UN Resolution 1325 at 16: Where to from here in the Horn?

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Currently, we run conflict transformation programmes in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions in partnership with local civil society organisations and universities in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and the DRC. There is also a common programme including publications, policy work and methodology design based in Sweden.
EDITOR'S NOTE

This November-December 2016 issue of the Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) seeks to mark the 16th anniversary of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), a landmark resolution which had the objectives of protecting women and children in situations of armed conflict and ensuring women’s participation in post-conflict processes. UNSCR 1325 is to be commended in so far as it has enabled the incorporation of a gendered lens into peace and security interventions at the global, regional and national levels.

Africa has been at the forefront in developing a normative and institutional framework for UNSCR 1325, as several articles in this issue of the HAB attest. At the continental level, the Protocol to the African Union Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) are key instances of the progress that has been made to embed UNSCR 1325 in African instruments. States are also expected to report regularly on the level of implementation of the Maputo Protocol and the SDGEA. Several regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development have also adopted Regional Action Plans (RAPs) to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of UNSCR 1325. Other regional organizations are also in the process of drawing up RAPs. Nearly 20 African Union member states out of 54 have adopted 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs). The NAPs have reportedly led to concrete results in the actualization of the pillars of UNSCR 1325; at the levels of legal and policy reform, the inclusion of women in decision making positions and creating mechanisms to implement and monitor implementation.

Nonetheless, the concept behind the issue was to uncover and also initiate a conversation on the latest insights and new frontiers on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda - especially attuned to the realities of the Horn of Africa. 16 years of UNSCR 1325 and extensive efforts to actualize the pillars of UNSCR 1325, should have led to several iterative rounds of testing assumptions, forging new solutions and innovations in relation to furthering the women, peace and security agenda. To that end, the editorial team sought articles covering a broad range of themes: pieces that would interrogate the major WPS funding streams in the Horn of Africa and its aggregate impact, latest thinking and programming around the role of masculinities in conflicts in the Horn, intersectionality as a lens for analysing various conflicts, practice and prospects for prosecutions as a form of transitional justice mechanism for conflict-related sexual violence, social media discourse in the Horn of Africa on the WPS and traditional mechanisms for addressing sexual violence in conflict settings and the potential to use Women’s Situation Rooms during elections as an innovative conflict preventive measure. However, we had a hard time finding articles and authors that would take on the challenge. Although we were a bit disappointed, the editorial team also took this as an interesting commentary on the state of theorizing and degree of rethink that is going on in the WPS community of practice. Is thinking and theorization in the sphere of UNSCR 1325 still ongoing? Or alternatively is this another instance of the tendency to discount gender issues in peace and security discourse? This also begged the question whether the emphasis on practice in the realm of WPS has tended to discourage theorization and reflexivity. It perhaps also suggests the need for greater engagement of policy and academic actors with activists and practitioners-and greater efforts to ‘excavate’ the sites and spaces where ‘progressive’ theorizing and practice is happening. To sum up, this editor’s note is both a reminder and also a call to action to our subscribers and stakeholders, to foreground a gendered lens in their security analysis in 2017 and to push the ‘frontiers’ of theorising and reflection in the WPS realm.
However, it is not all bleak as a number of contributions in this issue of the HAB make a sustained effort to rethink, regionalize and localize UNSCR 1325 discourse. The excellent opening article by Semiha Abdulmelik, who also served as guest editor, provides not only an exhaustive overview of the institutional and normative framework underpinning the WPS agenda at the global and African levels, but also identifies entry points for African Member States and institutions to have an impact on global policy and practice on UNSCR 1325. Jeanine Cooper’s article titled, ‘Financing for Women, Peace and Security’ discusses the issue of resources for the WPS agenda. Her article identifies innovative models for fundraising in the area of ‘Public-Private Partnerships’ and also pinpoints the possible obstacles with these models. Rahel Sebhatu’s article argues for a ‘critical feminist’ perspective on UNSCR 1325 and 1820 that would aim for structural transformation in gender relations and a ‘Gender-Just Peace’. Rahel uses the experiences of women in liberation movements in the Horn of Africa to explore the potential and limitations of their gender emancipatory impact. Obert Hodzi’s article touches on an aspect that combines ‘protection’ and ‘relief and recovery’, two pillars of UNSCR 1325. Obert highlights the limitations of the approach that sees the gendering of United Nations peacekeeping operations as being realized solely through the increase in the numbers of women deployed in peacekeeping operations. The article in French, for our francophone readers, by John Gbenagnon, is more abstract in its focus and argues that a gendered lens is imperative to not only ensure positive peace but also inclusive socio-economic development.

Semiha Abdulmelik and Demessie Fantaye

Editors

[1] The following are a few cases in point of regional organizations developing action plans and instruments to embed the provisions of UNSCR 1325; Southern African Development Community (SADC) Gender Policy (2007), SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (2008), East African Community (EAC) Gender and Community Development Framework.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) marked a watershed moment in the acknowledgment of the physical security of women in armed conflict, as well as recognizing their agency and leadership in conflict resolution and broader peacebuilding. Over time, and in subsequent resolutions, this agenda has been broadened to include not just women’s physical security, but other forms of insecurity for women, as well as looking at the role of women in post-conflict contexts. October 2015 presented a critical milestone for the women, peace, and security agenda globally. It marked the 15th year anniversary of UNSCR 1325 and the launch of the High-Level Review and Global Study on Implementation of 1325. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) subsequently adopted Resolution 2242, which among other things, emphasized the critical role for regional organizations in driving this agenda and the further progress required at national level[1].

The Global Study documented important and tangible progress in achieving the aims enshrined in 1325. There has been greater involvement of women as peace-builders and growing tendency towards incorporating gender specific provisions in peace agreements.[2] Provision of gender expertise and technical assistance to mediation processes and wider political processes and actors-including women’s groups has become more standard. Gendered analyses of conflict have become the norm rather than the exception. Another outcome of 1325 is the emphasis given to broader representation of women in decision-making positions, particularly through the use of special measures, quotas, and incentives[3]. The institutionalization of the language of women, peace, and security at the strategic level of the UNSC and impact on programming and funding streams is notable; however, shifts in operational tools and practice, as well as on-ground impact has been less visible. More broadly, international security discourse has yet to fully move away from the traditional notions of security to one firmly embedded in human security as well as definitely resolve the ongoing tension over the goals of peace-making-to end violence or create peace[4].

The review of 1325 implementation also coincided with a number of related review processes at the global level, from a review of the UN peace-building architecture, UN peace operations, Hyogo Framework, Millennium Development Goals, to the global humanitarian architecture. These were all opportunities to bring more coherence, prominence, and synergy to the women, peace, and security agenda within them, as well as bring African perspectives to bear on these issues. These multiple reviews raised a number of critical conceptual and operational considerations for the women, peace, and security agenda. These include the need for a shift in focus from ‘women’ to ‘gender’ in peace and security, and a focus on the role of masculinities and militarization in peace and security; the primacy of conflict prevention-both as activity and outcome- as well as attention to structural issues and systemic drivers; and incorporating emerging issues
and trends including climate change and violent extremism among others.

The women, peace and security landscape in Africa

Continently, the women, peace, and security architecture in Africa comprises of an elaborate normative framework built around a basket of policy and legal instruments starting from UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions, which has been embedded and developed further at continental and regional levels; implementation frameworks which include national and regional action plans on UNSCR 1325 as well as other WPS commitments; regional policy engagement platforms on WPS; and institutional programs, measures and flagship initiatives.

While National Action Plans (NAPs) are not the only vehicle to drive implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda[^5], they offer a useful measure to assess the overall state of domestication of UNSCR 1325 nationally. In Africa, only 19 Member States—or a third (1/3) plus one—have adopted 1325 NAPs. To a large extent, gains in Member States have been around instituting legal, policy and institutional measures, with some progress around changes in practice and impact for women. There still exist consistently high rates of violence against women and girls in conflict situations, as well as post-conflict settings and poor access to justice; low levels of participation of women in formal peace processes and political settlements, as well as the security sector and other spheres of public life; and weak support to women’s economic recovery and empowerment in post-conflict settings. In addition to enduring structural barriers and lasting harmful attitudes on gender roles and the normalization of gender based violence; poor localization, both in terms of grassroots sensitization and local-level institutional machinery; inadequate and unsustainable resourcing for implementation; weak integration with broader development or governance policy; and weak data collection and monitoring systems seriously hamper effective implementation of NAPs[^6].

Regionally, two regional bodies have developed and adopted 1325 Regional Action Plans (RAPs). These are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). West Africa has the largest concentration of 1325 Action Plans, with thirteen (13) ECOWAS Member States – of the fifteen (15) – having NAPs. With the adoption of 1325 NAPs by Kenya and South Sudan in 2016, now three (3) IGAD Member States—of the eight (8) have NAPs. Given the (sub)regional cause and consequence of conflict in Africa, many sub-regions, such as the Great Lakes and the Manu River have also engaged through multi-country consortia—strong civil society engagement—to drive discussions on regional WPS plans. At the continental level, Agenda 2063’s Ten Year Implementation Plan and the African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016-2020 provide the overall planning framework for women, peace, and security.

The degree and nature of civil society engagement in the development, implementation, and monitoring of NAPs has varied. In some contexts, civil society has partnered and engaged substantially with governments and regional institutions in the implementation
and monitoring of NAPs/RAPs. In addition to being part of multi-stakeholder steering committees and other ‘formalized’ roles within government-led spaces, civil society has played a proactive role in 1325 implementation. Nonetheless, space for civil and political engagement is not given in many African countries, and has been shrinking in several contexts[7]. Financing for local action also remains limited and unsustainable[8], and driven largely by donor priorities.

Entry points for enhanced African leadership on WPS

The foregoing illustrates that Africa has a rather elaborate architecture for WPS-much of which has been characterized by horizontal and vertical innovation and experimentation-as well as significant international attention. Substantial implementation gaps remain however. The below, while recognizing the need for accelerated performance on WPS commitments generally, identifies a number of entry points and opportunities for African Member States and institutions to demonstrate enhanced thought and practice leadership globally on WPS.

The focus in African Member States has largely been on domestic implementation, rather than as a part of foreign policy, or external promotion of the women, peace, and security agenda. As African Member States and regional organizations increasingly take the lead in mediation processes and broader conflict resolution and prevention efforts, and hold prominent roles in global peace and security fora such as rotational non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council or the African Union Peace and Security Council, there is potential for influencing global and regional discourse and practice on WPS. It has been argued “that there has not emerged a serious African perspective about the African role in, and contribution to the discourses on international security, as distinct from African perspectives about security in Africa.”[9]. This challenges the region to play a larger role in shaping global discourse and agenda-setting on WPS.

Leveraging global policy and decision-making spaces

Ethiopia, the fourth largest African contributor of peacekeepers, and the leading contributor of female peacekeepers[10], has just commenced its two-year tenure as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Given this opportunity, Ethiopia, both as an individual Member State, and African member of the UNSC, can use its membership to influence the treatment of WPS at the UNSC, particularly in peacekeeping contexts.

Peacekeeping in Africa covers a wide range of conflicts-both those with and without high levels of sexual violence. Peacekeeping mandates, resourcing, and tools need to be responsive to a broader WPS agenda which transcends physical security. In this regard, it should be noted that the AU adopted a Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations in 2015, which included a section on WPS[11].

Influencing discourse and practice

The AU Panel of the Wise noted that “since the early 1990s, Africa has served as a vast testing ground for new policies to address impunity, seek truth and justice, and enable...
reconciliation in fractured societies”[12]. With regards to gender-responsive justice, this has largely focused on accountability for sexual violence, and with prosecutions as the main tool for redress. Recent African experience, including in the draft Africa Transitional Justice Policy- which seeks to consolidate comparable transitional justice practices in Africa[13] as well as the Report of the Commission of Inquiry Report on South Sudan[14]-particularly its recommendations on reconciliation which seek to address systems and structures that perpetuate women’s rights violations provide the basis for the continent to influence prevailing international discourse and practice on justice.

*Promoting good practice and innovative models*

Conflict prevention, in principle, has now been endorsed as a peace and security priority coming out of the 2015 Review of United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture[15]. The Women’s Situation Room, a women-led initiative to prevent and mitigate electoral violence-particularly against women candidates and voters-has been set up in over ten African countries with slight variations and contextual adaptations[16]. This innovative model twins the imperatives of early warning, conflict prevention and mediation. This model, which is led by civil society but engages a wide range of government institutions and actors, represents an effective infrastructure for peace. As far back as 2010, it was noted as best practice by the African Union and most recently acknowledged by the UNSC[17].

The foregoing highlight a few opportunities and entry points for enhanced African leadership on WPS. Nevertheless, the challenge will not just be in shaping global and continental discourse and approaches to WPS, but pursuing greater autonomous capacity to implement these approaches on the African continent. This points to the need to engage more in ‘disrupting’ the political economy of international development cooperation and aid for security generally, and women, peace, and security specifically.

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**Sources**


Financing for women, peace and security
By Jeanine Cooper

It has been 16 years since the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (1325) on women, peace and security (WPS) was signed. While considerable progress has been noted in terms of policy development, and several regions and countries have adopted action plans to deliver on 1325 objectives, actual implementation has not been as robust as expected. One key reason has been the failure to allocate sufficient resources and funds.

Globally, funding for gender equality programming, including for WPS is low, and it is unpredictable. In 2012-13, just 2% of all aid in fragile states and economies targeted WPS[1], and there are still significant funding gaps in the economic and productive sectors known to be the root causes of many conflicts, and therefore, the basis for post-conflict recovery.

The Executive Director of UNWOMEN, Mme. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka noted that “It is a continuing frustration that the level of rhetoric for gender equality and the level of ambition expressed, is not evidenced in financing.[2]”

In 2015, noting changes in the global situation contexts and new dimensions in conflicts, the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Ban ki Moon, commissioned a study of the implementation of 1325. The report, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, was a comprehensive review of progress made since the year 2000, of challenges faced, and included recommendations for the next 15 years, in line with the Sustainable Development Agenda.

2015 was also the year of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), when the global framework to guide development and human security was recast from the Millennium Development Goals. The SDGs were launched in September of that year. But long before that, it was recognized that financing for this new global agenda would require all hands on deck. In July, the Secretary General convened another meeting: Financing for Development (FfD), bringing together thousands of the world’s best thinkers, from the public and private sectors, from civil society and governments, to craft out strategic resource mobilization for the fifteen years to follow.

Inadequate funding has become a common refrain for humanitarian and development actors and for Member States trying to implement national strategies for economic growth in general. This is why FfD is considered to be the most important pillar of the post-2015 agenda, paramount for the implementation of the SDGs and for global peace and security. In conflict and post-conflict settings, where domestic public finance is the least available option, funding is critical to address the risks that accompany state fragility. Worryingly, it is precisely in these settings that implementation of the WPS agenda is paramount, and where it needs support the most.

Special Funds such as the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women are important
multi-lateral sources but there is still a significant gap between funding that is available and the demand for resources at global, regional and national levels. In 2015, a Global Acceleration Instrument on WPS and Humanitarian Action (GAI)[3] has been set up as a multi-stakeholder initiative from Member States, the UN entities and civil society. The GAI is meant to provide dedicated and scaled-up financing for the implementation of the WPS agenda and to act as a collective platform for coordination and for the exchange of knowledge and experiences. One wonders if it is enough at global level, and how much of the acceleration will reach fragile states and communities regularly subjected to conflict and violence.

**Innovations in financing**

FfD explored innovations to traditional fundraising. A key component, and indeed the one that the World Bank has seized upon for implementation, and for moving the funding available for development purposes from “billions to trillions to action” is in the area of partnerships: Public-Private Partnerships, or PPPs, to be exact. This is in recognition of the growing limitations of Official Development Assistance, of public financing, and even of philanthropy, to fund the development objectives that many countries have defined. The public sector alone cannot make the investments needed to finance development. And at the same time, there is an increasing realization across the board that financial and social returns can co-exist: private sector businesses can do well while doing good.

Since the FfD Conference, organizations and Member States are looking at creative funding mechanisms that permit the leveraging of available funding, and scaling it up with private sector investments, corporate philanthropy, charity, impact bonds and so forth. The African Union for example is looking at options for mobilizing resources from continental sources and several African institutions are embracing the self-help methodology while working in partnership with the private sector.

In December 2016, the International Committee of the Red Cross pioneered the launch of a Humanitarian Impact Bond (HIB), looking to mobilize $25-35 million for five years of activities. Impact bonds finance outcomes, humanitarian or development impact, not just activities, making them also attractive for aid effectiveness. Interested donors such as the Belgian, Dutch and Australian governments and Spain’s La Caixa Banking Foundation are already on board with $19.7 million of commitments to the ICRC HIB. Parties to the bond will agree the rate of return for private investors, which will also be determined by how well the ICRC meets or exceeds the project’s targets.[4]
In Africa, and specifically in the Horn of Africa, global and local businesses have worked with national and international responders during times of crisis. The earliest experiments using remittances and cash transfers to target vulnerability happened in the Horn, bringing social purpose in direct contact with the banking sector. The partnership between the Kenya Red Cross Society and the private sector corporations anchored the Kenyans-for-Kenya initiative that helped to finance drought response in 2011 and again in 2015. The same model was used by the African Union (AU) to finance its deployment of medical practitioners to Ebola-affected countries in 2014-15. In 2016, President Kagame of Rwanda established an economic task force of public sector and private sector individuals to drive the implementation of the AU’s continental resource mobilisation, including the funding of its Peace Support Operations.

The women, peace and security agenda in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has been plagued with large and small-scale conflict for decades. Even an economic powerhouse like Kenya has experienced inter-communal clashes, post-electoral violence, and has been the victim of cross-border terrorist attacks in the years since UNSCR 1325 was adopted. As a consequence of the conflicts, the Horn of Africa has one of the highest incidences of forced displacement, within borders with high numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) or across national frontiers with refugees. The top three refugee-hosting nations in Africa are in the Horn of Africa (Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya); all three plus Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea fall under the regional jurisdiction of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

IGAD is one of only two regions in Africa with Regional Action Plans (RAPs), on WPS. Within IGAD, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan have developed National Action Plans (NAPs). And while conflict and forced displacement continue to take a toll on women, on peace and security, the NAPs and the RAP have embraced a human security approach to peace and security, looking beyond the physical to emphasize secure livelihoods, environmental protection and access to resources.
Kenya adopted its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, the KNAP, in March 2016. The KNAP provides a comprehensive overview of the conflict fault lines in the country and the areas where a robust agenda on WPS could make tremendous strides in advancing peace and security. KNAP also takes a broader human security approach including secure livelihoods, environmental protection and access to resources. For its financial resources, the KNAP refers to public budgetary allocations and seems to assume a degree of external funding. Like many of the women’s organizations cited by Arutyunova and Clark in *Watering Leaves, Starving the Roots*[5], the KNAP seems to rely primarily on project support rather than long-term flexible funding. And no mention is made of collaboration with the private sector, despite the country’s positive experiences with such partnerships.

**A partnership model to finance WPS in the Horn of Africa**

While several examples exist for enhanced partnerships to pay for the WPS agenda around the world, a Kenyan prototype, built on its successes in PPPs for disaster preparedness, response and recovery, could demonstrate the possibilities to prevent conflicts and sustain peace. Kenya is already a well-respected innovation hub with considerable technological capacities and a robust banking sector and stock exchange that have repeatedly demonstrated ingenuity in crafting financial instruments with social purpose. Kenyans in the public and private sector are familiar with blended finance options that mix public sector social return objectives, in this case the WPS objectives as espoused in the KNAP, with private sector financial return goals. The diverse composition of the Kenyan private sector: multi-national corporations, locally owned companies, institutions and individuals, serves to diminish the risks of external priorities prevailing over national (KNAP) objectives.

Alternatively, an impact bond for conflict prevention in Kenya would leverage funding from the public sector, either the GAI or from national budgets, focusing on the impact of mending conflict fault lines and areas where prevention efforts can be most effective. Such a bond should target human security outcomes that intersect with private sector priorities, like business continuity in areas known for conflict fragility. The bond allows for individual and institutional funds to flow towards known objectives including financial return. Such a partnership with the private sector can produce multiplier effects not only from money raised, but also the use of established private sector platforms, advertising, and other resources used to tackle social issues.

**Constraints to keep in mind**

Embracing non-traditional methods of fundraising is uncomfortable even if all indicators point to the need for this to happen. Partnerships with the private sector are not universally embraced and businesses are often viewed as primarily focused on money and profits with only shareholders’ interests at heart. Recent evidence from disaster response in Kenya and in the Horn of Africa debunks such outdated suspicions and there is growing global momentum to revisit the partnership with the private sector. Also, not all aspects of the WPS agenda fit well with innovative financing methods. Gender
equality may resonate less well than conflict prevention in certain circles. Fundraising strategies have to be aware of the priorities that intersect with each partner, whether in the public sector or the private. And there is nothing that threatens businesses more than the unpredictability of conflict and insecurity risks that are often too significant for either the public or the private sector to take on alone. The possibility of being able to reduce corporate risks through cooperation with the public sector on conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery is attractive for all concerned. The peace and security portion of the WPS agenda provides the lever to begin the conversation with the private sector. Meanwhile, public sector funding, or other donor contributions like the GAI, can target aspects of the WPS agenda that are less likely to stimulate private sector interest.

Kenya looks to hold national elections in August 2017, a process that has often been accompanied by violence and displacement in the past and this provides impetus to test a blended financing model in Kenya, applying the country’s strategic capacities and ability to raise domestic resources to help finance the KNAP. Testing a PPP prototype in Kenya aligns with the aspiration of 1325 to grow out of local contexts, to build on local capacities and to resolve local problems. WPS success in Kenya is replicable and can be scaled up to benefit the entire region.

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Sources


[2] Ibid. Page 375

[3] Ibid. Page 385


Reaching higher: Women liberators and gender
By Rahel Weldeab Sebhatu

National Action Plans (NAPs) and Regional Action Plans (RAPs) on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) are useful guides and advocacy tools for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1325 on WPS and UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence against civilians and armed conflict, for both state actors and civil society organizations. However, such documents have been slow on bringing about the desired social change. This is even more problematic for countries that have yet to develop NAPs. In the Horn of Africa[1], only three out of the eight members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have NAPs on WPS, two of which were adopted in 2016, 16 years after the adoption of UNSCR 1325. To promote the WPS agenda in the Horn, IGAD adopted the IGAD Regional Action Plan (IGAD-RAP) for 2011-2015 to implement UNSCRs 1325 and 1820[2].

The aim of this paper is to call on WPS activists, as well as feminists in the Horn, to reach higher than NAPs by challenging the discourse that women are solely victims of conflict, and emphasise women’s agency in peace and state-building. Moreover, all actors should pay due consideration to gender-just peace and transitional justice. By doing so, a critical feminist engagement with UNSCR 1325 and 1820 should argue that the political participation emphasised in the IGAD-RAP has become conflated with agency[3]. Governments of the Horn must ensure space for women to engage in peace-building while also considering their needs and representation in processes of transitional justice by acknowledging the role women have played in national liberation, reconstruction, and state-building processes.

Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda are the only countries in the Horn that have adopted NAPs on WPS. And although all of the action plans seek to “enhance justice for victims of GBV (gender-based violence) through institutions established to take relevant actions while addressing existing gaps and challenges in this regard”[4], what these action plans fail to do is identify and seek to combat other gender-justice gaps. Actors and stakeholders should be wary of the fact that “[m]ainstream transitional justice and peacebuilding practices tend to re-entrench gendered hierarchies by ignoring women or circumscribing their presence to passive victims in need of protection”[5]. By taking into consideration gendered hierarchies, while also recognising women’s agency in processes of peace- and state-building, one is able to advocate not just for peace, but for gender-just peace.

“A gender-just peace is understood not as a reconstruction of the pre-war situation, but as a positive peace that provides for social justice and equity and that recognises women’s social and reproductive roles and women’s agency.”[6] In other words, gender-just peace looks beyond gender mainstreaming and women’s “participation” in peace-building initiatives, peace negotiations, and within security forces; it seeks to avoid and challenge conservative backlash for women in post-conflict order[7].
There have been recent efforts to develop a more complex understanding of gendered agency\[8\] that emphasises women’s participation in violence, including that of resistance and as a means to bring about emancipation. Women of the Horn have participated in liberation movements in various ways. However, after liberation, these women experienced a conservative backlash that saw their once-praised participation somewhat dwindle in post-conflict times.

**Women as liberators**

Although the Horn (as a collective of countries) is often referred to as one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world, women’s participation and influence in these conflicts cannot be characterised in a homogenous way. However, the experiences of women as perpetrators of violence in some of the countries requires acknowledgement.

Women’s participation as armed combatants in non-state armed groups were most prevalent in the case of Eritrea and in the northern region of Ethiopia, namely Tigray. To some extent, women also participated as armed combatants during the second civil war (1983-2005) in Sudan, with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A)[9].

A third, or 34%, of the fighters in the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) were female[10]. Eritrean women joined the EPLF’s struggle for independence not just in support of its political cause, but also because gender equality was included within the agenda of the EPLF. Women who fought in the liberation struggle “enjoyed a marked change of status from their former position as marginalised women—they fought as equals alongside men, achieving high military positions and status” [11][12]. Feats of heroism, as noted by the National Union of Eritrean Women[13], “[tore] apart the reactionary feudal myth that women are weaklings.[14]”

In the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray, women contributed as Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) soldiers (making up about 30% of the armed movement) in the victory against the brutal military regime known as the Derg[15]. Despite the disadvantages and limits to the services they received within demobilisation and reintegration programs, “studies[16][17] found that TPLF women war veterans had a ‘fighter identity’ and ‘androgynous’ perception of womanhood that included certain traits traditionally associated with men (assertiveness, courage, ambition, and economic independence).”[18]

In South Sudan, particularly during the second civil war (1983-2005), Dr. John Garang, leader of the SPLM, sought to incorporate women into the resistance movement by recruiting them into the Woman’s Battalion[19]. Although South Sudanese women did participate in combat, their participation as combatants was not as prominent as that of their Eritrean and Ethiopian sisters. However, because of their contribution, they were able to demand a special unit within the SPLA/M to address women’s affairs, which was elevated into a Commission for Women, Youth and Social Affairs in 1989 and upon the signing of the CPA in 2005, it was again elevated into a full-fledged ministry[20]. The South Sudanese NAP for WPS also notes how women challenged oppression in other
ways such as through public protest, secretly sheltering soldiers and war victims, and undertaking dangerous work as messengers and decoys[21]. Women in both Eritrea and Ethiopia had also taken on similar tasks of resistance, even if they were not armed combatants.

Despite their notable contributions towards liberation, post-conflict times saw a conservative backlash when these women were reintegrated and demobilised. However, to deride their participation as combatants as being a negligible contribution towards achieving gender equality because of this backlash would be incorrect. As Eliatamby notes, despite the fact that women were in some ways expected to return to pre-war social norms, these women had experienced “more freedom and emancipation than they ever had prior to taking up arms”[22].

**Women liberators after war**

Ex-combatant women found it difficult to return to a society that was not ready to accept the kind of gender equality they had experienced in the field. In peace time, these women liberators found it difficult to adjust to traditional gender norms, which can be attributed to the fact that reintegration and demobilisation programs did not take into consideration (nor had the resources to challenge) the complex barriers to reintegration women liberators would encounter. It should also be noted here that Eritrea, Ethiopia and South Sudan have all returned to war and conflict soon after liberation. Unfortunately, women’s participation and representation in peace negotiations have been essentially invisible[23].

Only in Eritrea do women continue to be conscripted into state armed forces[24] as policy links military and national service to civic duty and citizenship. After independence, the SPLA had transformed itself to a regular army where both men and women are recruited, but as traditional perceptions still persist, women’s participation in state armed forces has been very limited. After the Derg regime was defeated in Ethiopia, many ex-combatant women understood that international law forbade women to be soldiers, and that the prevailing government applied this law, although no such international law exists[25].

Although expectations in post-war times, particularly that of gender equity, have not been fully met, the continuous role that women play in the reconstruction, state-building, and development of their respective countries cannot be ignored. Because the reintegration and demobilisation of female combatants had been “hastily planned and implemented”[26] in a way that did not consider the special needs of female combatants, the need for gender-just peace had not been recognised or acknowledged, let alone achieved. This has led female combatants to be somewhat disempowered after having put their lives at risk for the sake of their country and people. Nevertheless, their participation as (armed) liberators influenced much needed societal change and reforms, including that of citizen rights, the right to participate in the paid work force, and the criminalisation of forced marriage. Some women ex-combatants hold key positions within their respective governments. Undoubtedly, the generations of girls and women
that have come after these women have benefited from societal changes women liberators were able to bring about.

Conclusion

So far, this paper has discussed the agency of women in the Horn to take up arms not just because they believed in the cause of liberation, but also for the sake of their own emancipation. And even though there has been considerable conservative backlash upon liberation that has seen women, as gendered identities, “reconstructed, reconfigured, and redefined through interactions between liberal peacebuilding discourse and nationalism [and] culture”[27], the impact and legacy of their roles as liberators cannot and should not be overlooked. Had their agency been duly acknowledged through peace-building and gender equity initiatives, an environment to create gender-just peace could have prevailed.

NAPs and RAPs on WPS do not necessarily have a causal relationship to their desired outcomes, as these action plans are only as good as the paper they were written on if the proposed actions are not undertaken (all of the action plans in the Horn mention a current lack of resources necessary for implementation). Moreover, initiatives taken to implement such action plans might not bring about the required structural changes needed in order to have sustainable and gender-just peace. By putting more emphasis on the role women of the Horn have played as liberators—before and after liberation—WPS activists and feminists can advocate for an understanding that not only acknowledges women’s agency in state-building, but also that state-building and peacebuilding are linked projects. It should be noted that there is a difference between being a peacebuilder and being a pacifist. Accordingly, WPS activists and feminists who challenge the structural and epistemic violence that denies them their right to participate, to be represented in decision making processes, and to challenge structural discrimination (i.e. their right to practice agency), do so in resistance to patriarchy that is embedded in the post-independence, postcolonial situation they are currently in. For such women liberators, the transfer of power at independence and the achievement of national sovereignty was not the end, but simply a stage along the way in their struggle for full emancipation[28]. Although peacebuilding is often associated with non-violence, it is important to note that even though women liberators have now “put down their guns”, they are still resisting patriarchy and violence in a postcolonial politics in which they experience their everyday.

As UNSCR 1325 constructs gender in a way that characterises women as in need of protection and constructs security as the responsibility to protect firmly in the hands of elite political actors in the international system[29], so does the IGAD-RAP. Despite the fact that the IGAD-RAP does propose actions that considers structural issues with the aim of eliminating GBV, other structural issues such as the lack of equitable education and employment opportunities, social services, reproductive health care, and child services—all which should be viewed as reparations in post-conflict times—are missing.

By acknowledging women’s experiences of war as that of a liberator and a vital
participant in state-building processes, states will be one step closer to engendering gender-just peace. Some have criticised UNSCR 1325, and consequently IGAD-RAP, as being too broad. This paper does not call on the widening of the IGAD-RAP as such, but for a holistic understanding of what the goal of WPS agendas in the Horn should be, which is to place women’s participation in peace- and state-building within a historical and political context that acknowledges their historical legacy of engagement. It is more than putting women at decision making tables; it’s about giving women the gender-just peace they rightfully earned and deserve.

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Beyond numbers: Gender and UN peacekeeping
By Obert Hodz

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security acknowledges the disproportionate effects of violent conflict on women. The Resolution, therefore recommends a two-pronged approach that combines increasing the number of female peacekeepers with an integration of gender perspectives within its peace and security operations. Shifting from the gender-neutrality of previous UN peace operations, the goal of Resolution 1325 is to mainstream gender in all areas of peacekeeping, conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, humanitarian responses and post-conflict reconstruction.

At the 10th anniversary of Resolution 1325 however, the number of female troops deployed was a mere 2.4% in 2010. By the end of 2015, the number of female troops deployed at all UN peacekeeping missions had increased to an average of 3.1%, and as of August 2016, female troops constituted only 3.7% of all troops deployed in UN peacekeeping operations. In converse to the miserly number of female peacekeepers, there has been a surge in gender-based violence in armed conflict zones. The abduction of 250 girls in Nigeria by Boko Haram and the mass raping of women in South Sudan reflect the unchanging nature of sexual and gender-based violence as weapons of war.

Allegations of UN peacekeepers committing sexual violence and exploitation, such as rape and ‘food-for-sex’ against women and girls in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo have done little to instill confidence. Furthermore, reports published in June 2014 that a group of women were gang-raped in Juba, South Sudan by alleged pro-government forces not far from their heavily guarded UN refugee camp and close to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) camp increased concerns that the United Nations could be far from achieving its Resolution 1325 goals. Based on this background, this article explores the gaps and challenges hindering the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, with a focus on UN Peacekeeping operations.


Resolution 1325 assumes that an increase in representation of women at all decision-making levels, combined with an increase in female troops deployed as peacekeepers may translate to the achievement of gender mainstreaming goals at policy level, and in the increased protection and participation of women in peace building and conflict resolution. A study conducted by Lindy Heinecken however, suggests that the presence of female peacekeepers does not necessarily lead to protection of women in armed conflict situations because there is little focus on gender in peacekeepers’ mission-readiness training. Her finding suggests that gender is still dominantly considered by most Member States to be a ‘women’s issue’ that are distinct and secondary to peacekeeping - more of an extra burden on peacekeepers.

The major gap is that Resolution 1325, in placing the responsibility to train UN
peacekeepers on Member States, does not consider the entrenched culture of ‘militarised masculinity’ that female troops are trained in and operate in before deployment. In addition, because the major providers of UN peacekeeping troops are developing countries with poorly resourced militaries, there is poor pre-deployment training due to resource and operational constraints further inhibiting the capacity of their troops to mainstream gender in their training and operation. Without centralised or standard training of UN peacekeeping troops, the conduct of female troops in UN peacekeeping operations will continue to vary depending on their country of origin. Furthermore, the combined effect of lingering perceptions about women in the military and the UN’s reliance on troop contributing countries to implement Resolution 1325 mean that some UN Member States are still hesitant to deploy female peacekeepers, especially in volatile conflicts such as the ongoing civil war in South Sudan.

Secondly, once deployed, female troops, as is the case with their male counterparts are usually ill-prepared to deal with cultural or religiously embedded gender inequalities in the areas they operate. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo rape is widely used by both rebel and government troops as a weapon of war and a tool to subjugate rival communities, while in some cases female UN peacekeepers are not considered to be adequate ‘protectors’ by local women due to communally entrenched prejudices against women soldiers. Without a contextualised understanding of the gender-specificities in areas they operate in, the increased number of female UN peacekeepers is of inconsequential effect. The implication is that besides the quantitative increase in women peacekeepers, albeit small, women in conflict zones have remained victims of gender based forms of violence.

The second gap is that Resolution 1325 does not take into consideration the changing nature of armed conflicts. An overwhelming number of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are now intrastate, and are fought between government forces, state-sponsored militias and groups of rebel forces or insurgents, bringing to the fore new forms of armed conflict distinct from the traditional conflicts fought by uniformed and organised opposing forces. With most of these armed conflicts being fought in urban and peri-urban areas that once offered refuge to internally displaced persons, the war front has expanded for the number of UN peacekeepers that are often deployed. Under strain, gender-mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations is increasingly being relegated to a secondary issue.

Linked to the changing nature of armed conflicts is that the actors in the conflicts now also consist of transnational armed non-state actors, operating in more than one country. This is aided by porous borders in regions such as East, West and Central Africa. With groups, such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab eroding the autonomy of neighbouring states, and who utilize indiscriminate targeting of civilians, especially women as a strategy, UN peacekeeping operations are operating in increasingly difficult contexts. Furthermore, these groups exhibit features that conflate rebellion, religious extremism and terrorism while operating outside the realms of international law challenging effective implementation of Resolution 1325. Furthermore, the blurring of lines between war and organised crime mean that these groups may not be interested in political
settlement, and will seek to perpetuate the war to derive economic benefits.

In addition, the tendency of the armed groups in countries such as South Sudan to split into several factions make it difficult for Member States and the international community to hold them to account. The splits as in the case of the SPLM in South Sudan mean that various factions fight against each other as well as against the government making it complicated to determine the actual protagonists to hold to account and to implement the provisions of UNSCR 1325. Even in cases such as South Sudan where both the government and SPLM-IO signed separate communiques with the UN on combating sexual violence by their troops, the UN has found it difficult to enforce and monitor implementation of those communiques at the local level. Since most women remain in the villages protecting their properties and fields while men are conscripted by government forces or in the various rebel factions, they remain vulnerable. There is therefore a need for a paradigmatic shift from a focus on traditional forms of violent conflict with defined antagonists to a more fluidic insurgent-terrorist-organised crime kind of actors engaged in transnational violence. This implies that UNSCR 1325 should be adapted to hold both states and non-state actors to account, the same way that the Rome Statute has been used to hold rebel faction leaders, such as Germain Katanga of war crimes committed by rebels under his command.

The changing nature of armed conflicts mean that UN peace operations are increasingly being deployed in areas still under armed conflict, without peace to keep or maintain. Coupled with high rate of conflict relapse, the deployment of UN peacekeepers and other military forces mandated to protect civilians and critical infrastructure have in some cases led to further ‘militarisation’ of the conflict areas introducing new forms of gender-based violence. The targeting of UN peacekeepers in Mali and South Sudan leading to several casualties and deaths suggest that UN troops can be viewed by belligerents as parties to a conflict. The labelling of UN troops as ‘enemies’ has far-reaching effects on vulnerable groups that rely on their protection.

**Geopolitical Concerns and UN Peacekeeping**

The divisions in the UN Security Council seem to suggest that international politics and geopolitical concerns rather than gender considerations, constitute the paramount consideration. The implication is that gender analysis has not become an automatic element in the making of decisions to deploy or in the case of the affected state, accept the deployment of UN peacekeepers. States, particularly, the United States, Russia and China “tend to prioritize their strategic interests (e.g. enhancing national security, protecting trade routes, securing investment interests and increasing access to energy resources) above all other idealistic or humanitarian concerns.”[3] The result is that in some cases, the deployment of UN peacekeepers has been delayed even in cases where systematic rape and sexual violence is used as a weapon of war. In other cases, their mandate has been drastically limited inhibiting their ability to protect civilians.

While South Sudan’s political elites negotiate for peace with mediation from China, and the regional body, Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), fighting and
political violence continues. Women in South Sudan remain vulnerable and bear the biggest brunt of the conflict despite the various bilateral and multilateral interventions by South Sudan’s major investment partner, China. This is possible because when decisions on bilateral and multilateral interventions are made, the implication of those interventions on women are not usually considered to be of prime importance. Both the South Sudanese political elites and those that influence the intervention policy of foreign powers do not consider themselves responsible for how their intervention behaviour affects the women in South Sudan. The situation is further exacerbated by the exclusion of women from high-level mediation and peace negotiations, such that the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in South Sudan was quoted by Al Jazeera as saying: “If the men got out of the way, women would probably just run the country better.”[4]

Conclusion

Since decisions on deployment of peacekeepers are usually made at the United Nations Security Council, the planning and practice of UN peacekeeping is still dominated by realist and neorealist approaches, privileging states and the international system rather than human security. What has remained peripheral in the geopolitical calculations of the members of the Security Council are the gender dimensions of the intervention process (from the decision by a foreign state to intervene in an external conflict to the implementation of that intervention) by external powers in intrastate armed conflicts. This suggests that a mere increase in the number of women in peacekeeping does not equate to a gender-sensitive peace and security operation because as discussed above, there still is no meaningful correlation between the number of women peacekeepers and protection of women in conflict areas. This means that the underlying issue is not numerical increase of women participation but change of the underlying frame of thinking within the UN, its Member States and actors in conflict zones. This can be achieved by standardising UN peacekeepers’ vetting and pre-deployment training, ensuring that uniform procedures, policies and resources are used by all troop contributing countries. While the standardisation of pre-deployment training may not significantly change pre-existing Member State security and military policies, it will ensure that UN peacekeepers from different countries have a similar understanding of the UNSCR 1325 goals.

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Comment garantir la paix à travers la réduction des inégalités ?

By John Gbenagnon

Pour garantir la paix dans la société, il est important que chaque individu cultive la tolérance, accepte la diversité qui existe entre lui et son semblable, respecte les valeurs collectives et individuelles, promeut et encourage les droits des minorités, et travaille au quotidien pour cultiver la charité.

L’égalité de genre, ou l’égalité entre hommes et femmes, recouvre la notion selon laquelle tous les êtres humains, hommes et femmes, sont libres de développer leurs aptitudes personnelles et de faire leurs propres choix, sans qu’ils ne soient contraints par les stéréotypes, la division rigide des rôles et les préjugés.[1]

L’égalité de genre signifie que les comportements, les aspirations et les besoins différents des hommes et des femmes sont pris en compte, valorisés et encouragés de manière égale. Cela ne signifie pas que les hommes et les femmes doivent devenir identiques, mais que leurs droits, leurs responsabilités et leurs opportunités ne dépendront plus du fait d’appartenir à l’un ou l’autre sexe.[2]

D’après le guide de formation de l’UNESCO sur le genre, l’égalité signifie assurer l’accès des femmes et des hommes aux mêmes chances, droits, occasions de choisir, conditions matérielles par exemple, même accès aux soins médicaux, partage des ressources économiques, même participation à l’exercice du pouvoir politique...tout en respectant leurs spécificités.[3]

De plus, les droits des femmes sont aussi des droits humains. Selon le programme d’action de Beijing[1], ils couvrent tous les aspects de la vie : santé, éducation, participation politique, bien-être économique, absence de violence, parmi beaucoup d’autres. Les femmes et les filles doivent pouvoir bénéficier du plein exercice de tous leurs droits humains dans l’égalité et d’être à l’abri de toutes les formes de discrimination car cette dimension est fondamentale pour assurer des droits humains, la paix et la sécurité, et un développement durable.[4] Parmi les pays qui constituent un exemple positif, nous avons le Rwanda, qui après avoir passé par une période génocidaire, a pu mettre en place des mécanismes spécifiques qui ont favorisés l’augmentation de la participation politique des femmes. Au nombre de ces mécanismes, nous pourrions citer la garantie constitutionnelle, le système de quota et des structures électorales innovatrices.[5]

Ainsi, il est possible d’avoir un environnement pacifique à travers la réduction des inégalités .

Mais qu’es ce que la paix ?

« La paix est une création continue »[iii].
Que ce soit dans un cadre personnel, professionnel; à l’échelle locale, régionale, nationale ou internationale, la paix est une quête permanente qui nécessite que des actes soient posés afin de la pérenniser.

Les nombreux conflits politiques et ethniques sur le plan international sont les éléments les plus visibles sur la scène médiatique. Mais bien au-delà de ces conflits ayant des dimensions politiques, économiques, sociales et culturelles, beaucoup d’actes sont posés au quotidien qui sont de nature à troubler la paix existante ou à contribuer à alimenter les foyers de tensions pouvant mener au conflit.

En effet, lorsque les efforts visant à consolider la paix et à assurer la sécurité et le développement ne sont pas efficaces sur le terrain, c’est souvent parce que les dimensions de genre dans les conflits ont été négligées. Elles sont souvent exacerbées par les conflits violents. Il est de plus en plus évident qu’il faut promouvoir l’égalité de genre dans la paix, la sécurité et le développement pour parvenir à une paix durable et à une stabilité sociale.

Il existe des tendances mondiales à l’inégalité entre les hommes et les femmes. Par exemple, les femmes ont tendance à subir des violences de la part de leurs partenaires plus souvent que les hommes; la participation politique des femmes et leurs représentations sont inférieure à celle des hommes; les femmes et les hommes ne disposent pas des mêmes opportunités économiques ; la majorité des femmes vivent dans des conditions de pauvreté ; une majorité des femmes et des filles travaillent dans le secteur informel et sont exposés au commerce sexuel et au trafic. Tous ces problèmes doivent être résolus afin de promouvoir l’égalité du genre. Bien que les politiques soient en place pour l’intégration du genre dans la paix, la sécurité et le développement, de nombreuses lacunes dans la mise en œuvre pratique demeurent. Les hommes et les femmes, en raison de leurs divers rôles, responsabilités et accès au pouvoir, ont une incidence différente sur les conflits et sont affectés différemment par eux, aussi bien négativement que positivement. Cela influence donc la mesure dans laquelle ils peuvent s’adapter, transformer la dynamique des conflits et contribuer à la paix et au développement. Comprendre ces dynamiques est essentiel pour la prévention des conflits, la consolidation de la paix et le développement. Les identités et les attentes liées au genre peuvent influencer les cultures sous-jacentes de la violence et de la discrimination, qu’il faut cibler afin d’empêcher les conflits et de parvenir à la paix. En effet, il est maintenant de plus en plus admis qu’il existe un lien entre les approches sensibles au genre et des réponses aux conflits plus équitables, inclusives et durables.

L’Initiative de consolidation de la paix, un projet conçu en partenariat avec le Bureau de soutien de la consolidation de la paix des Nations Unies pour partager l’information au sein de la communauté de consolidation de la paix, souligne qu’il existe deux dimensions clés pour adopter une approche basée sur le genre pour la consolidation de la paix et le règlement des conflits. Premièrement, l’approche doit reconnaître les différences entre les femmes et les hommes, en s’assurant que les intérêts et les besoins des femmes sont satisfaits. Deuxièmement, l’approche doit reconnaître les rôles clés que jouent les femmes dans la consolidation de la paix et la résolution des conflits, et de faciliter ces
rôles chaque fois que cela est possible (Peacebuilding Initiative, 2009).[10]

Pour garantir la paix à travers la réduction des inégalités, il est nécessaire de favoriser les conditions favorables à l’indépendance et l’émancipation (« empowerment ») des femmes, ainsi que leur participation aux différents niveaux.

Cependant, une approche duale est nécessaire, consistant d’une part à soutenir spécifiquement l’autonomisation des femmes et d’autre part à intégrer l’égalité de genre dans tous les programmes et les politiques. Cela garantit que les changements de rôles et des relations peuvent être pris en compte.[11]

Outre l’insécurité physique, les femmes sont confrontées dans les situations de post-conflit à l’extrême pauvreté, à la destruction des réseaux sociaux et des mécanismes d’adaptation, aux faibles possibilités d’emploi et des moyens de subsistance, et à leur exclusion des structures politiques et de prise de décision. Si les causes insécurités physique, économique et sociopolitique des femmes ne sont pas résolues, la réalisation d’une paix durable et du développement sera compromise.

Dans des circonstances de déplacement et d’instabilité, même si les hommes et les femmes doivent s’adapter à la perte des réseaux sociaux et à la destruction des stratégies traditionnelles d’adaptation, les femmes peuvent sentir plus vivement cette perte en raison de leur plus grande implication et responsabilité dans les exigences quotidiennes de la vie familiale et communautaire. En raison qu’elles sont souvent exclues des processus de décision, que leurs droits sont davantage violés et leur accès aux ressources moindre que pour les hommes, les femmes rencontrent souvent plus de difficultés que les hommes à s’adapter à la transformation des relations sociales, politiques et économiques.[12]

D’après le Wiki Gender, au niveau mondial, la participation des femmes dans les processus de paix formels est très faible. Selon une étude de 2012, sur l’analyse de 31 processus de paix ayant eu lieu entre 1992 et 2011, seulement 4% des signataires, 2,4% des médiateur-trices et 9% des témoins étaient des femmes.[13]

La sous-représentation des femmes est beaucoup plus marquée dans ces instances de négociations que dans d’autres instances publiques de prise de décision, pour lesquelles les femmes restent en sous-représentation, mais où le fossé tend à se combler de façon plus régulière.[14] Cependant, les femmes ont toujours été très actives dans les campagnes et les mobilisations publiques pour la paix auprès des gouvernements ou de groupes armés. Ce rôle informel est souvent crucial mais peu visible dans les instances formelles de négociation de la paix.[15]

Il enressort que des efforts doivent encore être accomplis pour reconnaître les femmes comme desacteurs actifs et des agents de changement dans les processus de consolidation de la paix.

Les inégalités de genre peuvent refléter de plus larges déséquilibres de pouvoir qui existent dans la société, et sont donc des indicateurs importants des niveaux de qualité
et d’accès à la sécurité, à la justice et de l’émancipation économique vécus par une population donnée.

Adopter une approche de genre dans les questions de développement telles que la santé, l’éducation et la sécurité humaine pourrait contribuer à la prévention des conflits et à la consolidation de la paix, notamment par l’autonomisation des femmes et en leur fournissant les compétences et les ressources nécessaires pour participer activement à la vie publique. Cela permettrait à la fois aux hommes et aux femmes d’être mieux équipés et plus résilients pour s’adapter et répondre à l’évolution des circonstances, y compris dans les situations d’insécurité et d’instabilité.

En conclusion, pourquoi les questions de genre sont-elles pertinentes pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement?

- L’analyse de genre est un outil utile qui peut nous aider à voir et à influencer les différences de pouvoir et d’identité, qui alimentent les conflits et jouent un rôle dans la création de la paix, de la sécurité et du développement

- Les engagements internationaux qui font appel à l’intégration d’une perspective de genre dans la paix et le développement, tels que la RCS 1325[iii] et la CEDEF[iv], doivent être respectés et mis en œuvre.

- Tant les femmes que les hommes ont le droit d’être impliqués dans la consolidation de la paix et le développement, d’en bénéficier et d’en retirer plus d’autonomie.

Pour garantir la paix à travers la réduction des inégalités, il nous faut aller vers une consolidation de la paix qui prend en compte la promotion du genre. Les processus de consolidation de la paix et de développement peuvent offrir des opportunités pour les populations affectées durant le conflit, et peuvent offrir un espace pour soutenir une redistribution plus équitable du pouvoir, des ressources et de la capacité d’influence dans les ménages, les communautés et la société dans son ensemble.

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