TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

II. CHANGING POLICIES TOWARDS DEFECTORS ................................................................. 2

III. LESSONS FROM KOREAN HISTORY .................................................................................. 5
    A. COLD WAR USES AND ABUSES ......................................................................................... 5
    B. CHANGING GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES ........................................................................... 8
    C. A CHANGING NATION ........................................................................................................... 9

IV. THE PROBLEMS DEFECTORS FACE ................................................................................. 11
    A. HEALTH ................................................................................................................................. 11
       1. Mental health ....................................................................................................................... 11
       2. Physical health ................................................................................................................... 12
    B. LIVELIHOODS ....................................................................................................................... 14
       1. Unemployment .................................................................................................................... 14
       2. Cultural barriers ............................................................................................................... 16
       3. Debts and money .............................................................................................................. 16
    C. DISCRIMINATION ................................................................................................................ 17
       1. Language .......................................................................................................................... 18
       2. Visibility and prejudice .................................................................................................... 19
    D. WOMEN ............................................................................................................................... 20
    E. CHILDREN ............................................................................................................................ 21

V. HOW DEFECTORS JOIN A NEW SOCIETY ......................................................................... 22
    A. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES ............................................................................................... 22
       1. On arrival ............................................................................................................................ 22
       2. Long-term support ........................................................................................................... 23
       3. The North Korean Refugees Foundation ......................................................................... 24
    B. NON-GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES ............................................................................... 24
       1. Local social welfare organisations ................................................................................... 24
       2. The Korean Red Cross .................................................................................................... 25
       3. NGOs ................................................................................................................................... 25
       4. Religious organisations .................................................................................................... 25
       5. Alternative schools .......................................................................................................... 26
    C. NEW GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PRIVATE RESPONSES ....................................... 27

VI. NEW INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ............................................................................... 28

VII. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 30

APPENDICES
    A. MAP OF THE KOREA PENINSULA ....................................................................................... 31
    B. STATISTICAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................. 32
    C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ................................................................. 35
    D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2008 .............................. 36
    E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES .............................................................................. 38
STRANGERS AT HOME: NORTH KOREANS IN THE SOUTH

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the number of defectors from North Korea arriving in the South has surged in the past decade, there is a growing understanding of how difficult it would be to absorb a massive flow of refugees. South Korea is prosperous and generous, with a committed government and civil society, and yet refugees from the North almost all fail to integrate or thrive. Part of this is the change in the people coming; it is no longer just senior officials and fighter pilots who were useful and privileged propaganda tools. Nowadays many are women who have endured terrible deprivation in the North and abuse on their way to the South. Reconfiguring programs for defectors to take account of this change is essential if new defectors are to find a place in their new home.

The heart of the issue is humanitarian: those who arrive in the South are often fleeing material deprivation and political persecution and under South Korean law must be accepted and helped. But as with all humanitarian issues, it is complicated by politics. Defectors have been used by both sides. The South once rewarded them with wealth and public regard but that changed when rapprochement with the North began in the late 1990s. Defectors became something of an embarrassment, and policies to help them did not keep up with the numbers and types of people arriving.

As the difficulties of absorbing North Koreans become clear, the South is also wrestling with the possibility that it one day might have to handle a vast outflow of refugees from a collapsing North. The two sides of the Demilitarised Zone have diverged so much in economics, politics, language and social organisation that the people are now strangers to each other. South Korean law and opinion from some quarters would likely demand a rapid unification, but economic and social realities suggest such a move could be catastrophic. The difficulties of handling just over 20,000 refugees over a few decades should be a warning to those who wish to encourage the collapse of the North rather than a more gentle integration.

The divergences between North and South mean that defectors are on average significantly smaller, more poorly educated, less healthy and less likely to have useful skills. They must adapt to a country where credentials and networks are essential for finding jobs. They also come from a country where an all-powerful bureaucracy makes almost all decisions about their lives; there is almost no choice in education, employment or even food. New arrivals describe a bewildering rush of modernity, consumption and choice that rapidly overwhelms them. They also complain of discrimination by Southerners, who have stereotyped them as heavy drinkers, prone to crime, shirking work and relying on state handouts.

Many arrive nowadays suffering from serious physical and mental health problems, resulting in part from poor diet and trauma in the North and sometimes from abuse during their escape. South Korea is not well equipped to handle this: it has the highest suicide rate of wealthy countries and one of the poorest systems for providing mental health care. As more vulnerable people have begun to arrive, not enough has been done to accommodate their needs.

The South Korean government has devoted significant resources to helping defectors, but its efforts have often lagged behind new developments. The lavish welcome defectors received in the past has ended, and there is a more practical approach to education and integration, but as the arrivals have soared, facilities have not kept up. Civil society, particularly religious groups, has stepped up to help, but relations with the government are often strained. Better coordination of such efforts, improved oversight to determine what works and a more sensitive approach to discrimination are all needed.

Critically, policy on defectors needs to be insulated both from the occasional burst of belligerence from the North and from policy shifts in the South towards Pyongyang. What is clear is that the problems Northerners face on arrival take many years to resolve. What is needed is a long-term approach that allows a greater role for civil society and is less subject to change with each new government.

This report aims to draw attention to the challenges defectors have faced in integrating into the South, in the hope that the many international actors engaged with both Korea and refugee issues will devote more attention to planning for the possible need to accommodate much lar-
ger numbers due to conflict or other sudden major change on the Korean peninsula.

Among the issues to be tackled are:

- the government, particularly the Ministry of Unification, should endeavour to be more responsive to the needs of defectors by listening to civil society groups and those who come from the North;

- there is a need for greater oversight to ensure that money is allocated to those programs that meet defectors’ needs most closely. This could be a role for the newly established North Korean Refugees Foundation;

- the government needs to improve public awareness among South Koreans to increase tolerance for Northerners, as well as tough anti-discrimination laws and practices; and

- the international community should accept more refugees from the North and engage the South Korean government to provide help in such areas as English-language education.

Seoul/Brussels, 14 July 2011
STRANGERS AT HOME: NORTH KOREANS IN THE SOUTH

I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to the last decade, very few North Koreans had defected to the South. There were only 86 defectors from 1990 to 1994, and the numbers remained under 100 each year until 1999. North Korea’s deteriorating economy and a subsequent famine in the mid-1990s, along with an erosion of border controls that opened an escape route into China, began to push the numbers higher by 2000. In 2001, 583 North Koreans arrived in South Korea. The following year the figure nearly doubled to 1,138. By 2007, about 10,000 North Korean defectors had arrived in the South, and by December 2010, the number reached 20,360 (see Appendix B, Table One, below). The number is expected to remain steady at about 2,500-3,000 per year until 1999. North Korea’s deteriorating economy and a subsequent famine in the mid-1990s, along with an erosion of border controls that opened an escape route into China, began to push the numbers higher by 2000. In 2001, 583 North Koreans arrived in South Korea. The following year the figure nearly doubled to 1,138. By 2007, about 10,000 North Korean defectors had arrived in the South, and by December 2010, the number reached 20,360 (see Appendix B, Table One, below). The number is expected to remain steady at about 2,500-3,000 per year even to increase, although slightly fewer defectors arrived in 2010 due to tightened restrictions in North Korea, including greater punishment for attempting to defect.

In comparison with past displacement on the Korean peninsula, this is a small number. For example, during the two years following the Japanese Empire’s collapse in 1945, as many as 2.6 million Koreans migrated to the southern part of the peninsula from Japan, Manchuria and northern Korea. About 3.5 million Koreans died during the Korean War (1950-1953), including about 2.5 million North Koreans (about one fourth of the northern population). The South Korean media often report that there are 10 million Korean family members separated by national division, but a more credible estimate of separated first-generation Koreans is about 500,000-750,000 out of a total Korean population of 72 million.

This report is based on interviews in South Korea with defectors and those involved in providing services to them for resettlement. It also draws on extensive Korean language research on this issue. One of the aims of the paper is to bring some of this to the attention of a wider audience, in the hope that the many international actors engaged with both Korea and refugee issues will devote more attention to planning for considerably larger numbers as a possible

---

1 "북한이탈주민 입국인원 현황 [Current number of North Korean defectors in South Korea]", unification ministry (MOU), www.unikorea.go.kr. See Appendix B, Table One, for annual totals.
3 “Current number of North Korean defectors in South Korea”, op. cit.
4 Ibid.
5박정란 [Pak Chong-ran], “탈북자 지원체계의 정정과 발전 방향 [Ways to improve issues with the support system for North Korean defectors]”, 북한경제리뷰 [North Korean Economy Review], Korea Development Institute, September 2010, p. 50.
7 In comparison, in more recent times, Afghanistan has had the world’s greatest number of refugees. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, more than 6 million Afghans – over one fifth of the population – had fled the country by 1992, mostly to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. See “Refugees from Afghanistan: The world’s largest single refugee group”, Amnesty International, 1 November 1999. By late 2007, more than 4 million Iraqis were displaced, about 2.2 million of them still within the country. "Statistics on displaced Iraqis around the world", UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), September 2007. In July 2007, Iraq’s population was estimated to be about 27.5 million. See “The 2008 World Factbook”, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, www.cia.gov.
10 This includes individuals who were separated from their families at the time of the war but not their descendants. James A. Foley, “Ten million families”: statistic or metaphor?”, Korean Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (2001), pp. 96-110. In July 2007, the South Korean population was estimated to be about 49 million, and North Korea’s was estimated to be about 23.3 million. See “The 2008 World Factbook”, op. cit.
result of conflict or other sudden major change on the Korean peninsula.

It follows an earlier study by Crisis Group of refugees from North Korea fleeing to China and South East Asia. This paper examines what happens to these people if they reach South Korea and the problems they face integrating into society. While primarily a humanitarian concern, the issue is linked to the risks of conflict or instability in North East Asia and the resolution of the longstanding tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The problem of integrating refugees is important because of the possibility that South Korea may one day have to deal with the total failure of the North Korean state. There are a number of possible scenarios from a peaceful hand-over of power to the eruption of violence within the North. At the moment it is impossible to predict if or how North Korea may collapse, and as events in North Africa have shown, it is unlikely anyone can predict how, when or if a transition will take place. What would be likely if that time arrives, however, is a massive outflow of refugees because of the brutal living conditions in the North. South Korea’s struggle to integrate quite small numbers shows what an immense challenge this would be for the region and international actors.

II. CHANGING POLICIES TOWARDS DEFECTORS

South Korea is a prosperous country that should be well equipped to cope with new arrivals. However, the settlement of a relatively small number of defectors has presented several legal, social, and economic challenges. According to the South Korean constitution, citizenship is “prescribed by law”, and “all citizens are equal before the law”. The constitution declares that the territory of the Republic of Korea (ROK) includes the Korean peninsula and surrounding islands, but the Nationality Law is ambiguous on the status of North Koreans. It would appear to grant automatic ROK citizenship to Koreans who lived in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), but the Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North Korea, which was implemented in January 1997, is the legal mechanism governing the transition of North Koreans into full-fledged citizens.

The legal basis for supporting the settlement of defectors began in April 1962 with the ROK’s enactment of the Special Relief Act for Patriots and Veterans, and North

---


12 Even the terminology for “defector” is controversial in the South because of the political connotations of different terms. Until the 1970s or 1980s, the word歸順者[kwisunja] was used, meaning someone who “submits or surrenders”. The act of “submission or defection” usually included a press conference at which the individual announced his allegiance and shouted three times “Long live the Republic of Korea [大韓民國 萬歲]!” By the 1990s, the term 脫北者[t'albukcha], a “person escaping from the North” became the norm. Around 2005, the Roh Moo-Hyun [No Mu-hyŏn] government began using the term 새터민[saetŏmin] or “people in a new place”. The Roh government considered this term more neutral and conducive to its policy of “peace and prosperity” towards the North. But North Korean defectors in the South generally dislike the term, so after the change in governments in 2008, the MOU announced it would stop using it. Since 2008, the correct legal term is北韓離脫住民(pukhan'italjumin, “citizens who escaped from North Korea”), according to the Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North Korea, Article 2. However, t'albukcha remains the common colloquial term in South Korea. This report uses “defector” to refer to all former North Koreans now living in South Korea and makes no assertions about their legal or political status in the South.

13 Republic of Korea Constitution, Chapter I General Provisions, Article 2; and Chapter II Rights and Duties of the Citizens, Article 11.

14 Nationality Law.

15 Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North Korea.
Korean Defectors.\textsuperscript{16} Defectors were given a status equal to that of patriots with special national merit or considered “human national treasures”. In December 1978, the ROK enacted the Special Compensation Act for Heroes Who Defect to the South.\textsuperscript{17} During the Cold War, the few defectors who made it to the South carried significant propaganda value and were rewarded handsomely. In 1993 the government enacted the Act on the Protection of North Korean Defectors, which significantly reduced the amount of compensation and required defectors to earn their livelihood.\textsuperscript{18} In 1997, the Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North Korea was promulgated, re-establishing the government assistance system for defectors.\textsuperscript{19} This law has been revised six times, most recently in March 2010.

According to Article 7 of the Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North Korea, a defector must first ask for protection at a South Korean embassy or consulate before the government can consider the right to receive protection and resettlement into the South. The law stipulates that protection will be provided in accordance with humanitarian principles. The head of the diplomatic mission is required to report the request to the unification minister and the director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS); the former subsequently decides in consultation with a ministry consultative council chaired by the vice unification minister. However, the minister can reject applicants such as criminals or others deemed unworthy of consideration. The unification minister is authorised to establish facilities for the protection of defectors as well as logistical support facilities once they arrive. The NIS director is authorised to establish separate facilities, and the president can issue decrees on matters related to the types, management and operation of these facilities.\textsuperscript{20}

Few defectors have integrated into South Korean society effectively, and the government mechanisms set up to help them have been relatively ineffective. Defectors have transitioned from being Cold War heroes to an embarrassment for Seoul as the Roh Moo-hyun [No Mu-hyŏn] government (2003-2008) sought rapprochement with Pyongyang. As the Lee Myung-bak [Yi Myŏng-bak] government (2008 to date) has urged a national discussion on preparations for a unified Korea, defectors offer a microcosm of the challenges that lie ahead. Earlier defectors tended to be men from the North Korean elite. Nowadays, those arriving in the South are more likely to be women, many of them single mothers with dependent children. In 1998, only 12 per cent of the 947 defectors in the South were female. But they surpassed males in 2002, and in 2010 they accounted for 76 per cent of the 2,376 defectors who arrived in the South.\textsuperscript{21} By January 2011, the cumulative total of defectors nineteen years of age and younger was 3,174 – 15.4 per cent of all defectors in the South.\textsuperscript{22}

About 70 per cent of the defectors arriving recently have graduated from middle school or high school, about 9 per cent have graduated from junior colleges, and about 8 per cent are college graduates. About 50 per cent were unemployed or dependents before they left the North, and about 39 per cent were workers. In April 2011, at least 65 per cent of them were living in the greater Seoul-Inch’ŏn metropolitan area. The unification ministry (MOU) estimates that 54 per cent are suffering from personal hardships and about 16 per cent are in the South with other family members.\textsuperscript{23}

The issue presents a constant risk to delicate negotiations between the Koreas; Pyongyang has frequently used it as an excuse to block progress in inter-Korean relations. For example, when a North Korean fishing boat malfunctioned and drifted south in early February 2011, four of the crew decided to defect, but 27 wished to return. They were not repatriated until 50 days later because the North insisted that the whole crew be returned. Pyongyang continued to insist that the four were being held against their will and that there would be consequences for Seoul if they were not returned.\textsuperscript{24}

There have been cases of North Koreans slipping into the South disguised as defectors to conduct covert operations. Although ROK authorities had suspected this for years, the first case was disclosed only in 2008. A North Korean woman, Wŏn Jŏng-hwa, entered the South in October 2001 immediately after marrying a South Korean businessman she met in China.\textsuperscript{25} She told him she was Korean-Chinese

---

\textsuperscript{16}國家有功者 및 越南歸順者 特別援護法 [Special Relief Act for Patriots and Veterans, and North Korean Defectors]. The law was abolished in 1985.

\textsuperscript{17}越南歸順勇士 特別補償法 [Act on Special Compensation for North Korean Defectors to South Korea].

\textsuperscript{18}歸順北韓同胞保護法 [Act on the Protection of North Korean Defectors].

\textsuperscript{19}Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North Korea.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid, Article 10.

\textsuperscript{21}“Current number of North Korean defectors in South Korea”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{22}At the end of January 2011, the total number of defectors to have reached the ROK was 20,539. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23}“북한이탈주민 정착지원 현황과 정부의 역할 [Current status of settlement support for North Korean defectors and the government role]”, internal MOU document, no date.

\textsuperscript{24}Kim Mi-ju, “27 North Koreans finally repatriated: Four others on fishing boat defected, adding to tensions”, Korea Joongang Daily, 28 March 2011.

\textsuperscript{25}정지우 및 홍석희 [ Chŏng Ji-u and Hong Sŏk-hŭi], “위장탈북 여간첩 검거..경교에 성로비 두기말 배내 [Arrest
but later told the ROK authorities that she was a defector from the North. In fact, Wŏn had received three years of training to join a unit that conducts special operations in the South, but was discharged when she was injured. She reportedly was sent to China in 1998 by the DPRK’s national security ministry where she assisted in the kidnapping of seven South Korean businessmen and about 100 North Korean defectors for repatriation to the DPRK. Her stepfather followed her to China in 1999, also posing as a defector while actually working for the DPRK’s national security ministry. He then followed her to the South in 2006, passing through Cambodia.

Once in South Korea, she approached military and police officers and eventually was hired to give lectures about the North to military personnel. In 2008, authorities discovered that she had taken photographs of U.S. and ROK military installations and engaged in sexual relations with South Korean military officers to acquire classified information that she passed to the North. She also established a fisheries products trading firm and traveled fourteen times to China, where she met with DPRK national security ministry officials to coordinate her espionage activities. Wŏn reportedly exposed ROK agents, who were later murdered, and delivered contact and background information about 100 senior military officers as well as the whereabouts of prominent North Korean defectors such as Hwang Jang-hyŏp, who would become the target of an assassination plot.

The Hwang assassination plot apparently began when two North Korean special agents departed North Korea disguised as defectors in December 2009. They passed through Cambodia. The Hwang assassination plot apparently began when two North Korean special agents departed North Korea disguised as defectors in December 2009. They passed through

The immense difficulties faced by defectors in adapting to life outside the North is also a lesson for those who would like to see North Korea squeezed to the point of collapse. While most South Koreans would prefer a gradual unification following inter-Korean convergence in politics, economics, society and living standards, the Lee Myung-bak government has suggested that discussions and preparations for unification are necessary now. President Lee has stated that unification must be pursued regardless of the costs or burdens. Over the last two decades, the government position has been to pursue a “soft landing” for the North, but now some ruling party advisers and pundits believe official unification policy should include plans to seek unification after a DPRK collapse or emergency. China and South East Asia before arriving in South Korea in January 2010. However, the plot was discovered while the agents were being processed and debriefed prior to release into South Korean society. Hwang, a former senior North Korean party official who defected to the South in 1997, was the highest-level defector ever to reach the South. He was a former president of Kim Il-sung University and is considered the true architect of Kim Il-sung’s ‘chuch’e ideology. The agents reportedly were dispatched by the General Reconnaissance Bureau, which is responsible for special operations against the South and is believed to have been behind the sinking of the ROK naval vessel Ch’ŏnan. They were sentenced to ten-year prison terms in June 2010.

33이관범 [Yi Gwan-bŏm], ‘황장협 암살조’ 징역 10년 [‘Hwang Jang-hyŏp assassination team’ get 10 years imprisonment], The Munhwa Ilbo, 1 July 2010.
34Ibid; 김미애 [Kim Mi-ae], ‘황장협 암살조’ 北간첩 징역10년•자격정지 10년 선고 [‘Hwang Jang-yŏp assassination team’ sentenced to 10 years as North Korean spies and lose rights for 10 years], Asia Today, 1 July 2010.
36Kwon Mee-yoo, ‘NK spies get 10-year jail term for plot to kill Hwang’, The Korea Times, 1 July 2010.
40Kwon Mee-yoo, ‘NK spies get 10-year jail term for plot to kill Hwang’, The Korea Times, 1 July 2010.
41On 15 August 2010, President Lee proposed a unification tax to prepare for unification and declared that South Koreans must prepare for it. Lee Tae-ho, “Lee proposes unification tax”, The Korea Times, 15 August 2010.
42On 15 August 2010, President Lee proposed a unification tax to prepare for unification and declared that South Koreans must prepare for it. Lee Tae-ho, “Lee proposes unification tax”, The Korea Times, 15 August 2010.
The Obama administration policy is not to seek regime change, but to deal with the DPRK as it is. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, has stated that regime collapse is not the goal of U.S. policy and that collapse is unlikely. Bosworth also has emphasised that a change in DPRK behaviour is necessary for an improvement in bilateral relations.40 However, some high-level Republican Party officials, such as Senator John McCain, have suggested that regime change should be the U.S. goal.41

Coping suddenly with an entire population that has lived under such oppressive control for so long would certainly push the capacities of the South and the wider international community beyond their limits. In a worst case scenario, Kim family regime loyalists could retreat to remote areas to resist unification on ROK terms. At best, cooperation from the disbanded DPRK government and military would be instrumental in avoiding immediate violence, but in the longer term, the economic and social challenges would be extraordinary.

III. LESSONS FROM KOREAN HISTORY

Korea was a traditional agrarian society that was isolated until the late nineteenth century. From 1392 to 1910, the Chosŏn Dynasty’s neo-Confucian ideology viewed society as a function of five human relationships: ruler and subjects; father and son; older brother and younger brother; husband and wife; and friend and friend. Social cleavages were traditionally a function of social class, family relations, regional origins, educational level and school ties.42 Foreigners were absolutely excluded in the strict neo-Confucian world view. Korea’s geographic isolation resulted in few foreign visitors except for those in the periodic attempts by neighbours to conquer the peninsula, which reinforced xenophobic attitudes in Korea. Christianity was viewed as heretical and subversive.43 On the other hand, shipwrecked foreigners were treated well until they could be repatriated.44 In sum, Korea has had no experience in peacefully integrating significant numbers of outsiders.

Since personal ties based on family links, alumni connections or regional hometown networks are critical for personal success and social mobility in South Korea, North Korean defectors face significant obstacles. South Korea’s economy has seen profound transformation and modernisation since industrialisation took off in the 1960s, but sons traditionally have taken over family businesses or families have pooled resources for entrepreneurial ventures. School ties or regional networks are still valuable assets when seeking employment or credit, or when a reference is required to vouch for one’s reliability. North Korean defectors have an extremely difficult time opening doors and establishing positive personal reputations without pre-existing social networks.

A. COLD WAR USES AND ABUSES

The propaganda value of Korean defectors has long been recognised in Pyongyang and Seoul. After national division in 1945, both sides tried to exploit defectors to demonstrate the superiority of their political system and government. The intense rivalry and deep ideological division, exacerbated by the Korean War, continued throughout the

---


40 Hwang Doo-hyong, “Clinton expresses concerns about rising tensions due to N Korea’s nuke weapons”, Yonhap News, 3 March 2011.


42 During the Chosŏn Dynasty, officially there were four social classes: yangban (elite ruling class); chung’in (professional middle class); sangmin (commoners); and ch’ŏnmin (lower class including slaves). For a description of these classes, see Gregory Henderson, Korea: The politics of the vortex (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 36-55.

43 The Korean government executed about 300 Catholic converts and imprisoned or exiled hundreds of others in 1801. Key-Hiuk Kim, The last phase of the East Asian world order (Berkeley, 1980), pp. 31-38.

44 Ibid, p. 51.
Cold War. The status and repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs) prolonged the Korean War armistice talks for about two years, as the Chinese and North Koreans insisted that all POWs be repatriated to their home countries, while the UN side refused to send any back against their will. Ultimately, the Chinese and North Koreans agreed to voluntary repatriation, and those who refused to return home became propaganda symbols. The overwhelming majority of the 22,600 POWs who refused repatriation were Chinese, but 357 POWs from the UN side (333 South Koreans, 23 Americans, one Briton) expressed their intention to decline repatriation.45

During the Cold War, six American soldiers defected to the DPRK while assigned to bases in the ROK. Private Larry Allen Abshier and Private First Class James Joseph Dresnok crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in May and August 1962.46 Corporal Jerry Wayne Parrish defected in December 1963,47 and Sergeant Charles Robert Jenkins defected while on patrol in January 1965.48 These four became celebrities in the DPRK after starring in a series of films as American villains. Roy Chung, who defected to East Germany in 1979, later arrived in the DPRK.49 Private First Class Joseph White crossed the DMZ at Guard Post Ouellette in August 1982.50 Dresnok is the sole American defector remaining in North Korea, after Jenkins was permitted to leave in 2004.51

For at least two decades after the Korean War, the obstacles to defecting were considerable, and there were few if any material incentives for North Koreans to depart for the ROK, since the DPRK economy was outperforming the economy in the South. Furthermore, defectors in the early years switched sides for ideological reasons, and the vast majority of Koreans had already migrated to the side representing their personal ideological convictions in the late 1940s and during the war. Nonetheless, during this period, the overwhelming direction of this migration was from the North to the South.

Extensive migration also resulted in many separated families. Many Koreans were caught up in the shifting battle front that crossed most of the peninsula during the first months of the war. While some switched sides voluntarily, others had no choice and were conscripted into military or forced labour service. In many cases, it has been impossible to determine whether migrants switched sides voluntarily or were kidnapped. But this classification has been important for family members because of governmental and societal perceptions. Deliberate defection has serious consequences for family members, and although the South Korean government and legal system officially do not penalise relatives for unrelated individual acts, there is still a heavy social stigma for betraying the nation and defecting to the North. For example, in 2007, a South Korean prevailed in a legal case to have his father reclassified as a victim of abduction rather than a defector as he was a passenger in a two-seat light aircraft that flew to the North in October 1977.52 In the case of North Koreans defecting, collective punishment is standard, and banishment to a penal labour camp or execution for extended family members are common.

According to the 1954 ROK Yearbook, 82,959 South Koreans were kidnapped by the North during the war, and 10,271 defected.53 Between the signing of the Korean War Armistice in July 1953 and November 2010, North Korea abducted 3,824 South Koreans (3,721 fishermen) and returned 3,318. All but eight of those repatriated were detained for six to twelve months. About 506 abducted South Koreans are believed to still be in the North.54

---

48 Jim Frederick, “In from the cold,” Time, 5 December 2004.
51 Jenkins is married to Japanese abduction victim Hitomi Soga, who was released after Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in May 2004. He subsequently was permitted to meet his wife in Indonesia, after which they travelled to Japan, where Jenkins turned himself in to U.S. military personnel at Camp Zama. Three defectors are confirmed dead: Abshier from a heart attack in 1983; White in 1985, reportedly while swimming in a river, but many believe he was executed or committed suicide; and Parrish from an abdominal infection in 1996. “Last US defector in North Korea”, op. cit.; “In from the cold”, op. cit; Min Lee, “Last U.S. defector in N Korea feels at home,” The Washington Post, 18 October 2006.
53 韓國年鑑 cited in 조성훈 및 김미영 [Cho Sŏng-hun and Kim Mi-yŏng], “6•25전쟁 납북자 대상자별 실태 파악 및 명예회복 방안 연구 [Research into understanding compensation, discrimination, and the restoration of the honour of those kidnapped to the North during the Korean War]”, 한국전쟁남북사건자료원 [Korean War Abductees Research Institute], October 2009, p. 4.
eral other foreign nationals are suspected of being kid-
napped or held against their will in the DPRK.55

The most notable abduction probably was the 1978 kidnap-
ping of South Korean movie producer Shin Sang-ok and his
actress wife, Ch’oi Un-huí, in Hong Kong. The couple had
recently divorced, and Ch’oi was lured to Hong Kong
first before Shin followed to look for her. They were taken
to North Korea under orders from Kim Jong-il in a bizarre
plan to improve the North Korean film industry and pro-
duce propaganda movies. After producing films for the
North and finally gaining Kim’s trust, they were permitted
to travel to Vienna in 1986, where they escaped from
their minders and asked for asylum in the U.S.56

During the Cold War, the few defectors who made it to the
other side were mostly air force pilots, soldiers stationed
near the DMZ or high-level officials who could travel interna-
tionally and flee while abroad. Some defectors were
prized for their high propaganda and intelligence values.
In the case of South Korean defectors, the most notable
case probably is the defection of former Foreign Minister
Ch’oi Dók-sín (1961-1963) in 1986.57 Some South Korean
scientists have defected and subsequently worked in the
North’s nuclear program, including Yi Sŏng-gi, who was
in charge of this program in the early years.58 Yi defected
during the early part of the Korean War. He had become
disgruntled after an incident with ROK President Rhee
during a visit to Seoul National University in February
1950.59 South Korean defectors also have participated in
radio broadcasts to the South and cooperated with North
Korean authorities to collect information about the South
and in other intelligence activities.60

North Korean defectors after the Korean War were in-
frequent, and the defectors were rewarded generously for
bringing aircraft, weapon systems and valuable intel-
ligence. Settlement packages included cash, a new home, a
new job and even a new spouse. The first pilot to fly south
was Yi Gŏn-sun in April 1950, but the event gained little
attention because it was before the Korean War, and he
flew a Soviet-made World War II vintage Il-10.61 In late
1952, the U.S. implemented “Operation Moolah” to en-
tice an enemy pilot to defect with a MiG fighter jet. On
21 September 1953, less than two months after the armi-
stice was signed, Lt. No Kŭm-sŏk flew his MiG-15 to Seoul
and was awarded $100,000.62 However, benefits have been
reduced significantly since the end of the Cold War.

Some defectors have come to the ROK with valuable in-
telligence. For example, in September 1974, Kim Bu-sŏng,
a special agent for the Korean Workers Party Liaison De-
partment, defected and revealed North Korea’s tunnelling
activities under the DMZ.63 In May 1983, Korean People’s
Army Captain Shin Chung-ch’ŏl defected and provided
information that led to the discovery of the North’s fourth
infiltration tunnel in March 1990.64 Prominent defec-
tions continued during the 1990s,65 including a KPA guard at

---

55 Yoshi Yamamoto, “Taken! North Korea’s criminal abduction of citizens of other countries”, The Committee for Human Rights
in North Korea, 2011.
56 Mike Thomson, “Kidnapped by North Korea”, BBC News, 5
March 2003; “Shin Sang-Ok: Shin Sang-Ok, film director and
abductee, died on April 11th, aged 79”, The Economist, 27
April 2006.
57 고제규 [Ko Je-gyu], “월북한 최덕신의 ‘이념 공네’ 40년
공개 [South Korean defector Ch’oi Dók-sín’s ‘ideological stunts’
over 40 years released to public]”, Sisa Journal, no. 566, 31
August 2000.
58 김정성 [Kim Chŏng-sŏn], “北核두뇌 상당수가 남한출신
[Considerable number of the brains behind the North’s nukes
came from South Korea]”, The KyungHyang Shinmun, 4 April 2003.
59 안종주 [An Jong-ju], “비날론발명 복화자 리승기 박사
별세 [North Korean chemist Ri Sŏng-gi known for vinalon
dies]”, The Hankyoreh, 10 February 1996.
60 홍일도 [Hwang Il-do], “북한 통일전선부 출신 탈북자가
충전한 ‘대남공작부서의 오만 것’ [Testimony of defector
from North Korea’s Unification Front Line Department ‘every-
thing in the South Operations Department’]”, Shindonga, no.
574, 1 July 2007, pp. 264-275.
61 남찬순 [Nam Ch’an-sun], “[황설수설] 노급석씨 [Random
62 No had not heard of the reward money prior to defecting.
Robert F. Dorr, “Intel gained from pilot’s gift”, The Air Force
63 Four infiltration tunnels have been discovered (in November
1974, March 1975, October 1978, and March 1990), but some
believe there could be as many as twenty. Kim Il-sung issued a
directive to build the tunnels on 25 September 1971. 백건예
주요역할 귀순 김부성씨의 다시 입증/제
량굴발견 계기로본 속전속결 전략
[My testimony about North Korea’s surprise southern invasion
substantiated again/discovery of tunnel number 4 is a chance to
see the blitzkrieg strategy]”, The Seoul Shinmun, 4 March 1990.
64 유승용 [Yun Sŏng-yong], “양박 풀자 역풍속 실제
드러내/망글 탐색현장 [displayed in the wind after drilling
through a rock wall/on the scene in the tunnel search]”,
The Hankook Ilbo, 4 March 1990.
65 These included Ko Yong-hwan (diplomat, May 1991), Kang
Myŏng-do (nephew of former DPRK Prime Minister Kang
Sŏng-san, July 1994), Cho Myŏng-ch’ŏl (Kim Il Sung University
professor, July 1994), Ch’oi Ju-hwal (KPA senior colonel,
October 1995), Hyŏn Sŏng-il and Ch’ŏl Su-bong (diplomat
and wife, January 1996), Ri Ch’ŏl-su (Mig-19 pilot, flew aircraft
to South, May 1996), Hwang Jang-hyŏp (KWP secretary, April
1997), and Kim Dong-su (diplomat, February 1998). “80년대
이후 주요 탈북자 입국 일지 [Dates when principal North
Korean defectors entered the South]”, The Chosun Ilbo, 19 Au-
gust 2002.
the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom in February 1998.66

B. CHANGING GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES

During the Cold War, both the ROK and DPRK governments used defectors to the full extent of their propaganda value. In recent years, the number of South Korean defectors going to the North has dropped to a very small number. The DPRK system does not lure South Koreans, and Pyongyang has tightened security around those who might contemplate fleeing to the South.67 The consequences for family members and close associates of North Korean defectors are severe, which is a sombre deterrent for any potential defectors who would leave behind family. However, the famine of the mid-1990s began to push destitute North Koreans across the Chinese border in search of food and resources.

The famine resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and a deterioration of social control in the DPRK.68 The decline of state and party capacity to govern was a primary reason Kim Jong-il turned to “military-first” politics [先軍政治] in the late 1990s.69 “Military first” coincided with ROK President Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” of seeking reconciliation between the two Koreas. While Kim Dae-jung is recognised as a long-time human rights activist, he was willing to remain silent on human rights issues in North Korea because it might have undermined his goal of encouraging North Korea to open and reform.

When President Roh Moo-hyun pledged to build upon Kim’s “sunshine policy” after taking office in February 2003, the number of North Korean defectors in the South was on the rise. Many of these defectors have become the most vocal critics of the DPRK government and the Kim Il-sung family. The Roh government took a neutral public stance regarding North Korean human rights issues, and it consistently tried to silence or reduce the influence of defectors who were critical of Pyongyang. Essentially, the government tried to conceal the defector issue.70 This policy position is ironic given No’s background as a human rights lawyer, but the government considered it a short-term tactical move within the context of a long-term strategy of “peace and prosperity” for the Korean peninsula.

Since the election of President Lee Myung-bak in December 2007, the policies of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun have been rolled back considerably. Unconditional delivery of rice and fertilizer to the North ended after Lee was inaugurated in February 2008. Initially, the Lee administration insisted that the DPRK government must ask for aid before it would be considered. Subsequently, inter-Korean relations steadily deteriorated, particularly after a South Korean tourist was shot and killed at the Kumsang Mountain resort in the North in July 2008.71 After the sinking of the ROK’s Ch’ŏnan and the artillery attack against Yongp’yŏng Island in 2010, relations sunk to their lowest level in decades.72

The Lee government also reversed the policy of taking a neutral stance on DPRK human rights and trying to squelch North Korean defectors in the South. The Roh government either abstained or was absent when the UN Human Rights Council voted on resolutions condemning North Korean human rights, except for 2006 after the North’s first nuclear test.73 However, since 2008 the South has cooperated with the European Union (EU), Japan and the U.S. to propose and vote for draft resolutions on DPRK human rights.

South Korea’s Grand National Party (GNP) introduced a North Korean human rights bill in the National Assembly for the first time in 2005, but it failed to pass.74 Another

---

66주병철 [Chu Byŏng-ch’ŏl], “북 장교 판문점 통해 첫 귀순/변용관 상위 [First officer from the North to defect through Panmunjom/captain Pyŏn Yong-gwan]”, The Seoul Shinmun, 4 February 1998.
68DPRK officials stated in 1999 and 2001 that the famine caused 220,000 deaths between 1995 and 1998. Other estimates run as high as 3.5 million. However, the likely number of “excess deaths” due to the famine is probably somewhere between 600,000 and 1 million. See Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: markets, aid and reform (New York, 2007), pp. 73-76.
69Kim Jong-il has relied more on the military rather than the party to govern, in contrast to his father. For a brief description of “military first” see Byung Chol Koh, “Military-First Politics’ and Building a ‘Powerful and Prosperous Nation’ in North Korea”, Policy Forum Online, PFO 05-32A, Nautilus Institute, 14 April 2005.
72Crisis Group Report, North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea, op. cit; Crisis Group Asia Report N°200, China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Yellow Sea, 27 January 2011.
74대한변호사협회 및 북한인권시민연합 [Korean Bar Association and the Citizens Alliance for North Korean Human Rights], “북한인권의 현황과 국제캠페인 전략 [North Korean human rights conditions and a strategy for an international campaign]”, joint academic conference proceedings, 26 November 2010, p. 135.
bill also failed to pass the National Assembly in April 2011. However, the U.S. and Japan passed North Korean human rights legislation in 2004 and in 2006 respectively. Amnesty International recently criticised South Korea’s passive response to human rights in the North and abuses under its National Security Law.

As the numbers of defectors has increased, more and more South Koreans (including defectors) are taking collective action to voice their opposition to the DPRK government. Many defectors have become active in the media by publishing internet newspapers and broadcasts. The most prominent defector journalist is Kang Ch’ŏl-hwan, who writes for the conservative Chosun Ilbo, one of the most popular dailies. Other defectors are active in new media and NGOs, but they serve a very narrow audience; the average South Korean is indifferent at best to defector issues. Moreover, many question the credibility of their reporting and the value of the NGO activities.

C. A CHANGING NATION

Racial purity traditionally has been viewed as virtuous and desirable in Korea. Until 2006, biracial South Koreans were not permitted to serve in the military even though they were Korean citizens, and there is mandatory conscription for all men. No biracial Koreans hold public office or positions in government bureaucracies; they have been shunned, and many have been pushed to the entertainment industry, where they are featured as “oddities”. Biracial children are teased and bullied, resulting in high drop-out rates and high unemployment. There are also numerous reports of foreign wives being abused and even murdered.

The topic of multi-ethnicity or biracial citizens was mostly taboo until the U.S. football player Hines Ward won a Super Bowl championship with the Pittsburgh Steelers and visited Korea in 2006.

In North Korea, racial purity is deeply ingrained in the national consciousness and identity. Pregnant defectors repatriated from China reportedly are forced to undergo abortions, and their babies are subject to infanticide if born in detention. The author Brian Myers argues that North Korean ideology is based on a racist world view. According to Myers, North Koreans are indoctrinated to believe they are racially pure and must be protected by the Great Leader from an impure and hostile world. As Marxism has lost its appeal, DPRK propaganda has come to rely more on “racial purity” to differentiate the North from the globalised South.

Non-Koreans are still a rarity in South Korea. As of May 2011, there were 969,507 registered foreigners in the country, making up around 2 per cent of the population.

76 Political parties and South Korea media did not pay much attention to the bill because of by-elections held on 27 April 2011. 조종익 [Cho Jong-ik], “조종익, 북한인권법 4월 처리 요구 고폐 목소[Ruling and opposition parties ignore demands to pass North Korean human rights bill in April]”, The Daily NK, 29 April 2011.

77 Amnesty International also asserted that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea has been losing its independence and authority under its present leadership after failing to speak out or act on some significant human rights issues. “Amnesty International Report 2011: The State of the World’s Human Rights”.


80 Ward is half Korean and half black and was raised by his Korean mother. His visit brought wide-spread media attention along with an awkward visit to the presidential Blue House. Kim Soe-jung, “Hines mania leaves bitter taste in mouths of biracial Koreans”, The Korea Joongang Daily, 17 February 2006; Paul Wiseman, “Ward spins biracial roots into blessing”, USA Today, 10 April 2006.


82 Brian Myers, The cleanest race: how North Koreans see themselves and why it matters (Hoboken, 2010).
2050, this figure is expected to increase to 4.09 million (about 9.8 per cent).\textsuperscript{83} The number of undocumented foreign workers was about 13,000 at the end of 2010, but it is expected to rise to about 27,000 by the end of 2012.\textsuperscript{84} In May 2011, there were 168,450 foreigners in the ROK illegally.\textsuperscript{85}

South Korea exported labour, primarily for construction in the Middle East, from the 1960s to the late 1980s, but since the 1990s it has imported migrant workers, mostly for manual or unskilled labour positions that are undesirable to many Koreans. In 1994, the government introduced an “industrial trainee program” that in reality was a mechanism for importing short-term unskilled workers, who were paid below the minimum wage. The program was changed to an “employment permit system” in 2004 whereby migrant workers could stay for three years with an option to extend for another three years, but many workers begin to establish roots and have incentives to stay.\textsuperscript{86} As the South Korean population ages, the influx of foreign workers is expected to increase.\textsuperscript{87}

Discrimination against outsiders, including ethnic Korean-Chinese, is common, and media warn Koreans about foreign criminal activities.\textsuperscript{88} Media are quick to report crimes or other unsociable activities by Koreans from China but tend to ignore the discrimination they face.\textsuperscript{89} Korean cyberspace is full of bigotry, which has led the National Human Rights Commission to ask the Korea Internet Self-governance Organisation to block racist expressions.\textsuperscript{90} Such an environment will have serious consequences for South Korea’s increasing number of ethnically mixed children, who numbered 44,258 in 2007 and 58,007 in 2008.\textsuperscript{91}
IV. THE PROBLEMS DEFECTORS FACE

North Korean defectors are sicker and poorer than their Southern brethren, with significantly worse histories of nutrition and medical care. They have distinctive accents, use different words and have little experience in the daily demands of life in a developed and open society. In the North, their education, employment, marriage, diet, and leisure were determined by the government, which assigned them to a class of people based on family history and political reliability. In the South, the array of choices presents them with endless difficult decisions that can be overwhelming.

On top of these differences, many have faced arduous journeys through China or other third countries to get to the South. They often have suffered abuse, human trafficking, sexual assault, near-starvation and forced labour on their way. They all live with the possibility that not only will they never see their families again but that their relatives may have been punished, even executed, as a result of their defections. Nevertheless, most South Koreans seem ignorant of their plight. Since only about 20,000 North Korean defectors are in the South, the number is still too small to make a significant impact on society.

A. HEALTH

1. Mental health

Defectors often face serious mental health problems, which in turn make employment and integration that much more difficult. The extent of the problem is unclear, but a number of studies suggest high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. One study found that nearly 30 per cent of defectors have PTSD. Another study showed that at least half of those tested show signs of PTSD and that this was the most important factor limiting adjustment to their new lives, followed by economic status and job status. Shortages of food and water, along with illnesses and no access to medical care, have been cited as key forms of trauma. Asked of their fears during their journey to the South, more than 80 per cent said they had feared for their lives while in hiding. Almost all defectors have suffered some form of trauma before entering South Korea, with the most commonly cited being “witnessing public executions” and “hearing of the death of family members from starvation”. Refugee and defector surveys also reveal multiple sources of trauma and anxiety.

These problems are exacerbated because many defectors do not know how to get treatment even when it is available, while many others are reluctant because they lack awareness or underestimate the seriousness of their conditions. Culturally, Koreans tend to suppress and tolerate mental health problems rather than get treatment, which has resulted in insufficient facilities and systems for identifying and treating disorders. Despite South Korea’s high suicide rate, mental health screening is quite rare in the ROK, although there are no statistics on it. Only 11.4 percent of those with mental health problems had psychological consultation with doctors or counsellors in 2006 compared to 27.8 per cent in the U.S. during 2001-2003. Between 2006 and 2010, the number of South Koreans treated for depression increased 17.3 per cent from about 440,000 to about 517,000, and those treated for bipolar disorder increased 29 per cent from 42,530 to 54,792. However, these figures only reflect the number of people treated over the period, not the number suffering from these problems.

98 “Correlation between traumatic events and post-traumatic stress disorder,” op. cit.
Suicide is the fourth highest cause of death in the ROK, and it has become a serious social problem. While the suicide rate is decreasing in most Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the rate in South Korea has been rising rapidly. From 1990 to 2006, the average suicide rate of OECD countries decreased by 20.4 per cent; however, the rate increased by 172.2 per cent in the ROK. In 2009, the ROK suicide rate was the highest among OECD countries, 28.4 per 100,000 people. This is much higher than second-ranked Hungary (19.6) and third-ranked Japan (19.40). In 2009, suicides accounted for 15,413 of the country’s 246,942 total deaths (6.2 per cent). Former President Roh Moo-hyun committed suicide by jumping off a cliff in May 2009. South Korea’s top universities have also been shaken by suicides.

While the ROK’s mental health infrastructure has much room for improvement, the country’s total health care expenditures amounted to 6.5 per cent of GDP in 2008, the third lowest share among OECD countries. The number of doctors per 1,000 persons was 1.9 in 2008, the second lowest among OECD countries, and the number of nurses also remains far below the number in most OECD countries.

As defectors arrive in a land with inadequate mental health care facilities, those who come alone seem to suffer the worst problems. Families that escape the North together fare better in the long-run, but they are not immune to serious health issues. Heads of families are often overwhelmed when facing the economic pressures of providing childcare, children’s education and the healthcare of elderly parents. According to Yun Yŏ-sang, president of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, many defectors encounter difficulties in the South because of an inferiority complex as they struggle to assimilate. Many of them feel marginalised, discriminated against, excluded and victimised by a systemic bias. South Korean society tends to be clannish, which makes North Korean defectors feel like strangers in their own country.

Many defectors report considerable loneliness in South Korea, compounded by intense guilt over leaving relatives behind. According to Pak Chŏn-ran [Park Jeon-ran], a specialist on defectors at Seoul National University’s Institute for Unification Studies, “the health status of defectors who left their families in the North is five times worse than that of defectors who escaped North Korea with relatives or friends”. She also found in a study that 20 per cent of ailments afflicting defectors were psychosomatic. The medical staff at a government reintegration centre reported that about 70 per cent of their patients exhibited symptoms of depression or other stress-related disorders.

Mental health problems persist for some time after resettlement. Studies in other countries suggest that refugees who have experienced particularly harsh regimes, such as that of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, suffer from PTSD for several years after reaching their host country. The director of a social welfare organisation in Seoul observed that defectors usually experience depression for two to three years upon arriving in the South, because they feel helpless and unable to improve their lives. According to a survey conducted in 2001 and followed up three years later, men were more vulnerable to depression than women. This may be explained by a marked decline in social status among men, who often find it more difficult than women to obtain work in the South.

2. Physical health

North Korea has faced a public health crisis since the mid-1990s. There has been a complete degradation of hospital and other medical services, as well as an enduring problem of malnutrition. The diet has been so poor that many consume about 40 per cent of their food in the form of in-

---

102 Former President Roh Moo-hyun committed suicide by jumping off a cliff in May 2009.
103 South Korea’s top universities have also been shaken by suicides.
104 Crisis Group interview, Yun Yŏ-sang, president of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, Seoul, 14 April 2011.
106 Ibid.
digestible filler from fibrous plant matter and husks. Chronic digestive problems are common due to damage from irregular wild foods eaten during times of severe shortages. Years of poor nutrition and inadequate or non-existent health care have compromised immune systems, which make defectors susceptible to disease, and many poor North Koreans and defectors are infected with parasites. Defectors mostly arrive in the South in poor health and require medical treatment.

In 2007, researchers from Seoul National University disclosed that in interviews conducted with over 200 defectors, 80 per cent indicated they had contracted at least one ailment since arriving in the South. In April of the same year, the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs released a study on the health of 6,500 defectors who had arrived in the South between 2000 and 2005. Some 1.8 per cent were infected with syphilis in 2004 and 2.1 per cent in 2005. About 20 per cent of 700 women aged twenty to forty nine suffered from some type of gynaecological disorder.

The Korea Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) reports that the average height and weight of defectors is much lower than their South Korean counterparts. The average North Korean male defector is 164.4 cm tall and weighs 62.0 kg, compared to the average South Korean man, who stands 171.4 cm tall and weighs 72 kg. The figures for North Korean female defectors and South Korean women are: 154.2 cm and 58.4 cm; 52.8 kg and 57.1 kg. The average teenage male defector’s height is 155.7 cm, 13.5 cm less than the average South Korean counterpart; the average weight is 47.3 kg, 13.5 kg less than that of the South Korean. The average heights and weights for teenage female defectors and South Korean teenage females are: 151.1 cm and 159.4 cm; 46.9 kg and 52.3 kg.

In a recent study that included 109 defectors, with questionnaires and eleven in-depth interviews, the Citizens Alliance for North Korean Human Rights found the subjects to have recurring or chronic health problems. Of those surveyed, 38 visited hospitals or medical clinics ten times or more the previous year, and 30 were hospitalised for at least two days. Twenty-four respondents reported taking medical leave and about one third divulged they “suffered from depression, nightmares, recurring headaches, anger or problems of trust toward people”. While most defectors must be strong to survive the extraordinary hardships in the North and the perilous journey to the South, many must deal with long-term or chronic health issues. For elderly defectors who reach the South, health care is the most urgent problem.

Young children suffer the long-term consequences of early childhood malnutrition. Poor nutrition leads to increased childhood mortality, stunting (low height for age), wasting (low weight for height), and cognitive development problems. Childhood malnutrition and related health problems have a significant impact on an individual’s prospects for education, employment, and life-time income. Studies have shown that early intervention is critical to avert these long-term issues.

To deal with medical issues when defectors arrive in the South, the Hanawon resettlement centre, the government training facility that hosts defectors for three months prior to their release into South Korean society, operates a clinic. In addition, the government provides health care assistance and subsidies to cover treatment at local hospi-

---

113 “The Crumbling state of health care in North Korea”, op. cit.
114 The Korea Centre for Disease Control and Prevention found 35.8 percent of adolescent and 24.6 of adult defectors had parasites, up to twelve times the rate of infection among South Koreans. “N Koreans are smaller, weaker than S Koreans”, The Chosun Ilbo, 17 February 2010.
115 The rate of infection in South Korea was 0.2 per cent in 1995 and 2000, rising to 0.7 per cent in 2005. 백진옥 [Paek Chin-ok], 지현중 [Chi Hyon-jung], 김태균 [Kim T’ae-gyun], 김현숙 [Kim Hyon-suk], 이민길 [Yi Min-gil]. 최근 일반 감강인에서의 매독 유병률 경향: 서울지역 단일 기관에서의 연구 [Recent trends of syphilis prevalence in normal population in Korea: a single center study in Seoul], 대한피부과학회지 [Korean Dermatological Association Journal], vol. 49, no.2, 2011, pp. 107, 109.
116 “In mind, body, North Koreans still suffer after they defect”, op. cit.
117 The figures are from KCDC annual medical examinations for 8,214 defectors who arrived in the ROK from 2005 to 2008. The data here are for those between the ages of thirteen and eighteen and the average differences between the groups. “N Koreans are smaller, weaker than S Koreans”, op. cit.
Health care coverage in the ROK is regulated by The National Health Insurance Act, which was first enacted in 1999 and revised several times, most recently in May 2011. Coverage is mandatory for all ROK citizens, who must register for national health insurance through their employers or residences.

Special subsidies and assistance is provided to disadvantaged through The Medical Care Assistance Act. Families receive “class I medical assistance” if their income is below the minimum subsistence standard as determined by the health & welfare ministry (see Appendix B, Table Two). Other legislation has established special classes that receive class I medical assistance, such as victims of natural disasters, patriotic martyrs and their families, adoptees under eighteen, people of national merit and their families, national human cultural treasures and their families and victims of the 18 May 1980 Kwangju democratisation movement and their families.

With the class I medical assistance, the ROK government pays for most categories of medical care. In 2008, defectors took advantage of class I medical assistance on 301,446 occasions with the government paying ₩9.98 billion ($10 million) of the total ₩10.2 billion cost. Since many defectors require continuous medical treatment, they often avoided seeking employment out of fear they would lose their class I medical assistance. Therefore, from January 2011, defectors receive this benefit for five years after arrival even if they are hired and obtain regular employment health insurance and benefits. In the event of sudden unification, the provision of similar health care subsidies for all Koreans in the North would have significant budgetary consequences. But either grandfathering or repealing the benefits for former defectors in the South likely would face political obstacles.

B. LIVELIHOODS

1. Unemployment

In North Korea, jobs are allocated on the basis of political reliability, family connections and the needs of the state. Many are purely sinecures; work often involves just turning up. Since North Korea’s economic decline and famine in the 1990s, many citizens turned to the unofficial market to trade and acquire resources to survive. The government has acquiesced at times, and it implemented some economic reform measures in July 2002, but it has since moved to reassert strict control over the economy. In particular, it executed a currency reform the first week of December 2009 that eliminated the savings of small traders who earned a living in the market. While rent-seeking opportunities abound for the authorities, private actors remain mired in a world of uncertainty. This absence of developed and institutionalised markets means that the average North Korean is unable to acquire the skills and knowledge to function and operate in the ROK economy.

Being thrown into South Korea’s dynamic and highly competitive society is one of the greatest challenges for defectors. In January 2011, only 50 per cent of defectors were employed (10,248 of 20,539), and most of these were in unskilled manual labour jobs (7,901, or 77 per cent of those

124 Coverage through employers also includes family members for a small fee. Citizens registered through employers must pay a monthly insurance premium based on income and other criteria. Private employers are required to pay 50 per cent of the monthly premium. Citizens registered through their residences must pay a premium based on the member’s income and assets. The coverage requires patients to pay 20 per cent of hospitalisation costs, and 30-60 per cent of outpatient care depending on the type of hospital. Children under six and those over 65 pay reduced fees; those with debilitating diseases such as cancer are only required to pay 5 per cent of the costs for five years.
125 This law first went into effect in December 1977 and has been amended several times, most recently in March 2011, with the change taking effect on 1 July. 의료급여법 [Medical Care Assistance Act], www.law.go.kr.
130 Prior to the policy change in January 2011, upon gaining employment defectors were re-classified to receive the same health insurance as other South Koreans, which in effect eliminated the subsidy for essentially free health care when they found jobs. “2011년부터 이렇게 달라집니다 [From 2011 things will change this way]”, ROK government, 2010, p. 318.
employed). Only 439 defectors (4 per cent) were working in skilled jobs, and 381 were working in administrative positions.\textsuperscript{133} There has been no real progress over the years. For example, a survey in 2006 showed that 45 per cent of defectors were unemployed, and 30 per cent worked half time. Only 12 per cent were self-employed or worked full-time.\textsuperscript{134} Another survey in 2006 showed that about two thirds described themselves as unemployed.\textsuperscript{135} In the same year, 61.9 per cent of South Koreans aged fifteen or over were “economically active” and 59.7 per cent were employed, so only a small fraction of those seeking jobs were unemployed.\textsuperscript{136}

Many defectors become discouraged and simply give up looking for work.\textsuperscript{137} Those who do find work earn on average ₩1.27 million (about $1,170) per month, which is just above the minimum subsistence level for a family of three.\textsuperscript{138}

These levels of unemployment persist despite subsidies for employers who hire defectors; the government provides up to ₩500,000 of monthly salaries for the first year and up to ₩700,000 of monthly salaries for the second year.\textsuperscript{139} The Lee Myung-bak government has tried to ad-

dress the employment problem by making defectors more “employable”. Instead of simply being given a lump sum of cash and released to society, defectors are paid bonuses for earning certificates in vocational programs.

In 2008, the employment and labour ministry spent ₩3.9 billion (about $3.61 million) on job training for 772 defectors, but only 261 (41.3 per cent) were able to find jobs. In 2009, ₩4.0 billion (about $3.7 million) was spent to train 881 defectors, but only 237 (36.9 per cent) found employment.\textsuperscript{140} Some employers hire the workers with the intention of laying them off and hiring new defectors when the government subsidy expires.\textsuperscript{141} In 2001, 251 defectors were employed under the wage subsidy program in 226 firms. By 2009, the number increased to 1,489 in 1,151 firms.\textsuperscript{142} However, a specialist on this issue told Crisis Group that the companies taking advantage of this wage subsidy program are in declining industries and seeking to reduce their wage costs through the subsidies.\textsuperscript{143}

The government has hired very few defectors, and until June 2011, when Cho Myŏng-ch’ŏl was appointed as director of the Education Centre for Unification, none held a high-level position there or in the military.\textsuperscript{144} The competition for government jobs is very intense, and applicants are screened through a rigorous exam process. Without a South Korean education and adequate exam preparation, it is virtually impossible to get hired. However, the public administration and security ministry recently announced a plan to hire administrative assistants beginning 1 February 2011; it is expected to take about 200 defectors in to government jobs,\textsuperscript{145} and as of May 2011, 50 had been hired.\textsuperscript{146}

Despite government initiatives, unemployment remains a problem, and most employed defectors find their jobs through friends, family, neighbours or newspapers adver-
tisements.\textsuperscript{147} Most NGOs working with defectors and resettlement issues agree that employment prospects must improve if defectors are to integrate successfully into society.

2. Cultural barriers

Upon arrival, most defectors feel a sense of relief having escaped from the North, and they are very optimistic about the future.\textsuperscript{148} But they tend to underestimate the cultural differences and the type of adjustments they will have to make. What are considered normal and necessary activities in a liberal market-oriented society can be daunting for those from centralised and strictly controlled North Korea. Although they do not miss the oppression in the North, many of the defectors reminisce about the simplicity of a situation in which everything is decided by the government.\textsuperscript{149} Adapting to a free and open society is difficult for many.\textsuperscript{150}

North Koreans are taught that money is “an instrument of slavery” in capitalist society, symbolising selfishness and evil. In a study by Dr Jeon Woo-taek [Chon U-t’ae] at Yonsei University Medical School, nearly 80 per cent of the defectors surveyed felt ambivalent towards money.\textsuperscript{151} One respondent said, “I do not want to be a slave to money. But at the same time, I desperately need money to live in this society. At first, when I received money after I gave my first anti-communism lecture in South Korea, I felt insulted; because in North Korea, a lecture could not be regarded as labour, and I did that from my heart. But if I take money, it looks like I am only speaking for financial gain”.\textsuperscript{152}

Productivity in the South is significantly higher than in the North. Defectors have said that if they had worked in the North as hard as South Koreans, they would have been treated as “enthusiastic elements,” not always a good thing as jealousy could lead to problems with co-workers.\textsuperscript{153} When participating in group indoctrination and self-criticism meetings in the North, those who are viewed as too enthusiastic in criticising others face peer retribution.\textsuperscript{154} Southerners are seen as individualistic, independent and active, and North Koreans are viewed as passive and dependent.\textsuperscript{155} This is often seen as “laziness” or “bad communist habits” by Southern colleagues. On the other hand, defectors often see Southern individualism as selfish and aggressively competitive. Defectors are also hampered by insufficient computer and English skills when seeking employment.

3. Debts and money

Many defectors reach the South with the help of people known as brokers.\textsuperscript{156} The journey can cost anywhere from $2,500 to $15,000. Many brokers will defer payment until the government in Seoul has paid resettlement money.\textsuperscript{157} To prevent a developing business in bringing defectors to the South, in 2005 the government cut the payments from a W10 million (about $9,400) lump sum to W6 million (about $5,600) paid out over several years.\textsuperscript{158} This has left many defectors with considerable debts. Some are repeat-


\textsuperscript{148} Crisis Group interviews, Seoul.

\textsuperscript{149} The transition is especially difficult for the elderly. For example, one elderly gentleman told Crisis Group about the anxiety he felt when he had to buy clothing. He appreciated the abundance of consumer goods but lamented how stressful it was to select the appropriate style of many, compare prices and quality, etc. He said it was so much easier just to get issued a shirt and not have to worry about all this. Crisis Group interviews, Seoul.

\textsuperscript{150} “Cold reception, lack of jobs worry defectors”, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{153} “새터민의 취업과 직장생활 갈등에 관한 연구 [A study on conflicts in the workplace of North Korean refugees]”, op. cit., pp. 29-52.

\textsuperscript{154} North Koreans frequently attend indoctrination meetings where party officials encourage participants to expose faults and report misdeeds of others. However, serious criticism of others is generally avoided unless an individual has committed a severe transgression that would bring collective punishment. The discussions usually turn to mundane topics such as “watching too much television” or “smoking too many cigarettes” and subsequent vows to focus more on upholding the teachings of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Crisis Group interviews, Seoul.

\textsuperscript{155} Crisis Group interview, Yang Yong-ch’ang, dean of student affairs, 자유시민대학 [Civic College for Freedom], a Christian NGO for defector re-settlement education, Seoul, 23 March 2007. The college was established in 1999 and offers six-month education programs to help defectors assimilate into South Korean society, www.freecitizen.kr.

\textsuperscript{156} Crisis Group Report, Perilous Journeys, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{157} Crisis Group interview, Chong Yu-gun, director, North Korean defector resettlement support team, Seoul Yangch’ŏn-gu Red Cross Service Centre, Seoul, 20 March 2007.

\textsuperscript{158} This lump sum has been reduced several times. At one point, the amount was W36 million [about $34,000] in addition to the housing subsidy which was W528,000 [about $500] per month, as noted in “Cold reception, lack of jobs worry defectors”, op. cit.
edly visited and threatened by brokers to repay.\textsuperscript{159} Debts have forced people to take whatever jobs come along and have led some women into the sex industry.\textsuperscript{160} “Some young female defectors work as prostitutes. It is hard for them to resist that sort of easy money when facing such high debts”.\textsuperscript{161}

A journalist who spent time with adolescent defectors found that they either spent money extravagantly or simply misplaced it.\textsuperscript{162} In one instance, a boy had lost the equivalent of about $2,000 in cash. Lacking money management skills, few defectors are able to save.\textsuperscript{163} In addition, they are often the victims of crimes. At least one in five Northerners falls prey to fraud, a rate more than 40 times higher than the national average.\textsuperscript{164} In most cases the frauds are carried out by fellow defectors borrowing money and not repaying it, running pyramid schemes or offering to get relatives out of the North but never delivering. These experiences have increased suspicions, as most defectors feel they cannot trust anyone in South Korean society.\textsuperscript{165}

As the number of defectors has increased, more are sending remittances to their relatives in the North. The DPRK does not have the banking system to accept wire transfers, so defectors rely upon brokers or Chinese traders who act as middlemen to deliver cash. Middlemen usually take 30 per cent, and many defectors confirm the delivery through mobile phone calls.\textsuperscript{166} In December 2010, the Database Centre for North Korean Human Rights polled 396 defectors and found that 49.5 per cent said they had sent remittances to their families in the DPRK. The ROK government estimates that defector remittances now amount to about $10 million per year. Those who send cash usually send the equivalent of about $1,000 to $2,000 annually.\textsuperscript{167}

Defector remittances have come under government scrutiny in the wake of the attacks against the Ch’ŏn’an and Yŏng’ŏng Island in 2010. In May 2010, Seoul imposed unilateral sanctions against Pyongyang, and most trade and investment has been suspended. In May 2011, the MOU indicated it has submitted a bill to revise the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act; if passed, it would require defectors to receive ROK government approval before sending remittances.\textsuperscript{168} However, it is unclear whether the government will be able to monitor and block transfers, since the amounts are small and flow through irregular channels.\textsuperscript{169} The ministry will review transfers case-by-case and does not intend to block small remittances sent to family members with a humanitarian objective, though some officials and analysts argue all foreign exchange to the DPRK should be blocked. Some defectors have vowed to resist or circumvent any government policy to block their cash transfers.\textsuperscript{170} Furthermore, the remittances signal South Korean prosperity to citizens in the North, which could be subversive in the long run.\textsuperscript{171}

\section{C. Discrimination}

Defectors are frequently victims of an array of prejudices about Northerners that developed during the decades when both sides demonised each other. Few South Koreans know much about the North; indeed many defectors are shocked how little they even care. South Koreans tend to underestimate or ignore the cultural differences between the two Koreas and assume that any burdens of adjustment and assimilation fall upon defectors. Koreans generally apply different standards for cultural integration; foreigners who speak a few simple words of Korean will be praised repeatedly and told they speak Korean so well, but ethnic Koreans who grew up abroad are harshly ridiculed if they are unable to speak like a native. Neo-Confucianism extols the “doctrine of the mean” and is intolerant of anything but the “right way”. Consequently, this cultural perspec-

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{159}장벽 넘어 장벽 ‘새터’ 못 찾는 새터민 [A barrier beyond the barrier, new settlers who can’t find their ‘settlement’], op. cit.
\textsuperscript{161}Crisis Group interview, Chŏng Yu-gûn, director, North Korean defector resettlement support team, Seoul Yangch’on-gu Red Cross Service Centre, Seoul, 20 March 2007.
\textsuperscript{163}장벽 넘어 장벽 ‘새터’ 못 찾는 새터민 [A barrier beyond the barrier, new settlers who can’t find their ‘settlement’], op. cit.
\textsuperscript{165}1 out of 5 North Korean defectors swindled”, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{166}Some defectors do not disclose they are in the ROK because they fear it could endanger their relatives, so instead tell them they are working in China. Crisis Group interviews, Seoul.
\textsuperscript{167}Song Sang-ho, “Remittance to N.K. helps enlighten about South Korea: defector”, \textit{The Korea Herald}, 13 February 2011.
\textsuperscript{168}Kim So-hyun, “Seoul tightens rules on cash flow to North Korea”, \textit{The Korea Herald}, 23 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{169}Song Sang-ho, “N Korea defectors slam remittance approval plan”, \textit{The Korea Herald}, 26 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{170}Kim Young-jin, “NK defectors vow to fight Seoul’s control on remittances”, \textit{The Korea Times}, 29 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{171}The DPRK authorities have stopped punishing recipients of cash from relatives in the South because there are too many cases now, and it only draws attention to the issue. Furthermore, the cash is a safety valve for the faltering DPRK economy. Crisis Group interview, MOU official, Seoul, 27 May 2011.
\end{flushleft}
tive focuses on differences, which inherently are viewed as "wrong".

1. Language

Most of the variance in Korean language is due to accents. The language spoken throughout the peninsula is intelligible to other Korean speakers, but with distinct differences in pronunciation and intonation. Native speakers can immediately identify someone who speaks with another regional accent.

As communication between North and South Korea has been minimal in the past 60 years, it is not surprising that the language has diverged. The sentence structures and basic vocabulary have largely remained the same. However, North Korean language policy has been influenced by Kim Il-sung's chuch'e philosophy, which was reflected in two major directives by Kim in January 1964 and May 1966. These prescriptive language policies aimed to purge foreign words and also prohibited the use of Chinese characters, even though 60 per cent to 70 per cent of the Korean lexicon comes from Chinese characters.

After Kim's 1966 directive, the country began a "campaign for cultural language" to eliminate Sino-Korean words and foreign words in the standard language. Kim Jong-il also issued a language directive, in 1992, called "chuch'e literature theory".

The different international orientations and development strategies of the two Koreas have also affected modern language usage. The DPRK economy is autarkic, but the ROK economy is affected by globalisation, including linguistic influences. South Koreans commonly insert English lexicon into colloquial speech even though pure Korean words could be used instead, which is extremely frustrating to North Koreans with very limited exposure to or understanding of English.

Several defectors said that language differences are very troubling and that resettlement education at Hanawŏn should dedicate more time to them. They usually say language is as critical when assimilating in the South as other problems, such as cultural differences, personal economic problems and employment prospects. In the ROK, many English words have been adopted for new technologies and products either because they originated abroad or South Koreans have a global market in mind when developing products. However, the North Korean technical and mechanical lexicon has been influenced by Russian, so words for common technologies or machines are either unintelligible or sound extremely odd to the South Korean ear.

Defectors who work in the service industry have more difficulties with language barriers and are often unaware of basic words. New vocabulary can be learned easily but masking an accent is more difficult. Many defectors blame this for making them stand out and blocking employment prospects. One defector said how much easier her life became after she was able to change her accent; South Koreans began to treat her differently. However, another defector said he refuses to change his accent and immediately tells South Koreans he is from the North. He said he would rather know whether anyone holds that against him, but he also resents the discrimination he has experienced.

To address the divergences in the language, the two governments agreed in October 2004 to compile a joint dictionary. The agreement provided for conferences four
times a year, and the joint panel aimed to compile a 300,000-word dictionary by 2012 (subsequently revised to 2013). However, the two countries have had to negotiate politically charged words, which they have agreed to omit along with many English words adopted for colloquial use in the South. These restrictions have eliminated many words most needed by defectors in the ROK. The dictionary was 56.7 per cent complete in 2010, but the ROK government suspended funding for the project after the sinking of the Ch’ŏn’an, so the 2013 target date will almost certainly be missed.

2. Visibility and prejudice

Media coverage of defectors often has been negative. For example, an article headlined “More defectors rely on crimes for living” referred to criminal acts by defectors and asserted that “crimes by defectors are also getting more pervasive and grave” but provided no evidence of worsening rates. It also cited experts as saying “North Korean defectors are easily involved in crimes because of their inadequate knowledge of capitalism and insufficient government support”. Another article cited statistics indicating that the crime rate among defectors was twice that of South Koreans. Until 2004, the National Police Agency had a policy of publicising crimes attributed specifically to North Korean defectors, but it has since stopped. Social workers report a widespread perception of defectors as noisy, heavy drinking, and troublesome neighbours.

sixth year after the South and North joined hands to compile the “National Grand Dictionary” it faces a crisis of running aground”, The Hankyoreh, 4 October 2010; Choi Jae-bong, “Integrated Korean dictionary faces funding crisis”, The Hankyoreh, 5 October 2010.

The project was supported by ROK legislation that was passed in April 2007. 조선민주주의인민공화국민정부통일부법 [Act on the North-South Joint Compilation of the National Grand Dictionary], revised 28 April 2011, www.law.go.kr.

The first six digits of a national identification registration number begin with the person’s birth year, month and date, followed by a hyphen and a seven digit number. The first digit indicates gender (one for male and two for female), followed by a two-digit number that identifies the location of registration centre to make it impossible for them to be identified in the sinking of the Ch’ŏn’an, so the 2013 target date will almost certainly be missed.

They are seen as benefiting from generous state subsidies while poorer South Koreans lack the same advantages. Although South Koreans acknowledge difficult conditions in the North and feel sympathy, this does not necessarily extend to defectors personally. They are often treated in the same dismissive manner as immigrants and are viewed as inferior and lacking sophistication. One study found that South Koreans commonly see defectors as being ruthless for having left their families behind, as having betrayed people and relying on handouts rather than working for themselves.

It has been easy to identify defectors because of their resident registration number, which appears on ROK citizen identity cards. The second and the third of the last seven digits of the number indicate the place of registration. Until June 2007, all defectors were registered in Ansŏng City, home to the Hanawŏn resettlement centre, and so share the same two digits, which are known to the public. People with the Ansŏng City code, even those born there, find it difficult to obtain work and are routinely rejected for Chinese visas because the authorities in Beijing are concerned that they may be travelling there to meet family.

The number is used in many daily transactions, such as endorsing a check or opening a bank account, making defectors feel vulnerable to prejudice. Several groups, including the Association for North Korean Defectors and the Committee for North Korean Democratisation, pressed the government to issue registration numbers using the location where defectors first live after leaving the resettlement centre to make it impossible for them to be identified in this way. In 2007, the government began issuing num-

184 The project was supported by ROK legislation that was passed in April 2007. 거래말큰사전남북공동편찬사업협약법 [Act on the North-South Joint Compilation of the National Grand Dictionary], revised 28 April 2011, www.law.go.kr.


186 “남북 손잡고 6년째 편찬 ‘거래말큰사전’ 좌초위기 직면 [In the sixth year after the South and North joined hands to compile the “National Grand Dictionary” it faces a crisis of running aground]”, op. cit.; “Integrated Korean dictionary faces funding crisis”, op. cit.


189 “Cold reception, lack of jobs worry defectors”, op. cit.

185 The first six digits of a national identification registration number begins with the person’s birth year, month and date, followed by a hyphen and a seven digit number. The first digit indicates gender (one for male and two for female), followed by a two-digit number that identifies the location of registration and then four random digits. The identification numbers for those registered in Ansŏng City area are: ******-125**** for males, and ******-225**** for females. 정해원 [Chŏng Hye-


191 The first six digits of a national identification registration number begins with the person’s birth year, month and date, followed by a hyphen and a seven digit number. The first digit indicates gender (one for male and two for female), followed by a two-digit number that identifies the location of registration and then four random digits. The identification numbers for those registered in Ansŏng City area are: ******-125**** for males, and ******-225**** for females. 정해원 [Chŏng Hye-

192 The first six digits of a national identification registration number begins with the person’s birth year, month and date, followed by a hyphen and a seven digit number. The first digit indicates gender (one for male and two for female), followed by a two-digit number that identifies the location of registration and then four random digits. The identification numbers for those registered in Ansŏng City area are: ******-125**** for males, and ******-225**** for females. 정해원 [Chŏng Hye-

193 The first six digits of a national identification registration number begins with the person’s birth year, month and date, followed by a hyphen and a seven digit number. The first digit indicates gender (one for male and two for female), followed by a two-digit number that identifies the location of registration and then four random digits. The identification numbers for those registered in Ansŏng City area are: ******-125**** for males, and ******-225**** for females. 정해원 [Chŏng Hye-
bers based on initial residence after leaving Hanawŏn. The Association for North Korean Defectors has called for new identity card numbers for those already in the South. In 30 January 2009, the Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaped from North Korea was revised, and according to Article 19-3, a defector can apply to change the registration number if it has been issued based on the Hanawŏn resettlement centre.

### D. WOMEN

Women often suffer from the mental and physical effects of sexual assault and forced prostitution during their journeys to the South. Almost all female defectors (94.1 per cent) transit and stay in a third country before entering the ROK, 90.3 per cent of them in China. While in China, many marry Chinese men or ethnic Koreans living there to avoid repatriation to the DPRK. Others are trafficked and forced into marriages through coercion or deception. According to a survey of 401 female defectors conducted by the Seoul Foundation of Women and Family in October 2009, 59.1 per cent responded that they were unemployed while in a third country before arriving in the ROK. In order to survive, many married. In a sample of 177 from the same study, 61.6 per cent did so once, 35.6 per cent twice and 2.8 per cent three times or more. This study also revealed that 41.5 per cent were still with their spouses, but that 24.6 per cent had never married, 15.7 per cent were widowed, 13.4 per cent divorced and 4.7 per cent separated.

Although many of the female defectors in China are traded or trafficked in a marriage system, some of them are forced into the sex industry and work in brothels or karaoke bars. In China, women are more likely to be trafficked into forced marriages, because the Chinese government enforces anti-prostitution laws relatively strictly, but in South East Asia, women more often end up in the sex industry. This experience exposes these women to gynaecological health risks in addition to psychological trauma.

However, once in the South, many women adapt more easily than male defectors. According to a social worker working with women defectors, “female defectors feel the sense of freedom here.” Women’s relatively higher social status in South Korea and increased job opportunities often allow them to demand more equality with their husbands. This has also been a source of tension within families, because of changed expectations regarding family roles in the South. Male defectors also have a higher rate of alcohol dependency (55 per cent) than their female counterparts (27 per cent).

Many women who make it to the South have left behind spouses and children in the North or in China, where children who are born there are stateless. Some women sub-

---

204 Ibid, p. 80.
206 이금순 [Im Kım-sun], “북한여성의 이주출신인과 인권문제 [Seminar regarding North Korean defector women]”, The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, April 2007, p. 11.
207 As noted above, according to a survey of 700 women between the ages of twenty and 40 at the Hanawŏn resettlement facility, one out of five suffered from gynaecological disorders. “In mind, body, North Koreans still suffer after they defect”, op. cit.
208 A survey of 63 defectors conducted in April 2010 found the men to be less satisfied with their lives in the South than the women. 김용태 [Kim Yong-t'ae], 배철호 [Pae Ch’ŏl-ho], “북한이탈주민의 지역사회적응과 생활지원 방안 [A program for North Korean defectors’ regional social adaptation and livelihood support], 한국경찰학회보 [Korean Association of Police Science Review], vol. 25, 2010, p. 103.
209 Crisis Group interview, Ch’oi Mi-yŏn, social worker, Defector Resettlement Support Centre, Yangch’ŏn-gu Hanbit general social welfare organisation, Seoul, 21 March 2007.
sequently remarry in the South. A social worker told Crisis Group that double marriages and mixed forms of families are emerging problems for women defectors. “I know one defector who has three sons through marriage and cohabitation, all with different surnames living together, one from North Korea, one from China and one in South Korea. Her case is somewhat extreme, but many single female defectors have children with different men”. A newly revised law on the protection of North Korea defectors that came into effect in January 2007 allows defectors to divorce spouses still in North Korea. In the first such cases, the Seoul Family Court allowed thirteen defectors to divorce in June 2007.

E. CHILDREN

North Korean children are now physically distinctive from their peers in the South because many are stunted as a result of famine. These children and teenagers often struggle to develop personal relationships in the ROK. In addition to the general difficulties of adjusting to South Korean society, they often exhibit anxiety caused by their experiences in North Korea, uncertainty over their future and their confusion over how their past fits into their identities.

Out of fear of discrimination, adolescent defectors tend to hide their origins. Facing a constant struggle to conceal their true identities, their past becomes a constant mental burden. A 25-year old defector told Crisis Group that his North Korean accent and his efforts to adapt in the south result in enforcing South Korean stereotypes that defectors are irrational, untrustworthy or violent. A South Korean scholar has warned that discrimination against defectors and other minorities in the South could lead to home-grown terrorists venting their frustration through violence.

The number of school-age defectors is increasing. In 2005, 724 youths came to the South, and the number steadily has risen with 841 in 2006, 1,050 in 2007, 1,319 in 2008, 1,478 in 2009, and 1,711 in 2010, accounting for about 12 per cent of the total entrants. About 83 per cent enrol in regular schools, and about 9 per cent pursue their education at alternative schools. Han’gyö Middle and High School is a specialised school for North Korean teenagers, and about ten other private institutes support education with financial assistance from the government. In 2009, the government eased regulations to make it easier to establish alternative schools that can be designed to fit the particular education needs of children who lived in the DPRK.

Parents find it overwhelming to deal with the multitude of choices to be made about their children’s education. The


221 Alternative schools are divided into two categories: authorised and unauthorised. Crisis Group interview, Ch’ŏi Mi-yŏn, social worker, Defector Resettlement Support Centre, Yangch’ŏn-hu Hanbit general social welfare organisation, Seoul, 21 March 2007.

222 Crisis Group interview, Yun Yŏ-sang, president of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), Seoul, 14 April 2011.
ROK’s education system emphasises test scores and is fiercely competitive. Children and youth from the North have a difficult time adjusting to it.\textsuperscript{222} The drop-out rate of North Korean children enrolled in middle school and high school from late 2003 to late 2004 was 13.7 per cent compared to 1.95 per cent for their southern counterparts.\textsuperscript{224} The drop-out rate was 11.9 per cent in 2006, 17.9 per cent in 2007, 11.0 per cent in 2008, and 8.8 per cent in 2009.\textsuperscript{225} As expected, the lack of a high school diploma affects job prospects.

Children and youth from the DPRK are at an extreme disadvantage, as their previous studies in North Korea are of little use. Education for many has been disrupted due to food shortages in the North and lengthy journeys to the South. Many are placed in classes with students who are much younger. This in turn creates difficulties, as age plays an important role in establishing hierarchies among people in South Korea.\textsuperscript{226}

Unlike in North Korea, private tutoring is an important part of South Korean education. Parents of defector students are often dismayed when they discover their children’s entire education is not covered by the public school system. More than 80 per cent of students attend university in the South, while in North Korea university attendance is reserved for a small minority from the elite. Although North Korean defectors can receive financial aid for university or college – 100 per cent if they are admitted to national universities and 50 per cent at private universities\textsuperscript{227} – defector families are not prepared for the intense competition for admission that absorbs much of adolescent life for Southerners. Failing to attend university or college is a huge obstacle to success, as one’s alma mater contributes heavily to future opportunities in South Korean society.

\textsuperscript{222}배임호[Pae Im-ho], 양영은[Yang Yong-ŏn], “학업중단 북한이탈 청소년의 적응과정에 관한 점적연구[A study on the adaptation process of North Korean immigrant youth discontinuing formal education]”, 사회복지연구, vol. 41, no. 4, 한국사회복지연구회, p. 197.

\textsuperscript{224}권혁철[Kwŏn Hyŏk-ch’ŏl], “탈북 청소년 90% 북한에서 학력결손 [90 per cent of North Korean children had insufficient education in North Korea too]”, The Hankyoreh, 28 November 2004.

\textsuperscript{225}“북한이탈주민 정착지원 현황과 정부의 역할 [Current status of settlement support for North Korean defectors and the government role]”, internal MOU document, no date.

\textsuperscript{226}In the Korean language, there are different words and verb infixes and endings that are specific to the age of the person being addressed.

\textsuperscript{227}“북한이탈주민 정착지원 현황과 정부의 역할 [Current status of settlement support for North Korean defectors and the government role]”, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{229}For more information, see Eugene Yim, “The first four months of resettlement for North Koreans”, 26 July 2006, http://med/stanford.edu.

\textsuperscript{230}“북한이탈주민 정착지원 현황과 정부의 역할 [Current status of settlement support for North Korean defectors and the government role]”, op. cit.

which is scheduled to open in late 2012 and will have a capacity of 500 residents.  

Defectors attend 420 hours of classes covering the skills needed for daily life and some vocational training. They are taught some English words used in the South and basic computer literacy. The centre organises job fairs to introduce them to potential employers. It also provides medical care on site. The training is very limited, and defectors are expected to master an almost entirely different culture in about three months while often recovering from the emotional and physical trauma of their escape from the North. Therefore, the ROK government increased the budget for the four main subject areas at Hanawon from ￦68.7 billion (about $64 million) in 2009 to ￦90 billion (about $84 million) in 2010, an increase of 31 per cent.  

On the third Thursday of each month, one group of defectors is released from Hanawon at dawn and handed over to other organisations.

2. Long-term support  

After completing the training in Hanawon, defectors can receive additional assistance, including financial assistance, regional adaptation education, employment support, education support and medical support. They receive an individual base payment of ￦6 million (about $5,600) and other bonuses. Additional payments are provided for those over 60, single parents, and the physically handicapped (see Appendix B, Table Two). Defectors can receive incentive payments or subsidies (up to ￦24.4 million, about $22,900) when they attend job training, find employment and acquire certifications. In light of problems with defectors handing over their settlement money to brokers or swindlers, additional money is paid in tranches. 

Defectors are helped by a network of private and public institutions. There are 30 regional Hana Centres that provide assistance to complete residence registration paperwork, information on job training, employment and other administrative necessities when a defector moves into a new residence. Police stations maintain “Community Security Cooperation Committees” that include officers, lawyers, doctors, and teachers, etc., to support defectors as they adjust to society.  

There are more than 700 officers at district police stations to help defectors and provide counselling for protection. Before the number of arrivals rose so steeply, these officers were often the greatest help to defectors. However, their workload has increased to the point where they can no longer provide sustained handholding. For example, one police officer takes care of fifteen defectors in Kumi City, North Kyongsang Province. It is widely recognised that more officers are needed to manage the increasing number of defectors.  

The housing and employment officials working with defectors have been less successful, particularly those involved with job hunting. The labour ministry’s Work Information Centres are severely understaffed; one office had only a single official for 900 defectors living in a dis-
trict. In 2009, there were 81 Employment Information Service Centres nation-wide, and the government has been trying to strengthen employment support services the last two years. Among them, 55 centres with 55 counsellors provide support services to defectors, but at least three of them are understaffed.

Although numerous private organisations have been involved in resettlement, a real partnership between the public and private sectors is lacking. A social worker told Crisis Group that the government only partially supports the private sector, and the efforts of the different agencies remain uncoordinated. But according to Yun Yŏ-sang, president of the Database Centre for North Korean Human Rights, money is not a problem; the government is very generous in funding numerous programs, but there is no sustained or detailed follow-up to assess which work well. Without evaluation, neither the government nor the private sector can identify and support the programs that are most effective and efficient.

3. The North Korean Refugees Foundation

The programs and related assistance from government agencies have been fragmented and not monitored effectively. In order to address this problem, in 2010, the government amended the Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaped from North Korea to establish the North Korean Refugees Foundation (北韓難民支援財団), which aims to provide more professional and specific support.

The foundation was established in September 2010 to coordinate and support long-term assistance for defectors after they leave Hanawŏn. It has about 60 staff and directs defectors to appropriate organisations, such as the Red Cross, for assistance. The foundation has the support of about 800 government officials who provide personal security, about 200 who provide home security, and 55 government security staff for workplaces. Its Research Support Centre collects and analyses data to provide feedback and support for resettlement. On 30 May 2011, the foundation opened a 24-hour call centre with eight counsellors (four of whom defected from the North) to assist defectors with urgent problems.

B. NON-GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES

1. Local social welfare organisations

The number of NGOs dealing with defectors began to increase around 2005, and their role also began to grow. Most of them are small and provide counselling and referrals to local social services. Providing services through a large number of small operators has provided some flexibility. Those operating in neighbourhoods favoured by families focus on such issues as education and job support. In areas where young women predominate, the groups have concentrated on issues tailored to their needs. The North Korean Refugees Foundation now recognises 65 NGOs that are authorised to work with it and defectors.

Despite these programs, defectors who have just graduated from Hanawŏn are slow to take advantage of these services, and it is difficult for the social workers to draw them in. A social worker observed that immediately after completing the Hanawŏn program, defectors seem to be focused only on earning money and usually ignore the advice of social workers, preferring to listen to other de-

244 2010년 고용노동부서 [2010 Employment and Labour Policy]”, employment and labour ministry, 2010, p. 25
248 Crisis Group interview, Yun Yŏ-sang, president of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), Seoul, 14 April 2011.
249 “북한이탈주민 정착지원 현황과 정부의 역할 [Current status of settlement support for North Korean defectors and the government role]”, op. cit.
252 The list of organisations is available on the North Korean Refugees Foundation’s website. See “소속단체명단 [Affiliated organisation list]”, at www.dongposarang.or.kr/private/position.php.
factors.\textsuperscript{254} Only after failing to find a job or settle into life do they reach out.\textsuperscript{255}

2. The Korean Red Cross

The Korean Red Cross looks after a considerable number of defectors once they leave Hanawon.\textsuperscript{256} Volunteers from the organisation’s nationwide network assist defectors for a year, guiding them through paper work and settling into new apartments.\textsuperscript{257} When defectors require specialised expertise, such as psychological counselling or employment services, the volunteers refer them to welfare organisations. Volunteers visit twice a month, providing considerable personal attention.\textsuperscript{258} This type of care often creates close bonds and builds trust, something that is lacking with many professional social workers. Defectors generally prefer to work with the Red Cross rather than other welfare organisations.\textsuperscript{259}

3. NGOs

A large number of NGOs are involved in the resettlement process, mostly operating with little coordination with the government. Several NGO workers complained that the government and NGOs rarely discussed their activities, resulting in “high costs and low effectiveness”.\textsuperscript{260} A frequent complaint is that the government rarely discusses changes to resettlement policies with NGOs. Rather than work together to adjust policies, NGOs feel the unification ministry only issues directives and expects them to fall into line. NGOs particularly sense this attitude when they receive funding from the MOU, which they consider expects them to be grateful for the financial support.\textsuperscript{261}

The North Korean Refugees Foundation was established to address these problems, but it is too early to evaluate its effectiveness.\textsuperscript{262}

Civic College for Freedom. This church-funded “college” offers resettlement education to 50 adults at a time and has graduated 433 defectors.\textsuperscript{263} To be eligible, students must have already lived in the South for between six months and five years\textsuperscript{264} and have developed some ideas on what they need from the program.\textsuperscript{265} For the first six months of the eight-month program, the students learn about South Korean society and culture. After that they choose elective classes in college or courses for employment preparation. The college sees its goal as enabling defectors to be competitive in the labour market and providing links to vocational institutes where they can take courses. Yang Yong-ch’ang, former dean of student affairs, said graduates typically rate themselves an average of three years ahead of other defectors in their resettlement process.\textsuperscript{266} As of May 2011, graduates of the program have been able to open eight convenience stores with the support from Good People, a Christian NGO affiliated with the Civic College for Freedom.\textsuperscript{267}

Good Friends. A Buddhist human rights NGO, Good Friends runs a “good neighbours” program in which defectors are paired with volunteers who provide assistance with the basics of surviving daily life. While this program has been successful, it is quite small and serves only a fraction of the need among defectors for continuing assistance.\textsuperscript{268} Good Friends also holds a sports competition festival for reunification and a field trip program on South Korean history for Hanawon residents.\textsuperscript{269}

4. Religious organisations

There is no religious freedom in the North, with only a handful of government-controlled churches and temples operating, but most defectors say they follow some faith. A 2003 survey found that nearly 70 per cent were religious.

\textsuperscript{262} The unification ministry asserts it has made extensive efforts to consult with NGOs, and the ministry established the North Korean Refugees Foundation as a result. Crisis Group email correspondence with MOU official, 13 July 2011.

\textsuperscript{263} News at the Civic College for Freedom website, www.freecitizen.kr.

\textsuperscript{264} Announcement at the Civic College for Freedom website, www.freecitizen.kr.

\textsuperscript{265} Crisis Group interview, Yang Yong-ch’ang, dean of student affairs, Civic College for Freedom, Seoul, 23 March 2007.

\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{267} Announcement at the Civic College for Freedom website, www.freecitizen.kr.

\textsuperscript{268} “Welcome to the 21\textsuperscript{st} century: North Korean refugees in South Korea”, Refugees International, 17 December 2003.

\textsuperscript{269} Good Friends website, www.goodfriends.or.kr/community/community1.html.
and three quarters of those surveyed identified themselves as Christians.270 Another report put the percentage of Christian defectors between 80 per cent and 90 per cent.271 Christian churches have become popular among defectors as organisers of defector groups and advocates for human rights in the North. “The South Korean government has been guilty of neglecting its duty. We have been silent too long – we have forgotten about it too long”, said Kim Hyŏn-ŭk, a leader at the Catholic Lay Apostolate Council of Korea.272

Since the mid-1990s, a growing number of South Korean and Korean-American missionaries have been working along the China-DPRK border, proselytising and distributing bibles. They also provide money for defectors to reach South East Asia, from where they can travel to Seoul. After being introduced to Christianity during this arduous journey, many defectors start worshipping at churches once they get to South Korea. In March 2000, 66.2 per cent of defectors surveyed were Christians upon arrival at Hanawŏn. A follow-up survey of defectors revealed that 76.2 per cent practiced Christianity in 2001, and in 2004, 61.6 per cent continued to practice the religion.273 An entire floor of the education building at Hanawŏn is devoted to religious education.

Kang Ch’ŏl-ho, a defector, founded his own Peace Unification Church that is mostly attended by others from the DPRK. As well as services, it provides support to defectors, even helping them set up businesses. Two food manufacturers founded by members of the church work out of the same building and have been among the most successful started by defectors.274 Some South Korean churches hold special services for defectors and provide an array of support services.275 Others also give material and financial assistance, but the appeal is mostly spiritual.276 “Mentally, Christianity helps a lot.

When you are going through a lot of hardships, religion is the only thing you can rely on”, said a defector.277 In a survey examining why defectors attend church, 69.4 per cent cited peace of mind, 41.8 per cent living a moral life, 35.7 per cent to have a relationship with South Koreans and 21.4 per cent to get useful information about settling in South Korea.278

Nevertheless, Kang Ch’ŏl-ho points to problems in the way some churches support defectors.279 Financial aid leads some to view churches primarily as a source of money rather than spiritual guidance. Kang says he often receives phone calls from defectors asking, “how much money does your church give when defectors register?” He also points out that some defectors stop attending services once the cash stops or they register with several churches at the same time to receive multiple benefits. Some churches require a profession of faith and disclosure of past experiences, particularly hardships, in front of the congregation. This, Kang contends, is counter-productive and often traumatic. Some defectors feel conflicted about religion, since the fervour of some churches feels reminiscent of the worship of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.280

Buddhist orders and temples also provide special services for defectors. For example, the Han’gyŏl Buddhist Order has operated as part of the formal South Korean education system since the mid-1990s.281

5. Alternative schools

Some ten special schools for young defectors have been founded, mostly by NGOs. They offer short-term classes in a full range of subjects but have not been acknowledged as part of the formal South Korean education sys-
tem and cannot award recognised diplomas. They concentrate on filling gaps in the education that children receive in the North, particularly in English, Korean and social studies. However, in 2010, Yŏmyŏng [Yeomyung] School became the first alternative school to be recognised officially by the ROK government, so graduating students are not required to take an extra qualification examination.

Most schools are small. The best known, Yŏmyŏng School, produced only nine graduates in 2007, but seven of them went on to college, a remarkable figure given the high drop-out rates of Northerners mentioned earlier. According to the school principal, “students are very closed and aggressive when they enter the school, but most of them become more cheerful and open to others with time”. The lack of recognition by the government has proved a serious problem in retaining students. “Since the government doesn’t recognise those alternative schools, students don’t receive any financial support from the government, so that they have to do part time work along with their studies. This difficulty leads some students to drop out”. Recently, the government has begun to provide financial support to eight alternative schools.

C. NEW GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PRIVATE RESPONSES

As the number of defectors arriving in the ROK has increased, the government has tried to adjust its policies for resettlement. Many of the issues and problems that emerged were not anticipated, and policies naturally required modification over time. As noted, the North Korean Refugees Foundation was established to address the coordination problems in linking defectors with appropriate governmental agencies and NGOs to deal with the multitude of long-term difficulties. There are several other new initiatives.

In July 2010, the MOU and Hyundai Motor Microcredit Bank signed an agreement to start a micro-finance program, the “hope store project”, which is designed to provide training and financing for defectors to open their own shops. By December, the ministry had selected 27 defectors for the project, and a total of W970 million (about $850,000) in loans had been provided. MOU and Hyundai plan to offer four rounds of training sessions for about 80 defectors in 2011. The project will coordinate with the Rural Development Administration to provide training and assistance for those who wish to establish agricultural businesses. Under this project, the MOU also seeks to establish at least fifteen consortia among local governments, NGOs and large firms to work with defectors to create new economic opportunities.

To address the needs of female defectors and single-mother households, the MOU is trying to allocate more resources for their needs and create new programs. Some of these efforts include the establishment of three shelter and retreat centers for women, mentoring and assistance for child-rearing and a W300,000 (about $300) government contribution when giving birth. For those who are alone and destitute, the government has established eight facilities that provide rooms and some community living areas, and there are plans to build five more. The government also has provided ten “group homes” for defector children with no families or homes and is planning to make three more available.

The MOU has established the “West program” to give defector college students leadership training, English language training, and an opportunity to study abroad in the U.S. The first group of five students was selected in April 2011 and is expected to depart for a six-month training and internship program in July 2011. The MOU collaborated with the U.S. embassy and the Ministry of Education and Science and Technology to choose the students and coordinate the program.

In April 2011, the Federation of North Koreans in the World, the Korea Future Foundation and Chung-ang University established a consortium to operate a leadership academy program for young North Korean defectors who are college students.

---

284 Ibid.
285 In 2010, the government provided W170 million (about $160,000), and in 2011 will provide W700 million (about $660,000). Crisis Group email correspondence with MOU official, 13 July 2011.
286 이귀원 [Yi Gwi-won], “통일부 ‘올해 탈북자 창업자금 지원 강화’ [MOU ‘strengthen support for North Korean defectors to finance and start businesses’]”, Yonhap News, 5 January 2011.
287 “북한이탈주민 정착지원 현황과 정부의 역할 [Current status of settlement support for North Korean defectors and the government role]”, op. cit.
289 “북한이탈주민 정착지원 현황과 정부의 역할 [Current status of settlement support for North Korean defectors and the government role]”, op. cit.
or recent graduates. The MOU is providing ₩20 million (about $18,800) for the program from its budget to support unification activities. Twenty-five defectors were selected for the first four-month program in April, and the plan is to train about 1,000 who could become influential in a future unified Korea.292

While government programs and private sector initiatives are critical for defector resettlement, smooth and effective assimilation is not simply a matter of defector actions and bigger budgets for more programs. South Korean society also will have to adjust and become more tolerant and considerate of defectors and the challenges they face. To increase mutual understanding, the MOU is supporting a summer camp for college students, where defectors and Southerners can spend time building trust and friendship through outdoor activities. The ministry also has begun to support special television programs and community broadcasts through cable networks on defector issues to increase community awareness.293

---

292 The four-month program will include lectures once a week; and the consortium has recruited 33 lecturers, including Georgetown University Professor Victor Cha and Kookmin University Professor Andrei Lankov, in addition to other well-known scholars and experts. See 조민정 [Cho Min-jŏng], “탈북자 남북통합 역군화 아카데미 첫 개설 [First leadership academy opens for young North Korean defectors to produce a pillar of unification]”, Yonhap News, 5 April 2011; 이영종 [Yi Yong-jong], “탈북 지식인 1000명 통일 주역으로 양성 [Training 1,000 North Korean intellectual defectors as a pillar of reunification]”, The Joongang Ilbo, 9 April 2011; Kim Young-jin, “Academy to open for young NK defectors”, The Korea Times, 5 April 2011.


VI. NEW INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

That defectors face numerous difficulties when resettling in South Korea also raises questions for the international community. First, what role can it play in helping them adjust? Secondly, should some defectors be granted asylum and settled in other countries? Crisis Group interview data, research and media surveys and extensive Korean language literature have all identified limited English language capability as a serious obstacle for defector resettlement. A strong command of English is not necessary to excel and advance in South Korea, but widespread use of English words there that are unintelligible and alien to North Koreans disadvantages them. In the ROK’s globalised economy, employers often see English as a prerequisite or as a screening device to sift through job applications. Without some English and computer skills, higher paying jobs are often out of reach for defectors.

Basic English education begins in primary school in the ROK, and private English education at expensive cram schools is beyond the means of almost all defector families. The English-speaking world could help bridge this gap by providing training programs, which can be tremendously helpful in developing skills and building confidence. For example, the UK began a pilot program in 2010, providing ten defectors with free English language training at the British Council in Seoul. The “English for the Future” program was expanded in 2011 to include one year of free English training for 50 individuals at the British Council and one scholarship to pursue a master’s degree in the UK, as well as nine internships for three months with South Korean firms in Seoul.294 Canada and New Zealand are considering similar programs.295

Because of the difficulty in adjustment to South Korea, some defectors might have better luck in other countries. Many who leave the DPRK as economic migrants later change their minds and have no desire to return. It is common for defectors to spend considerable time in China before eventually arriving in South Korea, but China does not accept refugees from North Korea. Even children of female defectors and Chinese fathers are not granted legal status in the country; permanent settlement in China is, in short, not practical because of Chinese laws and practices.

In 2004, the U.S. enacted the North Korean Human Rights Act, which has several provisions designed to improve


humanitarian conditions for defectors, including the right to ask for asylum and settle in the U.S. However, as of 6 July 2011, 21 had been resettled in the current fiscal year and only 122 North Koreans had been resettled since the 2004 Act was passed.\textsuperscript{296} Between 1994 and 2008, over 2,000 North Korean refugees settled in countries other than South Korea.\textsuperscript{297} Apparently, some defectors had become dissatisfied with their lives in South Korea and fled after having received ROK citizenship. Until recently, the UK has been a common destination. The exact number of Korean asylum seekers in the UK is unknown, but press reports give between 665 and about 1,000.\textsuperscript{298} Upon arrival, they destroyed their passports and subsequently requested asylum as North Korean refugees.\textsuperscript{299} Several cases are in court, and adjudication will require considerable time. After the large number of asylum claims around 2004-2006 (some coordinated with the aid of brokers), the UK tightened controls in an effort to screen fraudulent claims.

The UK government needs assistance from the ROK government to investigate and discern the true identities and claims of these asylum seekers. However, this has been held up because Seoul says South Korean privacy protection law prohibits the exchange of data for identity checks. The negotiations on the issue have been strained at times, but the two governments seem likely to reach a cooperative understanding and working relationship.\textsuperscript{300}

Only a few defectors might prefer settling in other countries if difficulties (anticipated or experienced) in the ROK were eased. The South Korean government is trying to make adjustment and assimilation successful. South Korea is a developed liberal democracy with sufficient material resources to manage the integration of 20,000 North Korean defectors. The justification for third-country asylum after going through the ROK resettlement process would have to be exceptional and extraordinary. However, claims must be handled on a case-by-case basis, and all such by DPRK nationals should be reviewed and adjudicated according to international refugee law.

\textsuperscript{296} Crisis Group interview, U.S. official, Washington, DC, 8 July 2011. The first defectors did not arrive until 2006. “US has received 101 NK refugees since 2006”, \textit{The Korea Times}, 8 May 2011. Also see Congressional Research Service report, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy and Internal Situation” 17 June 2011, which noted the limited numbers of North Korean refugees resettled in the U.S.
\textsuperscript{297} Park Si-soo, “NK defectors flee from Seoul to UK for asylum”, \textit{The Korea Times}, 27 August 2011.
\textsuperscript{298} “N Korean defectors fail to adapt to life away from home”, \textit{The Chosun Ilbo}, 16 May 2011; Park Si-soo, “NK defectors flee from Seoul to UK for asylum”, \textit{The Korea Times}, 27 August 2010.
\textsuperscript{300} Crisis Group interview, Seoul.
VII. CONCLUSION

During the Cold War, the small number of defections was manageable. The financial and social burden of integrating the mostly skilled defectors was so low as to be non-existent, while the propaganda value and level of compensation for these defectors were high. However, the end of the Cold War and the rapid increase in the number of defectors, many of them traumatised and destitute, created a number of problems.

Defectors in the South have become an issue that affects inter-Korean relations. Many proponents of engagement with the North have sought to downplay their significance or avoid mentioning them with the hope the issue will not undermine engagement. On the other hand, many conservative critics of the North view defectors as a legitimate instrument with which to assail or undermine Pyongyang. In sum, the defectors have become a political football in the South, which has consequences for their personal lives. Humanitarian principles dictate that they should be insulated from domestic politics. Furthermore, DPRK belligerence should not affect South Korean policies towards defectors and their integration into society.

Most of the support programs have been short term, but many defectors need long-term tailored help. The ROK government seems prepared to provide large-scale support – there is broad political backing in the National Assembly for funding programs. To ensure resources are used efficiently, hard questions must be asked about effectiveness, but this is risky politically. Anyone questioning current government programs or approaches risks condemnation from political opponents. Independent oversight could be useful in making long-term assessments and recommendations on how best to integrate defectors. The problems are social and humanitarian in nature, not political. Areas that need attention are nutritional support and long-term mental health care, educational support and employment support. The international community, both the private and government sectors, also could assist by providing scholarships. The ROK government should take appropriate legal action to protect defectors from discrimination in the workplace.

The South Korean government and NGOs need to make more efforts to address the particular problems facing women and children. Women make up about 70 per cent of all the defectors entering the South. Support to ensure family stability for children is critical for their education and future. Investing in these families now would be much less costly than dealing in the future with adults who are unable to assimilate and become productive citizens. Those who are unable to excel in South Korea’s competitive education system geared for college entrance should have access to vocational schools that provide skills required for sustained and productive employment.

The ROK government has recognised that it cannot do everything to ensure successful resettlement of defectors. Although the MOU has worked extensively with NGOs and provided financial support to them, coordination and communication could be better. The government could listen more to NGOs and be more open to suggestions for new or innovative programs. This does not mean every fresh idea must be implemented, but being unresponsive to good ones means opportunities are missed.

The difficulties of integrating about 20,000 defectors are a small taste of the problems that the South might experience if there were any sudden reunification with the North. The economic, social, cultural and psychological gulfs between the countries would take decades to close and overwhelm the resources and welcome offered by the South. Defectors are mostly a self-selecting group; the challenges of integrating those in the North who might not welcome reunification with a dominant South are difficult to assess.

The South Korean government recognises that a precipitate change in the North would present it with immense problems, but it should not allow such concerns or the occasional threats from Pyongyang on the resettlement of defectors to cloud the need to integrate them in the most effective way possible. Studies of defectors show that the health issues from their lives in the North and their difficult journeys South may take many years to resolve. Education and jobs may also be problems for long after they reach the South. Policies need to be devised that insulate the process from political changes and provide the support that is needed.
APPENDIX A

MAP OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Courtesy of University of Texas at Austin.
APPENDIX B

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Table One. Number of North Korean Defectors Arriving in the ROK by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>2,544</td>
<td>2,809</td>
<td>2,927</td>
<td>2,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,128</td>
<td>4,409</td>
<td>6,303</td>
<td>7,686</td>
<td>9,704</td>
<td>12,248</td>
<td>15,057</td>
<td>17,984</td>
<td>20,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROK Ministry of Unification
### Table Two. Resettlement Support for North Korean Defectors in the ROK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Assistance for Resettlement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic support payment</td>
<td></td>
<td>₩6 million for one-person household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Incentives</td>
<td></td>
<td>For those who attend job training, acquire certifications, and find employment (up to ₩24.4 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Bonuses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 60 or older (₩7.2 million)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically challenged (up to ₩15.4 million)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-parents with children 13 years of age or younger (₩3.6 million per household)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term hospitalization (3-9 months; ₩800,000 per month)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal assistance in finding rental housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Subsidies</td>
<td></td>
<td>₩13 million for one-person household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Ministry of Employment and Labour provides about ₩300,000 per month during job training period (depending on needs criteria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Subsidy</td>
<td></td>
<td>MOU provides half of defector monthly salary (from ₩500,000 to maximum of ₩700,000 per month) up to three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment officer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Employment and Labour provides counselling and help with job searches at 55 employment centres nation-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Welfare</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living Assistance Payments</td>
<td></td>
<td>Subsidy provided for those with incomes below the poverty line as prescribed in the National Basic Living Security Act (₩420,000 for a one-person household)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical care</td>
<td></td>
<td>Class I medical assistance benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National pension</td>
<td></td>
<td>Qualified to register for national pension if entering the ROK between the age of 50 and 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special admission/transfer into universities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special admissions or transfer into ROK universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition benefit</td>
<td></td>
<td>Free enrolment for public middle schools, high schools, colleges and universities; 50 per cent tuition subsidy for private universities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table Three. Gender of North Korean Defectors in the ROK (as of January 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>2,197</td>
<td>2,261</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>14,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>2,544</td>
<td>2,809</td>
<td>2,927</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>20,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROK Ministry of Unification

Table Four. Age of North Korean Defectors in the ROK (as of January 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0-9</th>
<th>10-19</th>
<th>20-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>2,381</td>
<td>5,644</td>
<td>6,575</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>20,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROK Ministry of Unification

Table Five. Employment Status of North Korean Defectors in North Korea Prior to Defection (as of January 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Worker</th>
<th>Administrative</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Arts, Athletics</th>
<th>Voluntary Service</th>
<th>Military or intelligence</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,248</td>
<td>7,901</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROK Ministry of Unification

Table Six. Education Level of North Korean Defectors Prior to Defection (Until January 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preschool</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Primary School</th>
<th>Middle and High School</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>University and/or graduate school</th>
<th>Miscellaneous or unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>14,477</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROK Ministry of Unification
APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison premises in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates nine regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in fourteen additional locations (Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Bujumbura, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo and Seoul). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.


July 2011
APPENDIX D

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2008

Central Asia
Political Murder in Central Asia: No Time to End Uzbekistan’s Isolation, Asia Briefing N°76, 13 February 2008.
Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of Judicial Reform, Asia Report N°150, 10 April 2008 (also available in Russian).
Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm, Asia Briefing N°79, 14 August 2008 (also available in Russian).
Central Asia: Decay and Decline, Asia Report N°201, 3 February 2011.

North East Asia
China’s Thirst for Oil, Asia Report N°153, 9 June 2008 (also available in Chinese).
South Korea’s Elections: A Shift to the Right, Asia Briefing N°77, 30 June 2008.
China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, Asia Report N°166, 17 April 2009 (also available in Chinese).
North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, Asia Report N°167, 18 June 2009.
North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, Asia Report N°168, 18 June 2009.
China’s Myanmar Dilemma, Asia Report N°177, 14 September 2009 (also available in Chinese).

Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea, Asia Report N°179, 2 November 2009 (also available in Chinese).
The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing, Asia Briefing N°100, 17 February 2010 (also available in Chinese).
North Korea under Tightening Sanctions, Asia Briefing N°101, 15 March 2010.
China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Yellow Sea, Asia Report N°200, 27 January 2011 (also available in Chinese).

South Asia
After Bhutto’s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan, Asia Briefing N°74, 2 January 2008.
Nepal’s Election and Beyond, Asia Report N°149, 2 April 2008 (also available in Nepali).
Nepal’s New Political Landscape, Asia Report N°156, 3 July 2008 (also available in Nepali).
Bangladesh: Elections and Beyond, Asia Briefing N°84, 11 December 2008.

Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities, Asia Briefing N°93, 3 June 2009.
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE, Asia Report N°186, 23 February 2010.
Steps Towards Peace: Putting Kashmiris First, Asia Briefing N°106, 3 June 2010.
Indonesia: Pre-election Anxieties in Aceh
Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown
Crisis Group Asia Report N°208, 14 July 2011

Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah
Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis
Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing
Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso
Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform

Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis, Asia Briefing N°111, 16 September 2010.
Nepal’s Political Rites of Passage, Asia Report N°194, 29 September 2010 (also available in Nepali).
Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement, Asia Briefing N°115, 28 November 2010.
Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate, Asia Briefing N°117, 23 February 2011.
Nepal’s Fitful Peace Process, Asia Briefing N°120, 7 April 2011 (also available in Nepali).


South East Asia
Indonesia: Jamaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia Report N°147, 28 February 2008 (also available in Indonesian).
Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua, Asia Report N°154, 16 June 2008 (also available in Indonesian).
Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, Asia Briefing N°78, 7 July 2008 (also available in Indonesian).
Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency, Asia Briefing N°80, 28 August 2008 (also available in Thai).
Indonesia: Pre-election Anxieties in Aceh, Asia Briefing N°81, 9 September 2008 (also available in Indonesian).
Thailand: Calming the Political Turmoil, Asia Briefing N°82, 22 September 2008 (also available in Thai).

Local Election Disputes in Indonesia: The Case of North Maluku, Asia Briefing N°86, 22 January 2009.
Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency, Asia Briefing N°87, 9 February 2009.
The Philippines: Running in Place in Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°88, 16 February 2009.
Indonesia: Deep Distrust in Aceh as Elections Approach, Asia Briefing N°90, 23 March 2009.
Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand, Asia Report N°170, 22 June 2009 (also available in Thai).
Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings, Asia Briefing N°94, 24 July 2009 (also available in Indonesian).
Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base, Asia Briefing N°95, 27 August 2009.
Southern Thailand: Moving towards Political Solutions?, Asia Report N°181, 8 December 2009 (also available in Thai).
The Philippines: After the Maguindanao Massacre, Asia Briefing N°98, 21 December 2009.
Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua, Asia Report N°188, 11 March 2010 (also available in Indonesian).
Philippines: Pre-election Tensions in Central Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°103, 4 May 2010.
The Myanmar Elections, Asia Briefing N°105, 27 May 2010 (also available in Chinese).
Bridging Thailand’s Deep Divide, Asia Report N°192, 5 July 2010 (also available in Thai).
Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Asia Briefing N°107, 6 July 2010.

Indonesia: The Deepening Impasse in Papua, Asia Briefing N°108, 3 August 2010.
Illicit Arms in Indonesia, Asia Briefing N°109, 6 September 2010.
Managing Land Conflict in Timor-Leste, Asia Briefing N°110, 9 September 2010.
Stalemate in Southern Thailand, Asia Briefing N°113, 3 November 2010 (also available in Thai).
Indonesia: “Christianisation” and Intolerance, Asia Briefing N°114, 24 November 2010.
Indonesia: Preventing Violence in Local Elections, Asia Report N°197, 8 December 2010 (also available in Indonesian).
Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back, Asia Briefing N°115, 16 December 2010.
Myanmar’s Post-Election Landscape, Asia Briefing N°118, 7 March 2011 (also available in Chinese and Burmese).
The Philippines: Back to the Table, Warily, in Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°119, 24 March 2011.
Thailand: The Calm Before Another Storm?, Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 (also available in Chinese).
Timor-Leste: Reconciliation and Return from Indonesia, Asia Briefing N°122, 18 April 2011.
Indonesia: Gam vs Gam in the Aceh Elections, Asia Briefing N°123, 15 June 2011.
APPENDIX E

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

CHAIR
Thomas R Pickering
Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria; Vice Chairman of Hills & Company

PRESIDENT & CEO
Louise Arbour
Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey

Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC

Maria Livanos Cattaui
Member of the Board, Petrouos Holdings, Switzerland

Yoichi Funabashi
Former Editor in Chief, The Asahi Shimbun, Japan

Frank Giustra
President & CEO, Fiore Capital

Ghassan Salamé
Dean, Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po

George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute

Pär Stenbäck
Former Foreign Minister of Finland

OTHER BOARD MEMBERS
Adnan Abu-Odeh
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein, and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN

Kenneth Adelman
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Kofi Annan
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001)

Nahum Barnea
Chief Columnist for Yediot Achronoth, Israel

Samuel Berger
Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC; Former U.S. National Security Advisor

Emma Bonino
Vice President of the Senate; Former Minister of International Trade and European Affairs of Italy and European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid

Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Sheila Coronel
Toni Stabile, Professor of Practice in Investigative Journalism; Director, Toni Stabile Center for Investigative Journalism, Columbia University, U.S.

Jan Egeland
Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, United Nations

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gareth Evans
President Emeritus of Crisis Group; Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Australia

Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium

Joshua Fink
CEO & Chief Investment Officer, Enso Capital Management LLC

Joschka Fischer
Former Foreign Minister of Germany

Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University; Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Carla Hills
Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative

Lena Hjelm-Wallén
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of Sweden

Swanee Hunt
Former U.S. Ambassador to Austria; Chair, Institute for Inclusive Security; President, Hunt Alternatives Fund

Mo Ibrahim
Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation; Founder, Celtel International

Igor Ivanov
Former Foreign Affairs Minister of the Russian Federation

Asma Jahangir
President of the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan, Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief

Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands

Ricardo Lagos
Former President of Chile

Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Former International Secretary of International PEN; Novelist and journalist, U.S.

Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown
Former Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Deputy Secretary-General

Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India, Ambassador to the U.S. and High Commissioner to the UK

Jessica Tuchman Mathews
President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, U.S.

Benjamin Mkapa
Former President of Tanzania

Moisés Naim
Senior Associate, International Economics Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy

Ayo Obe
Legal Practitioner, Lagos, Nigeria

Paul Reynolds
President & Chief Executive Officer, Canaccord Financial Inc.; Vice Chair, Global Head of Canaccord Genuity

Güler Sabancı
Chairperson, Sabancı Holding, Turkey

Javier Solana
Former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, NATO Secretary-General and Foreign Affairs Minister of Spain

Lawrence Summers
Former Director of the US National Economic Council and Secretary of the US Treasury; President Emeritus of Harvard University
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL

A distinguished group of individual and corporate donors providing essential support and expertise to Crisis Group.

Canaccord Finacial Inc.  Steve Killelea  Ford Nicholson
Mala Gaonkar  George Landegger  Ian Telfer
Frank Holmes  Harry Pokrandt  Neil Woodyer

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Individual and corporate supporters who play a key role in Crisis Group’s efforts to prevent deadly conflict.

APCO Worldwide Inc.  Rita E. Hauser  Jean Manas  Shell
Stanley Bergman & Edward Bergman  Joseph Hotung  McKinsey & Company  Statoil
Harry Bookey & Pamela Bass-Bookey  Lara Lee & George Gund III Foundation  Harriet Mouchly-Weiss  Belinda Stronach
Chevron  George Kellner  Näringslivets Internationella Råd (NIR) – International Council of Swedish Industry
Neil & Sandy DeFeo  Amed Khan  Yves Oltramare
Equinox Partners  Faisal Khan  Anna Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey Hoguet
Fares I. Fares  Zelmira Koch Polk  Michael Riordan
Neemat Frem  Elliott Kulick  Talisman Energy
Seth Ginnns  Liquidnet  Tilleke & Gibbins

SENIOR ADVISERS

Former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).

Martti Ahtisaari  Mong Joon Chung  Timothy Ong  Grigory Yavlinski
Chairman Emeritus  Chairman Emeritus  Chairman Emeritus  Chairman Emeritus
George Mitchell  Pat Cox  Olara Otunnu  Uta Zapf
HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal  Gianfranco Dell’Alba  Lord (Christopher) Patten  Ernesto Zedillo
Hushang Ansary  Jacques Delors  Shimon Peres  Michel Rocard
Óscar Arias  Alain Destexhe  Victor Pinchuk  Volker Rühe
Ersin Arıoğlu  Mou-Shih Ding  Surin Pitsuwan  Mohamed Saennoun
Richard Armitage  Gernot Erler  Cyril Ramaphosa  Salim A. Salim
Diego Arria  Marika Fahlin  Fidel V. Ramos  Douglas Schoen
Zainab Bangura  Stanley Fischer  George Robertson  Christian Schwarz-Schilling
Shlomo Ben-Ami  Malcolm Fraser  Michel Rocard  Michael Sohlman
Christoph Bertram  I.K. Gujral  Volker Rühe  Thorvald Stoltenberg
Alan Blinken  Max Jakobson  Mohamed Saennoun  William O. Taylor
Lakhdar Brahimi  James V. Kimsey  Salim A. Salim  Leo Tindemans
Zbigniew Brzezinski  Aleksander Kwasniewski  Douglas Schoen  Ed van Thijn
Kim Campbell  Todung Mulya Lubis  Christian Schwarz-Schilling  Simone Veil
Jorge Castañeda  Allan J. MacEachen  Michael Sohlman  Shirley Williams
Naresh Chandra  Graça Machel  Thorvald Stoltenberg  Sima Veil
Eugene Chien  Nobuo Matsunaga  William O. Taylor  William O. Taylor
Joaquim Alberto Chissano  Barbara McDougall  Leo Tindemans  Shirley Williams
Victor Chu  Matthew McHugh  Ed van Thijn  William O. Taylor

