Strategic Research into National and Local Capacity Building for DRM

Haiti Fieldwork Report

Roger Few, Zoë Scott, Kelly Wooster, Marcela Tarazona and Mireille Flores Avila.

May 2015
Acknowledgements

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<tr>
<td>ASEC</td>
<td>Assemblée de la Section Communale</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDRC</td>
<td>Building Disaster Resilient Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRACED</td>
<td>Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASEC</td>
<td>Conseil d’Administration de la Sections Communale</td>
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<td>CB</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
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<td>CBDRM</td>
<td>Community Based DRM</td>
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<td>CBDRR</td>
<td>Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPC</td>
<td>Comité Communal de Protection Civile</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDGRD</td>
<td>Comité Départemental de Gestion des Risques et Désastres</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDPC</td>
<td>Comité Départemental de Protection Civile</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLD</td>
<td>Comité Local de Désastres</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLGRD</td>
<td>Comité Local de Gestion des Risques et Désastres</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLPC</td>
<td>Comité Local de Protection Civile</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMDRR</td>
<td>Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Comité de Protection Civile</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRF</td>
<td>Croix-Rouge Française</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRH</td>
<td>Croix-Rouge Haïtienne</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<td>DIPECHO</td>
<td>Disaster Preparedness European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<td>DPC</td>
<td>Department for Civil Protection</td>
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<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian aid Office</td>
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<td>EIC</td>
<td>Equipe d’Intervention Communautaire</td>
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<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRC</td>
<td>French Red Cross</td>
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<td>GRC</td>
<td>German Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRD</td>
<td>Gestion des Risques de Désastres</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRCS</td>
<td>Haitian Red Cross Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MEL</td>
<td>Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICT</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales</td>
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<td>MTPTC</td>
<td>Ministère de Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications</td>
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<td>NCBDRM</td>
<td>National Capacity Building for DRM</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>OCB</td>
<td>Organisation Communautaire de Base</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Oxford Policy Management</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
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<td>PDNA</td>
<td>Post Disaster Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>PNGRD</td>
<td>Plan National de Gestion de Risques et des Désastres</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q&amp;A</td>
<td>Quality and Accountability</td>
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<td>RC/RC</td>
<td>Red Cross/Red Crescent</td>
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<td>RUDR</td>
<td>Reducing Urban Disaster Risk</td>
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<td>SBDRR</td>
<td>School Based Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>SNGRD</td>
<td>Système National de Gestion des Risques et Désastres</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Spanish Red Cross</td>
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<td>UBRR</td>
<td>Urban Based Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VCA</td>
<td>Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment</td>
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1 Introduction and methodology

1.1 Introduction to the research

In September 2013, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) contracted Oxford Policy Management and the University of East Anglia to conduct Strategic Research into National and Local Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Management.

To date there has been little formal, empirical research that has been conducted on capacity building for disaster risk management (DRM), and as a result international actors lack robust, evidence-based guidance on how capacity for DRM can be effectively generated at national and local levels. The research project has been designed as an initial step towards filling that knowledge and evidence gap.

Our central aim in the research is therefore to draw lessons and guidance on ‘how to’ build DRM capacity in a range of contexts. We will do this by analysing the characteristics, effectiveness and relative importance of a range of capacity building for DRM interventions across a variety of country contexts.

Our objectives are to research the following overarching issues of concern:

1. How is capacity for DRM generated most effectively at both national and local levels?
2. What factors enable or constrain the building of national and local capacity for DRM?
3. How and why does this vary across different environments?
4. How is the international community currently approaching the task of building national and local capacities for DRM?
5. How can we identify and measure improving capacity for DRM?

The core research is based on a country case study approach. A pilot study was conducted in March / April 2014 in Ethiopia. The second case study was conducted in Pakistan in June 2014 using the refined standardised methodological framework for data collection and analysis. The third case study was conducted in Myanmar in November 2014. The Philippines was the fourth case study, conducted in January / February 2015. Haiti was the fifth case study conducted in April 2015. This report sets out the approach taken and the findings of the Haiti case study. One further case study will take place in Mozambique, which will enable comparative analysis across countries and interventions. In each case study the team looks in-depth at 1-3 programmes that involve capacity building for disaster risk management.

The Research Team is led by Dr. Roger Few, Senior Research Fellow at the School of International Development (DEV) in the University of East Anglia. The Project Manager is Zoë Scott who is a full-time staff member at Oxford Policy Management. Marcela Tarazona, also from OPM, is the disaster risk management (DRM) specialist. The Fieldwork Leader is Kelly Wooster and the Research Assistant is Mireille Flores Avila. Brooke Olster is an international consultant based in Haiti who assisted the research team during the fieldwork.
1.2 Methodology

In Haiti, as in each case study country, we aim to analyse the following themes:

- Context/dynamics
- Specific examples of capacity-building activities for DRM
- Actors/programme characteristics
- Approach to CB process
- Content of CB activities
- Effectiveness
- Capacity development for DRM (in general)

In order to investigate CB activities for DRM the team selected two capacity-oriented DRM intervention programmes for in-depth study. In each case study the programmes are selected with consideration for the research as a whole - they are not intended to give a representative picture of the situation in Haiti but are intended to combine with the selections made in other case study countries to give a broad overview of different types of intervention to feed into the final synthesis report. Overall the selection of case studies will enable the team to look at a balance of different scales, contexts, disasters and CB for DRM activities. On occasion the team will select programmes that are similar to facilitate comparison, at other times unusual projects will be selected, that could offer lessons learned to a wider audience.

When selecting interventions the following criteria are applied:

- The programme should have both capacity building and disaster risk management as a central focus.
- The programme should aim to enable government, organisations, communities or individuals to make better decisions regarding disaster risk management in a sustainable way.
- The programme should be nearly finished or recently finished (ideally evaluations will have already been done) so there has been adequate time to reflect on lessons learned and observe impact. The project should not have finished many years earlier as it will then be difficult to track down stakeholders and budget information.
- The programme should not be exclusively training, provision of equipment or building of infrastructure (training may be considered if it is followed up with action planning, development of DRM committees and follow-up support).
- The programme should not be exclusively or mainly located in areas in which the research team cannot travel due to security constraints.

In the case of Haiti, the following steps were taken to identify and select appropriate programmes:

1. A web-based search and literature review identified a long-list of possible programmes.
2. This list was supplemented with information and suggestions from the consultant in Haiti.
Several programmes were ruled out for the following reason:

- Some of the DRM programmes in Haiti did not meet the criteria outlined above and in the research methodology. Most of the capacity building activities focused on training only or provision of materials only.

Two programmes emerged as appropriate case studies:

- Red Cross Consortium: Reinforcement of DRM Capacities and Resources of the Haitian Populations (DIPECHO/9).
- GOAL: Operationalising a Neighbourhood Approach to Reduce Urban Disaster Risk in Two High-Risk Neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Four National Societies comprised the Red Cross consortium programme: Spanish, French, German and Haitian Red Cross, as well as IFRC Haiti. This programme was selected because, upon closer investigation, it was noted that one of the main objectives was the creation, institutionalisation and standardisation of DRM systems in Haiti. The team saw an opportunity to learn how the programme enabled government and other DRM actors in Haiti to make better decisions on DRM and how the programme influenced the DRM context. The project included different actors and scales across national, regional, provincial, and community levels, working specifically on capacity building for DRM.

GOAL’s programme provided an opportunity to investigate how an international non-governmental organisation (INGO) can assist in building capacity of urban communities, community-based organisations (CBOs), civil society and local authorities. It was also one of the only community-based programmes across our case studies with a specific focus on mitigation work and the team decided to investigate that process more closely. The organisation specifically funded, targeted and assisted urban communities in Port-au Prince to integrate DRM systems into their plans.

Both initiatives fit in with the selection criteria and reached from the national to the community level. The combination of the initiatives was believed to be an opportunity for rich findings for the fieldwork report.

1.2.1 Data collection tools

During the case study we used the following tools for data collection:

a) **Desk review of secondary data sources** (documents and databases) such as programme reports, financial data and review articles, which provided key information for several of the research questions.

b) **Key informant interviews and group interviews** at a range of scales (national / subnational / community). Semi-structured interviews (individual and group) were the primary research tool, and were guided by question schedules (see Annex B). These were flexibly applied according to the interviewee(s).

c) **Ratings exercise** conducted with interviewees and groups. At the close of each interview a brief exercise component was included that asks interviewees to rate the importance of the six proposed principles of effective capacity building identified in the ‘conceptual framework of change’\(^1\) on a scale of 1-4.

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\(^1\) The six principles were identified from a global literature review conducted during the inception phase of the research.
1.2.2 Case study procedure

During the case study the team undertook the following steps in data collection and analysis:

a) Preliminary desk-based study. During the month preceding the field visit the team undertook a desk-based search and analysis of secondary sources and a preliminary stakeholder mapping exercise. Documents such as programme reports, evaluation reports, review articles and general contextual and policy documents on disaster risk, DRM and governance were accessed via internet searches and through liaison with in-country partners and wider networks. Relevant text from these sources was coded and collated in relation to the research questions. The mapping of key stakeholders formed an initial list for the key informant interviews which was refined and added to as the fieldwork progressed.

b) Main data collection in country. The main data collection phase comprised the collection of additional secondary sources (including non-electronic sources not previously accessed) and financial data relating to selected programmes, key informant interviews (semi-structured) at a mix of scales, and group interviews.

c) Final workshop. At the close of the fieldwork a final workshop was organised with stakeholders at national scale. The workshop’s purpose was to provide an update/debrief and feedback/validation of the preliminary findings of the case study, and provide an opportunity to undertake a large-scale M&E framework testing exercise with national experts. The workshop lasted for a half-day and 25 individuals attended.

d) M&E Framework Testing. The final workshop provided a forum to discuss and reflect on the M&E framework which had been revised and refined based on the experience of the Ethiopia pilot case study. During the workshop a group activity was undertaken whereby participants were introduced to the proposed M&E framework and asked to provide feedback on tools created for one core outcome indicator. Groups reported back on the ease of use, measurability, the guidance tool and were also asked whether they could suggest other core indicators that could measure the outcome area. The national consultants also provided separate feedback.

e) Initial analysis. Preliminary analysis of primary data sources commenced whilst in the field. For qualitative data sources the initial analysis entailed coding/collation of interview transcripts. The coding scheme has a shared core component to facilitate comparative analysis.

f) Integrated analysis. Data from across data sources has been compiled for each selected activity and for the Haitian context as a whole to provide a narrative analysis. Triangulation of data sources has been employed wherever possible to maximise robustness of the analytical points drawn; and where interpretations of evidence are more speculative this is clearly indicated.

1.2.3 Coverage

In total 103 individuals were interviewed as part of the fieldwork in 29 different key informant interviews, workshops or focus groups. Of the 103, 36 participants were female. Eight group interviews at subnational and community level were conducted; this included five mixed groups, two female-only groups and one male-only group. Key informant interviews were done with
different level of actors and scales in the two selected capacity building programmes. Information on context was gathered during the two workshops which included 32 key informants.

Therefore the vast majority of the individual informants were actors directly engaged in the DRM capacity building activity, including those engaged primarily as programme donors, implementers, and those engaged primarily as programme beneficiaries. The remaining key individual informants provided contextual information or commentary on the selected programmes. There were 25 attendees at the final workshop.

The Research Team adhered strictly to the ethical guidelines whilst in country, which included gaining verbal consent from all participants in the research prior to interviews. The research was conducted on the basis of anonymity, and therefore in this report we do not disclose the identity of those making statements that are reported. All verbal sources have been removed from this report, but the research team has retained the information so that findings in the synthesis report can be verified. Documentary sources are retained, but not presented in the analysis sections. A bibliography to this report has been provided at the end of the document.

The research team presented the M&E framework and one of the core indicators with guidance notes in the workshop in Haiti. Details of the subsequent discussion are given in a separate report focusing specifically on M&E findings from the case study.

1.3 Challenges and limitations

There were a number of challenges that the team encountered during the fieldwork:

**National Capacity on DRR:** It is a preference of the research team to work in partnership with national / local consultants where possible. In Haiti, unlike in other countries, it was a challenge to find a qualified person on DRM or DRR despite significant effort and liaison with different organisations based both in and outside the country. Therefore the team hired an international consultant based in Port-au-Prince.

**Security and protest:** The instability and general insecurity in the country represented a constraint to the team. Red Cross provided the team and driver with a security briefing and ongoing support to monitor the situation. Due to protests in Port-au-Prince the team was asked to follow a curfew and were not able to leave the hotel on some days. This limited the team’s ability to arrange face-to-face interviews on those days. Nonetheless OPM’s security protocols were followed for travelling to high-risk areas. The team did not encounter any personal security incidents.

**Language and communication:** It was a challenge to find translators and interpreters who were familiar with DRM terminology, met the quality standards needed for the research and who were available for the time period. Unfortunately some case study tools had to be re-translated as the initial attempts were not satisfactory. The team had to spend extra time recruiting and briefing new support staff during the visit and coordinating logistics for language support.

**Financial analysis:** The team was able to collect substantial budget information for the GOAL programme, but only selected information for the DIPECHO/9 programme. It was particularly challenging to get breakdowns of financial data related just to capacity building. Nevertheless, the fact that both selected programmes were almost exclusively focused on CB for DRM facilitated our ability to analyse the resources required for the various CB activities and we were able to collect information on staffing numbers for different CB activities.

**Commentators:** In Haiti, as in most countries, it was a struggle to find interviewees who could serve as commentators for the selected initiatives. The trend has been that only those who have a
stake in the initiative are familiar enough to comment. Hence only one commentator interview was undertaken.
2 Country context

2.1 General Background

Haiti is the third largest Caribbean country and shares the Hispaniola Island with the Dominican Republic. The country is characterized by high degrees of poverty, low agricultural productivity, an economy very dependent on food imports, weak institutions, and very high vulnerability to disasters. In Haiti, 77% of the population lives on less than US$2 a day and 52% lives on less than US$1 a day. Population density is very high, with more than 60% of people living in urban areas (GFDRR, 2010). Haiti is listed as the sixth most aid-dependent country per capita (OECD, 2014) and is classified 168 out of 187 in on the UN’s Human Development Index (2014). The country is struggling to meet its MDG indicators and was unlikely to meet any MDG by the 2015 deadline (FFP, 2014).

2.2 Disaster risk

The above conditions make the Haitian population extremely vulnerable to disasters, ranking the most vulnerable country on the Climate Change Vulnerability Index in the Western hemisphere and the sixth most vulnerable in the world (Verisk, 2014).

Haiti is highly prone to tropical cyclones, floods, and earthquakes. It has the highest cyclone risk index of all developing island countries, as it sits in the middle of Atlantic tropical storm systems that affect the Caribbean region every year between June and November. Due to the high vulnerability of the population, even small or medium size disasters can have a huge impact on rural and urban communities. Between 2001 and 2012 more than 18 tropical cyclones and floods left more than 6,000 dead and 132,000 persons homeless, affecting approximately 6.4 million people in total (ECHO, 2013). In 2008 and 2009 there were four successive hurricanes causing over $1 billion in damage and destruction of livelihoods.

Haiti is located in a zone that is seismically active, intersected by several major tectonic faults. The high population density is complemented with unregulated construction, weak public infrastructure, lack of land-use planning, and unstable governance that further aggravate the country’s vulnerability. On January 12, 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti. It was the most powerful quake to hit in more than 200 years, killing an estimated 220,000 people and displacing thousands (Bradley, 2014). The disaster exacerbated the country’s existing fragility and has been followed by other subsequent disasters that continue to inhibit Haiti’s recovery, such as a cholera outbreak, Hurricane Sandy, Tropical Storm Isaac and several droughts.

2.3 Governance structure and policies

The Haitian Red Cross (HRC) was founded in 1932 and officially recognised by the Government of Haiti as an organisation whose purpose was to provide disaster relief to affected populations throughout the country. The Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales (Ministry of the Interior or MICT) is the primary agency responsible for disaster management and it operates through the Direction de la Protection Civile (Department of Civil Protection or DPC). The DPC was established in 1997 and is responsible for reducing the impact of disasters through the coordination of all response operations and promotion of risk management. The System National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (SNGRD or the Haitian National Disaster Risk Management System) came into effect in 2001, signed by 10 key line ministers and the president of the Haitian Red Cross.
The SNGRD developed a National Disaster Risk Management Plan (PNGRD) and has promoted a culture of risk management through prevention, preparedness and response activities in the country. The PNGRD provides the operational framework for the SNGRD and identifies the specific roles and responsibilities of the participating institutions. The system is headed by the National Disaster Risk Management Council (CNGRD), which is led by the Prime Minister and composed of the signatory Ministers of the SNGRD and the President of the Haitian Red Cross. The DPC is a key institution in the implementation of the PNGRD, yet as a line ministry Directorate, it does not have the mandate or the technical capacity to design national or sectorial DRM strategies for adoption and implementation by the government and its key line ministries.

On an operational level, the DPC and the Permanent Secretariat for Disaster Risk Management (SPGRD) are responsible for the implementation of the PNGRD. The SPGRD, led by the Director General of the MICT, is composed of technical representatives for the signatory Ministries of the SNGRD and the Red Cross, and is divided into two branches: a disaster management branch consisting of the Emergency Operation Center; and a risk management branch, composed of thematic and sectorial committees.

The SNGRD has prioritized the engagement of local communities and the strengthening of their capacities in an effort to decentralise their operations and bolster the system’s capacity. The SNGRD has established an extensive network of Departmental Disaster Risk Management Committees (Comité Départemental de Protection Civile, CDPC) present at the departmental level (all 10 departments) and municipal level (more than 110 of the existing 165 municipalities). Under the leadership of relevant senior government officials (the delegate of the President at the departmental level and the mayor at the municipal level), the CDPCs are composed of the representatives of government, civil society and international technical partners. Trained initially to focus on disaster management activities (preparedness and response), the CDPCs are acquiring the tools and capacities to assume greater responsibility in the development of their respective DRM strategies and execution of local risk reduction activities.

The Haitian government had limited response resources prior to the January 2010 earthquake. The disaster had a significant impact on what little resources it had — personnel, infrastructure, vehicles and equipment. National coordination has been further weakened by low capacity, misuse of aid and loyalties to municipalities as opposed to the national government. Following the earthquake, donors such as the US government provided logistical and communications support to the Haitian government and the World Bank funded the Haitian government’s payroll in order to encourage government workers to return to work. The Haitian government attempted to coordinate relief efforts with the assistance of the US government and UN agencies through the establishment of a management framework and a Presidential Commission for Recovery and Reconstruction. However, they lacked the capacity to directly deliver services to its affected population.

After the January 2010 earthquake, the Haitian government, supported by technical and financial partners, undertook a broad revision of the SNGDR. This was done through a consultative process held for the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and the development of the government’s Action Plan for National Recovery and Development.

DRM has been included as a key cross-cutting priority in the Haitian government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2014) and as a principle pillar of the United Nations Integrated Strategic Framework (2010-2011), as well as the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (2009-2012). More recently, the Post-Earthquake Disaster Needs Assessment 2010 and the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti include DRM as a cross-cutting priority for both the public and private sectors and present it as an opportunity to promote (a) decentralisation; (b) a stronger civil society; and (c) an innovative private sector. Overall, this demonstrates a growing
consensus within the GoH and amongst its partners of the importance of integrating DRM as a critical component of poverty reduction and economic growth (World Bank, 2011).

2.4 Recent history of DRM interventions

More than 12 national and international organisations have led DRM interventions in Haiti or are currently implementing DRM projects in rural and urban areas of the country. Due to the collapse of several buildings prior to the earthquake and the striking impact of the January 2010 earthquake, post-disaster assistance has centered around improving regulation of the public construction sector and strengthening the capacity of rehabilitated and new communities to prepare for and respond to disasters.

Three key players are the European Commission’s Department (ECHO), USAID and the World Bank. ECHO supported a number of humanitarian organizations in Haiti to implement disaster preparedness projects since 1998. Before the 2010 earthquake, ECHO worked through the Disaster Preparedness Program (DIPECHO) with €5.4 million disbursed. After the earthquake, ECHO mainstreamed DRR throughout the scope of its humanitarian response, focusing on preparing people, communities and institutions to prevent, be prepared for and respond to disasters. ECHO has also continued to fund specific DRR actions focused on increasing the resilience of communities and key institutions to future disasters. Their projects are implemented in close collaboration with the National System of Disaster Risk Management (particularly the DPC and the Haitian Red Cross).

USAID supports local and national governments and organisations to transition from recovery to development and mitigate the damage of future disasters. In Haiti, their work is particularly aimed at improving local capacity by training Haitians to manage disaster response efforts - from preparing first responders, to designating leadership roles, to managing relief supplies. Their funding in Haiti is solely focused on urban areas.

The World Bank invests in improving national disaster response capacity and enhancing the resiliency of critical transport infrastructure, which is complemented by the strategic use of trust fund resources (GFDRR), leading to building codes for public buildings, as well as a multi-hazard assessment following the earthquake. The Bank’s Disaster Risk Management and Reconstruction Project for Haiti has five components: (1) Natural hazard risk assessment and analysis; (2) Support to disaster preparedness and emergency response and strengthening the institutional capacity of the DPC; (3) Rehabilitation of vulnerable and damaged critical transport infrastructure and strengthening the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MTPTC) and other relevant ministries, departments and agencies; (4) Emergency response and recovery; and (5) Project management and implementation support. The World Bank channels all investments directly to the Government of Haiti.

2.5 Progress towards DRR

Most ministries and other agencies still fail to integrate DRM into their respective strategies. However, key coordination ministries (Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Economy and Finance) are working with international agencies to build their DRM institutional capacity (both strategic and technical). Institutional strengthening has led to improved procedures and to the development of tools (World Bank, 2011).

According to one donor report, at the national level, most line ministries do not have the legal mandate, strategic framework or technical capacity to effectively fulfil the DRM role and responsibilities defined within the PNGRD. This limits the allocation of financial resources and the
involvement of the signatory ministries at the institutional level. As a result, the SNGRD mostly relies on multi-sectoral coordination committees without the necessary corresponding institutional involvement. At the local level the situation is better, with the establishment of CDPCs that are claimed to be effective in the development of local knowledge and capacity (ibid).
3 GOAL’s Programme on Reducing Urban Disaster Risk

Table 1: The Reducing Urban Disaster Risk (RUDR) programme at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Overview at a glance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Which actors are involved in the CB activity?</td>
<td>The programme is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) with some additional funding from the implementing agency, GOAL. Actors benefiting from the programme include community members, community-based organisations (CBOs), schools, a university, DPC and local government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the funding level and duration?</td>
<td>Total budget: USD $1,020,080 over 21 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 1: 15 months (Sep 2013-Dec 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget: OFDA: $500,000  GOAL: $70,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 2: 6 months (Jan-Jun 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget: OFDA: $450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the scope of the activities?</td>
<td>Improving urban disaster risk management capacity through formation of community DRR intervention teams, provision of materials and equipment, training, public and household level mitigation works and research. The programme reached institutional, community and individual levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the geographical focus?</td>
<td>The programme targets two neighbourhoods of the Western Department, in Port-au-Prince Municipality, Turgeau District. The research component was designed to inform urban DRR work at a national level in Haiti.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first programme selected as a case study was entitled “Operationalizing a Neighborhood approach to Reduce Urban Disaster Risk in Two High-Risk Neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince, Haiti” hereafter referred to as Reducing Urban Disaster Risk (RUDR).

The RUDR programme was directly implemented by GOAL with support from OFDA. The programme’s objectives were:

- To reduce risk in informal and marginalized neighbourhoods through reinforced local capacity for community managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) and the integration of neighbourhood-based, urban disaster risk management with national policies and plans; and
- To increase disaster resilience at neighbourhood and household levels through the mitigation of identified risks.
The programme’s activities were targeted at the institutional, community and individual levels and the capacity building activities included formation of community DRR intervention teams, provision of materials and equipment, training, public and household level mitigation works and research (GOAL, 2013a).

The OPM team focused more on Phase 1 of the programme because the activities were completed three months prior to the team’s arrival. This made the timing more suitable for our study because it gave stakeholders enough time to reflect on the experience. However, the research component from RUDR Phase 2 is also covered in this section.

The activities are described in sections 3.1 to 3.4, followed by an extended analysis in relation to the 6 principles of CB\(^2\) in section 3.5.

3.1 Programme actors

USAID/OFDA is the primary funder for RUDR. It is the leading U.S. government agency to provide international development and disaster funding. Haiti currently receives the highest level of investment from USAID/OFDA within the Latin America and Caribbean region. Current programmes in the country focus on the revitalisation of the economy after the 2010 earthquake, the environment, health, agriculture and governance (USAID, 2011).

GOAL, an international humanitarian organisation established in 1977 with headquarters in Ireland, has worked in over 50 countries around the world. Its primary objective is ensuring that poor and vulnerable people have access to fundamental rights and adequate services in terms of food, water, sanitation, healthcare and education. GOAL is both a funder and the implementer of the RUDR programme and has been working in Haiti since shortly after the earthquake in 2010. While their original programmes focused principally on disaster response, GOAL has recently been evolving their portfolio of programmes to be more focused on development including disaster resilience.

GOAL’s primary government counterparts were the local authorities including the Conseil d’Administration de la Section Communale (CASEC) and Comité Local de la Protection Civile (CLPC\(^3\)). Local authorities actively participated in programme design and programme activities including serving on the steering committee for selection and monitoring of small-scale mitigation works. The Department of Civil Protection for the West Department and HRCS provided the bulk of RUDR programme trainings (GOAL, 2014a).

GOAL used Community Platforms (networks of CBOs and community representatives), schools and churches to raise awareness of CB for DRM activities and liaise between GOAL and communities.

GOAL’s partner for the research component on urban disaster risk management was initially Quisqueya University. However due to turnover at the university and other circumstances, the partnership was mutually forfeited during Phase 1. GOAL then partnered with Haiti State University (Université d’Etat d’Haïti) to pursue the research during Phase 2. RUDR presented the first formal opportunity for community level urban disaster risk management research for the university.

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\(^2\) The six principles were identified following a global literature review early in the research. A definition for each one is included in the text below.

\(^3\) Other government agencies included: Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Transportation & Public Works, Ministry of Education, Office de Surveillance et D’Aménagement du Morne Hopital, the Mayor’s office of Port-au-Prince, and CCPC of Turgeau.
The beneficiaries of the GOAL project were communities in Haut Turgeau and Debussy, Equipe d’Intervention communautaire (EIC) members, the CLPC, the CASEC, the Community Platforms, CBOs, teachers, school management, Haiti State University faculty, students and masons (trained by GOAL in disaster resilient building techniques). Beneficiaries also played an active role in programme assessment and implementation and contributed their own resources where possible.

3.2 Funding and timescales

The RUDR programme was initially envisioned to take 15 months. As the last quarter of the project approached GOAL began designing a new follow-on programme that expanded its existing DRM activities in Turgeau. At the same time, USAID/OFDA offered the opportunity for a cost-extension to the programme for six months to scale up small scale mitigation activities both on a community-level, as well as add some new activities.

Funding for the capacity building programme was provided by USAID/OFDA with some additional funding from GOAL. OFDA provided a total of USD 950,000 (including the cost-extension) and GOAL provided a total of USD 70,080.

The budget for Phase 1 was divided into two sectors detailed in the table below:

• Sector One which covered all of the capacity building components of the programme such as formation of EICs, all trainings and the research with 60% of the budget; and

• Sector Two, which covered the provision of small scale mitigation works and shelter support for vulnerable groups with 40% of the budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sector One: Risk Management &amp; Policy Practice</th>
<th>Sector Two: Shelter and Settlements</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>160,050</td>
<td>53,350</td>
<td>213,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fringe Benefits</td>
<td>45,031</td>
<td>15,010</td>
<td>60,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>5,208</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>6,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>3,073</td>
<td>3,073</td>
<td>6,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Programme Activities</td>
<td>80,130</td>
<td>114,735</td>
<td>194,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24,682</td>
<td>22,381</td>
<td>47,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Costs</td>
<td>25,059</td>
<td>16,562</td>
<td>41,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>343,233</strong></td>
<td><strong>226,847</strong></td>
<td><strong>570,080</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seven full-time positions were provided to conduct RUDR including a DRR officer, mitigation officer, two field agents, a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) officer, finance assistant and logistics officer. Several other positions were partially funded under the RUDR budget including senior management, engineers and monitoring and evaluation team members (GOAL, 2013b).

3.3 Geographical coverage

This programme targeted two densely populated neighbourhoods of Turgeau District, Municipality of Port-au-Prince, West Department. The neighbourhoods are located on a steep terrain with high
risks to floods, landslides, storms and earthquakes. GOAL has worked continuously in these
neighbourhoods since the earthquake in 2010.

The research programme component with Haiti State University (in particular Faculty of Ethnology)
is a national level component which aims to inform urban DRR programming throughout the
country (GOAL, 2013a).

3.4 CB activities

The RUDR programme operated at two scales: national and community level. These are
described below by scale.

3.4.1 National / institutional level

GOAL partnered with Haiti State University to conduct research on best practice in CMDRR in the
urban context. This programme component was designed to reinforce the role of universities in risk
reduction policy development. The final published research will be used to increase the knowledge
and understanding of CMDRR in the urban context for DRM stakeholders and to advocate for
ongoing donor investment. The formulation of the research team, research planning, data
collection, analysis and report drafting activities were complete at the time of the OPM research
field visit. Therefore the research team focused on capturing lessons learned from these activities
(GOAL, 2013a). At the time of writing the final research was yet to be published.

3.4.2 Community level

GOAL has formed three EICs in Turgeau following an informally accepted national model for
community DRR intervention teams. At the beginning of the programme GOAL staff announced the
intention to form the EICs through Community Platforms, churches, organised groups and other
informal community structures in Turgeau. Candidates took a written test which was used to
identify their level of literacy, motivations, community volunteer experience and commitment to
community development. Candidates with the top 14 scores were presented to the wider
community and local authorities for validation. The 14 validated candidates became members of
the EIC.

The EIC members then participated in a series of training courses. DPC, HRCS and GOAL trained
EIC members on DRM concepts, emergency shelter management, The Sphere Project\(^4\), logistics,
meeting management, vulnerability and capacity assessments (VCAs), education and organisation
for community preparedness, community early warning systems, damage and needs assessments,
project management and first aid. The Haitian Fire Department conducted training on search and
rescue.

EICs, in coordination with local authorities performed VCAs in their own neighbourhoods and
presented the results to GOAL. GOAL technical experts analysed the data and returned to the
community with a Priority Matrix outlining actions to be taken to improve resilience. The EICs then
agreed to accept GOAL’s terms and implemented the actions prescribed by GOAL. Within the
agreement GOAL provided DRR equipment and supplies and ongoing support to the team. EICs
have also drafted emergency and response plans including evacuation plans for their
neighbourhoods during the process.

\(^4\) The Sphere Project is a voluntary initiative that establishes a Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Humanitarian Response to promote and improve accountability of humanitarian actors to their constituents, donors and
affected populations.
Seven small-scale mitigation projects were also provided through the RUDR programme through a participatory project selection process. Using information from the VCAs, GOAL’s mitigation officer conducted a complementary diagnostic of the target neighbourhoods to identify possible mitigation projects. The preliminary list of projects was prioritised by the communities through a participatory meeting. GOAL then extended a call for Expression of Interest to CBOs and local NGOs that would like to be the selected candidates to execute the projects.

A mitigation works steering committee was formed to select successful candidates and monitor implementation. The committee was composed of GOAL staff, the CASEC, Community Platforms, the CLPC and related government departments. Candidates who expressed interest were invited to initial training on how to write a proposal with later training on project management where participants learned to assess, design, implement and monitor a project. The candidates formed management committees and created proposals for the small mitigation works in their neighbourhoods.

The selected mitigation works included drainage works, retaining walls, pedestrian bridges across dangerous ravines and stairs to access steep terrain more safely. Each management committee signed a Memorandum of Understanding with GOAL for assistance and support for implementing the small mitigation works. The management committees oversaw the project and managed community contributions and the payroll for masons, labourers, suppliers etc. GOAL supported the management committees to create a plan for ongoing maintenance after the project was complete.

234 CBO and community members were trained in risk identification and mitigation activities. They were also sensitised on: the role of EICs, community emergency and response plans, evacuation procedures, early warning systems including the meaning of alerts as issued by authorized providers and disaster preparedness measures at a household level.

At seven schools, GOAL provided trainings for school teachers, management and school children in first aid, search and rescue and school safety. The training activities included disaster-related games and activities, contests and practice drills for different types of hazards. First aid and basic search and rescue equipment was provided to the schools from GOAL. School brigades were created with representative pupils who had responsibilities in prevention, evacuation and first aid.

Finally, as a pilot, GOAL provided materials and support for upgrading transitional shelters into permanent houses for 55 vulnerable households in the community under RUDR. These community members had lost their homes in the 2010 earthquake and were still living in tarp houses. Masons who were trained in disaster resilient building techniques were hired by beneficiaries to complete the construction. Community members also contributed to transportation of materials and labour, and supervised the masons with technical support from GOAL’s engineers (GOAL, 2013a; GOAL, 2014a).

3.5 Analysis in relation to the six principles

In this section, the above described programme is analysed in relation to six principles for effective capacity building in disaster risk management.

3.5.1 Flexibility/Adaptability

Definition: The need to approach capacity building interventions flexibly, ensuring that the design of the programme can be adapted to the context in which it is applied rather than applied as an externally-imposed ‘blueprint’. It includes working with and reinforcing existing skills, strategies,
systems and capacities. It also includes understanding and accounting for the political and power dimensions that can contribute to or undermine capacity building.

**Research question:** How has the programme approached capacity development in a flexible manner, adapting the approach to context?

- The GOAL team ensured that RUDR was aligned to the national DPC strategy as well as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency strategy and the five priorities of the Hyogo Framework for Action. Within the national DRM strategy, GOAL chose to align to the informally accepted EIC model for the establishment of community DRR intervention teams. The team felt that previous multi-sectoral experience in Turgeau since 2010 helped them to design RUDR in a way that recognised the communities’ needs, vulnerabilities and capacities.

- The GOAL team also completed programme-specific assessments for RUDR to ensure the needs of the target group were met on the ground. The assessment process for RUDR is described in detail in the Comprehensive Planning section. Interviewees from GOAL also emphasised the importance of recognising and adapting CB for DRM programmes to the advantages and disadvantages of working in an urban context. The box below is a summary of how GOAL took the urban environment into account in the design and delivery of RUDR.
Evidence indicates that GOAL’s strategy of adapting their approaches to take into account the advantages and disadvantages of working in an urban environment have contributed to the effectiveness of RUDR. Below is a summary of how the RUDR programme was adapted to the urban context.

GOAL staff strategically utilised existing community structures such as the Community Platforms, churches, schools and other informal structures to access the densely populated neighbourhoods to raise awareness of programme activities and encourage participation. As a result the programme attracted more than enough community members to participate in various activities. For example, in Haut Turgeau over 70 applications were received for the 14 spaces on the EIC team.

In comparison to rural communities, people from urban areas had a higher capacity and higher education levels which were actively drawn upon through various meetings, activities and trainings. Training participants and providers commented that the interactive nature of trainings allowed participants to contribute their own ideas and knowledge to the content making it practical and relevant in the context.

GOAL adapted the prescribed EIC trainings to reflect the needs of an urban environment (where cholera and other water-borne diseases are prevalent) by adding sessions on water, sanitation and hygiene. Several interviewees commented trainings were of high quality, suitably designed for the purpose and one of the most highly valued programme elements. Training evaluations and pre and post-tests were often, but not always, used to gauge the effectiveness of courses and future trainings were adjusted to meet learning needs accordingly.

The transitional shelter upgrading and small mitigation works components were also designed to maximise on the communities’ capacities to identify needs, manage and contribute to implementation. The communities of urban areas already enjoyed better access to basic services than could be expected in rural areas, so the mitigation works were designed to improve on existing urban infrastructure and ease access to services available. Those who were particularly vulnerable in the informal urban settlements were selected for transitional shelter upgrading support. GOAL’s complimentary programming in other sectors was also highly appreciated and important to the success of RUDR in the environment according to beneficiaries.

Being located in an urban environment, GOAL was able to benefit from easier access to all levels of government and the international community for the improved design and implementation of RUDR. The programme benefitted from improved integration and sustainability as a result of the active participation of the mayor, the CASEC, CLPC and DPC which is described further detail in the Ownership section. GOAL also actively participated in and benefitted from the national level DRR coordination and networking meetings where best practices in DRM work and the application of the EIC model were shared (GOAL, 2013a).

Programme design also needed to take into consideration some of the disadvantages of implementing in an urban environment. For example, traditionally used early warning systems (such as sirens and the red, yellow and green flag system prescribed in the EIC model) were less effective in urban environments because of the level of audio and visual distractions. Therefore GOAL adapted the model by utilising EICs to disseminate alerts and warnings using available technology.

In addition, political sensitivities can be higher in urban areas as people are more aware of political issues through better access to media, according to interviewees. GOAL worked closely with local authorities, but emphasized the need for transparent decision-making processes wherever possible. For example, GOAL used mixed groups of government and community members in assessments, in the selection of EIC members and in selecting successful candidates for the small mitigation works. The approach helped to build trust and demonstrate impartiality in the delivery of the programme.
• Several interviewees appreciated the community-led processes in the assessment and analysis stages of the EIC and mitigation works. However participants of two group interviews commented that after submitting their assessment findings and proposed actions to GOAL, there was less flexibility. Interviewees noted that they had little or no opportunity to negotiate the implementation plans or the division of responsibilities as prescribed by GOAL in the Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). Community members felt they were capable and wanted more power to adjust plans and manage resources as they saw fit. The local authorities were also in support of lending more freedom for growth to the beneficiaries. One interviewee from government said, “I agree that some CBOs are weak, but let’s put measures in place to let them grow. Let them make some mistakes so they can learn from them.” Interviewees from GOAL explained that they must consider technical quality and quality assurance, as well as their own financial and legal responsibilities such as cost-effectiveness, value for money and reduction of fraud and corruption. GOAL sought to balance these concerns with offering a model that lent as much independence to communities as possible.

• The research team from Haiti State University found that GOAL’s flexible approach to the research contributed to a better outcome. The methodology for data collection was adapted to meet informational needs when it was discovered that group interviews were not the most effective means to understand the situation. Individual interviews were added to the data collection process to facilitate cross-checking data from group interviews for an improved outcome. Since the concept of DRM research was fairly new, the stakeholders benefitted from the ability to adapt their plans during the course of implementation.

3.5.2 Comprehensive Planning

**Definition:** The need to carefully design interventions so that they are appropriate, responsive and sustainable. It includes planning on the basis of existing capacity and capacity gaps, and appropriate scheduling of interventions so that pressure to show visible results does not undermine capacity development. Also critical is planning for the long-term sustainability of capacity gains after the withdrawal of interventions.

**Research question:** What has been the approach to full programme planning?

• Timetabling for the programme was initially envisioned for 15 months. While most project activities were scheduled to finish on time, the research component and GIS mapping components fell behind due to internal and external turnover. GOAL was developing a new proposal for a follow-on programme (which was awarded) when OFDA offered the opportunity for a six-month cost-extension to scale up small scale mitigation activities both on a community and household level, as well as some new activities. Finally, the programme was scheduled in two Phases: Phase 1 for 15 months and Phase 2 for six months. GOAL staff felt the timing for RUDR was sufficient, however they emphasised the importance of having a longer-term presence in Turgeau through future programming.

• GOAL staff underlined that previous programmes to respond to and recover from the earthquake in 2010 provided the enabling environment for community based disaster risk reduction activities in Turgeau. One staff member reflected, “To be successful with a programme in the Haiti context, you have to build on consolidated gains.”

• Care was taken to design the programme based on the identified needs of the two neighbourhoods in Turgeau using a combination of tools and approaches. The assessment for
RUDR included participatory mapping exercises and needs assessments to identify detailed information on specific risks identified in these communities. The assessment also included the participatory identification of potential mitigation projects prioritized to reduce mapped risks in targeted neighbourhoods. A group of complimentary assessment and monitoring tools were used to further design and shape the programme. These are listed in the table below (GOAL, 2013a).

**Box 2 Assessment and Monitoring Tools for CB for DRM.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOAL’s Community Resilience Toolkit</td>
<td>Facilitates measurement of 30 resilience components in five key thematic areas. Each category is scored and then stakeholders were facilitated to identify actions to improve the score. GOAL team members particularly found the scoring system to be useful as it became a point of discussion where community members could challenge it and then come to understand the logic behind the assessment and its outputs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR KAPB (Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Behaviour) test</td>
<td>A household level quantitative survey used to measure a communities’ capacity in relation to DRM. This survey was done before the RUDR programme and then annually after implementation began to discern to what level capacity had been built. GOAL staff found this to be one of the more effective tools particularly with regards to reporting and justification for actions and decisions with donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCA Toolbox</td>
<td>Aims to gauge people’s exposure to and capacity to resist natural disasters. Local authorities, males and females of various ages and people with disabilities participated in the exercises. Various tools were used such as seasonal calendars, focus group discussions, transect walks and observation. Participants particularly liked how the exercises led to a self-determined plan of action for reducing risk. The exercises engaged them to act together as a team and build ownership to reach the defined goals. The results of the VCA were also used to help identify some of the small-scale mitigation works.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier Analysis/Designing Behavioural Change (BA/DBC) Framework</td>
<td>Used widely by GOAL, was used to monitor and improve the quality of DRM awareness-raising efforts for beneficiaries. The idea was to understand what prevents people from practicing responsible risk-informed behaviours such as following evacuation procedures to protect their family from a hurricane. Participants identified enablers and barriers in the environment and stakeholders as “doers” and “non-doers” to help prioritise activities. The behaviours were analysed and the community developed a plan to tackle the behaviours and therefore improve effectiveness of awareness-raising campaigns. GOAL staff found the exercise to be useful, but it was too early to determine whether the exercise had its intended impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Pre and Post-Tests</td>
<td>These tests were given before and then approximately two months after trainings to measure pre-existing knowledge and knowledge retention respectively. This form of monitoring was required by OFDA, but proved to be troublesome for GOAL to implement as many participants were not motivated to re-gather to take the post test. GOAL has tried several methods to increase participation: 1) doing the post test at the beginning of the next training they attended; 2) giving post-test by phone; 3) providing a general post-test which covered several trainings. The latter was the most effective solution as it was the only method that increased participation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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• There was mixed evidence across the programme as to the future sustainability of RUDR. The programme approach was fairly reliant on training as the key factor for enabling the community to carry on efforts in DRM. As an example, the community masons who were trained in hazard-resistant building techniques are a community capacity for now and in the future. The communities interviewed did feel that while they held the capacity to design and conduct future DRM activities as a result of the trainings, they were not confident that the government or other donors would be there to fund them. There was also a concern about the sustainability of EIC capacity in one neighbourhood because there were not sufficient storage facilities or systems in place for maintaining disaster preparedness and response equipment. GOAL’s strategy to align to the EIC model proved to enhance the programme’s sustainability. The EICs are accepted and actively integrated into the CLPC through GOAL’s continued efforts to link the community to local authorities in assessments, trainings and community meetings.

• GOAL’s use of a steering committee (with a wide range of stakeholders across government and communities) in the selection of small mitigation works helped to ensure the acceptance of the works and their future sustainability. GOAL provided extra maintenance materials and worked with the small mitigation works management committees to create a plan for ongoing maintenance. Mitigation works beneficiaries reported that they would volunteer time and resources to the maintenance of mitigation works after the programme finishes. However, it is notable that GOAL’s programme design did not include a robust and effective system for handing over mitigation works to local government and therefore, in some cases, the works are not legally owned by anyone and are not, as yet, included in annual government budgets for ongoing maintenance.

• Although maximising sustainability appears to be a ‘work in progress’ for GOAL, the organisation anticipates a longer term presence in Turgeau to build on community capacities gained in RUDR. The GOAL team saw the OFDA grant as a bridge between emergency and development phases. There is already an on-going 30-month development project which is focusing on longer-term capacity building activities, building on the consolidated gains of previously implemented projects in the area, including the RUDR.

• Some technical staff turnover had a negative impact on Phase 1 of the RUDR programme. Most of the plans for GIS mapping in assessments and evacuation planning were delayed until Phase 2 due to turnover. Interviewees stated that it was difficult to recruit and retain a person with the level of technical mapping skills required by the programme. People with technical skills were in high demand in Haiti and GOAL’s salaries were less competitive than some other agencies. To address the issue of turnover in general, GOAL revised its salary scale and increased internal and external training opportunities for staff. Recently, the Haiti team attended a regional DipECHO conference and won a prize for their presentation of DRR activities which was highly motivational to the team members. In addition, new policies were established to prioritise internal promotion and offer of longer term contracts which have helped to improve retention. Having several ongoing donor grants has contributed to GOAL’s ability to make these improvements. Retention of staff towards the end of the Phase 1 and beginning of Phase 2 has improved.
• GOAL had one of the most highly developed monitoring and evaluation systems in place compared to other case study countries. Monitoring of the RUDR programme was the responsibility of Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) team and the project manager. GOAL provided extensive support to the MEL team through a network of global and regional advisors. These advisors had the responsibility of building the Haiti MEL and programme teams’ capacity to effectively implement the monitoring strategy and utilise MEL tools. The Box below provides further details on how the Global Advisors provided learning support.

Box 3 Distance learning and remote support to enhance monitoring

GOAL Haiti is able to access their pool of Global Advisors on an as-needed basis for remote support, and generally one time per year for in-country support. GOAL’s global MEL support team includes a Behaviour Change Advisor, a Survey & Assessment Advisor, a Regional Accountability and Learning Coordinator (based in Africa) and a Regional Accountability and Learning Advisor (based in El Salvador).

When GOAL introduced the BA/BC monitoring tool to the MEL team, a formative research and behaviour change training was facilitated by their Behaviour Change Advisor remotely through the use of pre-recorded webinars followed by live skype chats with the Haiti team. The Haiti team was able to watch and listen to the webinars at their own pace. Interviewees stated that this was especially useful since the sessions were produced in English and the team’s native languages were French and Creole. Following the remote training, the team conducted small assignments related to behaviour change research (across DRR and water, sanitation and hygiene promotion), with the remote support of the Advisor. The team appreciated how the methodology could be adapted across a number of different sectors, and were able to utilise it for specific behaviours they acknowledged as being particularly difficult to change, such as “prompt evacuation after receiving notice of an impending cyclone.” The support of the Advisor enabled the identification of challenging behaviours, the development of activities with associated monitoring plans, and then the ability to evaluate using behaviour change indicators, as opposed to simply knowledge based indicators.

• The MEL team in Haiti was also supported by a Grants and Communications Manager (GMC) who ensured reporting requirements were met using an “output tracker” - a database used to enforce reporting deadlines. The GMC organised Grants Management Meetings (GMMs) at three key intervals within the project cycle: opening, interim, and closing (which was conducted three months prior to the end of the project). GOAL has met their reporting deadlines throughout RUDR and they have also begun sharing quarterly monitoring reports with the DPC as a way to improve communication with stakeholders on programme progress (GOAL, 2013c). The GOAL Monitoring and Evaluation plan was divided into two sections: 1. Performance management matrix which defined what was being measured and how (outputs and outcomes) and 2. The data management plan which illustrated who handled data and when from source to usage. In addition to the above, GOAL also used a gamut of participatory assessment and monitoring tools to measure the baseline and track progress during the lifetime of the project as described in the Box above (USAID, 2013). Evidence suggested that the GOAL Haiti team had effective strategies and systems in place to effectively monitor and evaluate capacity building for disaster risk management.

3.5.3 Ownership/Partnership

Definition: The need to ensure that those targeted for capacity development have a clear stake in the initiative and its design and implementation, again to help ensure it is appropriate, effective and
sustainable. Ownership is likely to rest on active participation, clear statements of responsibilities, engagement of leaders, and alignment with existing DRM/DRR strategies.

**Research question:** How has ownership been fostered?

- Actors from the government and the community alike stated that GOAL’s previous response and recovery programmes in Turgeau after the 2010 earthquake positioned them well to gain acceptance for and to implement the RUDR programme. Humanitarian relief delivered effectively by GOAL helped to establish trust and effective working relationships with stakeholders.

- After the initial concept note for the RUDR programme was accepted by USAID/OFDA, GOAL arranged meetings with the DPC, CASEC, the Mayor and other government officials to design the full proposal to ensure it aligned with local and national priorities in DRM. GOAL has had regular consultative meetings with government throughout implementation to discuss programme progress and to address issues as they arose. Government interviewees were satisfied that GOAL was competent to support government in delivering CB for DRM programming and expressed appreciation for their collaborative approach.

**Box 4 Recovering from Aid Dependency through CV for DRM**

According to GOAL staff there is a current challenge to fostering ownership and partnership in CB for DRM and community-based programmes in general in Haiti which has also had an impact on the RUDR programme. Programme beneficiaries were used to a high level of support from foreign entities which has created a culture of dependency on foreign aid. This can partially be attributed to the 2010 earthquake response from the international community, although the history of charity in Haiti goes long before then. GOAL staff wanted to improve the sustainability of the RUDR by switching the community from the mentality that aid comes from the outside, to aid comes from within. To do this, they focused on an existing social principle in the Haitian context: the principle of “Konbit” – which means the community members work together to support each other to achieve community and household level priorities. Below are some of the notable techniques GOAL used to reinforce the idea of community volunteerism and ownership of CB for DRM:

- **Participatory Selection of Volunteer Teams (EICs):** The community-driven transparent process to recruit volunteer team members which included testing of candidates and the community validation process built on the sense of volunteerism within the community. Interviewees appreciated the selection process in the context of an urban community where trust and close social networks were lacking. The high number of applications to become one of the 14 EIC members in Haute Turgeau demonstrated a keen interest from communities. A GOAL staff member expressed, “EIC members need to have the trust and respect of the community to be able to engage with them and vice versa.” Several EIC members described the community validation process for the team to be a motivator to be committed to community work.

- **Required Community Contributions** outlined in Letters of Agreement between GOAL and their beneficiaries enforced the idea that the programme implementers and beneficiaries mutually have responsibilities in the implementation DRM activities. Community contributions in RUDR included activities such as conducting assessments, management of projects, labour, provision of materials and transportation of materials. Beneficiaries who were deemed highly vulnerable, such as those with disabilities, were exempt from providing contributions of labour and other, more capable, community members would volunteer to
help them. Some interviewees from the shelter and mitigation works expressed frustration at the level of community contributions required when people in Turgeau are poor and in need of support. However, at the same time, the GOAL project offered opportunities for livelihood improvement which were valued by the beneficiaries.

**Non-Payment for Participation:** GOAL’s policy has been not to pay for community participation in capacity building activities such as participation on the EIC and attending trainings. One GOAL management team member said, “I feel the community’s natural social fabric is eroded through paid volunteerism and dependency created by NGOs. EIC members should participate in their teams because they want to save lives, help out their communities and reduce risks.” The communities interviewed were also not concerned with being paid to attend DRM activities. They did appreciate transportation to some trainings and that refreshments were provided during breaks. For the groups interviewed, the motivation to attend was to learn new and practical skills to serve their families and communities.

Despite some frustrations about the level of community contributions required, there was a strong indication that GOAL excelled in encouraging ownership through their implementation strategies. Overall RUDR beneficiaries felt that GOAL was supportive and facilitated them throughout programme implementation and that their active role has contributed to building their capacity.

- One challenge to the sense of partnership in RUDR was the issue of effective time management. Several interviewees stated that if they were not given good notice to attend activities such as trainings, or if GOAL staff were late to meetings, it made them feel less valued and respected. EICs were most concerned about the lateness of some equipment and supplies to be delivered to the EICs as defined by Memorandum of Understanding. EICs were concerned that their communities blamed EIC members and not GOAL for the fact that these materials had not been received. The equipment was late due to logistical challenges with GOAL’s suppliers, but communities appeared to be unaware of the reasons (GOAL, 2014b).

- The programme clearly fostered a sense of partnership between GOAL and Haiti State University to promote best practice in urban DRM. GOAL co-developed the Terms of Reference (ToR) with the faculty and met regularly to check progress and adapt the approach. The interviewee from the university described the relationship with GOAL as cordial and collaborative. He stated, “Other institutions say they want to work with us. They just give us a ToR and tell us to do the work, but GOAL was different. They worked along-side the university.”

### 3.5.4 Integration of Actors and Scales

**Definition:** The need to build capacity to coordinate across scales and to work with other stakeholders. Capacity building can act to bridge capacity and communication gaps that commonly exist between national and local levels. Initiatives can focus on building capacity of coalitions of stakeholders, and on building local people’s capacity to interact with other stakeholders.

**Research question:** How has the programme built capacity across scales and actors?

- The project aimed to build capacity almost exclusively at the community and local levels focusing on individuals, CBOs, community representatives and local authorities. Local government benefitted from improved community infrastructure through the small scale mitigation works and the establishment of EICs which can be deployed for DRM activities. Building on the knowledge and experience gained at the community level, RUDR, sought to
capture best practices and lessons learned in urban community managed DRR programmes to be shared at the national level through the research component.

- GOAL staff prioritised sharing knowledge and best practices with DRM counterparts at the national level. According to a commentator, GOAL is well known in the DRM community for their active participation in the UNDP-DPC organised DRR Forum and working groups. GOAL was one of the contributors to the development of the national proposed EIC model. GOAL staff commented that all those using the model spoke the same language, sharing experience on the VCAs and EIC package which created a useful synergy across actors.

- Evidence suggested that the RUDR programme led to improved coordination and collaboration between actors by “forcing” them to work together to achieve a common goal. One interviewee commented that the Haiti State University research team came from several different departments and became better aligned in relation to DRM terminology and how to evaluate DRM interventions in a collaborative way as a result of RUDR. The local CASEC reflected, “I can say that GOAL provides the lubricant to our relationships. Communities in urban areas tend to do things on their own, but this programme forced them to communicate with each other.” The School Director interviewed also commented that new relationships with other schools were built through RUDR. In one example, a competition between schools to write a song to highlight issues of vulnerability was identified as an effective way to create interest and improved commitment to address DRM across actors.

- Perhaps the most salient step towards integration of scales for DRM was the link that RUDR enabled between the EICs and the CLPC. The CLPC now actively recognises and uses the community teams’ capacity to manage and protect people at public events. The most recent example was the use of EICs at the 2015 carnival where the teams were used for awareness raising, first aid, crowd control and incident response. Several interviewees cited examples of how DPC has been actively using EICs to conduct DRM activities described in more detail in the Functional Capacity section.

- Evidence suggested that trainings and meetings that mixed participants from different areas enhanced capacity to work across actors and scales in DRM. Training providers from HRCS, DPC and GOAL used consistent DRM terminology which facilitates communication between EIC team members, the broader community, local authorities and the university. As pointed out by the EIC teams and the CASEC, EICs may one day need to respond to each other’s neighbourhoods in a disaster. The opportunity to meet each other and visit each other’s neighbourhoods for trainings has increased their confidence in their ability to respond. EIC members also reported more confidence to call fire and ambulance services as a result of meeting them in trainings and increased awareness of services available.

### 3.5.5 Attention to Functional Capacity

**Definition:** The need to focus on functional capacity building – i.e. building the managerial and organizational capabilities needed to ensure effective decisions and actions can flow from technical know-how. It includes aspects such as improving coordination and decision-making processes. It also includes fostering an enabling environment, such as developing incentive structures for good performance and to ensure staff retention, as well as promoting the wider political conditions to support DRR as a priority.

**Research question:** How is the mix of potential elements for CB targeted?
• For the EICs and the small scale mitigation works, the mix of capacity building elements of the programme appeared to work well together to improve functional capacity. The participatory selection processes undergone by candidates gave an incentive for good performance. The trainings contributed to technical DRM knowledge and functional skills such as project management and team work. The provision of equipment and supplies enabled the teams to carry out preparedness, response and mitigation activities. Finally, the Letters of Agreement ensured clear responsibilities and coordination between stakeholders. The programme enabled beneficiaries to put their new capacities into practice and further learn from their experiences.

• For the two neighbourhoods of Turgeau, three EICs have been established that are actively used by local authorities to contribute towards community resilience. Evidence suggests that the EICs have capacity to effectively conduct preparedness and response activities. RUDR-trained EICs provided protection services at the 2015 Carnival celebration where they effectively responded to a serious electrical accident by calming crowds and providing first aid to victims. The CASEC and DPC have also expressed confidence that EICs are prepared to conduct DRM awareness-raising, act as agents to communicate early warning messages to communities and facilitate evacuation procedures. DPC stated that as a direct result of the programme, the EICs of Turgeau are now capable to do the first steps in emergency response before DPC arrives.

• Another output has been improved community awareness and engagement for DRM as a result of the DRM trainings and activities from GOAL. Schools, CBOs and the wider community are now aware of community emergency response plans, evacuation routes and how to react to early warning systems. These plans are currently being finalised and will be shared with the CLPC.

• While it is not yet possible to determine the final impact of the research on urban DRR best practices, there are several positive outcomes for the research community in Haiti. Haiti State University has an improved skill-base in conducting DRR and DRM research. Across different faculties, staff members are using consistent terminology for the first time. The practical experience of conducting the research has helped staff to understand new concepts and the Haiti State University interviewee was confident that there was now improved capacity to conduct evaluations concerning DRM programmes. He said, “Before I only considered evaluation to be financial audit. I saw some realities as a result of this experience. I learned that you don’t see everything in reports as you do in the field such as managing human relationships. Knowing these kinds of things helps us. If you go only by theory, you miss many things.”

3.5.6 Contribution to Disaster Resilience

**Definition:** The need for a more holistic DRR-influenced approach to DRM capacity. This includes attention to: understanding and planning for long-term changes in risk; moving beyond a focus on short-term emergency management to capacity in disaster prevention, mitigation and long-term recovery; prioritizing the reduction of vulnerability; targeting the needs of vulnerable groups; and addressing gender disparities in both vulnerability and capacity.

**Research question:** How has the programme captured wider aspects of the DRR approach?

• RUDR focused on response, preparedness and mitigation, with one activity related to earthquake recovery. Preparedness and response activities focused on the formation of community DRR intervention teams and upscaling community response capacity through
provision of trainings and equipment. The small mitigation works were designed to address the vulnerability of the target group by improving access to services and reducing the impact of disasters to the community by providing safer infrastructure. The upgrading of transitional shelters for the most vulnerable were to address gaps in 2010 earthquake recovery.

• The VCA exercises and action planning conducted during the RUDR helped communities to raise their awareness and respond to the needs of vulnerable groups within the community. One EIC team showed acute awareness of people with vulnerabilities in their community and were confident they had a plan in place to address their needs in times of emergency response. One EIC member said, “We have a responsibility to help people who are the most vulnerable and the VCA exercises helped us to identify those needs.”

• There was evidence that GOAL prioritised the needs of vulnerable people through their programming approach. As an example, in the RUDR transitional shelter upgrade component, households who were still living in tarp homes since the earthquake were prioritised to receive transitional shelters upgrade support using vulnerability criteria. People with disabilities were prioritised and exempt from making contributions. Those with disabilities were also actively consulted in the assessments for mitigation works. Three beneficiaries with disabilities interviewed felt that GOAL/CBOs listened to their concerns and actively used their input in the designs.

• GOAL’s strategy to follow the EIC model will likely enhance better mainstreaming of community-based DRR approaches in national policies and plans, although it is too early to know the final impact. Many INGOs and the Red Cross are following this model despite the fact that it is not officially validated by government. Perhaps the benefit of conforming to the model will be that there has been more flexibility to test and refine the EIC model through best practice sharing in the DRR Forum/DRR thematic working group before it is validated by SNGRC/DPC.

• Explicit attention to gender focused on ensuring participation of women in the CB for DRM programme activities. Several interviewees discussed that women had a marginalised place in Haitian society, but the recognition of gender roles in the DRM trainings under GOAL seemed fairly limited, aside from the training on The Sphere Project. Sphere training covers gender as a cross-cutting issue in provision of humanitarian assistance. One female member of the EIC commented, “There is a huge importance of women in the context. I think it’s important for women to participate [in EIC] to show that they can do the same work as men. We need to show this to the community and the whole world.”

• Evidence suggested that in an urban area with extreme poverty RUDR needed to take a broader approach to resilience by tackling wider livelihood needs of vulnerable people. That is to say CB for DRM needed to be offered as part of a broader programming package which included water, sanitation, hygiene, housing, livelihoods etc. Communities were also clear during the interviews that while disaster risk is important, they have daily struggles and concerns to meet basic needs which must be addressed in order to consider participation in CB for DRM activities.
## 4 Reinforcement of DRM Capacities and Resources of the Haitian Population Programme (DIPECHO/9)

Table 3: Reinforcement of DRM Capacities and Resources of the Haitian Population Programme at a Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Overview at a glance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Which actors are involved in the CB activity?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Funders</strong>— European Commission Humanitarian aid Office (ECHO) – funding for this particular project came from the Disaster Preparedness Director General of ECHO, or DIPECHO). <strong>Implementers</strong> -- Spanish Red Cross (lead implementer), French Red Cross, German Red Cross, Haitian Red Cross and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Targeted vulnerable Haitian populations in the Nippes, Leogane, West and Lower Artibonite regions of Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the funding level and duration?</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,862,000</strong> <em>(€1,570,000 requested from DG ECHO and $292,000 co-financing across four implementing organizations) for a 15 month programme (May 2013 – July 2014). Some activities went through to December 2014.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the scope of the activities?</strong></td>
<td>The goal was to strengthen the SNGRD (Disaster Risk Management National System) structures and the population’s capacities in risk management. Primary capacity building activities were training and support to national, regional and local institutions responsible for DRM and to community intervention teams (EICs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the geographical focus?</strong></td>
<td>The project was implemented in three geographical regions (called ‘departments’) and at the national level: (1) three Sections in the Nippes department (German Red Cross); (2) four Sections in the West department (Spanish Red Cross); (3) four Sections of the Lower Artibonite department (French Red Cross); and (4) the national level (IFRC).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second programme selected as a case study is the Spanish Red Cross-led DRM project funded by ECHO in the Lower Artibonite region of Haiti.

The Reinforcement of DRM Capacities and Resources of the Haitian Population Programme (hereafter referred to as DIPECHO/9) aims to build upon existing capacity to reduce the risk of disasters for the population by strengthening the SNGRD structures and the population’s capacities in risk management, especially preparedness and response.

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5 Figures converted from Euros to USD using the FT conversion rate of 1 euro = 1.12 USD (accessed 12/05/15)
The programme’s activities were targeted at the institutional, organisational and community levels and included capacity building activities such as:

- Training (theoretical and practical) for Community Intervention Teams (EICs) and representatives from the Haitian Red Cross, Civil Protection Department (DPC), the CASEC (local state representative) and other local authorities from the commune, regional and departmental levels;
- Ongoing technical assistance; and
- Monitoring and support to the national, regional, departmental and local level DPC (Civil Protection Directorate) and Haitian Red Cross.

The activities are described in sections 4.1 to 4.4, followed by an extended analysis in relation to the six principles of CB\(^6\) in section 4.5.

### 4.1 Programme actors

The DIPECHO/9 project was funded by the Disaster Preparedness Director General of the European Commission Humanitarian aid Office (DIPECHO). The project built on experience implementing the DIPECHO/8 and HIP 2011 grants from ECHO in Haiti.

The project consisted of five implementing organizations: (1) Spanish Red Cross (Lead Implementing Organization), (2) German Red Cross, (3) French Red Cross, (4) International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), and (5) Haitian Red Cross (at national and regional levels).

Key partners for the project included: (1) Civil Protection Department (DPC, at national and regional levels), (2) CASEC (State’s local representative), (3) Mayors (at local level), and (4) Community Intervention Teams (EICs, at local level).

The DIPECHO/9 project targeted 105,030 direct beneficiaries who were either beneficiaries of the DIPECHO/8 / HIP 2011 projects or beneficiaries in new project areas. These beneficiaries included: Community Intervention Teams (EICs) who participated in trainings, community members engaged in and benefitting from the mitigation works micro-projects, community members benefitting from Early Warning Systems (EWS) and Vulnerability Capacity Assessments (VCAs), Haitian Red Cross representatives who participated in Training of Trainers (ToT) at the National Training Center in Port au Prince, local authorities who participated in project activities and other affected residents of the communities where the project directly intervened. The number of direct beneficiaries represents approximately 35% of the entire population in three project areas (Croix-rouge-es, 2013)

### 4.2 Funding and timescales

The 15 month programme (May 1, 2013 – July 30, 2014) was funded by the Director General of the European Commission Humanitarian aid Office (DIPECHO). The total project budget was $1,862,000 of which $1,570,000 was received from the donor (84%) and the remaining $292,000 (16%) was contributed as co-financing by the four implementing organizations (Croix-rouge-es, 2013). Table 4 presents the breakdown of the budget of DIPECHO/9.

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\(^6\) The six principles were identified following a global literature review early in the research. A definition for each one is included in the text below.
Table 4: Breakdown of DIPECHO/9 budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Initial budget</th>
<th>Final committed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>11.402.72</td>
<td>6.898.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment costs</td>
<td>91.685.44</td>
<td>109.945.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontracting costs</td>
<td>218.744.96</td>
<td>149.801.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumable and goods costs</td>
<td>540.411.20</td>
<td>508.733.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel costs</td>
<td>877.828.00</td>
<td>956.108.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1.740.072.32</td>
<td>1.731.486.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Costs</td>
<td>121.804.48</td>
<td>121.204.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total costs</td>
<td>1.861.876.80</td>
<td>1.852.690.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to finalize some activities of the project (the external capitalisation of the EICs methodology with all the DRR partners in the country and some activities at the national level), there were 3 no-cost extensions. First, an extension from July to August 2014, second, from August to October 2014, and third, from November to December 2014.

4.3 Geographical coverage

The DIPECHO/9 project was implemented in communities of three areas of Haiti (Lower Artibonite, West Leogane, and Nippes). In addition, activities at the national level took place in Port au Prince.

DIPECHO/8/HIP 2011 project locations were selected for inclusion in DIPECHO/9 in order to build on initial progress made during the earlier project. Additional new locations chosen for DIPECHO/9 were based on the following criteria: (1) vulnerability to hazards (flooding, hurricanes, landslides, drought), (2) proximity to DIPECHO/8/HIP 2011 project locations, (3) lack of response capacity and existing DRM resources, (4) existence and functionality of DPC and HRC structures at project site level, (5) affected by hurricanes Sandy and Isaac, and (6) rural areas with limited response capacity (Croix-rouge-es, 2013).

As part of our fieldwork, the research team visited two communities - Duclos in Desdunes and Chardene (Bois-Neuf) in Lower Artibonite - where the French Red Cross was the implementing partner. FRC chose to work in Lower Artibonite as they had previous experience working in the region.

4.4 CB activities

DIPECHO/9 operated mainly at the national and community levels, and also at the regional level. The research team studied activities implemented at the national level, where IFRC and HRC were the implementers (with the support of SRC), and at the activities implemented at the community level in the two communities chosen in Lower Artibonite by FRC. The activities implemented at the community level in other areas were similar to the ones in this location (Croix-rouge-es, 2013).

4.4.1 National / institutional level

An objective of DIPECHO/9 was to reinforce the institutional arrangements of SNGRD and the HRC. The project aimed to do this by implementing different activities at the local level (like the EICs) that would have an impact in the national system. DIPECHO/9 aimed to harmonise approaches and develop consolidated methodologies to be included in the national disaster risk
management processes. This was to be done through the promotion and creation of space for dialogue amongst authorities at different levels (Croix-rouge-es, 2013).

**Institutional strengthening of SNGRD:** DIPECHO/9 aimed to contribute to the structure of SNGRD through the formalisation and standardisation of CBDRM mechanisms and operating procedures like the EIC model, early warning systems and simulation exercises. The work done at the community and regional levels aimed to impact the national structure of SNGRD (Croix-rouge-es, 2013).

**Capitalisation of EIC methodology:** One of the objectives of the project at national level was to institutionalise the EIC methodology. IFRC and HRC were responsible for coordinating with SNGRD to obtain formal validation. Although legal validation has not been achieved yet, the methodology has been approved by DPC and different organisations are now implementing it in their programmes.

**Institutional development of HRC training centre:** DIPECHO/9 aimed to improve the trainers’ network and the economic feasibility of the HRC training centre. The project intended to certify and train 10 managers and 50 community trainers chosen from HRC branches’ existing pool as well as to create a business plan for the training centre. The objective was to expand and better prepare the network of trainers to enable the organisation to offer better quality training.

The partners responsible for the national level activities and for coordinating with the government were mainly HRC accompanied by IFRC and SRC (Croix-rouge-es, 2013).

### 4.4.2 Regional and district level

The main objective of DIPECHO/9 at the departmental and municipal levels was to strengthen the vertical communication and coordination systems of the different DRM actors. The project aimed to create better coordination mechanisms between key DRM stakeholders like the CDPC, CCPC and LCPC. It was also an objective to assign and clarify the different roles and responsibilities of these stakeholders, including the different roles of HRC and DPC.

The institutional strengthening activities were done through training processes and provision of equipment and resources. The programme involved all stakeholders in all the training, which covered their specific roles and responsibilities (Croix-rouge-es, 2013). Different levels of seniority within the organisations were invited to the training activities to ensure coverage throughout the organisation and to enable an environment where stakeholders could meet, talk and work together.

The organisations and HRC-DPC, had the opportunity to work and coordinate with the community on simulation exercises.

### 4.4.3 Community level

Most of the activities under DIPECHO/9 were focused on the community level. One of the main objectives of the programme was to reinforce, through training and provision of materials, the EIC structures that were created under DIPECHO/8. There were also new EICs created and trained (Croix-rouge-es, 2013).

The EICs were created by DIPECHO/8 and DIPECHO/9 and replaced the CLD (Local Disaster Committees), which were previously created and supported by HRC. The regional HRC was involved in supporting the CLDs, which only included HRC and not the government. DIPECHO/8 created eight EICs and DIPECHO/9 created two. The DPC encouraged the DIPECHO/9 team to work with existing teams (CLDs) instead of creating new ones.
The FRC supported the creation of the EICs in the communities. Their support included help in the selection process for EIC members, training on responsibilities and assignment of roles. The regional HRC did follow up visits to make sure that EICs were functional.

CASECs also played a role in the creation of the EICs. In Bois Neuf, they supported the process by creating the list of candidates standing for election by the community, explained the roles of each post and the importance of EICs to the community, and implemented a survey to determine if people selected for EIC roles were qualified/credible.

DIPECHO/9 made use of the EICs developed in previous phases of the project to advocate and support the creation of EICs in new areas. Members of ‘new’ EICs visited ‘old’ EICs to share experiences and discuss the benefits of participating. There were simulation exercises conducted with the participation of both ‘old’ and new’ EICs to facilitate cross-learnings. DIPECHO/9 also supported the creation of a network of EIC members to encourage exchanges between less and more experienced people. This process was described as successful by one of our interviewees.

The training received by EICs was theoretical and practical and aimed to build the capacities of the EIC members as well as to reinforce the coordination mechanisms amongst DRM actors at the local level. The EIC members had the opportunity to learn about vulnerability assessments and to practice by conducting one in the community. They were also trained on inventory stock management and were given mitigation kits and EWS materials. First aid training was provided as well as project planning and management training that led to the creation of mitigation activities like water retention walls and bridges. Other activities included door to door sensitisation campaigns and family emergency planning, creation of EWS, school campaigns on DRR and needs assessments. Simulation exercises were also conducted in the communities facilitated by the RC in coordination with the CASEC, CLPC, EIC members and HRC volunteers (Croix-rouge-es, 2013).

At the community level, it was the responsibility of the different National Societies to implement the activities. FRC implemented in Lower Artibonite, GRC in Nippes and SRC in Leogane. The activities were done in coordination with the local branch of HRC and DPC at the local level.

4.5 Analysis in relation to the six principles

In this section, the above described programme is analysed in relation to six principles for effective capacity building in disaster risk management.

4.5.1 Flexibility/Adaptability

Definition: The need to approach capacity building interventions flexibly, ensuring that the design of the programme can be adapted to the context in which it is applied rather than applied as an externally-imposed ‘blueprint’. It includes working with and reinforcing existing skills, strategies, systems and capacities. It also includes understanding and accounting for the political and power dimensions that can contribute to or undermine capacity building.

Research question: How has the programme approached capacity development in a flexible manner, adapting the approach to context?

- DIPECHO/9 was designed taking into account the progress made by previous DIPECHO interventions and adapting to the local needs. For instance, the identification of new communities for DIPECHO/9 was done through a two stage process. When DIPECHO/8 finished, there was an evaluation that identified new communities or possible areas for intervention. Then, under DIPECHO/9, a needs assessment was carried out in collaboration with DPC. In addition, a vulnerability and capacity assessment (VCA) was
done, with the involvement of DPC, HRC, local leaders and community leaders and teachers.

- The needs assessment aimed to understand how the project could better respond to the communities' needs. It was conducted in meetings that were followed up by telephone calls. The information collected was related to the hazards affecting the communities, their existing capacity and their potential for capacity building and their commitment to work with the project if selected. This process allowed DIPECHO/9’s team to adapt and respond to the needs of the communities.

- The DIPECHO/9 consortium benefited from relations previously established in the communities to design the project. FRC had some existing links with communities through the HRC which were useful, as they provided an open door when DIPECHO/9 arrived to the communities to conduct their assessments. The communities were more open and the DIPECHO team had good starting knowledge of the communities on which to build.

- Interviewees from FRC and the regional HRC described the assessments that they conducted as very time consuming. For example, in Artibonite, they took approximately 6 months. However, in those communities where DIPECHO/8 had already worked, it took less time, because good working relationships had previously been established.

- Previous relations also eased the implementation of the project. According to one interviewee from FRC, ‘previous and good relations with teachers and community leaders were key in the success of the project implementation’.

- DIPECHO/9 was aligned with the Haitian National DRR framework. The alignment was possible thanks to HRC’s involvement from very early stages of the project (even from DIPECHO/8). HRC was in charge of coordinating and making sure that the proposed methodology of CB-DRM was followed and respected (i.e. the methodology included in the 2012-2015 Strategic Plan for HRC). Some of the activities in the project were guided by the Civil Protection Plan of Action and aligned with the HRC institutional strategy. There was wide agreement between our interviewees that for this to be possible, it was key to have permanent collaboration between SRC’s team, who led the writing of the proposal, and HRC, who checked their inputs and provided timely feedback.

4.5.2 Comprehensive Planning

**Definition:** The need to carefully design interventions so that they are appropriate, responsive and sustainable. It includes planning on the basis of existing capacity and capacity gaps, and appropriate scheduling of interventions so that pressure to show visible results does not undermine capacity development. Also critical is planning for the long-term sustainability of capacity gains after the withdrawal of interventions.

**Research question:** What has been the approach to full programme planning?

- Given the long-standing relationship between DIPECHO and some of the institutions, regions and communities where DIPECHO/9 worked, the team was in a good position to design a project that would respond to their needs. The result was an ambitious project design that, in the view of most of interviewees, had an unrealistically short timeframe for implementation. While the plans and activities in the design were appropriate, there was just too little time to implement them all. This was especially the case for activities at the national level. This was reflected in a very ambitious logframe. According to one interviewee, the donor did not approve proposed changes to simplify and reduce the scope
of the logframe. The total implementation time for DIPECHO/9 was 15 months, with one interviewee claiming that it is not possible to do sustainable work in 15 months or to change people’s behaviour. It took six months to complete the needs assessments and during this period there were no activities. It also took longer than anticipated for the HRC to plan their side of activities (including trainings).

- Between DIPECHO/8 and DIPECHO/9 there was a gap of eight months due to internal procedures within DIPECHO. It was stated by some interviewees that this affected the continuity and the sustainability of the project as both national and international staff contracts ended, and when the new phase started, people with knowledge of the project were no longer available. In addition, the gap happened during the dry season which is the ideal time to implement activities such as trainings and meetings.

**Box 5 The EICs- a vehicle for sustainability and ownership.**

| The creation of EICs was one of the main achievements of DIPECHO/8 and DIPECHO/9. It was part of the project's approach and is recognized by most actors as key in creating ownership among the communities and providing a basis for sustainability. EICs were included in the National Contingency Plan of 2012. This was a significant achievement of DIPECHO/9 as it was the first time that the EICs were included in a national level plan.  

The creation of EICs was successful because it responded to a previously identified need. The DPC at national and local levels had recognised the lack of structures at community level and the communities themselves had identified and mentioned that they needed structures and mechanisms in place. The CLDs that had been previously established in some places did not include the government. DIPECHO/9 had the funding and the support of international donors to develop these structures. In addition, the creation of the EICs benefitted from the long relationship previously developed between the Red Cross and the communities.  

The EICs are an example of DIPECHO’s work in partnership. As mentioned in Section 4.5.1, a combination of Red Cross agencies and national partners worked together in their creation. During our interview with HRC, there were a number of learnings identified. First, the consortium had to build their relationship with DPC in order to get their support for the creation of the EICs, as they were initially reluctant to support them. After approximately 6 months and numerous meetings that led to an improvement of the relation between the two institutions, and to the clarification of their roles and responsibilities, the creation of the EICs was approved by DPC. Second, HRC benefitted from good relationships among the team and from having a leader who supported the idea of the EICs. This helped them surmount the challenges faced by the limited resources they had in place (only one focal point who was also in charge of other activities). It was clear from the interview that there was a lot of 'negotiation, time needed for advocacy, patience, longstanding working relations and many extra hours of work' needed to see the EICs created.  

Despite the success of the EICs, there are mixed views regarding the sustainability of the capacity developed and strengthened by DIPECHO/9. At the community level, on one side, the creation of the EICs was seen as important and key to provide sustainability to the activities developed by the project. The communities are now better informed on how to respond in the event of a disaster as a result of the trainings and support provided by DIPECHO/9. However, in some cases the EICs are not fully operational due to the lack of follow up from the DPCs, who do not see them as their responsibility. At the national and regional levels, although staff received various training and support, there is no mechanism
in place to test whether these skills are being used. One respondent highlighted that it is not possible to track the results of the capacity building undertaken.

- According to SRC, high staff turnover was a challenge for DIPECHO/9. The DPC changed most of their team between DIPECHO/8 and DIPECHO/9, and the expertise that was created with DIPECHO/8 was completely lost at the local level. At the national level, there was a DPC person appointed to be in charge of the EICs. This person however is not a high ranking official, and hence DPC’s support is still limited. Given the time gap between DIPECHO/8 and DIPECHO/9, staff turnover was also an issue for other members of the consortium whose staff moved to different positions during the gap.

- DIPECHO/9 had an M&E system in place. The monitoring was the responsibility of the coordinator at the national level. At the end of each stage of the project, there were team meetings to discuss lessons learnt and areas for improvement. There were also monthly meetings held with the communities and DPC to gather their opinions and modify next steps accordingly. In addition, there were departmental visits and interviews. The project carried out monitoring surveys with the communities after each activity (for instance, after simulation exercises and trainings). These surveys were considered very useful as they helped identify gaps or misunderstandings within the community.

- DIPECHO/9 did not develop an exit strategy, as there are plans to keep working with the communities (in the form of a DIPECHO/10, for instance).

4.5.3 Ownership/Partnership

**Definition:** The need to ensure that those targeted for capacity development have a clear stake in the initiative and its design and implementation, again to help ensure it is appropriate, effective and sustainable. Ownership is likely to rest on active participation, clear statements of responsibilities, engagement of leaders, and alignment with existing DRM/DRR strategies.

**Research question:** How has ownership been fostered?

- DIPECHO/9 aimed to involve all relevant stakeholders in all phases of the project and at all levels. At the national level, HRC and DPC had numerous meetings during which they redefined their relationship and clarified their roles. At the regional level, HRC and DPC had monthly project meetings with the President and the Civil Protection Officer, although these were not always well coordinated. These problems were sorted out over time, through an effort to show the importance of the project and by involving the Director of the DPC. Over time, collaboration was improved. Communities were also involved from the very beginning of DIPECHO/9 as part of the needs assessment exercise, and later were involved in regular meetings with different actors.

- Despite efforts to integrate a wide range of actors in the project’s design, some felt excluded at different stages. Some interviewees requested more coordination with the Regional Red Cross and felt they were not consulted enough during the design phase regarding the locations to be prioritised and the DRM activities to be implemented.

- EICs were also useful to create sensitisation and ownership of DIPECHO/9 in the communities (see Box 5). There was some initial resistance to the project, because it seemed ‘foreign’ and because EIC members are not paid, for example. However, after training that emphasised the benefits of having such structures in place in the event of a disaster, community members became better engaged with their EIC. The fact that EIC
members are not paid was identified by one interviewee as a challenge for the development of the project. It was argued that payment was necessary so that EIC members could always attend meetings and training rather than have to prioritize income generating activities.

- During DIPECHO/9, the EIC teams were fully responsible for the implementation of mitigation projects (one example was the construction of a bridge, retrofitting of a road). FRC provided support with training on proposal writing skills, budget development and project design. This aimed to develop the communities’ skills to access funds in the future, for example appealing to the local mayor or applying directly to a donor. According to FRC, it was a conscious decision by DIPECHO’s team to make the community entirely responsible for implementation. This was because during DIPECHO/8, which was implemented by FRC rather than the community, when maintenance or repair works were needed then the communities had said that it was the responsibility of FRC, as it was their project.

- Children were highly involved in community activities. They participated in carnivals and created theatre pieces. They were also involved in learning about different hazards and the DIPECHO/9 team used drawing activities to analyse children’s understanding about DRR and hazards.

4.5.4 Integration of Actors and Scales

**Definition:** The need to build capacity to coordinate across scales and to work with other stakeholders. Capacity building can act to bridge capacity and communication gaps that commonly exist between national and local levels. Initiatives can focus on building capacity of coalitions of stakeholders, and on building local people’s capacity to interact with other stakeholders.

**Research question:** How has the programme built capacity across scales and actors?

- Several interviewees appreciated the work that DIPECHO/9 did in facilitating relations between different stakeholders, both horizontally and vertically. This was achieved through inviting different parties to project activities. During these activities, people from different organisations and levels had the opportunity to interact and better understand the complementarity of their roles and responsibilities.

- Several examples were identified of horizontal relationships that had improved as a result of DIPECHO/9, including relations between DPC and HRC who, according to several interviewees, now work in a more coordinated way. DIPECHO/9 used both HRC and DPC logos in their communications as a strategy to present the complementarity of the work of both institutions. Similarly, at the regional level, representatives of HRC and DPC of Desdunes stated that their relationship had been strengthened by DIPECHO/9, and they gained an understanding of their shared interests and concerns. Participation of SRC, HRC and DPC in several meetings that were deliberately designed to be inclusive also improved their relations.

- DIPECHO/9 also helped strengthen vertical links. The project invited participants of different institutions and of various levels to training sessions. This facilitated team work, and also enhanced relationships. For example, regional level HRC representatives participated in community level trainings. Simulation exercises included participants from DPC, HRC and communities.
In spite of several positive examples of how relationships had improved, interviews in the communities revealed that collaboration with DPC is still not always possible. An HRC community mobilizer and members of the EIC of Lagon stated that the DPC does not have strong incentives to work with and oversee the EIC.

Box 6 Active engagement of the partners ensured a harmonized approach.

DIPECHO/9’s consortium was built on a model that combined the strong leadership of SRC, the active engagement of several national societies (the Spanish, French, German, and Haitian Red Cross) and the support of IFRC. This model was described as successful by several interviewees. The leadership of SRC was enhanced by their previous knowledge of the local context and ensured good coordination among stakeholders. They led the communication between the societies and represented the consortium.

The consortium partners worked towards the harmonisation of tools and approaches. Meetings were called monthly in PAP with DIPECHO and representatives from Spanish, French, German, Haitian Red Cross and IFRC. The Haitian Red Cross role was to contextualise the tools and provide feedback and inputs. The National Societies tailored the harmonized tools and approaches to the specific needs of the communities. For example, while the FRC worked with micro-project for mitigation, the SRC focussed on WASH and shelter, and the German Red Cross had more activities related to agriculture.

The consortium had a Steering Committee with a representative delegate from each of the partners. The Committee met once a month to address any challenges that came out of the operational meetings. The operational meetings had a coordinator in charge of organising monthly meetings with one representative from the local level offices. According to the interviewees of the HRC, the fact that the Committee did not include representatives from the regional level was a weakness as their perspective was not always represented. One interviewee stated that the meetings showed that several communities were facing very similar problems and challenges, and the consortium organised similar strategies to resolve them.

One interviewee stated that the Haitian Red Cross is in a very good position to do capacity building for DRM as they have a unique position as an auxiliary to the government. It was crucial for the implementation of DIPECHO/9 to have HRC represented at all levels of the government. This facilitated work in new places and enabled the programme to easily join existing networks.

4.5.5 Attention to Functional Capacity

Definition: The need to focus on functional capacity building – i.e. building the managerial and organizational capabilities needed to ensure effective decisions and actions can flow from technical know-how. It includes aspects such as improving coordination and decision-making processes. It also includes fostering an enabling environment, such as developing incentive structures for good performance and to ensure staff retention, as well as promoting the wider political conditions to support DRR as a priority.

Research question: How is the mix of potential elements for CB targeted?
• Evidence suggests that DIPECHO/9 facilitated the creation of a process to inform the communities of hazards, based on good coordination among different stakeholders. It is the responsibility of the CASEC to inform the EICs and EIC members to pass the information to others in their community. Both HRC and DPC benefited from the establishment of this process, as it strengthened their institutional capacities. For example, the CASEC in Bois Neuf works closely with the Chaden EIC, not only in terms of early warning but on wider risk management, visiting them every 2 to 3 months to advise on key response messages. CASEC is also in touch with the Mayor to provide guidance and support in the implementation of mitigation projects.

• Several interviewees, including from the target groups, stated that the capacity of communities was strengthened by DIPECHO/9. This was due to the creation and/or strengthening of EIC teams to implement micro-projects, and the creation and strengthening of EWS. Interviewees specified that they had benefited both from strengthening of DRR knowledge and skills; and from the physical works brought by the micro-projects.

• The regional HRC ran the training for EIC members. In Lagon, EIC participants were very positive about the training which included the identification of needs through community assessments, determining DRR responsibilities among the community, writing a proposal, creating a budget, an action and an implementation plan and how to think critically. This served the community as they felt empowered to propose and implement their own projects. In addition, communities also received material provisions, which gave EICs credibility and status in their communities.

• One of the goals of DIPECHO/9 was to conduct a programme of Training of Trainers (ToT), where approximately 50 trainers were trained, coming from different parts of Haiti. These trainings facilitated the decentralization of DRR activities, as instead of having to send someone from the capital, there is now a network of people in other regions that can be contacted as needed. The trainings were either conducted in PAP (where there is physical infrastructure from HRC) or in the regions, where they used other National Societies’ infrastructure (for example the American Red Cross).

• One interviewee from SRC noted that DIPECHO/9 also built the capacity of HRC. HRC is now better positioned at the national level. At the regional level, the project helped improve relations between HRC and DPC, and to identify and clarify their roles and responsibilities. At the community level, DIPECHO/9 improved HRC volunteer’s capacities so that they could also differentiate their roles from those of DPC and HRC.

4.5.6 Contribution to Disaster Resilience

Definition: The need for a more holistic DRR-influenced approach to DRM capacity. This includes attention to: understanding and planning for long-term changes in risk; moving beyond a focus on short-term emergency management to capacity in disaster prevention, mitigation and long-term recovery; prioritizing the reduction of vulnerability; targeting the needs of vulnerable groups; and addressing gender disparities in both vulnerability and capacity.

Research question: How has the programme captured wider aspects of the DRR approach?

• DIPECHO/9 addressed preparedness and mitigation activities. Preparedness was addressed in trainings, simulation exercises, provision of equipment, and developing early warning systems. The early warning systems were established during DIPECHO/8, but
DIPECHO/9 ensured that they were officially recognised by the government. Although no community in DIPECHO/9 has had to respond to a large scale disaster so far, one interviewee argued that the project has strengthened the communities’ capacity to respond. This is partly a result of information sharing and simulation exercises, which include practicing life-saving techniques. Mitigation activities were specific to Artibonite and led by the FRC. The project planned eight micro-projects with a budget of 1,000USD each. The goal of these projects was to build capacity by asking EIC and community participants to engage in the whole implementation process.

- There was no clear evidence of DIPECHO/9 addressing climate change risks. Some interviewees said that this was ‘out of their control’ as it depends on many actors. The project only took into account current extreme events and hazards. Climate change considerations were not addressed, although it was recognized by one interviewee of FRC that it should probably have been included.

- Within the project some attention was directed to particularly vulnerable groups. In Desdunes, for example, the HRC worked together with the community members to identify the most vulnerable people. This information was put in a document with the support of the FRC, so that all residents of the zone know who is most vulnerable in the event of a disaster.

- The attention paid to the inclusion of gender in the project appears to have been limited largely to the participation of both men and women in trainings and activities, rather than how the different vulnerabilities and capacities of men and women might be taken into consideration in CB. However, an Emergency Family Plan was developed by FRC as part of DIPECHO/9. When doing the Emergency Family Plans at the community level, the project took into account all family members including older people, children, people with disabilities and pregnant women. The EIC volunteers adapted the plan to meet the needs of the family and defined who in the family was responsible for what in the event of a disaster. The Plan consists of a simple tool that takes about 30 minutes to prepare and is combined with the provision of a plastic pouch for important documents. The Plan has been submitted to the national system for validation and is currently being reviewed. DIPECHO/9 also did an awareness campaign where issues such as disability were highlighted through theatre and musical plays.
Towards capacity building – key lessons from the Haiti case study

This concluding section brings together a series of key lessons on CB for DRM derived from the case study – drawing both from discussion of the specific programmes and from the wider context of DRM intervention in Haiti. The material here is organized on the basis of the six ‘principles’ of CB for DRM, already introduced in sections 3 and 4, and is accompanied by a set of summary statements with associated levels of confidence.

These lessons will be cross referenced with findings from other country case studies conducted for this research project and so are presented here as tentative, initial lessons learned that will evolve and be refined using evidence from other countries. They should not be viewed as final conclusions but as stepping stones that will shape our future research and contribute to the conclusions and policy implications that will be set out in the final analytical report that will be published at the end of the research. With this in mind, after each ‘lesson’, there is a short statement in italics indicating how it relates to other case studies and how we intend to take the finding forward during the rest of the research.

Flexibility and adaptability

Urban CBDRM programmes face particular opportunities and challenges in comparison to rural equivalents, and CB programmes can improve their effectiveness by tailoring to their urban context (High).

Evidence indicates that GOAL’s strategy of adapting their approaches to take into account the advantages and disadvantages of working in an urban environment have contributed to the effectiveness of their DRM CB programme. Considerations include, for example, that urban populations in many developing countries tend to have higher political awareness and level of education, and better access to services than rural populations. Urban populations tend to have better access to all levels of government, international organisations and the media. All this can be harnessed to strengthen DRM capacity. On the other hand, disaster risks may be different because of a densely-settled urban environment, which again has implications for how CB is conducted. For example, GOAL adapted the EIC training to ensure that material on water-borne diseases in disaster situations was included, as these environmental health risks tend to be more prevalent in low-income urban environments.

The case study has been very useful as two relatively similar CBDRM programmes were studied, with one focused on rural and the other on urban contexts. This has provided an opportunity to compare and contrast approaches. In other cases, it is likely that additional aspects of the urban context would emerge as significant in terms of capacity development – e.g. in the characteristics of social capital and social networks.

There can be a tension between giving communities independence to identify their own needs and related mitigation projects, and implementing agencies’ needs to ensure money is well-spent (High).

High confidence = conclusion drawn from multiple inputs (3 or more independent sources) with no prominent contradictory views expressed;
Medium confidence = conclusion drawn from more limited inputs (1-2 independent but authoritative sources) with no prominent contradictory views expressed;
(Low confidence (seldom used) = statement drawn from 1 source for which there is doubt over authoritativeness of the source, OR from 1 authoritative source that is countered by contradictory views.)
In the GOAL programme some beneficiaries argued that after initial needs and plans were submitted, there was little flexibility or opportunity to negotiate. There was a tension as community members, supported by local authorities, wanted the power to adjust plans and manage resources as they saw fit. However, this introduced difficulties for GOAL who had to consider their own financial and legal responsibilities including cost effectiveness, value for money and reduction of fraud and corruption.

The tension between allowing flexibility and responsibility to donors has been raised in other case studies. This is an argument that is increasingly discussed amongst international NGOs (for example in the ALNAP Community of Practice on humanitarian capacity building) where NGOs want to support local CSOs but find it difficult to because of accountability issues and donor appetite for risk.

Building on good relations and contextual knowledge from prior DRM or disaster response programmes can be key for contributing to successful programme delivery (High).

Both programmes studied in Haiti benefitted from previously established community relationships and built on the successes of earlier programmes. For DIPECHO/9 this tangibly improved the ease of programme delivery, for example in communities where DIPECHO had previously worked, assessments were substantially less time consuming than in new communities. Previous, good relations with teachers and community leaders were key in the success of the project implementation. Similarly, GOAL staff emphasised that their previous programmes to respond to and recover from the 2010 earthquake provided the enabling environment for community based disaster risk reduction activities in Turgeau. The GOAL team felt that previous multi-sectoral experience in the area since 2010 helped them to design RUDR in a way that recognised the communities’ needs, vulnerabilities and capacities and the previous work enabled them to build on established trust and effective working relationships with stakeholders.

This is a finding that has emerged in other case study countries.

5.2 Attention to Planning

Participatory needs assessments are very time-consuming and adequate time should be factored into project design for this important stage (High).

DIPECHO/9 implemented a participatory needs assessment in communities with the support of DPC. Meetings were followed up with telephone calls to collect information related to hazards, existing capacity, potential and commitment to work with the project if selected. Interviewees noted that the assessments were very time consuming, taking approximately six months out of the overall fifteen month implementation period.

This finding has been noted in other case study countries.

A basket of tools exist that can be useful both for assessing capacity needs and monitoring CB progress, especially if used in combination and adapted to the specific context (High).

GOAL drew on a combination of complimentary tools, which was seen as key to the success of their assessment and monitoring for RUDR. Some of the tools applied had the additional value of
providing a focal activity for community engagement and ownership, and a mechanism for technical skills and functional capacity development.

The VCA Toolbox and GOAL’s Community Resilience Toolkit are examples of such methods used in Haiti, and are widely reported in the application of community-based DRM programmes elsewhere. The key to their effective use in terms of CB seems to be in applying them in a flexible and participatory way, and building on community engagement in them to foster a greater motivation and commitment toward effective DRM.

Clear sustainability planning is not always a priority for DRM CB programmes (High).

There was mixed evidence of the sustainability of capacity gains across the GOAL programme, and maximising sustainability did not appear to always be a primary concern. For example, GOAL’s programme design included some attempts to ensure that mitigation works would be handed over effectively to local government for future ownership and maintenance, but these could be strengthened. Some sustainable capacity was built through the programme, for example, training of community masons and establishment of EICs, although some communities stated that whilst they felt their capacity to design and conduct future DRM activities had been strengthened, they were not confident that funding from either the government or international donors would be available.

This finding has also emerged from other case study countries. It appears that internationally less attention is paid to sustainability than other key principles (for example, ownership) despite its prevalence in the literature.

Donor funding and management cycles and preferences can impact negatively on programme timetables and implementation (High).

DIPECHO/9 was preceded by DIPECHO/8, but between the two there was a gap of eight months due to internal DIPECHO procedures. This negatively affected the continuity of the project as both international and national staff contracts ended, and when the new programme started staff had moved on, and institutional memory had been lost. Interviewees also remarked that DIPECHO/9 was too ambitious for its short duration, but that the donor did not approve attempts to simplify and downsize the logframe. The total implementation time for DIPECHO/9 was 15 months. According to most interviewees, this was definitely not enough time, particularly as it took six months to conduct the needs assessment.

The issue of donor preferences, particularly for shorter programme timescales, has been noted as a major obstacle in other case study countries.

Turnover is a serious problem hindering the effectiveness of DRM CB programmes, but initiatives to enhance staff retention can be effective (High).

Both of the programmes studied in Haiti had experienced severe problems with staff turnover which in turn had a negative impact on the overall programme achievements. GOAL found it difficult to recruit suitable technical staff. However, retention of staff towards the end of Phase 1 and beginning of Phase 2 has improved, which is attributed to GOAL reviewing its salary scales, length of contracts and internal promotion policies, and increasing internal and external training
opportunities for staff. Having several ongoing donor grants has contributed to GOAL’s ability to make these improvements.

This problem has been encountered in all the case study countries. It is useful to have GOAL’s example of internal changes resulting in reduced turnover – similar to measures taken in other countries to stem turnover.

**M&E of DRM CB is enhanced with robust global level technical support, information management systems and coordination (High)**

Both of the programmes studied had M&E as a shared responsibility of the project managers and organisational level M&E team. Generally, the shared responsibility worked well. However, GOAL appeared to excel in provision of technical support to the MEL team through distance learning opportunities, post-training assignments and ongoing technical advice in different thematic areas. Information management and reporting was enhanced through tracking systems at the global and local level to ensure reporting needs were met. GOAL staff in Haiti have expressed that global support to the MEL team has contributed to their ability to use monitoring tools appropriately and has enabled better communication with stakeholders on the project achievements and challenges.

Many of the programmes we have studied have struggled to establish and implement effective monitoring and evaluation systems. However the GOAL programme excelled in producing timely and effective monitoring and evaluation reports drawing on well-developed local and global strategies and systems.

**5.3 Ownership / Partnership**

Community-based disaster teams can function as an effective model for DRM in both urban and rural settings, especially if the recruitment and participation of members is open and transparent (High)

The model of EICs was an approach that facilitated meaningful community participation and successfully built ownership both in urban and rural settings. It was also viewed as being a sustainable approach, as EICs were included in the National Contingency Plan 2012 and are supported by the Civil Protection. GOAL instigated a community driven process to recruit community members for the EICs that worked well in an urban context where political sensitivities heightened the need for transparency. Interviewees appreciated the participatory process which resulted in a very high number of applicants, and motivated individuals to be committed to the EICs.

We have encountered community based DRM teams in other countries, but GOAL’s transparent recruitment is different from other examples and is a useful approach.

**Questions remain about the utility of providing financial incentives for participation in DRM CB programmes (Medium).**

Contrasting perspectives around the two programmes in Haiti raised the question of whether or not it is good practice to pay to incentivise participation in CB activities. GOAL took the decision not to pay people in cash, arguing that there is a need to move away from aid dependency and reinforce the idea that DRM is everybody’s responsibility. However, they did provide transportation and other assistance to facilitate people’s involvement. A commentator on the DIPECHO programme, on the
other hand, argued that non-payment of EIC members undermined engagement – because people had to prioritize income-generation over attendance of meetings and training.

This was an argument we encountered in the Philippines where one programme felt they had to financially incentivise participation and another was fiercely opposed.

Ownership can be enhanced when the beneficiary community is obliged to actively contribute to programme activities (Medium).

Letters of Agreement between GOAL and their beneficiaries enforced the idea that the programme implementers and beneficiaries have mutual responsibilities in the implementation of DRM activities. Community contributions in RUDR included activities such as conducting assessments, management of projects, labour, provision of materials and transportation of materials. Though there was some frustration expressed in Turgeau at the level of contributions required from a poor community, it was also recognised that the GOAL project offered livelihood opportunities.

In a similar mitigation works programme in Myanmar, interviewees argued that contributing labour to the programme built ownership and contributed to sustainability.

5.4 Functional Capacity Building

CB programmes targeting the community level can effectively build functional DRM capacity, as well as technical capacity (Medium).

The EICs trained and developed under the GOAL and DIPECHO programmes can be viewed as examples of created functional capacity. They are an additional resource for local authorities to use for community resilience, as several EICs now have capacity to effectively conduct preparedness and response activities. This was aided by the way training courses were developed under the programme, with participants able to take an active role in course content and design. The training provided to EICs has also covered functional aspects, for example, determining DRR responsibilities among the community, writing a proposal, creating a budget, developing action and implementation plans and thinking critically. As a result communities now feel empowered to propose and implement their own projects.

We have encountered several examples across the case study countries of training activities serving to develop functional capacities as well as technical DRM skills and expertise. This has mainly been at organisational levels, but is clearly just as applicable at community level.

Training-of-trainer approaches can reinforce decentralisation of DRM decision-making capacities by creating a geographical network of DRM expertise (Medium).

Under the DIPECHO programmes, it was argued that the ToT process served more than to extensify training, but to directly facilitate the decentralisation of capacity for DRM. The idea was that the ToT process created a network of people across the country whose capacity had been raised to contribute locally to emergency response and DRR, and thereby underpin the platform for decentralised decision-making on DRM.

A similar effect was observed by the JICA programme in the Philippines.
Functional CB can extend to the generation of research skills and the creation of an academic platform to support DRM (Medium).

Under the GOAL programme, considerable emphasis was placed on working with Haiti State University and building the capacity of the academic community to evaluate and contribute to policy on DRM. Direct engagement of university staff in DRM research has raised skills, understanding and motivation with regard to DRM.

In CB programmes in Ethiopia, Pakistan and Haiti we have seen activities designed to build the strength and standing of academic institutes working on DRM. Though such institutes often have a strong immediate remit with regard to training, they also could have a deeper role in the longer-term in the generation of a critical research base and platform for advocacy. This could potentially provide independent and knowledge-based momentum to underpin effective DRM and the progression to DRR.

5.5 Integration of scales and actors

Training and other project activities can be carefully designed to ensure mixing between levels and organisations, and thereby contribute to improved coordination (High).

Evidence from the GOAL programme suggests that training sessions and meetings that mixed participants from different areas enhanced capacity to work across actors and scales in DRM. Training providers from HRCS, DPC and GOAL used consistent DRM terminology that facilitated communication between EIC team members, the broader community, local authorities and the university. Similarly, DIPECHO/9 was able to improve coordination amongst DRM actors by inviting people from Civil Protection and HRC to all project activities, which facilitated people from different organisations getting to know each other and understanding the complementarity of their roles.

A similar finding emerged from the JICA programme in the Philippines case study.

National Red Cross Societies can work effectively in a consortium where each contributes according to their strengths, guided by the local knowledge of the host country National Society (Medium).

DIPECHO/9’s consortium included several National Red Cross Societies and was found to be a helpful model where each NS was able to contribute based on their strengths, but avoid duplication of meetings and activities. For example, the Spanish Red Cross, who knows the local context, led the communication between the societies and represented the consortium. Consortium partners worked together towards harmonisation of tools and approaches, with the HRC participating in monthly meetings to contextualise the tools and provide feedback and other inputs.
5.6 Linkage to disaster resilience

The reach and effectiveness of CB for DRM may be heightened in programmes that take a holistic approach to resilience, linking disaster risk to tackling underlying vulnerability and supporting wider development gains (High).

In areas with high levels of poverty, DRM CB programmes are likely to be most effective when they interlink with development needs. This can be interpreted also as creating an enabling environment for DRM. Evidence from the GOAL programme in urban areas suggested that the programme’s effectiveness was linked to an overall development focus, i.e. that CB for DRM was offered as part of a broader programming package which included water, sanitation, hygiene, housing, livelihoods and so on. Community members were also clear during interviews that while DRR is important, they have daily struggles and concerns to meet basic needs which must be addressed in order to consider participation in CB for DRM activities.

In several other countries the team has observed how poverty has acted as a barrier for participation in DRM CB programmes, and that poor communities necessarily prioritise meeting their daily basic needs over DRM initiatives. The GOAL programme is a useful example of packaging DRM CB activities in a way that overcomes this problem, by linking wider livelihoods to DRR and simultaneously creating a local enabling environment.
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