International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) offers the best framework for putting the mine ban into practice, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for:

- A total ban on the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines;
- Accelerated clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW);
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims; and
- Universal adherence to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all.
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive devices are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict but has been left behind and is no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

These legal instruments provide a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations, and it is the task of NGOs to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come.
Preface

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The ICBL is a global network of close to 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams, in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network, whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in nearly 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty, and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use, and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

On 1 January 2011 the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) merged with the ICBL to become the ICBL-CMC. The CMC and ICBL remain two separate and strong campaigns with a dedicated team of staff for both. For the last few years the ICBL, CMC, and the Monitor have increasingly been sharing resources to achieve their complementary goals: to rid the world of landmines and cluster munitions. Work towards these goals has been strengthened with the merge, while still ensuring the three components (CMC, ICBL, and the Monitor) continue to be the global authorities in their distinct areas of work.

The ICBL-CMC is committed to pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and, an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties, and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. A five-member Editorial Board coordinates the Monitor system: Action on Armed Violence, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Mines Action Canada, and Norwegian People’s Aid. The Editorial Board assumes overall responsibility for, and decision-making on, the Monitor system. The ICBL-CMC produces and publishes the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society
to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting by states required under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine, cluster munition, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications, to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of 72 Monitor researchers from almost as many countries, and a 12-person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

About this report

This is the 14th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. Landmine Monitor 2012 provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.

Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling in every country in the world, and also includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2011, with information included up to October 2012 when possible.
Acknowledgements

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/About-Us/Experts. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information.

We are grateful to ICBL and CMC staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial assistance in the release, distribution, publication and promotion of Monitor reports.

Responsibility for the coordination of Monitor’s reporting network lies with the five Editorial Board organizations: Action on Armed Violence (Katherine Harrison); Handicap International (Bruno Leclercq); Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose); Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon); and Norwegian People’s Aid (Atle Karlsen). Kathryn Millett coordinated the 2012 Monitor report whilst Program Manager, Jacqueline Hanson, was on maternity leave.

The Editorial Team undertook research and initial country report edits for Landmine Monitor from January to June 2012.

The Editorial Team included:

- Ban policy: Stephen Goose (team leader), Kate Castenson, Katherine Harrison, Mark Hiznay (Final Editor), Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Mary Wareham;
- Mine action and funding: Stuart Casey-Maslen (team leader), Nick Cumming-Bruce, Mike Kendellen; and
- Casualties and victim assistance: Megan Burke and Loren Persi Vicentic (team leaders), Stéphane De Greef.

Mark Hiznay provided final editing from August to November 2012 with assistance from Kathryn Millett (Monitor Coordinator); Vincent Farnsworth, Morgan McKenna and Dane Roth (Publications Consultants); and, Marion Loddo and Tomas Zak (ICBL-CMC Interns).

Report formatting and the online version of the report at www.the-monitor.org were undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. and Imprimerie Minute (Geneva) printed the report. Rafael Jiménez provided the cover design.

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- UNMAS

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* List accurate as of November 2012.
Contents

**Major Findings**
1
Global Landmine Overview 2011-2012
1
Overview of Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance
2

**Ban Policy**
3
Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance
3
Global Overview: States not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty
11

**Mine Action**
17
Summary of Progress
17
Mine-Affected States and Other Areas
17
Mine Clearance in 2011
18
Battle Area Clearance in 2011
19
Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Obligations
20
Risks to deminers
29
Concluding remarks
30

**Casualties and Victim Assistance**
31
Introduction
31
Key Developments
32
Casualties
32
Victim Assistance
36

**Support for Mine Action**
47
Key Developments
47
International Contributions
48
Funding by Thematic Sector
49
National Contributions
51
Other Funding Paths
51

**Status of the Convention**
53

**Mine Ban Treaty**
55

**Appendix**
63
Abbreviations and Acronyms
63
Glossary
64
### 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

#### The Americas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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#### Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

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#### Table Key

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Global Landmine Overview 2011-2012

The Monitor identified one government using antipersonnel mines so far in 2012 – Syria.

- In 2011, Israel, Libya, and Myanmar used antipersonnel mines.
- Use by non-state armed groups was confirmed in six countries – Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand, and Yemen – up from four countries in the last report.

A total of 4,286 new casualties from landmines and explosive remnants of war were recorded in 2011.

- The 2011 figure is similar to the number of casualties identified in 2009 and 2010, or approximately 11-12 casualties per day. The annual incidence rate is about a third of what it was one decade ago, when there were at least 32 casualties per day.
- Steady decreases in annual casualty rates continued in some of the most mine-affected countries, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, but these were offset by increases in countries with new or intensified conflicts, such as Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, South Sudan, and Syria.
- Due to incomplete data collection, the actual number of casualties was certainly higher than what was recorded. Some 59 states and six other areas were confirmed to be affected by landmines. A further 13 states have either suspected or residual mine contamination.
- Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, and Nigeria finished clearing all known mined areas in 2011; clearance was also completed in Abkhazia.

At least 190km² of mined areas were released through clearance or survey by 37 mine action programs in 2011, destroying more than 325,000 antipersonnel mines and almost 30,000 antivehicle mines.

- Over the past decade, 1,700km² has been released through clearance or survey; over 3.1 million mines were removed from the ground.
- The largest total clearance of mined areas was achieved by programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Sri Lanka, which together accounted for more than 80% of recorded clearance.
- An additional 233km² of former battle area was reportedly cleared in 2011, destroying in the process more than 830,000 items of unexploded or abandoned ordnance, as well as 55km² of cluster-munition-contaminated areas, with the destruction of more than 52,000 unexploded submunitions.

Setbacks in the availability and accessibility of assistance and services for survivors occurred in at least 12 countries in 2011, mostly as a result of declining international assistance and new or intensified conflicts.

- Direct international support for victim assistance programs through international mine action funding declined by US$13.6 million, an almost 30% decrease from 2010.
- The 2011 annual total of $30 million is the lowest annual total for victim assistance since the Monitor began reporting on funding for victim assistance. There were no indications that national funding or international development sources had filled the gaps created.

Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$662 million in international and national support for mine action in 2011, approximately $25 million more than in 2010, the largest combined total ever.

- In 2011, 42 donors contributed US$467 million in international support for mine action in 57 affected states and areas, a slight decrease of $13 million (3%) from 2010. This is the sixth consecutive year that international contributions totaled over $400 million per year.
- Thirty affected states provided US$195 million, 29% of global funding, in national support for mine action towards their own mine action programs, an increase of $38 million compared with 2010.
The production of antipersonnel mines has dwindled to a dozen states; there have been no recorded transfers of the weapon in recent years.

- Active production of antipersonnel mines may be ongoing in as few as four countries: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.
- Another eight countries reserve the right to produce antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Singapore, the US, and Vietnam.

**Overview of Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance**

- Three countries have joined the Mine Ban Treaty since July 2011: South Sudan (July 2011), Finland (January 2012), and Somalia (April 2012). With the additions of Somalia and South Sudan, all states in Sub-Saharan Africa are now States Parties, thus completing universalization in the sub-continent.
- Since September 2011, there have been new allegations of mine use by government forces in States Parties Sudan and Yemen that warrant ongoing attention, investigation, and resolution.
- A total of 19 States Parties have officially reported completion of their obligation to clear all known or suspected areas containing antipersonnel mines in territory under their jurisdiction or control. Of the other 45 States Parties that the Monitor believes have outstanding treaty obligations, 27 States Parties have been granted at least one extension period.
- 87 States Parties have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, collectively destroying more than 46 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Turkey, which had missed its deadline in 2008, completed destruction in 2011. Three States Parties remain in violation of the treaty after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline: Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine.
- Since the Mine Ban Treaty went into effect, most States Parties with significant numbers of survivors strengthened ownership for victim assistance through better coordination, planning, and understanding survivors’ needs and challenges.
Ban Policy

The Mine Ban Treaty is one of the great success stories in disarmament and in broader global humanitarian efforts, as demonstrated by its impressive implementation as well as by the widespread adherence to the norm it is establishing against antipersonnel landmines.

Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty was signed on 3 December 1997 by 122 countries and entered into force more than 13 years ago on 1 March 1999. Three new countries have joined the Mine Ban Treaty since the last Landmine Monitor report, making a total of 160 States Parties, or more than 80% of the world’s nations. Most of those still outside the treaty nevertheless abide by its key provisions, indicating near-universal acceptance of the landmine ban.

Yet challenges remain. Several major states are not yet party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including the United States (US), where an ongoing landmine ban policy review will not be decided until 2013. Syria was confirmed to be using antipersonnel mines in 2012, while Israel and Libya laid new antipersonnel mines in 2011, joining long-standing landmine user Myanmar. Moreover, while overall implementation has been impressive there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties.

Full implementation and universalization of the treaty remain key objectives for the cooperative and enduring partnership of governments, international organizations, and the ICBL.

This overview chapter has two parts. The first examines the implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty by its States Parties. The second section provides a global overview of mine ban policy, as well as the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines by the 36 states not party to the treaty. The focus of the reporting is on the period from September 2011 to October 2012.

Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance

In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. The treaty’s compliance provisions—contained in Article 8—have not been formally invoked to clarify any compliance question.

However, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. Other States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including those concerning mine clearance and victim assistance (see following chapters).

As the ICBL warned in November 2010, there is a danger that the Mine Ban Treaty’s effectiveness will be eroded in the future if these challenges are not acknowledged, discussed, and addressed.

Prohibition on use (Article 1)

There has never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became law in 1999.

However, previous allegations of mine use by the armed forces of Turkey in 2009 and Cambodia in 2008 and 2009 remain unanswered and warrant ongoing attention and resolution by those governments and other States Parties.

New allegations

In this reporting period, commencing September 2011, there have been new allegations of mine use by government forces in States Parties Sudan and Yemen. Both situations require further investigation, fact-finding, and reporting by the governments concerned and detailed consideration by other States Parties.
Yemen
At some point since May 2011, antipersonnel mines were laid inside a building compound of the Ministry of Industry and Trade in Sana’a. This situation came to public attention after a boy was injured by an antipersonnel mine at the site in March 2012. Further information was provided to Human Rights Watch (HRW) by guards from the government’s Central Security forces present at the site in March 2012. The guards said they knew of two other explosions at the compound, and that one of the explosions caused casualties among military personnel in January 2012. The guards also stated that men who identified themselves as members of the government’s elite Republican Guard claimed responsibility for laying mines inside the compound (date unspecified) during the process of transferring control of the compound to the Central Security forces. HRW does not have any further information to corroborate this latter claim.

Deminers from the Army Engineering Corps were seen in a video recording obtained by HRW removing at least 25 antipersonnel mines from the compound on 7 March 2012, including one mine type not encountered before in Yemen, either in stock or emplaced. The forces that used the mines at the compound cannot be conclusively determined. Before the conflict, government employees used the ministry building daily. On 23 May 2011, al-Ahmar tribal militia entered the Ministry around midday causing employees to flee, according to local shopkeepers and residents. Al-Ahmar fighters occupied the building for approximately 10 days while fighting with government forces, several residents and merchants told HRW. Cadets of the Supreme Military College subsequently occupied the premises. According to neighborhood residents, troops from the Republican Guard assumed control of the recaptured building around 16 October 2011. In January 2012, Central Security officers began guarding the building compound, they told HRW.

As of October 2012, the government of Yemen had not responded to several requests from the ICBL1 and HRW2 for an explanation or clarification of the use of antipersonnel mines in Sana’a.

In 2012, there were also credible reports of use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups (NSAG) in Sa’ada governorate and Abyan governorate (see section on NSAG use below).

Sudan
It is clear from evidence and testimony from various sources during the reporting period that, in the southern part of Sudan, antipersonnel mines are available for use. There is little to no official information on the situation available from the government, aside from blanket denials of prohibited activity, in either transparency reports or in statements to the public or media.

In 2011, there were reports of new mine-laying in South Kordofan state in the Nuba Mountains near the border with South Sudan as part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the northern branch of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, now called SPLM-N.1 UN reports claimed that both the SAF and the SPLM-N laid antipersonnel mines in strategic areas of Kadugli town, the capital of South Kordofan state.2

On 1 March 2012, a British journalist visited the town of Taroji in South Kordofan that had been taken over by SPLM-N two days earlier on 28 February; he found and photographed three crates containing a total of at least 100 antipersonnel mines in a structure previously used by Sudan government forces to store ammunition. The mines, with Farsi-language markings, were Iranian-made copies of the Israeli Mark 4 antipersonnel mine,3 a plastic, low-metal-content box mine.4 Locals warned the journalist about entering the hills surrounding Taroji, saying the area had been mined by Sudan government forces.5

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1 A 10-year-old boy named Osama was seriously injured when he stepped on an antipersonnel mine in a courtyard inside the compound on 4 March 2012. The boy’s right leg was amputated below the knee and he received injuries to his left leg and abdomen. The medical report obtained by Human Rights Watch (HRW) said the cause “had to be something that exploded from the bottom” and also identified the cause of the injuries as a “mine.” Armed clashes, the so-called “Hassaba war,” between members of the al-Ahmar tribal militia and government forces began in the area in May 2011.

2 In one incident, one soldier lost a leg and received YR400,000 (US$1,850) in compensation, while others received minor injuries. No one was hurt in the second incident, according to the guards. HRW interviews with six uniformed guards from the Central Security forces at the Ministry of Industry and Trade compound and interviews with local shop owners and residents, Jomhoriya Street, Hassaba neigh- borhood, Sana’a, 24–25 March 2012.

3 HRW obtained video footage of a demining operation conducted at the site on 7 March 2012, showing the removal of two types of antipersonnel mines, including East German PPM-2 blast mines. The PPM-2 mine is not reported to have been stockpiled by Yemen.

4 HRW interviews with six uniformed guards from the Central Security forces at the Ministry of Industry and Trade compound and interviews with local shop owners and residents, Jomhoriya Street, Hassaba neighborhood, Sana’a, 24–25 March 2012.

5 Letter from the ICBL to Abu Bakr Abdallah al-Qirbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen, 3 May 2012.

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1 Letter from HRW to Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, President of the Republic of Yemen, 15 April 2012.

2 After years of conflict the government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a peace agreement on 9 January 2005 that led to a referendum in January 2011 approving self-determination for the South. The Republic of South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 and the SPLA became the regular army of the new Republic of South Sudan while the SPLM became the governing political party. The northern branch of the SPLM became an independent party in Sudan after the South’s secession. See Salma El Wardany, “Sudan Army, Opposition Fighters Clash in Southern Kordofan,” Bloomberg, 24 September 2011.


4 This mine is also referred to as “No. 4,” and has been reported by the government of Sudan in its Mine Ban Treaty transparency reports to be present in this part of the country as part of the mine contamination.


6 The Monitor has a set of the landmine photographs on file. Interview with Peter Moszynski, London, 11 April 2012. See also, Peter Moszynski, “Intervention is urgently needed to prevent humanitarian catastrophe on Sudan’s border,” British Medical Journal, 19 March 2012.
On 8 March 2012, the ICBL expressed “grave concern” at allegations of antipersonnel mine use in February 2012 by armed forces of the Republic of Sudan in Southern Kordofan. In a letter, the ICBL requested that the government of Sudan clarify whether its forces used antipersonnel mines in 2011 or 2012. On 25 May 2012, the National Mine Action Centre responded to the ICBL on behalf of the government of the Republic of Sudan, stating, “The allegations reported to ICBL were provided by rebel groups (SPLA). So it is obvious there is incredibility of the source that has passed the report to ICBL.” According to the response, the reported type of mine used at Taroji is not part of Sudan’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines retained for training purposes. In the response, Sudan committed to “carry out an investigation” and “declare the findings” in its annual Article 7 report (due April 2013). At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2012, Sudan stated that it does not retain the type of mine that the allegation referred to, but publicly committed both in the plenary and at a side event to investigate the allegation.

Previous use allegations

Turkey

Also unresolved are serious allegations of at least two instances of use of antipersonnel mines by members of the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey near the border with Iraq, in Sirnak province (April 2009) and Hakkari province (May 2009).

In the first incident, the Turkish newspaper Taraf published a document allegedly belonging to the 23rd Gendarmerie Division Command indicating that members of the Turkish Armed Forces laid M2A4 antipersonnel mines in Sirnak province on 9 April 2009. Turkey did not announce that an investigation into this incident was underway until May 2012.

The second case relates to seven Turkish soldiers who were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Çukurca on 27 May 2009. The Turkish Army initially alleged that the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) planted the mine, but in June 2009 Turkish media reported that the mine was in fact laid by Turkish forces not long before its detonation.

An investigation by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office in Van determined that the mine belonged to the Turkish military and was planted on the orders of a Turkish Commander. The case was forwarded to the Turkish General Staff Military Prosecutor’s Office in 2010.

According to media accounts, in September 2010 a report on the incident to the Military’s Prosecutor’s Office found that the device used was an “anti-personnel landmine.” Brigadier General Zeki Es, who allegedly ordered the emplacement of the mine, was arrested in November 2010 and a case was opened in the Turkish Martial Court. General Es was released in February 2011 after several soldiers recanted their previous testimony.

In October 2011, according to a media account, an expert report prepared at the request of the military court found that commanders were responsible for the deaths due to negligence and poor planning. In February 2012, the Turkish General Staff’s Martial Court continued investigating the case against two generals and four other officers.

In recent Mine Ban Treaty meetings, Turkey has stated that it cannot comment on the mine use allegations while the judicial proceedings are underway. In May 2012, Turkey announced that an investigation had been initiated into the allegation of mine use not currently under judicial process, an apparent reference to the 9 April 2009 incident.

Cambodia

Previous allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Cambodian forces on the Cambodian-Thai border, made

16 The article stated that the mine was a handmade victim-activated explosive that was only referred to as a “Special Alert Warning System.”
19 Ibid.
20 Metin Arslan and Fatih Karakiliç, “General who planted deadly Çukurca mines sent to jail,” Zaman, 8 November 2010.
24 Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation, Geneva, 23 May 2012 (notes by the ICBL); and Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011 (notes by ICBL).
by Thailand in 2008 and 2009, have not been resolved.

In May 2011, in response to a request by the Monitor for an update regarding the Fact Finding Mission Report into the allegations, a government official stated:

Cambodia has been waiting for the responses from Thailand to five core questions, without which the result of the investigation conducted by the Fact Finding Commission of Cambodia cannot be substantiated and evidently concluded. Thailand has not responded to... neither answered nor substantiated the allegation it first made. The allegation made by Thailand regarding Cambodia’s use of new landmines can be summarized as baseless at best.

**Destruction of stockpiles (Article 4)**

A total of at least 153 of the 160 States Parties do not have stockpiles, including 87 States Parties that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, 64 that have declared never possessing antipersonnel mine stocks (except in some cases for training purposes), and two that have not made an official declaration but are not thought to possess stocks (Equatorial Guinea and Tuvalu). Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 46 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

It is certain that four States Parties still stockpile antipersonnel landmines. Three States Parties remain in violation of Article 4 after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline: Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine. Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, and Ukraine missed its deadline of 1 June 2010. In addition, Finland, which became a State Party on 1 July 2012, has a stockpile of over 1 million antipersonnel mines, which it is required to destroy by July 2016.

The stockpiling status for three other States Parties is uncertain. It is unclear whether Somalia, which became a State Party on 1 October 2012, has antipersonnel mines in government-held stockpiles, but stocks are likely held by other armed groups. South Sudan, which joined the Mine Ban Treaty in July 2011, declared the completion of stockpile destruction before independence from Sudan, but it has also reported discovering small quantities of landmines and it is unknown if these have been destroyed yet. Guinea-Bissau, which reported completion of stockpile destruction in 2005, stated in December 2011 it had discovered a small number of mines in storage and intended to destroy them by the end of March 2012, but the Monitor has not received confirmation that this was done.

The most recent state to complete destruction was Turkey, which had been in noncompliance with Article 4 since its deadline passed in 1 March 2008. Turkey ensured the destruction of the last 22,716 Area Denial Antipersonnel Mines (ADAM) in August 2011, completing destruction of a total of 2,938,060 antipersonnel mines.

The inability of Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine to complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep concern for States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. While it is encouraging that Belarus and Ukraine have made progress in stockpile destruction by providing additional information about projected completion dates, by requesting assistance, and by destroying stocks, it is a threat to the integrity of the treaty that three States Parties have remained in violation of Article 4 for several years. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 calls on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date.

Belarus completed destruction of its non-PFM antipersonnel mines in 2006 but has not been able to destroy any of its stock of almost 3.4 million PFM mines since that time. In December 2010, Belarus made progress towards the destruction of these mines after signing a contract with the Spanish company EXPAL to destroy its PFM mines within 28 months, which would mean that Belarus’s stockpile destruction is to conclude in 2013. During 2011 and 2012, Belarus and the contractor undertook the administrative, legal and logistical steps needed to begin destruction, including importing materials and beginning the construction of the destruction facility. In May 2012, Belarus reported that this process was taking longer than expected and that physical destruction had not yet commenced. According to information provided informally to the Monitor, destruction is likely to take at least one year more than planned.

Greece started its stockpile destruction of almost 1.6 million mines eight months after its four-year deadline

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27 In October 2008, two Thai soldiers stepped on antipersonnel mines while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. Thai authorities maintained that the area was previously clear of mines and that the mines had been newly placed by Cambodian forces. Cambodia denied the charges and stated that the Thai soldiers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts. In April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries. In September 2009, Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, Gen. Anupong Panchinda, stated that Cambodian troops were laying fresh mines along the disputed areas and close to routes where Thai soldiers make regular patrols. See Landmine Monitor Report 2009, pp. 243–244, 719–720; also ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Cambodia: Mine Ban Policy,” 6 August 2010, www.the-monitor.org.

28 Email from Vandy Hem, Assistant to the Prime Minister, Deputy Head of Secretariat, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties Organizing Committee, 24 June 2011. A copy of the letter from the Royal Cambodian Embassy in Bangkok to the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 21 November 2008 and a follow up letter of 16 March 2009 was attached to the email.

29 Tuvalu stated in 2002 that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.


34 Email from Iouri Zagoumenov, SCAF Belarus, 26 September 2012.
had already passed. After having destroyed 614,882 mines, Greece halted stockpile destruction operations in 2010 following an explosion at the destruction facility located in Bulgaria. Several issues with its contractor Hellenic Defense Systems S.A., or EAS, led Greece to cancel the contract in June 2010. In 2011, Greece reported both that it was moving ahead with a new contract with EAS\(^{35}\) and later that it was “assessing other offers from certified companies.”\(^{36}\) But in May 2012, Greece stated that any efforts to move forward on stockpile destruction were suspended pending the conclusion of the judicial process with EAS over the cancellation of the contract. Greece indicated that the main proceeding of the Administrative Court of Appeals would take place on 27 September 2012.\(^{37}\)

Ukraine previously destroyed most of its non-PFM mines and over 100,000 PFM mines, but still has nearly six million PFM mines to destroy, as well as around 155,000 non-PFM mines. Ukraine plans to destroy the PFM mines at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant, which it upgraded to meet European safety and environmental standards in 2011 with funds from Norway. In December 2011, Ukraine announced that the facility was operational with the capacity to destroy 1.1 million PFM mines per year, but that only small-scale destruction was taking place until funding became available.\(^{38}\) In September 2011, Ukraine and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) signed a €2.35 million (US$1.27 million) agreement to destroy 2.7 million PFM mines. The funds are to come from the European Union (EU) through a NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund.\(^{39}\) In May 2012, Ukraine reported that while it had passed the necessary legal measures, NATO and the EU were still finalizing an agreement that would allow the funds to be transferred.\(^{40}\) Ukraine has not provided information on plans to destroy around 3 million PFM mines not covered by its agreement with NAMSA; it also has not publicly announced plans to destroy its stockpile of 149,096 POM-2 mines. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2012, Ukraine announced that it planned to finance the destruction of 4,000 OZM-4 mines “in the next two months.”\(^{41}\)

States Parties have an obligation to provide international cooperation and assistance for stockpile destruction under Article 6, and have recommitted to providing support for stockpile destruction in Actions 37 and 42 of the Cartagena Action Plan.

### Reporting on and destroying captured, seized, or newly discovered stockpiles

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize, or receive surrendered arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. In this reporting period, Guinea-Bissau, FYR Macedonia, and South Sudan reported new discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines.

- **Guinea-Bissau** reported in December 2011 that an ammunition storage assessment conducted jointly with the UN Mine Action Service had identified seven PMN mines as well as two boxes with an undetermined number of POMZ-2 mines.\(^{42}\) Guinea-Bissau stated its intention to destroy them no later than 31 March 2012, but as of September 2012 the Monitor had not received a confirmation that the mines had been destroyed.

- **FYR Macedonia** discovered eight containers in May 2011 containing a total of 1,248 PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.\(^{43}\) On 10 May 2012, Macedonian army specialists in cooperation with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining completed the destruction of the newly discovered mines.\(^{44}\)

- **South Sudan** reported at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties that it discovered small quantities of landmines in former Sudan Armed Forces camps vacated after separation. South Sudan said these stocks would be destroyed in 2012 during the dry season. As of 1 September 2012, it was not known if the stocks had been destroyed.\(^{45}\)

It is a State Party's responsibility to report on newly discovered or seized mines and on their destruction, both before and after the completion of stockpile destruction programs. Action 12 of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014 calls on states to report on such mines and to destroy them “as a matter of urgent priority.”

States Parties agreed at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to modify Article 7 report Forms B and G to encourage such reporting. Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, the Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Niger, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda have used Expanded Form B since that time to report on newly discovered mines.

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\(^{36}\) Statement of Greece, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 21 May 2012.


\(^{40}\) Ibid.

\(^{41}\) Statement of Greece, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 20 June 2011.


\(^{43}\) Statement of South Sudan, Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 28 November 2011.
Mines Retained for Training and Research (Article 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques.... The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 72 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes. Of this group, 26 States Parties retain less than 1,000 mines and only two have retained more than 10,000 mines: Turkey (15,100) and Bangladesh (12,500).

A total of 83 States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 27 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.

For five States Parties, the status of retained mines is not known:

- Since 1999, Equatorial Guinea has not submitted an initial transparency report, so its status is uncertain.
- Neither South Sudan nor Tuvalu submitted its initial transparency reports, which were due in January 2012 and August 2012, respectively.
- Finland’s first transparency report is due in December 2012, but it has indicated it will retain 16,500 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes over the next 20 years.
- Botswana has indicated its intention to retain some mines for training, but has never made a formal declaration.

A total of 16 States Parties that retain mines failed to submit an annual transparency update for calendar year 2011, which was due by 30 April 2012. While this represents a slight improvement over the percentage for last year (22% compared to approximately 30%), it still reflects a lack of complete information regarding mines retained for training. Reporting is necessary to understand the intended purposes or actual uses of retained mines.

Key updates from calendar year 2011 were:

- Ukraine destroyed its remaining 170 mines retained for training;
- Luxembourg destroyed its remaining 599 mines retained for training;
- El Salvador reported that it destroyed all of the mines it retained back in 2008;
- The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reported that it retains five PMA2 mines for training, whereas in the past it has reported that it retains “some” mines;

In addition to those listed above, an additional 26 States Parties retain less than 1,000 mines each, which in sum total 10,086 retained mines.

A concern for the ICBL is the number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities, which is typically the case for most countries, and no other details have been provided about how the mines are being used.

A total of nine States Parties have never reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Bangladesh (12,500), Belarus (6,030), Bhutan (4,491), Cape Verde (120), Djibouti (2,996), Ethiopia (303), Niger (3,364), Senegal (37), and Togo (436).

Numerous States Parties have reported decreases in the number of mines retained, but few have explained the reductions in their transparency reports. Among the states that reduced the number of mines retained without explanation for calendar year 2011 were the Czech Republic (30 fewer mines), the Netherlands (191 fewer mines), Spain (9 fewer mines), and the United Kingdom (UK, 362 fewer mines). Each of these States Parties also reduced the number of mines retained without explanation in 2010, so this appears to be a recurring practice. Zimbabwe also reported possessing 50 fewer retained mines in 2011. Conversely, Cambodia reported an increase of 273 mines retained, but did not offer any explanation for this change.

While laudable for transparency, several States Parties were unnecessarily reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, or otherwise rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine. Technically these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty:

- Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Cambodia reported that all of their retained mines do not have fuzes;
- Canada reported that 86 of 1,921 mines retained do not have fuzes;
- Eritrea reported 71 of its 172 retained mines are inert;
- Senegal reported that 13 of its 37 mines are inert;
- Serbia reported that 1,045 of its mines were fuzeless;
- Australia retained only 100 serviceable detonators for over 6,900 retained mines; and
- Belgium, Gambia, Iraq, Portugal, and Sweden also reported that some of the mines they retained were inert or fuzeless, or were otherwise incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines.

A total of 29 States Parties have used expanded

[47] States retaining less than 1,000 mines under Article 3: Nicaragua (953), Ecuador (903), Jordan (900), Honduras (815), Mauritania (728), Portugal (694), Italy (643), Mali (600), Colombia (586), Zimbabwe (500), Cyprus (500), Togo (456), Republic of the Congo (322), the UK (311), Ethiopia (303), Ukraine (260), Eritrea (172), Cape Verde (120), Gambia (100), Rwanda (65), Ireland (62), Senegal (57), Benin (16), Guinea-Bissau (9), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (5), and Burundi (4).

[46] At the May 2012 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, however, Belarus reported that the eight mines were destroyed in February 2012 during training in mine detection and mine destruction activities, and that another such training was planned for the second half of 2012.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Last known declaration (for year)</th>
<th>Initial declaration</th>
<th>Reported consumed in 2010</th>
<th>Year of last declared consumption</th>
<th>Reduced as excess to needs</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,938 (2011)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,921 (2011)</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,879 (2011)</td>
<td>4,991</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,830 (2011)</td>
<td>4,076</td>
<td>Some: 191 fewer</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,780 (2008)</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,764 (2011)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,718 (2011)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Some: 9 fewer</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,683 (2011)</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,634 (2009)</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1,624 (2011)</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1,441 (2011)</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,439 (2011)</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1,272 (2011)</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1,118 (2011)</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>Some: 273 more</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,020 (2007)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not available = It is not possible to determine the number from the information provided by the State Party.*
Form D in annual transparency reports to voluntarily report additional information on retained mines (note that some States Parties on this list only used some voluntary elements of Form D).49

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that “Each State Party shall report to the Secretary General of the UN as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

As of 15 October 2012, only 86 States Parties, or 54% of States Parties, had submitted reports for calendar year 2011. This is the second lowest annual compliance rate in the past decade, a slight increase from the previous low of 52% for calendar year 2010.

New States Parties Finland and Somalia have initial Article 7 reports due by 28 December 2012 and 30 March 2013, respectively. South Sudan and Tuvalu are late to submit their initial reports due in January and August 2012, respectively. Equatorial Guinea is 13 years late in submitting its first report, which was due by 28 August 1999.

Of the 70 States Parties that had not submitted a report for 2011, most failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more years. Belize and Saint Kitts and Nevis, however, turned in an annual report in 2012 for the first time since 2006 and 1999, respectively.

Among the States Parties that did not submit reports for 2011 are six States Parties that had Article 5 clearance obligations in 2011 (Chad, Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Tajikistan, and Uganda).


As chair of the informal Contact Group on Article 7, Belgium continued in 2011 and 2012 to present its plans to review the Article 7 reporting forms and the associated reporting guidelines in order to address shortcomings in the quality of submitted reports.50

Eleventh Meeting of States Parties (Article 11)

Cambodia, the heavily mine-affected country that is widely acknowledged as the “cradle” of the movement to ban landmines, hosted the Mine Ban Treaty’s Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Phnom Penh from 27 November–2 December 2011. A total of 97 states attended with representatives from 82 States Parties and observer delegations from 15 states that had not joined the treaty, including China, India, Myanmar, Singapore, the US, and Vietnam. An ICBL delegation of more 275 campaigners from 61 countries, including landmine survivors, participated in the meeting.

The day before the meeting opened, on 27 November, Cambodian authorities organized field visits to mined areas and post-clearance sites in northwest Cambodia as well as to the Kean Klaing Rehabilitation Centre and to the Oudong Demining Training Institute. The prime minister addressed the opening ceremony, which included UNDP Administrator Helen Clark and ICBL Ambassador Song Kosal, a Cambodian landmine survivor.

The Eleventh Meeting of States Parties featured a special plenary segment marking 20 years of the movement to ban landmines, which provided an opportunity to reflect on how far Cambodia and the world have come in pursuing a comprehensive end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel landmines. The meeting was also billed as a “springboard” to encourage further action, both in terms of universalization and implementation, with the ICBL calling on all to “push for progress.”

At the meeting, Finland and Somalia confirmed their intent to join the treaty and acceded soon afterwards, on 9 January and 16 April 2012, respectively. Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein of Jordan accepted the President’s proposal to serve as the Mine Ban Treaty’s Special Envoy on Universalization.

The main outcome of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties was the Phnom Penh Progress Report, a document reviewing progress made in the second year of the application of the 2010–2014 Cartagena Action Plan adopted by the Second Review Conference in November 2009.

At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Burundi and Nigeria both declared that they had fulfilled their Article 5 mine-clearance obligations (though Burundi subsequently reported at the 2012 intersessional Standing Committee meetings that it still had suspected mined areas to release). The decision was made at the meeting to grant mine clearance deadline extension requests to Algeria, Chile, the Republic of Congo, DRC, and Ethiopia. The ICBL expressed concern that most affected States Parties are falling behind on their clearance plans and targets, with only a handful on schedule to meet their treaty deadline.

At the meeting, Turkey announced that it completed the destruction of its stockpile of 2.8 million landmines in June 2011, concluding a long-standing implementation concern after it had missed its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 March 2008. The ICBL expressed deep regret that Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine were still in violation of the treaty’s stockpile destruction obligation.

The Eleventh Meeting of States Parties agreed that the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty will be held in Geneva, Switzerland on 3–7 December 2012. Ambassador Matjaž Kovačič, permanent representative of Slovenia to the UN in Geneva, has been designated president of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties.

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49 Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, BIH, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and the UK.

Global Overview: States not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Universalizing the Ban

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states may no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 160 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 29 acceded.52

Three countries have joined the Mine Ban Treaty since Landmine Monitor 2011 went to print in September 2011. The Republic of South Sudan succeeded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 November 2011, less than six months after becoming an independent state.52 Finland acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 9 January 2012 after enacting legislation approving the Mine Ban Treaty in late 2011 and after many years of internal policy reviews. Somalia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 16 April 2012, becoming the 160th State Party. With the additions of Somalia and South Sudan, all states in Sub-Saharan Africa are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, thus completing universalization in the subcontinent. The 36 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include two signatories, Marshall Islands and Poland, which have not yet ratified.

States Parties, the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit, the ICBL, the ICRC, and UN agencies cooperate and coordinate their efforts promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Representatives from 15 states not party attended the Mine Ban Treaty’s Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, including from China, India, Myanmar, Singapore, the US, and Vietnam.

The treaty’s special envoy, Prince Mired of Jordan, continued to promote universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, visiting the Pacific countries of Tuvalu and Tonga in 2011 to discuss accession with government leaders and Libya in 2012. The ICBL promoted universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty with, among others, Somalia (which subsequently joined) and Oman (with a visit to capital in February 2012 as part of the effort). In March-April 2012, campaigners promoted the Mine Ban Treaty in states not party with the “Lend Your Leg” global action in such countries as Georgia, India, Israel, South Korea, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria, the US, and Vietnam.

Several states indicated in 2011 or 2012 that they are actively considering accession, including Lao PDR, Libya, Myanmar, Oman, and the US. Significant developments during the reporting period regarding universalization of the treaty include:

- Lao PDR stated in May 2012 that it “will accede to the Ottawa Convention as it has announced some time ago and it will continue to work toward that goal.”53
- Post-Gaddafi leaders in Libya expressed support for the Mine Ban Treaty in 2011 and 2012, but said that accession must wait until the new government is established and the legislative body can consider it.
- In November 2011, Myanmar’s Minister of Foreign Affairs U Wunna Maung Lwin said that the government is actively considering accession to the treaty.
- A delegation of officials from Oman met with the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit, States Parties and the ICBL on 17–18 September 2012, indicating that the government is considering accession.
- Legislation approving ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty was passed by Poland’s lower chamber of parliament on 10 October 2012 and will next be considered by the upper chamber.
- ICBL Youth Ambassador Song Kosal visited South Korea in March 2012 to accept the 2012 Tji Hak-soon Justice and Peace Award and used the occasion to urge South Korea to join the Mine Ban Treaty.54
- Sri Lanka has not made any formal statements on the Mine Ban Treaty since 2009, but in July 2012 a senior defence official reportedly stated to the media that the Ministry of Defense is ready for Sri Lanka to join the Mine Ban Treaty.54
- US officials confirmed that the comprehensive review initiated in late 2009 of US landmine policy and its position on joining the Mine Ban Treaty was concluded in the first half of 2012, but a decision was not anticipated to be made until 2013. Since the Second Review Conference in November 2009, the US has continued to participate as an observer in Mine Ban Treaty meetings.
- The Occupied Palestinian Territories provided its first voluntary Article 7 report in September 2012, but the report did not express support for joining the landmine ban.

Annual UN General Assembly resolution

On 2 December 2011, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 66/29 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted.

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51 The 29 accessions include two countries which joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” Montenegro after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro and South Sudan after it became independent state from Sudan. Of the 131 signatories, 43 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

52 According to the UN Office of Legal Affairs, the Mine Ban Treaty retroactively became effective for South Sudan on 9 July 2011, the date of state independence.


by a vote of 162 nations in favor, none opposed, and 18 abstentions.56

This was three fewer votes in favor than the previous year, and one more abstention. The 2010 resolution secured 165 affirmative votes, the highest number since the first UNGA resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty passed in 1997, while the lowest number of votes in support was 138 in 2001.57 Saudi Arabia abstained for the first time in 2011 after being absent for nearly every other vote.58 Lebanon also abstained from the vote on the 2011 resolution.59

The annual resolution provides an important opportunity for states outside the Mine Ban Treaty to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines and the objective of its universalization. Many countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 have done so after voting in support of consecutive UNGA resolutions, including Finland.60

Of the 19 states not party that voted in support of Resolution 66/29 on 2 December 2011, nine have voted in favor of every Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1997 (Armenia, Bahrain, Finland, Georgia, Oman, Poland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the United Arab Emirates); 10 that consistently abstained or were absent previously now vote in favor (Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Micronesia FS, Mongolia, Morocco, and Tonga). Somalia, now a State Party, was absent from the 2011 resolution, but has voted in favor in previous years.

The number of states abstaining from supporting the resolution has ranged from a high of 23 in 2002 and 2003 to a low of 17 in 2010, 2005 and 2006. The group of states that could be described as most opposed to the Mine Ban Treaty are the 15 states not party that have voted against consecutive resolutions since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Libya (since 1998), Myanmar, North Korea (since 2007), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan (since 1999), the US, and Vietnam (since 1998).61 Of those, there appear to be positive developments in Libya (post-Gaddafi), Myanmar, and the US.

56 The US was the first country to introduce a resolution to ban landmines in 1996, urging nations “to pursue vigorously” an international ban treaty “with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible.” UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 51/45S was passed on 10 December 1996 by a vote of 156-0, with 10 abstentions. The resolution also called on governments to unilaterally implement “bans, moratoria or other restrictions” on production, stockpiling, export and use of antipersonnel mines “at the earliest date possible.” Since 1999, it has abstained on every UNGA resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

57 The first resolution in support of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, UNGA 52/8A, secured a vote of 142 in favor, none against, and 18 abstained.

58 Saudi Arabia voted for the UNGA Mine Ban Treaty resolution in 1997 (since 1999; and while it voted in favor in 2010 subsequently clarified that it had intended to abstain).

59 Lebanon is the only country to have voted against the Mine Ban Treaty resolution (in 1999). It voted for the resolution in 1997-1998; abstained in 2001-2004 & 2006-2009, and 2011; was absent 2005 & 1999, and while it voted in favor in 2010 subsequently clarified that it had intended to abstain.

60 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Macedonia FYR, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey.

61 Uzbekistan voted in support of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.

Non-state armed groups
A significant number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have indicated their willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines since the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence, showing the strength of the growing international norm. At least 63 NSAGs have committed to halt the use of antipersonnel mines over the past 12 years.62 The exact number is difficult to determine, since NSAGs may split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. More than 40 NSAGs have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, most recently the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Sudanese NSAG, in April 2012.63 Previously, in April 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC), then the opposition authority in Libya, issued a communiqué formally pledging not to use antipersonnel or antivehicle mines and mentioning that any future Libyan government should join the Mine Ban Treaty.

Use of antipersonnel mines
Locations of new use of antipersonnel mines, 2011–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use by government forces</th>
<th>Use by NSAGs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar, Syria</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand, Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this reporting period, September 2011 through October 2012, the Monitor has confirmed the new use of antipersonnel mines by forces of the governments of Syria and Myanmar. Landmine Monitor Report 2011 documented the new use of mines by Israel and Libya earlier in 2011, but no new use was recorded in 2012. New use of antipersonnel by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand, and Yemen is also detailed below.

Syria
In 2011 and 2012, Syrian government forces used antipersonnel mines along the borders with Lebanon and Turkey. On 1 November 2011, a Syrian official told the media that “Syria has undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.”64 The ICBL expressed concern at Syria’s “disregard” for the

62 As of October 2012, 42 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). Prior to 2000 several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, whom some later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.


safety of civilians seeking to cross the border to flee the violence in Syria.\textsuperscript{59}

In March 2012, HRW documented new mine use on the Turkish border near Hasaniieh (PMN-2), Derwand, Jiftlek, Kherbet al-Joz toward Alzouf and al-Sofan, Armana, Bkaifa, Hatya, Darakosh, Salqin, and Azmeirin.\textsuperscript{60} New landmine use on the Lebanese border has been reported in al-Buni,\textsuperscript{61} Tel Kalakh,\textsuperscript{62} Kneissi,\textsuperscript{63} Heet,\textsuperscript{64} and Masharih al-Qaa.\textsuperscript{65} Civilian casualties have been recorded from this mine use.

Several states condemned mine use by Syria, as did the President of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Prak Sokhonn of Cambodia.\textsuperscript{66} States that expressed concern at the reported landmine use include Australia, Austria, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, and the US, as well as EU High Representative Catherine Ashton.

**Myanmar**

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently documented the extensive use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and NSAGs in many areas of Burma/Myanmar. During this reporting period, however, information available to the Monitor indicates a lower level of new mine use, and in use in more limited geographic areas. There was only one serious allegation of mine use by the Army (Tatmadaw), in Kachin State in October 2011. However, new government forces—former opposition fighters who have now been formed into government-controlled Border Guard Forces—were using antipersonnel mines at least until late 2011.

The reasons for the apparent significant decrease in use of mines by government forces are unclear, but it is notable that in July 2012 Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin claimed that government forces are no longer using landmines.\textsuperscript{67}

**Non-state armed groups**

Since January 2011, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least six countries: States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Thailand, and Yemen, and states not party Myanmar and Pakistan. This is an increase in the number of countries previously cited by the Monitor. There were also serious but as of yet unconfirmed allegations of NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in States Parties Sudan and South Sudan.

In Afghanistan, there has been extensive use of victim-activated IEDs by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, opposing the Kabul government and NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces. In February and July 2012, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released reports stating that armed groups in Afghanistan were deploying large numbers of pressure-plate, victim-activated, explosive devices.\textsuperscript{68} UNAMA has called on armed groups in Afghanistan to prohibit their members from using pressure-plate IEDs.\textsuperscript{69}

In Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world. Colombian NSAGs lay mines near their camp sites or bases, on paths that lead to areas of strategic importance (such as to their bases, or to main transit routes), and to protect caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing. In 2012, FARC was accused of laying mines near destroyed infrastructure to prevent or delay its reconstruction.\textsuperscript{70} NSAGs, predominantly FARC, also plant antipersonnel mines in or near coca fields to prevent eradication


\textsuperscript{64} “On March 9, The Washington Post published a photo of dirt-covered PMN-2 antipersonnel mines and TMN-46 antivehicle mines that it reported were planted by the Syrian army on the outskirts of the Syrian village of Heet”.


\textsuperscript{72} AP Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, Press Release: “During this reporting period, however, information available to the Monitor indicates a lower level of new mine use, and in use in more limited geographic areas. There was only one serious allegation of mine use by the Army (Tatmadaw), in Kachin State in October 2011. However, new government forces—former opposition fighters who have now been formed into government-controlled Border Guard Forces—were using antipersonnel mines at least until late 2011. The reasons for the apparent significant decrease in use of mines by government forces are unclear, but it is notable that in July 2012 Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin claimed that government forces are no longer using landmines.”

efforts, which caused casualties among coca eradicators. Government forces continued to recover mines from the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).

In Myanmar, at least 17 NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines since 1999, including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karen Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A). For the first time, in late 2011 and early 2012, a significant decrease in reports of mine use by NSAGs occurred as the government engaged almost all the groups in the country in a peace dialogue. Mine warfare by the KIA and the use of mines in conflicts between different armed groups in Karen State have reportedly continued. In May 2011, state media reported the seizure by the army of 30 homemade antipersonnel mines in the possession of a member of the KIA in Myitkyina Township. In October and December 2011, the government claimed to have seized 17 mines of an unknown type among other weapons from the KIA during operations. State media also reported the recovery of mines during the surrender of members of the Shan State Army (SSA) and the KNLA in late 2011.

In Pakistan, the government has reported that antipersonnel mines have been used throughout the country, and attributes the use to “terrorists.” The Monitor has reported a large number of casualties, apparently from newly laid mines, in Balochistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province), where the Pakistan Army and security forces have been engaged in armed conflict with Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Baloch insurgents, and as a result of conflict between anti-government armed groups and of inter-tribal conflicts.

In Thailand, an insurgency in southern Thailand has increased use of victim-activated IEDs. In March 2012, one Thai soldier was injured after stepping on a landmine in a farm field. Three more mines were later found. This is the most recent of several scattered incidents of use of victim-activated explosive devices reported in southern Thailand. In January 2011, a woman rubber tapper was injured after she reportedly stepped on a mine in Narathiwat’s Bacho district. In July 2011, a female soldier was injured after reportedly stepping on a mine near the site of an insurgent attack.

In Yemen, there were reports and allegations of landmine use by NSAGs in Hajja and Abyan governorates. In March 2012, Yemen’s Ministry of Defense reported new landmine casualties in Haja and Abyan governorates, which neighbors Sa’daa governorate and where Houthis rebels have been fighting local Sunni tribes backed by the government. In May 2012, withdrawing fighters of Ansar Al-Sharia reportedly planted many explosive weapons (including IEDs, antivehicle mines, explosive booby-traps, and a few factory-made antipersonnel mines) in Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan governorate, and near the southern town of Ja’ar before being forced out by government forces.

In Sudan, there were reports in 2011 of new mine use in South Kordofan state near the border with South Sudan as part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the northern branch of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). There is a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. The Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about which forces may have used antipersonnel mines.

In South Sudan, it appears that some new mine use took place in certain areas in the states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile, but the Monitor could not determine who was responsible for the mine-laying and the extent to which antipersonnel mines, as opposed to antivehicle mines, were being laid.

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Yemen.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past. Thirty-nine of these have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and Poland. A majority of major producers from

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84 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has been a producer.
85 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 35 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BIH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, UK, and Zimbabwe.
the 1970s to 1990s are among those nations that have stopped manufacturing and joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

Landmine Monitor identifies 12 states as potential producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not actively producing mines but reserve the right to do so. Active production may be ongoing in as few as four countries: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed the Monitor that most of its mine production has been shut down, but a small number of antipersonnel mines are produced by the military for research purposes.  

NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Thailand, and Yemen produce antipersonnel mines, mostly in the form of victim-activated IEDs. In 2012, the Colombian Army reported that FARC was producing non-detectable antipersonnel mines. 

Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. Landmine Monitor has not conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines. For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.

At least 10 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including seven landmine producers, have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they now have stopped exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

Stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

The Monitor estimates that of the 36 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, as many as 33 stockpile a collective total of about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Three states not party, all Pacific nations, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga.

States not party that may stockpile antipersonnel mines

| Armenia | Korea, North | Pakistan |
| Austria | Azerbaijan | Russia |
| Bahrain | Kyrgyzstan | China |
| Cuba | Lao PDR | Saudi Arabia |
| Egypt | Lebanon | Singapore |
| Georgia | Libya | Sri Lanka |
| India | Mongolia | Syria |
| Indonesia | Morocco | UAE |
| Iran | Myanmar | US |
| Israel | Nepal | Uzbekistan |
| Kazakhstan | Oman | Vietnam |

It is not certain that all of these states not party stockpile antipersonnel mines. Officials from the United Arab Emirates have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.

The vast majority of global stockpiles belong to China (estimated 110 million) and Russia (estimated 24.5 million). Based on 2002 data, the Monitor has cited a US stockpile of 10.4 million antipersonnel mines, but the Monitor was informed in 2010 that the US stockpile may be considerably smaller now. Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated six million) and India (estimated four to five million).

Prolific use during 2011 by forces of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the discovery of hundreds of thousands of stockpiled mines have shown how Libya’s previous denial of possessing a mine stockpile was patently untrue. The National Transitional Council pledged in 2011 to destroy all stocks of mines under its control.

Destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely occurs as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

Signatory Poland began destroying its stockpile of over 1 million antipersonnel mines in 2003. In 2011, it destroyed a further 186,428 mines, leaving a stockpile of 13,585. In June 2011, Mongolia reported that it had 206,417 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, and that 110 had been destroyed to “define an appropriate mine destruction technique friendly to the environment.”

85 Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2011), Form B.

The mines have a probable lifespan of 10–15 years. The mines vary in size, weight, and quantity of explosive, but have a common shape and detonation method (by pressure on a syringe). According to the officer, the protocol for dealing with these mines, once discovered, dictates that they should be destroyed on site. Only a few are kept for study (no more than 10). The destruction is done by “Grupos Marte” of the army according to the international standards for destruction. Interview with Sgt. Nelson Molina, 60th Demining Battalion, Colombian Army, Bogotá, 30 June 2011.

84 Emails from Lai Haiyang, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2012 and 7 September 2011.
Non-state armed groups

Few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago due to the halt in trade and production and due to destruction of stocks under the Mine Ban Treaty. A few NSAGs have access to mine stocks from old regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), while others produce their own improvised mines or acquire mines by removing them from minefields. In states not party, NSAGs have also been known to capture antipersonnel mines, steal them from arsenals, or purchase them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, and South Sudan. The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

In February 2012, the Sudanese opposition force Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North reportedly captured stocks of antipersonnel mines from a Sudanese government stockpile when it took control of Toroji in South Kordofan. The government of South Sudan reportedly recovered PMN antipersonnel mines from the rebel South Sudan Liberation Army in Unity State in June 2011.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the protocol gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2012, a total of 98 states were party to Amended Protocol II. Only one state ratified the protocol since the publication of Landmine Monitor 2011: Montenegro (30 December 2011).

Only 10 of the 98 states that are party to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and, while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol II, there are still 10 states that are party to the original but have not joined the amended protocol: Cuba, Djibouti, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.

A total of 19 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also producers of antipersonnel mines.

States that stockpile antipersonnel mines but are not party to CCW protocols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>UAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 Italics indicate states which also produce antipersonnel mines.


92 Mine Ban Treaty signatory Poland is party to CCW Amended Protocol II. Though it has not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, as a signatory it is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty, so it is already bound by a higher standard than Amended Protocol II.

93 Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Togo, and Uganda are party to the Mine Ban Treaty and are thus bound to the higher standard.

94 None of the countries listed in the table are party to the Mine Ban Treaty either.
Summary of Progress

As of October 2012, 59 states and six other areas were confirmed to be mine-affected. Of the 59 affected states, 36 were party to the Mine Ban Treaty. A further 12 States Parties and one state not party had either suspected or residual mine contamination.

It was reported that three states had completed clearance of all known mined areas in 2011: States Parties Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria, and state not party Nepal. In October 2011, HALO Trust completed clearance of all known mined areas in Abkhazia. In May 2012, Jordan reported to States Parties that it had completed its obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty though it would carry on “verification” of some areas “to ensure that the specified requirements of the Convention have been fulfilled.” At the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012, Denmark and the Republic of Congo (referred to hereinafter as Congo) were expected to declare that they too had fulfilled their survey and clearance obligations. Uganda failed to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 August 2012, and as of October it was unclear when it would complete clearance.

In 2011, mine action programs cleared at least 190km² of mined areas and more than 285km² of battle areas, including 55km² of areas contaminated by cluster munitions. In 2010, mine action programs cleared at least 200km² of mined areas (a record) and some 460km² of battle areas, including over 18.5km² of areas contaminated by cluster munitions. Worldwide, an area covering some 3,000km² remains to be cleared of antipersonnel mines. The vast majority of countries should be in a position to clear all known mined areas before the end of the current decade. A few, such as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, and Iraq, will likely need additional time.

Mine-Affected States and Other Areas

As of October 2012, 59 states, as well as six other areas, were confirmed to be mine-affected, as set out in the table on the following page. All but one—Mali—had antipersonnel mine contamination.

In June 2011, Nigeria announced that it had cleared all known mined areas from its territory. It subsequently made a formal declaration of completion to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in November-December 2011.3

Mali is believed to be contaminated by antivehicle mines only. Media reports published in June and October 2011 claimed that forces allied with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had laid an unspecified type of mine in the Wagadou forest near Mali’s border with Mauritania.4 Subsequent investigations indicate that antivehicle mines may have been used, causing at least one civilian casualty; however, the Monitor is not aware of any evidence that antipersonnel mines were used.5

Affected states not party

A total of 23 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are believed to be mine affected: Armenia, Azerbaijan,
China, Cuba, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. In June 2011, the UN announced that Nepal had cleared its last known mined area.7

**Mine-affected “other areas”**

Six other areas not internationally recognized as states were also mine-affected as of October 2012: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan, and Western Sahara. In October 2011, HALO completed clearance of all known mined areas in Abkhazia.8 Taiwan has set a deadline of 2013 for completion of mine clearance operations.

**States and other areas with suspected or residual mine contamination**

In addition to states in which mine contamination is confirmed, a further 12 states—all but one (Oman) party to the Mine Ban Treaty—have either suspected or residual mine contamination, as set out in the table below. This means these States Parties have an obligation to make “every effort” to identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines and then to clear any that they find. In cases when they are unable to complete this work by the expiration of their Article 5 deadline, they must request an extension in order to remain in compliance with the treaty.

**Extent of contamination**

The Monitor does not publish a global table of the estimated size of mine contamination by state because it believes that many of the estimates cited by states are far higher than the true extent of contamination. Instead, an order of magnitude for contamination as of October 2012 is given in the table on the following page.

**Mine Clearance in 2011**

There are continuing problems in discerning true mine clearance from battle area clearance (BAC) or land release by survey, in large part due to the poor quality of record-keeping and reporting.3 However, the Monitor believes that at least 190 km² of mined areas were cleared by 37 mine action programs in 2011 (compared with 200 km² in 2010, the previous record), with the destruction of more than 325,000 antipersonnel mines and almost 30,000 antivehicle mines. The global clearance figure

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**Note:** States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. Other areas are indicated by italics.

*Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK) both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.

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6 China’s December 2009 statement to the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty that it had completed “clearance of mine-affected areas within China’s territory” was put into doubt in September 2011 when a Foreign Ministry official reported to the Monitor that China maintains a small number of minefields “for national defence.” Email response to Monitor request for information from Lai Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2011. In addition, there may be a residual mine threat in China along the border with Vietnam as mine injuries have been reported since its 2009 statement.


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**Table: Mine-affected states and other areas with confirmed mined areas as of October 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe and CIS</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 states and 1 area

7 states

13 states and 1 area

14 states and 2 areas

10 states and 2 areas

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Note: States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. Other areas are indicated by italics.
is conservative and understates the extent of clearance due to the fact that several states do not report while others do not disaggregate clearance from cancellation by non-technical survey (NTS) or release by technical survey (TS). The largest total clearance of mined areas was achieved in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Sri Lanka, which together accounted for 80% of recorded clearance.

States with suspected or residual contamination as of October 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe and CIS</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Oman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of the Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 states</td>
<td>2 states</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated extent of mine contamination in affected states as of October 2012

- **States with very heavy contamination (more than 100km²)**
  - Afghanistan
  - Angola
  - Bosnia and Herzegovina
  - Cambodia
  - Chad
  - Croatia
  - Iran
  - Morocco (Western Sahara)
  - Thailand
  - Turkey

- **States with heavy contamination (10–100km²)**
  - Algeria
  - Colombia
  - Chile
  - Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
  - Egypt
  - Eritrea
  - Lao PDR
  - Libya
  - Mauritania
  - Mozambique
  - Myanmar
  - Russia
  - Somalia
  - South Sudan
  - Sudan
  - Sri Lanka
  - Vietnam
  - Yemen
  - Zimbabwe

Mine clearance in major mine action programs in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/area</th>
<th>Area cleared in 2011 (km²)</th>
<th>Area cleared in 2010 (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. Other areas are indicated by italics.

**Battle Area Clearance in 2011**

In 2011, at least 233km² of battle area was reportedly cleared, destroying in the process more than 800,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and more than 37,000 items of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). In addition, some 55km² of areas contaminated by cluster munitions were cleared of more than 52,000 unexploded submunitions. In 2010, at least 440km² of battle area was reportedly cleared as well as 18.5km² of areas contaminated by cluster munitions.

**BAC in major clearance programs in 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>BAC in 2011 (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

Far greater land release is achieved through cancellation by NTS or release by TS.

The number of AXO destroyed is an underestimate as many states and individual operators do not disaggregate between AXO and UXO.
Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Obligations

States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

Forty-five States Parties, as set out in the table below, were confirmed or suspected to be affected by antipersonnel mines as of October 2012, and therefore had obligations under Article 5 of the treaty.

Niger is now included in this list because, at the May 2012 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Niger informed States Parties for the first time that it had at least one mined area containing antipersonnel mines. The mines, which were laid by French forces during the colonial era, contaminate an area in Madama around a Nigerian border post with Libya. Niger’s Article 5 deadline expired in 2009 and it decided not to request an extension despite calls from ICBL to do so. Its current compliance with the treaty is highly uncertain.

Two of these States Parties – Denmark and Jordan – informally announced completion of all known mined areas in 2012. In addition, although Guinea-Bissau has not reported completion of clearance of all known mined areas the Monitor no longer lists it as mine-contaminated based on information from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).

Six of the States Parties listed above have not declared that they have (or still have) Article 5 obligations, but the Monitor believes they may be mine-affected, and thus their fulfillment of their treaty obligations may be in doubt: Djibouti, Greece, Montenegro, Namibia, Moldova, and the Philippines.

Greece announced in December 2009 that it was in full compliance with Article 5 of the treaty. However, there remains one marked minefield on the island of Rhodes which had been checked for mines on several occasions but never fully cleared. After several inquiries by the Monitor and concerns raised by the ICBL, Greece informed the Monitor in May 2012 that it would undertake full clearance of the area in 2012.

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### Table: States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe and CIS</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Republic of the</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>16 States Parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 States Parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 States Parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>13 States Parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 States Parties</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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15 States Parties

16 States Parties

6 States Parties

13 States Parties

4 States Parties

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13 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

14 Despite a statement that Namibia was in full compliance with Article 5 at the Second Review Conference, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.

15 Moldova, which had a 1 March 2011 Article 5 deadline, made a statement in June 2008 which suggested that it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

16 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) consistently over recent years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.


18 Meeting with representatives of the Greek Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Athens, 10 May 2012.
of the border also affects Montenegro. By October 2012, Montenegro had not officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations.

A further six of the States Parties listed above – Bhutan, Burundi, Germany, Hungary, Palau, and Congo – have declared to States Parties that they suspect having mined areas, but they have not yet confirmed the presence of antipersonnel mines in such areas.

At the June 2011 Standing Committee meetings, Hungary reiterated that it had two mined areas on its territory that had not yet been cleared. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Burundi declared that it had completed its Article 5 obligations, but subsequently reported at the 2012 intersessional Standing Committee meetings that it still had suspected mined areas to release. At the June 2011 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Germany informed States Parties for the first time that it had discovered a suspected mined area at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg. It reiterated this information at the May 2012 Standing Committee meetings.

Hungary reported the possible presence of antipersonnel mines on its territory only in 2011, despite the fact that it had earlier sought funding from the European Commission for survey and clearance work. Hungary has identified an area of suspected mine contamination in a strip of territory 79.6km long and varying in width from a few centimeters to a few meters along the border with Croatia between the municipalities of Matty and Kölked. Hungary did not request an extension to its Article 5 deadline prior to its expiry in 2009.

Palau submitted an Article 7 report in 2011 (for calendar year 2010) in which it declared for the first time that it had mined areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory. In its corresponding Article 7 report for calendar year 2011, Palau reported suspected contamination in the Umubrogol Mountains (on Bloody Nose Ridge).

The precise extent to which the Republic of the Congo is mine-contaminated remains unclear; its extended Article 5 deadline expires on 1 January 2013. With assistance from NPA, Congo was planning to conduct survey in the suspected region (the southwest of the country, close to the border with Angola) in 2012. Initial plans were disrupted by the March 2012 explosion at an ammunition storage area in the capital, Brazzaville, which killed more than 280 people and injured a further 2,300. As of October 2012, NPA was conducting NTS in the suspected region with experts from the Congolese Ministry of Defense.

A total of 19 States Parties have reported completion of their respective Article 5 obligations, as set out in the table below.

### States Parties reporting completion of their Mine Ban Treaty clearance obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Year of reported compliance</th>
<th>Article 5 deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi*</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1994**</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece***</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2010 (extended from 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As noted above, Burundi followed its initial declaration of completion in 2011 with a report in May 2012 that it still had suspected mined areas to release.

** Date of completion of demining program (prior to entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty).

*** Greece still has one mined area on the island of Rhodes to release and has not, therefore, completed its Article 5 obligations.

### States Parties and Article 5 deadline extensions

Significant challenges remain in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty’s survey and clearance obligations. In accordance with Article 5, states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas on territory under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. The first clearance deadlines expired on 1 March 2009, but 15 States Parties with 2009 deadlines failed to meet them and were granted extensions by the Ninth

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74 See, for example, Christophe Châtelot, “Congo-Brazzaville: vague d’arrestations de militaires après le drame du 4 mars” (“Congo-Brazzaville: wave of arrests of military personnel after the events of 4 March”), Le Monde, 12 April 2012 (updated 16 July 2012).
75 Email from Vanessa Finson, Desk Officer, Mine Action Department, NPA HQ, 24 October 2012.

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76 ** As formal statements of completion are generally made at a Meeting of States Parties, this list does not include Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, and Jordan, which all informally announced completion in 2012. Djibouti’s status remains unclear and the Monitor does not consider that Djibouti has made a formal declaration of completion.
Meeting of States Parties.23 In 2009, a further three States Parties with 2010 deadlines (Argentina, Cambodia, and Tajikistan) and one with a 2009 deadline that had already expired (Uganda) formally requested and were granted extensions by the Second Review Conference. The extension periods ranged from three to 10 years.24 At the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in 2010, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania were granted their requested extensions ranging from two months to 10 years, while Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe were granted their requests for second extensions ranging from 18 months to three years. In 2011, five more States Parties submitted requests that were granted by the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties: Algeria, Chile, DRC, Eritrea, and Congo (whose deadline had already expired by the time the Meeting had the opportunity to decide whether or not to grant an extension). The periods sought ranged from 14 months to eight years.

Of the 27 States Parties granted an extension so far, only one, Nicaragua, has formally reported completion of its Article 5 obligations. At the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012, however, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, and Congo were all expected to do likewise. It was not clear whether Uganda would also be in a position to declare it had cleared all known mined areas at the same meeting. Its extended Article 5 deadline expired in August 2012 without clearance having been completed, and thus, as of October, it was not in compliance with its treaty obligations.

Thus, of the 45 States Parties that the Monitor believes have unfulfilled obligations under Article 5 of the treaty, at least 21 were still taking active advantage of a first or second Article 5 deadline extension period as of 1 October 2012. In 2012, Afghanistan, Angola, and Cyprus all submitted a first extension request, while Zimbabwe submitted its third extension request. These were due to be considered by the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties. If granted, this would mean a total of 30 States Parties have been granted an extension to their Article 5 deadline. Furthermore, the status of compliance by Germany, Hungary, and Niger with Article 5 of the treaty was unclear. They are all States Parties whose deadlines expired in 2009 but which in 2011–2012 reported suspected or (in the case of Niger) confirmed antipersonnel mine contamination for the first time.

The Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012 was due to consider the adoption of a special deadline procedure, whereby the principles and procedures of Article 5 would be applied to any state that reported unfulfilled obligations under Article 5. This procedure would also apply to states where antipersonnel mines have been newly laid. Also of great concern is the UK, which was one of only two States Parties (the other being Venezuela) that was both known to be contaminated and which did not initiate formal clearance operations during its original ten-year Article 5 deadline. The UK released four mined areas in December 2009–June 2010, but did not conduct any further clearance in 2010 and sought to release only part or all of only two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), by survey alone, in 2011–2012. This leaves the UK with more than 110 mined areas to clear or otherwise release in less than seven years.

Of the four States Parties granted an extension in 2009, only Tajikistan appeared on track to complete its obligations in time (and this was in part due to the extremely long period it had sought and received).25


Many of the States Parties granted extensions to their Article 5 deadlines have since made limited progress and risk not being able to complete the plans they put forward along with their extension requests (see table below). The ICBL has called on states that have fallen significantly behind the benchmarks they laid out in their extension requests to submit revised plans to States Parties.26

Of the States Parties granted an extension, so far only Nicaragua has formally declared that it has completed its Article 5 obligations.27 Of the remaining States Parties granted extensions in 2009, only one (Venezuela) appeared very likely to complete its Article 5 obligations in accordance with their first extended deadline. In contrast, compliance by Mozambique, which had previously been on track, was in some doubt in 2012.28

As noted above, Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe had all sought relatively short extension periods in order to conduct necessary survey activities with the understanding that they would seek a second extension to complete their Article 5 obligations. Of these three states, however, only Denmark was due to complete clearance by the expiration of its second extension request. Indeed, neither Chad nor Zimbabwe was able to conduct the respective surveys of contamination during the initial extension periods and sought second extensions for the same purpose as the first extensions. Zimbabwe did not conduct the planned survey during its second extension and there were concerns as to whether Chad would complete its nationwide survey of contamination by its second extended deadline.

Also of great concern is the UK, which was one of only two States Parties (the other being Venezuela) that was both known to be contaminated and which did not initiate formal clearance operations during its original ten-year Article 5 deadline. The UK released four mined areas in December 2009–June 2010, but did not conduct any further clearance in 2010 and sought to release only part or all of only two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), by survey alone, in 2011–2012. This leaves the UK with more than 110 mined areas to clear or otherwise release in less than seven years.

Of the four States Parties granted an extension in 2009, only Tajikistan appeared on track to complete its obligations in time (and this was in part due to the extremely long period it had sought and received).29

28 The ICBL considered Tajikistan’s 10-year extension to be excessive when compared to the level of contamination and believes that it can complete its clearance obligations far earlier.
### An overview of the status of Article 5 deadline extensions (as of October 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period</th>
<th>New deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1 April 2012</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 April 2017</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1 March 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>No new information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 November 2009</td>
<td>14 months (1st extn.) and then 3 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2014</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1 November 2011</td>
<td>14 months</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>22 months (1st extn.) and then 18 months (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 July 2012</td>
<td>Completed clearance; declaration of completion pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1 November 2012</td>
<td>26 months</td>
<td>1 January 2015</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 October 2017</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1 February 2015</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1 November 2011</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>1 January 2012</td>
<td>Completed clearance; declaration of completion pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1 May 2012</td>
<td>Survey operations ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2011</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 January 2016</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>Status unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>1 May 2010</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 March 2017</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>1 March 2016</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1 April 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 April 2020</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>9.5 years</td>
<td>1 November 2018</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1 August 2009</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1 August 2012</td>
<td>Deadline missed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 October 2014</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>1 March 2015</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>22 months (1st extn.) and then 2 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*New extension requested*

Of the three States Parties granted initial extensions to their Article 5 deadlines in 2010, Guinea-Bissau had apparently completed clearance as of the beginning of 2012, though it has still to make a formal declaration, and Mauritania appeared to be on schedule to meet its extended deadline; the status of Colombia, given the ongoing armed conflict, was unclear. Of the five States Parties granted an extension in 2011, three appeared to be on track (Algeria, Chile, and DRC), one had fallen behind (Eritrea), and the status of Congo was unclear.

**Argentina**

At the Second Review Conference in Cartagena, Colombia in 2009, Argentina said it was unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it did not have access to the Malvinas due to the “illegal occupation” by the UK. Argentina said for this reason it had no other choice than to request an extension to its clearance deadline.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019 of BiH was presented as the blueprint for fulfilling its Article 5 obligations, but it has failed to achieve the strategy’s targets every year since it started. The strategy projected release of 30km² a year through clearance and TS, two-and-a-half times more than its 2010 achievement. In 2012, a new extension was requested.


24 / LANDMINE MONITOR 2012

Mine Action

2011, although manual clearance accelerated, the gap widened between targets and results in overall land release. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) informed Landmine Monitor in March 2012 that it was in the process of reviewing performance and revising the 2009–2019 strategy. 37 From the start of its mine action program in 1996 through 2011, BiH reduced its suspected area from 4,200km² to 1,340km², cancelling or releasing 2,860km². In its Article 5 extension request submitted in 2008, BiH estimated that by the start of 2013 it would have 1,004km² of suspected contaminated land remaining. 38 BiH would need to release 336km² in 2012 to reach this target, more than three times the amount of land released in 2011. 39

Cambodia

In Cambodia, the extent of clearance needed to fulfill its Article 5 obligations will not be known before completion of the baseline survey (BLS), which was scheduled to occur by the end of 2012. Partial results of the BLS, however, suggest a bigger clearance task than predicted in the Extension Request. As of end June 2012, survey had still to be completed in 35 of the 124 districts covered by the BLS, but results received already showed a total area of more than 945km² affected by antipersonnel mines. 35 Cambodia has asserted that such figures cannot be compared to the estimate of 648.8km² as the different BLS land categories may include antivehicle mines and ERW. 36 Still, mined area clearance, although nearly one-quarter higher in 2011 than the previous year (almost 37km²), continues to lag behind the clearance targets presented in Cambodia’s extension request, which predicted 40km² for 2011. 37 An additional complication for Cambodia has been heightened insecurity along its border with Thailand, including cross-border clashes in April 2011, which has led to interruption of demining in some border areas, including parts of the K5 mine belt. 38 The ICBL has called on Cambodia to ensure there are no undue delays in demining these heavily contaminated areas and to coordinate with Thailand to enable clearance of contested border areas. 39

Chad

At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Chad announced that it would be submitting a second, short Article 5 deadline extension request to finally conduct the survey for which it had been granted the first extension period. 40 A second extension request was submitted on 20 September 2010, seeking an additional three years to conduct the survey. In granting the request, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties noted, “it would appear that Chad does not possess much more knowledge now than it did in 2008 to develop a plan to meet its Article 5 obligations.” 41

Although survey activities had progressed through 2012, the first phase of the survey of other areas ended in June 2011 without completing survey of two regions and without having a clear date for resumption of survey activities. Demining operations started in August 2000 but stopped at the end of December 2005 due to lack of funding. There was subsequently only intermittent clearance of mined areas until Mines Advisory Group (MAG) returned to Chad in 2010. In May 2012, Chad pledged to present a new strategic mine action plan to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties. 42

Chile

In accordance with an eight-year extension request granted in 2011, Chile’s extended Article 5 deadline is 1 March 2020. In March 2011, in its extension request, Chile cited weather, distant mined areas in high altitudes, the difficult terrain, and the different types and conditions of the mines as the main reasons for needing the additional time. 43 In December 2011, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Chile was encouraged by the other States Parties to improve its land release methodology so it could meet its Article 5 obligations before 2020. The decision also noted that Chile intended to pay the full cost of meeting its Article 5 obligations. 44 Progress in clearance in 2010–2011 offers some optimism that Chile may be able to release the remaining 9.7km² of contaminated area before 2020.

Colombia

In 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011. Colombia’s extension request predicts that all mined areas will be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.” 45 Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan is a central component of the extension request. Fifteen of 660 possibly mine-affected

37 Interview with Tarık Serak, Mine Action Planning Manager, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 1 March 2012.
38 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 27 June 2008, p. 31.
39 Interview with Tarık Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 1 March 2012.
40 CMAA, “BLS Statistics by Land Classification,” received by email from Eang Kamrang, Database Manager, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), July 2012.
42 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, p. 55.
43 Email from Cameron Imber, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, Siem Reap, 30 March 2011.
48 Chile, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 April 2011, pp. 12–14 & 26–27.
49 Decision of States Parties on Chile’s Article 5 Extension Request, 2 December 2011.
50 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, pp. 41–42.
municipalities in five of Colombia’s 32 departments, with contamination covering an estimated 15,000m², were deemed priorities for clearance by 2013.46

Colombia did not include an operational plan for 2014–2020 in its extension request because of the lack of information on contamination and the uncertainty of the role and capacity of NGOs. In 2011, the laws and standards were passed to allow NGOs to clear mines, and accreditation of one international NGO began in August 2012. Based on the decision of States Parties in approving Colombia’s extension request, Colombia is due to submit an operational plan for 2014–2020 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2013.47

Republic of Congo
As noted above, Congo, with an extended Article 5 deadline due to expire on 1 January 2013, was planning to conduct necessary survey in 2012. Initial plans were disrupted by the March 2012 explosion at an ammunition storage area in the capital, Brazzaville. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was finally signed between NPA and the Congolese Ministry of Defense on 3 October 2012 following which a survey team deployed to the targeted district of Kimongo. NTS started on 9 October, visiting areas previously recorded by the French organization Demeter as suspected to be mined.48

Croatia
Croatia cleared and otherwise released or cancelled a total of 340,000m² of SHAs between the establishment of the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) in 1998 until the end of 2010.49 It has, however, consistently not met the targets set out in its extension request in the four years since it was granted. In 2011, Croatia released 70,350m² compared with 119,000m² projected in the extension request. The gap between projected and actual land release has widened significantly in the last two years, leaving a 28% shortfall over the four years since the extension came into effect. As a result, Croatia still had 738,000m² to release at the start of 2012 compared with the 652,000m² it had projected in its extension request.50 CROMAC has drafted a new three-year work plan for 2012–2014, but as of June 2012 it was awaiting approval by CROMAC’s Council before it could be submitted to the government for final approval.51

Democratic Republic of the Congo
In its extension request, DRC reported 70 SHAs and 12 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). In May 2012, it reported that 10 of the 12 CHAs had been cleared, covering 340,000m². However, since its extension had been granted, a further 10 SHAs had been identified during survey work while other areas still required general survey.52 DRC’s strategic plan for 2012–2016 sets as an objective clearance of all areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines or unexploded submunitions by the end of 2016.53

Denmark
In December 2010, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties granted Denmark’s request for a second extension to its Article 5 deadline, until 1 July 2012.54 In June 2011, Denmark stated that 310,000m² of area was still to be cleared from the World War II minefield on the Skallingen peninsula and again affirmed that the remaining area would be cleared at the latest by its July 2012 deadline. It noted, however, that clearing the dunes has been “challenging.” In May 2012, Denmark reported that clearance would be complete by its deadline but quality control measures would probably take several months beyond that.55 On 5 July 2012, Denmark issued a public statement announcing completion of its Article 5 obligations.56

Ecuador
At the end of 2011, Ecuador had released almost 220,000m² of the original estimate of contamination of more than 640,000m². However, with new information on 13 SHAs received from Peru, Ecuador has almost 1.9km² of SHAs remaining. Although Ecuador has met the clearance goals it set out in its 2010–2018 operational plan, it is still not clear how Ecuador can meet its 2018 deadline even if clearance rates were to double in 2012 as planned.

Indeed, Ecuador appears to have questioned whether it can now meet its 2017 deadline. A Ministry of Defense brochure disseminated at the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2012 stated that Ecuador expected to complete clearance by 2023.57 Ecuador did not make any commitment at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Phnom Penh in December 2011 or at

the May 2012 Standing Committee meetings to meet its September 2017 Article 5 deadline.58

**Eritrea**

In 2009, at the Second Review Conference, Eritrea had said that in the absence of significant international funding, it would take much longer than initially planned to clear all mined areas and that it would need to request an extension of its deadline to meet its treaty obligations.59 In Eritrea’s request for a three-year extension, it pledged to complete NTS by the end of 2012 and make a second extension request that will include an operational plan to clear the remaining mined areas.60 Eritrea’s extension request relies heavily on a level of international funding it has not seen since the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) departed the country in 2006 and demining NGOs were expelled in 2004. Unless Eritrea allows international operators who can access donor funds to work in the country, it is difficult to see how Eritrea can meet its targets outlined in the extension request. Eritrea, though, asserts that the EDA has sufficient capacity and that international operators are not needed.61

**Guinea-Bissau**

On 8 September 2010, Guinea-Bissau submitted a request for a two-month extension to its Article 5 deadline through 1 January 2012. Although it has made no formal statement on completion, as noted above, based on information presented by NPA in May 2012, Guinea-Bissau is believed to have completed clearance of all known mined areas.62

**Jordan**

At the Tenth Meeting of States Parties Jordan stated it would complete clearance of all known mined areas by the end of 2011 and it would complete quality control of those areas by its extended Article 5 deadline of 1 May 2012.63 In June 2011, Jordan expressed confidence the northern border project would enable it to meet its extended deadline, although NPA had already reported that survey and verification of land around the known minefields would take longer. Jordan reported completing clearance on 24 April 2012. In a statement marking the occasion, National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) Chairman Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein said Jordan would submit its formal declaration of completion to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012. He also acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas where landmines have been emplaced.”64 Mines found during survey operations since the expiration of Jordan’s Article 5 deadline on 1 May 2012 suggest that mined areas remain which must be surveyed and cleared in accordance with Jordan’s treaty obligations. It is unclear why an initial declaration of completion was made pending completion of this work.

**Mauritania**

On 10 April 2010, Mauritania submitted a request for a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. Mauritania explained that the reasons for its failure to meet its deadline were a lack of financial resources, insufficient progress in demining operations, use of only manual demining techniques, and difficult soil and climatic factors.65 Only minimal mine clearance occurred in 2009, and no mined area was projected to be cleared during 2010, according to the extension request.66 In 2011, NPA set up a program in Mauritania to support the national mine action authority in addressing mine and cluster munition contamination. Minimal clearance took place during 2011.

**Mozambique**

Since Mozambique submitted its Article 5 extension request in 2008, it has identified many new SHAs through the Mine Free District Assessment approach as well as from a HALO survey on the Zimbabwe border and from reports of residual contamination in the four northern provinces. This has resulted in an increase of almost 300% more area to clear than predicted in its extension request. Compliance by Mozambique, which had previously been on schedule, was in some doubt in 2012. In May, at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Mozambique stated its mine action program needed US$17 million in 2012 if it were to stay on course to meet its 2014 deadline.53

**Peru**

On 29 February 2012, it was reported that Peru’s Defense Minister Alberto Otárola said the border with Ecuador “would be free of landmines by 2016.” He continued, “I think in 2016 or 2017 we can say that our borders will be free of mines, as all the boundaries of democratic countries that respect the right to life of its citizens, must be.”68 In May 2012, at the intersessional Standing

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60 Eritrea Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2011, p. 7.
61 Ibid., p. 5.
62 See, for example, ICBL Statement on updates by States Parties that have completed implementation of Article 5 since the 11MSP, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee Meetings, Delivered by NPA on behalf of the ICBL, 21 May 2012.
64 “Jordan becomes the first Middle Eastern country free of all known landmines,” Press Release, AP Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, 24 April 2012.
65 Mauritania, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 February 2010, pp. 3–4.
66 Ibid., p. 28 (Annex 3).
68 Manuel Vigo, “Peru and Ecuador agree to clear border landmines by 2016,” Peru This Week (an online magazine tailored to English speaking foreigners living in Peru), 29 February 2012.
Committee meetings in Geneva, Peru said they would clear all remaining mined areas “as quickly as possible.”

**Senegal**

Senegal has not formally reported in detail on its progress in demining over the last few years and has still to determine the extent of remaining contamination with any degree of precision. In May 2012, Senegal claimed that 36 suspected “localities” covering an estimated total of 3.5km² required TS and, if necessary, clearance. At the Second Review Conference, Senegal expressed its hope that it would have fulfilled its Article 5 obligations before 2015 if the peace process continues. Senegal previously stated its intention not to seek a second extension period unless there were “truly exceptional circumstances.” As of May 2012, a total of only 320,000m² had been released in five years of demining. This has led to growing concerns that Senegal will not meet its extended Article 5 deadline. NPA’s mine action program in Guinea-Bissau ended in March 2012, following which staff and equipment were moved to Senegal where a program was being established as of September 2012.

**Tajikistan**

In general, mine clearance in Tajikistan has proceeded slowly, and operations were only initiated several years after it became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Furthermore, Tajikistan has still to establish the precise extent of mine contamination, although re-survey has clarified the mine threat on the border with Afghanistan. New national and international capacity now in place, including machines and mine detection dogs, should speed up land release significantly, and should enable Tajikistan to complete its Article 5 obligations well before its extended deadline of 2020. As of April 2012, there were 6.5km² of SHAs along Tajikistan’s Afghan Border and a further 2.3km² in the Central region. NTS was ongoing along the Uzbek border. In accordance with its strategic plan for 2010–2015, Tajikistan planned land release in 2012 of 1.5km².

**Thailand**

Thailand is already extremely behind schedule (more than 120km²) in terms of the targets in its Article 5 extension request. UNDP observed in a report at the end of January 2011 that, at the current rate of clearance, “it is estimated that it will take Thailand several decades to clear all landmines.” The Thai Mine Action Centre (TMAC) released a total of 3.46km² of mined area in 2011, representing less than 6% of the extension-request clearance target for the year and less than 1% of the 546km² that Thailand identified as mine-contaminated at the end of 2011. New demining capacity was added in 2011. Under a MOU signed with TMAC in November 2010, NPA started a land-release pilot project in early 2011 working with a 10-strong survey team undertaking TS and NTS along the border with Cambodia. Similar land release is being conducted by another international NGO, APOPO, which also started operations in 2011.

**Uganda**

In July 2009, Uganda declared that it had underestimated both the “complexity” of its clearance operations and the time required to clear them; subsequently it would not meet its 1 August 2009 Article 5 deadline. It applied for a three-year extension, which was approved at the Second Review Conference in December 2009 after its Article 5 deadline had already expired.

In July 2011, the Uganda Mine Action Centre (UMAC) provided an update of the original and remaining problem, which more than doubled the number of SHAs believed to contain antipersonnel mines and increased the total estimate of contaminated area by more than 0.7km². It also included a completely new mined area, about 0.3km² in size, at Bibia (a town on the border with Sudan). At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2012, Uganda said it “remained committed” to meeting its 1 August 2012 deadline. However, it ultimately failed to do so, and subsequently stated it would complete all remaining clearance by the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December. Even if this commitment is fulfilled, Uganda has become the only State Party to have missed its Article 5 deadline on two separate occasions, without having requested (or received) an extension in advance. As of October 2012, it was not in compliance with the treaty.

**United Kingdom**

At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, the UK reported the completion of its four-site pilot project that started on 4 December 2009 and was

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66 Thailand, Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2012.
67 Interview with Lee Moroney, Country Programme Manager, NPA, Bangkok, 28 April 2011.
71 Email from Vicent Woboya, Director, UMAC, 11 August 2012.
completed on 4 June 2010.\textsuperscript{82} The UK stated that it would report the findings of its analysis and its planned next steps to States Parties at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.\textsuperscript{83} The UK did not, however, announce any further clearance plans at that meeting. In a statement to the meeting, the ICBL regretted the failure of the UK to fulfill its obligation to provide “as soon as possible, but not later than 30 June 2010 a detailed explanation of...the implications for future demining” in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5 of the treaty.\textsuperscript{84}

In June 2011, the UK announced that it would be seeking contractors for land release of at least part of one or possibly two SHAs in the Falkland Islands; one SHA is behind the Stanley Common Fence (which borders the capital, Port Stanley) and the other is at the Murrell Peninsula, some 4km from Port Stanley.\textsuperscript{85} However, no mine clearance was predicted to occur. According to the UK, “The identification of the exact location and extent of the minefields in this area will be useful for subsequent clearance programmes.”\textsuperscript{86} No mines were destroyed in 2011.\textsuperscript{87}

The ICBL has regularly called upon the UK to provide a concrete plan and budget for fulfilling its Article 5 clearance obligations. It also reiterated that affected States Parties must clear all mined areas, not only those with a “humanitarian” impact.\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{Venezuela}

Venezuela did not begin clearing mines until 2010, more than 10 years after becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty. In December 2010, Venezuela said new procurement procedures for demining equipment should allow the total additional time needed to clear all mined areas to be reduced from five years to four and that clearance of all mined areas should be completed by June 2013.\textsuperscript{89} In 2012, however, Venezuela fell behind this planned completion date although it should still be able to clear the remaining mined areas by its extended Article 5 deadline.

\textbf{Yemen}

It is not known whether Yemen will meet its extended Article 5 deadline. Yemen’s Article 7 report for the 12 months through 31 March 2012 said it had surveyed and cleared 785km$^2$ of a total suspected area of 923km$^2$, indicating the remaining suspected area amounted to 138.4km$^2$. However, the area which the report identified as “ongoing,” “suspended,” or “left” as of 31 March 2012 amounted to a total of more than 330km$^2$, 28km$^2$ (9%) more than a year earlier.\textsuperscript{89} Yemen appears to have significant additional mine and UXO contamination as a result of conflict in 2011–2012 but the precise extent is not known.

\textbf{Zimbabwe}

At the Second Review Conference, Zimbabwe said “no significant progress” had been made since the beginning of 2009 in its clearance program due to the lack of both international and national support.\textsuperscript{90} At the June 2012 Standing Committee meetings, Zimbabwe repeated that it would not be able to complete planned surveying in the 22-month extension period and stated that it would request another extension.\textsuperscript{91} On 31 March 2012, Zimbabwe submitted a third extension request asking for two additional years to complete surveying (until 1 January 2015) to better ascertain the full extent of its landmine problem, citing a lack of international support for finishing the survey. In May 2012, the ICBL recommended that Zimbabwe submit a detailed survey and clearance plan in order to allow States Parties to properly assess the request before the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012.\textsuperscript{92}

\textbf{Compliance with Article 5 among States Parties with later deadlines}

Without enhanced efforts, future compliance with Article 5 deadlines seems likely to be similarly disappointing. Based on progress to date, the Monitor believes that the following States Parties are not on schedule to comply with their treaty clearance obligations by their deadlines, indicated in parentheses: Ethiopia (2015); Iraq (2018); Sudan (2014); and Turkey (2014). Serbia’s compliance is uncertain.

\textbf{Ethiopia}

In June 2010, at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Ethiopia said it would clear all mines by 2013, two years ahead of its deadline, if sufficient funding were available.\textsuperscript{93} In December 2010, at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Ethiopia repeated this goal.\textsuperscript{94} In May 2012, the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) reported it needed US$10 million to clear the remaining mined area but, because mine action was moving from a civilian

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\setcounter{enumi}{83}
\item Article 7 Reports for the years ended 31 March 2011 and 31 March 2012, Form C.
\item Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 2 December 2009.
\item “ICBL Comments on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 Deadline Extension Request,” May 2012.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
body to the Ministry of National Defense, funding would be impeded since donors that support humanitarian demining through their foreign aid programs are generally constrained from providing funds to armed forces. There was a total of some 1,200km² remaining to re-survey from the Landmine Impact Survey data, most of which is located in the Somali region. EMAO, however, has claimed that only some 5.9km² of this area needs to be cleared.

Turkey
Turkey has been slow to fulfill its obligations under Article 5 and has not reported in sufficient detail on either the remaining contamination or the clearance it has undertaken to date. In June 2010, Turkey said that “the Ministry of National Defense is taking the necessary steps for a comprehensive programme and timelines of clearance, in collaboration with NAMSA [NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency], to comply with the deadline set for 2014,” but at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties Turkey announced that clearance of the Syrian border, which it has identified as its clearance priority, would not be completed until 2016.

Although Turkey has initiated plans for clearance of its border minefields, it has made no announcement of any plans to clear the 77,984 mines it has stated are emplaced within its borders. Turkey also still needs to set out concrete plans for clearance of all affected areas under its jurisdiction or control to meet its treaty requirements, including areas under its control in northern Cyprus.

Risks to deminers
Demining operators remain at risk of attacks and abductions in some areas where non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operate, especially in Afghanistan. Insurgency and banditry continued to pose the main threat to the safety of Afghan deminers in 2011, when 13 personnel were killed and 33 injured in 43 security incidents and a total of 227 mine action staff were abducted, of whom 222 were later released. Among the security incidents in 2011, five Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA) deminers were killed in an attack in western Farah province in July when anti-government elements abducted 31 staff. Two other DAFA staff members were killed in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. A Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC) staff member was killed in a shooting incident in Logar, an Afghan staff member of EOD Technology was shot dead in Kandahar City, and a HALO driver was killed in Kapisa province in November 2011 when a 107mm rocket hit the vehicle in which he was sleeping.

In October 2011, in Somalia, Danish Demining Group (DDG) suspended all activities after two international staff members were abducted from their vehicle in South Galkayo, Galmudug. In November, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Handicap International suspended their activities after the DDG kidnapping. The two DDG

98 “Iraq: Mine free 2018 target will be missed,” IRIN, 22 May 2012.
100 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
staff members were rescued unharmed by US Special Forces on 25 January 2012. MAG and DDG resumed activities in February 2012.

**Concluding remarks**

Worldwide, an area covering some 3,000km² remains to be cleared of antipersonnel mines. The vast majority of countries should clear all known mined areas before the end of the current decade. A few, such as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Iraq, will likely need additional time.

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Introduction

Members of the ICBL, including survivor representatives, pressed hard to include assistance to mine victims in the Mine Ban Treaty. As a result, the treaty became the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty in which states committed to provide “assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration” to those harmed by a specific weapon. In the opening line of the Mine Ban Treaty, states also expressed their determination to “put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines”—to prevent more people from becoming victims or survivors of anti-personnel mines.1

The Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009, agreed upon at the treaty’s First Review Conference in 2004, defined the critical elements, or pillars, of victim assistance which States Parties should provide to include medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological and social support, socio-economic reintegration or inclusion and national laws and policies. The action plan prioritized the necessity of data collection on mine victims and their needs, as well as the importance of differentiating these by age and gender to implement appropriate services.2

Five years on, many states had developed plans and built the capacity to coordinate activities, though much still remained to be done to improve many services. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014, agreed upon at the Second Review Conference in 2009, further developed the concept of victim assistance by combining the various elements of victim assistance into an integrated approach to addressing survivors’ needs. This approach stressed the importance of cross-cutting themes, particularly the accessibility of services and information, inclusion and participation of survivors, and the concept that there should be no discrimination in the assistance provided among survivors nor between survivors and other persons with disabilities.3

Halfway through the time period for implementing the Cartagena Action Plan, states and their international and national partners have been working to address new challenges to increase their abilities to fulfill the victim assistance actions outlined by the plan. Nearly 15 years since the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty, civil society, through the ICBL and including survivor representatives, continues to monitor these efforts by states to fulfill their commitments.

This overview first presents an analysis of casualties caused by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) that occurred in 2011 as compared with casualty statistics from previous years. It then reviews the efforts of states to fulfill victim assistance commitments made through the Mine Ban Treaty and its action plans and considers this within the context of the general situation of victim assistance in 2011. Greater detail of progress and challenges in providing effective victim assistance at the national level is available through some 70 individual country profiles available online.4

1 “Victim” refers to those who have been injured or killed by a landmine and their families who suffer emotional, social and financial loss. Mine/ERW survivors are a subset of victims and are any individuals who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine or an explosive remnant of war (including cluster submunitions) and have survived the incident. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Article 6.3, www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-and-convention-text/.


4 All country profiles are available at www.the-monitor.org. Country profiles online include mine-affected states that are not States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Findings specific to victim assistance in states and areas with victims of cluster munitions are available through the Landmine Monitor 2012’s companion publication, the Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 which can be found at www.the-monitor.org/cmm/2012.
Key Developments

In 2011, steady decreases in annual casualty rates continued in some of the most mine-affected countries, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia. These significant decreases were offset by increases in countries with new or intensified conflicts, such as Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, South Sudan, and Syria. In 2011, casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), decreased as a percentage of overall casualties; casualties caused by antivehicle mines were a growing percentage of the annual casualty rate (see details on casualties by explosive item type below).

The 4,286 new casualties from mines and ERW identified in 2011 are about one-third of the recorded annual casualty rate one decade ago soon after the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force. The Monitor identified just under 12,000 new mine/ERW casualties in 2002, a number that declined significantly to about 4,000 annually in 2009, and has remained close to that total in 2010 and 2011.

While the annual rate of new casualties has decreased greatly during the past decade, the total number of survivors in need of victim assistance has continued to grow around the world each year.

In 2011, most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of survivors strengthened national ownership for victim assistance through better coordination, planning, and understanding survivors’ needs and challenges. They made less progress in mobilizing and dedicating national resources for these needs. Setbacks in the availability and accessibility of victim assistance occurred in at least 12 countries in 2011, most as a result of declining international assistance for victim assistance and new and intensified conflicts.

Casualties

Casualty data is an important resource for developing a victim assistance program that responds to the reality on the ground. It also provides an indication of the progress and challenges in clearance and risk education programs.

Casualties in 2011

Casualty figures in 2011 show the efforts made by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and other stakeholders in the mine action community to end the suffering caused by landmines by reducing the number of casualties. There were 4,286 casualties caused by mines, victim-activated IEDs, cluster munition remnants, and ERW in 2011. At least 1,320 people were killed and another 2,907 people were injured; for 59 casualties it was not known if the person survived the incident. Casualties were identified in 61 states and areas in 2011, down from 72 states and areas ten years ago and similar to the 62 states and areas in which casualties were identified in 2010.

The 2011 figure is similar to the number of casualties identified in 2009 and 2010, or approximately 11–12 casualties per day. The annual incidence rate is about a third of what it was one decade ago, when there were at least 32 casualties per day. Given improvements in data collection over this period, the decrease in casualties is likely even more significant with a higher percentage of casualties now being recorded.

In Afghanistan, Cambodia and Colombia, which are

![Number of mine/ERW casualties per year (2000-2011)](image)

5 Figures include individuals killed or injured in incidents involving devices detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and victim-activated IEDs. AXO and UXO, including cluster munition remnants, are collectively referred to as ERW. Not included in the totals are: estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not given; incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been caused by remote-detoxinated mines or IEDs (those that were not victim-activated); and, people killed or injured while manufacturing or emplacing devices. In many states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher.


7 The 56 states and five areas where casualties were identified in 2011 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen; as well as other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

8 Countries registering casualties in 2011 but not in 2010 were: Cuba, El Salvador, Mali, Morocco, Poland, Rwanda, Syria and Timor-Leste. States and areas with casualties in 2010 but none in 2011 were: Abkhazia, Ethiopia, Germany, Jordan, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Panama, and Zimbabwe.

9 Slight increases in the casualty rate were recorded between 2009 and 2010 (6%) and between 2010 and 2011 (2%) but these changes were statistically insignificant given variations in data availability in some countries from one year to the next.

Afghanistan, which has recorded more people harmed and killed by mines and ERW every year than any other country, had the most casualties again in 2011, with 812 people killed and injured. However, this number was down one-third from the 1,211 casualties identified in 2010. This is also many times fewer than the estimated 9,000 casualties in Afghanistan per year prior to the Mine Ban Treaty. At that time, Afghanistan alone was suffering more than double the total global casualty rate in 2011.

Colombia, with 538 casualties, was the third most impacted country. While the 2011 total was nearly identical to 2010, Colombia’s casualty rate has dramatically declined when compared with rates in earlier years: the mine/ERW casualty rate in Colombia peaked at around 1,200 casualties recorded annually in 2005 and 2006. Cambodia, with the fifth most casualties in 2011, also continued to record fewer casualties than in most previous years: the 211 casualties recorded in 2011 were 26% fewer than the 286 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2010 and much lower than the over 3,000 casualties identified in 1996.

**States with 100 or more casualties in 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>No. of casualties in 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.*

Pakistan, with 569 casualties, had the second highest number of casualties in 2011 and an increase of some 44% (175 casualties) from the previous year. Myanmar had the next highest casualty total among states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, making it the country with the fourth most casualties, following an annual increase of some 39% (107 casualties). Pakistan and Myanmar had both been among the countries with high casualty figures in previous years.

In 2011, significant increases in numbers of casualties were recorded in four other countries: Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Syria. Libya and Syria had large increases in the number of casualties, with Libya going from just one in 2010 to 184 in 2011, and Syria going from zero to 20.

Increases in these countries offset the decreases in casualty figures in the heavily-affected countries described above, maintaining an overall global casualty rate that was similar to the recorded rate in 2010 and 2009 (Figure 2). In all these cases, increased casualty rates were related to escalating conflict, to increased interaction of the civilian population with UXO and AXO, and to the new use of landmines.

**Change in mine/ERW casualties for the ten most affected countries (2010-2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely-used annual dataset of casualties caused by mines and other victim-activated weapons. For the year 2011, the Monitor collected casualty data from 26 different national or UN mine action centers, which recorded approximately half of the casualties identified during the year. In addition to official data-collection mechanisms and mine action information systems, the Monitor also collected data on casualties from various mine clearance operators and victim assistance service providers as well as a range of national and international media sources.

It must be stressed that, as in previous years, the 4,286 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2011 only include recorded casualties. Due to incomplete data collection at the national level, the true casualty total is higher. Based on Monitor research since 2009, it is likely that there are approximately an additional 1,000 casualties each year that are not captured in our global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in

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11) New sources of casualty information were available for Myanmar for 2011. However, increased armed conflict in Myanmar in 2011 was also linked with the rise in recorded casualties in that year. See “Myanmar: Conflict heightens landmine risk”, IRIN, 28 January 2011, www.irin-news.org. HRW, “World Report 2012: Burma: Events of 2011,” www.hrw.org. Preliminary reports suggest that mine use declined from late 2011 following a decrease in armed conflict as a nationwide peace dialogue was launched by the government.

12) Significant changes, both increases and decreases, in national casualty rates between 2010 and 2011 were also identified in Angola, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, but in these cases changes were not believed to be related to any real shifts in the numbers of casualties occurring, but rather to changes in the availability of casualty data. In Angola and Iraq, casualty data became more available, whereas in Iran and Yemen, very little casualty data was available for 2011.

13) Of the 26 mine action centers which collected casualty data, 20 were national mine action centers. The remaining six were UN Mine Action Centers or UN Missions which also maintained mine/ERW data collection mechanisms.

14) The Monitor identified 1,968 mine/ERW casualties (37% of all casualties identified in 2011) through the media that had not been collected through official data collection mechanisms. The majority of these casualties occurred in countries without any data collection mechanism though a significant number also occurred in countries with a data collection system in place.
severely affected countries. As in previous years, data collection in various countries such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen was believed to be incomplete due to the lack of a functioning official data collection system and/or to the challenges posed by ongoing armed conflict. However, the level of underreporting has declined over time as many countries have initiated and improved casualty data collection mechanisms. For example, in 2000, the Monitor identified some 8,000 casualties but estimated that another 7,000–13,000 casualties went unrecorded.

Casualty demographics

The overall impact of mines/ERW continued to be overwhelmingly on civilians rather than security personnel/forces. This includes the women, men, boys, and girls who were killed as well as the survivors and their families struggling under the new physical, psychological and economic pressures. In 2011, across nearly all variables tracked by the Monitor, the demographic profile of global mine/ERW casualties was consistent with findings from previous years, though with notable changes and variations occurring in some countries.

Mine/ERW casualties by age in 2011

Child casualties in 2011 accounted for 42% of all civilian casualties for whom the age was known. This matched the average annual rate of child casualties since 2005. In some of the most mine/ERW-affected countries in the world, the percentage was even higher in 2011. Children constituted 64% of all civilian casualties in Libya; 61% in Afghanistan; 58% in Lao PDR; and, 50% in Iraq. In Kenya, Uganda and Yemen, which had few casualties, children made up more than 90% of civilian casualties.

Between 2010 and 2011, significant increases in child casualties were seen in Pakistan, Syria and Iraq. In Pakistan, 99 children were killed or injured by mine/ERW in 2011, more than double those in 2010 (44). In Libya, 76 of 119 civilian casualties in 2011 were children, whereas just one casualty had been recorded for 2010. In Iraq, child casualties rose to 50 in 2011, compared with 18 in 2010. As in previous years, the vast majority of child casualties were boys (83%); 17% were girls. Since monitoring began in 1999, there have been at least 1,000 child casualties of mines/ERW every year, with significantly greater numbers of children killed and injured in 1999 and 2001.

2011 Child casualties in heavily mine/ERW affected countries, as a percentage of civilian casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Child casualties</th>
<th>Total civilian casualties</th>
<th>Percent of child casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2011, the percentage of female casualties among all casualties for which the sex was known was 10%, or 379 of 3,656. This was the same as in 2010 and the annual average since 1999. As in previous years, the vast majority of casualties where the sex was known were male (90%).

In 2011, the sex of 530 casualties was unknown, or 15% of all registered casualties, down from 16% in 2010 and 23% in 2009. This is a significant improvement in the disaggregation of casualty data by sex, plausibly in part as a result of calls for improvements in this area by the Mine Ban Treaty’s Cartagena Action Plan.

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16 There are 10 heavily affected countries with incomplete or nonexistent data collection mechanisms (Afghanistan, DRC, India, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen). For these countries, given reasonable estimates provided by mine action operators, victim assistance service providers and government and UN representatives as compared with recorded totals, it is possible to determine that unrecorded casualties across these 10 countries adds up to about 1,000. This is a significant drop from the estimated 7,000–13,000 unrecorded casualties just 10 years ago.

17 Security personnel/forces include military personnel, police, and representatives of non-state armed groups.

18 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties, to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.

19 This includes only the civilian casualties for which the age was known.

20 The Monitor began to be able to systematically collect age disaggregated mine/ERW casualty data for all states and areas in 2005. The 42% average has fluctuated by just two percentage points per year, with the exception of 2007 when children constituted 49% of all civilian casualties.

21 The sex of 120 child casualties was not recorded.

22 The Monitor identified more than 1,500 child casualties in 1999 and more than 1,600 in 2001.

23 This includes only the casualties for which the civilian/security status and the age were known.

24 Between 1999 and 2011, female casualties have represented 10.5% of all casualties on average for which the sex was known, with the percentage ranging from 8% to 13% per year. In that period, the sex of 48,659 was known and of these 5,119 were females.
Between 1999 and 2011, the Monitor identified over 1,000 deminers who have been killed or injured while undertaking demining operations to ensure the safety of the civilian population. Since 1999, the annual number of humanitarian demining casualties has fluctuated widely from 31 to 131, making it difficult to discern trends. Most major fluctuations have been related to the exceptional availability or unavailability of deminer casualty data in any given year and therefore cannot be correlated to substantive changes in operating procedures in humanitarian demining standards or demining equipment.

Casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Libya, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Vietnam; also in Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.

The percentage of civilian casualties as compared with military casualties slightly declined in 2011 from 2010, though it remained similar to other recent years since 2005. Civilian casualties (2,874 of 3,999) represented 72% of casualties where the civilian/military status was known, while this was 76% in 2010. As in previous years, the vast majority of casualties among security forces were recorded in a small number of countries with ongoing conflict or armed violence: Colombia (348), Pakistan (236), Myanmar (133), and Afghanistan (71).

Victim-activated weapons and other explosive items causing casualties

The most significant change in the type of explosive items causing casualties in 2011 as compared with 2010 was a decline in the percentage of casualties caused by victim-activated IEDs, acting as antipersonnel mines, followed by a somewhat smaller decline in the percentage of casualties caused by manufactured antipersonnel mines. In 2011, 45% of casualties resulted from antipersonnel mines (32%) and victim-activated IEDs (13%). In 2010, these two types of explosive items caused 52% of all casualties for which the cause was known.

Casualties by item of explosive item in 2011

Despite these declines, significant increases in the numbers of casualties from antipersonnel mines between 2010 and 2011 occurred in Myanmar, Pakistan and South Sudan. The two states registering the highest numbers of reported casualties from victim-activated IEDs in 2010, Afghanistan and Pakistan, both saw fewer victim-activated IED casualties reported in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total in 2011.

The totals for 2011 and 2010 are similar when one-off data that was available from Iran for 2010 is excluded. The Monitor identified 131 casualties among deminers in 2010, but 47 of these occurred in Iran. In most years, including 2011, Iran has not provided any casualty data to the Monitor, including deminer casualties.

This includes only the casualties for which the civilian/security status was known.
Between 2010 and 2011, the percentage of casualties caused by antivehicle mines, which are not prohibited or regulated under the Mine Ban Treaty, climbed significantly. In 2011, 663 casualties, or 17% of casualties for which the cause was known, were caused by antivehicle mines, compared with 375 or 10% of casualties in 2010. While antivehicle mines killed and injured people in 22 states in 2011, most of these casualties (84%) occurred in just four states, Cambodia, Pakistan, Sudan, and South Sudan. In the latter three, casualties from antivehicle mines increased exponentially from one year to the next.

In Cambodia, casualties from antivehicle mines declined somewhat between 2010 and 2011, from 78 to 68 casualties, but increased as a percentage of the total number of casualties from 28% in 2010 to 32% in 2011. In South Sudan, 145 casualties from antivehicle mines were reported, more than two-thirds of all casualties in 2011, compared to just two in 2010. Sudan, similarly, went from registering no casualties from antivehicle mines in 2010 to identifying 53 in 2011. Pakistan registered the highest number of casualties from antivehicle mines with 293, more than triple the 91 antivehicle casualties identified in 2010.

### States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe and CIS</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, DR</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Iran</td>
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Note: States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. Other areas are indicated by italics.

### Victim Assistance

In 2011, numerous governments and national and international organizations continued to make efforts to address the needs of victims. Efforts to better understand the needs of survivors and the obstacles to addressing these needs achieved positive results in many countries in 2011. This was because governments were better able to articulate the specific challenges they faced and communicate the assistance needed from the international community. However, decreasing levels of direct international funding for victim assistance, and new or intensified armed conflicts, threatened advances previously achieved in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty in some countries.

This section will look at the following topics in relation to victim assistance: national ownership; survivor inclusion and participation; access, availability, and quality of services; efforts to raise survivors’ awareness of the rights and services available to them; and synergies between the Mine Ban Treaty and other relevant humanitarian and human rights law. While the main focus of the section is on changes identified in 2011, longer-term trends since the Mine Ban Treaty went into effect and monitoring began are also identified.

### Strengthening national ownership

Monitor reporting has noted that enhanced national ownership entails more systematic coordination and improved planning by relevant ministries and state actors. Through national ownership, states themselves assess needs and develop strategies adapted to local realities. Victim assistance is made more sustainable and effective by placing key service sectors under national management, mobilizing external resources, and allocating national budgets. In 2009, the Cartagena Progress Review related nearly all victim assistance challenges to a lack of national capacity and commitment in mine-affected countries and a lack of long-term...
international assistance to strengthen these national capacities. Improvement in national capacities to exercise effective authority over victim assistance activities, including those that rely–entirely or partially–on external resources have been reported since 2009.

By 2011, many States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of survivors had strengthened national ownership for victim assistance in four ways:

- the sustained functioning of national coordinating mechanisms or the creation of new coordination groups;
- national planning;
- an increased level of knowledge about the needs of survivors; and,
- increased knowledge of specific national or local challenges preventing survivors from accessing services.

Coordination and planning

The number of relevant States Parties with coordination and planning in place grew while these continued to be the focus of sustained efforts for improvement. At least 19 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had functional national coordination mechanisms addressing victim assistance in 2011 (Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda), an increase of three states from 2010 (Burundi, DRC and South Sudan), while others took steps to improve coordination.

At least 17 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had active victim assistance or broader disability plans that explicitly included mine/ERW survivors, four more than in 2010 (Burundi, Chad, DRC and Colombia). Two others, Iraq and South Sudan, advanced in developing victim assistance planning. In South Sudan and DRC, victim assistance coordination transferred from UN to national responsibility.

Key progress occurred in the following countries:

- Burundi formed the Interministerial and Inter-sectoral Coordinating Committee for Victim Assistance in October 2011 and launched a national victim assistance plan.
- Chad developed a national victim assistance plan in 2011 which was approved in May 2012.
- DRC’s working group on victim assistance, chaired by the Ministry of Social Affairs, was created in mid-2011. Previously, victim assistance had been coordinated by the UN Mine Action Center, which remained an active participant in the new working group. The national victim assistance plan was approved in early 2011.
- In South Sudan, the new government, through its Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, assumed responsibility for the victim assistance working group, previously managed by the UN, and contributed to ensuring the inclusion of victim assistance in the 2012–2016 national mine action strategic plan.
- In June 2011, the United Nations Mine Action Office completed the handover of the Sudan victim assistance program to the national mine action center.

While Iraq lacked a regular national victim assistance coordination mechanism in 2011, during the year it strengthened its capacity to coordinate victim assistance and developed a proposal for a coordinating mechanism. A one-off national victim assistance coordination meeting developed a set of 32 victim assistance recommendations that served as a national work plan.

A few states were less successful in sustaining adequate victim assistance coordination through national authorities or broader disability bodies in 2011. While victim assistance coordination remained fairly weak in Uganda in 2011, efforts were made to integrate the coordination of victim assistance into the Intersectoral Committee on Disability in 2012. El Salvador’s National Disability Council suspended its role in victim assistance coordination during restructuring, although some coordinating functions were assumed by the Protection Fund for Disabled War Victims. Its National Victim Assistance Plan remained inactive during the year. Yemen approved its National Victim Assistance Plan 2011-2015 at the end of 2010. However, this plan has remained inactive since its approval due to the instability and ongoing armed conflict in the country.

Developing national ownership need not mean “going it alone.” All States Parties have made the vital
promise of providing assistance to survivors through the Mine Ban Treaty, whether through in-kind support, funding, or sharing experiences and best practices. The Parallel Programme for Victim Assistance Experts was established in 2007 “to stimulate discussion and increase the knowledge of States Parties’ expert participants on key components of victim assistance and to build the capacity of these experts.”41

The May 2012 Parallel Programme, convened by Algeria and Croatia as the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance to the Mine Ban Treaty, focused on coordination and the implementation of national victim assistance plans, noting challenges faced and efforts to overcome the challenges. Victim assistance experts from some 20 affected states and donor countries, together with the ICRC and civil society actors including survivors, also shared experiences in developing and monitoring progress in implementing plans through interministerial and inter-sectoral coordinating mechanisms. At the midway point of the Cartagena Action Plan, increasing states’ capacity to monitor and assess the impact of victim assistance and to build the capacity of these experts.42

Yet it is clear that efforts made in some 16 countries have resulted in those countries now being in a much better position to understand the problem than they were just a decade ago.43 In most cases, assessments were supported with international assistance, both financial and technical, demonstrating efforts by the international community to strengthen national ownership for more effective victim assistance.44

As of the end of 2011, 10 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors had carried out fairly comprehensive assessments of the needs of mine/ERW survivors and in most cases were continuing to maintain available information on an ongoing basis. In Albania, this had been implemented by 2005 and has been consistently maintained and shared with relevant governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. In Croatia, a survivor survey project based on interviews about changes in victim assistance over 20 years, published in December 2011, was carried out by NGOs, including a survivor network, with support from government institutions.

Some efforts were made by another six countries that initiated survivor needs assessments or completed partial surveys.45 While not providing complete information, these assessments increased the knowledge of survivors’ needs in particular areas of the country, providing the government authorities or other stakeholders with a basis to begin to plan and coordinate services in those areas. In two of these countries, Angola and Iraq, surveys were ongoing as of June 2012 and have the potential to dramatically improve planning efforts.

Several States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty need to make greater efforts to assess the needs of survivors. Through the end of 2011, nine States Parties with significant numbers of survivors had not begun to make any serious efforts to assess their needs.46 In Burundi, Mozambique, and Serbia, the lack of information about survivors and their needs was a serious obstacle to the development of effective plans to address these needs. In 2012, Ethiopia reported that it had begun to take steps towards developing a system to record mine/ERW survivors.47

As knowledge of the needs of survivors has increased, so has the understanding of challenges faced in providing victim assistance at both the national and international level. In its first edition in 1999, the Monitor noted that there was “a general lack of credible data” on mine victims, though it noted that the “basic needs of

43 Please see previous Executive Summaries of the Landmine Monitor and country profiles at www.the-monitor.org for a more detailed discussion of the shortcomings of various national survivor needs assessments.
44 Needs assessments in El Salvador have been supported with national funds.
45 Albania, BiH, Chad, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Peru, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Thailand.
46 Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda.
47 Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Serbia, Turkey, and Yemen. In Serbia, Assistance Advocacy Access—Serbia, a national NGO, completed a survivor needs assessment in April 2012. Results were pending as of the publication of this report.
48 In Ethiopia, there was recognized to be a lack of information about the needs of all persons with disabilities, in which survivors were included, which hindered disability planning.
mine victims everywhere are well known.” The first years of the Cartagena Action Plan have cemented a notable shift in the overall perception of how the promise of victim assistance is to be fulfilled. At the beginning of the Mine Ban Treaty, the emphasis was on the overall costs of implementation. Most affected states lacked an understanding of the specific challenges they faced and thus the efforts they, with the support of the international community, would need to make in order to overcome these challenges. In 2011, it was clearer to most States Parties that the need for national action was as important as the need for international funding.

Because of the lack of information available when the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, it was not possible to develop a sophisticated analysis of the specific challenges faced in a specific country, and so it was not possible to identify the amount of international assistance required in each state. Based on a concerted effort to make an assessment which went a long way to quantify the issue at the time, the ICBL called on the international community to contribute US$3 billion over ten years to address the needs of survivors globally.49

As recently as 2008, at least eight States Parties identified a lack of funding as the major obstacle to providing victim assistance but failed to provide sufficient detail showing how the funding would be used to resolve specific national challenges.50 However, by 2011, an increasing number of countries with significant numbers of survivors had developed national budgets for victim assistance. BiH, El Salvador, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan, and Tajikistan all had budgets outlining the costs of their victim assistance programs or national disability plans that were inclusive of survivors’ needs, albeit with varying levels of detail. While it lacked a specific budget, Croatia’s plan identified sources of funding for each area of activities. In most cases, national victim assistance budgets provided the international community with a better understanding of where financial support was needed. However, budgets mostly did not show how much funding had been dedicated from national sources in comparison to the need for additional funding from the international community.

Many States Parties also demonstrated a deeper understanding of the victim assistance situation in their own countries in updates provided at the Mine Ban Treaty meetings. As recently as 2008, at least eight States Parties identified a lack of funding as the major obstacle to providing victim assistance but failed to provide sufficient detail showing how the funding would be used to resolve specific national challenges.50

Declining international funding
Most mine-affected states have very limited financial resources, and it is expected that these states will continue to receive international assistance. However, international mine action funding for victim assistance has consistently been a very limited pool, recognized as insufficient to meet survivors’ needs. In 2011, the limited direct funding available markedly decreased.51 Victim assistance service providers in eight States Parties reported declining international funding that forced them to reduce their number of beneficiaries, to close specific projects, or to end their programs completely.54

Efforts to replace this international funding with national resources were only reported in one country, Sudan, where in order to ensure the continuity and sustainability of the program, the mine action center advocated for the inclusion of victim assistance in the budgetary and technical plans of relevant government ministries. Related to this effort, as of the end of 2011, the government of Khartoum state established a disability trust fund.

Nationalizing management of victim assistance
An area where efforts to strengthen national ownership have generally not been successful so far has been in transferring management of programs run by international NGOs to national bodies. Long-term processes to transfer management of services and programs from international organizations to national governments and national NGOs were planned to be

49 This estimate was based on an ICBL Victim Assistance Working Group finding that the average cost of providing victim assistance was US$3,000 for each survivor.

50 Angola, BiH, Burundi, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Senegal, and Uganda.

51 Afghanistan, Albania, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda.
Casualties and Victim Assistance

completed by the end of 2011 in three countries with significant numbers of survivors: Angola, Cambodia, and Uganda. In all three cases, the outcome of transition to national management has been very problematic and has resulted in a decline in the availability of, access to, and quality of services.

In Angola, international organizations began closing victim assistance programs and transferring management of health care facilities and rehabilitation centers to the government in 2005. All 11 physical rehabilitation centers were managed by the Ministry of Health by 2008; by 2009, the production of prosthetics in each center had declined due to a lack of materials and unpaid staff salaries. In 2011, all 11 centers faced immense difficulties responding to the demand for their services. In most centers, production of prosthetics decreased, while others were unable to produce any prosthetics at all and could only respond to the needs of mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities by providing medication and physiotherapy. During 2011, community-based rehabilitation activities previously undertaken by an international organization were transferred to local partners. Former staff members formed a national organization, but, as of May 2012, the staff was only working part-time and partly on a voluntary basis due to a lack of funding.

In Cambodia, after decades of internationally-run physical rehabilitation programs, the transfer to national management was planned to be completed by the end of 2011. In anticipation of the transfer of management, procedures for physical rehabilitation centers were drafted and management systems were introduced to the centers. However, as of mid-2012, most international organizations continued to provide management, as well as financial and technical support, while operating centers under government coordination. When the government ministry assumed management, it lacked the capacity and finances to sustain services.

A major challenge in transferring management in Cambodia was that government wages for staff of the rehabilitation centers were significantly lower than those paid by NGOs. As a result, many staff left their jobs after the transfer of management. By April 2012, one center had almost completely closed due to a lack of technical staff.

In Albania following the completion a five-year collaborative project to develop a rehabilitation system in 2011, the Nursery Faculty of Tirana continued to implement sustainable physiotherapy training in 2012 under the state system. However, the Kukes Prosthetics Workshop, which also had been supported through the project, had not yet secured the supply of materials necessary for the sustained provision of prosthetics.

Several international organizations closed or reduced their programs in Uganda between 2008 and 2010, transferring the responsibility to provide victim assistance services to relevant government ministries. Through the end of 2011, the impact of the departure of these organizations remained, reflected in gaps in physical rehabilitation, economic inclusion and psychological support as well as the means to access services. The availability of affordable physical rehabilitation was drastically reduced in 2011 as management of the Gulu rehabilitation centers was transferred to the Ministry of Health. The cost of prosthetic devices doubled, making them unaffordable for most survivors.

Survivor inclusion and participation

At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Phnom Penh in November–December 2011, an informal session reflecting on the past 20 years reminded all participants of the importance of survivor participation; survivors and other ICBL campaigners expressed the need for additional resources to strengthen the capacity of survivors to participate meaningfully. The participation of mine and ERW survivors has played a key role in the history of the Mine Ban Treaty and is also key to future victim assistance. In December 2009, survivors declared their commitment to promoting victim assistance by participating in planning, implementing and monitoring the Mine Ban Treaty and contributing to the provision of services, including peer support, for survivors and other persons with disabilities. In 2011, survivors and survivor networks in at least 28 states and areas, of which 21 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, were able to act on this commitment, by ensuring that their firsthand knowledge was applied to improve the quality and availability of victim assistance for all survivors.

During 2011, 21 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty included mine/ERW survivors, or their representative networks, in national victim assistance coordination. This includes all 17 States Parties with functioning coordination mechanisms, as well as four other states in which survivors participated in ad hoc planning meetings or within broader disability coordination structures. All of the 15 states with more effective survivor participation in coordination had active survivor networks that were engaged in victim assistance and able to represent the situation and views of many survivors.

However, in six of those 21 states, this participation was limited, often in terms of the ability of survivors to contribute to decision-making. In Colombia and Cambodia, where survivor participation in coordination was not reported to have been effective, there were many local survivor associations that did have a limited capacity to advocate at a national level but did not have unified representation through a national network. In Colombia, while survivors were invited to participate in regional and national meetings, they were seen to be unprepared and unable to speak out forcefully on the needs of survivors. In contrast, during 2011 a new survivor network was launched in Turkey that was able to present objectives with a single voice to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

55 States with survivor inclusion in coordination in 2011: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. Of these, Algeria, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Mozambique were the four that had ad hoc planning meetings or broader disability coordination structures.

56 States with limited survivor participation in coordination: Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, and Iraq.
and the national Administration for Disabled People, heightening the impact of their advocacy.

In 2011, survivors and survivor networks were also active in implementing victim assistance in at least 22 States Parties as well as several states not party. Survivors, through survivor networks, were most often active in peer support, including raising awareness of services and providing transportation, social inclusion, and advocacy on survivors’ rights, but in several states they were also active in the fields of physical rehabilitation and economic inclusion.

Survivor networks continued to rely on international financial support for the greatest part of their operating costs. In 2011, survivor networks in both Afghanistan and Albania had to significantly reduce their peer support programs due to declining international funding. Overall, national government support for survivor networks was extremely limited despite the key role they played in assisting states to achieve victim assistance goals, particularly as the only providers of psychological peer support, as well as referral to services. Some exceptions to this general situation were reported in Tajikistan, where the Mine Action Center strengthened the capacity of emerging networks and helped link the networks with international financial assistance, and in Colombia, where the Medellin City Council trained local survivor associations in providing psychological support. Increasing government support for national survivor networks, while increasing national ownership for victim assistance, ensures the long-term sustainability of victim assistance.

Survivors and survivor networks also had a key role in monitoring national victim assistance implementation for Monitor reporting. In 2011, survivors or survivor networks formed part of the Monitor research network in 10 States Parties, one state not party and one other area, investigating all aspects of victim assistance coordination and implementation.

Through the Cartagena Action Plan, States Parties made a commitment to ensure the continued involvement and effective contribution of experts, including survivors, in their delegations. However, little participation of survivors on official state delegations was reported in 2011 or 2012.

Victim assistance experts discussed the possibilities for enhanced survivor participation in a side event held during the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Phnom Penh in 2011. There was general agreement that such participation should contribute to the outputs of the delegation and not be simply tokenistic representation. Tajikistan reported on its efforts to ensure that the landmine survivors who were working with the mine action program also participated in the official government delegation by including the cost of survivor participation in project budgets. Similarly, a survivor who was also the government victim assistance officer, participated in the delegation of BiH at the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in June 2012.

Although most states did not include survivors on delegations, many survivors contributed in various ways to the work of their states’ international representation. Cambodia had not included survivors in its official delegations to Mine Ban Treaty meetings since the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005, but many survivors were involved in the organization of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in their country. Uganda has never included a survivor as a member of its delegation to international meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, but the government victim assistance focal point shared statements prepared for international meetings with survivors’ representatives prior to the meetings.

However, there were often instances where survivors felt that they had not been asked to contribute their knowledge and expertise. NGO victim assistance stakeholders noted that in Colombia, survivors or their representative associations were not invited to contribute to the government statements on progress in victim assistance in 2011 that were prepared in advance of intersessional meetings and the meeting of States Parties, nor did any survivors participate as members of the official Colombian delegation to those meetings. Similarly, in Chad survivors were not involved in decision making and did not participate on international delegations, while a decrease in the inclusion of survivors’ representative organizations in the activities of the victim assistance coordination body was reported by a national disabled persons’ organization.

**Service accessibility and effectiveness**

Through the Cartagena Action Plan, States Parties agreed to “increase availability of and accessibility to appropriate services.” Improvements in victim assistance services were identified in many more States Parties in 2011 than in 2010, with improvements reported in ten countries in 2011, compared with just three in 2010. Mozambique made progress in 2010, but did not in 2011.

Most improvements were a result of increased availability of and/or greater access to victim assistance. Efforts to improve the quality of victim assistance were reported in many States Parties through training and capacity-building undertaken by the ICRC or NGOs. Very limited information was available on how the quality of services changed as a result of these efforts. As capacity-

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57 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. The survivor network in Yemen suspended its operations in 2011 due to armed conflict.

58 Some examples of States Parties where survivors were involved in providing physical rehabilitation include Afghanistan, DRC, El Salvador, and Iraq; and in economic inclusion activities include BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, and Senegal.

59 Survivors representing networks in El Salvador, Iraq, Ethiopia, Senegal and Uganda were researchers or information providers. Survivor networks in Afghanistan, Cambodia, DRC, Serbia and Turkey provided information. The Monitor research network also included survivor networks from Vietnam (a state not party) and Western Sahara.

Building assistance was often provided by international organizations, the ultimate challenge in this regard was ensuring that the quality was maintained after the international actors move on.

Improvements across multiple types of victim assistance services were reported in the following countries:

- In DRC, changes were reported in the accessibility, availability, and quality of services due to the combined work of NGOs and the government, with significant support from an international donor.
- In El Salvador, there was increased availability of all services provided through the national fund for war victims. In particular, the availability of microcredit programs increased and peer to peer support expanded in geographic coverage throughout the country.
- Ethiopia improved the quality and accessibility of medical care and continued to gradually increase production of prostheses for mine/ERW survivors. There was also a small increase in the number of economic inclusion projects that benefited survivors.
- Iraq continued the reconstruction of medical and rehabilitation centers, using the opportunity of the improved security situation and the greater mobility for mine/ERW survivors to access these services.
- In Cambodia, emergency medical care continued to improve, while the number of prostheses produced declined sharply during the year. A survey of survivors indicated that most had the devices that they needed.

Increased availability of physical rehabilitation was reported in another four States Parties:

- Burundi increased the number of services open to survivors during the year, particularly in the area of physical rehabilitation.
- Colombia increased the availability of physical rehabilitation services with a new rehabilitation center in an area with some of the highest numbers of mine/ERW survivors in the country.
- In Tajikistan, prosthetics production at the nationally managed rehabilitation center increased.
- Thailand continued to make community-based rehabilitation services more available in mine/ERW affected areas.

In Senegal, there were increased activities to enable child survivors to access education, though the victim assistance program overall was hampered by armed conflict and a lack of funds.

No significant changes in the access to or quality of victim assistance services were reported in Algeria or Turkey in 2011. Both were reported to have over 6,000 casualties, but neither country has self-identified as having significant numbers of survivors in need of assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty process. However, Turkey and Algeria took on the role of co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration for 2010 and 2012 respectively.

For the first time in recent years, in 2011, several other States Parties reported declines in all types of victim assistance. Previously, fluctuations in the availability of services were limited to just one or two areas of assistance. Some of these declines were connected to reductions in international assistance or closure of international programs without corresponding increases in national programs:

- In Angola, all international organizations had completely withdrawn by the end of the year. A continued lack of government funding for physical rehabilitation in 2011 caused a further decline in the availability and quality of services.
- In Eritrea, activities were scaled back significantly with the completion of the UN support program.
- The availability of affordable physical rehabilitation and psychological support in northern Uganda, the area with the greatest number of mine/ERW survivors, was significantly reduced as the remaining international organizations closed their programs.
- In Mozambique, waiting lists for services lengthened throughout the country. Decreased availability in all areas of assistance in BiH was also noted.

The impact of armed violence and conflict on victim assistance

Conflict and armed violence prevented several States Parties from being able to meet victim assistance commitments in 2011. The Monitor estimates that approximately half of all mine/ERW survivors were living in countries that were involved in armed violence and conflict during the year. Any global effort to address the needs of survivors must consider how this affects national programs and international support to these programs.

Heightened armed violence in States Parties Afghanistan, Chad, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, and Yemen, as well as in new State Party Somalia, undercut efforts to improve access to and availability of victim assistance. Instead, demand increased for emergency medical care and physical rehabilitation services, further taxing available services, and survivors were prevented from travelling to services. Service providers (such as the ICRC and other international and national organizations) also reported limiting their areas of service, thus inhibiting access to survivors in conflict-affected areas.

Ongoing violence prevented the rebuilding of health centers and other vital services that had been destroyed or degraded by conflict. At the same time, survivors, just like many other persons with disabilities, faced particular

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62 ICRC “Annual Report 2011,” Geneva, May 2012. See also country profiles for Afghanistan, Chad, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen for information on other service providers that had limited service areas due to conflict in 2011 at www.the-monitor.org/cp/.
risks from violence due to their limited mobility and more generally limited access to financial resources:

- In Afghanistan, ongoing conflict slowed the delivery of services by disability stakeholders. Female personnel, in particular, were prevented from working in remote and unsecured areas, resulting in unequal availability of disability services which adversely affected women and girls.
- Services for mine/ERW survivors in Chad were hampered by intermittent internal and border conflicts.
- In Senegal, the escalation of violence in the northern part of the Casamance region decreased access to all services for survivors in this area because transportation was limited.
- In Somalia, the few existing service providers were difficult to access. Ongoing and heightened conflict continued to erode the minimal health resources available and the number of war-wounded patients requiring treatment in hospitals in Mogadishu increased, compounding the problem.
- South Sudan’s lack of transportation and high levels of insecurity made access to victim assistance difficult for the majority of survivors (who live outside the capital city of Juba). Already inadequate medical and rehabilitation services and infrastructure struggled to handle increased needs as refugees returned from Sudan and the number of new mine/ERW survivors increased.
- Similarly, poor security conditions in Sudan prevented survivors from accessing victim assistance in the areas with the highest concentrations of mine survivors (the southern states and the Darfur region).
- Nearly all victim assistance activities were reduced or suspended in Yemen in 2011.

Children and victim assistance services

Children, especially boys, are one of the largest groups of survivors, yet age-sensitive assistance remained one of the least considered aspects of the victim assistance activities under the Mine Ban Treaty. Since child survivors have specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance, the Cartagena Action Plan requires that victim assistance be age-appropriate. Children whose injuries result in amputated limbs require more complicated rehabilitative assistance; they need to have prostheses made more often as they grow and may require corrective surgery for the changing shape of a residual limb (stump).

In 2011, a number of developments to address the specific needs of survivors according to their age were reported in States Parties. These developments included progress in several countries, but also recognition of the remaining and ongoing challenges.

A high number of child survivors were recorded among civilians injured by landmines in Colombia. It was reported that most hospitals were able to provide emergency medical care specific to the needs of child survivors, though access to appropriate ongoing medical care was more challenging due to administrative and bureaucratic obstacles. Two articles of the Colombian Victims Law adopted in 2011 relate to the situation of child landmine survivors and require the provision of age-appropriate services. While the impact of this law had not yet been felt in 2011 or into the first half of 2012, it held the potential to improve access to care for child survivors. In Turkey, medical specialists who conducted a survey of child mine/ERW survivors identified a lack of facilities capable of addressing the rehabilitation needs for survivors, particularly children, in mine-affected areas.

In Yemen, where most recorded casualties in 2011 were children, UNICEF expressed grave concern that children were increasingly being killed and injured by mines and ERW in 2012. Reports also indicated that family housing was inaccessible for child survivors who need to use wheelchairs after injury. Additionally, families of child survivors struggled to afford medical care, the timing and quality of which is vital to the long-term prospects of children after injury.

By mid-2012, the Regional Center for Psychosocial Rehabilitation of Children and Young People, including Mine Victims “Model of Active Rehabilitation and Education (M.A.R.E.),” was successfully established in Rovinj, Croatia, making it the largest joint project of its kind between the government and non-governmental sectors in the country. The Center was intended to serve vulnerable children, young people and their families from the region of Southeastern Europe and beyond.

In many countries, child survivors have to end their education prematurely due to the period of recovery needed and also due to the accompanying financial burden of rehabilitation on families. Accessible inclusive or special education is seldom available and further hindered by the lack of appropriate training for teachers. In Yemen, it was found that long periods of hospitalization together with trauma made returning to school a significant challenge. Since 2008, an inclusive education program has been operating in Afghanistan, run by the Ministry of Education, with financial and technical support from the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA). In 2011, inclusive education training for teachers as well as children with disabilities and their parents increased, as did enrollment of children with disabilities. However, also in 2011 some national organizations were affected by a shortage of funding for their inclusive education activities and these were slightly reduced.

A lack of physical access to schooling and other public services essential to social and economic inclusion
was an ongoing challenge for child survivors in many countries. In Uganda it was very difficult for children to access services as often as needed. Widely publicized standards for physical accessibility to public spaces for persons with disabilities, which had been introduced in 2010, lacked the force of law and most schools remained inaccessible in 2011. Physical access to public buildings, including schools, in Iraq was also very limited. Despite legislation enabling children with disabilities to study alongside other students in DRC, inclusive education was available only in some schools in the capital, Kinshasa. According to Handicap International (HI), the whole system needed to change. No significant progress has been noted since 2009.

In Eritrea, UNICEF had for many years helped children with disabilities in remote rural communities to attend school by providing donkeys for transportation through a project run in collaboration with the government. However, this ceased when the UN-funded victim assistance program ended in mid-2011. Child survivors in rural areas in Colombia faced challenges in returning to schools. A scarcity of school transportation in these areas prevented child survivors from accessing education; the schools themselves were not adapted to the needs of children with disabilities.

In 2011, NGOs and UNICEF in Senegal established new projects to improve access to education for children affected by mines/ERW in the mine-contaminated region of north of Casamance. In Albania, the education and social inclusion of boys and girls who are survivors in mine/ERW-impacted areas remained an ongoing focus of victim assistance activities, even as other victim assistance activities declined due to funding constraints.

Insufficient awareness of disability issues among teachers and fellow pupils can lead to discrimination, isolation, and the inability to participate in certain activities. This is a de-motivating factor for child survivors to stay in school. To combat this lack of awareness, the national landmine survivors’ NGO in Afghanistan ran education mainstreaming centers in three cities which provided inclusive education and vocational training opportunities for children with and without disabilities. The program was designed to bring about social change in attitudes towards disability while at the same time providing services to survivors.

Gender-sensitive victim assistance

Only limited information was available regarding gender-sensitive services in 2011, as in past years. Among States Parties, there was increasing recognition that services should take into account the differing needs of women, men, boys, and girls and that although the vast majority of mine survivors are male, the particular needs of female survivors and of women as secondary victims must be addressed.

For example, in Afghanistan the landmine survivors’ network and several NGOs specifically provided gender-sensitive services and advocated for the rights of female survivors. Also in Afghanistan, ICRC sports programs for persons with disabilities ensured that there were both male and female teams. In Colombia, at least one program focused on female heads of households. The mine action center in Egypt advertised gender-sensitive micro-credit loans assigned for female mine/ERW survivors and members of families of deceased males. In El Salvador, the state fund for victims of conflict also provides social protection for family members of those killed. In Eritrea, a national association provided employment and economic inclusion opportunities specifically for female war veterans with disabilities.

Awareness of survivors’ rights

When the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force, victim assistance focused on comprehensive rehabilitation and care for mine survivors, much like the medical approach to disabilities that still existed in many countries in 1999. At that time, there was no mention in victim reporting of human rights or the legal rights of survivors and their fulfillment. By 2004, States Parties, together with other victim assistance stakeholders, recognized the importance of human rights and committed to “ensure that national legal and policy frameworks effectively address the needs and fundamental human rights of mine victims.”

Limited progress on this front by 2009 led to stronger language in the Cartagena Action Plan and two activities to develop and implement laws and policies to meet the needs and human rights of survivors and to raise awareness of these rights among survivors, government institutions and service providers. By 2011, an increasing number of mine-affected States Parties had passed better laws to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, including survivors, mostly due to their efforts to implement the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). However, there were few instances where survivors felt the impact of these laws in their daily lives.

Over the past decade, the ICBL and numerous NGOs, including survivor networks, have advocated for the rights of survivors and worked to raise awareness of survivors’ rights among survivors and others. Active in many of the most mine-affected countries in the world, HI worked to promote access to rights for people with disabilities, including landmine survivors. The former Survivor Corps (Landmine Survivor Network) developed the capacity of survivors to advocate for their rights. The legacy of this continues with national survivor networks that emerged from its branches in several countries as a result of the closure of Survivor Corps, as well as through other networks established independently.

In 2011, numerous survivor networks around the world met with other survivors and informed them about their rights and how to access services. For example, during the year the survivors’ networks in BiH and Senegal met with each and every person injured by mines and ERW during the year to assist them and inform them

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about their rights. Survivors’ networks in many other States Parties provided similar services, including in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and El Salvador. In 2012, the ICBL launched the Survivor Network Project to increase support for national survivor networks.64

In addition to these ongoing efforts, the Monitor identified new activities in Cambodia, Colombia, and Croatia, implemented as collaborative efforts between civil society and government, to increase awareness about the rights of survivors.

In Croatia, although survivors’ rights were regulated by numerous laws and regulations, it was reported that civilian survivors were mostly not able to exercise their rights through the existing system. Only 20% of survivors surveyed in 2011 said that they were fully informed about their rights. In 2011, two important activities were undertaken to increase survivors’ awareness of their rights. With the support of the Ministry of Health, a regional administration and a survivors’ organization, a brochure and service directory on rights and opportunities for people with disabilities was widely distributed. In addition, the national mine action center began visiting survivors in hospitals to inform them of rights and services and provide copies of the publication.

In Colombia, efforts were also made in 2011 to increase survivors’ understanding of their rights and how to exercise them. The national mine action center held regional and national meetings with mine/ERW survivors, local authorities, and victim assistance service providers to increase awareness of the rights of survivors under the new Law of Victims and Restitution of Land. Numerous service providers multiplied these efforts through their beneficiaries and through the outreach activities of survivor’s associations. However, more and clearer information was needed; as of the end of the year, a great deal of confusion and misinformation remained around the law’s implications for survivors.

The Cambodian Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions (CCBL) recognized that survivors living in rural and remote areas still lacked information about their rights and about services that they could access. In early 2011, the CCBL (along with the assistance of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority) published a booklet providing details about relevant services available at the district level, with the goal of making this information available at the very local level for survivors. The CCBL continued in 2012 to visit local authorities and survivors in each district to share the information in the booklet and gather new information to continue to update it.

International legislation and policies

The Cartagena Action Plan calls for a holistic and integrated approach to victim assistance that is sensitive to both age and gender as well as being in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law. As the Cartagena Action Plan refers to the need for adequate assistance, without defining what adequate means, relevant international humanitarian and human rights law can also guide States Parties on the scope of their responsibilities. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) clearly recognizes the right “to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”65 Similar applicable provisions are found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.66

Other international instruments with close relevance to victim assistance that may be used synergistically with the Mine Ban Treaty include the CRPD, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and protocols annexed to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

The CRPD is an international human rights convention that recognizes the dignity and human rights of persons with disabilities by identifying their fundamental human rights and provides for the implementation of those rights.67 In the Mine Ban Treaty context, the CRPD is considered to “provide the States Parties with a more systematic, sustainable, gender sensitive and human rights based approach by bringing victim assistance into the broader context of persons with disabilities.”68

The Cartagena Action Plan often refers to a rights-based approach to assistance. Interested in seeing the coordinated implementation of both conventions benefit survivors and other persons with disabilities, the ICBL has noted that synergies between victim assistance obligations and CRPD obligations require efforts on both fronts; the ICBL also has cautioned that mainstreaming of victim assistance within the broader field of disability without the championing of assistance specifically for mine/ERW victims will likely lead to some victim assistance obligations not being fulfilled.69

By 1 August 2012, 15 countries with significant numbers of survivors among States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had ratified the CRPD; two of these ratified during this reporting period: Colombia in May 2011 and  

64 The majority of states in the world are parties to the ICESCR. As of June 2012, other than Mozambique, all States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with survivors were also parties to ICESCR.


66 The Optional Protocol to the CRPD is a separate treaty which establishes both a complaints procedure and an inquiry procedure. Given the complete lack of provisions for enforcement of victim assistance commitments under the Mine Ban Treaty, the Optional Protocol may increasingly provide a means to keep states accountable for their responsibility to uphold the rights of mine/ERW survivors with disabilities.

Mozambique in January 2012. Another three such States Parties were signatories.

**Convention on Cluster Munitions**

The Convention on Cluster Munitions ensures the full realization of the rights of all persons in communities affected by cluster munitions by obligating states to adequately provide assistance, without discriminating between people affected by cluster munitions and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other causes. The principles of the convention’s Vientiane Action Plan mirror most of those of the Mine Ban Treaty Cartagena Action Plan, but unlike the Mine Ban Treaty’s plan, the Vientiane Action Plan contains a range of concrete timeframes for actions. As of 1 August 2012, except for Lao PDR and Lebanon (both of which also have significant numbers of mine survivors), all other Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties and signatories with cluster munition victims were party to the Mine Ban Treaty. In total 20 of the 30 states with cluster munition victims were party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty continued to coordinate their implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions victim assistance obligations with their efforts under the Mine Ban Treaty. All but one States Party to the Mine Ban Treaty which had designated a victim assistance focal point under Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions had chosen the same focal points as those active under the Mine Ban Treaty. The exception, BiH, designated the national mine action center for the Mine Ban Treaty but, for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, reported the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the focal point.

**Convention on Conventional Weapons**

The Plan of Action on Victim Assistance under CCW Protocol V on ERW, adopted on 11 November 2008, contains similar provisions to the Cartagena Action Plan and the Convention on Cluster Munitions on victim assistance, though without the specific and time-bound obligations for States Parties. As of 15 September 2012, seven States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with responsibility for survivors were parties to Protocol V. Reporting on victim assistance in ERW-affected countries under Protocol V has been intermittent, inconsistent, and incomplete. However, this reporting has sometimes presented otherwise unavailable insights into victim assistance in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty such as Georgia, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia. The Protocol V Meeting of Experts in April 2012 included discussion on how different stakeholders are working to assess the needs of ERW victims and to ensure that assistance actually matches the needs. Proposed new reporting requirements on victim assistance with a reporting template were also presented.
Support for Mine Action

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in fulfilling its treaty obligations. The Monitor reports annually on support for mine action by affected countries and on international mine action assistance reported by donor states. In most cases, the Monitor relies on responses to requests for information sent to donors and affected states.

Key Developments

Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$662 million in international and national support for mine action in 2011, approximately $25 million more than in 2010, the largest combined total ever. In addition, appropriations from the UN General Assembly for mine action operations within ten peacekeeping operations provided $90 million in 2011, a 10% increase compared with the previous year and a 25% increase from 2009.

International support for victim assistance declined by US$13.6 million, an almost 30% decrease from 2010. The 2011 annual total of $30 million in direct international support for victim assistance (VA) activities to fulfill treaty obligations is the lowest annual total for victim assistance since the Monitor began reporting by sector in 2007. This amount accounts only for direct contributions to VA activities while many donors support VA activities through other development or disability activities.

The top ten donors and recipients remained mostly the same, as they have since 2006. Afghanistan received more funding than any other country for the tenth consecutive year and the United States (US) and Norway were again the top two donors, contributing almost 40% of all mine action funding in 2011.

International contributions

In 2011, 42 donors contributed US$467 million in international support for mine action in 57 affected states and areas, a decrease of $13 million (3%) from 2010. However, this is the second largest annual total of donor contributions recorded by the Monitor.

The majority of funding came from just a few sources. Contributions from the top four mine action donors—the US, Norway, Australia, and Japan, respectively—accounted for almost 60% of all donor funding. This is similar to 2010, with Australia replacing the European Commission (EC) as one of the top four donors.

Fifty-seven countries received mine action support in 2011. The top six recipient states—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Lao PDR, respectively—received half of the total international support. Donors contributed US$52 million to institutions, organizations, and trust funds without designating a recipient state, including nearly $23 million to the ICRC and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The UN and organizations engaged in advocacy efforts also received global funds.

The majority of funding was provided for activities in the following sectors: clearance and risk education (85% of all funding), victim assistance (6%), advocacy (3%) and stockpile destruction (1%). Of the total contribution to victim assistance, 38% was provided via the ICRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

National contributions

Thirty affected states provided US$195 million, 29% of global funding, in national support for mine action towards their own mine action programs, an increase of $38 million compared with 2010.

1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs and in accordance with international treaty obligations. For more information on funding contributed via other mechanisms see “Other Funding Paths” section below. Mine action support includes funding for landmines, cluster munitions and unexploded ordnance.

2 It is difficult to assess the amount of funding for VA activities given that many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs for development and the rights of persons with disabilities.

3 The Monitor reports funding by donor and recipient states. If a contribution cannot be traced to a recipient state it is categorized as “global.”
International Contributions

In 2011, 42 donors reported contributing US$467 million in international support for mine action. This represents a decrease of $13 million (3%) from the $480 million reported in 2010, but is nonetheless the second largest annual amount of donor contributions recorded by the Monitor. The majority of support went to 57 states and areas, with $52 million not earmarked for any specific country.4

International contributions for mine action in 2011 totaled more than US$430 million for a sixth consecutive year. Since 2006, when international assistance for mine action jumped from $371 million to $464 million, funding has ranged from $437 million to $480 million per year.

Donors

In 2011 the US remained the top mine action donor, followed by Norway, Australia, Japan, and Germany.

Australia increased its contribution in 2011 by US$21 million (87%), while the EC decreased its contribution by $30 million (61%) and Canada decreased its contribution by $13 million (44%). Yet, overall, funding was only 3% less than in 2010. There were several reasons for this: other major donors maintained similar amounts as in 2010; donors supported Libya with $19 million as part of an emergency operation that included NATO; and the exchange rate with the US dollar in the Eurozone, Japan, and Australia was more favorable than in 2010.

In 2011, the top five donors provided 64% of all international funding, about the same as 2010, when contributions from the top five donors made up 61% of the total contribution.

Although 42 states and institutions contributed to international assistance in 2011, of these 12 contributed less than US$400,000. New international donors reporting contributions in 2011 through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (UNVTF), administered by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), or through the IFT Enhancing Human Security (formerly the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance; hereinafter, ITF) included Estonia, Monaco, Oman, Romania, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the Corporación Andina de Fomento, a regional development bank based in Venezuela.

Funding paths

Donors provided funding via several trust fund mechanisms, including: the UNVTF administered by UNMAS; the Cluster Munition Trust Fund for Lao PDR, administered by the UNDP; the ITF established by the government of Slovenia; and several NATO PfP trust funds.

Other organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2011 included the ICRC (US$13.1 million)1 and the GICHD (US$10.5 million).4

Recipients

A total of 57 states and areas received US$445 million from 41 donors in 2011. A further $52 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area. The number of donors for each country and the amount of support each country received varied from one donor contributing several hundred thousand dollars (to the Solomon Islands) to 20 donors contributing almost $100 million (to Afghanistan). Of the 57 recipients, 17 received less than $1 million and 16 had only one or two donors.

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of the funding. The top six recipient states—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, and Lao PDR—received 51% of all international mine action contributions in 2011, down from 55% in 2010.

Libya led the new recipients in 2011 with US$19 million from 15 donors. Only Afghanistan had more donors. The other seven new recipients—Armenia, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Estonia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands—received a total of $3.4 million. Of the seven new recipients in 2010, only Egypt received assistance again in 2011.7

For the five years from 2007 to 2011, support to Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Lebanon, Sudan, in addition to funds categorized as “global,” represented 64% of all contributions.

1 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Christine Pahlman, Mine Action Coordinator, AusAID, 24 April 2012; by Esther Schindler, Office for Foreign Affairs, Liechtenstein, 8 March 2012; and by Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 March 2012; Belgium Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Form I, 30 April 2012; Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Programme Officer, Directorate for Political Affairs, Human Security Division, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, 24 June 2012; and by Katrine Joensen, Head of Section, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, 1 May 2012; and US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2012,” Washington, DC, July 2012.


7 The other new recipients for 2010 were Algeria, Benin, Falkland Islands/ Malvinas, Liberia, Moldova, and Sierra Leone.
Support for Mine Action

Contributions by donor: 2007–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>131.4</td>
<td>129.6</td>
<td>118.7</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>534.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>226.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>19.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>124.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>224.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>115.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>114.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>185.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>102.3</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>154.9</td>
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<td>18.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>76.5</td>
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<td>11.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>58.0</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<td>7.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors*</td>
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<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>227.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Other donors in 2011 included Andorra, Corporación Andina de Fomento, Estonia, International Road Union11, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Oman, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Romania, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) trust fund program under NATO and its Maintenance and Supply Agency.

† The International Road Transport Union (IRU) was founded in Geneva in 1948. It supports the interests of bus, coach, taxi and truck operators to ensure economic growth and the sustainable mobility of people and goods by road worldwide. The IRU contribution to Afghanistan through the UNVTF was US$1.9 million in 2011.

Top recipients of international contributions: 2007-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Contribution ($ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>499.3</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global*</td>
<td>274.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>179.5</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>152.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>124.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>119.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Global refers to funds from donors which were not earmarked for use within a designated recipient state or area and were allocated to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, the UN, ICRC or GICHD. Most advocacy funding is contained within this category of funding.

Funding by Thematic Sector

More than 80% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education (RE) activities. Victim assistance (VA) support fell by US$13.6 million from 2010 and represented just 6% of mine action support. Stockpile destruction increased as a result of a contract by the EC for €3.9 million (US$5.4 million) to destroy...
PFM-type antipersonnel mines in Belarus.9 Norway supported stockpile destruction with NOK§.8 million (US$1.04 million) to Ukraine.10

### Contributions by thematic sector: 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>Percentage of total contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance/RE</td>
<td>399.2</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Assistance</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile destruction</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>466.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mine clearance and risk education

In 2011, 86% of all reported support for mine action went toward clearance/RE activities (US$399.2 million), a decrease of US$12.3 million from 2010 (US$411.5 million).

Many donors reported clearance and RE as a combined figure, although clearance accounts for most of the reported funding. Fifteen donors reported contributions totaling US$11.8 million specifically for 32 RE projects in 19 countries, though RE programs are implemented in all mine-affected countries and seven areas.

### Victim assistance

Direct international support for VA activities to fulfill treaty obligations declined sharply in 2011 with 19 of 42 donors contributing US$30 million in direct international support for VA activities, down from $43.6 million in 2010. This represents 6% of all reported support for mine action in 2011, compared to 9% in 2008–2010.

As the Monitor country profiles on VA indicate, nationally-allocated resources through health, education, labor, and social welfare agencies and organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) largely support programs and activities that target persons regardless of the cause of the injury or disability, including landmine and cluster munition survivors. Funding and expenditures for programs that benefit the larger disability community are not disaggregated in Article 7 annual reports and in other sources to account for support to mine/ERW survivors.


Of the US$30 million in direct contributions for VA in 2011, 86% came from the US, Norway, Australia, and Belgium. Most mine-affected countries did not receive any international support for VA. Of 57 countries and territories that received mine action support in 2011, only 24 with survivors/casualties received VA funding, including 14 States Parties, eight states not party, and two areas.11

### Victim assistance funding by donor12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the international level VA is represented by a small group of implementers and donors. The donors include the US Department of State (including the US Agency for International Development Leahy War Victims Fund, USAID), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Belgium Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the IF. The implementers include the ICRC, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Handicap International, Clear Path International, and the Polus Center. Of the US$30 million in direct contributions to VA activities in 2011, $24.5 million or 83% went through these implementing organizations.

### Advocacy

In 2011, 3% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities (US$11.8 million). Of the 42 donors reporting international contributions to mine action in 2011, 14 reported supporting advocacy activities, which is a decline of two donors from 2010.

Advocacy activities included: support for the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties for the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh and the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Convention for Cluster Munitions in Beirut, Lebanon; travel sponsorship through UNDP for government personnel; and the sponsorship program of the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit. The CMC, the ICBL, GICHD, Geneva Call, and the Monitor also received donor support for advocacy.

11 States Parties that received international assistance for VA were Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Uganda and Yemen. Non-state recipients of international assistance for VA were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. The two areas were Somaliland and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

12 Other VA donors are: Austria, Canada, Common Humanitarian Fund (Sudan), Denmark, Germany, Finland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Slovenia, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, and UNDP.
National Contributions

While there has been more transparency from affected states, national contributions for mine action activities continue to be under-reported overall. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports. Thirty states reported US$195 million in contributions to mine action from their national budgets in 2011. Angola (US$59.6 million) and Croatia (US$46 million) accounted for 53% of the total. For the first time, Taiwan reported the cost of its demining program. In 2011, it reported it spent TWD$280 million (US$8 million) clearing mines.13 Chile, Denmark, and Venezuela are the only mine-affected countries, and Taiwan the only mine-affected area, that receive all of their mine action funding from national sources. The mine action programs in Azerbaijan and Croatia receive more than 80% of their funding from national sources.

The Ministry of Health in Libya contributed US$450,000 through the ITF for assistance to victims in Libya.14 El Salvador contributed $2.7 million to landmine survivors in 2011 through the government’s Fund for the War Wounded.15 Algeria, India, Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam (all mine-affected states with significant contamination and major clearance operations, usually by the army) have never reported annual expenditures. Some unofficial estimates put annual government contributions to demining in Vietnam to be as much as US$100 million.16

Other Funding Paths

The US$467 million in support to mine action in 2011 represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs and in accordance with international treaty obligations. It does not represent the complete expenditures for field operations. Other funding sources include national funding, foundations, private fundraising by NGOs, and mine action allocations in countries with peacekeeping operations.

In 2011, 28 donors contributed US$75 million to the UNVTF (of which 98% was earmarked) compared to 19 donors and $63 million in 2010 and 19 donors and $91 million in 2009. Australia, Canada, and Japan were the largest donors to the UNVTF, representing 56% of all contributions. Several small donors used the UNVTF to contribute to mine action, including Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Oman, Romania, and South Korea. For the first time, the US contributed to the UNVTF for Afghanistan.17

Donors allocated US$25 million in 2011 through the ITF18 and $4.1 million to the Organization of American States (OAS) for mine action programs in Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru.19

Peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping operations in Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Western Sahara have mine action programs that are partially funded by UN General

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Notes:
15 Fondo de Protección de Lisiados y Discapacitados a Consecuencia del Conflicto Armado (Protection Fund for the Disabled and Injured as a Result of the Armed Conflict), or “The Protection Fund”.
19 Email from Carl Case, General Coordinator, OAS, 20 March 2012.
Assembly assessments as part of its peacekeeping mission budgets. 

Nearly US$59 million in 2011 was allocated for mine action to peacekeeping missions in Sudan, which included Darfur and South Sudan.

### Peacekeeping assessed funds for mine action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/other area</th>
<th>Peacekeeping operation</th>
<th>Assessed funds for mine action (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td>25.1</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)</td>
<td>16.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>UN Mission for the organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>89.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 1 October 2012 there were 160 State Parties.

### States Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Signature</th>
<th>Date of Ratification</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Andorra</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
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<td>3 May 99</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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### Status of the Convention

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<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97</td>
<td>13 Apr 99</td>
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</table>

### Signatories

- Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97
- Poland 4 Dec 97

### States not Party

- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Bahrain
- Burma/Myanmar
- China
- Cuba
- Egypt
- Georgia
- India
- Iran
- Israel
- Kazakhstan
- Korea, North
- Korea, South
- Kyrgyzstan
- Lao PDR
- Lebanon
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97
- Samoa 3 Dec 97
- San Marino 3 Dec 97
- Sao Tome and Principe 30 Apr 98
- Senegal 3 Dec 97
- Serbia 18 Sep 03
- Seychelles 4 Dec 97
- Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98
- Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97
- Slovenia 3 Dec 97
- Solomon Islands 3 Dec 97
- Somalia 16 Apr 12
- South Africa 3 Dec 97
- South Sudan 11 Nov 11
- Spain 3 Dec 97
- Sudan 4 Dec 97
- Suriname 4 Dec 97
- Swaziland 4 Dec 97
- Sweden 4 Dec 97
- Switzerland 3 Dec 97
- Tajikistan 12 Oct 99
- Tanzania 3 Dec 97
- Thailand 3 Dec 97
- Timor-Leste 7 May 03
- Togo 4 Dec 97
- Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97
- Tunisia 4 Dec 97
- Turkey 25 Sep 03
- Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97
- Tuvalu 13 September 2011
- Uganda 3 Dec 97
- UK 25 Feb 99
- Ukraine 24 Feb 99
- United Kingdom 3 Dec 97
- United Arab Emirates
- United States
- Uzbekistan
- Vietnam
- Libya
- Micronesia
- Mongolia
- Morocco
- Nepal
- Oman
- Pakistan
- Russian Federation
- Saudi Arabia
- Singapore
- Sri Lanka
- Syria
- Tonga
- United Arab Emirates
- United States
- Zimbabwe

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54 / LANDMINE MONITOR 2012
Mine Ban Treaty

18 September 1997

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Preamble

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;

c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

**Article 2**

**Definitions**

1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

**Article 3**

**Exceptions**

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

**Article 4**

**Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines**

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

**Article 5**

**Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas**

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:

   a) The duration of the proposed extension;

   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:

      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;

      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and

      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;

   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and

   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6
International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;

   b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;

   c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

   d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

   e) Assistance to mine victims;

   f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

Article 7
Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;

   b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

   c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

   d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

   e) The status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

   f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

   g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines...
Article 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party...
declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

   a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;

   b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or

   c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

**Article 9**

**National implementation measures**

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

**Article 10**

**Settlement of disputes**

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.
Article 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13
Amendments
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14
Costs
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
**Article 15**

**Signature**

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

**Article 16**

**Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession**

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

**Article 17**

**Entry into force**

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

**Article 18**

**Provisional application**

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

**Article 19**

**Reservations**

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

**Article 20**

**Duration and withdrawal**

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

**Article 21**

**Depositary**

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

**Article 22**

**Authentic texts**

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Appendix

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AHD  antihandling device
AOAV  Action On Armed Violence
AP or APM  antipersonnel mine
ARF  ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AusAID  Australian Agency for International Development
AV or AVM  antivehicle mine
AXO  abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC  battle area clearance
CBU  cluster bomb unit
CBR  community-based rehabilitation
CCW  1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CD  Conference on Disarmament
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CMC  Cluster Munition Coalition
DCA  DanChurchAid
DDG  Danish Demining Group
DfID  UK Department for International Development
DPO  disabled people’s organization
EC  European Commission
ECHO  European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EOD  explosive ordnance disposal
ERW  explosive remnants of war
EU  European Union
FY  Fiscal year
GICHD  Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI  Handicap International
HRW  Human Rights Watch
ICBL  International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP  internally displaced person
IED  improvised explosive device
IMAS  International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA  Information Management System for Mine Action
IRIN  Integrated Regional Information Network (UN)
ISU  Implementation Support Unit
ITF  International Trust Fund Enhancing Human Security (Slovenia)
LIS  Landmine Impact Survey
MAC  Mine Action Center or Mines Action Canada
MAG  Mines Advisory Group
MASG  Mine Action Support Group
MAT  mine action team or Mines Awareness Trust
MDD  mine detection dog
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement
NAMSA  NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  non-governmental organization
NPA  Norwegian People's Aid
NSAG  non-state armed group
OAS  Organization of American States
OCHA  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PPR  Partnership for Peace (NATO)
QA  quality assurance
QC  quality control
RE  mine/ERW risk education
SAC  Survey Action Center
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SHA  suspected hazardous area
SMART goals  specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound goals
Appendix

64 / LANDMINE MONITOR 2012

Glossary

Abandoned explosive ordnance – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspect hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Community-based rehabilitation – Programs in affected communities (often rural areas) that are designed to supplement facility-based programs in urban centers. These programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities, and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to service, due to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and limited human resource capacity.

Community liaison – According to IMAS, “liaison with mine/ERW affected communities to exchange information on the presence and impact of mines and UXO, to create a reporting link with the mine action programme and develop risk reduction strategies. Community mine action liaison aims to ensure community needs and priorities are central to the planning, implementation and monitoring of mine action operations.”

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Explosive remnants of war – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Failed cluster munition – A cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so.

Improvised explosive device – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

IMAS – International mine action standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action.

WHO World Health Organization
VA victim assistance
UXO unexploded ordnance
USAID US Agency for International Development
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UN United Nations
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
IMAS International Mine Action Standards

Appendix 65 / LANDMINE MONITOR 2012
by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

**IMSM** – The UN’s preferred information system for the management of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA provides users with support for data collection, data storage, reporting, information analysis, and project management activities.

**Landmine Impact Survey** – A national or regional assessment of the socioeconomic impact on communities caused by the actual or perceived presence of mines and ERW, in order to assist the planning and prioritization of mine action programs and projects.

**Land release** – The set of activities and methodologies intended to release previously suspect hazardous areas with the minimum possible risk.

**Mine action center** – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some MACs also implement mine action activities.

**Mine/ERW risk education** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training and community mine action liaison.

**National mine action authority** – A governmental body, normally interministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.

**Non-state armed groups** – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

**Risk reduction** – Those actions which lessen the probability and/or severity of physical injury to people, property, or the environment due to mines/ERW. Risk reduction can be achieved by physical measures such as clearance, fencing or marking, or through behavioral changes brought about by mine/ERW risk education.

**Submunition** – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).

**Survey** – A study of the assessment of the location and impact of mines and ERW at the local or national level. General survey focuses on the location of mined and battle areas and the type of contamination they contain. A landmine impact survey also assesses the impact of explosive contamination on nearby communities (see separate definition for landmine impact survey). Technical survey aims to confirm and identify the outer perimeters of the hazardous area using one or more demining tools and to gather other necessary information for clearance.

**Unexploded cluster munitions** – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

**Unexploded ordnance** – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate; unexploded submunitions are known as “blinds” or “duds.”

**Victim** – The individual directly hit by a mine/ERW explosion, his or her family and community.

**Victim assistance** – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, casualty data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social reintegration, economic reintegration, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families and communities in society.
Landmine Monitor 2012 provides a global overview of efforts in 2011 and the first part of 2012 to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally assess the international community’s response to the global landmine and explosive remnants of war problem. It covers developments in the areas of antipersonnel landmine use, production, stockpiling, mine action, casualties, victim assistance, and mine action funding.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community’s response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Left: Landmine survivors Mr. Boniface Kapindo (left) and Mr. Amos Muhindo (right) from Kiholhu Village in western Uganda, near the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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Cover photo: Sameta, a woman deminer working for Handicap International in Mozambique.
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