Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan
August 2014

Source: Children describing their hope and vision for peace in Bor, Jonglei State. Courtesy of Non Violent Peace Force (South Sudan)
Disclaimer

The analysis in this report is informed by dialogue and discussion that took place at the Protection Cluster workshop in June/July 2014, which was facilitated by Ferdinand von Habsburg-Lothringen (Consultant). The information presented here is changed from the original workshop report and adapted for the humanitarian community in South Sudan and presents a broad overview of trends and dynamics. Any views on the trajectory of the current crisis are based on opinions and information from field sources and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Protection Cluster or its members.

Glossary and Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internal Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement (Darfur armed group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians (in this document refers to sites within the legal boundary of UNMISS sites reserved for civilians seeking refuge/flight from violence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>South Sudan Defence Front (formerly Khartoum aligned group during the Second Civil War, integrated into the SPLA with the 2006 Juba Declaration, representing a loose coalition of Greater Upper Nile forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDM</td>
<td>South Sudan Defence Movement – Cobra Faction (Armed group formalized during the 2012-13 armed conflict between the government and Murle insurgent David Yau Yau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSLM/A</td>
<td>South Sudan Liberation Movement Army (launched in 2011 by Peter Gadet, present post election broad based opposition to government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army (national South Sudan army and former liberation group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (main political party in South Sudan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM/A-IO</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (political and military opposition to the government of South Sudan represented by President Salva Kiir, led by Dr. Riek Machar Teny and other senior SPLM/A officials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan (followed the mission in Sudan (UNMISS) and was mandated in 2011 to support South Sudan peace consolidation and state building functions but with a Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians. Following the Dec ‘13 crisis protection of civilians has become the primary responsibility and focus of the mission).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Contents

1. Background ................................................................................................................................. 4

2. Macro-level analysis of trends in conflict and protection ......................................................... 5

   2.1 Critical Current Issues ........................................................................................................... 8
       2.1.1 Increased Political Fragmentation .................................................................................. 8
       2.1.2 Rising Intolerance and Contesting Narratives ............................................................. 10
       2.1.3 Ethnic fragmentation and role of violence ................................................................. 10
       2.1.4 Further entrenching of communal defence mechanisms ........................................... 12
       2.1.5 Rising Insecurity and confrontations .......................................................................... 13
       2.1.6 Acute poverty, humanitarian needs and resources ..................................................... 14
       2.1.7 Outstanding Sudan-South Sudan issues ..................................................................... 15

3. Key conflict issues in the Greater Regions ............................................................................... 17

4. Positive and Negative Trends in the next 6 months ............................................................... 23

5. Criticality of analysis in the protection and broader humanitarian response in South Sudan ................................................................. 24

6. Additional Resources on South Sudan Context ...................................................................... 26
1. Background

The Republic of South Sudan, three years into its independence, has suffered a tremendous political and social upheaval as divisions within the ruling party, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement, and fragmentation of its army, has turned into major violence engulfing significant parts of the country. What started as a political dispute has been interpreted through a lens of old, deeply bitter narrative of ethnic rivalry between Dinka and Nuer, and is exacerbated by a host of complicating unresolved political, economic and social issues. The polarisation and arming of communities along ethnic lines in this conflict, and its ready manipulation by powerful elites, is a key factor that risks a rapidly deepening and widening war with serious regional humanitarian and political consequences.

1.1. Structure of Report

Recognising this need and the gap in *publicly available and joint humanitarian* analysis, the Protection Cluster held a workshop with a number of field based protection actors¹ to consolidate existing information and analysis from the field and Juba. This information presents a baseline of sorts from which to develop a deepening understanding of the threats, risks and vulnerabilities that civilians are facing directly and indirectly from the conflict. Further and more detailed work is planned to build upon this process in the coming months to allow the humanitarian community to enhance its response and inform conflict-sensitive programming, as well as inform discussions about longer-term humanitarian action needed in 2015. This report sets out some of the macro trends in South Sudan as well as in the greater regions, with a particular emphasis on the current epicentre of the conflict. The information contained herein is also meant to complement the work of research institutions and other bodies currently producing analysis on the context. Where appropriate clear links and references are provided to allow readers to enhance their own understanding of particular dynamics.

The report is structured around the following broad themes:

- Macro level trends and protection implications;
- Current situation in the greater regions;
- Positive and Negative trends in the next 6 months;
- Current overview to dynamics in the three greater regions; and
- Lesson learned and best practice for information management and analysis.

---

¹ Protection actors here refers to UN, UNMISS and NGO actors supporting activities to ensure civilian safety from acute harm that has resulted from the current conflict in South Sudan. The workshop aimed at bringing together an initial group of people to discuss the context and conflict dynamics and was by no means comprehensive.
2. Macro-level analysis of trends in conflict and protection

South Sudan is enveloped by *multiple, interconnected conflicts* (political, military and communitarian), and this frames the complex context in which humanitarian and protection actors are operating. The nature of these conflicts and points of interaction have a significant bearing upon the level and nature of violence that populations have been exposed to and will continue to define the choices they make to meet their basic needs as this conflict evolves. Indeed, the causative factors are likely to shift in emphasis and importance as the conflict develops.

**Political Conflict:**

First and foremost the dynamics of power in South Sudan have been deeply problematic and recall some of the issues that drove southern groups to war with Sudan (especially 1983-2005). These issues include deep-seated perceptions of marginalization, injustice, exclusion from centralized power, inequality in the distribution of services, and violent intolerance for opposition or dissent. Few of these issues were adequately addressed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) and independence (2011), and have transformed into much more powerful triggers for violence.

Though the current crisis was precipitated by a political dispute within the ruling party the internal crisis within the SPLM is *longstanding and unresolved* and exists along personal, ethnic, regional, and historic lines. Current relationships between powerful political and military actors have been defined by agendas in part created during the previous Sudan civil war (1983-2005), and specific disputes over the vision and leadership of the movement and country. In 1991 Riek Machar, along with other prominent SPLA/M officials split from John Garang to create the largely Nuer dominated Nasir/United Faction, which presented a significant set back to the movement and almost caused the SPLM/A to lose the war with Sudan. The split also precipitated brutal cycles of violence between Nuer-Dinka and intra Nuer groups and led to the mass militarization of both of these communities.

Political rivalry continued into the post Comprehensive Peace Agreement period sparking insurgencies in the aftermath of the 2010 elections that continued well into

---

2 Guiding reflections should be the question: are we trying to change these dynamics that have been in motion for decades or do we find ourselves as agents or factors in this wider narrative?

3 Throughout this paper previous civil wars are mentioned, Sudan was engulfed by two major civil wars (north versus southern regions) in 1955-1972 and then again in 1983-2003. The latter war saw a major explosion of south-south violence previously unseen. The 2013 civil war represents a succession of wars in South Sudan’s overall history.

4 SPLM/A – Nasir/United later went through several incarnations of itself. Following the 1997 Khartoum Agreement it became the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army, and following the Nuer reconciliation conference in Akobo the South Sudan Defence Forces housed various local armed groups. The SSDF presented the single biggest threat to the SPLM/A prior to 2006 when through the Juba Declaration SSDF soldiers were absorbed into the SPLA (national army).
independence. South Sudan since 2005 has effectively been led by one party state (SPLM) in which key positions were reserved for the liberation movement’s hierarchy and the rest to key insurgent leaders with a view to purchasing loyalties. Patronage and elite based politics has effectively stymied the emergence of a democratic and civilian leadership capable of governing.

By the time 2013 came around the SPLM, which had temporarily demonstrated unity of purpose around the referendum, had unraveled.

Since December 2013 the power contests within the SPLM are:

Please note that ethnicities of key personalities are noted simply for the purposes of demonstrating that this is not a simplistic conflict consisting of two sides.

1. Main opposition faction nominally led by Riek Machar (SPLM/A in Opposition) and flanked by Alfred Lado Gore (former Minister of Environment and prominent Bari- Equatorian) is now Machar’s deputy, and Taban Deng Gai (Former Unity State Governor). Machar on a number of occasions since 2006 has declared intentions to take on the SPLM Chairmanship and thereafter the Presidency of South Sudan.

2. Loose coalitions of SPLM stalwarts known as ‘Garangists or Garang Boys’, and also are sometimes known as ‘SPLM-7’ (this refers to SPLM leaders detained in December 2013 and released in early 2014 and now part of the IGAD mediation proces). Key personalities include Madame Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior (wife of John Garang and prominent Bor Dinka), Pagan Amun (former SPLM Secretary General and Shilluk), Deng Alor Kuol (former Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Dinka Ngok), and Kosti Manibe (former Minister of Finance and Equatorian). This group has been unable to articulate a clear alternative vision or leadership and lacks military weight.

3. President Salva Kiir and senior SPLM leaders such as James Wani Igga (Vice President and Equatorian), Kuol Manyang Juuk (Minister of Defence and Bor Dinka), Nhial Deng Nhial (Chief Negotiator in Addis and Dinka), Paul Malong Awan (Chief of General Staff of SPLA and Dinka). These individuals variously present hardline or loyalist viewpoints in the government.

Basic References and Reading:
Military Conflict:
In the CPA period the SPLA represented both a unique opportunity for change as well as a significant risk to overall stability of the state. Though in principle separate entities SPLM ideology was and is premised on the armed rebellion against Khartoum, and many old guard military leaders that have made up the political leadership, the SPLM and SPLA have been synonymous. As an institution the SPLA was comprised of concentric circles of armed actors variously absorbed/integrated from old guard SPLA (mainstream), ex southern Sudan Armed Forces, and various Khartoum aligned militias and groups e.g. South Sudan Defence Forces. As many of these armed groups were based in Greater Upper Nile (Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei), large numbers of Nuer troops were brought into the SPLA. Many of the absorbed forces continued to hold allegiance to local commanders than to the line ministry or Presidency. The SPLA therefore became ethnically skewed, lacked cohesion, and allowed parochial interests to trump national ones. Purchasing loyalties through patronage, salaries and services was commonplace and continues to be a tool that is employed in the current conflict. In December 2013 one of the reasons that violence quickly took on an ethnic dimension was because of the inherent flaw in integration of forces in the SPLA and a widely held perception that one ethnic group dominated the army hierarchy.

Basic References and Reading:

Communal Conflict:
Through the CPA and independence period South Sudan has witnessed persistent and increasingly violent inter and intra communal violence. The disenfranchisement of communities, widening gulf between government and citizens, proliferation of arms, and lack of rule of law all contributed to the populations sense of isolation and marginalization from the ‘state’. A sense of nationhood was not adequately developed and instead appeals to southern unity and homogenous identity was explicitly linked to political processes such as the referendum, elections and eventually independence. In 2009 with growing food insecurity and violence between and within communities erupted across parts of Greater Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal (includes Northern and Western Bahe el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes states) and provided a powerful reminder that unresolved tensions and political manipulation of local grievances could easily spill into the national realm. The militarization of youth, that took place during the Sudan Civil War (1983-2005), and erosion of civilian authority and traditional control over these groups, as well as the conscious manipulation of ethnicities for political and military purposes has contributed significantly to increasingly violent interactions
between communities. This violence has taken on increasingly brutalized forms, sexual violence and attacks on vulnerable sections of society (elderly, women, girls, boys) has occurred at staggering levels, with impunity by armed groups (including civilian militias seeking to exact revenge and retaliation). This violence is enabled by political agendas, widespread circulation of arms, and militarized structures being adopted by armed youth groups. Sexual violence in particular is also intended to deliberately impact social cohesion, shame, and emasculate communities. In the current conflict inter and intra communal violence is linked to the wider conflict in terms of resource acquisition, settling of new and old scores, and neutralizing threats. These local tensions though surmountable, as recent events in Pibor County have demonstrated, do however enable conflict to become far more long standing and protracted.

Basic References and Reading:
- http://www.lse.ac.uk/businessAndConsultancy/LSEEnterprise/pdf/sudan.pdf

2.1 Critical Current Issues

This section highlights some of the key factors and scenarios emerging in the current conflict.

2.1.1 Increased Political Fragmentation
There will likely be further political fragmentation as leadership of the SPLM remains divided and competing agendas are unable to find common ground on basic issues in IGAD mediation effort in Addis Ababa and Juba. Tactics of deliberate stalling, and lack of clear purpose and agenda continues to impact the IGAD mediation process. Terms such as federalism have proved very provocative to the government, and risks sidelining Equatorians leaders and elites that in the future would be key actors in any transitional government. SPLM/A in Opposition is becoming fare more politically organized to the point of presenting its ideas for a new governance framework in the public domain. Whilst militarily both sides have continued their engagement and posturing in various locations, SPLM/A IO’s adoption of a new parallel structures and appointments to fill it indicates a potentially stronger and more conflicting line.

---

5 Manipulation of identities (ethnic or tribal) was and is a successful or effective means of maintaining loyalties, mobilising support and ensuring motivation of fighters.
6 In 2011 – 13 large scale violence erupted in parts of Jonglei especially Pibor County as a result of forced disarmament, increasingly brutal cycles of retaliatory attacks between Lou Nuer and Murle communities, and am armed insurgency against the state led by David Yau Yau. Following events in December 2013 Lou Nuer and Murle armed youth and chiefs temporarily called a halt to inter-communal violence, formed joint defence guards, and have set about to resolve major tensions around cattle raids.
7 Federalism is a loaded term and currently signifies different things to different audiences. For those angry at Government or ‘Dinka domination’ or both, the term would suggest a break with the past, empowerment of new leaders or even a total administrative parting. For Dinkas, it might mean a threat to their President’s position and power. It is also a very misunderstood term.
The internal affairs of SPLM are in disarray and the current standoff will lead to either one of three effects:

1. *Sinking ship and lifeboats:* SPLM implodes and each person heads to the best possible option, the majority erodes away over time.
2. *Theatre prop:* SPLM keeps surviving but remains in crisis; the party vehicle is used to serve the interests of the few.
3. A compromise within the SPLM with a revision/accommodation of different players. The ground between and within the SPLM, the established opposition and SPLM in Opposition will remain fluid with leaders and members ‘crossing over’ regularly. This suggests tremendous political uncertainty; more hardline opposition tactics; general political disaffection among citizens leading to corrosion of progressive politics; higher tensions playing into communities and more ground fighting.

Political and military leaders appear to either not represent even their own community or have a strong affinity with their own constituency at the cost of a national appeal. Therefore, there is an increasingly apparent absence of potential representative and national leaders. Yet, despite a lack of legitimacy, the warring parties through their militarized power still have a dominating reach into the most local villages. A broader contest of power has thus been playing out across South Sudan leaving communities more vulnerable than ever.

**Protection and Humanitarian Implications:** The political disarray in South Sudan has taken emphasis off policy and service delivery for the citizenry and focused on political survival and in fighting. Concern for citizens and their protection is not a priority and ministers and other government officials will be called to express allegiance to one or other political and/or ethnic constituency, hence opposing blanket protection for all citizens. This dynamic indicates that beyond the simplistic ethnic dimension to the conflict that citizens are prone to being targeted on the basis of their political affiliations as well.

Despite the parties signing the recommitment to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in May 2014 violence against civilians has continued. Attempts by the humanitarian community to advocate for ‘days of tranquillity’ to enable humanitarian assistance to reach populations in need and populations to move freely and without fear to markets, safe areas away from frontlines, and access to critical livelihoods zones, have not been observed. Lack of, or limited freedom of movement for civilians (in urban and rural displacement settings) is severely restricted due to high levels of insecurity and direct targeting for violence on populations (often based on perceptions of loyalties to conflict
parties based on ethnicity and other affiliations).

Finally, as “civilian authorities” proliferate a new class of actors are vying for humanitarian assistance to be brought into their areas. Political and military leaders as the conflict develops will need to demonstrate an ability to protect and to provide services as a means to maintaining the war and ensuring allegiances. Thereby, this could lead to increased politicisation of humanitarian assistance and introduce new protection risks for civilians (e.g. diversion, theft, abuses towards aid recipients, pressure to distribute along frontlines etc.)

2.1.2 Rising Intolerance and Contesting Narratives
The potential for growing intolerance by government of criticism within a climate of multiple, contesting narratives as higher political tensions is leading to tighter control on the levers of power, less tolerance of and greater pressure on civil society (causing further polarization), the media, opposition and the international community. The local and national media in South Sudan will encounter greater restrictions and more obstacles to objective reporting. As spaces appear to shrink there will be greater sensitivities to international criticism and hardening attitudes to the work of the international community.

Protection and Humanitarian Implications: Messaging and actions by government and SPLM/A IO is taking on an increasingly hard-line language (of ‘for or against us’ nature) and ensure that the possibilities of a public debate on viable solutions to the political deadlock are squeezed. Key will be the creation of an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty to muzzle opinions. Restrictions on and control of the media has stymied public debate and is isolating the periphery from the centre.

There is a concern that as the rains continue and conditions in the camps deteriorate further, the number of deaths will rise and the life choices made will be ones of either extremist tendencies to use the images and experience to deepen the trauma, anger and turn it into radical and more violent tendencies or self-preservation to refugee camps and/or into diaspora. This presents the risk of widening attacks against civilians, encouraging collective punishment leaving prone wider sections of society to violence.

2.1.3 Ethnic fragmentation and role of violence
In this conflict polarised ethnic rhetoric has promoted the targeting of civilians and motivated increasingly violence cycles of revenge attacks. However, an overemphasis on Nuer-Dinka grievances does disguise the complex relations that exist across communities through inter-marriage, negotiation and dialogue, and also trade. Ethnic
categories can disguise the fact that closer relationships sometimes are evidence between different ethnic groups above and beyond members of their own group. The risk in the current conflict is the deliberate use of ethnicity and identity to mobilise divide communities against each other. Developing pan-identities risks demanding constructive relationships and networks that exist across communities.

The narrative of ‘victims’ is has become a key tool for mobilisation and is increasingly creating justifications for violence and reprisal attacks. In particular the contested narrative around displaced populations inside the PoC’s and liberation narratives is fueling wider conflict dynamics and potentially significantly increasing risks to IDP’s inside PoC areas. This conflict has also revealed a new dynamic amongst larger groups like the Nuer, who have effectively employed a victim narrative to create a pan-Nuer identity and form a political bloc. This is unusual in a group that has lacked homogeneity and unity of purpose, and beset by internal rivalry. Political units tended to be smaller, based on clans and sub sections. The ready use of Nuer prophecies (which previously would have applied to Dinka communities too) to solidify this unity also points to a concerning trend towards ultra-nationalism. Whereas this process is underway within the Nuer a homogenous Dinka identity has not yet emerged, this is illustrated by on going fighting in Lakes State amongst different Dinka sub clans and a Dinka Governor. This process has the ability to both cause a massive fragmentation of ethnicities and entrench divisions in a way that could take years to unpick.

Past SPLA-citizens relationships/fautlines are also dictating the nature of the targeting against civilians and fragmentation across identity groups e.g. early in 2014 attacks by opposition SPLA and Nuer White Army in Malakal town directly targeted Shilluk residents. This has created deep resentment of the Shilluk against the Nuer. In part this is related to the brutal SPLA counter insurgency campaigns on Shulluk militias in 2010. Resentment of the recent attacks risks rising militancy amongst young men has also led to the Shilluk reportedly mobilizing its own defence forces.

**Protection and Humanitarian Implications:** The risk of many of the latent conflicts now erupting across South Sudan, including in conflict-free or ‘peaceful’ areas is at an all-time high. Where politicians have had localized disagreements or where small inter-communal violence related to cattle raiding has been a seasonal the risk of these

---

8 In particular across IDP and refugee communities  
9 IDPs in PoC sites in areas such as Juba have commonly referred to waiting to be liberated  
10 Nuer prophets play a significant role in Nuer culture and helping to frame future relations with other communities. The most influential prophet was Ngundeng in the 19th century who is said to have predicted the coming of the current armed conflict in South Sudan. Recent prophets include Dak Kueth in Jonglei. In recent months prophecies have been used to mobilise and encourage fighters.
building into full-blown violence is very real. There is a risk that leaders, individuals and communities may now feel that to dehumanize another is not only justifiable but also necessary for survival.

So far in this conflict horrendous acts of violence have been employed against vulnerable sections of society. Razing and destruction of civilian property, use of rape (women, girls, boys and men), torture, execution style killings, forced disappearances are amongst some of the means being used by different armed groups.

2.1.4 Further entrenching of communal defence mechanisms
Fragmented and contested political and military leadership and ever-deepening inter-ethnic fragmentation have encouraged the preservation of the gelweng, titweng, the jech mabor (White Army) and more visibly military styled units or militia. The gelweng, titweng and jech mabor while distinctively formed out of different ethnic groups (the first two are common to the Dinka while the latter is a feature of the Nuer) have their roots among the armed youth of the cattle camps across large parts of South Sudan, born out of crisis or the risk of violence, creating a spirit of self-defence and pride in identity that binds groups to defend their communities and livelihoods.\textsuperscript{11} Many of these groups existed during the Sudan Civil War (1983-2005), and now are called upon to become the de-facto defence and offense mechanisms to fill in any security vacuum. Despite the CPA and the nascent years of the new state, these local defense forces never waned in popularity and usage at a local level.

Mass recruitment is occurring in other community groups, not simply within the Dinka and Nuer, both on request from the government and SPLMA IO and of their own volition. With these local defense forces fighting with the more formal, standing armies, there will continue to be a blurred line between these forces. Though difficult to fully quantify the number of pre-existing/re-activated, active, and announced community defence militias are proliferating. The rise of civilian militias and potential proliferation of local commanders/ political leaders vying for influence and political power could create renewed and deepening cycles of conflict at a local level.

**Protection and Humanitarian Implications:** Mobilisation of community defence forces may provide security in the short-term but often with poor command-and-control, no training, differing motivations and very localized interpretations of the determinants of

\textsuperscript{11} The chain of command, interaction and arming of such groups is necessarily a grey area within and between such groups, but it is important to note that these groups have form, recognition and authority from their communities and have been known to be more organized than the SPLA
actions, the risk of non-combatants on the opposing side being collateral damage or very deliberately targeted have become reality and are likely to spread to non-belligerent communities. The prevalence of child soldiers creates immediate and longer-term concerns for individual and community trauma. Once armed and drawn into the conflict, it be hard to disarm and decommission them. A culture of violence and militancy has pervaded for decades and will deepen; acts of brutality, gender-based violence and domestic violence has already become the norm in some communities in the current conflict with inter- and intra-communal cyclical violence demonstrating greater destructive dynamics.

2.1.5 Rising Insecurity and confrontations
As both the protagonists continue to fight for advantage, the rains gives the SPLM/A IO the potential for the upper hand, holding less conventional weaponry and having a more ‘popular’ army segment (including Jech Mabor or White Army) accustomed to moving and conducting operations under the difficult conditions of the rainy season. Additionally, the Government’s continued serious financial challenges will further slow and/or even prevent payment of salaries to its military and other security forces increasing defections, desertions and insecurity from theft, assaults and taxation. Losing military will increase the risks of more child soldier recruitments, mercenary-like groups and forced recruitment more generally. Previous experience such as in Pibor County in March 2013 demonstrates the threat to communities if and when armed groups return from conflict. In Pibor County communities were exposed to considerable levels of violence when armies retreated back into urban areas after experiencing heavy casualties. The converse also applies, if armed groups believe that a peace framework will be established re-armament is likely to continue apace as groups posture for positions in a newly configured governments.

Such rising levels of insecurity have driven ever larger numbers of people and livestock onto farming communities’ lands and re-ignited tensions that existed for at least two decades between Dinka pastoralists and other groups.

Protection and Humanitarian Implications: The loss of life, the witnessing of increased brutality by civilians in numbers as great as during the second civil war and the manner in which some of the violence has recently been executed leave no doubt that the legacy of these ongoing events will have made its mark way beyond 2014.

As violence and deepening tensions drive people from their homes, patterns of

---

12 Many communities have illustrated this as youth once armed during the second civil war continue to commit acts of violence or armed criminality while disarmament campaigns have totally failed
‘temporary’ settlement familiar from the second civil war have begun to be noticed again. It is recognized that the average span of time spent by IDPs in ‘temporary’ locations is between 10 and 20 years – almost a generation – a factor that has major repercussions on human settlement patterns, security, land ownership, and inter-communal relations. There is a higher probability that violence between cattle herders and farmers will break out, tied to the ethno-politics that leaders are pressing. At risk are livelihoods, vulnerable populations and an already weakened resilience.

A new, more urbane\textsuperscript{13} and computer-literate South Sudanese generation such as the Diaspora are seeking their own influence, able to lead often harmful exchanges with few geographical or social boundaries. The issue of conflict has not only followed those fleeing the violence but also been further exacerbated by them as they use the tools of the 21st century to fire back into the country they have left. This is a growing trend that can only continue, using real-time technology, to expand the boundaries of the conflicts. Within few actions being taken to refrain Diaspora from inciting violence and hate speech by host countries such as Australia, U.S and U.K is resulting in people engaging in conflict within little consequence or accountability.

2.1.6 Acute poverty, humanitarian needs and resources
The cumulative layers of poverty and violence have stripped away the resilience of South Sudanese, exposing new generations to its brutal effects. Expanding poverty, economic and resource-based conflicts risks being significantly increased as the economy further staggers, oil revenues fail to rise and the government focuses on purchasing arms, thus undermining investor optimism. Furthermore, the conflict and resulting civilian displacement and deliberate destruction of markets and restrictions to freedom of movement by armed actors have triggered severe food insecurity across large areas of Greater Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. According to the UN 1.1 million people are facing emergency food insecurity levels this year, with 50,000 children at risk of severe malnutrition. This points to a serious deterioration in access to food and the household and community level if conflict does not abate or access to food is not sustainably improved.\textsuperscript{14} Food therefore has become a much-demanded commodity not only for communities but also armed groups. Food has become a primary draw for

\textsuperscript{13} While this is still a minority, yet within the diaspora and South Sudanese urban populations, these are some of the most radical groups, conversant with internet (facebook, e-mail, twitter etc.) and keen to exploit political and security situations, while driving tensions and violence from a distance. The lack of responsibility in the comments made is often clear and very worrying, as the potential repercussions have been and could yet be catastrophic (the violence experienced in 2011 was, in part, encouraged or driven by such).

populations forced to make untenable trade offs on their safety and security to access food and other basic goods.

Acute humanitarian needs are layered over chronically poor pre-crisis social and humanitarian indicators. Despite the abundance of resources in South Sudan, resources are violently contested. Needs therefore are widespread across South Sudan, and the likelihood that humanitarian assistance itself could become contested is high.

The Government of South Sudan has yet to financially contribute to the humanitarian response (or basic service provision in conflict affected areas) yet at the same time is reported to be prioritizing spending on the security sector. This deprivation of resources is critically undermining resilience and the ability of populations to both endure the consequences of the conflict but also recover quickly.

**Protection and Humanitarian Implications**: The culture of patronage, nepotism and corruption has become pervasive in South Sudan. Playing out across communities, IDP and refugee camps, state and the national capitals, the rise and fall of fortunes is a very serious factor in violence, driving some to turn to criminality, others to build or join cartels that disadvantage the already poverty-stricken and yet others who use the political and security systems to secure their livelihoods and life-styles to the detriment of others.

Humanitarian assistance (services and assets) is a prime commodity at this point in the absence of other external resources (e.g. development and broader service delivery) and is prone to manipulation and diversion. In addition to this how assistance creates “pulls” and “push” must be looked at in terms of community owned protection strategies. For example, it has become apparent that population movements between Unity-Lakes, for access to markets, have continued peacefully across opposition and government lines and has become a key dynamic in preserving localised stability and unity amongst communities.

### 2.1.7 Outstanding Sudan-South Sudan issues
Abyei, South Sudan-Sudan border demarcation and other outstanding issues remain hard to move forward causing increasing tensions for border communities on either side, bringing radical voices to the fore and allowing for politicians and military to be on the ascendancy – a dangerous dynamic that encourages illegal arms flows as well as insurgency and counter-insurgency tactics within both countries, thus raising greater likelihood of military confrontations. The massive insecurity south of the common border will provide the continued perfect cover for insurgencies by Sudan and its
proxies and a dangerous grey area for rebels fighting Sudan to utilize the opportunity and the territory to re-group and re-arm.

**Protection and Humanitarian Implications:** Opportunistic, with risk of rapid and massive escalation, the conflicts on the border are known for their intensity and intractability. The broader political agreements are proving elusive and perhaps by design are intended to leave the possibility of conflict and insecurity open to actors to engage in old conflicts as well as deflect from internal criticism by escalating incidents at the borders. The economic and geographical vulnerabilities of the border populations either side leave them uncertain, wounded and often angry at the delays in peace – a perfect place for recruitment of soldiers, militia and insurgents.
3. Key conflict issues in the Greater Regions

This section intends to capture some of the key conflict issues in the Greater Regions, and how this is affecting the coping mechanisms of the civilian populations and the broad protection risks. As such, this section is not intended to be exhaustive but provide a snap shot of the key conflict dynamics and corresponding protection risks facing populations in the current most conflict affected/vulnerable areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Broad conflict and human security issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Upper</td>
<td>Greater Upper Nile is currently a patchwork of conflict and control. No one armed group has complete territorial control or advantage, which is resulting in shifting front lines. This is exacerbated by divided military structures and emergence of armed militias, and community armed groups. Key figures such as Peter Gadet, Matthew Puljang, Riek Machar, Taban Deng and even the Nuer prophet Gatdeng have or are striving to build influence within Greater Upper Nile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>It is important to note that prior to the conflict the population living in the Greater Upper Nile would have faced the most chronic development indicators with low levels of food security. Given the low levels of human security prior to the most recent conflict, community resilience to conflict is low in terms of their assets, and strategies to reduce exposure to violence and food insecurity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>In addition to the direct violence against the civilian community, which has also witnessed the destruction of civilian property and infrastructure, the movement of displaced populations is placing people at risk as they cross front lines, pass checkpoints and encounter armed groups. People have to move in search of food, away from flooding and to seek safe shelter. In addition to levying of taxes and other charges, populations have been exposed to violence such as rape, castration and execution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>Jonglei State has three significant blocs in terms of territorial and military control, although there are a large number of affiliated armed groups within and across these groups. The White Army represents a broad confederation of armed Nuer youth and likely continued mobilisation in northern Jonglei in the coming months. Murle age set youth are still active and heavily armed but have joined Lou Nuer in joint border monitoring, resolving cattle disputes and protection (defence and offence) from ‘Dinka’ armed groups. Any changes to the SPLA-SSDM relationship, and an opportunistic raid could re-ignite tensions with the Lou Nuer. SSDM-Cobra (Yau Yau) faction troops in nominal control of Pibor County. Unclear relations with the SPLA (still stationed in key sites) and tensions emerging as to Pibor’s role in the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The establishment of the Greater Pibor Area Administration sets an interesting precedent for militarised federalism.

Twic and Duk counties are prone to potential joint raids and attacks by armed Lou and Murle youth, or formal opposition groups making populations vulnerable to displacement by both conflict and flooding. In particular the islands along the Nile offer refuge for displaced populations but risks isolating populations in hard to reach areas with few resources for survival. This points to a wider national concern of isolated pockets of communities cut off either by conflict or flooding in the coming months.

The risks and rise of attacks on and fighting around Akobo, Ayod and Canal/Khorflous as armed groups retreat and move around points to the mobility of armed groups but also the need of many populations to remain on the move to avoid armed actors and/or seek the protection of armed groups. The dynamic of armed groups moving to higher ground or into urban centres means the likely continuation of the displacement of populations away from urban centres, services and infrastructure that enables a cost effective humanitarian response (i.e. presence of all weather airstrip, rub-halls, accommodation etc.). It could also entail the further isolation of communities from vital services and resources.

Unity

In Unity State, while receiving the most significant reports of violence directly targeting the civilian population, the conflict between armed actors is the least factionalised in Greater Upper Nile at present. Mayom is currently one of the most contested areas, with frontline dynamics in Mayom County. Opposition forces (Gadet) are holding south of River Na’am and the Government central and northern areas through Matthew Puljang Bul Nuer forces (formerly SSLA). The historic rivalry between Gadet and Puljang are playing out now as part of the broader conflict. The SSLA forces although Bull Nuer are aligned with the Government of South Sudan and its forces. These dynamics point to the fact that we cannot make basic assumptions of a Dinka verses Nuer conflict and that sub-clan violence has the potential to unravel this conflict further and bring conflict to an increasingly household level.

There are high-risk population movements between Bentiu-Guit-Leer and to Mayom for access to food/goods, and to reunify families. This freedom of movement restricted by armed groups (government, opposition, and others e.g. JEM) which is affecting the populations ability to move from violence, in search of goods and increasingly forcing choices on civilians to choose between different options on insecurity i.e. risk disease such as Cholera or face starvation by staying where you are or expose yourself to the high probability of physical (including sexual) violence by moving.

Upper Nile

In Upper Nile, armed hostilities between opposition, government and proxies is in constant flux, and is presently controlled by a patchwork of armed actors (government, opposition and proxy militias). Neither the SPLA nor SPLA-IO
has been able to achieve a decisive advantage in the state.

Malakal is an SPLA garrison town. Fighting and/or targeted attacks on civilians on-going in Renk, Maban with armed movements in and out of Doleib Hills and Paioche (oil fields). The emergence of the Mabanese Defence Forces (MDF) and targeted killings of ethnic Nuer is escalating already existing tensions between the Mabanese community, refugees from Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and IDP’s on who is engaging with what side in the conflict. Nasir remains a flash point between the Government and Opposition, as a strategic town on the Nile near Ethiopia and with historical resonance as a Nuer stronghold and location of SPLM split in the 1990’S between Machar and John Garang. On-going tensions and fighting in and around Nasir, changing hands. The opposition has interests in capturing oil installations and controlling sites is a critical bargaining tool for negotiations in Addis as well as cutting off much needed income for GRSS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greater Bahr el Ghazal</th>
<th>Northern Bahr el Ghazal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Bahr el Ghazal</td>
<td>Warrap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Greater Bahr el Ghazal is broadly Government aligned, but is riven by local disputes between the political actors. The potential for communal violence. Greater Bahr el Ghazal while classified as a non-conflict State has indicators of tensions and internal dynamics that may result in it becoming directly engaged in the broader conflict. There have been key defections and desertions have taken place in Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Of particular note is the prominent defection of General Dau Aturjong Nyuol (one of the founding members of the SPLA) in Northern Bahr El Ghazal, due to opposition to Paul Malong the current General Chief of Staff of the SPLA. There is an increased political and social disaffection with the three Governors, either stemming from what some term ‘dictatorial tendencies’ (Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal and Lakes) as well as accusations that the 2010 elections were partially rigged. There is an increase of desertions and defections in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal related to the SPLA, including due to soldiers not being paid, left of Nuer who wish to leave their posts and Equitorians who do not wish to be affiliated by what they perceive to be a Dinka and Nuer conflict.

Currently, two significant protection threats face the civilian population. While not at current risk from the front line conflict, the Governments lack of tolerance for political dissent means that state violence is a risk if there is a rise in popular unrest due to the conflict and/or other forms of social protest. Secondly, the longer those communities who have remained out of the conflict (i.e. not declared an alignment) they may be forced to declare loyalties, and anyone considered to defect/desert or not support either side and their communities may face targeting from armed groups. Small marginalised groups such as the Fertit (confederation of 15 smaller ethnicities) are exceptionally vulnerable, they have been divested of their land by larger ethnic groups such as the Dinka, conflict over political representation in Wau, and the focus on a larger conflict can place these groups at risk.

Western Bahr el Ghazal also points to issues of Sudan engaging in the conflict in South Sudan, the Kafia Kingi enclave (Raja county) continues to be contested between South Sudan and Sudan and the on-going perception of Sudanese
Involvement and Darfuri involvement in the conflict increases the risk to Darfuri’s and other Sudanese persons residing in South Sudan.

**Lakes**
Lakes State continues to be a highly combustible State at high risk of internal fragmentation as the conflict in Greater Upper Nile continues. Inter-communal violence between different Dinka sub clans is extremely high. In July-August the assassination of a prominent community leader, combined with increasingly vicious resource based conflict, and broader conflict with the current Governor Matur Choul Dhoul has spiralled out of control to the point that sub clans are encouraging rape and other forms of brutalised violence against women and girls (“30 days of rape”) from perceived “opposing” communities.

Linked to this the mobilisation of cattle camp ‘home guards’ and militias (encouraged by Governor, commissioners, or communities) should not be dismissed as simple cattle raiding. Cattle raids are increasingly violent and of a retaliatory manner in Rumbek East, Centre and North and Yirol. The Titweng/Gelweng (community defence groups comprised of Dinka cattle keeping youth) are on the rise, who do not appear to have a formal command link to the SPLA. The ascendancy of these groups is reflected in the civilian disarmament campaigns. The Governor is attempting a chief lead disarmament programme but at the same time local forces have armed the youth. There have been reports significant levels of arms trafficking into Warrap and Jonglei States via Lakes.

The policy is counter-intuitive and contradictory. Given the escalating inter- and intra- communal violence, any attempted disarmament campaign is likely to be heavily resisted and increase civilian displacement and casualties within and from Lakes State.

Targeting of women and children is becoming increasingly socially permissible in these hyper-violent raids. As food insecurity increases there is greater potential for intensified inter-clan cattle raiding within the State and across State line in the historic cattle raiding between Warrap, Lakes and Jonglei. The pattern of displacement should they be displaced in large numbers would be to initially disburse within Lakes State and then exceptionally across State lines into Central Equatoria State and Warrap (contingent upon who the raiding entity is).

The links between Lakes and Unity State have been observed with the displacement of populations from Unity into Lakes. The relationship between Atok Dinka and Nuer from Panyijar Unity is emblematic of local protective mechanisms and cross community cooperation. Movement for trade is critical for maintaining local stability and arresting potential draw into the wider conflict.

**Greater Equatorias**
Central Equatoria State was the initial centre of conflict, with dynamics in Juba perpetuating dynamics across Greater Upper Nile. The reports of Nuer targeting within the first week of fighting in Juba led to the rapid mobilisation of the...
White Army. This is first time that the Nuer youth armed groups have consolidated in such a way. This has a direct correlation with the violence in Bor i.e. ‘reprisal’ attacks against Dinka civilians in Bor as revenge for reports of Nuer targeting in Juba.

Juba, capital of Central Equatoria State currently hosts the largest IDP population inside UN bases. The existence of these IDP’s inside the bases exposes Juba to a continual potential threat due to the victim/liberation narrative of IDP’s being ‘freed’ from bases by armed groups purporting to act on their behalf. This narrative is also evident in relation to the Bor PoC area. The displacement of Nuer populations into the PoC areas and outside of Juba has led to an ethnic reconfiguration of Juba that is fuelling a perception that President Kiir is consolidating a ‘Dinka dominated’ Government. Forms of ‘urban violence’ including Government restrictions on the media and civil society is placing political and human rights space under extreme pressure. The role of civil society and the media in addressing the humanitarian emergency as well as promoting dialogue and accountability is critical. While this move may appear negligible against the wider backdrop of conflict in the Greater Upper Nile region, the domino of the restriction of the media and civil society is great.

Within Equatorian populations, there is a growing perception that there is an anti-Equatorian agenda of the current Government. The reports of disarmament of Equatorians within the Presidential Guard triggered major concerns and counter-reports that Mundari in Central Equatoria State were being mobilised as well as relocating families away from Juba. The fears of the debate over federalism have started to play out with surprising alacrity. The Western Equatoria Governor is currently attempting to mediate the conflicts within the SPLM pointing to Equatorians as ‘protagonists for peace’ but also a group attempting to protect their political space while avoiding becoming dragged into armed conflict. A motivating concern is to protect Equatorian land from being appropriated by Dinka groups, including IDP’s. Any mass displacement of the Equatorian population is likely to push them into neighbouring countries, with no natural point to displace into within South Sudan.
**CURRENT AFFAIRS: WHY ARE WE WHERE WE ARE?**

*Factors within a history of division and trauma, past and present – a crisis within crises*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society/Media, Churches, Muslim</td>
<td>Constriction, restriction, politicised (pro/against) e.g. IGAD, polarised, non-partisan?, representation/representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Parties</td>
<td>Agenda, more of the same?, pluralism or military movements, ethno-politics, corruption or resource conflicts, history; peace makers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM (govt.)</td>
<td>Vertical leadership, culture of intolerance?, ethnic divisions, inability to adapt, corruption, CPA (none of either C, P or A), conflict over resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>Mother army, militia groups = integration/disintegration?, total or permanent split, re-linking to original traditional, militant, armed youth (<em>Jec Mabor, Gelweng, Arrow Boys, etc.</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities (in govt. or SPLM-in-O areas, IDPs, refugees, diaspora) - counties, payams, sections, sub-sections, clans, cattle camps, religious communities</td>
<td>Crisis of leadership and relationships (modern-traditional, youth majority, who holds the resources?), security-militancy, changing cultures, increasing isolation within globalisation, stress and vulnerability on elderly, children, women. How do people see identity? Changing face of violence (Jonglei, Warrap, etc. etc. compare 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Community</td>
<td>Resources, witness/presence, politics of these (interference/manipulation both ways), leadership, divisions and competition, appropriate structures, conflicting policies and priorities, tensions HQ, CO and field, incoming UN SecGen and SRSG, different approaches: UNDAF, Stabilisation, New Deal, Humanitarian, early recovery, World Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other Factors**

- Natural (El Nino, drought, floods, crop failure, famine, death of livestock)
- Man-made (Famine, IGAD, National Dialogue, CNHPR/NPPR, Regional politics: armies, arms, insurgencies)
4. Positive and Negative Trends in the next 6 months

The following section is based on analysis of the potential unfolding scenarios based on the current trajectory of the conflict. The negative trends are likely to emerge as some of the following (continue to) happen:

- IGAD talks drag on failing to show concrete, credible results on the ground. Opponents fail to find consensus, between themselves and sometimes within their camps. Pressure from the international community increases tensions and makes leaders defensive and perhaps constructs artificial and non-sustainable approaches.
- Continued fighting, both between the military and/or the armed groups/youth affects at least a quarter to half the country.
- Other forms of inter- and intra-communal tensions and violence continue or intensify in Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Upper Nile, Warrap and Western Bahr El Ghazal States as well as in all 10 state capitals.
- Rains will change some of the military strategy, enable the SPLA in Opposition to retake places as talks continue, affecting morale of the SPLA and creating dangerous dynamics within a fluid military situation.
- IDP camp populations will suffer from the effects of the rains, disease, fear, anger and political manipulation, building an even more volatile community (and radicalized elements for generations to come). Significant numbers of deaths will signal the worst type of victims’ narrative.
- Talk of elections; federalism and reviewing the Constitution raise political tensions and stakes. Leaders seek constituents’ support, using any means (persuasion or fear).

The positive trends are likely to emerge as some of the following (continue to) happen:

- Local peace agreements and dispute resolution mechanisms are sustained and create barriers to entry into the wider conflict, this includes cross community support opening up localized access to trade of goods and services.
- The process of credible, alternative dialogue platforms such as those of the National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation and of the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation receive gradual support, grow in numbers and influence and expand to the grassroots.
5. Criticality of analysis in the protection and broader humanitarian response in South Sudan

The following lessons were captured in the workshop to emphasise the importance of maintaining dialogue on the context to support conflict sensitive programming which entails utilizing information and analysis to make better informed decisions and mitigate harm in a context where armed conflict has depleted communities of key physical, social, economic and other resources.

- Knowledge is key within this polarized environment and the UN and NGOs must be capable of navigating the context with a good understanding of the dynamics. This can be achieved through a variety of means. Creating safe space for dialogue and exchange of information is critical in helping to produce a deeper and broader baseline of data and to look at trends in a more systematic, longer-term way.

- The absence of South Sudanese in such fora is a major challenge to relationships as well as the process of information gathering and sharing as it potentially plays towards the risks of further polarization, biased information, suspicions and deeper tensions. It also ignores the very useful role agencies and organisations can potentially play in opening up such spaces with government, civil society and South Sudanese in general as well as the fundamental necessity of South Sudanese insights. Creating a graduated process of inclusion is a must.

- Re-emphasising the crucial nature of perspectives (historical, cultural, social, political, religious, economic etc.) both among South Sudanese and internationals suggested that a space for holding a more holistic debate about events and personalities in South Sudan is not only useful but crucial in enabling better delivery of humanitarian services.

- Seeking to building a stepping stone out of conflict may utilise the space where information is shared to explore and confront the narratives and draw peoples’ opinions closer to their leaders while re-establishing a relationship between government and international community when the time is right.

- Insisting on operating with often minimal or poorly analysed data is a high-risk strategy exposing staff to serious physical risks as well as potentially ‘doing harm’. Every step must be taken to do as little harm as possible.

- With important resources available (OCHA maps and data, the National Bureau for Statistics’ mapping department supported by UNDP, anthropologists, resource persons or experts), much more should be done to maximize their use.
The tendency for reactive humanitarian response missed great opportunities presented before the crisis for preventative work that could be the mainstay for early warning. This crisis has presented a further opportunity that must not be lost.

Challenges to Information Management in South Sudan

- Polarised camps in South Sudan: contested narratives create challenges in interpreting information.
- Complex socio-politico-cultural environment, which can create pockets of information rather than comprehensive information.
- Narrow understanding by internationals of the context to improve programme design, leading to inaccurate interpretations of events.
- Poor culture of taking lessons learnt due to high turn over of staff.
- ‘Elite’\(^{15}\) capture of information.
- Documentation and then what? Who reads or studies the information, where is it stored?

How to improve Information Management in South Sudan

- Compulsory orientation course for all humanitarian actors by both South Sudanese and ‘specialists’
- Read, discuss, no short cuts to understanding
- Be careful of our definitions
- Work with different interlocutors
- Build broader geographical research to increase coverage
- Refer to previous experiences, and lessons learned around Operation Lifeline Sudan
- Take time to analyse, encourage debate
- Devise more intelligent, useful questions while understanding the context – be more interested, persevere more
- Be prepared to spend more time collecting informal information; learn the languages; spend more time with South Sudanese
- Debrief exiting staff – lessons learnt
- Use discussion fora to challenge unilateral data collection; cross-fertilise with government, communities, civil society and wider international community

---

\(^{15}\) Elites can be categorised as leaders (political, intellectual, military and other) who hold influence over communities
6. Additional Resources on South Sudan Context

Owing to the multi-faceted nature of the current conflict situation and primacy of historic trends a number of readings are located in the following drop box location for download. https://www.dropbox.com/sh/xdeedqj9o6e866h/AACKfzFkpiVrcgotGOkH0vjDa

Humanitarian response data and information, including updated maps are available here: www.humanitarianinfo.org and specific protection cluster information can be found here: https://southsudan.humanitarianresponse.info/clusters/protection

In addition to this the following research and policy institutions, commentators, generate regular updates and analysis on the conflict and context that should be monitored on a regular basis.
www.crisisgroup.org
www.smallarmssurvey.org (of particular relevance is: http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/de/facts-figures/overview.html)
www.enoughproject.org
www.hrw.org
http://africanarguments.org/category/making-sense-of-sudan/

Rift Valley Institute houses an archive of South Sudan historic analysis and anthropological datasets, which can be found here: http://riftvalley.net/project/sudan-open-archive#.UiOnVZy_1o

Relevant news sites on South Sudan, please note that not all provide objective information or analysis but remains a useful tool for monitoring political, economic and social dynamics.
www.sudantribune.com
www.gurtong.net
www.southsudannewsagency.org
www.radiotamazuj.com
www.upperniletimes.com

A number of books have been produced on South Sudan, the following provides a clear and detailed over of dynamics and trends that remain relevant. Copies are available for kindle download from: www.amazon.com

Young, John, *The Fate of Sudan: The origins and consequences of a flawed peace process*, 2012