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Thank you
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Who was affected?

Percentage of population affected: top 5 countries, 2014

- Sierra Leone: 100%
- Liberia: 79%
- South Sudan: 69%
- CAR: 63%
- Yemen: 60%

Number of people affected: top 5 countries, 2014

- China: 59.9m
- Yemen: 14.7m
- Syria: 12.3m
- Philippines: 11.8m
- Afghanistan: 11.7m

How much was given...

International humanitarian response

US$24.5 billion
2014
US$20.5bn in 2013

Funding and unmet requirements, UN appeals, 2013–2014

Funding

- US$12.0bn
  2014
- US$8.5bn in 2013

Unmet requirements

- US$7.5bn
  2014
- US$4.7bn in 2013

Revised requirements

- US$19.5bn
  2014
- US$13.2bn in 2013

Where does the money come from?

Governments contributions

US$18.7bn
2014
US$15.1bn in 2013

Private contributions

US$5.8bn
2014
US$5.4bn in 2013

Top 5 government donors of international humanitarian assistance, 2014

- United States: US$6.0bn
- United Kingdom: US$2.3bn
- Germany: US$1.2bn
- Sweden: US$933m
- Japan: US$882m

Other government donors

- US$1.9bn
  2014
- US$0.8bn in 2013
  of which Gulf donors
- US$1.7bn
  2014
- US$0.8bn in 2013

OECD DAC donors

US$16.8bn
2014
US$14.3bn in 2013

Turkey

US$1.6bn
spent on hosting Syrian refugees in 2013

Largest increase 2014

- US$1.2bn
United States
Executive summary

Humanitarian financing is in the spotlight now as never before. This is for two reasons: firstly the urgent resourcing challenges of meeting the wide and multidimensional needs of more people; and secondly the unique opportunities to find solutions, in the form of the 2015 and 2016 global processes on risk, development, climate and humanitarian action.

Bringing these issues into stark focus in 2014, the Ebola virus disease outbreak and the conflict in Iraq tested humanitarian assistance in very different ways and added to the escalating emergencies and protracted crises elsewhere, including in Syria and South Sudan. Compared with in 2013, 10.7 million more people worldwide were affected by disasters caused by natural hazards, while conflict and persecution pushed the numbers of displaced people to the highest level ever on record.

Far East Asia has consistently been the region worst affected by natural hazards over the last decade. In contrast, the geographic and economic context of forced displacement is shifting. Driven by the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, there are now more displaced people in the Middle East region than in Africa, and more displaced people in middle income countries (MICs) than in low income countries (LICs). This means a shift in planning and resourcing for response and resilience – the roles of refugee-hosting governments, notably Turkey, and of Gulf donors are central to the humanitarian financing effort.

In response to this rising scale and changing nature of needs, international humanitarian assistance rose for the second year running, reaching another record high. Up nearly a fifth (19%) from the previous year, contributions totalled US$24.5 billion.

Increases in humanitarian assistance came from both public and private donors. International humanitarian assistance from governments and EU institutions increased by 24% in 2014. All of 2013’s ten largest donor governments gave more in 2014, and many gave their largest contributions of the decade. While many of these were the same as in previous years, Saudi Arabia joined the group of the largest contributors. Combined, international humanitarian assistance from donor governments in the Middle East increased by 120% from 2013, largely in response to conflicts in the region.

Private contributions rose by an estimated 8% – less steeply than contributions from governments. This assistance from individuals, companies, corporations, and trusts and foundations accounted for around one-quarter of international humanitarian assistance last year. Tending to favour disaster over conflict response, private donors as a group were the largest international humanitarian contributor to the Typhoon Haiyan response in 2013 and the third largest to the Ebola response in 2014, according to UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS).

In 2014, US$12 billion of international humanitarian assistance went to meet requirements from UN agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other responders, set out in UN-coordinated appeals. While this was an unprecedented level of support, it was not sufficient to meet the record request of US$19.5 billion. The unmet requirements of US$7.5 billion (38%) were also the highest to date. This global shortfall continued to play out unevenly between crises: the gap between the best- and worst-funded UN appeals grew to 78 percentage points in 2014 – the largest difference since 2008.

Funding was concentrated to a small number of countries both within and beyond the UN-coordinated appeals. Funding to five major acute emergencies in 2014 – those designated Level 3 (L3) by the UN: Syria, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Iraq and the countries affected by the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa – received 57% of total reported funding last year. This is a significant increase in the proportion of funding to L3 emergencies from the previous year (36%). Donor preferences and competing demands meant that certain crises remained ‘forgotten’, including many contexts not covered by international appeals.
How humanitarian assistance gets from the donor to the crisis-affected person matters. The timeliness, cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of response are all affected by ‘channels of delivery’ and by the length and nature of transaction chains. Almost half international humanitarian assistance (48%) from government donors continued to go first to six UN agencies with key roles in humanitarian coordination and response in 2013. UN-managed pooled funds remained important channels to meet surges in demand and address underfunded emergencies in 2014. Though relatively small, they mobilised a greater volume (US$1.1 billion) yet lower share (4%) of the total international humanitarian response for the second consecutive year.

NGOs directly received 18% of humanitarian assistance reported to the FTS in 2014, of which the vast majority was initially channelled through international NGOs. Despite widespread acknowledgement of the important role of national and local NGOs in humanitarian action, data from 2014 suggests that their direct share of the total has halved from 0.4% in 2012 to 0.2% in 2014.

The proportion of international humanitarian assistance channelled to the government authorities of affected states has increased from the previous two years but remains low at just 3% of all assistance reported to the FTS in 2014. Donors outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) show a greater willingness to provide humanitarian assistance via crisis-affected governments.

The increase in displaced populations is reflected in how humanitarian resources are being spent. For the second year running, ‘multi-sector’ assistance for refugee response dominated both appeal requirements and funding. Detail on spending beyond broad sectoral categories remains difficult to ascertain. Cash and voucher programming has undoubtedly become more prominent in recent years. However, the exact amount of funding apportioned to cash programming is not visible within current financial reporting. The same is true for disaster risk reduction and also for gender equality, despite a ‘tracker’ intended to assess all programmes for their contribution to gender equality.

While early action and rapid response are critical, two-thirds (66%) of humanitarian assistance from DAC donors alone continues to go to long-term-recipient countries – due to protracted or recurrent crises. New financing mechanisms to respond to recurrent risks are emerging. At the same time, UN-coordinated appeals have evolved in response to changing realities, with a continuing trend towards multi-year appeals with a resilience focus.

Some 93% of people living in extreme poverty are in countries that are either politically fragile, environmentally vulnerable or both.
THE STORY

2014 saw growing numbers of people hit by crises, with many different and multi-dimensional needs requiring many different resources. 2015’s global processes offer a unique opportunity to work together towards a vision of adequate and appropriate resources for people to prepare for, withstand and recover from crises. Sudan and South Sudan were among the countries with protracted and recurrent crises where humanitarian needs rose during 2014. These women are Sudanese refugees collecting water at Doro refugee camp in Maban County, South Sudan. As well as responding to the needs of around 7.3 million South Sudanese people, humanitarian actors also struggled to assist over 200,000 Sudanese refugees living in South Sudan.
INTRODUCTION
Introduction

The spotlight is on financing to address crisis, vulnerability and risk as never before. This is for two reasons – the urgent challenge of attempting to meet rising humanitarian needs with limited resources, and the unique opportunities to find solutions presented by a suite of global processes in 2015 and 2016. The Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report 2015 provides the evidence to understand the former and to inform the latter.

The challenge of rising needs is caused by both increased numbers of people affected by crisis and the broadening scope of what humanitarian action is for. In other words, as well as trying to reach the growing caseload of people hit by crises including in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan and Western Africa (see Chapters 1, 2 and 4), resources are required to address a greater spectrum of needs – from disaster risk reduction to protracted response and recovery (see Chapters 6 and 7). Despite record levels of international assistance, available resources cannot keep up with all of the requirements everywhere. The problem of shortfalls persists. While it is clear that meeting people’s needs depends on many factors other than money – including access and appropriate capacity – a needs-based response also cannot happen without the right quality and quantity of funding.

The solutions lie both within and beyond humanitarian financing. This is why the global processes in 2015 and 2016 are so important. Within humanitarian financing, there is a need to improve sufficiency and efficiency – sufficiency being increased resources from diverse donors (see Chapter 3) and efficiency being smarter means of delivering them (see Chapters 5 and 7).

Beyond humanitarian assistance there is a need to understand and better mobilise other resources, both public and private – such as domestic, development, climate and security-related resources – in order to end poverty, reduce vulnerability and build resilience (see Chapter 8). After all, people need international humanitarian assistance only when the other resources available to them prove inadequate. Where adequate provisions exist, a shock does not become a humanitarian crisis and a crisis does not become chronic. In light of this, there have been calls for international humanitarian assistance to refocus its attention on what is ‘mission critical,’ and for others (including providers of development, private and domestic resources) to step up to address protracted and underlying needs – as well as, in some cases, crisis response.

The Syria conflict (see Chapter 7), Typhoon Haiyan and the Ebola virus disease outbreak (see Chapter 3) have highlighted the need for, and emergence of, responses that combine many different types of resources according to the nature of the crisis, existing capacities and context. These were very different crises (conflict, natural hazard and disease) in very different political, economic and geographic contexts, pointing to the roles that national governments, the private sector, development assistance and different configurations of humanitarian donors might play. No one crisis will mirror another and therefore the mix of resources will always need to vary to fully address the needs. Throughout this report we therefore draw comparisons and distinctions between conflict and natural hazard settings, between the income level and coping capacity in affected states and between the phase and duration of response.

Ultimately, whatever context people find themselves in, they should have the right resources to prepare for, withstand and become resilient to crises – no one should be left behind. With 93% of those people in extreme poverty (below $1.25 a day) living in countries that are politically fragile or environmentally vulnerable or both (see Chapter 1), the need to address poverty, vulnerability, risk and crisis together is clear. The needs of people affected by crisis are multi-dimensional and so the collective test of effectiveness for all actors should be the same: impact on the inter-connected needs of affected populations.

The outcomes of the 2015 and 2016 global processes and their implementation could offer the potential to bring together the disparate development, humanitarian, disaster risk and climate communities around this vision and to mobilise the means of financing it. While all of the ongoing global processes refer to aspects of risk and
resilience to some extent, and some links are being made, they have varying degrees of relevance to financing and coherence with one another. For example, the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction set targets for disaster risk reduction, but with no accompanying financing plan; and the World Humanitarian Summit will not produce inter-governmental agreements but is likely to prompt a number of discrete initiatives on humanitarian financing.

What all of these processes do, however, have in common is the need for timely, comprehensive and transparent data – data on who is in need of what, where, as well as what resources are and could be available to meet those needs (see Chapter 9). This report aims to provide a shared and independent evidence base from the available data and to highlight where and how better data could be provided. We hope that this will inform both the ongoing global deliberations and the daily context-specific decisions faced by those working to best direct their resources to meet the needs of people in crisis.
More people were displaced by crises in 2014 than ever before on record. Situations of protracted conflict and violence are creating increasingly large caseloads of both refugees and internally displaced persons. As well as a rise in the overall numbers, there is also a noticeable shift in the geography of displacement. The largest numbers of displaced people are no longer only in Africa but also in countries in the Middle East region. Conflicts in Syria and Iraq have largely been driving this trend. Last year, millions of Syrian refugees continued to cross borders into Lebanon, Turkey (pictured), Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, seeking safety and protection.
WHO WAS AFFECTED?

In 2014, the lives of tens of millions of people were severely affected by the crises in Syria, South Sudan and Iraq and by the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa, while many more people suffered as a result of other new, chronic or recurrent conflicts and disasters. There is no exact data on how many people were affected by crisis and where: many people go unreached and uncounted, situations change quickly, and population data is often lacking in the most crisis-prone settings.

However, global figures indicate a rise since 2013: over 58 million people\(^1\) – the highest number to date – were reportedly forced to flee from violence or persecution, while an estimated 107.3 million people\(^2\) were affected by disasters caused by natural hazards – over 10.7 million more people than in the previous year.

Conflict has caused the numbers of refugees and internally displaced people (IPDs) to rise year on year: protracted caseloads persist and new displacements continue. There has also been a shift in the geography of displacement, necessitating changes in who provides assistance and how they do so. Driven largely by the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, the largest numbers of displaced people are no longer only in Africa and lower income countries (LICs), but in the Middle East and middle income countries (MICs).

Taken alone these broad numbers of people affected do not reveal the extent of the need for humanitarian assistance. This is determined by whether people have the resources to prepare for, cope with and recover from a crisis – poverty is a key factor, in turn exacerbated by crisis. Countries at high risk of crisis are home to the majority of the world’s poorest people. In 2013 an estimated 93% of people living in extreme poverty (on less than $1.25 a day)\(^3\) were living in countries that were either very politically fragile or very environmentally vulnerable or both.
FIGURE 1.1

Humanitarian needs and risks, 2014

TOP 10 COUNTRIES, AFFECTED POPULATION NUMBERS (MILLIONS) INCLUDING REFUGEES

1. China 59.9
2. Yemen 14.7
3. Syria 12.3
4. Philippines 11.8
5. Afghanistan 11.7
6. Nigeria 10.0
7. South Sudan 7.8
8. Sudan 7.6
9. DRC 6.8
10. Sierra Leone 6.3

TOP 10 COUNTRIES, PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION AFFECTED

1. Sierra Leone 100%
2. Liberia 79%
3. South Sudan 69%
4. CAR 63%
5. Yemen 60%
6. oPt 57%
7. Syria 54%
8. Somalia 41%
9. Afghanistan 38%
10. Djibouti 34%


Notes: INFORM data is from the mid-2015 data release (12 March 2015). Data on the number of people affected is taken from UN-coordinated appeals or from EM-DAT CRED data where no appeal was launched, as well as UNHCR data on refugee numbers. Target population is derived...
### CHAPTER 1: WHO WAS AFFECTED?

#### TOP 10 COUNTRIES, TARGET POPULATION IN UN-COORDINATED APPEALS (MILLIONS)

1. Syria 12.9  
2. Nigeria 8.0  
3. Yemen 7.6  
4. Cameroon 6.9  
5. Sudan 6.7  
6. Afghanistan 5.0  
7. Iraq 5.0  
8. DRC 4.7  
9. South Sudan 4.5  
10. Mali 3.7

#### TOP 10 COUNTRIES, PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION TARGETED IN UN-COORDINATED APPEALS

1. Syria 56%  
2. oPt 46%  
3. South Sudan 40%  
4. CAR 39%  
5. Yemen 31%  
6. Cameroon 31%  
7. Djibouti 29%  
8. Mali 24%  
9. Niger 19%  
10. Somalia 19%

From UN-coordinated appeals. No target population figures are given for countries covered under the UN-coordinated Ebola Overview of Needs and Requirements since the appeal document does not include these numbers. The number of people targeted in UN-coordinated appeals for Syria does not include members of refugee-hosting communities since this would affect the calculation of the percentage of the total population in Syria targeted in UN-coordinated appeals. CAR, Central African Republic; DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo; oPt, occupied Palestinian territory.
How many people were affected? This question is central to understanding the scale of needs but hard to answer: situations are dynamic, populations are hard to access and quantify, groups go unregistered or uncounted, and baseline data is often lacking in the most crisis-prone settings. Further, taken alone, the numbers of people affected do not reveal the scale of need for humanitarian assistance – this is determined by whether people and governments have the resources to cope with and recover from a crisis. However, as Figure 1.1 shows, several sources can together build a picture – albeit broad and static – of how many people were affected and where. The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) provides estimates on the numbers of people affected by disasters caused by natural hazards; the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintains data on people displaced by violence and persecution; and UN-coordinated appeals now also estimate the total numbers of people affected by emergencies in the countries that they cover.

In 2014 over 3.3 billion people were living in 48 countries rated as ‘very high risk’ by the Index for Risk Management (INFORM), an index that measures and ranks countries according to their risk of humanitarian crisis. Somalia, with an estimated 4.2 million people affected (41% of the population) – a relatively small number compared to China and Yemen – had the highest INFORM risk ranking. This means that, as well as facing high levels of hazard, Somalia also had high levels of vulnerability and low levels of coping capacity according to a number of indicators. It is this combination of exposure to hazards, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity that triggers the need for a humanitarian response.

Of the 48 countries classed as ‘very high risk’ by INFORM, 27 had UN-coordinated appeals in 2014. There were also UN-coordinated appeals in six countries classed as ‘high risk’ and one country classed as ‘medium risk’. Combined, the 31 UN-coordinated humanitarian appeals in 2014 identified 122.7 million people in need and aimed to assist just over 71% of them (87.5 million people) (see Chapter 2). Syria ranked highest in 2014 according to both the number of people and proportion of the total population targeted for assistance.

DATA POVERTY: SUB-NATIONAL DATA

National-level data can mask great differences in the numbers of people affected by a crisis within a given country. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is estimated to have affected 10% of the total population, but the proportion was much higher in severely affected eastern provinces. EM-DAT CRED and UNHCR publish national but not sub-national data, while INFORM is beginning to explore some sub-national data. Humanitarian agencies do routinely conduct and update sub-national needs assessments and vulnerability mapping, and these are becoming increasingly sophisticated. However, they are often not reflected in the humanitarian needs overviews or strategic response plans (SRPs), making it hard to see at a glance exactly where the needs are. One exception in 2014 was the Iraq SRP. The first SRP 2014 for Iraq was issued in February 2014 and focused in particular on Anbar Province as the governate worst-affected by violent conflict and displacement, identifying approximately 16% of its population as being in need of assistance.
Trends in affected populations

The types and contexts of humanitarian need have changed significantly over the last decade. These shifts in geographic and economic context necessitate reassessments of who is best placed to fund and deliver assistance, and in which ways.

Displacement

Displacement has continued to rise year on year for the past four years, with over 58 million people forced from their homes by violence and persecution in 2014. But whereas until 2012 displaced populations were largely within sub-Saharan Africa, by mid-2014, as Figure 1.2 shows, there were more people displaced in the Middle East – 12.3 million (compared with 11.8 million in the South of Sahara region), most of whom were people displaced within Syria (6.7 million people), Iraq (2.2 million people) and Lebanon (1.1 million people).

In 2014, over 95% of the world’s refugees and IDPs were in LICs or MICs (Figure 1.3). Numbers in MICs in particular have been growing since 2005: by mid-2014 displaced populations in MICs were more than three times those in LICs. The crisis in Syria has been the main cause. However, the numbers of displaced people in Colombia, Pakistan, Sudan, Iraq and South Sudan have also significantly contributed to the shift.

This trend does not mean that the need for international assistance is necessarily reduced. Each group incorporates a broad range of income, poverty levels, access to resources and vulnerabilities. Further, the thresholds that separate countries’ income into ‘low’, ‘middle’ (lower and upper) and ‘high’ are arbitrary and also do not reflect sub-national income disparities within countries. In conflict settings it is often political and access factors rather than economic factors that determine who receives assistance from the state.

Even in upper middle income countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, national coping capacity can be overwhelmed by the numbers of refugees. In these settings, as Chapters 7 and 8 explore, this demands a coherent response from many different national and international actors.

Natural hazards

While Far East Asia has seen relatively low levels of displacement due to violence and persecution, as Figure 1.4 shows, it has been consistently the region worst affected by disasters caused by natural hazards over the last decade, reaching a peak in 2010 when 203.6 million people were affected. China alone accounted for 180.7 million of those affected that year, mostly due to flooding (affecting 140.2 million people) and drought (affecting 35 million people). However, these figures do not indicate the severity of the disaster nor the capacity to cope.

After a significant decrease in the number of people affected by disasters caused by natural hazards in the Far East Asia region between 2010 and 2011, the number has subsequently risen. The increase was caused by flooding, drought and storms in China in 2014 as well as by natural hazards in the Philippines, where 25.7 million people were affected in 2013 – 17.9 million people by Typhoon Haiyan and other tropical storms.

Elsewhere disasters caused by natural hazards in South and Central Asia were typified by flooding, typhoons and storms, whereas those in sub-Saharan Africa were mainly related to drought, flooding and disease. In both regions the numbers of people affected have declined since 2011, but show year-on-year variation.

The contexts in which natural hazards occur also have implications for the direction of investments in disaster risk and response and climate financing, as Chapters 6 and 8 explore. People affected by natural hazards, like those displaced by violence and persecution, are primarily in MICs [Figure 1.5]. This wide group of countries masks very different national and sub-national capacities to prepare for or cope with these shocks. For example in the peak year of 2010, the largest numbers of people affected were in China, Pakistan and Thailand – all countries in the middle income bracket but with varying levels of coping capacity, according to INFORM.

The new Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, agreed in Sendai, Japan, in 2015, for the first time set global targets to reduce the numbers of people killed or affected by disasters caused by natural hazards, and to increase international support to complement national capacity.
FIGURE 1.2

Number of displaced persons by region, 2005–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UNHCR data.
Notes: ‘Displaced persons’ includes refugees and people in refugee-like situations, IDPs and asylum seekers. IDP numbers include only those persons protected/assisted by UNHCR. Data is organised according to UNHCR’s definitions of country/territory of asylum. Countries are organised according to OECD DAC’s classification of regions.

FIGURE 1.3

Number of displaced persons by income group of host country, 2005–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UNHCR and WB data.
Notes: ‘Displaced persons’ includes refugees and people in refugee-like situations, IDPs and asylum seekers. IDP numbers only include those persons protected/assisted by UNHCR. Data is organised according to UNHCR’s definitions of country/territory of asylum. Countries are organised according to World Bank’s classification by level of income.
FIGURE 1.4

People affected by disasters caused by natural hazards by region, 2005–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on EM-DAT CRED data.
Note: Countries are organised according to OECD DAC’s classification of regions.

FIGURE 1.5

People affected by disasters caused by natural hazards by country income group, 2005–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on EM-DAT CRED data.
Notes: Income groups are classified by the World Bank on an annual basis. Lower middle income countries (LMICs) and upper middle income countries (UMICs) have been combined because China moved from the LMIC to UMIC group between 2009 and 2010 resulting in a dramatic shift in the numbers of people within those groups affected by disasters caused by natural hazards between those years.
Poverty, crisis and risk

Estimated number of people living in extreme poverty in environmentally vulnerable and politically fragile countries, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank World Development Indicators, World Bank PovcalNet, INFORM, FFP Fragile States Index. Notes: Chart not to scale. ‘Fragile states’ as defined by the group of ‘very high warning’ countries (scoring over 80) on the 2013 Fragile States Index. Environmentally vulnerable countries defined as countries scoring ‘high’ and ‘very high’ across INFORM indicators ‘natural hazard’, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘lack of coping capacity’. Poverty estimates use World Bank PovcalNet 2011 modelled data; regional poverty estimates have been applied to 33 countries with missing poverty data, 13 of which are under the classification of politically fragile, environmentally vulnerable or both.

Poverty, vulnerability and crisis are inextricably linked. Poverty makes people more vulnerable in the event of conflict or disaster caused by natural hazards, while these shocks and sustained crises deepen their poverty, rendering them further at risk. Consequently an estimated 93% of people living in extreme poverty – on less than $1.25 a day – live in countries that are environmentally vulnerable (30%), politically fragile (32%) or both (31%).

DATA POVERTY: POVERTY DATA

Politically or environmentally fragile countries are also often those countries with the least data on poverty, or indeed with unreliable or non-existent data on basic population figures. According to 2013 data from the Fragile States Index and INFORM, 70 countries were classed as fragile states and 38 as environmentally vulnerable. There were 30 countries falling into both categories and there is no data on levels of extreme poverty for 6 of these, including Afghanistan and Somalia. In the absence of reliable data, the World Bank uses average regional poverty rates, for example in its PovcalNet tool. However, some of those with missing data, for example Afghanistan, may in reality be those with poverty levels higher than the regional average.

The poverty data used in Figure 1.6 is modelled for 2011 based on available poverty data. Actual levels of extreme poverty in certain countries may have changed significantly since then. In the case of some countries, including Syria, recent crises are likely to have increased poverty levels.
In 2014, a year marked by multiple large-scale emergencies, the volume of international humanitarian assistance received rose to new heights. An estimated US$24.5 billion was provided, a rise of 19% from the previous record high of US$20.5 billion in 2013. This is the second consecutive year that international humanitarian assistance has substantially grown – a change from previous single year peaks.

As this total grew, so did the volume of funding to the UN-coordinated appeals – up to US$12 billion from US$8.5 billion in 2013. However, even this 41% rise in funding failed to match the scale of the increased requirements, which reached a record high of US$19.5 billion. This meant that, despite record volumes of funding, there was a 38% shortfall overall and a widely varying shortfall in funding between appeals.

In 2014 not only were there more appeals – including for the Ebola virus disease outbreak, Iraq and Ukraine – but the requirements grew for the largest appeals, notably Syria and South Sudan. Requirements were concentrated in a small number of large appeals – together, the five largest appeals accounted for 53% of total requirements to all 31 appeals. These were once again dominated by the demands of the Syria crisis response, which attracted 59% of all funding to the appeals. Total appeal requirements are still growing in 2015.

Requirements from the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) Movement also grew – reaching a combined US$1.6 billion and attracting US$1.4 billion in funding. While the bulk of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) requirements were driven by the same large-scale crises as the UN appeals, including Syria, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) appeals were dominated by the Ebola response.
What is humanitarian assistance?

Humanitarian action is designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. This definition is set out in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and Good Practice Guidelines. In this report, when used in the context of data, humanitarian assistance refers to the financial resources for this action.

Humanitarian assistance can come from many sources – international (spent outside the country from which the resources originate) and domestic (originating and spent within the crisis-affected country).

As well as being focused on emergencies, humanitarian assistance differs from other forms of foreign and development assistance or domestic expenditure because it is intended to be governed by the key humanitarian principles of:

- **humanity** – saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found
- **impartiality** – acting solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations
- **neutrality** – acting without favouring any side in an armed conflict or other dispute
- **independence** – ensuring autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives.

These are set out in the fundamental principles of the RCRC Movement, reaffirmed in UN General Assembly resolutions and enshrined in numerous humanitarian standards and guidelines such as the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and the new Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability launched in December 2014.¹

There is no universal obligation or system for reporting expenditure on international or domestic humanitarian assistance (see Chapter 9). The main reporting systems for international humanitarian assistance are that of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affair (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS). The 29 OECD DAC members are obliged to report their humanitarian assistance to the DAC systems as part of their official development assistance (ODA), in accordance with definitions set out by the DAC.² Some other governments also voluntarily report to the DAC. The FTS is open to all humanitarian donors and implementing agencies to voluntarily report contributions of internationally provided humanitarian assistance, which are checked against specific definitions of humanitarian context and activities.³

The GHA report analyses international humanitarian assistance reported to the OECD DAC by DAC members, and reported to the FTS for all other donors. For domestic assistance, we use data reported by the specific national authorities where available. Between these international and national sources, what is included as humanitarian assistance can vary. GHA reports what others report as ‘humanitarian’ but aims to consistently label and source the data used.
International humanitarian response

For the second year running, donors responded to a rise in major crises and increased their international humanitarian assistance to record levels in 2014. Reaching US$24.5 billion, this was an increase of nearly a fifth (19%) from the previous high of US$20.5 billion in 2013.

The 2014 rise was driven by the response to rising needs from new emergencies against a backdrop of major ongoing crises. The response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak accounted for US$3.2 billion of international humanitarian assistance while US$1.2 billion went to the needs arising from the Iraq conflict. At the same time, the crises in South Sudan and Syria escalated in 2014, accounting for US$7.4 billion of international humanitarian assistance reported to the UN OCHA FTS.

While funding has now grown for two years in a row, previously, assistance has risen in response to major crises – for example in 2008 due to the global food price crisis, and in 2010 following the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods – but then subsequently dropped. Both of the recent rises have been substantial – international humanitarian assistance has risen by US$6.7 billion since 2012, which was dubbed a year “of no mega-disasters”. This is an increase of more than 38% and shows that in the face of growing demands, more assistance can be mobilised.

This international humanitarian assistance comprises reported contributions from government donors and European Union (EU) institutions as well as from non-governmental (or private) donors – including individuals, trusts and foundations and companies and corporations. As Chapter 3 explores, funding from both groups increased from 2013 to 2014 – from private donors by nearly 8% (slightly less than the 2012–2013 rise) and from governments and EU institutions by just under 24% (more than the 2012–2013 rise).

For the second year running, donors responded to a rise in major crises and increased their international humanitarian assistance to record levels in 2014.
UN-coordinated appeals: funding and requirements

The UN-coordinated appeals represent the largest collective request for international humanitarian assistance. In 2014, this request totalled an unprecedented US$19.5 billion. Requirements have climbed year on year for the past four years and continue to rise. Largely driven by increased requests for responses to ongoing crises in Syria and South Sudan, and to the new Iraq and Ebola crises, the 48% rise between 2013 and 2014 was the highest in the last nine years.

This record request attracted US$12 billion of international humanitarian assistance, the highest level to date and an increase of over 41% from the previous year. Yet this was still insufficient to meet identified needs. Growing funding did not keep pace with growing demand – the record request to date was met with an increase in the shortfall from the year before. Just 62% of requirements were met in 2014, a drop from 65% in 2013, and below the average of 65% over the past decade.

Growing funding did not keep pace with growing demand – the record request to date was met with an increase in the shortfall from the year before.

The UN-coordinated appeals are based on the needs assessed and responses planned by a group of UN agencies and NGOs in specific countries. Some international agencies responding in an appeal country are not included (notably the RCRC Movement (see page 28) and Médecins Sans Frontières), nor are the requirements of affected-state governments. Also, not all emergencies prompt such appeals: some are dealt with by affected-state authorities (see Chapter 3); some are covered by IFRC appeals only or appeals by specific humanitarian agencies; and others may be ‘forgotten’ (see Chapter 4).

FIGURE 2.2
Funding and unmet requirements, UN-coordinated appeals, 2005–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UNHCR data.
Notes: 2012 data includes the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) 2012 monitored by UNHCR. UN-coordinated appeals include strategic response plans (SRP) and those inside and outside the previously named consolidated appeals process (CAP). 2014 data includes the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak Response Plan. Funding to the Ebola Response Plan in 2014 is calculated using decision dates up to and including 31 December 2014. 2014 data includes the Ebola appeal. Data is in current prices.
In 2014, the appeals showed the clear stretch on humanitarian response – not only were there more appeals than in 2013 but the largest appeals grew. There were 31 appeals in 2014, 8 more than in the previous year, including significant new appeals for Iraq, the Philippines Typhoon Haiyan response (both of which were Level 3 [L3] crises – the highest level on the UN’s emergency scale – see analysis on page 58), the Ebola response, as well as Nigeria, the Sahel region and Ukraine.

A small number of large appeals accounted for the majority of requirements – 53% of total requirements were within the top five appeals. The demands of the Syria crisis heightened and requirements grew to unprecedented levels – levels that are still growing in 2015. Combined, the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan (3RP) called for nearly US$6 billion in 2014, up from US$4.4 billion in the previous year. The South Sudan appeal also grew significantly – from just under US$1.1 billion in 2013 to over US$1.8 billion in 2014, with an additional US$0.7 billion for the South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan.

At the other end of the scale there were more appeals for less than US$100 million – 11 in 2014 compared to just 4 in 2013. But these smaller appeals tended to have less of their needs met: with the exception of the high-profile crisis in Ukraine, all were less than 50% funded. In contrast, South Sudan, Iraq and the Ebola response, which each requested over US$1 billion, were 90%, 75% and 81% funded, respectively.

As donor resources stretched to respond to the unprecedented number and scale of appeals, the levels of funding between appeals varied more starkly than in the previous year and the difference grew between the best- and worst-funded appeals. This difference was 78 percentage points in 2014 – the largest gap since 2008.

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS.

Notes: The Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak Response Plan is not directly comparable to the other appeals: launched in September 2014, its revised requirements of US$1.5 billion covered needs in 2014 and into 2015. Also as a health response it was outside the usual UN-OCHA or UNHCR-led SRP or Refugee Response Plan process. Led by the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, it appealed for development as well as humanitarian resources. Requirements for all other appeals represent the revised requirements at the year end. Funding data is in current prices.
CHAPTER 2: HOW MUCH WAS GIVEN?

Figure 2.4

Average revised requirements and funding per targeted person in UN-coordinated appeals, 2013–2015

Source: UN OCHA’s FTS and UN-coordinated appeals.
Notes: 2014 and 2015 figures in particular are subject to change. No figures are provided for average US$ funding per person in 2015 as commitments/contributions are still ongoing. Does not include the following: Ukraine in 2014 since only a small amount of the appeal requirements were apportioned to 2014, with the bulk of appeal requirements appearing in 2015; the Republic of Congo appeal which was included in funding for the Central African Republic (CAR) crisis but for which no separate appeal document is available; the Sahel Regional SRP in 2014 or 2015 since it overlaps with nine SRPs for countries in the Sahel region; the ‘Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak Response Plan in either 2014 or 2015 since no comparable target population figures were included in the appeal documents.

The combined requirements of UN-coordinated appeals continued to rise into 2015. Early requirements were for US$20.9 billion and are likely to grow in the course of the year.4 The appeals also aim to reach more people. So far in 2015 over 95.2 million people are targeted in the appeals to receive humanitarian assistance – even without counting the Ebola response5 – compared with just under 87.5 million people in 20146 and just over 78.4 million people in 2013.7

With more funding requested, the average amount required per person has decreased slightly for the first time in the last three years (a decrease of just over 1%) between 2014 and 2015: this compares with two previous annual rises of 22% (2013 to 2014) and 53% (2012 to 2013). Beneath these averages, there are many factors influencing the cost of providing humanitarian assistance to different people in different locations. These include the type of assistance required, access to affected populations, availability of existing services, and costs of procuring and transporting relief items.8

Aggregate per capita costs also mask significant differences between appeals. The largest appeals have driven up the global average and in 2015 the gap between these and other appeals has widened substantially. For example, the Syria 3RP (and the South Sudan RRP) request almost double the amount per person of the other appeals in 2015.

In the case of the 2015 Syria 3RP, this rise (from US$576 in 2014, to US$851) partly reflects the nature and context of the response but also partly reflects the increasingly ambitious scope of the appeal, beyond providing emergency response to longer-term development dimensions (see Chapter 7).

Financial requirements are broken down into a ‘refugee component’ and a ‘resilience component’ – the latter accounting for 38% of the total amount requested.
The average funding provided per person also increased between 2013 and 2014, though not at the same rate as the amount requested per person. In 2014, average per capita funding to the appeals rose 13% from 2013, up to US$123. Again, there are significant differences: the South Sudan 2014 appeal attracted US$425 per person (US$474 per person requested) compared to the Nigeria 2014 appeal, which received only US$2 per person (US$12 per person requested).

Counting the numbers of people in need of international humanitarian assistance and costing the response is not an exact science, and methods vary between appeals. However, the 2014 move from consolidated appeals to a humanitarian programme cycle, in which humanitarian needs overviews are followed by strategic response plans, has generated more-comparable data between crises on the numbers of people in need and targeted.

Several appeals\(^9\) are also using ‘alternative costing’ approaches. There is currently no standardised methodology behind this, with each humanitarian country team developing its own approach. However, what these appeals have in common is a move away from using the overall costs of individual projects as the starting point. Instead they use the average costs of delivering specific types of goods and services to estimate overall funding requirements. In 2014 the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) commissioned an external review of ‘alternative costing’ and UN OCHA is now conducting its own analysis ahead of producing new guidance.

With more funding requested, the average amount required per person has decreased slightly for the first time in the last three years.
Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA’s FTS and UN-coordinated appeals. Notes: 2014 and 2015 figures in particular are subject to change. No figures are provided for average US$ funding per person in 2015 as commitments/contributions for 2015 are still ongoing. Does not include the following: Ukraine SRP in 2014 since only a small amount of the appeal requirements were apportioned to 2014, with the bulk of appeal requirements appearing in 2015; the Republic of Congo appeal which was included in funding for the CAR crisis but for which no separate appeal document is available; the Sahel Regional SRP in 2014 or 2015 since it overlaps with nine SRPs for countries in the Sahel region; the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak Response Plan in either 2014 or 2015 since no comparable target population figures were included in the appeal documents. Data is in current prices.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) maintain independence from the UN-coordinated appeals system. In 2014, the ICRC and IFRC together requested over US$1.6 billion and received nearly US$1.4 billion.

ICRC’s appeal has grown for the second consecutive year, reaching US$1.4 billion in 2014. Compared to the UN appeals, and indeed those of the IFRC, ICRC appeals are well funded, with a 10% shortfall in 2014 and 8% in 2013.

The increased requirements in 2015 are driven by escalations of need in high-profile countries: South Sudan (with requirements up 105% on the previous year), CAR (up 98%), Liberia (up 221%), Syria (up 56%), Lebanon (up 92%), as well as a new appeal for Ukraine.

There was a strong overlap in the crises responded to by the largest UN and ICRC appeals – six of the ten largest ICRC appeals for responses to crises that were also in the ten largest UN-coordinated appeals. All of the conflict-related crises classified as L3 emergencies by the UN system in 2014 (CAR, Iraq, South Sudan and Syria) were in the ten largest requirements within ICRC appeals and together these crises accounted for 29% of the ICRC’s total response.

IFRC’s mandate includes disasters caused by natural hazards, creating smaller but more volatile funding demands than those of the ICRC, which focuses on conflicts. IFRC’s peak requirements in 2010, and peak levels of funding, reflected the crises in Haiti and Pakistan. IFRC also relies on private sources for the bulk of its funding, making for starker variations in funding levels than the ICRC, which is largely government-funded. IFRC crisis-specific appeals in 2014 totalled requirements of US$198 million, which were only 55% met compared with 73% met the previous year.

The rise in the total amount requested by the IFRC from 2013 to 2014 was largely driven by the Ebola response, for which the combined appeals for affected countries totalled nearly US$103 million. However, the rise also resulted from new appeals in response to conflict situations, including US$27.5 million requested for the Syrian refugee response in Lebanon and Jordan and US$23.4 million in response to the Iraq crisis.

IFRC appeals were issued for all crises classified by the UN as L3 emergencies – namely Syria, South Sudan, CAR and Iraq – as well as Ebola. Combined, responses to these major crises called for nearly US$173 million, 87% of the total requested by IFRC in 2014. In terms of funding they accounted for nearly US$98 million – 90% of the total received.

However, in addition to these high-profile crises, the IFRC also issued ten smaller appeals in response to disasters caused by natural hazards in 2014 for which there were no UN-coordinated appeals. These comprised the drought in Kenya, floods in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Serbia, Bosnia, Paraguay, Honduras and the Solomon Islands and the earthquake in Chile. Levels of funding ranged from 98% for the Pakistan floods to 1% for the Kenyan drought appeal.

**FIGURE 2.6**

Funding to ICRC and IFRC emergency appeals against requirements, 2010–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on IFRC reports, ICRC annual reports and OECD DAC.

Notes: IFRC figures in this graph may differ from previous years reports. Each year GHA reviews all the latest emergency appeal documents; figures and dates are often subject to change. CHF (Swiss Francs) amounts have been converted to US$ based on OECD exchange rates. Requirements for ICRC are based on initial requirements and budget extensions/reductions from annual reports.
Both government and private donors increased their international humanitarian assistance in 2014. Assistance from government donors reached a record US$18.7 billion – a rise of 24% from the previous year. Initial estimates indicate that private contributions grew by 8% to US$5.8 billion.

The group of 20 largest government donors of international humanitarian assistance in 2014 was largely the same as in previous years, and the US continued to provide the largest sums. However, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates joined the ten largest and 20 largest donors respectively. Driven by the conflicts in the region, total contributions from Middle Eastern donors increased by 120% from 2013.

Private donors – predominately individuals, but also trusts, corporations, foundations and companies – provided nearly one-quarter of all international humanitarian assistance. They tend to respond more generously to rapid-onset disasters caused by natural hazards – and as a group were the largest humanitarian contributor to the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan response and the third largest to the 2014 Ebola response. International non-governmental organisations continue to be the largest mobilisers of private funding, receiving 89% of the total in the past five years. However, both the Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement and UN agencies are beginning to draw increasingly larger proportions of their revenue from private donors.

International humanitarian assistance, public or private, is necessary only when there is insufficient national capacity or readiness to respond. Many governments spend substantial sums on domestic preparedness and response, negating or reducing the need for international financing – Turkey’s US$1.6 billion expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees in 2013 exemplifies this. No global data exists on the value of domestic response but Sierra Leone’s US$17.2 million spending on the Ebola response and Mexico’s US$3.3 billion expenditure on disaster response also illustrate its importance in two very different economic and crisis contexts.
Government donors gave a record amount of international humanitarian assistance in 2013, but in 2014 they gave even more – reaching a new high of US$18.7 billion. This was up by nearly a quarter (24%) from the US$15.1 billion given in 2013 and was the largest rise in volume in the past 15 years.

Most international humanitarian assistance – 83% in 2014 – continues to come from government donors in Europe and North America. However, that from the Middle East region more than doubled – rising by 120% from US$764 million in 2013 to nearly US$1.7 billion in 2014. This region’s share has doubled over the last decade – from 4% of the total in 2005 to 9% in 2014. This is partly due to improved reporting, but also undoubtedly in response to increased need within the region. Most funding from the Middle East region came from four Gulf donors – Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see page 34).

In 2014, international humanitarian assistance from the Far East Asia region was at its highest level since the 2005 aftermath of the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami. It reached just over US$1 billion, up 11% from the previous year. The vast majority (86%) came from Japan who gave US$882 million, with smaller, but significantly increased contributions from China and Korea of US$53.7 million and US$81.7 million respectively.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) includes 29 member governments. These donors accounted for 94% of reported international humanitarian assistance from governments over the last decade and 90% (US$16.8 billion) in 2014.

While the annual increase in funding from DAC donors was interrupted with a dip in 2012, funding from other government donors has risen in both of the past two years. Reaching a total of US$1.9 billion in 2014, reported international humanitarian assistance from these other governments increased by 127% from 2013 and is almost triple 2012 levels, largely driven by the increases from the Gulf states.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data.
Notes: OECD DAC data for 2014 is partial and preliminary. Funding from OECD DAC donors includes contributions from EU institutions. OECD country naming has been used for regions. ‘Other regions’ includes the combined total of regions where funding was below US$1 billion in the 15-year period (see Data & Guides).
FIGURE 3.2
20 largest government contributors of international humanitarian assistance, 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data.
Notes: 2014 data for OECD DAC is preliminary. The contributions of EU member states includes an imputed amount of the EU institutions’ expenditure (see Data & Guides). Data only includes humanitarian assistance spent internationally, see p.38 for analysis of refugee-hosting costs.
Largest government donors

The government donors providing the most international humanitarian assistance were for the most part the same in 2014 as in 2013, but with two notable shifts reflecting the increasing importance of certain Gulf donors. Saudi Arabia became one of the ten largest donors for the first time since 2008, rising to become the 6th largest donor in 2014, from 16th largest in the previous year. The UAE also joined the largest 20 donors, becoming the 15th largest government donor in 2014.

The 20 largest donors contributed 95% of all international government contributions in 2014, in line with the previous year. But there was a marked concentration in the five largest donors, which accounted for around two-thirds of all international humanitarian assistance from governments – 61% in 2014, again in line with 2013.

The US continues to be the largest donor by far, providing 32% of all international humanitarian assistance from governments in 2014, and more than the total of the next-three-largest government donors (UK, Germany and Sweden) combined. Over the past ten years, the US has provided 33% of the total from government donors. It provided nearly four times more than the next largest donor, the UK, over the decade. This reflects its status as the largest global economy in 2014, just over six times larger than that of the UK.

Totals of international humanitarian assistance from EU member states include their contributions to the EU institutions. If the EU were to be included as a separate donor, it would be the third-largest donor in 2014, and in the nine previous years the EU has consistently been the second-largest donor. In 2014, the EU institutions, primarily the Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), contributed US$2.3 billion, a rise of 15% from the previous year.

In 2014, the largest government donors continued to give more. All of 2013’s largest ten donors increased their international humanitarian assistance in 2014. Of the 20 largest donors in 2014, all except Belgium and Spain increased their contributions from the previous year. The US, the UK, Germany and Sweden have given the largest totals over the past decade and for all of these donors 2014 represented a peak year. Eight out of the ten largest donors gave their largest contributions of the decade in 2014.

While there was a total rise of 24% in funding from all governments, some donors showed particularly high proportional increases. The largest was from the UAE – a rise of 317% from US$90.1 million in 2013 to US$375 million in 2014. However, in terms of volume, the largest increase from 2013 to 2014 came from the US, up by US$1.2 billion (25%). The second-highest volume increase came from Saudi Arabia, whose increase of US$518 million meant it more than trebled its contribution from the previous year.
FIGURE 3.3
Top 10 largest changes in international humanitarian assistance from government donors, 2013-2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data.
Notes: 2014 data for OECD DAC donors is preliminary. The contributions of EU member states includes an imputed amount of the EU institutions’ expenditure (see Data & Guides). Decreases not included in this chart as most were small and none were among the ten largest changes.
The six Gulf-state governments have long been important international humanitarian donors, and their role is growing as the numbers of people in humanitarian need in the Middle East region increases (see Chapter 1). In 2014, they gave a combined total of US$1.7 billion. Four states, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), contributed the bulk of this – US$1.6 billion. This was a record sum, which was more than double that from 2013 and equivalent to their total funding for the previous three years together.

While all of these four donors reported rises from 2013 to 2014, Saudi Arabia’s contribution more than trebled, accounting for nearly half (46%) of these four donors’ combined total, and UAE’s more than quadrupled. Their contributions in 2014 meant that Saudi Arabia rose from the 16th to the 6th largest government donor, and the UAE entered the largest 20 donors for the first time since 2011, as 15th largest.

The rise is clearly driven by conflict and displacement in the region. In 2014, a total of US$1.1 billion (or 66%) of disbursements from the six Gulf-state governments reported to specific countries went to the top three recipients: Iraq (US$557 million or 33%), Syria (US$356 million or 21%) and the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) (US$183 million or 11%). In comparison, the Ebola response received US$12.1 million (1%) of reported international humanitarian assistance from these donors, while the response to Typhoon Haiyan received US$34 million (2%).

Nearly two-thirds (62%) of assistance from these donors was channelled via UN agencies and IOM in 2014. While the bulk of this went to the World Food Programme (WFP) (36%), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (23%) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (15%); very little went to the Central Emergencies Response Fund (CERF) – just 0.1%. Equal proportions (12%) went to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) societies and to the governments of affected states, and only 1% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations.

The Gulf states’ contributions to crises in Iraq, Syria and oPt account for significant shares of the totals given to these crises. In 2014 they accounted for 44% of the international humanitarian assistance reported to Iraq and 20% of that to oPt. They accounted for 12% of the funds to the two Syria appeals (half of which came from Kuwait) and 16% of the totals reported to the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) for Syria and the refugee-hosting countries in the region.
Of the four Gulf states, Saudi Arabia was the largest donor in 2014, with a contribution of US$755 million, over three times its total in 2013. The response to the crisis in Iraq drove this rise – representing almost 70% (US$512 million) of the 2014 total. This includes a US$500 million disbursement to the UN in Iraq in July 2014. This contribution brought Iraq from being the third-worst-funded UN-coordinated appeal to the best-funded appeal – 198% beyond its requirements by September 2014.

This is part of a tendency to step in with large contributions to underfunded emergencies in the region. In December 2014, amid announcements that WFP would have to suspend its food assistance to Syrian refugees, Saudi Arabia committed a package of funding to WFP that included US$53.3 million to the Syrian regional crisis. The same amount was also committed to WFP’s responses in Ethiopia and Kenya (US$43.0 million and US$10.2 million respectively).

Saudi Arabia has displayed different preferences for how to channel its assistance in different years. In 2014 it channelled most of its reported international humanitarian assistance (86%) through UN agencies: 43% went through WFP, including US$149 million (out of the US$500 million contribution) to Iraq and the US$53 million contribution to the Syria crisis. In 2011 it contributed all of its reported assistance via UN agencies, but in 2012 and 2013 only 15% and 8% respectively. In 2010 it channelled 56% of its assistance to the government of the affected state, nearly all of which was to Pakistan after the floods.

As the influence of these Gulf states as humanitarian donors rises, there is increasing dialogue about the nature of their role in humanitarian action and humanitarian financing, including through the World Humanitarian Summit and as part of wider commitments by the League of Arab States. Reporting of humanitarian assistance by these donors has long been partial and variable, but the increased sums reported in 2014 may reflect efforts to improve this. For example, as well as reporting increased sums in 2014, Saudi Arabia also retrospectively reported US$426 million that it had disbursed over the 2010–2013 period. Also in 2014, the UAE became the first non-OECD country to join the OECD DAC.
The 20 largest donors of international humanitarian assistance 2014, measured in three different ways

**International humanitarian assistance as percentage of gross national income (GNI)**

- Luxembourg 0.17%
- Denmark 0.14%
- UAE 0.10%
- Ireland 0.09%
- Kuwait 0.24%
- Sweden 0.15%
- Norway 0.12%
- Saudi Arabia 0.10%
- UK 0.09%

**International humanitarian assistance per citizen (US$)**

- Luxembourg 119
- Sweden 97
- Qatar 75
- Norway 126
- Kuwait 101
- Denmark 87
- Switzerland 60

**International humanitarian assistance as percentage of ODA**

- US 19%
- Denmark 16%
- Poland 15%
- Slovak Republic 14%
- Ireland 23%
- Canada 17%
- Luxembourg 15%
- Sweden 14%
- Switzerland 14%

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN Central Emergency Response Fund, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and UNSCEB, UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination data.
### International humanitarian assistance as percentage of gross national income (GNI)

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### International humanitarian assistance per citizen (US$)

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### International humanitarian assistance as percentage of ODA

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**Notes:** Countries for which there is no data available for relevant measure have been excluded. All data is partial and preliminary.

GNI data for 2014 has been estimated using historical data on GNI and real GDP growth rates for 2014.
In focus: Turkey and refugee-hosting costs

Most of the world’s refugees – 88% – find themselves in developing countries. Turkey is exceptional among refugee-hosting countries in two ways: by May 2015, it had become the world’s largest refugee-hosting country, responding to the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq and hosting nearly 1.8 million registered Syrian refugees. Secondly, the Turkish government leads the management and financing of the Syrian refugee response, including the establishment and running of 22 refugee camps by its Disaster and Emergency Refugee Agency (AFAD) with more camps being built.

The sums that the Turkish government spends on hosting Syrian refugees are significant – totalling US$1.6 billion in 2013. This is considerably more than the total international humanitarian assistance given globally by many other major donors. If this sum was international humanitarian assistance, in 2014 it would make Turkey the third largest donor by volume, the second largest by percentage of GNI, and the seventeenth largest per citizen.

This is not a one-off contribution. Since the Syria crisis began, Turkey has been hosting significant numbers of refugees and its financial contributions totalled US$2.7 billion between 2011 and 2013 (see Figure 3.7). Exact figures are not yet available for 2014, but Turkey has reported a total of US$1.8 billion in humanitarian assistance to the OECD DAC for 2014. It is reasonable to assume that most of this was for the Syrian refugee response in Turkey: in 2013, 96% of the humanitarian assistance that Turkey reported to the DAC was for this purpose.

As a result of the Turkish government’s contributions, the amount of international humanitarian assistance required is much less than it would otherwise have been. Compared with the other countries hosting Syrian refugees in the region, the amount requested for Turkey in the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) – is relatively small: US$624 million, compared with US$2.1 billion for Lebanon and US$1.8 billion for Jordan (see Figure 7.6 in Chapter 7).

FIGURE 3.7

Registered number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Turkey’s assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey and international humanitarian assistance to Turkey for Syria response, 2011–2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UNHCR data and Turkish Development Assistance reports.
Notes: International humanitarian assistance to Turkey for Syria response does not include funding channelled regionally.
In 2013, Turkey received US$194 million in international humanitarian assistance for the Syria response, equivalent to 12% of its domestic contribution. In total between 2011 and 2013 it has received US$272 million – equivalent to 10% of its contribution over the period.

The search for durable solutions to the protracted displacement of millions of Syrian refugees is prompting new efforts to work with host states and look beyond humanitarian assistance. This includes the resilience approach described within the Syria 3RP (see Chapter 7). The Solutions Alliance, launched in 2014, also seeks to bring together diverse public and private sector actors to “enable the transition for displaced persons away from dependency towards increased resilience, self-reliance and development.” Ultimately, rather than costing their hosts, refugees have the potential to boost their economies.

There is no comprehensive and comparable data on how much developing countries spend on refugee hosting, or responding to other crises within their own borders, as explored on page 46. Data is only available on a case-by-case basis for some countries and is not readily accessible for many of the world’s largest refugee-hosting countries. Turkey is also an exception in this regard – as well as reporting its domestic response and international humanitarian assistance in its publically available reports, it also voluntarily reports its top-line figures to the OECD DAC.

When OECD DAC members report to the DAC, they can count refugee-hosting costs as part of their ODA (for only the first year) – but not as part of their humanitarian assistance. Turkey, as well as being a reporter to the DAC, is also considered a developing country by the DAC and is therefore eligible to receive ODA. This, together with the exceptional scale of their response, could explain why Turkey chooses to include Syrian refugee-hosting costs as part of its humanitarian assistance. In addition to financing the hosting of Syrian refugees within camps, Turkey supports asylum seekers from Syria and other countries and reports these costs under its non-humanitarian refugee-hosting ODA. In 2013, this amounted to an additional US$87.3 million.

Nearly all DAC donors (27 of the 29 in 2013) and two other government donors choose to report refugee-hosting costs within their development assistance. In 2013, the latest year for which data is available, a total of US$5 billion of refugee-hosting costs was reported as ODA by DAC donors. However, there is significant variation between donors in what they choose to include or exclude in these totals and how they choose to cost them.

As Figure 3.8 shows, Turkey’s contribution by far exceeded the reported refugee-hosting costs of any of the OECD DAC members in 2013. It was over US$500 million more than that reported by the US, the next highest reporter of refugee-hosting costs.

Independent of its refugee hosting contributions, Turkey has grown in profile as an international humanitarian donor in recent years, contributing to a number of responses, including in Somalia through direct presence, when many other international actors were absent. According to its own reports, in 2013 it contributed nearly US$58 million in international humanitarian assistance to countries including Somalia and Myanmar. Turkey has also dealt with a number of disasters caused by natural hazards within its borders, including earthquakes in 1999 and 2011. It therefore straddles not only continents but also both conflict and natural hazard response; recipient and donor status; and domestic and international response. Given the nature of its role and the scale of its contributions, Turkey is a key global strategic actor in humanitarian preparedness and response and will be hosting the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016.

The sums that the Turkish government spends on hosting Syrian refugees are significant – totalling US$1.6 billion in 2013. If this sum were international humanitarian assistance, it would make Turkey the third largest donor by volume and the second largest by percentage of GNI.
Refugee-hosting costs reported to the OECD DAC and international humanitarian assistance from top 20 OECD DAC countries and Turkey, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, IMF WEO, UNSCEB data and Turkish Development Assistance report 2013.

Notes: As donors use different costing models when reporting refugee-hosting costs as ODA, amounts may not be comparable. Turkey’s refugee-hosting costs include assistance to asylum seekers, Syrian and non-Syrian, reported as ODA and expenditure on Syrian refugees within Turkey reported as part of Turkey’s humanitarian assistance to Syria in OECD DAC table 2a, and may count assistance beyond the first 12 months of stay. Data on international humanitarian assistance from Turkey is from the UN OCHA FTS. Only top 20 OECD DAC donors displayed for scale reasons.
Brazil is a relatively small humanitarian donor, ranking 34th in terms of volume and 53rd in terms of international humanitarian assistance as a proportion of gross national income (GNI). However, it is of strategic importance. One of a small group of countries that has been both donor and recipient over the last decade, it is also a member of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Group and one of the increasingly influential BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) economies. Brazil is a founding member of the BRICS’ New Development Bank. It has also long been a contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. In 2010, Brazilian investments in peacekeeping operations peaked at US$328 million (36% of total development cooperation from Brazil).23

A key player on the development stage in the post-2015 discussions, Brazil is hailed as a positive example for reducing its national rate of extreme poverty by almost three-quarters; beyond the Millennium Development Goal to halve rates by 2015. Other developing countries have expressed interest in learning from this experience. Brazil is a leading proponent of South–South cooperation, promoting solidarity with developing countries, non-interference in domestic affairs, equality in relationships with other developing countries and demand-driven cooperation.24

Humanitarian assistance represented 17% of Brazil’s development assistance in 201025 (the latest date for which the most comprehensive reporting is available) and is primarily managed by the General Coordination for International Actions Against Hunger (CGFOME). CGFOME coordinates the Inter-ministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance, which oversees requests for assistance by affected countries. Brazil does not have a formal humanitarian assistance policy but in practice CGFOME favours a ‘structural approach’ that sees humanitarian intervention as an opportunity to build long-term, sustainable solutions that will prevent the endurance and recurrence of crisis.

Contributions peaked in 2012 at US$52.4 million with almost half allocated to the WFP to tackle hunger and food insecurity in Somalia. Brazil favours multilateral channels of delivery; in 2014 contributions were channelled to UN agencies with the World Health Organization (WHO) being the largest recipient to support the response to Ebola in West Africa. Brazil also directed funding through pooled funds – with US$1.9 million going to the CERF and US$0.6 million to the Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund.

Countries experiencing food insecurity are the main recipients of Brazilian humanitarian assistance. Over the past three years, Somalia has been the largest of these, receiving almost half of the total in 2012, the year of the Horn of Africa famine, and accounting for the peak in Brazil’s humanitarian assistance that year. Contributions to Niger aimed at addressing acute malnutrition and protecting livelihoods made Niger the second largest recipient in 2012. Ethiopia and oPt were the largest recipients in 2013 and 2014 respectively and all funding to these countries also went to address nutrition or food insecurity.
Private donors provided 26% of all international humanitarian assistance in 2013 and an estimated 24% of the total in 2014: US$5.4 billion and US$5.8 billion respectively. This diverse group of non-state donors (individuals, trusts and foundations, and companies and corporations) has long supported international humanitarian assistance, providing 27% of the total between 2009 and 2013.

There is increasing focus on the role of private actors. This is driven by the necessity to diversify the funding base to meet growing needs and the recognition of their important and diversified role not just as donors but as direct responders to recent crises. According to the UN OCHA FTS, private donors as a group were the largest humanitarian contributor to the Typhoon Haiyan response in 2013 and the third largest to the Ebola response in 2014.

GHA’s 2014 briefing paper ‘Humanitarian assistance from non-state donors: what’s it worth?’ shows that private donors tend to respond more generously to rapid-onset disasters caused by natural hazards than they do to chronic and conflict-related crises. Of the many severe humanitarian crises in 2013 and 2014, most were chronic and/or conflict-related, which may explain why, despite the Haiyan and Ebola responses, government funding rose so much more than private funding did in 2013 and 2014.
Individuals have long been major donors of humanitarian funding, providing an estimated 19% of the total international humanitarian response between 2009 and 2013. The rise in philanthropy in both the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) suggests that this has potential to grow even further.

Detailed data is not available for 2014, but in 2013 individuals provided an estimated 72% (US$3.9 billion) of the total private funding to international humanitarian agencies – including international NGOs, UN agencies and the RCRC Movement – consistent with the 71% share over the five-year period. Private sources accounted for 40% of NGOs’ humanitarian income in 2013 and, of this, 83% came from individuals.

The overall share of private humanitarian assistance from trusts and foundations over this period has dropped slightly, from 8% in 2009 to 5% in 2013. Compared with other types of private donors, funding from large charitable trusts is relatively well represented in FTS data. Some US$34.2 million of funding from private trusts was reported to the FTS in 2013, of which 95% came from the two largest trust-based donors on the database for that year: the Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services (US$41.3 million) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (US$9.3 million).

At the same time, the share from private companies and corporations increased slightly from 5% to 8%. They provided an estimated US$385 million in humanitarian funding in 2013, and US$1.6 billion between 2009 and 2013. Both the Financing for Development and the World Humanitarian Summit processes are dedicating attention to the changing and potential role of the private sector in meeting development and humanitarian needs – and financial donorship is just one part of this. The scope of private sector engagement has also expanded to include risk-financing models, logistical and legal services, technology, in-kind goods and personnel.

RCRC national societies and UNICEF national committees have generated a declining share of total private assistance since a peak in 2010, representing 7% in 2013. However, their impact is still significant: in 2013 they accounted for 71% of RCRC private humanitarian funding. While this funding was mobilised from diverse sources, often using innovative models of income generation, evidence suggests that the largest share also came from individuals. National committees (primarily UNICEF national committees) accounted for the largest share (43%) of the private funding that went to UN agencies, with individuals providing 28% of this.

**FIGURE 3.11**

Private international humanitarian assistance by donor type, 2009-2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on GHA’s unique dataset of private voluntary contributions.
International NGOs (INGOs) are the largest mobilisers of private funding, raising an estimated US$4.7 billion in 2013, and US$22.7 billion (89% of the total) in the five years between 2009 and 2013. This reflects INGOs’ greater dependence on private sources, compared with UN agencies and the RCRC Movement who receive a greater proportion of their income from government donors. For the group of INGOs in our dataset, private funding accounted for more than 40% of their combined income. This dependence carries some risks of funding volatility in response to ‘mega-crises’, but recipient agencies report significant longer-term benefits of flexibility and independence, as well as greater reliability, from regular private donors than from governments.

However, in 2013, this share dropped slightly as the proportions of private funding mobilised by the RCRC32 and UN agencies both increased – from 3% to 4%, and 5% to 9%, respectively. UN agencies increased the volume as well as the share of total private humanitarian assistance, bringing their private income up to the same level as in 2010, the year of the Haiti and Pakistan crises.

Of the UN agencies, UNICEF and UNHCR raised the most private humanitarian assistance in 2013 at US$194.8 million and US$191.0 million respectively. Between them, these two organisations raised 83% of all private humanitarian assistance given to UN agencies that year. Private humanitarian funding given to UNICEF peaked at US$345 million in 2010, before declining two years running to US$83 million in 2012, when UNHCR became the UN agency that raised the largest amount of private humanitarian funds. UNHCR’s private humanitarian funding has increased year on year from US$50.7 million in 2009 to US$191 million in 2013. A 135% increase in funding to UNICEF in 2013 meant it again replaced UNHCR as the largest UN fundraiser of private humanitarian assistance.

For more detailed analysis of the most recently available data on private humanitarian assistance, see GHA’s 2015 paper Humanitarian assistance from non-state donors: latest trends.33

![Figure 3.12](source: Development Initiatives based on GHA’s unique dataset of private contributions.)
In focus: Humanitarian assistance from individuals through Zakat

All of the world’s major religions contain some element of almsgiving, and faith-based organisations play a key role in the funding and delivery of humanitarian response across the world. In 2013 they accounted for approximately 16% of all international humanitarian assistance channelled through NGOs. If the five largest Christian and Islamic INGOs were classed alongside international donors, their combined private humanitarian assistance of US$396.7 million would have made them the 12th largest donor in 2013.

Islamic countries and those with large Muslim populations are also rising in significance as both humanitarian donors and recipients, prompting global interest in the humanitarian potential of Islamic social financing. Between 2011 and 2013, reported international humanitarian assistance from states within the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) grew from US$497 million to US$773 million, with an additional US$1.6 billion contributed by Turkey for its hosting of Syrian refugees. At the same time, an estimated 75% of people living in the top ten recipient countries of humanitarian assistance in 2013 were Muslim.

Zakat, the mandatory Muslim practice of giving 2.5% of one’s accumulated wealth for charitable purposes every year, is one of the main tools of Islamic social financing. There is no reliable global figure for the total value of Zakat contributions. However, GHA research indicates that the total volume collected each year through formal mechanisms alone is, at the very least, in the tens of billions of dollars. Data for Indonesia, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, which make up 17% of the world’s estimated Muslim population, indicates that in these countries alone at least US$5.7 billion is currently collected annually through formal Zakat-collection institutions. Between 23% and 57% of this Zakat is used for humanitarian response, depending on the context in which it is raised and used.

The collective economy of Islamic and Muslim-majority countries is currently one of the fastest growing in the world, suggesting potential future growth in Zakat. At an estimated 205 million people, Indonesia is home to the world’s largest Muslim population. Between 2004 and 2012, Indonesia’s GDP increased by 60% and Zakat collection increased seven-fold, reaching an estimated US$217.8 million in 2012. Meanwhile, international humanitarian assistance to Indonesia exceptionally peaked at US$962 million in 2005 following the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami, and totalled US$47 million in 2012.

For more information, see GHA’s 2015 paper, An act of faith: Humanitarian financing and Zakat.

Governments of affected states

Domestic governments have the primary responsibility to respond to crises on their territory and many spend substantial sums on preparedness and response, negating or reducing the need for international support. This includes expenditure on hosting refugees (see page 38), disaster risk reduction and management through national disaster management authorities, and safety net schemes to respond to food crises (see Chapter 6). As the examples of Brazil and Turkey show, the distinction between recipient and donor state is not always clear: a single state may find itself preparing or responding domestically, assisting internationally and receiving assistance.

A running theme of the Sendai Framework, the World Humanitarian Summit Consultations and the High Level Panel on Sustainable Development is the importance of national and local government capacities and ownership. As Chapters 6 and 7 show, the responses to both Typhoon Haiyan and the Syrian refugee crisis have prompted a renewed recognition of the role of domestic governments in planning and implementing international humanitarian response.

The scope and scale of national capacities to meet people’s needs in crisis varies enormously, as does the political commitment to reach the most vulnerable, particularly in conflict settings. However, whatever the context, international responders need to understand national (and sub-national) resources to know where, how and to what extent to complement appropriately.

The following case studies on the Sierra Leonean government’s role in the Ebola response and the Mexican government’s investments in disaster management highlight the domestic contributions to crisis response in countries with two very different national capacities. Sierra Leone, one of the lowest-income countries in the world and a fragile state, mobilised US$17.2 million of domestic expenditure in response to the 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak, a crisis that necessitated the largest regional appeal for international humanitarian assistance that year. Mexico, an upper middle income country, has invested at least US$3.3 billion in disaster response as part of a comprehensive disaster-management approach. It has received no humanitarian assistance in 2014 and only US$27.8 million over the last decade.

Sierra Leone government spending in the Ebola response

Nearly 13,000 Sierra Leonians were infected by the Ebola virus disease outbreak which began in 2014 – a higher number than in both Liberia and Guinea, the two other countries most severely affected by the epidemic. The Sierra Leonean government declared a national emergency in July 2014, two months after the first confirmed case of Ebola, shortly before the WHO proclaimed an international health emergency.

Sierra Leone is a low income country that, even before the epidemic took its toll on the economy, had a per capita domestic government expenditure of just US$192, just over half a dollar per person per day, and a tenth of the PPP$2,264 average for all developing countries. At the start of the outbreak, it had one doctor for every 33,000 people. The scale and nature of the epidemic and the paucity of domestic funding meant that national coping capacities were quickly overwhelmed and significant international assistance was required.

However, despite limited capacity, the Sierra Leonean government did invest in the response. On the launch of the Accelerated National Ebola Outbreak Plan in July 2014, the Sierra Leonean government pledged a US$10.0 million contribution towards the US$25.8 million of identified requirements. By mid-November 2014, the government’s reported expenditure on the Ebola response stood at US$17.2 million – 4% of total domestic revenue in 2014. Total spending is likely to be higher, however, as this figure does not capture regular budget transfers to recipient states. Unlike for international humanitarian assistance, there is no global reporting system for domestic government expenditure on humanitarian assistance and so no estimate of the total value of these contributions. In some of the most crisis-affected states, little or no current data is available (see Chapter 8). Where data is available, states also report their budgets and expenditure, and national and state levels, very differently, making it hard to derive aggregates or make comparisons. Further, disaster risk reduction and response activities are commonly spread across multiple budgets, making assessments difficult.

In the absence of a global estimate of the value of domestic response, the 2014 GHA report examined individual state budgets in India, Kenya and the Philippines in 2014. The GHA programme continues to gather and analyse available budget information on specific countries to understand their role in response and complementarity to international resources.
line ministries and local councils that have been redirected towards the response.

It is hard to compare the size of the Sierra Leonean government’s contribution to that of the international response. International funds came from a number of different development and humanitarian institutions and were both in-kind and financial, and were not captured in a single financial reporting system. Looking at the amounts of reported international humanitarian assistance alone, it appears that, by August 2014, the government’s US$10 million pledge was a third more than that contributed by international donors but, by the peak of the crisis in December 2014, the cumulative international humanitarian response was almost 27 times the size of Sierra Leone’s US$17.2 million contribution.

The government budgeted a further US$9.7 million for the Ebola response in 2015, nearly half of which is for post-Ebola recovery activities aimed at rebuilding livelihoods and reviving economic activity. The Ebola virus disease outbreak has had a severe economic impact on Sierra Leone and the region – economic growth in Sierra Leone more than halved to 6.0% in 2014 from 20.1% before the epidemic,39 with projected forgone GDP in 2015 of US$920 million.40 To finance its response and accommodate lower domestic revenue, the government reduced its capital budget and borrowed US$8 million from the domestic securities market.

### FIGURE 3.14

**Domestic expenditure in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in Sierra Leone, May–November 2014**

- **US$7.6m** (44%)
  - Hazard pay incentives to healthworkers
- **US$6.4m** (38%)
  - Public sensitisation, protective gears, disinfectants, training and surveillance
- **US$1.0m** (6%)
  - Transfers to local councils for health services
- **US$2.1m** (12%)
  - Other unspecified Ebola response measures

Source: Development Initiatives based on Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance and the International Monetary Fund.
Mexico’s disaster management investments

Mexico is at high risk from a number of natural hazards. In 2010, 2 million people were affected by a combination of floods, storms and earthquakes with financial losses estimated at US$8.0 billion (0.7% GDP). Even in 2012, a year of less severe disasters, 1 million people were affected by storms and earthquakes and estimated losses were US$1.4 billion (0.1% GDP).

Mexico established its cross-government civil protection system in 1985 in the aftermath of the Mexico City earthquake which killed 10,000 people and injured 30,000. Its disaster management approach is supported by legislation and includes dedicated funds for both preparedness and response.

The Ministry of Finance is bound by law to direct 0.4% of its annual programmable federal expenditure to Mexico’s National Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN). Tracked disaster response expenditures increased by 158% between 2005 and 2014, reaching US$3.3 billion in 2014. Spending peaked in 2013 to US$4 billion in response to the damage and losses caused by a succession of hurricanes from both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.

Mexico’s domestic investments in disaster response mean that it requires little international assistance. In the last decade, it received US$27.8 million in international assistance compared with almost US$16 billion of domestic spending on response from federal and state budgets. However, as Figure 3.15 shows, these flows do not cover all estimated damages, but on average 50% over 2007–2012, varying from a low of 29% coverage in 2007 to a high of 84% in 2011.

The Mexican government has a number of other financing mechanisms to protect against and respond to disaster loss. Additional financing can come from a number of sources, including national budget surpluses from oil revenues, to fund unmet budget requirements. Mexico also has a fund for disaster response in rural areas and operates market-based risk transfer mechanisms, including Mexico’s MultiCat 2012 bond—a US$315 million catastrophe bond launched in 2012 with World Bank support that provides coverage against earthquakes and hurricanes.

At the state level, there are also specific mechanisms: following 2010 increases in damages, a new reconstruction fund was introduced to help states meet co-financing requirements for infrastructure. The fund provided financing to states and is managed by the national development bank BANOBRAS. Mexico also uses insurance at state level to reduce future costs. FONDEN co-financing schemes provide incentives for states to insure their infrastructure and in 2012 new legislation made insurance mandatory.

In 2003 Mexico established a prevention fund (FOPREDEN, under FONDEN), which supports risk assessment and mitigation as well as initiatives to build a culture of prevention among the population. However, financing and uptake of this is relatively small compared with that dedicated to disaster response. FOPREDEN expenditures were on average equivalent to 2% of response funds, with a maximum volume at US$43.1 million in 2009, although this does not include many other investments in disaster risk reduction that are outside the fund and hard to track.

Figure 3.15
Mexico’s disaster response expenditure, international humanitarian assistance received and disaster losses 2005–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, CENAPRED and FONDEN data.
Note: ‘Domestic disaster response’ represents only funds from Mexico’s FONDEN budget. International humanitarian assistance is shown in orange on chart, but due to scale is hard to see.
With growing requirements and competing priorities, donors have to make decisions about where to direct increasing but not unlimited resources. Responding to needs is central to humanitarian response but no donor can meet all needs everywhere.

There is a clear concentration of funding in a small number of countries. In 2013 Syria received the most funding. Together with its refugee-hosting neighbours, Lebanon and Jordan, it accounted for 43% of international humanitarian assistance to the top ten recipients and 15% of the total response. Crises in these countries represented 33% of UN appeal requirements in 2013.

The largest recipients in 2013 were also a group of countries experiencing protracted or recurrent crises. Six of the ten largest recipients had featured in this group more than eight times in the last decade; they include Sudan, the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), Ethiopia and Afghanistan, all of which have featured every year. None of these ten largest recipients had experienced sudden-onset disasters, and nine are long-term fragile states.

In 2014 there was a growing group of major acute emergencies – the conflicts in Syria and the Central African Republic continued to be designated ‘Level 3’ (L3) emergencies by the UN, and were joined by the crises in South Sudan and Iraq. The Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa also called for a large-scale and complex response. These five major emergencies accounted for the majority of humanitarian funding in 2014: 57% of total reported funding and 66% of funding to UN-coordinated appeals. In comparison, in 2013, L3 emergencies accounted for 36% of total funding and 42% of funding to appeals.

At the same time, a number of crises continue to receive less funding and less attention. For example, the conflicts in Algeria/Western Sahara, Colombia and Myanmar have consistently appeared on the Forgotten Crisis Index of the European Commission’s Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO).
The ten largest recipient countries of international humanitarian assistance are a largely consistent group. In 2013, only one country, Jordan, joined the group of ten largest recipients for the first time in the decade. Six countries featured in this group more than eight times in the last decade, highlighting that humanitarian assistance is rarely a short-term endeavour (see Chapter 7). All of the ten largest recipients in 2013 were affected by protracted or recurrent crises. Conversely, the Philippines, which suffered a major rapid-onset crisis (Typhoon Haiyan) in late 2013, became only the 11th largest recipient that year.

Countries affected by the crisis in Syria continued to dominate the response. In 2013, over US$3 billion went to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon combined, accounting for 43% of the funding to the ten largest recipients and 15% of the total international humanitarian response.

To relate this to the scale of requirements, these crises represented 33% of the amount requested in UN-coordinated appeals.

DATA POVERTY: TIMELINESS

We use the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’s data to analyse the recipient countries of contributions from DAC donors. However, complete data relating to the recipients of DAC donor funding in 2014 is not available until December 2015. Therefore while we make reference to 2014 data wherever we can, there are some instances where we have to refer to 2013 figures.
Note: ‘Top 10 appearances’ indicates number of top ten appearances in the past 10 years. DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo.
In light of the ongoing conflicts, the geographic focus of funding was towards the Middle East: four of the ten largest recipients in 2013 were in that region (Syria, oPt, Jordan and Lebanon). Together these received US$3.8 billion, 19% of the international humanitarian response in 2013. Five of the ten largest recipients were in sub-Saharan Africa – Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – and these received a combined total of US$2.8 billion, 13% of international humanitarian response.

These figures reflect 2013 data as this is the latest year for which comprehensive recipient data is available from the OECD DAC. However, preliminary funding levels in 2014 available from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) suggest that Iraq and the Ebola-affected countries in West Africa may significantly alter the picture when DAC data becomes available for 2014 (see Figure 4.4).

In 2013, a total of 147 countries received international humanitarian assistance in volumes ranging from US$10,000 for Tokelau to US$1.9 billion for Syria. Of these, the 20 largest recipients accounted for 82% of country-allocated assistance – and the five largest for 40%.

These 20 major recipients in 2013 also received the majority (71%) of the total given over the last decade. As Figure 4.1 shows, four recipients (oPt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Afghanistan) have been among the top ten every year. Either due to major sudden-onset crises in a single year or to recurrent or protracted crises, seven of the largest recipients in 2013 (Sudan, oPt, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Somalia, DRC and Syria) were among the ten countries in receipt of the largest aggregate volumes since 2004.

However, these aggregate figures mask significant year-on-year differences and all recipients have seen variation in funding levels over the period. In some countries, including Pakistan, Haiti and Somalia, disasters caused by natural hazards have driven significant peaks that account for large proportions of their totals in that decade. Elsewhere, escalations in conflict in chronic or new crises have driven peaks. Funding to Syria in 2013 was 56% of its decade total and that to Jordan and Lebanon in two years of the Syria crisis (2012 and 2013) accounted for 47% and 33% respectively of their decade totals. In other situations of protracted or chronic crisis, the variations are smaller – for example, Chad and DRC have each seen a more even distribution of funding over the period.
FIGURE 4.2

Twenty largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance, 2004–2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data.
Notes: Proportions have been calculated from total international humanitarian assistance allocated to countries only.
Largest variations – increases and decreases – in international humanitarian assistance, 2012–2013

Largest increases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE %</th>
<th>US$m</th>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>↑ 144%</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>Syria was declared an L3 emergency in January 2013 due to ongoing violence and displacement. By the end of 2013, approximately 6.5 million people were internally displaced and the number of refugees from Syria had risen to 2.3 million. The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance more than doubled between 2012 and 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ 112%</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>Jordan is host to large numbers of people fleeing fighting in Syria. By the end of 2013, Jordan was host to almost 650,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, the vast majority of whom were displaced by the conflict in neighbouring Syria. This is more than double the number of refugees and asylum-seekers in the country in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ 65%</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>Continuing violent conflict and displacement in Sudan meant that, as of December 2013, an estimated 6.1 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance. This compares to 4.4 million people estimated to be in need of assistance in the country in December 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ 199%</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November 2013 devastated dozens of provinces and affected an estimated 11.3 million people. In addition, other conflicts and disasters caused by natural hazards affected nearly 8 million more people. This compares to just over 1.3 million people affected by conflict and disasters in the Philippines in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ 17%</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>The protracted crisis in occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) left approximately 2.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance – an increase of 200,000 on the 2.1 million people estimated to be affected in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ 72%</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>↑ 81%</td>
<td>79</td>
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<td>↑ 18%</td>
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<td>↑ 73%</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>↑ 60%</td>
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### Largest decreases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE %</th>
<th>US$m DECREASE</th>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>↓ -24% South Sudan -210</td>
<td>Insecurity and displacement has left millions of people in South Sudan vulnerable and in need of assistance. Approximately 4.4 million people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2013. This compares to the estimated 4.6 million people requiring assistance in the country in 2012.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ -37% Pakistan -197</td>
<td>Following devastating floods in Pakistan in 2011, millions of people were still estimated to be in need of early recovery assistance in the years to follow. In 2013 the number of people estimated to be affected by flooding was 1.5 million compared with around 5.1 million people in 2012.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ -50% Chad -152</td>
<td>Cyclical climatic shocks combined with widespread food insecurity and displacement have affected a high proportion of the population of Chad. In 2013 an estimated 2.9 million people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance, compared with approximately 4.4 million people in 2012.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ -22% Somalia -132</td>
<td>Somalia has suffered over two decades of conflict, displacement, poor basic service provision and severe food insecurity. In 2013 around 3.2 million people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance. This compares to 2012 when, at the beginning of the year, an estimated 3.8 million people were in need of humanitarian response.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ -23% Kenya -93</td>
<td>Periodic incidences of inter-communal violence combined with climatic shocks and food and livelihood insecurity have left many people vulnerable and in need of assistance in Kenya over recent years. In 2013 approximately 1.7 million people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance, compared with over 4.4 million people in 2012.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ -30% Niger -88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ -62% Côte d’Ivoire -64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ -30% Niger -88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ -40% Zimbabwe -60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ -8% Afghanistan -37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 4.4

Funding by donor region to the ten largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance, 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.

Note: Private figures based on FTS data, not GHA’s dataset for private funding (see Data & Guides). We group private donors together here to compare with government donors. OECD country naming has been used for regions (see Data & Guides). Funding represents only that reported to the FTS as humanitarian assistance; for the Ebola response in Liberia in particular, much more may have been given through development channels.
Donor mixes to largest recipients, 2014

Different humanitarian situations attract different mixes of government and private donors – reflecting in part the type of crisis and its location. Looking at the 2014 group of ten largest recipients, according to reporting to UN OCHA FTS, the composition of donors varies significantly with donors from different regions and private donors providing quite different shares.

In keeping with the fact that they provide the largest total international humanitarian assistance (see Chapter 3), North American and European donors responded with significant shares to all of these ten crises. North American donors (primarily the US) provided the largest share of reported international humanitarian assistance to seven of the ten largest recipients, followed by European donors in all of these. European donors provided the largest share in two countries – the Philippines and Somalia.

However, in one country – Iraq – Middle Eastern donors provided the largest share, mostly due to contributions from Saudi Arabia (see Chapter 3). This is part of the regional geographic preference of Middle Eastern donors shown in their shares to the top ten recipients in Figure 4.4. Their reported contributions to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and oPt represented between 10% and 42% of the total funding reported to the FTS for these countries. Conversely, Middle Eastern donors contributed only negligible shares of the humanitarian assistance to the three African countries among the ten largest recipients.

Far East Asian donors, primarily Japan, showed the least variation in their share of humanitarian assistance to most crises. Funding from this region represented between 1% and 4% of funds to nine of the ten largest recipients. However, the contribution of Far East Asia was significantly larger in the Philippines, where it contributed 11% of reported assistance, in keeping with Japan’s global role in disaster management and response (see GHA Report 2014).

Indeed, the large-scale and rapid-onset disaster caused by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines drew in the most even mix of contributions. This included 22% from the private sector, higher than to any of the other largest recipients, and in line with the tendency for private donors to favour natural hazards over conflicts (see Chapter 3).

Funding according to need is central to humanitarian commitments; the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship affirm that funding should be allocated in proportion to and on the basis of needs. However, individual donors cannot cover all needs and must make choices about where to prioritise their finite resources. These choices are guided by various factors, which can include the location of the crisis and the type of disaster as well as foreign policy objectives and historical ties.

Understanding the preferences and behaviour of donors is essential to an effective and global needs-based response. Without this, individual donor responses can add up to a concentration of funding to certain appeals and crises (see Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2) and the neglect of others (see Figure 4.6). Some donors have their own informal means of coordinating with other donors, particularly in rapid-onset emergencies – and there are a number of fora for communication at global and crisis-affected country level. However, though required to inform a coordinated response to meeting competing needs, there is currently no global forum for gathering and sharing information on donor priorities, capacity and intentions.

The large-scale and rapid-onset disaster caused by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines drew in the most even mix of contributions. This included 22% from the private sector.
Funding to ‘Level 3’ and major emergencies

In both 2013 and 2014 a small but rising number of major emergencies dominated international humanitarian response. These include those designated as Level 3 (L3) emergencies by the UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator – which means that they require leadership, capacity and resources to respond to exceptional circumstances. The decision to designate an emergency L3 is based on five criteria: the scale, urgency and complexity of needs, as well as lack of domestic capacity to respond and ‘reputational risk’ for the UN. By the end of 2013 three L3s were declared: the conflicts in Syria and the Central African Republic (CAR) and the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. While the response to Typhoon Haiyan was de-activated as a L3 emergency in February 2014, the responses to the emergencies in both Syria and CAR remained at L3 status throughout the year. These were joined in February 2014 by South Sudan because of escalating violence, and then in August 2014 by the conflict in Iraq. While the Ebola response fell under a different system of coordination and leadership from these crises, and was thus not designated an L3, the scale, urgency and complexity of the crisis and response make it comparable.

The same five emergencies accounted for the majority of international humanitarian assistance given in 2014: 57% of the total reported to FTS, and 66% of funding to UN-coordinated appeals. In comparison, in 2013, the three L3 emergencies accounted for 36% of all funding for emergencies – showing that major crises took up a larger proportion of assistance in 2014.

The data does not reveal whether the increased concentration of requirements and funding to these emergencies resulted in decreased funding to other ‘lower-priority’ emergencies in 2014. The amount of international humanitarian assistance grew both to these major emergencies and to others. Also, as Chapter 2 shows, there is significant variation between individual appeals. However, on average the L3s had a higher proportion of their requirements met (67%) than did other UN-coordinated appeals (49%). In 2013, the difference in these averages was much smaller – 63% for L3 emergencies and 60% for others.

The demands of these major emergencies, a combination of both rapid-onset disasters and escalations of chronic conflicts, are clearly requiring increased humanitarian assistance from donors and prompting difficult choices on how and where to prioritise funding. In light of this, the idea of a global pooled fund for major emergencies has been suggested as a solution. As Chapter 5 notes, one suggestion is for a ‘super-CERF’ to act as a global reserve to respond to these acute surges in need.

Five major emergencies – in Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, CAR and Ebola – accounted for more than half of the requirements (59%) stated in UN-coordinated appeals in 2014, a total of US$11.6 billion.
FIGURE 4.5

Funding to L3 emergencies plus Ebola and all other funding reported to FTS, 2013 and 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.
Notes: Data was downloaded on 16 March 2015 for 2013 figures and 9 April 2015 for 2014 figures and includes funding both inside and outside the appeals. The Philippines Typhoon Haiyan emergency was designated L3 status in November 2013, and declassified on 14 February 2014. Typhoon Haiyan data for 2013 includes all funding up to and including 31 December 2013, and data for 2014 includes all funding between 1 January 2014 and 14 February 2014. Funding to Syria and South Sudan emergencies includes funding to those countries and also includes those in their respective refugee response plans.
Forgotten crises

While some emergencies are high profile and prompt ‘system-wide activation’, others remain more under-reported and underfunded. This is a result of both existing individual donor preferences (see page 56–57) and the competing demands on finite resources of concurrent major emergencies (see page 58). The collective impact of these individual donor choices is that certain crises are, and remain, ‘forgotten’.

ECHO’s Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) continues to be one of the most widely used tools for identifying neglected emergencies. These comprise several protracted displacements, such as of the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria; some ‘whole-country’ neglected situations such as Somalia and CAR; other crises that affect particular parts of a country, such as Mindanao in the Philippines; and minority groups within a country, for example the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar living in Bangladesh.

The FCA index ranks emergency situations using a series of weighted indicators under four general categories: vulnerability; media coverage; public aid per capita; and a qualitative assessment by ECHO’s geographical units. The annual FCA index, along with other analysis, then informs ECHO’s operational strategy and priorities for the following year.

A number of emergency situations appear year on year in the FCA index. For example, both Algeria/Western Sahara and Myanmar have appeared on the index 12 times – every year since 2003–2004. Other situations escalate and suddenly deteriorate, drawing increased media and donor attention. For example: Haiti appeared on the FCA index in 2003–2004 and 2007–2008, but has not appeared since; and CAR featured on the index five years running, from 2009–2010 to 2013–2014, but is not included in ECHO’s most recent index for 2014–2015 due to its relative high status and current L3 emergency classification.

Source: Development Initiatives based on the ECHO FCA Index.
Note: IDP, internally displaced persons; LRA, Lord’s Resistance Army.
In focus: forgotten crisis – Colombia

Ongoing violent conflict in Colombia displaces around another 300,000 people each year and more than one in ten Colombians have at some point in their lives been forced to flee their homes as a result of actual or feared violence related to the armed conflict. As of mid-2014, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that around 5.7 million people were internally displaced, making Colombia home to the second-highest internally displaced population after Syria. Combined with the 0.4 million Colombians who have fled the country to seek asylum elsewhere, displaced people currently account for around 13% of the total population.

Colombia is classified by the World Bank as an upper middle income country, with a gross national income per capita of US$7,590 in 2013 (ranking 96 out of 213 countries). The country has relatively strong levels of governance and institutional capacity, with an overall ranking of 4.4 for ‘lack of coping capacity’ (out of a possible ten) in the Index for Risk Management (INFORM).

FIGURE 4.7

Levels of international humanitarian assistance and displacement, Colombia, 2004 –2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on the ECHO FCA index, OECD DAC data for 2004 to 2013, UN OCHA FTS data for 2014, and UNHCR displacement data.

Notes: Funding from EU institutions is official bilateral humanitarian assistance. UNHCR displacement figures include refugees and people in refugee-like situations, IDPs, protected/assisted by UNHCR, including people in IDP-like situations and asylum seekers.
Several specialised institutions have been set up to respond to emergencies caused by conflict or by natural hazards at the national level, such as the Unit for the Attention and Integral Reparation to Victims and the National Unit for Disasters Risk Management. Despite this, 5% of Colombia’s population are estimated to be living on less than PPP$1.25 a day, and in 2009, an estimated 83% of Colombia’s internally displaced persons were thought to be living in extreme poverty.

Colombia has appeared on the FCA index nine times – every year since 2006–2007. Despite this, levels of humanitarian assistance have fluctuated over the eight-year period between 2007 and 2014. International humanitarian assistance to Colombia reached a peak of US$117 million in 2007, but fell to a low of US$66 million in 2013 – 44% lower than the amount provided in 2007. Preliminary figures from FTS data suggest an increase of humanitarian assistance in 2014, although levels are still well below the amount provided in 2007.

Humanitarian assistance from EU institutions to Colombia has remained relatively steady over the past 11 years, with a slight increase in 2007 to US$30 million, in line with the trend for international humanitarian funding, and largely declining thereafter to a low of US$17 million in 2013.

As of mid-2014, the Office of the UNHCR estimated that around 5.7 million people were internally displaced, making Colombia home to the second-highest internally displaced population after Syria.

Data for 2014 suggests a slight increase in funding from EU institutions but with levels still over a third less than that provided in 2007.

The Humanitarian Country Team in Colombia issued a strategic response plan (SRP) in 2014, though it was considered a pilot and aimed at strengthening collective response planning and underpinning coordination arrangements. The 2015 SRP is published externally and discussions are ongoing to ensure systematic tracking of funding received against the SRP framework in OCHA’s FTS.
Although military interventions can be high profile, the total humanitarian spending they represent is relatively small. During the decade 2004 to 2013, just 1.2% of humanitarian assistance reported by OECD DAC donors was channelled via military organisations.

Military and defence actors played a significant role in the response to the West African Ebola virus disease outbreak in 2014. Working together with a team of engineers from the Armed Forces of Liberia, the US Department of Defense helped build Ebola treatment units across Liberia, including this one in Tubmanburg. In total the US committed 3,000 troops as well as engineers and military assets to its Ebola response.
How humanitarian assistance gets from the donor to the crisis-affected person matters. Rarely a direct transaction, funding moves from donor to a ‘first recipient’ agency or mechanism and then sometimes through several further levels before it materialises in the form of goods, services or cash for crisis-affected people. The timeliness, cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of response are all affected by these ‘channels of delivery’ choices as well as by the length and nature of the various transaction chains.

Traceability is key to understanding and improving these channels of delivery. However, the data does not allow money to be systematically followed beyond the first recipient. Fully compliant reporting to meet the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standard could allow contributions to be traced through the system from the donor down to the activity level.

Current data does reveal that the majority of international humanitarian assistance went in the first instance to UN agencies, and that the largest share of this came from government donors. In 2013, 48% of government funding went to the six major UN agencies involved in humanitarian coordination and response. The World Food Programme (WFP) has received the bulk of funding to UN agencies over the last decade, but the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also received a significant and steadily increasing amount.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are the second-largest group of first recipients and in 2013 they received 20% of government donors’ international humanitarian assistance. Most of this goes, at least in the first instance, to international NGOs (INGOs) – 2014 figures suggest that local and national NGOs directly received 1.2% of that given to all NGOs, two-thirds of the share that they received the previous year. Funding channelled through the affected state and through donors’ defence agencies remains small, though with the recent Ebola and Typhoon Haiyan responses, there is growing attention to their respective roles.

Pooled funds are important mechanisms for rapid response and gap-filling at the global and country levels. In 2014, the UN-managed pooled funds mobilised US$1.1 billion, 4.4% of international humanitarian assistance. Funding, however, tends to be concentrated – 50% went to five countries, and some major donors chose to channel little or no assistance through these funds.
FIGURE 5.1

Humanitarian funding channels, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF data and GHA’s unique dataset for private voluntary contributions. Notes: GHA’s first-level recipient data from government donors and EU institutions uses OECD DAC CRS and UN OCHA FTS data. The figures in our calculations for total humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors use data from OECD DAC Tables 1 and 2a, so totals here may differ. “Public sector” refers both to the OECD definition of public sector and the FTS category of funding channelled to the “affected government”. OECD DAC CRS codes “other”, “to be defined” and “Public Private Partnerships” are merged and expressed as “other” unless otherwise specified. Private funding figures use GHA’s unique dataset on private voluntary contributions for humanitarian assistance. RCRC, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
Channels of delivery

Different donors display different preferences in how they direct their humanitarian assistance. For example, while multilateral organisations (primarily UN agencies) received an estimated 61% of international humanitarian assistance from governments traceable to first-level recipients between 2009 and 2013, this proportion was much higher for contributions from DAC donors (62%) than for other governments (41%). These statistics in turn mask individual donor preferences in different contexts.

While both DAC and other government donors appear to prefer channelling their delivery through multilateral agencies, they vary in how they choose to direct the rest of their assistance.

Around 19% of humanitarian assistance from DAC donors went directly to NGOs over the five-year period, while just 2% of reported allocations from other governments was channelled this way. In contrast, according to GHA’s unique dataset on private voluntary contributions, private donors channel the largest share of their funding by far through NGOs (89%). Between 2009 and 2013, they channelled an estimated 21% (US$0.8 billion) of their assistance this way.

International humanitarian assistance is not a direct transaction between donor and recipient. Funding moves through transaction chains of varying lengths and complexity. 'Following the money' through these is essential to promote accountability and improve efficiency. Yet while there is significant interest in understanding transaction costs and value for money, it is not currently possible to track humanitarian funding on its journey from donor to the crisis-affected person.

As Figure 5.1 shows, most government funding does specify a first-level recipient. Yet while we know that these initial recipients often then pass funding to second- or third-level recipients or beyond, this is not systematically captured in current reporting systems.

To address this gap, IATI (see Chapter 9) aims to provide a common reporting standard that will allow the coding of funding and spending relating to specific activities. If such information was systematically and comprehensively reported, it would be possible to trace disbursements from donor to final implemented programmes and resources delivered. Geo-coding at the activity-reporting level would also allow the delivery of assistance to be mapped geographically. As shown in the GHA Report 2014, tracking tools such as d-portal already allow development funding to be traced in this way.

First-level recipients of international humanitarian assistance by donor type, 2009–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Type</th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>International RCRC Movement</th>
<th>Multilateral organisations</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAC donors</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other government donors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private donors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data, and GHA’s unique dataset on private voluntary contributions.

Note: Channels of delivery data for private funding is based on GHA’s own calculations and further analysis is available in Chapter 3.
The largest share of international humanitarian assistance is channelled, at least in the first instance, through UN agencies – and this share is growing. In 2013, nearly half (48% or US$7.3 billion) of international humanitarian assistance from government donors went via the six UN agencies with a key role in humanitarian coordination and response: WFP, UNHCR, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This was a slight rise from their 45% share (US$5.7 billion) in 2012 – and significantly higher than their 16% share in 2004. These UN agencies can act as both appealing agencies and grant-makers, and both coordinators and implementers – roles often taken on by the same agency within the same emergency.

UN agencies receive funding in a number of ways, through: regular core funding from government donors; other contributions from governments; institutional and private donations; and pooled funds. A small proportion for UN OCHA, UNHCR and UNRWA also comes from the general UN budget. In the case of FAO, a proportion also comes from assessed contributions from member states.2

Overall, voluntary contributions from government donors provide the majority of funding to these six UN agencies, predominantly donors from the OECD DAC group – who provided 96% of their funding in 2013 (US$7.0 billion) – through both core contributions and other allocations. The largest DAC donor to these UN agencies in 2013 was the US with US$3.1 billion (accounting for 55% of all DAC donor contributions). The next largest donor, the UK, contributed a quarter of that at US$716 million (13%), while Japan gave US$476 million (8.4%).

Most of the funding from DAC donors to these UN agencies is for specific responses rather than core funding. In 2013 19% was for core funding – a stark reversal from the decade before, when core funding represented 85%. However, some of the difference may be explained by improved reporting of other allocations over the decade.

Donors outside the DAC group provided 4.2% of the total from governments to these six UN agencies in 2013 – US$305 million. In 2013 by far the largest of these donors was Kuwait, which contributed US$224 million, followed by Russia with US$31.3 million and Saudi Arabia with US$18.9 million. However, the shares and volumes of funding from this group of donors may change significantly in 2014, given the allocations to WFP from Saudi Arabia that year (see Chapter 3).

Of the UN agencies, WFP and UNHCR receive the largest share of direct humanitarian assistance from governments – 47% to WFP and 27% to UNHCR over the past ten years. Over this period, WFP has received US$23.8 billion of international humanitarian assistance, almost equivalent to that received by UNHCR, UNRWA and UNICEF combined. Funding to WFP has grown at the highest rate but with significant volatility – this is perhaps explained by the nature of food crises, including the 2008 global food price crisis which prompted a peak in WFP funding. Conversely, funding to UNHCR, the second-largest UN agency recipient, has increased steadily from US$471 million in 2004 (31% of total funds disbursed via the six agencies) to US$2.3 billion (31%) in 2013, mirroring the year-on-year growth in the numbers of people displaced (see Chapter 1).
FIGURE 5.3

International humanitarian assistance from governments to six UN agencies, 2003–2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (UNSCEB) data.

Notes: The calculation for the top chart is composed of core and non-core humanitarian assistance given by governments to UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, UNICEF, FAO and UN OCHA. In the bottom charts no figures are available on core humanitarian contributions for FAO and UN OCHA from the DAC governments for 2003 and 2008.
Pooled funds can counter-balance bilateral donor preferences, fill funding gaps at a global and country level and respond to changing needs. They can also provide a trusted channel in contexts where donors lack capacity to manage direct grants. The UN-managed humanitarian pooled funds – the global Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the country-based emergency response funds (ERFs) and common humanitarian funds (CHFs) – received US$1.1 billion in 2014, 4.4% of the total humanitarian response that year. This is the second consecutive annual increase in their volume and decrease in their share, from US$987 million (5.6% share) in 2012.

The CERF accounted for 45% (US$480 million) of this pooled funding in 2014, consistent with its five-year average. Managed by UN OCHA, it directly disburses only to UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration (who then often sub-grants to others) in both rapid-response (see Chapter 7) and underfunded emergency settings. In 2014 it allocated funds to crisis responses in 45 countries.

The CHFs and ERFs operate in 19 countries, are open to local and national NGOs as well as multilateral agencies, and aim to support both existing UN-coordinated appeal priorities and new or escalating urgent needs. Varying in size in different countries – from US$137 million in South Sudan to just US$50,000 in Uganda – these country-based pooled funds together received US$593 million in 2014.

Humanitarian pooled funding is concentrated in a small number of countries, of which the five largest received 50% of all such funding in 2014. In 2014 South Sudan received 22% of this (mostly from the CHF) – at US$190 million this was a tenth of all humanitarian assistance to the country that year. South Sudan has been described as a test case for pooled funding3 and has been in the top two recipients of pooled funds every year since its independence. Sudan, the DRC, Ethiopia and Somalia have been among the ten largest recipients of pooled funds every year between 2010 and 2014. There were however three new additions to the ten largest recipients in 2014: Iraq, Afghanistan and oPt. None of the countries covered by the Syria appeals appear in the top ten in 2014.

Many of the largest bilateral humanitarian donors were also among the largest donors to pooled funds, with some notable exceptions. The UK was the largest pooled funds contributor in 2014, giving US$288 million. Together, the UK, Sweden and Norway provided 52% (US$2.6 billion) of total funding to pooled funds between 2010 and 2014, and have consistently been the three biggest donors over that period. In contrast, the US and Japan tend to channel relatively little humanitarian assistance via pooled funds, contributing respectively 0.4% and 0.2% of the total to humanitarian pooled funds in 2014.

There is increasing attention on pooled funds in discussions on improving the sufficiency and efficiency of humanitarian funding. New guidance on country-based pooled funds4 has been issued, and discussions continue on how to make them more accessible to national and local NGOs (see page 5). At the global level, the idea of a ‘Super-CERF’ has been suggested – reserved for major crises (see chapter 4) and funded from assessed contributions from UN member states.5

FIGURE 5.4
Total funding to humanitarian pooled funds, 2010–2014

![Bar chart showing total funding to humanitarian pooled funds, 2010-2014](image)

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and CERF data.
CHAPTER 5: HOW DOES IT GET THERE?

FIGURE 5.5

Ten largest recipients of pooled funds, 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and CERF data.
Notes: Pooled funds are expressed as a percentage of humanitarian assistance reported to UN OCHA FTS only.

FIGURE 5.6

Ten largest government contributors to humanitarian pooled funds, 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, CERF and OECD DAC data.
Recovery and development pooled funds

In many countries, humanitarian pooled funds are just one of many multi-donor funding mechanisms, with remits ranging from preparedness and early recovery to peacebuilding and stabilisation. These other mechanisms could play an important role in financing preparedness and sustainable recovery as part of a broader resilience approach, complementing and aligning with humanitarian pooled funds. A recent study on development and climate adaptation pooled funds noted, for example, that "financing chronic vulnerabilities largely through humanitarian assistance over the long term, without linkages or synergies with other sources of finance is unlikely to address the root causes of vulnerabilities and reduce the pressure on humanitarian assistance."^6

Recovery- and development-orientated pooled funds include UN multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), national MDTFs and stand-alone joint programmes,^7 and can attract a mix of humanitarian and development funding. However, for the largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2014, expenditure by these pooled funds was generally significantly lower than that by humanitarian pooled funds. For example, in Somalia, US$54.9 million was received through the CERF and CHF in 2014, compared to only US$3.8 million received through MDTFs and Joint Programmes that same year. None of the ten largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2014 received funding from trust funds administered by the World Bank in 2014.

There are examples of spending through development-orientated pooled funds slowing down in countries as a crisis escalates and humanitarian funding increases. For example, expenditure through the Iraq United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Trust Fund was US$12.7 million in 2013 compared to just US$5.7 million in 2014. At the same time, the CERF allocated US$10.0 million to Iraq in 2013 (2.1% of all CERF funding in 2013), increasing to US$25.5 million in 2014 (5.6% of all CERF funding in 2014). While this scaling down of development funds in times of acute crisis can to some extent be expected, there is significant rationale and scope for development pooled funds to remain engaged in many crisis-affected countries. This is particularly the case in protracted and largely predictable emergencies. Pooled funds can be a means of channelling support to address vulnerabilities and build resilience in fragile states where other development modalities may be difficult.

A number of Joint Programmes illustrate the potential of humanitarian and development partners working together and combining resources in certain contexts. The UNDP/UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative Joint Programme for Refugees and their Host Communities in Eastern Sudan is an example of this: financial and technical support aims to encourage communities in refugee camps in Eastern Sudan to transition into self-sufficient settlements. Host populations also receive assistance through the programme and local government authorities have joint ownership of the project to create an enabling environment for overall improvement of sustainable livelihoods and economic development.^8

Pooled funds can be a means of channelling support to address vulnerabilities and build resilience in fragile states where other development modalities may be difficult.
FIGURE 5.7

Ten largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance 2014, by pooled-funding mechanism type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Funding Mechanism</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>US$2,180m</td>
<td>CERF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>US$1,889m</td>
<td>CHF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>US$1,400m</td>
<td>ERF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>US$1,062m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>US$912m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>US$880m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>US$862m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>US$666m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>US$627m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CERF, CHF and ERF funding as proportion of total humanitarian assistance

- Syria: 0.6%
- South Sudan: 10%
- Iraq: 2.2%
- Lebanon: 0.5%
- Liberia: 0.2%
- Philippines: 0.0%
- Jordan: 2.8%
- Somalia: 8.2%
- Sudan: 13%

Other pooled funds

- Syria Recovery Trust Fund (German Development Bank KfW as Trustee)
  - US$5.5m
- South Sudan Recovery Fund
  - US$6.9m
- UNDG Iraq Trust Fund
  - US$5.7m
- Lebanon Recovery Fund
  - US$1.7m
- Peacebuilding Fund
  - US$4.2m
- New Deal
  - US$0.2m
- Joint Project oPt Rule of Law
  - US$0.1m
- Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery
  - US$3.2m
- Palestine Partnership for Infrastructure Multi-Donor Trust Fund (World Bank)
  - US$0.1m
- Joint Programme for Refugees and their Host Communities in Eastern Sudan
  - US$0.8m
- Darfur Peace and Stability Fund
  - US$8.0m
- UNDP/UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative
  - US$3.8m
- World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Sudan (Closed in 2013)
  - US$9.2m

Key
- CERF
- CHF
- ERF

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, CERF, UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, World Bank and UNDP data.

Notes: Data in constant 2013 prices, except for expenditure from ‘other pooled funds’. Several ‘other pooled funds’ with expenditure of less than US$10,000 in 2014 or zero/negative expenditure have been excluded. 2014 disbursement data for the Syria Recovery Trust Fund is not available. 2014 disbursement data is available for the Palestinian Partnership for Infrastructure Multi-Donor Trust Fund (World Bank), but allocations of US$57 million made since July 2012. Expenditure for pooled funds reporting to the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office are subject to change pending finalisation of year-end expenditures for 2014.
Funding channelled through NGOs

NGOs access humanitarian funding both directly from donors and indirectly through UN agencies and other NGOs. In 2014 they directly received 18% of the total funding reported to UN OCHA’s FTS. It is likely that they received significantly more indirectly, as sub-grants from international agencies, but the data does not reveal how much this amounted to (see page 67).

As requirements and funding grew from 2013 to 2014, so did the amount directly received by NGOs – from US$2.9 billion to US$4.0 billion. The number of NGOs directly receiving international humanitarian assistance grew from 400 in 2012 to 483 in 2014, and the majority (70%) of those directly receiving funds in 2014 were INGOs. Funding was somewhat concentrated, with the ten largest international NGO recipients accounting for 36% of all funding to NGOs that year.

Local and national NGOs have long been recognised as crucial in effective and appropriate humanitarian response and resilience. They can often respond more quickly and stay longer than international actors, flexing between development and humanitarian action. They can also draw on local knowledge, access populations which are out of reach to international actors, and play a role in holding national and international actors to account. ‘Localisation’ has been a recurring theme in World Humanitarian Summit consultations, including calls for the role of national and local NGOs to be better supported.

International humanitarian financing, however, remains oriented to international humanitarian agencies and NGOs, with only a small proportion of reported funding being channelled directly to local and national NGOs. Between 2010 and 2014, local and national NGOs combined received US$243 million – 1.6% of the total given directly to NGOs and 0.3% of the total assistance reported to the UN OCHA FTS over the period. Their share of total funding has halved from 0.4% in 2012 to 0.2% in 2014, and their share of the total given to NGOs has almost halved – from 2.3% to 1.2%. The volume of international humanitarian assistance they received has also declined from a peak of US$58.0 million in 2011 to US$46.6 million in 2014.

The number of local and national NGOs receiving this funding has also dropped – only 16 local NGOs and 80 national NGOs were recorded as having received funding in 2014 in UN OCHA FTS, down from 22 and 95 respectively in 2013. At the same time, the number of INGOs receiving funding grew – from 300 in 2013 to 339 in 2014.

ERFs are designed to be accessible to NGOs, and indeed the majority of ERF funding has been channelled through them. Over the past five years, 57% of US$297 million total ERF funding of US$524 million has been channelled through NGOs. National and local NGOs have directly accessed US$39.2 million of this, representing 7.5% of all ERF funding and 13% of ERF funding channelled through NGOs.

The RCRC Movement channelled a greater share of its funding to NGOs – 70% in 2014 compared with 62% from ERFs. However, the sums involved were smaller – US$7.3 million total funding from the RCRC compared with US$90.3 million from the ERFs. The RCRC also channelled a significantly greater proportion of its NGO funding to local and national organisations – 21% in 2014 alone.
**FIGURE 5.8A**

International humanitarian assistance to NGOs by type, 2014

- **US$3.4bn**  
  - 85%  
  - International NGOs

- **US$43.7m**  
  - 1.1%  
  - Southern international NGOs

- **US$24.1m**  
  - 0.6%  
  - Affiliated national NGOs

- **US$40.9m**  
  - 1.0%  
  - National NGOs

- **US$5.7m**  
  - 0.1%  
  - Local NGOs

- **US$485m**  
  - 12%  
  - Undefined

**Total** **US$4.0bn**

**FIGURE 5.8B**

ERF funding channelled through NGOs by type, 2014

- **US$40.4m**  
  - 72%  
  - International NGOs

- **US$2.5m**  
  - 4.5%  
  - Southern international NGOs

- **US$0m**  
  - 0%  
  - Affiliated national NGOs

- **US$10.0m**  
  - 18%  
  - National NGOs

- **US$2.2m**  
  - 3.9%  
  - Local NGOs

- **US$0.6m**  
  - 1.1%  
  - Undefined

**Total** **US$55.7m**

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.

Notes: Values are those committed/contributed (constant 2013 prices). Scaled by percentage. For NGO coding methodology, see Data & Guides.
Very little international humanitarian assistance is normally channelled via the authorities of the affected state. The Good Humanitarian Donorship principles call on donors to “strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and coordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.” Nonetheless, for a combination of practical, political and historical reasons, particularly in conflict settings, the bulk of international humanitarian assistance is channelled through international agencies. Recently, in the wake of the Philippines and Ebola crises and in the search for solutions to protracted refugee situations in the Middle East, there is a renewed focus on national partnership in non-conflict settings. This is reflected in the language of the UN-coordinated appeals, most notably that of the Syria Refugee and Resilience Plan (see Chapter 7). National capacity is also a recurring theme in the World Humanitarian Summit discussions.

However, the proportion of international humanitarian assistance provided to government authorities of affected states remains low. In 2014 just 3.1% of assistance reported to the FTS was channelled through the affected state – a small proportion but a significant rise from the previous two years.

With funding via the state in active conflict settings often at odds with humanitarian principles, peaks in the volume and proportion of this type of funding have clearly been prompted by rapid-onset disasters – in 2005 by the Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake, in 2010 by the Pakistan floods and Haiti earthquakes and in 2014 by the Ebola virus disease outbreak. Pakistan, Jordan, Haiti and Sierra Leone have been the four largest recipients of direct funding to affected states since 2010.

These totals however mask differences between donors. While many major donors might refrain from providing humanitarian assistance via the affected state government due to commitments to financial governance and humanitarian principles, other donors may be impelled to do so by commitments to South–South solidarity and state sovereignty. Donors outside the OECD DAC group show a greater preference for providing bilateral support to affected governments than do their DAC counterparts. These donors provided 6.5% of the total reported humanitarian assistance to the FTS from 2010 to 2014, but they provided 50% of all funding channelled to affected governments over the period. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and China were all among the five largest donors providing direct bilateral support to affected governments. Given that not all funding from donors outside the OECD DAC group is likely to be reported to the UN OCHA FTS, the figures may in fact be higher. As these figures include only international humanitarian assistance, they also do not show the degree to which all government donors choose to channel other forms of development cooperation to the affected state to support crisis prevention, recovery and long-term solutions (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9).

**FIGURE 5.9**

International humanitarian assistance channelled to affected-state governments, 2005–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS.
Notes: Funding channelled through the affected state includes only those funds channelled through the domestic government in the affected country. Data on ‘Public sector’ in Figure 5.1 refers to funds that may have been channelled through the donor-government public sector, the recipient-government public sector, or in some cases a third-party-government public sector.
Military channels

Military actors have played significant roles in the recent responses to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa and to Typhoon Haiyan. In the case of the Ebola response, the US committed 3,000 troops as well as engineers and military assets as part of its ‘Operation United Assistance’, while the UK deployed 750 troops and assets including a naval ship and helicopters. Other states, including the Netherlands and China, also provided military assistance. Although such interventions are high profile, the total expenditure they represent is relatively small as, in keeping with international guidelines, the military should deliver international humanitarian assistance only in exceptional circumstances.

Between 2004 and 2013, 1.2% of humanitarian assistance reported by DAC donors was channelled via military organisations. From a 2008 peak of 2.6% (US$294 million), this proportion reached a low of 0.4% (US$47.5 million) in 2013, the lowest since 2004. Afghanistan received 6.4% of its humanitarian assistance from DAC donors via the military over the decade. Since 2009, however, the volume of Afghanistan’s humanitarian assistance channelled via the military has been in decline and other countries, including Haiti, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have received higher volumes in certain single years.

FIGURE 5.10
Humanitarian assistance from donor defence agencies, 2004–2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data.
Notes: Total OECD DAC bilateral humanitarian assistance refers to the sum of humanitarian-related ODA disbursements reported by all DAC members. Humanitarian assistance from donor defence agencies refers to those humanitarian-related ODA disbursements reported by defence agencies or ministries of DAC member governments. Bubble size represents volume of disbursements.
However, these figures may not represent the full picture – only projects that are well described in reporting to the DAC are captured. This may explain why funding via the military to the Philippines appeared to decline from US$0.8 million in 2011 to US$0.7 million in 2013 rather than increase the year of Typhoon Haiyan.

International humanitarian assistance channelled via the military may come from different donor ministries or departments. International humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC members that came specifically from donors’ defence agencies, rather than their development or foreign affairs agencies, has represented a small proportion of total humanitarian assistance from DAC donors – an average of 2.5%. This proportion has declined from 6.5% in 2004 to 0.5% in 2013, momentarily spiking in 2010 in response to the Haiti earthquake.

While the US has long been the largest DAC reporter of humanitarian spending via its military (accounting for 77% in the past decade), in 2013 humanitarian assistance specifically from the US Department of Defence fell by 76%. The cause of this fall is unknown, as the US does not specify recipient countries in its reporting. In the same year, the Canadian Armed Forces’ response to Typhoon Haiyan drove a 50-fold increase among other DAC members, with Canada accounting for 99% of all donor defence agency spending from DAC members outside the US that year.

The proportion of international humanitarian assistance channelled through the military by DAC donors reached a low of 0.4% in 2013, the lowest since 2004.

**DATA POVERTY: MILITARY CHANNELS**

This data represents funding only from DAC donors as similar data is not available for other countries. Data on DAC donor defence agency spending is limited to the 11 of the 29 DAC donor countries whose defence agencies report to the DAC. Reporting of humanitarian assistance from donor defence agencies and that channelled through the military has tended to be poor over the last decade, with data relating to 21% of assistance channelled via military organisations failing to specify the recipient country. However, reporting does appear to have improved in the last year – while in 2012 67% was unspecified, in 2013 this fell to 1.0% – primarily because the US tended not to specify its recipients but has substantially decreased the sums that it reports.
Humanitarian assistance is spent on a range of services and activities, the mix of which is determined by the nature of different crises. The continuing rise in displacement including from Syria, South Sudan and Iraq in 2014 has influenced the global mix of what funding is requested for and spent on. For the second year running, ‘multi-sector’ assistance for refugees has dominated appeal requirements and funding.

Beyond broad sectors, it remains hard to know exactly how much is spent on specific activities. In some cases funding is deliberately unearmarked or simply goes unspecified in reporting. In other cases activities or approaches are mainstreamed into wider programmes, making visibility difficult. This is true in three very different areas – gender equality, disaster prevention and preparedness (DPP), and cash programming – where there is widespread recognition of the need for investments but a lack of reliable data on how much is actually spent, by whom and where.

Many humanitarian agencies and donors have committed to promoting gender equality in all their programmes, and the extent to which they do this should be marked when they report their funding. A ‘gender marker’, introduced five years ago to track that the proportion of funding with an explicit gender focus fell to less than a fifth in 2014. However, despite improvements in reporting, nearly two-thirds of funding did not use the marker at all.

In the year of the Sendai Framework (see page 88), the importance of increasing spending on DPP is internationally agreed. And humanitarian spending on DPP from donors within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) alone does appear to have increased for the third year running, reaching US$649 million in 2013, but does not necessarily target the most environmentally vulnerable countries. While DPP represents 5% of total humanitarian assistance from DAC donors, more goes untracked within wider humanitarian and development contributions. So, as governments prioritised increasing investments at Sendai, the true baseline is unknown.

Cash programming can transform the model of humanitarian response, allowing recipients rather than donors to decide what their humanitarian assistance is spent on. It has clearly grown in scale – most recently due to programmes in the Syria refugee response. Again, as funding for cash programming is often not visible in financial reporting, a recently launched ‘Cash Atlas’ has the potential to improve tracking of how much is being spent in this way.
FIGURE 6.1
OECD DAC donors’ bilateral humanitarian assistance by expenditure type, 2009–2013
Units: US$ billions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Disaster prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>and preparedness</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<td>5%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Emergency food aid</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Material relief</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>assistance and services</td>
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<td>58%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>68%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relief and rehabilitation</td>
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<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<td>Relief coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>protection and</td>
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<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<td>6%</td>
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<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data.
Note: Bubbles scaled by volume.
Categories of expenditure – OECD DAC donors

The OECD DAC groups humanitarian assistance into five categories for the purposes of financial reporting. These are different from the 12 standard sectors that funding is recorded against in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) [see page 83]. Not only are the groups different, but so too is the scope of what counts as humanitarian assistance within them – meaning that the categories are not comparable. As well as a wider modernisation of the DAC definition of ODA in the context of the post-2015 processes, these humanitarian categories may also be under review.

For each of the past five years, the majority of humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC countries has been spent on material relief assistance, which encompasses a very broad range of crisis response activities including water and sanitation, shelter and health. In 2013 this saw the steepest increase in the period, a 41% rise which took it from US$6 billion in 2012 to US$8.5 billion in 2013 and was largely driven by increases to Syria and the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). Material relief assistance in 2013 represented over two-thirds of official humanitarian assistance from DAC donors, compared to just over half in 2009.

Emergency food aid is the second-largest category of OECD DAC expenditure, but the US$2.2 billion spent on this in 2013 was only just over a quarter of the sum spent on material relief assistance. Expenditure on food aid has been declining every year since the 2008 food crisis. This is largely due to a reduction in funding reported as food aid from the largest food aid donor, the US. During the five-year period, the US accounted for nearly half of the total, but the amount it reports as food aid to the DAC has declined year on year, from US$2.1 billion in 2009 to US$600 million in 2013. This is largely because it does not include cash and voucher assistance [see page 90] under this food aid heading; allowing for this and other reporting anomalies, US food assistance has in fact remained more stable. Total food-sector funding reported to the FTS has also largely been declining since 2009, but rose again in 2014.

As expenditure on pre-disaster prevention and preparedness increased for the third year running, expenditure on post-crisis reconstruction fell for the fourth year. However, the volumes and proportions of spending on each remain small. Expenditure reported to DPP rose to US$649 million (5% of the total) in 2013, from US$414 million in 2009 – a 57% rise. Increased global attention on DPP and disaster risk reduction (DRR) has both driven more investments and generated incentives to improve reporting of expenditure, and it is unclear which of these accounts for the apparent rise in the totals.

Material relief and assistance in 2013 represented over two-thirds of official humanitarian assistance from DAC donors, compared to just over half in 2009.
Funding by sector in UN-coordinated appeals

Requirements in UN-coordinated appeals are broken down by the needs identified by the clusters – coordinated groups of agencies working on specific areas of response. As cluster names can vary across appeals, requirements and funding are reported against 12 standardised sectors to allow for comparison over time and between appeals.

In 2014 the rise in displacement, particularly from Syria, South Sudan and Iraq, prompted an increase in ‘multi-sector’ requirements – which predominantly covers assistance to refugees – from US$4.1 billion in 2013 to US$5.5 billion. For the second year running, this sector was larger than food aid, which dominated requirements over the last decade and which also rose from US$3.0 billion in 2013 to US$4.4 billion in 2014.

Food aid and multi-sector, the largest categories in terms of requirements, also had two of the highest proportions of those requirements met in 2014 – 66% and 57% respectively. Only coordination and support services had more of its requirements met, at 75%.

Over the last decade certain sectors have been consistently well funded, with others consistently underfunded. Higher levels of funding to food aid, coordination and support, and multi-sector meant that they had the highest averages of requirements met over the ten years – 82%, 73% and 63% respectively. The food sector has accounted for over 40% of the funding provided to UN-coordinated appeals over the last decade – at US$26 billion.

At the other end of the scale, seven of the twelve clusters had an average of less than 50% of requirements met over the decade. Safety and security, economic recovery and infrastructure, and protection had the lowest averages at 34%, 39% and 40% respectively. These are all relatively small sectors – among the five smallest in terms of the total they required over the period.

As the total amount requested by UN-coordinated appeals rose to record levels in 2014 (see Chapter 2), and the Ebola response placed additional demands on donors, all but two of the sectors [protection and agriculture] saw drops in the proportion of requirements met from the previous year. The rise in total appeal requirements was driven by higher requests in nine of the twelve sectors – only agriculture, safety and security and mine action did not increase their requirements.

In 2014 significant drops in the proportion of requirements met were seen in several sectors: in mine action after a 2013 peak due to funding to Afghanistan and South Sudan; in shelter and non-food items which reached a record low; and in food aid whose second largest requirement to date saw the lowest levels of funding to date (66%) in 2014. However, the proportion of requirements met in protection rose from 30% in 2013 to 47% in 2014, driven by funding to appeals for the conflicts in Iraq, South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR).

DATA POVERTY: SECTOR NOT SPECIFIED

In 2014, the amount of funding reported to the appeals that did not specify a sector almost trebled from US$457 million in 2013 to US$1.3 billion in 2014. As this accounted for more than 10% of the total reported to the appeals in 2014, it may distort the overall picture. A number of factors may explain this – including a lack of detailed reporting from certain donors, un-earmarked contributions and contributions for multi-purpose cash programming. The expansion of the alternative costings approach (see Chapter 2) is also likely to have had an effect. This approach means that financial requirements of specific individual projects are not visible in the response plans of each cluster. While funding should ultimately still be tracked by cluster (or standard sector at the global level) this is much more complex than in project-based appeals, involves a time-lag and potentially results in gaps in reporting.

In 2014, the amount of funding reported to the appeals that did not specify a sector almost trebled.

Only one other sector had more than half of its requirements met – health (51% funded). Water and sanitation, protection, agriculture and mine action were all over 40% funded. The most underfunded sector was safety and security with coverage of 14%, followed by shelter and non-food items (26%) despite this category having the fourth-largest requirement across appeals, of US$1.8 billion.
FIGURE 6.2
Requirements and funding levels in UN appeals by sector, 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.
Notes: Financial data is in current prices. ‘Multi-sector’ is predominantly used for multi-sector assistance to refugees. In the FTS, contributions are tagged with both ‘standard sectors’ and clusters. Cluster names vary across different appeals, whereas sectors are standardised into 12 categories and allow for comparative analysis across countries, years and appeals. Protection/human rights/rule of law has been abbreviated to ‘protection’; safety and security of staff and operations has been abbreviated to ‘safety and security’. The Ebola Virus Outbreak appeal document was not organised around sectors so these funds have not been included in the analysis.
FIGURE 6.3

Trends in levels of funding to sectors in UN-coordinated appeals, 2005–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.

Notes: ‘Multi-sector’ is predominantly used for multi-sector assistance to refugees. In the UN OCHA FTS, contributions are tagged with both ‘standard sectors’ and clusters. Cluster names vary across different appeals, whereas sectors are standardised into 12 categories and allow for comparative analysis across countries, years and appeals. Protection/human rights/rule of law has been abbreviated to ‘protection’; safety and security of staff and operations has been abbreviated to ‘safety and security’. The Ebola Virus Outbreak appeal document was not organised around sectors so these funds have not been included in the analysis.
In focus: Sexual and gender-based violence

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) occurs in all types of crisis settings – conflict and disasters caused by natural hazards. Programming to address SGBV primarily falls under the protection sector, which has tended to receive low levels of funding (see Figure 6.3).

Growing political attention on SGBV has translated into strengthened international policy commitments over recent years. In November 2013, 13 donors were among those who signed a UK Department for International Development (DFID)-instigated ‘Communiqué on Protecting Girls and Women in Emergencies’ with commitments to prevent violence against women and girls in humanitarian emergencies. The following June the Global Summit on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict focused on transforming political commitments into practical action. One of its recommendations was for strengthened funding for responding to SGBV that is both multi-year and locally accessible in order to appropriately address the long-term changes required.

Funding commitments were announced by many donors following both the communiqué and the summit, and levels of reported funding to SGBV though still low are rising. Some US$107 million was spent on projects identifiable as addressing SGBV in 2014, an increase of 16% from 2013 and 121% from 2012. The US$15 million rise in funding in 2014 is equivalent to the total additional funding pledged at the June 2014 summit, although this is not accounted for by the exact same donors in each case.

South Sudan was the largest recipient of humanitarian assistance for SGBV-related projects, receiving US$21.2 million in 2014, almost three times as much as the next-largest recipient, Iraq (US$7.2 million). Yemen received US$4.7 million and the Democratic Republic of Congo, often the focus of global SGBV attention, US$5.4 million.

Actual levels of funding to address SGBV may be higher than these reported figures, partly because SGBV activities may be mainstreamed within other programmes. Activities may also be funded through other development assistance. The Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) gender marker should allow gender-related programming to be identified. However, on average, 49% of SGBV funding was not coded with an IASC gender marker in 2014, the highest since the inception of the gender marker in 2011.

Some US$107 million was spent on SGBV in 2014, an increase of 16% from 2013.
Funding to gender-related programmes

Women and men, girls and boys have different needs in crises as well as different contributions to make and capacities to respond. Recognising the importance of this, humanitarian agencies both mainstream a gender approach and implement targeted programmes, with the overall goal of gender equality.2

Knowing exactly how much humanitarian assistance is directed to gender-related activities has been difficult as so much is mainstreamed within other programmes. So, in 2010 following a call from the UN Secretary General, the IASC rolled out a gender marker that allows donors and agencies to code projects according to the degree to which they consider and respond to the needs of women and men equally, and the extent to which they lead to gender-related outcomes.

However, reporting against this gender marker is currently poor, and declining. As Figure 6.5 shows, nearly two-thirds of funding reported to the UN OCHA FTS is for projects that are ‘uncoded’ (i.e. not coded using the IASC gender marker) – increasing significantly from 57% in 2012 to 65% in 2014 although this may be partly due to the general rise in unspecified funding.

At the same time the proportion of projects coded as ‘unspecified’ – meaning that they are marked as having a gender dimension but the nature of this is not detailed – has increased from 4% in 2013 to 9% in 2014. As these uncoded and unspecified projects rose, the proportion of projects coded as making a ‘significant’ or ‘principal’ contribution to gender equality fell – from 24% in 2012 to just under 20% in 2014. This means that less than a fifth of all projects reported to the FTS in 2014 were reported as having an explicit focus on gender.

Donors are obliged to report their funding to the UN-coordinated appeals against the IASC gender maker. A commitment to use the IASC marker when reporting on all their humanitarian spending – for UN appeals and more widely – would help to fill this gap in information on funding to gender.

Some donors also have their own ways of tracking gender in their spending and programming. In 2013 the European Commission’s Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) introduced a new ‘Gender-Age Marker’ (2013). This uses a similar coding system to the IASC marker, allowing for consistent reporting across systems. It is also applied throughout the programme cycle, allowing tracking of funding to gender in practice beyond just the project proposal stage.

Nearly two-thirds of funding reported to the UN OCHA FTS is for projects which are not coded using the IASC gender marker.
FIGURE 6.5
International humanitarian assistance marked as gender-related, 2011-2014

These codes are based on the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) gender marker:

- Gender issues not considered [0]
- Principally contributes to advancing gender equality [2b]
- Gender related [GHA coding]
- Contributing in some way to gender enhancement [1]
- Not specified or applicable [3] + [4]
- Uncoded [not gender related]

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.
Notes: Gender related [GHA coding] refers to activities without an IASC gender marker but that do in some way contribute to gender equality or specifically target girls or women according to a keyword search (see Data & Guides).
Disaster prevention and preparedness

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction consolidated consensus on the importance of investments to prevent and prepare for disasters caused by natural hazards. While the agreement in March 2015 was not accompanied by commitments to a global financing plan (only Japan committed funds at the conference), one of the four priority actions of the framework was ‘increased investments in disaster risk reduction’.

It is clear that these investments do not, and cannot, come exclusively from international humanitarian assistance. As Chapters 7 and 8 explore, supporting disaster prevention and management systems and addressing the long-term factors that make people vulnerable to risk demands a range of national and international financing approaches: from domestic resources (see Chapter 3); from international development assistance and climate adaptation funds (see Chapter 8); and from innovative risk financing mechanisms (see Chapter 7).

National infrastructures, policies and financial capacity for disaster prevention and management vary enormously between affected states. An increasing number of countries that are environmentally vulnerable, according to the Index for Risk Management (INFORM), also have a national disaster management authority (NDMA). Roughly half [18] of these environmentally vulnerable countries [38] have NDMA and there are active regional NDMA in South East Asia, the Caribbean and Central America. These include those in the Philippines and Pakistan that have taken a key role in coordinating recent humanitarian responses, and provide the opportunity for international assistance to align with and support national plans.

There is no comprehensive global data on international assistance for disaster prevention, preparedness or risk reduction (see box). However, the data on reported investments from OECD DAC donors on DPP (a category of humanitarian assistance - see Figure 6.1) shows that, among the most environmentally vulnerable countries, the majority of DPP ODA (82%) goes to countries that have NDMA.

Turkey was the largest recipient, having received an average US$95 million each year between 2011 and 2013, followed by Bangladesh, Viet Nam and the Philippines, which each received between US$39 million and US$58 million in the same period. Environmentally vulnerable countries with NDMA and higher levels of domestic capacity (proxied by government spending per person) receive lower volumes of DPP ODA. Venezuela and Bosnia and Herzegovina received US$0.4 million and US$81,000 per year on average respectively between 2011 and 2013.

However, this DPP expenditure does not necessarily target the most environmentally vulnerable countries. Four of the five largest recipients of DPP ODA between 2011 and 2013 are not environmentally vulnerable, and in aggregate more than 60% of DPP ODA goes to countries which are not. Significantly more may go to environmentally vulnerable countries both from countries outside the DAC group and from DAC donors through other forms of assistance.

Data Poverty: Disaster Risk Reduction

There is no comprehensive global data on how much is spent either within or outside humanitarian assistance on DRR or DPP either by international donors or by national governments. While some international donors and national governments do report this, data is not comparable between countries, or available for most.

Investments from international actors in DPP or DRR are often a component part of wider assistance and support programmes, or mainstreamed within them, making expenditure hard to track. Attempts to derive an estimate by looking at project descriptions against funding reported to the FTS or OECD DAC’s CRS will count only those that have a clear project description with a visible DRR or DPP component. And although DPP is a category for DAC reporting, it is not a specific sector in FTS.

As noted in the GHA Report 2014, a marker for ‘disaster risk management’ had been considered by the OECD as a means of identifying less visible investments, but this has not yet materialised.
FIGURE 6.6

Environmental vulnerability, DPP ODA, government expenditure per person and presence of national disaster management authorities (NDMA)

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, INFORM, International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, World Bank and ReliefWeb data.

Notes: Environmentally vulnerable countries are defined using the INFORM index (see Data & Guides). 33 environmentally vulnerable countries are included in the figure (5 are excluded due to lack of data on government spending per person).
Giving people money instead of goods has long been part of humanitarian assistance. However, it is an approach which has grown in profile and scale in recent years. The responses to the 2010 Pakistan floods and the 2011 drought and famine in Somalia both included significant cash elements, and providing vouchers to Syrian refugees has brought cash programming to a new level (see Figure 6.7).

There is a range of cash programming modalities, including directly transferring money or vouchers to heads of households, and schemes that provide payment for work. Cash programming often sits alongside other forms of programming where in-kind goods or services are also provided.

Cash programming may not be appropriate everywhere but, where markets are functioning, it allows people choice in how to best meet their needs. It can also stimulate the local economy and improve speed and efficiency of response. In some contexts it also has the potential to link humanitarian response with longer-term social protection and poverty alleviation. In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, WFP provided cash via the Philippine government’s social safety net scheme; during the food crisis in 2011, the Ethiopian government increased the reach of its Productive Safety Net Scheme. Recognising these benefits, a High-Level Panel on Cash was convened in 2015 to explore its potential to further transform humanitarian response.
WFP’S FOOD VOUCHER PROGRAMME FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES

The World Food Programme (WFP) provided nearly all of its food assistance to Syrian refugees (98%) through food vouchers in 2014. This is WFP’s largest programme of its kind, with over US$1 billion spent so far, reaching 1.9 million Syrian refugees in both camp and non-camp settings in all five of the countries included in the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP).

Instead of a fixed basket of food rations, people are given paper or electronic vouchers to spend in participating shops. The programme has evolved over the past four years and the limited amount of assistance initially delivered through food rations has increasingly transitioned to paper vouchers. These in turn have been gradually replaced by electronic cards, which are akin to pre-paid credit cards, loaded with a specified amount of credit.

While a number of different agencies have been providing cash and voucher assistance on different cards, WFP has been working with the private credit-card company MasterCard, to develop one that allows multiple agencies to use a single common electronic card. In Jordan, UNICEF’s winter cash programme launched in January 2015 uses pre-existing WFP electronic cards, and in Lebanon this approach is being piloted with a cash consortium of six NGOs.

FIGURE 6.7

WFP’s food voucher assistance to Syrian refugees by host country, 2012–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on WFP project reports.
Notes: The amounts represent the actual value of the voucher transfer to beneficiaries. Data for 2012 is from July when the WFP voucher project began. Financial data for all years is in current prices. Beneficiary numbers may include those receiving cash as well as vouchers.
Cash programming: data poverty and data innovations

Drawing on examples such as the responses to the Syria refugee crisis and Typhoon Haiyan, it appears that cash programming is on the rise. However, there is no precise data available on its financial value, the proportion of overall international humanitarian assistance that it represents, or a global picture of the main donors and recipients. This is because it is often integrated into larger contributions or programmes and the funding is not distinctly labelled as a cash-based response.

In the absence of a specific identifier for humanitarian cash transfer programmes, GHA searched project titles and descriptions on UN OCHA’s FTS for words associated with cash transfer spending such as ‘voucher’, ‘cash’ and ‘coupons’. Entries are categorised as either ‘full’, being entirely composed of cash transfers, or ‘partial’, indicating that a programme includes some element of cash transfer (see Data & Guides).

According to these calculations, an estimated US$113 million was spent on ‘full’ humanitarian cash transfer programmes in 2014 and another US$96 million on ‘partial’ programmes (see Figure 6.8). However, it is clear that this is a very limited picture and total expenditure is far higher in reality – many programmes are either not reported to the FTS or project descriptions do not reveal the cash element. For example, WFP’s food voucher programme for Syrian refugees does not show up in the FTS data for 2014, but in that year alone disbursed US$608 million – three times the total funding on cash transfers tracked using the FTS.

The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) – Cash Atlas

CaLP is a multi-agency initiative set up to promote and improve cash programming. In 2013, in response to the data gap, it launched the Cash Atlas – an online global mapping tool that tracks funding to humanitarian cash programmes. In 2014, it recorded over 200 cash transfer projects with a total budget of US$3.6 billion. This is more than 17 times the amount gleaned from FTS reporting (Figure 6.8). With fields on delivery modalities, beneficiary numbers and sub-national information sitting alongside budget data, users are able to gain a good understanding of the projects reported to the Cash Atlas.

However, while the atlas has the potential to be a key tool for greater transparency on humanitarian cash spending, in its first year of operation it does not yet provide a comprehensive picture. The atlas focuses on budget rather than expenditure data and not all projects are distinguishable by donor. Some major cash initiatives, including the cash-for-work interventions in the oPt, and the WFP’s food voucher programme for Syrian refugees, are not tracked in the atlas.
Humanitarian action may be characterised as short-term emergency response but this is rarely the case. Sudden-onset disasters and protracted crises often overlap in the same contexts, as do people’s acute and chronic needs and their ongoing vulnerabilities. While rapid response to the acute phase of an emergency has been described as the ‘mission critical,’ in practice humanitarian action has a broad scope including ‘during and in the aftermath of emergencies’ as well as ‘preparedness and prevention’.1

The 2011 Horn of Africa famine prompted renewed focus and commitments on early action to respond to warning signs as part of a broader effort to build resilience. By definition, crisis response is already too late and early warning and early action demand the investment of resources beyond humanitarian. This includes investment in development activities, social safety-net schemes and insurance mechanisms to respond to triggers, such as the African Risk Capacity. However, in the event of rapid onset or rapid escalation of a crisis, swift allocation and disbursements of humanitarian funds are critical and there are several rapid response funds designed to expedite this.

While required to facilitate a rapid response, the bulk of humanitarian assistance goes to the same countries year after year. Two-thirds of all international humanitarian assistance from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors alone went to such long-term recipient countries in 2013. Of the 20 largest recipients of humanitarian assistance that year, 19 were long- or medium-term DAC recipients, raising questions about both the models of humanitarian financing and the targeting of other resources, notably development assistance.

The UN-coordinated appeals are adapting to this reality. Just two years after the introduction of the first multi-year appeal in 2013, there were 13 such appeals by March 2015. These now account for 39% of all requirements within the UN appeals. The Sahel crisis appeals and the Syria Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) have dominated these requirements, impelled by the need to address the very different challenges of chronic food insecurities and protracted displacement. Announced as a ‘paradigm shift’ from previous UN-coordinated appeals, the Syria 3RP explicitly builds on the national response plans of the refugee-hosting countries and seeks to bring together national and international, development and humanitarian, capacities and resources.
Early action

Responding to the first signs of a crisis not only saves lives and prevents escalation, it can also be cost-effective. The fatal consequences of the late response to the Horn of Africa famine and food crisis in 2011 prompted widespread consensus on the critical importance of early action. Early warning and risk monitoring tools are increasingly able to predict, identify and communicate impending or emerging crises. In the face of multiple crises which are both large-scale and severe, however, it can be challenging to mobilise funding at scale for those which are not yet either.

Part of a broader resilience approach, early warning and early action demand the investment of resources beyond humanitarian, including in development activities, social protection and safety-net schemes, and insurance mechanisms. Arguably, humanitarian response will by definition be too late, needed only when these other mechanisms are absent or insufficient to match the type or scale of events. So, early action requires a dual approach: scaling up of long-term financing for risk and vulnerability (see Chapter 8); and contingency mechanisms for deploying rapid humanitarian assistance where and when it is necessary.

Both kinds of response require a clear set of triggers for early action. The 2014 Intergovernmental Authority on Development Second Summit on Drought Resilience repeated previous calls for a common system among donors for agreeing and responding to early warning triggers. While such a global system has not been developed, there are individual initiatives that do respond to some form of trigger, including crisis modifiers, contingency funds and risk-financing mechanisms.

While much early warning innovation has focused on weather-related events, which can be linked to meteorological triggers, early warning and action for conflict remains more difficult, for both technical and political reasons. The Ebola crisis response also failed to act at scale to early warning signs (see Chapter 3). Although Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) sounded the alert in March 2014, the World Health Organization announced the emergency only in August, slowed down by technical, political and institutional factors.
Rapid response

Rapid response to acute emergencies has been described as the ‘mission critical’ core of humanitarian action. Timely funding is essential in the sudden onset or escalation of a crisis, and a number of fast-track mechanisms have been created to expedite normal decision-making and disbursement processes. In the past two years, the capacity for rapid response has been tested in very different ways and contexts – including in response to the conflict in Iraq, to Typhoon Haiyan and to Ebola.

At a global level, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (see Chapter 5) includes a rapid response window that can allocate funding of up to US$30 million to an emergency. This aims to enable time-critical response to a sudden onset emergency or to rapid deterioration of a crisis, and activities funded by this window must be completed within six months. In 2014 it made 360 grants, allocating nearly US$291 million through this window (63% of its total allocations that year in line with an average of 65% in the last five years).

The Start Fund11 (see also Chapter 9), funded by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and Irish Aid, has a much smaller capacity (up to GBP£30 million (US$49 million) over three years) but funds NGOs directly and specifies that funding should be disbursed within 72 hours and spent within 45 days. At country level, RAPID, the NGO-led fund in Pakistan, funded by USAID, takes an average of nine to ten days to disburse to local, national and international NGOs.12

Many government donors also have their own rapid response mechanisms (RRMs). These include fast-tracking through pre-positioned funding with Red Cross and Red Crescent societies or NGOs, and pre-negotiated drawdown agreements with accredited partners that can be quickly activated. These were used in response to Typhoon Haiyan and included £5 million from DFID disbursed through pre-selected NGOs.13

These UN, NGO and government donor mechanisms are important both to enable specific agencies to respond quickly and sometimes to prompt other donors to respond. However, their net effect is not at sufficient scale to enable a rapid response to all identified needs and entirely counterbalance slower or sporadic funding. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show that in the case of Ukraine, a rise in funding was prompted by the launch of the flash appeal, but was not sustained at these levels. In the case of Iraq, funding flows remained low despite the escalating situation until Saudi Arabia contributed US$500 million in July 2014 (see Chapter 3).

Sweden’s rapid response mechanism

Sweden’s development cooperation agency Sida is one of a number of donors that has an RRM. The Sida RRM pre-positions funding with Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and with NGOs. RRM partners are pre-selected according to a defined set of quality and capacity criteria, and then allocated funding annually, which they can draw down as required for rapid response. In 2014, the Sida RRM allocated a total of US$35.5 million to 11 pre-selected partners.

Data poverty: real-time reporting

Fast-moving humanitarian crises require rapid decision-making and disbursement. Reporting of pledges, commitments and disbursements therefore needs to be available and monitored in real time in order to understand and respond to the changing picture of funding flows and gaps (see Chapter 9). The UN OCHA FTS provides the most up-to-date data, but can only ever be as fast as the speed at which information is reported by donors or agencies – which can often create a time-lag.
FIGURE 7.1
Timing of international humanitarian funding response to Ukraine, February to December 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and IDMC data, UN OCHA, UNHCR, humanitarianresponse.info platform and media reports.
Note: Funding data in current prices. IDP, internally displaced persons. SRP, strategic response plan.
FIGURE 7.2
Timing of international humanitarian funding response to Iraq, January to December 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and IOM data, and UN OCHA and media reports.
Notes: Funding data is in current prices. Reduced levels of funding against appeal needs in November and December are due to the appeal being revised upwards at the end of October 2014.
Long- and medium-term humanitarian response

Humanitarian assistance may be required to respond quickly but it is rarely a short-term intervention. The majority goes to the same countries year after year, due to recurrent or chronic crises, often continuing to provide basic goods and services where other international or national investments are absent.

In 2013, two-thirds (66%) of official humanitarian assistance from DAC donors went to long-term recipients, that is those that had been in receipt of an above-average share of their ODA in the form of humanitarian assistance for eight years or more. A further 23% went to medium-term recipients – those meeting the same criteria for between three and seven years.

Long-term recipients are also often the largest recipients – of the 30 long-term and 28 medium-term recipient countries, 19 were among the 20 largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2013.

The three largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2013 – Syria, oPt, and Sudan – are all long-term recipients.

A country may be a long-term recipient for a number of reasons, including chronic or recurrent conflict and insecurity, protracted displacement, recurrent disasters caused by natural hazards, or a complex mix of all of these. For example, Pakistan is a long-term recipient due to a protracted refugee situation and recurrent flooding over the past ten years, while Kenya is also in this group as it has hosted a protracted refugee population, suffered recurrent droughts and experienced several incidences of internal conflict.

Many medium- and long-term recipients of humanitarian assistance are countries with high poverty rates and low levels of domestic public resources (see also Chapter 8).

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN CERF data.
Notes: Long-, medium- or short-term classification is determined by the length of time the country has received an above-average share of its ODA in the form of humanitarian assistance. Calculations are based on shares of country-allocable humanitarian assistance.
Of the 19 medium- and long-term recipients that featured among the 20 largest humanitarian recipients in 2013, 8 had over a third of their population living in extreme poverty. In Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) this was as high as 84%. Average government expenditure per person to these 19 countries stood at PPP$997 in 2013, significantly lower than the average government expenditure per person to all other developing countries of PPP$2,444 in the same year. However, as Chapters 1 and 8 note, in many of these contexts, national (let alone sub-national) poverty and expenditure data is missing or pre-dates crises – Syria and Somalia being prime examples.

The fact that so much humanitarian assistance goes to long- and medium-term recipients presents a challenge to both humanitarian and development financing. Many donors do offer flexible multi-year funding arrangements to allow agencies to plan and resource long- and medium-term programming and avoid damaging effects of unpredictable single-year funding, and this should be the norm in long-term recipient countries.

Overall, non-humanitarian ODA does exceed humanitarian assistance (see Figure 7.4) to these countries, with the exception of Sudan, Syria, and the Philippines. However, in some countries where non-humanitarian ODA sums are greater at the national level, at the sub-national level humanitarian assistance may be providing basic services or be a substitute for social protection in the absence of other national or international resources. As Chapter 8 shows, greater investments – including of development assistance – are required to provide more suitable and sustainable solutions.

A recent World Bank and Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) initiative on ‘making the links work’ between relief and development recommended finding convergences between multi-year humanitarian funding and development assistance, as well as using the establishment of social safety-net programmes as part of “an incremental exit strategy for humanitarian assistance” and to prevent recurrent humanitarian crises.

In 2013, two-thirds (66%) of official humanitarian assistance from DAC donors went to long-term recipients, and a further 23% went to medium-term recipients.
FIGURE 7.4

Official humanitarian assistance to 20 largest recipients as percentage of net ODA, 2013
For long-, medium- and short-term recipients

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF and IMF WEO data.
Notes: Humanitarian assistance refers to official humanitarian assistance from DAC countries and the EU; ODA is from DAC countries and multi-laterals. Countries are ordered from top to bottom by amount of international humanitarian assistance received in 2013. ODA is net and excludes debt relief; humanitarian assistance to the Philippines was larger than net ODA due to high levels of ODA repayments in 2013.
Multi-year appeals and multi-year funding

UN-coordinated appeals had, until 2013, always been for one year or less, driving short-term contributions to their projects even when appeals for the same crises were launched year on year. The first multi-year appeal, for three years for Somalia, was launched in December 2012, reflecting a longer-term resilience approach after lessons learned from the 2011 famine. In 2014, 14 more appeals followed suit.

By March 2015, there were 13 current multi-year appeals. Ten of these relate to the Sahel: the Sahel regional response plans and the nine specific country appeals within the region (for Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal). The multi-year appeal for Somalia is also still active, and is joined by a new multi-year appeal for Yemen and the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP – see page 102). Iraq and South Sudan have reverted to single-year appeals – situations in both countries rapidly deteriorated in 2014 and necessitated frequent appeal revisions and a focus on immediate acute needs, to the extent that multi-year planning became difficult. All of the 2015 multi-year appeals have a strong focus on resilience.

The needs covered by these multi-year appeals represent a significant proportion of total needs in all UN-coordinated humanitarian appeals. In 2014, 45.8 million people – nearly 52% of the total number of people targeted for assistance – were covered under multi-year appeals. In financial terms, these appeals requested 33% (US$6.5 billion) of the total 2014 requirements in the appeals. By March 2015, this had risen to US$8.1 billion (39% of the total), a figure dominated by the requirements of the Syria 3RP (see Figure 7.6) and which may rise as the appeals continue to be revised upwards. All of the multi-year appeals present their requirements on an annual basis but revise them as necessary in the course of the year.

Current reporting systems record only donor contributions disbursed within a single year, and do not indicate whether these were made as part of overarching multi-year agreements. Therefore it is hard to know if there has been an increase in donors’ tendency to provide multi-year funding agreements, in step with the increase in multi-year appeals. As analysis in the GHA Report 2014 showed, a number of donors were providing multi-year funding to Somalia, and several also do so for the Sahel, although the Sahel Regional SRP noted that “more predictable, multi-year funding remains an elusive goal, the case for which is all the more compelling for a 3 year Sahel humanitarian strategy with a strong resilience theme.”

FIGURE 7.5

Number of multi-year UN-coordinated appeals, their revised requirements, and number of people targeted to receive humanitarian assistance, 2013–2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data and UN-coordinated appeals.
Notes: 2015 figures are subject to change and correspond to May 2015. Does not include 2015 SRP for Djibouti, which was expected to issue as a multi-year SRP at the time of writing. Change from consolidated appeals process (CAP) to strategic response plan (SRP) reflects the change in system for UN-coordinated appeals from 2013–2014.
In focus: Syria – resilience and protracted refugee crises

The scale of the displacement from Syria and the apparent intractability of the conflict have renewed international attention to the need for durable political and economic solutions for refugees. Resilience initiatives had hitherto largely focused on the droughts and famines of the Horn of Africa and Sahel. In 2014 however, resilience became a framing concept for the Syria refugee response with the launch of the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). This called for a “new aid architecture” to respond to the needs of displaced people and their host communities, and to address the “massive structural impact of the crisis” on countries in the region. The 3RP explicitly builds on national response plans and seeks to bring together national and international, development and humanitarian, capacities and resources. It also calls on international donors to provide both humanitarian and development funding, stating that “This crisis demands that we break down financing silos.”

The 3RP covers the five Syrian refugee-hosting countries in the region – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – and sets out requirements of US$5.5 billion for 2015, US$4.5 billion of which is for agency requirements. Unlike the Somalia and Sahel response plans, where resilience activities are integrated into sectoral needs, the 3RP has two components, for each of refugees and for resilience.

The 3RP covers the five Syrian refugee-hosting countries in the region – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – and sets out requirements of US$5.5 billion for 2015, US$4.5 billion of which is for agency requirements. Unlike the Somalia and Sahel response plans, where resilience activities are integrated into sectoral needs, the 3RP has two components, for each of refugees and for resilience.20

The refugee component aims to address the protection and assistance needs of refugees inside and outside camps, and the most vulnerable members of affected communities. This represents 72% of the total funding requirements.

The resilience component aims to address the resilience and stabilisation needs of affected communities; build national and sub-national service delivery capacity; and strengthen the ability of governments to lead the response. This represents 28% of the total funding requirements.

Of the five countries, Lebanon accounts for the largest volume of requirements under the plan at almost US$2.1 billion (US$2 billion for agency requirements only), 34% of which is marked for resilience. The effect on the Lebanese economy of hosting Syrian refugees between 2012 and 2014 has been to depress government revenue collection by US$1.5 billion while simultaneously increasing government expenditure by US$1.1 billion due to the surge in demand for public services.

As explored in Chapter 3, the significant contribution from the Turkish government meant that although the country hosted the largest number of refugees, the agency requirements for international humanitarian assistance were lower. There were no Turkish government requests for the resilience or the refugee component.

As the 3RP calls for development and humanitarian funding, tracking the pledges, commitments and disbursements against it is complex. As Chapter 9 explains, a new initiative to track both humanitarian and development funding is being piloted to address this challenge.
Humanitarian agency and domestic government requests for resilience in the Syria 3RP, and refugee numbers by country

Figure 7.6

Source: Development Initiatives based on Syria 3RP.
Notes: The data in this chart equals total funding requests for the Syria 3RP. This includes government and agency requests. For Egypt, requests came from the Ministries of Health and Education. Requests for Lebanon came from the Ministries of Education, Higher Education, Energy and Water, Agriculture, Public Health and Social Affairs. There was no breakdown of ministry requests for Jordan – government agency request figures have been calculated by subtracting total requests by agency requests.
Humanitarian assistance alone cannot address the poverty, risks and vulnerability than drive crises – other resources are required. Domestic resources, though often low, are vital to progress. Development assistance from international donors, although not consistently targeted to the most crisis-prone countries, can be critical too. Afghanistan – a long-term fragile state – aid constituted 68% of recorded international inflows. The Government of Afghanistan set up the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme in 2010, supported by the United Nations Development Programme, to engage Afghans of all backgrounds in reintegration efforts. Mohammad Akbar, a former combatant from a village in one of Afghanistan’s northern provinces, turned in his weapons and now manages seven tube wells funded by the programme.
Both 2015 and 2016 are marked by a series of high-level events that will shape global strategies across the development and humanitarian spheres for years to come. It is essential that a coherent approach emerges from these various processes. Crisis, poverty and vulnerability are intimately interconnected: some 31% of people in extreme poverty live in countries that are both environmentally vulnerable and politically fragile. Nine of the twenty largest recipient countries of humanitarian assistance between 2004 and 2013 have more than a quarter of their population below the international $1.25 extreme poverty line.

Domestic public resources are the primary drivers of progress but domestic capacity is often low where vulnerability to crises is high, and problematic in conflict settings. Government expenditures in the largest recipient countries of humanitarian assistance in 2013 are just PPP$981 per person per year, compared with PPP$2,444 per person per year in other developing countries.

International resources therefore are also important, and they are growing: flows to the largest humanitarian recipients have more than tripled since 2000. But the distribution of such resources is not even and the largest recipients of humanitarian assistance receive a quite different mix of resources from other countries.

Resources that aim to address the drivers of fragility and vulnerability to natural hazards are not always well targeted. While significant amounts of official development assistance (ODA) for conflict, peace and security, for example, does go to some high-risk countries, such financing accounts for very small proportions of the total resources going to many other long-term fragile states. Similarly, the distribution of climate adaptation ODA only partly reflects the distribution of environmentally vulnerable countries and people, with conflict appearing to be a key inhibitor to such financing.

Better data can inform how such resources should come together to address crisis, risk and poverty systematically, and will be a key step towards a shared vision of sustainable, resilient development as well as sufficient and effective humanitarian response.
FIGURE 8.1

2013 resource mix to 20 largest humanitarian assistance recipient countries

Source: OECD DAC; UN OCHA FTS; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UN Central Emergency Response Fund, UN CERF; World Bank; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI; International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, IMF WEO.

Note: Data in this graph refers to 20 largest humanitarian recipients 2013. Recipient data for some resource flows is not available and therefore is excluded from the graph and throughout the chapter unless otherwise stated.

Not to scale
The current mix of resources to large recipients of humanitarian assistance

With 93% of people in extreme poverty living in either politically fragile or environmentally vulnerable countries (see Chapter 1), the challenge of addressing poverty, vulnerability and crisis is one that requires a complex and dynamic mix of approaches, tailored to the context. Some 31% of people in extreme poverty live in countries that are both environmentally vulnerable and politically fragile. Humanitarian assistance may have a vital function in meeting the acute needs of the most vulnerable. But the wider challenge is a multi-faceted one that cannot be addressed through humanitarian approaches alone.

This is not just a question of better mobilising or linking relief to development funding. The post-2015 financing agenda presents a fundamental shift from an international-aid-driven focus under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the explicit recognition of the potential of multiple sources of finance. This includes public and private, domestic and international finance, and encompasses a broad range of actors across development, commercial, security and environmental sectors. The challenge facing the suite of high-level processes set for 2015 and 2016 is to determine how such resources should come together, working to their comparative advantages towards a shared vision of sustainable, resilient development.

Understanding the mix of resources available and how this differs from one context to another is the first fundamental step towards this. As Figures 8.2 and 8.3 show, there is a clear contrast in the resource mix between the group of countries receiving large volumes of international humanitarian assistance and other developing countries, although the countries within each of these groups all have different and dynamic needs and resource profiles.

For most countries, domestic public revenues and expenditures are the largest resource. An overview of the 20 largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2013 shows that this group of countries is no exception. However, government expenditures are comparatively low, at PPP$981 per person per year, compared with PPP$2,444 per person per year in other developing countries.

The mix of international inflows also differs substantially. In 2013 remittances constituted the largest proportion of inflows for the 20 largest humanitarian assistance recipients – some 40%, more than double the 17% of other developing countries. The Philippines (US$26.7 billion), Pakistan (US$14.6 billion) and Lebanon (US$7.6 billion) were the largest remittance recipients within the group.

ODA was the second largest inflow to this group of 20 countries, accounting for 21% of inflows, five times the 4.2% in other developing countries. For some countries proportions are substantially higher, such as Afghanistan (68%), Myanmar (67%) and Ethiopia (51%). Unsurprisingly, the share of humanitarian assistance (5.7%) and peacekeeping (4.1%) ODA is also much greater than in other countries (just 0.1% each).

Conversely, debt and commercial finance characterise the profile of international flows to other developing countries. Long- and short-term debt combined accounted for 45% of inflows to other developing countries compared with 13% to the top humanitarian recipients. Of these flows, over 80% went to just four of the top humanitarian recipients – Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan and the Philippines. Similarly, foreign direct investment (FDI) as a proportion of resources going to large humanitarian recipients (14%) was just over half that of other developing countries (25%).

The Philippines (US$3.9 billion), Sudan (US$3.1 billion), Iraq (US$2.9 billion), Lebanon (US$2.8 billion) and Myanmar (US$2.6 billion) were the largest recipients within the group, accounting for 63% of the total – much of which concerns large extractive industries.
FIGURE 8.2
Resource mix to the 20 countries receiving most international humanitarian assistance, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UNCTAD, UN CERF, World Bank, IMF WEO and SIPRI data.
Note: Data in this graph refers to the largest 20 humanitarian recipients in 2013. Recipient data for some resource flows is not available and therefore is excluded from the graph and throughout the chapter unless otherwise stated.
FIGURE 8.3
Resource flows to all other developing countries, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UNCTAD, UN CERF, World Bank, IMF WEO and SIPRI data.
Vulnerability, poverty, crisis and domestic public resources

The data is clear: vulnerability, poverty and crises are inextricably linked (see Chapter 1). Crises drive people into poverty and further undermine their ability to improve their wellbeing, while poverty erodes peoples’ resilience to subsequent shocks. Nine of the twenty largest recipient countries of international humanitarian assistance between 2004 and 2013 have more than a quarter of their population below the international $1.25 extreme poverty line. Two of these twenty countries [Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Haiti] have poverty rates of over 50%. And two countries [DRC and Burundi] of the three with the highest poverty rates in the world have received humanitarian assistance year on year on a long-term basis.

International humanitarian assistance is needed only when domestic resources are insufficient. In aggregate, government spending in countries requiring international humanitarian assistance is much lower than in other developing countries. In 2013 per capita government expenditure in the twenty largest humanitarian assistance recipients over the previous decade averaged PPP$1,140 – less than half of the PPP$2,466 average in other developing countries. Seven of the fifteen countries with the lowest levels of government spending per person are long-term recipients of humanitarian assistance. All seven have per capita expenditures under PPP$350 a year – less than PPP$1 per person per day.

As shown in Figure 8.4, crisis and high poverty levels often go hand-in-hand with low domestic spending. As Chapter 7 also notes, many long-term recipients of international humanitarian assistance are countries with extremely low levels of domestic resources and high levels of poverty. For example, the Central African Republic, a long-term recipient and currently a Level 3 emergency, records the lowest government expenditure per person in 2013 (PPP$78 per person – 3% of that spent by other developing countries) together with high poverty rates (57%). Similarly long-term recipients DRC and Burundi, with two of the three highest poverty rates, have per capita government expenditures under PPP$270 a year.

Increased government revenues and expenditure does not automatically result in improved resilience for the poorest and most crisis-affected people. For that to happen, what and who it is spent on is critical. Political decisions must be made to target investments that will benefit those most vulnerable to crisis – often those who are most marginalised within countries. The relevance of domestic resources also varies widely depending on the type of crisis – government expenditure may be crucial for people in natural-hazard settings and in refugee-hosting countries, but clearly will not benefit all civilians caught up in active civil wars.

However, without increased and dedicated financial capacity, countries are unable to invest in disaster risk reduction or have the fiscal space to cope with certain shocks. Thus the UN Financing for Development process emphasises the need to mobilise domestic public resources as an overarching financing priority, while the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) squarely locates the central focus of investment in DRR for building resilience specifically with national governments.

DATA POVERTY: GOVERNMENT SPENDING

Government spending, or revenues, per person\(^1\) can be used as a proxy for understanding the potential capacity of domestic public institutions – however, it captures total spending from government as a whole and does not indicate the volumes directed to crisis prevention and response or differentiate between the varying degrees of priority that different countries place on these. As Chapter 3 notes, although some governments are becoming more open and transparent in their finances,\(^2\) detailed, comparable and current information on domestic humanitarian financial flows, for example from contingency or disaster funds, is difficult to access. In the case of Figure 8.4, 15 countries are excluded from the analysis due to the lack of current data even on overall government expenditure. Six of these – Cuba, Myanmar, Somalia, Syria, occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and Korea DPR – are long-term recipients of humanitarian assistance.

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\(^2\) Although some governments are becoming more open and transparent in their finances, detailed, comparable and current information on domestic humanitarian financial flows, for example from contingency or disaster funds, is difficult to access.
FIGURE 8.4
Domestic government spending per person against poverty, showing countries receiving long-term international humanitarian assistance

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UNCTAD, UN CERF, World Bank and IMF WEO data.
Notes: The bubble for each country is scaled by the amount of humanitarian assistance received in 2013; x-axis caps net government expenditure per person at PPP$8,000; 15 countries are excluded due to missing data, including six long-term humanitarian recipient countries. Extreme poverty refers to people living below the poverty line of PPP$1.25 a day in 2011.
Limited domestic finance in many crisis-affected countries (see Figure 8.4) means that international resources are vital, as Chapter 3 also explores. International resources are required in different volumes and configurations to respond to immediate needs and to invest in preventive and durable solutions.

Such international sources are multiple, spanning public, private and commercial finance – from loans from multilateral banks to governments, to remittances between households. In aggregate, such flows to the group of 20 countries receiving the largest amounts of international humanitarian assistance between 2004 and 2013 have more than tripled since 2000, reaching US$213 billion in 2013 (US$204 billion excluding international humanitarian assistance).

At the same time, the value of remittances – an immediate, flexible and often predictable source of finance that can reach households directly – to the 20 largest humanitarian recipient countries has tripled since 2000. Commercial FDI, with its potential for broad-based development through investments such as infrastructure, has increased more than five-fold over the period, while ODA, which can more directly target the poorest people, has more than tripled.

However, resources (including ODA) have not necessarily gone to the most vulnerable countries. While eight of the largest humanitarian recipients between 2004 and 2013 fall within the largest 20 recipients of ODA, a further eight (Sudan, Lebanon, Zimbabwe, Syria, Chad, Somalia, South Sudan and Myanmar) are outside the largest 40 ODA recipients. This suggests that longer-term aid investments have not accompanied or followed on from humanitarian response (see also Chapter 7), particularly in fragile states. Sudan, the largest humanitarian recipient between 2004 and 2013 was only the 46th largest ODA recipient when humanitarian assistance is excluded.

FDI encompasses a range of investments including those that both boost economies and improve resilience and those that can bypass the poorest and aggravate natural and human hazards. It is also concentrated in a small number of recipient countries, notably Indonesia, which accounted for just under a third of FDI going to the largest humanitarian recipients. Resource-rich Iraq and Sudan also accounted for large proportions, concentrated in the extractive industry sector rather than other productive investments.
Volumes of international resources to the countries receiving most international humanitarian assistance have not kept pace with those in other developing countries – particularly when viewed on a per capita basis. In total, 2013 international resource flows were equivalent to US$224 per person for the largest humanitarian recipients, compared with US$392 per person for other developing countries. Thus, for many countries that have faced significant crises, domestic fiscal capacity has been limited while their ability to attract productive international investments has fallen behind those of other developing countries.

For many developing countries, commercial flows such as FDI, portfolio equity and lending by commercial creditors, account for the largest inflows. However, for the top 20 humanitarian assistance recipients they are less than half those in other developing countries in per capita terms, at US$116 and US$284 respectively. Excluding Indonesia, this falls to US$57 per person for the other 19 largest recipients of HA. Remittances, while constituting a significant proportion of international flows to the largest 20 recipients of international humanitarian assistance, are lower in volume than to other developing countries, at US$54 per person in 2013 compared to US$74 per person.

Flows of official finance (ODA, humanitarian assistance, other official flows and official long-term debt) to the largest recipients of humanitarian assistance, however, are significantly larger than to other developing countries in per person terms. From similar levels in 2000 at US$29 and US$25 respectively, official financing for the top recipients of international humanitarian assistance has grown more rapidly, rising to US$53 per person in 2013, compared with US$34 for other developing countries.

**FIGURE 8.6**

Official international flows per capita to the 20 countries receiving most humanitarian assistance and all other developing countries, 2000–2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, IMF WEO and World Bank data.
Notes: Official flows comprised of ODA, other official flows, humanitarian assistance and official long-term debt. Data in this chart referring to top 20 humanitarian assistance recipients is based on the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance, 2004–2013. Commercial flows comprised of commercial long-term debt, short-term debt, FDI and portfolio equity. Data in this chart is based on the top 20 recipients of international humanitarian assistance, 2004–2013.
There are many different drivers of risk and vulnerability that make a country ‘fragile’ – including conflict and civil unrest and weak state institutions – and the group of fragile states includes countries with very different levels of fragility. Fragility also means a lack of resilience to environmental as well as conflict-related shocks, resulting in complex crises.

The particular challenges faced by fragile and conflict-affected states, such as the development and monitoring of governance institutions, were not incorporated into the MDG framework, nor were the contexts of implementing existing MDGs in such countries considered. This lack of focus has, in part, led many fragile states to fall further behind in social and economic progress.\(^5\) Fragile states, while often starting from a low base, score poorly across current MDG indicators and over one-third are ‘seriously off target’ on meeting MDG 1 of halving poverty rates.\(^6\) Further, poverty is expected to become increasingly concentrated in such countries as their progress continues to fall behind.

Conflict can reverse development gains achieved over decades. For example, countries experiencing major violence between 1981 and 2005 have extreme poverty rates 21 percentage points higher than more peaceful states.\(^6\) But recent progress witnessed across a number of fragile states, such as Guinea and Timor-Leste, demonstrates that progress is achievable, even in challenging circumstances.

These challenges are now explicitly recognised in the new framework of the post-2015 sustainable development goals (SDGs), with justice, safe and peaceful societies and strong institutions recognised by the UN Secretary-General’s Synthesis Report\(^7\) as one of the six essential elements for meeting post-2015 goals. However, much work is needed to better implement the principles of the 2011 New Deal\(^8\) and achieve tangible results. Capitalising on key development finance themes of the post-2015 agenda, more innovative and flexible uses of aid will be needed to support nationally led plans, help countries build domestic revenues and attract productive international finance.

Aggregate international resource flows to long-term fragile states may appear to have increased significantly since 2000, rising more than three-fold to US$353 billion, or US$228 per person, in 2013. However, much of this growth happened in the early 2000s and since 2005 growth has been slower, at an average 2% per year.
In 2013, 56% of gross country allocable ODA (excluding humanitarian assistance) was allocated to long-term fragile states overall. However, distribution has been uneven, with large proportions going to a limited number of countries such as Afghanistan and Egypt. And despite the international focus on fragile states articulated through the New Deal in 2011, stagnating levels of aid globally mean that such attention has not translated into substantial increases in financing. Since 2010 the proportion of ODA to fragile states has fluctuated by only a few percentage points each year and 2013 proportions are almost the same as those before the New Deal in 2010.

Conversely, a number of other resources such as remittances have continued to grow. Remittances, accounting for the largest financial flow to long-term fragile states (35% of international flows in 2013) can play an important role during the immediate aftermath of crisis and in building resilience. However, remittances tend to be concentrated in countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh with large and economically active diaspora populations. Similarly, FDI flows are concentrated in resource-rich countries such as Colombia (17% of total FDI to long-term fragile states during 2000–2013), Nigeria (12%) and Iran (6%).

The transition from conflict or political fragility to stability takes time; and investments in peace and security, strengthening institutions and governance require sustained commitment. The type and predictability of financing, as well as the complementarity of responses to immediate crisis and ongoing developmental support, are as crucial as overall volumes (see, for example, the use of non-humanitarian pooled funds in Chapter 5).

However, despite the counter-cyclical advantages of ODA, aid provided to fragile and conflict-affected states is often volatile and unpredictable. Across all 70 countries classified as fragile states in 2013, 36 experienced four or more aid shocks – a 15% or more fluctuation in aid from one year to the next – between 2005 and 2013. For some countries aid fluctuations are substantial. For example, the four long-term fragile states Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea and Zimbabwe have each experienced more than five shocks in the past eight years.

**FIGURE 8.8**
ODA per capita volatility to selected long-term fragile states, 2005–2013

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International resources to address conflict and insecurity

Humanitarian assistance can respond to the impacts of conflict and insecurity but it cannot deal with the causes: political stability, governance and effective institutions lie at heart of durable solutions. ODA can play a critical role in transitioning from a humanitarian response to conflict or fragility to a longer-term developmental focus.

A small proportion of security and peacekeeping expenditure can be reported as ODA under the heading of ‘conflict, peace and security ODA’ (CPS). This captures security and peacekeeping spending which has a development objective and does not involve direct military support and includes conflict resolution, landmine clearance and some security sector reform activities. However, this remains a controversial category and reporting practices vary by donor.

Aid supporting the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) endorsed under the 2011 New Deal for Fragile States has tended to target countries most at risk of ‘human hazards’ according to the INFORM index, as seen in Figure 8.9. Larger volumes of conflict, peace and security spending, for example, have been disbursed to high-risk countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria, where such funding also constitutes large proportions of total ODA (8.4% and 11.8% for Afghanistan and Somalia respectively). However, for a number of long-term fragile states at high risk of conflict, such as Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan and Yemen, conflict, peace and security spending accounts for very small proportions of total ODA (0.5%, 0.73%, 1.0% and 1.3% respectively).

With just 2.5% of total ODA to fragile states spent on conflict, peace and security, overall proportions remain small.

Further, at just 2.5% of total ODA to fragile states spent on conflict, peace and security, overall proportions remain small. While more than double the proportion spent in other developing countries, such proportions are low compared with the need to engender security and rule of law. However, significantly more may be spent by donors outside of their ODA (see box on 118). Less than 0.5% of ODA, for example, was spent on security-system management and reform, falling even lower when Afghanistan and Iraq are discounted. Just 3.0% of ODA to fragile states went on legal and judicial development and legislatures and political parties, and only 5.6% on spending related to broader political processes.
FIGURE 8.9

Conflict, peace and security ODA spending to long-term fragile states against INFORM’s human hazard score, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS, FFP Fragile States Index and INFORM data.
Notes: The size of each bubble is scaled by the volume of CPS ODA in 2013. Higher scores on the x axis mean a greater likelihood of human hazard.
Peacekeeping

Spending on peacekeeping operations has grown rapidly since the early 2000s and, after a fall between 2011 and 2012, it grew in 2013 to a high of US$9.82 billion (marginally higher than the 2011 total of US$9.79 billion). Preliminary data suggests further growth in 2014: UN missions, which have historically accounted for the majority of total peacekeeping budgets, grew 46% from 2013, to US$8.5 billion.

This growth is partly attributable to increased spending on nine of 15 existing peacekeeping missions. Spending on some missions increased dramatically: the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (US$960 million increase between 2013 and 2014); the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (US$330 million increase); and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (US$215 million increase). Spending on these existing missions combined increased by 22%.


Between 2012 and 2013, spending on other specific peacekeeping missions increased, from US$0.5 billion in 2012 to US$1.2 billion, largely attributable to the French military Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic (CAR) (costing US$130 million) and Serval in Mali (costing US$863 million). The cost of Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire also increased by US$19 million between 2012 and 2013.

DATA POVERTY: SECURITY SPENDING

The volumes of ODA represented in Figures 8.9 and 8.10 do not represent the totality of investments in security in fragile and conflict-affected states: those reported as channelled in the form of ODA are likely to be a small proportion of the total. However, beyond that spent through ODA there are no international standards for monitoring security spending and data is scarce. As a global public good, better information on both international and national security spending in such countries is crucial. This would inform understanding of its impacts (both positive and negative) on the most vulnerable people, and help to improve understanding of both the opportunity costs and potential of such expenditure to work more effectively with other resources to build stability.

FIGURE 8.10

Peacekeeping budgets, 2003–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on SIPRI and UN data.
Notes: Figures are peacekeeping budgets attributable to missions, including ECCAS, ECOWAS, OAS, CIS and other bilateral or independent peacekeeping missions, excluding the multinational force in Iraq (2003–2006). The ‘UN’ category includes political and observer missions; the UN 2014 figure is an estimate based on approved mission budgets. Data is in current prices. OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
International resources to environmentally vulnerable states

**FIGURE 8.11**
Trends in resources to environmentally vulnerable countries, 2000−2013

Despite recognition of the importance of investing in disaster preparedness and risk reduction, progress has been slow in the ten years since Hyogo. Exposure to hazards has outpaced efforts to reduce vulnerability: more than 1.5 billion people were affected by disasters in the last decade, with women and children in environmentally vulnerable countries disproportionately affected.

With a new global deal agreed at Sendai, Japan in 2015, ambition has been renewed and enhanced. Though lacking quantified targets, a series of goals to substantially reduce the impact of disasters has been agreed to enable progress to be monitored against clear development outcomes.

Tackling the drivers of vulnerability is an important priority in the Sendai framework, necessitating scaled-up investment, disaster risk mainstreaming, and improved coordination and risk governance among diverse actors. Investments in disaster risk management already come from a range of stakeholders and use of public–private risk-financing mechanisms is growing (see Chapter 7). However, in-depth budgetary assessments will be needed to assess the impact of Sendai. Similarly, ODA investments in DRR lack a clear methodology to benchmark progress and outcomes.

International resource flows to environmentally vulnerable countries have grown rapidly since 2000, rising three-fold to reach a total US$383 billion in 2013, or US$156 per person. Remittances, the largest resource flow to the group, grew from US$36 billion in 2000 to US$129 billion in 2013. However, these flows are concentrated in a few countries, with India accounting for 51% of remittances to the group as a whole.

Humanitarian assistance has fluctuated between 1% and 3% of total international resources to environmentally vulnerable countries every year between 2000 and 2013. The largest recipients of humanitarian assistance within the group during 2000 to 2013 were Sudan (16% of total), Afghanistan (10%) and Ethiopia (9.5%). ODA (excluding humanitarian assistance) to environmentally vulnerable countries more than doubled over the same period, rising from US$23 billion in 2000 to US$53 billion in 2013 (peaks in 2005 and 2006 are due to exceptional debt relief).

Source: Development Initiatives based on INFORM, OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UNCTAD, World Bank and IMF WEO.
Note: For definition of environmentally vulnerable countries refer to Data & Guides.
Climate adaptation financing

Climate finance presents a new opportunity to resource disaster risk reduction. While DRR and climate change adaptation have evolved separately they share many common goals and principles. Already, the small amount of climate finance going towards explicit DRR activities such as early warning systems is increasing.

Climate change is now a near certainty according to the fifth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). An increase in the frequency and intensity of climate events is set to increase the numbers of people living in poverty. One assessment for example estimates that by 2030 more than 325 million poor people will live in the 49 most affected countries.

It is also certain that the impacts of climate change will not be distributed evenly. The effects will be mostly felt where people and places are most vulnerable and least resilient to these hazards. For example, according to the latest IPCC report, sub-Saharan Africa will be disproportionately affected, with the region potentially facing an aggregate 22% decline in agricultural yields by mid-century. Further, the impacts of climate change are far from apolitical, nor set to be confined to neat, episodic ‘natural’ hazards. Maplecroft’s 2015 Climate Change and Environmental Risk Atlas identifies a combination of climate change vulnerability and food insecurity as escalating the risk of conflict across 32 countries, including Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria and the Philippines.

The links between climate, poverty, domestic capacity and conflict are already evident. For example, of the 20 countries in receipt of the most international humanitarian assistance between 2004 and 2013, six are also included in the bottom 20 countries of the University of Notre-Dame’s Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN), which ranks 178 countries according to both vulnerability to climate change and capacity to cope with it. Of these 20 countries, over half had also experienced conflict in the last decade and all are considered fragile states.

Following the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference, international donors have reported funding US$35 billion in Fast Start Finance (more than the US$30 billion commitment) for climate change support in developing countries between 2010 and 2012. Countries also committed to jointly mobilise US$100 billion a year by 2020 from both public and private sources to address the needs of developing countries. Public investments are channelled through a number of specific UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and multilateral climate funds, as well as a series of bilateral initiatives and activities. Cumulative approvals since 2002 through these channels for adaptation reached US$2.8 billion in 2014, with a significant boost following the UN Secretary-General’s climate summit in September 2014. However, only US$277 million has been disbursed to date.

Bilateral ODA ‘marked’ by reporting donors as having a climate adaptation primary or significant purpose has also grown steadily, from US$8.5 billion in 2010 to US$10.8 billion in 2013 – a 27% rise in real terms over a period where overall bilateral sectoral commitments fell by 11%. Roughly two-thirds has gone to water and sanitation, agriculture and environmental policy sectors.

While volumes have increased, the targeting of such ODA to countries most vulnerable or least prepared for climate change has been mixed (Figure 8.12). Since 2010, 33% of bilateral country-allocable ODA marked as having climate adaptation as its primary objective has gone to least developed countries, lower than the 41% of bilateral ODA commitments over the period.

Vulnerable countries – defined by both their vulnerability to climate change and their ability to make adaptive investments – such as Bangladesh, Kenya and Ethiopia have been among the larger recipients of such ODA. However, less vulnerable countries, such as Viet Nam, South Africa, Colombia and Thailand have also received comparatively larger volumes. Conversely, many of the most vulnerable countries are among the smallest recipients of adaptation-driven ODA. Sub-Saharan, conflict-affected countries such as DRC, CAR, Liberia and Eritrea constitute the bulk of such countries, typically with high existing levels of poverty and among the lowest per capita domestic expenditures in the developing world.

Adaptation channelled through specific climate funds such as those established under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, while accounting for smaller recorded volumes, better target more vulnerable counties. As seen in Figure 8.12, larger proportions of such funds are allocated to countries facing greater risk from and with lower capacities to manage climate change. However, even here, finance often fails to reach the most vulnerable conflict-affected countries such as DRC and Chad.

For adaptation finance to target the most vulnerable people, sub-national assessments are required (see box on data poverty in Chapter 1). However, the systems necessary to target and monitor the impacts of finance are not sufficiently developed. Many domestic governments have conducted national vulnerability assessments to identify their most vulnerable communities and ecosystems but do not have the capacity to monitor the delivery of adaptation finance at local level. Thus, as with the challenges faced in allocating ODA, it is difficult to assess whether such financing is going to where it is most needed and what impact it is having.
FIGURE 8.12

How climate-specific adaptation funds and ODA marked as adaptation target climate change vulnerability

Source: University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN); OECD DAC; Climate Funds Update; FFP Fragile States Index.
Notes: Climate funds include: The Least Developed Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Adaptation Fund, the Pilot Program on Climate Resilience of the Climate Investment Funds and the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Program. Funds data and ODA data reported through separate mechanism. Some climate fund data may also be reported as ODA. ODA refers to activities where climate change adaptation is marked as its principal objective.
In Rakhine State in Myanmar, inter-communal tensions continue and 139,310 people remain displaced as a result of the violence that erupted in 2012. Among them are this mother and child in Thea Chaung camp on the outskirts of Sittwe. In 2013, Myanmar received its highest levels of humanitarian assistance since cyclone Nargis hit in 2008. As international humanitarian assistance to Myanmar continues at scale, alongside other international financing flows such as official development assistance, access to information will play a critical role in ensuring accountability to both donors and the local population. Myanmar’s government recently established Mohinga, an aid transparency portal on aid coming into Myanmar. Mohinga allows users to track international assistance and provides access to further resources.
For better response

People at risk of or affected by crises may access and require many different types of resources: local, national and international; public and private. Accurate, timely and comprehensive information on these flows is critical to inform decision-making in specific crises as well as the priorities set through global processes. Information also has a crucial part to play in ensuring accountability to crisis-affected people and donors.

Knowing exactly who and where people in need are, what resources are reaching them, and with what results, is a challenge across development and environmental as well as humanitarian communities. This has prompted the call for a ‘data revolution in sustainable development’.¹ In crisis-affected contexts there are particular information imperatives, and data needs to meet the ‘3 Ts’ for transparent information flows:

- **totality**: reflecting all resources beyond humanitarian assistance
- **traceability**: being able to follow assistance beyond the first-level recipient, through the transaction chain from donor to the crisis-affected person (see Chapter 5)
- **timeliness**: providing real-time data on available resources in fast-moving humanitarian settings (see Chapter 7).

A number of promising innovations and solutions are emerging. The Information Management and Analysis Support (IMAS) toolkit in Lebanon offers an example of a local initiative to track information on all resources. Data reported to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standard demonstrates the potential of full traceability of humanitarian funding, as well as timely and forward-looking data on actual and planned expenditure.

As the data revolution evolves, new technology and innovations in the availability and use of data are transforming the mapping of humanitarian needs and the delivery of response (see Chapters 5 and 6). Methods to gather, store and publish data are becoming more sophisticated, such as the Humanitarian Data Exchange. These innovations also have the potential to transform humanitarian financing, and now is the time to build on them.
Totality: tracking wider resources in crises

International humanitarian assistance is just one of the resources available to people in crisis. As Chapter 8 shows, in many cases it represents a small fraction of the actual and potential mix. To best meet needs and most effectively direct humanitarian assistance, all those involved in both giving and spending need to know what other resources are at work and where. This is not the case just in preparedness and transitional contexts but also in acute crises.

The responses to Typhoon Haiyan, the Ebola virus disease outbreak and the Syria refugee crises have required and attracted resources at a scale beyond those provided by international humanitarian donors. The Ebola crisis required investments in infrastructure and basic services from development and private actors as well as domestic response (see Chapter 3); the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for Syria takes national capacity as its starting point and calls for development investments. Yet humanitarian tracking systems currently allow us to see only the international humanitarian assistance component of this and not the wider, often more substantial, funding allocations and gaps. This meant that when the Ebola crisis struck West Africa it was not possible for decision-makers or stakeholders to get a comprehensive picture of the response.

To address this problem, country-based initiatives in Lebanon and Myanmar are developing ways of tracking humanitarian assistance in the context of other critical resource flows. They provide models which could be replicated in other crises, as well as at a global level. A single system for tracking resources to address crisis and vulnerability would provide the missing evidence base for a complementary and effective response that meets people’s interconnected needs. IATI (see page 129) offers one such way of providing this evidence, and Development Initiatives’ recently launched Development Data Hub (see page 155) is an example of bringing information on multiple resource flows together in one place, in an easily accessible and usable format.

OPEN INFORMATION ABOUT INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO MYANMAR: MOHINGA

Mohinga is an aid transparency portal for tracking all forms of international assistance to Myanmar, including development and humanitarian funding. It was established and is managed by the government of Myanmar’s Foreign Economic Relations Department and the Development Partners Working Committee, which is made up of a range of government and multilateral donors including the Asian Development Bank, Australia, the EU, Japan, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the UN, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank.

The portal uses a mix of IATI and other data sources to visualise assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors at national and provincial level. Aimed primarily at development cooperation partners (non-governmental organisations [NGOs] and partner governments) and citizens, it provides access to shared resources beyond information on financial assistance. This includes donor and domestic government strategies, as well as information on coordination structures and global development effectiveness agreements. Mohinga aims to improve the transparency and accountability of aid to Myanmar stating that: “Access to better quality aid information...supports the equitable allocation of resources, both sectorally and geographically, ensuring that all Myanmar people can benefit.”

http://mohinga.info/en/
Before 2011, Lebanon had a population of around 4 million; by 2014 it was host to over 1.1 million refugees, over 90% of whom have fled ongoing violence in neighbouring Syria. Lebanon now has the highest per capita ratio of refugees in the world and refugee numbers are predicted to increase almost ten-fold from 180,000 people in December 2012 to 1.5 billion people in December 2015. The speed and scale at which Lebanon has been affected by the crisis in Syria has meant that basic public services and infrastructure have been unable to cope.

In 2013, at the request of the Lebanese government, the World Bank (in collaboration with the UN, the European Union [EU], and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) undertook a rapid Economic and Social Impact Assessment, which aimed to quantify the impact of the crisis and stabilisation needs of the country. It predicted that between 2012 and 2014 the crisis would cut growth in gross domestic product (GDP), double unemployment, and push more people into poverty. Its predictions of fiscal impact (see also Chapter 7) were realised across the board and the total cost of the impact of the Syrian conflict in Lebanon to date is thought to be somewhere in the region of US$7.5 billion.

The assessment prompted a paradigm shift in the crisis response in the context of the 3RP (see Chapter 7). This broadened the focus from being solely toward refugee needs with marginal host-community support to a more holistic picture of the macro-impact on neighbouring host countries nationally, in which every sector of society and/or the economy was affected.

Given the demand for development investments as well as humanitarian assistance, the Lebanese government has been working with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to build an information management system. This aims to enable consistent sharing of data and information in order to better understand needs and track financial contributions and resources (domestic and international, private and public, humanitarian and development), as well as activities being delivered, across the country.

The IMAS toolkit was conceived as a means of facilitating this joint approach to crisis response, allowing the domestic government to work alongside international actors to plan and coordinate the response to the refugee crisis as part of wider work to maintain basic public services across the country. It consists of four main components, all integrated into an online package with a common mapping system. The components are: a Who, What, Where, When [4Ws] tracking and mapping tool; municipal risk and problem mapping; a non-humanitarian financial tracking tool for the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office; and a digital atlas that underpins the whole toolkit.

The financial tracking tool allows the domestic government to consolidate all additional resources not currently tracked by any international system, including private contributions. As well as data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service (FTS), IMAS contains data from the Lebanese Ministry of Economics, the Council for Development and Reconstruction, and international government donors. It also contains information on the activities being delivered by domestic and international actors, as well as data on population stress, risks and health service availability.

Lebanon now has the highest per capita ratio of refugees in the world and refugee numbers are predicted to increase almost ten-fold from 180,000 people in December 2012 to 1.5 billion people in December 2015.
Traceability: following humanitarian assistance to the recipient

All assistance, humanitarian and other, needs to reach the people for whom it is intended as efficiently, appropriately and cost-effectively as possible. As shown in Chapter 5, transaction chains are complex and currently it is possible to trace funding only to the first-level recipient. Systematic traceability is essential to understand and improve effectiveness and underpin accountability to both donors and recipients. Page 128 shows how full reporting to IATI would enable this. Until this happens, case studies to ‘follow the money’ can give snapshots of what happens to resources in specific contexts.

The example in figure 9.1, which follows a single transaction through from donor to delivery, shows what traceable data could look like. Combined with a complete and timely picture of all other resources available in a particular context, this would be a powerful tool in enabling complete complementarity in the use and distribution of assistance, while also increasing accountability to those people affected by crises and those providing assistance.

Start Fund response to flooding in Sri Lanka

Launched in April 2014 with contributions from DFID and Irish Aid, the Start Fund – based on the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies’ Emergency Response Fund – is a UK-based pooled fund that provides emergency funding to its 19 members and their implementing partners. The fund, managed by its members, is designed to provide a rapid funding response following a step-change or escalation in humanitarian needs. It focuses on responding to small- to medium-scale crises that do not receive sufficient funding or attention from other existing mechanisms. It provides an early funding response to slow-onset crises, and a fast response to both rapid-onset crises and spikes in chronic crises, where agencies already active on the ground need to respond quickly.

The fund is triggered by a member agency raising an alert. All members active in the affected area then complete a survey to assess the need for rapid funding. The allocation committee then meets within 24 hours of an alert being raised to assess the survey responses and make a decision on whether and how much to allocate. If the fund is activated, agencies submit applications and funding is awarded within a further 48 hours. The aim is for funding to reach affected communities within four days of an alert being raised. Between 1 April and 31 December 2014, the Start Fund was alerted 20 times, with funds totalling GBP£2.1 million (US$3.5 million) allocated to 30 projects across 13 emergencies.

One of these was in January 2015, when the Start Fund was activated to respond to flooding in Sri Lanka. Three NGO Start members were awarded a combined total of £266,590 in funding: CAFOD, Care and World Vision. Each of these international NGOs worked with their country offices and local partners in Sri Lanka to assist in the delivery of assistance provided through Start funding. Using detailed IATI-compliant data reported by the Start Fund itself, its NGO members and their local delivery partners (in some cases reported by a Start-member NGO on their behalf), it is possible to trace the money through the system, from when it left the donor right through to the activities delivered on the ground. The data shows how much assistance was delivered and in what form, the activities or resources that were provided with it, who benefitted, where and when.

Traceability would be a powerful tool in enabling complete complementarity in the use and distribution of assistance, while also increasing accountability to those people affected by crises as well as to those providing assistance.
FIGURE 9.1

Start funding for flooding in Sri Lanka, January 2015


Note: All funding is expressed in GBP£. CARE Sri Lanka underspent by £1,725, which was returned to CARE UK and assigned to management costs (staffing and support). NFIs: non-food items.
A crisis can evolve rapidly, as can the funding picture, particularly in the immediate aftermath of a rapid-onset crisis. Yet, even for rapidly disbursed humanitarian assistance, there is often a time-lag before it is reported – for development assistance in humanitarian settings, such as the Ebola response, this can be longer.

Up-to-date information on the resources available in a rapidly changing crisis situation is critical to identify gaps, improve coordination and ensure the response meets the needs on the ground at any given time. Timely publishing to the IATI standard (see page 129) and/or to UN OCHA FTS could support this.

In situations of chronic and long-term humanitarian crisis, where the agencies responding know that they are likely to remain active there for a number of years, a reliable picture of the funding available over that period can enable longer-term programme planning. As Chapter 7 shows, although many donors do provide multi-year funding, this is not currently captured in humanitarian tracking systems. Publishing planned expenditures relating to multi-year funding would help to plan, manage and coordinate appropriate programming.

The IATI standard allows donors to report forward-looking data on expenditure by publishing their aid budgets in an open, accessible and comparable format. Using forward-looking IATI data, it is already possible to begin to build a picture of planned expenditure by donors in a given context over a period of years, rather than months.

Figure 9.2 shows a partial picture of future development and humanitarian funding to Afghanistan, as only a limited number of donors are currently reporting their projected expenditure to the IATI standard. If all aid budgets were reported this way, donors’ and implementing agencies’ financial preparedness and longer-term planning would be better informed.

**Figure 9.2**

**Budgeted aid expenditure in Afghanistan, 2015–2018**

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Humanitarian</th>
<th>Governance and security</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 budget</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>95.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>769</td>
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<td>2017 budget</td>
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<td>54.5</td>
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<td>561</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on IATI data, accessed through d-portal.org.
Notes: Excludes negative value of US$1.6 million from DFID for infrastructure in 2018.
The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)

In response to the need for a single transparent reporting standard, IATI was launched in 2008. There are now 340 governments and agencies actively publishing to the standard. It offers a solution to many of the issues of totality, traceability and timeliness highlighted in this report, making information about aid spending easier to access, use and understand. On the totality question in particular, IATI has the potential to incorporate many other international funding flows – including funding from development finance institutions, private trusts and foundations and corporate institutions – and thus provide a better picture of the total resources available in a crisis situation (see page 124).

IATI is a voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative that seeks to improve the transparency of international development and humanitarian financing in order to increase its effectiveness. It is a data standard, so it provides a format and framework for publishing data on development and humanitarian activities. IATI is intended to be used by a range of organisations engaged in the funding and delivery of those activities, from government donors and multilateral agencies to private sector organisations and national and international NGOs.

Publish once; use often

The IATI mantra is ‘publish once; use often.’ A fundamental strength is that it provides a way for development and humanitarian actors to carry out multi-purpose reporting. Publishing once in the IATI format enables publishers to generate data that can be used both internally and externally, for example in financial reporting, activity monitoring and donor reporting.

However, there is also potential for IATI data to be used to feed data directly into other humanitarian information management systems, such as the UN OCHA FTS and domestic aid management systems, so organisations do not need to fulfil multiple different reporting requirements. This is already in progress – all FTS data is currently published to the IATI standard, and progress is underway to feed the FTS with IATI data. IATI data can also be used to carry out internal monitoring and reporting.

Almost all major government donors have signed up to IATI, and some have made it compulsory for their grant recipients to report to IATI. However, donors also need to start using the IATI data provided by organisations as part of their reporting requirements, in order to demonstrate its worth.

Publishing once in the IATI format enables publishers to generate data that can be used both internally and externally, for example in financial reporting, activity monitoring and donor reporting.

To stimulate this process, IATI is currently looking at a number of different donors’ grant reporting forms and requirements to identify what information could be provided by IATI data. Donors tend to request similar information from their grant recipients but in slightly different formats. If they were willing and able to use IATI data in place of current reporting requirements, this would reduce the multiple-reporting burden currently placed on organisations receiving funding from more than one government donor. The umbrella organisation, British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND), is working with donors on the standardisation of reporting requirements and terminology, including looking at which areas could be fulfilled by IATI data.
What information is published to IATI?

The IATI standard is split into two parts.

**The Organisation Standard**

Describes the organisations involved in providing international development and humanitarian assistance. It holds information on:

- the organisation’s name and identification
- forward-looking budgets
- strategic documents such as country plans, annual reports
- country or regional budgets.

**The Activity Standard**

The space where organisations can publish comprehensive details on their projects and activities. This includes:

- basic activity information (project title, description and dates)
- outgoing and incoming funds
- sub-national geographic coding on the project’s location
- sectors and classifications
- forward-looking budgets (where relevant)
- conditions attached to activities, and results – outputs and outcomes.

The humanitarian extension

As it was originally designed to meet the needs of development financing, the IATI standard has until now not been fully compatible with the information requirements of humanitarian assistance. For example, available fields were not able to capture some of the specific sectoral detail, and the frequency of updating data was not sufficient for use in a rapidly evolving crisis situation.

Following consultation with a group of stakeholders and experts, an ‘extension’ is now being added to the IATI standard to address these issues. The flexible, open structure of the standard allows for additional data to be added, without those fields having been formally approved as part of the standard proper (a process that involves lengthy consultation).

The FTS has already constructed such an extension to communicate humanitarian-specific categories of data not currently covered by the IATI standard, such as those concerning emergencies, appeals and clusters, which will be available for use by all reporters this year.

The IATI technical team, together with UN OCHA and other humanitarian agencies, is planning to build on the FTS’s work to ensure that IATI can deliver timely and comprehensive data for real-time use during emergencies. For example, current best practice for reporting on development activities is for data to be refreshed monthly, a month in arrears, but humanitarian operations may require daily updates.

By adding a humanitarian marker, the extension will allow donor and implementing agencies to flag up those activities that need fast-tracking through their publishing cycle.

If all actors involved in the funding and delivery of humanitarian assistance report comprehensive data to the standard once the humanitarian marker is in place, IATI data could provide enough information to fully meet the ‘3Ts’ for transparent information flows on humanitarian assistance.
Methodology and definitions

More information on our methodologies and definitions can be found on our website: www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides. We also provide a free, friendly helpdesk service for data-related queries on gha@devinit.org.

Cash transfers

Our analysis of cash transfers is based on a keyword search on the title and long description of projects reported to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service [FTS]). Our coding distinguishes between full and partial cash programmes. Projects labelled ‘full’ are primarily for cash transfer interventions; those labelled ‘partial’ combine cash transfer interventions with other activities.

Channels of delivery

We use this term to describe the agencies and organisations receiving funding for the delivery of humanitarian assistance – multilateral agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the public sector, the military, pooled funds and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – whether they deliver the assistance themselves or pass it on to partner organisations. Our channels of delivery data for governments comes predominantly from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the UN OCHA FTS. For private donors, we use our own unique dataset on private contributions.

Constant prices

Our financial analysis on resource flows is in US$ constant prices (base year 2013) unless otherwise stated. We use data from the OECD DAC and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s World Economic Outlook April 2015 edition to convert financial data from current to constant prices.

Country and region naming conventions

Country and region naming conventions used throughout this report are based on those used by the OECD DAC or UN-coordinated appeals. Conventions used do not reflect any political positions of GHA or Development Initiatives.

Domestic governments

Data on domestic government expenditure in response to disasters and crises within their own borders is not systematically collated and reported to a single body. In this year’s report we include our own research into the domestic contributions of three governments – Turkey (for Syrian-refugee hosting), Sierra Leone (for response to Ebola virus disease outbreak), and Mexico (expenditure on disaster response) – using publicly available national budget documents and development assistance reports (see Chapter 3).

Donor defence agencies and military channels

We use the bilateral humanitarian assistance reported to the OECD DAC CRS by a DAC donor’s ministry or department of defence to analyse humanitarian spending by donor defence agencies. Humanitarian assistance channelled via the military refers to the bilateral humanitarian assistance reported to the CRS that is delivered or implemented by a military organisation. We identify this assistance by a keyword search on the ‘channel reported name’ and ‘long description’ fields of the CRS.

Environmental vulnerability

We define environmentally vulnerable countries using information from the Index for Risk Management (INFORM). Countries that are ‘very high’ and ‘high’ risk on the human hazard, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity sub-indexes are classified as environmentally vulnerable.

Exchange rates

We use exchange rates from the OECD DAC for OECD DAC members and data from the IMF World Economic Outlook April 2015 edition for countries outside of the OECD DAC.

Forgotten crises

Our analysis of forgotten crises is based on the European Commission Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)’s forgotten crisis assessment (FCA) index, which is compiled annually using a series of weighted indicators to come up with an overall ranking of emergency situations.

Fragility

Countries are classified as fragile and long-term fragile according to the Fund for Peace Fragile States index (formerly Failed States index). Fragile states are those that score over 80 on the index. Within this fragile states group are long-term fragile states that have scored over 80 on the index every year since first appearance on the index up to 2013.

Government spending

Total government spending is in US$ to allow comparison with international resource flows. Government spending per person is presented in 2011 PPP$ as purchasing power parity gives a more accurate indication of spending power within each country.
Governments and European Union institutions

Our data and definition of international humanitarian assistance from governments plus the European Union (EU) institutions comprises:

- the ‘official’ humanitarian assistance of the 29 members of the OECD DAC
- international humanitarian assistance by governments outside of the OECD DAC, sometimes referred to as ‘non-DAC donors’ or ‘South-South development partners’, as reported to UN OCHA FTS.

We treat domestic government expenditure – that spent on humanitarian action within the borders of the country providing the assistance – separately (see Domestic governments).

Humanitarian assistance

Please see definition on page 20.

Humanitarian needs

Our analysis in Chapter 1 of who was affected by humanitarian crises is based on:

- the number of people affected by crises – data is sourced from UN-coordinated appeals, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)’s EM-DAT disaster database and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s Mid-Year Trends 2014 report
- the proportion of the total population affected in crisis countries (based on World Bank 2013 population data).

Income groups

Country income groups are based on four classifications: higher income, upper middle income, lower middle income and lower income, as defined by the World Bank based on gross national income per capita in US$ (Atlas methodology).

International humanitarian response

This comprises the combined international humanitarian contributions of:

- governments (data taken predominantly from the OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS)
- individuals, private foundations, trusts, private companies and corporations (using our own unique research [see p140])

Long-term humanitarian assistance countries

In this report, long-term humanitarian assistance countries are defined as those receiving a greater than average proportion of ODA (excluding debt relief) in the form of humanitarian assistance for more than eight years between 1999 and 2013. ‘Medium term’ refers to those receiving a higher than average proportion for between three and seven years inclusive, and ‘short term’ means under three years.

NGO classifications

Analysis of funding to NGOs is based on our own categorisation of five types of NGO, which was established following consultation with a range of recognised sources and stakeholders. Categories include:

- international NGOs – those based in an OECD DAC member country and carrying out operations in one or more developing countries
- southern international NGOs – those not based in an OECD DAC member country and carrying out operations in one or more developing countries
- affiliated national NGOs – nationally operating NGOs that are affiliated to an international NGO
- national NGOs – those operating in the developing country where they are headquartered, working in multiple sub-national regions, and not affiliated to an international NGO
- local NGOs – those operating in a specific, geographically defined, sub-national area, without affiliation to either a national or international NGO; this grouping can also include community-based organisations.

Poverty

We refer to the $1.25 a day (‘extreme poverty’) line in this report and use data from the World Bank. This measure is expressed in ‘international dollars’, based on 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.

Private funding

This comprises contributions from individuals, private foundations, trusts, private companies and corporations. We have developed a unique methodology to attempt to quantify and analyse this under-reported resource flow [see p141].
Refugees and displaced persons

We use UNHCR data for our analysis on refugees and displaced persons unless otherwise stated. We include refugees, people in refugee-like situations, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and asylum seekers in our definition of displaced persons. IDP numbers include those persons protected/assisted by UNHCR only.

To estimate the total number of displaced persons globally by the end of 2014, we have primarily used UNHCR’s mid-year 2014 data for numbers of refugees and asylum seekers; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)’s data on Palestinian refugees in its areas of operation as of July 2014; the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s data on the number of IDPs globally at the end of 2014; and revisions of UN-coordinated appeals in 2014. More accurate estimates of displaced populations can be found in UNHCR’s Global Trends Report 2014, due for publication on 18 June 2015.

Rounding

There may be minor discrepancies in some of the totals in our graphs and charts, and between those and the text; this is because of rounding.

Gender

Analysis of funding to gender programming is based on data reported to UN OCHA’s FTS that is coded with an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) gender marker. The IASC gender marker comprises six codes by which donors and agencies mark their programme expenditure.

To estimate the proportion of humanitarian assistance that currently does not have an IASC gender marker but contributes to gender equality in some way, we carry out a keyword search on the project titles and descriptions of the uncoded funding. Similarly, to identify funding for activities to address sexual and gender-based violence we carry out a word search on relevant terms.

UN-coordinated appeals

We use this generic team to describe all humanitarian response plans and appeals coordinated by a UN agency – including strategic response plans (SRPs), regional refugee response plans and flash appeals. We use UN OCHA’s FTS for our financial analysis of UN-coordinated appeals. Our 2012 data includes the Syria Regional Response Plan monitored by UNHCR. Our 2014 data includes the Ebola Virus Outbreak Response Plan – though as the appeal document was not organised around sectors it is not included in our sector analysis or in our analysis of funding per targeted person in UN-coordinated appeals. This is because the Ebola appeal documents in 2014 and 2015 did not include comparable target population figures. Funding to the appeal in 2014 is calculated using decision dates up to and including 31 December 2014.

Zakat

Our research on Zakat draws on evidence gathered through case studies and other existing research as there is no reliable or readily-available data on Zakat mobilised globally. We used three main sources: data published by Zakat collection and management institutions or provided directly to GHA by the agency or by an umbrella body; reports and press releases detailing Zakat collection and expenditure in specific contexts; and the Islamic Social Finance Report 2014. Full methodology can be found in our 2015 report An Act of Faith: ‘Humanitarian Financing and Zakat’.
GHA’s unique calculations

International humanitarian assistance from governments

Our calculation of international humanitarian assistance from government donors is the sum of:

- ‘official’ humanitarian assistance (OECD DAC)
- international humanitarian assistance from donors outside the OECD DAC

Our ‘official’ humanitarian assistance calculation comprises:

- the bilateral humanitarian expenditure of the 29 OECD DAC members, as reported to the OECD DAC database under table 1
- the multilateral humanitarian assistance of the 29 OECD DAC members. This in turn comprises:
  - the core and unearmarked ODA contributions of DAC members to seven key multilateral agencies engaged in humanitarian response: UNHCR, UN OCHA, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UNRWA, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP), as reported to OECD DAC table 2a and the CRS. We do not include all ODA to FAO, IOM, UNICEF and WFP but apply a percentage to take into account these agencies that also have a ‘development’ mandate. These shares (applied to all years retrospectively) have been calculated using data from the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (UN SCEB).
  - contributions to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) that are not reported under DAC members’ bilateral humanitarian assistance. We take this data directly from the UN CERF website.

When we report on the official humanitarian assistance of individual OECD DAC countries who are members of the EU, we include an imputed calculation of their humanitarian assistance channelled through the EU institutions, based on their ODA contributions to the EU institutions. We do not do this in our total international humanitarian assistance and response calculations to avoid double-counting.

To calculate funding from government donors outside the OECD DAC we use data from UN OCHA FTS.

Private funding

We approach humanitarian delivery agencies (including NGOs, UN agencies and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement) directly and request financial information on their income and expenditure by means of a standardised dataset. Where direct data collection is not possible, we use publicly available annual reports and audited accounts to extract key data.

Our dataset includes the following:

- 171 NGOs that form part of ten representative and well-known NGO alliances and umbrella organisations such as Oxfam International, and a further 14 large international NGOs operating independently (see table)
- Six key UN agencies engaged in humanitarian response: UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO)
- The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Our private funding calculation comprises an estimate of total private humanitarian income for all NGOs, and the private humanitarian income reported by the six UN agencies, the IFRC and ICRC. To estimate the total private humanitarian income of NGOs globally, we calculate the annual proportion that the 171 NGOs in our dataset represent of all NGOs reporting to the UN OCHA FTS. The total private humanitarian income reported to us by the NGOs in our dataset is then scaled up according to this proportion.

Data is collected annually, and new data for previous years may be added retrospectively. Global estimates for previous years may therefore be different to those presented in past reports, as our data becomes more comprehensive and these estimates become more precise. Due to limited availability of data, detailed analysis covers the period 2009–2013.

We provide an estimate for 2014 private funding by calculating the share of overall private humanitarian assistance represented by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) for the previous five years. Using data for 2014 provided to us by MSF, we then scale their private humanitarian income figure up according to the average share, to reach a global estimate. Note that, due to an exceptional and disproportional rise in funding to MSF in 2014 due to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa, on advice from MSF their 2014 surplus was discounted from this calculation.
GHA’s private funding dataset

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>ORGANISATION TYPE</th>
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### UN-coordinated appeals, 2005–2014

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**Notes:**
- Original requirements are as defined by UN OCHA and UNHCR.
- Revised requirements include adjustments for changes in the strategic response plan (SRP) and regional refugee response plans.
- Funding is calculated based on decision dates up to and including December 31 of each year.

**Source:** Development initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UNHCR data.
## TABLE 10.2

Top 20 government donors, plus EU institutions, international humanitarian assistance, 2005–2014

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Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, IMF WEO and UNSCEB data.

Notes: Data for OECD DAC members includes their core ODA to UNHCR, UNRWA and UN OCHA as well as calculated proportions of WFP, UNICEF, FAO and IOM ODA contributions. EU contributions are imputed for OECD DAC EU countries and included in their totals. EU institutions are in this table to indicate where it ranks alongside government donors. It is highlighted with white as this funding has been imputed into EU countries’ total figures; we do not do this in our total international humanitarian assistance and response calculations to avoid double-counting. All figures include contributions through the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). All funding is in constant 2013 prices. Data for 2014 is preliminary for OECD DAC data.
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Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, IMF WEO and UN SCEB data.
### TABLE 10.4
Top 20 government donors of official development assistance (ODA), plus EU institutions 2005–2014

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Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data.
Notes: Data for 2014 is preliminary. ODA excludes debt relief.
### TABLE 10.5

Top 20 recipients of official development assistance (ODA), 2004–2013

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Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data
Notes: Data includes ODA from OECD DAC countries and multilateral institutions. ODA excludes debt relief.
### TABLE 10.6

Top 20 government contributors of international humanitarian assistance measured in three different ways, 2014

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<th>Humanitarian Assistance as % of ODA</th>
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*Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, IMF WEO, World Bank and UNSCEB data.*  
*Notes: Countries for which there is no data available for relevant measure have been excluded. All data is partial and preliminary. GNI data for 2014 has been estimated using historical data on GNI and real GDP growth rates for 2014. Data only includes humanitarian assistance spent internationally, hence Turkey’s contribution to the Syrian refugee response within Turkey is excluded. See p38.*
### TABLE 10.7

International humanitarian assistance to top 20 recipients, in the context of other resource flows, 2013

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<th>DOMESTIC FLOWS</th>
<th>OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL FLOWS</th>
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Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, UNCTAD, World Bank, IMF WEO and SIPRI data.

Note: Based on top 20 humanitarian recipient countries 2013. Funding flows based on 2013 data.
## Data sources

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<td>‘Donor response to programmes and appeals’, IFRC, Geneva</td>
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### Abbreviations

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<td>AFAD</td>
<td>Disaster and Emergency Refugee Agency (Turkey)</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>African Risk Capacity</td>
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<td>ARV</td>
<td>Africa Risk Review</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BOND</td>
<td>British Overseas NGOs for Development</td>
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<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<td>CaLP</td>
<td>Cash Learning Partnership</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated appeal process (UN)</td>
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<td>Country-based pooled fund</td>
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<td>Central Emergency Response Fund (UN)</td>
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<td>CGFOME</td>
<td>General Coordination for International Actions Against Hunger (Brazil)</td>
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<td>Common humanitarian fund</td>
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<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System</td>
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<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>Gross national income</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMAS</td>
<td>Information Management and Analysis Support</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>National disaster management authority</td>
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<td>Multi-donor trust fund</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
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<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid response mechanism</td>
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<td>RRP</td>
<td>Regional refugee response plan [South Sudan and Syria]</td>
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<td>Sustainable development goal</td>
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<td>Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
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New and escalating crises, including the Ebola virus disease outbreak and the conflict in Iraq, added to the humanitarian needs generated by ongoing emergencies elsewhere in 2014. More people worldwide were affected by disasters caused by natural hazards and displaced by conflict and persecution than ever before on record. Millions of Iraqis were affected during the course of the year, with an estimated 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance by October 2014 and numbers continue to rise. This informal camp for internally displaced persons in northern Iraq is host to over 900 people who fled violence and human rights abuses by armed groups. As well as protection, adequate shelter is an urgent need for displaced populations in Iraq.
Notes

Chapter 1

1 This figure is an estimate by Development Initiatives based on data from UNHCR’s Mid-Year Trends 2014, June 2014; IDMC’s Global Overview 2015: People internally displaced by conflict and violence, May 2015; UNRWA’s data on Palestinian refugees in its areas of operation; and revisions of UN-coordinated appeals in 2014. UNHCR’s Global Trends 2014 Report, due to be published in June 2015, contains more detailed information on displaced populations in 2014: http://unhcr.org/54aa91d89.html


3 The $1.25 a day line is expressed in ‘international dollars’, based on 2005 purchasing power parity exchange rates.

4 World Bank 2013 population data.

5 Not including those targeted in the Ebola response since the Ebola Virus appeal document for 2014 does not include target population figures.


9 INFORM 2015 data

Chapter 2

1 Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability, www.corehumanitarianstandard.org

2 OECD DAC, The list of CRS purpose codes valid for reporting up to and including 2014 flows www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/2012%20CRS%20purpose%20codes%20EN_2.pdf

3 UN OCHA criteria for inclusion of reported humanitarian contributions into the FTS, and for donor/appealing agency reporting to FTS. September 2004: fts.unocha.org/exception-docs/AboutFTS/FTS_criteria_for_posting_contributions.pdf

4 Requirements according to UN OCHA FTS as of 7 May 2015. As in previous years it is likely that the amount requested will continue to increase as existing SRPs are revised and new appeals are added. This is, by its nature, unpredictable but based on an average increase of 39% over the last four years (2011–2014), UN-coordinated appeal requirements for 2015 could rise to as much as US$27.1 billion by the end of the year.

5 The UNMEER-led Ebola Virus Response Overview of Needs and Requirements does not specify the exact numbers of people targeted.

6 This figure includes the target population for the Ukraine SRP and excludes the IDP target population in the South Sudan RRP – already covered within the South Sudan SRP target population.

7 There may be a number of reasons for the particularly high target population in 2014 compared to 2013 and 2015. Several countries revised their target population to receive humanitarian assistance downwards between 2014 and 2015, such as Nigeria which targeted 8 million people to receive humanitarian assistance in 2014 but only 2.8 million people in 2015 (and did not issue an SRP in 2013). Similarly, Cameroon targeted 6.9 million people in 2014, decreasing to 1.6 million in 2015 (and published no SRP in 2013).

8 See also Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014, p14.

9 Six countries have used alternative approaches to costing within their SRPs in 2015: Afghanistan, CAR, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Myanmar, Ukraine and Yemen. Different approaches to costing UN-coordinated appeals began with pilots in DRC and Afghanistan in 2008.

Chapter 3

1 ‘Europe’ here refers to countries within the geographic regional grouping, as used by the OECD – not the grouping of EU member states.

2 The 29 OECD DAC members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

3 This includes only humanitarian assistance spent internationally, hence Turkey’s refugee-hosting expenditure is not included.

4 This is based on Development Initiatives calculation of GDP based on market exchange rates using IMF WEO data. China is the largest global economy when using GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.

5 The figure may be higher if some allocations marked ‘regional’ were included.


7 In 2014 in Kuwait, a League of Arab States (LAS) summit resolved to establish an Arab Mechanism for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance within the LAS Secretariat.

8 Development Initiatives based on UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2014 report.

9 UNHCR, UNHCR warns of bleaker future for refugees as Syrian conflict enters 5th year, 12 March 2015: www.unhcr.org/55016fff6.html
In 2013, US$5.5 million of international assistance from Turkey was reported to UN OCHA’s FTS by recipient agencies that year. This report uses data from FTS for Turkey’s humanitarian assistance for the purposes of consistency with other donors outside of the OECD DAC.

Syrian Guests in Turkey 2014, AFAD, Turkey

Turkey’s refugee-hosting costs were included in international humanitarian assistance totals in previous GHA reports (2012 and 2013), prior to clarification of the composition of the totals voluntarily reported to the DAC by Turkey.


According to UNHCR’s Mid-Year Trends 2014 report, the top ten refugee-hosting countries [including people in refugee-like situations] as of mid-2014 were: Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Uganda and China.

Turkey was reported to UN OCHA’s FTS by recipient agencies that year. This report uses data from FTS for Turkey’s humanitarian assistance for the purposes of consistency with other donors outside of the OECD DAC.


Charitable giving in the UK increased from GBP£9.6 billion in 2011/12 to £10.4 billion in 2012/13, according to the Charities Aid Foundation: www.cafonline.org/pdf/UK%20Giving%202012-13.pdf

Charitable giving in the US rose for the fourth year running in 2013 reaching over US$335 billion, according to the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy: www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/news/article/giving-usa-2014


Detailed data on the breakdown of funding from RCRC national societies and UNICEF national committees is not available.

See methodology for a list of all agencies included

Our figures for RCRC represent only funds which flowed through the international headquarters of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and do not include finds given directly to or between national societies.


Chapter 4

1 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Displacement Continues despite Hopes for Peace, available at: www.internal-displacement.org/americas/colombia/2014/displacement-continues-despite-hopes-for-peace

2 OCHA, Strategic Response Plan for Colombia 2015, November 2014.


Chapter 5

1 Figures are obtained using a combination of FTS and DAC data, meaning they are not directly comparable to data presented on private funding.


3 Harvey, P, South Sudan: European Commission and US Approaches to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – A Case Study, in Raising the Bar: Enhancing Transatlantic Governance of Disaster Relief and Preparedness, Global Public Policy Institute, 2009.

4 UN OCHA, Policy Instruction Country Based Pooled Funds, 2015, available at: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Policy%20Instruction%20on%20OCHA%20CBPFs.pdf. This includes a commitment to strengthening partnerships with national actors: “NGO partners, in particular national NGOs, are often in closer proximity to people in need and have better knowledge of local contexts, languages and cultures. OCHA is committed to supporting NGOs in developing their capacity to become eligible recipients of CBPF funding.”


Chapter 6

1 The Call for Action noted that “Donors need to make longer-term funding commitments [beyond one year] in order to build necessary systems and long-term engagement with communities; funds should be made accessible for local level organisations and leveraged from other areas.”


3 The Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction

3 Note that many countries not classified as highly environmentally vulnerable also have NDMAs.
Chapter 7


3 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction includes the target: “Increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to the people by 2030”, although financing for DRR or early action was not part of the discussions; available at: http://www.wcdr.org/uploads/2015-2030.pdf.

4 The IGAD Second Drought Resilience Summit in 2014 called for: strengthening of early warning systems, flexible development funding and factoring in drought risk; the establishment of common triggers and protocols to escalate early warning to decision-makers at national, regional and global level to mobilise early action; and for institutionalisation and investments into scalable social protection schemes.


11 http://www.start-network.org/how/start-fund/#. VX1HoPiViko


14 Calculation of weighted average refers to 15 of the top 20 humanitarian assistance recipients; four countries were omitted from the calculation due to data availability, while Mali was removed due to status as not a long- or medium-term humanitarian assistance recipient; 11 countries were excluded from all other developing countries’ weighted average due to data availability.


16 Target population figures not available for 2014 Ebola appeal.


21 Within the Syria 3RP, funding requirements for Jordan are higher than those for Lebanon at US$2.9 billion. However, US$1.1 billion of this amount is for subsidies, security support, infrastructure depreciation, income loss and management, which are not included in the funding requirements for other countries covered by the 3RP.

Chapter 8

1 The data used here is for total government spending less general budget support ODA and borrowing by the public sector from international sources, to avoid double counting with the international resources analysed elsewhere in the chapter.


3 ODA here excludes humanitarian assistance.


8 The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was endorsed at the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan.

9 See, for example, Tanner, T and J Rentschler, Unlocking the Triple Dividend of Resilience – Why Investing in Disaster Risk Management Pays off, Overseas Development Institute, 2015.

10 The Hyogo Framework for Action was endorsed in 2005.

11 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 agreed at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction.


Chapter 9


Chapter 10

What we do

The Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) programme provides objective, independent, rigorous data and analysis on humanitarian financing and related aid flows. Our aim is to enable access to a shared evidence base on resources relevant to crisis-affected people. We believe reliable information is fundamental for improved accountability and effectiveness.

Reports

We have been publishing our flagship annual Global Humanitarian Assistance report since 2000. We also produce a number of other reports on particular crises, humanitarian actors and financing mechanisms. Our most recent special focus reports include:

- Humanitarian assistance from non-state donors: Latest trends
- The UN-coordinated appeals in 2015: An ambitious plan to meet growing humanitarian needs
- An act of faith: Humanitarian financing and Zakat
- Afghanistan beyond 2014: Aid and the transformation decade
- Funding gender in emergencies: What are the trends?

Archive and future reports can be found here: www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/reports

We also contribute to reports published by other organisations. Examples include: Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria (IECAH) Annual Report, 2014, La acción humanitaria en 2012–2013: instalados en la crisis (published in Spanish); World Humanitarian Data and Trends 2012 and 2013, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; and chapters for the World Disasters Report 2012, 2014 and 2015, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. To find out more about the full range of our work, visit our website at www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org

Follow us on Facebook at www.facebook.com/ghaorg and connect with us on Twitter at https://twitter.com/gha_org

Crisis briefings

We produce briefings on both high-profile and forgotten humanitarian crises. We aim to make these available to anyone working in and on a particular crisis, via our email list and our dedicated webpage. We are also partnering with the Start Network to provide analysis to inform their funding allocation decisions. The Start Network is a consortium of British-based humanitarian international NGOs, which has its own fund to help fill funding gaps and enable rapid response to under-reported crises where need is great. Within 12 hours of a funding alert, GHA produces a rapid overview of the humanitarian funding picture – recent funding, an overview of appeals and funds, and analysis of donor trends. Emergencies covered include the earthquakes in Nepal, conflict in Yemen, internally displaced persons in Nigeria, flooding in southern Africa and the Ebola virus disease outbreak in Sierra Leone. These analyses are available at: www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/crisis-briefings
Country profiles

On the GHA website we maintain an active set of country profiles (available at www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/country-profiles) to capture key information on humanitarian spending across the globe. There are currently 69 country profiles for recipients, donors and countries that are both recipients and donors of humanitarian assistance. Our profiles are updated annually, and new countries added. Each country profile is accompanied by unique, core datasets. The data is drawn from a wide variety of sources, including the OECD DAC, the UN OCHA FTS, UN OCHA field offices, the World Bank and the European Commission.

Data and methodologies

We provide guidance on data sources and methodologies, and offer a range of simple visual tools that help to explain financing in humanitarian crises (available at www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides). This section of the GHA website will be updated with GHA’s new datasets in 2015.

www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides

We provide guidance on data sources and methodologies, and offer a range of simple visual tools that help to explain financing in humanitarian crises.

Helpdesk

We have a free, friendly helpdesk that provides support in using and applying the data. We respond to information and data requests from anyone working on humanitarian issues including donors, government organisations, UN agencies and academics. We receive a wide variety of requests relating to data, methodologies and humanitarian information.

Please get in touch on gha@devinit.org

Engagement and partnerships

We regularly engage with governments, NGOs, civil society organisations, UN agencies and other members of the humanitarian community, often participating in discussion panels and presenting at meetings and events. We are part of the World Humanitarian Summit’s expert group on effectiveness. We believe in aid transparency and are committed to making information on financing in humanitarian crises easier to access, understand and use, and are working actively with the International Aid Transparency Initiative on developing the standard and its use for humanitarian purposes.
Development Initiatives (DI) is an independent organisation committed to ending poverty by 2030, and GHA is one of its programme areas. The GHA programme allows DI to connect crisis, poverty and vulnerability, and situate humanitarian financing data within that of other resource flows including development assistance.

Earlier this year, we launched a new Development Data Hub – available at: http://devinit.org/data. This is the most comprehensive online resource for data on financial and resource flows data alongside poverty, social and vulnerability indicators. It combines an extensive data store with interactive visualisations enabling users to chart, map and compare poverty, vulnerability and financial resource flow data at the global, national and local level.

It brings together many datasets, turning complex data around poverty, vulnerability and resource flows into easy to understand interactive maps, charts and visualisations. It aims to answer questions such as:

- What kinds of development finance are going into a country, who gives these, and are they allocated according to need?
- What are countries really sending and receiving when you ‘unbundle’ resources like aid and other official flows?
- What domestic revenue does a national government raise, what mechanisms does it use, and where is it allocated?

We are constantly updating and adding new data and will be including more on humanitarian financing and crisis as well as additional risk indicators in the coming months. We hope this will provide a resource for all those involved in addressing crisis, risk, poverty and vulnerability, allowing a comprehensive overview of the synergies and gaps between all relevant resource flows.

We are undertaking a series of events and training on the Development Data Hub over the coming months. If you would like to find out more about the Development Data Hub or request training, please contact us at: info@devinit.org.

devinit.org/data
The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015 uses the latest data to present the most comprehensive assessment of international financing allocated to humanitarian situations. Sections on trends in humanitarian assistance, recent emergencies and their human impact, and efforts to strengthen the response to people in crisis, reveal the complexity of the international humanitarian response. The report answers questions about the way that the world finances response to crisis and vulnerability.

How much humanitarian assistance is there? Who provides it? Where does it go? How does it get there? What other resources are available? Transparent and reliable information, as provided by the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015, is essential for all those working to address crisis, risk and vulnerability.

Please visit our website at www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org to read previous reports and to download and share this one. To communicate with the authors, ask questions or provide comments, please contact us by email (gha@devinit.org) or via our helpdesk on our website. We welcome your feedback.

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