-Eastern/Iraqi Border

Mine clearance in the south-eastern/Iraqi border areas is not due to begin until 2019, after completion of phases one and two of the EU Integrated Border Management Project along the eastern border. Clearance in the south-eastern/Iraqi border areas will be conducted in accordance with the national mine action strategy.\(^\text{84}\)

Non-Border Areas

In its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, Turkey reported that until an NMAC had become operational, and clearance operations were tendered out, mine clearance in non-border areas would continue to be carried out by mine clearance units of the Turkish Armed Forces. Assets used include hand detectors, MDD teams, and mechanical assets. Following the establishment of NMAC, the centre will take over the ongoing clearance activities, including the tender process.\(^\text{85}\)
LAND RELEASE

Between December 2013 and January 2015, Turkish Armed Forces cleared a meagre 157,251m² of land, destroying 1,506 anti-personnel mines and 19 anti-vehicle mines during clearance operations. Turkey further reported that this amount had not yet been deducted from the total remaining CMA as of end-2014 (172.69km²), because the newly established NMAC had not yet accredited mine clearance units of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Survey in 2014

Turkey did not report any survey in 2014.

Clearance in 2014

Between December 2013 and January 2015, 157,251m² of CMA was cleared, of which 11,000m² was cleared on the Iranian border and the remaining 146,251m² was cleared in non-border areas. During this period, 1,506 anti-personnel mines and 19 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed (see Table 3). Not all the mines cleared have a corresponding area of land released/cleared, as some of the mine clearance, especially on the Syrian border, is to meet military objectives only.

Table 3: Mine clearance between December 2013 and January 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-border areas</td>
<td>Siirt</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hakkari</td>
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<td>29,061</td>
<td>31</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Sirnak</td>
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<td>146</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Batman</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diyarbakir</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Iranian border</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kils</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sanlurfa</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>157,251</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area     APM = anti-personnel mines     AVM = anti-vehicle mines

Turkey had revealed in its 2013 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request that since 1998 it had only cleared a total of 1.15km² of mined area, close to three-quarters of which took place in one year [2011], with destruction of 760 anti-personnel mines and 974 anti-vehicle mines. In addition, military teams had cleared 24,287 mines, but only to allow safe movement of troops, not to release a contaminated area.

87 Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), Turkey is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. Turkey is not on track to meet this deadline.

Turkey’s original APMBBC Article 5 deadline was 1 March 2014. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in December 2011, Turkey disclosed that clearance of its border with Syria would not be completed until 2016. In 2012, it acknowledged to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties that it would seek an extension to its deadline.90

Turkey submitted an APMBBC Article 5 extension request in March 2013 asking for an eight-year extension until 2022 to complete clearance of all mined areas. Turkey stated that the envisaged timeframe was subject to revision pending progress with tenders and clearance activities on the ground.91

In its 2013 APMBBC Article 5 extension request, Turkey cited a number of circumstances that had impeded it from carrying out mine clearance activities, including: delays in the establishment of an NMAA and NMAC which will supervise mine clearance activities; adverse weather conditions only allowing clearance activities to be conducted for five or six months a year; security problems posed by the continuation of the terrorist threat; mined territories contaminated with metal residues resulting from the fight against terrorism; uncertainties with regard to the mine-free status of some areas due to the irregular completion of registration forms; and topographical challenges. According to Turkey, the eastern and south-eastern borders and non-border areas are the most complicated to address due to topographical difficulties.92

The 2013 APMBBC Article 5 extension request provided a more detailed statement on Turkey’s mine contamination and its plans to tackle them than previously, but shed no light on any new issues, creating uncertainty over the prospects of it fulfilling its clearance obligations. No budget had been allocated for clearance of areas inside the country, which have caused most of Turkey’s mine casualties. A budget was subsequently allocated in Turkey’s 2015 updated workplan.93

In granting the 2013 APMBBC Article 5 extension request, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties recalled the number of efforts to be carried out during 2013–14, crucial to the success of the implementation of Turkey’s plan, and requested Turkey report to the Third Review Conference in June 2014 on: the tendering processes for clearance along Turkey’s border with Syria, and the results of any related demining efforts and annual milestones of expected progress; the tendering processes for the clearance of areas along Turkey’s eastern borders; developments in the establishment of NMAA and NMAC; and process in clearance of mined areas in non-border areas.94 Turkey did not provide a publicly available update on clearance progress at the Third Review Conference.

Turkey’s total mine clearance to date only amounts to a small fraction (less than 1%) of the overall mine contamination, and more than eleven years after becoming a state party to the APMBBC, Turkey has only made very marginal progress in addressing mine contamination.

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2010–1495

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>157,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>827,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>984,773</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In granting Turkey’s 2013 APMBBC Article 5 deadline extension request, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties noted “any additional delays in the establishment of an NMAA and NMAC should not further delay clearance efforts from proceeding”.96 Unfortunately, clearance efforts do appear to have suffered unnecessary delays partly due to the lack of an NMAA and NMAC. However, the adoption in January 2015 of a law to establish an NMAC should mean that the centre, which has now been established, can become fully operational without further undue delay.

However, while Turkey’s submission of an updated workplan for APMBBC Article 5 implementation in March 2015 and the establishment of NMAC can be viewed as positive developments, the workplan itself only includes plans to address a small portion (10%) of overall mine contamination, and it is unclear how and when the remaining contamination will be addressed. This is of particular concern and was highlighted in the preliminary observations of the Committee on APMBBC Article 5 implementation, produced for the APMBBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2015.97 The ABMBC Article 5 Committee observed “that Turkey’s plan at present suggests that it will not be able to complete implementation of APMBBC Article 5 by its deadline in 2022”.98

90 Statements of Turkey, APMBBC Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 1 December 2011; and APMBBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2012.
94 Decision on Turkey’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, APMBBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, 5 December 2013.
96 Decision on the Turkey APMBBC Article 5 Extension Request, APMBBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, 2-5 December 2013.
97 APMBBC “Preliminary observations of the committee on Article 5 implementation – observations on the implementation of Article 5 by Turkey”, 23 June 2015.
ZIMBABWE

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2018
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Zimbabwe has continued to progress in the implementation of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance obligations, but needs to ensure far more accurate reporting.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Zimbabwe should revise estimates of remaining mine contamination size on the basis of ongoing survey efforts and set a realistic but ambitious target for completion of all mine clearance.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure that all operators are using appropriate land-release methodologies and standards.
- As neighbouring Mozambique has declared its completion of clearance of mined areas in September 2015, surplus mine clearance equipment beyond Mozambique’s residual capacity requirements should be exported to assist clearance of the remaining mined areas on Zimbabwe’s side of the border as soon as possible.
- Greater efforts should be made to improve the quality of national reporting and the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) should respond to requests for data from the international mine action community.
- Zimbabwe should ensure an appropriate administrative framework for clearance operations is in place.
- Zimbabwe should develop a resource mobilisation plan and clarify how financial resources will be used to fulfil its extension request targets.

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2014, Zimbabwe had 199 confirmed mined areas (CMAs), covering just under 63 km², across six locations (see Table 1).¹

Table 1: Contamination by location as of end 2014²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mined area location</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Musengezi to Rwenya</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>28,025,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusitu to Muzite Mission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Forest to Beacon Hill</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma Valley</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>806,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusulu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>199</strong></td>
<td><strong>62,991,706</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area

¹ Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (for 2014), Forms C and F and Annex 1, “Zimbabwe Mine Action Workplan for 2015–2017”, pp. 2 and 9. In its Article 7 report, Zimbabwe reports multiple contradictory totals for the amount of contamination remaining at the end of 2014. Under Form C, it lists a total of 202 areas with a size of 62,632,669 m² remaining as of 31 December 2014; however, later in the same table it lists the same areas and corresponding sizes but erroneously calculates the total size as 62,443,206 m². According to HALO, both estimates double count areas listed as Rushinga and Mukumbura which are already accounted for in the total size reported for the Musengezi to Rwenya mined area (see note three below). Email from Tom Dibb, Programme Manager, HALO, 17 October 2015. Later under Form F, Zimbabwe reports that a total of 188 mined areas remained to be addressed under its Article 5 obligations with a total size of 62,433,206 m² at the end of 2014. On p. 2 of Annex 1, it reports again that as of 31 December 2014, the remaining area to be addressed totalled 197.23 km² across eight mined locations, over three times that reported throughout the rest of the report. It then states that “current contamination”, presumably as of 30 April 2015, the date of the Article 7 report submission, was a total of 62,443,206 m² remaining, however this number does not match the total areas reported in the same table, which actually add up to 62,569,486 m².

² APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C.
Zimbabwe’s mine contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is anti-personnel, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a conflict of decolonisation. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with six distinct major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, laid by the Rhodesian Army. Initially, anti-personnel mines were laid in very dense belts (reportedly 5,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) to form a “cordon sanitaire”. Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion and so, in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” directional fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel mines were laid “inland” of the cordon sanitaire. Anti-vehicle mines were used extensively by insurgents but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.

Contamination was assessed at some 310km², which was “erroneously” reported by Zimbabwe as 511km². In its fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in December 2013, Zimbabwe reported remaining contamination of almost 209km². This was reduced to a total of under 63km² of contamination remaining at the end of 2014, largely on the basis of a significant amount of land release by non-technical survey during that year and previously by international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which began operating in 2013. As of April 2015, remaining contamination comprised five minefields, referred to as: Musengezi to Rwenya, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner, Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Sheba Forest to Beacon Hill, and Lusulu. The Burma Valley minefield was completed in February 2015 and a former suspected hazardous area (SHA), at Kariba, was cleared of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in June 2013.

Zimbabwe has reported that the population most at risk from the remaining mine threat comprises rural subsistence farmers and communities close to the Musengezi to Rwenya and Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefields.

HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the two NGOs conducting mine action in Zimbabwe, have reported that the mined areas are located close to populated areas and have considerable humanitarian, social, and economic impacts on communities. In March 2015, HALO reported that in areas where it operates in the north-east of Zimbabwe, mines continue to block access to residential land, inhibit cross-border trading, deny small-scale farmers access to agricultural land, and separate communities from primary water sources, adversely affecting sanitation and livestock production. The threat to livestock is particularly severe and results in a heavy socio-economic impact as livestock is a major investment commodity in rural mine-affected areas in Zimbabwe. HALO estimated on the basis of a socio-economic survey that US$55,000 worth of livestock had been lost due to mine accidents by just 10% of households along a 10km stretch of border minefield alone, prior to HALO’s clearance of the area.

Zimbabwe has reported that clearance of mined areas will generate opportunities for commercial farming, business, and tourism, and construction of schools and clinics. Clearance will also enable safe border-crossing routes and allow for the return of more than 250 households in 13 communities which have been displaced and relocated to Mozambique as a result of the mine threat.

While Zimbabwe does not maintain a reliable database of mine casualties, it has estimated that since 1980 at least 1,561 persons had been killed or injured by mines and over 120,020 livestock as well as thousands of wild animals had been killed. HALO informed Mine Action Monitor that six persons were reportedly injured in mine incidents in 2014 in its areas of operations in Mashonaland Central and East.

HALO reported that the Musengezi to Rwenya confirmed mined area location with a total size of 28,025,706m² includes the areas Rushinga (reported as 2,500m²) and Mukumbura (reported as Mukumbura, with a size of 7,500m², but also as Mukumbura, with a size of 7,500,000m²) that ZIMAC double counts in its April 2015 Article 7 report. According to HALO, of the total 187 areas comprising Musengezi to Rwenya, a total of 180 areas covering a total of 27,867,264m² are confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines, six areas covering a total of 45,350m² are contaminated by anti-vehicle mines, and the remaining area with a size of 113,072m² is classified as “battle area/cache”. Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 17 October 2015; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Forms C and F.

Fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary (received 31 December 2013), issued as APMBC Third Review Conference document CONF/2014/WP.4, 5 June 2014, p. 1. HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying”, undated but accessed 10 February 2014. In addition, the quality of earlier clearance by the Zimbabwean army is open to question as accidents have been reported on cleared land.

Fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 3 and 5. HALO and NPA released a total of just over 151km² of mined areas through survey in 2014. Nearly all was cancelled through non-technical survey, the majority by HALO, while 114,823m² was reduced by technical survey. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015 and Learnfirst Musiza, Acting Programme Manager, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, Advisor, Department for Humanitarian Disarmament, NPA, 29 April 2015.

Includes the mined areas of Rushinga and Mukumbura.

Email from Learnfirst Musiza, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 October 2015; and Fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6.

Third different types of mined areas can be found in Zimbabwe: “Cordon Sanitaire, consisting of three rows of subsurface anti-personnel mines laid in a standard pattern with a width of 25 metres emplaced close to or on the international border; ploughshare minefields, consisting essentially of three rows of ploughshare directional fragmentation anti-personnel mines mounted on 0.5 to 1 metre high stakes, protected by sub-surface anti-personnel mines; and reinforced ploughshare minefields, which consist of 6 rows of ploughshare directional fragmentation anti-personnel mines mounted on 0.5 to 1 metre high stakes, protected by sub-surface anti-personnel mines.” Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 3.

HALO informed Mine Action Monitor that six persons were reportedly injured in mine incidents in 2014 in its areas of operations in Mashonaland Central and East.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NAMAZ.19

In 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government of Zimbabwe to train ZIMAC personnel and to provide metal detectors, protective equipment, and trauma kits.20 ZIMAC subsequently developed a joint strategy with the government of Zimbabwe and ICRC as a follow-up to the 2012 cooperation agreement, which was extended to the end of 2014. In 2014, ICRC continued its support to ZIMAC, to build its capacity to manage mine action operations, implement national mine action standards, strengthen demining operations, train demining instructors, and facilitate the provision of risk education. ICRC also continued to organise workshops and train dozens of ZIMAC staff, particularly in quality assurance (QA) and information management.21

Under its latest Article 5 deadline extension request, Zimbabwe again pledged to relocate ZIMAC outside of military installations once the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds.22 ICRC reported that at the end of 2014, ZIMAC was still housed within military premises; however ZIMAC’s mine clearance unit had benefited from donations of basic equipment, it said.23

ZIMAC and, since 2013, HALO and NPA, conduct land release. Under its current extension request, Zimbabwe has reported that its remaining mined areas will be surveyed and cleared with support from HALO and NPA, as follows: HALO tasked to survey and clear the Musengezi to Rwenya, Rushinga, and Mukumbura mined areas; NPA assigned survey and clearance of the Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Sheba Forest, and Burma Valley mined areas; and the Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS) responsible for survey and clearance of the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner and Lusulu mined areas.24

In 2014, HALO deployed ten manual demining sections and one survey team in its operations.25 NPA increased its operational capacity from 20 to 30 deminers in 2014 as a result of increased donor funding.26 Neither operator deployed mechanical assets in 2014.27 ZIMAC reported that the NMCS had a capacity of three troops of 120 deminers as of April 2015.28

13 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015 and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
15 Ibid.
16 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, pp. 2–4.
17 Ibid., p. 3.
18 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, Programme Manager, HALO, 28 April 2015.
19 APMBC Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7.
20 ICRC, “Zimbabwe: Living with the dread of an invisible enemy”, 29 November 2013. In 2012 and 2013 through November, 69 deminers were trained on international mine action standards, and the ICRC donated 50 sets of mine detection equipment and deminer personal protective equipment.
22 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2016, p. 6. Zimbabwe made the same commitment in its (second) extension request of 2010.
24 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 4 and Fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 27.
25 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015. HALO reported that any change in capacity in 2015 would be dependent on donor support.
26 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
**Strategic Planning**

In April 2015, Zimbabwe reported that it was in the process of developing a national strategic plan, which would be completed upon submission of NPA’s final survey reports of two minefields. ICRC reported that, with its help, ZIMAC had prepared a plan of action for increased demining operations on the Mozambican border in 2014. A cross-border demining cooperation agreement between Zimbabwe and Mozambique had also been drafted with assistance from ICRC, but had not been finalised at the end of 2014. Mozambique declared completing clearance of all anti-personnel mine contamination on its territory in September 2015.

**Standards**

National mine action standards took effect in July 2013. NPA reported no amendments to the standards in 2014.

**Quality Management**

As a result of training supported by ICRC, as of November 2013 ZIMAC operates a quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) team. Both NPA and HALO confirmed that external and internal QA activities were carried out in 2014. According to HALO, ZIMAC monitors conducted QA/QC visits to its programme on a near monthly basis. Internally, both HALO and NPA reported that QA/QC activities are integral parts of their programmes and happen on a continuous basis.

**Information Management**

In 2014, NPA claimed that ZIMAC’s ability to use the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database had improved as a result of capacity building for ZIMAC staff provided primarily by ICRC.

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**LAND RELEASE**

The total mined area released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 was approx. 0.5km² (the various figures provided by Zimbabwe are inconsistent, as discussed below), compared to almost 0.8km² in 2013. A further 1.51km² was cancelled by non-technical survey, resulting in significant overall land release.

At the time of submission of its latest extension request in December 2013, Zimbabwe reported that since independence in 1980, a total of more than 101km² of contamination had been “cleared” with the destruction of 208,338 anti-personnel mines.

**Survey in 2014**

Survey of remaining contaminated areas was expected to be completed by September 2014 under Zimbabwe’s current extension request. As of December 2014, Zimbabwe reported that survey operations had been completed in Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Sheba Forest to Beacon Hill, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner, and Burma Valley minefields. In April 2015, ZIMAC reported that remaining non-technical survey had been completed in the Musengezi to Rwenya minefield as of February 2015.

HALO and NPA released a total of just over 151km² of mined areas through survey in 2014. Nearly all was cancelled through non-technical survey, the majority by HALO, while 114,823m² was reduced by technical survey. An additional 48.5km² was confirmed as mined by technical survey (see Table 3).

HALO reported that as a result of its survey activities in 2014 in Mashonaland Central and East, it was able to cancel 80% of the previously estimated contaminated area. This was due to better definition and narrowing of minefield boundaries rather than cancelling entire tasks. NPA reported that only half of its survey task had been completed at the end of 2014, but stated that based on survey results, existing estimates of the total size of contamination would be significantly reduced.

**Table 3: Survey in 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>Mined areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland East and Central)</td>
<td>120,604,294</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>28,025,706</td>
<td>114,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Manicaland)</td>
<td>30,720,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20,480,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMAC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>151,324,294</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,505,706</strong></td>
<td><strong>114,823</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N/R = not reported  TS = technical survey
Clearance in 2014

According to its Article 7 report for 2014, Zimbabwe claims that a total of 1.1km² of mined areas, was cleared in 2014, compared to 0.8km² in 2013. Given the inconsistencies, Mine Action Monitor has taken the clearance figures directly from the two international operators and added the reported clearance by NMCS. The Article 7 report acknowledges the support of ICRC including its provision of demining equipment, training assistance, and information management hardware to ZIMAC, and the commencement of mine action operations by HALO and NPA in 2013.

In 2014, a total of 0.34km² was cleared by HALO and NPA with the destruction of 3,863 anti-personnel mines, as set out in Table 4. HALO reported that the significant increase in its own clearance figures in 2014 compared to 2013 was due to the fact that its clearance operations only commenced in late 2013, so figures for 2014 are its first for a full year’s work. NPA stated that its increase in area cleared in 2014 compared to 2013 was due to the introduction of systematic technical-survey methodology and an increase in daily productivity rates as deminers gained greater experience in the field.

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mine areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland East and Central)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>227,713</td>
<td>3,681</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA (Manicaland)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>115,081</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMAC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>150,075</td>
<td>3,295</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>492,869</td>
<td>7,158</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance  N/R = not reported

32 Fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7.
33 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
34 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 5.
35 HALO stated that QA/QC was built into its drills internally while NPA reported that an internal QA/QC officer checked samples of all processed areas on a daily basis including on medical capacity, manual clearance, site set up, explosive ordnance disposal, and minefield marking and completion. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
37 Fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013; and statement of Zimbabwe, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 11 April 2014.
38 Different and inconsistent figures were reported in Zimbabwe’s APMBC Article 7 report for 2014.
40 Ibid.
41 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 5.
43 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
44 Ibid.
45 In 2013, NPA conducted non-technical survey on 17.15km² across three mined areas but surprisingly no land was released as a result, while HALO carried out non-technical survey of 7.8km² of land on the Musengezi to Rwenya minefields. Emails from Christian Andersen, Desk Officer, Africa, NPA, 13 February 2014; and Tom Dibb, HALO, 20 February 2014.
47 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
48 Ibid.; and response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015. Different and inconsistent figures were reported in Zimbabwe’s APMBC Article 7 report for 2014.
49 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.
52 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
54 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
Deminer Safety

HALO reported that three of its deminers were slightly injured in separate accidents involving anti-personnel mine clearance. NPA reported no accidents or injuries involving its mine action personnel since the start of its operations in 2013.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In June 2014, Zimbabwe was granted an Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension of three years until 1 January 2018. Since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, it has submitted three previous extension requests, the last of which expired on 1 January 2015. The current extension until 1 January 2018 is to enable further survey and clearance, but Zimbabwe is not committing itself to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period, nor will it manage to do so.

Under the current three-year extension, Zimbabwe is undertaking “to clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations”. The purpose of the extension period is also to complete survey of all remaining areas and to clear approx. 4km² of mined area. Zimbabwe intends to meet the following milestones: clearance of 1.23km² and the development of a national strategic plan on the basis of survey results in 2015; clearance of 1.28km² in 2016; and clearance of 1.51km² and the submission of a new clearance plan in 2017.

Zimbabwe has claimed that three primary factors have prevented it from implementing its Article 5 obligations since becoming a state party to the APMBC: inadequate funding for demining from the government; insufficient demining equipment; and the impact of sanctions imposed by some potential donors. However, Zimbabwe reported that many of these conditions no longer affect it in 2014 in light of the support it is currently receiving from international organisations.

In its latest extension request, Zimbabwe enumerated possible risks and assumptions that could impede it from achieving future extension request milestones, including heavy rains, difficult terrain, metal contamination in ploughshare minefields, administrative delays, and lack of funding.

In 2014, HALO reported receiving in-kind support from the government of Zimbabwe in the form of duty-free importation of goods. NPA reported receiving assistance from the government, which provided explosives for mine destruction while it was obtaining its own licence to procure explosives, a long and complicated process in Zimbabwe. It also reported that the authorities had pledged to provide mechanical assets, such as bulldozers, if required to service or open access routes.

Zimbabwe forecasted that activities planned over the course of its three-year extension request will cost a total of US$12.97 million, with $2.875 million to be provided by the government of Zimbabwe and more than $10 million to be sought from international donors through partner organisations. In granting the extension request, states parties urged Zimbabwe to develop a resource-mobilisation strategy at the earliest possible date.

In October 2015, HALO was optimistic that Zimbabwe was now on track to meet its 1 January 2018 extension request targets for further survey and clearance in light of the significant amount of area cancelled through non-technical survey since the start of 2014. Neither HALO nor NPA, though, expressed confidence as to when Zimbabwe, based on present operational capacity and productivity rates, could fully complete anti-personnel mine clearance unless significantly more funding is made available to all operators. NPA estimated that with sufficient funding, Zimbabwe might be able to complete its Article 5 clearance obligations within five years and emphasised that increased donor funding would facilitate far greater achievements.

HALO reported that there were too many unknowns, particularly with respect to funding, to predict when Zimbabwe might achieve full completion of mine clearance. In 2015, HALO claimed that it would need to expand its present capacity of more than 150 staff “by a factor of five or six in order to get the job done in ten years”. It added that the inclusion of mechanical assets could improve productivity in areas with high metal contamination and/or deeply buried mines.

Positively, both HALO and NPA reported expecting to receive increased funding for operations in 2015.

In March 2015, HALO destroyed its 5,000th mine since its clearance operations began in Zimbabwe in November 2013. At that time it was employing 153 national staff members, the majority of whom were from affected communities, and was continuing its clearance operations along the 400km stretch of border minefield assigned to it by Zimbabwe.

A major programme event for NPA in 2015 was the official handover of the Burma Valley minefield on 9 July 2015, after clearance was completed in February 2015. NPA planned to recruit an additional ten deminers during 2015 with an anticipated increase in funding, which it said would allow it to begin work at a second task site. Along with a growth in operational capacity, NPA expected its productivity to continue to improve significantly in 2015 as a result of increased use of systematic technical survey. It planned to engage with the authorities on the possibility of introducing mine detection dogs (MDDs) into Zimbabwe, which it believes could exponentially increase technical survey output while significantly reducing the timeframe for Zimbabwe’s full Article 5 compliance. NPA’s survey operations were due to continue until 30 April 2016.

In April 2015, Zimbabwe reported that it would continue to solicit support from the international community for demining and invite at least two international demining organisations, in addition to NPA and HALO, to undertake mine action in partnership with the government.
The Ten Most Contaminated States Parties

Zimbabwe

55 Ibid.; and response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015. Different and inconsistent figures were reported in Zimbabwe’s APMBC Article 7 report for 2014.

56 ZIMAC reported that HALO destroyed 3,409 anti-personnel mines. APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form G.

57 ZIMAC reported that NPA destroyed 196 anti-personnel mines. Ibid.

58 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F and G.

59 ZIMAC also reports that 162,000 “mines” were destroyed in 2014 in accordance with Article 5 under Form F of its Article 7 report. It then reports on the same form that a total of 3,734 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in HALO’s area of operations, 3,295 in the NMCS’s, and a further 181 anti-personnel mines destroyed in NPA’s areas of operations, or a total of 7,210 anti-personnel mines destroyed during the same reporting period. APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.

60 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015. HALO reported that the most severely injured lost two fingers and a thumb.

61 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.

62 Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014. In granting its latest Article 5 deadline extension request, its fourth, states parties stated that Zimbabwe had not complied with the principal commitment it made under previous extension requests “to garner an understanding of the true remaining extent of the challenge and to develop plans accordingly and precisely project the amount of time that will be required to complete Article 5 implementation”. They noted, however, that Zimbabwe had made progress towards building capacity and increasing efficiency by engaging support from international organisations and developing survey and clearance plans for the remaining contamination. Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.

63 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 5–6.

64 This is composed of 4,322,000m² in Musengezi to Rwena minefield, 550,000m² in Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield, and 250,000m² in Rusitu to Muzite Mission minefield. Fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 5.

65 Ibid., pp. 5–6.

66 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 5.

67 Ibid., p. 7.


69 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.

70 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6.

71 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 7; and Fourth APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 22. Previously in 2013, the government of Zimbabwe reported contributing $800,000 to its mine action programme. A breakdown of this contribution has not been provided. In 2012, Zimbabwe received international assistance for mine action for the first time since 1999.

72 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 17 October 2015.

73 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.

74 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015.


76 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015 and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.


78 Ibid.

79 Email from Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, 19 October 2015.

80 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.

81 Ibid.

A danger sign indicates the spot where a grenade has been found in a residential area of Goma, DRC, in 2013. © UN Photo Sylvain Liechti
OTHER CONTAMINATED STATES PARTIES
ALGERIA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2017
(ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Algeria’s mine action programme has continued to perform at a very high level, with clearance output in 2014 significantly greater than the previous year.

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2014</th>
<th>For 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMANCE SCORE: GOOD</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

Algeria should improve its reporting to ensure that accurate data is publicly available on progress achieved, as well as the extent of land remaining to be cleared.

CONTAMINATION

Algeria is affected by anti-personnel mines as a result of World War II, the French colonial occupation, and the insurgency of the 1990s. During Algeria’s struggle for independence, mines were laid by the French along the Challe and Morice lines on the eastern and western borders of the country. Algeria has estimated that more than 10 million mines were laid, with a density of more than three mines per square metre in some instances. Algeria conducted a first clearance phase from 1963 to 1988, during which some 500km² of mined areas were cleared by manual and mechanical means, resulting in the destruction of more than 7.8 million anti-personnel mines. A second clearance phase began in November 2004.

In 2011, Algeria declared that all suspected minefields located along its south-west border had been cleared, meaning that remaining contamination is located in the north-west and east of the country only. Algeria has identified 17 mined areas still requiring clearance, but the precise extent of contamination is not reported. Algeria most recently reported in June 2011 that confirmed mined areas along the Challe and Morice lines covered more than 13.5km².

Six of 48 wilayas (provinces) in Algeria still contain suspected mined areas, as set out in Table 1. Algeria reported that as of March 2015, a total of 14 communes with mined areas over a length of 172km remained in the east of the country, down from 23 in 2013: eight in El Tarf, one in Tébessa, two in Souk-Ahras, three in Guelma. In the west, three minefields covering 7.4km² remained to be addressed, down from 10 in 2013: one in Tlemcen, and two in Nâama.

Table 1: Contamination by province as of March 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wilaya</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>Length (km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Tarf</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guelma</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nâama</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souk-Ahras</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tébessa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlemcen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>350</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Occasionally, ‘isolated’ anti-personnel mines are also found outside known mined areas. Between January 2007 and March 2015, 1,235 mines were found in such circumstances, including 168 mines between March 2014 and March 2015. In addition, the north of the country is said to be contaminated by an unknown number of artisanal mines and other explosive items laid by insurgent groups.

The total number of mine survivors in Algeria is unknown.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Interministerial Committee on the Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, set up by presidential decree in 2003, is the governmental focal point for all mine action activities in Algeria.

In 2006, a joint mine action capacity building project was established with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The project was initially planned to last three years, but was extended until December 2013. In April 2014, the UNDP representative in Algeria explained that the project aimed to facilitate implementation of Algeria’s mine action strategy as well as to support national authorities’ efforts on mine risk education.

All demining activities are carried out by the Algerian army. As of June 2014, five military units were deployed to conduct clearance.

1 Revised Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011, p. 5.
2 APMBC Article 7 Report, February 2014, p. 3.
4 Revised APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011, p. 6.
7 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 UNDP, “Appui à la formation et la mise en œuvre d’un plan national d’action contre les mines:” (”Support for the development and implementation of a national mine action plan”), undated but last accessed on 15 May 2014.
LAND RELEASE

The total of mined area released by manual clearance in 2014 was 6.4km², compared with 5.5km² in 2013.

Algeria reported in its revised extension request that it would only use manual clearance during demining operations because machines were not considered a sufficiently reliable clearance method and could not be used in mountains or on rocky terrain.13

Clearance in 2014

Algeria reported clearing more than 6km² of mined areas in five wilayas in 2014, destroying more than 42,000 anti-personnel mines (see Table 2). This represents a 16% increase in cleared area compared with 2013.

Table 2: Mine clearance in 201414

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wilaya</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Tarf</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>13,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tébessa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souk-Ahras</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>16,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlemcen</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>42,428</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines

Progress in 2015

According to Algeria’s mine action plan, in 2015 operations would start in Guelma, conclude in El Taref, and be underway in Souk-Ahras, Tébessa, and Nâama. Operations in Tlemcen were planned to conclude in 2014, but as of March 2015 one area remained to be addressed. In its most recent Article 7 report, Algeria reported the release of one area in Souk-Ahras in March 2015 with the destruction of 5,220 anti-personnel mines and clearance of 0.5km² of land.15
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2011), Algeria is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2017. Algeria’s consistent clearance results suggest that it is just on track to meet its 2017 deadline.

In June 2014, Algeria stated that clearance operations were proceeding according to the national workplan set out in its extension request.16 As of 31 December 2014, Algeria reported that 81km² of mined area had been released since November 2004, resulting in the destruction of 950,896 anti-personnel mines, of which 80% were found during planned clearance operations (see Table 3 for clearance in 2010–14).17

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2010–1418

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Algeria’s latest extension request, submitted in March 2011, cited as justifications for its inability to complete clearance on time the delay in initiating clearance operations, the choice of purely manual demining, climatic conditions, and the extent of contamination.19

In August 2011, a revised extension request was submitted providing a clearer picture of the remaining problem.20 It also included a detailed workplan for 2012–17 containing annual milestones against which progress could be compared. By the end of June 2015, Algeria projected that operations would be underway in four wilayas: El Taref, Souk-Ahras, Tébessa, and Nāama. Operations in Guelma would only start at the end of 2015. Operations in Tlemcen were planned to conclude in April 2014, although in its May 2015 Article 7 transparency report, Algeria reported that one mined area still remained to be cleared in this wilaya.

Algeria has systematically funded its mine action programme through its own resources, though it has never provided details of expenditures or cost estimates for clearance operations.

In its 2011 extension request, Algeria noted that deminers could sometimes be called away for urgent demining operations elsewhere in the country, which could impact on its ability to complete clearance on time. Additionally, Algeria reported that demining is “particularly challenging” in three mined areas in the north-west of the country: at Moghrar oasis; at Tiout; and in a third minefield close to the town of Ain Sefra.21 In October 2014, Lieutenant-Colonel Telli Mohamed from the Algerian Army mentioned difficulties in locating mines due to landslides and rocky terrain.22

13 Revised APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011, p. 7.
14 APMBC Article 7 Report, May 2015, Annexe 1.1–1.3.
15 Ibid, Annexe 1.1.
18 Ibid., Annexes 1.1–1.3.
19 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2011, p. 7.
20 Revised APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011.
21 Ibid., pp. 21–2.
ARGENTINA

RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

Argentina should renew an earlier offer to the United Kingdom to support demining of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

CONTAMINATION

Argentina reports that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.¹ On ratifying the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Argentina submitted a declaration reaffirming "its rights of sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich and the surrounding maritime areas which form an integral part of the territory."² The islands were mined, mostly by Argentina, during its armed conflict with the United Kingdom (UK) in 1982. Argentina has reported that no other territory under its jurisdiction or control is mine-affected.³

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Argentina has a Humanitarian Demining Office under the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces and a Humanitarian Demining Training Centre (Centro de Entrenamiento de Desminado Humanitario).

LAND RELEASE

Argentina has argued that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it did not have access to the Malvinas due to the "illegal occupation" by the UK. It did, however, offer to support demining of the islands.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2009 by the APMBC Second Review Conference, Argentina is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020. At the Second Review Conference Argentina said it was unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it did not have access to the Malvinas due to the "illegal occupation" by the UK. Argentina said for this reason it had no other choice than to request an extension to its clearance deadline.⁴

¹ Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 April 2010.
² APMBC Article 7 Report, Form A, 31 August 2000.
⁴ Ibid.
CHILE

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2020
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: GOOD 7.2 5.4

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Chile’s mine action programme performance improved in 2014 with significantly greater clearance.
RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

Chile should maintain and if possible increase its pace of land release to ensure annual targets are met.

CONTAMINATION

Chile has more than 9.9km² of confirmed mined area (CMA) and almost 3.28km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA), as set out in Table 1. Contamination is from both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.¹ Chile is also affected, to a limited extent, by explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants (CMR).

Five of 15 regions in Chile still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas. Arica and Parinacota in northern Chile is the most mine-affected region with 33 CMAs over 8.4km², which represents more than 60% of its total remaining contamination.

Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 2014²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arica and Parinacota</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8,386,427</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarapacá</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56,817</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antofagasta</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>474,739</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,261,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valparaíso</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magallanes and Antartica Chilena</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,030,108</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,948,091</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,275,336</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area     SHA = suspected hazardous area

The mines were all laid during the Pinochet regime in the 1970s on Chile’s borders with Argentina in the south, and with Bolivia and Peru in the north. The mined areas are generally difficult to access and mostly in unpopulated regions. The vast majority of the mines were laid in the northern region, with some minefields located as high as 5,000m above sea level.³

In 1970–2014, Chile identified 140 casualties due to mines and ERW. The total included 56 civilians (16 dead, 40 injured) and 84 military casualties (12 dead, 72 injured).⁴ In February 2015, media reported a total of 177 mine victims in Chile (including civilians and soldiers).⁵

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by the National Demining Commission [Comisión Nacional de Desminado, CNAD], which is chaired by the Minister of Defence. Its main functions are to advise the President, mobilise resources, coordinate demining with state agencies, and develop plans for implementing the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.⁶

Demining is conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Peace and Demining Division (POMTA).

Chile reported developing a joint demining manual text for its armed forces in 2014, in which procedures for the destruction of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were included.⁷

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² Ibid.
³ Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (for 2009), Form I.
⁴ “Minas antipersonales; una deuda pendiente” (“Anti-personnel mines: an outstanding debt”), Baldo Prokurica, Senator of Atacama region, 9 May 2014.
⁷ Response to questionnaire by Juan Pablo Rosso, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 May 2015.
LAND RELEASE

Total mined land released by clearance in 2014 was 2.1km². Twenty-six mined areas were cleared and 10,523 anti-personnel mines and 6,541 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed [see Table 2]. In 2014, Chile’s demining capacity consisted of seven mechanical assets, and a total capacity of 191 people was dedicated to clearance operations.11

Table 2: Mine clearance in 20149

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arica and Parinacota</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7,229</td>
<td>5,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antofagasta</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2,863</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magallanes and Antartica Chilena</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,523</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,541</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines AVM = anti-vehicle mines

Chile did not provide an annual clearance total for 2013. Its April 2014 report just mentioned that 0.4km² were cleared in the two regions of Arica and Parinacota, and Magallanes and Antartica Chilena, and three mined areas were released in Antofagasta.12 Chile also explained that several areas in Antofagasta were inaccessible due to snow and severe rainfalls in 2013, causing demining units to be moved to other areas and stopping demining efforts for several months.13

In 2014, with about 2km² cleared, only half of Chile’s 2014 clearance target, as set out in its workplan 2010–20, had been achieved [4.2km² were planned to be cleared]. But based on the 2013 clearance “partial estimate”, this represents an encouraging improvement in productivity.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC [and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2011], Chile is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2020. Chile is on track to meet its extended deadline.

As of end 2014, remaining contamination covered approx. 13.2km² across a total of 71 areas. This implies that Chile needs to clear approx. 2km² per year to meet its 2020 deadline, which seems achievable based on 2014 clearance results. In February 2015, Colonel Juan Mendoza, CNAD’s executive secretary, was quoted in the media as saying: “We have made progress at an annual rate of 10 percent, which leads us to believe that we will meet the deadline.”14

Chile’s latest extension indicated that 199 mined areas covering 23.3km² across six regions were emplaced and registered by the Armed Forces in the 1970s. The mined areas were said to contain a total of 181,814 anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.15 The request included a workplan for 2010–20 containing annual projections, according to which by 2018 Chile should have cleared all its mined areas except those in the region of Magallanes and Antartica Chilena.16 Chile cited difficult climatic conditions and terrain, remote mined areas in high altitudes, and extreme environments as the main reasons for requesting additional time.17

On 2 March 2015, the Ministry of Defence declared the island Tierra del Fuego, in the region of Magallanes and Antartica Chilena, free of mines, and reported that at national level, more than 96,000 mines had been destroyed, representing almost 53% of Chile’s target.18 Weather and terrain challenges faced by demining teams have seriously affected the development of demining operations, especially in the north of the country. Indeed, in November 2014 Colonel Mendoza was quoted saying that meeting the 2020 deadline “will be the big challenge. If we have normal circumstances we think we can get it done.”19

According to its extension request, Chile intended to cover the full cost of meeting its Article 5 obligations, which was estimated at US$61 million. Since 2003, the government of Chile has provided almost all funding towards its own mine action programme, having not received international funding since 2007.

9 Ibid.
10 APMBC Article 7 Report [for 2013], Form C.
11 Interview with Col. Juan Orlando Mendoza, Executive Secretary, CNAD, in Geneva, 11 April 2014; and APMBC Article 7 Report [for 2013], Form C.
13 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 April 2011.
14 Ibid., Annex no. 5.3-7.
15 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 April 2011.
16 Ministry of Defence, “Ministros de Defensa de Chile y Argentina declaran Tierra del Fuego zona libre de minas antipersonales”, [“Ministers of Defence of Chile and Argentina declared the Tierra del Fuego free from mines”], 2 March 2015, at: http://www.defensa.cl/noticias/ministros-de-defensa-de-chile-y-argentina-declaran-tierra-del-fuego-zona-libre-de-minas-antipersonales/.
17 Response to questionnaire by Juan Pablo Rosso, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 May 2015.
19 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 April 2011.
MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

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PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE

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PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Colombia’s mine action programme performance improved slightly in 2014, with national mine action authorities moving to embrace a land-release approach. The programme has received a major fillip with the March 2015 agreement on demining, which should allow mine clearance to pick up considerable speed, if bureaucratic procedures can be effectively streamlined.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Colombia should take advantage of the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) to significantly accelerate clearance of remaining mined areas in accordance with its obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
- Colombia should elaborate, in consultation with its demining partners, national mine action standards on mine detection dogs (MDDs) and land release.
- Colombia’s mine action programme authorities urgently need to improve data management and planning procedures.

CONTAMINATION

Colombia’s mine problem is the result of decades of conflict with non-state armed groups. The precise extent of contamination remains unclear, though the national database contains information that at least 30 of the 32 departments may have a mine threat. As of end-2013, the most affected departments were believed to be Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Tolima. According to the HALO Trust, Colombia is one of the most mine-affected countries in the world.

Colombia has stated that all existing mines and minefields laid by the Colombian Armed Forces prior to entry into force of the APMBC were cleared before its initial Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011. Remaining contamination is due to mine-laying by non-state armed groups whose continued and irregular use of improvised rather than factory-produced mines makes it very difficult to obtain an accurate picture of contamination. Grant Salisbury, then HALO Trust’s Programme Manager for Colombia, reportedly commented in 2013 that “Colombia is the first country that we’ve worked in, indeed the first country that I know of, where all the mines used are improvised (explosive devices) – every other country where we work, the vast majority of mines come from state factories.”

The Organization of American States (OAS) had affirmed that no mined areas have been found in Colombia that could be considered as high- or medium-density minefields. So-called “nuisance mines” have been found in schools, water sources, pathways, and stream crossings. In fact, the pilot project of Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), described further below, has found mines in patterns.

On 7 March 2015, negotiators for the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) announced that agreement had been reached on demining. According to a joint statement, the government and FARC will select a number of pilot zones with the highest level of threat from anti-personnel mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), unexploded ordnance (UXO), or other explosive remnants of war (ERW). NPA will oversee non-technical survey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and technical survey and clearance of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). This will give a much better picture of the mine and ERW threat.

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1 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C, and Landmine Monitor analysis of available data.
3 Revised APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 13 August 2010.
4 Statement of Colombia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 11 April 2014.
6 Email from Carl Case, Director, Office of Humanitarian Mine Action, OAS, 28 June 2012.
7 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, Country Director, Colombia, NPA, 5 November 2015.
9 “Acuerdo Sobre Limpieza y Descontaminación del Territorio de la Presencia de Minas Antipersonal (MAP), Artefactos Explosivos Improvisados (AEI) y Municiones Sin Explosar (MUSE) o Restos Explosivos de Guerra (REG) en general” (“Agreement on Clearance of Areas Contaminated with anti-personnel mines, IEDs, and ERW”), Joint Statement #52, Havana, 7 March 2015, at: https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/comunicados/comunicado-conjunto-52-la-habana-7-de-marzo-de-2015, and email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 November 2015.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Established on 30 July 2002 under Law No. 759/2002, the National Interministerial Commission on Anti-Personnel Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP) is the national mine action authority responsible for implementation of the APMBC, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance. Two new key actors for mine action in Colombia are the Victims Unit and the Land Restitution Unit, neither of which existed when CINAMAP was created. Changes to the law are needed in order for them to become full members of CINAMAP.10

The Presidential Programme for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) previously served as the technical secretary of CINAMAP. It was responsible for coordinating implementation of the 2009–19 Integrated Mine Action Plan, whose aims were to minimise the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and ERW, and to implement sustainable development programmes in affected communities.11 In September 2014, however, Decree 1649 modified the structure of the Presidency’s Administrative Department, creating the Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección para la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA) to replace PAICMA.12 DAICMA has retained the same mandate and functions as PAICMA, the only change being that DAICMA is now supporting the Minister-Advisor for Post-Conflict, Human Rights and Security and the Minister-Advisor’s office in the strategic management of the national mine action programme.13

Strategic Planning

Colombia’s APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request projected, improbably, that all mined areas would be released by 2020.17 Colombia’s 2011–13 operational plan was to address 6,000 dangerous and mined areas in 14 of 660 mine-suspected municipalities covering an estimated 15km².18 Colombia did not reach its targets.

Colombia was due to submit an operational plan for 2014–20 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013, but did not do so. Colombia did present a demining “action plan” for 2014–16 at the APMBC Third Review Conference in Maputo in July 2014.19 The plan foresees a first phase of mine action in 91 municipalities and steadily increasing national army demining capacity to 54 units, as well as the number of non-technical survey teams to 15 by 2016.20

Standards

National mine action standards were said to have been developed based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS),21 but as of late-2015 new standards were being elaborated for adoption in early 2016.22 By a July 2014 resolution, Colombia adopted standing operating procedures for humanitarian demining.23

HALO Trust has noted, however, that the current interpretation of the national standards for demining is that once a municipality has been surveyed, the operator is obliged to clear any known minefields within that area. As a result, operators are often required to clear low-priority minefields, running the “risk that higher priority areas may not be addressed in a timely manner. A simple but much-needed reform would be to allow operators to prioritise areas for clearance according to the greatest humanitarian need, allowing donor resources to be more effectively employed.”24

Operators

The Interagency Humanitarian Demining Group (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario), commonly referred to as the Instancia Interinstitucional, is the government’s decision-making body for humanitarian demining, comprising the Director of PAICMA (now DAICMA), the Minister of Defence, and the Inspector General of the army.14 It approves accreditation, national standards, tasks, and clearance priorities. OAS and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) have served as advisors to the Interagency Group on accreditation and national standards.15

HALO Trust has stated that lengthy bureaucratic processes interfere with efficient operational planning of mine action. According to HALO’s Programme Manager, Nick Smart, Colombia “has a clear and pressing need for demining but up until now the government’s response to the issue has been slow. For example, the assignation of a municipality for demining can take up to six months to process. Streamlining routine procedures such as municipality assignation, the deployment of teams to minefields, and the submission and monitoring of operational reports would mean that Colombia’s severe mines problem could be addressed in a more rapid and effective way.”26
it was seeking to expand from 200 to 800 deminers over the next five years to support Colombia’s implementation of its APMBC Article 5 obligations.\textsuperscript{30}

NPA formally initiated a mine action programme in April 2015, having participated as an observer in the peace talks that concerned demining. The first step in the process of implementing the agreement on demining was the conduct of non-technical survey of contamination in the departments of Meta and Antioquia.\textsuperscript{31}

OAS serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia.\textsuperscript{32} OAS is responsible for managing and implementing a national monitoring system on behalf of the Interagency Group.\textsuperscript{33} OAS has been serving as an advisor to the Interagency Group on accreditation of NGOs in Colombia,\textsuperscript{34} but it was planned to transfer all of its responsibilities to DAICMA by the end of 2017.\textsuperscript{35}

Since 2010, UNMAS has been advising DAICMA on a legal and technical mine action framework to allow NGOs to conduct mine clearance. UNMAS has also assisted DAICMA in accreditation and monitoring procedures as well as management processes.\textsuperscript{36}

Information Management

Poor information management has been a feature of Colombia’s mine action programme since its inception. While lack of access has undoubtedly played a role in this, efforts to verify and consolidate meaningful mine action data have proved inadequate. HALO Trust has found that the information stored on the national IMSMA database is largely inaccurate: over the course of operations in five municipalities since September 2013, HALO’s survey teams have discredited 84\% of IMSMA “events” investigated, while 91 of the 106 minefields identified (86\%) were not registered on the national database at all.\textsuperscript{37}

Government decree 1649 of 2014 assigned to DAICMA responsibility for maintaining the IMSMA database and to “compile, systematise, centralise, and update relevant information” to serve as a basis for programme planning.\textsuperscript{38} This remains a central challenge for the programme.

\textsuperscript{10} Acta CINAMAP 02/2013, 2013/12/18, pp. 3–4.
\textsuperscript{11} Presidency of Colombia, Decree 2150 of 2007.
\textsuperscript{12} APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ministry of Defence, Regulatory Decree No. 3750 of 2011.
\textsuperscript{15} Emails from Carl Case, OAS, 29 June 2012, and Marc Bonnet, Programme Manager/Senior Technical Advisor, UNMAS, 23 September 2013.
\textsuperscript{16} Email from Nick Smart, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, Colombia, 23 October 2015.
\textsuperscript{17} Revised APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 13 August 2010, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{19} Statement of Colombia, APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, December 2013.
\textsuperscript{20} Statement of Colombia, APMBC Third Review Conference, June 2014.
\textsuperscript{22} Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 November 2015.
\textsuperscript{23} Resolución No. 104 el 7 de julio de 2014, adopting the “Procedimientos Operaciones de Desminado Humanitario realizado por el Batallón de Desminado N° 60 ‘CR Gabino Gutiérrez’”. APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A.
\textsuperscript{24} Email from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015.
\textsuperscript{26} APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.
\textsuperscript{27} HALO Trust, “HALO starts humanitarian demining operations in Colombia” 24 September 2013, at: http://www.halotrust.org/node/666.
\textsuperscript{28} Email from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 November 2015.
\textsuperscript{38} Email from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015.
\textsuperscript{39} APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C.
LAND RELEASE

Survey in 2014

HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey in 2014 in the municipalities of Carmen de Viboral, La Unión, Nariño, San Rafael, and Sonsón, covering an area of 220 veredas [about 2,671km²]. HALO cancelled 60 SHAs (loosely called “events” by the mine action programme in Colombia), which amounts to cancellation of approx. 210,000m² (based on an average area of 3,500m² per SHA). At the same time, HALO confirmed 43 areas as mined, an area totalling 105,144m². HALO has observed that the “irregular nature of the conflict in Colombia has meant that mines have often been laid sporadically and without any kind of set pattern...” which presents challenges for survey teams when defining minefields. The collection of information can also be difficult in areas where the population has been displaced during the conflict years, resulting in a lack of knowledge about the history of minelaying. Furthermore local communities are often afraid to share mine information for fear of retribution from armed groups.” By recruiting and training people from the mine-impacted communities, HALO has sought to build trust among the local population while ensuring that its survey teams possess a thorough knowledge of the areas in which they work.

HALO also conducted technical survey in two areas during 2014, reducing 1,776m² of mined area. No mines or ERW were destroyed in the process.

Clearance in 2014

Table 1: Mine clearance in 2014

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<tr>
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<td>Totals</td>
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* Colombia has not disaggregated items destroyed for 2014 so all have been listed as UXO. APM = anti-personnel mines AVM = anti-vehicle mines UXO = unexploded ordnance

HALO has reported that “demining in Colombia presents a challenge for operations and logistics. Minefields are frequently inaccessible by paved road, which creates difficulties when setting up remote camps and delivering supplies. HALO has adopted the local solution of using mules, and sources building materials and supplies locally wherever possible in order to minimise logistical requirements. This not only increases efficiency but also means that additional donor funding is remitted to the local population. The conditions on minefields themselves also pose challenges to HALO’s operations: mines containing minimum metal, highly mineralised soil, thick vegetation, dense root structures, and wet and stormy weather conditions all have an impact on deminers’ productivity.”

Progress in 2015

In 2015, HALO has been working in south-east Antioquia, in the municipalities of Abejorral, Carmen de Viboral, La Union, Nariño, San Rafael, and Sonsón. HALO was aiming to complete and hand over the municipalities of La Union and Nariño by the end of the year. HALO also planned to operate in two new departments before the end of 2015.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2010), Colombia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021. Colombia is not on track to meet this deadline.

In its statement to the APMBC Third Review Conference, Colombia stated that it would not be able to free the country of landmines by 2025 [sic].44 The ongoing survey combined with the successful implementation of the peace agreement should allow Colombia to give an estimated timeframe for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations before the expiry of its 2021 deadline.

43 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F; and email from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015. Figures in Colombia’s Article 7 report on clearance in 2014 by HALO Trust [3,690m²] differ to those provided directly by HALO to Mine Action Monitor as they refer only to completed clearance of mined areas within 2014. Email from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 27 October 2015.

44 Email from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015.
45 Ibid.
### MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

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**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE** 5.8
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Cyprus should clarify whether mine contamination remains in any areas they control, including in or close to the buffer zone.

■ Cyprus and Turkey should both heed the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s call for “both leaders to intensify their efforts … to facilitate, without delay, access to all remaining mined areas inside and outside the buffer zone, in line with Security Council Resolution 2197 (2015), and to achieve, finally, a mine-free Cyprus”.1

CONTAMINATION

Cyprus is contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. The island has been divided geographically and politically by a heavily mined, 180km-long buffer zone since 1974 when Turkish Armed Forces occupied the north of the island. Minefields were laid within and outside the UN buffer zone by both the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Armed Forces. The exact extent of the remaining mine contamination across the island is not known.

A total of 20 mined areas containing 4,653 anti-personnel mines previously existed in areas under the effective control of Cyprus outside the buffer zone, which had been emplaced by the National Guard. An additional 81 mined areas were located within the buffer zone (13 of which contained mines laid by the National Guard) containing a total of 27,174 mines and extending over almost 11km².2

In total, between becoming a state party on 1 July 2003 and its original Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention [APMBC] Article 5 deadline of July 2013, Cyprus released all 20 mined areas under its effective control.3 In November 2013, Cyprus reported that no minefields under Cypriot control remained in the buffer zone, after having cleared two mined areas in Dali in 2012 and a further mined area at Potamia by July 2013, in accordance with its National Plan.4 According to the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Cyprus may be in a position to report, in accordance with APMBC Article 7, on the location of anti-personnel mines, but the Republic of Cyprus is not aware of the current condition of these minefields and whether they have been cleared by the Turkish Armed Forces or not.”5

The extent of contamination in areas controlled by Turkish Armed Forces is not known, although Cyprus has claimed in its latest APMBC Article 7 transparency report that 21 minefields laid by Turkey’s occupation forces, mostly next to the buffer zone, “are known not yet to be cleared of anti-personnel mines…. Precise information on their size, on their composition (whether they include mines other than anti-personnel mines) and on how much land can be safely treated as arable when mines have been cleared are unknown.”6

Cyprus further reported that “before and during the invasion of 1974, the Cypriot National Guard laid … 28 minefields north of Nicosia towards the Pentadaktylos mountain range, which are today located in the Turkish-occupied areas. The latter minefields included 1,006 anti-personnel mines, but the Republic of Cyprus is not aware of the current condition of these minefields and whether they have been cleared by the Turkish Armed Forces or not.”7

According to the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Cyprus may be in a position to report, in accordance with APMBC Article 7, on the location of these mined areas, and include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area.8 The Greek Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades subsequently provided the coordinates of the 28 minefields during a meeting on 15 May 2015.9 This meeting marked the re-launching of negotiations after an almost seven-month hiatus, and the decision to provide information on these minefields was commended by the UN Secretary-General.10

2 “Analysis of the request submitted by Cyprus for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention”, 4 October 2012.
3 APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Observations on implementation of Article 5 by Cyprus”, 23 June 2015; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form G.
5 APMBC Article 7 Reports (for 2012, 2013, and 2014), Form C.
7 APMBC Article 7 Reports (for 2013 and 2014), Form C.
8 Ibid.
9 APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Observations on implementation of Article 5 by Cyprus”, 23 June 2015.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In the buffer zone, survey is typically conducted by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Clearance is conducted by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Troop Contributing Country (TCC) demining teams (currently the Cambodian Construction & Engineering Company (CAMBCOY)), as part of UNFICYP’s inter-mission cooperation with UNIFIL. 12

Quality Management

External quality assurance (QA) is conducted by the UNMAS Lebanon QA section, in accordance with procedures detailed in its standard working procedures (SWP) and the national technical and safety guidelines (TSG). 13

LAND RELEASE

The total mined land released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 was 34,032m², comprising 7,032m² cleared and 27,000m² reduced by technical survey. A further 50,000m² was cancelled in 2014 by non-technical survey.

Previously, in 2013, Cyprus cleared 1,130 anti-personnel mines from the mined area near Potamia village. 14 In total, between entry into force in July 2003 and its original July 2013 deadline, Cyprus released the 20 mined areas under its effective control. 15

As of March 2015, Cyprus was not aware of any clearance progress in the part of Cyprus occupied by Turkish forces, or in the buffer zone. 16 However, subsequent developments in May 2015 (detailed in the contamination section), resulted in survey of suspected mined areas in Turkish controlled territory in northern Cyprus.

Survey in 2014

In April 2014, UNMAS surveyed an area in Mammari, suspected as contaminated with mines displaced into the buffer zone through flooding in December 2013. 17 During the survey, 7,000m² of land was confirmed as mined while 7,000m² was reduced by technical survey. 18 In addition, UNMAS also surveyed two areas in Famagusta, in the eastern edge of the buffer zone, during which 20,000m² was confirmed as mined but which was subsequently reduced by technical survey. A further 50,000m² was cancelled. 19

Clearance in 2014

Clearance of the confirmed mined area (CMA) in Mammari, which was contaminated as a result of flooding, was conducted by a 21-strong CAMBCOY demining team, working under UNIFIL. 20 The operation in April 2014 resulted in clearance of 7,032m² and the destruction of one anti-vehicle mine. 21
**Buffer Zone**

On 30 December 2014, mines were displaced into the buffer zone from north of the ceasefire line owing to heavy rain. The area, which is near Mammari in Sector 1, is regularly patrolled by UNFICYP and farmed by civilians.23

UNMAS conducted non-technical survey of the Mammari area in February 2015.24 In addition, as part of a pre-deployment visit and in their capacity as tasking manager for all UNIFIL TCC demining assets, CAMBCOY also conducted survey of the wash-out area in Mammari in April 2015, during which 16,691m² was confirmed as mined, and an additional 45,000m² was reduced by technical survey.25

Clearance began on 26 May 2015, conducted by a 20-strong team, also deployed by UNIFIL’s CAMBCOY as part of UNFICYP’s inter-mission cooperation with UNIFIL.26 During clearance, 16,691m² was cleared, during which three anti-vehicle mines (one mine considered as complete, two others found in parts), one anti-vehicle mine fuze, one anti-personnel mine fuze, and two anti-vehicle TNT pieces were destroyed.27 The task was completed on 2 September 2015, and the suspected mined area in the buffer zone (resulting from the flooding) was declared clear and handed back to the community and landowners on 9 September 2015.28

The UN Secretary-General reported that “to avoid a similar incident in the future, UNFICYP liaised closely with the Turkish Cypriot authorities and secured their commitment to clear the area north of the ceasefire line in the coming months.”29

**Turkish-Controlled Territory in Northern Cyprus**

On 4 June 2015, the President of Northern Cyprus, Mustafa Akinci, asked for assistance to address the 28 minefields on Turkish-controlled territory in Northern Cyprus. In response, and with the view to facilitating future demining, UNFICYP and UNMAS worked to refine the data and map out the minefields, which are suspected of containing both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.30

A non-technical survey to assess the scope of the contamination and the requirements for subsequent clearance started on 18 June 201531 and was completed on 7 July 2015.32 The survey was conducted by UNMAS, supported by Turkish Engineering Forces, in conjunction with UNFICYP. UNMAS performed quality assurance.33

During the survey a total of 321,363m² was cancelled while 92,963m² was confirmed as mined. This included the 28 minefields referred to above (one of which was sub-divided into three minefields), of which 25 were cancelled totalling 321,363m², and the remaining five areas, totalling 6,163m², were confirmed as mined. An additional 13 minefields were cancelled (area not verified), while nine other suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) were confirmed as mined, totalling 86,800m².34

There is no agreed timeline for technical survey and clearance of the confirmed mined areas, as negotiations regarding demining continue between the different parties and resource-mobilisation efforts are being undertaken by UNFICYP.35 As of October 2015, demining of the areas was in a planning process between UNMAS and UNFICYP.36

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11 Ibid., pp. 1 and 7.
12 “UNFICYP to clear mine hazard area in Cyprus buffer zone”, UNFICYP, 25 May 2015, at: http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=6710&ti=graphic&lang=lt; and email from Julie Myers, Programme Officer, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, Chief of Operations, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015.
13 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015.
14 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form G.
15 APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Observations on implementation of Article 5 by Cyprus”, 23 June 2015; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form G.
16 Email from Maj. Xanthos Ioannou, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 March 2015.
17 “UNFICYP announces demining project in buffer zone”, Cyprus Mail, 4 April 2014, at: http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/04/04/unficyp-announces-demining-project-in-buffer-zone/; and email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015.
18 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015.
19 Ibid.
20 “UNFICYP announces demining project in buffer zone”, Cyprus Mail, 4 April 2014.
21 Ibid.
22 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015; and “UNFICYP ready to support both sides in clearing buffer zone minefields”, Cyprus Mail, 4 April 2015.
24 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015; and “UNFICYP to clear mine hazard in Cyprus buffer zone”, 26 May 2015, at: http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=6710&ti=graphic&lang=lt.
25 Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APBMC (and in accordance with the three-year extension granted by states parties in 2012), Cyprus is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 July 2016. Cyprus is not on track to meet this deadline and has submitted a request for a further extension.

Cyprus cleared all anti-personnel mines in mined areas that it accepted were under its control within ten years of becoming a state party, namely by 1 July 2013. A three-year extension to its APBMC Article 5 deadline until 1 July 2016 was requested and approved in 2012, due to anti-personnel-mine contamination remaining in territory occupied by the Turkish forces, which it was unable to clear.

On 27 March 2015, Cyprus submitted a second APBMC Article 5 deadline extension request, for a further three-year extension, until 1 July 2019. The reason cited for the second extension request was the same as the first request, namely that Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining contaminated areas.

Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 2014. In 2013, states parties granted Turkey an eight-year extension for clearance of mines in Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for clearance in Cyprus.

At the intersessional meetings in June 2015, Cyprus stated that “negotiations for a settlement of the Cyprus question have recently resumed and there are good reasons for being hopeful that this will in fact be the last extension request that Cyprus needs to submit.”

The UN Security Council, most recently in July 2015, has called on both sides to facilitate clearance of all remaining mined areas on the island. The Council noted with regret “that the sides are withholding access to the remaining minefields in the buffer zone, and that demining in Cyprus must continue”. The Council also noted “the continued danger posed by mines in Cyprus”, referring to “recent proposals and discussions as well as positive initiatives on demining”, and urging “rapid agreement on facilitating the recommencement of demining operations and clearance of the remaining minefields.” The Council called on “both sides to allow access to deminers and to facilitate the removal of the remaining mines in Cyprus within the buffer zone”, and urged “both sides to extend demining operations outside the buffer zone”.

The corresponding report of the UN Secretary-General stated: “With the opening of new crossing points, which will require mine clearance around the ceasefire lines, a comprehensive approach to demining is now required.” The Secretary-General called upon “both leaders to intensify their efforts to that end, to facilitate, without delay, access to all remaining mined areas inside and outside the buffer zone, in line with Security Council resolution 2197 [2015], and to achieve, finally, a mine-free Cyprus.”
### Mine Action Programme Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Performance Score: Average and Improving**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s mine action programme performance increased slightly in 2014 despite increasing funding constraints. The likelihood of DRC meeting its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline was improving as of October 2015, with estimates that DRC could complete clearance as early as 2017, three years earlier than expected.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- DRC should finalise and submit a detailed and realistic workplan for work to be carried out in 2015–20 under its second APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request.
- As soon as the security situation allows, the DRC should conduct survey in Aru and Dungu territories.
- DRC should significantly improve the quality of the national mine action database to ensure that it is accurate, up to date, and owned by national authorities.
- Greater efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2014, DRC had four confirmed mined areas [CMAs], covering just under 0.05km², and a further 118 suspected hazardous areas [SHAs], covering 1.8km² as set out in Table 1. Seven of 11 provinces still contained CMAs or suspected mined areas [see Table 2].

Table 1: Contamination as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44,062</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1,803,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44,062</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1,807,602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area     SHA = suspected hazardous area     APM = anti-personnel mines     AVM = anti-vehicle mines

DRC is affected by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), a result of decades of conflict involving neighbouring states, militias, and rebel groups since gaining its independence in 1960. All 11 of DRC’s provinces are contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO), including the capital, Kinshasa. Four provinces (Equateur, Katanga, Orientale, and Maniema) remain the most affected.

Table 2: Contamination by province as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,812</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>920,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientale</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19,200</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>174,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>458,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maniema</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>155,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Kivu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Kivu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai-Occidental</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44,062</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1,807602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area     SHA = suspected hazardous area

When DRC became a state party to the APMBC, it reported a total of 904 SHAs. This was later found to significantly overestimate the number and size of areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, with early survey efforts uncoordinated and unsystematic, and carried out by inadequately trained staff.
In April 2014, DRC was able to report that 130 SHAs affected by mines remained in eight provinces (Equateur, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Orientale, Maniema, North Kivu, Katanga, Province Orientale, and South Kivu) covering an estimated 1.8km², more than half of which was located in Equateur and Katanga provinces, on the basis of the results of a nine-month-long National Landmines Contamination Impact Survey (NLCS) launched in March 2013 to determine the full extent of mine, cluster munition, and other ERW contamination across the country. In addition to five SHAs affected by cluster munition remnants (CMR) identified by the survey, the Aru and Dungu territories in Orientale Province, however, were not surveyed due to insecurity.4

DRC used the survey’s results as the basis for its second Article 5 deadline extension request, which it submitted in April 2014. In June 2014, states parties to the APMBM granted DRC a six-year extension to complete anti-personnel mine clearance on its territory by 1 January 2021.

In October 2015, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that of the total 135 SHAs, 53 had since been released in ongoing survey and clearance operations, bringing the total number of SHAs remaining to 82. The total number of provinces remaining to be addressed fell from seven at the end of 2014 to six (Province Orientale, Equateur, Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu and Kasai Occidental) with the completion of South Kivu province following a Congolese Mine Action Centre (CCLAM) mission in early October that cancelled the last remaining SHA.9 UNMAS stated, however, that several SHAs were newly identified in 2014 and that it expected that further hazards might be identified in the future, especially while conflict continued across DRC.10

DRC is also significantly affected by ERW, including large quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance, which the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) considers much greater in extent than mine contamination. The UXO threat in DRC includes CMR.

In May 2015, UNMAS reported that a total of 2,540 mine and ERW victims were registered in its database, including 47 new victims in 2014 alone.11 UXO contamination is a particular threat to internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as an impediment to humanitarian access.12 According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there were 2.7 million IDPs in the DRC in 2014 due to the ongoing conflict in the east.13

UXO contamination also continues to have significant socio-economic impact on the country, limiting movement of goods and hindering reconstruction of infrastructure.14 Released land is used for agriculture and settlement development, in addition to opening up access to markets, water, and firewood.15

Insecure weapons and ammunition stockpiles pose a serious humanitarian threat in DRC, with proliferation of weapons among the civil population and non-state armed groups exaggerating insecurity and fuelling community violence, and leading to unplanned explosions in ammunition storage areas. In January 2014, an explosion occurred in a military ammunition depot in the city of Mbuji Mayi, Kasai Oriental province, killing 21 people and injuring 54, leaving 2,000 homeless, and scattering UXO over a 10km radius.16

2 An escalation of conflict between rebel group M23 and Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC) with support of the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), from August to November 2013, prior to the disbanding of the M23, also resulted in new contamination of large areas of land, including roads and access routes, with UXO. UNMAS, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects – Democratic Republic of the Congo 2015”, undated but 2015, at: http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/print/country_portfolio/49f06-1870-78801.pdf.
5 Analysis of DRC’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the APMBM Third Review Conference on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p.2.
6 Ibid., pp. 2 and 6.
8 Ibid.
9 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 16 October 2015.
15 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Michelle Healy, UNMACC, Kinshasa, 29 April 2013. In addition, MONUSCO uses released land for their field bases and airport terminals.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

On 9 July 2011, national mine action legislation was signed into law by the President of DRC. The UNMACC, established in 2002 by UNMAS, coordinates mine action operations in DRC through offices in the capital, Kinshasa, and in Goma, Kaleme, Kananga, Kisangani, and Mbandaka. UNMACC is part of the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission. UN Security Council Resolution 1925 mandated UNMACC to strengthen national mine action capacities and support reconstruction through road and infrastructure clearance.

In March 2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2098 called for transfer of demining activities to the UN Country Team and the Congolese authorities. As a consequence, UNMAS operates two separate projects after splitting its humanitarian mine action activities between support for the government of DRC and its in-country team, and its activities in support of MONUSCO. In accordance with Security Council Resolution 2147 of March 2014, demining is no longer included in MONUSCO’s mandate.

The CCLAM was established in 2012 with support from UNMACC/UNMAS. In May 2015, UNMAS reported that in 2014 it continued to support CCLAM in its operations and to promote full transition of all coordination activities to CCLAM by the end of 2016.

Strategic Planning

The DRC’s national mine action strategic plan for 2012–16 sets the goal of clearance of all areas contaminated with anti-personnel mines or unexploded submunitions by the end of 2016, as well as for transition of the mine action programme from UN management to full national ownership.

In granting DRC’s second APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, states parties called on DRC to present a detailed workplan by 30 April 2015 on implementation of its remaining Article 5 obligations throughout its extension period. In June 2015, DRC informed states parties that due to difficulties in finding funding it was unable to submit a workplan or finalise its projections by that time. It pledged to provide more information at the next meeting of states parties in December 2015.

Standards

As of October 2015, National Technical Standards and Guidelines for mine action, including 24 national mine action standards, had been developed but not yet finalised.

Operators

Five international operators are accredited for mine action in DRC: DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), commercial company Mechem, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).

At the outset of 2014, HI employed 33 national and five international staff, and deployed three mine detection dog (MDD) teams and one mechanical asset. Its mine action operations ended in February 2014 due to lack of funding.

MAG employed one team specifically working on mine clearance in 2014 and one team working on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks for both mines and ERW, which was deployed for five months in 2014. In May 2015, MAG reported that both the mine clearance and EOD teams had been demobilised due to lack of funding.

Mechem initially, at the start of 2014, deployed four multitask teams (MTTs), one MDD team, and a mechanical asset. However, also due to a decrease in funding, one MTT was demobilised in June and its MDD and mechanical asset were demobilised in November.

NPA deployed one mine clearance team (MCT) and one MTT in 2014. It also focused efforts on providing capacity development support to the CCLAM, including equipment, vehicles, and office construction assistance, as well as training on information management, operational efficiency, and gender, in cooperation with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Gender and Mine Action Programme.

In 2014, CCLAM employed 58 staff, including in operational, managerial, information management, risk education, victim assistance, and support capacities. No national organisations in DRC were accredited to conduct clearance activities. National organisations are responsible for carrying out non-technical survey and risk education.
Quality Management

MAG, Mechem, HI, and NPA reported that external quality management activities were very limited in DRC in 2014.\(^{17}\) UNMAS claimed that a quality management system was in place and that quality assurance (QA) activities were normally carried out on a monthly basis per team/organisation in 2014. However, it said that in 2015 very few QA activities were being carried out in the field “due to both logistics and funding constraints”.\(^{21}\)

All four operators reported having internal quality management systems in place. Mechem stated a new QA system had been established, tested, and implemented in 2014, while MAG, HI, and NPA reported that internal quality control (QC) was carried out on a regular basis.\(^{27}\)

Information Management

UNMAS reported an increase in 2014 in the number of information management staff employed and trained and a corresponding increase in staff commitment to information management under the CCLAM.\(^{19}\) Yet UNMAS was still unable to establish an effective information management system during this reporting period. Data from the national mine action database in response to Mine Action Monitor research queries varied significantly from operators’ records, and in some cases was partial or even unusable.

LAND RELEASE

The total mined area in DRC released by clearance in 2014 was 0.23km\(^2\), compared with 0.1km\(^2\) in 2013.\(^{38}\) An additional 0.36km\(^2\) was released by survey in 2014.\(^{40}\)
Survey in 2014

In 2014, operators cancelled a total of 0.03km² of suspected mined area through non-technical survey and reduced a further 0.33km² through technical survey. An additional six areas covering 0.06km² were confirmed as mined on the basis of technical survey. After General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) and General Mine Action Survey (GMAS) activities carried out in 2009–12 were deemed to be too slow, inefficient, too difficult and expensive to implement on a territory the size of DRC, DRC decided to discontinue the GMAA and GMAS, establishing instead the National Landmine Contamination Survey (NLCS) in 2013, which also included a survey of CMR. This change in survey methodology resulted in much more efficient results to clarify the extent of contamination remaining and enabled substantial reduction in the size of SHAs.

Table 3: Survey in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>Mined areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15,061</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,595</td>
<td>77,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>249,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13,151</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43,849</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28,212</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>55,244</td>
<td>326,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHAs = suspected hazardous area   TS = technical survey

Clearance in 2014

The total mined area cleared in 2014 was 0.23km² (225,484m²), with the destruction of 43 anti-personnel mines, ten anti-vehicle mines, and over 7,300 items of UXO in the process. This was compared to the release of 0.1km² (110,961m²) by clearance in 2013, with the destruction of 76 anti-personnel mines and six anti-vehicle mines.

In June 2015, DRC informed States Parties to the APMBC that over the course of 2014 through the first half of 2015, a total of nearly 0.42km² (418,854m²) had been cleared, and 52 anti-personnel mines, 167 anti-tank mines, and 68,615 items of ERW destroyed.

UNMAS reported that the deployment of an integrated mechanical and MDD team by MECHEM in 2014 contributed to the increase in clearance output in 2014, but there was a decrease in the total number of teams (four operational across all operators) in 2014 due to funding constraints. It reported that as of October 2015, however, 13 teams were operational in DRC.

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
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<td>170,325</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7,114</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23,040</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHEM</td>
<td>2 (partially)</td>
<td>225,484</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>2 (partially)</td>
<td>27,766</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>17 (3 partially)</td>
<td>225,484</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7,327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deminer Safety

No demining personnel were killed or injured as a result of mine action accidents or incidents in DRC in 2014. However, three employees of a private company contracted by a demining unit of MONUSCO were kidnapped in North Kivu province in April 2015.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the six-year extension request granted by states parties in June 2014), DRC is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2021. In October 2015, DRC appeared in a position to meet this deadline as early as 2017, provided sufficient funding is maintained. The purpose of the six-year extension period is to (a) conduct technical surveys and clear the 130 identified mined areas; and (b) conduct non-technical and technical surveys as well as clear and/or release areas in the territories of Aru and Dungu in the Orientale province. Previously, in March 2011, DRC submitted a request to extend its initial Article 5 deadline of November 2012 by four years. This first request largely blamed poor survey by demining operators for the failure to meet its deadline, although poor management and insufficient national ownership of the programme were also major factors. In June 2011, however, at the Standing Committee meetings, DRC informed states parties it was seeking only an interim two-year extension and that it would present a definitive extension request in 2014. It subsequently requested a 26-month extension that states parties approved at the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012. While clearance operations continued during the extension period, the main activity was the national survey which aimed to provide DRC with the information needed to submit another extension request in 2014.

41 Ibid.
42 Analysis of DRC’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the APMBC Third Review Conference on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, pp. 2–3.
44 Figures as reported by NPA in response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 18 May 2015. UNMAS originally erroneously reported far lower total figures for NPA’s survey activities in 2014; these were later retracted by UNMAS in favour of the figures provided by NPA directly to Mine Action Monitor. Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 20 May 2015.
45 Figures reported by MAG. UNMAS did not include figures for MAG’s survey or clearance activities in its response to Mine Action Monitor for clearance data in DRC in 2014. MAG reported that only technical survey was carried out in its operations in Katanga in 2014 as non-technical survey was conducted in 2013 as part of the NLCS. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Julia Wittig, MAG, 29 May 2015.
46 Figures reported by HI. Figures originally reported by UNMAS did not include figures for HI’s non-technical survey activities and erroneously reported figures for land reduced through its technical survey operations, according to HI. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Julien Kempenkees, HI, and email, 3 June 2015.
48 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Colin Williams, UNMAS, 19 May 2015; and Julien Kempeneers, HI, (and email) 3 June 2015.
49 UNMAS’s dataset reported to the Mine Action Monitor which accounted for the release of one mined area with the clearance of 13,200m² and destruction of three anti-personnel mines. Email from Deon Greyley, Operations and QA Manager, Mechem, 21 May 2015.
50 Figures provided by both UNMAS and HI in agreement. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Julia Wittig, MAG, 29 May 2015, and Julien Kempenkees, HI, (and email) 3 June 2015.
53 Figures reported by MAG. UNMAS did not include figures for MAG’s survey or clearance activities in its response to Mine Action Monitor for clearance data in DRC in 2014. MAG reported that the figures it provided to Mine Action Monitor corresponded to its operations in Katanga where UNMAS conducted QA on a road where MAG had done technical survey and cleared UXO and subsequently released it. Work on a second road was started but had not finished in 2014. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Julia Wittig, MAG, 29 May 2015.
54 Figures reported by UNMAS in response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Colin Williams, UNMAS, 19 May 2015. DCA declined to provide data directly to Mine Action Monitor for 2014.
55 UNMAS originally erroneously reported Mechem as releasing a partial mined area, clearing 14,566m², and destroying no anti-personnel mines. This was subsequently clarified by Mechem who indicated that the completion report for a task in Katanga province (SR 3295 Bederra) submitted to UNMACC on 8 May 2014 was not included in UNMAS’s dataset reported to the Mine Action Monitor which accounted for the release of one mined area with the clearance of 13,200m² and destruction of three anti-personnel mines. Email from Deon Greyley, Operations and QA Manager, Mechem, 21 May 2015.
56 Figures provided by both UNMAS and HI in agreement. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Julia Wittig, MAG, 29 May 2015, and Julien Kempenkees, HI, (and email) 3 June 2015.
58 Ibid., 27 May 2013.
On 7 April 2014, DRC submitted a second request to extend its Article 5 deadline starting in January 2015. The extension indicates that at least 30% of the total mined areas can be released through technical survey, indicating that some 1.3km² would need to be cleared. The extension request estimates that on average 0.21km² will be cleared each year.

The extension request includes annual projections of progress to be made during the extension period, though without providing a detailed workplan with a monthly breakdown of activities for each operator in each area in order to achieve these. It also foresees expenditure of US$20 million, of which some $19.4 million will go to demining the 130 mined areas, while the remainder will be spent on survey and clearance in Aru and Dungu.

Since 2010, demining organisations have cleared a total of nearly 1.3km² of mined areas (see Table 5).

**Table 5: Mine clearance in 2010–14 (m²)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>225,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>110,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>354,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>364,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>265,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,320,360</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 1 October 2015, DRC had not submitted a detailed workplan on the implementation of its extension request targets nor its updated annual APMBC Article 7 transparency report, due by 30 April 2015.

In its second Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in April 2014, DRC indicated that the total costs of its planned mine action operations amount to nearly US$20 million. It announced that the national government of DRC had committed to contribute FC579,831,000 (about $600,000) a year to mine action activities, starting in January 2015.

DRC has reported that challenges for implementing its current extension request plan milestones include funding and logistics, the security situation, and geographical obstacles, including dense vegetation and heavy rainy seasons. In its extension request, DRC estimated that on the basis of DRC’s operational and financial capacity for demining in 2009–13, mine clearance could be completed within four years; however, additional time would be needed to conduct survey and clearance in the Aru and Dungu territories, thereby totalling the six years requested. In June 2015, DRC reported to states parties that after six months of implementation of its second extension request, it had concerns over declining international funding and consequences for its ability to achieve its extension targets.

UNMAS did not expect a change in mine action capacity in DRC in 2015. It expected to continue to deploy three operational MTTs in support of MONUSCO, while a further five MTTs were contracted for operations beginning in July 2015. The new teams were to conduct technical survey and clearance in North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Katanga provinces.

A deminer training on a Mine Wolf demining machine on a military compound near Kisangani. © Till Mayer/Handicap International
In May 2015, UNMAS stated that it was optimistic that DRC could meet its extension request targets and clearance deadline of 31 December 2020, provided that international funding remained stable for operations on a yearly basis. It noted, however, that the ongoing security situation in the east of DRC remained a serious concern and could delay DRC’s achievement of its clearance targets, making it difficult to estimate when DRC could complete its Article 5 obligations. As noted above, UNMAS reported that new SHAs were identified in 2014 and believed that further hazards would be identified in the future, especially while conflict continues.

Operators were more optimistic that DRC could meet its Article 5 deadline even earlier than expected, provided that current mine action funding levels are maintained or increased. In October 2015, NPA estimated that DRC could meet its deadline by 2017, three years before its extended deadline. This is based on progress in technical survey and clearance of SHAs reducing the total number identified by the NLCS of 130 in February 2014 to 85, as of 2 October 2015. NPA stated that remaining SHAs in Katanga, Maniema, Province Orientale, and North Kivu province (depending on the security situation in Beni) could be cleared by March 2016, and a portion of the SHAs in Equateur province completed by March 2017, leaving only the northern parts of Equateur province, plus two areas not covered by the NLCS, to be addressed after March 2017. MAG estimated that survey and clearance of mined areas could be completed within the next three years provided appropriate funding levels are sustained to mine action operators. HI likewise indicated that DRC could realistically meet its Article 5 deadline so long as funding continued.

In May 2015, NPA was planning to deploy its MTT, MCT, and four technical survey teams in Katanga province with the priority of carrying out technical survey on SHAs identified by the NLCS and GMAS, along with continuing its training and technical support operations with the CCLAM, in cooperation with the GICHD. NPA reported that as of April 2015, its first two technical survey teams had been deployed and funding secured for the additional two teams. Activities were expected to continue in Katanga in 2016.

In 2015, Mechem was continuing to deploy its three MTTs under UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) funding, but reported an additional contract had been secured for the establishment of five further MTTs to be deployed in eastern DRC.

In May 2015, MAG reported that its priorities in DRC for 2015 continued to be to address the SHAs identified by the 2013 NLCS. While one mine clearance team and the EOD team were demolished earlier in 2015, two other teams, which had focused on cluster munition clearance in 2014, were deployed to clear mines, cluster munitions, and other ERW in Katanga and Equateur in 2015. In addition, it stated that new teams could be added in 2015 if funding was secured and subsequently would be deployed to the most heavily contaminated provinces of Equateur and Katanga. HI expected to receive funding for mine clearance in 2015 and reported it was working on methodology for systematic demining by district in Orientale province. It planned to focus its operations on an area of 193,371m² with a strong humanitarian impact, in tandem with long-term partner Congolese organisation AFRILAM.

64 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 48.
65 Ibid., p. 49.
66 Ibid., p. 81.
67 Ibid., p. 12.
69 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 52. In June 2014, the ICRC welcomed the “important national contributions” to be provided by the DRC towards covering mine action expenses in anticipation of declining in donor support and noted the government’s intention to increase its national contribution and draw on human resources from the armed forces and national police. Statement of the ICRC, APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 23 June 2014.
70 Analysis of DRC’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the APMBC Third Review Conference on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, pp. 5–6.
71 Statement of DRC, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
77 Presentation to the Mine Action Support Group by Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, New York, 9 October 2015, and email, 22 October 2015.
79 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Julien Kempeneers, HI, 3 June 2015.
80 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 18 May 2015. NPA was not deploying mechanical assets in 2015.
83 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Julius Kempeneers, HI, 3 June 2015.
ECUADOR

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2017
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

ECUADOR PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Ecuador’s mine action programme improved in 2014, with clearance up significantly on the previous year, a result of increased national demining capacity.

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Ecuador should ensure that all reporting, especially on mined area released and remaining, is accurate and consistent.
- Ecuador should maintain, and if possible increase, its land release performance in 2014 in order to be able to release the remainder of its mined areas by 2017.

CONTAMINATION

Ecuador’s contamination results from the 1995 border conflict with Peru. The most heavily mined section of the border is the Condor Mountain Range which was at the centre of the dispute. 1 As of April 2015, Ecuador had 14 confirmed mined areas containing anti-personnel mines covering some 200,000m² and a further eight suspected mined areas covering 7,910m². 2 It is also contaminated to a smaller extent with anti-vehicle mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Three of 24 provinces in Ecuador still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas (SMAs), as set out in Table 1. The provinces are located in the south of the country along the border with Peru. As of December 2014, Zamora Chinchipe was the most mine-affected province with seven confirmed mined areas (CMAs) covering almost 145,000m², which represents 70% of Ecuador’s remaining mined areas. The extent of the contamination in Zamora Chinchipe has significantly increased compared with 2013 due to the addition of one task “La Media”, for which information was provided by Peru in January 2014. The mined area covers 68,000m² and is estimated to contain 448 mines. 3

Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 2014 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zamora Chinchipe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>143,919</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morona Santiago*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastaza</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>200,219</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7,910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area  
SMA = suspected mined area
* Includes the “square kilometre of Tiwintza” area the control of which Peru has ceded to Ecuador although it is located in Peruvian territory; it covers 43,500m² and contains 881 anti-personnel mines. 5

Ecuador’s contamination problem remains somewhat fluid due to a continued exchange of information with Peru regarding mined areas. Peru handed over the last of its mined areas in January 2014, but new areas may be found and exchanged between both states due to topography and terrain. 6

In its 2008 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, Ecuador listed farming, mining production, and tourism as the main productive activities affected by mine contamination. It also outlined the severe socio-economic impacts on communities residing along the border. 7

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2 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C.
5 Ibid.
6 Email from Léon Aviles, Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 6 May 2014.
7 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, November 2008.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by the National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI), an interministerial body chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while mine action operations are conducted by the Army’s General Demining Command (CGD).

Until October 2013, the Organization of American States (OAS) provided technical oversight and quality assurance (QA) of clearance. By October 2013, the OAS’s monitoring support structure at the military base in Morona Santiago province had been dismantled.

Under the Binational Cooperation Program (Programa Binacional de Cooperación) established in 2000, in April 2013 Ecuador and Peru adopted a Binational Manual for Humanitarian Demining (Manual Binacional de Desminado Humanitario) to unify the demining procedures of both states in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). In December 2013, the joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit of 30 deminers conducted its first exercise in Morona Santiago, during which 317 m² were cleared and 30 anti-personnel mines found. A second exercise took place on the Peruvian side of the border in 2014 but the results were not publicly reported.

LAND RELEASE

The total amount of mined land released by clearance and survey in 2014 was 87,405 m², compared with 12,331 m² in 2013. Seven mined areas were cancelled or released through clearance, and 4,181 anti-personnel mines were destroyed (see Table 2). In 2014, Ecuador’s clearance capacity consisted of 18 demining teams and one mechanical team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Mined areas released</th>
<th>Area cancelled by survey (m²)</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Total area (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morona Santiago</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47,744</td>
<td>39,570</td>
<td>87,315</td>
<td>4,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastaza</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>47,744</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,660</strong></td>
<td><strong>87,405</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,181</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines

Land release in Ecuador continues at a slow pace, although there was a significant increase in 2014 compared to previous years. This increase in the rate of release in 2014 can be attributed to the fact that more than half of the total area released was cancelled through survey and to an increase in demining personnel.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2008), Ecuador is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2017. Ecuador is not on track to meet this extended deadline.

In June 2014, Ecuador declared taking all the necessary measures and using all available resources to ensure clearance of its mined areas is completed within its deadline. In May 2015, Ecuador believed that it was on track to meet its extended clearance deadline.

Ecuador has cleared less than 170,000 m² of mined area in the last five years with the destruction of more than 5,200 anti-personnel mines (see Table 3).

Table 3: Land release in 2010–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Mined area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>39,660</td>
<td>47,744</td>
<td>4,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>12,331</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>21,911</td>
<td>47,106</td>
<td>813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>60,110</td>
<td>6,167</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>33,439</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>167,451</td>
<td>110,517</td>
<td>5,203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines

Ecuador’s latest extension request submitted in March 2008 indicated bad weather, difficult terrain conditions, the bad state of communication networks, and the difficulty in accessing some mined areas as the main reasons for needing additional time. The request included a workplan for 2009–17 containing annual projections. It also estimated that more than US$9 million would be needed to carry out the remaining demining work. In granting the request, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted that based on the planned increase in funding and demining capacity, Ecuador “may find itself in a situation wherein it could proceed with implementation faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested.”

In its revised extension request summary, Ecuador indicated that its remaining contamination included 75 mined areas covering an estimated 500,000 m². As of December 2014, the remaining contamination covered approx. 200,000 m² across a total of 22 areas. Ecuador indicated that about three-quarters of the contaminated areas identified in its Extension Request had been released, and that 100,000 m² of its initial challenge remains to be addressed.

Ecuador’s low clearance rate in recent years in combination with the possibility of identifying new SMAs call into question its ability to clear its contaminated areas within its deadline. Ecuador also questioned its own ability to meet its deadline in 2012 when a Ministry of Defence brochure disseminated at the Intersessional Meetings in Geneva stated that Ecuador expected to complete clearance by 2023. The increase in Ecuador’s land release rate in 2014 is encouraging but continued efforts are needed in order to ensure compliance with its 2017 deadline.

No information was available for Ecuador’s funding of mine action activities in 2014 and 2015, although Mine Action Monitor was informed in May 2015 that “the National Demining Plan is financed properly” and “the demining operations will continue normally.”
ERITREA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2020
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR

3.8  4.9

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Eritrea’s mine action programme has performed very poorly in most areas, with performance seemingly deteriorating during 2014. As noted overleaf, in May 2015, the Deputy General Manager of the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA) even informed Mine Action Monitor that there was “no significant progress registered by the EDA currently”.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Greater priority needs to be afforded to demining in Eritrea. The authorities should ensure that demining units are not reoriented to other tasks but focus on survey and clearance operations for humanitarian purposes.
- Eritrea should urgently submit an up-to-date list of all known or suspected areas containing anti-personnel mines and a detailed timeline of activities planned under its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 extension request, including annual projections of areas to be addressed and a corresponding budget.
- Eritrea should submit its outstanding annual APMBC Article 7 transparency report, which was due by 30 April 2015.
- Eritrea should reconsider its policy of excluding international technical assistance from the country, which would support more efficient land release and re-open international funding paths.
- Eritrea should develop and make public a resource mobilisation strategy on the basis of a clear understanding of remaining contamination.

CONTAMINATION

Eritrea is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) dating back to World War II, but largely as the result of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed conflict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000.

In May 2015, in response to Mine Action Monitor’s request for updated information on the state of contamination and mine action activities in Eritrea as of the end of 2014, the Deputy General Manager of EDA reported “no significant progress registered by the EDA currently”. He claimed, though, that EDA was undergoing reorganisation in an effort to make “better progress”.1 EDA did not respond to repeated requests from Mine Action Monitor for further information.

The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported that 434 mined areas remained over an estimated 33.4km².2 This is a two-thirds reduction on the earlier estimate of 99km² in June 2011,3 and significantly lower than the 129km² identified by the 2004 landmine impact survey.4

Eritrea also remains contaminated with other ERW, possibly including cluster munition remnants (CMR). The majority of unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination is in the former Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), where the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) found ordnance primarily along the trench lines.6 ERW in Eritrea may also include items dating back to the Italian invasion prior to World War II.7

Anti-personnel mine and other ERW contamination is reported to negatively affect socio-economic conditions in Eritrea, blocking access to agricultural and pastoral land vital to farmers and animal herders, and preventing the implementation of construction and development projects, including of roads, schools, and clinics.8

Table 1: SHAs by region as of end 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zoba (region)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Estimated area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semienawi Keih Bahri</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>9,462,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anseba</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>10,230,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gash Barka</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6,252,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debub</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,894,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maakel</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,423,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debubawi Keih Bahri</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,169,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>434</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,432,818</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHA = suspected hazardous area

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1 Email from Habtom Seghid, Deputy General Manager, EDA, 6 May 2015.
2 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7. This was despite finding 49 previously unrecorded suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in five regions across an estimated area of 9km² during non-technical survey in 2013. Analysis of Eritrea’s Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 20 June 2014, p. 2.
3 Eritrea’s reply to questions from the APMBC Article 5 Analysing Group about its Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 June 2011, p. 2.
7 “Between the Wars – Italian Occupation of Ethiopia”, 15 September 2005.
8 Analysis of Eritrea’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2014, p. 3.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Eritrea mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. EDA, established in July 2002, is responsible for policy development, regulation of mine action, and implementation of mine clearance operations. EDA reports directly to the Office of the President.

Demining is primarily conducted by the engineering units of the Eritrean defence forces under the supervision of EDA, which also carries out quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) in accordance with Eritrea’s National Mine Action Standards.10 According to its second Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in January 2014, Eritrea planned to deploy “at least” five demining teams during its second extension period, the same number as then deployed, but might increase the number if adequate financial and logistical support were found.11 However, Eritrea’s demining units may be re-tasked toward infrastructure building, such as construction of roads and dams, “at any point”.12 Following expulsion of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 2005, Eritrea does not allow any international humanitarian demining operators to conduct survey or clearance in Eritrea.

LAND RELEASE

Under its 2014 extension request, Eritrea projected that up to 15.4km² of mined area could be cleared within five years. It reported that 67.3km² of contaminated area had been cancelled through non-technical survey and that 5.7km² was cleared over 38 mined areas in 2011–13.12

Eritrea has not provided any updates to states parties to the APMBM, nor responded to Mine Action Monitor requests for information on any mine action activities (including survey activities) undertaken in 2014. Previously, in 2013, Eritrea reported release of 157 SHAs totalling 33.5km², leaving 385 mined areas of close to 24.5km² to be surveyed.13 Forty-nine new mined areas with a total size of 33.5km² were discovered in five of the country’s six regions during non-technical survey in 2013: Anseba, Debub, Gash Barka, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri.14 Likewise, Eritrea has not made public any information on any mine clearance undertaken in 2014. In 2013, Eritrea seemingly cleared approx. 2.26km² of mined area, almost twice the amount cleared in 2012 (1.2km²).15 The number of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines destroyed in 2013 has not been reported.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBM (and in accordance with the three-year extension granted by states parties in 2011), Eritrea is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2020. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

In January 2014, Eritrea submitted a second Article 5 deadline extension request seeking a further five years to continue clearance and complete resurvey of SHAs, but not to fulfil its clearance obligations under the treaty. It is not clear how this is consistent with the terms of APMBM Article 5. In June 2014, however, states parties to the APMBM granted Eritrea its extension request until 2020, but noted that five additional years beyond Eritrea’s previous February 2015 deadline “appeared to be a long period of time to meet this objective”.16

Resurvey during the second extension period is planned to involve both technical and non-technical survey of all remaining mined areas across six regions. Resurvey is planned to run concurrently with clearance in priority areas in the Anseba, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri regions.17

Based on a predicted clearance rate of 384,000m² per team per year and 1.92km² per five teams per year, Eritrea has estimated that five teams operating at this optimum pace could clear almost 15.4km² in the five-year period.18 However, this clearance rate was acknowledged by Eritrea as “ambitious” due to the “inevitable collaboration … of the demining teams with the survey teams”. In addition, while Eritrea seems to have set reasonable estimates for its clearance rates that approx. match its progress in previous years with similar capacity, this accounts for only less than half of the total area Eritrea has estimated as requiring either clearance or resurvey (33.5km²), leaving approx. 18.1km² unaccounted for in the workplan.19

Eritrea projected that costs for the extension period will amount to more than US$7 million, all to be raised nationally.20 During 2011–13, Eritrea managed to raise only $257,000 annually. As of December 2013, Eritrea had not received international funding for mine clearance and in its statement at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Eritrea said that progress in clearing mines would be slow because it “had limited resources and capacity of one small poor nation”.21 It is therefore unclear how Eritrea intends to raise the finances necessary for its survey and clearance activities, particularly in light of its regrettable policy not to accept international technical assistance.

9 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F, p. 5.
10 Ibid., p. 10.
11 ICBL interview with Habtom Seghid, Deputy General Manager, EDA, Eritrea, 10 April 2014.
12 Analysis of Eritrea’s Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2014, p. 2.
14 Analysis of Eritrea’s Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7.
15 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F, p. 10.
16 Decision on Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.
17 Statement of Eritrea, APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 26 June 2014.
19 ICBL Comments on Eritrea’s Article 5 Extension Request, March 2014.
20 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 11.
In April 2014, at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Eritrea stated that the extension period was designed to gain greater clarity about its mine problem, at which point Eritrea "could plan and think about the financial resources to be allocated for mine action". It was further stated that Eritrea "won’t complete clearance in the next five years", and will likely require a third extension.

Table 2: Action mine clearance in 2010–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,232</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines   AV = anti-vehicle mines   N/R = not reported

Since 2008, Eritrea is said to have contributed approx. US$257,000 per year towards its mine action programme. UNDP provided operational support for national demining teams until 2011, while Eritrea covered the salaries. Eritrea has not reported receiving international support since 2011. Despite Eritrea’s acknowledgement that it lacks adequate funding, the government of Eritrea has persistently refused to accept the return of international demining NGOs, which would bring in extra capacity and financial resources, since their expulsion in 2005.

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23 Ibid.
25 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 March 2011, p. 22.
**ETHIOPIA**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2015**
(MISSED DEADLINE AND CURRENTLY IN SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION)

**PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY**

Ethiopia’s mine action programme continued to deteriorate in 2014. From being one of the best mine action programmes a decade ago it is now one of the worst, with little meaningful progress registered since September 2011.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Ethiopia should establish an independent mine action programme and/or coordinating body as the Ministry of Defence has made little progress in survey and clearance.
- Ethiopia needs to take its international obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) far more seriously. Its failure to request and secure an extension to its Article 5 deadline put it in serious violation of the APMBC.
- Ethiopia should significantly improve the quality and frequency of its reporting both at APMBC meetings and through Article 7 reports.

CONTAMINATION

In March 2015, Ethiopia reported that nearly 5.9 km² of confirmed mined areas (CMAs) remained in the country, along with 314 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) with a total size of more than 1,193 km². The remaining SHAs were located across six regions (Afar, Benishangul, Gambela, Oromia, Tigray, and Somali), as set out in Table 1. The Somali region is believed to be by far the most heavily affected. Based on past operational experience, however, Ethiopia estimated that after technical survey only 2%–3% of the SHAs would be confirmed to contain mines, indicating that up to 36 km² of actual mine contamination would remain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benishangul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumuz*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambela</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>1,186.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigray</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>314</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,193.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHA = suspected hazardous area

*Spelt Benshangul Gumz in Ethiopia’s extension request.

1 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 7 and 24. Previously in April 2014, Ethiopian officials also reported during a meeting with ICBL that 5.9 km² of scattered contaminated areas remained to be released. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) meeting with Muez Gebre Tsadik, Head of Obstacle Construction and Removal Section, Combat Engineers Division (CED), Ethiopian Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 10 April 2014. However, in Ethiopia’s extension request there are inconsistencies. On p. 7, it states that “in order for Ethiopia to meet its clearance obligations it still needs to carry out clearance of 196 mined areas measuring 37,872,244 square meters”. The Mine Action Monitor believes the latter to be erroneous reporting, as according to a 2012 Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining report, a total of 196 mined areas were confirmed with a total surface area of 37.89 km², and of this area, EMAO had cleared 37.31 km² by June 2012, leaving 0.58 km² to be cleared, all in the Somali region. P. Simon, “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia”, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), p. 3.

2 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 7, 24, and 41. Ethiopia stated that the total amount of SHAs remaining did not include areas along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border which remained unsafe to access as the border demarcation had not yet been confirmed. Ethiopia also inconsistently and erroneously reports the total number of SHAs remaining throughout its extension request (see note 5 below). Additionally, on p. 41, Ethiopia reports that “314 communities are known and suspected containing mines [sic]”, while on p. 42 it reports that “the remaining 307 communities can be cleared and released within the Five years period [sic]”. The figure of 314 SHAs remaining is used throughout the rest of the document however and was reported in Ethiopia’s statement to states parties at the intersessional meetings in April 2014.

3 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 7, 24, and 41.

4 Ibid., pp. 42. On p. 47, Ethiopia estimated that 2% of the LIS (24.75 km²) would be confirmed as mined through survey.

5 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 26 and 42; and statement of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 9 April 2014. Ethiopia reported two different sets of figures for the total size of the remaining SHAs in its extension request in two tables, one on p. 26 and one on p. 42, both purporting to show the number and size of the remaining 314 SHAs. It also reported that both sets of (different) figures in the two tables totalled 1,193,168,623 m². In fact, in neither table do the figures add up to 1,193,168,623 m². The first table on p. 26 totals 1,193,168,274 m², while the second table on p. 42 totals 1,193,263,623 m². The tables contain different figures for the size of the SHAs remaining in the Afar and Oromia regions.

6 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 26 and 42.

In 2001–04, a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in ten of Ethiopia’s 11 regions, with 1,916 SHAs across more than 2,000 km² impacting more than 1,492 communities. The Afar, Somali, and Tigray regions accounted for more than four-fifths of impacted communities.

The Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) believed that the LIS had overestimated the number of both SHAs and impacted communities, citing lack of military expertise among the survey teams as the major reason for the overestimate. Indeed, in 2012 Ethiopia reported that subsequent technical survey and non-technical (re-)survey of SHAs identified during the LIS confirmed mine contamination in only 136 SHAs. However, 60 previously unrecorded hazardous areas were also identified, which were confirmed as mined by technical survey, resulting in a total of 196 CMAs. Also in 2012, Ethiopia reported that 358 SHAs across an area of 1,200 km² from the LIS data remained to be re-surveyed.

EMAO expected to clear approx. 3 km² per year, but it appears that only very limited clearance of 0.1 km² has taken place since the transfer of EMAO’s responsibilities to the Ministry of Defence in 2012. It has since requested an extension, as yet to be approved, to its Article 5 clearance deadline of 1 June 2015, for an additional five years until June 2020.

The last known estimate of mine and ERW victims in Ethiopia stems from the 2001–04 LIS, which had recorded 16,616 mine and ERW casualties, of which 9,341 people were killed and 7,275 injured. Ethiopia reported that two-thirds of the victims were engaged in herding and farming activities at the time accidents occurred. Mine and ERW contamination is reported to continue to cause socio-economic harm, including through: denying access to agricultural and pasture land, which contributes to food insecurity and serious economic hardship for certain communities; blocking access to water for communities and particularly for nomadic pastoralists; and blocking secondary and tertiary roads important to local communities.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In February 2001, following the end of the conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers established EMAO as an autonomous civilian body responsible for mine clearance and mine risk education. EMAO developed its operational capacities effectively with technical assistance from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In 2011, however, EMAO’s governing board decided that the Ministry of Defence was better suited to clear the remaining mines because Ethiopia had made significant progress in meeting its APMBC clearance obligations and the remaining threat did not warrant a structure and organisation the size of EMAO. It has further asserted on numerous occasions that a civilian entity such as EMAO would have difficulty accessing the unstable Somali region.

In response to the decision to close EMAO and transfer demining responsibility to the army’s Combat Engineers Division (CED) division, NPA ended its direct funding support and had completed the transfer of its remaining 49-strong mine detection dog (MDD) capacity to EMAO by the end of April 2012, with some MDD handlers and support staff transferred to the federal police. The CED assumed management of the MDD Training Centre at Entoto where it conducted training in demining in early 2012. In March 2013, a representative from the Ministry of Defence confirmed that transfer of all demining assets had been completed and reported that it was preparing to deploy survey and clearance teams to the Somali region. Ethiopia reported, though, that its demining capacity had been reduced due to secondment of three demining groups to the UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan.

Transition of the mine action programme from EMAO to the Ministry of Defence was described as “ongoing” in April 2014 and was expected to be concluded “soon”. In June 2015, Ethiopia stated that “the process of transfer has taken more time than expected” but did not indicate conclusively if the transition had been finalised. Under its extension request, Ethiopia reports that by the end of May 2020 it will deploy four demining companies and four survey and rapid-response teams. In June 2015, Ethiopia stated that over the past two and a half years, four demining companies consisting of 140 men had received “basic humanitarian deminers’ training”, with the first training course held from July to November 2013.
Standards

Under its extension plan targets, Ethiopia has stated that in 2015 its National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) would be “developed and updated” and that standard operating procedures (SOPs) for mine clearance and land release would be updated using the current International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). It reported that its NMAS and SOPs had previously been updated in accordance with amendments to IMAS with support from NPA.

Ethiopia also reported spending 2012–13 building its own demining capacity by “developing mine action standards through combat engineer teams”, with the aim of being able to conduct training and clearance activities at minimal cost from the units’ own budgets.

Quality Management

In its extension request, Ethiopia reported that operations had been “employing overall quality management including quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) efforts to ensure that operations are in accordance with NMAS and IMAS.”

Information Management

Ethiopia also reported that EMAO had previously installed and customised a new version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and had been working on capacity development to upgrade data processing. However, it stated that database challenges remained and until “the gap” in the IMSMA system could be resolved, the National Defence Force would “continue using alternative data processing packages together with IMSMA for planning, reporting, and analysis”. In its extension request, Ethiopia requested technical advisory and training support to finalise the IMSMA database and make it fully functional.

The quality of Ethiopia’s reporting on its mine action activities in recent years has been poor. As of mid-October 2015, Ethiopia had not submitted any updated annual Article 7 transparency reports mandated by the APMBC covering years 2012, 2013, or 2014. Its March 2015 extension request is riddled with inconsistent figures and mathematical errors.

9 Interviews with Gabriel Lager, Deputy Director, EMAO, in Ljubljana, 14 April 2008, and in Geneva, 4 June 2008.
11 Simon, “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia”, GICHD, p. 3. In its extension request, Ethiopia reports that 136 areas were confirmed as mined by re-survey efforts and an 58 additional areas outside the LIS were identified (which would be 194 areas in total), but still reports the total CMAs remaining as 196. APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 7.
13 Statements of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings [Committee on Article 5 Implementation], Geneva, 25 June 2015; and Intersessional Meetings [Standing Committee on Mine Action], 24 May 2014.
14 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 6.
15 Ibid.
LAND RELEASE

Ethiopia has reported that in 2002–12, almost 60km² of mined areas had been cleared and nearly 1,200km² of SHAs released by technical survey, with the destruction of 9,260 anti-personnel mines, 1,466 anti-vehicle mines, and 197,985 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).34 Ethiopia did not report any further survey or clearance for 2014 or the first half of 2015. Previously, in April 2014, Ethiopia had informed states parties to the APMBC that in January–November 2013 its rapid-response teams had visited more than ten ERW-impacted communities in “Amhar, Oromiya, south and Somalia regional states” clearing more than 100,000m² and destroying ten anti-personnel mines and 176,000 items of UXO.35 No details were given as to the exact location of the spot tasks.

In its extension request, Ethiopia stated that four demining teams and four technical survey and rapid response teams were scheduled to start clearance and survey as of November 2015, and an additional four technical survey and rapid response teams would be deployed in December 2015. Prior to deploying any clearance operators, training and refreshment courses were held from 15 July 2015 to 30 September 2015, it said.36

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Ethiopia was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2015. It failed to meet this deadline and is therefore in serious violation of the APMBC.

In April 2014, at the APMBC intersessional meetings, Ethiopia informed states parties that it intended to request a two-year extension to its Article 5 deadline.37 In March 2015, however, Ethiopia submitted a request for an extension of five years until 1 June 2020 to complete survey and clearance of all remaining mined areas.38 In the request, Ethiopia provided the following intended yearly milestones and targets:

- In 2015–17, non-technical and technical survey would be carried out on all remaining 314 SHAs covering a total area of over 1,193km². Of this, 22 SHAs with an area of almost 29.9km² would be addressed in 2015; 149 SHAs covering 516km² in 2016;39 and a further 143 SHAs with a size of 647.8km² in 2017.40

- It further projected that a total of 0.45km² would be cleared in 2015; 4.88km² in 2016; and 4.8km² in 2017: a total of 10.135km².

- In 2018–20, clearance would continue in the surveyed areas, mainly in the Somali region.41 Ethiopia promised that an updated workplan would be submitted to states parties by April 2017.42

Previously, in 2010, Ethiopia said it would clear all mines by 2013 (two years ahead of its deadline) if sufficient funding were available.43 By March 2013, however, following the closure of EMAO and transfer of responsibility for mine action to the Ministry of Defence, Ethiopia reported it was unlikely to meet its Article 5 deadline due to secondment of demining units to Sudan and gaps in training, equipment, and funding.44

In its March 2015 extension request, Ethiopia listed the following reasons for its inability to comply with its 1 June 2015 Article 5 deadline: insecurity in some SMAs and CMAs; the absence of basic social services and infrastructure necessary for mine action operations in rural areas; continuous redeployment of demining teams in scattered mined areas; lack of funding; the finding of additional hazardous areas; climate factors such as a three-month rainy season; and a lack of precise information on the number and locations of all mined areas in the country.45

With no functioning mine action programme as of the end of 2014 and little progress reported in clearance since September 2011 (see Table 2), Ethiopia’s ability to meet its future extension request plan is dubious. As of mid-October 2015, Ethiopia had not submitted annual Article 7 transparency reports for 2012, 2013, or 2014, itself a violation of the APMBC. The inconsistencies and errors throughout its extension request do not provide sufficient clarity on or confidence in the true extent of mine contamination remaining or a realistic estimate of when clearance could be completed.46

34 Ibid., p. 24. However on the next page of its extension request, Ethiopia included a table of munitions destroyed which reported the destruction of 9,363 anti-personnel mines, 1,373 anti-vehicle mines, and 141,112 items of UXO. Ethiopia previously reported slightly different figures of destroying 9,278 anti-personnel mines and 1,266 anti-vehicle mines. See Simon, “Transferring Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia”, GICHD, pp. 16–17.
36 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 11 and 44.
37 Statement of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings [Standing Committee on Mine Action], Geneva, 9 April 2014. Ethiopia also confirmed this informally that it intended to request a two-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until June 2017. ICBL meeting with Muez Gebre Tsadik, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
38 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 10.
39 Ibid., p. 46. In the extension request Ethiopia appears to give different figures for the number and amount of SHAs to be addressed per year: in a separate table also on p. 46, it also reports that 12 SHAs covering 28.3km² would be surveyed in 2015. On p. 45, however, it reverses figures for clearance and survey and erroneously reports that over the course of 2015, 452,890m² would be addressed by non-technical and technical survey, while a total of 28.1km² would be cleared. It also reports a different figure of 160 SHAs with a size of more than 517.5km² to be surveyed in 2015 in the table on p. 46.
40 Ibid., p. 24. However on the next page of its extension request, Ethiopia included a table of munitions destroyed which reported the destruction of 9,363 anti-personnel mines, 1,373 anti-vehicle mines, and 141,112 items of UXO. Ethiopia previously reported slightly different figures of destroying 9,278 anti-personnel mines and 1,266 anti-vehicle mines. See Simon, “Transferring Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia”, GICHD, pp. 16–17.
41 Ethiopia also confirmed this informally that it intended to request a two-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until June 2017. ICBL meeting with Muez Gebre Tsadik, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
42 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 10.
43 Ibid., p. 46. In the extension request Ethiopia appears to give different figures for the number and amount of SHAs to be addressed per year: in a separate table also on p. 46, it also reports that 12 SHAs covering 28.3km² would be surveyed in 2015. On p. 45, however, it reverses figures for clearance and survey and erroneously reports that over the course of 2015, 452,890m² would be addressed by non-technical and technical survey, while a total of 28.1km² would be cleared. It also reports a different figure of 160 SHAs with a size of more than 517.5km² to be surveyed in 2015 in the table on p. 46.
In its extension request, Ethiopia claims it will cost a total of more than US$37 million to complete clearance by May 2020, a seemingly inexplicable increase from the $10 million that EMAO reported was required to clear all remaining areas in 2012. The request stated that Ethiopia would cover most of the mine action programme’s administrative costs, including QA, information management, and training to respond to residual contamination, but did not report the size of its national contribution.

Ethiopia affirmed that primary concerns around implementing its extension request milestones and completing clearance by 2020 included the security situation in affected areas, funding, population movements, high metallic content in hazardous areas, and heavy rainy seasons. Specifically, Ethiopia reported that as of March 2015, it was now possible for military demining to commence in the Tigray border minefield. However, it said that addressing the Afar, Somali, Gambela, Benishangul, and Oromia mined areas presented challenges due to insecurity and lack of infrastructure, social services, and access in remote areas.

Ethiopia has stated on a number of occasions that it will require technical and financial support from international NGOs to meet its mine clearance obligations. In June 2015, Ethiopia requested the transfer of mine detection and clearance technologies from states parties in order to acquire increased technical expertise in clearing mine and improvised explosive devices, it said.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>2,038</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines    AV = anti-vehicle mines    N/R = not reported

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40 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 45–66. However, these figures add up to 1,193,826,636m², which is greater than any of the four slightly different figures reported in the extension request as the total size of the remaining SHAs. Likewise, the alternate figures listed in the preceding footnote total 1,193,681,680m², which is also greater than any figure reported for the size of the total remaining SHAs. To add to this confusion, in its statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2015, Ethiopia reported that only 22 SHAs covering an area of 647,810,293m² would be addressed in 2015–17.

41 Statement of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015.

42 Statement of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; and APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 47.


RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Jordan should request a new extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline for the period through to the completion of all demining to humanitarian standards.
- Jordan should commit more national resources to its land release programme and increase the number of teams deployed on demining tasks.

CONTAMINATION

Jordan is contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Contamination is primarily the result of the 1948 partition of Palestine, the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1970 civil war, and the 1975 confrontation with Syria. Military training ranges and cross-border smuggling have added to the ERW problem.

Jordan claimed that it had completed clearance of all known mined areas on 24 April 2012 after Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) finished clearance of the mine belt along its northern border with Syria the previous month, but subsequently acknowledged that not all mines along the border had been accounted for. In fact, Jordan appears to still contain mined areas on its territory.

NPA was due to “verify” some 10.5km² of land adjacent to the mine belt for close to 10,000 mines from the mine belts unaccounted for and which may have been removed during unrecorded army clearance operations or by smugglers, or may have shifted due to weather, floods, or land erosion. NPA’s verification procedure involved a mixture of visual inspection of areas adjacent to the mine belt, “ground preparation” with mechanical assets and limited involvement of manual deminers, and full technical survey of areas where evidence and experience pointed to a risk of contamination. When operations halted in February 2013 due to security issues on the northern border, NPA had completed work on 8.2km², leaving 2.3km² to be verified. The National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) had “inspected” 6.8km² of the total area, leaving a total of 3.7km² requiring inspection.

Jordan is also continuing verification and clearance in the Jordan Valley. The Army’s Royal Engineering Corps (REC) cleared the area and declared completion in 2008 but NCDR concluded that operations had not met national standards. Verification and clearance operations in the past two years have found 354 uncleared mines. Jordan estimated the area remaining to be verified and cleared at 12.5km² in mid-2011. By the end of 2013, the estimate had fallen to 5.4km² and by the end of 2014 to 4.85km².
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Jordan established NCDR as “the primary national mine action authority” under a 2000 law, while a April 2002 royal decree appointed its board of directors, which includes representatives of the Jordanian Armed Forces, the government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), landmine survivors, and the media. NCDR became fully operational in 2004 when Prince Mired Raad Zeid al-Hussein became its chair.6

NCDR was responsible for preparing and overseeing implementation of a national mine action plan and for ensuring mine action is integrated into the country’s wider development strategies.7 It is responsible for coordinating, accrediting, regulating, and quality-assuring all mine action organisations, as well as for fundraising.8

Strategic Planning

NCDR’s 2010–15 National Plan, published in June 2010, aimed to complete clearance of all known mines, including 65,000 mines from the northern border, by May 2012, and to clear all ERW by December 2012.9 Jordan had also planned to complete Jordan Valley verification and clearance by the end of 2015 but now says the timing of completion will depend on the availability of resources. In 2014, NCDR said it had provided US$21,000 for verification and clearance and that the government had provided additional support in kind.10

NCDR has drawn up a National Plan for 2015–20, which now aims to eliminate all ERW contamination by 2020. It targets completing Jordan Valley verification and clearance by the end of 2017, employing six manual clearance teams and one mechanical demining team at a projected cost of $2 million. Resuming verification and release of the remaining 3,7km² along the northern border with Syria will depend on the security situation but, according to the plan, would require one year of work and expenditure of $1 million.11

The plan also states that NCDR “will transform from a ‘national’ institution focusing largely on its own mine clearance to one that will concentrate on assisting other war-affected countries to overcome the challenges associated with the work of mine action and Explosive Remnants of War removal.”12

1 “Jordan First Arab country free of landmines”, UNDP, 26 April 2013; and Mohammad Ghazal, “Jordan first Mideast country to be free of minefields”, Jordan Times, 25 April 2012.
2 Statement of Jordan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 29 May 2013; and email from Mikael Bold, Programme Manager, NPA, 12 February 2012. NPA estimated the number of mines missing from the mine belt at between 9,345 and 10,083.
3 Email from Jamal Odibat, Operations Reporting Officer, NCDR, 8 May 2014.
4 Emails from Muna Alalul, Head of International Relations, NCDR, 25 July and 31 July 2011.
5 Email from Mohammad Breikat, National Director, NCDR, 22 March 2015, and from Jamal Odibat, NCDR, 18 March 2014.
7 Email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 31 July 2011.
10 Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 22 March 2015.
12 Ibid., p. 9.
LAND RELEASE

In 2014, army engineers continued verification and sampling in the Jordan Valley, operating with two manual teams of Royal Engineers and releasing 546,000m², down significantly from about 1.1km² the previous year.¹³ Operations verified ten areas, destroying in the process 112 anti-personnel mines, one anti-vehicle mine, and 56 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).¹⁴ NCDR said it expected operations in 2015 to release a further 0.6km² but that the level of operations would depend on the availability of resources.¹⁵

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Given Jordan’s recognition of remaining suspected contaminated areas, Jordan still has outstanding Article 5 survey and clearance obligations to fulfil. As it does not currently have an extension period granted by states parties, Jordan is in violation of the APMBC.

Jordan officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations on 24 April 2012, just ahead of the 1 May 2012 deadline set as a result of the four-year extension granted by states parties in 2008. It submitted its formal declaration of completion to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012.¹⁶ Jordan’s announcement came after NPA completed demining minefields along the northern border with Syria. Announcing completion, however, Prince Mired acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas where landmines have been emplaced”.¹⁷

Jordan subsequently noted that completion of northern border verification will depend on security conditions. At the 2013 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Jordan said it expected to complete ‘verification’ of 4.4km² in the Jordan Valley in 2015.¹⁸ However, Jordan revised its estimate of the area needing verification up to 5.4km² in 2014, and the 2015–20 National Plan said it would need three years to finish the task, aiming for completion by December 2017.¹⁹ Even the extended target date may prove unrealistic unless Jordan is able to commit more resources to the programme and increase the number of demining teams deployed on the task.

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¹³ Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 22 March 2015.
¹⁴ Ibid.
¹⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶ Implementation Support Unit, “Jordan becomes the first Middle Eastern country free of all known landmines”, Press release, 24 April 2012; “Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction”, submitted by Jordan, 4 December 2012.
¹⁷ “Jordan becomes the first Middle Eastern country free of all known landmines”, Press release, 24 April 2012.
**MAURITANIA**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2016****NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE**

**MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY**

Mauritania’s performance score has reduced compared to the previous year as it has failed to complete its Article 5 obligations by the expiry of its first deadline extension. The quality of its reporting has failed to improve and overall its programme performance has dropped, which is disappointing given the considerable external technical assistance and funding the programme has received.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Mauritania should engage actively with Morocco with a view to ensuring the clearance of remaining mined areas in accordance with its obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
- Mauritania should report clearly and in detail on areas it suspects may be on its territory.

CONTAMINATION

The north of Mauritania has limited remaining mine contamination, a legacy of the conflict over Western Sahara in 1975–78. As of the end of 2014, only 1.7km² across 13 confirmed mined areas (CMAs) remained to be addressed, all in Dakhlet Nouadibou province. During 2015, the programme’s four demining teams were due to finish clearance activities in the remaining contaminated areas of Swaïdiyyat, Bolinwar, and Nouadibou.

Other contaminated areas are located near the border with Western Sahara and might be considered as outside of Mauritanian territory and thus not under its jurisdiction. In its request for a second extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline, Mauritania stated that it “suspects that the security system along the border with Western Sahara, which comprises fortifications and minefields, crosses Mauritanian territory, especially since there is no natural border [between the two countries].”

A 2006 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) had found a total of 65 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 76km² and affecting 60 communities. This represented a significant exaggeration of the actual mine threat. In March 2010, Morocco provided detailed maps of minefields laid during the Western Sahara conflict. The minefields had been partially cleared using military procedures prior to entry into force of the APMBC.

In 2013, clearance was completed in two of the three contaminated provinces; Tiris Zemour and Adrar. According to a joint survey conducted by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), initial non-technical survey of Nouadhibou province in December 2013 identified just over 8km² still requiring technical survey and clearance.

The last reported mine casualties were in 2012 when one person was killed and three others were injured.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

PNDHD coordinates mine action operations in Mauritania. Since August 2007, the programme has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization, with oversight from an interministerial steering committee, set up by decree in September 2007. PNDHD has its headquarters in the capital, Nouakchott, and a regional mine action centre (RAMAC) in Nouadhibou.

Strategic Planning

Mauritania’s extension request included a detailed workplan for 2010–15, containing annual milestones of area to be released each year and against which progress could be compared. By the end of 2011, operations were due to be completed in the provinces of Tiris Zemour and Adrar. This was finally achieved in 2013.

According to Mauritania, in the four years since January 2011 (the beginning of its extension period), the programme released all 18 areas that were the subject of the extension covering 64.8km² and with the destruction of 587 anti-personnel mines, 244 anti-vehicle mines, and 5,179 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) or abandoned explosive ordnance. A further 22 contaminated areas were identified during PNDHD survey conducted with NPA, mainly in Dakhlet Nouadhibou and Adrar provinces, of which 2.29km² were released, with the destruction of 123 anti-personnel mines, 225 anti-vehicle mines, and four explosive remnants of war (ERW).
Standards
National mine action standards are in force. They are based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).³

Operators
In accordance with a 2006 decree, all clearance activities have been conducted by the Army Engineer Corps operating under PNDHD. In March 2011, NPA signed a memorandum of understanding with Mauritania to provide support for mine and battle area clearance (BAC) in the country. NPA subsequently worked in Mauritania both as an operator and in a capacity-building role. As of 2015 its role was largely an advisory one to PNDHD. Its demining capacity was released at the end of 2013.¹⁰

Information Management
The national mine action database is held at PNDHD.

LAND RELEASE

Survey in 2014
In a survey completed in January 2014, NPA cancelled 22 SHAs covering almost 27.5km², while confirming another 27 SHAs as mined over a total area of 1.7km².¹¹

Table 1: Survey in 2013–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs confirmed as mined</th>
<th>Area confirmed as mined (m²)</th>
<th>Mined area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ttimishat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13,336</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>586,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldwairah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>600,000</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqwayyet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>865,566</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34,434</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaidyyat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,731,165</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,138,836</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolinwar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10,926,359</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>317,726</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nouadibou</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11,342,058</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>247,068</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27,478,484</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,738,064</td>
<td>586,664</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHAs = suspected hazardous area   TS = technical survey

The national mine action database was cleaned of inflated figures at the end of 2013.¹²

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¹ Email from Melissa Andersson, former Country Director, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) Mauritania, 10 September 2015.
² Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 April 2014.
³ APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April 2015, p. 4. In the original French: « ... nous suspectons que le dispositif de sécurité le long de la frontière avec le Sahara occidental, composé de fortification et champs de mines interfère en territoire Mauritanien surtout qu’il n’existe aucune frontière naturelle. »
⁴ Revised Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 September 2010, p. 3; and email from Melissa Andersson, 17 September 2015.
⁶ Decree No. 1960/MDAT/MDN establishing the PNDHD, 14 August 2007.
⁷ Decree No. 001358/MDAT establishing the Steering Committee of the PNDHD, 3 September 2007.
⁸ Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April 2015, p. 5.
⁹ Email from Melissa Andersson, 17 September 2015.
¹⁰ Ibid
¹² Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Melissa Andersson, 10 September 2015.
Clearance in 2014

NPA reports clearance of 0.72 km² in 2014, with the destruction of 59 anti-personnel mines, 26 anti-vehicle mines and 13 items of UXO.13

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tmimishat</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>721,140</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance

According to NPA, total area cleared decreased slightly in comparison with 2013 (0.84 km²), mainly due to additional time spent conducting basic training and personnel rotations in the new capacity-building arrangement between NPA, PNDHD, and the Army Corps of Engineers. Total capacity (four manual teams with a total of 20 deminers) remained the same as in 2013.14

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2010), Mauritania is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2016. Mauritania is not on track to meet this deadline and has requested a further five-year extension.

In its first extension request, Mauritania explained that the reasons for its inability to meet its deadline were lack of financial resources, insufficient progress in demining, use of only manual clearance, and difficult soil and climatic factors.15 In presenting its extension request to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2010, Mauritania stated that it had a “coherent plan” that combined land release by survey and clearance and that it hoped to involve international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in its demining programme.16 NPA was subsequently invited to establish a mine action programme in 2011.

In May 2013, Mauritania said it was fully committed to achieving the objectives of its extension, noting that only lack of funding could impede timely fulfilment of its workplan.17 In April 2015, however, Mauritania submitted a request for a second extension of its deadline, for a further five years through to 1 January 2021. During this period, the Mauritanian government would enter into a dialogue with “all of the stakeholders in the Western Sahara conflict so as to be in a position to clarify the status of the suspected areas”.18

Mauritania further undertook to elaborate and implement an action plan which would identify the resource needs for release of the contaminated areas and to inform the states parties of progress at the annual meetings and through Article 7 reports. It would also maintain PNDHD and the operational demining units for residual clearance and risk education.19 The second extension request, though, lacked detail and timelines on future actions to be undertaken.

The APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2015 was due to decide whether Mauritania’s request for a second extension should be granted.
MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE 5.7 6.0

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Mozambique failed to meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline of 1 January 2015. Nonetheless, it has now completed clearance of all confirmed or suspected mined areas (CMAs/SMAs), one of the most heavily affected states to have done so.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Mozambique should make a formal declaration of compliance with its Article 5 obligations and submit a report to the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2015.
- Surplus mine clearance equipment beyond Mozambique’s residual capacity requirements should be exported to assist other mine-affected countries, in particular Zimbabwe, as soon as possible.
- Increased efforts should be made to address remaining mine contamination on the other side of the Mozambican border in Zimbabwe.

CONTAMINATION

On 17 September 2015, Mozambique announced it had completed clearance of anti-personnel mines on its territory.¹ In a public ceremony, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Oldemiro Baloi declared the country to be free of the "threat" of mines following survey and clearance of more than 3,000 areas across a total of over 55km² in 2008–14, with the destruction of more than 86,000 anti-personnel mines. Mozambique was once one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, and major demining operations, which began in 1993, concluded after 22 years in 2015.²

Mozambique was contaminated with mines, mostly anti-personnel, as a legacy of nearly 30 years of conflict that ended in 1992. Mozambique made considerable progress in clearing mined areas and was planning to complete all clearance by 31 December 2014, in accordance with its extended Article 5 deadline under the APMBC. However, Mozambique failed to meet its 1 January 2015 deadline, a serious violation of the APMBC, as of when almost 290,000m² of CMAs and SMAs still remained.³

Of this, five CMAs containing anti-personnel mines covered a total of 171,000m², while 51 SMAs had a total size of 118,000m².⁴ Contamination was located in three provinces – Inhambane, Manica, and Sofala – as set out in Table 1.

Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 2014⁵

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>171,000</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>118,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area  SMA = suspected mined area

On 17 February 2015, Mozambique provided an update to states parties to the APMBC on its remaining contamination and the factors that had prevented it from meeting its Article 5 deadline. It announced that it would complete clearance of all remaining contaminated areas by the end of September 2015 and "certainly no later than the end of November 2015."⁶

While it is no longer contaminated by anti-personnel mines, Mozambique still has residual contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW) and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Mozambique’s National Demining Institute (IND) 2015 annual workplan includes an objective to "establish and implement mechanisms for the management of risks from residual UXO and other ERW".⁷

Cluster munitions were also reported to have been used on "a limited scale" during the war in Mozambique.⁸

Clearance of all known cluster munition remnants (CMR) was completed in 2014 and was scheduled to be verified through additional survey in 2015 to ensure compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, to which Mozambique is also a state party, "by no later than 2016", according to IND.⁹

In 2014, the remaining mine contamination was mostly in small nuisance minefields in remote areas around former military positions, and around a number of infrastructure sites, blocking access to agricultural land and infrastructure. All high-priority mined areas with humanitarian impact were cleared prior to 2014, with the exception of the dense-pattern minebelt around the Cahora Bassa dam in Tete province; sections of the Rhodesian cordon sanitaire bordering minefields which extended into Mozambique’s Tete and Manica provinces; and the defensive minebelts placed around power lines in Maputo, Manica, and Sofala provinces.¹⁰

The clearance of anti-personnel mines in Mozambique has had significant socio-economic benefits for the country, enabling development investment in support of natural resource mining, agriculture, and infrastructure construction, while also directly contributing to Mozambique’s national Poverty Reduction Action Plan. Other benefits from clearance include increased mobility and opportunities for cross-border trade for local populations along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border, and longer-term benefits for rural communities through improved access to health and education services and facilitating their expansion.¹¹

The total number of casualties in Mozambique is not known, though according to government estimates as many as 10,900 people have been killed or injured by mines in the past two decades.¹²
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no national mine action authority as such in Mozambique. IND serves as the national mine action centre (MAC) in Mozambique, reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Provincial demining commissions have been created to assist in planning mine action operations. Since 1999, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has provided technical assistance; in recent years, support was provided under a three-year programme due to expire in 2015.13

Standards

Mozambique’s National Mine Action Standards, adopted in 2002, were reviewed and updated in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) in 2012.14

Operators

In 2014, four international humanitarian mine clearance organisations were operational in Mozambique: APOPO, HALO Trust, Handicap International (HI), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Demining was also conducted by the Mozambican Army and a number of commercial operators.

In accordance with Mozambique’s National Mine Action Plan, NGO operators were encouraged to increase their capacity in 2014, to accelerate returning survey and clearance activities in order to meet Mozambique’s end-2014 Article 5 deadline. This resulted in an increased number of manual deminers, mechanical assets, and mine detection animals (mine detection dogs (MDDs) and mine detection rats), in comparison to capacity in 2013.15

In 2014, APOPO employed more than 220 staff and deployed six mechanical demining sections, six sections of mine detection rat teams, and 16 sections of manual deminers.16 HALO increased its capacity from 24 to 38 manual sections while continuing to deploy four mechanical teams, with a total peak programme size of close to 430 national staff, in order to complete the dense border minefields in Tete province by the end of the year.17 HI’s capacity comprised of 60 deminers, seven mechanical assets, including two Hitachi demining machines on loan from IND, and five MDD teams until September 2014, when it reduced capacity to 40 deminers and six machines in accordance with the decreasing size of remaining tasks towards the end of the year.18 NPA employed a total of 54 deminers in 2014. It did not deploy any mechanical assets and scaled down its operations sizeably in 2015, retaining 11 staff until July.19 IND had two Hitachi BM307-V24 demining machines and one Mini-Minewolf MW240 which it loaned to operators during the year, and a JCB armoured excavator, as of January 2015.20

1 Email from Hans Risser, Chief Technical Advisor, Mine Action, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 13 October 2015.
4 Ibid.
5 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by the National Demining Institute (IND), provided by email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 20 May 2015.
7 Mozambique, “Progress Report on completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (from 1 March to December 2014)”, p. 19.
8 Statement by Alberto Maverengue Augusto, Director, IND, to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 4 September 2014.
9 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by IND, 30 April 2015; statement by Alberto Maverengue Augusto, IND, CCM Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 4 September 2014; and responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by IND, 20 May 2015; APOPO, 11 May 2015; and Mario Nuzies, Country Director, NPA, 29 April 2015. APOPO reported that the initial figure for its survey task was 264,000m². Email from APOPO, 24 June 2015.
18 Emails from Aderito Ismael, Mine Action Coordinator, HI, 28 May 2015, and Hans Risser, UNDP, 28 May 2015; and response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Aderito Ismael, HI, 3 April, provided by email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 30 April 2015. In providing the report, it was noted that “the IND is in full agreement with HI’s input to the report and has not altered the HI report in any way”.
In 2014, five commercial demining operators were contracted by IND to conduct clearance and technical survey: Bicmut-Desminagem, Empresa Mocambicana de Desminagem, Mine Kills Mocambique, Monechecha, and Moprotector.  

**Quality Management**  
All four NGO operators confirmed that personnel from IND conducted external quality assurance (QA) through routine assessments and checks of clearance activities and procedures in 2014.  
HALO and APOPO reported having an internal quality management system in place regarding land release activities and that measures were taken to ensure all standards and procedures were implemented in accordance with internal standing operating procedures and the IMAS.

**Information Management**  
Mozambique has a national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database housed within, and fully managed by, IND, with technical support from NPA. A new version of IMSMA was released in 2014. IND and NPA continued efforts throughout 2014 to coordinate and improve the reliability and accuracy of operator data. Nonetheless, discrepancies between figures operators reported directly to Mine Action Monitor and those contained in the IMSMA database for 2014 operations were significant and recurrent. IND reported that while efforts had been made to harmonise reporting and increase use of land-release terminology according to IMAS, it had not been possible to reach agreement between all operators on land-release terminology, such as survey, clearance, cancellation, reduction, and confirmed and suspected hazardous areas, as some operators employed land-release methodology while others did not. In addition, as late as mid-May 2015 IND was still awaiting final completion reports for 2014 from some operators.

**LAND RELEASE**  
The total area released in 2014 was just over 6.3km², of which 3.5km² was mined areas released by clearance and technical survey, while a further 2.8km² were cancelled by non-technical survey. Despite the best efforts of the government, humanitarian and commercial demining operators, and international partners to complete clearance of all mined areas by the end of December 2014, Mozambique failed to meet its Article 5 deadline, as reported above.

**Survey in 2014**  
According to operator and IND data, a total of just over 2.8km² was cancelled and another 2.4km² confirmed as mined by non-technical survey in 2014, and a further 0.5km² reduced through technical survey (see Table 3).

**Table 2: Survey in 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APOPO¹²</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1,263,620</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>665,692</td>
<td>102,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO¹³</td>
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<td>51,576</td>
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<td>216,445</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI¹⁴</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1,056,127</td>
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<td>897,939</td>
<td>65,072</td>
</tr>
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<td>NPA¹⁵</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>71,028</td>
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<td>231,469</td>
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<td>Commercials¹⁶</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>13,253</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND¹⁸</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>92,390</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals¹⁹</strong></td>
<td><strong>229</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,901,820</strong></td>
<td><strong>122</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,418,355</strong></td>
<td><strong>502,544</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHA = suspected hazardous area  
CMA = confirmed mined area  
TS = technical survey

**Clearance in 2014**  
A total of just over 2.9km² of mined area was reported as having been cleared in 2014, with the destruction of nearly 45,700 anti-personnel mines, six anti-vehicle mines, and 250 items of UXO (see Table 4).
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APOPO</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>665,692</td>
<td>10,278</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>866,164</td>
<td>34,025</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>897,939</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>258,768</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercials54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>366,258</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambican army9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13,253</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>228</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,068,074</strong></td>
<td><strong>45,681</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>247</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

- APM = anti-personnel mines
- AVM = anti-vehicle mines
- UXO = unexploded ordnance

**References:**

21 Email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 29 May 2015.
27 Email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 20 May 2015.
28 Ibid.
32 Figures provided and verified by APOPO. The IND IMSMA database reported that APOPO had cancelled 92 SHAs covering 1,520m² through non-technical survey, confirmed a further 24 areas covering 0.620m² as mined, and reduced an additional 0.171m² by technical survey. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by IND, 20 May 2015; and APOPO, 20 April 2015; and emails from APOPO, 29 May 2015; 23 and 29 October 2015.
33 Figures provided and verified by HALO. The IND IMSMA database reported HALO as cancelling 91 SHAs with a total area of 173,121m² and confirming 49 SHAs with a total area of 766,814m² through non-technical survey and reducing a total of 9,477m² through technical survey. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by IND, 20 May 2015 and HALO, 14 May 2015 and email from Olly Hyde-Smith, HALO, 27 May 2015.
34 Figures provided by IND. HI stated in its response to Mine Action Monitor’s questionnaire that “no fully dedicated survey” was conducted by HI in 2014. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by IND, 20 May 2015; and HI, 3 April 2015. HI did not report its figures according to IMAS terminology, but stated that it was reporting internal “cumulative” figures. Email from Aderito Ismael, HI, 27 May 2015.
35 Figures provided by NPA. The IND IMSMA database reported NPA as cancelling 19 SHAs with a total area of 158,373m² and confirming five SHAs with a total size of 242,286m² through non-technical survey and reducing a total of 155,909m² through technical survey. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by IND, 29 May 2015; and NPA, 12 June 2015.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 The total survey figures reported in the IND IMSMA database for 2014 were 372 SHAs cancelled (total size 3,366,418m²) and confirmation as mined of 123 SHAs (total size 2,907,579m²), both through non-technical survey, and reduction of 604,564m² of mined area through technical survey. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by IND, 20 May 2015.
41 Figures provided and verified by APOPO. IND reported that APOPO released 24 areas over 621,027m² by clearance, destroying 10,271 anti-personnel mines, one anti-vehicle mine, and 60 items of UXO. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by IND, 20 May 2015 and APOPO, 20 April 2015 and emails from APOPO, 29 May and 29 October 2015.
42 Figures provided and verified by HALO. IND reported that HALO cleared 49 areas with a total size of 766,814m² and destroyed 33,206 anti-personnel mines, four anti-vehicle mines, and 34 items of UXO. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by IND, 20 May 2015 and HALO, 14 May 2015; email from Olly Hyde-Smith, HALO, 27 May 2015; and email from Calvin Ruyzen, Regional Director Southern Africa, HALO, 30 October 2015.
43 Clearance figures provided by HI. HI reported to Mine Action Monitor that it cleared 181 areas with a total size of 1,618,250m². However, HI did not report its figures according to IMAS terminology, but stated that it was reporting internal “cumulative” figures. Email from Aderito Ismael, HI, 27 May 2015 and responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by IND, 20 May 2015; and HI, 3 April 2015.
44 Figures reported by HI. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by HI, 3 April 2015. The IND IMSMA database reported HI as destroying 2,056 anti-personnel mines in 2014; however, both HI and IND agreed that this was due to errors in the database and in HI’s completion reports. Emails from Aderito Ismael, HI, 27 May 2015; and Hans Risser, UNDP, 28 May 2015.
45 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by HI, 3 April 2015 and IND, 20 May 2015; and emails from Aderito Ismael, HI, 27 May and 26 October 2015; and Hans Risser, UNDP, 28 May and 27 October 2015.
47 Figures provided by NPA. The IND IMSMA database reported NPA as clearing five areas with a total size of 262,286m² and destroying 107 anti-personnel mines, no anti-vehicle mines, and 10 items of UXO. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by IND, 20 May 2015 and NPA, 12 June 2015.
49 Ibid.
50 The totals reported by the IND IMSMA database for 2014 were clearance of 123 areas with a total size of 2,907,579m² and the destruction of 45,650 anti-personnel mines, six anti-vehicle mines, and 221 items of UXO. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by IND, 20 May 2015.
51 In June 2014, NPA’s survey teams identified a confirmed hazardous area with at least six visible Alpha bomblets in Cahora-Bassa district in Tete province. The contaminated area was estimated to total approx. 210,000m². APOPO was tasked by IND to clear the area by the end of 2014. After additional survey and clearance in October and November, APOPO cleared a total of 369,453m², destroying 12 Alpha submunitions. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by IND, 30 April 2015; APOPO, 11 May 2015; and Mario Nuñes, Country Director, NPA, 29 April 2015. APOPO reported that the initial figure for its survey task was 246,500m². Email from APOPO, 24 June 2015. Statement by Alberto Maverengue Augusto, IND, CCM Fifth Meeting of States Parties, 4 September 2014; and responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by IND, 30 April 2015; and APOPO, 15 May 2015.
Cluster Munitions Clearance

The total cluster munition-contaminated area released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 was approx. 350,000m².\textsuperscript{51}

Deminer Safety

In 2014, four separate demining accidents occurred among HALO Trust deminers working on sections of the Rhodesian cordon sanitaire border minefield in Tete province.\textsuperscript{52} Investigations by HALO and IND could not identify a common factor between the incidents, though three of the incidents resulted in dismissal of the deminer concerned for not following HALO’s standing operating procedures.\textsuperscript{53} According to IND, the accidents were likely a reflection of the intensity of the demining operations along a very dense and complicated minefield containing minimum-metal mines.\textsuperscript{54}
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with its second extension for a period of ten months granted by states parties in December 2013), Mozambique was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2015. In June 2014, despite indications that it was not on track to meet its deadline, Mozambique failed to request another extension at the APMBC Third Review Conference in Maputo, and was in serious violation of the Convention from 1 January 2015, when its Article 5 deadline expired, until it completed clearance in September 2015. Mozambique received a no-cost extension from donors to complete clearance activities in 2015.

In February 2015, Mozambique reported that it failed to meet its extension deadline due to three primary factors. The first was on-going “low-intensity military hostilities creating a situation of temporary insecurity” between January and August 2014 in Manica and Sofala provinces, which prevented access to some mined areas and caused logistical and transportation difficulties. Second, it stated that continuing insecurity raised transportation and logistical costs, resulting in delays and reduced productivity in certain areas as teams and equipment had to take longer, alternative routes to reach affected areas. Third, some demining tasks in Manica and Sofala provinces were suspended due to heavy rains in December 2014, it said. Mozambique submitted a comprehensive and detailed progress report to states parties to the APMBC on its activities in 2014 and its plans and capacity to complete the remaining clearance in 2015.

Following its announcement of completing the last anti-personnel mine clearance task on its territory in September 2015, Mozambique was expected to make a formal declaration of compliance with its APMBC Article 5 obligations and submit a report to the Article 5 Committee at the next meeting of states parties in December 2015.

In 2014, the government of Mozambique provided an annual budget for mine action which covered the salaries of IND staff and some operations, and also provided a budget for commercial tendering of demining tasks. The government’s total national budget for mine action for the year was US$1.8 million, of which nearly $730,000 was used on a public tender to contract five national commercial demining operators to conduct clearance and technical survey. The total cost of demining operations in 2014 was $17.5 million. Upon announcing completion of mine clearance, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Baloi estimated that the overall cost of demining activities in Mozambique since 1993 amounted to more than $220 million.

According to IND, due to the nature of the mine contamination in Mozambique and the lack of mine maps, there is a residual risk of finding mines after Mozambique’s declaration of compliance with Article 5. In May 2015, IND reported that it was working with the government to establish a sustainable national capacity to manage any residual risk, in accordance with its National Mine Action Plan. IND has reported that additional funding will be needed for future ERW-related projects, as well as for training and equipping a national capacity to manage residual contamination.

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52 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by IND, 20 May 2015; and HALO, 14 May 2015. HALO reported that one accident was particularly serious, resulting in loss of sight when the deminer’s visor shattered. The other accidents were less serious, involving injuries to the hands, including loss of fingers. In its response to Mine Action Monitor’s questionnaire, HALO said: “these accidents show that the border minefields are dangerous and that mines are still very much functional. The number of accidents is very unfortunate but should be considered against the number of mines cleared which was in excess of 34,000 in the year”.


55 For example, Mozambique reported that “due to conflict in Southern Sofala, teams and equipment from the south had to travel an alternative route via Zimbabwe which delayed deployment and caused increased costs”. Letter from Amb. Pedro Comissário to Amb. Remigiusz A. Henczel, 17 February 2015.

56 Ibid.

57 Mozambique, “Progress Report on completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (from 1 March to December 2014)”.

58 Email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 11 October 2015.

59 Email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 29 May 2015.

60 Mozambique, “Progress Report on completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (from 1 March to December 2014)”, p. 22.

61 UNDP in Mozambique, ‘Mozambique declared ‘mine free’”, undated but accessed 19 October 2015.


63 Ibid.
NIGER

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Niger’s mine action programme performance improved in 2014, with technical survey helping to better identify the mine threat.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Niger should provide in a timely manner more clarity about its remaining clearance challenge, especially concerning the newly identified mined area.
- Niger should include in its extension request a detailed workplan providing monthly benchmarks against which progress could be assessed, as well as its exact needs for financial and technical support to address the remaining contamination.
- Niger should continue providing regular updates on its clearance progress.

CONTAMINATION

Niger has one confirmed mined area (CMA) covering some 39,000m². It has also identified one suspected hazardous area (SHA), believed to contain both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, but as of June 2015, the size of this SHA had not yet been determined.

One of Niger’s seven regions, Agadez, in the north, contains the two mined areas. The CMA, located at Madama military post, was identified during an assessment mission in June 2011 and initially estimated to cover 2,400m². The minefield is in a remote desert area, 450km from the rural community of Dirhou, and as of June 2015 no mine incident involving humans had been reported in this area.¹ The minefield is reported to contain French MI AP ID 51 mines, which date back to the French colonial era.²

Technical survey in 2014 concluded that the extent of contamination at Madama was considerably larger than the earlier estimate, covering almost 40,000m². The survey also identified one other area nearby suspected to be contaminated with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.³

Niger’s contamination includes other anti-vehicle mines, which are the result of rebellion in 1990–2000 as well as fighting between the Nigerien army and a non-state armed group, the Nigerien Justice Movement (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice), and some splinter factions in 2007.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), which reports directly to the President. All demining activities are carried out by the Nigerien army.

Niger’s 2013 extension request included a workplan for 2014-15 requiring clearance of Madama mined area, a technical survey in the northern Kawar department (Agadez region), and the verification of other suspected mined areas (SMAs). As of June 2015, Niger was preparing a second extension request to tackle its mine contamination, and was planning to provide a new demining plan when submitting it.

In May 2015, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted an evaluation mission in Niger. NPA is considering providing assistance to national demining efforts through the provision of equipment and short-term technical support to improve Niger’s clearance productivity.⁴

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¹ Statement of Niger, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 11 April 2014; and interview with Youssouf Maïga, Chair, Arms Control and Counter-proliferation, National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI), Geneva, 25 June 2015.
⁴ Interview with Chris Natale, Mine Action Advisor, NPA, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
LAND RELEASE

Survey in 2014

As noted above, in June 2015 the CNCCAI reported that technical survey of Madama found that the minefield was larger than expected, covering almost 40,000m². During survey activities, an SMA was also identified, but the exact size of the area has not been determined as of end-June 2015. The CNCCAI did not provide more details on its technical survey results.

Clearance in 2014

Total mined land released by clearance in 2014 was 634m². Clearance operations in Madama military post started on 17 November 2014 and by the end of the year 42 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed.5 Niger’s clearance capacity consisted of 60 deminers, although due to lack of adequate equipment, all deminers could not work at the same time.6

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) [and in accordance with the two-year extension granted by states parties in 2013], Niger is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2016. Due to greater than expected contamination at Madama and the identification of another area of suspected contamination, Niger is not on track to meet this deadline.

At the June 2015 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Niger reported it was preparing a second extension request to address its mine contamination. In November 2015, Niger submitted a request for a further five-year extension to the beginning of 2021.

In 2002–06, Niger consistently reported the existence of mined areas in the country.7 However, at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in 2008, Niger declared that no areas on its territory were suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, stating it had evidence only of the presence of anti-vehicle mines.8 Nonetheless, in May 2012, more than two years after the expiry of its Article 5 clearance deadline, Niger reported to states parties that it was contaminated with anti-personnel mines in at least one area.9 Finally, in July 2013, more than four years after its original deadline expired, Niger submitted its first extension request, following the discovery of one known and five suspected mined areas in the Agadez region in June 2011.

In its extension request, Niger noted that desert environment, insecurity, and lack of funding may challenge the implementation of its workplan for the period.10 In granting the request, states parties regretted the delay between the discovery of contamination and the beginning of demining.11 Since being granted its two-year extension period, Niger has provided regular updates on its clearance and survey activities. In April 2014, at the Intersessional Meetings, Niger informed states parties that non-technical survey had been conducted in the five suspected areas in the Agadez region (in the localities of Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, and Zouzoudinga). The survey concluded that the areas did not contain anti-personnel mines but were suspected to contain anti-vehicle mines. Niger noted that the areas contain wells and water sources.12

In 2014, technical survey was conducted in Madama, which concluded that the contaminated area covered almost 40,000m². It also identified one new suspected area. Clearance operations started in November 2014 and had reached an average rate of 100m² cleared per day by mid-April 2015.13 Based on its demining capacity and productivity, as well as its relatively small contamination, Niger should not need more than two years to complete clearance and survey.

Niger funded all mine action activities carried out in 2014, although the amount of this support was not publicly available as of June 2015.14

7 APMBC Article 7 Reports for 2002–06.
9 Statement of Niger, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 28 May 2012.
10 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013.
11 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Decision, 5 December 2013.
12 Statement of Niger, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 11 April 2014.
Oman is suspected to be contaminated by mines, although the precise location and extent of any residual threat is not known. In its initial APMBC Article 7 transparency report, submitted in 2015, Oman declared that there are no confirmed mined areas (CMAs) in the Sultanate, but there are “many” SMAs in the south, particularly Dhofar Region. According to the report, during the mid-1960s to mid-1970s the presence of rebel movements in Dhofar led to “vast” areas being affected by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. After the end of the conflict in 1975, the government made significant efforts to clear the areas, but it is impossible to be sure that the areas have been fully cleared. This is for three reasons: the size of the region (about 99,000km²); the lack of maps or marking; and the terrain (which includes mountains and valleys), with many SMAs located on steep slopes. In addition, the rain over the years may have scattered the mines.

In 2001, it had been reported that the Royal Army of Oman had mapped seven zones of SMAs based on historical records of battlefield areas, unit positions, and landmine incident reports.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

Oman has no functioning mine action programme. It is expected that survey and clearance will be performed by its army engineers or police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel.

**LAND RELEASE**

There are no reports of any land release occurring in 2014. In 2007, the Ministry of Defence reported that “almost 99%” of mined areas had been cleared and all remaining SMAs had been marked and fenced. This information does not appear to be consistent with Oman’s Article 7 report.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Oman acceded to the APMBC in August 2014, the most recent state to do so. Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Oman is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2025. It is too early to say whether Oman will meet this deadline but it should be perfectly possible for it to do so if modern land-release approaches are employed successfully.

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1. Initial APMBC Article 7 Report, pp. 4–5.
2. Ibid.
Peru’s mine action programme continues to perform poorly. As of June 2015, Peru could not even offer an estimate for the size of its mine contamination, despite being a state party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) since 1999. Total mined area released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 was only a quarter of the 2013 clearance results.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Peru should urgently revise its clearance plan to include the 128 additional mined areas inherited from Ecuador since 2012.
- Peru should inform states of its exact needs for assistance and resource shortfall, and provide a clear plan on how Peru intends to raise the additional funding needed.

CONTAMINATION

As of June 2015, Peru could not provide the total extent of its mine contamination. Previously, in April 2014, Peru reported 438,254m² of confirmed mined area (CMA).

In May 2015, Peru reported its remaining contamination covers 133 mined areas, down from 135 in 2013, and contains more than 11,000 mines, as set out in Table 1. Peru’s contamination is located along the border with Ecuador.

Table 1: Mine contamination by sector as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coangos</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>3,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector B</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector C</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cenepa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achuime</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hito Morona</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Zarsa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>133</td>
<td><strong>11,179</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area

Mine contamination in Peru results from the 1995 border conflict with Ecuador. During this conflict, part of the two states’ common border was mined, affecting four departments in Peru: Amazonas, Cajamarca, Piura, and Tumbes. The most heavily mined section of the border is the Condor Mountain Range which was at the centre of the dispute. In 2012–13, Peru’s total mine threat increased significantly as a result of information exchange with Ecuador, with the addition of a total of 128 mined areas covering 402,254m² and containing more than 6,000 mines. In June 2015, Peru declared that other mined areas might be found.

Peru has had two other mine problems. In the 1980s, mines were laid, in the centre of the country, to protect infrastructure against attacks from non-state armed groups. Peru completed clearance of its entire mined infrastructure in April 2012. In February 2012, Peru suffered further mine contamination along its border with Chile following mine displacement caused by torrential rains and floods in northern Chile. The floods caused mines laid in the 1970s to surface in the area Quebrada de Escritos, near the main highway linking Arica, in Chile, with Tacna, in Peru. Peru and Chile tasked Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to clear the area, which it completed in December 2012, destroying some 300 mines in the process.

Peru has reported that mines have had severe socio-economic impacts on the populations living in affected areas, but the remoteness of the areas has made it difficult to estimate the number of casualties.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by the Interministerial Executive Council of the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS), chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CONTRAMINAS is responsible for setting strategy and priorities, in addition to plan and budget approval. It is also responsible for overall management and day-to-day coordination of mine action activities.

Until the end of 2013, the Organization of American States (OAS) provided technical and financial assistance to Peru’s mine action operations, which it initiated in May 2011 through its Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South America (Misión de Asistencia a la Remoción de Minas en América del Sur, MARMINAS).

In April 2013, under the Binational Cooperation Programme (Programa Binacional de Cooperación) established in 2008, Ecuador and Peru adopted a Binational Manual (Manual Binacional de Desminado Humanitario) to unify the demining procedures of both states in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

In December 2013, the joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit of 30 deminers conducted its first exercise in Morona Santiago, Ecuador, during which 317m² were cleared and 30 anti-personnel mines were found. A second exercise took place on the Peruvian side of the border in 2014, but the results were not publicly reported.

Peru’s Article 5 deadline extension request provided a timeline with conservative yearly targets for clearance in 2009–17. According to its national clearance plan, Peru planned to release four mined areas in 2015 and three in 2016.

Regarding the additional mined areas identified in 2012–13, Peru noted that clearance would require a “significant increase in the resources of the Peruvian State to provide greater capabilities to humanitarian demining process in order to comply with the obligations of the Convention and complete clearance and destruction of mines by March 2017.” As of June 2015, Peru had not provided details of its exact needs for assistance and resources.
LAND RELEASE

Total mined area released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 was 6,422m², which represents only one quarter of 2013 clearance results, during which 25,715m² were cleared. Land release operations took place in Cenepa sector and included the destruction of 452 mines.

This sharp decline in mined area cleared may be due to a decrease in the work periods: from twelve work periods in 2013, to only seven in 2014. Moreover, deminers are only able to work during a limited number of days as a work period consists of 20 days. Difficult climatic conditions may also impact the pace of land release. Indeed, in October 2014, the Peruvian president, Ollanta Humala, mentioned the torrential rains as a latent risk in demining operations. Demining in the Cordillera del Condor area is a challenging endeavour due to its topography as a mountainous jungle prone to heavy rain for much of the year, and reaching heights of 2,900m that makes it only accessible by a two-hour helicopter flight.

Deminer Safety

On 24 September 2014, a Peruvian deminer was injured during clearance operations in the Cordillera del Condor area.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2008), Peru is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2017. Peru is not on track to meet its 2017 deadline.

In the last five years, Peru has reported clearing less than 120,000m² of mined area with the destruction of almost 8,500 mines (see Table 2). Of the 38 mined areas identified in its extension request, Peru has addressed 30 of them, meaning it has completed more than 80% of its initial challenge.
Table 2: Mine clearance in 2010–14\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (m(^2))</th>
<th>Mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6,422</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25,715</td>
<td>2,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13,791</td>
<td>4,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>46,572</td>
<td>1,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>24,927</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals** 
117,427 8,475

Peru’s latest extension request submitted in 2008 cited limited transportation and communication networks, difficult meteorological conditions in the areas of operations, the geography of the region, and limited financing for operations as the main reasons for needing additional time.\(^2\)

In granting the eight-year extension, the APMBC Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted that “after sporadic progress since entry into force, the request indicates a commitment on the part of Peru to proceed at a more constant rate though the extension period.”\(^2\)

Peru has addressed two of its three mine problems: at the border in Chile following 2012 floods; and around its infrastructures. However, its primary mine problem at the border with Ecuador remains. More troubling is that total contamination is greater than its initial estimates, combined with the fact that Peru’s clearance output over the last five years has been inconsistent at best.

In its revised extension request, Peru estimated that a budget of US$26 million would be needed to complete clearance, of which $17.8 million (almost 70%) would be provided by its national budget.\(^\text{25}\) This projection does not take into account the need for increased resources due to additional mined areas identified. Peru has not yet provided an estimation of the extra financial resources needed to complete clearance, nor indicated how it intends to raise those funds.

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22 Statement of Peru, APMBC Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015.
23 Revised APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 August 2008.
24 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request Decision, 28 November 2008.
25 Revised APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 August 2008.
Senegal’s mine action programme continued to perform very poorly in 2014, further deteriorating an already unacceptable situation. Senegal had still not reported on the extent of any land release in 2014, as of end-October 2015.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Senegal should complete non-technical survey as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a more complete and accurate estimate of its mine threat.
- Senegal should prioritise clearance and technical survey in areas readily accessible and with credible evidence of a mine threat.
- Senegal should take appropriate actions to improve transparency and dialogue between all actors involved in land release operations, as well as to restore confidence among donors and international operators in its mine action programme.
- Senegal should provide regular and detailed reports of its clearance efforts and results, indicating, in particular, square metres cleared per year, the number of mines found and destroyed, and the number of mined areas released.

CONTAMINATION

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of its mine contamination. As of June 2015, Senegal had identified 52 confirmed mined areas (CMAs) covering 478,328m², and a further 12 suspected mined areas (SMAs) whose extent has not been defined. Survey was said to be still required in 216 localities covering 1.6km² to 2km².¹

Four of 45 departments (Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye and Ziguinchor) still contain CMAs or SMAs. The affected departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal, between Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 30 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fighting with some factions of MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 2004.

Mine contamination is said to pose a great risk to local residents, seriously hindering the socio-economic development of Casamance and limiting access to agricultural land.² In August 2014, seven people were killed and three were injured when a cart rolled over a mine in the department of Bignona.³ In March 2014, Senegal reported a total of more than 800 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties.⁴

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by the Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (Centre National d’Action Antimines, CNAMS). Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.⁵

Sporadic international technical assistance was provided to the programme by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2008–14, in particular through a technical or chief technical advisor. In May 2012, however, Senegal said that “slowness in the procedures of certain partners” had “significantly delayed the initiation and conduct of projects.”⁶

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¹ Second Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015.
⁴ Interview with Col. Barham Thiam, Director, CNAMS, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.
⁵ These committees meet three times in a year in Ziguinchor, and twice a year in Sédhiou and Kolda, bringing together local authorities, civil society, and NGO operators to coordinate demining activities.
⁶ Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 21 May 2012.
Strategic Planning

Senegal’s national mine action strategy for 2007–15 set clearance of contaminated areas as a key objective, though without providing a clear workplan with annual benchmarks or a specific timeline. It also lists prioritisation criteria for clearance operations.

Senegal’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in June 2015 included plans for survey and clearance in 2016–20. The request projects that remaining non-technical survey in the 216 localities would be carried out in 2016–17, though without explaining how the insecurity reported in 111 of these areas, which is said to have prevented survey activities from being conducted in previous years, would be overcome.

Concerning technical survey and clearance, the plan projects that:
- In January 2016–June 2017: operations would be conducted in Goudomp
- In October 2016–December 2016: operations would be conducted in Oussouye
- In October 2016–December 2018: operations would be conducted in Ziguinchor
- In October 2016–June 2020: operations would be conducted in Bignona.

Operators

Handicap International (HI) remained the sole international demining operator in Senegal until mid-2012, when new clearance capacities were added with the arrival of Mechem and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). In 2014, however, NPA withdrew from Senegal as a result of “government-imposed limitations on demining activities”, which had prevented it from deploying demining resources where the necessary clearance could be done safely, and from undertaking non-technical survey in areas believed to be contaminated but which had not been surveyed. The withdrawal was followed by loss of funding from the European Union (EU), Germany, and Norway.

Senegal reported that, during 2014, demining operators were deployed along the national road 6 (RN6), with HI undertaking non-technical survey and Mechem conducting clearance. As of June 2015, Senegal’s clearance capacities remained considerably limited. HI was only carrying out non-technical survey, risk education, and victim assistance, whereas Mechem’s deminers were on “lay-off” since November 2014 awaiting new assignments. In June 2015, Mamady Gassama, working for the Landmine Victims Association in Senegal, was quoted saying that “there are no technical surveys, non-technical surveys, nor concrete demining activities ongoing on the ground.”

In July 2015, HI informed Mine Action Monitor that a 14-month project, including non-technical and technical survey, and clearance, as well as mine risk education, would be initiated “in the coming weeks”.

LAND RELEASE


In 2014, HI conducted non-technical survey along a main road, the RN6, identifying 17 paths as SMAs over a total length of 17,070m, and nine other suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 22,694m². Surveyors also identified 29 abandoned villages containing at least one SHA near the RN6.

Deminer Safety

In March 2013, clearance operations were progressing rapidly as a consequence of the new demining capacity brought by Mechem and NPA. As they approached MFDC-controlled areas, a faction of the rebel group called publicly for a halt to humanitarian demining on the ground that clearance teams had reached a “red line beyond which operators’ safety could not be guaranteed”. On 3 May 2013, armed men kidnapped 12 deminers working for Mechem in the village of Kailou (Ziguinchor department). All were released safely, although nine were held for 70 days.

As a result of the incident, the government ordered a halt to all survey and clearance activities, a suspension that lasted until November 2013. To help ensure deminer safety, Senegal assigned a national contact committee to meet MFDC leaders and discuss, among a number of topics, the areas that could safely be cleared on a case-by-case basis. Whenever a specific agreement is reached, the CNAMS claims to issue task orders for that area.
Inconsistency in Clearance Task Orders Since 2013

Since the resumption of clearance operations in November 2013, Mechem, operating as a demining operator with funds administered by UNDP, has been tasked to clear sections of the RN6 and a dozen laterite quarries used in a project to renovate the RN6. While the task orders have been criticised as they assign clearance assets to areas not known to be affected by mines, Senegal has cited its politico-security situation to justify deployment of its clearance assets in areas where the safety of its demining teams could be guaranteed.

According to HI, when tasks orders were given in November 2013, only one polygon crossed by the RN6 in Sindone Lagoua (20km from Ziguinchor) was recorded as an SHA in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMISMA) database, and the quarries had never been recorded as SMAs or CMAs. In 2014, HI identified the 17 suspected paths referred to above and the nine SHAs during non-technical survey operations along the RN6.

Additionally, reports indicated that considerable mine contamination may lie in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases. But since the resumption of clearance operations and even though most of the military bases can be readily accessed – as they are under the control of the Senegalese armed forces – they have not been cleared nor considered as a priority for demining operations. Some areas are confirmed as contaminated; areas such as the village of Djirack, in which operations are planned to start only in 2016. Others remain as either SHAs or as credible, if unrecorded and unconfirmed, reports of contamination by local populations, such as in Badème, Basséré, Kouring, and Santhiaba Mandjack. Some clearance around military installations was carried out by HI in 2007–12 in Darsalam and Gonoum, during which 177 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in cooperation with the Senegalese armed forces, and by Mechem in 2013 in Mpacc, during which 136 anti-personnel mines were destroyed (representing all the mines found that year).

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) (and in accordance with the seven-year extension granted by states parties in 2008), Senegal is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2016. Senegal is not on track to meet this deadline. In June 2015, it requested five additional years to comply with its survey and clearance obligations.

Senegal reported release of about 730,725m² and the destruction of 383 mines in 2008–13. Most of these results were achieved between February 2012 and May 2013 with 548,137m² cleared, representing three-quarters of the total and 259 mines destroyed.

Senegal had repeatedly asserted its intention not to seek a second extension period and to complete clearance within its new Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2020. Nevertheless, on 20 June 2015 Senegal submitted a request to extend its Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2020. Senegal noted as circumstances impeding compliance with its international legal obligations: general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to demining operations; the eight-month suspension of operations in 2013; ongoing concerns over deminer safety; and a decrease in technical and financial resources in recent years. Furthermore, Senegal has noted that security conditions and lack of funding could affect its ability to complete clearance in a timely manner. The new extension request was to be considered at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2015.

8 NPA, “Humanitarian Disarmament in Senegal”, undated; and K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2014.
9 Interview with Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, in Geneva, 22 June 2015.
12 Emails from Nicolas Charpentier, Senegal Programme Director, HI, 6 and 8 July 2015.
13 Email from Nicolas Charpentier, HI, 6 July 2015.
15 Interview with Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.
16 Email from Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 13 May 2014.
18 Email from Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 13 May 2014.
20 Email from Nicolas Charpentier, HI, 6 July 2015.
21 K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2014.
22 Ibid.
23 Email from Luc Sambou, Mine Coordinator, HI, 8 May 2014; and K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2014.
26 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015.
27 Ibid., p. 22.
28 Ibid.
The lack of land release and concrete political will to address its mine problem, and as a consequence, the inadequate use of clearance capacities, have prevented Senegal from fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. This led to withdrawal of a major operator and the loss of financial support from key donors, explaining in part the sharp reduction in its clearance capacities. Indeed, while Senegal recorded a significant increase in clearance productivity in 2012–13, the way CNAMS has allocated tasks after the 2013 kidnapping has been criticised for directing resources and clearance assets to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying clearance assets were denied.29

Senegal has reported contributing about US$3.9 million to its mine action programme since 2007, although no funding was allocated to land release operations.30 Senegal’s extension request submitted in June 2015 foresees expenditure of approx. $11.5 million to support its mine action programme, of which $6.4 million would be allocated to technical survey and clearance operations. Senegal has planned to contribute to about 30% of the total to cover the running costs of its programme (approx. $3.3 million).31

The elaboration of a five-year workplan for 2016–20, although late in coming, is encouraging. However, questions remain regarding its implementation. Senegal has regularly indicated that all demining operations would be conducted within the framework of the ongoing peace talks and would first be approved by MFDC in meetings with Senegalese officials. In that context, in 2015, talks between an MFDC faction (Front Sud) and Senegal were reportedly underway concerning the restarting of demining in at least seven villages in Nyassia (Ziguinchor department). The process was, though, interrupted following clashes between the Front Sud and the Senegalese Army in April 2015.32 With no changes in the situation on the ground, it is doubtful that the clearance roadmap provided could be followed. Moreover, survey activities are planned to start in 2016 even though more than half of the concerned areas are said to be inaccessible due to insecurity. Senegal has not provided details on whether or not the conditions in some of these areas have changed and if surveyors can effectively access them.

Finally, the stagnation of survey and clearance operations in recent years, and Senegal’s apparent reluctance to deploy clearance assets in CMAs, such as around military installations, are worrying signs. They suggest that Senegal still lacks a comprehensive understanding of its mine problem as well as a realistic strategy to comply with its Article 5 obligations in a timely manner. Its failure to clear contaminated areas around military bases is beginning to look like use of anti-personnel mines, a violation of Article 1 of the APMBC.

29 K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2016.
30 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, p. 20.
31 Ibid., p. 28.
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2019  
(UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

### MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**  
5.7  5.0
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) has implemented a more efficient land-release methodology, emphasising the need for evidence to confirm areas as hazardous. As part of this process, SMAC has re-categorised all previously confirmed mined areas (CMAs) as suspected mined areas (SMAs). It has been using a more integrated approach to survey using mine detection dogs (MDDs) and other assets to cancel suspected areas not found to be contaminated. Clearance actually took place in 2014 (which it did not in 2013) even though no mines were found. Although Serbia has revised its timeline for completion of clearance its target is still within its extended Article 5 deadline.

RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

Serbia should take ownership of its limited mine contamination and commit more national resources towards the cost of meeting its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 obligations, especially for clearance.

CONTAMINATION

Serbia has 2.85km² of area suspected to contain anti-personnel mines across 19 SMAs. Only one of Serbia’s 150 municipalities still contains SMAs, as set out in Table 1. Survey and clearance in 2014 resulted in the municipality of Preševo being declared cleared of mines, leaving Bujanovac as the sole municipality with SMAs.¹

Table 1: Contamination by municipality as of end 2014²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>SMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>Dobrosin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,153,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lučane</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Končulj</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,139,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turija</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>131,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Veliki Trnovac*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali Trnovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Djordjevac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>64,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ravno Bučje</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demirska Mahala*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>89,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Breznica*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>131,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,849,126</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The villages of Breznica, Demirska Mahala, and Veliki Trnovac were not listed as contaminated in Serbia’s 2013 Article 5 deadline extension request as they were only identified as contaminated during survey in 2014.²

SMA = suspected mined area
Previously, for 2013, Serbia had reported 1.2 km² of CMA and 2 km² of SMA. However, SMAC subsequently decided to re-categorise all pre-existing CMAs as SMAs, following previous survey results that revealed a small number of mines found over a relatively large area. In line with more efficient land-release methodology, which emphasises the need for evidence to confirm areas as hazardous, SMAC intends to use an integrated approach using survey, MDDs, and other assets to cancel suspected areas not found to be contaminated, and thereby reduce to a minimum the area confirmed as mined, which will be subject to physical clearance.4

Mine contamination in Serbia can historically be divided into two phases. First, as a legacy of the armed conflicts associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Second, as a result of emplacement of mines in 2000–01 in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo by paramilitary group the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (OVPBM). The remaining contamination in Serbia is a result of this later phase. Contamination was suspected in late 2009, with formal survey of SMA starting in 2010.5 Serbia is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants [CMR] and other unexploded ordnance [UXO]. Contamination also exists within Kosovo (see separate report on Kosovo).

Bujanovac is one of Serbia’s least-developed municipalities. The affected areas are mainly mountainous, close to populated areas.6 Mined areas impede access to local roads, grazing and breeding land for cattle, tobacco growing, mushroom picking, and other forest products. Mines also pose an increased risk of fire. In addition, potential construction projects for solar energy plants, primary tobacco processing facilities, and other infrastructure are hindered by mined areas.7

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

Serbia does not have an interministerial national mine action authority. SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004 law making it responsible for coordinating demining, collecting and managing mine action information (including casualty data), and survey of suspected hazardous areas [SHAs]. It also has a mandate to plan demining projects, conduct quality control [QC] and monitor operations, ensure implementation of international standards, license demining organisations, and conduct risk education.8

SMAC does not use the Information Management System for Mine Action [IMSMA] at present, but has been discussing with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining [GICHED] possible use of IMSMA.9

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1 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Miroslav Pisarevic, Project Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 5 May 2015; and email from Branislav Jovanovic, Director, SMAC, 7 September 2015.
2 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015; and APMBC Article 7 Report [for 2014], Form C.
3 Email from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 7 September 2015.
4 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015; and APMBC Article 7 Report [for 2014], Form C.
5 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2013, p. 5; and Article 7 Report [for 2014], Form C.
6 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2013, p. 23.
7 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 5 May 2015.
Standards
According to SMAC, survey and clearance operations in Serbia are conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). National mine action standards were said to be in the final phase of development as of September 2015. SMAC and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) were jointly developing separate standing operating procedures (SOPs) for land release of both mined and cluster munition-contaminated areas.

Operators
SMAC does not carry out clearance or employ deminers but does conduct survey of areas suspected to contain mines, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Clearance is conducted by commercial companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which are selected through public tender procedures executed by ITF Enhancing Human Security.

NPA personnel seconded to SMAC have conducted all non-technical survey in Serbia. In 2014, NPA deployed a single two-strong non-technical survey team. The Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC) in Sarajevo deployed two demining teams in 2014, comprised of a total of 24 deminers, to conduct manual clearance.

Quality Management
SMAC and its partner organisations undertake quality assurance (QA) and QC of clearance operations in mine- and ERW-affected areas. QA and QC is carried out at all levels of operations, including during review of execution plans of clearance operators, ad hoc inspection visits to sites, and final control procedures upon conclusion of operations at a site.

On every clearance project, SMAC QC and QA officers are said to conduct sampling on between 5% and 11% of the total project area, depending on project complexity and size. In 2014, both mine clearance tasks were sampled, with 5.11% and 5.4% of the total area cleared respectively.

LAND RELEASE
Total mined area released by clearance in 2014 was 0.27km², following no clearance in 2013. A further 0.5km² was cancelled in 2014 by non-technical survey.

Survey in 2014
Non-technical survey in 2014, conducted by SMAC and supported by NPA, resulted in seven SMAs being confirmed as mined, totalling a little over 1km². Four SHAs were cancelled in 2014, totalling 0.5km². No technical survey was conducted in 2014.
Table 2: Survey in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>SMAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Mined areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area confirmed as mined (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMAC supported by NPA</td>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>333,732</td>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13,332</td>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53,434</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Preševo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>141,677</td>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>237,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preševo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,081</td>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preševo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>521,627</td>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>521,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18,533</td>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>131,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>503,822</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,001,691</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SMA = suspected mined area

Survey and clearance operations in 2014 revealed that the municipality of Preševo is free of mine contamination.

Clearance in 2014

In 2014, two SMAs were released by clearance in Cerevajka village, Preševo municipality, totalling 270,616m² of land. During clearance operations, seven items of UXO were destroyed, but no mines. This compares with 2013 when no mine clearance was conducted.

According to Serbia, clearance productivity per deminer is up to 100m² a day, depending on the mine situation, terrain configuration, land characteristics, and vegetation; and one pair of mine detection dogs can demine up to 1,500m² a day.

In response to severe flooding in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Croatia in May 2014, SMAC established a regional expert team, together with the mine action centres of BiH and Croatia. The regional team exchanged data on locations of mine contamination, types of mines, and possible directions of the movement of mines due to flooding. SMAC also collaborated on other cross-border projects. In addition, SMAC conducted a joint survey in Serbia with expert teams from the Ministry of Interior’s Department for Emergency Situations and the Serbian-Russian Humanitarian Centre to assess the potential flooding-related risk.

9 Email from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 4 May 2015.
10 Ibid; and interview, 10 September 2015, in Dubrovnik.
11 Interview with Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 10 September 2015, in Dubrovnik.
12 Interview with Petar Mihajlović and Sladana Košutić, SMAC, Belgrade, 26 April 2010.
13 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, Programme Manager, NPA, Belgrade, 13 March and 29 April 2014; and email from Miroslav Pivarski, NPA, 4 September 2015.
14 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015; and Miroslav Pivarski, NPA, 5 May 2015.
15 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015; and email from Nermi Hadžimujagić, Director of the Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC), 9 October 2015.
16 Email from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 4 May 2015.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, 7 September 2015.
20 Email from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 4 May 2015; Serbia’s APMBC Article 7 report for 2014 contained two different totals (106,000m² and 503,822m²) of the land cancelled in 2014. SMAC subsequently confirmed that the correct total is 503,822m². Email from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 10 September 2015.
21 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.
22 Email from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 4 May 2015.
23 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.
24 “Mine action after floods – regional response to the crisis, development of technology and capacity building”, “Non-technical survey of flooded mine risk areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia”; “Additional survey and re-marking of the flooded mine suspected areas of the approximate border zone between Croatia and Serbia”. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015.
25 Ibid.
Progress in 2015

In 2015, SMAC was planning to survey 1.2km² of SMA in the municipality of Bujanovac, with technical survey conducted by MDDC. NPA was planning to continue non-technical survey in 2015 of areas contaminated with mines, CMR, and other ERW, including survey in flooded areas.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), Serbia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019. It is not clear whether Serbia is on track to meet this deadline.

As late as May 2012, Serbia held out hope of meeting its original Article 5 deadline, but in March 2013 it applied for a five-year extension. In granting the request, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties noted that “implementation could proceed much faster if Serbia was able to cover part of demining costs and thereby become more attractive for external funding.” The states parties further noted that the plan presented by Serbia was “workable, but it lacks ambition, particularly given the small amount of mined area in question.”

Serbia’s claim to continued jurisdiction over Kosovo entails legal responsibility for remaining mined areas under Article 5 of the treaty. However, Serbia did not include such areas in its extension request estimate of remaining contamination or plans for the extension period.

In the last five years Serbia has cleared less than half a square kilometre of SMA (see Table 3).

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2010–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
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Serbia is falling behind its planned clearance timeline set out in its 2013 Article 5 deadline extension request, which envisaged clearance of just under 0.49km² in 2013, and just over 0.57km² in 2014. In its original extension request Serbia also predicted it would complete survey by the end of 2015, which it is not on target to achieve.

In 2015, however, Serbia reported that it had adjusted its extension request plan and now predicts that of the remaining 2.85km² of SMA, some 1.2km² would be surveyed in 2015 and the remaining 1.65km² in 2016. Of this, Serbia expects to clear a total of 1.6km², of which it planned to clear 0.4km² in 2015, 0.6km² in 2016, and 0.6km² in 2017. Based on this revised plan, Serbia expects to complete survey and clearance of mined area in 2017, ahead of its 2019 deadline.

According to SMAC, clearance is contingent on funding. If funds are secured, Serbia predicts that mine clearance could be completed in two years. SMAC claimed that the reason no clearance took place in 2013 was because Serbia had to direct limited donor funds to clearing CMR and other UXO. Clearance in 2014 was possible due to securing United States funding through the ITF.

SMAC expected a larger area would be released in 2015 due to more clearance personnel and mechanical assets being deployed than in previous years, as a result of Serbia allocating national funds for mine clearance and ongoing negotiations with donors to match these funds. SMAC is funded by Serbia, and in 2015 the government allocated €100,000 for mine clearance operations. SMAC reported it was in negotiations with donors to attempt to get this funding matched.

Despite Serbia’s updated plans to complete mine survey and clearance by the end of 2017, and well ahead of its 1 March 2019 deadline, it may fail to meet its target if adequate funding is not secured.

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26 Ibid; and email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 4 September 2015.
27 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 5 May 2015; and email from Darvin Lisica, Regional Director South East Europe, NPA, 26 June 2015.
28 Statement of Serbia, APMBC Inter-sessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 23 May 2012.
29 Analysis of Serbia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse request for extensions, 2 December 2013.
31 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid; and Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015.
34 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
SOMALIA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
(UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
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PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE

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PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Somalia’s mine action programme is showing signs of improvement with new international capacity.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Greater priority needs to be accorded to demining by Somalia, including for survey.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
- Somalia should develop a resource-mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.
- Somalia should provide resources to support operational mine action.

CONTAMINATION

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, the Federal Republic of Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). According to the United Nations (UN), anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were newly laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag in the north of the country.¹

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia’s three major regions: south-central Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland, a semi-autonomous administration in the north-east; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecongnised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west.

No estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination in south-central Somalia.² However, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.³ Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.⁴

According to HALO Trust, as of November 2014, 172 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remained to be cleared in Somaliland, including a total of 8.5km² of confirmed mined areas (CMAs) and another 6.7km² requiring verification and/or area reduction.⁵

In Puntland, mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.¹ The LIS was conducted from February to April 2005 and identified 35 affected communities in 47 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Of the 35 communities, nine were categorised as “high impact” and nine as “medium impact”; eight sites were identified for spot clearance tasking. The LIS estimated that about 151,000 people – around 6% of the population of approx. 2.5 million – live in mine-affected communities.⁶

Somalia is heavily contaminated with ERW, including cluster munition remnants (CMR). Unsecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups, also have a serious humanitarian impact. The extent of the explosive threat is not well known, except in Puntland and Somaliland where a range of survey activities has been carried out over the past decade.⁷

In 2015, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that explosive hazards, including residual ERW contamination and explosive stockpiles and ammunition caches, presented a daily threat to almost every community across south-central Somalia.⁸ In 2011–15, the vast majority of deaths and injuries from explosive hazards in south-central Somalia (93%) were caused by IEDs, while the number of victims of ERW fell from 170 in 2010 to 41 in 2013. Few mine victims were recorded.¹⁰

The humanitarian imperative to address ERW contamination in Somalia is heightened significantly by the movement of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to ongoing conflict in the country. In March 2015, it was estimated that 1.1 million Somalis, or one tenth of the population, were IDPs.¹¹ Contamination from mines and ERW in south-central Somalia remains a particular threat.¹²

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² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 27 April 2014; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013), Form C.
⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire from Klaus Ljerring Pedersen, DDS, 8 May 2012; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013), Form C.
⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰ Ibid. In 2014, 84 people were reportedly victims of ERW and 434 of IEDs, of whom 127 were killed. UNMAS, “UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019”, undated, p. 6.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The UN implements its mine action activities in Somalia according to the three geographical regions: south-central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine action in each of these areas are the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC), and the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC). All three centres design their strategies, set priorities, and operate under the supervision of, and with the support of, UNMAS.

In 2011, the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) was established by a Presidential Decree issued by the Republic of Somalia.13 This decree was later cancelled and replaced by a new decree on 6 August 2013, signed by the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, which renamed the institution SEMA and moved it from being an independent institution under the Office of the President to become a department under the Ministry of National Security (later changed to the Ministry of Internal Security). SEMA has the authority to coordinate, oversee, and implement mine action activities in Somalia. It is responsible for approving national strategies and implementing all obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), and other disarmament treaties to which Somalia is a party. SEMA also has limited responsibility for weapon and ammunition management.14

South-Central Somalia

In 2015, SEMA was seeking to coordinate the work of international and local mine action operators.15 SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.16 As of June 2015, however, SEMA was not yet fully operational and lacked critical capacities to perform its mine action responsibilities.17 SEMA’s director reported that, with support from the Japanese government, UNMAS was assisting SEMA to better integrate within the Ministry of Internal Security.18 Discussions were also underway between donors and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to establish a joint capacity development project to strengthen SEMA’s institutional capacity.19

In 2014, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed 12 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams to each sector and 30 explosive dog detection (EDD) teams. Nine government police EOD teams were deployed in south-central Somalia.20

Puntland

PMAC was established in Garowe with the support of UNDP in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, PMAC has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).21 UNMAS reported that PMAC was working towards integrating with SEMA as the political relationship between the regions and the Federal government of Somalia improved.22

PMAC runs the only police EOD team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance and was the only team operational in Puntland in 2014. In June 2015, Puntland requested assistance to increase its capacity and deploy three EOD teams in Bosaso, Galkayo, and Garowe.23

Somaliland

In 1997, UNDP assisted the government of Somaliland in establishing SMAC, which has since undertaken responsibility for coordinating and managing all demining in Somaliland.24 Officially, SMAC is under the authority of the Office of the Vice-President of Somaliland, who heads the interministerial Mine Action Steering Committee.25

Since 2009, UNMAS has worked with SMAC to develop a transition plan to a locally owned programme. In 2015, UNMAS reported that SMAC orchestrated coordination between HALO, DDG, and police EOD teams to prioritise tasks. UNMAS provided support to SMAC to build its capacity with a view to long-term stability.26 UNMAS’s financial support to SMAC ended in May 2014, although Swiss in-kind advisors assisted SMAC until the end of the year.27

In 2014, seven police EOD teams were operational in Somaliland. UNMAS continued to support the teams with funding, equipment, and training, which was scheduled to continue through to October 2015.28
Strategic Planning

Mine action activities in Somalia since 2013 have been increasingly tied to the implementation of the Somali Compact and its priorities for government stabilisation and development, infrastructure initiatives, and humanitarian assistance.29 Focus is placed on national ownership of mine action, training of national police EOD capacity, and community-based demining projects, as a source of employment for local people and former combatants, and to contribute to stabilisation.30

In 2015, UNMAS developed a draft Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework for Somalia for 2015–19 (including Somaliland and Puntland), seeking to promote a comprehensive response to explosive threats with community participation.31 The draft Framework contains objectives specific to CMR and cluster munition victims.32

As of June 2015, the document was awaiting final approval from SEMA and the Federal government of Somalia. UNMAS stated the draft was serving as guidelines for implementers until the end of September 2015, when SEMA was expected to hold an initial workshop with all stakeholders to develop its national strategy.33

UNMAS reported that in 2015 Puntland would work to develop a “comprehensive mine action programme” and review existing structures with a view to long-term stability.34 Somaliland has a five-year strategic plan for mine action for 2011–16, with goals focusing on strengthened national coordination capacity, operationalisation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, clearance of high priority minefields, and systematic victim support.35
Standards
UNMAS has developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia, including Puntland, which were used by implementers in 2014. There were no updates to national mine action standards during the year.\textsuperscript{36}

Operators

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
DDG began operations in the country in 1999 with mine and ERW clearance in Somaliland, and has since undertaken mine action programmes in Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland.\textsuperscript{37} In 2014, DDG did not conduct any manual or mechanical mine clearance. It carried out EOD spot tasks, non-technical survey, and ERW workshops in: Galdogob, in Mudug province in Puntland; Abudwaq, in the central Galguduud region of south-central Somalia; and across Somaliland. It employed 270 personnel and, at the start of 2014, deployed seven EOD teams. This was reduced to four teams in March 2014, due to the end of donor funding. One EOD team continued to operate in Puntland, two teams in Somaliland, and one team in south-central Somalia.\textsuperscript{38}

HALO’s mine clearance programme in Somaliland was established in 1999. In 2014, HALO was the only mine action operator in Somaliland, with the programme employing 452 operational and 129 support national staff.\textsuperscript{39} It deployed three mechanical teams with front-end loaders for the majority of 2014, carrying out survey, mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), and EOD spot tasks.\textsuperscript{40} In the first half of 2015, HALO opened a new programme in south-central Somalia, aiming to begin survey and clearance along the Somali border with Ethiopia. It reported funding for this purpose had been secured until the end of January 2016.\textsuperscript{41}

In 2014, MAG continued its arms management and destruction (AMD) programme across south-central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland, handing over a total of 20 armouries after construction and rehabilitation work. It also carried out risk education in Puntland.\textsuperscript{42} At its maximum capacity in 2014, MAG employed 43 national and eight international staff. MAG previously conducted non-technical survey and EOD in Puntland, along with training and support to police EOD teams, but halted its mine action programme in August 2013 in agreement with donors due to changes in strategy and a worsening security situation.\textsuperscript{43}

In 2014, NPA was invited by the Somali authorities to initiate a programme in south-central Somalia for survey, BAC, and capacity-building assistance to SEMA.\textsuperscript{44} It deployed three multitask teams (MTTs) in south-central Somalia to carry out BAC, starting in November 2014 and employing a total of 41 personnel.\textsuperscript{45}

Commercial Companies

In 2014, UNMAS continued to contract the Ukrainian commercial operator Ukroboronservice to undertake mine-action-related tasks in south-central Somalia. Previously, The Development Initiative (TDI) was operational in 2012–13 until operations ended in December 2013 due to lack of funds.\textsuperscript{46}

Quality Management
SEMA reported that it carried out external quality assurance (QA) activities in 2014 with support from UNMAS, as well as internal QA of the Puntland police EOD teams.\textsuperscript{47} SMAC also conducted QA activities in 2014 comprising of random QA of ongoing clearance work and prior to handover checks of completed tasks.\textsuperscript{48} NPA, HALO, and DDG all reported that internal QA processes were in place.\textsuperscript{49}

Information Management
In 2014, an IMSMA database was in use by SEMA covering south-central Somalia. PMAC was responsible for a separate IMSMA database in Puntland.\textsuperscript{50} In Somaliland, HALO led a project to assist SMAC to repopulate its IMSMA database with HALO’s historic country data. It was completed in June 2015 with support from UNMAS.\textsuperscript{51}

LAND RELEASE

The total area released in 2014 in south-central Somalia and Somaliland was just over 8km\(^2\), of which approx. 3.5km\(^2\) was released in Somaliland by survey, clearance, and BAC, and 4.6km\(^2\) by BAC in south-central Somalia.\textsuperscript{52} No land release occurred in Puntland in 2014; only limited operations were carried out, consisting of risk education and EOD spot tasks.\textsuperscript{53}

In contrast, in 2013, a total of nearly 7.8km\(^2\) was released in south-central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland, including 2.5km\(^2\) through mine clearance (nearly all in Somaliland), and 5.3km\(^2\) through BAC (approx. half in Somaliland and half in south-central Somalia).\textsuperscript{54}

In Puntland, very little mine clearance has been conducted since the LIS was completed in 2005. According to MAG, the impact from mines is still unclear and further non-technical and technical survey are required to ensure the cost effectiveness and positive impact of future clearance.\textsuperscript{55}

DDG reported that the reason for the reduction in number of EOD teams was due to international donors moving away from funding traditional EOD teams towards funding MTT and AMD projects. The governments in Somaliland and south-central Somalia had also reached sufficient capacity to provide their own national EOD teams. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Jamie McGhee, Somalia Operations Manager, DDG, 27 May 2015.


As of May 2015, HALO employed 35 community members from Ceel Barde, Beletwewe, Mataban, and Abudwaag, trained and supported by six existing staff members re-tasked from its Somaliland programme. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Dave Willey, Regional Director – Angola, Somalia, South Sudan, MAG, 7 May 2015.

Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Homera Cheema, Desk Officer Somalia, MAG, 28 April 2014.


Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Homera Cheema, MAG, 28 April 2014.
Survey in 2014

According to SEMA, only limited survey activities were carried out in 2014. No overview of SHAs exists in south-central Somalia and as of June 2015, no national survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.

Previously, a detailed LIS was undertaken in Somaliland and Puntland, including in the disputed territories of Sool and Sanaag, in 2002–07. In 2012–14, HALO and SMAC carried out a second survey which resulted in the cancellation of many areas identified in the first LIS. HALO reported cancelling 14 areas suspected to contain mines covering a total of nearly 0.65km² (556,505m²) across Somaliland through non-technical survey and reducing a further 0.1km² (101,221m²) through technical survey in 2014. It also confirmed an additional 86 suspected mined areas (SMAs) covering a total of almost 4.2km² (4,186,060m²).

Clearance in 2014

In Somaliland, HALO released a total of 3.5km² through survey, mine clearance, and BAC in 2014, in comparison with a total of 4.8km² of land released in 2013. Of the 3.5km² released in 2014, 2.2km² was released through mine clearance and a total of nearly 0.7km² through survey, with the destruction of 29 anti-personnel mines, five anti-vehicle mines, and 35 items of UXO in the process. HALO also released five battle areas covering a total of 0.7km² through BAC, destroying two anti-personnel mines, 43 anti-vehicle mines, and 102 items of UXO.

In comparison, in 2013, HALO released nearly 5km², of which, 2.44km² were mined areas, 2.16km² were battle areas, and 0.2km² was cancelled through non-technical survey. During the operations, 124 anti-personnel mines, 29 anti-vehicle mines, 2,221 items of UXO, and 391 items of abandoned unexploded ordnance (AXO) were found and destroyed.

HALO reported that in 2014 there was a general decrease in team clearance rates as compared to 2013 due to factors such as high metal contamination and hard soil, which slowed daily demining operations, and tackling larger numbers of smaller tasks, which resulted in more days lost as teams travelled between distant locations.

Battle Area Clearance

Approx. 5.25km² of BAC occurred in south-central Somalia and Somaliland in 2014, a slight decrease from the reported 5.32km² in 2013.

In 2014, an UNMAS commercial contractor and NPA conducted limited BAC in specific districts in Bay, Galgudud, Gedo, Hiraan, and Lower Shabele in south-central Somalia. A total of 4,577,769m² of BAC was completed in south-central Somalia in 2014. NPA reported that its MTT carried out 170,000m² of surface BAC in November and December. UNMAS reported that commercial contractor Ukroboronservice conducted 4,407,769m² of surface BAC, destroying 163 UXO items.

As reported above, in Somaliland, HALO Trust released five battle areas through BAC of a total of 673,520m². DDG did not conduct mine clearance or technical survey in 2014. It primarily focused on EOD tasks and non-technical survey. In 2014, DDG reported destroying a total of 29 anti-personnel mines, one anti-vehicle mine, and 4,021 items of UXO during EOD spot tasks and as part of its ERW workshops. MAG reported that it did not encounter any anti-personnel mines in its AMD activities in 2014.

Progress in 2015

Both HALO Trust and NPA initiated survey activities in south-central Somalia in 2015. HALO deployed its first operational teams in May 2015, with funding from the government of Japan via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund, for a nine-month period until 31 January 2016. Four community liaison teams were recruited and deployed along the border to conduct a socio-economic survey and basic impact assessment. Following trainings in the first half of 2015, HALO deployed nine non-technical survey teams in early September in the Somali–Ethiopian border regions of Bakool, Galmudug, and Hiraan. At the end of September, the results of the initial surveys were analysed by HALO’s survey officers from Somaliland and international staff, following which the survey teams were re-deployed in October after a short refresher training. HALO reported that it expected to process the results of the first of the non-technical surveys at the end of October.

In the first half of 2015, NPA was preparing its MTT to start survey activities in south-central Somalia and began conducting systematic survey and clearance in the north of Banadir region, on the outskirts of Mogadishu, and along the Afgoye corridor.

Beginning in August 2015, an UNMAS contractor was set to conduct survey along the four main supply routes in south-central Somalia.
HALO reported that one staff member received minor injuries while investigating a signal and excavating directly onto an anti-personnel mine, in violation of standard operating procedures.\textsuperscript{50}
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Somalia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022.

In seeking to meet this deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland.

In October 2015, HALO and NPA indicated that it was not possible, due to a lack of realistic evidence on the size of the remaining contamination and the unpredictability of the security situation and future donor funding levels, to estimate when Somalia might complete mine clearance. Ongoing survey by HALO and NPA that began in 2015 will provide greater clarity on the extent of the challenge remaining and the time required for completion of clearance.

In Somaliland, HALO believes that the clearance of all known explosive hazards in the region could be completed by the end of 2017, and any residual tasks handed over to the SMAC for mine clearance or to police EOD teams, provided sufficient donor funding is maintained. SEMA and PMAC did not receive funding from the government in 2014.

In the first half of 2015, NPA focused its BAC activities in Mogadishu and its outskirts, and began to prepare its MTT to carry out survey work. It also expected to initiate a capacity-development project in the second half of 2015. HALO hoped to expand its operational capacity in the south-central region, in addition to continuing its clearance operations in Somaliland. HALO did not plan to undertake clearance or EOD activities in south-central Somalia for the majority of 2015 until its non-technical survey activities progressed sufficiently, following which it would look for safe and secure areas where it could conduct clearance.

MAG intended to continue its AMD work across south-central Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland, as well as its targeted risk education in 2015. DG did not envision significant changes in its operations in 2015, apart from a small increase in personnel due to the opening of a new office in Laas Caanood.

Both HALO and DDG have raised concerns about changes in funding priorities in 2015 and ensuring that sufficient resources are made available to carry out ongoing work in Puntland and Somaliland, as well as for new projects in south-central Somalia.

81 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, and Terje Eldøen, NPA, 29 October 2015. DDG estimated that mine clearance in south-central Somalia could be completed as late as 2023, based on current mine action capacity and known threats. It noted, however, that funding prioritised for survey and MTT in south-central Somalia could speed up clearance and reduce the number of years required to reach completion. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Jamie McGhee, DDG, 27 May 2015.


83 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015. NPA also reported that it did not receive any funding or in-kind support from the government, but that the SEMA participated in the UNMAS-led accreditation of its MTT. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Terje Eldøen, NPA, 19 May 2015.

84 In the second half of the year, NPA planned to do survey and impact assessment in Belet Weyn. It also planned to undertake physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) activities on a number of identified ammunition storage facilities on the road axis leading to Mogadishu, and to initiate a capacity building project with the SEMA to increase its abilities within the areas of information management, impact assessment, and monitoring and evaluation. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Terje Eldøen, NPA, 19 May 2015 and UNMAS, “2015 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia”, undated, at: http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/print/country_portfolio/02/55-1070-1055.pdf

85 HALO’s priorities in 2015 also continued to be the completion of clearance in Somaliland in regions with only a few minefields remaining, along with bringing a road verification unit to verify suspected areas of road thought to be low threat areas. It also will continue its support to SMAC and SEMA to enhance their capacity for establishing an accurate IMSMA database. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015.

86 MAG intended to expand its AMD activities across south-central Somalia as the security situation improved. In Puntland, MAG intended to undertake a survey of remaining armoury and explosive store house related needs across the region in late 2015. It will also continue its targeted risk education initiatives across south-central Somalia and Puntland. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Dave Willey, MAG, 7 May 2015.


88 HALO noted concern that as the security situation improves in south-central Somalia, it is beginning to see donor fatigue towards funding operations in Somaliland. While most donors continued to show interest in funding mine action in Somaliland with the 2017 completion goal in mind, a reduction in funding for Somaliland in 2015 could in turn jeopardise the completion of clearance within this timeframe. DDG reported that its reduction in EOD capacity from seven to four teams in 2014 was due to diversion of donor funding from traditional EOD teams to MTT instead, along with more money being allocated to weapons and ammunition management programmes. In Somaliland and south-central Somalia, increased national capacity to carry out EOD tasks also reduced the need for international EOD assistance. Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaires by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015 and Jamie McGhee, DDG, 27 May 2015.
SOUTH SUDAN

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

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</tr>
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<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE AND IMPROVING 5.3 3.9

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

South Sudan’s mine action programme improved in 2014 despite the ongoing armed conflict. Although still subject to challenges, land release and reporting showed improvement in 2014.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- South Sudan should make every effort to end the conflict, which is preventing access to contaminated areas and increasing the risk to civilians from mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
- South Sudan should increase its financial support for operational mine action. Greater support should also be provided to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) in order to enhance its capacity to develop effective mine action plans and policies.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
- South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2014, South Sudan had a total of 311 areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, covering a total area of nearly 119 km², as set out in Table 1. All ten of South Sudan’s states contain suspected mined areas (SMAs), with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, followed by East Equatoria and Jonglei.

Table 1: Contamination as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>118,974,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVM</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2,667,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster munition remnants</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>7,617,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2,214,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>721</strong></td>
<td><strong>131,474,007</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHA = suspected hazardous area  APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance

Table 2: Contamination by province as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Equatoria</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>9,590,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Equatoria</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>28,777,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>32,676,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>982,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Bahr El Ghazal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,477,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13,827,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39,301,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrap</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bahr El Ghazal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,838,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Equatoria</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,993,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>721</strong></td>
<td><strong>131,474,007</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHA = suspected hazardous area

South Sudan is heavily contaminated by anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and other explosive weapons which were used regularly during nearly 50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005, prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, leading to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011.

The full extent of South Sudan’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination remains unknown. Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) continue to be identified, while the existing threat is being compounded by renewed heavy fighting since December 2013 which continues to result in new UXO contamination, particularly in Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states. Ongoing conflict...
in these states has made access to certain areas extremely limited, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination.\(^1\) In 2014, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that it expected to see “a substantial change in contamination levels and a significant increase in the threat posed by ERW and possibly landmines”\(^2\).

Mine Action Monitor is not aware of any confirmed reports of the new use of anti-personnel mines in the renewed conflict, which began in 2013.\(^3\) However, in March 2015, a group of states monitoring the ceasefire in South Sudan reported that a government armed forces officer “stated clearly that anti-personnel mines had been deployed in the area around Nassir”, in Upper Nile state, by government forces. The monitoring group, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, consisting of seven east African states, reported that the officer made the statement on 12 March 2015, in a meeting between senior government armed forces officers, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) staff, and members of IGAD.\(^4\) According to a media report, South Sudan’s army information director, Malaak Ayuen, later denied the allegations that government forces had used landmines in response to the IGAD report.\(^5\)

 Civilians continued to be killed and injured by anti-personnel mines and ERW in 2014 and 2015. A total of 38 victims of anti-personnel mines and ERW from five states were recorded in 2014, including 31 people injured and seven killed.\(^6\) The number of anti-personnel mine and ERW victims rose alarmingly from January to the end of August 2015, with 59 new victims reported, including 17 killed and 42 injured.\(^7\) In January 2015, UNMAS stated that since records began, 4,500 victims of mines and ERW have been identified.\(^8\)

In 2015, UNMAS reported that the socio-economic cost of mines and ERW in South Sudan in terms of interrupted agricultural production, food insecurity, halted commerce, and the lack of freedom of movement “is incalculable”. UNMAS estimated that explosive hazards threatened more than 1.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs), local communities, peacekeepers, and humanitarian aid workers.\(^9\)

Remnants of cleared mines, Karpeto, South Sudan. © Lucy Pinches/NPA

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1. Email from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 27 October 2015, and response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire 30 March 2015. According to UNMAS, all recorded mined areas contained in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database are considered suspected mined areas as no technical survey has been performed on them. The areas were registered on the basis of non-technical survey and as such are considered suspected mined areas.
3. Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 27 October 2015, and response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire, 30 March 2015. According to UNMAS, all recorded mined areas contained in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database are considered suspected mined areas as no technical survey has been performed on them. The areas were registered on the basis of non-technical survey and as such are considered suspected mined areas.
4. Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 27 October 2015.
7. According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), there were no allegations of new anti-personnel mine use previously in the renewed fighting which began in 2013, nor in 2014; however in 2011 there were several apparent incidents of anti-personnel mine use which the ICBL was unable to determine the extent to which anti-personnel mines were being laid, as opposed to anti-vehicle mines, nor those responsible. A fact-finding mission was sent to investigate the reports in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, and Western Bahr El Ghazal states in June-July 2012, during which civil authorities and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders denied involvement in new use of anti-personnel mines, however SPLA officials confirmed that mines had been laid by rebel forces in Unity and Jonglei states. See Landmine Monitor, “Country Profile: South Sudan, Mine Ban Policy”, 30 October 2014, at: http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/south-sudan/mine-ban-policy.aspx
9. Gridneff, “South Sudan Army’s Landmine Use Escalates War, Monitors Say”.
10. APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form J, p. 13; and UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—December 2014”. UNMAS reported that the actual number of new victims in 2014 is likely higher due to underreporting resulting from lack of access to contaminated areas.
The main objectives of the plan are to ensure that:

- The national mine action programme actively contributes to the Millennium Development Goals, reducing poverty and increasing socio-economic development by mainstreaming mine action activities into development programmes.
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In March 2015, UNMAS reported that due to the ongoing conflict, all evaluation of progress in implementing the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2012–2016 had been suspended.19 In October 2015, UNMAS stated that the plan was in the process of being redrafted.20 According to NMAA, South Sudan intends to develop a multi-year clearance plan for 2015–17, “which takes into consideration the known hazardous areas, historical patterns for resources available to the mine action sector, as well as the prevailing operational and security environment in various regions of the country”.21

While it is planned that eventually NMAA will assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 notes that the government did “not have the financial and technical capacity to support its mine action program. UN agencies, development partners, and international organizations will need to support the program in providing technical and financial assistance”.22 UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorised UNMISS to support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.23

In May 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2155 in response to the conflict that broke out in December 2013. This resolution, which marked a significant change from Resolution 1996, focuses on four areas: protecting civilians; creating the conditions for humanitarian access; reporting and investigating human rights violations; and supporting the Cessation of Hostilities agreements. Significantly, most capacity development for government institutions is no longer part of the mission’s mandate.

Strategic Planning

As noted above, South Sudan has a National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2012–2016, which was developed by NMAA with assistance from the UN and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).19 The main objectives of the plan are to ensure that:

- South Sudan is in a position to comply with all international instruments related to mines and ERW, and has the capacity to conduct and manage the national mine action programme.
- The scope and location of mine and ERW contamination are fully recorded, and all high-impact contaminated areas are identified, prioritised, cleared, and released.
- The national mine action programme actively contributes to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, reducing poverty and increasing socio-economic development by mainstreaming mine action activities into development programmes.20

In March 2015, UNMAS reported that due to the ongoing conflict, all evaluation of progress in implementing the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2012–2016 had been suspended.19 In October 2015, UNMAS stated that the plan was in the process of being redrafted.20 According to NMAA, South Sudan intends to develop a multi-year clearance plan for 2015–17, “which takes into consideration the known hazardous areas, historical patterns for resources available to the mine action sector, as well as the prevailing operational and security environment in various regions of the country”.21

In October 2015, UNMAS reported that a review of South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) for mine action had been completed and that the NTSG were in use.22

Operators

Four international demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operated in South Sudan in 2014: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Four commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechem, MineTech International (MTI), and The Development Initiative (TDI). No national demining organisations were involved in clearance in 2014.24

Of these, seven operators (the four NGOs and three of the four commercials) reported destroying anti-personnel mines in 2014.25 At the beginning of the year, DDG operated 11 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams; this number was reduced to two by the end of 2014 due to funding.26 MAG mainly conducted EOD spot clearance and community liaison (CL) activities, and reported destroying mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR), and other ERW. MAG deployed one seven-deminer multitask team (MTT) from February 2014 with a Bozena 4, and a new MineWolf team with eight deminers starting in November 2014.27 NPA deployed four teams: three MTTs and one manual demining team.28 DCA declined to provide information on its operations.

G4S reported a total capacity for its mine action operations of approx. 230 staff, including two integrated clearance teams, supported by ten deminers and a CL team, with a MineWolf 240 as a primary resource, and eight MTTs.29 MTI deployed four MineWolf teams, supported by a manual clearance team and a CL team.30 TDI, which employed 298 staff in South Sudan, reported that its teams were completing the final year of a three-year operation in 2014.31

Standards

In October 2015, UNMAS reported that a review of South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) for mine action had been completed and that the NTSG were in use.32
Quality Management

A new quality management system was developed in 2014 and, following approval by NMAA, was being implemented as of October 2015. According to UNMAS, the new system involves a more rigid internal policy to be adopted by operators and a new system of monitoring and evaluation to be implemented by NMAA and UNMAS.13 NMAA was reported to have visited field teams and carried out quality assurance (QA) activities in 2014.14 All operators conducting mine survey and clearance operations reported carrying out their activities according to standard operating procedures, and that internal QA and quality control (QC) activities were conducted regularly.26

Information Management

According to UNMAS, IMSMA database clean-up is conducted on a weekly basis and has had no effect on the total size of contamination or number of SHAs recorded in 2014.34 UNMAS stated that operators and programme implementers assist in data entry and fault-finding, and that as such the database “is constantly evolving”.37

LAND RELEASE

In 2014, UNMAS reported “closing” 1,320 “hazardous areas” and releasing a total of approx. 9.3km² back to local communities, with the destruction of 880 anti-personnel mines, 357 anti-vehicle mines, and 15,245 items of UXO in the process. In addition, a total of 407km of roads were opened through route assessment and verification.38 This is a significant decrease in the size of land release from 2013, when UNMAS reported release of 1,518 hazardous areas totalling 27.1km², with the destruction of 8,65 anti-personnel mines, 215 anti-vehicle mines, and 22,018 items of UXO.39 UNMAS explained that in 2014, due to ongoing conflict and security restrictions, movement of mine action teams was “severely curtailed” and that operations were constantly held up awaiting permission to enter certain areas, with many areas becoming inaccessible.40

UNMAS has also reported that in 2004–14, a total of 9,486 hazards have been addressed, more than 1,130km² of land has been released, and nearly 23,300km of roads opened, with nearly 29,000 anti-personnel mines, 5,000 anti-vehicle mines, and 855,000 items of UXO destroyed.41

22 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 23 October 2015.
24 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 6 June 2015. Four national organisations carried out risk education. Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL), a national implementing partner of MAG, conducted survey in 2012–2016, Juba, February 2012, p. iii.
26 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Rickard Hartmann, Head of Programme, DDG, 22 May 2015.
27 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Ismael Frioud, Programme Officer, MAG, 9 April 2015.
29 Email from Mark Buswell, Programme Manager South Sudan, G4S, 3 June 2015
30 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Mark Livingstone, Project Manager, MTI, 2 June 2015. These consisted of two MineWolf 240 machines and two MineWolf 370 teams, all with flail and tiller configurations. In 2013, MTI had deployed an MDD team but this was phased out at the end of the 2013 demining season.
31 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Stephen Saffin, Chief Operating Officer, TDI, 4 June 2015.
32 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 23 October 2015. NPA reported in May 2015 that South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines for mine action were under revision, but that the existing national standards revised in 2013 were being implemented. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Augustino Seja, NPA, 11 May 2015.
33 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 23 October 2015, and response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire, 30 March 2015.
36 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.
37 Ibid.
40 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.
Survey in 2014

As summarised in Table 3, a total of 55 suspected mined areas covering just over 1km² were cancelled through non-technical survey and a total of 96,019m² was reduced by technical survey in 2014. A further 107 areas comprising nearly 1.6km² were confirmed as mined through technical survey, according to UNMAS records. This compares to release of 82 confirmed mined areas in 2013 through technical survey and clearance of over 4.3km², with non-technical survey additionally resulting in the cancellation of almost 17km².

UNMAS reported that the significant decrease in SHA cancelled by non-technical survey in 2014 compared to the previous year was due to operations focusing on better-defined hazardous areas in 2014, which did not contain large areas that could be cancelled. Additional cancellation beyond that reported from non-technical survey also occurred in 2013, due to database clearance based on spatial analysis of hazardous areas and the completion of polygons.

Table 3: Survey in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>Mined areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4S</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>546,686</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56,315</td>
<td>96,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHEM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>81,310</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>140,996</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,186,193</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSIL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33,385</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMAS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>480,866</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>70,973</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,037,552</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1,569,496</td>
<td>96,019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHA = suspected hazardous area  TS = technical survey

Clearance in 2014

A total of 120 mined areas covering almost 2.72km² were released through clearance and technical survey in 2014, including 2.62km² through clearance and nearly 0.1km² by technical survey, with 880 anti-personnel mines, 357 anti-vehicle mines, and 15,245 items of UXO destroyed. The bulk of the clearance was conducted by the three commercial operators – G4S, MTI, and TDI – using mechanical methods. In comparison, in 2013, a total of 135 confirmed mined areas (CMAs) and 24 SMAs were released through technical survey and clearance over 4.33km², destroying in the process 691 anti-personnel mines, 150 anti-vehicle mines, and 2,142 items of UXO. According to UNMAS, the reduction in land release through clearance and technical survey in 2014 was due to a decrease in access and information from certain areas.
Table 4: Mine clearance in 2014\(^{47}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,354</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4S</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,007,471</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55,048</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHEM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,088,091</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>433,163</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31,814</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2,619,941</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>15,245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines     AVM = anti-vehicle mines     UXO = unexploded ordnance

### Battle Area Clearance

In 2014, five operators (MAG, G4S, MTI, TDI, and NPA) conducted battle area clearance (BAC) over 5.57km² and closed a total of 1,119 UXO spot tasks, destroying 13,987 items of UXO.\(^{50}\) This is a slight decrease from the 5.78km² of BAC carried out in 2013, with the destruction of 13,430 UXO items.\(^{51}\)

### Clearance of Cluster Munition Remnants

The total cluster munition-contaminated area released in 2014 was 1.4km², compared with 0.6km² in 2013. Of this, 1.28km² was released through clearance and a further 0.12km² was cancelled through non-technical survey.\(^{52}\) This compares to release in 2013 of 0.63km² of cluster munition-contaminated area; 0.51km² through technical survey and clearance, and cancellation of 0.12km² by non-technical survey.\(^{53}\)
Progress in 2015

From January to 1 September 2015, some 10.4km² of “hazardous areas” was released, including 3.1km² through non-technical survey, 4.1km² through mine clearance and technical survey, and 3.1km² through BAC, with the destruction of a total of 1,374 anti-personnel mines, 381 anti-vehicle mines, and 17,224 items of UXO.14

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), South Sudan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan is not on track to meet this deadline.

Under its existing national mine action strategic plan for 2012–16, South Sudan expects to have surveyed and recorded all SHAs by the end of 2016 to facilitate development of the next strategic mine action plan and to release 5km² of confirmed hazardous area per year through technical survey and/or clearance, corresponding to a total of 25km² for 2012–16.15

In March 2015, however, UNMAS again highlighted the serious obstacles posed to mine action operations by ongoing fighting and insecurity, lack of access to contaminated areas, and new UXO contamination, along with continuing significant challenges from lack of infrastructure and access to vast areas of the country, and the unpredictable rainy seasons.16 Given the current security situation, it is not possible to know if South Sudan could still meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline.

Table 5: Release of mined areas in 2010–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared and reduced (km²)</th>
<th>Area cancelled (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>21.78</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>35.46</td>
<td>6,916</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.72</td>
<td>75.88</td>
<td>13,428</td>
<td>2,093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines

South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan budget for 2012–16 is estimated at US$204 million.17 According to UNMAS, no national funding or in-kind support is provided by the government of South Sudan for mine action, but it has been previously claimed that the government provides a budget to NMAA to cover salaries and limited operational costs.18

In April 2015, NMAA reported that South Sudan would develop a multi-year clearance plan for 2015–17, including projections for clearance targets based on levels of remaining contamination, available resources, and the operational and security environment across the country. It stated that the plan would be published in “subsequent Article 7 reports” and that updates would be provided to states parties.19

UNMAS did not foresee major changes in mine action capacity in South Sudan during 2015.20 However, with the collapse of peace talks in March 2015, continued conflict and internal unrest were expected, particularly during the dry season, raising serious concerns of new contamination and further constraints on access to mined and ERW-contaminated areas.21

In 2015, NPA planned to increase operational survey capacity to three teams.22 MAG planned to maintain its operational capacity in 2015 and expand its geographical coverage to border and, if possible, conflict-affected states, while seeking further support for its MTT and mechanical and EOD capacity.23 G4S planned to add another four Quick Response Teams to its mine action capacity and work its assets through the wet season in 2015.24 Mechem, which did not conduct area clearance in 2014, was planning under a new contract from 1 August to 31 December 2015 to deploy two MTTs to carry out non-technical and technical survey, mine clearance, surface and subsurface BAC, and spot demolitions.25 MTI did not foresee changes to its capacity in 2015, but it expected to cut its MineWolf teams from four to two in 2016.26 DDG expected to add an additional MTT to its existing two EOD teams during 2015.27

Despite the heightened need for an urgent response to new explosive hazard contamination and the impacts of renewed conflict on the civilian population, many operators have expressed concern over decreased funding for mine action in South Sudan in 2015, with donors prioritising other humanitarian sectors or refusing to fund mine action activities while the conflict is ongoing.28
OTHER CONTAMINATED STATES PARTIES

54 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report—August 2015”.
56 UNMAS, "About UNMAS in South Sudan”, updated March 2015.
57 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report—December 2014”;
59 Ibid., p. 30.
60 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.
62 Ibid.
63 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Augustino Seja, NPA, 2 June 2015. Following restructuring of its MTT, NPA reported that work would focus on survey but that any CMR contamination found in the process would be recorded and cleared.
64 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Ismael Frioud, MAG, 9 April 2015. MAG’s MTT’s work was scheduled to finish at the end of June 2015 and if new funding is not secured, will not be redeployed. The MineWolf team is expected to continue operations and renew its contract in September 2015.
65 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Mark Buswell, G4S, 27 May 2015, and Stephen Saffin, TDI, 4 June 2015. TDI did not report specific changes to its capacity or operations in 2015 but stated that it would continue to focus on delivering CMR survey and clearance operations “to a high standard” in 2015.
68 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Rickard Hartmann, DDG, 22 May 2015.
## MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

| Performance Score: Average | 5.0  | 4.1  |

## PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Sudan’s mine action programme performance in 2014 represents a slight improvement on the previous year, with greater clearance output compared to 2013.
CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2014, Sudan had 108 areas containing anti-personnel mines covering a total of just over 21km². According to the Sudanese National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), 2.9km² is confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines, while 18km² is suspected to contain anti-personnel mines.¹

Sudan’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination results from decades-long conflict since its independence in 1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and other explosive weapons were used heavily by all parties to the conflicts, resulted in widespread contamination that has since claimed thousands of victims.² In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, ending the civil war and ultimately leading to the independence of the south in July 2011. However, since South Sudan’s independence, conflicts have again broken out in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states and in the Abyei region, which have caused an unknown amount of new contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Sudan’s total estimated remaining mine and ERW contamination affects ten of its 18 states: Blue Nile; Central, East, North, South, and West Darfur; Gadaref; Kassala; Red Sea; and South Kordofan.³ Of these, five contain anti-personnel mines: South Kordofan, Kassala, Blue Nile, Red Sea, and Gadaref, as set out in Table 1. Contamination is largely concentrated in South Kordofan (18km²), followed by Kassala (2km²) and Blue Nile (1km²) states, while Red Sea and Gadaref states each have 10,000m² or less anti-personnel mine contamination remaining. No mine contamination has been reported in Darfur, where the main threat is from UXO.⁴

Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 2014⁵

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Total area remaining (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>272,456</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>905,583</td>
<td>1,178,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kordofan</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2,182,548</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15,615,710</td>
<td>17,798,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>434,176</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,576,744</td>
<td>2,010,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadaref</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2,889,180</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18,115,237</td>
<td>21,004,417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area  SHA = suspected hazardous area

Mine Action Monitor is unaware of any confirmed reports of new use of anti-personnel mines in Blue Nile or South Kordofan states since conflict began in 2012. However, in 2013, non-state armed groups were alleged to have laid new mines on the border between Sudan’s White Nile state and South Sudan’s Upper Nile region, with reports of civilian and livestock casualties.⁶

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¹ APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C, p. 7. Sudan’s Article 7 report lists land cancelled through non-technical survey erroneously as “reduced” and land reduced through technical survey as “cancelled”. It also contains a copy error where figures for the number of and total area size of known or suspected areas containing anti-personnel mines at the beginning of the reporting period (calendar year 2014) are identical to those listed as number and total area remaining to be addressed at the end of the reporting period, despite listing the total amounts released through clearance and survey in 2014.
³ Ibid.
⁴ APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Forms C and F.
⁵ Ibid., Form C.
Since 2002, 1,953 mine and ERW victims have been registered in Sudan's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. From the start of the new conflict in South Kordofan in 2011 and during 2012–15, 225 further casualties were reported. Of the total casualties recorded, 40% were children. In 2014, 39 new victims were identified. In February 2014, a Sudanese Red Crescent Society volunteer was killed in a mine accident near Abu Juba, in South Kordofan. From January to end-June 2015, NMAC reported that one other person was killed and another 16 were injured in mine and ERW accidents.

Mine and ERW contamination continues to pose a daily threat to the lives of civilian populations in Sudan and also has a significant detrimental impact on the socio-economic development of local communities. In the Abyei area, the United Nations (UN) has on repeated occasions expressed concern over the residual threat of mines and ERW and the impact of contamination in obstructing the safe return of displaced persons and preventing safe migration. The presence of mines and ERW also hinders provision of humanitarian assistance and access to the conflict-affected states.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

NMAC and the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) manage Sudan's mine action programme. In 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the signing of the CPA established the legal framework for the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Sudan to manage quality assurance (QA) of all mine action activities in Sudan in the frame of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). That same year, NMAC started working in partnership with UNMAO, NMAC was set up, and a National Mine Action Policy Framework was developed, revised, and then approved by August 2006.

Following UNMIS and UNMAO's closure in July 2011 upon the independence of South Sudan, NMAC assumed full ownership of national mine action with responsibility for coordinating all mine clearance, including accreditation and certification of mine clearance agencies. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which had opened an emergency programme in Sudan in 2002, continued to provide support to mine action in Sudan through technical support to NMAC to the end of 2013.

In January 2014, UNMAS phased out of its lead role in support of mine action activities in a planned handover to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP assumed the role in September 2014 and provided capacity-building support to NMAC for a three-month period until December. However, after restructuring in light of adopting a new strategic plan for 2014–17, UNDP decided to transition out of support for mine action. As such, UNDP, along with the government of Sudan, requested that UNMAS retake the lead role in support of mine action in Sudan in December 2014. In March 2015, UNMAS sent an assessment mission to Sudan and resumed its role in support of NMAC to build institutional capacity and implement mine action activities.

In 2011, in response to the outbreak of heavy conflict in Abyei, the UN Security Council authorised a UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to monitor the activities of SAF and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the area, but it did not have a mandate for peacekeepers to conduct mine clearance. In November 2012, UN Security Council Resolution 2075 expanded UNMAS's role to include identification and clearance of mines in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone around Abyei. UNMAS also facilitates access by assessing and clearing priority areas and routes.

The UN Security Council renewed the mandate of UNISFA again in February 2015 (until 15 July 2015) and included an obligation for the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to continue to facilitate UNMAS's deployment to ensure the freedom of movement of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, and the identification and clearance of mines in the Abyei area and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone.

In the Darfur region, under the umbrella of the African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) works in direct support of UNAMID priorities. In 2012, UNAMID contracted The Development Initiative (TDI), a commercial company, to assess, survey, mark, identify, and clear contamination in all five Darfur states. TDI's activities depend on availability of security forces and permission from the government of Sudan and the UN Special Representative for Political Affairs. TDI has reported that it will transition to a mentoring role in supporting local national demining teams to increase their operational capacity and production by embedding one international staff in the teams. It noted its task was up for re-tender in 2015. Mine action in Darfur is funded through assessed peacekeeping funds for UNAMID.

**Strategic Planning**

Sudan has a multi-year National Mine Action Plan for 2013–19. According to NMAC, the plan was designed in light of the overall security situation in Sudan and the capacity for mine action and types of assets available. The plan includes details of operations for addressing contamination in all affected states by year, with a focus on the eastern states of Kassala, Red Sea, and Gadaref, and parts of Blue Nile. When security permits, work will start according to the plan in South Kordofan and the remaining parts of Blue Nile states.

**Operators**

In 2014, no international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) conducted mine clearance or survey in Sudan. One international NGO, Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR Japan), carried out mine risk education, along with a national NGO, SIBRO Organization for Development. The only international operator to conduct clearance activities in 2014 was TDI, which carried out explosive ordnance
destruction (EOD) tasks in Darfur in support of UNAMID. It deployed five multitask teams (MTTs).\textsuperscript{28} In 2015, NMAC called for other international NGO operators to undertake mine action in Sudan.\textsuperscript{29}

Previously, two international mine clearance NGOs had programmes in Sudan but were forced to close down their operations owing to government restrictions that impeded their operations.\textsuperscript{30} DanChurchAid (DCA) ended its operations in 2012.\textsuperscript{31} In June 2012, the Sudanese government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) ordered Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and six other NGOs that provided humanitarian aid to leave Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea states in eastern Sudan.\textsuperscript{32} Following months of negotiations with HAC and donors, MAG ended its operations in Sudan, leaving in early 2013.\textsuperscript{33}

National demining operators are the National Demining Units, JASMAR for Human Security, and Friends of Peace and Development Organization (FPDO). In 2014, the National Demining Units comprised four mine clearance teams (MCT), one MTT, three mine detection dog (MDD) teams, and one mechanical team. FPDO and JASMAR had one MCT each and conducted land release and mine risk education in Kassala and Gadaref states, with limited funding according to NMAC.\textsuperscript{34}

Standards

In May 2015, NMAC stated that a review of National Technical Standards and Guidelines was ongoing and that a new version would be published on its website after their approval.\textsuperscript{35}

Quality Management

According to NMAC, a quality assurance (QA) programme became operational in 2006 with three regionally based QA teams of one to two persons each. The teams are based in Damazeen, Kassala, and Kadugli, as well as in Khartoum, with each team responsible for one to three states.\textsuperscript{36} TDI confirmed that a QA system was in place in Sudan but reported that very few external QA activities were carried out in 2014.\textsuperscript{37}
**LAND RELEASE**

In 2014, a total of just over 4.2km² of land was released in Sudan through mine-action-related activities, including 3.7km² of area containing anti-personnel mines. The amount of mined land released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 was 2.8km², while a further 0.9km² was cancelled by non-technical survey, nearly all in Kassala state. In addition, 1,563km of roads, all in the Darfur region, were assessed.

This was in comparison to 2013, when Sudan released some 11.3km² of mine- and ERW-contaminated areas, almost all in Kassala state. A total of 2,660km of roads were assessed in 2013, all in Darfur.

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2007–09 covering Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan states. Since then, “ad hoc” reports of additional mine-/ERW-contaminated areas have been registered as dangerous areas in the database, causing the LIS baseline of 221 hazards to expand significantly, including in areas not originally surveyed.

As of December 2014, a total of 93.6km² of dangerous areas had been released, (74% of the 125km² of the total contamination identified since 2002) and 37,151km of roads verified and cleared. A total of 10,002 anti-personnel mines, 3,134 anti-vehicle mines, and 57,600 items of UXO were destroyed in the process.

**Survey in 2014**

According to NMAC, a total of 1.2km² of mined area was released through survey in 2014, all in Kassala state. Of this, nearly 0.9km² (898,524m²) was released through non-technical survey, along with a further 0.3km² (285,212m²) by technical survey.

**Clearance in 2014**

According to NMAC, nearly 2.5km² of mined area was released through clearance in 2014 (see Table 2), the majority of which occurred in Kassala state (2.4km²), along with a further 0.08km² in Red Sea state. This compared to 2013 when a total of 0.8km² of mined area was cleared.

**Table 2: Mine clearance and survey in 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Area cancelled by NTS (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Total (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>898,524</td>
<td>285,212</td>
<td>2,389,368</td>
<td>3,573,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>898,524</td>
<td>285,212</td>
<td>2,469,368</td>
<td>3,653,104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 2.5km² cleared in 2014, 2.3km² was released by manual mine clearance, 0.06km² by mechanical clearance, and 0.1km² by MDDs. A total of 171 anti-personnel mines, 95 anti-vehicle mines, and 2,976 items of UXO were destroyed.

While NMAC’s records do not disaggregate land-release figures between different operators, TDI reported that 2014 was a “good year” for its operations, with a significant increase in the amount of UXO it located and destroyed. It said this rise in productivity was due to greater independence of TDI teams from UNAMID escorts and a switch to escorts from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and local police, which allowed teams more freedom of movement and a greater ability to reach suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).
From June 2011 through the first half of 2015, ongoing conflict has prevented mine action activities from being carried out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In Darfur, which is heavily affected by UXO, EOD tasks could only be carried out in certain accessible areas due to the impact of ongoing instability. Land-release operations were only possible in Kassala and the eastern states, where the security situation remained stable. However, as NMAC reported in 2015, and in accordance with its national mine action strategic plan, as soon as the security situation improved mine clearance was scheduled to restart in the conflict affected areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Positively, in June 2015, FPDO was deployed to conduct land release in South Kordofan, while JASMAR and the NDU also commenced land release in Blue Nile state, with Swiss funding.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), Sudan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2019. Sudan is not on track to meet this extended deadline.

Despite hopeful prospects in June 2011 for completion of Sudan’s Article 5 clearance obligations by its original deadline of 1 April 2014, a combination of factors has been asserted for the failure to do so: funding shortfalls; ongoing instability; lack of access in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states; (formerly) prioritisation of clearance in areas now within South Sudan; discovery of new hazardous areas; and the departure of international NGOs. In 2013, Sudan requested and was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. Table 3 summarises progress in clearance in 2010–14.

Table 3: Release of mined areas in 2010–14 (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Release by clearance</th>
<th>Release by NTS and TS</th>
<th>Total release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>9.61</td>
<td>10.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>25.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>34.34</td>
<td>41.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NTS = non-technical survey  TS = technical survey

Under its extension request plan, Sudan plans to clear all contaminated areas in the states of Darfur, Gedaref, Kassala, and Red Sea by 2016, when clearance is due to begin in Blue Nile and Kordofan states. In addition, Sudan is scheduled to continue the general mine action assessment (GMAA) in areas requiring survey or resurvey. Sudan indicated that GMAA would be completed in Blue Nile and South Kordofan within six months of survey beginning [dependent on an improved security situation].
Sudan has also indicated that it expected to fill the gap created by the departure of international mine action operators by: maintaining and increasing the capacity of the National Demining Units (NDUs) through further training; engagement of FPDO and JAMSAR in survey and clearance operations; and more QA visits to the field. In 2013, NMAC accredited FPDO and JAMSAR to conduct land release.

According to its extension request plan, in 2014–15, Sudan expected to address 46 SHAs and 15 confirmed mined areas (CMAs), cancelling a total of 3km² through technical survey and releasing a further 5km² through technical survey and clearance. At the end of 2014, NMAC reported that only three SHAs had been addressed and 13 confirmed mined areas closed, and a total of 1.2km² released through survey and 2.5km² through mine clearance during the year.

Sudan’s ability to meet its Article 5 extension request milestones remains heavily dependent upon improvement in the security situation of the heavily affected states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, where access remains restricted and UXO contamination continues to increase. In 2015, Sudan also cited the frequent movement of internally displaced persons, continued finding of additional hazards, the high metallic content in mined areas, and the rainy season as additional hindrances to meeting its extension request targets. Other significant factors which continue to impede Sudan’s progress include a lack of funding and the lack of clearance capacity formerly provided by international mine clearance operators.

Similarly, in Abyei and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, UNMAS reported significant challenges, including: commitment from the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to implementing UN Security Council resolutions on Abyei; ongoing conflict and increased contamination; regional insecurity and curtailed freedom of movement; and the rainy season from June to the end of September, during which demining operations are not possible.

Due to the challenges it faced to implement mine action activities planned under its extension request for 2014, NMAC recommended revisions to its extension request plan and the amount of suspected mined areas (SMAs) or CMAs to be released in 2015–19. In its latest Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2015, NMAC revised downwards the planned number of mined areas to be released: from 38 to 12 in 2015–16; from 29 to 15 in 2016–17; from 19 to 17 in 2017–18; and from 14 to 3 in 2018–19.

According to NMAC, the government of Sudan has supported mine action in the country by paying all NMAC staff salaries, and covering the operational cost of NMAC and some of the deployment costs of the National Demining Units. In 2014, the government contributed a total of 3,000,000 SDG (equivalent to more than US$325,000 at June 2015 exchange rates). NMAC reported receiving US$1.5 million from different donors in 2014, however this was less than expected for mine action and additional funding was being sought for 2015.

NMAC did not report destruction of any anti-personnel mines in the first half of 2015. In March 2015, UNMAS reported that NMAC planned to release the remaining 6.3km² of mined area in the affected eastern states and declare them cleared in 2015. In June 2015, NMAC reported that from January to the end of June, an additional 66 hazardous areas were registered and 62 hazardous areas cleared, bringing the total of active hazardous areas remaining to be addressed to 227. A total of 338,144m² of land had been released, 344km of roads assessed, and a total of 20 anti-vehicle mines and 2,039 items of UXO destroyed.

In June 2015, a representative from NMAC stated that Sudan was committed to meeting its National Mine Action Plan clearance deadline of 2019, but re-emphasised that it faced large challenges due to lack of funding and ongoing conflict in Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

UNMAS reported that, as of early 2015, nearly all mine clearance activities were suspended due to lack of funding. It stated that US$6 million was necessary to complete land release in the eastern states and emergency clearance in the southern states, as a result of Sudan’s mine action programme being “seriously underfunded” in 2014, when total funding requirements were estimated at $7 million, while total funding received from multiple sources amounted to $1.1 million.

In June 2015, UNMAS reported that its operations in Abyei were fully funded through 30 June 2016 and that UNISFA had allocated $25.4 million in support of its activities in Abyei and along the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone for the period of 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016.
TAJIKISTAN

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2020
(UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR 4.9 5.0

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Tajikistan’s performance score has dropped to poor (from average the previous year) as only 18 of the 107 mined areas that Tajikistan newly reported in September 2013 have been surveyed to date. In addition, figures of estimated contamination provided by the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) continue to change, without sufficient justification or adequate explanation.
### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Tajikistan should, as soon as possible, complete survey of the 107 mined areas whose records were made publicly available in September 2013, in order to clarify the actual extent of mine.
- Tajikistan should then revise its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 completion workplan and its mine action strategic plan with precise and clear milestones.
- Tajikistan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy to secure funding for mine clearance operations in both the border regions and the central region.

### CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan has 4.9 km² of confirmed mined area (CMA) and a further 6.4 km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA), across three provinces, as set out in Table 1, representing a combined total of 11.3 km² remaining mined and suspected mined/ERW area. NPA reported that during a November 2015 meeting with the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC), 2.3 km² of the 6.4 km² SHA was reported as BAC containing ERW only, and this has been subsequently clarified by TNMAC.

Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khatlon (Tajik-Afghan border)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>146*</td>
<td>4.40*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central region</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>81</td>
<td><strong>4.9</strong></td>
<td>161</td>
<td><strong>6.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 107 unsurveyed minefield records, covering 146 mined areas, and covering approx. 4.4km²
CMA = confirmed mined area
SHA = suspected hazardous area

Mine contamination in Tajikistan is the consequence of different conflicts. Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian forces in 1992-98; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 2000–01; and the central region of Tajikistan was contaminated as a result of the 1992–97 civil war.

Mine contamination remains in the provinces of Khatlon (on the Afghan border), the central region, and in Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO). In 2013, following a Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) survey, FSD and TMAC concluded that no mines remain on the Tajikistan side of the border with Uzbekistan. Tajikistan also has light cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination in the central region, the clearance of which it hoped to complete in 2015.

A national survey in 2003–05 by FSD estimated mine and ERW contamination to extend over 50 km². It was subsequently acknowledged that due to lack of experience of the initial survey teams, lack of minefield records and other important information, and lack of proper survey equipment, the first impact survey did not yield high-quality results. As a result, the sizes of SHAs were miscalculated and their descriptions not clearly recorded.

As of January 2013, the TMAC had reduced total SHA to 7.2 km² through non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance, of which 4.9 km² were along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan while just under 2.3 km² were in the central region. In September 2013, however, TMAC unexpectedly revised its estimate of remaining contamination to almost 11.7 km² of contaminated land: 9.3 km² of mined area and just under 2.4 km² of battle area. The basis for this new estimate remains unclear.

In March 2014, TMAC reiterated its estimate of contaminated area of 11.7 km², but claimed that 8.9 km² contained mines, while 2.8 km² contained ERW. The estimates did not, however, include area covered by 110 minefield records that were made public for the first time by TMAC in September 2013. According to TMAC, survey of the areas covered by these records would take place in 2014. The minefield records concern areas where security constraints have prevented survey activities in the past. The number of previously unrecorded minefields was subsequently confirmed as 107 (not 110), and nearly all are located on the border with Afghanistan. Non-technical survey of the 107 minefields began in 2014 (see section below, Survey in 2014).

According to an APMBC Article 5 progress report, delivered by Tajikistan at the APMBC Third Review Conference, as at 1 January 2014, total remaining contamination was 13.08 km², although it was unclear if this included battle area. In June 2015, Tajikistan reported that “100 confirmed mined areas plus 149 unsurveyed areas are remaining for conducting NTS [non-technical survey] and clearance operations”; and that the “total size of areas consists more than 11km²”. TNMAC, the successor body to TMAC, explained that this data was likely to include battle areas and unsurveyed minefields, and that the correct data is what was reported to Mine Action Monitor as at end-2014.
As at the end of 2014, TNMAC reported an estimated 4.9 km² of CMA and 6.4 km² of suspected mined area (SMA), including the 107 minefields not previously made public.\(^\text{18}\) However, it is unclear whether this data pertains entirely to mined area or if it also includes ERW contamination.

Since 1992, TMAC has recorded 851 mine/ERW casualties (369 killed, 482 injured), of whom 30% were children.\(^\text{19}\) Mine contamination in Tajikistan also constrains development, limits access to grazing and agricultural land, and affects farming, wood gathering, and grazing activities related to rural life, especially in the central region.\(^\text{20}\) The threat from mines is greatest when people come to the mountain areas to graze their sheep.\(^\text{21}\)

### PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIILH) acts as Tajikistan’s national mine action authority (NMAA), responsible for mainstreaming mine action into the government’s socio-economic development policies.\(^\text{22}\)

In June 2003, the government of Tajikistan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established TMAC with a view to it becoming a nationally owned programme in the near future,\(^\text{23}\) although this did not happen for more than ten years. TMAC was made responsible for coordinating and monitoring all mine action activities.\(^\text{24}\) Since then, TMAC has acted as the secretariat for the CIILH, to which it also reports.\(^\text{25}\)

On 3 January 2014, TNMAC was established by government decree.\(^\text{26}\) Prior to this, lack of legal recognition had presented problems for TMAC.\(^\text{27}\) For example, it could not open a bank account to receive and disburse funds.\(^\text{28}\)

The importance of clarifying TMAC’s status had been highlighted in the 2012 evaluation of UNDP support to mine action in Tajikistan.\(^\text{29}\) Since its nationalisation, TNMAC believes its cooperation with national ministries and agencies has improved.\(^\text{30}\)

The Ministry of Defence plays a significant role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector. With the adoption by the Ministry of the Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining (2013–16) in July 2013, the ministry focuses on three main objectives: to further support demining; to enhance national capacities; and to create the conditions for a sound national mine action programme.\(^\text{31}\)

1. Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, Programme Manager, NPA, 17 November 2015; based on confirmation from Parviz Mavlkonkulov, Land Release Advisor, Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (UNDP).
11. Email from Muhhabbat Ibrohimov, TMAC, 19 March 2014.
14. Email from Muhhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 30 September 2015.
17. Email from Muhhabbat Ibrohimov, TNMAC, 10 October 2015.
22. Ibid., p. 4.
29. Ibid., pp. 27–29.
30. Email from Muhhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 May 2015.
Strategic Planning

Tajikistan’s current national mine action strategic plan (NMASP) 2010–15 was expiring at the end of 2015, and a new strategy for 2016–20 was under development as of the middle of the year. The TNMAC Article 5 completion workplan (2015–20) was also said to be under revision.

Legislation and Standards

In 2015, Tajikistan drafted a ‘Humanitarian Demining Law’, which includes all aspects of mine action. As of June 2015, the draft law was due to be circulated for consultation, after which it must be approved by parliament and signed by the President of Tajikistan. It was expected that the law would be adopted by November 2015.

Tajikistan’s National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS) have been revised and were awaiting translation into Russian and government approval as of June 2015. The TNMAS predominantly refer to mines, but also cover unexploded ordnance (UXO), including unexploded submunitions.

Operators

FSD and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) are the two international demining operators in Tajikistan. FSD started operations in 2003, since when it has conducted both survey (in 2004–05 and 2007–09) and clearance; provided technical assistance to TMAC; and, by November 2012, supported capacity development of the Union of Sappers of Tajikistan.

NPA started operations in Tajikistan after signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government in 2010. NPA’s arrival significantly increased the demining capacity of Tajikistan’s mine action programme and its clearance output.

As of the end of 2014, combined FSD, NPA, and Ministry of Defence operational capacity for survey and clearance in Tajikistan comprised 184 employees across 14 multipurpose teams, one non-technical survey team, and one mechanical demining team. While manual demining capacity increased slightly in 2014 compared to the previous year, mechanical capacity decreased, with only one of FSD’s two machines operating. The Ministry of Defence’s demining machine was also not operational in 2014, due to difficulties obtaining spare parts. Mine detection dogs (MDDs) were not operational at all in 2014 as few of the remaining contaminated areas are accessible to machines, and the dogs have been handed over to the police and border guards (the reason for this is not known).

In 2014, FSD deployed one five-strong non-technical survey team, two multipurpose manual teams (totalling 26 personnel), and one six-strong mechanical demining team. FSD reported that its capacity in 2015 would be further decreased due to reduced donor funding, diversification of its activity from mine action to environmental protection, and a broader downsizing of the organisation.

NPA increased its capacity from eight 12-person manual demining teams in 2013 to nine teams in 2014, thanks to deployment of an additional (all-female) team in April 2014. Six of the teams comprised seconded military staff. NPA expected to maintain the same operational capacity in 2015.

Following the signature of an MoU with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2009, the Ministry of Defence established a Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU). Since TMAC’s nationalisation, the HDU has acted as a contractor for TNMAC, and OSCE funds the HDU through TNMAC. The OSCE office in Tajikistan has been supporting mine action since 2003. OSCE’s strategy in Tajikistan is twofold: supporting national capacity building for demining; and fostering regional cooperation in border management and security.

In 2014, the Ministry of Defence’s HDU deployed three multipurpose teams totalling 39 personnel. In 2013, OSCE financed the operational costs of the HDU’s Mini MineWolf, which was procured and delivered by the United States (US) Department of Defense Foreign Military Financing programme in 2012. Between 2012 and 2013, the HDU increased its capacity by adding a manual demining team, which has been financed by the US’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and by Luxembourg via the OSCE Office in Tajikistan. Due to financial issues, however, overall operational capacity in 2015 has reduced to 11 manual clearance teams and one non-technical survey team.
**LAND RELEASE**

The total mined area released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 was just over 1.15km², compared with 2.93km² in 2013. A further 0.85km² was cancelled in 2014 by survey.

**Survey in 2014**

In 2014, just under 0.5km² was reduced by technical survey while 0.85km² was cancelled and almost 0.83km² was confirmed as mined by non-technical survey [see Table 2].

In 2014, TNMAC and UNDP convened a Land Release Technology Working Group, comprising TNMAC, UNDP, NPA and FSD, to undertake joint non-technical and technical survey. The joint assessment and re-survey was deemed necessary as results of previous survey had been found to be of poor quality and inadequate to accurately define CMAs and SHAs. NPA was not prepared to conduct clearance without prior joint assessment and re-survey.

The joint assessment on its own covered five priority areas located in three districts in the central region, and resulted in cancellation of 685,000m² as well as confirmation of two mined areas totalling 200,000m².

The central region had previously been restricted for mine action activities since internal armed conflict in late 2010 and 2011. In 2014, however, restrictions were gradually lifted and TNMAC was granted permission to resume operations there. Following the joint assessment, NPA completed survey and clearance of the remaining task in Rasht, resulting in the district being declared mine-free. This secured access for the local community (324 beneficiaries) to water, pastures, and wood gathering.

In addition to the joint assessment, FSD, NPA, and the Ministry of Defence also conducted individual survey and clearance operations, as detailed in Table 2.

From September to November 2014, FSD began surveying the 107 minefields, the existence of which had not been made public until September 2013. During 2014, FSD completed survey of 18 of the 107 minefields.
Table 2: Survey in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>District/Province</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Shurobod</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>420,200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panj</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khatlon (Afghan border)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qabodiyn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89,283</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Kumsangir</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>108,398</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panj</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32,429</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jilikul</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18,376</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farkhor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,547</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Panj</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khatlon (Afghan border)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint assessment (NPA, FSD, TNMAC)</td>
<td>Jirgatol central region</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>585,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tojikobod central region</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rasht central region</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>846,750</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>826,200</td>
<td>499,012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHA = suspected hazardous area  CMA = confirmed mined area  TS = technical survey

Clearance in 2014

In 2014, FSD, NPA, and the HDU cleared 0.65km² of mined area, releasing 48 areas and destroying 5,990 anti-personnel mines and 80 items of UXO [see Table 3]. This is a major decrease from 2013, when the same three bodies released 1.99km² through clearance.39

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>District/province</th>
<th>Mined areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Khatlon (Afghan border)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>377,580</td>
<td>4,256</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Rasht (central region)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22,033</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Qabodiyn (Khatlon, Afghan border)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>125,229</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Darvaz (GBAO)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,504</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD HDU</td>
<td>Panj (Khatlon, Afghan border)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>114,445</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>654,791</td>
<td>5,990</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance

TMAC had expected to release 2km² of contaminated land in 2014,42 therefore the amount of land cleared in 2014 was lower than expected. NPA attributed its increased land release in 2014 over the previous year to: increased capacity [one extra team in 2014]; beginning earlier in the demining season; and greater efficiency resulting from staff capacity building.43 FSD reported that lack of funding resulted in a decrease in its operational capacity, and subsequently in the area of land it cleared in 2014.43
Progress in 2015

TNMAC reported that operations in 2015 would be focused on manual demining, as most areas accessible to machines and MDDs have now been released.\(^{64}\) NPA was focusing operations in the central region during the summer of 2015, and along the Afghan border during the remainder of the demining season.\(^{65}\) In the central region, NPA planned to prioritise the sole remaining task in Jirgatal district.\(^{66}\)

Continuation of survey of the 107 minefields (which had previously not been made public until 2013), which started in 2014, was due to continue in 2015. However, survey, by one non-technical survey team, was postponed due to a delay in receiving funds. The survey was scheduled to start in October 2015.\(^{67}\)

Deminer Safety

Three mine accidents were reported in 2014. On 6 May, an NPA team leader was injured in a mine blast, losing his right leg below the knee.\(^{68}\) On 6 June 2014, an FSD deminer was injured during clearance operations.\(^{69}\) On 1 October 2014, an NPA deminer suffered a minor injury, but later returned to work.\(^{70}\)

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2009), Tajikistan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2020. It is unclear whether Tajikistan is on track to meet this deadline.

In granting the APBMC Article 5 request in 2009, states parties noted that while no demining had taken place until more than four years after Tajikistan became a state party to the Convention, since then significant progress has been made, particularly by release of land through resurvey.

The states parties further noted that use of mechanical demining assets might enable Tajikistan to “find itself in a situation wherein it could proceed with implementation much faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested.” The analysing group mandated to analyse extension requests under APMBC Article 5 also noted shortcomings in Tajikistan’s original estimate of the size and locations of mined areas and recognition by Tajikistan of the need for resurvey.

Overall, FSD planned to: downsize staff and operations in Tajikistan in 2015; establish a regional office for Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan; and diversify from mine action to environmental protection. For mine action, FSD planned to focus on a cross-border demining project in Afghanistan by deploying one or two demining teams in the Darwaz/Tavidara region, and a non-technical survey team (funded by UNDP), as well as community-impact survey and victim-assistance support in the Darwaz region. FSD also planned to increase its presence in weapons and ammunition disposal (WAD), and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), with one to two teams in Tajikistan.\(^{68}\)

In the last five years, Tajikistan has cleared a total of 7.22 km\(^2\) of mined area (see Table 4).

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2010–14\(^{72}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km(^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{58}\) Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 3 April 2015, and email, 10 October 2015. There was a small discrepancy between cancellation data for Khatlon province reported by NPA (165,161 m\(^2\)) and TNMAC (159,203 m\(^2\)). In addition, NPA did not report the 40,000 m\(^2\) confirmed mined area in Kumsangir.

\(^{59}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014.

\(^{60}\) Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimov, TNMAC, 10 October 2015. There was a discrepancy between cleared data for Khatlon province reported by NPA (424,097 m\(^2\)) and TNMAC (377,580 m\(^2\)).


\(^{62}\) Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 10 May 2014.


\(^{64}\) Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimov, TMAC, 17 February 2015.

\(^{65}\) Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 10 May 2014.

\(^{66}\) Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 23 February 2015.

\(^{67}\) Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 30 September 2015.


\(^{69}\) Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 10 May 2014.


\(^{71}\) Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 10 May 2014.

\(^{72}\) See Landmine Monitor reports on clearance in Tajikistan covering 2010–13.
Between 2003 and the end of 2014, Tajikistan reported conducting land release over 234 mined areas in 16 districts, resulting in release of 14.5 km² through survey and clearance operations. It is unclear whether these figures include ERW.

In June 2014, Tajikistan estimated that just over US$35 million would be required to release all contaminated areas in Tajikistan, with just over $27 million required for the Afghan border, and a little over $7.5 million for the central region. The government of Tajikistan supports TNMAC with some $52,000 annually. In addition, the government provides in-kind and technical support to the programme equated to approx. $700,000 annually.

Tajikistan was, though, expecting to receive less funding in 2015, with Germany and Canada ending mine action funding for Tajikistan. NPA expected to maintain similar funding in 2015. While NPA does not receive funds from the government of Tajikistan, national military staff are seconded to NPA for clearance operations on a seasonal basis, though with their costs covered by NPA.

Many SMAs or CMAs in Tajikistan are in remote and difficult-to-access locations with challenging terrain. TNMAC is assessing how to address these challenges in order to meet its APMBC Article 5 clearance obligations. Extreme weather conditions also pose a challenge to clearance operations, with many SHAs only accessible for three to four months of the year, during the summer. NPA reported that one of the remaining tasks in the central region, in Tojikobod, is extremely remote and at a high altitude, making it difficult to plan technical survey and clearance.

In addition, Tajikistan has reported that other risk factors that may affect implementation of its APBMC Article 5 plan, including reduced operational capacity due to decreased funding, and potential change in the security situation at the Tajik-Afghan border.

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73 Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015.
74 Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.
75 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimov, TNMAC, 17 February 2015.
76 Ibid.
77 Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 10 May 2014.
78 Ibid., APMBC Article 5 Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 3.
80 Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 23 February 2015.
81 Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.
**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2016**

*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET THE DEADLINE)*

### MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR 4.9**
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Ukraine should ensure it does not use anti-personnel mines and should request an extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline.
- Ukraine should take all necessary measures to protect civilians from mines and ERW.
- Ukraine should establish an operational national mine action centre (NMAC) under civilian control.
- Ukraine should establish a centralised database to collate information on mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination resulting from the ongoing conflict.
- Ukraine should undertake survey to identify the extent and impact of anti-personnel mines (in particular in Donetsk and Luhansk) at the earliest opportunity, and conduct clearance as soon as possible.

CONTAMINATION

In the first half of 2014, escalating violence erupted between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country. Evidence exists of use of mines and other ordnance in Ukraine, but the full extent of contamination may remain unclear until the cessation of hostilities.

Prior to the current conflict, Ukraine was historically affected by mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in World War II, but also from World War I. Ministry of Defence engineering units completed partial clearance of affected areas in the mid-1970s. The precise scope of any residual mine problem is not known.

In its previous APMBC Article 7 reports, Ukraine declared no known or suspected areas containing anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control. However, since the outbreak of hostilities in 2014, there is significant evidence from various locations that several types of mines were available to parties to the conflict, and it is clear that anti-personnel mines have been used.

In February 2015, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported contamination in Ukraine with OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines, MON (50, 90, 100, and 200) directional anti-personnel mines, and TM-62 anti-vehicle mines. In an April 2015 Technical Briefing Note, Human Rights Watch reported the presence of at least two types of blast anti-personnel mines, three types of MON-series directional fragmentation mines, and OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines that can function as anti-personnel mines depending on the type of fuze used, as well as PDM-1M anti-landing mines equipped with fuses capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person. In September 2015, OSCE observed four blast PMN type anti-personnel mines on the outskirts of Pavlopil, a government-controlled village, 26km north-east of Mariupol.

In June 2015 at the APMBC intersessional meetings, Ukraine reported that it has not used anti-personnel mines since signing the APMBC in 1999, and accused Russia of having used anti-personnel mines in the current conflict. At the intersessional meetings, Ukraine also asserted that approx. 8% of the territory in eastern Ukraine is contaminated with anti-personnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It appears that reports of minefields being emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea were actually either ‘phoney minefields’ or areas containing trip flares.

While Ukraine did not report the detailed location of suspected or confirmed anti-personnel contamination in its APMBC Article 7 transparency report for 2014, it did state that anti-personnel mines had been cleared and destroyed in areas of combat operations. In mined areas in Donetsk and Lugansk, demining was carried out by engineering and demining units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Border Guard Service, and the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU), “in the course of the antiterorist operation”.

In June 2015, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) met two representatives of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) “ministry for emergency services”, who said that there was a need for mine clearance on more than 51,000 hectares (510km²) in “LPR”-controlled areas.

In September 2015, OSCE reported that “in government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south–west of Donetsk), the Deputy Head of the Emergency Services of Volnovakha district told the OSCE SMM that 30% of the district was contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and expressed particular concern about government-controlled Novotroitske and Mykolayivka (36 and 39km south-west of Donetsk, respectively), and Starohnatyvka and Andriivka (51 and 61km south of Donetsk). He added that near government-controlled Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), eight or nine people had suffered injuries in booby-trap incidents over the last three months.”

According to the Ukraine Armed Forces, 45 military servicemen were killed, and 115 injured by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), most in the first half of the year. This data includes casualties from both military operations and clearance operations. The Armed Forces do not maintain statistics of civilian casualties but believed them to be “significant.”

According to open-source data monitoring, between May 2014 and 13 October 2015 there were 287 ERW accidents. Of these, 19 resulted in 40 child victims (eight killed and 32 injured), while 268 accidents caused 584 adult victims (204 killed and 380 injured).

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported that according to government figures, between March 2014 and March 2015 mines and UXO in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine killed 42 children and injured 109 others.

In addition to posing a serious risk to human life, the presence of mines and ERW also has a detrimental socio-economic impact, with contamination preventing safe use of agricultural land for cultivating crops or raising livestock – two major sources of livelihood.
**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

An interministerial working group was set up by the Cabinet of Ministers in February 2006. On 25 December 2009, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued an order that tasked the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Emergency Situations, and Ukroboronservice (a commercial company) to put forward proposals by mid-April 2010 for a national body for demining.17

On 2 September 2014, Presidential Decree No. 423 on “A Mine Action National Authority” was signed.18 Following the decree, the Ministry of Defence’s Department of Ecology and Mine Security became responsible for coordinating demining and serving as the national mine action secretariat in Ukraine. The Ministry is working to develop legislation on a national mine action authority.19 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has been working with the OSCE Project Coordination Unit in Ukraine to help foster mine action institutions.20 As of June 2015, however, no NMAC had been established.21

**Strategic Planning**

The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 131 of 18 February 2009 adopted the State Programme for Demining by the Ministry of Emergency Situations for 2009–14.22 The programme foresaw clearance of 15km² over the course of five years, with the destruction of 500,000 explosive remnants of war (ERW) items. As of June 2015, there was no new programme for 2015 onwards due to the ongoing armed conflict.23

Ukraine has developed a plan for humanitarian demining operations in the Donbass and Luhansk regions, if it obtains safe access to the areas. The main goals for 2015 are demining of populated areas, security during rehabilitation of infrastructure, and clearance of UXO from agricultural areas.24

**Legislation and Standards**

A special instruction for the identification, render-safe, and disposal of explosive items, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), was approved by the General Staff of the Ukrainian armed forces on 1 August 2014.25

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1 Violence erupted in eastern Ukraine following the 21 February 2014 ousting of President Viktor Yanukovich. By mid-March, armed groups initially calling themselves “self-defence units” seized and occupied administrative buildings in several cities, towns, and villages in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The Ukrainian government’s counterinsurgency operations in these regions have intensified since the country’s 25 May 2014 presidential elections and were continuing sporadically as of October 2015 despite a ceasefire in place.

2 See, e.g., Ukraine’s APMBC Article 7 reports, Form C. Ukraine’s national reports under Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II list information on mined areas as “missing” (see CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, for the year 2013).


6 OCSE, “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 28 September 2015”, 29 September 2015.


8 Ibid.

9 CCW Amended Protocol II defines a phoney minefield as “an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term ‘minefield’ includes phoney minefields.” Art. 2(B).

10 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Forms C, G, and F.

11 OCSE, “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 11 June 2015”, 12 June 2015.

12 OCSE, “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 10 September 2015”, 11 September 2015.


14 Email from Edward Crowther, Head of Programme, DDG Ukraine, 13 October 2015.


16 OSCE, “Cleaning-up unexploded ordnance in eastern Ukraine”, 31 July 2015; OSCE, “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 6 April 2015”, 7 April 2015; OSCE, “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) 3 April 2015”, 6 April 2015; and OSCE, “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 2 April 2015”, 3 April 2015.


18 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form D; and Protocol V Article 20 Report (for 2014), Form A.

19 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Head of Engineer Ammunition Service, Central Department, Ukrainian armed forces, in Geneva, 25–26 June 2015; and email from Anton Shevchenko, Project Officer, Politico-Military and Environmental Projects, OSCE, 23 June 2015.


21 Email from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 23 June 2015.


23 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian armed forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.


25 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2014), Form A.
Operators

Following a presidential decree in September 2014, the Ministry of Defence is now the central coordinating body for demining in Ukraine. However, a number of other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake clearance and disposal of ERW and mines. 14

SESU, formerly known as the Ministry of Emergencies, is generally responsible for humanitarian clearance of affected territories, with the exception of those allocated to the other ministries and bodies. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for all areas where military units, educational institutions, companies, or organisations belonging to the armed forces are permanently located. The Engineering Division of the Ministry of Defence conducts UXO spot clearance tasks. The national Border Guard Service conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea. The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Special Transportation Service is responsible for clearance of national transport (railways, roads, terminals, etc.). Lastly, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has an engineering department that conducts EOD, in particular for IEDs. 27

Ukrboronservice is a national demining organisation that acts as a subcontractor for the Ukrainian government. As of June 2015, Ukrboronservice was not undertaking clearance in Ukraine, but the government was considering putting out a tender for the services of humanitarian demining organisations. 28

As of April 2015, SESU deployed 32 ‘pyrotechnic’ units, totalling 500 personnel, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) deployed 27 units, totalling nearly 200 people. Forty per cent of capacity is dedicated to humanitarian demining and UXO clearance in areas contaminated as a result of former conflicts. 29 According to OSCE, SESU planned to deploy 50 five-strong teams in the 2015 clearance season. 30

In the separation zone, the Ukrainian armed forces are undertaking ad hoc clearance of mine and ERW contamination. 41 In areas controlled by pro-Russian rebel groups, the separatists are undertaking clearance of mines and ERW. In Donets, former SESU personnel, now organised under the separatist Donets People’s Republic (DPR), are undertaking the bulk of clearance around Donets city. The personnel are organised into regular shifts, with clearance being carried out all day and all night. 42

The Ministry of Defence was deploying 25 manual clearance teams comprising a total of 125 personnel, two explosives detection dog (EDD) teams, 15 demining robots, and four BMR-2 machines. 31

In July 2015, OSCE and SESU launched a project to assist in clearing territories in the eastern regions from UXO, backed by a €1 million contribution from Germany. According to OSCE, this provision of assistance is urgently required, due to destruction of assets of the two regional emergency services teams in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions during the ongoing conflict. Under the project, SESU staff will receive training, equipment, and assistance in optimising clearance standards for UXO clearance. Four 22-strong EOD teams will be assigned to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and detection and protective equipment and vehicles will be provided. 32

In September 2015, Danish Demining Group (DDG) started a €1.57m project funded by the European Union (EU) to equip four SESU teams in the eastern oblasts, providing demining equipment, vehicles and training, and also to expand mine risk education (MRE) activities across the region along the contact line, in government-held areas. 33

Quality Management

Quality management is headed by the 133rd Engineering division. 34

Information Management

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) has been piloted by GICHD and SESU in four regions of Ukraine. There are plans to institutionalise it and expand its use across the country. 35

LAND RELEASE

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of mines and ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and pro-Russian separatist groups. 36 Clearance of mine and ERW in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk is typically reactive and takes place soon after attacks or when notification of contamination is received via members of the local community. Items of UXO are either destroyed in situ or removed to storage areas or compounds. 37

SESU is actively clearing government-controlled areas of mines and UXO. 38 Ukraine asserts that it conducts clearance of mines and ERW in the shortest time possible, and as of June 2015 reported clearance of 15,775 explosive items, including an unspecified number of anti-personnel mines. 39 Clearance of mines and ERW is often undertaken by its pyrotechnic teams, and according to reports has sometimes taken place quickly within 36 hours of new contamination, especially in populated areas. Clearance operations are often as a result of emergency call-outs from members of the community, which trigger deployment of a reconnaissance team and, if required, a pyrotechnic team to neutralise the threat. 40

In the separation zone, the Ukrainian armed forces are undertaking ad hoc clearance of mine and ERW contamination. 41 In areas controlled by pro-Russian rebel groups, the separatists are undertaking clearance of mines and ERW. In Donets, former SESU personnel, now organised under the separatist Donets People’s Republic (DPR), are undertaking the bulk of clearance around Donets city. The personnel are organised into regular shifts, with clearance being carried out all day and all night. 42

The Ukrainian authorities and pro-Russian rebels are, to varying degrees, recording written logs of emergency call outs and clearance operations, but data is not typically disaggregated into weapon type. 43 Clearance data is not available from pro-Russian separatist groups, and an accurate picture of the scale of mine and ERW clearance being undertaken in eastern Ukraine and of remaining contamination is not available.
Deminer Safety

In September 2015, a Ukrainian serviceman was reportedly killed, and another soldier injured, during demining operations near the village of Novotoshkovsk, in the Popasna district of the Luhansk region. In occupied territory in Obozne, 18km north of Luhansk, an LPR deminer was reportedly injured by a landmine while checking the area for contamination. A further mine blast was reported to have injured another LPR deminer on 26 September 2015, also in rebel-controlled Obozne.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Ukraine is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2016. Ukraine is not on track to meet this deadline. As of 2015, Ukraine had not submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request.

While Ukraine did not report on the detailed location of suspected or confirmed anti-personnel contamination in its APMBC Article 7 report for 2014, it did report that clearance and destruction of anti-personnel mines had been carried out in areas of combat operations in mined areas in Donetsk and Lugansk.

In the case of the discovery of new areas containing anti-personnel mines in Ukraine, under a special process agreed by states parties at the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012, Ukraine should inform states parties of their discovery and location, and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. In addition, if Ukraine is unable to complete the clearance of mined areas before the next meeting of states parties it should submit a request for an extended deadline, which should be as short as possible and no more than ten years, in accordance with the obligations set out in Article 5.

Russia is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC. Nonetheless, Russia has obligations under international human rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control.

National funding is provided for clearance of mines and ERW, and the Department of Ecology and Mine Security has its own budget within the Ministry of Defence. Ukraine also receives assistance from OSCE and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for demining material. Germany has provided the Ministry of Emergency Situations with 50 metal detectors to support the pyrotechnic units’ demining in the liberated territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

According to the OSCE Project Coordination Unit, in order to address the main operational challenges Ukraine needs to: institutionalise a national mine action authority and centre appropriate to a conflict setting; introduce legislation for emergency ERW response; and expand the IMSMA system to enable centralised nationwide information management.

26 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian armed forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015; and email from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 23 June 2015.
27 Ibid.
28 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian armed forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
33 Email from Edward Crowther, DDG Ukraine, 12 October 2015.
34 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian armed forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
35 Email from Megan Latimer, Advisor, Land Release and Operational Efficiency, GICHD, 3 July 2015.
36 Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015, and interview, 18 February 2015.
37 Ibid.
38 UNICEF, “Children killed and injured by landmines and unexploded ordnance in eastern Ukraine”, 31 March 2015.
41 Email from Eva Veble, Programme Director, Albania, Norwegian People’s Aid [NPA], 10 June 2015; and meeting with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian armed forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
42 Email from Megan Latimer, GICHD, 3 July 2015.
44 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian armed forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
48 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Forms C, F, and G.
50 Russia is a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, which requires in its Article 2 that member states respect and protect the right to life.
51 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian armed forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
53 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form E; and Germany CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form E.
**UNITED KINGDOM**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2019**
*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET THE DEADLINE)*

**MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY**

The United Kingdom (UK) initiated clearance in the Falkland Islands again in 2015 although it is not on track to meet its extended Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline.
RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

The UK should present detailed plans and timelines for completing demining in the Falkland Islands in accordance with its international legal obligations.

CONTAMINATION

The only mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the UK are on the Falkland Islands.\(^1\) As of 30 April 2015, the UK had almost 12.35km\(^2\) of mined area, as set out in Table 1.\(^2\)

At the end of 2014, contamination stood at 12.6km\(^2\) across 107 mined areas, before clearance operations resumed in January 2015. A further 0.26km\(^2\) was cleared between January and end of April 2015, releasing an additional nine mined areas.\(^3\)

Table 1: Contamination by area as of 30 April 2015\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>Area (m(^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox Bay</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,369,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Howard and Port Fitzroy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,300,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murrell Peninsula</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6,046,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darwin and Goose Green</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>172,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Area 1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>134,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Area 2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>939,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Area 3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,096,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Area 4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>288,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>98</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,348,090</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UK is affected by anti-personnel mines by virtue of its control and assertion of full sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, which were contaminated during the armed conflict between the UK and Argentina in 1982. The conflict resulted in many thousands of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines being laid on the islands, most by Argentina.\(^5\) It also led to contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance.

In its 2008 APMBC Article 5 extension request, the UK reported that 117 mined areas remained, totalling 13km\(^2\), and containing just over 20,000 mines (anti-personnel and anti-vehicle).\(^6\) Clearance operations between October 2009 and March 2013 reduced mine contamination to 107 mined areas, covering a total area of 12.6km\(^2\).\(^7\) Demining in January to April 2015 further reduced the mine contamination to 98 mined areas, covering 12.35km\(^2\).\(^8\)

No civilian mine casualty has ever occurred on the islands.\(^9\) The UK has reported that six military personnel were injured in 1982 and two more were injured in 1983. Most military accidents took place while clearing the minefields in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 conflict or in the process of trying to establish the extent of the minefield perimeters, particularly where no detailed records existed.\(^10\)

Over the years, however, there have been numerous instances where civilians have deliberately or inadvertently entered a minefield. The Ministry of Defence reported “infringement” of minefields by a total of six locals and 15 foreign fishermen or tourists between March 2000 and December 2008.\(^11\) On 6 December 2008, three crew members of a Belgian yacht inadvertently entered a minefield at Kidney Cove on East Falklands but were not injured. In October 2002, a Falkland Islander was fined £1,000 for entering a minefield on Goose Green.\(^12\) It is a criminal offence on the Falkland Islands to enter a minefield.

The socio-economic impact of contamination on the islands is said to be minimal. All mined and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are reported to have been “perimeter-marked and are regularly monitored and protected by quality stock proof fencing, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.”\(^13\) According to the UK, the mined areas represent “only 0.1% of land used for farming. The mined areas cover a wide range of terrain including sandy beaches and dunes, mountains, rock screes, dry peat, wet swampy peat, and pasture land.”\(^14\) A number of instances of cattle, sheep, or horses entering the minefields have been recorded since 2000, some of which resulted in the animals’ deaths.\(^15\)

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1. APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008. There is a sovereignty dispute over the islands with Argentina, which claims jurisdiction over the Malvinas. Argentina has been granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline until 2020.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, p. 2.
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
10. APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, p. 20.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2009 to oversee clearance of mined areas.\textsuperscript{16} The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) chairs NMAA, and the Falkland Islands government and project contractors are also represented.\textsuperscript{17}

In October 2014, the Governor’s Office in Port Stanley announced that demining contracts had been awarded to two companies for Phase 4 of clearance on the islands. Dynasafe BACTEC Ltd. (BACTEC) was awarded the land-release contract, which involves survey of SHAs and removal of contamination, while Fenix Insight is responsible for the Demining Project Office, which ensures quality management of demining operations. While the announcement by the Governor’s Office asserted that 108 minefields existed at the start of Phase 4,\textsuperscript{18} the FCO subsequently confirmed that the correct figure was in fact 107.\textsuperscript{19}

It was envisaged that over Phase 4 of the project, at least 23 mined areas as well as one battle area would be cleared.\textsuperscript{20} To implement Phase 4, which began in January 2015, BACTEC has a team of 46 demining staff, along with other support and management personnel.\textsuperscript{21} BACTEC has also been using three mechanical assets during the project: two flails and a tiller.\textsuperscript{22} As of October 2015, the UK reported that it was working to complete Phase 4 and to prepare for the next phase of demining operations “where possible”.\textsuperscript{23}

Strategic Planning

The UK has not provided plans to implement Article 5 of the APBMC beyond the end of 2015.\textsuperscript{24} It does not have a strategic plan in place for clearance of the Falkland Islands.

Legislation and Standards

According to the UK, demining operations in the Falkland Islands are conducted according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and the specifications set out in the contract with BACTEC and Fenix Insight.\textsuperscript{25}

Quality Management

An independent company (Fenix Insight) monitors the project on a daily basis and undertakes external quality assurance and control (QA/QC). The size of the sampled areas at each task is decided by the quality contractor based on the guidance set out in IMAS 09.20.\textsuperscript{26}

Information Management

In 2015, the UK government disseminated reports on three phases of “exploitation work” conducted during Phases 1, 2, and 4 on the Falkland Islands. These reports, although specific to the Islands, were released in hope they may be of broader interest to the mine action community with regards to the effects of aging and weathering of these types of mines. The reports focus on two anti-personnel mine types, SB33 (Italian) and P4B (Spanish), and two anti-vehicle mine types, SB81 (Italian) and C3B (Spanish).\textsuperscript{27}

LAND RELEASE

No clearance or land release took place in 2014 and no land was cancelled through non-technical survey. Instead, the UK focused during the year on agreeing a plan for the next round (Phase 4) of mine clearance operations, and preparing and mobilising for clearance operations to commence in 2015.\textsuperscript{28}

In June 2015, the UK reported to Mine Action Monitor that the first three phases of clearance had been completed, along with the first stage of Phase 4. Phase 1 took place from October 2009 to June 2010; Phase 2 from January to March 2012; Phase 3 from January to March 2013; and Phase 4(a) from January to end-April 2015.\textsuperscript{29}

During the first three phases of clearance (from October 2009 to March 2013), 35 mined areas were cleared, totalling 0.9km²,\textsuperscript{30} with the destruction of 97% anti-personnel mines and 600 anti-vehicle mines.\textsuperscript{31} Phase 2 of the project (January to March 2012) focused on clearance and cancellation of areas not containing mines, with almost 3.5km² released through cancellation and battle area clearance (BAC).\textsuperscript{32} A further 183,000m² of BAC was released in Phase 3 (see separate report on CMR).\textsuperscript{33} Phase 4(a) released a further nine mined areas, totalling 264,800m². Details of mine clearance in Phases 1, 2, 3, and 4(a) are set out in Table 2.\textsuperscript{34}

13 APBMC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 18 November 2008, p. 2.
14 Ibid.
20 Governor’s Office, “Falkland Islands demining contracts awarded”, 28 October 2014.
21 In total, 74 staff are said to have been employed on the project.
Table 2: Mine clearance by project phase and area in October 2009 to 30 April 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Phase</th>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>Mined areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Oct 2009 to June 2010)</td>
<td>Fox Bay</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24,175</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Darwin and Goose Green</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stanley Area 1</td>
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<td>488</td>
<td>568</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stanley Area 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,770</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Phase 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>89,540</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>568</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jan 2012 to March 2012)</td>
<td>Stanley Area 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stanley Area 2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>805,550</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stanley Area 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Phase 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>826,000</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(January 2015 to May 2015)</td>
<td>Stanley Area 3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>264,800</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Phase 4(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>264,800</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Phases 1, 3 and 4(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,180,340</td>
<td>3,399</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines

Despite IMAS, the UK does not use the separate categories of confirmed mined areas (CMAs) and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the Falkland Islands. However, although records do not exist for some of the mined areas, there is a high degree of confidence that mines will be encountered in most of them.

Progress in 2015

Phase 4 consists of two sub-phases, both in 2015: 4(a) which ran from January to 30 April 2015; and 4(b), which was scheduled to run from September to December 2015. At the end of 4(a), nine mined areas totalling just over 0.26km² had been cleared.

In addition to these, work also commenced on a number of other SHAs, which were due to be completed in Phase 4(b). These tasks were suspended from May to September 2015 due to weather conditions. Work resumed in September and was due to continue until December 2015. In addition to suspended tasks, clearance of new tasks was also due to be completed in Phase 4(b). A total of just under 0.93km², across 15 mined areas, was expected to be released under 4(b). In addition, 1.19km² of BAC, is also forecast to be cleared during Phase 4(b).

References:
23 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Ayling, Conventional Arms Policy Officer, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 2 October 2015.
24 Preliminary observations of the committee on Article 5 implementation – observations on the implementation of Article 5 by the United Kingdom”, 23 June 2015.
25 Email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, FCO, 1 July 2015; and response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Ayling, FCO, 2 October 2015.
26 Email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, FCO, 1 July 2015.
29 Ibid.; and email, 11 June 2015.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.; and emails, 11 June and 1 July 2015.
35 Ibid.
36 Email from Sarah Ayling, FCO, 2 October 2015.
37 Jeremy Wilmshurst, FCO, 3 June 2015; and APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015.
39 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Ayling, FCO, 2 October 2015; and email, 13 October 2015.
40 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Ayling, FCO, 2 October 2015.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2008), the UK is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019. The UK is not on track to meet this deadline.

Total mined area cleared so far represents approx. 9% of overall mine contamination. This is far less than the 48% that the UK forecasted it would clear after five years in its 2008 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request. As at 30 April 2015, almost 12.35km² of mined area remained across the Falkland Islands, of which the UK planned to clear an additional 15 mined areas totalling 0.93km² by the end of 2015. The APMBC Article 5 Committee observed “the United Kingdom’s plan for 2015 represents a significant increase in ambition”. The Committee further observed “that, notwithstanding this ambition, the United Kingdom’s pace of implementation suggests that it will not be able to complete implementation of Article 5 by its deadline in 2019”.

In its 2008 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, the UK reported 117 mined areas totalling 13.12km². On the basis of additional information obtained by the UK by ongoing survey and clearance activities, the total contaminated area was increased to 13.53km². As of the end of Phase 4(a) demining operations in April 2015, just over 1.18km² of mined land had been cleared since the UK joined the APMBC, releasing 19 mined areas in total. Of this, just over 0.26km² was cleared in early 2015, and the remainder over the last five years, though three of the past five years saw no clearance of mine-contaminated land (see Table 3).

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2010–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 (January to March)</td>
<td>826,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 (January to March)</td>
<td>0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2009 to June 2010</td>
<td>89,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Phase 2 focused on clearance and cancellation of areas not containing mines, with 3.5km² of SHAs canceled and battle areas cleared, in addition to 0.18km² of BAC in Phase 3.

The APMBC Ninth Meeting of States Parties in December 2008 agreed to the UK’s request for a ten-year extension but noted the UK had agreed to provide, not later than the end of June 2010, a detailed explanation of how demining is proceeding and the implications for future demining in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5. As of June 2015, the UK had not yet fulfilled this commitment, though it had reported on clearance operations to date in the Falkland Islands, as well as clearance plans for 2015.

At the June 2010 APMBC intersessional meetings, the UK stated that the FCO would analyse data gathered from the Phase 1 operations on four sites in 2009–10 “and make recommendations for future work based on this analysis.” It added: “We intend to report the findings of our analysis and agreed next steps to States Parties at the Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.” The UK did not announce further clearance plans at the December 2010 Meeting of States Parties or subsequently.

In June 2011, the UK stated that it had planned a two-year pilot project in its extension request before it would be in a position to set out a full plan to meet its legal obligations. On that basis, the UK was due to present the full plan in 2013. The FCO said in May 2014, that it would release details of plans for a fourth phase of demining “as soon as possible”.

In June 2015, the UK provided details of the clearance operations to-date (Phases 1 to 4(a)), along with forecasts for Phase 4(b), which was due to take place in September to December 2015. Once this phase is complete, 83 mined areas will still remain. The UK government funds all mine-clearance operations in the islands.

Many remaining mined areas are in extremely remote locations, exposed to adverse weather conditions, and, in the UK’s view, pose negligible risk to civilians. In addition, the UK has also reported concerns about the environmental impact of demining. The UK said in June 2015 that it was reviewing how it might address these challenges as it seeks to fulfil its APMBC Article 5 obligation, and that it was considering how it will continue with the next phase of demining without significant delay.
**YEMEN**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2020**  
*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET THE DEADLINE)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR**  
4.3 5.3
Lack of funds and the escalation of conflict in the second half of 2014 imposed major constraints on mine action at a point when the extent of the problem has increased, setting back prospects for fulfilling Yemen’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 obligations and dragging down the performance of the mine action programme.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION**

- The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) should draw up a new national strategy with an updated estimate of mine contamination, details of available human and financial resources, and estimates of what it can realistically achieve.
- Yemen should take all possible measures to protect civilians from explosive hazards.
- Yemen should allow international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to participate in technical survey and clearance to take advantage of their additional capacity, technical expertise, and fundraising capabilities.

**CONTAMINATION**

Yemen is contaminated with mines from conflicts in 1962–69 and 1970–83, as well as mines that were laid in border areas between North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and again in conflicts that erupted in 1994 and since 2010. The extent of contamination is not known.

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) completed in 2000 identified suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) containing mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) covering an estimated 922km² and affecting 592 mine villages across 18 of Yemen’s 21 governorates. Yemen’s first Article 5 deadline extension request stated in 2008 that 710km² had been released and 457 areas covering 213km² remained to be addressed.

However, additional mine contamination resulted from the 2010 insurgency in northern Sada’a governorate led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi and the 2011 insurgency around southern Abyan by militants belonging to Ansar al-Sharia, linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. YEMAC reported that insurgents in Sada’a had laid homemade mines, later clearing some but missing others. In 2011, under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s Republican Guard reportedly laid thousands of mines in the Bani Jarmoz area near Sana’a in what amounts to a serious violation of the APMBC. The number of mines and extent of area affected remain to be determined. Information provided to YEMAC by local inhabitants in February 2014 suggested 25 villages were impacted.

In December 2013, Yemen’s second Article 5 deadline extension request identified 107 confirmed mined areas (CMAs) covering some 8km² and 438 SHAs covering a further 338km². It added it had still to survey the governorates of Amran, Hajjah, and Sana’a. Then in March 2014, YEMAC reported SHAs affected by anti-personnel mines covering 132km² from a total SHA of 294km². The total included 22km² of area contaminated by anti-vehicle mines.

Yemen’s last Article 7 transparency report for the year to the end of March 2014 claimed that 20 of Yemen’s 21 governorates are affected by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, and estimated contamination at 432.89km², only slightly more (by 4%) than the previous year’s Article 7 report estimate. Most of the remaining areas identified as contaminated were in Abyan, Ibb, and Saada governorates.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

Yemen established a National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) in June 1998 by prime ministerial decree to formulate policy, allocate resources, and develop a national mine action strategy. NMAC, chaired by the Minister of State (a member of the cabinet), brings together representatives of seven concerned ministries.

YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as NMAC’s implementing body with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country. It is supported by a Regional Executive Mine Action Branch (REMAB) and a National Training Centre in Aden, also set up in 1999, and another REMAB in al-Mukalla (Hadramout governorate), added in March 2004. REMABs are responsible for field implementation of the national mine action plan.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) started a programme to support YEMAC in May 1999, switching from UN execution to national implementation in October 2003. In March 2013, UNDP embarked on a new US$10 million, four-year programme of support, returning to “direct implementation” and providing an international technical advisor to work with NMAC and YEMAC to develop a national strategy, set priorities, and define national standards. The project document states: “the existing YEMAC technical, operational and financial resources require significant realignment to effectively respond to the challenges of mine action during the next six years: 2014–2019.”

**Strategic Planning**

In December 2013, Yemen applied for a second five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until March 2020, identifying remaining mined area for clearance at 8.14km². The request projected clearance of more than 1.6km² of mined area a year between June 2014 and May 2019, and allowed another year for clearing any additional hazards identified during the extension period. The request called for total expenditure of more than $65 million over the five years, equivalent to more than $13 million a year, compared with average annual expenditure of less than $2 million over the past five years.
Yemen acknowledges its mine action strategy is outdated and needs to be revised, and reached an agreement with UNDP to provide technical support to develop a new strategy, including for resource mobilisation. The strategy will also lay out UNDP’s exit from mine action in Yemen.11

YEMAC’s 2014 workplan aimed at clearance of a total of 2.36km² of contaminated land, including 1.77km² of mined area. It made no reference to non-technical survey but set a target of conducting technical survey on areas totalling 38.27km².12 YEMAC reportedly started 2014 with six demining companies, a demining platoon, three mine detection dog (MDD) groups, 12 survey teams, and two quality assurance (QA) teams. It planned to add additional capacity and to acquire new detectors, safety equipment, and vehicles, but deferred equipment purchases because of shortage of funds.16

**LAND RELEASE**

YEMAC released a total of mined and ERW-contaminated area of 837,476m² through clearance and 2.6km² through survey in 2014, according to UNDP’s 2014 annual report of its programme in Yemen.13 YEMAC did not provide information directly on the results of survey and clearance operations in 2014. Despite escalating conflict in 2015, YEMAC indicated in March 2015 that its staff had been able to continue working in a number of areas, including Ibb and Al Dhale governorates, but gave no details of its operations.18

**Survey in 2014**

YEMAC teams conducted non-technical survey in July 2014, identifying 14.6km² of suspected contamination in three districts in Sa‘ada’s governorate [As Sa‘rah, Saada city, and Sehr] and 2.9km² of SHA in two districts of Sana’a’s governorate [Arhab and Bani al-Harth].15 YEMAC teams conducted technical survey of a total of 3.55km² in the governorates of Abyan, Sa‘ada and Sana’a, releasing 2.6km² and marking 0.96km².20

**Clearance in 2014**

YEMAC reportedly cleared a total of 837,476m² in 2014, of which 498,165m² (59%) was attributed to “UXO groups” apparently denoting battle area clearance (BAC). Clearance operations were largely confined to the first half of the year and resulted in destruction of five anti-personnel mines, eight anti-vehicle mines and 384 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Eight mined areas were reportedly handed over to the population in 2014, benefitting 126,718 people in Abyan, Al Dhale, Amran, Hadhramaut, Ibb, Lahij and Sa‘ada.21

YEMAC reported that its teams started survey and clearance of mines laid in Bani Jarmoz on 6 March 2014, but five days later it halted all activities because of a lack of funding.22
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted in 2014), Yemen is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2020. This is Yemen’s second extension to its Article 5 deadline and it is not on track to meet this new deadline.

Even before the renewal of major conflict in 2014, Yemen’s second extension request acknowledged that it was largely “based on speculation” and operations in 2014 fell well short of the extension request target of clearing 1.6 km² a year, hampered by insecurity and an acute shortage of funds. The sharp escalation in conflict since late March 2015 has further limited the scope of operations in 2015, underscoring the need for Yemen to provide, when security circumstances permit, a new assessment of the scope of mine contamination and to map out a strategy for tackling it.

Table 1: Mine clearance in 2010–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 December 2013, p. 15.
24 Compiled by Mine Action Monitor from data provided by YEMAC [2012–13] and UNDP [2014]. No results were reported for 2010 and 2011.
CONTAMINATED STATES
NOT PARTY
### MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>Land-release system in place</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE** 5.4
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Armenia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Armenia should clarify the extent of remaining mine contamination and mobilise the necessary resources to finish clearance.
- Armenia should develop a national mine action strategy and set a deadline for completion of clearance operations.

CONTAMINATION

Armenia has 6.7km² of confirmed mined area (CMA) and a further 17.3km² of suspected mined area (SMA), as set out in Table 1. The CMAs and SMAs contain either anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, or a combination of anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and unexploded ordnance (UXO).¹

Of 107 CMAs, 63 contain anti-personnel mines, totalling just under 3.9km²; as do four of the seven SMAs, totalling just over 13.5km². The breakdown of contamination by type is detailed in Table 1.²

Table 1: Contamination as of end 2014³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APMs</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2,591,037</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>105,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVMs</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2,821,724</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,728,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMs and AVMs</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,286,224</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13,470,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMs and UXO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12,828</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMs, AVMs, and UXO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,842</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>6,716,655</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17,303,565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area     SMA = suspected mined area     APMs = anti-personnel mines     AVMs = anti-vehicle mines     UXO = unexploded ordnance

Four of 11 provinces in Armenia still contain CMAs or SMAs. Three of the four provinces are contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, and the fourth province solely with anti-vehicle mines, as set out in Table 2.⁴

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¹ Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Ruben Arakelyan, Director, Armenian Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (ACHDE), 30 March 2015; and email from Varsine Miskaryan, Operations Officer, ACHDE, 15 May 2015.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
Table 2: Contamination by province as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SMA</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gegharqunik</td>
<td>APMs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>584,022</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>105,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AVMs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,428,953</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,728,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syunik</td>
<td>APMs</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,839,464</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AVMs</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>309,716</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APMs and UXO</td>
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<td>12,828</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APMs, AVMs, and UXO</td>
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<td>4,842</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vayots Dzor</td>
<td>AVMs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67,452</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavush</td>
<td>APMs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>167,551</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AVMs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15,603</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APMs and AVMs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29,429</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13,470,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>107</td>
<td>6,716,655</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17,303,565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area  SMA = suspected mined area  APMs = anti-personnel mines  AVMs = anti-vehicle mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance

In addition, 14 CMAs and six SMAs contain solely UXO contamination, and no mine contamination. These areas total 1.4km² and 6.4km² respectively and are located in the provinces of Gegharqunik, Syunik, and Tavush. Excluding areas containing solely UXO or anti-vehicle mine contamination, the total combined number of SMAs and CMAs has decreased since 2013, as has the total area of land contaminated with anti-personnel mines. This is the result of cancellation of land through non-technical survey in 2014. Some SMAs were not previously surveyed during non-technical survey in 2012–13 due to unfavourable weather. Syunik province was surveyed in the summer of 2014 resulting in cancellation of SMAs, as well as the identification of three previously unrecorded CMAs.

The Armenian Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (ACHDE) reports that there are 34,523 inhabitants in communities impacted by remaining mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination. Priority in clearance is given to agricultural land.

Mine and ERW contamination in Armenia is primarily the consequence of armed conflict with Azerbaijan in 1988–94, which saw use of mines by both sides. The most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines with Azerbaijan, including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories controlled by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Forces. Armenia’s border with Georgia has been cleared of mines, whereas the border with Turkey, also mined during the Soviet era, may still be contaminated. While non-technical survey in 2012–13 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) did not find evidence of mines outside the buffer zones in Ararat province, which borders Turkey, certain areas on the border with Turkey have not yet been surveyed because they are controlled by Russian border troops. The 2005 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 102 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in five districts bordering Azerbaijan. The LIS estimated the extent of contamination at more than 321km², affecting 60 communities. In August 2012, HALO Trust conducted partial survey of 17 sites, cancelling 80% of the area identified by the LIS there. However, HALO activities were suspended following a grant awarded by the United States (US) Department of State to FSD to resurvey Armenia. FSD conducted a non-technical survey from November 2012 to May 2013. According to FSD and ACHDE, the survey found 131 “dangerous areas”, totalling 47km², in four districts bordering Azerbaijan. Thirteen of these areas, totalling 1.8km², were found to contain only UXO and not mines. Of the 131 “dangerous areas”, 17 were SHAs that covered 26km² and 114 were CHAs that covered 21km².

FSD was mandated by the government of Armenia to survey impacted communities outside the military restricted zone. Therefore, 50 SHAs that fall inside the military perimeter were not included in the survey, which was conducted only within the internationally recognised boundaries of Armenia.

During the 2012–13 survey, FSD teams collected data on 271 non-recent mine victims. These records were submitted to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which maintains a mine victim database in Armenia. In addition, the ACHDE is the coordination body to which all casualty data is submitted for inclusion into the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

Territory seized from Azerbaijan during the conflict is believed to be significantly contaminated by mines and ERW, including unexploded submunitions. However, the precise extent of contamination in those districts is unknown.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2002, the ACHDE was established under the Ministry of Defence as a state agency for mine action activities. In February 2012, the government of Armenia changed the legal status of the ACHDE to a civilian, non-commercial state organisation responsible for conducting survey and clearance, and identifying contaminated areas. Under its new status, the ACHDE can negotiate with international demining organisations, accept international funding, sign contracts, and receive international assistance. In 2013, a government decree made the ACHDE Armenia’s National Mine Action Centre (see below section, legislation and standards).

Strategic Planning

Armenia does not formally have a national mine action programme or strategy. In March 2013, a discussion was held at the Ministry of Defence on the 2012–13 survey. The chair of ACHDE’s council, Ara Nazaryan, stated that “the drafting of a national mine action programme, its approval and subsequent implementation are priority tasks for comprehensive demining activities in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.”

Based on the survey findings, ACHDE will develop a national mine action plan to be submitted to the Armenian government, which will be implemented by ACHDE following government approval. In 2015, ACHDE confirmed plans to develop a national mine action programme once mine action legislation has been adopted (see below).

In 2014, ACHDE launched an initiative to help improve efficiency in coordinating and directing mine action operations, and ensure a “realistic” land release policy.

Legislation and Standards

In 2013, by government decree, ACHDE launched the process of developing national mine action legislation. According to the decree, ACHDE will draft the law and a mine action strategy for discussion among the government in the first half of 2016, in addition to proposing possible amendments to national mine action standards covering explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and the use of mine detection dogs.

In 2013, with the assistance of FSD, ACHDE developed the Armenian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and submitted them for government approval. The NMAS were approved by the government in April 2014. With the support of FSD, ACHDE has set up and manages the national IMSMA database.

5 Ibid.
7 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 8 June 2015.
9 Ibid.
10 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 19 March 2014, and interview in Geneva, 1 April 2014, and email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 17 July 2015.
13 Emails from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 17 February 2014, and Valeria Fabbroni, Head of Operations, FSD, 26 February 2014.
15 Ibid.
16 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 21 February 2014.
18 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 19 March 2014.
23 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 8 June 2015.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., and email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 3 September 2015.
31 Emails from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 19 March 2014 and 30 March 2015.
32 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 19 March 2014.
Operators

FSD had been present in Armenia since 2012, but withdrew at the end of January 2015 due to lack of funding. From August 2013 to January 2015, FSD implemented a capacity development programme, covering: basic EOD training; mentoring the ACHDE in tasking, planning, quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC); IMSMA; reporting systems and mechanisms; data collection; and support for the elaboration of standing operating procedures (SOPs) and policy.

In mid-2012, HALO briefly operated in Armenia, mainly undertaking non-technical survey. At the end of 2013, it deployed staff to one of Armenia’s affected regions with a view to starting technical survey and clearance. HALO clearance operations began in April 2014 and continued in 2015, with funding secured until July. In addition to its clearance operations, HALO also works to build national capacity in Armenia by training and supervising deminers from the Armenian Peacekeeping Engineering Brigade (PKEB).

Clearance assets deployed in Armenia in 2014 consisted of HALO clearance teams and HALO-led teams from the PKEB of the Armenian Ministry of Defence. HALO deployed two seven-strong manual clearance teams and one three-person mechanical team, operating an armoured Volvo frontloader. In addition, HALO led and supervised a further three manual clearance teams each with seven PKEB deminers. While HALO supervises PKEB deminers in the field, their deployment schedule, support, and staff rotations are determined by the Armenian Ministry of Defence. The PKEB teams worked from April to the end of October 2014 and were then stood down for winter. Clearance operations started up again in May 2015 with the same capacity as in 2014.

In January 2014, the Foundation for Demining and Demolition (FDD) was established as a national, civilian, and non-commercial demining organisation in Armenia with support from ACHDE, Geowulf LLC, FSD, and the government of Armenia. Its main tasks are to conduct demining and destroy expired or obsolete arms and ammunition in Armenia. As of writing, however, FDD had not conducted any operations since its creation and was seeking funding.

Quality Management

In 2014, with technical support from FSD, a quality management (QM) system was developed to be implemented in accordance with IMAS and the NMAS. QA is conducted by QA officers through regular field visits to inspect cleared land. In 2014, around 35% of the total area manually cleared was checked.

HALO deploys a supervisor to train PKEB staff in accordance with IMAS and to provide ongoing QA. A HALO supervisor is present in the field at all times. ACHDE conducts regular QA of HALO’s clearance as well as post-clearance QC.

ACHDE is in the process of developing SOPs so that a uniform QM system may be applied. The SOP will outline the responsibilities of Operations Department personnel responsible for QM, and the drills and procedures to be followed.

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33 Email from Valeria Fabbroni, FSD, 26 February 2014.
34 Email from Matthew Wilson, Deputy Head of Operations, FSD, 11 May 2015.
35 Ibid.
36 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 17 February 2014.
37 Responses to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 30 March 2015; and Andrew Moore, HALO, 22 May 2015.
40 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 1 September 2015.
41 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 20 March 2014.
42 Ibid., 19 March 2014.
43 Emails from Matthew Wilson, FSD, 11 May 2015; and Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 8 June 2015.
44 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 8 June 2015.
45 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
LAND RELEASE

Total mined area released by clearance in 2014 was 0.04km², compared with no clearance in 2013. A further 13.8km² was cancelled by non-technical survey.59

Survey in 2014

ACHDE conducted non-technical survey on one SHA in the Syunik marz region of Armenia, resulting in 13.8km² being cancelled. In addition, three mined areas were confirmed, totalling 0.16km².50 Non-technical survey by ACHDE in 2014 was enabled by capacity development and training provided by FSD.55

Clearance in 2014

HALO started clearance in April 2014, clearing two mined areas during the year in Syunik province, totalling 0.04km², and destroying 13 anti-personnel mines and two items of UXO.52 As of March 2015, clearance of seven mine/UXO-contaminated areas was in process.53

In September 2013, HALO opened an office in the Kapan region in order to initiate its new demining activities under a US$600,000 grant awarded by the US Department of State for a two-year period (August 2013–July 2015).54 On 1 April 2014, HALO’s demining and survey teams, together with PKEB manual demining and EOD units, started technical survey and clearance near the town of Kapan, in Armenia’s most contaminated region (Syunik).5

The project aimed to release 0.1km² of mined area by November 2014 while training PKEB to international standards so that they could manage demining operations by the end of 2015.56 The 0.04km² cleared in 2014 in two areas falls short of what was envisaged for the year.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Armenia is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.57

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although Armenia has not acceded to the APMBC, it voluntarily provides information on anti-personnel mines to the United Nations and to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for transparency and confidence-building.58 Whatever information is provided, however, is not publicly available.

One of the objectives of the Armenian Mine Action Strategy 2007–11 was release through technical survey and clearance of 2.2% (7km²) of the SHAs identified by the LIS and 6.8% of the SHAs outside the restricted military zone.59 Scant progress was, though, made towards these targets.60 Armenia cites some of the challenges in mine and ERW clearance as being due to low-level contamination, and the random distribution of mines.61 One of Armenia’s highest priorities for 2015 was demining close to populated areas, and technical survey to better define the borders of mine and UXO contaminated areas.62

Historically, Armenia has not reported systematically on its mine clearance operations, but comprehensive information was provided for 2014. In the past, demining in Armenia has been slow and productivity rates low, with the Ministry of Defence reporting only some 2km² of mined area cleared from 2002 to the end of 2008.63 During 2013, only non-technical survey was conducted by FSD, with the support of ACHDE.64 In April 2014, clearance operations began again in Armenia. Humanitarian demining was not carried out prior to this, due to lack of donor funding.65

50 Ibid.; and email, 8 June 2015.
51 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 17 July 2015.
53 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Ruben Arakelyan, Director, ACHDE, 30 March 2015.
54 Interview with Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, in Geneva, 1 April 2014; and email, 30 March 2015.
56 Interview with Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.
57 Armenia is a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of which requires that each state party respect and protect life of everyone under its jurisdiction, including in occupied areas.
61 Ibid.
63 Mediamax, “Armenian Minister of Defence visited the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise”, 5 April 2011.
64 Email from Valeria Fabbroni, FSD, 26 February 2014.
### Table 3: Mine clearance in 2010–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Armenia does not fund clearance operations, but it does provide in-kind support to the three PKEB demining teams, including: payment of salaries; provision of vehicles, fuel, food, accommodation, demining equipment, and medical assets; and support for mine and UXO destruction. Armenia claims to have the necessary expertise and equipment to successfully complete mine and UXO clearance on its territory, but states that progress is contingent on financial support from the international community. In 2013, HALO Trust received funding from the US to conduct clearance in Armenia from August 2013 to July 2015, based on priorities set by ACHDE. Both ACHDE and HALO expected to maintain the same level of capacity in 2015. HALO’s internal priority is to improve clearance rates that have been slow to date due to heavy metal contamination in some of the mined areas being cleared.

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68 Ibid.
70 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 30 March 2015; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 2 June 2015.
### MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

6.1
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Azerbaijan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Azerbaijan should report on its plans and timelines for clearance of all known or suspected mined areas under its effective control.

CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of contamination from anti-personnel mines in Azerbaijan is unknown, as Armenian forces currently occupy a significant area of the country where considerable contamination exists. As of December 2014, survey and clearance had reduced mined area in areas under Azerbaijani control to 120km². The extent of contamination in areas occupied by Armenia is unknown, although the Azerbaijani National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has suggested that contamination may cover between 350km² and 830km².

Since 2001, survey and clearance have been reducing and better defining the extent of contamination within areas under the control of Azerbaijan. In 2003, the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 970 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 736km². In 2006, resurvey reduced the estimate of contamination to 306km². Further resurvey by ANAMA in 2008–09 combined with clearance operations reduced total SHA to 184km² across 280 areas, of which 89 were believed to contain mines and 191 only unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Azerbaijan is the consequence of the 1988–94 armed conflict with Armenia—which saw landmines laid by both sides—and ammunition abandoned by the Soviet army in 1991. The most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh (see separate report on Nagorno-Karabakh). Apart from Nagorno-Karabakh, the adjoining districts of Gubadly, Jabrayil, Kelbajar, Lachin, and Zangilan, and parts of Aghdam, Fizuli, and Tartar are under the control of Armenian forces, and are suspected to contain mines and UXO.

In 2014, ANAMA recorded 13 mine incidents that resulted in six deaths (four military and two civilian), and 16 injured (11 military and five civilian).

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A 1998 presidential decree established ANAMA, which reports to the Deputy Prime Minister as head of the State Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. In April 1999, ANAMA established the Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme, a joint project of the government of Azerbaijan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A joint working group, established in December 1999 and consisting of representatives from various ministries, provides regular guidance to ANAMA.

ANAMA is tasked with planning, coordinating, managing, and monitoring mine action in the country. It also conducts demining along with two national operators it contracts: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and the International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF). No commercial company is active in mine action in Azerbaijan.

Strategic Planning

ANAMA is integrated into the State Social and Economic Development programme of Azerbaijan. The current mine action strategy is for 2014–18. ANAMA’s long-term strategy is to clear the occupied territories as and when they become released.

Legislation and Standards

Azerbaijan is in the process of adopting a mine action law, with draft legislation currently under revision by the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan. Once adopted, the law will regulate and determine the conditions of mine action in Azerbaijan, such as licensing, accreditation, quality assessment (QA), and tender procedures.

3. Ibid.
7. Email from Tural Mammadov, Operations Officer, ANAMA, 9 October 2015.
10. Ibid., p. 13.
11. Ibid., p. 15.
**LAND RELEASE**

The total mined area released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 was 10.4 km², which compares with almost 7.1 km² in 2013. A further 10.7 km² was cancelled in 2014 by non-technical survey.

**Survey in 2014**

Just over 5.66 km² was reduced by technical survey in 2014, comprising almost 4.6 km² across 57 locations in 12 districts in Azerbaijan (see Table 1), and a further 1.07 km² reduced using mechanical assets in 18 locations in eight districts in Azerbaijan (see Table 2). A further 10,694,880 m² was cancelled by non-technical survey.

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**Table 1: Land release by technical survey by district in 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aghdam</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>237,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aghjabedi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>167,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agstafa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fizuli</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,132,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabala</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>672,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garadagh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazakh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>138,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geranboy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>684,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khojavend</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>189,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenkeran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naftalan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartar</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,233,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,595,399</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Mechanical ground preparation by district in 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agstafa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>68,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fizuli</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>258,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabala</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garadagh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazakh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>129,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geranboy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>135,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenkeran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>391,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,068,600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TS = technical survey

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14 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 12 October 2015.
17 Ibid.
20 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 8 October 2015.
21 Email from Ahmad Manafov, ANAMA, 19 February 2014.
22 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 8 October 2015.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
26 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 8 October 2015; and ANAMA, “ANAMA Monthly Report for December 2014”.

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**Operators**

In 2014, ANAMA employed approx. 600 operational and administrative staff and had 45 mine detection dogs (MDDs). Six demining machines were deployed, four of which were mini flails and the other two medium flails, with one “EOD BOT” robot designed to lift heavy items of UXO.

National capacity includes two national demining organisations, IEPF and RA, which are contracted for mine clearance. These two operators jointly employ 176 operational and administrative staff.

This mine action capacity was expected to be maintained in 2015.

**Quality Management**

Established in 2011, ANAMA’s training, survey, and QA division (TSQAD) is responsible for training and QA. TSQAD also conducts quality control (QC).

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ANAZERBAIJAN
Clearance in 2014

ANAMA reported a total of just under 4.76km² of mine clearance in 2014, comprising almost 2.8km² of manual clearance (see Table 3) and more than 1.95km² of mine clearance with the support of MDDs (see Table 4). This represents a slight increase compared to 2013, when ANAMA cleared more than 4.6km² of mined land: 1.80km² through manual clearance and 2.8km² with MDD support.

During clearance operations, 42 anti-personnel mines were destroyed, along with 218 anti-vehicle mines, and 52 items of UXO (see Table 3). This is a small number of mines given the extent of reported clearance (4.76km² of mined area).

Table 3: Manual mine clearance in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aghdam</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>412,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agstafa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>247,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fizuli</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>114,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabala</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,429,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazakh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>74,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenkeran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>458,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,795,304</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Manual mine clearance with MDD support in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aghdam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agstafa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,472,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fizuli</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabala</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>113,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazakh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>110,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>166,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,955,183</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 8 October 2015.
29 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 8 October 2015, and “ANAMA Monthly Report for December 2014”.
30 Ibid.
31 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 8 October 2015.
Azerbaijan submitted voluntary APMB Article 7 transparency reports in 2008 and 2009 but has not submitted an Article 7 report in the last five years.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Azerbaijan is not a state party or signatory to the APMB, but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.33

Over the last five years, nearly 18km² of mined area has been cleared in Azerbaijan, with annual clearance increasing slightly year on year (see Table 6).

Table 5: Mine clearance by operator in 2014.32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANAMA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,574,952</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIPF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>624,375</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>551,160</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4,750,487</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines   AVM = anti-vehicle mines   UXO = unexploded ordnance

Currently, 90% of mine action in Azerbaijan is nationally funded, with the government contributing more than 80% of funding for mine clearance.35 ANAMA expected to maintain the same budget for 2015.36 ANAMA’s long-term strategy is to be ready to mobilise and start clearance of the occupied territories as and when this is possible.37

Table 6: Mine clearance in 2010–14.34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 Ibid.
33 Azerbaijan is a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of which requires that member states respect and protect the right to life.
36 Ibid.
The extent of contamination in China is not known.

In the 1990s, the United States reported that China had emplaced mines along its borders with India, the Russian Federation, and Vietnam. China's military estimated that around two million mines of a wide variety of types were emplaced on the Vietnam border alone. China conducted clearance operations along its border with Vietnam between 1992 and 1999, and between 2005 and 2009.

In 2009, China said it had completed demining along the Yunnan section of its border with Vietnam and that this "represents the completion of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China's territory." However, casualties from landmines continued to be reported in parts of Yunnan bordering Vietnam where some areas were still marked as mine-affected and press reports said one or two people were injured in this region every year.

Moreover, in September 2011, a Foreign Ministry official reported to Landmine Monitor that China maintains a small number of minefields "for national defence." Two months later, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, China said that large-scale demining activities had "on the whole eliminated the scourge of landmines in our territories." At the Maputo Review Conference in 2014, China said it had "basically eradicated landmines on its own territory." China has not reported on mine contamination along its borders with Russia and India or on operations to clear them.

3 Ministry of Defence, "Post-war Demining Operations in China", December 1999, p. 11. Before the clearance operations, there were said to be more than 560 minefields covering a total area of more than 300km².
4 Interview with Shen Jian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 1 April 2008; and Huizi and Yun, "Chinese soldiers nearly done with landmine sweeping on the Sino-Vietnam border", Xinhua, 31 December 2008.
7 Email from Lai Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control & Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 December 2011.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no formal mine action programme in China. Any mine clearance is conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a military activity.

LAND RELEASE

Demining of the Vietnam border was conducted in three ‘campaigns’ in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The first was in 1992–94 and the second in 1997–99. Press reports cited claims by the Chinese military that this second clearance operation was the largest in world military history.10

However, these two campaigns did not deal with minefields located in disputed areas of the border, where 500,000 mines covered an estimated 40km². After a technical survey of mined areas, China embarked on a third clearance campaign in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan province in 2005. China stated in 2009 that it had completed clearance of this border after clearing a total of 5.15km².11 In early November 2015, however, China embarked on a new two-year demining operation along the border with Vietnam. According to media reports, operations would focus on six counties across southern Wenshan and Honghe prefectures.12

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

China is not a state party or signatory to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) but nonetheless has obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

CONTAMINATION
Cuba’s mine contamination remains unchanged from previous years. Cuban authorities maintain minefields around the US naval base at Guantánamo in the south-east of Cuba. In 2007, Cuba said it carries out “a strict policy with regard to guaranteeing a responsible use of anti-personnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for [Cuba’s] national security.” According to an earlier statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, existing minefields are duly “marked, fenced and guarded” in accordance with Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts. According to a book published in 2008, mines laid around the naval base detonate “at least once a month,” but it has not been possible to independently confirm this claim.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no mine action programme in Cuba.

LAND RELEASE
Cuba has not conducted any mine clearance in its minefields around the US naval base at Guantánamo over the last ten years.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Cuba is not a state party or signatory to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention but nonetheless has obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

3 “The Cuban mines detonate at least once a month, sometimes starting fires that sweep across the fence line. [Staff Sergeant Kaveh Wooley of the US Marines]... described a fire that started the previous summer and turned into a giant cook-off, with about 30 mines exploding...” Daniel P. Erikson, Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution Bloomsbury, USA, October 2008, pp. 196–7.
Egypt is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the Western Desert, which date from World War II, and in the Sinai Peninsula and Eastern Desert, which are a legacy of wars with Israel between 1956 and 1973. Some recent mine incidents in Sinai may have been caused by mines emplaced by anti-government jihadist groups. The precise extent of contamination across the country remains unknown and past estimates have been generally unreliable.

Most of the Western Desert contamination occurs around the location of World War II battles that took place between the Quattara depression and Alamein on the Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas lie around the city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan border.

The government has stated that some 17 million landmines were left in the Western Desert and another 5.5 million in Sinai and the Eastern Desert. In an April 2009 assessment, the United Nations (UN) Mine Action Team cautioned that data needed careful analysis to avoid reporting areas that had already been cleared and thereby misrepresenting the problem.

In August 2010, the Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast (Executive Secretariat) reported to donors than the army had destroyed 2.9 million mines while clearing 38km² in five areas, leaving “more than 16 million mines” covering an estimated area of 248km². Details of items cleared do not appear consistent with other information.

In 2013, the army formally handed over to the Ministries of Housing and of Planning and International Cooperation an area of some 105km² in the Western Desert, which it had reportedly cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Details of clearance operations were not reported. Minister of Housing Tarek Wafiq was quoted as saying that with completion of the project one fifth of the Western Desert had been cleared.

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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine clearance in Egypt is conducted by the Egyptian Military Engineering Organisation, part of the Egyptian armed forces.

In November 2006, the Egyptian government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) agreed a project: Support the North West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Programme: Mine Action. The project provided for creation of an Executive Secretariat for Mine Clearance and the Development of the North West Coast in the Ministry of Planning to coordinate implementation of the North West Coast Development Plan through a partnership consisting of the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Defence, and UNDP. The project provided for demining according to humanitarian and development needs, mine risk education, and assistance to mine victims.6

The project was to be conducted in two phases lasting about 18 months each. The first phase concluded in 2014. In October 2014, the European Union (EU) agreed to provide €4.7 million to finance the second phase of the project, targeting clearance of 332km².7

LAND RELEASE

The Executive Secretariat reported that Egyptian army engineers released a total of 155km² in the Western Desert in 2014 through manual and mechanical clearance, although details of the procedures applied to the land were not publicly available. The Executive Secretariat reported that teams cleared "scrap landmines, scrap UXO’s, scrap metal” but gave no details. In 2015, the Executive Secretariat planned to release a further 134km² in the Western Desert.8

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Egypt is not a state party or signatory to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.9

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7 “EU and UNDP celebrate the launch of the second phase of the project to help develop the North West Coast and mine action”, UNDP press release, 24 October 2014.

8 Emails from Haytham Said Sabbah, Head of Information Management, Executive Secretariat, 14 and 15 April 2015.

9 Egypt is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE 2014</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR** 4.3
RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

- Georgia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

CONTAMINATION

Georgia has some 2.7km² of mined area across six minefields, as set out in Table 1. This includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri District, which is in a military zone and where the size of mined and battle areas is unknown. Contamination comprises both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. Georgia is also contaminated by cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Table 1: Contamination as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region &amp; District</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kvemo Kartli (Marneuli District)</td>
<td>Kachagani [Red Bridge]</td>
<td>APM and AVM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,579,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtskheta-Mtianeti (Dusheti District)</td>
<td>Barisakho 1, Barisakho 2</td>
<td>APM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtskheta-Mtianeti (Dusheti District)</td>
<td>Kadoeti</td>
<td>APM and AVM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imereti (Terjola District)</td>
<td>Chognari (Military restricted area)</td>
<td>APM and AVM and UXO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>87,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shida Kartli (Kashuri District)</td>
<td>Osiauri (Military zone)</td>
<td>APM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,695,315</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines   AVM = anti-vehicle mines   UXO = unexploded ordnance

Georgia has mined areas around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the mine problem has not been reported publicly. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defence, in 2009 suspected mined areas (SMAs) were located at Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Firing Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani. Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009 to January 2010, which identified eight suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and seven confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in 13 districts, the latter of which totalled more than 4.5km² in estimated area. Of the 15 SHAs and CHAs in total, ten contained mines and five contained unexploded ordnance (UXO). Between 2009 and the end of 2012, HALO Trust cleared five of the minefields that had a humanitarian impact and identified one additional small minefield in a military restricted area. At the end of 2014, six mined areas remained in Georgia. This includes an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the ‘Red Bridge’ border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia. There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia. Since the 1990–92 Georgian-Ossetian war, and more recently the 2008 conflict with Russia, South Ossetia has been difficult to access. HALO has planned to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but, to date, has not been granted access.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defence and the international non-governmental organisation (NGO) Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP) to establish the Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC). On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Defence issued a decree instructing that mine action be included as part of the State Military Scientific Technical Center – known as DELTA – an entity within the ministry. The agreement with iMMAP ended on 31 March 2011 and ERWCC took ownership of the mine action programme.
Through the iMMAP project, ERWCC became the Georgian national mine action centre, tasked to coordinate and execute action to address the ERW threat.12 The ERWCC, under DELTA, is the national body responsible for humanitarian demining.13 The primary task of ERWCC is to coordinate mine action in Georgia, including quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC), and to facilitate the creation and implementation of Georgian National Mine Action Standards in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).14

**Standards**

Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) have been drafted and are awaiting completion in coordination with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).14 iMMAP has conducted training on IMAS for ERWCC staff, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and DELTA.

**Operators**

HALO Trust did not conduct any survey or clearance of mines in Georgia in 2014, only clearance of CMR and other ERW.15 At the request of the government of Georgia, the NATO Partnership for Peace (PIP) Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict. In 2012, a NATO Trust Fund project planned to provide support to establish long-term local capability and capacity for ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.15 As part of the project, 66 members of the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade were trained in demining, battle area clearance (BAC), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).15 No updated information has been received on the implementation of the project.

**Quality Management**

Under the control of DELTA, ERWCC now conducts QA/QC.16 iMMAP has also conducted training on QA/QC for the QA/QC section of ERWCC, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and DELTA.

**LAND RELEASE**

No mine clearance or survey took place in 2014.18 However, Georgia reported that in 2015 it planned to start mine clearance of the Red Bridge minefield, an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.19

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Georgia is not a party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.21 Limited mine clearance has been conducted in the last few years. Between 2009 and the end of 2012, HALO cleared five minefields with humanitarian impact and identified a sixth.22 It is not known if any of the military areas have been cleared.

HALO did not conduct any mine clearance in 2013 or 2014, instead focusing on clearing CMR and also conducting BAC of former firing ranges.23 Georgia, though, planned to commence clearance of the Red Bridge minefield in 2015, along the border with Azerbaijan.24 This is the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment.

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1 Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus & Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 4 June 2015; and Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, State Military Technical Scientific Centre – DELTA, 19 October 2015.
2 Ibid.
3 Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defence, 6 September 2009.
4 Email from Jonathan (Gus) Guthrie, Programme Manager, NPA, 19 March 2010.
5 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 4 June 2015.
7 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 4 June 2015.
8 Interview with George Dolidze, Director, Department of Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
10 Ibid.
11 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.
12 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 23 October 2015.
13 Ibid.
15 Email from Andrew Moore, DELTA, 29 May 2015.
18 Response to Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire by Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO, 21 August 2012.
19 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015.
21 Georgia is a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of which requires that member states respect and protect the right to life.
22 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 30 August 2012.
23 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 29 May 2014.
CONTAMINATION

India is contaminated with mines, mainly as a result of large-scale mine-laying by government forces on and near the Line of Control (LoC) separating India and Pakistan during the 1971 war and the 2001–02 stand-off between the two states. Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were laid on cultivated land and pasture, as well as around infrastructure and a number of villages.

Despite occasional official claims that all the mines laid were subsequently cleared, reports of contamination and casualties have continued. A media report in November 2013 cited a government statement that about 20km² of irrigated land was still mined in the Akhnoor sector of the LoC alone. Security forces also report extensive use of mines by Maoist insurgents in the north-eastern states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand, although mine types are not specified and may include command-detonated as well as victim-activated explosive devices.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

India has no civilian mine action programme. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed.

LAND RELEASE

There is no publicly available information on land release in 2014. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for clearing mines as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed by non-state armed groups. Media reports have indicated police also play an active part in clearing mines and IEDs on an ad hoc basis in states dealing with insurgency.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

India is not a party or signatory to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

3 Interview with army officer speaking on condition of anonymity, New Delhi, 18 February 2008.
4 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Article 13 Report (for 2006), Form B.
5 India is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that each state party protect and respect life.
Iran is contaminated by anti-vehicle and anti-personnel landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly as a result of the 1980–88 war with Iraq.

Mine contamination is heavily concentrated in five western provinces bordering Iraq. Minister of Defence Hossein Dehghan said in 2014 that the 4,500km² of mine and ERW contamination left by the Iran-Iraq war in the five western provinces had been reduced to 280km². In contrast, Iran’s mine action authorities have consistently reported the war left 4,200km², while in February 2014 the Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC) reported the five Western provinces had contamination totalling 250km² (see Table 1). However, two anti-vehicle mine incidents in early 2014 confirmed reports of contamination in the Lut desert spanning central and eastern Iran where police reportedly placed mines as a measure against drug traffickers.

Table 1: Mine/ERW contamination in five western provinces (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Ilam</th>
<th>Kermanshah</th>
<th>Khuzestan</th>
<th>Kurdistan</th>
<th>West Azerbaijan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ilam</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2014, Landmine Monitor recorded 48 mine/ERW incidents in Iran causing 77 casualties in ten Iranian provinces. Most incidents occurred in the five western provinces bordering Iraq. They included nine incidents in Kermanshah, which IRMAC officials had previously declared completely cleared. One incident was reported in each of the other five provinces. These included the eastern provinces of Baluchestan, Kerman and Sistan, and South Khorassan, as well as the northern provinces of Mazandaran and Eastern Azerbaijan.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

IRMAC was established in 2005, taking the place of a Mine Action Committee in the Ministry of Defense, and made responsible for planning, data, managing survey, and procurement. It also sets standards, provides training for clearance operators, concludes contracts with demining operators (military or private), and ensures monitoring of their operations. It coordinates mine action with the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries and organisations, and handles international relations. IRMAC also oversees victim assistance and risk education but has partly delegated these roles to entities such as the Social Welfare Organisation and the Iranian Red Crescent Society.¹

IRMAC’s future appeared uncertain in 2014 amid debate on institutional reforms. IRMAC’s statement that 99% of contaminated land had been cleared led to proposals to transfer the mandate for the remaining work to the Ministry of Interior. As of April 2015, it was not yet clear if, to what extent, and when, these changes will materialise. According to reports of mine action sources, clearance operations have slowed down due to these uncertainties.⁵

LAND RELEASE

No data was available on clearance and land release of mined areas in 2014 or the previous year. IRMAC earlier reported (see Table 2) that Iran had released 41,750km² in the 25 years to 20 March 2013 (end of the Iranian year 1391), averaging 1,670km² a year, but did not indicate how much was mined or battle area.

Table 2: Land release in 1988–2013 (km²)⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Estimated contamination in 1988</th>
<th>Total released</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khuzestan</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilam</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>16,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kermanshah</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>42,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,750</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deminer Safety

Demining incidents reported by Iranian media in 2014 caused the death of one deminer and injured 17, markedly fewer than in previous years. There were 28 deminer casualties (one killed, 27 injured) recorded in 2013 and 71 casualties in 2012, when 29 deminers were reportedly killed and 42 injured⁷ and deminer casualties surpassed civilian casualties.⁸

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Iran is not a state party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, but nonetheless Iran has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.⁷

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¹ Ministry of Defence, “Commander Dehghan in the ceremony of World Mine Awareness Day: In Iran 28,000 hectares of land are landmine-contaminated”, 8 April 2014.
² “Mine Explosion Killed a Desert Explorer in Birjand”, Islamic Republic News Agency, 4 January 2014; and “Four tourists hit a landmine in Lut: one was killed”, Iranian Students’ News Agency, 25 March 2014.
³ IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, Meeting with Monitor researcher at IRMAC headquarters, Tehran, 9 February 2014.
⁴ IRMAC PowerPoint Presentation, Tehran, 9 February 2014; and IRMAC, “Presentation of IRMAC”, at: http://www.irmac.ir/sites/default/files/.
⁵ Telephone interview with mine action sector operator, provided on condition of anonymity, 5 April 2015.
⁶ IRMAC PowerPoint Presentation, Tehran, 9 February 2014.
⁷ Based on Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports for 2013.
⁸ Based on Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports.
⁹ Iran is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
### Mine Action Programme Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Performance Score: Average** 5.0
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Israel should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Israel should be more transparent in reporting the extent of mine contamination nationwide, not merely in areas not considered essential for Israel’s security.

CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of mine contamination in Israel is not known. Israel has reported 53.5km² of confirmed mined area (CMA) and a further 72.5km² of suspected mined area (SMA), as set out in Table 1. But the combined 126km² represents only the area affected by mines that are not deemed essential to Israel’s security. The size of other mined areas is not made public.

Table 1: Contamination as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>SMAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM only</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVM only</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM and AVM</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area     SMA = suspected mined area     APM = anti-personnel mines     AVM = anti-vehicle mines

Israel’s mine problem dates back to World War II. Subsequently, Israel laid significant numbers of mines along its borders, near military camps and training areas, and near civilian infrastructure. In August 2011, Israel’s military reported planting new mines to reinforce minefields and other defences along its de facto border with Syria in the Golan Heights. The 2014 estimate of 126km² for mined areas that are not, or no longer, considered essential for Israel’s security is slightly lower than the 2013 estimate of 128km². Based on the results of the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) mine clearance projects, actual contamination is thought likely to cover between 5% and 10% more or less than this. Contamination includes “minefields in the sea”, estimated to cover 0.5km². Israel is also contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO).

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A March 2011 law on minefield clearance established the INMAA to undertake a “comprehensive programme of mine clearing projects inside Israel.” The law’s aim was “to create a normative infrastructure for the clearance of minefields that are not essential to national security, and to declare them as free from landmines with the highest degree of safety to civilians, in accordance with the international obligations of the State of Israel, and within the shortest period of time possible.”

INMAA was established in the Ministry of Defence with ministry staff responsible for planning mine action. INMAA is comprised of ten employees, and there are no plans for expansion. INMAA manages a “minefield information bank” that is open for public queries concerning demining plans and programmes.

Strategic Planning

Israel reports that INMAA has a multi-year clearance plan for 2014–17 that calls for clearance of areas in northern Israel [the Golan Heights and Galilee] in the summer and in southern Israel [the Jordan Valley and Arava Plain] in the winter. According to Israel, demining operations clear on average 1.5km² a year. In addition, INMAA will continue to manage projects in the West Bank, funded by the governments of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

In addition, there are externally funded development projects, such as clearing a path for the future gas pipeline to Jordan, and removing lines that block the expansion of terminals and trade zones on the Jordanian border.
Legislation and Standards

The 2011 law on minefield clearance was noted above. INMAA sets national standards “taking into consideration the procedures of the Israel Defense Forces that will be as compatible as possible with the International Mine Action Standards.”

Operators

Commercial companies are contracted to conduct clearance and to conduct quality assurance (QA). In 2014, mine clearance was conducted by two national clearance contractors: Eitan Lidor Projects (ELP) and the Israeli Mine Action Group (IMAG).

The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) also conduct mine clearance according to the IDF’s own mine action plans “that are executed by their military methods and techniques” and implements an annual programme that includes maintenance of mined area protections. During wintertime, IDF gives special attention to minefields that are located in proximity to farms, residential areas, or hiker routes, as mines may be carried into these areas by floods.

Quality Management

Every mine clearance project in Israel has an INMAA supervisor, a QA/quality control (QC) contractor, and a clearance operator. As of June 2015, three QA/QC contractors were formally registered, with a fourth contractor expected in the future.
LAND RELEASE

Total mined land released by clearance in 2014 was 1.2km², compared with 2.2km² in 2013.\(^\text{18}\) According to INMAA, Israel does not use non-technical or technical survey for land release. All land is released through clearance. “Low-risk” areas are released after the completion of at least one clearance phase.\(^\text{19}\)

Clearance in 2014

The clearance of 1.2km² in 2014 was by commercial operators contracted by INMAA (see Table 2).\(^\text{20}\)

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2014\(^\text{21}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>SMAs released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMAG</td>
<td>Snir (northern Israel)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELP</td>
<td>Valley of Springs (northern Israel) and Ein Yahav (southern Israel)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>690,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>18,034</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SMA = suspected mined area  APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance

Clearance operations are concentrated on areas for agricultural development in the south, together with clearance in the north to improve access to water, clear hiking trails, and expand cattle grazing areas. Clearance is conducted throughout the year: in the north during the summer and in the south during the winter.\(^\text{22}\)

The IDF’s mine action programme is implemented independently of INMAA, using military methods and techniques.\(^\text{23}\) The area cleared or released by the IDF is unknown. According to Israel’s Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report for 2014, IDF has made significant progress in clearing additional minefields and releasing areas of land for civilian use.\(^\text{24}\)

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Israel is not a party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.\(^\text{25}\)

Israel has reported that since its establishment in 2011 and through the end of 2014, INMAA cleared and released more than 5.1km².\(^\text{26}\)

INMAA has an annual mine action budget of NIS27 million (approx. US$7.7 million).\(^\text{27}\) Israel has stated that achieving clearance goals depends on the actual allocation of pledged annual budgets.\(^\text{28}\) During 2014, INMAA received only 50% of its year’s budget outlined in the 2011 Law, which caused a major delay in operations. The other 50% of the 2014 budget was received in 2015.\(^\text{29}\)

The current annual budget of NIS27 million, if fully allocated in time, allows 1.5km² of contaminated land to be cleared per year. Based on this clearance rate, it will take a long time to clear remaining contamination. INMAA is seeking additional funding and assistance in order to speed up operations.\(^\text{30}\)

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\(^\text{18}\) Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Michael Heiman, INMAA, 13 April 2015, and email from Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014.

\(^\text{19}\) Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Michael Heiman, INMAA, 13 April 2015.

\(^\text{20}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{21}\) Ibid. In contrast, according to Israel’s CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014, Form B), approx. 1.5km² was cleared in 2014, with the destruction of 18,472 mines. The reported reason for this inconsistency is that the CCW Article 13 report contains “dangerous mine remains”. Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 13 April 2015.

\(^\text{22}\) Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Michael Heiman, INMAA, 13 April 2015.

\(^\text{23}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{24}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{25}\) CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form B.

\(^\text{26}\) Israel is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.

\(^\text{27}\) CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form B.


\(^\text{29}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{30}\) Ibid., and email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 2 June 2015.

Kyrgyzstan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

Kyrgyzstan should detail whether it has fully addressed mine contamination in areas under its jurisdiction or control and, if not, report on the extent and location of its remaining mined areas and clearance operations.

Kyrgyzstan is suspected to be contaminated by mines, although the precise location and extent of any residual threat is not known. According to the Minister of Defense, contamination in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the result of mine use by Uzbekistan’s military between 1999 and 2000, was cleared by Uzbek forces in 2005. It was reported, however, that rainfall and landslides had caused some mines to shift.

In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities claimed that Uzbek forces had also laid mines around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. Press reports have suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory around the Sokh enclave in 2004–05 and that they completely cleared mines around the Shakhimardan enclave in 2004.

Kyrgyzstan has admitted using anti-personnel mines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its borders, but has claimed that all the mines were subsequently removed and destroyed. In June 2011, a government official confirmed: “We do not have any minefields on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.”

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1 Fax from Abibilla Kudaiberdiev, Minister of Defense, Ministry of Defense, dated 4 April 2011.
3 S. Zhimagulov (Bishkek) and O. Borisova (Tashkent), “Kyrgyzstan Tries to Defend Itself from Uzbek Mines”, Navigator (Kazakhstan), 14 March 2003, and “Borders are becoming clear”, Blog, at: www.uzbekistan.wordpress.com.
4 Statement of Kyrgyzstan, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) [Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention], Geneva, 8 May 2006; and Letter 011-14/809 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2010.
In October 2011, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and Kyrgyzstan's Ministry of Defence conducted a mine action assessment mission. The assessment confirmed that poor ammunition storage conditions as well as obsolete ammunition posed a serious threat to human security. Agreement on cooperation was reached on 25 July 2013, when ITF signed a Protocol on Cooperation with the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic. ITF has reported that in 2014, it continued to implement activities agreed on in the Protocol on Cooperation. This includes technical checks on anti-personnel mines and other ammunition in three storage warehouses, procurement of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment, and support for disposal of ammunition surpluses.

7 Ibid.
10 Kyrgyzstan is a state party to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
CONTAMINATION

The extent of mine contamination in Lao PDR is not known, the main threat being from unexploded ordnance (UXO). All sides in the war in the 1970s laid anti-personnel mines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. A Handicap International (HI) survey in 1997 found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages, and a decade ago one clearance operator estimated Lao PDR may have as many as 1,000 mined areas.

The remote location of many mined areas means that mines had little impact, are not a clearance priority, and made up only 1% of the more than 93,800 explosive remnants of war (ERW) cleared by operators in 2014. The National Regulatory Authority (NRA), however, has stated that "with a steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will become areas for growing concern."

LAND RELEASE

No systematic mine clearance was conducted during 2014, although operators cleared a total of 151 mines (anti-vehicle and anti-personnel) during UXO clearance. Seventy-eight mines were destroyed during regular UXO clearance operations and a further 73 during roving clearance. The overwhelming majority of the mines were cleared by UXO Lao.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Lao PDR is not a state party or signatory to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Nonetheless, Lao PDR has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since mid-2006, has an interministerial board chaired by the deputy prime minister and composed of representatives from 11 government ministries. NRA has four sections: Administration and Finance, Planning and Cooperation, Quality and Standards, and Operations and Information. This includes a single quality management team.

6 "UXO Operation Progress Report”, NRA, received by email 11 May 2015.
7 Lao PDR is a state party to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
## MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE** 5.7
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Lebanon should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Lebanon should commit to clearance of all mined areas on its territory.
- The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) should be mandated to conduct demining for humanitarian purposes.

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2014, Lebanon had almost 29.5km² of confirmed mined areas (CMAs), not including the Blue Line, as set out in Table 1. Five regions of Lebanon still contain CMAs. Of this, 1.28km² of mined area cleared in 2014 had not been entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, as of late 2015, which would reduce the contamination estimate to some 28.2km². A further 178 “dangerous areas” totalling 8.8km² are suspected to contain either cluster munition remnants (CMR) or mines. Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) is in the process of clarifying these more accurately. An additional 93 dangerous areas totalling almost 2.9km² are suspected to contain booby-traps, not all of which fall under the APMBC definition of an anti-personnel mine.

Lebanon’s mine contamination is largely a legacy of 15 years of earlier civil conflict and Israeli invasions of south Lebanon [in 1978 and 1982], and subsequent occupations that ended in May 2000. Mines affect the north and south of the country, though most contamination is found in the south. LMAC had earlier identified 2,598 suspected mined areas (SMAs) over 191km² in Batroun, Chouf, Jbeil, and Jezzine, north of the Litani River, in the Bekaa valley, and across Mount Lebanon.

Data refinement (which removed duplicate entries of areas that had been cleared or re-cleared), along with survey and clearance, has since significantly reduced the problem. The mid-term review of Lebanon’s 2011–20 national strategy stated that as of end September 2013, of the total 44.5km² of SMA (excluding the Blue Line), almost 21.5km² (48%) had been cleared and 23km² (52%) remained. The review also reported that, as of 2013, one-quarter of the 9.5km² of Blue Line minefields had been cleared leaving almost 7.3km² to release. According to the mid-term review, clearance of Blue Line minefields was behind target, due to underfunding and political decisions.

The end-2014 estimate of 28.2km² (taking into account clearance, and excluding the Blue Line) is thus a significant increase on the 23km² estimate of September 2013. LMAC has attributed this to discovery of new mined areas and refinement of LMAC’s database to bring it in line with revised International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Land Release guidelines.

Mine contamination hinders socio-economic development, restricting access to land and productive resources. Most contaminated land is valuable for agriculture, and contamination prevents safe access to land. Lebanon is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants (CMR).

Table 1: Contamination by province as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Beqaa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,619,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Janoub (south Lebanon)</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1,626,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nabatiyeh (south Lebanon)</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>6,852,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>19,092,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Shimal (north Lebanon)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>299,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>29,690,505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area

1. The 118km-long Blue Line borders Israel. It is the line of withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces.
5. Ibid., 12 May 2015.
8. Ibid., pp. 18 and 37.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 37.
17. “LMAC Newsletter Issue No. 5: 1 January–30 June 2015”, LMAC.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Established in 1998 by the Council of Ministers, the Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA) is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. LMAA, which is chaired by the Minister of Defence, has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine action programme. In 2007, a national mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate the programme on behalf of LMAA.18

LMAC, part of the Lebanese Armed Forces,14 is based in Beirut. Since 2009, a regional mine action centre (RMAC) in Nabatiye has overseen operations in southern Lebanon.15 LMAC also manages risk education and victim assistance.16

In 2015, the Ministry of Defence, represented by LMAC and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), signed a Memorandum of Understanding to manage and coordinate the Arabic Outreach Programme for Mine Action. Planning, management, and coordination of the Programme will be handed over to LMAC by the end of 2017, and LMAC, through the Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon (RSHDL), will constitute a regional centre for the Programme’s activities.17

Strategic Planning

In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan for 2011–20.18 The plan called for clearance of all CMR by 2016 and for completion of mine clearance outside the Blue Line by 2020.19 Both goals are dependent on capacity and progress has fallen well short of planning targets.20 A review of the strategy in January–March 2014 found that in 2011–13 mine clearance was slow, suffering from underfunding and fewer operating teams than foreseen, while previously unreported contaminated areas were identified.21 Demining the area bordering Israel is said to be dependent on “political developments” that will allow the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to conduct technical survey and clearance.22

Lebanon has set three levels of priority for mine action operations. The first is to address infrastructure to allow those displaced by the 2006 conflict to return home; the second is to release agricultural land; and the third is to release land for activities other than agriculture. The first priority goal was met in 2009, and clearance of agricultural and development areas are now the priority targets.23

Operators

In 2014, mine clearance was conducted by international operators DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and LAF. A total of 11 mine clearance teams (nine teams working for international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and two working for LAF/Engineering Regiment (ER)), four mechanical teams (LAF/ER), and seven mine detection dog (MDD) teams operated by LAF/ER in Lebanon in 2014.24 LMAC has consistently raised concerns over lack of survey and clearance capacity to address mine and CMR contamination, which it ascribes to inadequate funding.25

The total number of MAG employees in Lebanon decreased from 199 to 189, after completion of a project funded by the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office in March 2014. MAG deploys nine clearance teams, six non-technical survey teams, two clearance teams, one mine risk education team, one mechanical team, one demarcation team, and support staff. The programme also deployed eight mechanical assets in support of manual clearance activities. MAG did not foresee any major changes to capacity in 2015.26

Handicap International (HI) employed 51 staff in Lebanon in 2014, of whom 42 were operational. HI deployed three manual clearance teams: two teams of seven deminers and one of ten deminers.27 As of early 2015, HI deployed an additional manual clearance team, bringing their capacity to four teams of seven deminers per team, deployed in north Lebanon.28

UNIFIL was established in 197829 to: confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which occurred only in 2000); restore international peace and security; and assist the government of Lebanon in re-establishing

19 Ibid., p. 17.
20 Response to Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire by Brig.-Gen. Imad Odiemni, LMAC, 2 May 2014.
22 Presentation by Maj. Bou Maroun, RMAC, Nabatiye, 4 May 2012; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Programme Manager, UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMSTA), 7 May 2014.
25 Statements of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) First Meeting of States Parties, Ventiane, September 2010; Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, September 2013; Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Costa Rica, September 2014; Mine Action Support Group meeting, 18 October 2013; and CCM Intersessional Meetings, 9 April 2014; and CCM Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form F.
27 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Catherine Smith, HI, 20 March 2015.
28 Email from Chris Chenavier, Head of Mission, HI, 31 August 2015.
its authority in the area. The primary task of UNIFIL mine clearance teams has been to clear access lanes through minefields in order to visibly demarcate the 118km-long Blue Line. UNIFIL does not generally conduct clearance on the Blue Line for humanitarian purposes but only to facilitate placement of markers by clearing three-metre-wide lanes into mined areas. A total of 306 demining personnel were validated by the UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMAST) during 2014, which consisted of six rotations of the UNIFIL troop contributing countries (TCCs). Only one mechanical team was deployed, by the Cambodian Field Engineering Platoon.

At the beginning of 2014, operational assets consisted of ten demining teams provided by Belgium, Cambodia, China, and Italy. During 2014, the Italian Combat Engineering Platoon ceased its demining operations, and in December, Belgium’s Multi-Role Combat Engineering Platoon ended its peacekeeping efforts in south Lebanon. The resulting reduction in capacity from ten to seven demining teams is said to have slowed the demarcation process. UNIFIL expected to maintain that capacity throughout 2015.

UNMAST, a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), coordinates mine clearance operations with LMAC. It trains UNIFIL demining units and monitors and validates UNIFIL mine clearance on the Blue Line to ensure it complies with IMAS. It also assists LMAC in resource mobilisation. UNMAST operating funds come from UNIFIL’s assessed peacekeeping budget.

### Standards

Lebanon developed National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) in 2010. LMAC is currently working with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other partners to revise the NMAS, with a view to ensuring enhanced efficiency while respecting IMAS. LMAC expected to complete the revision by the end of 2015. Based on the new version of NMAS, implementing agencies will develop their own standing operating procedures (SOPs).

### Quality Management

Between 10% and 40% sampling is conducted during clearance operations by the organisation site supervisor and quality assurance (QA) officer; 10% sampling is conducted by the LMAC QA/quality control (QC) officer during work; and 30% sampling is conducted by LMAC’s sampling team at the end of the task. Sampling was conducted in all areas released during 2014.

### LAND RELEASE

The total mined area released by clearance in 2014 was almost 1.28km², compared with 0.54km² in 2013. A further 0.8km² was cancelled in 2014, by non-technical survey.

### Survey in 2014

In 2014, LAF cancelled 30 SHAs totalling 808,107m² through non-technical survey. This marks a significant increase over the 34,391m² cancelled in two SMAs in 2013. In addition, in 2014, 141 SHAs totalling 1,355,479m² were confirmed as mined. An increase in population and relocation of some families to previously deserted areas led to discovery of new targets for survey and an increased risk of accidents.
Clearance in 2014

Lebanon reported clearance of almost 1.28km² of mined area in 2014, destroying 645 anti-personnel mines and 38 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) [see Table 2].

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2014\(^\text{45}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>128,208</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA*</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>68,784</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>92,208</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>985,874</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,275,355</strong></td>
<td><strong>645</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) mine clearance in 2014 was the result of a call-out from the local community. 

APM = anti-personnel mines    UXO = unexploded ordnance

An additional 2.1km² was cleared through battle area clearance (BAC) in 2014, while LAF rapid-response teams destroyed 98 submunitions, 390 anti-personnel mines, and 375 items of UXO during rapid-response operations.\(^\text{46}\) Furthermore, UNIFIL reported destruction of 178 anti-personnel mines during their 2014 operations on the Blue Line.\(^\text{47}\)

The 1.28km² cleared in 2014 marks a significant increase compared to 2013, when clearance of 28 mined areas over almost 0.54km² destroyed 12 anti-personnel mines, six anti-vehicle mines, and 294 items of UXO.\(^\text{48}\)

HI explained that the increased mine clearance in 2014 compared to the previous year was due to an additional operational team in 2014 and a mild winter that resulted in loss of only a few days due to bad weather.\(^\text{49}\) In 2015, HI planned to remain focused on mine clearance in the three affected districts of north Lebanon: Batroun, Becharre, and Koura.\(^\text{50}\)

Deminer Safety

In September 2014, an HI employee was injured in a mine accident that occurred while the employee was inspecting a detector signal.\(^\text{51}\)

\(^{45}\) Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 12 May 2015, and ‘Annual Report 2014’, LMAC, p. 29. Clearance data reported by MAG and HI contained inconsistencies with LMAC data. MAG reported clearing five areas in 2014, totalling 76,220m², destroying 24 anti-personnel mines and 60 items of UXO. MAG suggested the discrepancy may be due to a task that had been cleared, but not handed over. HI reported clearing 10 areas in 2014, totalling 93,187m², destroying 91 anti-personnel mines and 18 items of UXO. DCA declined to provide clearance data to Mine Action Monitor so cross-verification was not possible.


\(^{47}\) Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Henri Francois Morand, UNMAS, 2 October 2015.

\(^{48}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Brig.-Gen. Odiemi, LMAC, 2 May 2014.

\(^{49}\) Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Catherine Smith, HI, 28 March 2015.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Lebanon is not a party or signatory to the APMBC, but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.\(^{52}\)

Clearance of mined areas was expected to be completed by the end of 2020, in accordance with the 2011–2020 national strategy.\(^{53}\) However, meeting this target was contingent on deployment of optimal resources, comprising an estimated 125 manual clearance teams, two mechanical teams, and nine two-strong MDD teams needed for mine clearance.\(^{54}\) Current mine clearance capacity is far lower than this.

In addition, as demining teams complete clearance of higher priority tasks and move to more remote areas the harder terrain and quality of soil are said to directly affect productivity and reduce clearance rates.\(^{55}\) Furthermore, in accordance with the NMAS, the current search/clearance depth for mines in Lebanon is 20cm. Some technical challenges still make it difficult for some demining teams to reach the desired level of productivity due to depth of old mines.\(^{56}\)

Lebanon has cleared almost 4.5km² of mined area in the last five years, as detailed in Table 3.

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2010–14\(^{57}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.48</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lebanon has reported contributing US$9 million towards mine clearance in the country, covering administrative staff, two sampling teams, three non-technical survey teams, two mine clearance teams, two battle area clearance teams, four mechanical teams, and seven MDD teams.\(^{58}\) In addition, LAF provided three companies for rapid response across Lebanon.\(^{59}\)

In 2015, LMAC expected a decrease in funding, as indicated by donors, resulting in a reduction in capacity and overall productivity. The lower funding is ascribed to varying exchange rates as well as a shift in regional donor priorities.\(^{60}\)

According to LMAC, in order for Lebanon to complete mine clearance in line with 2011–20 strategy, the international community needs to show increased commitment. Based on current capacity LMAC reports that Lebanon is not on track to complete mine clearance by the end of 2020, and for this to be achieved it would need 138 clearance teams.\(^{61}\)

LMAC has access to various sources of funding, including international donations, bilateral contributions, and private sector contributions. However, it reported a shortage of funds for 2014, having sought US$64.5 million but receiving only $12.75 million.\(^{62}\)

Lebanon has also stated that the timeframe for completion of clearance might be affected by the new discovery of contaminated land.\(^{63}\) Lebanon will conduct a second mid-term review in 2016 and will update findings accordingly.

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52 Lebanon is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.


54 Ibid.


56 Ibid., p. 29.


59 LMAC, “Annual Report 2014”.


61 Ibid.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>2014</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTAMINATION

Libya is contaminated with mines but no survey has been conducted to determine the extent. Contamination dates back to the desert battles of World War II and conflicts with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980–87, which resulted in mines being laid on those borders. Its border with Tunisia is also affected. During Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's four decades in power, mines were emplaced around a number of sensitive locations, including military facilities and key infrastructure.1

Mines were used by both sides in the 2011 conflict leading to Colonel Qaddafi's overthrow. The only confirmed instance of landmine use by rebels occurred in Ajdabiya, but other locations where pro-government elements laid mines included Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains.2 The escalation of conflict in Libya in 2014 brought new reports of mine use by armed groups fighting around Tripoli airport.3

The most commonly used anti-personnel mine type was the low-metal content Brazilian T-AB1 mine, but evidence has also been found of Belgian NR 413 stake and bounding fragmentation mines (PRB NR 442). Anti-vehicle mines used by government forces have included Chinese Type 72SP and Type 84 mines that were scattered by rockets over the port city of Misrata, and Belgian PRB-M3 and PRB-M3AI anti-vehicle mines, as well as minimum-metal mines. Sea mines were also used by government forces in the port of Misrata.4

2 Ibid; and email from Jenny Reeves, Weapons Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, Tripoli, 22 February 2012.
5 Interview with Dr. Taher Siala, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, in Tripoli, 12 May 2005.
7 Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012; interview with Max Dyck, Team Leader, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012; and email from Stephen Bryant, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Libya, 23 July 2012.
Under the former Qaddafi regime, the Ministry of Defence and the Civil Protection Unit, located within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, each had responsibilities for various aspects of mine action. The Ministry of Defence reportedly cleared areas serving either a military or civilian development purpose. The Civil Protection Unit is said to have carried out clearance in affected communities.5

Since the change of regime, mine action has felt the effects of wider political turmoil reflected in competing claims for a role in the sector by multiple institutions. The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LMAC), reportedly in existence as early as May 2011,6 was mandated by the Minister of Defence in December 2011 to coordinate mine action, support efforts to control ammunition storage areas (ASAs), and decommission weapons, while the Office of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army has jurisdiction over arms and ammunition and a role coordinating a range of operations.7 A decree issued by the Ministry of Defence in December 2013 specified that LMAC would be responsible for supervising the work of international organisations in mine action, survey of mined areas, and information management, but made no reference to ammunition or small arms storage.8

LMAC opened an office in Tripoli in 2012 and became the main focal point for humanitarian demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but with limited authority outside Tripoli as a result of the breakdown of centralised government that followed the change of regime.9 A new Director, Colonel Mohammad Turjoman, was appointed in December 2013 and took up his position early in 2014, subsequently renaming LMAC as LibMAC. In April 2014, LibMAC closed temporarily as a result of internal staff disputes.10

Other institutions claiming a role in mine action have included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ National Programme for Demining and Rehabilitation of Lands, which was set up in 2004 and revived by the ministry after the change of regime, and the Ministry of Interior’s National Safety Authority which supports explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and counter-IED (improvised explosive device) activities.11

A United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT) became operational in April 2011 and provided initial coordination for international NGOs, liaising closely with the Army Chief of General Staff,12 resulting in tension with LMAC. In July 2012 UNMAS became integrated into the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as the Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section. In August 2013, UNMAS assigned an operations officer and quality assurance to LMAC to develop data management, testing and QA capacity.13 UNDP has been working with national authorities drafting a law to provide framework for mine action.14 It also has a capacity building mandate overlapping with UNMAS’ mandate under Security Council Resolution 2095 “creating ... confusion for national counterparts”.15

International operators working in Libya in 2014 included DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group, Handicap International (HI), Mines Advisory Group, and commercial operator Mechem.16 International operators evacuated expatriate staff in mid-2014 because of deteriorating security. DDG redeployed to Libya in October 2014 but operations were suspended due to delays in accreditation.17 National non-governmental organisations (NGOs) reportedly working in 2013 included Free Fields, Salama, and No Mines No War18 but it was not clear if they were active in 2014.

Strategic Planning

A draft National Strategic Plan states that: “the strategic goal of the government and its development partners over the 2011–2021 period is to reduce the humanitarian and socio-economic threats posed by landmines/unexploded ordnance to the point where a residual amount of contamination remains that poses no significant impact on the population or infrastructure, and where capacity remains to take account of the needs of future development”. The UN noted that the objective of the programme is to develop and modernize national structures to implement a national mine action programme.19 As of April 2014, the plan awaited government approval.20

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9 Telephone interview with Tripoli-based international mine action stakeholder requesting anonymity, 30 July 2012.
10 Telephone interview with Tripoli-based mine action stakeholder, 30 May 2014.
11 Email from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS Programme Manager, Libya, 20 July 2013.
12 Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012, and interview with Max Dyck, Team Leader, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012.
13 Email from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS Programme Manager, Libya, 20 July 2013.
14 Interview with Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP (Libya), in Geneva, 2 April 2014.
15 “2nd Quarter Progress Report, (PIP) Supporting the Capacity Development of Central and local stakeholders in mine action activities in Libya (Phase two)”, UNDP, July 2013, p. 6.
16 Email from Bridget Forster, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS, UN Support Mission in Libya (based in Tunis), 15 July 2015.
17 Email from Lutz Kosewsky, Operations Manager, DDG, 7 July 2015.
18 Email from Jenny Reeves, Capacity Building Advisor, GIZ, 11 April 2014; Email from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS, Libya, 20 July 2013.
20 Interview with Stephen Bryant, UNDP, in Geneva, 2 April 2014.
LAND RELEASE

Libya for the moment lacks an active programme for clearing landmines. No clearance of mines was recorded by international operators in 2014.\(^2\) International and national organisations working with LibMAC are focused on EOD and safe small arms and ammunition storage. Mine action sector sources said there were reports that some spot clearance of mines occurred in 2015 but LibMAC did not respond to requests for information.

UNDP observed in 2013 that “humanitarian mine action stakeholders in Libya have been thwarted in their attempts to effect the sound implementation of mine action in country due to a void in established governance within the sector. The resultant lack of confidence and the delays in recognising a properly mandated National Mine Action Authority with the necessary resources and capacity by the government has only compounded the issue.”\(^2\)

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Libya is not a state party or signatory to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) Email from Bridget Forster, UNMAS, 15 July 2015.

\(^2\) “2nd Quarter Progress Report, (PIP) Supporting the Capacity Development of Central and local stakeholders in mine action activities in Libya [Phase two],” UNDP, July 2013, p. 3.

\(^2\) Libya is a state party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of contamination of the area of Western Sahara controlled by Morocco, on the west side of the Berm, is not known. In the past, Morocco declared, highly improbably, that a total of 120,000km² of area was contaminated. According to Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), though, “the areas surrounding the Berm are believed to be some of the most heavily mined in the world.” It also has a significant problem with cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Morocco’s contamination is a result of the conflict between the Royal Moroccan Army and Polisario Front forces over Western Sahara. Morocco has reported having registered and mapped the minefields it has laid, and has pledged to clear them as soon as the conflict over Western Sahara is over.

As of April 2013, Morocco identified ten areas as having been mined by the Polisario Front since 1975: Bir Anzarane, Douiek, Gerret Auchflahgt, Gor Lbard, Gor Zalagat, Hagounia, Idiriya, Imlili, Itgui, and Tarf Mhkinza. The area of Glibat Jadiane, which had been listed as contaminated in earlier years, is no longer included on the list of mined areas.

Between April 2014 and March 2015, six incidents were registered west of the Berm, resulting in three persons killed (two civilians and one soldier), and six injured (three civilians and three soldiers). Morocco reported a total of 195 casualties between January 2007 and October 2013, but did not provide any information as to where the casualties occurred.

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1 The Berm refers to the defensive wall built by Morocco in 1982–87 to secure the north-western corner of Western Sahara. It is constituted of earthen walls some three metres in height. Morocco controls the area located on the west side of the Berm.
4 Voluntary APMBC Article 7 Report, Form C, April 2013.
5 Ibid.
6 Voluntary APMBC Article 7 Report, April 2011.
7 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2015/246, 10 April 2015.
8 Statement of Morocco, APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, 2 December 2013.
CONTAMINATION

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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or a mine action centre (MAC).

Morocco initiated major demining efforts in 2007, following an increase in the number of incidents. The Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) conducts land release activities manually. In 2010, Morocco declared it has employed 10,000 deminers, although only 400 detectors were at their disposal at that time. This raised serious questions both about the procedures being used and the accuracy of clearance figures being reported. Morocco has not adopted national mine action legislation or standards, but reported, most recently in April 2013, that “normal safety and environmental protection standard have been followed.”

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) coordinates mine action activities with both parties to the conflict.

LAND RELEASE

The UN Secretary-General reported that, between April 2014 and March 2015, RMA cleared almost 223km², but did not provide additional details.

Morocco reported clearing a total of more than 268km² in 2013, destroying 81 anti-personnel mines, 32 anti-vehicle mines, and 1,693 items of UXO.

According to voluntary APMBC Article 7 reports submitted by Morocco since 2008, Morocco “cleared” approx. 2,270km² between January 2007 and December 2012. At the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Morocco claimed that 3,928km² had been “cleared” between January 2007 and October 2013. These figures must describe primarily land release by means other than physical clearance.

No information is publicly available on Morocco’s funding of its mine action operations.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Morocco is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless Morocco has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR 2.0
RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

- Myanmar should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority and clear all mined areas as soon as possible.

CONTAMINATION

Mined areas are located in areas of Myanmar adjacent to borders with Bangladesh, China, and Thailand, but are a particular threat in northern and eastern parts of the country as a result of decades of post-independence struggles for autonomy by ethnic minorities. Some 55 townships in Kachin, Kayin (Karen), Kayah (Karen), Mon, Rakhine, and Shan states, as well as in Bago (Pegu) and Tanintharyi (Tenasserim) regions, suffer from some degree of mine contamination, primarily from anti-personnel mines.1 Karen (Kayin) state and Pegu (Bago) division are suspected to contain the heaviest mine contamination and have the highest number of recorded victims. Landmine Monitor has also received reports of previously unknown suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in townships on the Indian border of Chin state and in the Sagaing region.2

No estimate exists of the extent of contamination, but Mine Action Monitor identified SHAs in the following divisions and townships:

- Kayah state: all seven townships
- Kayin state: all seven townships
- Kachin state: Chipwi, Hpakan, Mansi, Moguang, Momauk, Myitkyina, Tsawlaw, and Waingmaw
- Mon state: Bilin, Kyaikto, Mawlamyine, Thanbyuzayat, Thaton, and Ye
- Bago region: Kyaukkyi, Shwekyin, Tantabin, and Taungoo
- Rakhine state: Maungdaw
- Shan state: Hopong, Hsenwi, Hsihseng, Konkyan, Kyaukme, Langkho, Loilen, Mawkmai, Mongpan, Mongton, Monghpyak, Namhsan Tachileik, Namtu, Nanhkan, Yaksaw, and Ywangan
- Tanintharyi region: Bokpyin, Dawei, Tanintharyi, Thayetchaung, and Yebyu
- Chin state and Sagaing region.

A survey of security concerns in 222 villages in southeastern Myanmar conducted in 2014 by the Border Consortium, with the assistance of 11 community-based organisations, found 53% affected by mines. The questionnaire-based survey covered villages in southern Shan, Mon, Kayin, and Kayah states, and the eastern Bago and Tanintharyi regions.3

In 2013, humanitarian mine action teams of the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) documented 67 dangerous areas in eastern Bago region and Kayin and Mon states. Some 74% of the dangerous areas were contaminated by anti-personnel mines, 18% by unexploded ordnance (UXO), and the balance by anti-vehicle mines.4

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a three-day assessment of Kuyak Kyi in Bago Division in 2012 to support the resettlement of communities displaced by conflict. The assessment confirmed that areas considered for resettlement were mine affected, but NPA did not receive authorisation to conduct a more detailed survey of the area.5

Myanmar is also affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW), including mortars, grenades, artillery, and ordnance dating back to World War II, but the location or extent of contamination is not known.6

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2011, Myanmar agreed in principle to the creation of a Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC) under the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) and agreed to hire five staff to work on mine action. As of August 2015, however, no further action to establish it had been made. The MPC is led by the Minister of the Office of the President, U Aung Min, and is responsible for coordinating negotiation and implementing peace agreements with Myanmar’s ethnic minorities.

Minister U Aung Min told Landmine Monitor in May 2012 that mine clearance is a government priority, but said the peace negotiations and agreements between the government and ethnic minorities need to be firmly established before mine clearance can begin.7 As of September 2015, dialogue on a nationwide ceasefire was continuing.8 The draft text of the National Ceasefire Agreement mentions clearance but does not mention coordination through MMAC or standards.9

Standards

In 2013, a technical working group comprised of government representatives from MPC and humanitarian actors completed work on a draft national mine action strategy and on national mine action standards. As of September 2015, the strategy and standards had not received government approval and reportedly remained under consideration by MPC.10

Operators

International demining organisations, including Anti-Persoonsmijnen Ontmijneende Product Ontwikkeling (APOPO), DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and NPA, have had
offices in Yangon since 2011, but as of September 2015 none had received authorisation to conduct humanitarian mine clearance.1

Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Thailand Mine Action Centre conducted a training course for Myanmar officials in September 2014, covering use of mine detectors and land release.1

LAND RELEASE

No mine clearance by government-accredited humanitarian demining organisations has occurred in Myanmar.

Survey in 2014

NPA, in agreement with the government and the New Mon State Party, conducted three non-technical surveys covering a total of 70 villages in Mon and Kayin states in 2014 but did not find any mine contamination. NPA was informed there were mined areas close to some of the surveyed villages, but was not allowed access to them. The survey team recorded seven mine incidents that occurred at least ten years earlier.13

The first two surveys covered: eight villages in Ye township, Mon state (7 January–5 February); nine villages in Mudon and Thanyuzayat townships, Mon state; and ten villages in Kawkaireit township, Kayin state (24 April–21 May). A third survey, started on 24 July and still under way in September 2014, focused on 43 villages in Ye township, Mon state. The surveys did not identify any mined areas.

NPA conducted further non-technical survey at the request of the Karen National Union (KNU) at four villages in April 2015. The surveys [one in Kyaukkyi Township, Bago Region, and three in Thandaunggi township, Kayin state] also did not identify any mine contamination but recorded 24 mine accidents in these areas in the previous two years.14

Sporadic and unregulated mine removal has been reported in recent years by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s army), villagers, and ethnic minority organisations.

In 2014, the Karen Mine Action Center (KMAC) conducted a test clearing mines and UXO from two areas designated by the Karen National Defence Organisation using a KMAC manual clearance team and a locally produced machine, and reportedly operating to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).15

The Free Burma Rangers (FBR) include a course on mine identification and emergency clearance procedures in annual training programmes for new relief teams.16 Mines encountered on their missions have either been removed by FBR personnel, who turn them to anti-government militias, or are removed by militia members.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Myanmar is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless it has obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

1 Myanmar is divided into states and regions. States are the “home area” of ethnic groups. Other areas, which are not identified with a specific ethnic group, are administrative regions. The former military junta changed the name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 and also changed the names of some states. Many ethnic groups within the country still prefer to use the name Burma. Internal state and division names are given in their common form or with the name adopted by the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in parentheses.
2 Research conducted by Landmine Monitor. Data sources included casualty information, sightings of mine warnings, and reports by NGOs and other organisations of use, as well as interviews with field staff and armed forces personnel. The survey included casualty data from January 2007 through September 2015 and data from other informants from January 2008 through September 2015.
4 Meeting with Programme Manager, DanChurchAid (DCA), Chiang Mai, 9 October 2014. DCA provides technical assistance and support to CIDKP humanitarian mine action teams which conduct survey and mine risk education in affected communities.
5 Interview with Andreas Indregard, NPA, Bangkok, 12 April 2012; and telephone interview with Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Mine Action Programme Manager, NPA, 21 June 2012.
7 Landmine Monitor interview with President’s Minister Aung Min, Naypyidaw, May 2013.
8 A. Slowadowski, “Myanmar signs ceasefire with eight armed groups”, Reuters, 15 October 2015, at: http://news.yahoo.com/myanmar-signs-ceasefire-eight-armed-groups-060743874.html;ylt=AwrC1C2GjytWd1AAT7QtDMD;ylu=X3oDMTBybGY3bmFtZXRh
10 Email from international mine action staff member, Yangon, 27 October 2014.
11 Email from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, Yangon, 23 September 2014.
13 Email from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, Yangon, 23 September 2014.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and clear all mine contamination along the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) as soon as possible.

**CONTAMINATION**

The precise extent of the mine problem in North Korea is not known. North Korea admitted in 1998 that it had laid mines in the DMZ between the north and south of the peninsula. The affected areas are reported to be marked and fenced.¹ In early 2006, officials commented to the APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) that North Korea had not laid mines elsewhere in the country,² despite fears that, among others, sections of the east coast were also mined.

**LAND RELEASE**

No release of mined area is believed to have taken place in 2014, as in earlier years.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

North Korea is not a state party or signatory to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) but nonetheless has obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

North Korea has no functioning mine action programme.

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² Email from Kerry Brinkert, Director, ISU, 1 February 2006.
Pakistan remains heavily affected by mines and other ordnance from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89) and three wars with India, as well as from more recent and continuing conflicts in areas bordering Afghanistan, including, in particular, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Pakistan asserts that it "faces no problem of uncleared mines". In supporting this statement, it acknowledges that the army laid mines on its eastern border with India during an escalation of tensions in 2001–02, but says those mines were all cleared and the army has not laid any more since then.\(^1\) It has, though, reported continued improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, including improvised anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines.\(^2\) Pakistani non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have reported that, in earlier years, mines and other explosive devices have caused hundreds of casualties every year, most of them civilians.\(^3\)

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2 CCW Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form B.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action programme. Pakistani military engineering units are believed to be responsible for mine clearance in contaminated conflict zones, while the Frontier Constabulary has said it conducts mine clearance in contaminated areas of Baluchistan, FATA, and other conflict zones in the North-West Frontier Province.4

LAND RELEASE

There are no reports of formal land release in 2014. Pakistan reported attacks using IEDs and anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines “all over the country” and said that in 2014 the Army destroyed 2,944 anti-personnel mines.5

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Pakistan is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC, but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.6

4 Interviews with Khalil Ur Rehman, Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 9 April 2011; with Muhammad Kamran Akhtar, then-Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 23 April 2009, and 10 April 2007; with Brig. Azmat Ali, Spokesman, Inter Services Public Relations, Peshawar, 22 March 2010; and with Sifat Ghayur, Inspector General, Frontier Constabulary, Peshawar, 19 March 2010.
5 CCW Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form F.
6 Pakistan is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
**RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION**

- Palestine should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
CONTAMINATION

In Palestine, hazards encompass minefields, military training zones, and areas of confrontation where many explosive devices are left behind. A 2013 survey by the Palestine Mine Action Centre [PMAC] found that Palestine has mined areas covering 19.9km², marginally less than its previous estimate of 20.4km². A HALO Trust survey of the West Bank in 2012 identified 90 minefields, including 13 laid by the Jordanian military in 1948–67, and 77 minefields laid by the Israeli military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war. All minefields, including those laid by the Jordanian military, are under Israeli military control.

According to HALO, as of March 2015, of the total contamination, more than 0.6km² of confirmed mined area (CMA) exists across 11 minefields in Palestinian-controlled territory and two minefields in no man’s land between the West Bank and Israel. All 13 minefields (see Table 1) were laid by the Jordanian army.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM and AVM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMA = confirmed mined area
APM = anti-personnel mines
AVM = anti-vehicle mines

Six of the 12 governorates in the West Bank still contain mined areas, as set out in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>89,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalqilya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>154,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>189,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>116,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>610,981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most mined areas are located in Area C along the border with Jordan, which covers approx. 60% of the West Bank and is under full Israeli control regarding security, planning, and construction. In Area C, many suspected hazardous areas [S/As] are the result of military training. According to the United Nations [UN], of the estimated 90 minefields in the West Bank, the 11 situated in more “central areas” – the governorates of Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Qalqilya, and Tulkarm – are priorities for clearance.

In addition to posing a risk to civilians, mines affect the socio-economic development and livelihoods of Palestinian communities. All mined areas are: located in, or in close proximity to, inhabited areas; mostly on privately owned fertile agricultural and grazing land or along roads used daily by communities; and either poorly marked or not marked at all. Yet they are accessible to the population, and in some cases are even cultivated. These minefields were laid by the Jordanian military and are all located in areas under Israeli security control. Clearance operations must therefore be coordinated with the Israeli government.

Palestine is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), although the precise nature and extent of the problem is not known. Neither the West Bank nor Gaza is believed to be affected by cluster munition remnants.

Gaza had extensive ERW contamination resulting from Israel’s ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in 2008–09 and ‘Operation Pillar of Protection’ in November 2012. Clearance operations conducted in 2010 by the UN Mine Action Team in Gaza [UNMAT-GO], partnered with Mines Advisory Group (MAG), found mainly mortars, rockets, bombs, and M-15 anti-vehicle mines used to demolish buildings, but also some white phosphorous ordnance. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that explosive ordnance disposal [EOD] police destroyed 8.8 tons of ordnance in 2013 and by the end of the year had removed most of the unexploded ordnance [UXO] in Gaza City to a location outside it.

Further hostilities in Gaza took place under ‘Operation Protective Edge’ during a seven-week period between 8 July and 26 August 2014, causing unprecedented damage and destruction in Gaza. By late August, before hostilities had concluded, the UN estimated the operation had inflicted three times as much destruction to buildings as had Operation Cast Lead.

According to UNMAS, during the hostilities the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) conducted more than 5,085 airstrikes and fired 8,210 missiles, 15,734 naval projectiles, and 36,718 land projectiles. In addition, armed groups in Gaza fired 4,384 rockets and 1,676 mortars toward Israel, a portion of which fell short and landed within Gaza. Significant numbers of unexploded aircraft bombs, tank shells, and other ammunition from both sides have been reported in civilian areas. The hostilities ended in late August 2014, but the long-term risk to civilians from explosive hazards remains, either from UXO resulting from the firing of heavy weapons or by weapons and ammunition being abandoned in civilian areas. Based on an estimated 10% failure rate of munitions used in the conflict, UNMAS estimates that 7,000 ERW are buried in the rubble, representing a significantly higher level of contamination than in previous conflicts.

The unprecedented ERW contamination is said by UNMAS to have interrupted the lives of whole communities, making gaining access to homes, schools, food distribution centres, and health facilities challenging and dangerous. Livelihoods are also directly affected with small industries and farmlands destroyed or littered with ERW. The concentration of ERW in the debris of destroyed and damaged infrastructure impedes the initial clean-up of densely populated areas, public spaces, and farmland. Furthermore, the wide scale of contamination by explosive munitions compounds the problem of internally displaced people and complicates the return to neighbourhoods.
ERW accidents have increased significantly since August 2014 with 11 people killed and 40 injured as of March 2015. Most of the victims were men (64%), and an increasing number of children (23.5% boys, 7.8% girls).  

Four members of the EOD police had died attempting to disarm an unexploded bomb that also killed two other people.  

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

An authorisation from the Palestinian Authority’s prime minister on 25 March 2012 set up PMAC, appointed its director, and created a Higher Committee for Mine Action as an interministerial body, with 27 members representing the Ministries of Health, Justice, Education, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Military Liaison, Intelligence, and Police, and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the national mine action authority, is tasked to develop mine action legislation and allocate resources for the sector. PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the West Bank. It receives technical advice from UNMAS. The committee has established a number of subcommittees to deal with risk education, technical issues, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety. PMAC currently has ten employees and is staffed with personnel from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, and Civil Defence. PMAC also has a team of 30 that has been trained by UNMAS for demining, but which is not yet equipped to do so. The Civil Police have an EOD unit with 42 personnel in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Tulkarm, who conduct rapid response to locate and remove items of UXO.  

Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas: Area A is under full Palestinian civilian and security control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C (approx. 60% of the West Bank) where Israel has full control of security, planning, and construction.  

Strategic Planning

There is no strategic mine action plan for Palestine. Over two years, UNMAS has worked to build consensus among Israeli, Palestinian, and international stakeholders regarding a modus operandi for clearance operations in the central West Bank, and for Israel to authorise demining.
Operators

To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations by Palestinian deminers and no clearance operations have been conducted by or on behalf of PMAC. However, in September 2013, the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) gave formal authorisation for HALO Trust to clear two of the 11 minefields deemed high priority by PMAC. Following INMAA authorisation, HALO Trust began mine clearance in the West Bank in April 2014. HALO works under the auspices of both the Israeli and Palestinian mine action authorities.

Mechanical assets deployed by HALO include three front-loading shovels, one armoured excavator, and one rock crusher. In April–August 2014, HALO deployed 16 Georgian deminers and three mechanical operators, with an additional three deminers and one mechanical operator in August to December 2014. This capacity increased slightly in 2015, with an additional mechanical operator and five additional deminers, to allow expansion onto the second minefield at Husan.

In 2013, Israeli commercial operator Quadro Projects and Technologies (Quadro), contracted by California-based Roots of Peace and approved by INMAA, conducted mine clearance in the village of Husan, in the governorate of Bethlehem. Quadro has not conducted clearance since 2013.

Quality Management

INMAA and PMAC both provide external quality assurance (QA) of HALO’s clearance operations in the West Bank. In addition, 4CI Security is contracted to monitor HALO’s clearance in accordance with Israeli National Mine Action Standards.

LAND RELEASE

The total mined land released by clearance in 2014 was 12,226m², compared with 7,000m² in 2013. No land was cancelled in 2014 by non-technical survey.

Survey in 2014

HALO reported that in 2014 it surveyed eight mined areas across the four governorates totalling 266,354m², set out in Table 3. These sites were CMAs already recorded in PMAC’s database and on maps; the survey was intended to more accurately delineate the boundaries of the CMAs. HALO survey data is based on its joint site visits with PMAC and the INMAA, combined with information from PMAC, the INMAA, and local landowners.

Clearance in 2014

In 2014, HALO cleared 12,226m² of mined area in Qalqiliya province in the West Bank, with the destruction of 255 anti-personnel mines and 41 anti-vehicle mines.

Working with the approval of PMAC and INMAA, HALO’s demining operations began in April 2014 at a-Nabi Elyas village in Qalqiliya province. The minefield at a-Nabi Elyas was laid in 1965 by the Jordanian military with Belgian PRB M35 anti-personnel mines and British MkV anti-vehicle mines; an estimated 1,400 mines in total, of which many are known to remain in a functioning condition. Where mines have become deeply buried by soil movement, the plastic PRB M35 cannot be found with metal detectors. In such conditions, HALO uses armoured mechanical equipment to fully excavate contaminated soil and ensure that all deeply buried mines are found and destroyed.

The 12,226m² cleared by HALO in 2014 marks a small increase from 2013, when 7,000m² of mined area were cleared by Quadro.

In 2013, Israeli commercial operator Quadro Projects and Technologies (Quadro), contracted by California-based Roots of Peace and approved by INMAA, conducted mine clearance in the village of Husan, in the governorate of Bethlehem. Quadro has not conducted clearance since 2013.

Progress in 2015

As of October 2015, HALO was still working on the a-Nabi Elyas minefield and reported that it had been necessary to excavate deeper than planned in certain parts and also to include areas outside of the minefield due to land being littered with contaminated soil from the minefield. HALO aimed to complete clearance of the a-Nabi Elyas minefield in 2015.

In addition, in June 2015, HALO commenced clearance of Husan minefield, in the governorate of Bethlehem. This minefield had been partially cleared by Quadro in 2013 and HALO is now clearing the remaining contaminated area. Between 9 June and 31 August, 2015, 6,499m² was cleared with the destruction of 82 anti-personnel mines.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Palestine is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.47

In March 2015, PMAC’s director claimed that clearance of anti-personnel mines would be completed in five years, if there are no constraints by the occupation.48

To date, very little progress has been made in clearing mined areas in the West Bank, with less than 0.02km² cleared over the last five years (see Table 4). Clearance of mined areas in the West Bank is largely constrained by political factors, including the lack of authorisation granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct or oversee mine clearance operations. However, it is a positive development that HALO began mine clearance operations in April 2014. HALO expected to take a further four years to complete clearance of priority sites in the West Bank.49

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian authority only provides funding for the salary of PMAC employees and the PMAC office.51 PMAC has reported that donors have indicated that funding would be increased in 2015.52 In the West Bank, PMAC received US$171,000 from New Zealand. Furthermore, donors involved in mine clearance have expressed interest in supporting clearance operations in other minefields.53

Neither PMAC nor INMAA provides direct funding for HALO’s clearance operations. HALO’s clearance programme in the West Bank is funded by government and private donors, and HALO expected the level of funding to remain constant in 2015.54

UNMAS did not receive funding for activities in the West Bank in 2014 and was seeking funding in 2015 to better support PMAC.55
MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR 4.3
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Russia should accede to and abide by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Russia should take the necessary measures to identify the extent and impact of mine contamination (in particular in Chechnya and the North Caucasus) and clear mined areas in a timely manner.
- Russia should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance operations.
- Russia should ensure the protection of civilians from explosive hazards in areas it controls or occupies.

CONTAMINATION

Russia is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and 1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem. In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mine contamination affected 14km² of land and posed a major obstacle to development. In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organisations have previously estimated that 245km² of land was mined, including 165km² of farmland and 73km² of woodland.

As of 2011, according to UNICEF, 3,132 civilians, including 772 children, had been killed (731) or wounded (2,401) by mines and ERW in Chechnya since 1994. Data collection, which was conducted by a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) partner Voice of the Mountains, was suspended in January 2011 due to lack of funding.

Alleged Use of Mines in Crimea in 2014

Reports of minefields emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea, appear to have concerned either ‘phoney minefields’ or areas containing trip-flares. These devices are not covered by APMBC.

On 8 March 2014, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that “Russian combat engineers were seen placing mines in the land bridge connecting the [Crimean] peninsula to the mainland in order to foil any Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea.” The photographer Evgeny Feldman of the Russian publication Novaya Gazeta photographed an apparent minefield laid near a road leading into Crimea and close to the villages of Chongar and Nikolayevka, in Kherson Province, Ukraine. The photographs show a line of mounds of earth in a field and ‘Danger Mines’ warning signs. Other photographs, shared by a photojournalist with Human Rights Watch, showed an area near Chongar marked with ‘Danger Mines’ signs and evidence of stake-mounted, tripwire-initiated flares in the ground, also known as ‘signal mines’. Members of the local population informed Ukrainian partners of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that Russian Special Forces operating in Kherson Province had laid mines, but it was not possible to confirm the reports, including whether any mines laid were anti-personnel or anti-vehicle. On 7 March 2014, Ukrainian media reported that the Russian military had mined areas around the main gas line into Crimea, but this allegation has not been independently verified.

At a meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 2014, Ukraine alleged Russian use of TM-62 anti-vehicle mines and unidentified anti-personnel mines in Kherson province just north of Crimea. At the same CCW meeting, Russia denied use of anti-personnel mines, asserting “the Self Defence forces of Crimea, before the referendum, placed the minefields with relevant markings, around Chongar”. Russia said “they placed only signal mines and put proper signage around the fields”.

5. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II defines it a phoney minefield as “an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term ‘minefield’ includes phoney minefields.” Art. 2(8), CCW Amended Protocol II.
10. Ibid.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no formal civilian mine action programme in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by federal Ministry of Defence engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialised demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks). Russia reported the establishment of an International Demining Action Centre by the armed forces in 2014. The Centre serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action centre (MAC) as the term is generally understood in mine action.\(^{23}\)

While the overall operational demining capacity in Russia is not known, 23 specialists, 26 demining teams, 138 land and facilities deminers, 42 conventional improvised explosive devices (CIED) specialists, and 56 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators were said to have been trained in 2014.\(^{25}\)

LAND RELEASE

Russia has continued to clear ordnance left over from World War II from its territory, but has shown insufficient commitment to clearing mines and ERW from Chechnya and other affected areas in the North Caucasus.

In May 2010, a representative of the Chechen branch of Russia’s MES claimed that 2.47 km\(^2\) of land had been cleared during the past five years, and that 5,143 explosive devices and 21 air-dropped bombs had been “neutralised.”\(^{14}\) In 2012, the head of the Armed Forces’ engineers, Lieutenant-General Yuri Stavitsky, reportedly announced that the Federal Ministry of Defence had sent military engineers to Chechnya to clear about 0.5 km\(^2\) of farmland. He said a special battalion of deminers employing contract servicemen was undergoing training for deployment in Russia’s southern military district, including Chechnya.\(^{17}\)

Russia’s CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report for 2013 stated that more than 400,000 mines and explosive items were found and destroyed, claiming that clearance had been conducted over an area of more than 84,000 hectares. This huge area of demining (840 km\(^2\)) is not plausible, at least as far as mine clearance is concerned.\(^{18}\)

In March 2014, the engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defence was reported in an online article as having started a new phase of clearance in Chechnya. The engineering unit planned to clear 80 km\(^2\) of contaminated land in Achkhoy-Martan and Grozny districts, and in the highlands of Shatoy and Vedeno districts. In 2013, the same unit reportedly demined more than 20 km\(^2\) of agricultural lands, destroying over 1,700 explosive items.\(^{19}\)

Further online media reports in November 2014 reported that the demining battalion of the 11th Engineer Brigade of the Russian armed forces had been conducting mine clearance in Chechnya and Ingushetia. During clearance, mechanical assets were used first, followed by mine detectors, and in some instances mine detection dogs (MDDs). According to the article, demining has been conducted since spring 2012 and planned results for three years were achieved in two. In 2014, 3,200 hectares (32 km\(^2\)) of land was verified with more than 3,500 explosive devices found and destroyed.\(^{20}\)

In its CCW Amended Protocol II and Protocol V transparency reports for 2014, Russia stated that the main operational focus of its engineering troops was on demining in Chechnya and Ingushetia. The engineering unit of the Russian armed forces inspected and checked for explosives on 122.7 km\(^2\) of land, along with 332.4 km of road, 69 km of railway, and various premises and transportation infrastructure. In total, more than 200,000 explosive objects were destroyed.\(^{21}\) Of this total, Russia reported that much of the clearance concerned former arsenals, armoury bases, military areas, and demolition polygons (which were active in 2010–11). Russia has also, though, reported under CCW Protocol V that, in 2012–14, approx. 55 km\(^2\) of agricultural and forest land, economic infrastructure, and private houses were checked. During this period deminers reportedly destroyed 8,000 explosive items.

In 2015, the engineering unit of the Russian armed forces planned to clear 61 km\(^2\) of land.\(^{22}\)

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Russia is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.\(^{23}\)

See, e.g., “It is planned to establish special groups for demining of lands within MES”, Caucasian Knot, 23 July 2009; and “Autumn demining is completed in Chechnya”, Westi Kavkaza, 28 October 2010.

CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, Form B, 31 March 2015; and meeting with Andrey Grebenschikov, First Secretary, Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 9 April 2015.


“Russia begins mine clearing in Chechnya”, Novosti, 4 April 2012.


CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2014), Form A.

Russia is a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of which requires that member states respect and protect the right to life.
The Korean War left mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in southern Korea, and because of a security threat, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) laid barrier minefields along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating it from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north.

The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978, and in 1988. In May 2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites that cover an area of about 3km² in the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, below the CCZ.1

South Korea has had to contend periodically with wooden box mines carried by flood water from North Korea during the rainy season. The armed forces’ Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] said in July 2014 that the military had found 258 North Korean mines in the preceding four years.2

A report by the National Defence Committee in 2010 said that South Korea had about 1,100 “planned” mined areas covering 20km² and some 209 unconfirmed or suspected mined areas (SMAs) covering 97.82km².3

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1 Response to the Monitor by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
2 “Military urges extra care on land mines from North Korea”, Korea Herald, 14 July 2014.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no national mine action authority or mine action centre in South Korea. Demining is conducted by the South Korean army, which has undertaken limited clearance of the DMZ and CCZ, and has concentrated mostly on demining military bases in rear areas.

In November 2013, the Ministry of Defence said it had submitted a bill on mines to the parliament to allow civilian organisations to remove mines laid during the Korean War, in order to facilitate ongoing military clearance. "The bill is aimed at making legal grounds and a process to allow both the military and civilians to remove mines so as to protect lives and the property of people," the Ministry said in a press release.4 As of April 2015, South Korea’s National Assembly had not passed the bill.

LAND RELEASE

In its latest Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report submitted in March 2014, South Korea said army deminers had cleared 90,780m² in 2013, removing "approx. 431 mines". It said 341 military servicemen had participated in the programme costing more than US$1 million.5

The JCS reported that military deminers cleared 433 mines in 2014 from coastal areas and land close to the border with North Korea, of which 312 were anti-vehicle mines and 211 anti-personnel mines. The JCS said in a statement: "We will continue the operations to spot and remove mines near the border regions and major military bases in phases".6

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

South Korea is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.7

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4 “S. Korea pushes to allow civilians to remove land mines”, Yonhap News Agency, 14 November 2013
7 South Korea is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
### MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

#### 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Problem understood</td>
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<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

5.3
## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Sri Lanka should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Mine action authorities should draw up a new strategic plan laying out priorities and timelines for completing mine clearance.**
- **Mine action authorities should disaggregate data between mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).**
- **Sri Lanka should clarify whether international operators will have a role in mine action beyond 2016.**

## CONTAMINATION

Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Most (70%) of the contamination is in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), which ended in May 2009. However, Sri Lankan estimates of total mine and ERW contamination have fallen sharply from 506km² at the end of 2010, to 98km² at the end of 2012 and almost 78km² at the end of 2014 (see Table 1).¹

Operators have encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including anti-personnel mines with anti-tilt and anti-lift mechanisms, and often containing a larger explosive charge than the P4 MK1 mines (up to 140g compared to 30g). They also encountered tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and, to a lesser extent, anti-vehicle mines.⁵ However, much of the extensive mining by LTTE in northern districts has now been cleared and remaining contamination in the eastern provinces (Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee) is thought to be light.

Sri Lanka’s five northern provinces account for about 70% of the remaining mined areas, with the densest contamination concentrated to the north of Elephant Pass, marking the former frontline between the army and LTTE and covering about 14km².³ Both sides made extensive use of mines, including belts of P4 MK1 blast anti-personnel mines laid by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA), and long defensive lines with a mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid by LTTE defending approaches to the northern town of Kilinochchi.⁴

### Table 1: Remaining confirmed hazardous area (CHA) (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>End 2012</th>
<th>End 2013</th>
<th>End 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaffna</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilinochchi</td>
<td>19.45</td>
<td>18.06</td>
<td>17.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullaitivu</td>
<td>20.14</td>
<td>16.18</td>
<td>13.59</td>
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<td>Vavuniya</td>
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<td>Mannar</td>
<td>25.99</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>15.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trincomalee</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>6.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Batticaloa</td>
<td>14.67</td>
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<td>Ampara</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anuradhapura</td>
<td>3.35</td>
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<td>3.32</td>
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<td>Polonnaruwa</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>83.85</strong></td>
<td><strong>78.09</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Hindu Religious Affairs became the lead agency for mine action in 2015 as chair of the interministerial National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), which sets policy and is supposed to “manage linkages within the government, mine action community and donors”. Its policies and decisions are implemented by the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), set up in 2010 with responsibility for: liaising with government ministries and development partners to determine mine action priorities; preparing a strategic plan; and setting annual workplans to put it into effect. It is also responsible for accrediting mine action operators, setting national standards, and acting as the secretariat of NSCMA.

Clearance operations in the field are coordinated, tasked, and quality managed by a Regional Mine Action Office (RMAO) in Kilinochchi, working in consultation with District Steering Committees for Mine Action. The Committees are chaired by government agents heading district authorities.

A National Mine Action Strategy released in September 2010, a year after the end of the war with LTTE, called for a Sri Lanka “free from the threat of landmines and ERW”. It gave priority to clearance of land needed for resettlement of people displaced by the conflict and land needed for supporting livelihoods, giving access to schools, hospitals and religious centres, or within three kilometres of villages and main roads. It assigned medium priority to land needed for infrastructure development and low priority to hazards in jungle areas with no immediate impact. NMAC said in 2013 that it was revising the plan to take account of an expected downturn in donor support, but as of mid-2015 had not released a new plan.

In 2014, demining was conducted by SLA; one national non-governmental organisation (NGO), Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH); and two international NGOs, the HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). The government had set a deadline of the end of 2014 for withdrawal of international operators from Sri Lanka, but agreed to extend the deadline until the end of 2016. It was not clear if the government of President Maithripala Sirisena, elected in January 2015, intended to adhere to this deadline.
**LAND RELEASE**

Official data on clearance conducted in 2014 showed a continuing decline, recording a fall in mined area released through clearance to just 3.75km², 41% less than the previous year. The drop in productivity over the last two years follows a steady decline in capacity following closure of the operations of the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) in 2013 and two Indian demining NGOs, Horizon and Sarvatra, in 2012.

SLA's Humanitarian Demining Unit, the biggest operator nominally employing some 2,000 personnel, reportedly increased the amount of battle area clearance (BAC), but its mine clearance dropped sharply in 2014, releasing almost two-thirds less land than the previous year.

Official data showed HALO Trust also released, overall, less mined area in 2014. However, HALO reported that it released 2.1km² through clearance in 2014, about 0.5km² through survey. Working in the Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Mullaitivu areas of northern Sri Lanka, with 98 manual and six mechanical teams, HALO reported that its operations resulted in the destruction of a total of 20,422 anti-personnel mines and 122 anti-vehicle mines. MAG, which increased capacity from two clearance teams to five in 2014, concentrated these on the key food-producing area of Mannar where it was the only demining operator, reporting that it manually cleared 199,569m², but also cancelled or released a total of 2.68km² through non-technical and technical survey, destroying 1,927 anti-personnel mines.

**Deminer Safety**

Two HALO Trust deminers sustained injuries to their arms and hands in demining incidents in 2014, in both cases as a result of breaches of standard operating procedures for excavations.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Sri Lanka is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.

In the last five years, Sri Lanka has cleared more than 55km² of mined area, although in the last two years clearance has dropped significantly (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area (km²)</th>
<th>Battle area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>15.58</td>
<td>6.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>16.58</td>
<td>36.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13.22</td>
<td>255.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>55.57</td>
<td>303.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Mine and battle area clearance in 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>BAC (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DASH</td>
<td>567,406</td>
<td>50,900</td>
<td>11,610</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>121,079</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,743</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>1,597,256</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12,841</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>248,990</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA-HDU</td>
<td>1,213,889</td>
<td>1,978,178</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3,768,620</td>
<td>2,029,078</td>
<td>32,223</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>27,825</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BAC = battle area clearance  
APM = anti-personnel mines  
AVM = anti-vehicle mines  
UXO = unexploded ordnance

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3 Telephone interview with Valon Kumnova, Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 1 April 2014.
5 Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO Trust, 11 April 2014, and interviews with demining operators, Colombo, 29 March-3 April 2010.
7 The cabinet formally approved the creation of NMAC on 10 July 2010.
8 Email from Amanthi Wickramasinghe, Programme Officer – Peace and Recovery, UNDP, Colombo, 11 March 2011.
11 Interview with Monty Ratanunga, Director, Mine Action, NMAC, in Geneva, 11 April 2013.
12 Email from Damian O’Brien, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 18 August 2015.
13 Email from Alistair Moir, Country Director, MAG, 25 May 2015.
15 Email from Damian O’Brien, HALO Trust, 18 August 2015.
16 Sri Lanka is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Syria should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- All parties to the ongoing armed conflicts should cease mine-laying and clear mined areas as a matter of urgency.

CONTAMINATION

Syria is contaminated by mines, a legacy of Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 and the ongoing armed conflicts. The scale and intensity of combat involving heavy, indiscriminate weapons in Syria has tended to eclipse mine use and casualties since 2012, but media and other reports by groups monitoring or involved in the conflict point to continued use of mines by pro- and anti-government forces across the country.

International observers believe remotely delivered T-84 mines were used in the Golan Heights in the south-west of Syria and mine casualties reportedly occurred in areas of Hassakeh province in the far north-east contested by Islamic State and Kurdish forces. Islamic State was reported to have left mines in a number of locations in central and northern Syria, including around the ancient site of Palmyra. Rebel groups attacking a regime airbase at Wadi Deif, between the western cities of Hamah and Idlib, are reported to have suffered heavy casualties from mines placed around the perimeter. Rebel groups have reportedly made use of mines along with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and have in the past said they would re-use government-laid mines they recovered.

Kurdish groups in the north-eastern town of Ras al-Ain reported removal of some 60 tripwire-activated mines placed by jihadist groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in the nearby town of Tel Halaf.

Syrian refugees and opposition fighters arriving in neighbouring Lebanon in 2012 and 2013 related experiences with mines, but Turkish border areas have been particularly hazardous. Turkish authorities reportedly stated that between 613,000 and 715,000 mines had been planted along the Turkish-Syrian border, making clear they were not emplaced by Turkish forces though media reports gave no further details. In 2012, Human Rights Watch identified mine use on the Turkish border near Hasanieh (PMN-2 mines), Derwand, Jiftlek, Kherbet al-Joz toward Alzouf and al-Sofan, Armana, Bkafta, Hatya, Darkosh, Salqin, and Azmeirin. In 2014, casualties occurred among civilians attempting to cross the Turkish border to escape heavy fighting in the town of Kobani. Civilian mine casualties were also reported from villages close to the town.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no mine action programme in Syria, no national mine action authority (NMAA), and no mine action centre (MAC).

In March 2012, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) established an office in Damascus, initially as part of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), but this was closed in August 2012 and UNMAS does not have a presence in Syria. An UNMAS risk education project was included in the Syrian humanitarian response plan proposed for 2014, but Syrian authorities did not approve visas for staff to implement it.11

LAND RELEASE

No formal demining programme is being conducted in Syria, but limited clearance is reportedly conducted on an ad hoc basis by government and non-state armed groups as well as by some civilians.

Media reported the death of two Syrian army engineers in the course of demining in Homs Old City after the evacuation of rebels in May 2014, but it was unclear whether they were engaged in clearing mines or in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).12

Media reports have also referred to agreement by Palestinian factions besieged in the Damascus suburb of Yarmouk to allow the entry of a “mine detection committee” to search for mines and IEDs. Media reports said that roads into Yarmouk had been cleared of mines, although humanitarian agencies in Syria said they were not aware of mines affecting access.13

As an example of spontaneous clearance by local inhabitants, a video posted online by Human Rights Watch in March 2012 reported that a team of five local people had removed 300 anti-personnel mines as an example of spontaneous clearance by local inhabitants, a video posted online by Human Rights Watch in March 2012 reported that a team of five local people had removed 300 anti-personnel mines from the village of Hasanieh near the border with Turkey.14

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Syria is not a state party to the APMBC but nonetheless the government and all armed forces have obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.


Uzbekistan should accede to and abide by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

Uzbekistan should take the necessary measures to identify the extent and impact of mine contamination and clear mined areas in a timely manner.

Uzbekistan should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance operations.

Uzbek forces have laid mines along its international borders at various times, including on its borders with Afghanistan in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with Tajikistan in 2000. In 2010, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon criticised as “unacceptable” Uzbekistan’s emplacing of mines along parts of its border that have not been delineated.1

Soviet troops also laid mines on the Uzbek-Afghan border. Survey on the Tajik side of the border over several years had identified a total of 57 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) [size unknown] as of December 2008, which were subsequently deemed to be on Uzbekistan territory [see Tajikistan report]. Uzbekistan had reportedly cleared 95% of the minefields along the Tajik border by the end of 2007 in demining operations conducted by Uzbek army deminers in cooperation with Tajik border troops.2

In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked previously mined areas of the border around the settlements of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were free of contamination.3 According to the most recent information available (2005), Uzbekistan has no plans to clear mines laid on its 150km border with Afghanistan.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no functioning mine action programme in Uzbekistan.

LAND RELEASE
There are no reports of any land release occurring in 2014.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Uzbekistan is not a state party or signatory to APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.4

4 Uzbekistan is a state party to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR** 4.2
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Vietnam should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority and clear all mined areas as soon as possible.
- Vietnam should provide an assessment of mine contamination.
- The Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) and the Ministry of Defence should report on mined areas that are cleared each year and detail the items destroyed.

CONTAMINATION

Vietnam’s mine problem is small compared with its other explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination but the extent is unknown. Most mines were left by conflicts in the 1970s with neighbouring Cambodia and China and affect areas close to its borders with those countries. Some mines have also been found around former US military installations. Vietnam cleared an area up to 1km deep along its northern border under an agreement with China, but areas further inland from the border are still contaminated with mines emplaced by the military of both countries. Since 2004, military engineers have reportedly cleared around 95km² of contaminated land in the northern provinces of Cao Bang, Ha Giang, Lai Chau, Lang Son, and Quang Ninh bordering China under a project known as ‘Programme 120’, destroying mainly Type 72, K58, and PPM-2 anti-personnel mines.

Cambodian border areas were affected by randomly placed mines reflecting the more irregular nature of the fighting there, but Engineering Command reported in 2013 that the problem had been eliminated. Many ports and river deltas were mined extensively during the war and were not completely cleared when it ended, and some sea mines have been found on the coast.

MAG supervisor conducting clearance in Gio Linh District, Vietnam. © Le Van Tra/MAG
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Vietnam’s mine action programme is undergoing a period of transition from military management to civilian oversight. A Prime Minister’s Decision in 2006 assigned the Ministry of National Defence to oversee mine action at the national level, with clearance undertaken by the Army Engineering Corps of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). BOMICEN, part of the Ministry of National Defence, has acted as a central coordinating body for clearance and survey by national operators.

In 2013, Vietnam announced a Prime Minister’s decision to establish a national mine action centre (VNMAC) to strengthen the direction of mine action and provide a focal point for mine action operations. VNMAC was given responsibility to propose policy, draw up plans, serve as the focal point for international cooperation, lead fundraising, and “preside over” mine action information management. It is also responsible for organising and implementing quality assurance (QA). The government appointed VNMAC’s Director and two Deputy Directors in 2014 and the centre became officially operational in February 2015.

Strategic Planning

Vietnam’s National Mine Action Plan for 2013−15, released in May 2013, called for clearance of 1,000km² of ERW contamination a year to support socio-economic development, but set no targets for anti-personnel mine clearance. Implementation was dependent on mobilising substantial additional financial resources. Engineering Command estimated that to achieve the target would have needed at least double the actual number of clearance teams.

VNMAC reported that priorities for 2015−16 included drafting and issuing a decree on mine action, fundraising for VNMAC’s headquarters, developing a national database, conducting mine action in Ha Tinh province using Japanese funding, and developing and implementing mine action in Vietnam’s most contaminated provinces.

Operators

Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the PAVN Army Engineering Corps, whose officials have previously reported operating some 250 mine/UXO clearance teams, including the teams of around 50 military companies. Four international humanitarian operators conducted clearance in Vietnam in 2016: APOPO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and PeaceTrees Vietnam. Germany brought in APOPO at the start of 2014 to take over the programme previously managed by SODI (Solidarity Service International), but Germany stopped its funding in September 2014 and the programme closed. International operators are required to register with the People’s Aid Coordinating Committee to work in Vietnam, but negotiate agreements to operate separately with the authorities of each province.

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1 Interview with Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, Deputy Commander, Military Engineering Command, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
3 Information provided by Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, PAVN, in email received from Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), Hanoi, 24 September 2012, and in interview in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
5 Interview with Sr. Col. Nguyen Thanh Ban, Head of Bomb and Mine Department, Engineering Command, Hanoi, 18 June 2013.
7 Prime Minister’s Decision No. 96/2006/QD-TTg, 4 May 2006.
8 Email from Col. Nguyen Trong Dac, Ministry of National Defence, 6 August 2006.
9 Interview with Maj. Gen. Pham Quang Xuan, Director, VNMAC, in Geneva, 31 March 2014.
10 Prime Minister’s Decision 319/QD-TTg, 4 March 2014.
11 Information provided by Do Van Nhan, Deputy Director General, VNMAC, received by email from VVAF, 19 June 2015.
12 Ibid.
13 Interview with Sr. Col. Nguyen Thanh Ban, Engineering Command, Hanoi, 18 June 2013, and email from Executive Office of the National Steering Committee, 6 August 2012.
14 Email from TeKimiti Gilbert, Head of Mine Action, APOPO, 16 June 2015.
LAND RELEASE

The Ministry of Defence launched a two-year VND7.4 billion (US$3.5 million)15 project to clear a 6.6km² area of mines and ERW in Cao Bang and Lang Son provinces, starting in November 2013 and expected to continue into 2015. Army engineers reportedly cleared about 1km² in 2013, but the Ministry of Defence has not released results for that programme or any other mine clearance projects in Vietnam in 2014.16

Mine clearance by four international operators was incidental to their battle area clearance (BAC) projects. In 2014, the humanitarian operators reported destroying a total of 18 anti-personnel mines.17

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Vietnam is not a state party to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.18
### MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

6.0
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Kosovo should make a formal commitment to respect and implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and to clear all mined areas as soon as possible.
- Kosovo should disaggregate mine clearance from battle area clearance (BAC) in its reporting.

CONTAMINATION

Kosovo is contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of the conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 1990s, and the conflict between FRY and NATO in 1999. At the end of 2014, 77 confirmed mined areas remained covering 2.75km².

The UN reported in 2002 that “the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance [UXO] in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated”2, but further investigation revealed considerably more contamination.3

A non-technical survey of Kosovo by the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) and HALO Trust completed in 2013 revealed 130 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 10.36km².4 By the end of 2014, 128 CHAs remained covering 10.44km².5 KMAC explained the increase in the total size of CHAs by reporting that the end-2013 estimate for 130 CHAs did not include five tasks on which teams had started work and which inflated the real end-2013 total.6 HALO Trust did not have access to all of the north for the survey it completed in 2013 and KMAC looked forward to survey of remaining locations by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2015.7

Mines are found mainly on Kosovo’s borders with Albania and Macedonia but also in the area of Dulie Pass in south-central Kosovo.8 The KMAC-HALO survey confirmed 79 areas as mined over a total area of 2.76km², a greater number of tasks than the total of 48 CHAs and SHAs that had been identified at the end of 2012.9 By the end of 2014 KMAC reported the number of confirmed mined areas (CMAs) had fallen to 77 covering 2.75km².10

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In January 2011, the EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] Coordination Management Section became the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) under the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). KMAC is responsible for managing clearance of mines and ERW. It prepares an annual workplan in cooperation with demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and coordinates operations of both NGOs and the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR). It also coordinates survey, quality assurance (QA), mine/ERW risk education, public information, and victim assistance.11

Three NGOs have supported mine action in Kosovo: HALO Trust, the Bosnia-based Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC) and Mines Awareness Trust (MAT). MDDC and MAT were not funded to operate in 2014 but KMAC expected KSF and MDDC to start work on a new demining task in 2015. NPA received accreditation to conduct survey and was due to operate in northern Kosovo in 2015.12

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4 Email from Ahmet Sallova, Head, KMAC, Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, 20 February 2014.
5 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 18 March 2015.
6 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 27 May 2015.
7 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 18 March 2015.
8 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 30 July 2013.
9 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 20 February 2014.
10 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 18 March 2015.
11 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 1 August 2012.
12 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 18 March 2015.
**LAND RELEASE**

Clearance accelerated in 2014 after the downturn in clearance as a result of funding constraints in the previous year. KSF and the HALO Trust cleared a total of 0.8 km² in 2014 (see Table 1), double the area cleared in 2013, mostly of cluster munition remnants (CMR). KMAC does not disaggregate in its reporting between BAC and mine clearance.

**Table 1: Mine clearance and BAC in 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KSF</td>
<td>375,324</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>444,763</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>840,087</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = anti-personnel mines  AVM = anti-vehicle mines  UXO = unexploded ordnance

KSF operated three platoons with 75 deminers also trained for BAC and a fourth platoon with 25 deminers also trained for EOD who conduct both area clearance and spot EOD tasks. In 2014, it released one CHA and worked on three more that were suspended at the end of the demining season. KSF EOD also destroyed 449 UXO items in the course of 360 response tasks. HALO Trust, working with 57 deminers, cleared 59,456 m² of mined area, but focused mainly on clearance of CMR. HALO deminers average 22 m² a day on mined area, reflecting the constraints on clearance posed by steep gradients, dense vegetation, and significant metal contamination. To deal with this latter challenge, HALO was seeking additional funding to acquire Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) detectors in the expectation they could increase the mined area clearance rate by close to a third. HALO reported that an evaluation of Kosovo’s mine action programme, conducted by Strathfillan Consultancy in 2014 on behalf of the ITF Enhancing Human Security, concluded that KSF and HALO, continuing with their existing capacity and procedures, would take 12 years to complete clearance operations. The evaluation report suggested that if both organisations, with existing capacity, had access to HSTAMIDS detectors and adopted NPA’s Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) methodology, clearance could be completed in nine years.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Kosovo is not a state party to the APMBC. Nonetheless, Kosovo has obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible. At current rates of clearance, Kosovo will still be mine-affected in a decade from now.

**Table 2: Mine clearance and BAC in 2010–14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KSF’s budget remained at approx. € 900,000 (US$1.1 million) in 2014. HALO Trust, after the end of Belgian funding in 2013, received €172,000 (US$189,200) from Switzerland.

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 21 May 2015.
16 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 27 May 2015.
17 Email from Ahmet Sallava, KMAC, 18 March 2015.
18 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 21 May 2015.
MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

5.0
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should cease all use of anti-personnel mines and provide resources for mine survey and clearance.

The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should make a formal commitment to respect and implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and clear all anti-personnel mines.

CONTAMINATION

In 1988, a decision by the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia resulted in armed conflict in 1988–94 between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991, but this has not been internationally recognised.

All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by mines and unexploded submunitions as a result of the 1988–94 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mines were laid by both the Azeri and pro-Karabakh forces during the war, with a relatively high proportion of anti-vehicle mines being used in some regions, as well as anti-personnel mines throughout. The mines were of Soviet design and manufacture, and due to the nature of the conflict certain areas were mined several times by both sides.

New contamination was added in 2013. In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief, General Movses Hakobian, reportedly stated that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.” General Hakobian said use was aimed at preventing sabotage attacks by Azerbaijani troops.

In a 4 September 2013 response to a letter by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh did not deny that mines had been used. He stated that, “due to the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan ... today we are not in a position to refrain from using AP [anti-personnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of contact.” He noted further that, “these mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances and ceasing any possible military aggression against us.”

As of September 2013, remaining mined area was 1.6km², of which 0.88km² across 34 different areas contained anti-personnel mines and 0.73km² across 15 different areas contained anti-vehicle mines. However, this estimate is believed to only include contamination within the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh, and not mine contamination in the adjacent territories.

To date, HALO Trust has cleared 95% of all known minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh. However, HALO has reported that the goal to make Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh mine-free will take longer than expected due to reduced clearance capacity from 2015 onwards.

While progress has been made, around 70% of remaining contamination – consisting mainly of anti-vehicle mines – is in areas occupied by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Forces outside Soviet-era boundaries. HALO Trust has operated in these areas since the beginning of its presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, but in recent years HALO’s activities have reduced due to difficulties in attracting funds to operate in these areas.

In 1995–2013, HALO recorded 268 mine incidents resulting in some 330 casualties, including 73 killed. Eight civilian mine incidents were recorded in 2014, resulting in 11 casualties, two of which were fatalities. This represented a sharp increase over previous years, and seven of the eight accidents in 2014 were in adjacent territories not inside Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh. Taking into account that Nagorno-Karabakh’s population is only an estimated 140,000, this equates to a per capita incident rate of 7.9 per 100,000, one of the highest in the world.

Mines impede use of land, roads, and other areas, and affect the rural population in particular, whose main income is from herding animals and farming. Nagorno-Karabakh is also contaminated by cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). Explosive remnants of war (ERW) are said to “severely” impact rural communities, limiting the incomes of thousands of families.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A mine action coordination committee is responsible for liaising between the de facto government and HALO. In 2000, HALO established the Nagorno-Karabakh Mine Action Centre (NKMAC), which consolidates all mine-action-related information and responds to requests from the de facto government ministries, other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and local communities. The NKMAC maintains maps and a database that covers: suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) surveyed; areas cleared of mines and UXO; locations of mine and UXO incidents; and all mine risk education given.

In 1995 and 1996, HALO trained local Karabakhi personnel in demining and left national staff to manage operations. In 1999, HALO returned to find the programme had suffered significant failures, including many accidents and a one-person explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team, and three three-strong mechanical teams with each team operating an armoured Volvo front-loader. However, HALO’s USAID budget in Nagorno-Karabakh was reduced by one quarter for the fiscal year 2015, resulting in redundancy for 43 staff. This decreased operational capacity to ten manual teams, one EOD team, and two mechanical teams, funded by USAID.

HALO also received funding from the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) for one two-person risk education team and one four-person EOD team throughout 2014, and one eight-person manual team that operated for six months. In October 2014, Armenian Diaspora organisations, All Armenia Fund (AAF) and Landmine Free Artsakh (LFA), jointly provided HALO with funding for one additional manual team from August 2014 to April 2015.

As of the end of 2014, HALO was employing 129 staff in Nagorno-Karabakh. The 25% budget reduction in USAID applied from October 2014 to September 2015, HALO expected to maintain the reduced capacity throughout 2015.

LAND RELEASE

A total of 0.54km² of mined area was released by clearance in 2014, compared with 0.31km² in 2013. HALO has not reported whether the area contained anti-personnel mines only, anti-vehicle mines only, or a combination of both.

4 Ibid.
7 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
8 Email from Andrew Moore, Balkans and Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014.
11 Ibid.
14 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
18 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
20 Ibid.; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
27 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014.
Survey in 2014

In 2014, HALO confirmed 15 areas covering 839,754m² as contaminated with mines. In 2014, all land-release operations were directed to clearance of confirmed mined areas (CMAs), and therefore no land was released through technical survey or cancelled through non-technical survey.

Clearance in 2014

In 2014, a total of 27 mined areas covering 536,868m² were released by clearance. During mine clearance operations, 88 anti-personnel mines were destroyed, along with seven anti-vehicle mines, and 58 other items of UXO. HALO had aimed to clear some 0.35km² of land contaminated with anti-personnel mines and 0.3km² contaminated with anti-vehicle mines in 2014.

HALO was called out to 194 EOD tasks in 2014, during which an additional 53 anti-personnel mines and 13 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed, along with 91 submunitions and 362 other items of UXO.

HALO suspended use of large-loop detectors (LLDs) in mid-2014, due to almost all remaining anti-vehicle mines suspected to contain minimum metal. LLDs cannot detect TM-62P mines found in Nagorno-Karabakh, so HALO has developed prodding drills instead. However, the majority of anti-vehicle minefields in HALO’s 2014 workplan could not be prodded due to hard, rocky ground, and HALO therefore developed new clearance drills using a Minelab F3 detector with a large UXO head attachment. This drill, however, was much slower than both prodding and LLD. Clearance rates per team using LLD are 8,000m² a week compared to 3,500m² a week for prodding, while Minelab UXO head drills are 1,000m² a week.

Land release in 2014 assisted 2,710 direct and 6,672 indirect beneficiaries. The released area will mainly be used for agriculture, grazing, and woodcutting.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Nagorno-Karabakh is not a state party to the APMBC but nonetheless the authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.

Progress in mine clearance has fluctuated over the last five years, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Mine clearance in 2010–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2008–10, HALO cleared an average of between 5km² and 6km² of mined area annually, and averaged over 30km² of battle area clearance (BAC). In 2011, however, the UK interrupted its funding of the programme and HALO lost 37% of its capacity; consequently, clearance rates declined. The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities have not provided HALO with any funding for clearance of mined or CMR-contaminated areas.

HALO was receiving 25% less funding from its main donor, USAID, in 2015 than in the previous year, resulting in a one-third reduction in operational capacity. However, USAID has indicated willingness to extend HALO’s current two-and-a-half-year grant that ends in March 2016. USAID has requested that funds be used for clearance within the Soviet-era boundary of Nagorno-Karabakh oblast, and that HALO focus on mine clearance. Surface CMR clearance is funded by USAID as a secondary activity, to be conducted when minefields are inaccessible. No sub-surface CMR clearance is funded by USAID. In HALO’s opinion the above-mentioned prioritisation by USAID is reasonable, especially given that all reported accidents in 2014 involved mines.

In 2014, HALO reported that full clearance of minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh could be achieved within three years if sufficient funding were available. While 95% of mine contamination in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh has been addressed, reduced clearance capacity means that full mine clearance of that area may take longer than expected.

Furthermore, significant contamination remains in adjacent territories. HALO estimates that with its current capacity of only one team funded to work in adjacent territories, it will take more than 100 years to finish clearance there. HALO hopes to expand clearance in adjacent territories through fundraising from private foundations. Despite the clear humanitarian need to clear mines and ERW, though, international isolation of Nagorno-Karabakh also makes it difficult for HALO to raise funds to work in the region, and funds raised are often subject to territorial restrictions.

28 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 See ICBL-CMC Landmine Monitor reports on Nagorno-Karabakh covering the period 2010-2013.
36 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., and email 11 June 2015.
40 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 11 June 2015.
41 Ibid; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014.
42 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
43 Ibid.
## MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE** 5.6
CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of mine contamination across Western Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm are thought to contain some of the densest mine contamination in the world. The contamination is a result of fighting in previous decades between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguià el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces.

As of end-2014, Western Sahara had almost 260km² of confirmed mined areas (CMAs) to the east of the Berm, as set out in Table 1. This appears to be a significant decrease from the situation in March 2014, when the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) estimated that contamination totalled 292km².

Table 1: Contamination east of the Berm as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>242,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVM</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>151,361,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM and AVM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>108,360,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>259,964,454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the north and south of Western Sahara contained CMAs, as set out in Table 2.

Table 2: Contamination by region east of the Berm as of end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CMAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22,047,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>237,916,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>259,964,454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A survey in 2006–08 by an international non-governmental organisation (NGO), Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), had identified 37 mined areas on the east of the Berm, with nearly half located in Bir Lahou, followed by Tifariti, Mehaires, and Awanit. As of August 2015, according to UNMAS, the number of confirmed minefields remaining east of the Berm had increased to 43.

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1 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm, was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12 times the length of the Berlin Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China. H. McNeish, “Western Sahara’s struggle for freedom cut off by a wall”, Al Jazeera, 5 June 2015, at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/05/western-sahara-struggle-freedom-cut-wall-150528065625790.html.
3 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Holland, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 18 May 2015. The extent of contamination in Moroccan-controlled territory to the west of the Berm remains unknown.
4 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Holland, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 18 May 2015.
5 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Holland, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 18 May 2015.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Email from Penelope Caswell, Field Programme and Geographic Information System Manager, AOAV, 18 May 2010, incorporating information from James Mbogo, Information Management System for Mine Action Officer, UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, at: http://www.mineaction.org/resources/portfolio.
9 Email from Graeme Abernethy, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 20 August 2015; and UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Western Sahara”, updated May 2015, at: http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/westernsahara.
Neither survey nor clearance has been conducted in the 5km buffer zone to the east of the Berm. The extent of contamination west of the Berm remains unknown, and as of August 2015, no survey had been carried out there. RMA controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS, RMA cooperates with the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) and submits regular monthly reports, helping to build a clearer understanding of the mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) threat across Western Sahara. The total number of mine/ERW victims in Western Sahara is not known, though estimates suggest more than 2,500 victims since 1975. From April 2014 to April 2015, the UN reported four mine and ERW incidents, killing one civilian and injuring another five, and killing one soldier and injuring another five. West of the Berm, in a total of six incidents, two civilians were reportedly killed and three injured, and one soldier was killed and another three were injured.

The significant mine, unexploded submunition, and other UXO contamination in Western Sahara continues to pose a daily threat to the local, nomadic, and refugee populations, along with UN personnel and military observers, and humanitarian actors. Contamination from mines and ERW negatively impacts socio-economic growth and development, limiting access to fluctuating and seasonally dependent water sources vital for animal herding and small-scale agriculture on which local populations depend.

The UN reported, between April 2014 and April 2015, that many of the remaining minefields are located in areas with increasing civilian activity. According to the UN, civilians have been returning home from refugee camps and building infrastructure north-east of the Berm in several areas that were largely abandoned since 1976. Some of these areas remain heavily contaminated by mines and ERW, which the UN said was "limiting any additional growth, curtailing livelihoods and placing residents at risk".

## Cluster munition remnants

Western Sahara is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) as a result of RMA use of cluster munitions against Polisario Front forces in 1975–91. As of end-2014, 69 known cluster munition strike zones covering 4.7km² east of the Berm required clearance, three of which were discovered as recently as June 2014. New strike areas are expected to be found as information is received from local populations.

## Programme Management

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) manages a MACC. MINURSO MACC coordinates mine action activities east of the Berm, including clearance of mines and ERW for humanitarian purposes, route verification, risk education, and capacity-development activities. Mine action activities have been undertaken by MACC in partnership with international NGOs AOAV and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), local NGO Sahrawi Campaign to Ban Landmines, and commercial contractors Mechem and MineTech International (MTI).

In September 2013, the Polisario Front established a local mine action coordination office (MACO), which will eventually be responsible for coordinating mine action in Western Sahara east of the Berm and for conducting land release. SMACO, which was set up with UN support, started operating in January 2014. During the first half of 2014, AOAV and MINURSO MACC trained SMACO to coordinate and lead mine action activities east of the Berm. Trainings were held on human resources, operations, logistics, management, and finance-related aspects of mine action, as well as quality management and the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. In 2015, SMACO did not have any operational teams but facilitated the work of its demining partners.

## Standards

MINURSO MACC’s activities are conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). It planned to develop local mine action standards applicable to the east of the Berm.

## Operators

AOAV and MTI were the two implementing operators conducting mine clearance and survey in 2014, with the support of MINURSO MACC. AOAV was operational in the first half of 2014, until it began a demobilisation and handover process on 24 June due to lack of funding and loss of the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) tender for mine action in Western Sahara. In September, MTI took over the UN tender and began operations, and AOAV completed formal handover on 23 October 2014. Mine action was previously implemented through a partnership between AOAV and Mechem in 2012–14.

From 1 January to 31 August 2014, AOAV had the following capacity: two multitask teams (MTTs); one mechanical clearance team (MCT); one Mine Wolf and Vehicle Mounted Mine Detection System; one battle area clearance (BAC) team; and a total of 72 staff, of whom 68 were local. AOAV reported deployment of two new mine-protected vehicles (MPVs) in 2014, a CASPIR and a TAIPR. From 1 September to 31 December 2014, MTI’s mine action capacity comprised one Vehicle-Mounted Ground Penetrating Radar System, one community liaison team, two MTTs, and a total of 59 staff.
In 2015, NPA was deploying to Western Sahara with two MTTs for a two-year period. MTI expected to continue to operate with the same capacity in 2015. MINURSO MACC also secured funding for an additional MTT for a nine-month period. 32

Quality Management

MINURSO MACC reported that quality assurance (QA) activities are conducted externally by the MACC Operations and QA Officer on a regular basis (on average, three QA assessments per month), as well as internally by implementing partners. 33 AOAV conducted its own internal QA assessments on a daily basis, which were recorded and submitted in daily reports to MINURSO MACC. 34

Information Management

MINURSO MACC manages an IMSMA database for Western Sahara and provides mine and ERW threat data used in GPS devices and maps by MINURSO. 35 It reported upgrading its IMSMA software in 2014. 36

LAND RELEASE

The total mined area east of the Berm released by clearance in 2014 was approx. 1.2km², compared with 2km² in 2013. 37 In addition, a further 52km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA) to the east of the Berm was handed over to local communities in 2014, after the completion of a combination of non-technical and technical survey carried out in 2012–14. 38 Two route-verification tasks using a vehicle-mounted mine detection system (VMMDS) were completed for MINURSO’s military component totalling over 1.8km², up from the verification of 0.8km² in 2013. 39

To the west of the Berm, according to a UN Secretary-General report, RMA reported, improbably in the view of Mine Action Monitor, that it had cleared 222.8km² in territory under its control between April 2013 and March 2014. 40
Survey in 2014

Almost 4.2km² across three areas was confirmed as mined by survey in 2014 by MTI. No mined area survey was conducted in 2013.41

Clearance in 2014

According to UNMAS, AOAV and Mechem, and later MTI, cleared more than 1.16km² in 2014, a decrease from the 1.99km² reported cleared in 2013. UNMAS reported that MTI cleared a total of 0.03km², while AOAV-Mechem cleared a total of 1.13km² (see Table 3).42 Ten anti-vehicle mines and 89 items of UXO were destroyed. However, no anti-personnel mines were reportedly found by either operator.43

Table 3: Mine clearance in 201444

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOAV-MECHEM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,134,695</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29,375</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,164,070</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AVM = anti-vehicle mines    UXO = unexploded ordnance

A total of 524,405m² was released through battle area clearance (BAC) in 2014, compared to 985,000m² in 2013.45

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Western Sahara is not a state party to the APMBC. However, in June 2014, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) submitted a voluntary APMBC Article 7 transparency report to the UN "as a sign of the support of the Sahrawi State for the goals of the Treaty".46 The SADR has obligations under international human rights law to clear landmines as soon as possible, including under the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

In 2015, MINURSO MACC planned release of some 3km² of mined areas through technical survey and manual and mechanical demining. It expected to continue its QA visits to mine and ERW clearance teams and verification of patrol routes, as requested by the MINURSO military component to ensure safety of movement for UN military observers and verification of transport corridors, with a view to ensuring safe movement of local and nomadic populations. MACC did not expect funding levels to change in 2015.47

As of May 2015, NPA had completed recruitment and training national staff to be deployed as two MTTs in August 2015, initially to carry out survey around the village of Bir Lahlou. NPA was planning to work closely with SMACO to increase SMACO’s capacity.48

As of August 2015, two of the remaining 43 minefields with a total area of 4km² had been tasked for clearance in 2015, and operations were ongoing as of writing. UNMAS reported a total of almost 3.6km² across both mined areas had been released by non-technical survey and some 0.25km² had been cleared by manual and mechanical teams in January to end July 2015, destroying in the process 29 anti-vehicle mines, six items of UXO, and one fuze.49

MACC estimates that current mine action capacity will need ten years to address high- and medium-threat hazardous areas, including mined areas and cluster munition strike areas.50 According to UNMAS, key challenges include: insufficient information regarding location of hazardous areas, particularly to the west of the Berm; inclement weather conditions such as heavy winds, sandstorms, and temperatures exceeding 50°C; and the impact of Western Sahara’s political status on resource mobilisation.51

41 The precise total was 4,166,042m². Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 18 May 2015. In May 2015, AOAV no longer had access to data on its survey activities in 2013. It reported, however, that an additional mined area was identified in Mijek in 2014. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Melissa Fuether, AOAV, 7 May 2015.

42 Response to Landmine Monitor by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014.


45 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 18 May 2015. AOAV reported different figures from those contained in the UNMAS database. From January 2014 until it ceased operations in July, AOAV reported clearance of 2.85km² (2,864,640m²) in Mijek and Agwanilt: 392,925m² through manual clearance, 99,515m² through mechanical clearance, and 2,364,200m² through WMMDs. It stated that it destroyed three anti-vehicle mines and six items of UXO during mine clearance in 2014; no anti-personnel mines were found or destroyed. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Melissa Fuether, AOAV, 7 May 2015. UNMAS and AOAV were unable to reconcile the figures reported or account for the discrepancies. MTI declined to provide data on its clearance operations. Email from Melanie Villegas, Project Executive, MTI, 14 May 2015.

46 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 18 May 2015; and email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 31 August 2015.


49 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 2 June 2015.

50 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 20 August 2015.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANAMA</td>
<td>Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMBC</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Ammunition storage area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battle area clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACTEC</td>
<td>Battle Area Clearance, Training, Equipment and Consultancy International Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHMAC</td>
<td>BiH Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCLAM</td>
<td>Congolese Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td>Executive Commission for Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Confirmed hazardous area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAMAP</td>
<td>National Interministerial Commission on Anti-personnel Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Confirmed mined area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMAA</td>
<td>Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>Cambodian Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Cluster munition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMRS</td>
<td>Cluster munition remnant survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNIDAH</td>
<td>National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROMAC</td>
<td>Croatian Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>Department of Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDD</td>
<td>Explosive dog detection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive ordinance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Swiss Foundation for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GICHID</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKMAA</td>
<td>Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMCO</td>
<td>Iraq Mine Clearance Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iMMAP</td>
<td>Information Management and Mine Action Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INAD</td>
<td>National Demining Institute [Angola]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>National Demining Institute [Mozambique]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRMAC</td>
<td>Iran Mine Action Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Lao People’s Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIS</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMAC</td>
<td>Lebanon Mine Action Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mine Action Centre</td>
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<td>MACCA</td>
<td>Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MAPA</td>
<td>Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MDD</td>
<td>Mine detection dog</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>Multitask team</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NMAM</td>
<td>National Mine Action Authority</td>
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<td>NTSG</td>
<td>National Technical Standards and Guidelines</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
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<td>National Regulatory Authority</td>
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<td>Presidential Programme for Comprehensive Mine Action</td>
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<td>QA</td>
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<td>Regional Centre for Divers’ Training and Underwater Demining</td>
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<td>RMAC</td>
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<td>SEMA</td>
<td>Somalia Explosive Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Suspected hazardous area</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMA</td>
<td>Suspected mined area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>The Development Initiative</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded ordnance</td>
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</table>

**Land Release** describes the process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/explosive remnants of war through non-technical survey, technical survey and/or clearance.

**Mine clearance** is the formal process of removing and/or destroying all mines in a certain area to a specified depth.

**Non-technical survey** refers to the collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land-release prioritisation and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence.

**Technical survey** refers to the collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where contamination is present, where it is not, and to support land-release prioritisation and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence.