LANDMINE MONITOR 2018
LANDMINE MONITOR
2018

20TH ANNUAL EDITION

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
DanChurchAid • Danish Demining Group • Human Rights Watch
Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada
Research team leaders • ICBL-CMC staff experts
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or "Ottawa Convention") as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

**The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:**

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW);
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
Landmine Monitor 2018

PREFACE

LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to sustainable development and post-conflict reconstruction.
There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International (now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel
mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025, a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).

In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative, for the first time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is does not send researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting required of states under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.
The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of more than two dozen researchers and an Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 20th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. Landmine Monitor 2018 provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.

Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling, and also includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2017, with information included up to November 2018 when possible.

IN MEMORIAM KOFI ANNAN

We would like to express our mourning over the passing away of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on 18 August and convey our sympathies to his family and collaborators who over the years stood by him in the causes he led to make the world a better place. The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor team wishes to pay special tribute to him and acknowledge the important contributions he has made to a world free of landmines.

We recall and appreciate the words he shared at the March 2016 pledging conference for the Mine Ban Treaty (pictured right):

In 1997 the international community responded with unprecedented multilateral cooperation and called for determined action to rid the world of landmines.

The signing of the Ottawa Treaty was one of the highlights of my career at the United Nations. It provided us with great hope, not only for the disarmament agenda, but for the power of multilateralism in a world facing challenges of increasing complexity.

To a large extent, that hope has been validated. The determination of the States Parties has made the Ottawa Treaty one of the great successes of international diplomacy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial assistance in the release, distribution, publication, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board comprised of five NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee’s members include: DanChurchAid (Charlotte Billoir), Danish Demining Group (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team coordinator), Amelie Chayer (ICBL-CMC government liaison and policy manager), and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager) and ex officio member Hector Guerra (ICBL-CMC Director). From January to October 2018, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2018. The Editorial Team included:

- Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Marta Kosmyna, Yeshua Moser-Puangsawan, and Mary Wareham;
- Contamination, clearance, and support for mine action: Jennifer Reeves, Amelie Chayer, and Marion Loddo; and
- Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi Vicentic, Jennifer Reeves, Farzana Mursal Alizada, Éléa Boureux, Clémence Caraux-Pelletan, Michael Moore, and Marianne Schulze, with assistance from Clémentine Tavernier.

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from Clearing the Mines 2018) and country-level cluster munition reports (from Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publication.

Jeff Abramson of ICBL-CMC provided final editing in October and November 2017 with assistance from Morgan McKenna (publications consultant).

Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. Pole Communication printed the report in Switzerland. This report was also published digitally at www.the-monitor.org.

We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors:
- Government of Australia
- Government of Austria
- Government of Belgium
- Government of France
- Government of Germany
- Government of Luxembourg
- Government of Norway
- Government of Sweden
- Government of Switzerland
- Government of the United States of America**
- UNICEF

The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating organizations.

* List accurate as of November 2018.
** Specifically for research on mine action, support for mine action, casualties, and victim assistance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>battle area clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cluster Munition Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Humanity &amp; Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY

**Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO)** – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

**Accession** – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

**Adherence** – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

**Antihandling device** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

**Antipersonnel mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

**Antivehicle mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

**Area cancellation** – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

**Area reduction** – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

**Battle area clearance (BAC)** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Casualty** – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

**Clearance** – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Cleared land** – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.
**Confirmed hazardous area** – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Demining** – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

**Explosive remnants of war (ERW)** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)** – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

**Improvised explosive device (IED)** – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

**Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine** – An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.

**International Mine Action Standards** – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

**Land release** – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

**Mine action center** – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

**Mine/ERW risk education** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

**Non-state armed groups (NSAG)** – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

**Non-technical survey (NTS)** – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

**Reduced land** – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

**Residual risk** – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victim – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her family, and community.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 November 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 1 November 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table Key**

**The Americas**

- Antigua & Barbuda
- Argentina
- Bahamas
- Barbados
- Belize
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Canada
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Dominica
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- El Salvador
- Grenada
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Jamaica
- Mexico
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- Paraguay
- Peru
- St. Kitts & Nevis
- Saint Lucia
- St. Vincent & the Grenadines
- Suriname
- Trinidad & Tobago
- Uruguay
- Venezuela
- Cuba
- United States

**Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia**

- Albania
- Andorra
- Austria
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Bosnia & Herzegovina
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Georgia
- Austria
- Holy See
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Latvia
- Liechtenstein
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Macedonia, FYR
- Malta
- Moldova
- Monaco
- Montenegro
- Netherlands
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Russia
- Uzbekistan

**Middle East & North Africa**

- Algeria
- Iraq
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Morocco
- Saudi Arabia
- Bahrain
- Egypt
- Oman
- Palestine
- Qatar
- Tunisia
- Yemen
- Iran
- Syria
- United Arab Emirates

**East & South Asia & the Pacific**

- Afghanistan
- Australia
- Bangladesh
- Bhutan
- Brunei Darussalam
- Cambodia
- Cook Islands
- Fiji
- Indonesia
- Japan
- Kiribati
- Malaysia
- Maldives
- Marshall Islands
- Nauru
- New Zealand
- Niue
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Philippines
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Sri Lanka
- Thailand
- Timor-Leste
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu

**Sub-Saharan Africa**

- Angola
- Benin
- Botswana
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cameroon
- Cape Verde
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Comoros
- Congo, Rep.
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Djibouti
- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Eswatini
- Ethiopia
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Kenya
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Rwanda
- São Tomé & Príncipe
- Senegal
- Seychelles
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- South Africa
- South Sudan
- Sudan
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Uganda
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe
# Table of Contents

## Major Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 | Banning Antipersonnel Mines
| 7 | Use of Antipersonnel Landmines
| 8 | Universalizing the Landmine Ban
| 12 | Production of Antipersonnel Mines
| 14 | Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines
| 15 | Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines
| 16 | Stockpile destruction by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties
| 17 | Mines retained for training and research (Article 3)
| 20 | Transparency Reporting
| 21 | Map—1997 Mine Ban Treaty: Status 2018

## Ban Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 7 | Banning Antipersonnel Mines
| 8 | Use of Antipersonnel Landmines
| 12 | Universalizing the Landmine Ban
| 14 | Production of Antipersonnel Mines
| 15 | Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines
| 16 | Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines
| 20 | Transparency Reporting
| 21 | Map—1997 Mine Ban Treaty: Status 2018

## Contamination and Clearance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 24 | Mine Contamination in 2017
| 26 | Mine Clearance in 2017
| 31 | Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Obligations
| 31 | Completion of Article 5 implementation
| 31 | Progress on meeting deadlines
| 36 | Monitoring the progress of States Parties against their Article 5 obligations and the Maputo Action Plan
| 38 | Other issues affecting clearance obligations
| 41 | Country/Area Summaries
| 46 | Map—Mine Contamination: Status 2018

## Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 49 | Overview
| 50 | Casualty Recording for 2017
| 52 | Casualty demographics
| 52 | Mine/ERW types resulting in casualties
| 55 | Annex—Mine/ERW types causing casualties
| 57 | Map—Landmine, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), and Cluster Submunition Casualties in 2017

## Victim Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 59 | Introduction
| 60 | Victim Assistance Under the Maputo Action Plan
| 69 | Broader Frameworks for Assistance

## Support for Mine Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 73 | 2017 Figures and Trends
| 74 | International Contributions in 2017
| 84 | National Contributions in 2017
| 84 | Five-Year Support to Mine Action 2013–2017
| 86 | Map—Support for Mine Action: 2017

## Status of the Convention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 89 | Treaty Status
| 92 | Mine Ban Treaty
Mine marker visible during visit of Special Envoy Prince Mired of Jordan to new State Party Sri Lanka.

MAJOR FINDINGS

Landmine Monitor 2018, the 20th annual Landmine Monitor publication examining progress toward a mine-free world, continues to find that the Mine Ban Treaty regime is a resounding success. After two new states acceded in late 2017, 164 countries are now bound by and dutifully implementing the treaty’s provisions. The stigma against landmines remains strong. Only a small number of non-state armed groups use the banned weapons, often in the form of improvised mines. These have again resulted in a high number of casualties in 2017, with the majority of victims being civilians, nearly half of whom were children. As countries continue to work to clear mine-contaminated land, the Monitor identifies much that remains to be done, including to support the needs of landmine survivors and their communities. Countries both inside and outside the regime are contributing record high resources toward mine clearance and other mine action activities, affirming the impact that this first humanitarian disarmament treaty continues to have after 20 years.

TREATY STATUS

There are 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and one signatory—Marshall Islands—that has yet to ratify.

• Two countries joined the treaty in 2017, both in December: Sri Lanka acceded on 13 December, while the State of Palestine acceded on 29 December.

USE

From October 2017 through October 2018, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of one country—Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

• There have been no allegations of the use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the treaty in the reporting period.
• Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed any use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces during this reporting period.
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, and Yemen.

- Forces of the Islamic State likely continued to use improvised landmines in Iraq and Syria, but the lack of access to affected areas by independent sources makes it difficult to confirm new use in the reporting period.
- Landmine Monitor was unable to confirm allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Iraq, Mali, Libya, Philippines, Tunisia, and Ukraine in the reporting period.

CASUALTIES

2017 was the third year in a row with exceptionally high numbers of recorded casualties due to landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)—including improvised types that act as antipersonnel mines (also called improvised mines), cluster munition remnants, and other ERW.

- In 2017, the Monitor recorded 7,239 casualties by landmines/ERW—2,793 people were killed, 4,431 people were injured, and for 15 casualties the survival status was unknown.
- The continuing high total was influenced by casualties recorded in countries facing armed conflict and large-scale violence, particularly Afghanistan and Syria, as well as Ukraine, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, Myanmar, Libya, and Yemen. Accurate data gathering for active conflicts, however, remains challenging.
- The casualty count for 2017 was a decrease on that of 2016, which had marked the highest number of annual recorded casualties in Monitor data since 1999, but the total remained far higher than the annual casualty rate of five-years ago.
- For a second year in a row, the highest numbers in Monitor history were recorded for annual casualties caused by improvised mines (2,716) and for child casualties (2,452).

Casualties in 2017 were identified in 49 countries, of which 35 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and in four other areas.

- The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (87%) where their status was known, an even higher ratio than in recent years.
- In 2017, children accounted for 47% of all civilian casualties where the age was known, an increase of 5 percentage points from the 2016 annual total.
- Women and girls made up 13% of all casualties where the sex was known.
- The Monitor has recorded more than 122,000 mine/ERW casualties since its global tracking began in 1999, including some 86,000 survivors.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$771.5 million in combined international and national support for mine action in 2017, an increase of $203.6 million (36%) compared to 2016.

- This represents the highest combined total of international and national mine action funding ever reported in Monitor data, going back to 1996.

In 2017, international donors contributed $673.2 million to mine action in 38 states and three other areas, an increase of $190.3 million (39%) compared with 2016.

- This represents the highest level of international support ever recorded by the Monitor.
- The top five mine action donors—the United States (US), Germany, the European Union (EU), Norway, and Japan—contributed 79% of all international funding, with a combined total of $435.4 million.
The record 2017 total was primarily the result of massive increases in the contributions of the US ($309.0 million total, a $156.6 million increase) and Germany ($84.4 million total, a $47.1 million increase).

Mine action in five states—Iraq, Syria, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Lao PDR—received $435.4 million, or 65% of all international support in 2017.

The largest increases were for activities in Iraq and Syria, receiving respectively $120 million ($207.0 million total) and $70.8 million ($89.4 million total) more than in 2016.

Donor support explicitly dedicated to victim assistance remains low and difficult to track, representing only 2% of identifiable international support in 2017.

Ten affected states reported providing $98.3 million in national support for their own mine action programs, an increase of $13.3 million (16%) compared with 2016.

CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE

Sixty states and areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines as of November 2018.

- This includes 34 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 22 states not party, and four other areas.
- Mauritania completed clearance in December 2017. Mozambique, which had declared completion in 2015 but subsequently found previously unidentified antipersonnel mine contamination in 2016 and 2017, completed clearance in May 2017.
- Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (more than 100 km² total per country) is believed to exist in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, and other area Western Sahara.

About 128 km² of land was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2017, less than the 145km² revised total reported for 2016.

- In 2017, more than 168,000 antipersonnel mines and some 7,500 antivehicle mines were destroyed. This represented a significant decrease from the 2016 results. However, this is an underestimation as some actors do not systematically report clearance results.
- In 2017, clearance was reported in two-thirds of the contaminated states and areas: 29 States Parties, eight states not party, and three other areas.
- The largest total clearance of mined areas in 2017 was achieved in Afghanistan, Croatia, Iraq, and Cambodia (the same countries as 2016), which together accounted for more than 80% of recorded clearance.
- In 2017, three States Parties used non-technical and technical survey to release significant amounts of land—more than 30km²—thus greatly decreasing their estimate of remaining contamination: Angola, Cambodia, and Thailand.

Over the past five years (2013–2017), approximately 830km² of mined areas have been cleared. Some 1.1 million antipersonnel mines and more than 66,000 antivehicle mines have been destroyed in the context of mine and battle area clearance.

Twenty-nine States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance of all mined areas on their territory since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999.

- Jordan and Nigeria, where antipersonnel mine contamination is found, should declare that they have obligations under Article 5 and request a new deadline to complete clearance.
- Only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their treaty-mandated clearance deadlines: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.
• The political declaration adopted at the Mine Ban Treaty's Third Review Conference in 2014 includes a commitment to fulfill treaty obligations to the fullest extent possible by 2025. Although most countries are not on track with their respective Article 5 clearance deadlines, the majority should reach the 2025 clearance goal, with sufficient funds and commitment, and where security conditions permit.

• Almost all States Parties with mine contamination have a national mine action program or institutions that are assigned to fulfill the state’s clearance obligations. In stark contrast, fewer than half of the states not party with landmine contamination have functioning mine action programs.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

In 2017–2018, most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine victims lacked suitable resources and practices to fulfill the commitments they have made in the 2014–2019 Maputo Action Plan. Findings below relate to 33 States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims. The needs for assisting victims remain great, including in the newest States Parties Palestine and Sri Lanka.

• In most States Parties, some efforts to improve the quality and quantity of health and physical rehabilitation programs for survivors were undertaken.

• Nevertheless, following reductions in resources in recent years, many countries saw near-stagnation in the remaining core assistance services for mine/ERW victims. Survivor networks also struggled to maintain their operations as they faced decreased resources.

• Services remained largely centralized, preventing many mine/ERW survivors who live in remote and rural areas from accessing those services. Shortages of raw materials and financial resources were an obstacle to improvements in the physical rehabilitation sector in several countries.

• Only 14 of the 33 States Parties had victim assistance or relevant disability plans in place to address recognized needs and gaps in assistance.

• Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms, and survivors’ representatives participated in 18 of the coordinating processes among those 21 States Parties. State initiatives for capacity-building toward increased participation of mine victims were almost never reported.

• Significant gaps remain in access to employment, training, and other income-generation support activities in many of the States Parties where opportunities for livelihoods were most needed.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION, PRODUCTION, AND TRANSFER

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 54 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 500,000 destroyed in 2017.

• Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of the convention having missed their four-year deadline to complete destruction of their stockpiles.

• Two States Parties possess more than five million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (4.4 million) and Greece (643,267). Oman (7,630) plans to destroy its stocks by February 2019.

In 1999, all states collectively (both treaty signatories and non-signatories) stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global total may be less than 50 million.

Forty-one states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.

• The Monitor lists 11 states as landmine producers because they have yet to disavow future production, unchanged from the previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.
• Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.
• NSAGs produce improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen.
• Houthi forces in Yemen were “mass producing” landmines, including victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines).

At least nine states not party to the ban have formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US.
ICBL Ambassador Tun Channareth is giving an interview during the 16th Meeting of States Parties, held in Vienna.

© ICBL, December 2017
BAN POLICY

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

Over the past two decades, the Mine Ban Treaty has developed into an international norm with impressive universality. A total of 164 States Parties are implementing the treaty’s provisions, which prohibit antipersonnel landmines use, production, trade, or stockpiling and require victim assistance, clearance of mined areas within 10 years, and destruction of stockpiled mines within four years. Most of the 33 countries that remain outside of the treaty abide nonetheless by its key provisions. The stigma against landmines remains strong.

During this reporting period, Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Myanmar, a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines, particularly improvised mines, with a frequency and scale in recent years that is resulting in a palpable increase in new mine casualties and threatening progress toward the long-held goal of a landmine-free world.¹ NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries during this reporting period, including in States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Nigeria, Thailand, Yemen, and non-states parties India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory manner. However, some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, particularly mine clearance and victim assistance, as detailed in the relevant chapters of this report.

Like-minded governments, United Nations agencies, and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) continue to work together with the International Campaign

¹ The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as “a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term “improvised landmine” to refer to victim-activated IEDs.
to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to address Mine Ban Treaty compliance challenges in a cooperative manner. The unity demonstrated by this community over the past two decades remains strong and focused on the treaty’s ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines.

**USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES**

There have been no allegations of the use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period, from October 2017 through October 2018. However, Landmine Monitor documented or confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Myanmar. Previously, Landmine Monitor 2017 found that government forces in states not party Myanmar and Syria used antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel landmines by NSAGs in eight countries in the reporting period, as listed in the table.

**Locations of antipersonnel mine use October 2017—October 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use by government forces</th>
<th>Use by NSAGs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed during this reporting period any use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces or by Russian forces participating in joint military operations in Syria. NSAGs likely continued to use improvised landmines to defend its positions against attack as in previous years, but access by independent sources to territory under NSAG control made it difficult to confirm new use.

Landmine Monitor was also unable to confirm new antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Iraq, Mali, Libya, Philippines, Tunisia, and Ukraine in the reporting period. However, in many cases, a lack of available information meant that it was not possible to determine if mine incidents and casualties were the result of new use of antipersonnel mines or due to legacy contamination of mines laid in previous years.

**LANDMINE USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES**

**Myanmar**

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, known as Tatmadaw, and by various NSAGs in Myanmar. In June 2018, a Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor that the Myanmar military uses landmines strictly in self-defense, in well mapped
Previously, in September 2016, Deputy Minister of Defense Major General Myint Nwe informed parliament that the army continues to use landmines in internal armed conflict.

In September 2018, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar reported, following their investigations into mine use allegations in September 2017, that it had "reasonable grounds to conclude that landmines were planted by the Tatmadaw, both in the border regions as well as in northern Rakhine state, as part of the 'clearance operations' with the intended or foreseeable effect of injuring or killing Rohingya civilians fleeing to Bangladesh. Further, it seems likely that new antipersonnel mines were placed in border areas as part of a deliberate and planned strategy of dissuading Rohingya refugees from attempting to return to Myanmar."

In June 2018, the 20th Battalion of NSAG Kachin Independence Army (KIA) shared photographs with Landmine Monitor that it said showed mines its forces cleared from the villages of Gauri Bum, Man Htu Bum, and Uloi Bai in Danai township. The photographs show around 80 antipersonnel mines, all M14 and MM2 types, with marking indicating Myanmar manufacture. The KIA alleged that Tatmadaw forces laid these mines in April and May, when the government forces left villages after occupying them. The KIA stated that two of their soldiers were injured while clearing the mines.

Landmine Monitor subsequently showed the photographs to an official at the Myanmar Ministry of Defense in June 2018 and requested comment. The official noted that one mine shown in a photograph was an antivehicle mine and said that government forces do not use antivehicle mines against the insurgents as the NSAG do not use vehicles. He said that the antipersonnel mines could be copies of Myanmar-made mines that a NSAG planted as he said the Myanmar army does not leave landmines behind after an operation.

**LANDMINE USE BY NSAGs**

In the reporting period, Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel landmines by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, and Yemen.

**Afghanistan**

NSAG use of improvised mines in Afghanistan in 2017 and 2018 resulted in numerous casualties. The use of improvised mines in Afghanistan is mainly attributed to the Taliban.
Haqqani Network, and Islamic State forces. According to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), "anti-government" forces used victim-activated improvised mines in decreasing numbers throughout 2017 and the first half of 2018.10

Colombia

Government forces reported several seizures or recoveries of antipersonnel landmines from NSAGs in Colombia during the reporting period.11 A Colombian Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal-Descontamina Colombia, PAICMA) country-wide review of records of landmines cleared by the Colombian army during military operations reported landmine casualties and Colombian army seizures of improvised landmines. In doing so, it attempted to attribute responsibility for new mine use in 2017 and the first half of 2018.12 It found that residual or dissident forces from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC) were responsible for 306 mine incidents in 2017 and 341 incidents in the first half of 2018, while Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Naciona (ELN) forces were responsible for 219 mine incidents recorded in 2017 and 48 in the first half of 2018. It also attributed new mine use to criminal groups or paramilitaries, often working with drug traffickers.

India

The police in India attributed new use of improvised antipersonnel mines to the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.13 In January 2018, a wild elephant was injured by landmines in the Latehar district, Jharkhand state, allegedly laid by the CPI-M.14 Previously, in September 2017, an elephant was killed after it stepped on a landmine also attributed to the CPI-M in the same area of Jharkhand state.15 In July 2017, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in Chhattisgarh state told the state news agency, “Pressure IEDs planted randomly inside the forests in unpredictable places, where frequent de-mining operations are not feasible, remain a challenge.”16

Myanmar

NSAGs in Myanmar used antipersonnel mines in the reporting period. In June 2018, villagers in Kyaukme township of Shan state attributed landmine use, which caused civilian casualties, to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and claimed that the TNLA had warned locals

12 Information provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Mariano Monroy Torres, Advisor, Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal-Descontamina Colombia, 30 July 2018.
13 The CPI-M and a few other smaller groups are often referred to collectively as Naxalites. The Maoists also have a People’s Militia with part-time combatants with minimal training and unsophisticated weapons.
not to travel in the area. In January 2018, KIA Information Chief Colonel Naw Bu admitted use by the KIA, stating, “We use mines on paths approaching our frontline camps and around our headquarters. We only plant mines in the conflict area and do not plant mines in places where civilians move.” In March–April 2018 the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) laid new mines in areas Kay Pu and Ler Mu Plaw in response to increased Tatmadaw activity in the area. Villagers lost several livestock as a result. In April 2018, the KIA stated that they would launch an operation to lay mines in the Hukawng Valley in Tanai township of Kachin state.

Nigeria

In Nigeria, NSAG Boko Haram has used improvised landmines since mid-2014. In September 2018, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) issued a report detailing significant new use of improvised antipersonnel landmines by Boko Haram and its splinter groups on roads, in fields, and in villages, mostly in Borno state, but also in Yobe and Adamawa states.

On 6 March 2018, four loggers were killed when they stepped on landmines reportedly laid by Boko Haram near Dikwa, 90 kilometers east of Maiduguri in Borno state, after they went to retrieve a vehicle abandoned the previous day during a Boko Haram attack. Previously, in early 2017, UNMAS reported extensive use of improvised mines by Boko Haram in northern areas of Nigeria.

Pakistan

In December 2017, Pakistan told Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that NSAGs are using antipersonnel mines throughout the country. NSAGs in Balochistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period. Public rallies in Pakistan called for the clearance of landmines in the country.

In 2017, landmines were reportedly used by NSAG Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and Balochistan groups as well as by various clans. Sometimes improvised antipersonnel mines were used as detonators for larger explosive devices, or one initiator would set off multiple explosive devices.

22 MAG, “Out of Sight: Landmines and the Crisis in Northeast Nigeria,” September 2018, p. 4, bit.ly/MAGNigeria2018. MAG states that their research revealed that almost 90% of victims of explosive incidents were from antipersonnel landmines, with a casualty rate of almost 19 per day during 2017 and early 2018.
26 In April 2018, an estimated 60,000 people joined a rally organized by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement in Peshawar calling for the removal of landmines from war-torn provinces along the Afghan frontier as one of their main grievances. For more read Pakistan, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Pakistan: Mine Ban Policy,” www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/pakistan/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
27 Email from Raza Shah Khan, SPADO, 21 September 2017.
Thailand

The use of improvised landmines by the insurgency in southern Thailand has been reported previously and there was evidence of new mine use during this reporting period. On 2 July 2018, a rubber plantation worker in Yala province’s Krong Penang district, was maimed after he stepped on a landmine reportedly laid by an NSAG. A rubber plantation worker was seriously wounded by a landmine in Yala’s Yaha district on 28 June 2018, while another worker was wounded in a mine incident in Muang district on 2 July.\(^9\)

Yemen

Houthi forces in Yemen used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines during 2017 and 2018, primarily on the west coast of the country near the port of Hodeida. The Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) reported that Houthi forces laid more than 300,000 landmines between 2016 and 2018.\(^30\) International media reported that mine clearance teams funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) cleared and destroyed hundreds of Houthi-laid mines in 2018.\(^31\)

Houthi forces are reported to have used landmines in the past along the coast, along the border with Saudi Arabia, around key towns, along roads, and to cover retreats.

There is no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have used landmines in Yemen.

UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the treaty, but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 164 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 32 acceded.\(^32\)

Two countries joined the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period, both in December 2017: Sri Lanka acceded on the 13 December, while the State of Palestine acceded on 29 December.

The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory yet to ratify.

ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

Since 1997, an annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to demonstrate their support for the humanitarian rationale of the treaty and the objective of its universalization. More than a


\(^{31}\) See for example, @LostWeapons, “another couple weeks, another thousand mines cleared in yemen. TM62 anti tank mines, press plates, cylinder IEDs,” 12 October 2018, Tweet, https://twitter.com/LostWeapons/status/1050646259185242112/photo/1; and @BrowneGareth, “UAE soldiers prepare a cache of Houthi landmines and IEDs for a controlled explosion near Mokha today #Yemen #hodeidah #Aden #IEDS,” 17 July 2018, Tweet, https://twitter.com/BrowneGareth/status/1019296299391373312/photo/1.

\(^{32}\) The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of ‘succession.’ These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.
dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.\(^{33}\)

On 4 December 2017, UNGA Resolution 72/53 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 168 in favor, none against, and 16 abstentions.\(^{34}\) This is an increase in votes in favor from the 2016 resolution (164) and the lowest number of abstentions ever recorded.

A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions, most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, the United States (US), and Vietnam.\(^{35}\)

**NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS**

Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the weapon. None have done so during the reporting period. At least 65 NSAGs committed to halt using antipersonnel mines since 1997.\(^{36}\) The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have no permanence, frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

Most recently, in November 2016, in Colombia, the FARC and the Colombian government signed an agreement to end the armed conflict. This has largely halted the FARC’s widespread landmine use and resulted in the surrender and destruction of its stockpiled mines. On 1 October 2017, a ceasefire agreement between the government of Colombia and the ELN took effect. Under “abstention” the ELN had committed not to use antipersonnel landmines that could endanger the civilian population.\(^{37}\) However, the ceasefire ended in January 2018, and as of September 2018 had not been renewed.\(^{38}\)
PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past. Thirty-nine states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.

The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing mines but have yet to disavow ever doing so.

Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea. Production of antipersonnel mines by India appeared to be ongoing in 2017 and orders indicate that production may have continued into 2018. Purchase order records retrieved from a publicly accessible online government transaction database list private companies providing component parts for APER 1B antipersonnel mines to the Indian Ordnance Factories, a state-owned enterprise, in February 2018. In September 2018, Indian military officials told the Monitor that the final assembly of complete mine remains under the exclusive control of Indian Ordnance Factories. In the previous two years, components were produced under these contracts and supplied to the Ammunition Factory Khadki in Maharashtra State.

NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen. In September 2018, the arms consultancy Conflict Armament Research (CAR) reported that Houthi forces were “mass producing” landmines, including victim-activated IEDs (improvised landmines). CAR found that this includes the

---

39 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.

40 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zimbabwe.

41 For example, Singapore’s only known producer of antipersonnel landmines, ST Engineering, a government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it “is now no longer in the business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines.” Local Authority Pension Fund, “ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015, www.lapfforum.org/wp-content/press/files/20151118SingaporeTechnologiespressreleasefinal.pdf. However, Singapore is still listed as a producer as it has not formally committed to not produce landmines in the future.

42 In February 2018, Supreme Industries Ltd was listed as having concluded a contract for production of material for antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders, http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en. However, no other orders were listed as concluded between December 2017 and September 2018 for antipersonnel mines. Components and materials for directional mines and antivehicle mines were listed.


45 Previous lists of NSAG producing antipersonnel mines have included Iraq and Syria. However, with the loss of territory by the Islamic State, it was not possible to confirm that this activity continued in the reporting period.
standardization and production of explosive charges, pressure plates, and passive infrared sensors.\(^{46}\)

Previously, in January 2017, MAG reported that Islamic State in Syria and Iraq produced near-factory quality improvised landmines on a large scale.\(^{47}\)

## TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

A *de facto* global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antipersonnel mines originally stockpiled</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines used after 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PP-Mi-SR</td>
<td>GLD-150A (Claymore-type produced by China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMD-6</td>
<td>Gyata-64 (formerly produced by Hungary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMN</td>
<td>PMN-1 and PMN-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POMZ-2</td>
<td>PPM-2 (produced by former East Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSM-1 (formerly produced by Bulgaria)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: landmine producers China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, plus Israel, Kazakhstan, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting, including Cuba and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.\(^{48}\)

At least five types of antipersonnel mines produced in the 1980s have been used in Yemen since 2013. None of these mines were among the four types of antipersonnel mines that Yemen has reported stockpiling in the past, including for training mine clearance personnel.

The evidence of further use of antipersonnel mines in 2016 suggests either that the 2002 declaration to the UN Secretary-General on the completion of landmine stockpile destruction was incorrect, or that these mines were acquired from another source after 2002. In a September 2016 letter, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis and the General People’s Congress, alleged that individuals had smuggled weapons, including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, noting that their government had not been able to control its land or sea borders due to instability and fighting.\(^{49}\) In April 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that the Sanaa-based Ministry of Defense stockpiles antipersonnel mines.\(^{50}\)


\(^{48}\) Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.


\(^{50}\) Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen, to Human Rights Watch, 2 April 2017, bit.ly/YemenLetterApr2017HRW.
In June 2018, a private Indian arms manufacturer advertised a "bounding mine with fuze" in its sales catalogue at the Eurosatory military trade event in Paris. On the second day of the event, Eurosatory organizers ordered the display booth of the Indian company closed, and removed their entry at the event from the online catalogue.51 Previously in February 2017, the same Indian arms manufacturer had components for bounding fragmentation antipersonnel landmines listed in their sales catalogue on display at the IDEX military trade event in Abu Dhabi.52

### STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

#### STATES NOT PARTY

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile antipersonnel landmines.53 In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global collective total may be less than 50 million.54

It is unclear if all 30 states are currently stockpiling antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

#### NON-STATE ARMED GROUP STOCKPILES

Fewer NSAGs appear to be able to obtain factory-made antipersonnel mines now that production and transfers have largely halted under the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs in states not party have acquired landmines by stealing them from government stocks, purchasing

51 Upon being alerted to Ashoka's presence at the Eurosatory military trade fair, the ICBL contacted the French government regarding the sale catalogue's antipersonnel mine. The brochure was observed on display at Eurodatory by Omega Research in June 2018. Emails from Omega Research, 11 & 12 June 2018. See also, Rachida El Azzouzi, "La planète guerrière défile à Eurosatory," Mediapart, 15 June 2018, www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/150618/la-planete-guerriere-defile-eurosatory.
52 Ashoka Manufacturing Limited, "Marketing Brochure," undated. Brochure was observed on display at IDEX by Omega Research in February 2017. Email from Omega Research, 7 November 2017.
53 Three states not party, all in the Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga.
54 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is "less than" five million, but there is an amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called "scatterable" mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.
them from corrupt officials, or removing them from minefields. Most that use mines appear to make their own improvised landmines from locally available materials.

The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces, reports of significant use, or verified photographic evidence from journalists to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY MINE BAN TREATY STATES PARTIES

At least 158 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 92 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 66 states that have declared they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training in detection and clearance techniques).

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 54 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 500,000 destroyed in 2017. Two States Parties possess more than 5.0 million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (4.4 million) and Greece (643,267). Oman has a small stockpile (7,630).

Sri Lanka is expected to declare its stockpiled landmines when it submits an initial transparency report for the Mine Ban Treaty, due by 28 November 2018. It is uncertain if States Parties Somalia and Tuvalu possess stocks of antipersonnel landmines.55

Oman's 2018 Article 7 transparency report stated that 4,578 antipersonnel mines were destroyed during 2017 and indicated that it would finish its stockpile destruction by February 2019.56 To date, Oman has declared the destruction of 9,156 antipersonnel mines, just over 50% of its stockpile.

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.57 Neither state has indicated when the obligation to destroy its remaining stockpiles will be completed. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 called on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay, and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states to provide a plan for the destruction of their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.

DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES BY NSAGS

Disarmament of the FARC in Colombia, including destruction of its antipersonnel landmine stockpile and components, occurred under UN supervision and was completed on 22 September 2017. The UN mission destroyed 3,528 antipersonnel mines formerly belonging to the FARC, as well as components, including more than 38,000 kilograms of explosives and more than 46,000 detonators.58

---

55 Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines. Somalia acknowledged that “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals,” and that it is “putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.” No stockpiled mines have been destroyed since the treaty came into force for Somalia, which had a destruction deadline of 1 October 2016. It has not provided an annual update to its transparency report since 2014. Mine Ban Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April 2012 to 30 March 2013), Sections B, E, and G, bit.ly/MBTSomalia2013Art7.


57 Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.

On 22 May 2018 the Polisario Front in Western Sahara destroyed 2,500 antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{59} Previously, on 4 November 2017, the Polisario Front destroyed 2,500 antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{60} It also announced that it would destroy a 4,985 antipersonnel mines in 2018, which would finish the destruction of its declared stockpile.\textsuperscript{61} From 2006 to 2015, it undertook five public destructions of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, pursuant to the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH (ARTICLE 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 70 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 36 retain more than 1,000 mines and two (Finland and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Ninety-one States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 36 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past. On 18 September 2017, Algeria destroyed the 5,970 antipersonnel mines it retained for training purposes after completing its landmine clearance program.\textsuperscript{62}

In addition to those listed above, another 34 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines and together possess a total of 14,175 retained mines.\textsuperscript{63}

While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty; a total of at least 12 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.\textsuperscript{64}

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have been provided about how the mines are being used. A total of eight States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Nigeria, Oman, Senegal, and Togo.


\textsuperscript{60} On 4 November at Tifariti in Western Sahara. The Polisario destroyed 2,300 VS-50 (Italy), 100 SB-33 (Italy), and 100 M-966 (Portugal) antipersonnel mines. Also destroyed were eight BPRB-M3 antivehicle mines used as an explosive booster for the demolition. International Campaign against the Wall of Moroccan Occupation in Western Sahara, “The Frente POLISARIO destroys 2500 mines,” 11 November 2017, http://removethewall.org/the-frente-polisario-destroys-2500-mines/.


\textsuperscript{62} Three states have not submitted initial transparency reports, which would indicate whether they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes: Tuvalu (late) and Sri Lanka and Palestine (due date not reached).

\textsuperscript{63} Netherlands (974), Angola (972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Honduras (826), BiH (811), Mauritania (728), UK (724), Cambodia (720), Portugal (694), Italy (620), Germany (592), South Africa (576), Zimbabwe (450), Cyprus (440), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Congo (522), Slovenia (299), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Uruguay (260), Argentina (212), Bhutan (211), Cape Verde (120), Ethiopia (107), Eritrea (101), Jordan (100), Gambia (100), Ecuador (90), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).

\textsuperscript{64} Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, and Serbia.
### States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Last declared total (for year)</th>
<th>Initial declaration</th>
<th>Consumed during 2017</th>
<th>Year of last declared consumption</th>
<th>Total quantity reduced as excess to need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>16,192 (2017)</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,050 (2016)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9,313 (2017)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6,014 (2017)</td>
<td>13,948</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5,627 (2017)</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>5,050 (2017)</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4,875 (2011)</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>4,505 (2016)</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4,460 (2017)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,941 (2017)</td>
<td>4,559</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3,760 (2016)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,364 (2011)</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3,324 (2017)</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3,162 (2017)</td>
<td>15,604</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3,134 (2017)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,996 (2004)</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,454 (2015)</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2,395 (2016)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>2,206 (2017)</td>
<td>4,859</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2,197 (2017)</td>
<td>28,647</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>23,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2,118 (2017)</td>
<td>5,980</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2,015 (2017)</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2,000 (2017)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,878 (2017)</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,783 (2015)</td>
<td>4,991</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,780 (2008)</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,764 (2011)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,634 (2009)</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,547 (2017)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,355 (2017)</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,048 (2017)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1,204 (2017)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1,087 (2017)</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,024 (2017)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,020 (2007)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,019 (2011)</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Partial total**  
125,295  
294,384  
2,402  
69,441  

_Note: N/R = not reported._
TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party "report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party" regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

Sri Lanka and Palestine are required to submit an initial report by 28 November 2018. Only one State Party has an outstanding deadline for submitting its initial report: Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012).

As of 17 October 2017, 47% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar year 2017. A total of 85 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2017. Of this latter group, most have failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more years.65

Iraq, Tunisia, Nigeria, Yemen, and other states with recent allegations or confirmed reports of use of improvised landmines by NSAGs have failed to provide information on new contamination in their annually updated Article 7 reports.


States that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Rep of), Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova (Rep of), Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.

Young Women Leaders delivered a statement at the 16th Meeting of States Parties in Vienna. © Mark Hiznay, December 2017
Marking contamination in Vista Hermosa, Colombia.
© J. M. Vargas/IF, November 2017
CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE

States and other areas with antipersonnel mine contamination as of October 2018

| Afghanistan | India | Iran | Iraq | Israel | Jordan | Korea, North | Korea, South | Kyrgyzstan | Lao PDR | Lebanon | Libya | Morocco | Myanmar | Niger | Nigeria | Oman | Pakistan | Palestine | Peru | Russia | Senegal |
|-------------|-------|------|------|--------|--------|-------------|-------------|------------|---------|---------|-------|--------|---------|---------|-------|---------|-------|----------|-----------|-----|--------|---------|
| Angola      |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Argentina*  |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Armenia     |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Azerbaijan  |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Cambodia    |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Chad        |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Chile       |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| China       |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Colombia    |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Croatia     |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Cuba        |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Cyprus**    |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Ecuador     |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Egypt       |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Eritrea     |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Ethiopia    |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Georgia     |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Serbia      |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Somalia     |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| South Sudan |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Sri Lanka   |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Sudan       |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Syria       |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Tajikistan  |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Thailand    |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Turkey      |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Ukraine     |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| United Kingdom (UK)* |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Uzbekistan  |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Vietnam     |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Yemen       |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Zimbabwe    |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Kosovo      |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Nagorno-Karabakh |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Somaliland  |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |
| Western Sahara |       |      |      |        |        |             |             |            |         |         |       |        |         |         |       |         |       |          |           |     |        |         |

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated by *italics*.

* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.

** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

Ten States Parties have residual or suspected contamination (Algeria, Cameroon, Djibouti, Kuwait, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Palau, the Philippines, and Tunisia) and state not party Saudi Arabia is also suspected to be contaminated.
The political declaration adopted at the Mine Ban Treaty’s Third Review Conference in 2014 includes a commitment to fulfill treaty obligations to the fullest extent possible by 2025. Although most countries are not on track with their respective Article 5 clearance deadlines, the majority should reach the 2025 clearance goal, with sufficient funds and commitment, and where security conditions permit.

MINE CONTAMINATION IN 2017

Sixty states and areas have an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination (34 States Parties, 22 states not party, and four other areas). It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the total area contaminated by landmines, due to a lack of data. Nonetheless, some states continued to improve their understanding of the extent of contamination in 2017 using land release methodologies to cancel suspected areas by non-technical survey and to reduce confirmed hazardous area through technical survey. However, in a number of countries, extensive recent use of antipersonnel mines—particularly improvised mines—has not been fully quantified.

There was new contamination in 2017 and/or 2018 in States Parties: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, and Yemen; and in states not party: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, and Thailand. There was unconfirmed use in States Parties Cameroon, Mali, Tunisia, Ukraine; and states not party Libya and Saudi Arabia. (See the Ban Policy chapter for details.)

This table (right) is based on the information provided by official sources. The extent of contamination estimated in some countries may in the future be subject to significant revision—either increased or decreased—based on survey results.

States Parties Mauritania and Mozambique are no longer on the list of contaminated states, as they completed clearance in 2017.

Several of the states for which no estimate is provided are heavily or massively contaminated. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North Korea and South Korea and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world, but no data is available on the extent of contamination. Morocco, Myanmar, Russia, and Syria also have widespread contamination, but the extent is not known.

---

1 The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

2 This year’s Ban Policy chapter reports findings from October 2017 to October 2018, listing a slightly different set of countries where landmine use was confirmed or suspected. New use resulting in new contamination is confirmed to have occurred earlier in 2017 in Iraq and Syria, and was suspected earlier in 2017 in Cameroon and Saudi Arabia, as reported in Landmine Monitor 2017. Those countries are also here because this chapter reports on the entirety of 2017.

3 Four small suspected mined areas with a combined size of 1,881m² remain submerged under water. These areas are “suspended” and Mozambique plans to address them once the water level has receded and access can be gained. See, Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5, submitted by Mozambique, 16 December 2015, p. 5; and statements of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty Interessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017, and 8 June 2018.

Estimated extent of mine contamination at end of 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>East and South Asia, and the Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Massive (More than 100 km²)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Heavy (20–99 km²)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Medium (5–19 km²)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Argentina*</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Nagorno-Karabakh</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>UK*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Light (Less than 5 km²)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Somaliland</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Cyprus**</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**No estimate provided**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Korea, North</th>
<th>Korea, South</th>
<th>Lao PDR</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Georgia***</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Syria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated by *italics*.  
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.  
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.  
*** The known area in Georgia is small, but there also may be mined areas in South Ossetia.
Ten States Parties have residual or suspected contamination: Algeria, Cameroon, Djibouti, Kuwait, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Palau, the Philippines, and Tunisia. State not party Saudi Arabia is also suspected to be contaminated.

MINE CLEARANCE IN 2017

Total global clearance of landmines in 2017 was at least 128km², with at least 168,000 antipersonnel mines destroyed. However, this is an underestimation as some actors, such as armies, police, or commercial operators, may not systematically report clearance results. Moreover, in some states, informal clearance or community-based clearance has been conducted, which is not subject to quality management and entry into the national databases. In some cases, land was cleared that was found to contain no mines. For further details of land release results, both survey and clearance, see individual country profiles on the Monitor website.

In 2017, the reported global total area cleared declined for the third year in a row, while the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed was lower than the previous year. The decrease in reported area cleared between 2016 and 2017 can be mainly attributed to two countries: in Iraq improvised explosive device (IED) clearance was not included in the clearance figures as it is not known how much of this was contaminated by improvised mines; and in Croatia there was a 20% decrease in area cleared, although the amount of land released through survey was doubled. The number of antipersonnel mines destroyed fluctuated considerably across countries. The main explanation for the decrease in antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2017 compared to 2016 is the 62,589 antipersonnel mines destroyed by Algeria, which completed clearance that year.

5 In some cases, the Monitor records casualties in countries not listed as having confirmed landmine contamination. This happens when the casualties are due to ERW rather than landmines (Indonesia, Kenya, Poland, Tanzania, and Uganda), or when it has not been possible for the precise nature of the contamination causing casualties to be conclusively verified with regard to Article 5 obligations (Algeria, Cameroon, Kuwait, Mozambique, Philippines, and Tunisia).


7 In Cameroon, allegations of use by Boko Haram of improvised antipersonnel mines have been reported.

8 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

9 Antipersonnel mine casualties were reported in Kuwait in 2017.

10 In Mali, there are unconfirmed allegations of use of antipersonnel mines.

11 Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert is jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 2 June 2008, bit.ly/MoldovaNSA2008.

12 Despite a statement made by Namibia at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example, in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.

13 Palau may have residual antipersonnel mine contamination.

14 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.

15 There were casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Tunisia in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. It is likely that these devices were recently laid when they exploded.

16 Reports of mine use and seizures have occurred in southern Saudi Arabia on its borders with Yemen, in Aseer and Jazan provinces.

### Clearance of mined area in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/area</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>Includes mines destroyed during EOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>14,629</td>
<td>There are discrepancies between data sources. A total mined area of 40.04km² was cleared, including areas only contaminated with antivehicle mines. Total antipersonnel mines destroyed includes those on firing ranges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>5,780</td>
<td>There are discrepancies between data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>At least 16.27</td>
<td>At least 12,531</td>
<td>Additionally, 55km² of IED clearance was reported with the destruction of 13,212 IEDs. However, as the device types are not specified, it is not possible to know how much of this was improvised antipersonnel mine clearance. Large areas of this land were reported as cleared with no devices destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>A total of 8.56km² of ERW-contaminated land was cleared, but mine-contaminated land was not disaggregated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3.6km² of land cleared was found to contain no mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>31,012</td>
<td>There are discrepancies between data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>734</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>30,533</td>
<td>Areas verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3,546</td>
<td>Clearance results not available for national operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>2,557</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>143</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>5,728</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>26,381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1,749</td>
<td>There are discrepancies between data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>Clearance results not available for the Israeli Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>6,647</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>9,523</td>
<td>There are discrepancies between data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>10,510</td>
<td>Includes mines destroyed during technical survey. There are discrepancies between data sources on the reporting of land release as clearance or technical survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>There are discrepancies between data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>226</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>See note</td>
<td>East of berm: 0.28km² cleared but only antivehicle mines (32) found West of berm: An improbable 145km² reported cleared in Moroccan held territory between April 2016 and April 2017, resulting in destruction of 56 antipersonnel mines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 11 states and one other area that are massively contaminated with more than 100km² of mine contamination, three States Parties reported very low clearance results of less than 1km² in 2017: Angola, BiH, and Chad.

No mine survey or clearance occurred in States Parties Chad and Niger, nor in states not party Armenia and Myanmar. Only survey was conducted in Serbia, during which three antipersonnel mines were destroyed. No systematic mine survey or clearance occurred in state not party Lao PDR, although 23 antipersonnel mines were destroyed during EOD operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/area</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>There are discrepancies between data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Includes mines destroyed during EOD spot tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Clearance results not available for national operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Clearance completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>Did not report type of mines destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Figure includes technical survey. There are discrepancies between data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Results of Israeli clearance in the West Bank not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>Clearance completed of all known, accessible areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>No details of clearance provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>See note</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>An improbable 232km² of cleared area reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>See note</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Clearance is taking place, but results are not systematically recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>See note</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Did not provide details of mine clearance in 2017. Three mines destroyed during EOD operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: EOD = explosive ordnance disposal; ERW = explosive remnants of war; N/R = not reported.

Reported mine clearance in 2013–2017 (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>168,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>145*</td>
<td>232,702</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>157,672</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>231,708</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>1,065,082</td>
<td>66,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total amount of land cleared in 2016 has been corrected down from 170km². This is because the 2016 global figure included 22.1km² of clearance in Afghanistan of land that only contained antivehicle mines, and because 3.3km² of the clearance reported for Turkey, on the Syria border as part of construction of a border defense, was subsequently revealed to be overwhelmingly cancellation by non-technical survey.
No mine survey or clearance results were reported for States Parties Eritrea, Ethiopia, and for states not party, Cuba, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, and Uzbekistan. It was announced that some limited demining in the DMZ between North and South Korea commenced on 1 October 2018, as part of joint efforts to exhume the remains of troops from the Korean War. Although only a small area of land was cleared, and to unknown standards, the ICBL has welcomed this confidence-building measure and expressed hope that it would help decrease tensions on the Korean peninsula.

China reported that the army had conducted mine clearance between November 2015 and February 2017. Its Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V report submitted in March 2018 recorded no change on “landmine clearance,” although the media reported that mine clearance had resumed in November 2017. Russia reported in its CCW Protocol V transparency report that it had conducted antipersonnel mine clearance but did not provide details.

In several countries, mine clearance was known to have occurred in 2017, although it was not formally reported. In Syria, international and national operators, both civilian and military, have been active. There are media reports of clearance in State Party Nigeria, and in state not party India. In Iran, commercial clearance occurred in oil and gas producing areas.

In Algeria, which declared completion of clearance in 2016, no areas were reported as cleared but 137 isolated mines were destroyed.

IMPROVISED MINES

An improvised explosive device (IED) is a device produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. IEDs that are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine, and therefore fall under the Mine Ban Treaty. When victim activated, these devices are known as improvised mines.
Improvised mines are not new and have been found in many countries for decades. The countries here do not comprise an exhaustive list, so the true extent of global improvised mine contamination is probably more widespread. In 2017 and 2018, confirmed or suspected improvised mine contamination and/or incidents and casualties were reported in the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen; and states not party India, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.29

States Parties have a number of obligations with regards to improvised mines. Affected States Parties must report any confirmed or suspected improvised mine contamination in their Article 7 transparency reports. Resources must be made available to assess the extent of contamination and develop appropriate strategies to address it. States Parties should exchange expertise to ensure that standards are adequate for addressing improvised mines. Affected countries and donors must be prepared to cover the costs of equipment and resources needed to deal with improvised mines, which maybe higher than dealing with manufactured mines. Finally, States Parties should also monitor progress toward meeting Article 5 obligations related to improvised mines to ensure compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty.

The global understanding of the extent of contamination has slightly improved since 2016, but there has been no systematic survey of any improvised mine contamination. In 2017, Afghanistan reported 20km² affected by abandoned improvised mines,30 and it has yet to reach a reliable estimate of the 248km² identified through a rapid assessment.31 Colombia reports a national estimate of 46 km² of mine contamination, which is largely improvised mines, although it has yet to establish a national baseline.32 In Iraq, improvised mine contamination has not been subject to large-scale systematic survey, although the national authorities report that they cover hundreds of square kilometers.33 In September 2018, Iraq reported 184km² of IED contamination as of the end of 2017, which may in fact be improvised mines.34 In Syria, improvised mines made up more than three-quarters of items destroyed by one international clearance operator around Raqqa and more than 60% of items it destroyed in Hassakeh governorate.35

Afghanistan issued a policy paper on Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIM) in May 2018 that set out a number of principles to be followed by implementing partners.36 In Iraq, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) introduced a national standard on IEDs in 2016 and is working with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to update the standard to take into account the experience gained in tackling the dense contamination of improvised devices in areas liberated from the non-state armed group Islamic State since 2016.37

Cameroon and Nigeria should inform States Parties of the discovery of any contamination including victim-activated improvised mines. Iraq must consider improvised mine contamination as part of its Mine Ban Treaty obligations. It was not included in Iraq's 2018 Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension request, nor in its Article 7 report for 2017.

---

29 For further details, see individual country profiles on Mine Action and Casualties on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org.
31 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018; DMAC, “MAPA Fast Facts, Quarterly Update, 4th Quarter 1396 (January–March 2018).”
32 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.
33 Emails from Ahmed Al Jasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA, 6 April 2017; and from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), 8 April 2017.
34 Email from Ahmad Al Jasim, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 13 September 2018.
35 Email from international mine action operator on condition of anonymity, 3 May 2018.
MINE BAN TREATY ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years.

COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION

States Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation since 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Montenegro*</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Mozambique**</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Montenegro declared completion of clearance, but additional contamination was found and subsequently cleared in 2016–2017.
** In 2015, Mozambique declared completion of clearance, but additional contamination was found and subsequently cleared in 2016–2017.

Mauritania completed clearance in December 2017 and, as of July 2018, the mine action program had submitted a proposal to the government that a declaration of compliance with their Article 5 obligations be made. 38

In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994 before the Mine Ban Treaty was created.

Jordan declared completion of clearance under the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012 but is still finding antipersonnel mine contamination and therefore does not appear in the table. Nigeria declared completion of clearance in 2011, however there have been reports of new contamination resulting from use of antipersonnel mines by a non-state armed group. It therefore does not appear in the table.

PROGRESS ON MEETING DEADLINES

As of October 2018, only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their clearance deadlines, while 13 appear not to be on track, and the status of seven is unclear. Seven are awaiting approval of their extension requests submitted in 2018. Two States Parties that have declared completion in the past are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination and should request new deadlines. One State Party is ready to declare completion.

38 Email from Alioune ould Menane, National Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Déminalge Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 23 July 2018.
States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations, their deadlines, and status of any deadline extensions as of October 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>On track to meet deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2013</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>5 years (1st extn.) 8 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1 March 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>No change since extension granted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Interim extension request submitted to 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 November 2009</td>
<td>14 months (1st extn.) 3 years (2nd extn.) 6 years (3rd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Extension request submitted to 2026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1 July 2013</td>
<td>3 years (1st extn.) 3 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 July 2019</td>
<td>Extension request submitted to 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1 November 2012</td>
<td>26 months (1st extn.) 3 months (2nd extn.) 6 years (3rd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2021</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1st extn.) 3 months (2nd extn.) 5 years (3rd extn.)</td>
<td>31 December 2022</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
<td>3 years (1st extn.) 5 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2015</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 June 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2018</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 February 2028</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 May 2012</td>
<td>Should submit extension request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2011</td>
<td>5 years (1st extn.) 5 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2021</td>
<td>Ready to declare completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1 September 2009</td>
<td>N/A (1st extn.) 1 year (2nd extn.) 4 years (3rd extn.)</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>Declared completion in 2011, but contamination still found</td>
<td>Should submit extension request</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2017, five States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete their Article 5 obligations that were granted at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2017.

- **Angola** requested until 1 January 2026 with the goal of eliminating 1,465 mined areas totaling 221.4 km². It is in the process of completing national non-technical survey across the country.\(^{39}\) In granting the extension, States Parties requested Angola provide an updated and detailed workplan providing greater clarity on the amount of remaining contaminated land and milestones for completion.\(^{40}\) Angola pledged to submit this updated workplan by the 17th Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.\(^{41}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>On track to meet deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1(^{st}) extn.) 7 years 8 months (2(^{nd}) extn.)</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>7 years (1(^{st}) extn.) 5 years (2(^{nd}) extn.)</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Extension request submitted to 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2021</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1 April 2014</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 April 2019</td>
<td>Extension request submitted to 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1 April 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 April 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>9.5 years (1(^{st}) extn.) 5 years (2(^{nd}) extn.)</td>
<td>31 October 2023</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 March 2022</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2016</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Extension requested to 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Extension requested to 2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>6 years (1(^{st}) extn.) 5 years (2(^{nd}) extn.)</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>22 months (1(^{st}) extn.) 2 years (2(^{nd}) extn.) 2 years (3(^{rd}) extn.) 3 years (4(^{th}) extn.) 8 years (5(^{th}) extn.)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A = not applicable.

* Niger’s first extension request was granted until 31 December 2015 in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of the state’s Article 5 deadline.

\(^{39}\) Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), November 2017, pp. 6 and 11.

\(^{40}\) "Decisions on the request submitted by Angola for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention," Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.

\(^{41}\) Statement by Amb. Maria de Jesus Dos Reis Ferreira, Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 21 December 2017.
· **Ecuador** was granted a five-year extension until 31 December 2022. It stated that it was requesting an additional five years to clear the remaining 0.1km$^2$ of mined areas because mechanical assets cannot be used in these areas and operating conditions are challenging.\(^{42}\) In granting the extension, States Parties requested that Ecuador submit, by 30 April 2019, an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension request.\(^{43}\)

· **Iraq** was granted a 10-year extension until 1 February 2028. The extension request set out separate two-year and 10-year workplans. It said the two-year workplan was based on existing capacity and described the 10-year plan as “aspirational” and dependent on attracting donor funding.\(^{44}\) The plans did not address improvised mine contamination. In granting the request, States Parties requested that Iraq submit to the Fourth Review Conference in 2019 an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension request, and every two years following this. The meeting noted that success is contingent upon increased funding, the maintenance of security, and changes in the political climate to enable access to those hazardous areas near international borders.\(^{45}\)

· **Thailand** was granted a five-year extension to 31 October 2023. It had a total of 358.81km$^2$ remaining to be released, of which it foresees 86.5% of suspected contamination being cancelled.\(^{46}\) States Parties, recalling that the implementation of Thailand’s national demining plan may be affected by pending survey and demarcation of land boundaries, requested that Thailand submit to the States Parties, by 30 April 2019, an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension request.\(^{47}\)

· **Zimbabwe** was granted an extension request to 31 December 2025 to complete survey and clearance of all mined areas. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that the plan presented by Zimbabwe is workable, lends itself well to be monitored, and states clearly which factors could affect the pace of implementation.\(^{48}\) States Parties requested that Zimbabwe submit, by 30 April 2019, an updated detailed workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension.\(^{49}\)

In 2018, seven States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete their Article 5 obligations, for approval at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.

· **BiH** submitted an interim two-year extension request to 1 March 2021 in order to carry out survey activities to more accurately define the perimeter of mined areas. BiH believes it will then be better able to calculate the time required to complete its Article 5 obligations. It has pledged to submit a final extension request by 31 March 2020. During 2019 and 2020, BiH also intends to continue land release operations

---

\(^{42}\) Additional information to Ecuador’s deadline Extension Request, 8 September 2017.

\(^{43}\) “Decisions on the request submitted by Ecuador for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.

\(^{44}\) Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), August 2017, p. 13.

\(^{45}\) “Decisions on the request submitted by Iraq for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.

\(^{46}\) Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 5 and 6.

\(^{47}\) “Decisions on the request submitted by Thailand for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.

\(^{48}\) “Decisions on the request submitted by Zimbabwe for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.
in line with annual workplans, however it is not clear how this will be coordinated with the national survey. The extension request contained conflicting figures for the extent of suspected contamination.

- **Croatia** requested until 1 March 2026 to address its remaining 387.3 km² of mine contamination. Croatia intends to use state as well as European Union funds, which it is confident it will secure as planned.
- **Cyprus** submitted an extension request to 1 July 2022, referring back to its 2015 second request. The reason cited for the second request was the same as the first, namely that Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining contaminated areas.
- **Serbia** submitted an extension request to 1 March 2023. It includes a workplan for the completion of demining of 2.35 km² during the period 2018–2023. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) noted that the first extension request was found by States Parties to lack ambition, that the second extension request is for a similar amount of land to be released in a similar amount of time, and that it believes that Serbia’s targets could be more ambitious.
- **Sudan** submitted an extension request to April 2023. It includes an updated workplan, with annual targets for completion, with a total planned release of 53 confirmed hazardous areas with a size of 2.42 km² and 45 suspected hazardous areas with a size of 16.87 km², as of February 2018. Sudan committed to producing a detailed and updated workplan for clearance of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states for 2019–2023 when security conditions enable full access. It is expected that access will result in the cancellation of suspected areas as well as new hazardous areas being identified.
- **Ukraine** submitted an extension request to 1 December 2021. Ukraine’s preliminary estimation is that 7,000 km² of land is contaminated. This is not just antipersonnel mine contamination, but also includes ERW. Ukraine also reports the presence of improvised mines. The extension request states that the irregular and non-selective use of mines currently prevents an understanding of the extent of contamination. It also states that, “Currently Ukraine doesn’t have control over the temporary occupied parts on Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as over the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.” A State Program for Restoration and Development of Peace in Eastern Regions of Ukraine has been established, which aims to conduct demining activities in 2018–2020, funded by the state budget. The extension request outlines the roles and responsibilities of the different actors engaged in mine action, but does not provide a workplan. Until the extension request is approved by States Parties, Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 for missing its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline.
- **The UK** submitted a second extension request through to 1 March 2024. The UK expects that eight mined areas, covering an estimated 0.16 km² will remain by March 2020. These areas are all located in Yorke Bay, an environmentally sensitive beach.
and sand dune area. The technical survey at Yorke Bay will be conducted by 1 March 2019, which will enable the clearance work to be costed. The UK stated its "strong intention" to complete clearance within five years, but warned that there could be a delay in securing further funding.

MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF STATES PARTIES AGAINST THEIR ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS AND THE MAPUTO ACTION PLAN

In the Maputo Action Plan, adopted at the Third Review Conference in June 2014, States Parties agreed to "intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires." Actions #8, #9, and #11 relate to clearance.

The Committee on Article 5 Implementation presented its preliminary observations at the intersessional meetings in June 2018, reporting on 25 States Parties that had submitted information by that date.

The assessment of progress under the Maputo Action Plan is drawn from both the committee's observations and Landmine Monitor's review of the progress of States Parties.

MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #8: QUANTIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION OF REMAINING CONTAMINATION CHALLENGE

Almost all States Parties need to improve the quantification and qualification of the remaining contamination challenge. Only four States Parties have a clear understanding of the remaining contamination: Chile, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, and the UK. Thirteen States Parties have a good knowledge of the locations of confirmed and suspected contamination, but survey is needed to clarify the actual extent of contamination within those areas: Angola, BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, DRC, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Thirteen States Parties have reported on known contaminated areas, but do not have a complete picture of the extent of contamination, as there are areas that have not been surveyed: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Eritrea has not provided an update on the estimated extent of contamination since the end of 2013. Three States Parties have not formally reported the locations of any mined areas: Cameroon, Nigeria, and Oman.

There were inconsistencies between the figures provided by different sources (such as Article 7 reports, Article 5 extension requests, mine action centers, and operators) for the extent of remaining contamination at the end of 2017 in the following countries: Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, Peru, and Senegal.

59 Ibid., p. 4.
60 Ibid., pp. 14 and 15.
62 Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 7–8 June 2018, bit.ly/MBT2018ISM.
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation assessed the degree of clarity of the remaining challenge, finding that only seven of the 25 States Parties assessed had provided a high degree of clarity in their reporting: Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.63

MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #9: APPLICATION OF LAND RELEASE TECHNOLOGIES

Almost all States Parties that implemented systematic mine clearance programs in 2017 used land release methodologies (survey and clearance).

In 2017, three States Parties used non-technical and technical survey to release significant amounts of land—more than 30km²—thus greatly decreasing their estimate of remaining contamination: Angola, Cambodia, and Thailand.

In Angola, re-survey has been completed in 15 of its 18 provinces.64 Jordan continued the process of verifying areas for missing mines. In Somalia in 2017, for the first time, survey and risk education teams were deployed in all five of southcentral Somalia’s federal states, despite security challenges.65 In Sri Lanka, a district-by-district re-survey that began in 2015 was completed in February 2017, providing far greater clarity on the extent of confirmed contamination remaining.66

In some States Parties, plans are underway to increase the use of land release approaches. In BiH, a country-wide "assessment" is to be conducted in 2018–2019 to establish a more accurate baseline of mine contamination and help to improve the efficiency of follow-on survey and clearance operations.67 The new Cambodian national mine action strategy issued in 2017 emphasized that “it is essential clearance assets are only deployed in areas where there is clear evidence of mines,” reacting to a weakness in clearance operations in previous years. It said that, in the future, clearance tasks should be prioritized on the basis of "effective" non-technical survey.68 In Chad, at the end of 2017, funding was secured to conduct survey and clearance.69 Colombia’s strategic plan for 2016–2021 aims to establish a national baseline of contamination.

Continuous conflict in State Party Yemen since March 2015 has prevented systematic survey.

However, the committee observed that some States Parties have not adopted the most relevant land release standards, policies, and methodologies, in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and in a manner consistent with Action #9 of the Maputo Action Plan.70

MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #11: ON-TIME SUBMISSION OF HIGH-QUALITY REQUESTS

In 2018, six states submitted Article 5 extension requests on time: BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, Sudan, and the UK. Ukraine submitted a long overdue request in November 2018.

---

63 Ibid.
64 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8; and email from Gerhard Zank, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.
65 Emails from Claus Nielsen, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 22 March and 10 September 2018.
66 Email from Alistair Moir, Country Director, MAG, 27 September 2017.
69 Responses to questionnaire by Romain Coupéz, MAG, 3 May 2017; and by Benjamin Westercamp and Seydou N’Gaye, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 22 March 2017.
70 “Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation,” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, 7–8 June 2018.
All seven requests included information on progress made so far, and some form of political commitment to complete the task of mine clearance. Most contained consistent data, detailed plans for land release activities during the extension period, and milestones to measure progress. However, there was scope for improvement in the quality of data and description of plans in some extension requests.71

MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #25: ANNUAL SUBMISSION OF HIGH-QUALITY AND UPDATED INFORMATION

As of October 2018, Article 7 transparency reports for 2017 were still outstanding for Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Yemen. Four were outstanding in the same month of 2017.

Cameroon has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2009, Eritrea and Nigeria since 2014.

Sri Lanka’s initial Article 7 report is due by 28 November 2018.

(See the table “Clearance of mined area in 2017” above for notes about the quality of information provided on clearance by individual states.)

OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING CLEARANCE OBLIGATIONS

FUNDING

Inadequate funding was cited as a challenge to achieving Article 5 implementation deadlines by the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Iraq, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe.

Although DRC has stated that it can achieve its Article 5 deadline, it reported funding difficulties.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

Almost all States Parties with mine contamination have a national mine action program or institutions that are assigned to fulfill the state’s clearance obligations.

In Cyprus, the mine action program is managed by UNMAS.72

In Somalia, there was no government funding for the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), and UNMAS stopped funding SEMA at start of 2016, in expectation that its legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament and that funding for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget.73

In South Sudan, while it is planned that the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) will ultimately assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, UNMAS has reported that the NMAA’s continued serious financial and technical limitations challenged the effective management of operations in 2017.74 In 2018, UNMAS stated that reversing a change in the

71 See summaries above, and detailed country profiles for further information at www.the-monitor.org/cp.
72 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 11 September 2018.
73 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June and 14 June 2016. A seven-month grant from UNMAS expired in December 2015 under which SEMA was expected to have established itself as a sustainable government entity. Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
74 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate that halted the capacity-building of government institutions would greatly enhance UNMAS' ability to support the NMAA.75

In Ukraine, a national mine action program overseen by a national mine action authority and center is being developed with support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Project-Coordinator and the GICHD.76 The donors have agreed to an extension of the project until the end of 2018 due to delays in the adoption of the mine action law.77

In Yemen, the Yemeni Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) has become, de facto, two organizations, split between Sanaa, under the control of the Houthis, and the southern city of Aden controlled by the Saudi- and UAE-led coalition and Yemen's internationally recognized but exiled government. The Sanaa office coordinates operations in the north and center of the country while the Aden office oversees operations in southern provinces.78

In Eritrea, the mine action program was not functioning in 2017. States Parties, Nigeria, and Oman do not have national mine action programs.

In stark contrast, fewer than half of states not party have functioning mine action programs. There were no new mine action programs established among states not party in 2017. The following 12 states not party do not have national mine action programs: China, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan, India, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, and Uzbekistan. Egypt's mine action program continued to not function, while the status of Iran's mine action center remained unclear.

CLEARANCE IN CONFLICT

In 2017 and 2018, conflict affected land release operations in 11 States Parties (Afghanistan, Cameroon, Colombia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen) and four states not party (Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria). Insecurity also restricted access to some areas that are or may be antipersonnel mine-affected in States Parties Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Jordan, Senegal, Thailand, and Turkey.79

In Afghanistan, some provinces are inaccessible to mine action operators. In 2017, three humanitarian deminers were killed and one injured in conflict-related attacks.80

In Colombia, although the 2016 peace deal resulted in an agreement by the government and the FARC on demining, by August 2018, the election of a new president made the status of some of the pillars of the peace deal uncertain. In some locations, this has had an effect on the ability of operators to conduct land release.81 In 2017 and 2018, humanitarian demining operators had vehicles seized and damaged by FARC dissidents, in some cases resulting in the suspension of operations.82

---

75  Ibid.
77  Email from Miljenko Vahtaric, OSCE PCU, 30 April 2018.
81  International Crisis Group, “Risky Business: The Duque Government Approach,” 21 June 2018; and interviews with Pauline Boyer and Aderito Ismael, HI, Vista Hermosa, 8 August 2018; with Esteban Rueda, and Sergio Machecha, NPA, Vista Hermosa, 9 August 2018; with Hein Bekker, and Emily Chrystie, HALO Trust, San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and with John Jimenez, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), Vista Hermosa, 11 August 2018.
82  Email from Vanessa Finson, NPA, 11 May 2018; interviews with Alejandro Perez, CCCM, Bogota, 14 August 2018; and with Hein Bekker and Emily Chrystie, HALO Trust, San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and “Hombres armados detienen equipo de The HALO Trust en Uribe, Meta; amenazan al personal y queman una camioneta,” Descontamina Colombia, 19 July 2018.
In South Sudan, the release of mined areas plummeted in 2017 largely due to security concerns from the ongoing conflict, which significantly impeded mine action operations during the year. The program shifted away from large area clearance to EOD spot tasks using smaller, more mobile teams. Four mine action personnel were seriously injured in an ambush, and there were several instances of criminality in which teams were robbed by armed groups.

In Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen, despite insecurity, some progress was reported. In Iraq, the main priority was tackling the massive contamination by improvised mines and other ERW found in areas recaptured from the non-state armed group Islamic State, to facilitate the return of internally displaced people, the rehabilitation of public services, and the restoration of the economy. In Somalia in 2017, survey and risk education teams were able to be deployed in all five of southcentral Somalia’s federal states for the first time. HALO Trust was able to deploy survey and clearance teams despite persistently high levels of insecurity. In August 2017, three HALO staff were abducted by the non-state armed group Al-Shabaab; one was shot but recovered. All were eventually released. In Yemen, despite continued armed conflict, the YEMAC expanded operations and improved productivity.

In states not party Libya and Syria, where there is limited clearance capacity, international mine clearance operators have continued to focus their efforts on capacity-building and training of national actors.

Occupation and other issues related to the jurisdiction and control of territory also impact mine clearance. Cyprus does not have effective control of antipersonnel mine-contaminated areas. In Palestine, Israel will not authorize clearance by Palestinians, and most mined areas are in zones controlled by Israel or under joint control. Ukraine has noted that it does

---

83 Emails from Tim Lardner, Chief, Mine Action, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
84 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018; and from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
86 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.
89 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.
not currently have access to some mined areas.\footnote{Letter to the UN Secretary General from Ukraine, 1 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 3.} In Azerbaijan, Armenian forces occupy a significant area of the country where considerable contamination exists. In Georgia, there may be mined areas in South Ossetia, however, South Ossetia is effectively subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to the Georgian authorities and international NGOs. In Thailand, a high proportion of remaining contamination is located in border areas that are the subject of demarcation disputes or security issues.\footnote{Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 3 and 21.}

COUNTRY/AREA SUMMARIES

Below are brief summaries of contamination and clearance efforts in countries with massive contamination of more than 100km\(^2\), in addition to Syria where the scale of the extensive contamination is not known. (For complete information on all states, see the online mine action country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.)

Afghanistan

The Department of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) reported that State Party Afghanistan had 205km\(^2\) of areas containing antipersonnel mines at the end of 2017.\footnote{Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018. However, the Article 7 Report (for 2017) states that 2,088 antipersonnel mine hazards covering 223km\(^2\) remained at the end of 2017.} Surveys continue to find new areas of legacy contamination, and mine/ERW contamination continues to increase. The DMAC reported an additional 20km\(^2\) of improvised mine contamination, and it has not yet reached a reliable estimate of the much larger areas also thought to be contaminated by such mines.\footnote{Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018.} Afghanistan now identifies improvised mines as the greatest challenge for the mine action sector.\footnote{Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Background, p. 5.} Mine clearance is conducted by six national and three international NGOs.\footnote{National NGOs: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), AREA. International NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and Janus Demining Afghanistan (previously Sterling International).} Since 2012, land release has been affected by a sharp downturn in funding as well as security constraints.\footnote{Interview with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, DMAC, in Geneva, 8 June 2018; email from DMAC, 1 April 2018; and UN Mine Action Gateway, “Survey and Clearance of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) in 1397 (April 2018–March 2019),” undated.}

Angola

As of April 2018, State Party Angola reported a total 147.6km\(^2\) of mined areas: 89.3km\(^2\) of confirmed hazardous areas and 58.3km\(^2\) of suspected hazardous areas. All 18 provinces still contain mined areas.\footnote{Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8.} As of September 2018, national re-survey had been completed in 15 provinces. Of the remaining provinces, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul were due to be completed in 2018, while re-survey had yet to commence in Cabinda.\footnote{Ibid.; and email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.} Clearance is conducted by four Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) operators—the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard, as well as commercial companies, and three international NGOs—the HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Angola faces severe funding constraints to achieving its new Article 5 deadline of 2025.\footnote{Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.}
Azerbaijan

No estimate of the extent of contamination in state not party Azerbaijan was provided for the end of 2017, but at the end of 2015, 69.9 km² of area was suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. In addition, the extent of contamination in areas occupied by Armenia is unknown, although the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has suggested that contamination may cover between 350 km² and 830 km².  The most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2017, land release was conducted by ANAMA and two national NGOs, International Eurasia Press Fund (IEFP) and Daya. Land release increased in 2017 to facilitate the return by internally displaced people to a village that had been liberated from Armenian occupation in 2016. However, of the 7.69 km² cleared, 3.6 km² was found to contain no mines.

BiH

State Party BiH has provided conflicting estimates of the extent of contamination at the end of 2017, the lowest figure being 1,056 km². BiH expects that not all suspected hazardous areas are in fact contaminated by mines and that clearance will only need to be conducted in relatively small areas. An 18-month country-wide assessment is planned for 2018–2019. The results of this re-survey will enable BiH to plan for the realization of the new National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 and preparation of its final Article 5 extension request through to completion. In 2017, land release of mined areas was conducted by the BiH Armed Forces, Federal Administration of Civil Protection, the Civil Protection of Republic of Srpska, 10 NGOs, and four commercial demining companies.

Cambodia

State Party Cambodia's antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand. As of the end of 2017, the total known or suspected contamination is 895 km². In 2018, Cambodia launched a new National Mine Action Strategy to complete clearance of mines by 2025, beyond Cambodia's current Article 5 deadline of 2020. This is dependent on increased donor funding. The strategy emphasizes more efficient use of clearance assets. Land release is undertaken mainly by the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) and two NGOs, HALO Trust and MAG.

100 Email from Tural Mammadov, Operations Officer, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), 19 October 2016.
102 See report on Nagorno-Karabakh on Monitor website.
103 Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 May 2018.
105 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 7 September 2018, pp. 5, 17, and 18. It also reports 1,080 km². See p. 4. The Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, reports 1,061 km² of suspected hazardous area.
108 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 17 May 2018; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F; and BHMAC, "Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual Report 2017," January 2018, p. 14. The national NGOs are: DEMIRA, Dok-ing Deminiranje N.H.O., EDD Training Centre, Eko Dem, Pro Vita, Stop Mines, Udruga "Pazi Mine Vitez," and, Association UEM. The international NGOs are MAG and NPA. The commercial operators are: Detektor, N&N Ivs, Point, and UEM.
111 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
**Chad**

As of December 2017, State Party Chad reported a total of 122 km$^2$ of confirmed and suspected hazardous area. However, Chad expects more contaminated areas to be identified in the Borkou, Ennedi, Moyen Chari, and Tibesti regions. Improvised mines have been reported in the Lake Chad region. No land release was conducted in 2017. European Union funding was received in late 2017 for a project called PRODECO, in which Humanity & Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International) focuses on survey and clearance in the Borkou and Ennedi regions while MAG works in the Tibesti and Lake Chad regions. The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) provides technical support, training, and capacity-building to the National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND).

**Croatia**

At the end of 2017, State Party Croatia reported a total of 411 km$^2$ of mined area, of which 270 km$^2$ was suspected hazardous area and 142 km$^2$ was confirmed hazardous area. A further 33 km$^2$ of confirmed hazardous areas were under military control. Eight of Croatia's 21 counties are mine affected. Almost all civil clearance is conducted by local companies competing for tenders. Twenty-one companies conducted demining in 2017. Croatia aims to complete clearance by March 2026, according to its second extension request submitted in 2018.

**Iraq**

The full extent of contamination in State Party Iraq is unknown. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) reported a total of 1,219 km$^2$. However, this is not consistent with the figures provided in the Article 7 report. In addition, the DMA reported 185 km$^2$ of IED contamination, much of which may in fact be antipersonnel mines. In 2017 and 2018, Iraq's priority is the clearance of massive contamination by IEDs, including improvised mines from areas liberated from non-state armed group Islamic State, in order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by conflict, the restoration of public services, and economic recovery. Mine action in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The DMA coordinates and manages the sector in central and southern Iraq. IKMAA manages mine action in the four northern governorates that fall under the Kurdish Regional Government. Land release in 2017 was conducted by army engineers, the civil...

---

112 Email from Soultani Moussa, Manager/Administrator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), 19 June 2018.
116 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 14 September 2018.
117 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C; and email from Davor Laura, Head of Quality Control, Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC), 6 April 2018.
118 In Croatia’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, this was reported to be 32.66 km$^2$; and in Croatia’s 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, as 32 km$^2$.
119 Email from Davor Laura, CROMAC, 6 April 2018. See the country profile for the full list of operators in 2017.
120 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2019, p. 8.
121 This is the recent estimate of contamination as of the end of 2017, provided by email from Ahmad Al Jasim, DMA, 13 September 2018; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018. The Article 7 report for 2017 reported 1,072 km$^2$ at the end of 2017.
defense, IKMAA, national and international commercial companies, and five international NGOs (Danish Deming Group (DDG), FSD, HI, MAG, and NPA). Optima provided management for Al-Fahad.

Syria
State not party Syria is contaminated by landmines left by successive Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 but particularly by the conflict since 2011. All regions are affected. Ongoing hostilities and reports of continuing use of landmines have prevented systematic survey to determine the extent and types of contamination. Improvised mines have been used extensively. Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a national program for survey and clearance. UNMAS operates from Gaziantep, Amman, and Beirut to coordinate support to mine action. In July 2018, UNMAS signed a memorandum of understanding with the Syrian government, which was reported to enable UNMAS to conduct mine risk education. In 2017, mine action was conducted by a wide range of organizations, including military engineers of parties to the conflict, civil defense organizations, humanitarian demining organizations, and commercial companies. However, no land release results were available.

Thailand
By the end of 2017, State Party Thailand reported 391km² of suspected hazardous area. However, it expected that, based on previous survey results, almost 87% of this area would be cancelled. A potential obstacle to completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations is the high proportion—around 90%—of remaining contamination located in border areas that are subject to demarcation disputes or security issues. In 2017, clearance was conducted by the Thailand Mine Action Center’s (TMAC) four Humanitarian Mine Action Units and NPA. The Thai Civilian Deminers Association conducted non-technical and technical survey.

Turkey
State Party Turkey reported 164km² of contamination across 3,061 confirmed hazardous areas, with a further 701 suspected hazardous areas, for which no estimate of size is available. The majority of contamination is along the border with Syria and some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. Mines have also been laid inside the country around military installations, while improvised mines and other IEDs have been used by non-state armed groups. In 2017, Turkey completed Phase 1 of the European Union Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project on the eastern border with Iran, with clearance conducted by commercial company MECHEM. The Turkish armed forces also conducted land release along the borders with Iran and Syria, including to support the construction of the Border Security Surveillance System along the Syrian border.

123 Email from Gilles Delecourt, Senior Programme Manager, UNMAS, 22 May 2018.
124 Interview with Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, Geneva, 16 February 2018; and email, 22 May 2018; and UNMAS, “Programmes in Syria,” updated March 2018.
126 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D.
127 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 5 and 6.
128 Ibid., pp. 3 and 21.
129 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.
131 Email from Lt.-Col. Halil Şen, Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC), 21 June 2017; interview with Col. Zaki Eren, and Maj. Can Ceylan, TURMAC, in Vienna, 20 December 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form A.
132 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (form calendar year 2016), Form A; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Forms A and D.
Yemen

The extent of contamination in State Party Yemen is unknown. Its latest Article 7 report, submitted in 2017, reported suspected and known contamination of 323km² and noted that survey was expected to identify additional contamination. Yemen is contaminated with mines from conflicts in 1962–1969 and 1970–1983, mines that were laid in border areas between North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and mines from successive conflicts that erupted since 1994, including the ongoing conflict that began in March 2015. The latest conflict has involved extensive use of improvised mines. All land release is conducted by the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC). Despite the ongoing conflict, the YEMAC expanded operations in 2017. However, the teams are constrained by a lack of training and equipment.

Western Sahara

The exact extent of mine contamination across other area Western Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm are thought to contain some of the densest mine contamination in the world. To the east of the berm, mine action is managed by the Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Center (SMACO) with the support of UNMAS. The primary mine threat east of the Berm, excluding both the Berm itself and the buffer strip, is from antivehicle rather than antipersonnel mines; cluster munitions are also a major hazard. During 2018, non-technical survey efforts east of the berm greatly reduced the extent of suspected contamination to an estimated 120km² by September 2018. Areas located within the 5km-wide buffer strip are inaccessible for clearance. Land release east of the berm in 2017 was conducted by Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) and NPA. The area west of the berm is under Moroccan control, and land release is conducted by the Royal Moroccan Army. There the extent of contamination west of the berm is unknown.

---

133 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017), Forms D and L.
136 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm, was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12-times the length of the former Berlin Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China.
138 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018.
Nestor shows a map made with community members that identifies mine explosion accidents and possible dangerous sites in rural Corinto, Colombia.

© Nadège Mazars/HI, April 2018
OVERVIEW

High numbers of casualties continued to be recorded in 2017, following the sharp rise in 2015, with a total of at least 7,239 people killed or injured by antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines, including improvised landmines, as well as unexploded cluster submunitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW. However, it is certain that numerous casualties went unrecorded. Some of the most mine/ERW-affected countries do not have national casualty surveillance systems in place, nor do other forms of adequate reporting exist.

While remaining very high, the total for 2017 marks a decrease on the casualties recorded for 2016. The casualty database for Landmine Monitor Report 2018 includes an updated total of 9,437 casualties for 2016 (2,472 killed, 6,937 injured, and 28 unknown). At the time of the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2017, 8,605 casualties had been recorded for 2016 (2,089 killed, 6,491 injured, and 25 unknown).

More than 120,000 casualties have been included in the Landmine Monitor database in the period 1999–2017.

Of the total of 7,239 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor recorded for 2017, at least 2,793 people were killed and another 4,431 people were injured; for 15 casualties it was not known if the person survived or was killed.

For a second year the highest number of annual casualties caused by improvised mines and the most annual disaggregated number of child casualties were recorded.

---

1 Casualties from unexploded cluster submunitions (unexploded submunitions), which are cluster munition remnants, are included in the Monitor global mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by unexploded submunitions for the year 2017, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2018, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/cluster-munition-monitor-2018.aspx.

2 As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties and this information was not included in the Monitor mine/ERW casualty database.
Civilians represented the vast majority of casualties compared to military and security forces, continuing the well-established trend of civilian harm that influenced the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty: 87% of casualties were civilians in 2017 where the status was known.

The country with the most recorded casualties in 2017 was State Party Afghanistan, with 2,300, followed by state not party Syria with 1,906 casualties reported. Mine/ERW casualties were identified in a total of 53 states and other areas in 2017. Of the total recorded casualties in 2017, 60% (4,355) occurred in 35 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Since the first years of the Mine Ban Treaty, it was certain that many casualties went unrecorded. In 1999, the Monitor identified some 9,000 casualties, but estimates indicated that there were another 7,000–13,000 annual casualties that were not recorded in the available data. From 1999 through 2006 the number of new mine casualties (recorded and estimated) each year was between 15,000 and 20,000. For each year between 2009 and 2014 the Monitor estimated that there have been approximately 1,000 additional casualties (an additional 25–30% of the total) that are not captured in its global mine/ERW casualty statistics. Subsequently, due to the highly irregular accessibility of data for countries experiencing conflict after 2014, estimating the gaps become less viable. However, over time new data for past mine/ERW casualties sometimes becomes available.

The global casualties total since 1999 increases every reporting year, due to new casualties recorded, but also with the updating of historical data with newly available statistics. More than 122,000 casualties have been recorded by the Landmine Monitor just in the period since 1999. For all time, more than 500,000 casualties have been reported for affected states.

**CASUALTY RECORDING FOR 2017**

The 7,239 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2017 only include recorded casualties, not estimates. It is certain that there are additional casualties each year that are not captured in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries and those experiencing conflict. In some states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher in those countries.

---

3 The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat as well as members of non-state armed groups and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law, whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” ICRC, ”Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers,” 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFAQ.

4 In 2017, casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, and four other areas Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

5 Casualties were identified in the following States Parties in 2017, as well as Palestine and Sri Lanka which were not yet State Parties, but are now: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.


7 However, cumulative national casualty figures are sometimes multi-annual aggregates or based on extrapolations of survey results and therefore may not be included in the Monitor casualty dataset for the period 1999–2017.

8 The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely-used annual, and global, dataset of casualties caused by mines/ERW. The casualty total for 2017 included datasets or reporting from the following types of sources: international organizations, UN and national mine action centers, other UN agencies, humanitarian mine action operators, ICBL members, and other NGOs, as well as media scanning.
The Monitor identified 1,906 mine/ERW casualties in Syria from multiple sources for 2017. However, since the conflict began in 2011, annual recorded totals of mine/ERW casualties are thought to be an undercount. It is certain that the actual number of casualties occurring in Syria in 2017, as in past years, was significantly higher than the annual total recorded.

As in previous years, it is certain that there are many more mine/ERW casualties that occurred in Iraq in 2017 that have not been identified. It is particularly apparent that improvised landmine casualties that occurred in Mosul in 2017 are so far vastly underreported. It was reported that large sections of Mosul were mined and booby-trapped by the non-state armed group Islamic State. In August 2017, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was reported as stating that since clearance operations began in October 2016, some 1,700 people had been killed or injured by such explosive hazards. The 2017 total number of mine/ERW casualties recorded for Iraq was 304, with 124 of that number occurring in Mosul.

The ongoing conflict in Yemen prevented the operation of a national casualty surveillance mechanism. The 160 casualties identified by the Monitor for 2017 is certainly an underreporting of the annual total and is much less than the 2016 total of 2,037. In 2017 and 2018, various Yemeni authorities and human rights organizations reported annual totals and cumulative totals for all time. However, their reports rarely describe the source or methodology used to compile these figures, and in some cases, do not specify the time period. The figures provided differ widely, indicating the challenge of collecting reliable data in a context of ongoing conflict. Thus, no significant quantity of disaggregated annual data was available for Yemen for 2017.

Due to the continuing conflict, the national casualty surveillance system in Libya was not truly functional. The Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) collected information on casualties, but these were not in an integrated database. Furthermore, two key sources for Monitor data in previous years were no longer available. Therefore, the significant decrease to 184 casualties identified in 2017 from the 1,610 casualties reported for 2016 may not be indicative of the nature of a trend or scale.

New information on casualties in Nigeria (235 in 2017) was recorded by Mines Advisory Group (MAG), resulting in an improved understanding of the extent of the impact of improvised mines in that State Party.

### States with the most recorded mine/ERW casualties in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

---

9 Not including the occupied Golan Heights.
10 See, Landmine Monitor 2017 for details on the issues of reporting on improvised mine casualties in Iraq, the-monitor.org/LM17.
CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS

There were at least 2,452 child casualties in 2017. Child casualties in 2017 accounted for 47% of all civilian casualties for whom the age group was known (5,183). Children were killed (773) or injured (1,679) by mines/ERW in 38 countries and other areas in 2017.

As in previous years, in 2017 the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (84%).

ERW caused the most child casualties (1,332, or 54% of child casualties). Child casualties made up more than half (48, or 52%) of all casualties caused by unexploded cluster submunitions. (For more information on child casualties and assistance see the annual Monitor publication on landmines/ERW and children.)

In 2017, men and boys made up the vast majority of all casualties, with 87% of all casualties for which the sex was known (4,874 of 5,614). Women and girls made up 13% of all casualties for which the sex was known (740).

Civilians represented 87% of casualties in 2017 where the civilian/military status was known (5,802 of 6,701).

There were 839 military casualties. The country with the most recorded military casualties of mines/ERW in 2017 was Ukraine, with 189; followed by Nigeria, with 151 military and combatant casualties (including militia); and Pakistan with 93 military casualties recorded (including soldiers, militia, and militants).

In 2017, the Monitor identified 60 casualties among deminers in 14 countries (18 deminers were killed and 42 injured).

MINE/ERW TYPES RESULTING IN CASUALTIES

In 2017, landmines of all types caused at least 4,795 casualties—these were recorded as being caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (748), antivehicle mines (488), improvised mines (2,716), and other unspecified mine types (843).

Unexploded submunitions caused 93 casualties and other ERW caused 2,038 casualties. A total of 313 casualties were the result of mine/ERW items that were not disaggregated in data.

Casualties recorded as caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (thus, not including improvised mines) were documented in 23 states and areas in 2017.

Casualties from improvised mines (not included among casualties recorded as from factory-made antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, or other unspecified types of mines) were recorded in 14 countries (18 deminers were killed and 42 injured).

12 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.
13 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18-years of age at the time of the incident. Child casualties made up 40% of the total recorded casualties.
14 In 2017, child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Russia, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen, and two other areas, Kosovo and Somaliland.
15 There were 1,775 boys and 529 girls recorded as casualties in 2017; the sex of 348 child casualties was not recorded.
16 In 2017, casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chile, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Russia, Serbia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen.
17 In 2017, antipersonnel mine casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chile, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Senegal, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen, and other areas, Kosovo and Western Sahara.
Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2017

- **Antipersonnel mine**: 0 casualties
- **Antivehicle mine**: 488 casualties
- **Unexploded cluster submunition**: 441 casualties
- **Improvised mine**: 2,716 casualties
- **Other unspecified mine**: 93 casualties
- **Unknown mine/ERW item**: 313 casualties
- **ERW**: 748 casualties
- **Unexploded cluster submunition**: 48 casualties

were identified in 18 states in 2017.18 Most improvised mine casualties in 2017 occurred in Afghanistan (1,093) and Syria (887).

For 16 countries and areas, 862 casualties were recorded under the category of other unspecified mine types.19 Some three quarters of those casualties were recorded for Syria (1,208, or 74%).

In 2017, antivehicle mines caused at least 488 casualties in 20 states and areas.20 The states with the greatest numbers of casualties reported from antivehicle mines were Pakistan (132) and Ukraine (103).21

---

18 In 2017, improvised mine casualties were recorded in 17 states: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, Colombia, India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. Additionally, improvised mine casualties were known to have occurred in Myanmar, but these are undifferentiated from other mine casualties in data. Among sources used by the Monitor for calendar year 2017 data on improvised mine casualties included data from among the casualties of explosive incidents categorized as “victim-activated” in the Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) explosive violence data set for 2017. AOAV casualty data for 2017 provided by email from Jennifer Dathan, Researcher, AOAV, 29 August 2018; and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data for calendar year 2017. Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Issue 47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660.

19 In 2017, unspecified mine casualties were recorded in Algeria, Armenia, Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen, and other areas Nagorno-Karabakh.

20 In 2017, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and other areas, Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.

21 The Monitor shares, cross-references, and compares data with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Anti-vehicle mines (AVM) project. That project recorded 491 casualties from both confirmed and suspected antivehicle mines in 24 countries in 2016. GICHD-SIPRI casualty data provided by email from Ursign Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHD, 22 February 2018. See also, GICHD-SIPRI, “Anti-Vehicle Mines,” undated, www.gichd.org/avm. Monitor and GICHD-SIPRI methodologies used to enter data differ, resulting in the differences in annual casualties reported. For example, Monitor data does not include casualties that occur to persons engaged in laying or emplacing mines. Monitor reporting does include politically disputed geographic “other areas” in reporting, and tends to use the definitions employed in original whole data sets when possible. In some cases, when an incident was attributed to both antivehicle mines and improvised mines in different sources, the Monitor included those as improvised mine casualties.
Casualties caused by ERW numbered 2,038 in 38 states and areas in 2017. Of the annual total, 1,124 ERW casualties occurred in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{22} In 2017, globally, children made up 69\% (1,324) of civilian ERW casualties, when the age group was recorded.\textsuperscript{23}

Unknown or undifferentiated mine/ERW items were recorded as the cause of 313 casualties in 16 countries in 2017.\textsuperscript{24}

**States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>East and South Asia, and Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Afghanistan Cambodia</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties indicated in **bold**; other areas in *italics*.

---

\textsuperscript{22} In 2017, Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and other areas Kosovo, Somaliland, and Western Sahara. In addition to other types of ERW in 2017, casualties of unexploded submunitions were identified in Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Serbia, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen, and other areas Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara. For more information on casualties caused by unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year 2017, see ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor* 2018.

\textsuperscript{23} Of the total ERW casualties in 2016, 586 were adults.

\textsuperscript{24} Casualties from unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in: Angola, Azerbaijan, DRC, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen.
### Annex: Mine/ERW types causing casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of mine/ERW</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mines*</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mines</td>
<td>A munition designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, and therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antivehicle mines</td>
<td>Also referred to as “antitank mines,” and included among Mines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM), these are designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to that of a person and tend to contain a larger explosive charge than antipersonnel mines. Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless they are fitted with fuses that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improvised mines</td>
<td>Improvised mines are types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are “homemade” explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle. These are landmines and are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs). Antipersonnel improvised mines, including booby-traps (also included among “improvised mines”)** Antipersonnel improvised mines, including booby-traps that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, fit the definition of antipersonnel landmines and are therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. A booby-trap is an antipersonnel explosive device deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other unspecified mine type</td>
<td>When reported as a “mine” or “landmine” incident, lacking other details regarding the mine type or its construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category of mine/ERW</td>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexploded cluster submunitions and bomblets</td>
<td>Unexploded submunition</td>
<td>Submunitions or bomblets dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and failed to explode or that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive remnants of war (ERW), including abandoned and unexploded command-detonated IEDs</td>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Unexploded ordnance (UXO): Explosive weapons that have been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched, or projected yet remained unexploded. Abandoned ordnance (AXO): Explosive weapons that have not been used during an armed conflict, that have been left behind or dumped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive items, type unknown</td>
<td>Unknown mines/ERW item</td>
<td>Unknown mines/ERW are explosive items causing casualties that were detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle that were not attributed to a specific mine/ERW type either because it was not known what type of mine or ERW caused the casualty when information was recorded, or due to a lack of disaggregation between mines explosives and ERW causing casualties within a dataset, including when mine/ERW casualties are differentiated from other weapon victims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel IEDs are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Mine Ban Treaty definition, a mine is “placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area” and an antipersonnel mine is a munition “designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person…” Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless the fuzing allows them to be activated by a person. ** In most cases, it is not possible to distinguish between antivehicle and antipersonnel improvised mines that caused casualties because reporting does not provide a clear means of determining the sensitivity of fuzes after an explosion.
Technician at the Artificial Limbs and Polio Centre prepares prosthetic legs in the Gaza strip, Palestine.

© Alamy Live News, April 2018
VICTIM ASSISTANCE

INTRODUCTION

The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty was the first disarmament convention committing States Parties to provide assistance to the victims of a specific weapon. The components of victim assistance include, but are not restricted to: data collection and needs assessment with referral to emergency and continuing medical care; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and other assistive devices; psychological support; social and economic inclusion; and relevant laws and public policies.

The definition of "landmine victim" was agreed by States Parties in the Final Report of the First Review Conference (paragraph 64) formally adopted at the Nairobi Summit in 2004 as based on the then generally accepted understanding as "those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization."

Landmine victim, according to this widely accepted understanding of the term, includes survivors, as well as affected families and communities.

In the penultimate year for the Mine Ban Treaty’s Maputo Action Plan 2014–2019, this chapter principally takes stock of changes, progress, and challenges to the provision of assistance in States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and needs. It draws from reporting on the activities and challenges of hundreds of relevant programs implemented through government agencies, international and national organizations and NGOs, survivors networks and similar community-based organizations, as well as other service providers.

In most States Parties some efforts to improve the quality and quantity of health and physical rehabilitation programs for survivors were undertaken. However, after a trend of large reductions in services available in recent years due to decreases in resources, in 2017–2018 many countries saw near-stagnation in the remaining core assistance services for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims. Services remained largely centralized,

1 A “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/explosive remnants of war (ERW) and lived.

preventing many mine/ERW survivors who live in remote and rural areas from accessing those services. The needs remain great, including in the newest States Parties, Palestine and Sri Lanka.

Many existing coordination mechanisms had some survivor participation, but States Parties were yet to fulfill their commitments to building the capacity of survivors through their representative organizations. Most survivor networks struggled to provide essential local support not available through larger NGOs or existing state services.

The Monitor website includes comprehensive country profiles detailing the human impact of mines, cluster munitions, and other ERW and examining progress in victim assistance in some 70 countries, including both States Parties and states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. A collection of thematic overviews, briefing papers, factsheets, and infographics related to victim assistance produced since 1999 is available through the Victim Assistance Resources portal on the Monitor website.

Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with victims and needs highlighted in this section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>East and South Asia, and Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>(BiH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VICTIM ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MAPUTO ACTION PLAN

At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference held in Maputo in 2014, States Parties formally declared that they remain very much aware of their “enduring obligations to mine victims.” The actions of the Maputo Action Plan adopted at that conference can be summarized as follows:

- Assess the needs; evaluate the availability and gaps in services; and make referrals to existing services.


5 In addition, States Parties Mali and Ukraine, both of which have had hundreds of mine/ERW casualties in the past two years, may be considered to have significant numbers of survivors with great needs for assistance that remain unreported.

• Ensure the inclusion as well as the full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them; enhance their capacity.
• Increase the availability of and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social protection measures; strengthen local capacities and enhance coordination.
• Address needs and guarantee rights in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.
• Develop time-bound and measurable objectives and communicate progress annually.
• Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
• Report on measurable improvements in advance of the next review conference.

States Parties commit to addressing victim assistance objectives “with the same precision and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”7 The plan also affirms the need for States Parties to continue carrying out the actions of the previous Cartagena Action Plan in order to make assistance available, affordable, accessible, and sustainable.8

ASSESSING THE NEEDS

States Parties commit to assess the needs of mine victims. This commitment includes assessing the availability and gaps in services and support, and existing or new requirements activities needed to meet the needs of mine victims in the frameworks of disability, health, education, employment, development, and poverty reduction. They should also use this assessment activity as an opportunity to refer mine victims to existing services.9

In most States Parties no structured national needs assessments surveys were conducted in 2017 or into 2018. However, Mine Action Centers and service providers often collected information on mine victims in an ongoing manner in conjunction with other victim assistance and program activities.

Disability survey, including through national census questions, was discussed in many national victim assistance contexts. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (Article 31) calls on States Parties to collect information, including statistical and research data, and to disaggregate this information to identify barriers faced by persons with disabilities in exercising their rights. A common theme linking CRPD obligations and victim assistance data collections was the potential use of the Washington Group disability measurement tools.10 These are believed to be able to improve disability statistics and monitor the 2030 Agenda against indicators.11

PLANS AND POLICIES

At the national level and within the community of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Maputo Action Plan calls for activities addressing the specific needs of victims, while incorporating relevant actions into the appropriate sectors including disability, health, social welfare, education, employment, development, and poverty reduction.12

States Parties committed to have time-bound and measurable objectives to implement national policies and plans that will tangibly contribute to the main goals of victim assistance activities in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.

9  Maputo Action Plan Action #12.
12 Maputo Action Plan Actions #12 to #18.
assistance. In 2017–2018, 13 of the 33 States Parties with victims and needs had victim assistance plans or relevant disability plans in place.

Sudan adopted a victim assistance plan in 2017 through an approval process that started in 2016. Through 2017 in Colombia, some 19 municipalities had adopted area official plans for assistance for mine/ERW victims, and 20 municipalities had mapped out specific referral “pathways,” guiding survivors to their rights, services, and benefits available. This almost already reached the planned target for 2014–2018 of 22 municipal pathways for assistance. In 2018, Albania was in the process of national plan review. In BiH, the Victim Assistance Sub-Strategy 2009–2019 of the Mine Action Strategy remains in place, but a mid-way review was not yet adopted. Iraq continued to report that it developed annual victim assistance planning. Guinea-Bissau had reported on objectives of a victim assistance strategy in 2013, but the objectives, including establishing a new victim assistance coordination mechanism, were not reported against.

In 2018, victim assistance dialogues focused on the development of tangible strategic planning were held in Iraq and Uganda, in September and October respectively, hosted by national authorities with Implementation Support Unit (ISU) support and European Union (EU) funding.

Coordination

In 2017, 21 of the 33 States Parties had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms linked with disability coordination mechanisms that considered the issues relating to the needs of mine/ERW survivors.

A coordination mechanism for victim assistance in BiH received an official mandate in 2018 for the first time, after having restarted informal coordination in 2017 after a long pause.

Chad renewed victim assistance coordination in 2017.

INCLUSION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF MINE VICTIMS

In the Maputo Action Plan, each State Party has committed to do its “utmost to enhance the capacity and ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organisations in all matters that affect them.” In 2017, survivors and their representative organizations, including survivor networks and disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs), participated in coordination activities in at least 18 of the 21 States Parties with active mechanisms. However, states almost never report how survivor input is considered or acted upon. Survivors’ representative organizations and other service providers reported in some states that the contributions of survivors were not seriously taken into account.

14 Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. Algeria, Chad, Senegal, and Sri Lanka had plans pending approval or formal adoption.
15 In August 2017, the Council of the EU adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1428 in support of the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty through the treaty’s ISU as the technical implementer to support efforts on the part of States Parties, including towards the implementation of victim assistance.
16 The states with coordination mechanisms in 2017–2018 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey. Angonda had intermittent and infrequent coordination meetings that lacked disability sector integration, which is a key sustainability issue.
17 Maputo Action Plan Action #16.
18 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand.
Action plan commitments also include capacity-building, but as is the case with full and active participation, state initiatives for capacity-building for participation of mine victims were also almost never reported. One exception was the Quality of Life survey in Cambodia. Also, the need for improved education for survivor representation in Uganda was recognized.

In addition to examining the 33 States Parties, the Monitor identified many states and areas with mine victims where survivors networks reported developments in 2017 and into 2018. Unfortunately, in most countries, survivor networks struggled to maintain their operations with decreasing resources available. Networks in States Parties Croatia, Mozambique, and Somalia were largely unable to implement essential activities in much of 2017 and 2018. Activities of the national survivors’ network in Afghanistan were primarily advocacy and awareness-raising. Many others managed to maintain essential linkages at the community level and provide support, advice, and referrals as possible.

**Survivors networks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Examples of survivor networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghan Landmine Survivor Organization (ALSO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Albanian Assistance for Integration and Development (ALB-AID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survivor Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzBL) Survivor Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Organization of amputees UDAS Republic of Srpska (UDAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(CamCBLCM) Survivor Network; Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>ADISMAM; the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>National Association of Mine Survivors and Victims Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ANASDIV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Foundation Network of Survivors and Person with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Survivors Recovery and Rehabilitation Organization (SRARO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Network for Mine Victims (RAVIM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Nepalese Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) Survivor Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Solidarity Initiative for Development Actions (ISAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Assistance, Advocacy, Access Serbia (AAAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Tajikistan Survivor Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Uganda Landmine Survivors Association (ULSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Association for Empowerment of Person of Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(AEPD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>Sahrawi Association of Mine Victims (ASAVIM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Yemen Association of Landmine Survivors (YALS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*.

**AVAILABILITY OF AND ACCESSIBILITY TO SERVICES**

States Parties committed to “increase availability of and accessibility to appropriate comprehensive rehabilitation services, economic inclusion opportunities and social protection measures...including expanding quality services in rural and remote areas and paying particular attention to vulnerable groups.”*12* The following changes, progress, and

---

challenges were reported for 2017 in the 33 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and needs.

Medical care and physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

Medical care services for mine/ERW survivors were strengthened in some countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, including in Ethiopia and Senegal. In many countries, however, survivors continued to have to travel long distances in order to access services. In Chad, health services in mine-contaminated areas were limited, with few qualified personnel. In Guinea-Bissau, large parts of the population do not have access to healthcare. In Mozambique, survivors reported a general lack of medication, especially anti-retroviral medications for persons living with HIV/AIDS. In Uganda, there were regular shortages of medicines during gaps in the scope of budget allocations and quality healthcare remained unaffordable and inaccessible to many survivors.

In Iraq and Yemen, increased training and resources were provided in response to the greater demand for services caused by conflict. In Iraq, healthcare services for persons with disabilities decreased over time. However, international organizations and NGOs provided specific interventions, including for surgical care to the war-injured persons of Mosul. In Yemen, there was no specific mechanism in place for managing the responses to new mine/ERW survivors. Only 50% of health facilities remained functional, while the half that remained faced severe shortages in medicines, equipment, and staff. The influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan put a strain on available public health services and resources.

In Afghanistan, the health sector was not reaching as many people as needed and the quality of the services provided by the governmental hospitals dropped.

In Croatia, improved emergency response time also benefited mine/ERW survivors. Medical staff and trauma doctors from hospitals located in mine/ERW-contaminated areas in Tajikistan received training on managing weapon wounds.

The World Health Organization (WHO) released recommendations on health-related rehabilitation linked to the Sustainable Development Goals in 2017. In January 2018, the WHO held a general consultation outlining its activities for the next three years. This includes integrating rehabilitation into universal health coverage (UHC) budgeting and planning, developing a package of priority rehabilitation interventions, and establishing tools and resources to strengthen the health workforce for rehabilitation.

Measures taken to increase availability of physical rehabilitation services were reported in several Sub-Saharan States Parties, including Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. However, shortages of raw materials and financial resources were an obstacle to the development of the physical rehabilitation sector in most countries, even those where improvements were noted, including Angola, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. In the DRC, the decrease in available resources in recent years significantly impacts the capacities of NGOs to operate. An international NGO started a new physical rehabilitation pilot project in 2017 in the DRC. In Senegal, due to deteriorating equipment and a constant shortage of raw materials, the physical rehabilitation center in the mine-affected region did not deliver any new prosthetic devices in 2017. Access to rehabilitation for survivors from Senegal was available through an agreement with a center in Guinea-Bissau.

In Afghanistan, four new physical rehabilitation centers were established during the Maputo Action Plan period, however several more such centers were still needed. In Cambodia, some progress was reported in creating consistent reporting systems for the rehabilitation sector and the planning for handover of centers to government funding and management.

In Colombia, there was a significant increase in geographical coverage of rehabilitation due to the signing of agreements between the government and a non-state armed group that allowed access to areas that were previously labeled difficult access “red zones.” However, overall physical rehabilitation remained largely centralized in large cities. Survivors in rural areas faced challenges to access rehabilitation services due to transport and food costs. For the first time, a regional forum was held with representatives of rehabilitation centers from...
Ecuador, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, a central body for physical rehabilitation actors was under development. In El Salvador, planning for the construction of a new satellite prosthetics unit began.

In Albania, raw materials and components for the repair and production of prostheses were secured for the rehabilitation center in the area where most survivors live. In BiH and Serbia, while provision of orthopedic devices is mandated by law, access was sometimes impeded by excessive procedural demands. Staff from municipal centers for physical rehabilitation in BiH were introduced to the method of integrating peer support during the rehabilitation of mine survivors.

In Algeria, mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities continued to have access to most prosthetic and assistive devices free-of-charge. In Iraq, a 30% decrease in the number of assistive devices between 2014 and 2017 was an indicator of the ongoing necessity to enhance support to existing rehabilitation services for survivors. A much-needed new rehabilitation center was launched in Mosul in 2018. In Palestine, the only prosthetic center in Gaza faced significant strain on its limited resources while addressing an increase in patients with amputations among protesters who had been shot in the legs. In Yemen, increased support to the physical rehabilitation centers sector was reported in response to the needs caused by ongoing conflict, but availability of assistance overall remained far from adequate for meeting those needs.

Economic inclusion, education, psychosocial support

Projects to encourage the economic inclusion of survivors were severely lacking in Angola, the DRC, Ethiopia, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda. Some economic-inclusion programs were reported in Burundi, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Sudan, and Sudan.

In Albania, some vocational training was reported. However, the number of available economic-inclusion activities and beneficiaries has declined. A two-year socio-economic inclusion project for mine/ERW survivors in BiH was underway. In Croatia, regulations on the employment of persons with disabilities and professional rehabilitation needed to be amended to be aligned with existing legislation. Also in Croatia, a new center for professional rehabilitation was established.

In Iraq, DPOs reported that the number of persons with disabilities who received state-run vocational training seemed insignificant to the size of the population of persons with disabilities. Economic-inclusion activities were nearly nonexistent in Yemen, where livelihood activities by the survivors’ network stopped due to lack of funding.

Psychosocial services were deployed to four regions that had previously not been reached in Eritrea. Psychological support services in a mine/ERW victim assistance context were extremely limited, or near to non-existent, in Angola, the DRC, Mozambique, Senegal,
Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In South Sudan, where public mental health services are virtually non-existent, some 40% of the population show psychological effects of trauma from conflict and violence. South Sudan has one of the highest rates of suicides, and suicide rates in the refugee camps have spiked, while the lives of survivors and other persons with disabilities is increasingly precarious. Ethiopia launched safety net programs intended to benefit persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors.

Afghanistan and Cambodia required planning and structures to make available psychosocial support.

Psychological support was among the most serious needs of survivors in Albania, but no recent progress was reported. The provision of continuing psychosocial support remained weak in Croatia throughout 2017, despite there being 21 psychosocial centers.

The availability of psychological support and follow-up trauma care in Iraq, including for internally displaced persons, remained inadequate to meet needs. At least two new projects providing ongoing psychosocial support were reported in 2018. In Yemen, international NGOs continued to provide some mental health and psychosocial support activities to the war-wounded and their families. However, the national survivors’ network was only able to provide psychological support to a very small number of survivors.

Since 2010, the WHO community-based rehabilitation (CBR) guidelines, and how they can be used to start or strengthen CBR programs for victims of landmines, have been promoted among victim assistance actors in States Parties. Monitor reporting includes many examples of CBR programs that contribute to victim assistance implementation, including the following:

In Peru, a regional-targeted program continued to improve the quality of life of persons with disabilities and their families in the mine-affected Tumbes region in 2017.

In Angola, an NGO-run CBR program expanded to seven new provinces. In Ethiopia, an NGO provides CBR in three regional states. In Eritrea, the CBR program is the main provider of physical therapy and psychosocial support to landmine and ERW survivors and persons with disabilities. In Senegal, a national CBR program was on the verge of being approved.

In Afghanistan, NGO-led CBR activities are implemented in 12 of 34 provinces. In Cambodia, CBR services are available in 25 provinces.

GUARANTEEING RIGHTS IN AN AGE- AND GENDER-SENSITIVE MANNER

The Maputo Action Plan speaks of “the imperative to address the needs and guarantee the rights of mine victims, in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.”

Gender considerations

While men and boys are the majority of reported casualties, women and girls may be disproportionately disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents and suffer multiple forms of discrimination as survivors. To guide a rights-based approach to victim assistance for women and girls, States Parties can apply the principles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Of the 33 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, all except Somalia and Sudan are also States Parties to CEDAW.

---

20 South Sudan reported that landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities "now experience death as a result of poverty." Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), p. 13.

21 The WHO CBR Guidelines were the subject of focused training for government victim assistance focal points at the Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties in 2010; a victim assistance experts’ program was dedicated to their Geneva launch and training on their practical application, bit.ly/MBT10MSPVA.

22 Maputo Action Plan Action #17.

23 Of the 33 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, all except Somalia and Sudan are also States Parties to CEDAW.
CEDAW by States Parties to that convention should ensure the rights of women and girls and protect them from discrimination and exploitation.\(^{24}\)

Gender was a key consideration in victim assistance programming, but reporting was often limited to statistical disaggregation of casualties and service beneficiaries. Some other details, however, were available. In Somalia women with disabilities continue to be vulnerable to sexual violence and forced marriage. The government of Somalia proposed to focus on women and girls in their efforts to support persons with disabilities to address the double stigma of gender and disability. In Iraq, gender sensitive services are provided to most females through the provision of specialized female staff in rehabilitation and medical centers. The same applies to males. In Yemen, women faced additional challenges accessing medical care due to the lack of gender-sensitive services, including a lack of female rehabilitation professionals.

**Age considerations**

Child survivors have specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance. In 2017 and 2018, inclusive education and age-sensitive assistance were far from adequate in most countries. In this regard, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is particularly relevant to the implementation of victim assistance with a rights-based approach.\(^{25}\)

The annually updated Monitor factsheet on the Impact of Mines/ERW on Children contains more details on issues pertaining to children, youth, and adolescents.\(^{26}\)

**NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS**

According to the Maputo Action Plan, States Parties collectively agree that victim assistance should be integrated into broader national policies, plans, and legal frameworks and that they will make "enhancements" to the legal frameworks in effect as a means of operationalizing the integration. Some new plans and policies were adopted in the reporting period, and several more had been drafted and were pending endorsement.

Ethiopia National Disability adopted the Mainstreaming Guideline with specific guidance for the health sector and vocational training providers. Mozambique is in the process of drafting a national law for the protection and promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities. In Somalia, a bill to establish a National Agency for Persons with Disabilities was approved in 2018. South Sudan has developed a National Disability and Inclusion Policy.

Jordan adopted a new comprehensive law on the rights of persons with disabilities.

The process of amending discriminatory national disability legislation in Afghanistan was completed.

Tajikistan, not party to the CRPD, introduced a National Program on Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, covering physical rehabilitation services and social inclusion.

\(^{24}\) The Committee of CEDAW General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations and General Recommendation 27 on older women and protection of their human rights are also particularly applicable.


BROADER FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSISTANCE

The Maputo Action Plan calls for activities addressing the specific needs of victims and also emphasizes the need to simultaneously integrate victim assistance into other frameworks, including disability, health, social welfare, education, employment, development, and poverty reduction.27 It also recognizes that in addition to integrating victim assistance, States Parties need to, in actual fact, “ensure that broader frameworks are reaching mine victims.”

Many of these frameworks have their own representative international administrations, guidance documents, plans, and objectives that may also be reflected in national-level activities that can reach survivors, families, and communities.

Since the emergence of victim assistance through the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, other weapons-related conventions have adopted this rapidly emerging norm. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions codified the expanded principles and commitments of victim assistance into binding international law; these were introduced into the planning of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on ERW in 2008, and most recently included in the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

The CRPD is the international human rights legal instrument that has been most discussed in relation to the implementation of victim assistance. The linkages between rights-based victim assistance and the CRPD are particularly useful for implementation through integration and synergy. Only five States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of survivors are not party to the CRPD. Three of those are signatories to the CRPD: Chad, Somalia, and Tajikistan. Tajikistan signed in March 2018 and Somalia in October 2018. Eritrea and South Sudan have not yet signed or acceded to the CRPD. Victim assistance is very often linked with, or included in, the national CRPD coordination mechanisms of countries that are party to both the Mine Ban Treaty and the CRPD. Furthermore, some states initial reports submitted under Article 35 of the CRPD have referred to victim assistance and landmine survivors. Although the CRPD does not establish new human rights, it does provide much greater clarity to the obligations of states to promote, protect, and ensure the rights of persons with disabilities and presents the concepts for those rights to become reality through implementation of the convention.

Adopted 70 years ago this year, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) established for the first time the fundamental human rights to be universally protected. The basis of many elements of the CRPD that inform understandings of the components, or pillars, of victim assistance are found in the UDHR, including healthcare (and rehabilitation), employment, education, and participation.28

THE RIGHTS OF PEASANTS AND OTHER PEOPLE WORKING IN RURAL AREAS

In September 2018, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas was adopted by the Human Rights Council. It includes several aspects relevant to survivors and indirect victims of mines.29

The declaration is compatible with the implementation of Maputo Action Plan Article 15, which “entails removing physical, social, cultural, economic, political and other barriers, including expanding quality services in rural and remote areas and paying particular attention to vulnerable groups.” State delegations that endorsed the declaration on the Rights of Peasants included Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with recorded mines/ERW victims: Algeria, Ecuador, El Salvador, Kenya, Nicaragua, Palestine, and the Philippines.

27 Maputo Action Plan Actions #12 to #18.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are highly complementary to the rights-based aims of victim assistance under the Mine Ban Treaty. They also offer opportunities for bridging between relevant frameworks. The SDGs, a set of 17 aspirational goals with corresponding targets and indicators that all UN member states are expected to use to frame policies and stimulate action for positive change in 2015–2030, are designed to address the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Their emphasis is on reaching the most marginalized persons, commonly phrased as “leaving no-one behind.”

CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES


Two States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and ongoing conflict, the DRC and Yemen, had a Level-3 IASC system-wide response activated in 2017–2018. Syria, a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, was the only other country to have a Level-3 response active in the period.

In Yemen, the ongoing conflict dramatically increased demand for emergency and ongoing medical care beyond the capacity of the medical system. Additionally, the mine action center had to suspend victim assistance activities in 2018.

A UN strategic review for 2018 reclassified Afghanistan from a post-conflict country to one in active conflict. Movement restrictions due to conflict in Afghanistan were among the persistent obstacles to victim assistance in some parts of the country. Conflict continued to cause damage and disruption to social healthcare services, while trauma, physical injuries, and mass displacement increased the need for those services. Security constraints prevented some rehabilitation outreach services from operating. Other States Parties where conflict and unstable security situations similarly impacted implementation of victim assistance included Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, and South Sudan. In Somalia, insecurity was widespread and the indistinct nature of conflict front lines hindered delivery of assistance by many international humanitarian agencies, particularly to areas under the control of non-state armed groups.

Persons with disabilities are referred to directly in the SDGs: education (Goal 4), employment (Goal 8), reducing inequality (Goal 10), and accessibility of human settlements (Goal 11), in addition to including persons with disabilities in data collection and monitoring (Goal 17). With an emphasis on poverty reduction, equality, and inclusion, the SDGs also recognize the need for the “achievement of durable peace and sustainable development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations.”


Such an activation occurs when a humanitarian situation suddenly and significantly changes, and it is clear that the existing capacity to coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance and protection does not match the scale, complexity, and urgency of the crisis. Based on an analysis of five criteria: scale, complexity, urgency, capacity, and reputational risk. IASC, “L3 IASC System-wide response activations and deactivations,” 4 April, 2017, bit.ly/IASCL3.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to fulfill its treaty obligations. This chapter focuses on financial support for mine action provided for calendar year 2017 by affected countries and international donors. It also documents new funding announcements made by some donors in 2018 to support mine action efforts. Cooperation and assistance, however, is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing.

2017 FIGURES AND TRENDS

Total Support to Mine Action—Thirty-seven donors and 10 affected states reported contributing US$771.5 million in international and national support for mine action in 2017; this is $203.6 million more than the revised 2016 amount (a 36% increase). Taking into consideration inflation, it represents the second highest annual total of international and national mine action funding since the Monitor began reporting.

International contributions accounted for 87% of overall support for mine action in 2017, while states' contributions to their own national mine action programs accounted for the remaining 13% of global funding.

---

1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs for calendar year 2017, as of October 2018. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current dollars. Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year rather than the calendar year. The total amounts of international support between 2012 and 2016 were updated to include revised contributions from the European Union (EU) and the United States.

2 In 2012, international and national support totaled US$756.2 million. Adjusted for inflation, 2012 global support is $807.3 million in 2017 dollars, the highest annual total on record. The Monitor used the annual average of US All Urban Consumers Price Index (for all items) to adjust data on support for mine action for inflation. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: CPI-All Urban Consumers (Current Series)," Data extracted on 4 November 2018, https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CUUR0000SA0.
International Contributions—The level of international support for mine action provided by donors increased for the second consecutive year, rising from $482.9 million in 2016 to $673.2 million in 2017 (a 39% increase). This represents the highest level of international support recorded by the Monitor. The 2017 rise was primarily driven by massive increases in the contributions of the United States (US) and Germany.

- The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors—the US, Germany, the European Union (EU), Norway, and Japan—contributing a total of $532.7 million, or 79% of all international funding for 2017.
- The top five recipient states—Iraq, Syria, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Lao PDR—received a combined total of nearly $435.4 million, representing 65% of all international contributions.
- International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (59% of all funding), victim assistance (2%), capacity-building (1%), and advocacy (1%). The remaining 37% was not disaggregated by the donors.

National Contributions—The Monitor identified 10 affected states that provided $98.3 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, $13.3 million more than in 2016 (a 16% increase), when 11 affected countries reported contributing $85.0 million.

INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2017

For the second year running, donors increased their international mine action assistance in 2017 and provided $673.2 million in funding to 38 affected states and three other areas. This represents an increase of more than $190 million (39%) from the $482.9 million reported in 2016, and almost twice as much as the $376.5 million reported in 2015.

International support for mine action: 2007–2017*

Note: * Not adjusted for inflation.

---

3 The Monitor maintains records of international support to mine action back to 1996, and national support back to 2002. The 2017 international support total is the highest in nominal and inflation-adjusted terms.

The 2017 rise is in large part due to the substantial increases in the contributions of the US and Germany:

- US funding in 2017 ($309.0 million) doubled from 2016. More than half of the US contribution ($169.6 million) went to mine action projects in Iraq and Syria.\(^5\) In comparison, this is $17 million more than its 2016 total contribution of $152.4 million. The US provided $106.6 million to activities in Iraq aimed at clearing Islamic State explosive remnants of war (ERW) in order to facilitate the restoration of critical infrastructure and services, as well as the safe return of displaced populations. This represents a tripling in its contribution to this country compared to the $30.9 million provided in 2016. In addition, the US contributed $63 million to support clearance in areas liberated from Islamic State in northeast Syria, as well as risk education activities. This is six-times higher than US funding provided to this country in 2016.

- Germany’s funding in 2017 ($84.4 million) more than doubled from 2016. Germany’s largest contribution went to Iraq ($47.3 million) for clearance, victim assistance, and capacity-building activities. This represents more than half of its total contribution for the year, and more than double the funding provided to Iraq in 2016. Syria also received substantial funds from Germany, with $13.9 million provided.

PLEDGES IN 2018

At the Maputo Review Conference, in June 2014, States Parties committed to complete their respective time-bound obligations by 2025. This commitment has led to a number of initiatives and announcements aimed at strengthening international cooperation and assistance, and promoting the need for predictable adequate funding in order to meet the goal of a mine-free world by 2025.\(^6\)

In February 2018, 33 States Parties, one state not party, the EU, as well as non-governmental and international organizations attended the Third Pledging Conference for the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, hosted by Afghanistan in Geneva. In total, 11 States Parties\(^7\) made pledges to the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and sponsorship program. Four additional States Parties—Austria, Belgium, Canada, and Sweden—indicated their intention to support the work of the treaty but were not in a position to pledge a specific amount as their respective budgets were still under review.

In addition, some mine action donors renewed their commitment to providing financial resources:

- In March 2018, South Korea announced a pledge of $20 million to support clearance and capacity-building activities in the provinces of Quang Binh and Binh Dinh as part of the Korea-Vietnam Mine Action Project.\(^8\)

---

\(^5\) Amounts indicate the country in which funds were to be used. Funds often are not used by the governments in recipient countries, but instead by those providing services.


\(^7\) Australia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and Thailand. Mine Ban Treaty, Third Pledging Conference Report, 27 February 2018, bit.ly/MBT3rdPledging.

• In September 2018, the United Kingdom (UK) announced the provision of an additional £46 million (some $58 million) to support demining, risk education, and capacity development projects in Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, and Vietnam. 10

DONORS IN 2017

In 2017, 28 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, two states not party, the EU, and six other institutions 11 contributed a total of $673.2 million to mine action.

A small group of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action support with the five largest donors (the US, Germany, the EU, Norway, and Japan) accounting for nearly four-fifths of all international support with a combined total of $532.7 million. The US remained the largest mine action donor with $309 million and it alone provided nearly half of all international mine action support in 2017. Germany ranked second with $84.4 million, or 13% of all contributions, while the next three donors—the EU, Norway, and Japan—provided more than $30 million each.

Another 17 donors contributed less than $1 million each, compared to 11 contributing in that range in 2016. Support from States Parties in 2017 accounted for two-fifths of all donor funding, with 28 countries providing some $269.2 million. This represents a 9% increase from the $246 million recorded in 2015.

In 2017, the EU and its member states 12 contributed a total of $233.1 million and accounted for 35% of the total international support, up from $194 million provided in 2016 (40% of the total international funding for that year).

11 South Korea and the US are the two states not party. The six institutions are Howard Buffett Foundation, the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development (OFID), the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, the United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden, the UN, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
12 Eighteen EU Member States provided funding in 2017: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
### Contributions by donors: 2013–2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>309.0</td>
<td>152.4</td>
<td>159.3</td>
<td>113.1</td>
<td>113.5</td>
<td>847.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>176.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>301.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>184.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>235.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>102.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>115.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard Buffett Fndn</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors*</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>673.2</td>
<td>482.9</td>
<td>376.5</td>
<td>430.7</td>
<td>448.8</td>
<td>2412.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Other donors in 2017 included: Andorra, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development (OFID), Sudan Humanitarian Fund, United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden, and the UN.

Fifteen donors contributed more in 2017 than they did in 2016; including a $157 million increase from the US (103%), and a $47 million increase from Germany (126%). Additionally, Norway increased its assistance by $7.5 million. Five new donors were also identified in 2017: Finland, Monaco, Portugal, the Howard Buffett Foundation, and the UN.

In contrast, 17 donors decreased their funding, led by the EU (down $9.3 million, a 12% decrease) and Japan (down $8.3 million, a 20% decrease). Additionally, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands decreased their assistance by more than $6 million each.

---

13 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of international support for 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 were updated as a result of revised EU and US funding totals.

14 Finland budgeted funding for mine action in 2016, but it was reported that payments could not be executed due to changes in the administration and the extension of the tender-processes. As a result, no support was reported in 2016, and the 2017 total included some of the funding initially budgeted for 2016.
### Summary of changes in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Combined Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than $10 million</td>
<td>Germany and the US</td>
<td>$203.7 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than $10 million</td>
<td>Andorra, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK, OPEC, OFID, and UNA-Sweden</td>
<td>$19.4 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than $1 million</td>
<td>Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden, the EU, and OCHA</td>
<td>$52.4 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than $1 million</td>
<td>Estonia, Spain, Turkey, and the Sudan Humanitarian Fund</td>
<td>$0.8 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New donors in 2017</td>
<td>Finland, Monaco, Portugal, the Howard Buffett Foundation, and the UN</td>
<td>$20.4 million provided in 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table below summarizes the changes in mine action funding from the top 15 donors, expressed in their respective national currencies and US$ terms.

#### Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US$ terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Amount of decrease/increase (national currency)</th>
<th>% change from 2016</th>
<th>Amount of decrease/increase (US$)</th>
<th>% change from 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>+ €41.0 million</td>
<td>+121%</td>
<td>+ 47.1 million</td>
<td>+126%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>+ US$156.6 million</td>
<td>+103%</td>
<td>+ 156.6 million</td>
<td>+103%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>+ DKK33.6 million</td>
<td>+49%</td>
<td>+ 5.3 million</td>
<td>+52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>+ €0.9 million</td>
<td>+37%</td>
<td>+ 1.1 million</td>
<td>+40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>+ NOK57.9 million</td>
<td>+22%</td>
<td>+ 7.5 million</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>+ CHF2.9 million</td>
<td>+18%</td>
<td>+ 2.9 million</td>
<td>+18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>+ £2.4 million</td>
<td>+13%</td>
<td>+ 1.8 million</td>
<td>+7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>- €9.7 million</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>- 9.3 million</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>- C$3.4 million</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>- 2.4 million</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>- ¥787.8 million</td>
<td>-18%</td>
<td>- 8.2 million</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>- SEK11.0 million</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>- 1.3 million</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>- €5.8 million</td>
<td>-25%</td>
<td>- 6.0 million</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>- €1.4 million</td>
<td>-46%</td>
<td>- 1.5 million</td>
<td>-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>- NZ$10.3 million</td>
<td>-58%</td>
<td>- 7.1 million</td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>- A$9.7 million</td>
<td>-65%</td>
<td>- 7.1 million</td>
<td>-64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

FUNDING PATHS

Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by UNMAS and ITF Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known as the International Trust Fund).

In 2017, contributions through UNMAS totaled $81.7 million from 24 donors. Several small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action. Six donors as well as the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) and the UN allocated $3.8 million in 2017 through the ITF for mine action programs in seven states and one area.

While donor funding frequently is used for national activities, implementation is often carried out by an array of partnering institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies. Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2017 included Mines Advisory Group ($32.9 million), Norwegian People’s Aid ($23.2 million), HALO Trust ($20.5 million), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ($11.3 million), DanChurchAid ($11.5 million), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ($11.3 million), and Humanity & Inclusion ($8.6 million).

RECIPIENTS

A total of 38 states and three other areas received $627.3 million from 37 donors in 2017. A further $46 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The top five recipient states—Iraq, Syria, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Lao PDR—received 65% of all international support in 2017.

Iraq received the largest amount of funding (30% of all international support) from the largest number of donors (17). Eleven states and one area, or 29% of all recipients, had only one donor.

More than three-fifths of international support (63%, or $423.2 million) went to 16 countries or one other area with massive contamination ($320.2 million) and heavy contamination ($103.0 million). Most of this funding went to clearance and risk education projects.

In 2017, 29 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2016, including 14 recipients receiving more support, and 15 recipients receiving less support, four of which received no support. These fluctuations may be a reflection of shifts in donor priorities and changes in local situations.

---

16 The small donors included Andorra, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, and Portugal, as well as OCHA, the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and UNA-Sweden.
17 Only Afghanistan had the same number of donors in 2017.
18 Recipients with one donor included: Albania, Azerbaijan, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Mozambique, Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and other area Somalia.
19 Recipients of international support with massive contamination included: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Yemen, and the other area Western Sahara. Recipients with heavy contamination included: Colombia, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.
Iraq and Syria were the recipients with the largest increases, receiving respectively $120 million and $70.8 million more than in 2016, notably following the massive increases in the contributions of the US and Germany as previously detailed. In addition, three countries saw a substantial increase in support received: Colombia ($39.3 million more), Chad ($25.3 million more), and Libya ($18.6 million more).

- Support to Colombia ($65.5 million) more than doubled from 2016. In 2017, the Howard Buffett Foundation made a $16.1 million donation to support clearance activities in Colombia. Three donors considerably increased their contributions compared to 2016: the US ($12.5 million more), Japan ($7.8 million more), and Switzerland ($1.2 million more). These three countries participated in the Global Demining Initiative for Colombia ministerial-level meeting in September 2016, during which they pledged financial assistance to support Colombia’s mine action activities in the context of the peace process.\(^\text{20}\)


### List of international support recipients in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>200.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (CAR)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>673.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated by *italics*. 
• Support to Chad jumped from $0.4 million in 2016 to $25.7 million in 2017, following the awarding of EU funding to support capacity-building, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance activities. The EU was Chad’s sole international donor in 2017.

• Support to Libya ($26.5 million) more than tripled from 2016. This was due to the increase in the US contribution ($16 million provided in 2017 compared to $2.5 million in 2016) in order to build the operational capacity to dispose of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and to support clearance operations in Sirte, as well as to contribute to the development of the Libya Mine Action Center. Libya also received significant contributions from the EU and Germany, both providing more than $3.5 million each.

Croatia was the recipient with the largest decrease, receiving $37.8 million less than in 2016. Three additional countries experienced a high-value decline in support received in 2017: Cambodia ($20.2 million less), Afghanistan ($15.3 million less), and Lebanon ($10.1 million less). These decreases were the result of changes in donors’ contributions:

• Support to Croatia in 2017 ($12.9 million) was one quarter of that in 2016, primarily due to a decline after massive EU contributions to support clearance activities with $50.7 million provided in 2016.

• Support to Cambodia ($13.0 million) was reduced by more than half in 2017. The drop was mainly due to lower contributions from Australia (a decrease of $3.3 million less compared to 2016) and Japan (a decrease of $15.1 million).

• Support to Afghanistan dropped by a quarter in 2017. This was in large part a result of decreases in funding provided by the US ($11.6 million less than in 2016) and Canada ($2.9 million less). Despite these decreases, Afghanistan was the fourth largest recipient of mine action support.

• Support to Lebanon ($6.8 million) more than halved in 2017 and marked the return to a level of funding closer to that reported in 2014 ($7.0 million) and 2015 ($8.7 million).

### Summary of changes in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Combined Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than $10 million</td>
<td>Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, and Syria</td>
<td>$273.9 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase between $10 and $1 million</td>
<td>Georgia, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Vietnam, and Yemen</td>
<td>$18.4 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than $1 million</td>
<td>BiH, CAR, Jordan, Palau, the Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, the Solomon Islands, Western Sahara, and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$4.9 increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than $10 million</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, “Global,” and Lebanon</td>
<td>$94.4 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease between $10 and $1 million</td>
<td>Angola, Palestine, Somalia, and Ukraine</td>
<td>$8.1 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than $1 million</td>
<td>Albania, Azerbaijan, DRC, Kosovo, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Somaliland, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand</td>
<td>$3.5 decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients from 2016 that did not receive new support in 2017</td>
<td>Benin, Marshall Islands, Nigeria, and Peru</td>
<td>$1 million received in 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New recipients in 2017</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>$0.1 million received in 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR

In 2017, 59% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities, while support to victim assistance represented 2% of the total international support to mine action.

“Various” funding represented 37% of all international support to mine action. This includes contributions not disaggregated by the donors, as well as funding not earmarked for any sectors.

Contributions by thematic sector in 201721

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>% of total contribution</th>
<th>No. of donors</th>
<th>% of total dedicated contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance and risk education</td>
<td>395.9</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>249.9</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim assistance</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile destruction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>673.2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N/A = not applicable. "Dedicated contribution" (non-various funding) totaled $423.2 million in 2017 and included funding set for a specific sector (advocacy, capacity-building, clearance, risk education, stockpile destruction, or victim assistance). The "0" in stockpile destruction in 2017 does not mean states expended no funds for that activity, but rather that none of the contributions reported in 2017 detailed dedicated stockpile destruction funding.

Distribution of dedicated contributions by thematic sector

21 In 2016, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education ($346.8 million, or 72% of total international support), victim assistance ($21.0 million, or 4%), capacity-building ($12.5 million, or 3%), advocacy ($2.5 million, or 1%), stockpile destruction ($0 million, or 0%), and various activities ($100.1 million, or 20%). Data for 2016 was revised—based on new figures that detailed dedicated clearance and risk education funding as well as contributions that were not previously reported by donors.
Clearance and risk education

In 2017, $395.9 million, or 59% of all reported support for mine action, went toward clearance and risk education activities. This represents an increase of $49.1 million from 2016.22

Five of the 10 largest donors—the US, Germany, Norway, the UK, and the EU—provided 80% of all support to clearance and risk education ($315.6 million).

Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Twenty-two donors did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a total of $187.8 million in 32 countries and other areas (21 States Parties, eight states not party, and three other areas).23

Twelve donors reported contributions totaling $7.2 million specifically for risk education projects in 13 countries.24 Iraq received the most risk education-specific funding with $1.8 million.

Victim assistance

Direct international support for victim assistance activities remained below the level of most previous years, and decreased significantly as a percentage of total mine action funding. Based on information available as of October 2018, in 2017, $15.8 million was reported, down from $21 million in 2016. This represents just 2% of all reported support for mine action, in comparison, victim assistance funding ranged between 4% and 7% of all support from 2013 to 2016. This estimate may be conservative in that some donors were not able to provide specific details on dedicated victim assistance funding at the time of writing, but it still provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding situation.

Fourteen25 donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 10 States Parties, and four states not party.26 Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance. Funding for victim assistance activities, however, is especially difficult to track because many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs for development and for the rights of persons with disabilities. Since such contributions are not disaggregated, it is not possible to include them in Monitor reporting.

The top three victim assistance donors—Germany, Switzerland, and Norway—provided 60% ($9.5 million) of all victim assistance funding in 2017.

Eight donors reported contributing $12.3 million, more than three-quarters (78%) of all support to victim assistance in 2017, through the ICRC or national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.

---

22 Albania, Chad, Nepal, Serbia, and Sudan were the five recipients which did not receive funding dedicated to clearance and risk education in 2017. This does not mean that donors did not support activities related to this sector, but that none of the contributions reported detailed specific funding going to clearance and risk education only.

23 States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Mali, Mozambique, Palau, Palestine, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States not party that received international assistance for clearance were: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. Other areas that received international assistance for clearance activities were: Kosovo, Somalia, and Western Sahara.

24 Recipients of international assistance for risk education were: Cambodia, CAR, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

25 Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, the EU, and the OFID.

26 States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. States not party that received international assistance for victim assistance were: Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, and Nepal.
Advocacy and capacity-building

In 2017, just 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities ($3.6 million). Of the 37 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, 10 reported supporting advocacy activities.

Thirteen donors provided $8 million—1% of all international support—to support capacity-building activities in seven States Parties and two states not party.

NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2017

While there has been more transparency from affected states, overall national contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports. States Parties such as Iraq and Sri Lanka, as well as states not party India and Vietnam—all mine-affected states with significant contamination and major clearance operations, usually conducted by the army—have never reported annual expenditures.

Ten affected states reported $98.3 million in contributions to mine action from their national budget in 2017, $13.3 million more than the $85.0 million reported in 2016, but far from the $131.2 million reported in 2015.

In 2017, one state completely funded its own mine action program: Chile. Additionally, four States Parties reported funding more than half of their own mine action programs: Angola, BiH, Croatia, and Sudan.

FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION 2013–2017

Over the past five years (2013–2017), total support to mine action amounted to some $3.1 billion, an average of about $623 million per year.

Although data about national support remains incomplete, such support has accounted for about one-quarter of total mine action funding over the period, and amounted to approximately $709.1 million.

International support totaled $2.4 billion, an average of $481 million per year, and

---

27 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to, contributions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Units, the Gender Mine Action Programme (GMAP), the Geneva Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva Call, and the ICBL-CMC and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

28 Two of the 10 affected states analyzed in this chapter reported national funding for mine action in a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2017: Cambodia and Zimbabwe. Four others provided details on their national contribution for mine action in their extension requests: BiH, Croatia, Serbia, and Sudan. Lao PDR and Lebanon reported their national contributions in their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports for 2017. Information on national mine action provided in 2017 by Angola and Chile is available in their respective annual national budget laws.

29 Eleven affected states reported on their national contributions in 2016: Angola, BiH, Chad, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

30 Chile has not received international support since 2007.
represented 77% of all support. Three donors—the US ($847.4 million), the EU ($301.5 million), and Japan ($235.5 million)—contributed $1.4 billion, more than 50% of total international support. Four other donors—Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK—contributed more than $100 million each. Support from States Parties accounted for half of all international funding with $1.2 billion provided.

Between 2013–2017, the top five recipients—Iraq ($402.6 million), Afghanistan ($261.6 million), Lao PDR ($182.3 million), Cambodia ($132.5 million), and Colombia ($131.0 million)—received 46% of all international contributions. Syria was the only other country receiving more than $100 million over this five-year period.

Summary of contributions: 2013–2017
Some of the victim assistance and survivors’ rights materials in print over the past 20 years, displayed at the Mine Ban Treaty 16th Meeting of States Parties in 2017.

© ICBL, December 2017
STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (1997 MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 1 November 2018 there were 164 States Parties.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 14 May 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>8 Nov 02 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>6 Jul 98; 6 May 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>19 Sep 02 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Rep</td>
<td>4 May 01 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 20 May 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem Rep of Congo</td>
<td>2 May 02 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 18 May 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>16 Sep 98 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>27 Aug 01 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>12 May 04 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9 Jan 12 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 22 May 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 5 May 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>15 Aug 07 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>7 Sep 00 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>30 Jul 07 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1 Jul 05 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>23 Dec 99 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>26 Feb 99; 12 May 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>FYR 9 Sep 98 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 7 May 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>23 Oct 06 (s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>7 Aug 00 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>27 Sep 01 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>20 Aug 14 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>18 Nov 07 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>29 Dec 2017 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>28 Jun 04 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date of Ratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé &amp; Príncipe</td>
<td>30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>18 Sep 03 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>16 Apr 12 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>11 Nov 11 (s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>13 Dec 2017 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 23 May 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>12 Oct 99 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>7 May 03 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>25 Sep 03 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>13 September 2011 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SIGNATORY**

Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

**NON-SIGNATORIES**

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
China
Cuba
Egypt
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Libya
Micronesia, Federated States of
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Syria
Tonga
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1
General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
   b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
   c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 2
Definitions

1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

ARTICLE 3
Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
ARTICLE 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

ARTICLE 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
ARTICLE 6
International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
   b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
   c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
   d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
   e) Assistance to mine victims;
   f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.
ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
   b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
   c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
   d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
   e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
   f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
   h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
   i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
   a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
   b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
   c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.
ARTICLE 9
National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10
Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

ARTICLE 11
Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 12
Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States
Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 13
Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14
Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
ARTICLE 15
Signature
This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

ARTICLE 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

ARTICLE 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
**Landmine Monitor 2018**

*Landmine Monitor 2018*, the 20th annual Landmine Monitor edition, provides a global overview of efforts in 2017 and into November 2018 where possible, to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally assesses the international community’s response to the global landmine and explosive remnants of war problem. It covers developments in the areas of antipersonnel landmine use, production, stockpiling, mine action, casualties, victim assistance, and mine action funding.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community’s response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

**Cover:** Deminer Janisser Diaz, 22, at work in Vista Hermosa, Colombia. © J.M. Vargas/Humanity & Inclusion (HI), November 2017

**Top left:** Stockpiled antipersonnel landmines are being counted before their destruction in Western Sahara as part of the Polisario Front’s efforts under the Deed of Commitment. © N. Sion/GENEVA CALL, May 2018

**Top right:** Landmine survivor San San Maw volunteers as a prosthetic repair person at the Kawkareik Victim Assistance Centre in Karen state, Myanmar. The Centre is run by the Myanmar Physically Handicapped Association. © Mi Mi Khang/Hi, October 2017

Cover Design: Lixar I.T. Inc.

Printed and bound in Switzerland.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is coordinated by the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the Governance Board of the ICBL-CMC.

Research team leaders, ICBL-CMC staff, and expert representatives of the following organizations comprise the committee: DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group, Human Rights Watch, Humanity & Inclusion, and Mines Action Canada.

[www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org)