Severe humanitarian crisis
Afghanistan
Burkina Faso
CAR
Chad
Niger
CAR
Somalia
Chad
South Sudan
DRC
Sudan
Haiti
Yemen

Humanitarian crisis
Cameroon
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Iraq
Kenya
Lesotho
Malawi
Myanmar
Nigeria
Pakistan
Paraguay
Philippines
Senegal
Zimbabwe

Situation of concern
Angola
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Botswana
Burundi
Cambodia
China
Colombia
Jordan
Laos
Lebanon
Namibia
Thailand
Vietnam

Watch list
DPRK
Eritrea
India

Snapshot 08 – 15 October

In Syria, heavy fighting is ongoing in Rural Damascus, Dar’a, Aleppo, Idleb and Homs, with government forces making gains in Rural Damascus while the opposition has won ground in Dar’a. Despite the call of al-Qaeda’s leader for opposition fighters to unite, inter-group fighting has escalated in Aleppo over control for neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, the Syrian National Council announced that it did not intend to participate in the proposed Geneva II peace talks.

Tropical Cyclone Phailin made landfall on India’s eastern coast on 12 October, causing widespread material damage and affecting 9 million people across 14,500 villages in the coastal areas of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh.

A 7.2 magnitude earthquake hit the Philippines, mainly affecting the eastern provinces of Bohol and Cebu, on 15 October. The quake and several powerful aftershocks killed at least 67 people and affected at least 440,000 people to date.

Heavy rains since the third week of September have led to floods affecting 17 provinces throughout the northwest and along the Mekong River in central and southern Cambodia. To date, 134 people were killed and...
over 1,737,000 people affected by the flooding. Typhoon Nari, which hit Vietnam on 15 October, will most likely increase water levels further in the coming days.

Following a period of uneven rainfall and a locust plague in Madagascar, this year’s reduced harvest resulted in severe food insecurity that is now affecting up to 4 million people and putting another 9.6 million at risk, according to FAO.

Last Updated: 15/10/2013 Next Update: 22/10/2013
BURKINA FASO FOOD INSECURITY, DISPLACEMENT

**Highlights**

No new development this week. Last update was: 16/09/2013.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

Burkina Faso has been affected by insecurity and the ongoing military intervention in Mali.

**Displacement:** As of 30 September, UNHCR noted that the current number of Malian refugees in Burkina Faso (unchanged since April) stands at 49,975, including 27,146 children. Refugees are located in seven formally recognised camps and informal settlement sites: Mentao, Damba, Feréiro, Goudebo, Gandafabou, Bobo Dioulasso, and Ouagadougou. Most camps are in the northern region of Sahel, in the provinces of Soum, Oudalan and Seno, where almost 90% of Malian refugees are settled. The presence of Malian refugees and their cattle in this arid area exacerbates the scarcity of natural resources and poses a risk of increased tensions between local communities and refugees.

**Disaster:** As reported by OCHA on 11 September, heavy rainfalls in mid-August affected 6,712 people, damaged 600 houses, and impacted livestock and infrastructure in the east (district of Est) and the west (districts of Boucle du Mouhoun Sahel and Hauts Bassins) of the country. ECHO reported on 13 September that the population is in urgent need of food assistance and shelter, while wells and water points need to be rehabilitated.

To date, severe flooding has affected over 400,000 people across nine countries of the Sahel region in Africa.

**Food Security:** According to WFP, cereal production from the 2012/2013 agricultural season was over 30% higher than the 2011/2012 production. FEWSNET indicated in August that food access has improved for the poor and very poor, following cash assistance programmes and adapted prices. This allows the targeted population to remain at minimal levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 1). However, the country has undergone several shocks over the past five years, including the 2011/2012 drought, and the population has not yet recovered from the last food crisis, mainly because many households still suffer from the effects of negative coping strategies, such as the sale of assets, implemented during the 2012 crisis.

FEWSNET previously stated that, as of June 2013, about 80% of the 16.9 million Burkinabe are currently meeting consumption needs and face Minimal/None (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity. At end June, OCHA noted that 1.8 million people (20% of the population) were food insecure. Difficulties in accessing food are primarily due to low purchasing power, low household agricultural production, and difficult geographical access to markets. A March FAO report found that the food insecure are predominantly in the Sahel, north and east regions.

In the Sahelian area of Burkina Faso, an estimated 90% of people depend on agriculture and livestock for their livelihoods. Civil strife in northern Mali has contributed to increased food supply issues in parts of the country. OCHA reported early July that the arrival of Malian refugees and their cattle had further increased pressure on scarce resources leading to tensions with local communities. A May WFP and UNHCR joint assessment showed that 15% of the Malian refugee households have poor or borderline food consumption, against 13% in the host population. A February FAO/WFP joint assessment indicated an elevated prevalence of food insecurity in Malian refugee camps and in Burkina host communities with an estimated 52% of refugees and 58% of host populations affected by food insecurity.

**Health and Malnutrition:** In late August, 2,576 suspected cases of measles were reported, 35% in the Sahel Region. Of the 35% Sahel cases, 40% were from the refugee camps.

According to UNICEF, the incidence of meningitis was at 1,679 cases as of early May 2013, in comparison to 2012, which saw 4,814 officially registered cases for the same period. The incidence rate this year is 66% lower, indicating that the country is emerging from the high-transmission meningitis period and will most likely not experience an outbreak in 2013.

The 2013 total annual caseload of children <5 with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), as reported by UNICEF in late August, remains at January levels with an estimated 120,000. The number of children affected by Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) is estimated at 400,000, marking a decrease from January levels, bringing the <5 General Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate to 10.9%. According to 2012 assessments, the highest GAM rates were recorded in the regions of Centre North, East, North, Centre and Boucle de Mouhoun. In May, UNHCR and WFP reported that malnutrition is alarming among certain Malian refugee communities, especially in Goudebo, where rates are beyond critical thresholds (SAM: 5.3%, MAM: 19.1%).

Reviewed: 15/10/2013

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CONFLICT, FOOD INSECURITY, INSECURITY

**Highlights**

No new development this week. Last update was: 16/09/2013.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

The Central African Republic has been affected by conflict and food insecurity.

**Conflict:** Heavy fighting between the Seleka and volcanic rebels has led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The United Nations has described the situation as a humanitarian crisis.

**Food Security:** According to WFP, cereal production from the 2012/2013 agricultural season was over 30% higher than the 2011/2012 production. FEWSNET indicated in August that food access has improved for the poor and very poor, following cash assistance programmes and adapted prices. This allows the targeted population to remain at minimal levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 1). However, the country has undergone several shocks over the past five years, including the 2011/2012 drought, and the population has not yet recovered from the last food crisis, mainly because many households still suffer from the effects of negative coping strategies, such as the sale of assets, implemented during the 2012 crisis.

FEWSNET previously stated that, as of June 2013, about 80% of the 16.9 million Burkinabe are currently meeting consumption needs and face Minimal/None (IPC Phase 1) food insecurity. At end June, OCHA noted that 1.8 million people (20% of the population) were food insecure. Difficulties in accessing food are primarily due to low purchasing power, low household agricultural production, and difficult geographical access to markets. A March FAO report found that the food insecure are predominantly in the Sahel, north and east regions.

In the Sahelian area of Burkina Faso, an estimated 90% of people depend on agriculture and livestock for their livelihoods. Civil strife in northern Mali has contributed to increased food supply issues in parts of the country. OCHA reported early July that the arrival of Malian refugees and their cattle had further increased pressure on scarce resources leading to tensions with local communities. A May WFP and UNHCR joint assessment showed that 15% of the Malian refugee households have poor or borderline food consumption, against 13% in the host population. A February FAO/WFP joint assessment indicated an elevated prevalence of food insecurity in Malian refugee camps and in Burkina host communities with an estimated 52% of refugees and 58% of host populations affected by food insecurity.

**Health and Malnutrition:** In late August, 2,576 suspected cases of measles were reported, 35% in the Sahel Region. Of the 35% Sahel cases, 40% were from the refugee camps.

According to UNICEF, the incidence of meningitis was at 1,679 cases as of early May 2013, in comparison to 2012, which saw 4,814 officially registered cases for the same period. The incidence rate this year is 66% lower, indicating that the country is emerging from the high-transmission meningitis period and will most likely not experience an outbreak in 2013.

The 2013 total annual caseload of children <5 with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), as reported by UNICEF in late August, remains at January levels with an estimated 120,000. The number of children affected by Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) is estimated at 400,000, marking a decrease from January levels, bringing the <5 General Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate to 10.9%. According to 2012 assessments, the highest GAM rates were recorded in the regions of Centre North, East, North, Centre and Boucle de Mouhoun. In May, UNHCR and WFP reported that malnutrition is alarming among certain Malian refugee communities, especially in Goudebo, where rates are beyond critical thresholds (SAM: 5.3%, MAM: 19.1%).

Reviewed: 15/10/2013
10 October: The UN Security Council adopted resolution 2121, which provides the basis for a peaceful resolution to the crisis in CAR. It demanded the implementation of transitional arrangements leading to presidential and legislative elections 18 months after the start of the transition, and reinforced the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (BINUCA). The Council also urged elements of the ex-Seleka and other armed groups to participate in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

8-9 October: At least 50 people were killed and dozens wounded in clashes between the elements of the ex-Seleka and autodefence groups in Garga, northwest of the country. The two days of fighting caused the local population to flee in the bush and toward the neighbouring town of Yaloke.

Political and Security Context

On 10 October, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2121, which provides the basis for a peaceful resolution to the crisis in CAR, in a clear indication that international concerns are rising over the situation currently unfolding in the country. It demanded the swift implementation of transitional arrangements leading to transparent presidential and legislative elections 18 months after the start of the transition. Against that backdrop, the Council updated the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (BINUCA), reinforcing its role in five areas: support for implementation of the transition process, support for conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance, support for stabilisation of the security situation, promotion and protection of human rights, and coordination of international actors. The Council also urged elements of the ex-Seleka and other armed groups to participate in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes (DDRP). Paris is also pushing for the UN to back the African Union (AU) force deployed in the country and would ultimately favour the African mission to become a UN peacekeeping force.

On 13 September, the transitional President of CAR, Michel Djotodia, officially announced the dissolution of the Seleka movement, the armed force he led and which allowed him to seize power in late March. According to different estimates, the Seleka coalition numbered 25,000 fighters, some of whom had been recruited as the group advanced toward the capital Bangui between December 2012 and March 2013, and after the seizure of the capital. At present, the main issue that remains is the disarming of part of the Seleka armed movement that will not be integrated in the regular armed forces. After a period of voluntary disarmament that ended on 14 September, coercive disarmament of parts of the Seleka-affiliated fighters is to start in Bangui while the new authorities struggle to establish order throughout the country. To date, tensions are reported as the second phase of disarmament has not yet started.

As of mid-September, the situation in CAR remained highly volatile with various sources reporting widespread insecurity and clashes between elements of the only in-name-defunct Seleka coalition and the population. Various rebel leaders, de facto new warlords – some originating from neighbouring countries, are reportedly dominating the country outside of the capital Bangui. Looting and destruction is virtually unchecked, with an increasing number of unpaid Seleka members roaming the streets and setting up checkpoints to collect money. Increasingly, the local population is responding by organising vigilante groups.

According to a senior UN official who visited the country in early August, security is virtually non-existent beyond the capital, while state institutions are close to collapse. In various parts of the country, human rights infringements, arrests and executions are reported. In mid-August, another UN official commented that the country is on the brink of collapse and the crisis is threatening to spread beyond CAR’s borders. The new authorities are still unable to restore order or even deploy official representatives outside of Bangui. Over 600 people were killed in 2013; the three regions most affected by violence are Ouham, Bouar and Bangui.

On 6 October, 14 people have reportedly been killed in violent clashes between Christians and Muslims that have been ongoing since the previous week in Bangassou, some 750 km east of the capital Bangui. In a worrying development, this last series of violent incidents is another indication of the rise of interreligious fighting in CAR while witnesses reported that the clashes broke out on 1 October after local Christians organised a march to protest against abuses by Seleka’s predominantly Muslim fighters.

On 8-9 October, at least 50 people were killed and dozens wounded in clashes between the elements of the ex-Seleka and autodefence groups in Garga, northwest of the country. The two days of fighting caused the local population to flee in the bush and toward the neighbouring town of Yaloke. In late September, heavy fighting was reportedly ongoing in the volatile northwest of CAR, around Bossangoa and Bossembele, 150 kilometres and 300 kilometres north-west of the capital Bangui respectively, with little information available. Various vigilante groups, and groups loyal to the former authorities ousted by the Seleka, have proliferated over the past weeks and clashed with elements of the Seleka in the area. The conflict has reportedly become more and more religiously motivated. Renewed fighting has triggered new massive displacement with up to 170,000 people uprooted in September while the number of casualties remains difficult to ascertain.

The clashes began on 7 September in Bossangoa and later spread throughout the province. On 9 September, up to 100 people were killed and at least 50 people wounded when troops of the new regime battled fighters claiming loyalty to toppled president Francois Bozize in Bossangoa and Bouca, in Ouham district. Although defence and security forces were said to control Bossangoa, men claiming to serve the ex-president were still holding villages around the town. On 8 September, forces, possibly loyal to former President Bozize, infiltrated these villages, destroying bridges, and other infrastructure, and reportedly taking revenge against the Muslim population. The retake of the village by the Seleka resulted in attacks against the Christian population. According to UNHCR, the clashes triggered significant displacement, and at least eight villages were razed to the ground.

According to local reports, 28 August, eight civilians were killed by Seleka fighters in the village of Ngaoundaye, about 500 km northwest of the capital. Fighting between local residents and Seleka military also affected the nearby Makele village where at least two Seleka military were killed. On the previous day, fighting was reportedly ongoing in Bo village, 50 km from Ngaoundaye, and in Beboura village, 140 km east of Ngaoundaye, with
at least ten civilians killed in separate incidents.

A string of violent incidents between local residents and Seleka military already occurred end of August in the villages of Ngaoundaye, Makele, Bo and Beboura, about 500 km northwest of the capital. They came after insecurity resurfaced in Bangui between 20 and 27 August. Reports indicated that at least 13 people were killed and over 30 injured during an alleged disarmament operation of supporters of the ousted President F. Bozize by the new authorities. The operation mainly targeted the Boy-Rabe, Boeing, and Combattant neighbourhoods, believed to be strongholds of supporters of the former regime reside. According to various international observers, the manoeuvre was marked by arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, extortion, armed robberies, physical violence, restriction of movement, and lootings and led to an estimated 5,000-6,000 people fleeing from the Boeing quarter to take refuge in the nearby Bangui International airport.

The previous day, President Djotodia had allegedly barred fighters from the Seleka coalition from further participating in policing operations in Bangui and had declared that the task had to be left to the AU-led International Support Mission to Central Africa (MISCA). In mid-April, a first disarmament operation in Boy-Rabe was criticised by foreign observers, including Human Rights Watch, as it resulted in widespread lootings of houses amid indiscriminate shootings of civilians by members of the Seleka coalition.

In August, violent clashes between Seleka fighters and the population were reported across the country, affecting particularly the town of Bouca in the northwest, the town of Bohong in the north, the village of Beboura, 30 km from Paoua, a city near the Chadian border, in the Bossangoa city area in the northwest prefecture of Ouham, a village called Ouhman-Bac in the northwest and in the area of Bambari, the country’s third biggest city in the south. Widespread insecurity along the road from Bozoum to Bossangoa was also documented.

On 1 August, the Multinational Force of Central African States (FOMAC), which had been operating in CAR since before the coup and was dispatched to help in improving security, became the AU-led MISCA, with the main mandate of helping restore control of the authorities over the whole territory. As reported by local sources in mid-September, reinforcements have begun arriving for an African peacekeeping mission, but the planned 3,600-strong force will not be fully deployed before January 2014. According to authorities, the military force should have reached 2,000 soldiers by the end of the September. An estimated 450 French military force, which may be increased to 750 soldiers, are also posted in CAR, with a restricted mandate of securing the international airport, and protecting French interests and citizens in the country. Moreover, Paris has stated that it was ready to provide operational support to the MISCA forces.

On 18 August, the former rebel leader Michel Djotodia, head of the Seleka coalition that took control of CAR following a coup in late March, was formally sworn in as the country’s new president. The inauguration of Djotodia officially marks the beginning of his interim administration’s 18-month deadline to restore order and organise elections. Initially, violence erupted in CAR in December 2012, when the Seleka coalition, a group of five rebel movements, took up arms against the Government, claiming that it had failed to honour 2001 and 2007 peace deals declaring amnesty for fighters who laid down their arms. Throughout March, Seleka rebels took control of various towns and continued their advance until they seized Bangui on 24 March and toppled President Bozizé who fled to Cameroon.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

More than six months after Seleka rebels seized power in CAR, the country is still struggling with a humanitarian emergency. Humanitarian agencies have warned that the situation across the country and in Bangui is worsening, advocating for security, access, and protection of civilians. Ongoing lawlessness is considerable, and administrative offices, hospitals, health centres, and schools have been pillaged, depriving vulnerable communities of basic services. UNICEF reported in early July that the current humanitarian crisis is affecting an estimated 4.6 million people (the entire population of CAR), including 2.3 million children. As of mid-August, OCHA noted that 1.6 million people were in dire need of assistance.

**Displacement:** Levels of internal displacement in CAR are difficult to ascertain. As of 24 September, UNHCR indicated that over 170,000 people, half of them children, have fled over the previous two weeks in Ouham province in northwest CAR following increased fighting. As of 24 September, there were reportedly 394,900 IDPs in CAR. The latest IDP numbers mark a significant increase compared to estimates published at the beginning of the month.

As of 3 September, OCHA reported over 227,835 IDPs in CAR, half of whom are children. The districts with the most IDPs are Ouaka (58,793), Kemo (29,951), Basse-Kotto (28,153), and Ouham Pende (17,396). 3,000 IDPs are also reported in the capital Bangui. These numbers may be higher, given that humanitarian access to much of the country remains restricted due to insecurity. As reported by OCHA in late August, clashes between the local population and Seleka in north-western CAR led 4,125 people to flee to Chad, while over 17,000 persons were internally displaced. Recent unrest in Bangui in late August reportedly triggered a further displacement of up to 6,000 people.

As of mid-September, UNHCR reported that 62,714 people have fled from CAR since the latest crisis erupted last December. The DRC alone has received an estimated 42,600 refugees, while Chad witnessed the arrival of 13,087 people, including 4,125 who have arrived in the Moissala area since mid-July. An additional 4,841 people moved to Republic of Congo and 4,286 to Cameroon respectively. Cumulatively, there are over 220,000 refugees from CAR in neighbouring countries.

There are an estimated 17,000 refugees in CAR, mostly Congolese and Sudanese. In April and May, the UN reported that an estimated 5,000 people were displaced from Sudan’s Darfur into CAR following tribal clashes. According to local media, the 2,200 Sudanese refugees from camp Bambari demanded to be moved from the camp due to the deteriorating security and the humanitarian and health situation in the camp.

According to OCHA, in June 2013, the number of displaced in Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) affected areas remains at 21,000 but requires verification when the situation stabilises; 3,815 DRC refugees remain hosted in Haut-Mbomou with a majority (3,225) in Zemio camp.

**Disaster:** As reported by IFRC, on 3-4 September, heavy rains caused flooding in several...
areas of the 3rd district of Bangui. Of a total population of 90,000 people, over a third (33,000) were affected, with 337 families having their houses damaged or destroyed. An estimated 30% of the people who had their homes affected found refuge with host families, the rest are living out in the open. Almost all the wells and latrines in these areas were reportedly damaged by flood waters.

Access: On 8-9 September, two staff members of the NGO ACTED were killed in Bossangoa, about 300 km north of the capital. In Bangui, lootings of vehicles, notably off-road vehicles, operated by international organisations continue to occur, with several cases being reported over the past two weeks.

As reported by UNICEF on 2 September, a truck drivers’ strike in Cameroon over deteriorating security conditions in CAR was stopping humanitarian aid from reaching thousands of children. On 21 August, Cameroonian authorities temporarily shut down the border after claiming Seleka rebels had shot a police officer. But despite the border reopening, truckers remain cautious about crossing into CAR. According to UNICEF, other relief groups working in CAR are also impacted by the strike.

Security incidents are still reported in Bangui and across the country. The humanitarian community is increasingly the target of looting and attacks by armed groups. On 9 September, two aid workers were killed in clashes between troops of the new regime and fighters claiming loyalty to toppled president Bozize in Ouham district. In the capital, a local UN staff member was reportedly attacked by rogue Seleka elements on 12 August. This last incident followed one a week earlier when a local UN staff member was seriously wounded and his wife killed. UNHCR reported that it remains extremely concerned with limitations on humanitarian access, though access to refugee camps at Bambari, Batalimo, and Zemio that host mainly Congolese and Sudanese refugees in central and southern CAR, has improved. On 14 August, Caritas reported ongoing attacks against aid workers in the country.

OCHA reported on 17 July that the restriction of humanitarian space due to insecurity is limiting the delivery of aid to people in need. However, almost all NGOs have now returned to their previous locations and are deploying teams and resuming activities. The Humanitarian Country Team is facilitating access with Seleka authorities in regions outside Bangui to enable humanitarian actors to assist people affected by the crisis. UNDSS has approved the gradual return of critical international UN staff on 18 June, indicating an improvement in security-related constraints.

Despite these improvements, the use of secondary roads is inadvisable due to physical and infrastructural constraints, exacerbated by the impending rainy season. Access is largely limited to towns and populations along main roads.

Food Security: As reported by FAO in late August, an estimated 978,000 individuals were experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity levels while about 309,000 individuals are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) as of July. Accordingly, the total number of people in need of food assistance adds up to a total of about 1.29 million people (about 40% of the total population), nearly double the estimated level in February 2013. The estimation of the exact number of food insecure people in CAR remains nevertheless difficult to establish. In June, OCHA and the Food Security/Nutrition Working Group reported that 2 million people in CAR faced Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity.

On 8 August, WFP announced that it was scaling-up operations in CAR, amid increasing concerns that ongoing insecurity is fuelling hunger among people who have fled their homes and farms.

According to FEWSNET in late August, due to poor food availability and reduced income levels, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of acute food insecurity continued until the end of the lean season in September for northern, eastern, and central, conflict-affected areas. With the definitive start-of-season in the south and west, poor households are consuming wild and cultivated vegetables, which have improved food security conditions in these areas.

However, due to insecurity, households have not been able to make effective use of their livelihood assets and continued to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food security outcomes through September. The September harvests should enable households in most areas of the country to access food through their own crop production. However, in parts of northern, eastern, and central CAR, harvests are expected to be delayed and below-average. Consequently, households in these areas will continue to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food security outcomes between October and December. Nevertheless, according to some reports, the food security situation is likely to even further worsen in early 2014.

FAO reported in late August that market supplies are tight across the country and food prices are at high levels following severe and widespread market disruptions due to increased insecurity. The average inflation rate, which surged from 1.3% in 2011 to 5% in 2012, is forecast to rise further to 8% in 2013.

Health and Nutrition: As reported by Merlin in early June, 3.2 million people are living without health care. In August, OCHA reported that less than 20% of the country’s medical facilities are operational. In July, MSF stated that even before the coup, the country was in a state of crisis with mortality rates well above the emergency threshold in several regions.

Malnutrition and preventable diseases are reportedly rife. Malaria is the leading cause of death. The number of cases of malaria in northwest CAR has almost doubled, partly because of insecurity caused by armed groups operating in the rural north, according to MSF. MSF has treated 36,910 cases of malaria in Boguila, a region 50 km from the Chadian border, between January and June this year compared with 19,498 cases in the same period last year. Officially, malaria is estimated to be the cause of 54% of the deaths of children <5 in CAR.

According to UNICEF, a measles epidemic in Bangui county was confirmed and the organisation coordinated a vaccination campaign in late May. While the epidemic was initially diagnosed in the western region, it later spread to large parts of the county, such as the towns of Ngaoundaye, Abba and Carnot, Begoua, and Mbaiki, as well as the suburbs of the capital Bangui.

As of mid-August, over 13,000 people living with HIV/AIDS had their anti-retroviral treatment interrupted as a result of instability since December 2012.

According to UNICEF, malnutrition rates remain high with an estimated 13,500 children <5 suffering from SAM, and 44,000 affected by MAM. A recent exploratory mission in
southwest CAR, in Nola, Boda, Berberati, Gamboula and Gadzi, revealed an increase in levels of GAM, which ranged from 6%-10.3%. In May, as reported by an IPC seasonal analysis, the prevalence of SAM in children <5 was above the emergency threshold of 2% in nine of 16 prefectures.

Protection: INGOs have reported a sharp rise in human rights abuses across the country, including attacks on civilians, child recruitment, arbitrary arrest, illegal detention, summary executions, rape, and other violations against civilians. Several INGOs have indicated that children, notably those displaced by the conflict, remain particularly vulnerable. Several organisations, including UNICEF, have reported the re-recruitment of children <18, some of whom had been recently demobilised, into Seleka forces. According to OCHA, as of mid-August, at least 3,500 children have been recruited into armed groups.

In late July, the International Federation for Human Rights reported that Seleka rebels have killed 400 people, carried out dozens of rapes, and intentionally destroyed 34 villages/towns since February this year.

Updated: 15/10/2013

CHAD FLOODS, FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

No new development this week. Last update was: 23/09/2013.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Displacement: Chad has witnessed an escalating influx of migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries since March. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) on 29 July, instability in CAR, northern Nigeria and the Darfur region of Sudan has led many Chadians to return home with an estimated 1,000 returnees from CAR, 1,500 from Nigeria and 22,000 fleeing Sudanese Darfur to the border town of Tissi.

By early July, 20,640 Chadian returnees and 30,448 Sudanese refugees had arrived in Tissi. This marked the largest influx of Sudanese refugees into Chad since 2005. According to UNHCR on 18 August, the total number of Sudanese refugees in Chad is now 330,000 people. The displaced fled a conflict over gold mines in eastern Darfur between Maaliya and Rizeigat ethnic groups. Another wave later crossed into Chad fleeing inter-communal violence between Salamat and Misseriya ethnic groups in Um Dukhun, Central Darfur.

Ongoing political turmoil in CAR has led to 13,087 CAR refugees crossing into Chad since December (including 4,125 refugees who arrived mid-July in Moissala, southern Chad), bringing the number of CAR refugees in Chad to over 70,000, UNHCR reported on 13 August.

Humanitarian needs among incoming refugees are: access to potable water; hygiene; shelter; and health and nutrition care for children and women. Against this background, UNICEF reported in late April that basic social services are non-existent in Tissi, having been destroyed or damaged during the 2004-2006 civil war and following ethnic tension in the Sila region.

People fleeing violence in northern Nigeria have crossed into Western Chad around Lake Chad. Returnees from Nigeria are primarily unaccompanied minors from fishing villages in Bagakawa, notes UNICEF. As of early June, Chadian authorities reported an estimated 1,200 returnees dispersed across three hard-to-reach locations: Bagasola; Ngouboua; and Tchoucoutelia.

Disaster: On 21 August, local media reported that heavy rains struck eastern Chad and led to the destruction of more than 2,000 houses in the Sudanese refugee camp Mile. The number of affected people is unknown. The rainy season has yet to end, and flooding is causing significant access constraints and deterioration of sanitary conditions.

Access: OCHA reported on 17 September that humanitarian organisations in the areas of Tissi (southeast) are confronted with restrained access due to the proximity of two unstable borders, heavy rains, and insecurity.

Food Security: Two consecutive years of continued climatic shocks, including poor rainfall in 2011, caused significant food security concerns in Chad in 2012 that are continuing into 2013. According to WFP and the Chadian Government, 13% of households (around 1.2 million people) face severe food insecurity and another 9% face moderate food insecurity in 18 regions across Chad. In total, 2.1 million people are reportedly food insecure.

According to FEWSNET on 28 August, food insecurity remains stressed (IPC Phase 2) in Logone Oriental, Tangjilé, Logone Occidental, and Mayo Kebbi West, mostly due to seasonal price increase and depletion of stocks earlier than usual (as a direct result of the 2012 floods). The expected average October harvests will enable households to meet their food needs more easily between October and December.

The Chadian Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation reports that the final cereal production figures for the 2012/2013 agricultural season stand at 3.1 million tonnes of cereals. This marks an increase of 91% compared to the previous season and 54% compared to the five-year production average. The good 2012/2013 harvests have allowed very poor and poor households to replenish food reserves, while market prices across Chad have remained stable and even occasionally trending downwards. According to FEWSNET, food security conditions will steadily improve with the rebuilding of the production capacity and the replenishment of livelihood assets.

Despite a net cereal production surplus form the current harvest season, production deficits have been registered in some structurally food-deficient regions of the Sahel belt. The main reasons are: drought, crop diseases, and destruction by birds. In southern Chad, deficits are largely a result of floods.

In mid-July, local media reported that Sudanese refugees located in camps in eastern Chad faced food shortages. A joint assessment by WFP and UNHCR in May showed that the food security situation is alarming for 22,131 Central African refugees in the Belom camp in Maro (southern Chad). The most affected are refugees who arrived in Chad from January to March 2013 (compared to earlier refugees from 2002 to 2009), with 71.2% of
them food insecure. This is mainly due to the lack of access to agricultural lands, poverty, lack of diversified livelihoods, and unsustainable income generating activities. Local media reported on 13 August that Sudanese refugees in camp Djabal (eastern Chad) suffer from an acute lack of drinking water, putting the lives of 19,500 people at risk.

Health and Malnutrition: MSF reported in mid-September that the main causes of morbidity in the Tissi area are malaria, acute watery diarrhoea, and respiratory infections. The malaria caseload for 2013 is a cause of concern, with some of the hardest hit regions seeing a tenfold rise from 2012, following an unpredictable rainy season and the shortage of bed nets across the country. MSF reported that the number of malaria cases increased alarmingly in Am Timan, Salamat region, with 14,021 cases reported in August alone.

Since July, local media have regularly reported the dire conditions in which Sudanese refugees live in camps located in eastern Chad. On 12 September, it was reported that the refugees of camp Djabal have complained about the high incidence of malaria and diarrhoea, especially affecting the youngest and older persons, while camp authorities reported 22 deaths during August. Earlier in July, Sudanese refugees of camp Treguine had reported similar problems, indicating that there was an acute lack of medical staff and medicines in the camps.

The nutritional situation in Chad’s Sahel belt is at critical levels with a GAM rate surpassing the emergency threshold of 15% in nine of 22 regions, according to OCHA. The most affected areas are Batha (25% GAM), Wadi Fira (22% GAM), Salamat (22% GAM), Beg (21% GAM), and Kanem (21% GAM). UNICEF forecasts that an estimated 126,000 children will suffer from SAM in 2013.

Reviewed: 15/10/2013

**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO** CONFLICT, FOOD INSECURITY

### Highlights

- **10-12 October:** In North-Kivu, clashes between local militias caused at least two deaths and displaced an unknown number of people. In late September, fighting between the same armed groups killed 16 people including 4 children.

- **As of 10 October,** fighting between the militia Raia Mutomboki (RM) and the Forces Armées de la RDC (FARDC) in South Kivu caused 22,000 people to seek refuge in Maniema province (Pangi territory) within the last two weeks.

- **As of 9 October,** the number of IDPs in Katanga province has decreased from 389,700 to 358,400 since August. Over the same period, the number of returns has increased significantly due to the latest lull in violence in the territories of Kasenga, Manono and Mitwaba. The situation remains volatile in Malemba Nkulu and Pweto, where repeated clashes between government forces and local militias occurred.

- **As of 9 October,** there were 591,000 IDPs in South Kivu, 76% of which had to leave their places of origin because of insecurity caused by armed groups. This number marks a decrease in IDP numbers compared to August, mainly due to an update of figures for returnees in the province.

**6-9 October:** In North-Kivu, two rival factions of the militia RM clashed over mining resources in Shabunda, forcing the local population to flee in the bush. The RM has been active in the area with fighting reported in the beginning of the month. Peace talks reportedly started on 10 October between local authorities and RM representatives to end the state of violence.

### Political and Security Context

**International Context:** On 7 October, according to reports, the presidents of Rwanda and Uganda told UN Security Council envoys that their countries were not responsible for bringing peace to neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) volatile east, which has been plagued by endemic conflict for years. The two countries have long been accused of supporting various rebel groups in DRC, including the M23, which allegedly benefited from Rwanda’s support, a charge Kigali rejects. For observers, both countries are seen to foster instability in DRC.

**National Context:** On 5 October, the President Kabila pledged to turn recommendations from three weeks of national dialogue into policies to tackle the country’s lingering social, institutional and economic problems. On 4 October, recommendations by thematic groups working under the framework of the National Dialogue Forum (NDF) were validated in Kinshasa. The recommendations included the restructuration of the FARDC, the police and security forces, and the gradual establishment of new provinces. Opposition groups have reportedly included specific reforms to the national electoral commission ahead of 2016 presidential elections, while suspicions run high that the current President may seek a third term though the constitution currently prevents him from doing so.

The NDF opened on 7 September, with the agenda tackling the current political, social, and military crisis. Leaders are meeting in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi in Katanga province, and Kisangani in Orientale province to discuss the country’s governance, economy, and decentralisation process, as well as disarmament of insurgent groups and inter-communal strife. The main opposition force, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), is not present because reportedly their wish to review the agenda was disregarded by President Kabila and his government. The UDPS allegedly wanted to address such issues as human rights violation, children’s enrolment in armed groups, the sell-off of natural resources, corruption, and the legitimacy of institutions. While the discussions were meant to last up to 20 days, consultations were delayed because of profound disagreements between participating parties.

DRC is struggling with a proliferation of armed groups that shelter in different provinces. North Kivu, Katanga, and Orientale are currently the most volatile with ongoing heavy fighting. Across the entire country, sustained combat operations and infighting between various armed groups, non-state actors and government military are causing massive displacement.

In parts of Maniema and South Kivu provinces, various armed groups were reportedly present between July and September, with significant activism of the militia RM in Shabunda territory. Between 6 and 9 October, local media reported that two rival factions
of RM clashed over mining resources, forcing the local population to flee in the bush. In late September, fighting between RM and FARDC was also reported in Shabunda, where it triggered new displacements. Peace talks reportedly started on 10 October between local authorities and RM representatives to end the spate of violence, which started in Baliga area at the beginning of September.

According to local reports, various human rights infringements were reported, while several humanitarian organisations were forced to evacuate their staff from the area because of insecurity.

**North-Kivu Province:** According to local sources, North Kivu currently harbours more than 20 different armed groups, including the ethnic Tutsi-dominated M23 insurgency group, which has plagued the province with indiscriminate attacks on civilians and fighting with government troops for years. The conflict in the mining region also drags regional powers into the fighting, with neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda regularly accused by the authorities of backing militias.

On 6 October, an attack and looting of alleged M23 insurgents was recorded against a health centre in Kiwanja city, near Rutshuru. Although a representative of the M23 denied the group’s implication, the M23 had already been accused of having conducted attacks and lootings in the same area over the previous days.

On 26 September, clashes erupted in Kahunga, north of Goma city, ending the relative calm that lasted after UN peacekeeping troops and the government military forced M23 rebels to retreat at the end of August. Renewed fighting is threatening ongoing negotiations between government representatives and the M23. Up to 26 September, the ceasefire was generally respected in the south of the province, although M23 insurgents were reportedly continuing to harass the population and impose curfews, particularly around the township of Rutshuru, north of Goma.

Peace talks started in early 2013, but were interrupted in May when violence escalated in North Kivu where the M23 had earlier fought an 18-month uprising. In mid-July, renewed hostilities between FARDC and M23 occurred in the vicinity of Goma leading to the deadliest clashes since the beginning of the rebellion in April 2012. In late August, ongoing fighting between the M23 and FARDC caused heavy casualties on both sides and led to the involvement of the UN intervention brigade for the first time since the beginning of its unprecedented mandate to launch military operations against the insurgents. In early September, over 80 people were killed in another outbreak of violence, with reportedly an additional 30 civilians being killed as residential areas of Goma were shelled.

In mid-September, both belligerent parties resumed dialogue following an ultimatum set by leaders of Africa’s Great Lakes region. On 28 September, local sources reported that Ugandan mediators will present a proposal for the peace agreement between the DRC Government and the M23. Both sides are reportedly giving priority to the return of refugees and national reconciliation, but deep disagreement remains around the amnesty of M23 fighters and reintegration opportunities.

As reported by OCHA in mid-September, the northern area of Kamango, near the Ugandan border, was still considered unsafe for people to return, three months after clashes between FARDC and the Ugandan rebel group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) forced an estimated 66,000 refugees to cross into Uganda. While WFP reported in August that 70% of the refugees had returned to DRC, ongoing attacks by armed groups made the returnees reluctant to go back to areas of origin. According to the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Cong (MONUSCO), ADF carried out over 20 attacks on schools and hospitals in the Kamango area from November 2012 to July 2013. As reported by MONUSCO, there are urgent needs in terms of protection and food security in the area. New ADF attacks were reported by local sources in Watalingo area in mid-September.

In southern North Kivu, various armed groups are reportedly active, especially along the Masisi-Walikale axis. On 11-12 October, violent clashes between the Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) and the Hutu-dominated militia Nyatura caused an unknown number of people to flee to areas of origin. On 10 October, local media reported that new fighting between the Nduna Defense of Congo (NDC) militia and APCLS killed two people in Masisi territory. On 27-28 September, the three militias APCLS, NDC and Nyatura clashed in Kalembé, causing the death of 16 people including 4 children.

Throughout August and September, the NDC militia repeatedly clashed with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (DFLR), a Rwandan Hutu ethnic rebel group, the APCLS, and government military in Walikale territory, causing multiple population displacements. As of early October, the deployment of MONUSCO troops to Walikale has allegedly allowed for an easing of tensions, but the axis Masisi-Walikale remains under control of rebel groups.

**Orientale Province:** In mid-September, clashes between FARDC and the Patriotic Resistance Force of Ituri (FRPI) in Walendo-Bindi, in Ituri territory, displaced an estimated 120,000 people. In August, four days of fighting in Walendo-Bindi, Bavi and Olonga between the same belligerents had reportedly displaced over 80,000 people and affected 120,000.

In late August, clashes between unidentified armed groups were reported from Kakwa and Kaliko in Ituri territory forcing FARDC to intervene. In a separate incident, clashes between FARDC and a rebel group based in the Mambasa region were reported in mid-August.

In late August, renewed tensions between the FARDC and the Ugandan army were reported from Mahagi, north of Lake Albert and close to the Ugandan border. Little information is available to date.

Orientale province has been largely affected by the activism of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan militant movement operating in DRC since 2005, which allegedly conducted 30 attacks in the second quarter of 2013, mostly in Dungu territory.

**Katanga Province:** On 25 September, incidents continued to be reported in Manono, Pweto, and Mitwaba where increasing activism of the militia Bakata Katanga has caused renewed population movements. The separatist militia group Bakata Katanga has been carrying out continuous attacks in Katanga, notably in Ngarie, where it caused large displacement since June. However, since August, more than 350 members of Bakata Katanga have reportedly surrendered to government forces.

In August, other armed groups, including the Popular Self-Defence Forces (FAP), and local
militias have reportedly been active in Katanga province and have clashed with the FARDC.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement:** As of 31 August, DRC hosted over 185,000 refugees among whom over 127,000 are from Rwanda and the rest from CAR, Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, and the Republic of Congo. Since December 2012, UNHCR reported that 42,612 refugees have arrived in DRC from CAR. As of July, OCHA estimated that 2.6 million people remained displaced in DRC as a result of fighting between the FARDC and various rebel groups, mostly in North and South Kivu provinces and Katanga.

As of 25 September, over 225,000 Congolese refugees resided in Uganda and Rwanda with 140,000 located in Uganda, including 112,000 from North Kivu, and 85,000 in Rwanda, including over 63,000 from North Kivu, according to UNHCR. Since April 2012, over 30,000 new refugees had been registered in Rwanda.

**North-Kivu Province:** Over the past month, extensive fighting between armed non-state actors and government military, as well as infighting has led to massive displacement in North Kivu.

As of 25 September, OCHA reported that North Kivu currently hosts over 1.032 million IDPs, some displaced since January 2009. The new number represents a 0.8% increase compared to the cumulative figure released in August 2013 when over 1.024 million IDPs were recorded. This slight increase is due to an update of the numbers of displaced across the province and of new displacement following insecurity in the area.

In August, over half the displaced were located in the territory of Masisi (30%) and Walikale (23.5%). In the whole province, 63% of IDPs were reported to be living with host families, against 22% in public buildings, and 15% in camps. To date, population movements are still ongoing due to the presence of multiple armed groups and repeated clashes between insurgents and government forces.

In early September, OCHA reported that clashes between the rebel groups APCLS and the Congolese Army Movement (MAC) in the zone of Habula led to the displacement of most of the town toward Kashebere and Nyabidon in northwestern Masisi territory.

In August, several thousand people were forced to flee their homes because of clashes between various armed groups, mainly NDC, the DFLR, and the APCLS in Walikale territory. In mid-August, local sources reported that 16,000 people from Munzanga, Kisone, Munzanga, Busakara and Pinga were displaced to the villages of Rusamambu, Buleusa, Kateku, Kilambo, and Bukumbirwa. As reported by NRC in late August, 15,000 people who fled from Kituna in July were still displaced in Nyanzale, Khondo, and Kasoko.

In July, large displacements from Kishimba and Ikobo toward Bulewusa, Miriki, and Kanyabayonga, and from Rutshuru territory to the south of Lubero territory were reported. On 11 July, an attack by ADF-Nalu on the town of Kamango led to 66,000 people from eastern DRC North Kivu province fleeing into neighbouring Uganda. While WFP reported in August that 70% of the refugees had returned to DRC, ongoing attacks by armed groups made the returnees reluctant to go back to their areas of origin.

**South Kivu Province:** According to OCHA as of 30 September, there are currently 591,000 IDPs in South Kivu, 76% of which had to leave their places of origin because of insecurity caused by armed groups. This number marks a decrease of IDPs compared to August, mainly due to an update of figures for returnees in the province.

In August, the authorities reported that since the beginning of the year, large groups of displaced have returned to South Kivu with up to 81,000 returnees, 80% of all the returnees, settling in Shabunda territory. In late September, small-scale new displacement reportedly occurred following fighting between RM and government military in the area.

In August-September, according to OCHA, displacement had been registered in various parts of South Kivu with over 10,000 people fleeing from Muturule and Uvira in Rusisi Plain to neighbouring areas, up to 8,000 people fleeing from the town of Luberezzi Bwergera, Luvungi, Sange, and in Rusisi Plain with 9,800 people being displaced in the same area. These displacements have been largely triggered by renewed activism of armed groups in the area.

In August, over 1,200 people from South Kivu crossed into Burundi following ethnic conflict Barundi and the Bafulinro groups. Since January 2013, 6,000 DRC refugees have entered Burundi.

**Maniema Province:** On 26 August, OCHA reported that Maniema province was hosting an estimated 250,000 IDPs as a result of ongoing conflict in the Kivus. The IDPs are mainly located in the east of the province between Punja and Pangi and are reportedly suffering from limited access to humanitarian aid. As a result of fighting between the militia RM and the FARDC in South Kivu in late September, over 22,000 people arrived in Maniema province within the last two weeks, and are currently residing in Pangi territory.

**Orientale Province:** As of late August, OCHA reported that 351,617 people, including 51,262 since January 2013, remained displaced in Orientale province.

In mid-September, an additional 120,000 people were displaced following clashes between FARDC and FRPI in Walendu Bindi in Ituri territory. According to local sources, the IDPs are without shelter and in dire conditions. To date, ongoing fighting is hindering humanitarian access to these populations. The latest wave of displacement is largely believed to be a continuation of fighting in Walendu-Bindi, Bavi, and Olongba, which displaced 80,000 people in August. The August-September displacements in Orientale province are the biggest wave of population movement in the province since 2008.

As reported by local sources, an estimated 50,000 IDPS, displaced following recent fighting, live without access to humanitarian assistance in Soke locality in Ituri district.

**Katanga Province:** OCHA reported on 9 October that the number of IDPs in the province has decreased from 389,700 to 358,400 from August to September. Over the same period, the number of returns has increased significantly due to the latest lull in violence in the territories of Kasenga, Manono and Mitwaba. However, the situation remains volatile in Malemba Nkulu and Pweto, where repeated clashes between government forces and local militias continue to cause population displacement. The territory of Pweto is considered to be the most affected by these events, and records up to 40% of the IDPs of the province.
In late September, OCHA reported that activism of the militia Bakata Katanga has led to new population displacements. Since early June, attacks by Bakata Katanga resulted in the displacement of 23,000 people according to authorities. Recently, new people were displaced from Nganie to Mwanza, straining Mwanza resources, mostly with heightened food insecurity.

In early September, OCHA indicated that up to 9,000 people have been displaced from the area of Mwebe and Mkwa toward the Lufira River following fighting between unidentified militias and government forces. The displaced were reportedly in need of NFIs, food and medicine.

As of July, the UN reported that there were an estimated 43,800 IDPs in Pweto with population movements occurring mainly along the Pweto/Mutabi/Wantete and Pweto/Lukonzo/Nzwiba axes. In mid-August, an attack of the armed group FAP on the spontaneous IDP camp of Mwasi in the Pweto area was recorded. It was the second such incident in August.

Disaster: In Orientale province, heavy rains in Bas-Uele and Haut-Uele districts made roughly 6,000 people homeless on 4 September, according to OCHA. Ensuing floods destroyed houses, roads, and crops across six territories. The areas of Bangadi and Niangara were reportedly among the worst affected. In late August, local sources reported that over 500 people had been affected in Dungu with floods also damaging crops.

Access: Access is limited in large parts of DRC. Physical and infrastructural impediments to delivering aid are significant due to mountainous and volcanic terrain, and a lack of asphalted roads in some areas, especially in Maniema province.

Tensions between aid workers and the local population, with incidents of hostilities against aid workers and interference in delivering aid have been reported. Between January and August 2013, 137 security incidents against aid workers were recorded across the country.

In North Kivu in early August, the INGO Médecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) announced it would cease activities in the area of Pinga because of increased insecurity and reported threats to its staff. MSF’s suspension of activities is likely to further worsen the already dire health and humanitarian situation in the area.

Following increased fighting around Goma in North Kivu, ERWs, including mines, are being currently removed around Kibati, Karambi, Mugerwa, and Kanyaruchinya.

Food Security: A June report by FSNWG estimated that 6.4 million people are at Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity. The figure represents an increase of about 75,000 people compared to October 2012. Two-third of food insecure people, an estimated 4.2 million, are considered severely food insecure and concentrated in the east of North Kivu province and the south of Katanga province, where conflict has escalated since March.

Extreme poverty with few livelihood options are the main reasons for food insecurity. In eastern DRC, renewed conflict has significantly contributed to the deterioration of food security and the nutrition situation, according to WFP. The west of DRC, although relatively stable compared to the east, faces chronic food insecurity due to isolation, lack of social infrastructure, and the effect of several aggravating economic shocks.

In the northern provinces of Equateur and Orientale, the planting of the main season maize crops, to be harvested from October, has been completed under average rainfall conditions. Satellite analysis indicate that good rains benefited crops in northern and southern regions, while poor rains may have affected crops in central provinces of Bandundu, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental.

In Maniema, OCHA reported on 10 September that the cities of Matete and Salambabila (Kabambare territory) are particularly at risk of food insecurity, following the recent exclusion of the population from the Namoya mining area which caused 5,000 miners to be deprived of their livelihoods. Between 11 and 18 July, an inter-cluster assessment conducted in Punja territory showed that over 130,000 IDPs and returnees (18,755 households) are living in dire conditions, eating only two to four times per week. The conflict between FARDC and the RM in Punja (December 2012 – April 2013) caused the population to miss two agricultural seasons and lose most, if not all, assets during displacement.

Health and Nutrition: On 7 October, in North Kivu, MSF reported that at least ten people have died of rabies. The outbreak has reportedly infected 154 people. Reports about new cases have come from remote areas as the organisation is set to donate vaccines and post exposure treatment to the Ministry of Health.

Across the country, 19,000 cholera cases were registered for 2013 as of 30 August, OCHA reports. 337 deaths have been reported for a fatality rate of 2%. Over 60% of cases (more than 11,400) are registered in Katanga Province. During 2012, DRC had 30,753 registered cholera cases with 709 deaths, compared to 21,700 cases in 2011. The surge in cholera cases is largely the result of limited access to safe drinking water, poor hygiene conditions, and poor sanitation.

More than four million cases of malaria have been reported since the beginning of 2013 as of 17 June. 8,500 deaths have been registered due to malaria during the same period (21,000 deaths in 2012).

On 1 August, WHO reported 519 measles cases since January 2013. In Kasai Occidental, local media reported on 15 August an outbreak of measles in the area of Kamonia. Forty children have died of the disease in Kamako (including 26 deaths on 6 and 7 August) due to unsanitary conditions following massive population displacement and overcrowding in settlements.

In North Kivu, local sources reported that following violent clashes between Congolese forces and Ugandan rebels ADF/NALU in early July, health centres and shops are lacking medicines and basic items in an area where 80,000 people are exposed to waterborne diseases, including cholera and dysentery.

In South Kivu, local media noted on 11 September that seven cases of cholera have been reported in the last two weeks in Minova and surrounds. On 27 August, MSF reported that ten people died of rabies, mostly in the Lemera health zone, triggering a rabies intervention in the east of the country.
In Maniema, OCHA reported on 10 September that 97 displaced and returned children died of malaria over the month of August in Punia territory. An inter-cluster mission conducted in Punia and Kaseese from 11-18 July reported several deaths among children from both measles and severe anaemia. The health zone of Punia records high levels of infant mortality due to anaemia, mostly because of access and provision issues of medication stocks in health centres. At least 29 deaths of children <5 were reported in June.

In Kasai Oriental, OCHA reports that since mid-June, an epidemic of yellow fever is spreading in Kamana, Lubao and Lubindi-Lukula, with six confirmed cases.

In Katanga, local media reported on 11 September that 60 cases of measles (including two deaths) were recorded in Kasumbalesa in the last 40 days. According to OCHA on 26 August, more than 1,500 deaths due to malaria were recorded within the last eight months in the province.

WASH: On 12 August, ICRC reported that less than 50% of the population of South Kivu has access to safe drinking water.

Protection: At end July, UNHCR reported that ongoing violence in North-Kivu, involving FARDC, the M23, and the ADF/NALU, is increasingly exposing women and girls to violence, particularly rape. Between January and July 2013, 619 cases of rape were reported, compared to 108 cases during the same period in 2012. According to UNHCR, 70% of the cases of sexual violence are perpetrated by armed men. On 26 August, UNICEF indicated that a growing number of children are being killed or injured in renewed fighting and as many as 2,000 are being used as child soldiers in the current conflict.

Updated: 15/10/2013

Mali Conflict, Floods, Food Insecurity

Highlights

As of end of September, WFP reported that the regions of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao are the worst affected in terms of food insecurity with prevalence rates comprised between 32% and 36% for severe food insecurity, and up to 90% of the population affected by severe to moderate food insecurity and relying heavily on food assistance.

Political and Security Context

On 5 October, the Tuareg rebel group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) announced that they are resuming peace talks with the government, nine days after they declared their suspension from the process. The announcement to pull out of the peace talks on 26 September cited the government’s failure to keep its commitment to start prisoner releases as reason. On October 2, the government decided to free 23 prisoners arrested in clashes in the north, putting into practice the Ouagadougou accord reached between MNLA and the government in June. The freeing was followed by the announcement to resume peace talks by the rebels three days later. Less than ten days before the disruption of talks, the MNLA had committed to the national dialogue, and these declarations had raised hope for a political solution to the 18-month crisis triggered by the Tuareg uprising.

While President Keita created a Ministry for National Reconciliation and the Development of the Northern Region to seek solutions to the Tuareg issue, the central government remains unwilling to discuss autonomy for northern Mali or the release of prisoner separatist fighters. This latest failure of the two parties to engage in peace talks triggered a renewed upsurge in violence in the northern towns of Kidal and Timbuktu, where two attacks on military targets were conducted on 27 and 28 respectively, killing six people (including two civilians), and wounding eight. Fighting also erupted between fighters from the MNLA and the Malian army in Kidal in Northern Mali on 29 September. The fighting continued over the next day, before calm was restored in the afternoon.

On 8 July, Mali’s army accused Tuareg rebels of violating the ceasefire signed on 18 June by attacking civilians and the military just days after troops entered the flashpoint northeastern town of Kidal to secure it for national elections. The ceasefire agreement aimed to prepare for a second phase of negotiations. This allowed Malian troops to enter Kidal on 5 July, when Mali lifted a nearly six-month state of emergency.

Simultaneously to the clashes in the north, in the southern garrison town of Kati, close to the capital Bamako, officers who participated in the March 2012 military coup fired into the air in protest at not receiving promotions they said had been promised, underscoring the dual challenge facing the new government. On 2 October, Mali’s new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, dissolved an army reform committee dominated by former members of a military junta, following protests at the military base.

In a separate development, attacks by Islamic extremists in northern Mali have increased during the past weeks. On 7 October, Malian military sources reported that Islamic extremists fired shells on Gao, the main town in the desert north of Mali, in what marked the first attack on the city in months. The militants reportedly also destroyed a bridge near Mali’s northern town of Gao, which is on the only route between Gao and neighbouring Niger. It remains unclear whether the attack led to any casualties. The shots came nine days after a suicide attack in Timbuktu, the other main town in the north of Mali, which killed at least two civilians, wounded seven soldiers and killed the four bombers, according to the government. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility for the attack, which underlines the group’s continued capacity to carry out attacks in northern Mali and has raised fears of similar attacks in coming weeks.

On 6 September, newly-sworn President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita announced that the first parliamentary elections would take place on 24 November. This followed the August presidential election process, which was an important step on the path to recovery for the country, 18 months after the military coup and the seizure of its northern territory (Azawad) by radical Islamists.

On 18 July, Nigeria announced plans to withdraw some of its 1,200 soldiers from the UN peacekeeping force in Mali and Sudan's Darfur region, saying the troops are needed for security at home. The Nigerians are part of a force of 12,640 African troops who took over from a French-led mission on 1 July.

On 1 July, authority for the stabilisation of Mali was transferred from the forces of the...
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The creation of the peacekeeping force was approved unanimously by the UN Security Council on 25 April and the transfer was agreed by the UN Security Council on 25 June. As of 1 July, most of the 6,100 soldiers of AFISMA have become part of the peacekeeping operation.

French forces still present in Mali have formally handed over security duties to MINUSMA. A separate and reduced contingent of at least 1,000 French soldiers will remain in Mali to conduct counter-terrorism operations.

France’s involvement in the conflict came after Islamist fighters moved to within 20 km of Mopti, a strategically important town on the border between rebel and Government held territories, taking control of the strategic town Konna on 10 December 2012. With support from France’s armed forces, the Mali Government started a counter-offensive on 11 January.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement:** According to UNHCR as of 30 September, 483,000 people are displaced inside and outside Mali as a result of the crisis. According to the Commission ‘Mouvement de Populations’, there are 311,300 IDPs in the country as of 25 September, including 73,000 in the capital Bamako, 57,000 in the Gao region, 54,000 in the Timbuktu region, and 37,000 in the Kidal region.

A total of 171,405 refugees reside outside Mali, of 75,261 in Mauritania, 50,000 in Niger, 49,975 in Burkina Faso and 1,500 in Algeria.

As larger areas of central and northern Mali are secured, an increasing number of IDPs have started to return home. According to IOM, 137,422 people returned to the north between January and May 2013, and IOM reported that between 29 September and 5 October, 2,370 IDPs returned to the north, mostly toward the region of Timbuktu and Gao. On 1 August, OCHA reported that between 25 June and 12 July, 8,148 Mallian refugees who previously fled to neighbouring countries returned to Mali and were registered in Gao, Mopti, and Timbuktu. A joint assessment by OCHA and UNHCR reported that 226 refugees returned to Douekire, namely to Inalkary, Dongwe-Haussa, Adjowal, and Takumbaout, while an unknown number of refugees returned from Mauritania to Goundam Circle at the end of July.

IOM reported at end July that reasons cited for return by refugees and IDPs are: return to relative stability in the north following recent attempts to restore order; the desire to participate in the country’s elections; and the desire to survey what was left of homes and possessions. The gradual return of IDPs to the north is likely to strain limited social services.

**Disaster:** On 28 August, 34 people were killed and more injured by heavy rains, which provoked flash floods in almost all the neighbourhoods of the capital Bamako. Over 100 homes were destroyed and thousands of people were made homeless after the Niger River burst its banks. IOM reported on 12 September that 20,000 people were affected. Potentially contaminated underground and surface water is a concern. ECHO reported on 12 September that an increase in the number of malaria cases and water borne diseases could already be observed.

Earlier in August, OCHA reported that heavy rains caused flooding in the Kidal and Segou regions, destroying fields, houses and latrines, and affecting 11,300 people. To date, severe flooding affected more than 400,000 people across nine countries of the Sahel region in Africa.

**Access:** Humanitarian access continues to improve in central regions and parts of the north, and aid is increasing in the accessible parts, according to OCHA. Aid activities in other parts of the north are limited due to continued insecurity and banditry. Access to basic social services (water, education, and health) remains limited in the north largely because of the low return of civil servants, the destruction of infrastructure, and a lack of materials to support basic services.

**Food Security:** In late September, WFP reported that the regions of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao are the worst affected in terms of food insecurity with prevalence rates comprised between 32% and 36% for severe food insecurity, and up to 90% of the population affected by severe to moderate food insecurity and relying heavily on food assistance. As IDPs and refugees begin to return to the north, limited resources will be further strained and the number of people requiring assistance is likely to increase in the coming months. According to previous assessments finalised in May, people affected by food insecurity are estimated at about 3.5 million, including 1.4 million in need of immediate assistance.

FEWSNET notes that as of late September, the availability of green-harvested maize, tubers, and rice marks the end of the lean season in southern and northern growing areas, where poor households are seeing improved access to food products thanks to continued humanitarian aid, the availability of milk and gathered foods, and especially favourable terms of trade. Agricultural zones in the southern part of the country are experiencing Minimal food insecurity (IPC Phase 1).

**Health and Malnutrition:** On 5 August, OCHA reported that in the areas that were occupied by armed groups, 65% of health structures are reported partially, or non-functional compared to 17% nationally.

According to OCHA on 19 July, the nutritional situation is serious across Gao with a General Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate of 13.5%. An estimated 660,000 children <5 suffer from acute malnutrition in 2013, including 210,000 from severe acute malnutrition.

**Updated:** 15/10/2013

**MAURITANIA FOOD INSECURITY**

**Highlights**

No new development this week. Last update was: 08/10/2013.

**Political and Security Context**

On 22 August, Mauritania announced a six-week postponement of elections planned for 12
October, after the Coordination of Democratic Opposition (COD), a coalition of opposition parties, said they would boycott the vote. The current president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz seized power in a 2008 coup and was elected a year later, but the COD has never accepted his presidency as legitimate.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement:** UNHCR has stated that the number of Malian refugees in Mauritania has levelled off since March 2013 standing at 75,261 people as of 30 June. Almost all refugees (over 74,000) live in the Mbéra camp, 60% are women and children, according to UNICEF, and have lived in the camp for over a year.

**Disaster:** As of early October, the several weeks of consecutive rainfall since mid-August have caused flooding in much of the capital, Nouakchott, and the six surrounding regions of Brakna, Tagant, Hodh Ech Chargul, Assaba, Inchiri, and Adrar. According to the Department of Civil Protection, the damages caused by the flooding are unprecedented in the region. As reported by IFRC, more than 5,600 people have been affected by the flooding. 2,305 people have been displaced and at least eight people have died according to OCHA.

**Food Security:** WFP reported on 3 September that as of July, 23.7% of Mauritanian households are considered food insecure, representing a decrease compared to the same period last year (32.3%), but the rate is not as low as expected (estimation for July 2013 was 22%). Higher rates were recorded in the south of the country, in the Guidimaka (40%), Assaba (37%), Tangant (34%), and Gorgol (31%) regions. Food insecurity is higher in rural areas (28.5%) than in urban areas (17.4%), even though rural exodus and rising food prices are driving the urban food insecurity rates higher. 800,000 people are food insecure, which marks an increase from the estimated 560,000 food insecure people reported in January 2013. 190,000 people are classified as severely food insecure and 610,000 moderately food insecure.

**Health and Nutrition:** According to the SMART survey conducted in July, six regions of the country have reached or exceeded the emergency threshold of 15% for General Acute Malnutrition (GAM). The national Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) rate remains below (12.8%).

*Reviewed: 15/10/2013*

**NIGER FLOODS, FOOD INSECURITY, EPIDEMIC, DISPLACEMENT**

**Highlights**

As of late September, FEWSNET reported that crop development improved significantly in September following regular rainfall in July and August, leading to expectations of nearly average national cereal production. However, harvests may be below average in the Tillabery and Diffa regions due to planting delay. September harvests and institutional food aid are improving food access throughout the country, with acute food insecurity remaining Minimal (IPC Phase 1), except in the Nguigmi department where poor households are still considered Stressed (IPC Phase 2).}

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement:** According to the UN on 28 August, thousands of Nigerians were reported to be crossing into Niger, fleeing the ongoing military offensive against Islamist militants of the Boko Haram group. As of 15 August, UNICEF reported that an estimated 13,500 refugees from northern Nigeria had arrived in southeastern Niger (Diffa region). UNHCR also reported the arrival of 3,544 Nigerien returnees and 94 people of other nationalities (mainly Chadians). These refugees have been crossing into Niger since mid-May and have mainly settled in Bosso, Diffa, Kablewa, Maine, Tam, Tcokoujani, and Garin Amadou. The majority live with host families; others live in rented houses, but lack the money to pay rent. Others have no shelter at all.

According to UNHCR, an estimated 11,672 people have crossed into Niger since the start of military intervention in Mali on 11 January. As of 16 August, 47,583 Malian refugees are registered in Niger. There are 3,991 Nigerien returnees in the country, bringing the total number of displaced from the Malian conflict into Niger to over 53,000. Malian refugees continue to place a significant stress on the country with the large majority settling in regions hardest hit by the nutrition and food security crisis.

**Disaster:** As of 25 September, OCHA reported that severe flooding in July and August killed 32 people, affected over 165,000 people, and damaged 13,000 hectares of crops. Tillabery, Maradi, Tahoua, and Dosso regions are among the most affected areas.

Some 39,700 people are affected in Tillabery region. Aid distribution has taken place in areas in Tillabery, Kollo, Quallam, Say, and Filingué departments. But, several locations affected by the floods including Banibangou, Damana, Firwa kola, Gotheye, and Imanan Taggazar remain unassisted. Interventions remain limited to areas where humanitarian actors were already operational before the floods.

To date, severe flooding has affected over 400,000 people across nine countries of the Sahel region in Africa.

**Food Security:** According to OCHA on 19 July, 2.9 million people remain food insecure in Niger. Across Niger, household incomes are considered average to good this year and should allow households to purchase sufficient cereal to meet food needs. According to FEWSNET in late September, crop development improved significantly in September following regular rainfall in July and August, leading to expectations of nearly average national cereal production. However, harvests may be below average in the Tillabery and Diffa regions due to planting delay. September harvests and institutional food aid are improving food access throughout the country, with acute food insecurity remaining Minimal (IPC Phase 1), except in the Nguigmi department where poor households are still considered Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

FAO reported on 26 August that since Niger depends on food imports from Nigeria during the lean season, the current insecurity in the northeast has disrupted trade with surrounding countries and affected food availability. Small-scale breeding of desert locust has been observed in Niger’s Tahoua, Agadez and Zinder regions. As of 30 September, only 11,749 of a total of 44,555 hectares of infested crops were treated, a completion rate of about 26%. The low rate of treatment is related to the logistical constraints in the
Cereal prices reached a five-year high in April, with the sharpest increases in Maradi and Diffa regions. Prices stabilised in May, but have remained higher than the seasonal norm. Compared to the five-year average, the prices of dry cereals are rising, with millet (17%), sorghum (20%) and maize (9%) displaying the largest increases. The high market prices are largely due to production shortfalls and market disruptions in neighbouring Nigeria, following the 2012 floods. Central Niger is especially dependent on Nigerian grain flows and is likely to see the highest impact on prices.

Health and Malnutrition: From 18-24 September, 31 new cholera cases were reported, bringing the cumulative number of cases to 513 including 11 deaths (case fatality rate of 2.14%), since the government officially declared the epidemic on 10 May. The majority of cases are registered in the Tillabery region in north-western Niger. There is a high risk that the disease will spread along the Niger River. In 2012, more than 5,785 cholera cases and 110 deaths were reported countrywide.

With 41 registered cases, of whom 16 have die, diphtheria has returned to Niger seven years after the last epidemic in 2006. The recent epidemic has been confirmed by local health officials in Tillabery, 120 km northwest of the capital. The most affected age group is 5-14 years, with 26 registered cases.

On 31 July, OCHA reported that malnutrition has slightly decreased, with a rate of 13.3% GAM for children <5, compared to 14.8% in 2012, except in Maradi district where the 16.3% GAM rate is a concern. As of September, a SMART survey indicated that children aged 6-23 months are the most affected with a GAM rate of 20.6% and a SAM rate of 4.9%.

Updated: 15/10/2013

SOMALIA CONFLICT, FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

No new developments this week. Last update was: 08/10/2013

6 October: U.S. Special Forces engaged in a raid in Barawe, Lower Shabelle, to capture Abdikadar Mohamed Abdikadar who is said to be the link man for commanders of the Al Shabaab Islamist group in Somalia with al-Qaeda and Kenya’s militants. According to residents in Barawe, Al-Shabaab has sent about 200 masked fighters with heavy machine guns as reinforcement in response to the U.S. operation. Al-Shabaab has controlled the town since 2008.

Political and Security Context

Political landscape national

Conflict remains widespread in Somalia as the country struggles to curb an Islamist insurgency led by Al-Shabaab, an Islamist organisation allegedly tied strongly to al-Qaeda, which continues to conduct terrorist attacks and fight Government forces. According to sources, the movement has retained strongholds in parts of rural southern and central Somalia, while another faction is present in the mountains in the northern, semi-autonomous Puntland region. Although security in the capital Mogadishu has improved since its lowest point in August 2011, attacks by Al-Shabaab in urban centres and along transport axes are common.

Safety and Security

On 19 September, AU troops backed by Somali government forces reportedly captured Mahaday district (Middle Shabelle Region) from Al-Shabaab, marking it the third town in the region to be taken after Jowhar and Balca. According to local sources, heavy clashes between Al-Shabaab and government forces aided by AMISOM troops continued in Mahaday on 02 October.

Al-Shabaab has become increasingly isolated in southern Somalia and suffered significant territorial and reputational losses since Kenyan forces moved into Somalia in October 2011. Following the attack in Nairobi, which is seen as having introduced Al-Shabaab into the global terrorist scene, the European Union has increased security precautions for its military advisors in Somalia. The UN envoy for Somalia called for additional African troops to counter the 5,000 Al-Shabaab fighters, which the UN said posed an international threat.

On 7 September, 18 people were killed in the Somali capital Mogadishu when two blasts struck a restaurant in a suicide attack claimed by Al-Shabaab. On 3 September, the militants staged an ambush on President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s military-escorted flight from Mogadishu to Nairobi.
motorcade, firing rocket-propelled grenades at the convoy. Although no information on casualties is available, the President reportedly escaped unharmed. In July, over 25 people were killed in several attacks, including one against the Turkish embassy and one against a convoy of AU troops, staged by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu, prompting authorities to launch a military operation against Al-Shabaab in south and central Somalia. In mid-June, Al-Shabaab militants launched a high-profile assault targeting the UN compound in Mogadishu. The attack killed 15 and caused all UN missions outside Mogadishu International Airport to be suspended for 24 hours.

Conflict patterns
Since June, violence has been flaring up in Kismayo in Jubaland in the far south of Somalia, bordering Kenya and Ethiopia. On 19 August, a simultaneous series of land mine explosions occurred in the central business district of Kismayo, targeting African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) troops. To date, the number of casualties is still unknown. In Kismayo, control has long been split between multiple forces including clan militias, Al-Shabaab, and Kenyan and Ethiopian soldiers. On 28 August, it was reported that the central government agreed to establish a former Islamist commander as the interim leader of the southern Juba region, a deal which, if implemented, could end months of clan fighting and solidify plans for a federal nation. In an unexpected reversal, an official from Mogadishu allegedly signed a deal with Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, who had been competing for control of Jubaland's port city of Kismayo and of the adjacent hinterland against a clan warlord, Bare Hirale, who was widely seen before as backed by the central authorities.

In the latest round of fighting of the rival Somali warlords over Kismayo from 27-29 June, WHO reported that 71 people were killed and more than 300 injured. Fighters from the Ras Kamboni militia of Ahmed Madobe, who proclaimed himself president of the Jubaland region in June, battled against forces loyal to Bare Hirale, a former Somali defence minister. In early June, two days of heavy fighting between Madobe's forces and gunmen loyal to Ittin Hassan Basto, another local warlord claiming the presidency, left over 30 dead and almost 40 wounded. Reports indicated that more than 1,604 people had been displaced by the violence. These were the heaviest clashes the city had seen in four years and the first since several rival warlords claimed control of the lucrative port and fertile hinterlands in May. OCHA data indicated that some 60,000 people were in need of humanitarian assistance in Kismayo in early July.

In the aftermath of the June clashes, the central government called for the withdrawal of Kenya Defense Force troops from Kismayo believing that they sided with Madobe. Following the announcement, there have been a series of elders’ meetings in Dhobley to discuss the way forward. In retaliation for the involvement of Kenyan troops, Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the attack on a shopping centre in Kenya's capital from 21-25 September, killing at least 68 people and wounding 175.

Tensions persist between the central authorities and the semi-autonomous Puntland region. On 29 August, the president of Somalia's Puntland region said the central government was undermining plans to create a federal system, and that he would develop potential oil resources in his area even without a revenue-sharing deal with Mogadishu. The statement underlined deep ongoing national divisions. On 5 August, Puntland cut all ties with the central government in a clear sign of distrust toward Mogadishu. Puntland accused central authorities of refusing to share power and foreign aid with the region in line with the country’s federal structure, as well as taking its eye off the fight against al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist militants. In July, clashes were recorded between residents and security forces in Qardho (Karkaar region). Following the clashes, Puntland President Abdrahman Mohamed Farole announced the suspension of the 2013 Local Council elections planned for 15 July due to the instability and election violence.

On 29 September, the defense forces of Puntland raided al-Shabaab positions in the Galgala Mountains, reportedly inflicting casualties. Puntland forces have recently scaled up operations in the Galgala area, from where Al-Shabaab launches its attacks. The attack and potential defeat of Al-Shabaab could improve the operating environment for humanitarian activities in the area. Similar operations planned by Puntland authorities in the Bossaso airport, Galgacyo, Garowe and Gardo airstrips will potentially have a positive impact on humanitarian activities in terms of safety for operations.

Humanitarian Context and Needs
Protracted conflict, consecutive years of drought, and natural hazards and disruption of basic infrastructure have led to large-scale displacement in Somalia and across the region, leaving almost half of the population (around 3.2 million) vulnerable to external shocks, and lacking access to basic services and goods.

Displacement: An estimated 1.1 million Somalis are currently IDPs according to UNHCR, mainly in the South-Central region. In March-April, thousands of new IDPs were reported in the vicinity of Xudur after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from the area. Flooding that affected the country also displaced an additional 50,000 people, notably in the Jowhar and Baidoa areas.

Amnesty International reported on 12 September that the government is pressing ahead with plans to clean up Mogadishu, forcing thousands of people out of makeshift camps. In January 2013, the authorities announced their plan to relocate hundreds of thousands of IDPs from the capital to camps outside the city. These measures will directly impact more than 300,000 people living in Mogadishu where they are sheltering from cyclical drought, famine, and armed conflict. The relocation of IDPs has been put on hold as security and basic services in the chosen relocation site, Daynille (north of the capital) could not be guaranteed.

As of 10 September, UNHCR reported that 990,378 Somalis are refugees in neighbouring countries, mostly in Kenya (471,906), Ethiopia (245,068) and Yemen (230,855). 20,316 are new refugees who arrived in 2013, with more than half seeking refuge in Ethiopia (12,825). However, Somali refugees continue to return home, with 3,200 people reportedly returning in April 2013. UNHCR states that a total 20,207 refugees have returned from neighbouring countries to Somalia since January 2013.

As reported by HRW in August, IDPs in Somalia suffer from widespread abuses with rape and sexual violence posing a constant threat to women and children living in camps.

Disaster: As reported by OCHA, following the early beginning of the main rainy season (the Gui) in mid-March, an estimated 50,000 people were displaced and 6,400 hectare of crops damaged by floods.

as reported by OCHA, following the early beginning of the main rainy season (the Gui) in mid-March, an estimated 50,000 people were displaced and 6,400 hectare of crops damaged by floods.
Access: On 14 August, MSF announced an immediate stop to all operations in Somalia as a result of increased attacks on its staff. MSF has operated in Somali since 1991 and has treated roughly 50,000 people each month. Following the announcement, the Somali Government on 15 August urged MSF to reconsider its planned withdrawal stating that the decision will directly affect the lives of thousands of vulnerable people and could lead to a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. On 15 August, Al-Shabaab militants looted MSF hospitals in Dinsoor (Bay region) and Mararey (Middle Juba region) towns.

In southern and central Somalia, humanitarian access remains challenging. The withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from key towns in southern Somalia has enabled an increased international presence in some areas. Insecurity in these areas, however, continues to affect trade and market activities and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. FSNAU notes that conflict has disrupted the movement of food and other basic commodities in most parts of these regions, particularly in Bakool.

Attacks on aid workers pose a serious constraint for humanitarian operations. An attack in Mogadishu on 5 May led to the closure of main roads in the capital, hampering movement of aid workers and supplies.

According to OCHA, sporadic armed clashes took place between Somaliland security forces and the militia groups operating in Togdheer and in the disputed regions of Sanaaq and Sool, further hampering humanitarian access and aid delivery.

According to the UN, Al-Shabaab earned more than $25 million between 2012 and 2013 from illicit exports of charcoal to Gulf Arab states and from taxing the trucking of charcoal to the Somali ports of Kismayo and Barawe. Other funds come from informal taxes on small businesses in areas of Somalia that Al-Shabaab controls, and from donations from the Somali diaspora. Between November 2011 and February 2012, humanitarian aid worth £480,000 was appropriated by Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia from the offices and warehouses of partner organisations.

Food Security and Malnutrition: As indicated in a joint FSNAU and FEWSNET report in late August, an estimated 870,000 people, among whom 72% are believed to be IDPs, will remain in Crisis and Emergency food security status from August to December 2013. The recent figures represent a continued improvement since January when an estimated 1,050,000 people were in Crisis and Emergency (IPC Phases 3 and 4) food security status, and an even more significant since the country was plagued by a deadly famine. Between October 2010 and April 2012, famine in Somalia led to the deaths of 258,000 people, according to May OCHA estimates. Nearly 2.3 million additional people beyond those requiring more urgent assistance, one-third of Somalia’s population, are classified as Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

According to FEWSNET, recent improvements are attributed to a near average July/August 2013 gu harvest, increased livestock prices and herd sizes, improved milk availability, low prices of both local and imported staple food commodities, higher purchasing power from income from labour and livestock sales, and sustained humanitarian interventions over the last six months. However, according to FAO, cereal production is expected to be below average, with particularly low yields in areas of Gedo, Huduur and Hiran regions bordering Kenya and Ethiopia that received below average rainfall amounts. Nevertheless, FAO provided the same downward revised estimate of the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance.

FEWSNET and FSNAU reported that some areas, in addition to IDPs, people who live in settlements in very poor conditions are severely affected by food insecurity. For agro-pastoral households in Hiraan, central Somalia, an early end to the March to June gu rains, along with poor distribution, resulted in a very low harvest. As such, poor households are expected to fall into Crisis (IPC Phase 3) status during the October to December lean season. Poor pastoral households in Coastal Deeh, in central Somalia are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through at least the end of the year. Low livestock ownership will further limit income. On the Sool Plateau pastoral livelihood zone in northeastern Somalia, poor households are likely to divert funds to purchase water during the remainder of the hagaa dry season through October. Most poor households in Somalia are likely to remain in Stress (IPC Phase 2) conditions until December.

FAO reported in August that maize and sorghum prices were well below their levels of 12 months earlier (up to 50 % less) and about 75 % below their peak high in June 2011, when famine was declared.

Health and Nutrition: The first confirmed case of the wild polio virus since 2007 was reported in Mogadishu on 9 May. The total number of confirmed cases in Somalia stands at 175 cases as of 4 October. The polio epidemic has spread to neighbouring countries with 14 in Kenya, three in Ethiopia, and three cases reported in South Sudan. According to OCHA on 18 July, the Somaliland Minister of Health confirmed the disease had reached the northern regions with a case of polio in Sool region. The first vaccination campaign began on 14 May in Somalia. However, recent fighting in Kismayo halted the polio vaccination campaign planned for July, targeting 24,000 people. Large insecure areas of south-central Somalia have not conducted immunisation campaigns since 2009, leaving up to 600,000 children particularly vulnerable, according to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Two cases were confirmed from these parts of Lower Shabelle region. The risk to populations across other areas of Somalia is high, due to substantial population immunity gaps.

The nutrition situation in Somalia has improved since the 2011 famine. However, the prevalence of malnutrition remains above the WHO emergency threshold of 15%, especially among IDPs. More than 206,000 children <5 are acutely malnourished, a slight decrease since the beginning of the year. In January 2013, FSNAU estimated 215,000 children <5 to be acutely malnourished of whom at least 45,000 were severely malnourished. Two-thirds of these children are in Southern Somalia, where high rates of malnutrition persist and are attributed to an inadequate health infrastructure and poor feeding practices.

At the start of August, FSNAU reported critical levels of GAM (≥15% and <30%) in North East, Central and South Somalia. In Kismayo, 19% GAM rates were reported in a recent flashpoint area for tribal fighting that also hampered the polio vaccination campaign. The nutrition situation in Kismayo suggests a decline in acute malnutrition and improved nutrition when compared with results from December 2012 assessment, which reported a GAM rate of 28%.

As reported by FSNAU, the nutrition status of IDPs in the central and northern regions of
Somalia has deteriorated. Sustained malnutrition levels were seen among IDPs in Bossaso, Gaalkacyo, Garowe, Dhusamaareb, Kismayo, Dhobley, and Mogadishu.

-reviewed: 15/10/2013

SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT, FLOODS, FOOD INSECURITY, DISPLACEMENT

**Highlights**

As of **6 October**, OCHA reported that at least 159,130 people have been internally displaced by violence since January 2013, and South Sudan currently hosts 224,806 refugees, mostly from neighbouring Sudan. Early October some 2,500 new refugees from South Kordofan crossed into Upper Nile state.

As of **30 September**, 81,000 people are in need of humanitarian assistance in accessible areas in Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Unity, Warrap, and Western Bahr el Ghazal states following heavy rains and ensuing floods. Warrap, Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile states are the worst affected areas with over 21,000, 17,700 and 15,510 people affected respectively.

**Political and Security Context**

South Sudan is allegedly pushing ahead for a self-determination referendum for the contested Abyei border area. The referendum will let Abyei residents choose whether to remain part of Sudan's South Kordofan region or join the Bahr-el-Ghazal region in South Sudan. While Sudan has been reluctant to agree on a date, South Sudan has indicated it wants to press ahead with the referendum regardless. According to Government sources, South Sudan plans to hold the referendum in October. Violence linked to the self-determination issue has escalated in Abyei and has sparked fears of further intensification of violence.

On 3 September, South Sudan's President Salva Kiir visited Sudan for talks with President Omar Hassan al-Bashir about the oil conflict. This was his second visit to Khartoum since 2011. During the summit, the two leaders pledged to end their conflict. In a joint statement, Bashir and Kiir reaffirmed their commitment to all bilateral cooperation agreements including on oil export. The crude oil stoppage threat that has jeopardised their bilateral relations since June was not mentioned.

On 1 August, in a joint communiqué, the two sides officially agreed to immediately cease the support or harbouring of rebel groups from either side and prevent rebels from crossing the common border. This was in an attempt to end a quarrel that started early June over alleged support by Juba to rebels in Sudan and accusations that Khartoum backed rebels fighting in Jonglei state, South Sudan. If implemented, the oil stoppage would cut off the crude and transit fees that make up both countries' main source of foreign income.

Renewed tensions between Khartoum and Juba since June were a stark contrast to the gradual improvement of the relations witnessed in previous months, which had led to the signature in March of a technical agreement to establish a demilitarised border zone, the deployment of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, and the activation of all agreed security-related mechanisms.

The two states had also agreed on a plan for the coordinated implementation of all elements of the 27 September 2012 agreements, including the re-launch of crude oil exports from South Sudan. On 7 May, Sudan announced that cross-border oil flows had resumed and the first cross-border shipment was received at Heglig.

On 24 July, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir dismissed his entire cabinet, including main political rival Riek Machar who had announced his intention to run in the 2015 elections. While the AU urged President Kiir to form a new government and respect the country's diversity in doing so, the sacking of the government highlighted increasing tensions in the South Sudanese ruling Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) party. Salva Kiir and Riek Machar were on opposing sides of a split within the SPLM during much of the civil war with Khartoum that led to the independence of South Sudan.

Ethnic clashes and violence continue across much of South Sudan with an increasing number of human rights abuses reported, notably by government forces, according to a Human Rights Watch report released in July. Violence is concentrated in Jonglei state and the tri-state area of Lakes, Unity, and Warrap, with some incidents also reported in Northern Bahr El-Ghazal. In Jonglei state, the precarious security situation stems from the protracted conflict between armed groups and official troops, and from ongoing inter-tribal fighting. In Boma, Pibor and other population centres, almost all civilians have fled into the bush, amid increasing tensions between state and non-state armed actors.

In Rumbek, the Lakes state capital, a forceful disarmament campaign by local authorities continued, leaving two dead and four seriously injured on 17 September, according to local reports. Rumbek has struggled to curb recent inter-communal violence and proliferation of arms in the region. Five people were shot as clashes erupted between cattle herding groups on 7 September in Rumbek North county, according to local official sources. On 1 September, seven people were killed in separate inter-communal clashes between the Rup and Kuie communities in Rumbek Central county in Lakes state. The following day, six people were killed in a retaliatory attack in the same area.

In July, widespread fighting between ethnic groups, state and non-state actors affected large parts of Jonglei state, mostly Pibor county and, to a lesser extent, Pochalla county, forcing tens of thousands of civilians to flee. Initially, local authorities reported that groups of heavily armed South Sudanese gunmen, belonging to the Lou Nuer and Dinka tribes, were fighting their way toward a rival community, the Murle people, in eastern Jonglei state. As of mid-August, information, including numbers of casualties, remains unverified, although according to the authorities, over 300 people were killed during the clashes and at least 4,000 people injured.

Violence in Jonglei came after a fierce round of fighting in early July between government troops and various non-state actors. Against this background, HRW reported in mid-July an increasing number of abuses against civilians committed by South Sudanese authorities during the anti-insurgency campaign in Jonglei state. Earlier, the UN Security Council and the US had called for Juba to better protect civilians in Jonglei state amidst reports of killings, lootings, and beatings, including by government troops.

On 19 June, the rebel leader of a Jonglei-based rebel group, David Yau Yau, a member of...
the Murle group, officially agreed to begin peace talks with government representatives. The conflict between the Yau Yau rebel group, who calls itself South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDA), and the South Sudan Army (SPLA) had escalated since early March, after Juba conducted a major operation against the SSDA. South Sudan issued an ultimatum to David Yau Yau on 5 June asking him to cease hostilities unconditionally or risking being pursued by State military forces.

800 rebels belonging to a group blamed for attacks in Upper Nile state over the past two years accepted an amnesty offer from the South Sudanese government and handed over their weapons on 5 June. The surrender came two months after 5,000 fighters from the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), led by Brigadier General Babipyi Monyuet, took up the amnesty offer from South Sudanese President Salva Kiir. On 5 August, talks officially started with the former rebels of the SSLM. The rebel groups South Sudan Democratic Army and South Sudan Defense Forces also declared peace with the government of South Sudan and entered the negotiations.

Cattle-raiding, which mirrors local ethnic tensions, is a recurrent issue throughout South Sudan with recent incidents in Jonglei and Unity states. In mid-August, OCHA reported that violence in Pibor county in July was followed by an increasing number of cattle-raids and clashes in other parts of Jonglei. On 8 August, nine people were killed and seven injured in a cattle raiding incident in Twic East county in Jonglei state that officials blamed on the Murle group and the David Yau Yau group. Another incident was recorded in Bor county on 6 August.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Displacement: As of 30 September, OCHA reported that at least 159,130 people have been internally displaced by violence since January 2013. This figure reflects only those who have been accessed and assisted. Because of access constraints, it is a marked underestimation of the number of people displaced by violence in South Sudan. In 2013, 71,000 returnees have returned to South Sudan from Sudan, adding up to some 1.9 million returnees from Sudan since 2007.

Following increased inter-communal violence in Jonglei, various international organisations have reported new IDPs. In July, ECHO reported that there were 148,000 conflict affected people: most were displaced within Pibor county or fled to Juba or neighbouring countries following fighting. As reported by MSF, up to 120,000 civilians, mostly from the Murle group, fled their homes as a result of recent spikes in the ongoing violence. According to WHO, the increasing numbers of IDPs and returnees in Pibor, Gumruk, Akobo and Boma is of high concern to humanitarian partners.

As reported by OCHA in early September, about 75,000 people identified as affected in Pibor county, Central and Eastern Equatoria, were reached with humanitarian assistance. An inter-agency assessment conducted in Pibor county on 7 and 8 September indicated that most of IDPs and returnees report heavy losses of livestock and personal belongings. The majority said they have been displaced at least four times because of violence since the start of 2012. While the six main population centres in Pibor county (Boma, Gumuruk, Likuangole, Manyabol, Maruwa Hills, and Pibor) are either partially or completely abandoned, many civilians remain in the bush, cut off from assistance. In Gumuruk, IOM registered 23,000 IDPs as of 9 September, and people move in and out to receive assistance.

Vulnerable populations in Pibor county are living outside protected communities and without consistent access to food, safe drinking water, shelter, and health care. Most IDPs have resorted to extreme coping strategies, with some eating wild fruits and leaves. Following cattle raids, reported to be in the tens of thousands of cattle, the population is slaughtering female cattle for meat, even if this means that they cannot replenish stocks. According to the UN, 100,000 people have been cut off from vital aid in Jonglei state. As of 26 July, according to the authorities, some IDPs have begun to return home.

As reported by OCHA, since January, about 17,000 people have fled Jonglei state to Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. UNHCR stated that recent estimates of numbers of South Sudanese arrivals in Ethiopia are smaller than suggested by earlier reports. UNHCR noted the arrival of 2,178 refugees from 7 May–July. More refugees are expected to arrive in Ethiopia from Nyalongoro, Kaiwa and Niate areas of South Sudan.

In the first five months of 2013, over 5,390 South Sudanese from Jonglei were registered at the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. These numbers approach the total number of people that arrived in Kakuma from South Sudan in 2012. In Uganda, 2,700 refugees from Jonglei have arrived since the beginning of the year, averaging about 527 per month.

Some 224,808 refugees, mostly from neighbouring Sudan are in South Sudan as of 6 October. According to OCHA as of 31 August, there are currently over 119,000 Sudanese refugees in Upper Nile state and 74,700 in Unity state who need humanitarian assistance. According to OCHA, an estimated 71,000 South Sudanese returned from Sudan since January 2013. Up to 350,000 South Sudanese remain in Sudan.

Local authorities in Fashoda county, Upper Nile state, reported that 2,500 refugees crossed into the area from South Kordofan early October. UNHCR reported that 2,100 refugees from South Kordofan have arrived in Upper Nile since mid-July. Local authorities stated that 70% of the refugees are women and children, and fled their place of residence because of aerial bombardments, ground clashes, or food shortages. Many refugees showed signs of malnutrition. In mid-June, according to OCHA, an estimated 3,000 new IDPs arrived in Northern Bahr El Ghazal state, fleeing increased insecurity and armed attacks in areas around River Kiir, South Darfur and South Kordofan. 26,000 people were reportedly displaced as of 21 July. According to MSF, the remote area is practically inaccessible and IDPs have little access to aid. Their food situation is already dire and may further worsen as the rainy season gets underway.

Some 11,900 returnees were registered in four transit sites in Renk county in Upper Nile during a biometric registration in July and August. The figure marks a major drop from the previous estimate of 17,500 people, according to OCHA. About 4,400 individuals of those registered are willing to be transported to their final destinations; 7,500 individuals are not willing to be transported and prefer to stay in Renk town.

Disaster: As reported by OCHA on 30 September, partners found that 81,000 people need humanitarian assistance in accessible areas in Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Unity, Warrap, and Western Bahr el Ghazal states following heavy rains and ensuing floods. Warrap, Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile states are the worst affected
areas with over 21,000, 17,700 and 15,510 people affected respectively. In mid-September, OCHA estimated that the total number of people affected is estimated to be higher, stating that at least 100,000 people had been displaced by flooding.

In mid-September, Government figures suggested an even higher number of affected. The National Relief and Rehabilitation Commission said it is supporting more than 200,000 flood affected people across the country. Assessments are planned in parts of Jonglei, Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. In Unity state, logistical constraints have hindered access to flooded areas and needs assessments, meaning that the total number of people in need could be significantly higher.

Overall, at least two people were killed in the floods. As reported by OCHA, affected populations mostly need household items, clean water, emergency drugs, and short-term food assistance. Information on damage remains limited, though hundreds of houses have reportedly been destroyed across the five states.

In late August, an estimated 18,000 people were affected and partly displaced in Mauwut county, Upper Nile state, following floods. According to a 21 August WHO assessment, the health situation in Mauwut is deteriorating as malaria and waterborne diseases spread through the area.

According to local sources, floods have cut off the main road to Uganda, leaving busses, trucks, and passenger vehicles stranded at the Ugandan side of the border as of 28 August. The disruption is between the towns of Atiak in Uganda and Elegu in South Sudan.

Access: Insecurity, poor infrastructure, and lack of logistics capacity continue to severely hamper humanitarian access nationwide. The recent floods have exacerbated the challenges of humanitarian access in certain areas of South Sudan, with Unity state having been particularly difficult to access due to infrastructural constraints.

On 5 August, unidentified gunmen attacked an MSF vehicle outside the capital Juba. The attack resulted in the death of one MSF South Sudanese staff.

As reported by OCHA on 12 September, Upper Nile and Jonglei states are the worst affected in terms of access incidents, with repeated violence against humanitarian personnel and assets, active hostilities and interference in the implementation of relief programmes. Humanitarian actors have for the second time in August halted distributions of food assistance due to security constraints. Following widespread violence in July that affected over 140,000 people, aid workers had reached close to 21,000 people with food distributions as of 18 August but had to stop operations to review operational constraints, including guarantees of safety for civilians receiving assistance and for aid workers supporting them.

On 14 July, as reported by OCHA and for the first time in 2013, aid agencies reached parts of Pibor county, where thousands of civilians have been hiding in the bush. Persistent insecurity in Pibor county makes it complicated for humanitarian actors to operate in the area. In July and August, aid agencies reached IDPs in Dorein, Labrab, and Pibor town. As of 5 August, many areas remain cut off from assistance due to insecurity, according to OCHA.

The rainy season is affecting roads across South Sudan, according to OCHA, making them inaccessible and hindering humanitarian access, notably in Jonglei, Lake, Unity, and Northern Bahr El Ghazal states. Up to 60% of the country is inaccessible by road from May to October, with only 10% of Jonglei accessible during the rains. Limited air assets mean that responding to flooding over the coming months will be restricted.

Food Security: As reported by WFP in mid-August, the food security situation has improved compared to the same period in 2012 even if an estimated 8% (over 850,000 people) and 34% (over 3.5 million people) respectively remain severely and moderately food insecure in South Sudan. In 2012, an estimated 4.7 million people were food insecure across the country.

In June, FAO estimated that 4.1 million people were food insecure in South Sudan and would remain so until the harvest in September. In early August, FEWSNET highlighted that ongoing insecurity had negatively impacted food security in Pibor county, and in Unity, Warrap, and Lakes states. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) acute food insecurity was also expected and was expanding to other areas previously considered to be in Stress (IPC Phase 2). An estimated 1.2 million people were considered to be at Crisis and Emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and 4) with parts of Jonglei (especially Pibor county), Unity, Lakes, Warrap states and the Abyei area, disputed between Sudan and South Sudan, of particular concern.

WFP reported that the food security situation has deteriorated in some areas – Unity state, eastern parts of Eastern Equatoria and Lakes – that are experiencing drier-than-normal conditions characterised by erratic rainfall coupled with prolonged dry spell. The food security situation, because of problematic access to food due to limited and unreliable income and poor purchasing power, is grim in southeastern Jonglei state following prolonged insecurity in Pibor county. The food security situation across the country is projected to remain precarious in the coming months. IDPs and the returnees from Sudan remain especially vulnerable.

According to WFP, there is an ongoing rise in prices, albeit on a smaller scale than a year ago, that is coherent with seasonal patterns in South Sudan. As indicated by FAO, prices of locally produced cereal crops are increasing in most markets as the lean season progresses, household food stocks are beginning to dwindle, and most roads, especially in remote areas, are impassable during the rainy season, disrupting market supplies.

Health and Nutrition: A measles outbreak was officially announced in Upper Nile state in early October. Since August, at least 44 cases were registered in Malakal county according to the South Sudanese authorities and WHO. In May, South Sudan’s had already declared an outbreak of meningitis in Malakal county in late May.

OCHA reported that the hepatitis E outbreak that began in mid-2012 and peaked in February 2013 in refugee camps in Unity and Upper Nile states is now under control. Though the number of cases per week is decreasing in most locations, it is still increasing in others, with Maban and Doro refugee camps (Upper Nile state) of particular concern. In Maban, as of mid-July, 11,279 cases and 205 deaths were recorded since the beginning of the outbreak.

According to OCHA, as of mid-June, the children <5 GAM rate was 18.1%. In August,
using MUAC measurements, WFP estimated average national malnutrition rates to be around 11% with Jonglei, Unity, Warrap and Lakes states showing serious to critical levels ranging from 14% to 21%.

Updated: 15/10/2013

SUDAN CONFLICT, FOOD INSECURITY, EPIDEMIC, DISPLACEMENT

Highlights

11-13 October: Two separate attacks on UN peacekeeper in West and North Darfur occurred. On 13 October, three Senegalese peacekeepers were killed and one injured after being ambushed by members of an unidentified armed group in West Darfur. According to UNAMID, the police unit came under attack while escorting a water convoy from El Geneina town to the UNAMID regional headquarters in West Darfur. On 11 October, a UNAMID military observer from Zambia died in North Darfur capital El Fasher, following an attack by armed men who stabbed him and hijacked his vehicle. The latest incidents come barely four months after seven Tanzanian peacekeepers were killed and 17 injured in what was described as the worst-ever single attack in the troubled region since 2007.

10 October: According to an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification jointly undertaken by several humanitarian actors, 4,236,035 people in Sudan face Crisis and Emergency (IPC Phase 3 and 4) levels food insecurity. The figure marks an increase compared to the July estimate by FEWSNET suggesting that 3.7-4 million people in the country face Stressed and Crisis (IPC Phase 2 and 3) levels of food insecurity.

23 September – 11 October: Violent clashes between protesters, police, and military broke out in Khartoum and central Sudan on 23 September. On 11 October, protests were still ongoing, though the crowds were much smaller than the previous weeks. The death toll as of 15 October remains uncertain, with conflicting figures ranging from 34 (reported by official sources) to more than 210 deaths (reported by local medical sources and cited by Amnesty International). According to rights groups stationed in Khartoum, protesters were killed by bullets fired by military and police into dissenting crowds. Many more were reportedly injured by tear gas and rubber bullets employed to disperse the crowds. The government has disputed allegations from human rights groups, witnesses, and activists that the Sudanese police fired live rounds at protestors.

The protests erupted on 23 September following a decision by the Sudanese government to cut fuel subsidies, causing a sharp rise in fuel prices. Petrol stations in Khartoum almost doubled fuel prices overnight. The subsidy cuts have been driven by a severe financial crunch since the secession of oil-producing South Sudan in 2011, which deprived Sudan of 75% of the crude oil output - its main source of revenue for food imports.

On 11 October, protests were still ongoing, though crowds were much smaller than in previous weeks. 150 Sudanese people, reportedly mainly pro-democracy activists and Islamists, protested in Khartoum to demand the resignation of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. As of 15 October, 800 people have been detained, suspected of violent riots and vandalism.

Political and Security Context

Sudan – South Sudan

Sudan and South Sudan security officials agreed on 26 September to expel rebel groups from the demilitarised zone on the border between the two countries as part of efforts to normalise relations and open crossing points. The joint statement followed a meeting held by the Joint Security Committee, chaired by heads of Sudanese and South Sudanese military intelligences from 24 to 26 September. The statement is the most recent step to establish a demilitarised border zone, agreed by both countries in March 2013.

On 3 September, South Sudan's President Salva Kiir visited Sudan for talks with President Omar Hassan al-Bashir about the oil conflict. This was only his second visit to Khartoum since 2011. During the summit, the two leaders pledged to end their conflict and reaffirmed their commitment to all bilateral cooperation agreements including oil export.

On 26 July, Sudan announced the postponement of the closure of the pipelines carrying oil from South Sudan for two weeks to allow more time to end a quarrel that started early June over alleged support by Juba to rebels in Sudan. South Sudan repeatedly denied the claim, and in return accused Khartoum of backing rebels fighting in Jonglei state, South Sudan. If implemented, the oil stoppage would cut off the crude and transit fees that make up both countries' main source of foreign income.

Renewed tension between Khartoum and Juba since June were a stark contrast to the gradual improvement of the relations witnessed in previous months, which had led to agreement to establish a demilitarised border zone, the deployment of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, and the activation of all agreed security-related mechanisms.

Unrest

Violent clashes between protesters, police, and military broke out in Khartoum and central Sudan on 23 September. The violence is reportedly the worst unrest in central Sudan in decades. The death toll as of 15 October remains uncertain, with conflicting figures ranging from 34 (reported by official sources) to more than 210 deaths (reported by local medical sources and cited by Amnesty International). According to rights groups stationed in Khartoum, protesters were killed by bullets fired by military and police into dissenting crowds. Many more were reportedly injured by tear gas and rubber bullets employed to disperse the crowds. The government has disputed allegations from human rights groups, witnesses, and activists that the Sudanese police fired live rounds at protestors.

The protests erupted on 23 September following a decision by the Sudanese government to cut fuel subsidies, causing a sharp rise in fuel prices. Petrol stations in Khartoum almost doubled fuel prices overnight. The subsidy cuts have been driven by a severe financial crunch since the secession of oil-producing South Sudan in 2011, which deprived Sudan of 75% of the crude oil output - its main source of revenue for food imports.

On 11 October, protests were still ongoing, though crowds were much smaller than in previous weeks. 150 Sudanese people, reportedly mainly pro-democracy activists and Islamists, protested in Khartoum to demand the resignation of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. As of 15 October, 800 people have been detained, suspected of violent riots and vandalism.

Insurgent Groups

Khartoum continues to struggle to curb insurgencies waged by non-state armed groups reunited under the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) banner in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile.

On 24 July, in an indication of increasing levels of coordination between various armed movements, fighters of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), part of the SRF from the Darfur region, attacked an army position in al-Rachad in central North Kordofan, with deaths reported on both sides. Rachad is near the state capital El-Obeid and Um Ruwaba, a city stormed in a coordinated attack by the SRF in April.
Abyei

South Sudan is allegedly pushing ahead for a self-determination referendum for the contested Abyei border area. The referendum will let Abyei residents choose whether to remain part of Sudan's South Kordofan region or join the Bahr el-Ghazal region in South Sudan. Sudan has been reluctant to agree on a date, while South Sudan has indicated it wants to press on with the referendum regardless. Violence linked to the self-determination issue has recently escalated in the Abyei area, and the resolve by South Sudan to pursue the referendum before the end of October has sparked fears of further intensification of violence. On 21 September 2012, the African Union High Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP) proposed to hold the referendum in October 2013, in accordance with the endorsement from the African Union Peace and Security Council. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2046 on 2 May, deciding that Sudan and South Sudan should reach agreement on the final status of the Abyei area.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Displacement: An estimated 2.8 million Sudanese are currently internally displaced due to food insecurity and conflict. As of October, there are roughly 228,000 Sudanese refugees in South Sudan and Ethiopia, and another 346,000 in Chad, according to UNHCR.

By mid-September, an estimated 71,000 South Sudanese have returned from Sudan since January 2013. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), over two million people of South Sudanese origin have returned to South Sudan from Sudan since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Estimates on the number of South Sudanese in Sudan vary from 220,000 people (Government of Sudan estimate) to 350,000 people (UNHCR estimate). UNHCR reports that 153,000 refugees originating from other countries were in Sudan as of mid-July.

As of early October, humanitarian organisations estimate that since early September 2013, 2,500 people have arrived in the Abyei area from South Sudan. These population movements are reportedly linked to the upcoming referendum on the final status of the area proposed for October 2013. Previous information released in August indicates that up to 60,000 of the over 100,000 people displaced from Abyei in May 2011 have returned.

According to the Warrap State Government, following a visit to Abyei to assess the living conditions in the area, the situation is critical for many returnees with shortages of shelter, health, and water.

Eastern Sudan has received an average 500 Eritrean refugees per month in 2013, down from 2,000 a month in 2012. Sudan reportedly hosts at least 114,500 Eritrean refugees. According to UNHCR in June 2013, there are an estimated 86,900 registered refugees across the eastern states, mostly from Eritrea, with smaller numbers of people from Ethiopia, Somalia, and Chad.

Disaster: According to OCHA, heavy rains and floods have affected 16 states across Sudan and the Abyei contested area since 1 August. As of mid-September, the Government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) has revised the number of people affected by floods in Sudan to an estimated 500,000 people, or 99,980 families, due to more rainfalls reported in several states. The late August figure cited 341,000 people as affected by the floods. The significant increase in numbers is observed in Khartoum state, West Kordofan, and White Nile.

Khartoum remains the state worst affected by flooding with over 184,410 people affected, followed by El Gezira with over 52,975 people affected, and Blue Nile with 50,000 affected. OCHA states that immediate needs include emergency shelter, health, water, and sanitation support. This year’s floods are considered the worst since the historic 1988 floods. In 2012, 270,000 people were affected by floods nationally.

WHO has expressed concern that heavy rains and floods may aggravate outbreaks of communicable diseases, especially acute watery diarrhoea, malaria, dengue fever, and Rift Valley fever. Inconsistent chlorination, population movements, flooded and destroyed toilets, and poor community hygiene practices are risk factors for the potential outbreak and spread of water borne diseases.

Earlier reports from humanitarian actors indicated that the floods had damaged several roads, affecting transport and disrupting markets. Local media reported a lack of bread and an approximate 27% increase in commodity prices in some areas of Khartoum last week.

The recent floods have further destroyed large stretches of cropland. According to the State Ministry of Agriculture, an estimated 55,000 acres (53,000 feddans) of sorghum, sesame, beans, groundnuts, tomatoes, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, okra, eggplant, and banana plantations have been destroyed by floods in Blue Nile state alone.

Access: On 4 October, the Rapporteur of the joint Sudan and South Sudan Security Committee announced that Sudan and South Sudan reached an agreement to re-open five border crossings between the two countries. These crossings include the Kosti – Renk road, the Rabak – Renk road, the Babanusa-Aweil-Wau railway crossing, the Kosti – Juba river transport, and the Heglig – Fariang road. The Committee also recommended that both countries agree on facilitation of delivery of humanitarian assistance and the transport of citizens stranded at the joint borders, the relocation of refugees from the demilitarised zone, and the repatriation of prisoners of war.

On 21 August, as reported by local media, the Sudanese Interior Minister announced that the government will introduce new rules governing the work of foreign relief organisations. Authorities will now only allow national organisations to work for human rights, excluding foreign humanitarian groups and UN agencies. The imposition of additional restrictions on foreign actors underlines Khartoum’s lasting discomfort with international organisations that it has repeatedly accused of exaggerating the magnitude of conflicts in the country, disseminating false information, and spying. To date, the Sudanese government still refuses to grant international humanitarian groups access to rebel-held areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

The heavy rains that have hit Sudan since early August have reportedly affected the transport system. Stagnant water remaining in some areas is hindering humanitarian access to affected populations.

Access for humanitarian actors to affected populations, and access of affected populations to aid, is severely hampered by the presence of mines and Explosive Remnants of War.
Malnutrition rates in east Sudan (Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref states) are the highest in Sudan, with 28% of children suffering from moderate or severe acute malnutrition in Red Sea state.

Health: According to an official statement on 3 October, a debated vaccination campaign for children <5 will be initiated in non-Government controlled areas in November. The vaccination campaign, proposed by UNICEF and WHO and originally due to start in October, has been blocked due to disagreement between the Government and the SPLM-N. Routine vaccinations for children <5 were interrupted when fighting broke out in 2011. On 16 September, the Government stated that it would resume vaccinations "within the framework of cooperation between the Government and the Tripartite Partners". UNICEF and WHO had earlier agreed with the Sudanese Ministry of Health and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency on all technical details for the vaccination campaign, which will target 160,000 children <5. OCHA reports that the vaccination campaign will target 147,000 children in South Kordofan and 7,000 children in Blue Nile. If the vaccination campaign is implemented, it will be the first cross-line access into SPLM-N areas from within Sudan since 2011.

Darfur

Political and Security Context

On 9 September in Khartoum, Darfuri leaders took part in a conference to discuss the root causes of the recent tribal conflicts and find possible solutions for peaceful coexistence amongst tribes. Participants recommended both disarmament and the establishment of laws regulating relations between farmers and pastoralists, as well as the settlement of disputes over land resources. This was the first event organised by UNAMID (the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in the western Sudanese region), after the UN Security Council renewed its mandate late July 2013 until 31 August 2014, to address the causes of the escalating violence across Darfur.

Insurgent Groups

Clashes between the rebel group Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minawi (SLM-MM), part of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) umbrella movement, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have been ongoing in Southern and Eastern Darfur since April. Because of lack of up to date information, it is difficult to evaluate the intensity of the fighting. According to local sources, the SRF attacked a military convoy east of Kass in South Darfur on 19 August that resulted in 21 dead. Fighting between the SAF and allied militias and SLM-MM was reported in Onganja, south of Nyala, then Labado and Muahjria to the east, and later in Donkey Darisa, leaving hundreds of thousands of civilians displaced and without shelter in May. Government forces face attacks from dissident faction of the SLM led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) in Northern Darfur. Fighting has displaced civilians north and northwest of Nyala.

On 20 August, a consultation with Darfur's three rebel groups (SLM-MM, SLM-AW, and JEM) was organised under the auspices of UNAMID in Arusha, Tanzania and after a first meeting in May. Though representatives of the rebel movements allegedly welcome such initiatives, spokesmen for the groups reiterated their goal to negotiate with Khartoum on a
national agenda, and not on separate regional issues, through the SRF. The SRF is an alliance including the SPLM-N, fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and has ties with opposition political groups in Khartoum. It is unclear how Khartoum will respond to the initiative.

As reported since the beginning of August, SAF continues regular air raids targeting East Jebel Marra in South Darfur, and Kadja and Dady areas of North Darfur. On 11 September, people who fled from the villages Makariba A and Makariba B (south of El Fasher) and the area of Tabet, (East Jebel Marra) reported casualties due to intense shelling by heavy artillery, allegedly by the SAF. On 5 September, at least seven people, including four children, were reportedly killed in renewed air strikes against Darfur’s East Jebel Marra in the vicinities of Kined, Silo, Shangil Tobea, with the villages of Kunjara, Sharaf, Tirbo and Vanaga being hit. The next day, the explosion of an earlier unexploded bomb in the Dubbo Al Omda area killed four children. Clashes between the local population and pro-government militiamen were reported in East Jebel Marra. On 18 August, heavy bombing reportedly destroyed an entire village in East Jebel Marra, killing four. Air raids in North Darfur on 11 August killed nine and wounded dozens. A European international organisation, the Society for Threatened Peoples (STP), condemned what it described as indiscriminate air raids on civilians in the Jebel Marra Mountains that forced thousands of people to flee the area. Local media reported on 20 August renewed bombardments from SAF over the village of Abu Tega in North Darfur. Areas east, north and west of Marshang locality in South Darfur were also reportedly targeted.

Since April, near the cities of Katila, Um Dukhun, Ed Elfirsan, Kubum, and Rihaid Albirid in Darfur, tribal fighting between the Abbala and Beni Hussein, the Salamat and Ta’isha, Al-Gimir and Beni Halba, Dajo and Beni Halba, Misseriya, and Salamat tribes have intermittently flared. Clashes between the Tarjam and Fur tribes were reported in Southern Darfur in May.

**East Darfur**

Since mid-July, tensions over land ownership and cattle have increased between Rezeigat and Maaliya tribes in Kulyakli Abu Salama in Adila locality. Armed clashes during the week of 16-22 September resulted in the deaths of 21 tribesmen and injury of 55 people, reported OCHA. According to local sources, clashes took place on 18 September in the Bakhit region, 70 km east of East Darfur capital Ed Daen, allegedly leaving 20 dead and as many injured. The recent violence erupted despite a peace deal signed on 22 August by representatives of the two Arab tribes to end several weeks of deadly clashes and prepare for a reconciliation conference in Al-Tawisha, North Darfur.

On 17 August, the abduction of 42 Maaliya tribespeople by Rezeigat tribesmen jeopardised an earlier attempt to convey a conflict resolution meeting. As reported by STP on 14 August, over 300 people were killed in four days of clashes between the two nomadic pastoralist groups that started on 9 August. OCHA noted that an estimated 170 people were killed in the clashes, and as of 12 September, the HAC reported that these clashes had displaced an estimated 144,000 people.

**Central Darfur**

Fighting between Misseriya and Salamat tribes in Central Darfur State continues despite the signing of a third reconciliation agreement on 10 September in Um Dukhun town. According to OCHA, 45 people from the two tribes were killed from 23-29 September. Local media reports cite clashes erupting on 3 October between the tribes at Bindisi, resulting in an unknown number of dead and injured. The clashes supposedly spread into neighbourhoods of Bindisi city and surrounding villages.

According to local authorities in Central Darfur, armed Misseriya and Salamat tribesmen have been mobilising in Um Dukhun, Bindisi and Mukjar in preparation for conflict. The reconciliation agreement signed in Zalingei early July was yet another unsuccessful attempt at a lasting peace, followed by 230 people killed in two weeks of fighting. Violence between the two tribes has flared since April, causing large-scale displacement and numerous casualties. Between April and June this year, fighting between the two tribes forced over 55,000 people to flee their homes, including an estimated 22,000 IDPs and 30,000 displaced to Chad and 3,300 people to Central African Republic (CAR), according to UNHCR.

On 3 September, violent clashes reportedly erupted between police and pro-government militiamen at Tutul market in Nierteti locality. According to local sources, the clashes sparked from a conflict over who is entitled to levy taxes and duties on the market. The number of casualties is unknown. On 29 August, infighting between militiamen and SAF troops was reported from the same area, which is growing increasingly insecure. On 26 August, an ICRC convoy travelling from Zalingei to Nertiti was hijacked and four staff abducted. Although ICRC staff was released the next day, the vehicles and the other looted materials were not returned.

**South Darfur**

South Darfur has seen various different conflicts recently, including fighting between SAF and SLA-AW forces, between militias and Government security, and inter-tribal fighting. The state also faces problems of banditry and criminality.

Tribal disputes over land ownership continued in July, requiring Khartoum to deploy Special Forces to enforce a buffer zone between the Al-Gimir and Beni Halba tribes. In April, conflict between the two tribes reignited after a relatively stable period since February. Fighting intensified at end May, leading to 23 people killed and 51 injured. The violence led to the burning of Katela town of the Al-Gimir tribe, large displacements, and the Al-Gimir tribe accusing the Sudanese authorities of colluding with the Beni Halba tribe. On 26 June, conflict resumed in Katela with nine killed and dozens displaced. Clashes between the Dajo and Beni Halba tribes were reported in Kubum, South Darfur.

On 8 September, OCHA stated that increased criminality throughout Darfur is affecting humanitarian and commercial traffic, especially South Darfur. On 4 September on the axis between Zalingei and Nyala, armed men attacked a convoy of ten trucks carrying food commodities. On 6 September, a private vehicle was carjacked by gunmen. On 26 August, guesthouses used by ICRC and their warehouses in Nyala were attacked and looted by armed men. ICRC staff were beaten and personal property confiscated. In early July, fighting in the area resulted in the looting of offices and premises of several international organisations. During the looting, two aid workers from World Vision were killed and three injured. UNDSS has advised international humanitarian staff to minimise unnecessary movement in Nyala and surrounds.
At least five people were killed and 48 wounded as violent protests erupted in South Darfur capital Nyala on 19 September, according to local media. Thousands of angry demonstrators clashed with police as they protested against the incapacity of local government to uphold security in the town. The demonstrations were sparked by the killing of Ismael Wadi, a prominent businessman from the Zaghawa tribe, by an alleged Janjaweed militia on 18 September. Riot police tried to disperse the crowd, reportedly firing bullets and using tear gas. Order was restored on 20 September, but the general situation in Nyala remains tense with markets only partially open and minimal movements in town, OCHA reports.

North Darfur

Since the start of 2013, rival Abbala and Beni Hussein tribes have clashed violently over control of the Jebel Amer gold mine in Al Sareif Beni Hussein, leaving 839 people dead according to authorities and an estimated 150,000 displaced according to the UN. The gold mine death toll is over double the number of all people killed by fighting between the army, rebels, and rival tribes in Darfur in 2012, according to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s quarterly reports to the Security Council.

On 26 July, Abbala and Beni Hussein tribes signed a comprehensive peace agreement in El Fasher, and on 18 August, the treaty allegedly came into effect with the reopening of roads linking Saraf Omra with Al Sareif Beni Hussein. The two tribes agreed to cease hostilities, hold accountable outliers from any side, and return all stolen agricultural lands.

On 10 September, the Liberation and Justice Movement faction (LJM), a rebel group gathering ten smaller Darfur rebel organisations since February 2010, claimed liberation of the military region of Um Hashaba located west of the North Darfuri city of El Fasher. The rebels allegedly ousted army troops and militias from the area in an attack which killed 26 army staff and militiamen.

Insecurity and Attacks on Internally Displaced People (IDPs)

In September, there were reports of increased violence from SAF and affiliated militias against IDPs in camps in Darfur, and IDPs across Darfur continue to face attacks from various armed non-state actors. According to the Association of Displaced Persons and Refugees of Darfur, North, Central, and West Darfur are the hardest hit. On 18 September, 30 militiamen stormed into Kalma Camp in South Darfur, allegedly beating and harassing IDPs before police could intervene. In early September, attacks against IDPS were reported in Kerine in West Darfur, while attacks against civilians occurred in Manawashi in South Darfur on 2 September. On 3 September, new assaults were reported from Marshang in South Darfur. In August, attacks occurred in Hila Beeda near Zalingei, capital of Central Darfur, at Hamidiyah camp in Central Darfur, and near Dankoj IDP camp in Saraf Omra in North Darfur. Since late June, similar incidents have been reported from Zalingei in Central Darfur, and El Salam, Dumma and Toum Kittir camps in South Darfur, Murnei camp in West Darfur, Dreige camp in South Darfur, Um Haleeb camp and Nertiti camp in Central Darfur.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

OCHA reported in mid-August that 3.2 million people, over a third of Darfur’s population, are in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of the decade-long conflict and insecurity.

Displacement: According to UNHCR as of mid-August, there are 2.4 million IDPs in Darfur; an estimated 1.4 million live in camps.

OCHA stated on 30 June that an estimated 287,000 people have been displaced or severely affected by inter-tribal fighting and conflict between various armed groups and the Government from January to June. According to UNHCR in August, there are almost 300,000 new IDPs since the beginning of 2013.

UNHCR observes that around 36,200 Sudanese refugees from Darfur have arrived in Chad since January 2013. There are currently an estimated 330,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad. As instability persists across Darfur, this number may increase. Since January 2013, roughly, 3,400 new Sudanese refugees have arrived in CAR (mainly from Central Darfur). Roughly, 5,000 people were displaced from Sudan to CAR in March, reports the UN.

Up to 200,000 people, according to local sources, were displaced in the Nyala area in South Darfur. At present, people continue to arrive at camps, notably Alsalam camp where living conditions are dire.

In South Darfur on 21 May, renewed violence between Al-Gimir and Beni Halba tribes displaced 20,000 residents of Katela town to the southern neighbouring Tulus area. IOM reported fighting between Salamat and Taisha tribes that caused over 1,800 people to flee their homes in East and South Darfur and take refuge in South Darfur’s Kalma IDP camp. An estimated 60,000 people also took refuge in El Sereif and Saraf Omra in North Darfur.

In East Darfur, according to HAC, an estimated 144,000 people have been displaced following clashes between Reizegat and Maaliya tribes which started on 9 August in Adila and Abu Karinka. ECHO reported on 12 September that the most urgent needs of these IDPs are food, non-food relief supplies, emergency shelter, WASH, and health assistance. Because of Government restrictions, access to these two areas is reportedly limited. According to UNAMID, 10,000 people in Labado town continue to seek refuge near the UNAMID site, with the town remaining empty. In Kulaykili Abu Salama in Assialaja locality, East Darfur, tribal tensions forced about 500 people to flee the area in mid-July.

According to HAC, over 5,000 people fled two villages in East Darfur due to inter-tribal clashes in Ed Daein town, East Darfur, over the past week. According to community leaders, the total population of the two villages before the fighting broke was about 5,000 people. Of these, roughly 2,700 have fled to Ed Daein and Mina Al Bari towns and 2,300 to Adila and Abu Karinka.

An estimated 11,600 people displaced from around Muhajeria are taking refuge in Abu Dangal village and Shaeria town in East Darfur. According to HAC, these IDPs were displaced from Muhajeria town in Yassin locality in April following fighting between SAF and the Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minawi faction (SLA-MM). HAC states that the 9,000 displaced people in Abu Dangal have yet to receive any non-food relief assistance. There has been a sharp deterioration in the health coverage in Shaeria since MSF-Belgium suspended operations following a decision from the National Intelligence and Security
Services. This has negatively affected an estimated 16,000 people in Shaeria town and nearby villages.

In Central Darfur, according to HAC, an estimated 15,300 people have fled their homes and sought shelter in Um Dukhun town since April 2013, when fighting between Misseriya and Salamat tribes over resources started. The new IDPs in Um Dukhun were displaced mainly from Magan, Kabar, and Salaley administrative units and parts of Mukjar locality. HAC earlier estimated that over 22,000 people were internally displaced due to the Misseriya-Salamat conflict in Central Darfur. According to the HAC, most of these IDPs have not received food assistance, though some have benefited from non-food item distributions, and water and sanitation assistance.

As reported by the STP in mid-August, ongoing bombing by SAF of the Jebel Marra Mountains in North and South Darfur has displaced 17,000 people from the area. According to the UN, there are about 100,000 people in the Jebel Marra area either displaced or severely affected by conflict.

Disaster: As reported by OCHA, heavy rains since mid-August have impacted 29,135 people and destroyed 2,562 houses in North Darfur. In South Darfur 18,440 people are affected, and in West Darfur 960 people are affected. Local sources reported heavy rains in El Salam IDP camp in South Darfur destroying over 1,000 homes. In early September, heavy rains were reported in central Darfur, with at least 95 houses destroyed north and south of Nierteti, and in North Darfur with over 100 homes destroyed at camp Dankuj in Saraf Omra. In West Darfur, rains and floods caused a number of injuries among IDPs in the Abu Suruj camp.

In early August, heavy rainfall and subsequent flooding was recorded across North Darfur, affecting El Fasher, Mellit, El Mala, and El Malha as well as in South Darfur, in Nyala and surrounding IDP camps, killing seven people and destroying 400 houses. Rain also affected the districts of Al Wadi, Jebel, Al Jeer, Taiba, and Texas.

Access: Two separate attacks on UN peacekeepers in West and North Darfur on 11-13 October witness a deteriorating security trend in the region. On 13 October, three Senegalese peacekeepers were killed and one injured after being ambushed by members of an unidentified armed group in West Darfur. According to UNAMID, the police unit came under attack while escorting a water convoy from El Geneina to the UNAMID regional headquarters in West Darfur. On 11 October, a UNAMID military observer from Zambia died in the North Darfur capital El Fasher following an attack by armed men who stabbed him and hijacked his vehicle. The latest incidents come barely four months after seven Tanzanian peacekeepers were killed and 17 injured in what was described as the worst-ever single attack in the troubled region since 2007.

OCHA states that insecurity is hindering movement of humanitarian supplies by road in Central Darfur, especially to the southern corridor localities of Um Dukhun and Bindisi.

Inter-tribal fighting and clashes between Government security forces and armed movements in parts of East Darfur State is delaying the humanitarian response to people in need. The deteriorating security situation following inter-tribal tension and clashes between Rizeigat and Ma’aliya tribes and Government restrictions on movement have prevented humanitarian actors from reaching an estimated 150,000 IDPs in Adila, Abu Karina, Muhajeria and Labado, Yassin, and Shaeria, OCHA reported.

On 6 August, UNHCR stated that it had increasing difficulties negotiating the renewal of work permits for international staff in Darfur. After some staff had to leave Sudan, UNHCR temporarily scaled down operations in Darfur. Agencies such as WFP and UNICEF have not experienced problems with the renewal of work permits.

According to WHO, inaccessibility due to insecurity is a major concern in North Darfur, particularly in conflict-affected areas of Jebel Amir, namely Elseraif town, Kebkabya and Saraf Omra. In South and East Darfur, access, particularly in Jebel Marra, has been a concern for operational organisations.

OCHA reported that, as of 21 July, relief supplies for new IDPs in Um Dukhun in Central Darfur are still stranded in Zalingei and El Geneina due to logistic and security challenges. Most commercial transporters in the area are unwilling to go to Um Dukhun, citing insecurity.

In South Darfur on 15 July, government security forces informed humanitarian agencies about criminal groups in Nyala town, most of whom come from Kass locality and areas north of Nyala. In early July, growing insecurity in Nyala heavily impacted humanitarian actors after two aid workers from World Vision were killed and three others injured as a result of fighting in the city.

As reported by the UK-based Sudan Social Development Organisation on 19 August, an estimated 80,000 people in Abu Karinka, Adila, Bakhet and Abu Jabara towns in East Darfur have been cut off from life-saving assistance due to the ongoing strife between Maaliya and Rizeigat Arab tribes. These people are living without access to water, shelter, or medical assistance.

Food Security: As of October, according to an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification jointly undertaken by several humanitarian actors, 2,743,362 people in the Darfur States face Crisis and Emergency (IPC Phase 3 and 4) levels food insecurity, of whom 527,827 are in South Darfur, 1,023,611 in North Darfur, 468,891 in West Darfur, 492,933 in Central Darfur, and 230,100 in East Darfur.

Health and malnutrition: At least 25 people, among them eight children, diagnosed with visceral leishmaniasis (VL) and scabies have died in Kerenik (West Darfur). According to the HAC, most of these IDPs have not received food assistance, though some have benefited from non-food item distributions, and water and sanitation assistance.

Access: Two separate attacks on UN peacekeepers in West and North Darfur on 11-13 October witness a deteriorating security trend in the region. On 13 October, three Senegalese peacekeepers were killed and one injured after being ambushed by members of an unidentified armed group in West Darfur. According to UNAMID, the police unit came under attack while escorting a water convoy from El Geneina to the UNAMID regional headquarters in West Darfur. On 11 October, a UNAMID military observer from Zambia died in the North Darfur capital El Fasher following an attack by armed men who stabbed him and hijacked his vehicle. The latest incidents come barely four months after seven Tanzanian peacekeepers were killed and 17 injured in what was described as the worst-ever single attack in the troubled region since 2007.

OCHA states that insecurity is hindering movement of humanitarian supplies by road in Central Darfur, especially to the southern corridor localities of Um Dukhun and Bindisi.

Inter-tribal fighting and clashes between Government security forces and armed movements in parts of East Darfur State is delaying the humanitarian response to people in need. The deteriorating security situation following inter-tribal tension and clashes between Rizeigat and Ma’aliya tribes and Government restrictions on movement have prevented humanitarian actors from reaching an estimated 150,000 IDPs in Adila, Abu Karina, Muhajeria and Labado, Yassin, and Shaeria, OCHA reports.

On 6 August, UNHCR stated that it had increasing difficulties negotiating the renewal of work permits for international staff in Darfur. After some staff had to leave Sudan, UNHCR temporarily scaled down operations in Darfur. Agencies such as WFP and UNICEF have not experienced problems with the renewal of work permits.

According to WHO, inaccessibility due to insecurity is a major concern in North Darfur, particularly in conflict-affected areas of Jebel Amir, namely Elseraif town, Kebkabya and Saraf Omra. In South and East Darfur, access, particularly in Jebel Marra, has been a concern for operational organisations.

OCHA reported that, as of 21 July, relief supplies for new IDPs in Um Dukhun in Central Darfur are still stranded in Zalingei and El Geneina due to logistic and security challenges. Most commercial transporters in the area are unwilling to go to Um Dukhun, citing insecurity.

In South Darfur on 15 July, government security forces informed humanitarian agencies about criminal groups in Nyala town, most of whom come from Kass locality and areas north of Nyala. In early July, growing insecurity in Nyala heavily impacted humanitarian actors after two aid workers from World Vision were killed and three others injured as a result of fighting in the city.

As reported by the UK-based Sudan Social Development Organisation on 19 August, an estimated 80,000 people in Abu Karinka, Adila, Bakhet and Abu Jabara towns in East Darfur have been cut off from life-saving assistance due to the ongoing strife between Maaliya and Rizeigat Arab tribes. These people are living without access to water, shelter, or medical assistance.

Food Security: As of October, according to an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification jointly undertaken by several humanitarian actors, 2,743,362 people in the Darfur States face Crisis and Emergency (IPC Phase 3 and 4) levels food insecurity, of whom 527,827 are in South Darfur, 1,023,611 in North Darfur, 468,891 in West Darfur, 492,933 in Central Darfur, and 230,100 in East Darfur.

Health and malnutrition: At least 25 people, among them eight children, diagnosed with visceral leishmaniasis (VL) and scabies have died in Kerenik (West Darfur). According to the HAC, most of these IDPs have not received food assistance, though some have benefited from non-food item distributions, and water and sanitation assistance.
Blue Nile and South Kordofan states

Political and Security Context

Armed clashes between SAF and the SPLM-N in South Kordofan and Blue Nile continue to result in death and displacement of civilians, as per reports from humanitarian organisations. Hostilities continued in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States throughout September 2013, despite the unilateral cessation of hostilities declared by the SPLM-N on 31 August 2013, according to the South Kordofan and Blue Nile Coordination Unit (SKBN-CU). On 30 September, SPLM-N announced the end of a unilateral cessation of hostilities agreed last month, stressing they would work to support the current popular uprising.

SKBN-CU reports that the Sudanese Air Force aerial bombardments in September resulted in civilian casualties and displacement in El Buram, Dalami, Delling, Heiban, Kadugli, Rashad, and Um Durein localities in South Kordofan and Bau, Geissan, and Kurmuk localities in Blue Nile.

SKBN-CU previously reported that July and August saw intensive ground fighting in insurgent controlled areas in Bau, Geissan, and Kurmuk counties, Blue Nile leading to civilian displacement. In SPLM-N-controlled areas of South Kordofan, aerial bombardment and ground fighting resulted in civilian casualties and displacement. An August report by Sudan Consortium (a coalition of 50 Africa-based and Africa-focused NGOs) reported at least 23 civilians killed and another 81 civilians injured by aerial bombardments since January 2013.

In Blue Nile, heavy fighting was reported in the Tamado Mountain area in Geissan locality on 16 September, and fighting and aerial bombardments on 17 September near Dindiro in Bau locality, 90 km from the Blue Nile State capital, Ed Damazine. OCHA said that an estimated 300 people from Wigo and Madum areas in Bau locality (about 35 km southwest of Ed Damazine town) fled their homes because of fighting between SAF and SPLM-N forces.

On 24 July, in an indication of increasing levels of coordination achieved between various armed movements, elements of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance of armed opposition movements comprising SPLM-N and the JEM, attacked an army position in al-Rachad in central North Kordofan, with people reportedly killed on both sides. Rachad is near the state capital El-Obeid and Um Ruwaba, a city stormed in a coordinated attack of the SRF in April. On 27 July, elements of the SRF staged an attack on an SAF patrol in Al Dileima village, 18 km north of Delling town and 150 km from Kadugli on the main Kadugli-El Obeid highway linking South and North Kordofan. The fighting came as the AU was trying to mediate the oil crisis that has led to the worsening of the relations between Juba and Khartoum over the past weeks.

On 27 April, talks about a possible ceasefire between the rebel SPLM-N and the Sudanese Government stalled over the issue of humanitarian access corridors. According to SPLM-N, the adjournment of the negotiations is linked to Khartoum’s insistence on linking the humanitarian issue to the political one, a condition the rebel group strongly rejects. Humanitarian access to the area remains limited. As of June, no announcement regarding the date for the next round of talks had been made public.

At the end of April, after seizing Abu Karshola town, an SPLM-N armed group briefly besieged and looted the town of Um Ruwaba, a strategic stronghold linking Southern Kordofan to Northern Kordofan. This unprecedented attack and the fighting that ensued in the aftermath triggered regional resonance, leading Khartoum to overtly accuse Juba of supporting the rebels.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

On 26 June, in a controversial statement, Khartoum asserted that the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states is witnessing no problems, except in limited areas under rebel control.

Displacement: During September, more refugees continued to arrive in Upper Nile State, South Sudan from Talodi and Abu Jubaiha localities of South Kordofan due to aerial bombardments and acute food insecurity, according to SKBN-CU. Official numbers of the new refugee population from Talodi and Abu Jubaiha are unavailable, but OCHA reports that over 2,800 refugees were located in Fashoda, Malakal, and Melut counties in Upper Nile State as of 3 October 2013. NGOs reported that refugees from Talodi exhibited emergency levels of severe acute malnutrition (SAM). According to UNHCR, more than 196,000 Sudanese refugees from South Kordofan and Blue Nile have sought shelter in South Sudan.

Following ground fighting in Baw, Geissan, and Kurmuk counties inside Blue Nile, an influx of 3,000 refugees reportedly crossed into Ethiopia from Geissan county at Ashimbu and at a smaller crossing south of Kashankaro. The SKBN-CU reported that as of late September the numbers of IDPs remain high in Baw and Geissan areas, with Sudanese refugees from Geissan continuing to arrive in Ethiopia. SKBN-CU reported the arrival of 1,436 newly displaced people to Gambarda and Doglog areas in Kurmuk locality in late September. These people arrived from Kalatu Shamall area in Kurmuk following fighting between the SAF and SPLM-N forces in the area. As of early October, 32,000 refugees from Blue Nile have arrived in Ethiopia since 2011.

On 17 August, local authorities in Fashoda county, Upper Nile State in South Sudan said that a significant number of refugees crossed into the area from South Kordofan in previous days. The refugees were reportedly severely food insecure, with four persons dying after their arrival; 4,000-5,000 people were already in the area with urgent need for food, shelter, and other humanitarian assistance.

According to UNHCR, people from South Kordofan (Warni, Kaw Nyaro, and Talodi areas) continued to arrive in South Sudan’s Upper Nile state from 23-29 September. Most people are from Warni and reported to be fleeing insecurity.

More than 550 people arrived from South Kordofan in to South Sudan's Upper Nile State (Malakal and Fashoda counties) in September. People from Kaw Nyaro and Talodi areas say they left because of food insecurity and lack of prospect for future harvest.

Fighting in South Kordofan, in Rashad county where Abu Karshola is located, led to the displacement of over 63,000 civilians across SAF and SPLM-N controlled areas in late May according to IOM, SKBN-CU, HAC, and SRCS. Roughly, 21,000 displaced people have recently returned to areas of origin in South Kordofan, particularly to Abu Karshola,
with returns ongoing in late July. The remaining IDPs need food assistance and non-food supplies, according to WFP.

During May, SKBN-CU reported that aerial bombardment and ground fighting resulted in civilian displacement in Blue Nile state, from Mayak, Olmedon, Mufu, Abu Dera, Marmiton, and Khor Bashum in Wadeka payam, to Beillia and Sammari areas, moving closer to the South Sudan border. In Kurmuk county, internal displacement of over 20,000 civilians in Wadeka payam was reported late May to early June. SKBN-CU estimated that over 52,000 people were forcibly displaced in Blue Nile state in May.

As of 30 June, OCHA stated that 231,000 people in South Kordofan and 95,000 people in Blue Nile were displaced or severely affected by conflict in government-controlled areas. In SPLM-N areas, 700,000 people in South Kordofan and 90,000 in Blue Nile are displaced or severely affected by conflict according to local estimates. The UN reports that there is no presence in SPLM-N controlled areas and is unable to independently verify these figures.

Access: According to a 6th June UN report, access remains limited in rebel-held areas, but has improved in government-controlled areas since January. As of mid-August, there is no humanitarian access from Sudan to rebel-held areas in South Kordofan.

On 25 June, the Sudanese ruling NCP warned foreign aid groups expelled from the country against attempting to enter the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states without Khartoum’s permission. The secretary of the NCP stated that some organisations previously working in Sudan who had been expelled due to violating government policies were trying to sneak back in. He claimed that these groups were seeking entrance through political bodies and people with connections to rebels to collect information on the humanitarian situation in Sudan and fabricate reports with the help of organisations such as Amnesty International and Transparency International. The NCP official revealed a new strategy for civil society organisations that is in line with the government’s policies regarding human rights work in Sudan and underscores permanently banning groups that support rebels from entering the country. The authorities currently ban access of foreign groups to rebel-held areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

On 4 April, WFP reported a breakthrough in delivering food aid to the Blue Nile state for the first time since conflict began 18 months ago. WFP reported delivering aid to 33,000 IDPs in North Kordofan from Abu Karshola in South Kordofan in April and May.

Food Security: As of October, according to an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification jointly undertaken by several humanitarian actors, 104,240 people in South Kordofan, and 100,107 people in Blue Nile face Crisis and Emergency (IPC Phase 3 and 4) levels food insecurity.

FEWSNET reports that the highest level of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) is projected among IDPs in SPLM-N controlled areas of South Kordofan until December 2013. Poor households in these areas are projected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In Government-held areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, food security is relatively better due to ongoing humanitarian assistance, according to FEWSNET, although stressed levels (IPC Phase 2) are likely to persist through end December.

The effects of the deteriorating food security will be exacerbated by the continued lack of access to humanitarian assistance, the near-absence of income sources from agricultural production and labour, and progressive stripping of assets over an extended period since June 2011.

Malnutrition: According to unofficial reports, malnutrition rates among children <5 in the conflict-plagued regions is 30%, double the emergency threshold according to WHO.

Updated: 15/10/2013

CAMEROON FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

Mid-October: According to UNHCR, some 5,280 Central African refugees have been registered in Cameroon since January 2013. More than 1,800 registered refugees are in the eastern region and roughly 1,400 live in urban areas, mainly Yaounde and Douala. As of early October, UNHCR reports that some 90,372 CAR refugees are living in Cameroon.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Displacement: According to UNHCR on 30 September, 5,280 Central African refugees have been registered in Cameroon since January 2013. More than 1,800 registered refugees are in the eastern region and roughly 1,400 live in urban areas, mainly Yaounde and Douala. As of early October, UNHCR reports that some 90,372 CAR refugees are living in Cameroon.

On 29 July, operational INGOs reported that attacks carried out by Boko Haram, operating throughout Nigeria and the North East of Cameroon, have led to a significant deterioration of the security situation in the Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Since 10 June 2013, Nigerian refugees have been crossing the border to Cameroon’s Far North region, mainly in the departments of Mayo Sava, Logone Chari and Mayo Sanaga. As of 17 July, the International Red Cross estimated that there are about 10,000 Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, while local government and civil society sources say the number is closer to 20,000. As of 15 July, Government and UNHCR figures showed more than 8,000 located in the Far North region, mainly women and children. A joint assessment mission conducted on 20 June by UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, and WFP in Zelevet concluded that needs among the arrived refugees are largely in WASH, health and nutrition.

Disaster: On 17-18 September, heavy rains caused the rupture of the dam along the Logone River at the town of Dougui, Kai Kai District in the Far North Region of Cameroon. According to IFRC, this caused initial evacuations of people to the banks of the dam. As of early October, more than 800 people in Bigue, Palam and Djafja are affected by the 17 September floods.

Just over a week later, on 27 September, further torrential rains in the same area caused a second rupture in the dam 4 km from the first rupture, leading to severe flooding in the proximate area. The Cameroon Red Cross Society reports that an entire village of approximately 5,000 people were immediately displaced. The government has identified
9,000 people in need of immediate assistance, notably shelter, food and health care.

**Food Security:** According to FAO as of early October, recurrent climatic shocks in recent years have negatively impacted agricultural activities in the two Sahelian regions North and Far North. The regions have been slow in recovering from the 2011-2012 drought and 2012 floods. This has led to severe food insecurity and malnutrition for about 615,000 people.

GIEWS reports that as of mid-October, harvesting of the 2013 main season and the planting of the second season maize crops are underway concurrently in several bi modal rainfall areas of the Centre and South. Abundant precipitation during March to July, the main season planting and growing period, benefited crops. On the other hand, below average rainfall in August and September may have negatively impacted planting activities of second season crops, for harvest in December/January, and rainfall amounts and distribution in the coming months will be crucial for crop development and performance.

**Health and Malnutrition:** UNICEF reports that the nutrition situation for 2013 is similar to that in 2012 due to a structural vulnerability of populations in the northern Cameroon, which has increased with each consecutive crisis. As of 30 June, an estimated 83,233 children <5 suffered from SAM and 134,680 suffer from MAM.

*Updated: 15/10/2013*

**DJIBOUTI**

**FOOD INSECURITY**

**Highlights**

No new development this week. Last update was: 23/09/2013.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement:** The continued influx of refugees from Somalia is leading to an increase in humanitarian needs in both rural and urban areas. UNHCR reported that as of 10 September, there are 18,725 Somali refugees in Djibouti, including 630 who arrived since January 2013.

**Food Security and Malnutrition:** As reported by FEWSNET, crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity is expected to persist through December, in Southeastern and Obock pastoral zones. Poor consecutive rainy seasons, coupled with anticipated poor livestock production and a decline in labour opportunities, are widening household food deficits. Significant improvement in the Karan/Karma rains has enhanced pasture and water availability in north-western pastoral areas.

Reportedly, continued Stressed acute food insecurity is expected for most poor households in Djibouti City’s urban areas of Balbala, Radiska, and Bauloaos and is anticipated to heighten through December. High unemployment rates of up to 48% and high staple prices are causing urban to peri-urban migration to areas such as Balbala. The food voucher programme for vulnerable households (from July through September covering Ramadan and Eid), in addition to humanitarian and food assistance programmes, should improve household access to food.

Several consecutive years of drought have led to a critical food security situation in Djibouti. Currently, 70,000 vulnerable people are at Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity. Most households affected by severe and moderate food insecurity are concentrated in the rural areas of Ali Sabieh, Dikhil and Obock. Rainfall levels in coastal areas at the end of the Heys-Dadaa rainy season (October through March) were 50%-75% below normal. Rural areas near Obock town in the northeast and the central pastoral lowland livelihood zone are experiencing severe water shortages and critical malnutrition levels. In the southeast, water access is expected to become increasingly limited, particularly in Sankal and Kabah-Kabah. According to the April WFP report, food insecurity in Djibouti has increased since November 2012, while households’ own food production has decreased from 14.6% to 5.1% due principally to delayed rainfall and persistent cold.

**Health and Malnutrition:** According to FEWSNET and WFP, as of August, General Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates for children <5 stood at 17.9% while chronic malnutrition was 35.2%. Roughly 33% of children <5 are underweight, and 15% of women of reproductive age are acutely malnourished.

*Reviewed: 15/10/2013*

**ETHIOPIA**

**FOOD INSECURITY**

**Highlights**

No new development this week. Last update was: 08/10/2013.

**Political and Security Context**

As of mid-June, Kenyan and Ethiopian surveyors finalised a fresh demarcation of the disputed border around Lake Turkana in an attempt to resolve protracted armed conflict among pastoralists from the two countries and enable fishing in Lake Turkana.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

On 12 September, ECHO reported that 50,433 IDPs in East Harargue are in need of humanitarian assistance.

**Displacement:** According to ECHO on 12 September, inter-communal clashes in Kenya (Moyale area) have caused an estimated 25,000 to cross into Ethiopia since mid-July. Most of the IDPs have camped in schools with some hosted by relatives. Urgent needs include water, food, medicine, and cash assistance.

In addition to the newly arrived Kenyan refugees, UNHCR reported that Ethiopia is hosting 419,800 refugees: 245,068 Somalis (as of 10 September); 74,513 Eritreans; 65,447 South Sudanese; 30,614 Sudanese; and 4,238 refugees from several other countries (as of end July).
UNHCR registered 5,779 new arrivals in July, up from 3,555 in June. Over 3,000 new arrivals originated from South Sudan (mostly from Pibor county in Jonglei state where violence between non-state actors and Government forces has surged over the previous weeks), and another 1,519 from Eritrea, representing the highest arrival figure from that country so far this year. The new camp at Hitsats now accommodates 2,570 Eritrean refugees.

UNHCR is relocating thousands of South Sudanese refugees currently settled in the border Wanthowa district to the existing Pugnido camp in Ethiopia’s Gambella region. Although 16,000 South Sudanese are estimated to reside at the border with host communities, their exact number is unknown since refugees in the area remain unregistered.

**Disaster:** ECHO reported on 10 September that heavy rainfall causing floods in August affected an estimated 195,000 people (39,000 households) in 219 districts, killing up to 40. Flooding damaged livestock and over 30,000 ha of crops. Most affected areas are North Shoa, South Wollo, North Wollo, Oromiya (of Amhara region), North Gonder, and East and West Gojam. OCHA noted on 9 May that floods have affected an estimated 50,000 people across the country since April. Oromia and Somali regions were the most severely hit.

Over 8,300 hectares of belg cropland were destroyed by armyworms in Wolayita zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), an area that suffered from heavy rains which had already damaged belg crops. The damage caused by armyworms was deemed to further reduce the expected July to September harvest. The infestation spread to Boricha, Bona Zuria, Dara, Dale, Hawassa Zuria and Loko Abaya woredas of Sidama zone, Loma and Mareka woredas of Dawro zone (SNNPR), and in drought prone areas of East and West Hararge zones of Oromia region. In Borica woreda, more than 655ha of belg cropland was destroyed in a week.

**Food Security:** As of October, FAO reports that about 2.7 million people are estimated to be in need of food assistance due to consecutively below average belg and sugum rains. Similarly, the Ministry of Agriculture reported that as of September, due to recurrent droughts in past seasons leading to low crop production, deterioration of livestock, and asset depletion, more than 2.6 million people will be in need of emergency food assistance in the second half of 2013. The most affected regions are Oromia (897,000 people in need), Somali (690,970), Amhara (548,000), Tigray (321,400) and Afar (152,600).

Other estimates suggest that the total number of people affected by food insecurity might be as high as 3.5 million. Recent reports indicated that East and West Hararge zones in eastern Ethiopia have deteriorated into food insecurity Crisis (IPC Phase 3) following two consecutive, poorly-distributed rainy seasons and a below average meher harvest in October-November 2012.

Crops in most agropastoral areas in Afar, northern Somali, and the lowlands of Bale, Guji, and Borena zones in Oromia region are reported to be performing well. Most crops are currently at the seed setting stage as of early October.

According to OCHA, delayed belg rains in most belg-receiving parts of the country, including SNNPR, north eastern Amhara, eastern and southern Tigray, and central and eastern Oromia regions, have led to late planting of belg crops. FEWSNET asserts that poor households in affected areas will not be able to meet food needs through the next harvest without depleting livelihoods assets. Most households have turned to the market to access food as early as January as their food stock from the 2012 belg and meher harvest was exhausted.

According to FAO, prices of the main cereals continued in recent months to follow the upward seasonal trend that started at the beginning of the year, with prices of maize increasing by between 6 and 20% from June to August. FAO reported on 10 September that in Addis Ababa, prices of maize and red sorghum were 24 and 35% higher, respectively, than 12 months earlier, while prices of wheat, white sorghum and teff were at around the same levels.

FEWSNET reports that the above normal precipitation in August and September in highland areas continued to cause weather hazards including waterlogging, flooding, and landslides that have damaged crops, primarily in SNNPR. Flooding in Shashhego woreda in Hadiya, Humbo in Wolayita, and Loka Abaya in Sidama temporarily damaged crops in more than 3,000 hectares (ha) of land in total. In addition, torrential rainfall along with hail and strong winds in Shebedino woreda in Sidama zone destroyed crops including maize, coffee, chat, haricot beans, and enset on around 4,000 ha. Reports from North Gondar zone in Amhara revealed snows and hail fell in Debark, Gondar Zuria, and Adiarkay woredas, damaging 5,700 ha of crops.

**Health:** On 23 August, a polio outbreak in the Horn of Africa was reported to have spread in Ethiopia. According to WHO as of 1 October, three cases in Ethiopia are confirmed. This is the first case since 2008, but the area is considered high risk because of its proximity to Somalia.

The Yellow Fever outbreak declared in mid-May by the authorities continues in South Omo, Segen and Arbaminch zones, SNNPR with 141 cases reported and 55 suspected deaths (still to be confirmed) in North Ari, South Ari, Benatsemay, and Selmago woredas, as reported by OCHA. Past weeks saw a decrease in reported cases in parallel with the spread of the outbreak to neighbouring zones. Reported cases have gradually declined since mid-June.

**WASH:** According to the UN, critical water shortages continue in Afar region. Water availability has deteriorated over the past month in Tigray region. Water shortages were reported in Adadle and Kebridehar woredas. Though seasonal rains have fully replenished water sources in Somali and SNNP regions and in nearly all woredas of Oromia and Amhara regions, over 566,000 people still need water trucking across Ethiopia, down from 720,500 people in March.

Reviewed: 15/10/2013

KENYA FOOD INSECURITY, DISPLACEMENT, INSECURITY

**Highlights**

As of early October, tension is high along the West Pokot and Turkana county borders after two people were killed by raiders suspected to be Turkanas. End of June, a raid killed three herdiers, and repeated incidents in August and September caused an
unknown number of families to flee the area of Bargoi in Samburu county. Motives behind the attacks are unclear but are suspected to be in retaliation of the killing of a Turkana boy by Samburu raiders.

Political and Security Context

Even though Kenya is considered to be relatively stable, the eastern region of the country is regularly affected by the presence of the armed group Al-Shabaab, a Somali group of insurgents, which is active along the border, including the areas of Mandera, Butei, El Wak, Dif, Dabbada, and Garissa. On 21 September, a group of heavily armed Al-Shabaab fighters attacked a shopping centre in the capital Nairobi and took dozens of hostages. Multiple fires followed during a four-day siege, killing 67 people and wounding over 180. On 29 September, the Kenya government announced that no hostages were left in the building. Al-Shabaab reportedly claimed the attack in retaliation for the involvement of Kenyan troops in Somalia.

On 26 September, two police officers were killed in an Al-Shabaab-claimed attack on a security post in Mandera (near the Somali border). Such attacks against police and other targets are frequent along Kenya’s porous border with Somalia. The incursion of Somali Islamists in Nairobi is a source of concern, as the insurgents are not usually active beyond the eastern border area.

On 24 September, the Society for Threatened People reported that this latest attack by Islamist extremists may have serious consequences for the Muslim population (which comprises about 11% of the 40 million inhabitants) and for the Somali refugees in Kenya.

Mid-August, an attack blamed on Somali Islamist insurgents killed at least four people in Garissa, southeastern Kenya, and displaced hundreds of people. Dadaab has experienced high levels of insecurity due to the volatile situation in Somalia where clashes are occurring between the Garre and Degodia ethnic Somali clans, who have been feuding in Mandera county since March 2012. Tension and conflict between the two communities has historically revolved around competition for natural resources. Since March 2013, emerging tensions are attributed to political disagreements over governance issues under the new devolution structures. Inter-clan violence has spread to neighbouring Wajir county. Leaders from the warring Garre and Degodia clans signed a peace agreement on 23 June to stop the clashes, but violence resumed on 24 June. The Kenyan Red Cross reported that conflict between Garre and Degodia clans in Mandera County left over 85 people dead as of 25 June. From June 2012 to May 2013, Dadaab camp has seen kidnappings of humanitarian workers, explosions, grenade attacks, random shootings, and increased banditry. In 2010/2011, Dadaab experienced a huge influx of refugees from Somalia.

In the north of the county, inter-clan clashes have erupted over the last two months, in a region where communities have historically fought over resources. Local sources reported that inter-clan clashes exacerbated at the end of August, with two days of inter-community fighting between the Borana, the Burji, and the Gabbra in the areas of Somare and Teti. The clashes caused the death of at least 20 people and displaced over 25,000. On 11 July, OCHA reported that since January 2013, at least 181 people have been killed, 217 injured, and many displaced as a result of inter-communal conflict in Kenya.

In Narok county (southwest of the country), violence erupted on 2 September in three villages of Trans Mara West district, killing eight people and causing an unknown number to flee. Local authorities reported that the clashes followed a land dispute between the Kisi, Maasaai, Kipsigis and Kuria communities. Tensions remain high in part of Ntirango and Loliondo.

In unrelated violence in western Kenya, tension is high along the West Pokot and Turkana county borders after two people were killed early October by raiders suspected to be Turkanas. End of June, a raid killed three herdsmen, and repeated incidents in August and September caused an unknown number of families to flee the area of Bargoi in Samburu county. Motives behind the attacks are unclear but are suspected to be in retaliation of the killing of a Turkana boy by Samburu raiders. The western province saw a surge in indiscriminate attacks by various armed groups and gangs in early May, affecting the cities of Bungoma and Busia. However, the two communities recently held talks where they agreed to peacefully resolve feuds between them.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Displacement: On 11 June, OCHA reported that inter-communal conflict has caused over 52,000 people to be displaced since January 2013. According to ECHO on 12 September, inter-clan clashes in the area of Moyale displaced over 25,000 people, mostly across the border of neighbouring Ethiopia. IDPs are currently staying with relatives in Moyale and in Marsabit and Wajir counties.

According to OCHA, rains had displaced 12,380 people as of 17 May 2013, with an additional 2,000 displaced in Marigat district after the waters of Lake Baringo rose, flooding farms and homesteads at end July.

According to UNHCR as of June, the influx of Somali refugees into Kenya continues, with a total number of 494,704. ECHO reported however on 9 September that the verification exercise conducted in Dadaab by UNHCR showed a reduction by almost 16% of the camps’ population, from approximately 475,000 to 402,455. The Kenyan Government estimated the number of Somali refugees in Kenya at 600,000 people as of late June 2013. In July, Kenya and Somalia signed a deal for “voluntary repatriation”, though the actual modalities remain to be agreed.

Population displacement from Jonglei state in South Sudan to Kenya has been reported, with 5,000 refugees registered with UNHCR in Kenya since May 2013.

Disaster: At the end of July, local media reported that heavy rains increased water levels of Lake Baringo in western Kenya, forcing around 2,000 people in Marigat district to flee their homes for higher ground. More than 800 acres of food crops were destroyed and local leaders said many people were at risk of starvation. The western district of Pokot was affected with floods destroying maize crops, local media reported on 14 August.

Food Security: The food insecure population declined to 1.1 million in February 2013 from 2.1 million in August 2012 according to the Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2013 short rains assessment. This was attributed to near average short rains crop production and improved grazing conditions compared to the 2012 August to September lean season.
In the southeastern and coastal marginal mixed farming livelihood zones in Kenya, the average to above average rainfall in March and April 2013 was followed by a dry spell in May, which ceased during a critical stage of maize development. FEWSNET reported in August that poor households are likely to be able to meet minimum food requirements, however they remained at Stressed levels (IPC Phase 2) through September 2013 in localised parts of Makueni, Kitui, Taita Taveta, and Kwale counties. The proportion of children ‘at risk’ of malnutrition declined between June and July by almost 10% in Makueni and marginally in Kitui county, and the proportions remained below their five-year averages.

FEWSNET also reported that the March to May long rains were beneficial in pastoral areas, where livestock conditions and milk production improved, and the prices of livestock generally increased compared to the dry season.

Health: In the Horn of Africa, the outbreak of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) has reached 31 cases in total. According to OCHA on 16 August, ten cases were registered in Kenya, all in Dadaab in the northeast. This is the first WPV outbreak in Kenya since 2011. To date, two rounds of outbreak response activities have been undertaken, targeting 1.35 million people, including all age groups in Dadaab.

According to UNHCR, eleven epidemic outbreaks were reported in 2012. The situation is expected to deteriorate due to an influx of new arrivals following the Government’s decision to transfer Somali refugees from urban areas to camps around Dadaab.

Updated: 15/10/2014

LESOTHO FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

As of early October according to FAO, an estimated 223 000 persons require assistance due to constrained food access. The Food and Nutrition Security Working Group (Southern Africa) (FNSWG) reports that this number includes some 15% of the rural population. The number of food insecure marks a decrease of 70% compared to the previous year, mainly due to strong production gains made in 2013 compared to the drought-affected harvest of last year.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

According to FAO as of early October, an estimated 223 000 persons require assistance due to constrained food access. The Food and Nutrition Security Working Group (Southern Africa) (FNSWG) reports that this number includes some 15% of the rural population.

The number of food insecure marks a decrease of 70% compared to the previous year, mainly due to strong production gains made in 2013 compared to the drought-affected harvest of last year. In aggregate, production output has doubled compared to 2012.

Meanwhile, FEWSNET reports that generally stable or increasing incomes, stable food prices, and ongoing poverty reduction programs facilitate relatively average to good food access sufficient to meet minimum food needs (IPC Phase 1: Minimal) in most parts of the country at least through December.

Rains in Lesotho begin around October/November or November/December and are strongest between January-March. The 2013/14 rains are forecast to be near average for Lesotho.

Lesotho’s population is extremely vulnerable – the country has the world’s third highest prevalence of HIV (23.5%) and 39% of children <5 are stunted. Lesotho suffers from widespread poverty with the proportion of households living below the poverty line exceeding 55%, out of which about 40% are extremely poor.

Updated: 15/10/2014

MADAGASCAR FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

9 October: 4 million people are food insecure following this year’s reduced harvest, according to FAO and WFP. A further 9.6 million people are at risk of food insecurity. The sharp decrease in harvest output is attributed to several factors including flooding caused by Cyclone Haruna earlier this year followed by a period of poor rains, uneven rainfall distribution and a persistent locust plague.

Political and Security Context

Following the army-backed coup by current President Andry Rajoelina, who ousted President Marc Ravalomanana in 2009, Madagascar has been mired in turmoil. Elections designed to end the deep political crisis are planned for 25 October. The new dates were reached following three earlier postponements this year, amid a lack of funding and controversy over the candidacies of three top contenders. After the presidential polls, a parliamentary vote will follow on 20 December, along with a run-off if the October election does not deliver an outright winner.

An electoral court last month dropped the names of strongman Rajoelina, the wife of his exiled rival Lalao Ravalomanana, and a former president after the three refused to withdraw from the presidential race. The international community has repeatedly called for both men not to run in the election. Their candidacies, which did not meet electoral rules, had been internationally condemned.

Pre-election tensions have escalated recently, with a series of explosions the past months. Four blasts rocked the country in September, one of which killed one person in the capital Antananarivo. A suspected bomb-maker was killed in Madagascar’s capital Antananarivo on 14 October when an explosive device self-detonated.

A group calling itself Defenders of National Sovereignty claimed responsibility for the first blast which went off outside a hotel in the capital early this month, citing interference by the international community in the country’s electoral process as main reason.
Humanitarian Context and Needs

Food Insecurity: According to the crop and food security assessment undertaken by FAO and WFP, as many as 4 million people, or 28% of the households in rural areas, of Madagascar are food insecure following this year’s reduced harvest. A further 9.6 million people are at risk of food insecurity. The south of the island - already a chronically food-insecure area - has been particularly affected.

The sharp decrease in harvest output is attributed to several factors including flooding caused by Cyclone Haruna earlier this year followed by a period of poor rains, uneven rainfall distribution and a persistent locust plague.

Damage caused by cyclone Haruna in February 2013, resulted in widespread crop losses in south-western parts.

Uneven rainfall distribution (both temporally and spatially), and a delayed start of the 2012/13 rainy season by one to two months, were observed in the rice producing regions in the north and center of the country. As a result significant reductions in the rice output were estimated in north-eastern regions, of up to 60 %, relative to 2012’s harvest.

In addition, since April 2012, Madagascar has been facing a plague of the Malagasy Migratory Locust, which threatens the livelihood of 13 million people in the country according to FAO. Two thirds of the country was feared infested as of 25 September. Findings from a damage assessment conducted in May 2013 indicate that rice crop losses due to locusts in 2012/13 vary from 10-40% in 17 of Madagascar’s 22 regions. This has both damaged crops and discouraged farmers from planting.

The impact of the locust plague has been most severe in the southwest, which contributes on average about 7% to the national rice output. However, although the impact of the locust plague has been comparatively limited on the national rice production, it had a significant impact on the livelihoods of the households in affected areas. In addition, the locust plague, which has already reached some of the main rice producing regions in the north, is expected to have a serious impact on next season’s crop, if not controlled.

In total, according to the FAO/WFP Report, Madagascar’s 2013 rice output is estimated at 3.6 million tonnes, which is about 21% below the above-average level of 2012. Maize and cassava production are also estimated to have declined compared to the previous season, by 15 and 14% respectively. The country is estimated to have a rice deficit of about 240,000 tonnes for the 2013/14 marketing year (April/March), while approximately 48,000 tonnes of imported maize would be required to satisfy the national deficit.

Updated: 15/10/2013

ZIMBABWE FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

No new updates. Last updated was: 23/09/2013.

Food Security: According to the results from the 2013 Annual Rural Livelihoods Assessment (ARLA) by the National Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC), released in July, 802,603 persons in rural areas are currently (July-September) food insecure in Zimbabwe. The current number marks a seasonal decline from the 1.67 million people assessed to be food insecure in the first quarter of 2013. According to WFP, the current food insecurity is due to various factors including adverse weather conditions, the unavailability and high cost of agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilisers, and

Reviewed: 15/10/2013
projected high cereal prices due to the poor maize harvest. The ARLA assessment reports that the number of food insecure is projected to rise to 2.2 million people (25% of the rural population) during the peak lean period January-March 2014, with numbers starting to rise in October. This would be the highest number of food insecure in Zimbabwe since early 2009. The projected increase is mainly due to the lower domestic harvest.

The provinces of the south and west of the country generally have the highest rates of food insecurity, reflecting those areas that experienced unfavourable weather conditions and consequently poor cereal harvests in 2013, according to FAO. Zimbabwe has five natural regions, each with varying suitability for growing crops. The drought-prone provinces of the south and west, such as Masvingo and the South and North Matabeleland provinces, are typically ranked as the most unsuitable areas for crop production. The highest proportions of food insecure households are currently estimated to be in Zvimashavane (52%), followed by Binga (50%). These provinces have also experienced among the highest maize prices in the country in 2013.

Overall, the aggregate cereal harvest in 2013 is estimated at about 1 million tonnes, close to 150,000 tonnes below the 2012 output and about 27% below the five-year average. Maize production has been particularly low in 2013, estimated at about 799,000 tonnes, which is 17% lower than the below-average output in 2012. Poor rainfall during the main cropping season (November-June) in southern and western provinces, as well as an overall contraction in the area planted, contributed to this year’s production decline, FAO reports. By contrast, production of sorghum, which is generally more tolerant to water deficits, is estimated to have increased slightly by 6% to about 69,000 tonnes. The inter-wheat crop, to be harvested in October, is expected at a similar level to last season’s output.

Reviewed: 15/10/2013

ANGOLA FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

30 September: Out of the 1.8 million people affected by a severe drought in Angola, some 700,000 are reported to be at risk of food insecurity. The most severely affected areas are the five southern provinces of Namibe, Cunene, Kuando Kubango, Huila, and Benguela. Earlier in August, some 1.5 million people were reported to be food insecure as a result of the impact of the current severe drought.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Food Security and Malnutrition: Since November 2012, Angola has been affected by a prolonged drought leaving 1.8 million people affected, out of which 700,000 are reported to be at risk of food insecurity by OCHA in late September. Previously some 1.5 million were reported to be food insecure in August. Crop and livestock productions have been adversely impacted on account of the prolonged dry conditions and the resultant poor pastures. The five southern provinces of Namibe, Cunene, Kuando Kubango, Huila and Benguela are the most severely hit. In Cunene, the hardest hit province, the GAM rate has reached 24%. Crop losses in Cunene are expected to reach up to 80%, adversely impacting farmers including semi-nomadic communities and children <5. This represents 50% of Cunene’s population, of whom 130,000 are children <5.

In Namibe province, a joint assessment conducted in early June found that roughly 250,000 people were affected by drought and 70% of crops destroyed. CARE estimated that remaining household food stocks would not last until September. After food insecurity, the greatest reported problem is lack of access to water. Half of all water points are no longer working or have dried up, according to UNICEF. People are reportedly migrating in search of water and pasture for their cattle.

As a result of the drought, and despite an anticipated improvement of food security nationally compared to 2012, southern provinces are expecting a poor cereal harvest for the second consecutive year, negatively impacting food security. The government has established an emergency plan to provide assistance in the southern province of Cunene, where roughly 640,000 people are affected by drought.

Health and Nutrition: As a result of the use of untreated stagnant water, levels of water-borne diseases are increasing. An estimated 1,571 cases of cholera have been reported in the provinces of Huila, Cunene and Benguela, with 62 deaths. The Ministry of Health has reported an epidemic of dengue fever (over 900 cases and ten deaths) and an outbreak of measles in 60% of the municipalities across Angola, particularly affecting children suffering from malnutrition. Malaria is affecting large numbers of Angolans, with 75 deaths reported in eastern Lunda Sul province in the first quarter of 2013 and over 15,000 cases registered overall, according to official sources.

An estimated 533,000 children suffer from varying levels of malnutrition in a country that is still recovering from decades of civil war lasting until 2002.

Updated: 15/10/2013

BOTSWANA DROUGHT, FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

No new updates. Last updated: 05/08/2013.

Humanitarian Needs and Context

Disaster: The Government declared the 2013/14 agricultural season a drought year following a drought assessment. The food insecure rural population is estimated at 372,479 (49% of the rural population), 18% of the total population. The exercise confirmed that rainfall was poorly distributed and much below normal in most parts of the country. The overall food situation across Botswana has deteriorated and the whole country was declared to be affected by the drought. The most affected areas are Ngamiland, Ghanzi, Kgalagadi, Southern and Central districts.

The 2012/13 cropping season was also largely characterised by a prolonged period of below average rains, punctuated by intense rainfall in January which caused localised
flooding and minor damage to the agriculture sector. In addition to the unfavourable weather conditions, an outbreak of armyworms in late 2012, mainly concentrated in southeastern areas of the country, infested approximately 4,500 hectares of cropped land, representing about 3% of the average cropped area dedicated to cereals.

The national annual inflation rate remained comparatively stable between the last quarter of 2012 and first quarter of 2013, averaging at about 7.4% over the last six months.

The human water supply is generally low, especially the southern part of the country supplied from Gaborone Dam which is facing a precarious situation due to the dam’s low water volume. Agro-based livelihoods are expected to suffer income losses and asset depletion, especially in light of the anticipated drought-related livestock mortality.

Roughly 28% of Botswana’s population suffers from chronic food insecurity.

Reviewed: 15/10/2013

NAMIBIA DROUGHT

Highlights

No new development this week. Last update was: 31/08/2013.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Food Security: According to the Food and Nutrition Security Working Group for Southern Africa, the food security conditions are critical as the drought impacts continue to take its toll on vulnerable populations. The number of severely food insecure continues to increase, and as of August the figure has been revised from 330,927 people to 463,581 people. WFP had previously identified 331,000 people as food insecure (14% of Namibia’s total population). Another 450,000 are moderately food insecure, according to an 8-20 April 2013 Emergency Food Security Assessment.

On 17 May, the President of Namibia declared a national drought emergency and called for assistance from the international community. Results of an Inter-Agency Emergency Food Security Assessment also indicated that agricultural production will be very poor due to the lowest seasonal rainfall for decades.

The Government forecast suggests that the prolonged dry period during the 2012-13 cropping season (November-June) will result in a decrease in the main cereal production for 2013 by an estimated 42% compared to 2012 production levels. Grazing pastures have also been severely affected in six regions where many households rely on livestock production; 4,000 livestock deaths have been recorded. The cumulative rains between January and March were approximately one-third of the average with the poor rains most pronounced in southern and western Namibia. The northwestern Omusait Region, which contributes approximately 14% to the national cereal output, was severely affected by below-average rains and an outbreak of army worms. It is expected to record a sharp decline in cereal production, estimated at 50% below average. The most affected provinces are Omusati, Kunene, Erongo, Otjozondjupa, Khomas, and Kavango according to low resolution satellite images.

Water levels are decreasing, and 40-50% of water points no longer function. Many farmers are forced to sell cattle, due to lack of pasture, while cow-herds from Angola, which also suffer from the drought, are reportedly crossing the border in search of food, fuelling tribal tensions as competition for scarce pastures intensifies. The National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) has been activated in mid-September 2013. Its main role is the monitoring of the overall drought response. It is still unclear when the Emergency Response Plan, which is to be led by Government with support from humanitarian partners, will be adopted. The biggest challenge remains the issue of water stress for livestock and human consumption.

Droughts are recurrent in Namibia, impacting local economy and food security. The northern regions of the country have been historically most affected by droughts and are particularly vulnerable due to high population density. The situation is expected to worsen with the dry season and predicted to last until December.

As reported by IFRC, the initial response of the government’s food aid only targeted rural communities. However, it has been reported that people in urban areas, especially those in informal settlements in Kunene, are equally affected by the drought. Local authorities in Kunene have appealed to the government to include people in urban areas on the beneficiary list of its food aid.

The Namibia Red Cross Society reported in July that there are about 109,000 rural children <5 at risk of malnutrition because of lack of food and poor sanitation.

Health: IFRC noted that six cases of cholera were reported in Kunene region on the border with Angola at the end of July. These are now said to be under control. A screening centre was opened at the border of Namibia and Angola. At the end of 2011, Angola suffered a severe cholera outbreak.

WASH: An assessment in the four regions of Kunene, Oshikoto, Ohangwena and Kavango found that due to high food insecurity and malnutrition, and as only a few people practice household water treatment, the risk of water and sanitation related diseases from possible water contamination at household level is high. Of particular concern are regions with the lowest access to water and sanitation, and prone to diseases like cholera, including Kunene, Ohangwena and Kavango regions.

Reviewed: 15/10/2013

SENEGAL FLOODS, FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

As of late September, four northern regions are estimated to surpass the emergency threshold of 15% of General Acute Malnutrition (GAM): Matam (20%), Kanel (18%), Podor (17%), and Ranerou (16%).

Political and Security Context
Although Senegal enjoys a reputation for stability in a largely volatile region, the country has yet been unable to resolve the conflict in the Casamance area. Separatist movements are still opposing the authorities along Senegal’s southern border with Guinea-Bissau in a conflict that is however mostly dormant. In March, attempts to restart talks between the warring parties were undertaken, while rebels warned against demining the region.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Disaster:** On 13 September, ECHO reported that heavy rainfall caused flooding, which affected 163,212 people in the western regions of Fatick, Kaolack, and Thies, as well as in the capital Dakar, which registered the highest number of affected persons (88,466). To date, the floods caused three deaths and damaged a significant number of houses and infrastructure. Senegal’s rainy season lasts from July to September, with a peak in August, and this year’s floods particularly impacted urban areas, most notably in Grand Yoff (Dakar). Most urgent needs include shelter, food assistance and non-food items, and operations of disinfection of stagnant water in urban centres, to avoid a deterioration of the situation.

To date, severe flooding has affected more than 400,000 people across nine countries of the Sahel region in Africa.

**Food Security:** Nationally, an estimated 739,000 people (6% of the population) are affected by food insecurity, according to FAO. Results from a joint mission (Government/ActionAid/ Senegalese Red Cross/ FAO/ WFP) carried out in late December 2012 showed critical levels of food insecurity in Bakel (65%), Matam (64%), Medina Yoro Foula (63%) and Linguere (55%). Food insecurity is low in all areas of the regions of Fatick and Kaffrine where it is less than 15%, while it is moderate in the departments of Dagana and Podor.

While seasonably dry conditions prevailed until June in most parts of the country, abundant rainfall seen throughout August made up for the rain deficit recorded at the country’s central and northern gauging stations. Cumulative totals from May 1 to September 20 were normal to above-normal. This positive trend should continue until the end of October. Due to the stable price of main staple foods, normal income earning, availability from the near-average harvest, and terms of trade for goats/millet that favour pastoralists, households will continue to experience Minimal food insecurity (IPC Phase 1) until December according to FEWSNET.

Green harvesting of maize, cowpeas, and groundnuts has begun in Kaolack and Kolda, and spread throughout the country due to which cereal availability has been observed to have improved both in markets and in households. In 2012, harvesting of maize and millet, two major grains produced in Senegal, was completed in November, while the rice harvest was completed in late January. Aggregate 2012 cereal production was estimated at about 1.67 million tonnes, about 52% up on 2011 drought affected harvest, and a 15% increase relative to the five-year average. Domestic production covers only half the country’s cereal consumption, and the country still relies heavily on rice imports from the international market to meet its food requirements.

**Health and Nutrition:** According to UNICEF as of late September, four northern regions are estimated to surpass the emergency threshold of 15% of General Acute Malnutrition (GAM): Matam (20%), Kanel (18%), Podor (17%), and Ranerou (16%). UNICEF has reported that the Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) caseload for children <5 more than doubled the expectations of 2012. For 2013, the SAM burden is estimated at 63,323 children <5, and the Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) is estimated at 255,675 cases. UNICEF reported on 2 September that since the beginning of the response in 2012, 23,000 children have been admitted in treatment for SAM, including 1,559 new admissions reported in July (data from 36% of nutritional facilities). The 2012 SMART survey further identified 16 of 45 departments as critical. Based on this geographical breakdown, 11 of 14 regions were identified as in need of emergency support based on prevalence of malnutrition and aggravating factors such as diarrhoea and ARI: Diourbel, Fatick, Kaffrine, Kedougou, Kolda, Louga, Matam, Saint Louis, Sedhiou, Tambacounda, and Thies.

*Updated: 15/10/2013*

**ERITREA FOOD INSECURITY**

**Highlights**

No new development this week. Last update was: 16/09/2013.

No confirmed data on the food security situation or food price levels is available. Therefore, Eritrea is not included within the Global Overview prioritisation.

**Political and Security Context**

According to the Human Rights Watch, Eritrea is still plagued by human right abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention, and severe restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and religious freedom. Military conscription is compulsory and can last for an indefinite period of time.

Between 5,000 and 10,000 political prisoners are being held in this country of about 6 million people. The UN Human Rights chief has accused the Eritrean government of torture and summary executions.

On 21 January, dissident Eritrean soldiers with tanks laid siege to the Information Ministry, forced state media to call for the release of high-profile political prisoners, and demanded implementation of the constitution, which was never enacted by Parliament. However, calm reportedly returned to the capital Asmara on 22 January. No further information is available on the events.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement:** According to UNHCR, Eritrean refugees crossing to neighbouring Ethiopia are on the rise, while the number entering Sudan has dropped compared to 2012. Since January, UNHCR and the Ethiopia government’s refugee agency, the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), have registered over 4,000 new Eritrean refugees. As of June, Ethiopia hosts nearly 72,000 Eritrean refugees, a record high, in four camps in the northern Tigray region and two others in the Afar region in north-eastern Ethiopia.
According to UNHCR, eastern Sudan receives an average 500 Eritrean refugees per month in 2013, down from 2,000 a month in 2012. Sudan reportedly shelters at least 114,500 Eritrean refugees.

Djibouti also receives an estimated 110 Eritreans each month.

According to UNHCR as of 10 September, Eritrea is currently hosting 3,468 Somali refugees.

**Disaster:** Although information remains limited, Eritrean authorities have indicated that heavy rains and the damaging of a major diversion canal in Hashenkit area have caused flooding on 5 August in Halkota sub-zone, resulting in the destruction of at least 20 houses. Heavy rains have been recorded in the area since mid-July.

Extensive floods that affected tens of thousands of people were recorded in nearby Sudan.

**Access:** There is a lack of updated and reliable data on the humanitarian situation due to limited humanitarian access and a ban on humanitarian organisations assessing needs.

**Food Security and Malnutrition:** An estimated six million people in Eritrea are food insecure (98% of the population). Local food and fuel prices are likely to remain high, putting severe pressure on vulnerable groups’ coping mechanisms. The government of Eritrea officially denies any food shortages within its borders and refuses food aid.

Reviewed: 30/09/2013

---

### ASIA

---

### AFGHANISTAN

**Highlights**

- **15 October:** A bomb killed the Afghan provincial governor of Logar as he made a speech at a mosque after Eid prayers, close to the capital Kabul. Eight additional people were wounded in the explosion for which no group has yet claimed responsibility.

- **13 October:** A man in an Afghan army uniform short dead a US soldier in eastern Paktika province in another insider attack, according to NATO officials. The last incident is the tenth such attack reported this year and the fourth in less than a month; it brought the death toll of foreign personnel killed in insider attacks to 15 since the beginning of the year.

---

### International and Regional Political Context:

**International and Regional Political Context:** On 26 August, President Karzai arrived in Islamabad to attempt to mend bilateral relations while testing the ground for Pakistan’s involvement in peace talks with the Taliban. One of the visit’s aims was allegedly to press Islamabad into releasing a list of senior Taliban commanders detained in Pakistan who are seen as instrumental in bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table. On 21 September, Pakistan agreed to release Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a former Taliban second-in-command, who is in a safe house in Karachi. Baradar, a founder of the Taliban insurgency, is largely seen by Kabul as a respected figure who could use his influence to persuade moderate Taliban commanders to negotiate with the Afghan authorities. On 3 October, a potential meeting was cancelled after Taliban commanders refused to meet their former chief Baradar in the city of Peshawar, allegedly because the latter was accompanied by Pakistani security agents. As stated by the Afghan Taliban on 9 October, Pakistan has not freed their former second-in-command, Mullah Baradar as promised and the latter is still held in custody. Earlier in September, Pakistan released a group of detained Afghan Taliban, including senior commander Mansoor Dadullah, who were similarly not directly handed over to Afghan authorities. Mutual suspicions continue to run high.

On 14 August, as reported by a senior Afghan peace negotiator and former Taliban diplomat now working with the Karzai government, the resumption of peace talks in Qatar with the Taliban is increasingly unlikely. To date, fresh talks in Turkey or Saudi Arabia appear to be a more realistic option by Kabul. No Western source has yet commented on the statement, though it is unlikely that negotiations with the Taliban would be conducted without the US.

**International Military Presence:** On 12 October, US Secretary of State John Kerry and Afghan President Hamid Karzai ended two days of talks on a bilateral security pact without a deal because they could not agree on the issue of legal immunity for US troops in Afghanistan. The talks were meant to also determine how many US troops would remain in Afghanistan after 2014 when most foreign combat troops are due to withdraw.

**Political and Security Context**

---

---

---

---
independent counter-terrorism missions on Afghan territory.

A few months before the April presidential elections that will bring a new leadership to Kabul, the talks are crucial in determining the future of US-Afghanistan co-operation while US officials have openly stated that the zero option – a complete pull out of all US troops after 2014 – remained on the table if no deal was reached with Kabul. This possibility is largely seen as an implicit warning to Afghanistan as most observers believe that the Afghan security forces would be unable to hold against the insurgents without international backing on the ground.

Most of the 85,000 international troops stationed in Afghanistan are scheduled to withdraw by end 2014, and over 75% of the country was expected to be under national security control by end-July 2013, following the formal handover of national security from the US-led NATO coalition to Afghan forces on 18 June. Within the US-led NATO coalition, there is widespread concern regarding the capacity of the 352,000-strong Afghan security forces to cope with the insurgency. As reported by an Afghan official in early September, police deaths have nearly doubled as the NATO forces have started withdrawing and handing over security to local troops. An estimated 1,792 Afghan policemen died and over 2,700 have been wounded in the last six months.

National Political Context: On 16 September, candidate nominations opened for Afghanistan's presidential election scheduled for 5 April 2014. As reported by Human Rights Watch on 9 October, 2014 presidential candidates include former military and militia commanders implicated in serious rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's only leader since US intervention in the country in 2001, is constitutionally barred from running for a third term. According to international observers, there are at present no favourites to succeed Karzai, as the country is growing increasingly turbulent.

The Taliban movement officially announced on 6 August that it did not intend to participate in the 2014 presidential election and would continue fighting until all foreign troops leave the country. In June, the US leadership was forced to delay planned talks in Qatar, following the Afghan government's anger over being bypassed in the negotiations, and over the opening of a Taliban political office in Doha. To date, Kabul is refusing to participate in peace talks that are not "Afghan-led".

Security Context: Since they vowed to start a new campaign of attacks on 27 April, launching insider attacks as a key tactic against foreign and Afghan military forces targets, the Taliban have intensified offensives in Afghanistan. Since May, insurgents have largely targeted foreign military and humanitarian targets and have started to deliberately target civilians who are seen to cooperate with the government. A spokesperson for the Taliban indicated in late June that the insurgents have no intention of changing their tactics in conflict-plagued Afghanistan despite the possible peace talks and the scheduled presidential elections that are meant to bring a new leadership to the country. Over the past weeks, violence has further intensified across the country as the insurgents forcibly increased pressure on the NATO contingents currently withdrawing from Afghanistan with more and more insider attacks being reported.

On 15 October, a bomb killed the Afghan provincial governor of Logar as he made a speech at a mosque after Eid prayers, close to the capital Kabul. Eight additional people were wounded in the explosion for which no group has yet claimed responsibility. On 13 October, a man in an Afghan army uniform shot dead a US soldier in eastern Paktika province in another insider attack, according to NATO officials. The last incident is the tenth such attack reported this year, the fourth in less than a month; it brought the death toll of foreign personnel killed in insider attacks to 15 since the beginning of the year. On 5 October, a soldier belonging to the NATO-led force was killed by a security guard in an insider attack. On 26 September, a man in an Afghan army uniform killed a US soldier in Paktika province; a similar incident was recorded in the area province on 21 September. On 19 September, Taliban fighters ambushed a police convoy during an operation to clear an area in the northern Badakhshan province. Though information is difficult to ascertain, at least ten policemen were killed in the attack. Local sources reported that an additional 16 policemen were captured by the Taliban, a claim denied by authorities in Kabul. On 18 September, armed men shot dead a senior election official in Kunduz city, the first killing since candidate nominations for the April presidential elections opened on 16 September. Since early September, attacks have been recorded in Helmand, Ghazni, Wardak, and Nangarhar provinces. In a high-profile assault, heavily armed men detonated a truck bomb outside the US consulate in the city of Herat, triggering a fire-fight with American forces on 13 September. At least 19 people were killed and 17 injured in the attack.

In August, several attacks were reported across Afghanistan, affecting Nangarhar, Kunduz, Ghazni, Helmand, Farah, Herat, and Paktia provinces with dozens of Afghan military and civilians killed. The attacks increasingly targeted foreign troops and bases. In a high-profile Taliban attack on 28 August, seven people were killed and 62 wounded on a base operated by Polish and Afghan forces in Ghazni province. On 3 August, in a hit that has largely contributed to building regional tensions, suicide bombers attacked the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, Nangarhar, killing nine, including children, and injuring an additional 23 civilians in front of the consulate. The Taliban denied responsibility for the attack.

According to a UN report released in late July, the number of civilians killed and injured in Afghanistan rose by 23% since the beginning of 2012, with homemade landmines being the principal threat to Afghan civilians. From January through June 2013, 1,319 civilians were killed and 2,533 injured. The UN reported that 74% of casualties were caused by insurgents, 9% by pro-government forces, and 12% resulted from ground fighting between the two sides. These numbers are a significant increase compared to the first half of 2012 and close to the record casualties recorded during the same period in 2011. The increase in attacks underscores rising levels of violence as the international troops have started to disengage from the country.

As of August, ICRC continued to operate with caution in Afghanistan, following the major security incidents on the IOM compound on 24 May in Kabul and on their own compound in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province, on 29 May.

Military Operations: Against this background, military operations are ongoing. On 11 October, US forces reportedly captured senior Pakistani Taliban commander Latif Mehsud in a military operation in eastern Logar province. Other reports suggested that Mehsud was seized from an Afghan government convoy in the province as Afghan officials were trying to recruit him to launch peace talks several weeks ago, contributing to the current tensions between Washington and Kabul. The arrest of Mehsud could represent a blow to Tehreek-e-Taliban in Pakistan while the movement is reportedly already facing dissention
over the attitude to adopt regarding Islamabad’s attempts to launch peace talks. On 6 October, four NATO soldiers were killed in an operation in southern Afghanistan where the Taliban have been recovering ground, as forward operating bases were shut as part of the NATO disengagement plan. On 4 October, a retaliatory NATO airstrike in Nangarhar province after the insurgents shelled a joint NATO-Afghan base near Jalalabad has allegedly also resulted in the deaths of five civilians according to the authorities. The last incident came less than a month after another NATO air strike allegedly killed up to nine civilians in the Watarpur district of Kunar province. Both incidents are currently under investigation. Casualties of Afghan civilians and military caused by air strikes conducted by NATO-led forces have been a major source of friction between Kabul and its international allies over the years.

Heavy military operations were reported in Faryab, Badakhshan, and Maidan Wardak provinces in May and June. On 11 August, two US soldiers were killed in combat operations against insurgents in Pakta province in an area that has seen some of the highest levels of fighting over the years. According to Afghan military sources, insurgent numbers are up around 15% on last year’s summer fighting months. In early May, tensions sharply escalated between Kabul and Karachi following two border incidents, further straining the relations between the two countries.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

As reported by OCHA in mid-June, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nangarhar are three of the most vulnerable Afghan provinces, ranking high in numbers of security incidents, civilian casualties, and conflict displacement, health and nutrition indicators. Across Afghanistan, an estimated 7.7 million people are in need of protection while the situation in the country is increasingly volatile.

Displacement: In 2013, conflict-induced displacement is the main cause of acute humanitarian need, with a marked increase in previously stable provinces in the north, particularly in Faryab and Badakhshan, noted OCHA. As of 31 May, there were an estimated 570,000 IDPs in Afghanistan. An estimated 5.4 million people are affected by the ongoing conflict.

Nearly 2.9 million registered Afghan refugees remain in exile in Pakistan and Iran, with an estimated additional 2.4 million undocumented refugees. The government of Pakistan agreed not to expel Afghan refugees who had permission to stay in the country until June, with Kabul and Islamabad also agreeing, at a recent UN-backed meeting, to continue efforts to solve the protracted refugee situation. Pakistani media reported that the presence of Afghan refugees is triggering tensions in host provinces. On 5 July, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a Pakistani province hosting roughly 60% of Afghan refugees, officially opposed extending Afghan refugees’ stay in the country and suggested that should the need arise, registered Afghans be equally distributed among the four Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Punjab and Baluchistan.

Disaster: On 9 September, rainfall and consequent floods and landslides affected several villages in Zabek district, Badakhshan province. As of 10 September, local and international media reported 20 people killed and nearly 20 missing in a landslide, while 34 houses were damaged, livestock killed, and roads destroyed.

In early August, flash floods triggered by days of torrential rain killed over 60 people, according to the authorities. The rains and subsequent floods affected nine eastern and southeastern provinces and some districts of Kabul. As of 6 August, an estimated 3,400 people were affected by the flash floods, with 458 houses completely destroyed and an additional 61 damaged. OCHA reported on 11 September that the August floods caused contamination of drinking water in a number of provinces.

Access: As reported by OCHA in September, security incidents continue to affect humanitarian workers, mainly in the unstable eastern parts of the country. Although humanitarian programmes are not suspended, movement restrictions are increasingly applied and organisations are reviewing their security protocols. OCHA indicated that in August, 25 violence and assault incidents were reported in Nangarhar, Laghman, Logar, Kunar, and Balkh provinces, and eight aid workers were killed.

The humanitarian space in Afghanistan continues to shrink as security becomes increasingly precarious. Local sources, registered an increase of 62% in attacks on aid workers, excluding UN staff, during the first three months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012. In June, 25 incidents against humanitarians were reported in 16 provinces, ranging from killings, intrusion of health facilities, abduction, arrest and detention, collateral impacts of IEDs, intimidation, disruption of aid distributions, theft of humanitarian assets, direct small arms fire, and rocket attacks.

Food Security: OCHA reported in mid-June that 4.5 million people in Afghanistan are food insecure, with 2.25 million people considered severely food insecure and targeted with humanitarian aid. Households in the extreme northeast, especially in Badakhshan province, central highlands, low-income and disaster-affected households across the country, and IDPs are especially vulnerable to food insecurity.

According to a mid-August WFP report, though final production estimates are not yet available, a preliminary forecast put the 2013 wheat production at 4.9 million tons, slightly below the 2012 harvest, which was the second highest on record for the last 35 years. However, large differences exist between provinces. Smaller wheat harvests were gathered in Faryab, Ghor Jawzjan, and Khost due to dry spells and early rains combined with wheat rust in some areas. Despite bumper harvests in 2012 and 2013, wheat and wheat flour prices in some provinces have been increasing since June 2012. Flour prices recorded higher increases reflecting limited availability of domestic flour. Continuous depreciation of the Afghani over the last two years has amplified the price increases in local currency.

Health and Malnutrition: War-related hospital admissions increased by 42% from January to April 2013 compared to the same period in 2012. In Helmand province, there has been an almost 80% increase in hospitalised injuries caused by conflict. The Health Cluster reported a 40% increase in security incidents from January to April 2013 compared to 2012.

As reported by OCHA in mid-June, 125,692 children <5 suffer from Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM), including 28,650 suffering from Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM).

Updated: 15/10/2013
Syria Civil War

Highlights

13 October: The largest bloc in the Syrian opposition Coalition, the Syrian National Council, announced that it will not participate in the proposed Geneva II peace talks and that if the Coalition enters into discussions with the Government on a negotiated settlement, it will leave the alliance.

12 October: A temporary ceasefire between Government troops and opposition forces allowed for 1,500 people to be evacuated from the long-besieged Rural Damascus town of Madamiyat Elsham.

11 October: The leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahri, called on opposition fighters in Syria to rise above organisational loyalties and party partisanship to unite and set up an Islamic state in the wake of bloody clashes between opposition groups vying for control of Aleppo neighbourhoods.

Political and Security Context

Overview

The largest bloc in the Syrian opposition Coalition, the Syrian National Council (SNC), announced that it will not participate in the proposed peace talks in Geneva II and that it will leave the Coalition if it goes ahead with discussions on a negotiated settlement. The head of the SNC stated that the group is boycotting the peace talks because in its view the international community has not punished Assad for the August chemical weapons attack.

Meanwhile, inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are continuing their mission to identify and destroy chemical weapons and production facilities in Syria, with the objective of eliminating Syria's chemical weapons capacities by mid-2014.

Conflict has been intense in Rural Damascus, Dar’a, Aleppo, Idlib and Homs, and Damascus city has repeatedly been under fire from opposition mortar rounds. Clashes between rival opposition groups have spread, culminating in a bloody battle over the control of some northern Aleppo neighbourhoods. While Government forces have made gains in Rural Damascus, the opposition have won ground in Dar’a, with both sides renewing efforts to gain a firm upper hand before the proposed Geneva II peace talks are due.

Conflict

In Idlib, opposition groups staged a fierce onslaught against Government forces in a bid to control 2 military bases. The battles are still ongoing. Fighting intensified in many parts of Aleppo governorate, and in Aleppo city, Government forces have put an end to the opposition siege that had blocked supplies entering western neighbourhoods that are loyal to President Assad. Kurdish forces in Al Hasakeh clashed with extremist groups, leaving an unknown number dead. The Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) gained control of several rural towns.

After months of intense clashes, the opposition control the entire stretch of the border between Jordan and Syria, up until the Golan Heights. The Government released a statement saying its forces have regained control of a border crossing, but opposition forces deny this.

In the predominantly quiet governorate of Lattakia, clashes took place in 2 areas.

Inter-Group Fighting

Fighting between various factions of armed opposition groups has escalated. In Aleppo, a 3-day battle between 2 groups saw dozens of fighters die in fierce clashes over control over neighbourhoods. The leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahri, called on opposition fighters in Syria to rise above organisational loyalties and party partisanship to unite and set up an Islamic state.

Political Developments

A temporary cease-fire was arranged on 12 October that saw Government and opposition forces halt fighting in order to allow for the evacuation of 1,500 people from Madamiyat Elsham in rural Damascus. The town had been under siege for many months, its occupants having barely enough to eat, with 6 deaths through malnutrition having been reported in recent weeks. The truce between the warring sides was an uncommon event and came just over a week after the UN Security Council issued a (non-binding) statement calling on parties to the conflict to agree on temporary cease-fires to facilitate immediate humanitarian assistance to affected persons.

On 27 September, the Security Council endorsed the Russia-US pact to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons. Under the resolution, Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal is to be destroyed by mid-2014. Consequently, a team of disarmament inspectors has this week initiated onsite inspections and initial disabling of equipment in Syria. The UN resolution is legally binding, and the Council agreed that in the event of non-compliance, it would impose measures under Chapter VII, which grants the Security Council a right to use military force to restore peace. The resolution calls for the convening of a peace conference in Geneva as soon as possible. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon proposed a date in mid-November. On 1 October, the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mulallem told the UN General Assembly that his Government supports a negotiated settlement, but rejects conditions ahead of peace talks.

Spill-over of conflict into neighbouring countries

The conflict continues to spill over into neighbouring countries. Lebanon is particularly affected, with its border region often subject to shelling. Clashes erupt frequently in the northern city of Tripoli between communities that support the opposing sides within Syria.

On 29 September, the capital of the usually calm Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) experienced a bomb attack and gun clashes. This violence is likely to stall the re-opening of the Sehela border crossing that was closed temporarily due to elections in KR-I, halting the influx of refugees that have been entering KR-I since its borders were opened mid-
August. There are increasingly signs that the escalating violence in Baghdad and Anbar province in Iraq is linked to the crisis in Syria.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

**Displacement:** Preparations for the launch of a revised humanitarian appeal for Syria (SHARP) are ongoing. The revision of the appeal involves updating the April estimates of 6.8 million people in need and 4.25 million IDPs. Preliminary conclusions from these discussions indicate that numbers of displaced and of those in need of assistance are now significantly higher.

Syrians continue to flee to neighboring countries, despite restrictions currently in place in Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon. As of 14 October, the number of refugees registered and waiting to register stands at 2,172,559, up from two million at the start of September. Nearly 790,000 Syrians are registered or awaiting registration in Lebanon (Government estimates 1.3 million Syrians in total, including a large number of Syrian migrants), over 540,000 in Jordan (Government estimates 600,000 Syrians in total), over 504,000 in Turkey, 226,000 in Iraq, and nearly 126,000 in Egypt (Government estimates up to 300,000).

Amid the large-scale influx, Lebanon has introduced stricter measures for Syrians trying to enter the country. Since July 2013, the Lebanese General Security Office has imposed controls that require Syrians above the age of 15 to present full, undamaged documentation when entering the country. Following recent unrest in Egypt and the subsequent deterioration of the situation for Syrian refugees in the country, there has been a spike in the number of Syrians departing. Most Syrians have cited anxiety, insecurity, and diminished livelihood opportunities as reasons for wanting to leave Egypt.

UNHCR has proposed offering up to 30,000 Syria refugees resettlement or humanitarian admission to other regions by the end of 2014. To date, more than a dozen countries have offered 10,000 places for either resettlement or humanitarian admission to Syrian refugees. An increasing number of Syrians are paying smugglers to transport them on risky voyages to seek asylum in Europe, where over 47,000 Syrians have been registered.

**Access:** In Idleb, northern Syria, 6 International Committee of the Red Cross staff workers and 1 Syrian Red Crescent volunteer were kidnapped. The incident highlights the difficulties humanitarian actors face in carrying out their work. Reaching people in need is increasingly problematic due to insecurity, proliferation of checkpoints, and difficulties obtaining Government approval to reach distribution sites. A number of international UN staff have been evacuated, further limiting capacity to support humanitarian operations. Tensions between opposition groups are also further decreasing the geographic areas aid agencies can cover.

**Health:** Around 60% of public hospitals, 34% of public health centres and 92% of public ambulances have been affected by the conflict and around 212 health care staff have been killed, injured or kidnapped, according to OCHA. In areas that have seen heavy fighting, the percentage of healthcare infrastructure that has been damaged is exceedingly high. Multiple reports highlight that the Syrian Government is barring medical assistance from reaching opposition held areas, halting aid convoys carrying medical provisions and preventing healthcare practitioners working. Anti-Government groups have allegedly attacked hospitals. A severe lack of medicines and medical equipment further restricts healthcare provision. Prior to the crisis, pharmaceutical manufacturers in Syria catered for 90% of the country’s needs, now given the difficulty of importing raw materials, they can only meet 20-30% of needs.

Paediatricians from several clinics have reported a noticeable increase in the rate of moderate and acute malnutrition, and 6 reported deaths from malnutrition were reported in Madamiyat Elsham in Rural Damascus during its long besiegement.

**Food security:** Across the country, high food prices, increasing inflation and the steady devaluation of the Syrian Pound are eroding families’ purchasing power and limiting their access to basic food items, creating additional needs. The Government also faces challenges purchasing food on the international market, with an increasing number of unsuccessful tenders.

**Education:** Since 2012, 2 million children in Syria have dropped out of school due to the insecurity and displacement. Half of these children are now working in order to economically support their families. Some areas have been affected worse than others. In Aleppo, for example, only 6% of students are still in school.

Updated: 15/10/2013

**YEMEN**

**CONFLICT, FOOD INSECURITY**

**Highlights**

7-15 October: This week the Ministry of Interior was said to prepare to deploy more soldiers and security forces due to a break-down in security that has resulted in civilian deaths and injuries across the country. Six people were killed and more than ten injured in attacks in Lahj, Hadramout, and Hajja City.

10-12 October: On 10 October southern secessionists threatened to withdraw their support for the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), again protesting that they were being marginalized. Southern activists called for a mass march in Aden on 11-12 October to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the revolution between southern nationalist groups and the British in 1963. Reports indicate that the protest will also reject the ongoing NDC and call for the independence of South Yemen.

**Political and Security Context**

**International political landscape**

Yemen remains a strategic spot for the US and its Gulf allies who need to contain threats from al-Qaeda-affiliated militants and separatist tribes and for access to Saudi Arabia and nearby sea lanes where oil tankers pass. Amid these security concerns, drone strikes continue in the country with the support of the authorities. On 30 August, at least four suspected al-Qaeda militants were killed in a presumed US drone strike in the central al-Bayda province, according to local authorities. Since late July, drone attacks have killed at
least 40 people in Yemen. Since early August, local security forces have been on high alert amid fears of an imminent attack by al-Qaeda in Sana’a, which the US State Department described as specific and imminent. Reports indicated that al-Qaeda militants entered Sana’a from the Hadhramaut, Abyan, Marib, and Al-Shabwaa governorates and may be plotting a large scale attack using motorcycle and car bombs. The Ministry of Interior confirmed that security measures have been bolstered at all government installations in Sana’a, the presidential palace, the airport, embassies, foreign installations, and the Mövenpick Hotel, which is hosting the NDC. On 6 October, one person was killed in what was reported to be a failed kidnapping attempt of Germany’s ambassador. Several diplomatic missions suspended activities outside their embassies in response to this attack.

In 2012, the Yemeni army, with US backing, drove al-Qaeda militants and their allies from some of their strongholds, but the militants have since regrouped and mounted attacks on government officials and installations. Information available on the military operations remains scarce. In June, Yemeni government forces conducted several large-scale offensives against al-Qaeda affiliated groups that seized villages in the southeastern province of Hadhramaut, east of the port city of Mukalla. The aim of the Islamist militants is allegedly to set up an Islamist State eastern Yemen.

National political landscape

The National Dialogue Conference of political groupings was due to end its six months of negotiations on 19 September with recommendations on a new constitution and voting system, opening the way for full democratic elections in February 2014. But this week the Government has indicated that national dialogue and could be delayed for up to three months.

While all 565 participants agreed to install Yemen as a federal state, disagreements remain on the number of regions proposed. Southern secessionists want to divide Yemen into two regions with the south having significant control over its own affairs. A number of northern parties favour a multi-region federation. After withdrawing from talks in August, southern separatists agreed on 8 September to return after receiving assurances that the future of the south will be thoroughly discussed. On 10 October southern elements threatened to withdraw their support for the NDC again protesting that they were being marginalized. Southern activists have called for a mass march in Aden on 11-12 October to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the revolution between southern nationalist groups and the British in 1963. Reports indicate that the protest will also reject the ongoing NDC and call for the independence of South Yemen.

On 22 August, Yemen apologised to southern separatists and northern rebels for wars against them, seeking to encourage the national dialogue. In mid-August, southern representatives had withdrawn from the dialogue demanding apologies from the government and calling for the talks to be held abroad, where many of their leaders live in exile. National dialogue sessions, which started in March, spurred numerous protests and violent incidents in Sana’a and the Aden governorate.

While the National Dialogue Conference is drawing to an end, which will allow Yemen to re-boost its economy and put internal struggles to an end, radical Islamic militants continued their efforts to disrupt the reconciliation efforts and prolong instability.

Safety and Security

Dozens of suspected al-Qaeda militants captured a Yemeni army base and took military personnel hostage at the base in the city of al-Mukallain the south-east of the country on 30 September. Suspected al-Qaeda militants killed at least 31 Yemeni soldiers and policemen in attacks in Al-Shabwaa governorate, in the south of the country on 20 September. The attacks were the deadliest against Yemeni's military since May 2012, when a suicide bomber in army uniform killed more than 90 soldiers at a parade in the capital Sana’a. The Yemen-based branch of al-Qaeda said on 14 October that its attack on the army base last month targeted an operations room used by the United States to direct drone strikes against militants and threatened more such assaults. A Yemeni official denied that the army base contained a joint US-Yemeni operations room stating that its task was to prevent piracy in nearby Arabian Sea lanes.

This week the Ministry of Interior was said to prepare to deploy more soldiers and security forces due to a break-down in security that has resulted in civilian deaths and injuries across the country. A suicide bomb by a suspected al-Qaeda militant killed four people on 11 October in Lahj province in south Yemen. Two more people were killed in the southeastern Hadramout province this week. Eight people were injured in Hajja City on 13 October in clashes between the Al-Sharaqi tribe and the Al-Jameema tribe. The governor of Hajja governorate belongs to the former and the latter is associated with prominent General People’s Congress (GPC) member, Fahd Dahshoush. Four months ago, tribal clashes erupted in another popular Hajja market, leaving dozens of shops damaged.

Conflict patterns

Violence and insecurity continue across Yemen with inter-tribal fighting in the north, fighting between the Government and armed groups in the southern governorates, and civil unrest in urban centres of the west and central governorates along with tribal strife over scarce resources. Yemen is home to one of the most active wings of al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In recent weeks, clashes between Sunni Islamists and Shiite rebels killed at least 42 people in the western provinces of Amran (north of Sana’a) and Rudma (south of the capital).

Due to continued tribal attacks on energy supply lines, large parts of Yemen, including Sana’a are frequently without electricity.

A year-long ceasefire agreement was reached in Amran between tribesmen loyal to the Al-Houthis and tribesmen loyal to the Al-Ahmar family on 14 September. The tribal-mediated agreement is a break from fighting, but not a permanent solution.

A confrontation between qat farmers and government forces broke out over the exploration of new water wells on 6 October in Wadi Al-Ghail of Al-Qaeda district, in Ibb governorate. Water cuts in Al-Qaeda district, which occasionally last for two months, force locals to search for other options including purchasing water at a high cost or bringing it from Dhi Al-Sifal district by car, said Al-Shalfi. The six day drilling operation has reportedly resumed, with the support of ten military vehicles stationed in the area to protect the site. Clashes renewed Saturday over water resources between the Qurada and Al-Marzooh
villages in Taiz governorate.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

An estimated 13.1 million people (55% of the population) in Yemen need humanitarian assistance, according to OCHA.

Displacement: On 5 July, Yemen asked IOM to assist 200,000 Yemeni migrant workers forced to leave Saudi Arabia since April as part of a crackdown on undocumented migrants. Though a Saudi amnesty for undocumented migrants scheduled to expire in early July was extended until November, it was expected that the Yemeni migrants will have to leave by end September but to date no new information on their status is available. The number of Yemeni migrants returning from Saudi Arabia could increase in the coming months.

As a result of widespread conflict and according to the UN, over 306,000 IDPs were in Yemen’s north, including Sana’a, in early September. 162,000 IDPs have returned to their areas of origin in the southern Abyan governorate and in neighbouring areas thanks to improved security. Further returns are ongoing, according to UNHCR, however authorities are struggling to meet the needs of the returnees.

UNHCR recorded the arrival of over 46,000 refugees and migrants during the first six months of 2013, with an estimated 39,000 from Ethiopia and the rest from Somalia. Numbers of asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants in Yemen have been rising for six years. In 2012, a record 107,500 people made the journey. While numbers are lower for January to June this year at 46,700 compared to 56,146 for the same period in 2012, this year is another year with a high number of arrivals. Yemen hosts more than 242,000 refugees according to UNHCR. According to IOM, 22% are women and girls who have experienced repeated gender-based violence.

Disaster: Since mid-August, heavy rains and flooding have affected 50,000 people in 26 districts in nine governorates in southern and central regions of Yemen. OCHA reported on 4 September that new flash floods in the west wiped away the main road connecting Mudhaykhirah, Al Hammadi, and Taizz, and damaged crops, farms, and houses. Local media reported on 12 September that over 100 people were displaced. Since mid-August, up to 37 people have been killed and several others are still missing due to the floods. Affected governorates include Taizz, Hajjah, Al Hudaydah, and Ibb, and the Arqaa area between Shabwah and Abyan governorates. The flash floods have severely affected three IDPs camps near Harad, northwestern Yemen in Hajjah governorate, affecting about 12,000 people and destroying half the tents. According to OCHA, the heavy rains washed away over half the IDP shelters in Camp 1 and Camp 3.

Access: Information about humanitarian needs remains difficult to ascertain. Humanitarian access is hampered by insecurity across Yemen. There is a high risk of abduction of foreigners, significantly in large cities, primarily in Sana’a. There have been nine abductions/attempted abductions of expatriates in Sana’a since February 2013.

Over the last few months, since the start of the NDC, civil disobedience campaigns have disrupted humanitarian work and educational institutions in southern Yemen.

Food Security: According to WFP there is a noticeable decrease in the number of severely food insecure people: from five million people noted in the 2012 Comprehensive Food Security Survey to 4.5 million people as of September 2013. The overall number of food insecure people remains at ten million people. The primary underlying causes of food insecurity are extreme poverty and high unemployment, compounded by conflict and insecurity.

Food insecurity is of major concern in Aden and Lahij governorates, where 90% of households are food insecure and 30% severely food insecure.

According to FAO, recent surges in prices that reached their highest level since 2011 in April are likely due to conflict in several southern areas. During April 2013, Yemen’s general inflation was 14% while that of food inflation stood at 16.5%. Despite below-average March-May rains in main cropping areas of the west, preliminary crop production estimates suggest that the 2013 cereal harvest is forecast to be 13% higher than the five-year average.

New reports indicate that the desert locust situation has further deteriorated in Yemen and is potentially dangerous with hopper and adult groups, bands, and swarms forming in the interior during September. Only limited survey control operations could be carried out due to insecurity. Most infestations are located along the foothills near Marib and Bayhan, but important populations are also present in remote and isolated areas north of Wadi Hadhramaut and on the edge of the Empty Quarter between Al Abyr, Hazar and Thamud. These areas are extremely difficult to access, and it is here that an outbreak occurred in 2007, which led to a swarm invasion in the Horn of Africa. More swarms are likely to arrive from the plateau area to the north between Minwakh, Hazar and Thamud where the local population has reported infestations. Desert locust populations are expected to remain in Yemen. However, if northerly winds develop over the Gulf of Aden and persist for several days, there is a risk that some swarms could move south from the interior of Yemen, cross the Gulf of Aden and reach northern Somalia and perhaps adjacent areas of eastern Ethiopia. Because Yemen imports up to 90% of its staple foods, it is expected that the locusts will not have a large impact on domestic food prices and availability.

Health and Nutrition: A collapse of public services following the civil unrest in 2011 has severely disrupted access to health services, clean water, and basic sanitation. The UN reported that an estimated six million people did not have access to health care across the country in May. Epidemics are recurring, with 170 children dying from measles in 2012. As of 15 October UNICEF reported that 1,060,000 children <5 are estimated to be suffering from acute malnutrition, 279,146 severely so according to a regional consultation on 2014 needs. Previously UNHCR reported that 998,000 children <5 are acutely malnourished in Yemen with the 15% emergency threshold exceeded in six governorates. The situation is serious (GAM rates of 10-14%) in six other governorates.

Updated: 15/10/2013

IRAQ DISPLACEMENT, INSECURITY

Highlights
7-14 October: A series of bombs killed at least 31 people across Iraq on 13 October ahead of the Muslim feast of Eid al-Adha. Violence continues with attacks across the country killing at least another 21 people. In response to the surge of violence Iraq executed 41 people for acts of terrorism and mass killings this week.

13 October: As of 13 October, up to 63,000 people, roughly half of them children, have fled to Iraq from Syria since 15 August. The number of Syrian refugees in Iraq is around 228,000 with around 32,000 awaiting registration according to UNHCR. To date, Kurdistan hosts over 90% of Syrian refugees in Iraq.

Political and Security Context

Political landscape national

Over the past weeks, violence has accelerated in Iraq, bringing the country closer to general destabilisation, due to deep-rooted sectarian divisions between Shi'ite Muslim, Sunni Muslim, and Kurdish factions. According to the UN around 1,000 people were killed and 2,000 wounded in September. Baghdad was the worst affected province with 89% of the civilian deaths. Only in July the UN indicated that there were 1,057 victims and 2,326 wounded-the highest monthly toll since April 2008. So far in 2013, nearly 6,000 civilians have died and 12,000 injured as the country has slid to levels of violence unseen in five years.

This week a string of bombings in mostly Shia-majority cities across Iraq killed at least 31 people and wounded dozens on 14 October. Violence in Iraq killed 21 people on 10 October, among them four anti-Al-Qaeda fighters. The anti-Al-Qaeda fighters who joined forces with the United States from late 2006 and helped bring about a sharp reduction in violence in Iraq, are frequently targeted by Sunni militants, who consider them to be traitors.

The attacks are mainly claimed by the Iraqi wing of al-Qaeda. At present, bombings are increasingly targeting cafes and places where families gather, as well as the usual military facilities and checkpoints. Violence in Iraq was at its height in 2006-2007 when the number of people killed per month often exceeded 3,000.

On 2 September, a roadside bomb struck the convoy of Turkey's consul general in Iraq travelling from Erbil to Mosul in the north with no casualties recorded. The attack came as relations between Ankara and the central Baghdad governments have been especially strained over the Kurdish issue. On the same day in the Iraqi capital, a suicide bombing targeted the home of an Al-Qaeda militia chief recently appointed to lead the Sahwa, a collection of Sunni tribal militias.

Deadly violence has plagued areas around Baghdad and Kirkuk, raising concerns about destabilisation as the country went through one of the deadliest Ramadans in years with over 800 killed. The majority of attacks were claimed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the al-Qaeda affiliated group that enjoys strongholds in Al Anbar, Ninaveh, Kirkuk, most of Salah ad Din, and parts of Babil, Diyala, and Baghdad. On 30 August, ISIL claimed responsibility for bombings in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq in retaliation for the execution of Sunni Muslim prisoners. These attacks are one of the worst in the wave of sectarian bloodshed to hit Iraq in the past five years.

In July, a high profile double assault against the Abu Ghrabi and Taji prisons in the Baghdad area resulted in over 40 people killed. The attack allowed 500 prisoners to escape, which allegedly included several high-ranking al-Qaeda members and testified to the increasing strength of the ISIL.

The continuing string of deadly attacks is increasingly putting pressure on Iraqi authorities who are blamed for their inability to prevent the violent escalation. In response to the surge of sectarian violence Iraq executed 42 people for mass killings and other "terrorism" offences this week.

According to observers, levels of violence could increase ahead of elections, planned for April 2014. The elections are widely seen as the next major opportunity to shake up Iraq's political deadlock.

The ongoing violence is linked to Iraq's long-running political dispute between Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and religious and ethnic groups opposing the allegedly sectarian policies of his Shia-led Government. Since the start of 2013, widespread discontent of the Sunni Muslim minority has fuelled unrest with tensions at their highest since US troops left the country two years ago. During Ramadan, attacks on Shia communities increased across Iraq with many attributed to groups affiliated to al-Qaeda.

The civil war in Syria further contributes to volatile relations between Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish communities in Iraq. In July, the UN warned that escalating violence in Iraq can no longer be separated from the war in Syria due to an increased active presence of Iraqi armed groups in the neighbouring country. On 30 August, in another indication of the clearly regional aspect of sectarian Islamist militancy, an Iraqi Shi'ite militia group al-Nu'jaba'a, an umbrella movement which includes Iraqi Shi'ite militants who have crossed into Syria to fight alongside troops loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, officially stated that it would attack US interests in Iraq and the region if Washington carries out a military strike on Syria.

The first provincial elections in Iraq since the departure of US troops, held in April, were an important test of Iraq's political stability ahead of 2013 parliamentary elections. The Prime Minister’s State of Law coalition came top in April’s elections, but failed to win a majority in any district. On 31 August, highlighting the rising disaffection with the ruling political group, hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets in Baghdad and central and southern Iraq to protest against generous pension payments to lawmakers in a country where many struggle to get work and access basic services.

Kurdish Region

Political landscape:

On 29 September, militants launched a coordinated suicide and car bomb attack on the headquarters of the security services in the capital of Iraq's usually peaceful Kurdistan region, killing up to 11 people in the first major assault there since 2007. The explosions occurred one day after results of the region's parliamentary elections were announced. ISIL claimed responsibility the attack stating that it was carried out in revenge for the
region’s support for Kurds fighting Islamists in Syria. ISIL has claimed responsibility for attacks on both sides of the border and has fought Kurds affiliated with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which dominates in Syria and is aligned with the PKK.

Iraqi Kurdistan's main opposition party has come in second in the autonomous region's parliamentary election, according to preliminary results on 28 September that left the shape of the government still unclear a week after the vote. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) shared power in the previous cabinet with a combined 59 out of 111 parliamentary seats, having fought out their rivalries in a civil war during the 1990s. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Regional Government delayed local presidential elections to 2015, extending the term of Kurdish leader Barzani. Kurdish opposition denounced the extension as illegal.

While tensions persist between the central authorities in Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan, both sides have made attempts to move closer. Better relations with the Kurds should help ease pressure on Iraq's Shi’ite leadership, which is facing increased sectarian strife that it blames on Sunni Islamist insurgents. On 8 July, Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani visited Baghdad, following a visit of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to Kurdistan in June, the first such visit in over two years. According to local reports, Iraq's deteriorating security situation and the sharing of power between the two parties over the disputed areas of administrative jurisdiction are to be addressed in their dialogue.

As of early September, the withdrawal of Kurdish fighters from the PKK from Turkey to Iraqi Kurdistan has stopped, with fighters citing failures by the government to take steps agreed under a peace process. They vowed to maintain the ceasefire for now, but at the end of July, PKK commanders warned of new clashes if Turkey did not take concrete steps to advance the process. On 4 July, Kurdish militants attacked two military outposts in southeastern Turkey, breaking a three-month ceasefire. Despite the start of the withdrawal on 14 May, the Turkish Government stated in August that only 20% of PKK fighters had left Turkey, and they were mostly women and children.

The arrival of former PKK insurgents is likely to strain the already tense relations between the regional Kurdish authorities and Baghdad. It is also unclear what impact the withdrawal of the PKK militants from Turkey will have on the civil war in Syria where an increased activity by armed Kurdish groups, close to the PKK, has been reported over the past weeks.

UNHCR reported that despite political turmoil, the conflict in Syria, and tension at the Turkish border, the security situation in the Kurdish governorates of Iraq remains stable. On 27 August, contradicting an earlier statement made by the President of Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdish region on 10 August, a senior Iraqi Kurdish official indicated that Iraq's northern Kurdish region had no plans to send troops to Syria to defend fellow Kurds as fighting between Kurds and Islamist anti-government forces in northern Syria continues.

Kurdish militants in Iraq previously warned that the fragile peace process is endangered by increased military activity in the area, a lack of co-operation from Baghdad, and the continued detention of Kurdish politicians. Increased military surveillance and the construction of new army posts in the mainly Kurdish southeast are seen as undermining the opposition’s withdrawal from Turkey to Iraq.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Displacement: Based on the significant increase of sectarian violence across Iraq, UNHCR has warned that these developments threaten to spark a new internal displacement of Iraqis fleeing insecurity. Since the beginning of 2013, bombings and rising sectarian tensions have displaced 5,000 Iraqis, with people mostly fleeing from Baghdad into Anbar and Salah Al Din governorates, and causing displacement in Diyala and Nineveh governorates.

Many Iraqis in Syria have returned to Iraq. As of 22 January, UNHCR cited 68,122 returnees since mid-July 2012, with Baghdad receiving the largest number. Roughly 1.13 million Iraqis are currently displaced in Iraq as of September 2013, but there is limited updated information on figures. Some 467,000 IDPs, returnees, and squatters live in over 382 settlements on public land or in public buildings with limited access to basic services.

UNICEF has reported massive numbers of Syrian refugees crossing into Iraqi Kurdistan through the Peshkabour crossing, following the opening of the border on 15 August. This crossing point was re-opened by Iraqi Kurdistan authorities on 15 August after being closed since 19 May. As of 3 October, up to 63,000 people, roughly half children, have fled to Iraq from Syria since 15 August of whom 30,000 have been registered and the remaining 31,000 await registration. As of mid-September, the flow of Syrian refugee arrivals to Iraqi Kurdistan has remained at a steady rate of 800 to 1,000 people per day, according to UNHCR. The rate is consistent with earlier flows in April and May 2013, prior to the mid-May closure of the Fishkhabour border crossing in Duhok Governorate.

UNICEF reported on 9 September that most of these refugees have been transported to various locations in Duhok, Erbil, and Suleimaniyah governorates where nine new refugee camps and transit centres have been set up. The influx is expected to continue with reports that there are over 100,000 Syrians waiting to cross into Iraq on the Syrian side of the border. In late August, Iraq's Kurdish authorities reportedly introduced a limit of 3,000 refugees allowed into its territory a day. The majority of new arrivals are women, children and older persons from Aleppo, Afrin, Al-Hassakeh, and Qamishly areas. UNHCR has also observed a recent increase in numbers of new arrivals from Damascus.

At Erbil, about 2,000 new arrivals are camped at a site in Kawergost town where UNHCR has established an emergency transit/reception area. Some refugees are sheltered under UNHCR tents; others are in mosques or residing with family or friends in the area.

As of 13 October, the number of Syrian refugees in Iraq was approximately 228,000, including the estimated 63,000 who fled to Iraq since mid-August. To date, Kurdistan hosts over 90% of these refugees. The total number of refugees is expected to double by end 2013.

The situation at Domiz camp, in northwest Iraq's Dohuk Governorate, is especially worrying. The camp houses over 70,000 Syrian refugees in critically overcrowded conditions with inadequate water and sanitation facilities increasing the risk of water borne diseases. Another 90,000 refugees are scattered in and around urban centres in Iraqi Kurdistan. Spontaneous returns to Syria stand at 12,807 individuals returning through the Darabun crossing point.
Around 13 camps and centres are currently under construction in the Kurdistan region, however many are on former military bases with a danger of unexploded ordnances, mines, and other explosive weapons. Women and children are especially vulnerable as they venture out to collect fruit and other types of food.

OCHA and NRC state that Iraq’s appeal for financial support to host the Syrian refugees is heavily underfunded with only 14% of the money required for the humanitarian response materialised by early July.

Access: Although humanitarian access is less restricted, security threats for international staff remain high, particularly in Baghdad, the north, the central governorates, and the Disputed Territories. Security in Anbar province remains unstable with underlying internal conflict, risk of terrorism, and spillover of the Syrian crisis. Access to Al Qa’im refugee camp remains difficult, though missions can now be carried out by helicopter.

Health: Overcrowding in Domiz camp is impacting sanitation, which is already below humanitarian standards. Congestion and warmer temperatures are increasing vulnerability to outbreaks of diseases and tension between camp residents. Measles has been reported in new camp arrivals.

Updated: 15/10/2013

MYANMAR INTERNAL UNREST, FLOODS

Highlights

15 October: On 14 October, a rudimentary time-bomb exploded in a hotel in Yangon, wounding one foreign tourist. According to authorities, the explosion was part of a coordinated series of bomb attacks across Myanmar by a group targeting tourist haunts, a Buddhist temple, and other public places. It was the seventh blast since 11 October and was followed by two more explosions early on 15 October. The string of relatively small-scale bombings has left several people injured across the country and two dead in the town of Taungoo near the capital Naypyidaw since 11 October.

10 October: Authorities report that they signed a fresh peace deal with Kachin rebels. The deal, which follows three days of negotiations, is aimed at opening the way to political dialogue and ending the conflict in Kachin that broke out two years ago when a 17-year ceasefire crumbled.

8 October: The authorities released 56 political prisoners in a presidential amnesty, the second since July when President Thein Sein promised to free all prisoners of conscience. The amnesty allowed for the release of members of ethnic minority armies with whom the government is seeking a peace deal.

Political and Security Context

Political Context: Over the past months, central authorities have made significant progress towards pacification of Myanmar, signing several ceasefire agreements with various insurgent groups representing ethnic minorities across the country.

On 10 October, authorities reported signing a fresh peace deal with Kachin rebels. The deal, which follows three days of negotiations, is aimed at opening the way to political dialogue and ending the conflict in Kachin that broke out two years ago when a 17-year ceasefire crumbled.

On 8 October, prior to the deal, authorities released 56 political prisoners in a presidential amnesty, the second one since July when President Thein Sein promised to free all prisoners of conscience. The amnesty allowed for the release of members of ethnic minority armies with whom the government is seeking peace deal. Against this background, and although violence has recently flared up in parts of Myanmar in September, the government still plans to hold a ceremony in late October at which an alleged "nationwide ceasefire" is signed with the country’s many armed ethnic groups.

On 30 May, the Kachin Independence Organisation and government representatives signed a historic seven-point peace agreement, but ceasefire is yet to be achieved. The KIO, seeking greater autonomy for the one million Kachin people in Myanmar, is chairing the alliance of 11 ethnic armed groups, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). Fighting between the Government and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the armed wing of the KIO, re-ignited in June 2011.

On 15 July, President Thein Sein stated that for the first time in six decades a national ceasefire was possible and promised that all political prisoners would be released by end 2013 if the ceasefire is reached. On 24 July, the UN welcomed the release of an additional 73 political prisoners on top of January’s release of 600 political prisoners.

On 5 August, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, a once outlawed student movement, signed a state-level ceasefire agreement with Karen State government representatives. The preliminary understanding was seen as a step toward broader national reconciliation. In mid-June, an agreement to push ahead with a national ceasefire between authorities and the Union Peace-Making Committee and Karen National Progressive Party, representing the Red Karen in Kayah State, was reached.

Security Context: On 14 October, a rudimentary time-bomb exploded in a hotel in Yangon, wounding one foreign tourist. According to authorities, the explosion was part of a coordinated series of bomb attacks across Myanmar by a group targeting tourist haunts, a Buddhist temple, and other public places. It was the seventh blast since 11 October and was followed by two more explosions early on 15 October. The string of relatively small-scale bombings has left several people injured across the country and two dead in the town of Taungoo near the capital Naypyidaw since 11 October. It is unclear if they are related to ongoing intercommunal strife or to fighting between ethnic groups and authorities in various parts of the country.

Sectarian strife between Muslims and Buddhists continues. In June and October 2012, confrontations between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and the Muslim minority shook western Rakhine state, displacing thousands who remain in IDP camps. According to reports, clashes between Buddhists and Muslims since June last year have killed at least 237 people, including 192 people in Rakhine state. In recent weeks, human rights infringements were reported, and tensions remain high with authorities imposing restriction measures on the displaced Muslim minority in an increasingly tense local context.
On 5 and 6 October, fresh inter-communal violence was reported near Rangoon, as a mob attack by Buddhist residents of Kyaung Gone, an Irrawaddy Division town, destroyed at least three Muslim-owned homes according to local sources. The unrest had been sparked by allegations that a Muslim man had attempted to rape a Buddhist girl a month ago.

On 29 September, sectarian tensions surged again when over 800 Buddhist rioters torched homes and attacked local Muslims in Thandwe, a coastal township in western Rakhine State. According to reports, the violence left at least five dead and four injured. Roughly 60 houses and mosques were destroyed in four days of violence. Although little information is available, the violence reportedly displaced an unknown number of local Muslims, while the authorities struggled to restore order in the area.

In August, outbreaks of communal violence were reported from remote Htan Kone in Myanmar's northern Sagaing region where a group of local Buddhist rioters attacked Muslims from Rakhine state in a day of clashes, during which time witnesses reported that police dispersed crowds of Muslims, with two being reportedly killed, near the state's capital Sittwe. Several other communitarian incidents were reported from Rakhine's Thandwe, Pauktaw, and Mrauk-U townships in July and June. On 20 July, the authorities eventually lifted the state of emergency imposed around Meikhtila where heavy clashes and attacks, which resulted in 44 people killed and over 70 injured, occurred in March and April.

**Military Operations**: According to local media, though information is scarce, fighting between government troops and the KIA was reported in late September despite ongoing talks between the two sides. The signature of a new peace deal in mid-October is likely to allow for a ceasefire between the two sides.

On 12 September, it was reported that fighting was increasing in the northern Kachin State, after last week’s peace talks in Chiang Mai in Thailand between the Government and delegations of ethnic armed groups ended without reaching any agreement. Government forces have reportedly reinforced troops in the north and are said to be preparing an offensive against rebels from the KIO. A rise in clashes was reported earlier in September in Kachin state, and in the northern part of neighbouring Shan state, where signed projects of dam, mining, pipeline and agriculture have been on hold for three years due to on-and-off hostilities.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement**: As of June, an estimated 140,000 people are still displaced because of the inter-communal violence between Rakhine Buddhists and the Muslim minority that occurred in June and October 2012. The displaced are mostly located across eight Rakhine townships (Kyaukpyu, Kyauktaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, Myebon, Pauktaw, Ramree, and Rathedaung).

OCHA reported in August that an estimated 100,000 people have been displaced by conflict across Kachin and northern Shan states, including over 53,000 in areas beyond Government control. The number of registered IDPs has reached 91,000 people. Many have been displaced for up to two years, triggering renewed and additional needs for provision of basic services, livelihood, and protection. The most urgent needs in displaced communities include education, health care, renovation of shelter, and replacement of NFIs and WASH facilities.

Up to 400,000 people across 36 townships continue to be displaced in the southeast following years of conflict, according to OCHA.

In June, UNHCR reported that 28,000 Rakhine Muslims were registered as refugees in Malaysia. However, according to groups representing them, the real number of Myanmar Muslim immigrants is much higher and has surged this year because of the violence.

Roughly 440 people remained displaced as of 2 June in Lashio, following inter-communal violence at end May, while some 6,800 Muslim people remain displaced in June as a result of clashes in Meikhtila. Of the over 12,000 affected people at the beginning of the unrest in March 2013, more than 6,800 remained displaced in Meikhtila as of July 2013.

**Disaster**: On 26 September, local media reported flooding in Naypyidaw’s Lewe Township in southeastern Myanmar with at least 400 people displaced. According to the UN, heavy monsoon rains and flash floods have displaced almost 50,000 people across the country this year, though most of the people have since returned home. 70,000 acres of farmland have been flooded or destroyed this year.

As reported by local media, at least 1,500 people have been displaced in Mandalay Division and Sagaing Division following new flooding that was triggered by heavy rains in Upper Burma, encompassing Kachin and Shan States, in mid-September. To date, information on the overall number of affected people, and on damage, remains scarce. During the monsoon season, heavy rains and flash floods were reported in different parts of Myanmar, notably in Yangon, the former capital, in late August and in the northern parts of the country in the first half of September.

In late July, heavy rains caused flooding along the Salween River in southern Myanmar’s Kayin (Karen) state, inundating large parts of Hpa-an, Hlaing Bwe, Kyar Inn Seik Kyi, Myawaddy, Paing Kyone and Kyondo townships. About 30 relief camps have been set up on higher ground to provide shelter to the displaced. Floods have also affected Mon, Tanintharyi and Rakhine states, and the Ayeyawadi region.

The Myanmar Relief and Resettlement Department reported on 7 August that 7,338 people remained displaced following the monsoon floods. The number of affected and displaced had significantly decreased from the over 38,000 people reportedly displaced as of 2 August. According to authorities, 4,365 people are still affected in 22 locations in Kayin. In Mon state 1,855 IDPs are in three camps. In Ayeyawadi region, Tharbaung, and Maubin townships reported 1,079 people displaced to safer places as of 7 August. In Rakhine state, 39 people were displaced due to flooding. According to the authorities, people across the flood-affected areas are returning home with shelters scheduled to close.

WFP reported that some affected rural people would require food assistance until the harvest season in November-December as floods have destroyed food stocks and paddy fields.

**Access**: On 8 September, as reported by OCHA, an 11-truck humanitarian convoy led by the UN and other humanitarian partners delivered food, medicines, and other items to
displaced communities living in the Woi Chyai Camp in Laiza town in Kachin state. This is the first time that cross-line missions have been permitted to deliver humanitarian assistance to Laiza since December 2011. These missions supplement the aid delivered on a regular basis by local NGOs.

Access has reportedly improved as major highways in Kachin state, closed since the outbreak of hostilities between the Government army and the KIA in 2011, were reopened on 17 March following the renewal of talks between the two sides.

On 21 June, an UN-led aid convoy was allowed to cross into non-government controlled parts of Kachin state to deliver food and other life-saving relief to communities displaced by the conflict. It is the first time in nearly a year that the UN has been allowed to enter the area.

Access to affected populations in Rakhine state remains difficult, complicated by media campaigns based on claims of favouritism by international aid agencies towards the non-Rakhine Muslim minorities. According to OCHA, as of mid-April, access to IDPs is still seriously hampered by ongoing intimidation of national and international aid workers. In early July, OCHA encouraged humanitarian providers to adopt a “conflict-sensitive” approach to aid distribution with clear communication with the communities to explain the basis of aid distribution to mitigate the perception among the Rakhine population that assistance had been disproportionately provided to Muslim minorities.

Food Security: As reported by FAO in mid-June, the food security situation has improved across most of Myanmar. However, a poor harvest due to below average seasonal rains in lower Sagaing, western and central parts of Mandalay and most of Magway, is expected to lead to a deterioration of food security conditions in these areas. In Rakhine, southwest, Kachin, and Northern Shan states, where thousands of people have been displaced, food security remains a concern.

Health: Even though the numbers of dengue cases and related deaths were lower than expected for this year’s rainy season, health authorities still recorded 16,000 cases and 75 deaths for 2013, as of 12 September. In June, the cumulative number of dengue had surpassed the total for all of 2012, and officials feared that the monsoon season would worsen the epidemic. The lower-than-expected mortality figures indicate that medical treatment and public awareness are improving in the country.

As noted by OCHA in mid-July, a vulnerability mapping exercise showed that 36,000 people in 113 isolated villages in Rakhine State have no or limited access to basic services, including markets, education, and health care. Access to services is impeded by ongoing tension and restrictions on freedom of movement. This is in addition to the estimated 140,000 people displaced by 2012 inter-communal violence.

Updated: 15/10/2013

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES COMPLEX

Highlights

07 October: This week a total of 23 Palestinians, including six children and one international, were injured during clashes that occurred between Israeli forces and Palestinians in the West Bank, as reported by OCHA.

29 September: Around 1.7 million people are affected by the closure of the crossing points, restriction of movement of the population and closure of the smuggling tunnels in the Gaza Strip. Access to food, water, medicine and non-food items has decreased significantly since the beginning of the closures in July.

Political and Security Context

International political landscape

On 19 July, an initial agreement between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) on direct final status negotiations was announced. On 28 July, the Israeli government approved the release of 104 Palestinian prisoners as a sign of its readiness to revive the Middle East peace process. The peace talks opened formally in West Jerusalem on 14 August and Israel freed 26 of the promised 104 long-serving Palestinian and Israeli Arab prisoners on the same day. The prisoners will be released in four groups over the next nine months depending on progress in the newly-resumed peace talks with the Palestinian authorities. Negotiators were holding peace talks in Jerusalem on 16 September, although Israeli sources refused to confirm the meetings.

On 29 November 2012, the General Assembly voted to grant Palestine non-member UN observer State status, while expressing the urgent need for the resumption of negotiations between Israel and Palestine to move toward a permanent two-State solution.

National political landscape

While the negotiation process is expected to be lengthy, an ease of access and restriction of movement for the population in the OPT and for goods is pressing as recent action to counter illegal activities and insecurity in the Sinai have included imposing severe restrictions on movement of people through the Rafah Crossing with the Gaza Strip and closing down smuggling tunnels under the Egyptian-Gaza border. Around 1.7 million people are affected by the restrictions in the Gaza Strip as reported by OCHA in late September.

On average, fewer than 398 people per day have crossed the Rafah Crossing in both directions since July 2013, about 29% of the numbers who crossed in the first half of 2013 (1,353). On 11 September, Cairo closed the Rafah crossing completely following the crash of two explosive-laden cars into a security building along the border zone, which caused the death of six Egyptian soldiers. The crossing has been closed frequently for up to a week in a row. Even when the crossing has been open, hours have been reduced from nine to four and days from seven to six.

In addition, Egypt announced its intention of destroying the network of smuggling tunnels which are used to deliver goods to the Gaza Strip, on the grounds that Palestinians have been using the underground passages to help Sinai militants. The Sinai Peninsula has seen frequent battles between the Egyptian military and Islamist gunmen.

On 14 October, Israel said that it has frozen the shipment of building materials into Gaza
after discovering what it says is a sophisticated "terror tunnel" into its own territory from Palestinian land. Due to security reasons, it decided to stop for now the transfer of building materials into Gaza. Israeli authorities did not say how long the ban would remain in force. The Israeli army said the tunnel was buried 18m underground, made of concrete and ran for 1.7km with 450m extending into Israel.

Frequent closures have left OPT short of gas for cooking and heating, affecting businesses, agricultural production and health services, according to the UN. Due to the closure or destruction of these tunnels, the Gaza strip is suffering from a lack of goods such as fuel. The fuel crisis has meant Gaza's daily power cuts now last up to eight hours. Prices of basic foodstuffs have risen: flour is up 9%; cooking oil 4 – 5%; and sugar 7%.

The economic situation in the country is deteriorating with several thousand jobs in the construction industry being affected, livelihoods eroded and prices increasing. The Hamas government has paid only 77% of its $25 million August payroll for Gaza's 50,000 civil servants. A special payment of 1,000 shekels ($280) to the employees before the Eid al-Adha holiday this week was announced. However it remained unclear whether full September salaries will be paid this month.

According to WHO, an average 300 patients leave Gaza each day to access medical treatment. The Rafah Crossing is the primary exit and entry point to the Gaza Strip for Palestinians. Movement across the other crossing points Erez and Kerem Shalom in northern Gaza Strip has been severely restricted since September 2000. The closure of the crossing has affected prices of fuel, medicines, commodities and food. Kerem Shalom, the only functioning official crossing for goods to and from Gaza, was closed for 52 days during the first four months of 2013.

Safety and Security

The negotiations face several severe challenges, one of which is the issue of Israeli settlements. On 16 August, Israel announced that it was moving forward with plans to build nearly 1,200 new housing units in East Jerusalem and the West Bank and another 890 units in Gilo settlement, East-Jerusalem. In addition, excessive use of lethal force continues to impact civilians in the OPT. This week, a total of 23 Palestinians, including six children and one international, were injured during clashes that occurred between Israeli forces and Palestinians in the West Bank, as reported by OCHA.

Direct peace talks were briefly cancelled in August after clashes between Palestinians and Israeli forces erupted in the West Bank. Four people were killed and 24 wounded in a clash in the West Bank’s Kalandia refugee camp. UNRWA reported on 27 August that one of its staff members was shot dead and another one wounded by Israeli forces during an operation in Kalandia refugee camp. Credible reports say both men were on their way to work and were not engaged in any violent activity. An UNRWA investigation is ongoing.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

According to OCHA, the humanitarian situation in OPT remained unchanged during 2013. Longstanding protection threats affecting the Palestinian population, including movement and access restrictions, continue to generate high levels of humanitarian need.
facing dissention over the attitude to adopt regarding Islamabad’s attempts to launch peace talks.

11 October: A court ordered former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to be detained for 14 days in the latest development in the lasting quarrel between the country’s former strongman and the judiciary. The order followed Musharraf’s arrest the previous day over accusations that he was responsible for a 2007 raid on a radical mosque that killed more than 100 people.

10 October: Bomb attacks hit four major cities, Quetta, Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi, as well as the semi-tribal area of Bannu in the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The string of attacks killed nine people and wounded 60.

10 October: New attacks against security forces and government officials engaged in relief operations in the earthquake-affected areas in Baluchistan by Baluch militants were reported. Meanwhile, as of 9 October, aid workers reported that several foreign agencies have been denied permission to work in Awaran district, the epicentre of the earthquakes, confirming ongoing difficulties to get official clearance to work in the affected areas.

9 October: Hakimullah Mehsud, a Senior Pakistan Taliban leader (unrelated to Latif Mehsud) arrested in Afghanistan by US troops, suggested that he was open to peace talks with Pakistani authorities, while complaining that Islamabad had not yet taken any serious steps to begin dialogue. Mehsud reiterated however that the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) would continue to target the US and its allies and reiterated the demand that any ceasefire in Pakistan must include an end to US drone strikes.

8 October: Although recent talks to appease bilateral relations between Islamabad and New Delhi were conducted, India’s military continued to accuse Pakistan of helping insurgents to push into Indian Kashmir as foreign forces withdraw from neighbouring Afghanistan. Pakistan denied it is helping militants to cross into the Indian part of the contested region.

8 October: Rising tensions between Hindus and Muslims have been reported in Pakistan’s increasingly unstable Sindh province. According to local reports, a crowd of Islamic fundamentalists dug up the grave of a Hindu man and dragged it through the streets of the southern town of Pangrio in a dispute over the location of the grave.

Political and Security Context

India-Pakistan Context: On 8 October, and although recent talks to appease bilateral relations between Islamabad and New Delhi were conducted, India’s military continued to accuse Pakistan of helping insurgents to push into the Indian part of Kashmir as foreign forces withdraw from neighbouring Afghanistan. According to the Indian military, eight militants were killed in an operation as the military continue to fight a group that crossed into India in September. Pakistan has denied it is helping militants to cross into the Indian part of the contested region.

On 29 September, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met his Indian counterpart Indian

Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, amid heightened tensions over their shared Kashmir border. During the meeting, both leaders announced their intention to try to restore calm as an initial step toward reconciliation.

On the eve of these talks, on 26 September, new incidents were reported along the border with Indian forces reportedly killing three militants who allegedly infiltrated Indian Kashmir from Pakistan and attacked Indian police and soldiers. According to local media, at least nine people were killed on the Indian side, while the Indian authorities reported that they killed all three militants. In a separate incident, the Indian military reported that it had killed at least a dozen militants from a group of 30 to 40 heavily-armed fighters that had crossed from Pakistan into northern Kashmir. The latest attacks were widely seen as an attempt to derail the high-level talks between Islamabad and New Delhi.

Tensions have been running high along the India-Pakistan contested border in Kashmir, with international observers fearing that the November 2003 ceasefire and stalled peace talks between the two countries may be put into question. Since 6 August, violence has spiked between New Delhi and Islamabad after Indian authorities blamed Pakistani troops for killing five soldiers in a border attack. Islamabad has denied being behind the attack. In the aftermath, several incidents were reported across the Line of Control, which marks the de facto border in the disputed region, with casualties recorded on both sides on 7, 11, 13, 18, 22 and 25 August. India and Pakistan have been trading blame for the incidents that killed at least 44 members of the security forces since the beginning of the year, up from 17 for all of 2012, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, which monitors the violence. Meanwhile, on 6 September, an Islamist rally was openly staged in Islamabad where several thousand people allegedly called for holy war against India.

In mid-August, several sources in the Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba commented that the group is preparing to reignite the fight over Kashmir once Western troops leave Afghanistan next year. The bombing of the Indian consulate in the Afghan city of Jalalabad on 3 August, for which the Taliban has denied responsibility, might be an early indication of this change of strategy.

New Delhi has accused Islamabad of trying to push militants onto its side of Kashmir to revive a decade-old revolt there. On 11 September, a man was allegedly killed by Indian paramilitary forces during a demonstration in Shopian district, which triggered violent protests and led authorities to impose a curfew in parts of Indian-administered Kashmir. Several protests have sparked in Indian Kashmir over the last weeks with three people killed on 9 August in a demonstration in the Jammu region. Underscoring Indian concerns, protesters allegedly unfolded a Pakistani flag and shouted pro-Islam, pro-independence slogans after offering Eid prayers.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Context: Pakistan has played a pivotal role in establishing contact between the Taliban and the US in Qatar, which prompted the Afghan President Karzai to express his discontent over being bypassed. On 26 August, President Karzai arrived in Islamabad to mend bilateral relations while testing the ground for Pakistan’s involvement in peace talks with the Taliban. One of the visit’s aims was allegedly to press Islamabad into releasing senior Taliban commanders in detention in Pakistan who are seen to be instrumental in bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table. On 21 September, Pakistan agreed to release Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a former Taliban second-in-command, who
is now kept in a safe house in Karachi. Baradar, one of the founders of the Taliban insurgency, is seen by Kabul as a respected figure who could use his influence to persuade moderate Taliban commanders to negotiate with the Afghan authorities. On 3 October, a potential meeting was cancelled after Taliban commanders refused to meet their former chief Baradar in the city of Peshawar allegedly because the latter was accompanied by Pakistani security agents. As stated by the Afghan Taliban on 9 October, Pakistan has not freed their former second-in-command, Mullah Baradar as promised and the latter is still held in custody. Earlier in September, Pakistan released a group of detained Afghan Taliban, including senior commander called Mansoor Dadullah, who were similarly not directly handed over to the Afghan authorities as mutual suspicions continue to run high.

On 11 October, US forces reportedly captured senior Pakistani Taliban commander Latif Mehsud in a military operation in eastern Logar province. Other reports suggested that Mehsud was seized from an Afghan government convoy in the province as Afghan officials were trying to recruit him to launch peace talks several weeks ago, contributing to the current tensions between Washington and Kabul. The arrest of Mehsud could represent a blow to Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) in Pakistan while the movement is reportedly already facing dissent over the attitude to adopt regarding Islamabad’s attempts to launch peace talks.

National Political Context: On 22 August, by-elections were held in seats that were forced to annul results from the May vote due to violence or because candidates had since vacated their seats. The elections allowed Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s party, Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N), to further consolidate its power and increase the new government’s ability to push through unpopular economic reforms. On 30 July, Mamnoon Hussain, an ally of Nawaz Sharif, was voted to be the Pakistani President, a largely ceremonial role.

Since coming to power in May, Sharif has repeatedly suggested that his administration is ready to negotiate with the Pakistani Taliban. On 10 September, politicians from the main coalition and opposition parties backed Sharif’s calls for a dialogue, a united move that was welcomed by a Pakistani Taliban spokesman. On 16 September, the Pakistani Taliban set conditions for participating in the peace talks, demanding that the government release prisoners and withdraw troops from its tribal areas. This declaration is raising doubts about prospects for negotiations. In August, the Prime Minister publicly indicated his desire to welcome the TTP to the negotiation table while leaving open the possibility to continue using force. The issue is highly controversial in Pakistan. It is unclear if the influential Pakistani military welcome such talks, and tensions between military officials and the authorities are reportedly on the rise over the matter.

On 9 October, Hakimullah Mehsud, a Senior Pakistani Taliban leader unrelated to Latif Mehsud, was arrested in Afghanistan by US troops. He suggested that he was open to peace talks with the Pakistani authorities while complaining that Islamabad has not yet taken any serious steps to begin dialogue. Mehsud reiterated that, in the meantime, the TTP would continue to target the US and its allies and demanded that any ceasefire in Pakistan must include an end to US drone strikes.

In September, the city of Peshawar, capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and located near the the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where Islamist militants have strongholds, was severely hit by several bloody attacks. TTP leadership has denied responsibility for the attacks and stressed that it mainly targets “legitimate military assets” in its fight against the authorities. However, some observers have suggested that the last series of attacks may point to deep divisions running through the Pakistani Taliban movement between those ready to respond to the government’s offer to negotiate and hardliners. While some officials within the TTP unofficially acknowledged the existence of rifts within the movement, Pakistani authorities seem to remain reluctant to launch full-scale military operations against the TTP.

On 11 October, a court ordered former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to be detained for 14 days in the latest development in the ongoing quarrel between the country’s former strongman and the judiciary. The order followed Musharraf’s arrest the previous day over accusations that he was responsible for a 2007 raid on a radical mosque that killed more than 100 people. The arrest of the former army chief may be seen as a move of the judiciary to further challenge the power of the very influential military in Pakistan.

Security Context: On 8 October, rising tensions between Hindus and Muslims have been reported in Pakistan’s increasingly unstable Sindh province. According to local reports, a crowd of Islamic fundamentalists dug up the grave of a Hindu man and dragged it through the streets of the southern town of Pangrio in a dispute over the location of the grave. According to the authorities, the situation was brought under control before tensions escalated.

Tensions are running high in Pakistan with regular Taliban attacks reported across the country, notably in FATA and on the border with Afghanistan. According to an independent count conducted by the Center for Research and Security Studies, 4,286 persons were killed and 4,066 injured between January and 31 August in targeted killings, militant attacks, incidents of terrorism, and security operations by the armed forces and intelligence agencies.

On 10 October, bomb attacks hit four major cities – Quetta, Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi, as well as the semi-tribal area of Bannu in the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The string of attacks killed nine people and wounded 60. On 7 October, a bomb exploded near a polio vaccination team in Peshawar and killed two people in the last Taliban insurgents’ attack to date. On 3 October, a Taliban attack against a pro-government rival armed group in northwestern Orakzai tribal district killed at least 17 people. On 2 October, a suicide bomber killed at least three people and wounded 12 others at a southwestern border crossing point between Afghanistan and Pakistan. On 2 October, a bomb killed two soldiers and wounded three others involved in relief operations related to the earthquake near Mashkey town in Baluchistan province. The attack was claimed by ethnic Baluch separatists who have been fighting in the area for years and have promised to step up attacks against military personnel following the last attack.

On 29 September, a blast outside an ancient market in Peshawar killed 42 people and wounded over 100. A Taliban spokesman condemned the attacks which have not yet been claimed by any group. On 27 September, a bomb hit a bus on the outskirts of Peshawar, killing at least 18 people and wounding another 40. On 25 September, a bomb attack by militants in Mohmand tribal district, on the border with Afghanistan, resulted in three...
On 22 September, in one of the deadliest attacks to date against Christians in the predominantly Muslim country, two suicide bombers blew themselves up outside an Anglican church in Peshawar. At least 80 people were killed while dozens more were injured in the attack that was claimed by the Taliban-linked militant group TTP Jundullah. Following the bombing, the Prime Minister N. Sharif has significantly toughened his stance regarding dealings with the Islamist militants, but fell short of calling for outright military action against the insurgents. Nevertheless, the scale of the attack targeting Christians may have major repercussions on the authorities’ dealings with the Taliban on the country’s domestic front.

On 23 September, a bomb targeting police and claimed by the Taliban killed at least five people in Pishin district, north of Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan province.

Military Operations: On 6 September, at least seven militants, including two senior commanders, were allegedly killed in a suspected US drone strike near the Afghan border in Pakistan’s tribal region. An increasing number of such attacks in the FATA have been reported with at least six occurring since Nawaz Sharif was sworn in on 5 June. Seeing these US-led attacks as a breach of Pakistani sovereignty, the new Prime Minister has repeatedly called for an end to US drone strikes against militants, although one such attack killed the number two of the Pakistani Taliban, Wali Ur-Rehman, in North Waziristan on 29 May. To avenge his death, the Islamist movement officially announced in June that it had created a new wing to attack foreigners. As reported by Pakistani authorities in late June, UNHCR reported an estimated 80,000 people displaced from Khyber Agency to safer grounds in Peshawar, Kohat, and towards the camps of New Durrani in Kurram Agency and Jalozai in Nowshera District. An estimated 60,000 additional people began to flee their homes in Kurram Agency in mid-May due to the government’s security operations against armed non-state actors. As of 6 June, 51,582 people were registered in New Durrani camp. As of 18 July, according to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, about 66,000 IDPs had returned to their homes in Kurram, South Waziristan and Bajaur.

On 30 June, the Government of Pakistan agreed not to expel Afghan refugees who had permission to stay in the country until June, with Kabul and Islamabad agreeing, at a recent UN-backed meeting, to continue efforts to solve the protracted refugee situation. Pakistani media reports that the presence of Afghan refugees is triggering tensions in host provinces. On 5 July, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a province hosting an estimated 60% of Afghan refugees, officially opposed extending Afghan refugees’ stay in the country and suggested that should the need arise, registered Afghans be equally distributed among the four Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Punjab, and Baluchistan.

According to OCHA as of 15 July, an estimated 1.03 million IDPs were still in need of humanitarian assistance, 45% of them located in the Peshawar area in northwestern Pakistan. As noted by OCHA in early August, around 90% of IDPs live with relatives or in rented houses, and most IDPs are subsistence farmers. Displacement has forced them to leave their farms and relocate to the Peshawar area where employment and livelihood opportunities are limited. At present, many IDPs have switched to irreversible coping strategies, taking on debt and selling assets to pay for food. Most of the 1.64 million Afghan refugees located in FATA require humanitarian assistance.

On 30 June, according to official sources, the Pakistan Air Force bombed several alleged militant hideouts and killed at least 17 people in a mountainous tribal area between Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram understood to be the Taliban-linked militants’ main stronghold.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Displacement: According to authorities, an estimated 300 people were displaced in Kashmir on 26 August following shelling from the Indian side.

OCHA reported on 15 September that more than one million people are displaced in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA due to protracted conflict. Since mid-March, government military operations against the Taliban and clashes between militant groups in the Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency have led to additional and massive population movements. As of early June, UNHCR reported an estimated 80,000 people displaced from Khyber Agency to safer grounds in Peshawar, Kohat, and towards the camps of New Durrani in Kurram Agency and Jalozai in Nowshera District. An estimated 60,000 additional people began to flee their homes in Kurram Agency in mid-May due to the government’s security operations against armed non-state actors. As of 6 June, 51,582 people were registered in New Durrani camp. As of 18 July, according to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, about 66,000 IDPs had returned to their homes in Kurram, South Waziristan and Bajaur.

According to OCHA as of 15 July, an estimated 1.03 million IDPs were still in need of humanitarian assistance, 45% of them located in the Peshawar area in northwestern Pakistan. As noted by OCHA in early August, around 90% of IDPs live with relatives or in rented houses, and most IDPs are subsistence farmers. Displacement has forced them to leave their farms and relocate to the Peshawar area where employment and livelihood opportunities are limited. At present, many IDPs have switched to irreversible coping strategies, taking on debt and selling assets to pay for food. Most of the 1.64 million Afghan refugees located in FATA require humanitarian assistance.

On 30 June, the Government of Pakistan agreed not to expel Afghan refugees who had permission to stay in the country until June, with Kabul and Islamabad agreeing, at a recent UN-backed meeting, to continue efforts to solve the protracted refugee situation. Pakistani media reports that the presence of Afghan refugees is triggering tensions in host provinces. On 5 July, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a province hosting an estimated 60% of Afghan refugees, officially opposed extending Afghan refugees’ stay in the country and suggested that should the need arise, registered Afghans be equally distributed among the four Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Punjab, and Baluchistan.

According to OCHA on 15 September, 1.62 million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan. An additional estimated 2.4 million undocumented Afghan refugees are reportedly residing in Pakistan and Iran.

Disaster: According to the Pakistan Red Cross Society, an estimated 185,000 people have been severely affected by the 7.7 magnitude earthquake on 24 September and its main 7.2 magnitude aftershock on 28 September in the southwestern districts of Awaran (160,000 people affected) and Kech (25,000 affected), 350km south of Quetta in Baluchistan.
province. As of mid-October, at least 376 people have been killed and an estimated 824 injured by the tremors. The death toll is expected to rise as rescue teams reach remote villages.

The earthquake on 24 September was followed by a series of powerful aftershocks, causing further damage, and making rescue efforts dangerous. First estimates reported that over 300,000 people had been affected across six districts: Awaran, Kech, Gwadar, Pajgur, Chaghi and Khuzdar, and entire villages were reportedly flattened across these impoverished and sparsely populated areas of Baluchistan. According to local reports, the earthquake has destroyed over 21,000 houses.

In April 2013, a 7.8 magnitude quake in neighbouring Iran killed 41 people and affected more than 12,000 in Baluchistan.

According to authorities, as of 6 September, monsoon rains have affected 1.5 million people across the country. 53% of those affected are in Punjab with Narowal (222,260 people affected), Muzaffargarh (173,444), Jhang (127,230), and Rajanpur (95,171) the hardest hit districts. Other parts of the country were also severely affected including Kashmore (105,515 people affected), Sukkur (79,005), Khairpur (74,830), and Jamshoro (65,559) as the hardest hit districts in Sindh; floodplains from Sibi to Jaffarabad districts (148,889 people affected) were the most severely affected in Baluchistan.

In addition, 75% of the affected 1.46 million acres of crops are in Punjab, triggering food security concerns for the affected population. To date, the number of people displaced in camps has reduced from over 12,000 people to 4,155 in 408 relief camps across the three provinces. The floods have reportedly killed at least 193 people and injured over 1,100 people.

According to OCHA as of late April, around 1.5 million people still needed critical services in Baluchistan, Punjab, and Sindh provinces, following the flash floods triggered by heavy rains in September 2012. Many affected districts are still struggling to recover from the 2010 and 2011 flooding and have large inundated areas.

**Access:** Aid response to the earthquakes that hit Baluchistan in September have been complicated by the fact that the remote region is home to separatist insurgents who fear that the army, which is overseeing aid operations, may take advantage of the crisis to move more forces into the area. Attacks on helicopters carrying aid workers were reported in September. On 10 October, new attacks against security forces and government officials engaged in relief operation by Baluch militants against were reported. As of 9 October, aid workers reported that several foreign agencies have been denied permission to work in the Awaran district, the epicentre of the earthquakes, confirming ongoing difficulties to get the authorities’ clearance to work in the affected areas.

Assessments and humanitarian operations overall are hampered by difficult access due to insecurity and administrative delays. In June, OCHA reported 44 attacks against aid workers between January and April, with 18 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, 15 in Sindh province, four in Baluchistan province, one in the capital Islamabad, and six in FATA. The total figure for last year was 42 across the whole country. Several deadly attacks on polio vaccination teams in FATA have been reported since the beginning of the year.

Food Security and Malnutrition: Food insecurity is at emergency levels with an estimated 60% of Pakistan’s population considered food insecure. Inflation, rising fuel prices, and stagnating domestic productivity are pushing up food prices. Seven districts face IPC phases 3 (Crisis) and 4 (Emergency).

In June 2013, food inflation rose by 8.1% from 2012, against 4.4% for non-food inflation. Prices of wheat and wheat flour have steadily increased since June 2012, underpinned by higher producer support prices.

Health and Malnutrition: On 19 September, authorities in the northwestern Swat Valley, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province near the Afghan border, declared a health emergency after nearly 5,000 cases of dengue fever were reported in a month. To date, 14 people have reportedly died from the disease. It is believed the disease spread from Lahore, where a dengue outbreak killed 362 people and infected more than 21,000 in September 2011.

On 28 August, health officials warned of a serious polio outbreak after the disease was detected in 16 children in North Waziristan, a tribal district where militant groups have banned vaccination. OCHA reported on 15 September that 28 cases have been recorded so far in 2013 (58 in 2012). Most children affected were <5. According to authorities, over 240,000 children in North and South Waziristan are at risk because of the imposed ban on vaccination.

Since the start of 2013,269 deaths caused by measles have been reported. According to local media, 141 children have died of measles since January in Punjab province alone. Sindh province, hardest hit by the measles outbreak, was also affected by flash flooding that occurred in September 2012. WHO described the situation in Pakistan as alarming due to a steady increase in fatal measles cases. According to OCHA, in Punjab and Sindh provinces, 54% of 8,844 children assessed between January last year and mid-May this year were not vaccinated against the disease.

Malnutrition rates in some flood-affected districts were beyond emergency thresholds before the recurrent floods in 2012 and are predicted to worsen. According to WFP as of June, 15% of Pakistani children are severely malnourished, and 40% suffer from stunted growth.

**Updated: 15/10/2013**

**BANGLADESH INTERNAL UNREST, CYCLONE**

**Highlights**

**9 October:** A Bangladeshi tribunal has found a senior member of the BNP guilty of crimes against humanity stemming from the nation’s 1971 independence war and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The sentence has reportedly not triggered any popular protests to date.

**Political and Security Context**

Tensions between Islamic groups and secular activists are ongoing in Bangladesh. The Government, led by the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) in power since 2008, struggles to
contain protests while upcoming elections loom. In a publication released in late July, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that Bangladeshi security forces have frequently used excessive force in responding to street protests, killing at least 150 protesters and injuring over 2,000 since February 2013.

HRW has also criticized the ongoing trials of Islamic leaders judged for crimes committed during the country’s 1971 War of Independence against Pakistan, indicating that the tribunal’s procedures fall short of international standards. Several critics suggested that the trials are also used by the AL as a mean to undercut the two biggest opposition parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).

On 9 October, a Bangladesh tribunal found a senior member of the BNP guilty of crimes against humanity stemming from the nation’s 1971 independence war and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The sentence has reportedly not triggered any popular protests to date. On 1 October, Bangladesh’s war crimes tribunal sentenced a senior opposition leader to death in the seventh such verdict by the body set up to probe abuses during the country’s war of independence. The verdict prompted calls for a strike in Chittagong town, the hometown of the sentenced Islamic leader, although protests across the country remained limited.

On 18-19 September, a two day nationwide hartal, or strike, was enforced after another senior leader from the country’s largest Islamic party JI was handed the death sentence, overturning a previously imposed life sentence, for crimes committed during the war. In the violence that erupted after the verdict, at least one person was killed in the southern coastal district of Noakhali and dozens injured across the country. Since January, authorities have convicted six Islamists of crimes related to the 1971 war. Several JI leaders and two from the BNP are still officially on trial.

On 12-13 August, police and protesters clashed during a 48-hour hartal, called by JI. At least 50 people, including ten policemen, were injured. While the JI strike triggered tensions, it was only minimally supported by the BNP, allied to JI. The strike followed a Bangladeshi court ruling that declared JI illegal on 1 August, largely forbidding it to take part in general elections due at end 2013. In the wake of the decision, party activists took the streets in the capital, Dhaka, and other towns including Bogra, Jessore and Gaibandha.

Authorities jailed a prominent Bangladeshi human rights activist working for HRW over allegations that the US-based group made false accusations against the government forces after a deadly crackdown on protests in May. The move may be seen as a toughening of the AL stance prior to much awaited national elections. Against this background, local observers expect a worsening of the situation over the coming months.

Since January 2013, Bangladesh has seen recurrent hartals called by JI or BNP to protest against the arrest of senior party officials for committing offences during the 1971 War. The hartals have caused significant disruption to business and commerce and losses to the economy. In mid-July, after a war crimes tribunal convicted two top JI Islamist politicians to death for crimes of genocide, conspiracy in killing intellectuals, torture and abduction committed during the 1971 War, new strikes, enforced by BNP and JI, were recorded across the country. Shops and businesses were closed and main roads were largely deserted of cars in the capital Dhaka. Although information on casualties remains limited, at least nine people were killed during the protests. According to the authorities, another five JI leaders and two from the BNP are on trial.

High levels of violence were recorded in May after Islamist protesters demanding religious reforms from the government took to the streets in Dhaka and outside the capital. Several hundred people were injured and at least 20 killed in the protests. Protesters were trying to impose an Islamist agenda on Bangladesh by demanding an anti-blasphemy law with provision for the death penalty.

In early August, although little information is available, several inter-communal clashes were recorded in the Matiranga-Taindong tribal area in Khagrachari district in the Chittagong Hill Tracks.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Displacement: In early August, OCHA reported that following inter-communal violence at the border town of Tripura, northeast Bangladesh, around 1,500 people sought refuge and protection in India.

Disaster: As of 15 September, local authorities stated that flash floods starting on 10 September in the districts of Jamalpur, Rajshahi, Gaibandha, Kurigram, and Sirajganj affected more than 178,000 people. The northern Dhaka division is among the most affected areas. In July, torrential rainfall and consequential onrush of water from upstream resulted in floods in several northern districts, notably Thakurgaon, Gaibandha, Dinajpur Panchagarh, Nilphamari, Lalmoirhat, Kurigram, Jamalpur, and Sirajgonj. To date, an estimated 124,000 people have been affected with at least nine killed.

Bangladesh was spared significant human impact from Cyclone Mahasen that was weaker than expected. Nonetheless, the cyclone caused damage, including 49,000 destroyed and 45,000 partially destroyed houses, mostly in Pataukhali, Bholia, and Barguna districts. Government sources report that 14 people were killed and 65 injured by the cyclone. As of 22 May, over 1.2 million people were affected by the cyclone with 1.1 million people having been evacuated.

Bangladesh is considered one of the world’s most hazard-prone countries.

Food Security: Some 40% of the population is food insecure. The lingering effects of frequent natural disasters, including the floods at the end of June, mid-July, late September in 2012 and mid-May in 2013, violent demonstrations and disturbance, and other localised problems have raised the level of food insecurity of a high number of households.

Updated: 15/10/2013

CAMBODIA FLOODS, TYPHOON

Highlights

15 October: 17 provinces remain flooded across Cambodia since the third week of September. Heavy rains were reported throughout the northwest and along the Mekong
River in central and southern Cambodia. Typhoon Nari, which hit Viet Nam on 15 October, will most likely affect the Mekong River, potentially causing an increase in water levels in the next few days in some of the affected areas. To date, 134 people have reportedly been killed while over 1,737,000 people are affected. Over 119,600 people have been evacuated from affected zones to safer areas. As reported, over 160,000 houses, 1354 schools, 69 health centres and hospitals, and 498 pagodas along with roads, bridges and infrastructure were flooded and damaged.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Disaster: As of 15 October, as reported by the UN and humanitarian organizations, 17 provinces remain flooded across Cambodia since the third week of September. Heavy rains were reported throughout the northwest and along the Mekong River in central and southern Cambodia. The provinces of Otdar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey, Preah Vihear, Battambang, Pailin, Sihanoukville, Pursat, Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, Kratie, Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Thom, Prey Veng, Phnom Penh, Svay Rieng and Kandal have been affected. Typhoon Nari, which hit Viet Nam on 15 October, will most likely affect the Mekong River, potentially causing an increase in water levels in the next few days in some of the affected areas.

To date, 134 people have reportedly been killed while over 1,737,000 people are affected. Over 119,600 people have been evacuated from affected zones to safer areas. As reported, over 160,000 houses, 1354 schools, 69 health centres and hospitals, and 498 pagodas along with roads, bridges and infrastructure were flooded and damaged.

To date, initial assessments have identified food, shelter, access to safe water and sanitation, as well as health as being the most pressing needs of the affected populations, notably the people displaced. New assessments are currently ongoing. Several assessments, notably in Battambang province – one of the most affected areas, are still ongoing. According to reports, most immediate needs of affected populations include food, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter.

Updated: 15/10/2013

CHINA FLOODS, TYPHOON

Highlights

9 October: As reported by local authorities, ten people were reportedly killed and five others remain missing since Typhoon Fitow brought rainstorms to eastern China's Zhejiang Province. On 10 October, the rains had however reportedly stopped in many parts of Zhejiang.

On 7 October, Tropical storm Fitow, packing winds of up to 121 km/h, made landfall in Fujian province, just south of Zhejiang province, bringing heavy rainfall and causing widespread blackouts according to local sources. In Zhejiang 574,000 people were evacuated, while in Fujian 177,000 were displaced according to the authorities. Since August, large parts of the country have been affected by disasters, particularly flooding.

On 29 September, 74 Chinese fishermen were missing after three fishing boats sank in the South China Sea as Thailand and Vietnam braced for torrential rain and flooding due to Typhoon Wutip. The boats sank about 330 km from China's island province of Hainan, according to Chinese authorities.

On 21-22 September, category 5 Typhoon Usagi, that formed near the Philippines, made landfall in China, killing 25 people in the southern province of Guangdong. According to the authorities, as of 24 September, over 7.965 million people have been affected in Guangdong, with 27 people dead, 466,000 people evacuated, 9,700 houses collapsed, and more than 24,000 others were damaged. The Typhoon Usagi, locally known as Odette, is reportedly the strongest typhoon to hit China this year. This raises the death toll to over 380 lives claimed by natural disasters across China since early August.

As of 4 September, additional floods and heavy rain have affected more than 5.2 million people in the province of Heilongjiang, on the border with Russia. Residents from 904 towns and townships have been affected by the floods, and 331,000 people have been relocated. The floods caused 18,300 houses to collapse, according to authorities. The area, along with the neighbouring provinces of Liaoning and Jilin, had been hit by severe flooding, notably the people displaced. New assessments are currently ongoing. Several assessments, notably in Battambang province – one of the most affected areas, are still ongoing. According to reports, most immediate needs of affected populations include food, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter.

Since mid-August, China has experienced two typhoons in the south of the country and extremely severe flooding in the north with an estimated death toll surpassing 200. The authorities estimate the total number of affected by the disasters at over 10 million.

Heavy rains struck southern China as the country was affected by Typhoon Trami which made landfall on 23 August. The heavy rains triggered landslides that increased the number of casualties. According to local authorities, the typhoon has affected almost two million people in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region, coastal Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, and central China’s Hunan province. The total estimated displaced population stands at over 380,000 people. An estimated 1.4 million people were affected in the Zhejiang and Fujian provinces alone, with over 351,000 people displaced. At least two people were killed, hundreds of houses damaged, and crops lost across the provinces.

China's southern regions were affected by Typhoon Utor which resulted in 70 people dead...
and another 18 missing. Guangdong province experienced the most typhoon-related casualties, with 43 reported deaths as of 22 August according to IFRC. Following its passage across the Philippines on 12 August, Typhoon Utor, locally known as Labuyo, hit China’s south-eastern Guangdong province on 14 August. According to the authorities, it also affected the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region. All areas were struck by heavy monsoon rains in the aftermath.

Authorities reported that, as of 19 August, the typhoon and rains that followed have affected an estimated 8.37 million people in the south of the country. At the same time, the authorities reported that some 6.67 million people were affected in Guangdong province, with an estimated 513,000 that needed to be relocated, according to OCHA.

Utor reportedly damaged at least 19,000 houses across the provinces. At least 20 people were killed, and over a dozen remain missing as of 19 August following the typhoon and subsequent monsoon floods.

The provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang in north-eastern China, near the border with Russia, have been hit by severe flooding, reportedly the worst in decades, following heavy rains from 10 August on. As of 19 August, authorities reported that 800,000 people have been affected; 100,000 were evacuated, and 113,000 hectares of farmland were damaged in Liaoning. In Jilin, 760,000 people were reportedly affected, of whom over 100,000 were displaced and 35,000 houses damaged or destroyed. In Heilongjiang, nearly two million people were affected, of whom 140,000 were displaced and 15,000 houses damaged, according to the authorities. As of 20 August, an estimated 3.74 million had been affected across the three provinces. At least 85 deaths were reported across the three provinces and 100 people were reportedly missing. Since these three areas are major grain producers and the autumn harvest is entering its key phase, the authorities have reported concerns regarding agriculture recovery.

In mid-August, other Chinese provinces were affected by heavy rains and subsequent floods, including central Hunan province where floods affected 85,400 people in Lanzhan county. Of the affected, 35,000 people were displaced, and five people were confirmed dead in the area. At least 6,200 hectares of farmland were affected and almost 200 houses damaged.

China is an extremely hazard-prone country, regularly suffering from floods, earthquakes, landslides, and hailstorms.

Updated: 15/10/2013

JORDAN DISPLACEMENT

**Highlights**

**As of 14 October**: Over half a million Syrian refugees (543,199), including those awaiting registration, have crossed into Jordan since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, according to UNHCR. This marks an increase of more than 6,700 people from last week.

On 9 October, opposition fighters took control of the Hajanah border battalion post, near the Syrian city of Dar'a, after besieging it for two months and fierce clashes around it lasting a month. With its capture, opposition forces now control a ribbon of territory along the border from outside Dar’a to the edge of the Golan Heights.

**Political and Security Context**

On 9 October, opposition fighters reportedly took control of the Hajanah border post, near the Syrian city of Dar’a, after besieging it for two months and fierce clashes around it lasting a month. The border post is adjacent to an old customs post seized by opposition fighters on 28 September. With its capture, opposition forces now control a ribbon of territory along the border from outside Dar’a to the edge of the Golan Heights. The border region with Syria has seen increased fighting over the last weeks, as the opposition have pushed to gain more ground. On 13 October Syrian opposition forces allegedly shot down a Syrian government plane along the border with Jordan.

On 28 September, after four consecutive days of fighting, Syrian opposition forces, including members of an al-Qaeda-linked group, captured the Ramtha military post on the outskirts of the southern Syrian city of Dar’a, at the border with Jordan. The Government of Jordan sent the Syrian authorities a letter of protest after a shell landed in Ramtha, inside Jordanian territory during the clashes. The military advance of opposition forces is also felt within Jordan where officials stated this week that al-Qaeda-linked militants of the al-Nusra Front have been recruiting Jordanians for the fight against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

While Jordan’s economy and its social fabric have been significantly impacted by the large influx of Syrian refugees, the country has remained politically stable and secure. However this balance is fragile.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

The alleged chemical weapons attack on 21 August drove thousands of displaced Syrians towards Jordan. According to activists, some 10,000 civilians fled the Damascus governate towards southern Syria late on 21 August; with border towns reportedly receiving “mass waves” of hundreds of IDP families. However, the number of Syrians entering Jordan is still lower than in previous months due to the fighting along the border.

**Displacement**: In Jordan, the number of refugees crossing the border has fallen from 600-700 per day in mid-July to an average of 90 per day since 1 August. At the beginning of July, an average 1,600 people were crossing the border daily compared to 2,500 persons per day in February. Arrivals have continued to drop markedly since 10 July and have not resumed to levels seen earlier in 2013. At end June, fighting along the Jordanian-Syrian border closed the main access routes into Jordan, forcing displaced Syrians to use more arduous desert routes to enter the country. According to Syrian opposition groups, heavy clashes and shelling blocked off routes into southwest Syria, forcing opposition forces to restrict cross-border activity to “essential movement” of fighters and medical supplies and continue to suspend mass refugee crossings. Refugees are reportedly waiting two to three days in border regions before crossing into Jordan due to increased security measures put in place to deal with the increasing number of forged documents.
Syrian activists and rebel officials said some 80 displaced people have died from starvation along the border, as heavy shelling is preventing refugees from crossing into Jordan, raising the total number of displaced people currently stranded on the border to around 70,000. However, this number is not confirmed and estimates range from 10-100,000 people stranded. On 15 September, Syrian activists and rebel officials said heavy shelling is preventing some 5,000 civilians from crossing into Jordan.

As of 14 October, 543,199 Syrian refugees, including those awaiting registration, have crossed into Jordan according to UNHCR, which swells Jordan’s population size by 11%, placing enormous pressure on Jordanian resources. This marks an increase of more than 6,700 people compared to last week but is around half the number of newly registered two weeks ago. Recent reports warn of rising tensions between Jordanians and Syrian refugees, especially in communities that host large numbers of displaced Syrians.

Around 30% of Syrian refugees are accommodated in camps, and the others are residing with local communities. Most refugees remain in northern areas near the Syrian border, for example in Irbid, Mafraq, Ramtha or Zarqa. More recent statistics from the Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO) has stated that urban refugees comprise 75% of total refugee population, 30% in Amman, 45% in the north, 15% in the middle, and 3% in the southern region.

On 09 October, protesters blocked the Irbid-Amman road, near the Azmi al-Mofti Palestinian refugee camp, and clashed with security forces attempting to secure the area. This is the latest in a series of recent incidents that underscore the persistent threat of unrest in Jordan’s outlying areas, including major cities like Irbid. Riots have also erupted in Jerash, as a tribal altercation between residents of Al Hadada neighbourhood and residents of the Gaza Palestinian refugee camp evolved into clashes between Palestinians and the Jordanian police force. The riots are said to be led by pro-reform Jordanian youth who are suffering due to the contracting economy.

Jordan’s Za’atari refugee camp is the equivalent of an entirely new city that would be the country’s fifth largest with over 130,000 residents. The lack of security in certain parts of Za'atari camp impedes refugees’ access to services. The continuing limitation of transportation options for refugees affects accessibility to health services for the most disadvantaged, including persons with disabilities, older mobility-challenged refugees, and pregnant women. Security incidents in Za’atari camp are frequent. On 06 October refugees clashed with the staff while asking for the registration process to be speeded up. Police intervened and restored order.

Jordan’s King Abdullah II has asked for more support for the swelling number of Syrian refugees, warning on 25 September that his country was overwhelmed. Based on trends from January to March 2013, it is likely one million Syrians could need support in Jordan by the end of 2013, with as many as 300,000 hosted in camps and 700,000 with local residents, according to UNHCR. The government said on 26 September that it needs US$850 million in international assistance to meet the needs of this many refugees. Jordan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs predicted that the number of Syrian refugees could make up 40% of Jordan’s population by mid of 2014 unless the crisis ends.

On 13 August, officials said that Jordan was finalising preparations for its third Syrian refugee camp, with the capacity to receive its first refugee families in September (Mkheizen Al Gharbiya camp in the eastern city of Azraq). The camp is designed to host up to 500,000 Syrians in its initial phase, according to the UN, with an expandable capacity of up to 130,000.

In April, UNHCR reported that Syrians were returning home for a number of reasons, including improved security in border villages, to protect their property, and to reunite with family members and left-behind relatives and bring them to Jordan. Nearly 9,000 refugees in Jordan left for Syria in June, bringing the number of returnees to over 68,000 in the past two years. It is thought that many returnees spend a short amount of time in Syria and then re-enter Jordan. In the past weeks, Syrians in Jordan have been unable to return due Syrian troops engaged in heavy shelling around border towns.

**Food Security:** As a result of the refugee influx, Jordan’s economy, water, energy, education, and housing resources remain strained. Commodity prices are higher in Jordan than in Syria and the purchasing power of refugees to cover basic needs keeps decreasing. Jordanians also suffer from high unemployment (around 14%), inflation, and poverty.

According to WFP, the school feeding programme was reduced by 80% from 2008 to 2012, the fuel subsidy was lifted in November 2012, and the government is considering withdrawing or reducing other subsidies (i.e. bread) which could potentially trigger social discontent and further economic deterioration. Due to increased demand cereal import requirements in 2013/14 (July/Junee) are forecast to exhibit a slight increase of about 5% on the 2012/13 level of 2.19 million tonnes.

According to the National Department of Statistics, the monthly rate of food price inflation (year-on-year) reached 4.4% in June 2013, fuelled by increases in vegetable prices. By contrast, bread and cereal prices declined by 1.4% due to Government support schemes.

All humanitarian programming is required to include interventions to support poor Jordanians as a way of sharing the burden of the government to meet ongoing needs both of refugees and of its own vulnerable population. The socio-economic conditions in poor and food-insecure areas are not expected to improve in the short or medium term and could deteriorate with continuation of the crisis.

In early August, the UN reported that some Syrian refugees are donating to poor Jordanians or selling them extra food received from aid agencies at a discounted price. Northern governorates have been hit particularly hard by the refugee influx and demands on basic service provision. In Mafraq governorate, where locals are heavily affected by both high prices and irregular water supply, food, blankets, tents, and other items with UNHCR and other agency logos are publicly for sale.

UNHCR reports that 23% of community-based refugees were found to have a ‘poor’ or ‘borderline’ Food Consumption Score compared to 18.5% of refugees in camps, highlighting the needs for both refugees and hosting communities.

To accommodate the spike in water demand, Jordan is drawing on additional water resources, including buying water from private wells. The extra demand on water and sanitation services will cost the Government over $700 million dollars per year, even as Jordanians receive less water per capita.
**Health and Nutrition:** New cases of water borne and water-related diseases are appearing in Za’atari camp on a weekly basis, including diarrhoea, scabies, leptospirosis, rotavirus and hepatitis A. Other communicable diseases related to hygiene conditions have been reported, including acute jaundice syndrome, chicken pox, lice, and measles. While these diseases are often seasonal or endemic in the region, there have been alerts issued for a measles outbreak (six cases in Za’atari camp from 9 November 2012 to 14 June 2013, according to UNHCR) and higher-than-usual levels of jaundice, scabies and lice.

*Updated: 15/10/2013*

---

**LAOS FLOODS, EPIDEMIC**

**Highlights**

No new development this week. Last update was on: 08/10/2013.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Disaster:** According to OCHA, as of 2 October, over 217,000 people were affected in the five southern provinces of Salavan, Champasak, Attepeu, Savannakhet, and Xekong in Laos following ongoing extensive floods. Since mid-September, an additional three people had reportedly died, over 1,500 people were evacuated, and nearly 1,500 houses were damaged or destroyed. The recent additional flooding was caused by a tropical depression that passed through the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) from the South China Sea during 17-23 September and brought with it heavy rains. The affected areas were already flooded following ongoing heavy rains since June.

On 16 September, OCHA reported that seven provinces in LPDR remained flooded after heavy rains that began in June. An estimated 50,000 people were reportedly in need of immediate food assistance during the next three months. According to the UN, as of 29 August, an estimated 119,625 people were affected by the flooding while at least 17 people had been killed between June and mid-September.

From June to August, several provinces in the Northern and Central part of Laos were flooded due to heavy continuous rainfall. The authorities reported that two tropical storms Jebi (31 July–3 August) and Mankhut (5-7 August) caused flooding in the northern provinces of Oudomxay, Xayabuly, Xiengkhoung, and Bolikhamsay, in the central provinces of Khammoune, Xieng Khuang, and Luang Prabang, and in the southern province of Vientiane.

As stated by the UN, floods have damaged 14,000 hectares of rice with important loss of livestock also reported. Multiple public buildings and infrastructure, including schools, bridges, irrigation systems, water and sanitation systems were damaged in floods areas.

After relatively normal rainfalls between early May and mid-July, heavy rains between 24-26 June caused flash floods in Bolihan District, in the central province of Bolikhamsay, affecting 5,000 people and damaging houses, food stocks, livestock and equipment.

**Health:** As of 16 September, 50,000 cases of dengue fever have been recorded across all provinces since January 2013. The outbreak is the worst in the country’s history, with cases reported in all 17 provinces according to OCHA. The number of cases this year is four times higher than in 2010 and 11 times higher than in 2012. To date, 92 deaths have been reported this year with around 70% being children <15 years. The case-fatality rate is 0.2%.

The provinces in the far northwest, centre and far south of the country are among the worst affected. The highest concentrations of cases have been recorded in the capital Vientiane (4,617 cases) and the Champasak province (3,306 cases) in the southwest as of August. WHO indicated on 12 September that even though the numbers remained above the epidemic alert level, the weekly trend has been decreasing over the last month. The epidemic was expected to worsen as the rainy season is ongoing and previous epidemics have historically peaked in August and September.

*Reviewed: 15/10/2013*

---

**LEBANON CONFLICT, INTERNAL UNREST**

**Highlights**

As of 10 October: UNHCR reported that the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon reached around 790,000 including around 98,000 awaiting registration. Refugees continue to cross into Lebanon daily. With no formal camps, refugees in Lebanon are spread across 1,200 locations.

**Political and Security Context**

**Political landscape international**

Widespread involvement of Hezbollah alongside Syrian Government troops in the offensive against the opposition-held stronghold Qusayr prompted the Free Syrian Army and Jabhat al-Nusra to separately warn that their fighters could start fighting Hezbollah inside Lebanon. On 10 July, the UN Security Council called on Hezbollah to end all involvement in the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah leader Nasrallah denied on 23 September that his group had received chemical weapons from Syria after members of the Syrian National Coalition opposition group accused President Bashar al-Assad of transferring chemical weapons to Hezbollah leader Nasrallah denied on 23 September that his group had received chemical weapons from Syria after members of the Syrian National Coalition opposition group accused President Bashar al-Assad of transferring chemical weapons to Opposition and government forces were fighting in several areas around Lebanon. In the Bekaa Valley, the Lebanese army opened fire at a group of al-Qaida linked al-Nusra Front militants trying to illegally enter Lebanon through the Bekaa town of Arsal, killing one and wounding two others.

---

**Review: 15/10/2013**
Political landscape national

Insecurity in Lebanon has grown with renewed fighting between different sectarian groups. The Syrian conflict is increasingly spilling over into Lebanon, with almost daily shelling and sporadic clashes in the north and eastern border regions.

With repeated inter-sectarian strife reported in Tripoli, fears are rising that the Syrian conflict may become a regional one between Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims. The latest fatal incident was reported 11 October. On 23 August, 47 people were killed and more than 500 wounded in blasts that exploded outside two mosques in a Sunni neighbourhood of Tripoli. While local officials tried to play down the sectarian nature of the attack, the twin blasts came as a stark reminder of the increasing spillover of the Syrian war into Lebanon along sectarian lines. To date, no group has claimed responsibility. In June, intermittent clashes between supporters of the different Syrian parties, split along different neighbourhoods in Tripoli, were reported.

On 15 August, a car bomb in Beirut’s Ruwais district, a stronghold of the Lebanese Shi’ite armed movement Hezbollah, killed 27 and wounded over 330 people. A previously unknown group, the Battalions of Aisha, said it carried out the attack because of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian war. On the same day, the Syrian opposition National Coalition warned against the emergence of a “cycle of violence” in Lebanon if Hezbollah continued to send fighters to help the Damascus regime. In July, in one of the worst incidents since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, a car bomb wounded over 50 people in a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut’s southern neighbourhood Bir Abed. A Syrian rebel group, the Special Forces 313 Brigade, claimed responsibility. The group also claimed it was behind an attack on a Hezbollah convoy in eastern Lebanon on 28 June.

Three people were killed in clashes in the town of Baalbek after armed men from a Sunni Muslim clan opened fire on a checkpoint manned by the Lebanese Shia Muslim group Hezbollah on 29 September.

On 9 July, the Lebanese Parliamentary Speaker announced that the March 8th coalition, a major bloc in the Lebanese political system, collapsed after a trial alliance between two of its major parties, the Amal Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement, ended. The expiration of the March 8th alliance is expected to give a major boost to efforts to form a new Cabinet which has been delayed several times.

On 31 May, the Lebanese Parliament unanimously voted to extend its mandate by 17 months after failing to adopt a new electoral law at a time of deep internal divisions over the war in Syria. Elections that were originally planned for June were postponed. On 1 June, President Michel Sleiman lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Council to challenge the Parliament’s decision to extend its mandate and delay elections.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Both host and refugee populations are impacted by increasing pressure on the health and education systems, housing, employment opportunities, and food prices. Tensions are rising between host communities and refugees over strained resources, particularly with regard to overwhelmed health facilities and employment. Many Lebanese families see their livelihoods eroding as wages decrease and rent prices soar, with hard-pressed Syrian refugees working for less money and sharing single-family homes with multiple families to save on rent. Real economic growth was 7% in 2010, fell to 1.8% in 2013 and is expected to be at 2.1% in 2014. In June 2013, general inflation reached almost 9% year-on-year (compared to 2% in June 2012). Food inflation eased from 5.7% in June 2012 to 3% in June 2013. Unemployment rates are expected to double to 29% in 2014.

Displacement: As of 10 October, UNHCR reported that the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon reached 789,954, including around 98,000 awaiting registration. Refugees now represent over 18% of the country’s population and continue to cross into Lebanon daily. With no formal camps, refugees are spread across 1,200 locations. Vulnerable Syrian families are settling in communal areas in Beirut (highway underpasses, green spaces between major roads, etc.). Most Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in makeshift settlements, half-finished buildings, and cramped apartment blocks, often in unhygienic conditions and with little access to food, water, and medical care.

An increasing number of evictions in some areas of Lebanon has been observed during the past weeks, due to rising tension between Syrian refugees and host communities. This is particularly noted in informal settlements. It is now extremely challenging for these refugees to find alternative accommodation, especially as winter approaches.

According to the Lebanese General Security Authority, there are currently two million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Lebanon’s population has grown by 25% in under two years, while health, education, water and sanitation systems have all exceeded their capacities. The situation also has serious security implications, with 1.2 million Lebanese in host communities severely affected by the refugee influx. According to media sources, the Lebanese government is implementing strict entry controls on Syrians attempting to enter the country at all border crossings; only Syrians with valid identification cards or passports can enter. At border crossings, they are required to officially identify whether they are refugees or workers. The measures reportedly aim at preventing extremist and anti-Lebanese groups from entering the country.

On 23 July, Lebanese Social Affairs Minister first stated that special teams would start shutting down unlicensed Syrian-run businesses.

Access: Security in Tripoli and in northern and eastern border villages remains volatile with rockets and shelling hitting a number of towns, impeding humanitarian access, and restricting activities, and the availability of services.

The lack of funding continues to hamper humanitarian response in Lebanon. On 7 June, a Revised Regional Response plan was launched, requesting $1.2 billion for humanitarian operations in Lebanon. The Lebanese Government has requested an additional $500 million to provide aid to Syrian refugees and host communities.

According to the UN, the highly fragile situation in Lebanon, with intensified hostility in the north, South and Bekaa, is affecting programme delivery and staff movement. Access to unregistered Syrians detained in Lebanon remains challenging.

Health and Nutrition: UNHCR reported in July that physical access to health care is challenging for Syrian refugees living in remote locations. Outstretched available resources, short working hours, and non-availability of trained health personnel limit the
adequate provision of care for the displaced who suffer from trauma, substandard living conditions, and depletion of savings and assets. Common needs include reproductive health care, family planning, child health care, treatment for acute illnesses, chronic disease, and mental health.

Updated: 15/10/2013

PHILIPPINES CONFLICT, FLOODS, TYPHOON

**Highlights**

**15 October:** A 7.2 magnitude earthquake hit southern Philippines, southeast of Manila near the town of Carmen in Bohol province, while no tsunami alert was issued to date. Several aftershocks have been recorded. The initial quake stuck at an estimated depth of 35 km around Bohol Island, to the north of Mindanao Island that had been affected by large-scale violence between government troops and insurgents in September. To date, at least 67 people were killed in the tremor while over a hundred were injured across the two provinces. According to first estimates, over 440,000 people have been affected across the two provinces and Siquijor.

**11 October:** Typhoon Nari (category 2) struck central Philippines, North of Manila, bringing further rains. To date, no information on numbers of affected and damages is available.

**8 October:** The floods that hit the Zamboanga peninsula between 4 and 8 October resulted in additional displacement in an area where thousands of people had already been displaced by fighting in the area in September. According to OCHA, at least 1,000 additional people were forced to move inside evacuation centres in the area. The severe flooding affected people who were already displaced by the violence that hit the area in September, notably the largest evacuation centre hosting over 18,000 people. As of 8 October, an estimated 170,000 people were affected in Zamboanga city and Basilan province.

**Political and Security Context**

As of 7 October, as reported by OCHA, fighting between a faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MLF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) around Zamboanga City in Mindanao had ended, although available information remains scarce with no final numbers of killed available. It is also unclear if some rebels are still hiding in the area while clearing operations continue in areas where unexploded ordinance (UXOs) remain.

On 27 September, according to the authorities, the AFP captured several dozen rebels, with about 300 having been captured overall to date and reportedly rescued the final civilian hostages held by the Muslim insurgents. According to reports, about 200 people, including 166 rebels, were killed and almost 140,000 people displaced during the three weeks of fighting in Mindanao. These numbers should be however treated with caution while OCHA reported that an estimated 140 people had been killed as of 30 September. Sporadic gun fighting was still reportedly ongoing in Zamboanga as of 27 September.

On 23 September, Muslim rebels of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) clashed with the AFP and took hostages in a fresh outbreak of violence in the central part of the southern Mindanao Island. During the clashes, at least four fighters on each side were killed as the rebels reportedly took 15 hostages who were later released. According to the authorities, fighters of the BIFF retreated as the AFP received reinforcements. The attack came as the confrontation between the AFP and another Islamic insurgent group elsewhere in Mindanao entered its third week. The BIFF claimed that the incidents were not related.

On 9 September, fighting broke out in coastal villages at the outskirts of Zamboanga City, in the western part of the Mindanao Island, between a splinter group of the MNLF and AFP. The fighting between the rebel group that took over 200 people hostage and the AFP resulted in weeks of street fighting in the vicinity of Zamboanga City. Heavy fighting has left entire neighbourhoods razed to the ground. As reported by Human Rights Watch on 19 September, Philippines security forces and Muslim rebels have committed serious abuses during fighting in Zamboanga.

The last attacks in Mindanao are largely seen as an attempt to sabotage talks to end decades of conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and a breakaway group of the original MNLF that has conducted armed attacks in the area over the past decades, and the government.

Mindanao Island has been plagued by a decade old rebellion by Muslim fighters that has left thousands dead. The original MNLF fought a 25-year guerrilla war for independence, until the signature of a peace treaty in 1996 granted it limited self-rule in the southern Muslim area. The MILF officially signed an historic peace deal with authorities in October 2012 and has been conducting final negotiations with the Government over the past year. It is expected to take over an expanded autonomous Muslim region in the south by 2016. These talks resumed in August amid deadly attacks by the splinter guerrilla group that left 15 dead in Mindanao. In July, a compromise concerning the sharing of local revenues with the creation of a Muslim self-rule area in the Mindanao region that is expected to be led by the MILF was reached. The country’s President Aquino said the ongoing talks aim to end decades of rebellion that had claimed 150,000 lives in the country’s Muslim southern regions.

On 5 August, at least six people were killed and 29 injured in a powerful bomb blast in the centre of the city of Cotabato in Mindanao Island. It was the second bombing in Mindanao in ten days after a bomb attack in Cagayan de Oro City, killing six and wounding dozens. To date, no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks. The authorities have announced increased security measures in the area. As authorities enter the last stages of negotiating an agreement with the main rebel group, officials reportedly blamed the attack on breakaway insurgent groups or possibly on an alleged new al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militant group called the Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao-Black Flag.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement:** The floods that hit the Zamboanga peninsula between 4 and 8 October resulted in additional displacement in an area where thousands of people had already been displaced by fighting in the area in September. According to OCHA, at least 1,000 people were killed as the rebels reportedly took 15 hostages who were later released. According to the authorities, fighters of the BIFF retreated as the AFP received reinforcements. The attack came as the confrontation between the AFP and another Islamic insurgent group elsewhere in Mindanao entered its third week. The BIFF claimed that the incidents were not related.

On 9 September, fighting broke out in coastal villages at the outskirts of Zamboanga City, in the western part of the Mindanao Island, between a splinter group of the MNLF and AFP. The fighting between the rebel group that took over 200 people hostage and the AFP resulted in weeks of street fighting in the vicinity of Zamboanga City. Heavy fighting has left entire neighbourhoods razed to the ground. As reported by Human Rights Watch on 19 September, Philippines security forces and Muslim rebels have committed serious abuses during fighting in Zamboanga.

The last attacks in Mindanao are largely seen as an attempt to sabotage talks to end decades of conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and a breakaway group of the original MNLF that has conducted armed attacks in the area over the past decades, and the government.

Mindanao Island has been plagued by a decade old rebellion by Muslim fighters that has left thousands dead. The original MNLF fought a 25-year guerrilla war for independence, until the signature of a peace treaty in 1996 granted it limited self-rule in the southern Muslim area. The MILF officially signed an historic peace deal with authorities in October 2012 and has been conducting final negotiations with the Government over the past year. It is expected to take over an expanded autonomous Muslim region in the south by 2016. These talks resumed in August amid deadly attacks by the splinter guerrilla group that left 15 dead in Mindanao. In July, a compromise concerning the sharing of local revenues with the creation of a Muslim self-rule area in the Mindanao region that is expected to be led by the MILF was reached. The country’s President Aquino said the ongoing talks aim to end decades of rebellion that had claimed 150,000 lives in the country’s Muslim southern regions.

On 5 August, at least six people were killed and 29 injured in a powerful bomb blast in the centre of the city of Cotabato in Mindanao Island. It was the second bombing in Mindanao in ten days after a bomb attack in Cagayan de Oro City, killing six and wounding dozens. To date, no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks. The authorities have announced increased security measures in the area. As authorities enter the last stages of negotiating an agreement with the main rebel group, officials reportedly blamed the attack on breakaway insurgent groups or possibly on an alleged new al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militant group called the Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao-Black Flag.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement:** The floods that hit the Zamboanga peninsula between 4 and 8 October resulted in additional displacement in an area where thousands of people had already been displaced by fighting in the area in September. According to OCHA, at least 1,000 people were killed as the rebels reportedly took 15 hostages who were later released. According to the authorities, fighters of the BIFF retreated as the AFP received reinforcements. The attack came as the confrontation between the AFP and another Islamic insurgent group elsewhere in Mindanao entered its third week. The BIFF claimed that the incidents were not related.

On 9 September, fighting broke out in coastal villages at the outskirts of Zamboanga City, in the western part of the Mindanao Island, between a splinter group of the MNLF and AFP. The fighting between the rebel group that took over 200 people hostage and the AFP resulted in weeks of street fighting in the vicinity of Zamboanga City. Heavy fighting has left entire neighbourhoods razed to the ground. As reported by Human Rights Watch on 19 September, Philippines security forces and Muslim rebels have committed serious abuses during fighting in Zamboanga.

The last attacks in Mindanao are largely seen as an attempt to sabotage talks to end decades of conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and a breakaway group of the original MNLF that has conducted armed attacks in the area over the past decades, and the government.

Mindanao Island has been plagued by a decade old rebellion by Muslim fighters that has left thousands dead. The original MNLF fought a 25-year guerrilla war for independence, until the signature of a peace treaty in 1996 granted it limited self-rule in the southern Muslim area. The MILF officially signed an historic peace deal with authorities in October 2012 and has been conducting final negotiations with the Government over the past year. It is expected to take over an expanded autonomous Muslim region in the south by 2016. These talks resumed in August amid deadly attacks by the splinter guerrilla group that left 15 dead in Mindanao. In July, a compromise concerning the sharing of local revenues with the creation of a Muslim self-rule area in the Mindanao region that is expected to be led by the MILF was reached. The country’s President Aquino said the ongoing talks aim to end decades of rebellion that had claimed 150,000 lives in the country’s Muslim southern regions.

On 5 August, at least six people were killed and 29 injured in a powerful bomb blast in the centre of the city of Cotabato in Mindanao Island. It was the second bombing in Mindanao in ten days after a bomb attack in Cagayan de Oro City, killing six and wounding dozens. To date, no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks. The authorities have announced increased security measures in the area. As authorities enter the last stages of negotiating an agreement with the main rebel group, officials reportedly blamed the attack on breakaway insurgent groups or possibly on an alleged new al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militant group called the Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao-Black Flag.
additional people were forced to move inside evacuation centres in the area.

As of 24 September, IOM reported that almost 140,000 people have been displaced by fighting between the army and Muslim MNLF rebels in and near Zamboanga City; over 10,000 houses have reportedly been destroyed. As of 8 October, OCHA reported that in Zamboanga and Basilan provinces, almost 120,000 people are still displaced of which 52% are living inside evacuation centres despite the end of hostilities. The situation of IDPs remains grim as seasonal flooding has reportedly knocked down temporary shelters worsening their living conditions. The authorities have also expressed concerns over child protection and health in the camps.

On 19 September, it had been reported that over 129,000 people have been displaced by recent fighting in Mindanao with almost 115,000 people remaining in 57 evacuations centres near Zamboanga City. Over 2,000 remain in spontaneous displacement sites. IDPs are in need of water containers, hygiene kits, mats, blankets, and medicines. As of 16 September, some civilians still reportedly remained trapped in the affected coastal villages with some beginning to report shortage of food and essential household goods. To date, information on needs remains limited.

OCHA reported as of 14 September that an estimated 235,000 people are affected by the ongoing violence.

Disaster: On 15 October, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake hit southern Philippines, southeast of Manila near the town of Carmen in Bohol province, while no tsunami alert was issued to date. Several aftershocks have been recorded. The initial quake stuck at an estimated depth of 35 km around Bohol Island, to the north of Mindanao Island that had been affected by large-scale violence between government troops and insurgents in September.

Although limited information is available to date, the authorities reported that public and private buildings in Bohol and nearby Cebu provinces have been damaged. To date, at least 67 people were killed in the tremor while over a hundred were injured across the two provinces. According to first estimates, over 440,000 people have across the two provinces and Siargao.

On 11 October, Typhoon Nari (category 2) struck central Philippines, North of Manila, bringing further rains. To date, no information on numbers of affected and damages is available.

As reported by OCHA, torrential rains caused by the Southwest Monsoon and the effects of Typhoon Danas, locally known as Ramil, between 4 and 8 October caused flooding and landslides across the Zamboanga peninsula including Zamboanga city and the municipalities of Siocon and Sirawa in Zamboanga del Norte province and Tungawan municipality in Zamboanga Sibugay province. The severe flooding affected people who were already displaced by the violence that hit the area in September, notably the largest evacuation centre hosting over 18,000 people. As of 8 October, an estimated 170,000 people were affected in Zamboanga city and Basilan province.

Since 23 September, monsoon rains worsened by Typhoon Usagi, locally known as Odette, pounded the country. The most severely affected area was the town of Subic, about 80 kilometres northwest of Manila. Typhoon Usagi, reportedly the most powerful storm to hit the country this year, has moved north toward China, but is still continuing to exacerbate monsoon rains. According to latest reports, some of the affected areas experienced further heavy rains as tropical depression “Paolo” hit the area on 27 September.

As of 27 September, OCHA reported that Typhoon Usagi and the monsoon rains have displaced over 100,000 people and left 30 dead since 23 September. Nearly 600,000 people across six provinces – Bataan, Zambales, Rizal, Batangas, Cavite, Occidental Mindoro – have been affected by the heavy rains, and more than 123,000 remain displaced as of 27 September, in an area that has been hit by several severe disasters over the past weeks. 86,186 displaced people are staying with family and friends, while 20,753 are in 103 evacuation centres.

On 30 August, having formed just east of the Philippines, tropical storm Kong-Rey, locally known as Nando, moved north along the coast of China. In the Philippines, nearly 18,000 people were affected. One person was killed and one person injured, according to the authorities.

From 18 August, four days of heavy rains, triggered by the passage of the Tropical Strom Trami, locally known as Maring, and ensuing extensive floods, have affected Philippine’s Luzon Island, hitting the National Capital, where Metropolitan Manila is located, Cordillera Administrative, Ilocos, Central Luzon, CALABARZON, and MIMAROPA regions. As of early September, the floods have affected over 3.4 million people across 247 municipalities. The rains calmed on 21 August. Some affected provinces were already flooded when Typhoon Utor, locally known as Labuyo, crossed the region on 12 August.

According to OCHA, as floodwaters began to subside, flooding persisted particularly in the low-lying areas in Pampanga, Bulacan, Laguna and Rizal provinces surrounding Metro Manila, waist-deep in some locations. People in these areas may face prolonged displacement and require extended humanitarian aid. The state of calamity remained in effect at the local level in 37 areas: five provinces, 10 cities, 15 municipalities and seven barangays (villages).

On 25 August, the number of people evacuated peaked at over 688,000 people, but has since decreased to 230,000. As of 28 August, an estimated 47,800 people were in 251 evacuation centres, and 182,300 people were staying with relatives and friends. The floods in late August killed 25 people and injured 30 more while three remained missing as of 28 August. About 35% of all displaced people are in Metro Manila.

OCHA observes that the evacuees still need food, drinking water, sleeping kits, blankets, cooking utensils, sanitation items, and medicine. Suspected cases of measles and leptospirosis have been reported and are under investigation, according to the Health Cluster.

According to the authorities, losses from Typhoon Utor and the monsoon floods had a minimal impact on the country’s economic growth, and it will be possible to recover from agricultural losses.

On 11 August, Typhoon (category 4) Utor, locally known as Labuyo, struck the Philippines in the mountains areas north of Luzon at about 19:00 GMT. As of 16 August, the typhoon
affected over 383,000 people in 87 municipalities and five cities in 16 provinces across Ilocos, Cagayan Valley, Central Luzon, Bicol regions and the Cordillera Administrative Region according to the authorities. Over 120,000 people were displaced to host communities. According to authorities, most IDPs returned home the following week. Eight people were killed and another four reportedly missing. Information on damage remains limited, but at least 2,000 houses were totally or partially damaged, with road blocks, power and communications disruptions also reported.

The Philippines frequently experiences natural disasters, particularly tropical storms and cyclones. As of 17 May, 6.2 million people were still affected by Bopha, which struck the country on 4 December 2012 causing extensive damage across Mindanao. 921,649 people are displaced outside evacuation centres and a further 11,767 reside in evacuation centres; 158,769 houses were totally or partially damaged.

Health: As by local health authorities, an epidemic caused by water contaminated with rat urine has hit a flood-ravaged region in the north of the country. To date, six people were reportedly killed by the ongoing epidemic while 132 people have reportedly been affected by leptospirosis in and around the northern city of Olongapo.

According to the Department of Health, 1,528 dengue cases were reported in the first quarter of 2013 in Soccsksargen region, of whom 669 (41% of cases) are children <10. In Korondal City, South Cotabato province, the municipal government declared a state of calamity on 27 June after a dengue outbreak was declared in the town. According to authorities, 239 dengue cases have been recorded as of 8 June, more than the 159 cases recorded in 2012. Dengue has also surged in central Philippines, particularly in the province of Iloilo, south of Manila, where the number of people affected is already 71% higher than the number recorded for the same period in 2012.

Updated: 15/10/2013

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA FLOODS, FOOD INSECURITY

Highlights

No new development this week. Last update was on: 23/09/2013.

No current data on child mortality, food security, food price levels, and the general magnitude of humanitarian needs is available. Therefore, DPRK is not included in the Global Overview prioritisation.

Political and Security Context

On 17 September, UN human rights investigators released a report that documented a pattern of human rights abuses indicating inmates in North Korea’s prison camps suffering from starvation, torture, and other unspeakable atrocities. The inquiry, based on testimonies from North Korean exiles, came after pressure from Japan, South Korea, and Western powers to investigate and begin building a case for possible criminal prosecution. The report was rejected by Pyongyang and may strain relations between the North Korean regime and the international community that have only lately begun to improve.

On 5 September, North Korea agreed to restore a cross-border military hotline with South Korea, in a sign of easing tensions between the rival states. The line had been shut down in early spring parallel to the soaring of relations between the two neighbours.

On 14 August, North and South Korea agreed to reopen the joint industrial park in Kaesong after a series of talks concerning this rare bilateral economic cooperation. The two countries announced on 10 September that the facilities would open before the month’s end. In April, Pyongyang pulled its 53,000 workers out of the park at the height of tensions with Seoul and Washington over its nuclear military programme. On 7 August, Pyongyang announced that it was ready to reopen the joint industrial zone. The statement came only an hour after Seoul, exasperated by the North’s lack of responsiveness, signalled its willingness to let the facility close definitively. Prior to closing, Kaesong was a rare source of hard currency for North Korea.

The reopening of Kaesong appears to be a step toward improving Pyongyang’s relations with the West. After the soaring of the relations between Pyongyang and the West in early spring, relations with Seoul improved after an unexpected reversal on 6 June from Pyongyang, which proposed opening a dialogue. On 9 June, North and South Korean officials held their first talks in years in a positive end to months of military tension.

On 27 June during a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his South Korean counterpart Park Geun-hye in Beijing, Chinese authorities agreed to push for new talks between the two Koreas and appeared to favour a denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Disaster: In mid-July, heavy seasonal rain resulted in flooding in many parts of DPRK. Particularly affected are the provinces of North and South Pyongan. According to the Red Cross, Anju City, in South Pyongan province, was 80% flooded after the Chongchon River caused embankments to break on the morning of 21 July.

Noted by OCHA on 23 August, floods in DPRK have affected an estimated 800,000 people and left almost 49,000 homeless. Farmland has been inundated with at least 10,000 hectares affected, and 1,000 hectares of crops destroyed. Damage to agricultural land is extensive with up to 40% of the land in Pakchon county, including 80% of paddy, affected. An assessment conducted by the Health Cluster on 6 August documented damage to roads, bridges, houses, and public buildings, limiting the access of affected persons to basic health care and services. An increase in the number of diarrhoeal diseases was reported due to extensive damage to the water system. An estimated 678,000 people need basic health care, essential drugs, and hospital supplies for life-saving interventions.

On 9 August, authorities reported that the floods affected 73 counties and caused severe damage in 22 counties. Over 11,000 buildings were reportedly damaged. The number of affected was given at 788,000 people, including 56,000 children <5 and 14,800 pregnant women. In early August, authorities estimated the death toll at 33 dead with 18 people still missing. An estimated 59,000 people were displaced. According to WFP, IDPs are suffering from a lack of access to safe drinking water. This comes after flooding and a
subsequent typhoon in July and August 2012, which affected roughly 700,000 people, damaging health facilities and reducing access to primary and secondary health care.

Access: Humanitarian access to the country is limited. In early June, WFP approved a new two-year operation for DPRK starting on 1 July and targeting 2.4 million people, almost all children and pregnant and nursing women, with about 207,000 MT of food assistance.

Food Security: Little up-to-date information is available on the food security situation in DPRK. According to an August OCHA report, an estimated 16 million people, of a total population of 24.6 million, are chronically food insecure and an estimated 2.4 million people need food assistance. OCHA further reports that although the humanitarian situation has improved slightly over the last year, the structural causes of vulnerability persist and external assistance is needed, notably targeting the most affected northeastern provinces.

Despite the UN reporting that the main 2012 harvest and 2013 early season crops will see a 10% increase compared to a year earlier, which allegedly should result in the smallest cereal deficit since at least the early 2000s, the food security situation remains grim. According to OCHA, the lack of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertiliser and plastic sheets) remains the main challenge for food production.

Health and Nutrition: Despite a slight improvement, malnutrition rates continue to be alarming in DPRK. According to the 2012 National Nutrition Survey quoted in OCHA’s August 2013 report, the chronic malnutrition (stunting) rate among children <5 is 27.9% while 4% remain acutely malnourished (wasting). Chronic under-nutrition is a public health problem and a major underlying cause of maternal and child mortality.

Updated: 15/10/2013

THAILAND FLOODS

15 October: Tropical Cyclone Nari is about to hit Thailand and is expected to impact the same areas that have already been affected by flooding, OCHA reported. The Cyclone is expected to hit the provinces of Ubon Ratchathani and Nakhon Phanom and to affect up to 1.9 million and 650,000 people in the two provinces respectively.

11-14 October: Heavier-than-usual monsoon rains have resulted in floods in large parts of the country. To date, 2 million people living in 30 of Thailand’s 77 provinces have been affected by the floods since 17 September, and 39 people have reportedly been killed in this year’s flooding, according to the Government of Thailand. Nevertheless, on 14 October, the Government of Thailand indicated that the flood situation in many provinces had started to improve.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Disaster: On 15 October, Tropical Cyclone Nari is about to hit Thailand and is expected to impact the same areas that have already been affected by flooding, OCHA reported. The Cyclone is expected to hit the provinces of Ubon Ratchathani and Nakhon Phanom and to affect up to 1.9 million and 650,000 people in the two provinces respectively.

Over the past weeks, the heavier-than-usual monsoon season in Thailand has resulted in floods and heavy rains in large parts of the country. As of 11 October, 2 million people have been affected by the floods since 17 September, and 39 people have reportedly been killed in this year’s flooding, according to the Government of Thailand. Nevertheless, on 14 October, the Government of Thailand indicated that the flood situation in many provinces had started to improve.
People living in 30 of Thailand's 77 provinces are affected by this year’s floods. Provinces in the northeast and central plains are the worst hit. Heavy rains over several consecutive days caused the Moon river to overflow, leading to extensive flooding of communities. The flooding in the lower northeastern province of Nakhon Ratchasima is reportedly severe, with 20 of 32 districts in the province having been declared flood-disaster zones, including Muang, Dam Khun Tod, Non Thai, Phi Mai, Keng Sanam Nang, Pak Chong, Bua Yai, Kong, among others. In northeastern Si Sa Ket province, more than 350,000 people in 20 districts have reportedly suffered from the flooding situation. The rains have also caused Chao Phraya and Pasak rivers to overflow, causing flooding in several districts, according to ECHO.

Previously, on 30 September, the Government declared that the situation in five out of the 30 affected provinces had started to improve on 30 September. The Royal Irrigation Department earlier this week maintained that despite the rising water levels, the major dams have more than 30% of their capacity left, and can still accommodate more than 22.8 billion cubic meters of water during this rainy season.

This year's floods have not reached the levels of the devastating floods in 2011, which killed more than 800 people, affected more than 1.5 million people and caused massive disruption to the industry, cutting economic growth that year to just 0.1 percent. On September 26, Thai authorities offered assurances that floodwaters would not reach central industrial areas and Bangkok as in 2011.

Affected people in some hard hit areas are staying in school buildings, canteens and gymnasiums, according to the NGO Plan UK. Reported needs for the affected population are drinking water, food and medicine. The Public Health Ministry has expressed its concerns over the health of flood-affected residents, as the flood could bring in waterborne diseases, particularly Dengue Fever.

Access: In Prachinburi, the municipality of Kabin Buri is flooded, which rendered roads impassable to small vehicles. Thailand's Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation issued a warning about landslides, which are likely to hamper access to and by affected populations.

Updated: 15/10/2013

VIETNAM FLOODS

Disaster: On 15 October, as reported by local sources, central Vietnam was hit by Typhoon Nari that hit the country’s coast with wind speeds of up to 102 km/h. So far, the death toll stands at five people, and Nari is expected to weaken into a Tropical Depression by the end of 15 October.

According to local authorities, and although limited information is available to date, over 122,000 people had been moved to safe ground in several provinces, including people from Quang Nam and Danang city, before the Typhoon made landfall.

On 30 September, the powerful Tropical Cyclone Wutip made landfall on Vietnam's central coast after three Chinese fishing boats sank in the South China Sea. According to OCHA, as of 1 October, over 106,000 in four provinces were evacuated to shelters in vulnerable areas along the central coastline as schools were closed and boats ordered ashore in advance of Wutip. Authorities reported that heavy rains were ongoing to fall in several central provinces and flooding and landslides could strike the region in early October. To date, at least three people were killed and another 25 injured. Assessments in the affected areas are currently ongoing.

As reported by the Red Cross, over 150,000 houses were damaged or collapsed as the typhoon passed, leaving an estimated 300,000 people sheltered by friends and neighbours as of 30 September.

Every year, Vietnam is hit by an average of eight to ten tropical storms. Since August, ongoing floods exacerbated by the monsoon rains have killed at least 24 people across the country.

Updated: 15/10/2013

HAITI FLOODS, EPIDEMIC, HURRICANE

Highlights

11 October: As of early October, 1.5 million people still face severe food insecurity in Haiti and 5.2 million suffer from moderate food insecurity.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

Disaster: On 15 October, as reported by local sources, central Vietnam was hit by Typhoon Nari that hit the country’s coast with wind speeds of up to 102 km/h. So far, the death toll stands at five people, and Nari is expected to weaken into a Tropical Depression by the end of 15 October. According to local authorities, and although limited information is available to date, over 122,000 people had been moved to safe ground in several provinces, including people from Quang Nam and Danang city, before the Typhoon made landfall.
**Political and Security Context**

Riot police in Haiti broke up an anti-government demonstration attended by thousands of people to mark the anniversary of the 1991 ousting of the former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide on 1 October. A small group of protesters responded by setting ablaze barricades that blocked a major thoroughfare through the heart of downtown Port-au-Prince. Haiti was to have held legislative and local elections two years ago, but infighting among different branches of the government has delayed the vote. The current head of state Martelly has said elections will be held this year. However, it seems unlikely to happen before the end of 2013.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

**Displacement:** As of 5 July, nearly 3½ years after the earthquake, an estimated 279,000 people remained displaced in Haiti according to IOM, 41,000 fewer than reported in late May. In the second quarter of 2013, the highest decrease in IDP population since April 2012 was recorded. 33 sites closed and over 41,000 people were relocated, twice as many as from January to March 2013. The Shelter and Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster expects the number of IDPs to further reduce to 242,000 people in September and to 211,000 by December 2013.

Currently, 352 IDP sites and camp-like settlements host the remaining IDPs. The situation in these sites remains problematic with 75,000 IDPs in 105 sites possibly facing illegal forced eviction by private land owners in the coming months. Camp-settlements are vulnerable to floods and landslides, putting the IDP population at risk in the upcoming hurricane season.

Some 300,000 people could be affected by last week’s ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic that children of undocumented migrants, even if born in the Dominican Republic and registered as Dominicans since 1929, are not eligible for Dominican citizenship as their parents were considered seasonal workers “in transit.” Many are the descendants of Haitians who crossed the border to escape political violence and work in the country’s sugarcane fields and then settled there. If this sentence is applied, it means up to 300,000 people could become effectively stateless. Without documents, they would be unable to access health and education services, get married, or own property.

Recent surveys showed that 119 of Haiti’s 140 municipalities have been severely affected by drought, the tropical storm Isaac and/or hurricane Sandy in 2012, displacing at least 58,000 people.

**Disaster:** In early May, FEWSNET reported that seasonal rainfall in the Nippes, Sud, and Grand’Anse departments of southern Haiti was less than 50% below average. Seasonal rainfall in the Ouest and Sud-Est departments has also been below-average. The largest seasonal deficits occurred across the southwestern peninsula in the Nippes, Sud, and Grand’Anse departments. An increase in rain during the first week of August helped relieve the dryness over parts of Haiti. However, moderate seasonal precipitation deficits remain in many areas in northwestern and southern Haiti. Continued below average rainfall could further increase moisture deficits and negatively impact crops.

**Food Security and Malnutrition:**

In early October, OCHA reported that 1.5 million people across Haiti were still severely food insecure and risked a nutritional crisis; another 5.2 million people face moderate food insecurity. These 6.7 million people struggle to meet their own food needs on a regular basis according to WFP. 44 of 140 municipalities are affected, with over half the population facing high food insecurity. An estimated 800,000 people suffering from severe food insecurity had reportedly not received any emergency assistance and have begun implementing negative coping mechanisms.

The June IPC round in Haiti indicated that most departments faced stressed food security conditions (IPC phase 2). Some households in these areas, such as the agro-pastoral areas of North, Artibonite and Central Highlands, were in crisis food security conditions (IPC phase 3).

The poor and very poor in some municipalities in the Sud-Est, Ouest, and Nord-Est departments face crisis levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3) and have switched to irreversible coping strategies. Poor seed availability due to increasing prices, which are 20-30% higher than the 5-year average, is also threatening this year’s crop yields.

The harvest of the 2013 main cereal season was completed in September. Despite below average precipitation during the sowing period, the absence of tropical storms and flooding has resulted in good maize yields. Preliminary official estimates point to an increase of 30% in production from 2012’s sharply reduced levels. Planting of the secondary season departments face crisis levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3) and have switched to irreversible coping strategies. Poor seed availability due to increasing prices, which are 20-30% higher than the 5-year average, is also threatening this year’s crop yields.

The June IPC round in Haiti indicated that most departments faced stressed food security conditions (IPC phase 2). Some households in these areas, such as the agro-pastoral areas of North, Artibonite and Central Highlands, were in crisis food security conditions (IPC phase 3).

The poor and very poor in some municipalities in the Sud-Est, Ouest, and Nord-Est departments face crisis levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3) and have switched to irreversible coping strategies. Poor seed availability due to increasing prices, which are 20-30% higher than the 5-year average, is also threatening this year’s crop yields.

The harvest of the 2013 main cereal season was completed in September. Despite below average precipitation during the sowing period, the absence of tropical storms and flooding has resulted in good maize yields. Preliminary official estimates point to an increase of 30% in production from 2012’s sharply reduced levels. Planting of the secondary season departments face crisis levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3) and have switched to irreversible coping strategies. Poor seed availability due to increasing prices, which are 20-30% higher than the 5-year average, is also threatening this year’s crop yields.

The June IPC round in Haiti indicated that most departments faced stressed food security conditions (IPC phase 2). Some households in these areas, such as the agro-pastoral areas of North, Artibonite and Central Highlands, were in crisis food security conditions (IPC phase 3).

The poor and very poor in some municipalities in the Sud-Est, Ouest, and Nord-Est departments face crisis levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3) and have switched to irreversible coping strategies. Poor seed availability due to increasing prices, which are 20-30% higher than the 5-year average, is also threatening this year’s crop yields.

The June IPC round in Haiti indicated that most departments faced stressed food security conditions (IPC phase 2). Some households in these areas, such as the agro-pastoral areas of North, Artibonite and Central Highlands, were in crisis food security conditions (IPC phase 3).

The poor and very poor in some municipalities in the Sud-Est, Ouest, and Nord-Est departments face crisis levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3) and have switched to irreversible coping strategies. Poor seed availability due to increasing prices, which are 20-30% higher than the 5-year average, is also threatening this year’s crop yields.
In Haiti, since the beginning of the epidemic in October 2010, the total number of cholera cases reached 678,840 cases, of which 377,426 were hospitalized (55.5%) and 8,289 people died. Some 60,000 new cholera cases are expected until the end of the year with the caseload already standing at more than 40,000 people affected. Funding for the cholera response is covered by the least funded component in the Humanitarian Action Plan with only 23% of funding requirements for the health sector met as of October. Contamination of rivers, unhygienic conditions, and inadequate sanitation remain the principal causes explaining the spread of the disease.

This week, human rights lawyers reported that they plan to seek compensation for Haitian victims of a cholera epidemic they blame on U.N. peacekeepers. The decision to file suit in New York comes after the United Nations said earlier this year that it would not pay hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation claimed by cholera victims in impoverished Haiti.

An estimated 73,000 children <5 suffer from acute malnutrition, down from 82,000 as previously reported, including 18,000 with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM). Rural children are especially affected.

**Disaster:** On 28 August, the Government reported that heavy snowfall and frost have affected the six departments of Cochabamba, Potosi, Oruro, La Paz, Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca. Authorities reported that around 53,500 people have been affected. Some 1,270 hectares of crops were damaged and 2,830 heads of cattle killed. Livestock is the only livelihood for most affected families in these areas.

Meanwhile, five of the nine departments are affected by some type of water deficit: Tarija, Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, Beni and Cochabamba. In March, several southern departments were severely affected by damaging levels of torrential rain and floods, especially in Chuquisaca, Potosi, Tarija and Cochabamba. Overall, the floods impacted 145,000 people in nearly 25% of Bolivia’s municipalities. In Cochabamba alone, 40,000 people were affected between 18-25 March.

On 19 June, the Government issued a National Emergency Decree due to drought in the Departments of Tarija, Chuquisaca, El Chaco, Santa Cruz, and southern Cochabamba. As of 7 October, an estimated 306,410 people are affected by drought and 86,450 hectares of crops have sustained damage.

The department of Tarija is the worst hit with 43,724 hectares of crops estimated to have been lost. Santa Cruz recorded the highest number of affected cattle with 29,357 dead. In Cochabamba, 24,805 hectares in 594 communities reported damage during the first half of 2013. The most serious damage was caused by flooding (51%), drought (33%), and other lower-impact weather events.

**Food Security and Malnutrition:** FAO reported that the 2013 aggregate cereal production is forecast to decrease by 11% compared to the previous year. The recently harvested 2012-13 main season maize crop was severely affected by drought during the vegetative period.

This has significantly impacted price of staple foods: the seasonally adjusted price increases for rice and maize stood at 39% and 55% compared to September 2012. After declining in the previous months, the price of wheat flour, which is mostly imported, rose sharply in the first half of June, increasing by 19% and 36% in the major cities of La Paz and Santa Cruz respectively, and remaining significantly higher than a year ago.

According to the Ministry of Rural Lands and Development, at least 15,000 hectares of crops were damaged by the torrential March rains in the south of the country, but the Ministry has discounted the possibility of food security risks. However, according to WFP, at least 25,000 people needed food assistance in March. Subsistence farmers who normally cultivate crops at the riversides were the most affected. The floods hit at the end of the lean season, as farmers were about to harvest their crops and food reserves were at the lowest. Families that traditionally store their harvested potatoes and onions in the fields also lost reserves.

**Humanitarian Context and Needs**

- **Disaster:**
  - On 28 August, the Government reported that heavy snowfall and frost have affected the six departments of Cochabamba, Potosi, Oruro, La Paz, Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca. Authorities reported that around 53,500 people have been affected. Some 1,270 hectares of crops were damaged and 2,830 heads of cattle killed. Livestock is the only livelihood for most affected families in these areas.
  - Meanwhile, five of the nine departments are affected by some type of water deficit: Tarija, Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, Beni and Cochabamba. In March, several southern departments were severely affected by damaging levels of torrential rain and floods, especially in Chuquisaca, Potosi, Tarija and Cochabamba. Overall, the floods impacted 145,000 people in nearly 25% of Bolivia’s municipalities. In Cochabamba alone, 40,000 people were affected between 18-25 March.

**Political and Security Context**

More than 60 people were injured and 29 killed in fighting on 23 August between inmates at the maximum security area of Palmasola jail in the city of Santa Cruz. Overcrowding is a major challenge for Bolivia’s prison system. Already running at almost double capacity, 2011 saw a 20% rise in the number of inmates, presenting a fertile breeding ground for criminal gangs. Budget constraints and overcrowding also affect the way prisons are run in the country; with funding for guards tight, the insides of Bolivian prison facilities are often effectively run by the inmates themselves.

**Highlights**

- **Disaster:**
  - On 28 August, the Government reported that heavy snowfall and frost have affected the six departments of Cochabamba, Potosi, Oruro, La Paz, Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca. Authorities reported that around 53,500 people have been affected. Some 1,270 hectares of crops were damaged and 2,830 heads of cattle killed. Livestock is the only livelihood for most affected families in these areas.
  - Meanwhile, five of the nine departments are affected by some type of water deficit: Tarija, Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, Beni and Cochabamba. In March, several southern departments were severely affected by damaging levels of torrential rain and floods, especially in Chuquisaca, Potosi, Tarija and Cochabamba. Overall, the floods impacted 145,000 people in nearly 25% of Bolivia’s municipalities. In Cochabamba alone, 40,000 people were affected between 18-25 March.

**FLOODS**

- **As of 7 October,** an estimated 306,410 people are affected by drought in 66 municipalities and 86,450 hectares of crops have sustained damage.

- **Political and Security Context**
  - More than 60 people were injured and 29 killed in fighting on 23 August between inmates at the maximum security area of Palmasola jail in the city of Santa Cruz. Overcrowding is a major challenge for Bolivia’s prison system. Already running at almost double capacity, 2011 saw a 20% rise in the number of inmates, presenting a fertile breeding ground for criminal gangs. Budget constraints and overcrowding also affect the way prisons are run in the country; with funding for guards tight, the insides of Bolivian prison facilities are often effectively run by the inmates themselves.

**Updated: 15/10/2013**
COLOMBIA INTERNAL UNREST, DISPLACEMENT

Highlights

13 October: The Colombian government and the FARC rebels ended a 15th round of peace negotiations trading accusation over responsibility for the slow pace of the talks and for the first time failing to issue a joint statement on their progress.

Political and Security Context

On 13 September, OCHA reported that major protests were held throughout the month of August in 20 of Colombia’s 32 departments, with the population demanding improved social conditions in the country. Due to severe restrictions on mobility, several major cities were cut off, causing the rapid depletion of food stockpiles. Along with critical humanitarian access restricted in the southwest, central Colombia and the south, severe impact was recorded on basic services. Approximately 443,000 people were affected, and 15 municipalities in central Colombia were among the most affected due to confinement. As of 30 August, negotiations with the protesters ended the strikes in that area, but civil unrest is on-going in other regions.

End of August, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army, the country’s largest guerrilla group) resumed peace talks with the Government, following a brief interruption in reaction to a proposal that any agreement be put to a national referendum. National dialogue was initiated in August 2012 to seek an end to the conflict, but the Government called off the ceasefire several times, alleging violations of the truce by the FARC. In May, the two parties reached an agreement on one of the most contentious issues: land reform and compensation. Early July, the FARC announced they would be working with the ELN (National Liberation Army, the second largest guerrilla group in Colombia) to find a political solution to the social and armed conflict. End of August, President Santos announced that the Government was ready to begin peace talks with the ELN.

On 13 October, a 15th round of peace negotiations between the Government and FARC ended with the parties trading accusation over responsibility for the slow pace of the talks and for the first time failing to issue a joint statement on their progress.

The Colombian government wants a peace accord by November- the start of a national electoral cycle with a presidential vote in May 2014, a deadline both parties and observers now say is unlikely to be met.

Colombia has said it is ready to integrate up to 40,000 of demobilised rebels into society, as peace talks between FARC rebels and government negotiators entered their 15th round. Nevertheless, fighting has continued despite the resumption of peace talks on 3 October. On 5 October, two people were killed in an attack by FARC guerilla forces in Solano, Caquetá department.

In addition, on 7 October, Colombia’s second most important oil pipeline, the Cano Limon-Covenas, has been temporarily shut down after having been damaged by three bomb attacks. No group has claimed responsibility so far. A separate attack last week blamed on the FARC forced the temporary closure of the 190-mile (306 km) Transandino pipeline in southern Colombia.

In May, Colombia witnessed a 28% increase in armed actions, as compared to April, particularly in urban centres, including Cali, Medellín, Bucaramanga and Cartagena. Organised crime and urban violence are huge challenges to security and access to basic services in Colombia.

Humanitarian Context and Needs

OCHA reported on 31 August that the protests affected 443,000 people, including 241,000, which suffer severe humanitarian impact. Natural disasters account for 30,000 people affected in August.

Displacement: Beginning of August, the Victim’s Registry reported that between 1985 and 2013, 5,244,761 people were registered as internally displaced because of long-term conflict, with an estimated 127,714 IDPs in 2012 alone. In July 2013, and despite an important increase in armed activity during the month, OCHA reported three mass displacements with 500 people affected, which represents a major drop compared to July 2012, when nearly 12,000 people were displaced. As of 31 August, OCHA reported 1,746 newly displaced.

On 25 September, two mass displacement events were reported from the border with Venezuela, Norte de Santander, with at least 600 people displaced in the municipalities of Cucuta and Sardinata. The population is in need of shelter, potable water and food. The food stocks were estimated to last until 28 September.

Disaster: As of 10 September, OCHA reported that at least 78,530 people were affected by floods in 12 municipalities of the department of Putumayo. Hundreds of homes and 30,000 ha of crops were destroyed, and estimates of at least 1,000 people have not received assistance due to the limitation of movement as a result of the strikes. Authorities warned about the beginning of the second rainy season in the Andean and Pacific regions, which will run until early December.

The first rainy season of between mid-March and mid-June 2013 affected 140,000 people in one third of all municipalities in the country. The most affected zones were on the Pacific Coast in Chocó department with 64,215 people affected, followed by Cauca and Antioquia departments.

Updated: 15/10/2013

PARAGUAY DROUGHT

Highlights

No new development this week. Last update was: 08/10/2013.

Humanitarian Context and Needs
Disaster: The Chaco region, stretching over northern and western Paraguay, is currently experiencing a severe drought. The government of Paraguay declared a state of emergency on September 16 for 90 days. The National Secretariat of Emergency (SEN) reports that some 15,000 families (75,000 people) are affected in the departments of Presidente Hayes, Boquerón and Alto Paraguay. The worst affected districts in President Hayes are Lieutenant Irala Fernández, Puerto Pinasco and Villa Hayes. In Boqueron, the worst affected districts are Mariscal Estigarribia, Philadelphia and Loma Plata, and in the department of Alto Paraguay, almost all districts are severely affected.

Authorities have reported that the crisis is acute as the lack of rain continues to exacerbate the situation and no rain is expected to be received until late or mid-October. Food stocks are rapidly decreasing and many laborers and workers have lost their livelihoods due to the drought. In addition significant loss of pasture is already resulting in mortality of cattle—which has been observed to be up to 25-30% in some communes.

As of late September, authorities have been distributing water for the last 60 days to this zone in response of the drought that affect rural and indigenous communities. The affected population faced floods in the same zone last year.

On 21-22 September, a local severe hailstorm hit parts of Paraguay. According to the SEN, several departments of the country were affected by the storm, among which the worst affected are Central, Cordillera, Caaguazú and San Pedro. In total, an estimated 70,000 across the country are affected as of late September.

According to the National Emergency Secretariat, 99 schools were damaged in the violent storm, leading to disruption of activities. The departments hardest hit by the storms were reported to suffer large crop losses according official reports. The damage on infrastructure and houses is being assessed as of 30 September, but preliminary reports indicate large destruction in many affected areas.

Despite favourable weather conditions during most of the cropping season, severe frost at the end of July and during August in the main producing areas of Alto Parana, Itapua and Caaguazu caused severe damage to the crop already. Preliminary official estimates anticipate a reduction of the harvest between 30 and 40% and this year’s output could decline up to 840,000 tonnes, well below the early production forecast of 1.4 million tonnes. Moreover, it is anticipated that the quality of this year’s wheat will also be negatively affected.

Reviewed: 15/10/2013
Introduction to the Global Emergency Overview Update

The Global Emergency Overview is a weekly update that provides a snapshot of current humanitarian priorities and recent events. The Global Emergency Overview collates information from a wide range of sources, including Reliefweb and media sources, and displays this information in a manner that allows for quick comparison of different humanitarian crises. The primary objective of the Global Emergency Overview is to rapidly inform humanitarian decision makers by presenting a summary of major humanitarian crises, both recent and protracted. It is designed to provide answers to four questions:

1. Which humanitarian crises currently exist? (World map)
2. What has happened in the last seven days? (Highlights and Snapshot)
3. What is the situation in the country affected by a crisis? (Highlights Box and Narrative)
4. Which countries could be prioritised in terms of humanitarian response? (Prioritisation)

The Global Emergency Overview consists of three main sections:

First, the world map provides an overview of how the countries are prioritised, indicated by different shades of blue. The countries are subdivided by four priority levels: "on watch", "situation of concern", "humanitarian crisis", and "severe humanitarian crisis".

The priority levels are assigned on the basis of:
- the number of people affected by recent disasters
- the level of access to the affected population
- the <5 mortality rate
- the level of development of the country
- the number of protracted IDPs and refugees.

If a country experienced a disaster in the seven days prior to an update or witnessed an escalation of an ongoing crisis, a country is highlighted by a yellow dot on the map.

Second, the snapshot briefly describes what has happened in the last seven days from the date of publication, by outlining the crises that have occurred in the different highlighted countries.

Third, narratives for each country included in the Global Emergency Overview reflect major developments and underlying vulnerabilities of a country over the last months. Narratives are written based on secondary data. For each country, a specific highlights box is also added to put emphasis on the major developments that happened over the past 10 days.

The Global Emergency Overview is a mobile application.

To download the mobile application for Android phones click here.

To download the mobile application for iOS phones click here.

Update

The Global Emergency Overview will be updated once a week and the results will be available every Monday before midday (Central European Time/Central European Summer Time). In case of major new humanitarian events or an escalation of an on-going crisis which triggers a change of prioritisation, the Global Overview will be updated on an ad-hoc basis.

Disclaimer

While ACAPS has defined a methodology striving to ensure accuracy, the information provided is indicative and should not be used in isolation from alternate sources of information for any decision making. ACAPS is not responsible for any damage or loss resulting from the use of the information presented on this website.