

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP



The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Some Lessons Learnt

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
CSPs	Country Strategy Papers
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FCC	Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries
FSF	Fragile States Facility
GLR	Great Lakes Region
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MDG's	Millennium Development Goals
MDRTSP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Support Program
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSFU	Fragile States Unit
PARSEC	Post-Conflict Socio-economic Reintegration Support Project
PFM	Public and Financial Management
PNDDR	Congolese National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
PRs	Poverty Reduction Strategies
RMC	Regional Member Countries
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UN	United Nations
WDR	World Development Report

1. Introduction

1.1 Security is more than just the stability of a state and its government. It includes the security of life of individuals and their property i.e. freedom from fear. In all its forms, security is an important aspect of sustainable development and plays a critical role in reducing poverty and addressing human rights in developing countries. The security and development nexus has become much intertwined; short term security operations will not bring about sustainable benefits if they are not coordinated with long-term development efforts (e.g. job creation) and the reverse is also true. As the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) points out, none of the fragile and conflict affected countries (FCCs), have met any of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the poverty rate is 20 percent higher than in countries that have not experienced cycles of violence.¹ Moreover, evidence has shown that over the last eight decades, countries having once suffered from conflict have a tendency to relapse² with the “peacetime” becoming gradually smaller between conflicts.

1.2 Therefore, in post-conflict situations more than in any other, non-state actors such as militias and armed opposition groups with an overabundance of arms and ammunition, pose great risk to internal stability. It is necessary in such situations of reconstruction that security sector reform (SSR) programs address the initial monopoly, and that legitimate use of force is returned to the state very early in the peace process. Legitimate use of force by the state in this case will imply the existence of a recognized government and even fledgling institutions such as the courts to provide checks and balances. SSR in post-conflict situations is different from other situations because it has to deal with the legacy of past conflict and the re-establishment of the state-citizen social contract. Thus in post-conflict periods, it is inevitable to call for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, an important component of Peace-building that helps prevent the reoccurrence of conflict.

1.3 In line with the Fragile States Unit’s (OSFU) commitment to support better engagement in key priority areas of State Building, the present paper lays out some lessons to be drawn during programming and design stages of DDR. This study seeks to briefly look at DDR as part of a larger SSR process and what role the African Development Bank (AfDB) has played in this regard, within the overall framework of post conflict reconstruction and peace building.

2. DDR in the broader Security Sector Reforms program

2.1 Definition and Phases of DDR

2.1.1 DDR programs are one of the early attempts to initiate recovery services and contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that development can start. These programs aim to deal with the post-conflict security problem which arises as a result of ex-combatants having no livelihood or support network, other than

¹ World Bank World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, available at: www.worldbank.org

² *ibid*

the one they have been accustomed to during the period they served as soldiers. Therefore DDR seeks to support ex-combatants during the transition period from conflict to peace and development by helping them integrate socially and economically into society, and by laying the ground work for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals reintegrate while building the national capacity for long term peace, security and development. It is imperative to note that DDR alone cannot in itself bring about or guarantee the resolution of conflict or prevent violence. Furthermore, DDR should not be seen as, and should not replace extensive development programs; it can, however, help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a recovery and peace-building can proceed. It facilitates the transition from conflict to stability.

Box 1: UN definition of each of the phases of DDR

Disarmament

This is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons carried by both combatants and often also some civilians. Disarmament may also include the development of responsible arms management programs.

Demobilization

This is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. There are two stages of demobilization. The first stage of demobilization includes the processing of individual combatants and placing them in temporary centers plus the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks) while the second stage encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

Reintegration

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.³

Source: United Nations DDR Resource Centre

2.2 Linking DDR and SSR

2.2.1 Within the understanding of peace and state building, DDR is closely tied to the broader security sector reform (SSR). Policy makers and practitioners must therefore understand the linkages that exist between DDR and SSR if these peace building initiatives are to be sustained. The success or failure of one affects the other. For example Peace Agreements call for the absorption of armed groups involved in the conflict into the national army and dismantling of the remaining security apparatus. This is particularly important because ex-combatants that have been demobilized continue to pose risks in the short to medium term if they cannot easily rejoin the security sector either as military personnel, private security guards or the police force. However, the absorption of poorly trained former combatants can affect the quality and professionalism of the security sector (see box 2 below). On the other hand, SSR processes such as the size of the army, i.e. number of those to be integrated or demobilized from the army can affect budget allocations, as well as demobilization targets of DDR programs.

³United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center: Introduction to integrated DDR standards (2005), Available at: <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs>

Box 2: South Sudan's demobilization challenges

2.2.2 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines SSR as transforming the security system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework. Security sector reform (SSR) seeks to increase partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law.⁴

In the case of Southern Sudan, the demobilization process of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army and other combatants in an endeavor to create a professional army led to ex-combatants being the main source of recruitment into the police force. However, these ex-combatants had no prior training in civilian law enforcement and found themselves charged with managing internal security issues. Moreover little has been done to integrate women in the police force despite their contribution and involvement in the war.

Source: Lokuji A.S., Abetneh A.S and Wani C.K "Police Reform in Southern Sudan", June 2009

2.2.3 According to the OECD-DAC handbook, SSR covers three interrelated challenges facing all states:

- i. Developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors;
- ii. Strengthening the governance of security institutions; and
- iii. Building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities.⁵

2.3 An Overview of DDR Design Elements

2.3.1 In a recent study by the Fragile States Unit, it was noted that conflicts in Africa stemmed from three categories⁶ i.e. the first category is conflicts perpetuated by the primary drivers (bad governance, over centralization of power, politics of exclusion, ethnic marginalization, economic collapse and worsening forms of poverty; and state weakness and collapse) while the second is as a result of the secondary drivers of conflict (natural resource curse, land scarcity, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, structural colonial legacies, socio-economic and demographic stresses). The third category is the tertiary drivers of conflict which are usually as a result of the bad neighborhood (being surrounded by other countries that are also

⁴ OECD DAC handbook on security system reform: supporting security and justice, OECD 2007, available at: www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr

⁵ OECD DAC Security System Reform and Governance – DAC Guidelines (2005) available at: http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_2649_34567_33800289_1_1_1_1,00.html.

⁶ The primary drivers of conflict are referred to as the key factors that are related to the occurrence of a given conflict and therefore important. Secondary drivers are those that evolve after the outbreak of conflict. They do not directly cause conflict but are important in sustaining the war and determine the dynamics of the conflict. Finally, the third category is remotely related to the primary driver of conflict and although this driver is remote, it is important in understanding the latent factors at play in on-going conflicts.

going through conflicts thus the spillover effect). It is therefore important that in fragile and post-conflict situations, a broader definition of SSR should be adopted. This is because state building requires a holistic approach that covers the intricate and fragmented nature of security and governance in these countries. It calls for concurrently carrying out and integrating reforms in the defense, police and judicial system, which have previously been conducted separately. It also indicates that the mere modernization and professionalization of security forces to improve capacity without incorporating the principles of good governance and accountability ignore core issues of democracy. Further, it recognizes the important role of non-state actors in SSR-whether non-statutory security groups or civil society.

2.3.2 For the purpose of this paper, the main focus will be DDR and more specifically, the reintegration phase of DDR which covers both the economic and social dimensions⁷. According to the UN, reintegration is defined as “the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and job- and income generating projects”.⁸

2.3.3 Stabilization and peace-building initiatives such as DDR programs serve the purpose of:-

- Separates combatants from their weapons (disarmament) and gives non-state security actors such as rebels the opportunity of putting down weapons without feeling they have lost or surrendered.
- DDR helps build trust among ex-combatants and their communities. This lays the foundation for other Peace-building and State-building initiatives, e.g. SSR and for long-term development plans to begin.
- Gives ex-combatants the opportunity to re-unite with their families, reintegrate into civilian life, create social networks and stop living by the gun.
- Provides transitional safety nets in the short term for ex-combatants and their dependents.

2.3.4 The continued pervasiveness of violent conflict; recent emergence of numerous RMCs from conflict; the state of fragility that characterizes many African countries; and the likelihood of slippage into conflict of some RMCs, make a compelling case for donors, the Bank and its partners to be more proactive in altering such trend. This would help safe guard and prevent the erosion of limited positive gains in post conflict reconstruction and increase stability. As such, donors could provide assistance in developing poverty reduction strategies (PRSs) in ways that they

⁷ Social reintegration can be seen as the process by which an ex-combatant and his or her family feel part of, and are accepted by, the community. While economic reintegration encompasses the process through which ex-combatants can build a livelihood through production or some form of employment. Economic reintegration is one of the most difficult processes because most of those returning from war especially prolonged wars, lack education, lack skills or their skills have become obsolete and the societies they are returning to have no need for their skills. Yet it is imperative for these ex-combatants to earn a living otherwise, they are likely to be susceptible to enlisting in criminal gangs.

Fusato, Massimo. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2003 <<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/demobilization/>>

⁸ The United Nations. 2000. *The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Report of the Secretary General*.

are logical entry points for linking security and development needs. Moreover, DDR programs are in line with the Banks commitment to assist fragile and post-conflict countries achieve regional peace and security, a requirement for sustained growth and poverty reduction.

2.3.5 It is worth mentioning that some multilateral donors including the Bank are not directly involved in SSR. Organizations such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and United Nations (UN) have the mandate, expertise and comparative advantage when it comes to designing and implementing SSR programs. However, one of the key challenges that these organizations face is funding, and given that support to SSR and DDR requires long term commitment, the programs initiated face critical funding short falls thus affecting successful implementation.

2.3.6 In addition, one of the biggest criticisms of SSR and DDR programs in Africa has been the lack of local/national ownership. Due to the human capacity challenges and a lack of financial resources in fragile and Post-conflict countries, the design and implementation of peace building initiatives such as DDR and SSR are always led by external actors. Ownership of in-country security programs is a bi-product of the security vision being a local initiative; donors should support programs started by local actors rather than local support for donor programs. As it stands right now, most SSR efforts in Africa with the exception of South Africa have been an initiative of external donors. The problem this has posed is that international donors do not take time to fully comprehend the complex mix of conditions (political and economic) that contribute to the security environment in Africa. If robust and effective changes are to take root, they must be spearheaded and supported by regional bodies.

2.3.7 This is not to say that external help is not required especially with funding and capacity building. However donors should emphasize local ownership built on a foundation of high and meaningful participation by domestic stakeholders. This implies that resources provided to support DDR and SSR must be tailored to the capacities and budget limitations of national authorities and that adopting a long-term approach is vital. Building national capacities to manage and oversee security and justice provision represents a major component of sustainable SSR programming. Rendering local ownership operational therefore requires significant culture change in donor behavior that moves away from narrow timeframes, tight budget cycles and the demand for short-term output driven results.

Box 3: Liberia-lack of local ownership during SSR

In Liberia, through the U.S government, several American private firms were contracted to carry out SSR e.g. DynCorp international was responsible for restructuring, vetting, recruiting and training the Liberian military while Pacific Architects and Engineers was charged with specialized training, equipment, logistics and base services. In addition to this and without Liberian consensus, the Pentagon decided that the Liberian army would have 2,000 soldiers. Civil society and the legislature in Liberia felt that they had not been consulted, the process was not transparent and that the external actors were not being accountable and not heeding to Parliaments calls to appear before it.⁹ The use of foreign private sector companies therefore was playing a negative role in this regard, and undermined local ownership and legitimacy of the SSR process.

Source: Adedeji Ebo in Laurie Nathan

⁹ Adedeji Ebo in Laurie Nathan, “No ownership, No commitment: A guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform”, October 2009, Pg. 80.

2.3.8 A number of donors are opting to provide urgent assistance through budget support instruments which could have some key implications for peace building. As such, budget support to fragile and post-conflict RMCs that seek to clean up and focus on public expenditure/financial management (PFM) could also provide a critical review of the defense budget. This is particularly important because security is a public good and it costs money to buy new military equipment, uniforms and training of security personnel. Consequently, it will be imperative to recognize that such reviews should not only focus on the level of expenditure of the military but the quality of governance in the security sector.

Box 4: Challenges to Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo's DDR programs

In Sierra Leone for example, the DDR process saw over 70,000 combatants disarmed and demobilized, 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million rounds of ammunition collected.¹⁰ Overall, the DD phases (disarmament and demobilization) were a success. However, the R phase (reintegration) was left wanting: the Sierra Leone national army did not have the military capacity to absorb all the ex-combatants which meant that the surplus had to be reintegrated into civilian life. Moreover, the communities in which these ex-combatants were to be reintegrated were not economically prepared either. The Reintegration phase was also hampered by the ex-combatant hesitation to return to their communities for fear of reprisals for their actions during the conflict and also, these communities did not have the capacity to absorb all these returnees. The out-come was the migration of these ex-combatants to other West African countries, e.g. Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire to sell their labor as mercenaries and perpetuate instability.¹¹ Further, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the reintegration of ex-combatants into the national army units led to tensions between the ex-combatants and the already existing army. One of the ex-combatant units broke away and resumed fighting in Eastern Congo.¹² In addition to this, DRCs reintegration program was more individually focused and not tied to the assistance given to broader community development projects thus placing the sustainability of reintegration assistance in question.

Source: Gbla, Ginifer

2.3.9 Aspects of DDR especially the “R”- reintegration phase-need to be critically planned and well thought out if the overall success of these programs and the security environment in general are to be achieved (see Box 4 above). Donors and the Bank need to intervene by providing and contributing to meaningful social protection measures (skills building, gainful employment and income generating projects). As noted in the World Bank end of program evaluation report for the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration program (2002-2009), livelihoods support for ex-combatants must be realistic and market-friendly in order to reduce disappointment on the side of the ex-combatants, and therefore, the possibility of abandoning the DDR process. However the report notes that livelihood viability is highly dependent on the dynamics of the larger economy.¹³

¹⁰ Osman Gbla, “Experiences from the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme in Sierra Leone: Problems and Lessons Learned”, 2005. 1 May 2011
<<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no106/Sec1.pdf>>

¹¹ *ibid*

¹² Jeremy Ginifer, “Support for DDR and SSR after conflict in Africa: Lessons learnt and New Agendas in Africa, Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction in Africa”, 2007

¹³ World Bank, “Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of year Evaluation”, June 2010. Available at: http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_ReportFinalScanteam.pdf

3. Bank Support to DDR Programs

3.1 The Bank aims to contribute to the sustainable development and social progress of its regional member countries. In addition to this, the Bank's policy as delineated by the Bank's Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States, and the intervention principles as regards to post-conflict assistance are to help fragile countries transition from a situation of fragility to recovery by providing specific assistance required for long-term economic growth. The Bank realizes that for sustainable growth and poverty reduction to be achieved, peace and security are a priority. It is with this vindication therefore, that the Fragile States Facility (FSF) and its implementing arm the Fragile States Unit were set up in 2008 to operationalize the Bank's work in fragile states. It should be noted from the outset that in DDR, the bank only intervenes in the reintegration phase of it. This is true too for some of its other multi-lateral partners.

3.2 Over the past few years, the Bank has approved reintegration projects in Burundi, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). However, it is too early to point out the impact of the Bank's assistance in this regard as most of these projects are still on-going, and not much has been documented on the outcomes so far. Nevertheless, these projects were designed in conformity with Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) of the Bank and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of the individual countries that stress the need for stability and security, good governance and regional integration. For example, the 2007 DRC Post-Conflict Socio-economic Reintegration Support Project (PARSEC) funded by the Bank with UA 15 million as contribution to the Congolese National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (PNDDR), was developed in line with the DRC CSP of 2005-2007 and the PRSP of 2006-2008. The project in DRC covers 5 provinces, namely, Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu, Orientale and South Kivu.¹⁴ The objective of the project in DRC is to re-engage ex-combatants through vocational training and promotion of self-employment in the agricultural sector. The program is envisaged to benefit 28,500 ex-combatants of which 1000 are women. Program activities include: agriculture, fishing, stockbreeding, artisanal production of soap and bread making, tailoring/dress-making, welding/iron works, auto-mechanics etc.¹⁵

3.3 In addition to the above activities, the Bank through PARSEC has funded a study focusing on female ex-combatants to try and figure out why women are being under represented in the reintegration project. The study was also to help figure out what could be done to involve and improve women ex-combatant participation in DDR program. From this, it was discovered that one of the weaknesses of the DDR program in DRC was the criterion used to determine what participants would benefit from the program. The criterion was based on the "one gun one ex-combatant" rule. However, many of the women that participated in the conflict, did not necessarily hold weapons but contributed in other ways. The other reason as to why there was low participation of women in the PARSEC program was due to the stigma attached to ex-

¹⁴ The project focused on the Western region provinces mainly because at the time, the Eastern region of DRC was experiencing active conflict.

¹⁵ African Development Bank Group, Human Development Department.1 Appraisal Report on DRC Post-Conflict Socio-Economic Reintegration Support Project, July 2007.

combatants. Female ex-combatants did not want to be identified with the roles they played in the war and therefore, they self-demobilized and did not register with the program. Further, female ex-combatants especially the “wives” of the soldiers did not want to be attached to their “husbands” after the conflict ended.

3.4 It is worth mentioning that the Bank has registered positive outcomes from its work in the DRC PARSEC program mentioned above. Some of the outcomes include the increased presence and visibility of women in the assistance services to ex-combatants, which was a result of adopting a community approach involving both ex-combatants and members of the host communities where the DDR programs were being implemented. In addition to this and as a result of the female ex-combatant study discussed above, there was an increase in sensitization efforts leading to a rise in the number of women ex-combatants registered to participate in the program. The project is also in the process of recruiting two consultant firms to carry out a technical study¹⁶ on the implementation of ten (10) pilot farms that the Bank is proposing to set up in the five (5) provinces.¹⁷ The farms will be organized in such a way that each of the five (5) provinces will have two (2) farms per province and that, each farm will have a group of 100 individuals, of which 50 of these will be from the local community and the other 50 are ex-combatants (this model is to encourage a community based approach as opposed to the individual approach of reintegration programs). As a result of setting up these farms, its envisaged that infrastructure e.g. schools, health centers will be set up to benefit the larger local population these farms. In line, with the discussion on the proposed setting up of these farms, its imperative to mention the challenges for example there have been disagreements between the Program Implementation Units and the government on the sustainability of these farms.

3.5 In addition to the above specific case-by-case country support to RMCs, the Bank in 2009 awarded a grant of UA 14 million to the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Transitional Support Program (MDRTSP) out of a total cost of UA 16.31 million. The MDRTSP is a program that is supporting the transitional phase from the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) that started in 2002 and ended in June 2009.

3.6 The MDRP was set up with a goal to improve economic recovery and peace building in the Great Lakes Region (GLR). The GLR which is comprised of seven countries i.e. Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, CAR, DRC and the Republic of Congo, has been plunged into armed conflict and blood-shed. The Great lakes region truly exemplifies the regional dimension of conflict where all these countries are interlinked and instability in one causes adverse spill over effects onto another. It is in this state of affairs that the MDRP was established to support and finance the effective demobilization and reintegration efforts of 350, 000 ex-combatants.

3.7 At the close of the MDRP in 2008, about 279,000 ex-combatants (60% of original target) were demobilized, 254,369 were reinserted (80% of target) and

¹⁶ The technical study will identify what agricultural activities should be carried out on the pilot farms. The agricultural activities will depend on the prevailing agricultural conditions in each province.

¹⁷ 500 hectares of land have already been acquired by the Bank to set up these farms. The Bank is working in collaboration with the program implementation Units, NGOs, the local community and community chiefs.

300,160 (75%) were reintegrated into communities. In addition to this, the needs of 30,219 children associated with conflict were being provided for by child protection services.¹⁸ Although the MDRP has surpassed its targets, many DDR activities are still incomplete (not all ex-combatants have been demobilized and reintegrated) and the fragility of the region calls for a continuation and successful completion of these activities. Therefore, the MDRTSP was set up after the realization for the continued need of a regional facility to carry on the work of the MDRP. It will benefit another 10,000 ex-combatants of which 1,725 are women, repatriate 7,300 ex-combatants, provide continued technical support to the target countries, respond to cross-cutting issues not addressed and financed by national programs and promote knowledge building and sharing on DDR programs in the region.¹⁹

3.8 The MDRP has generated useful lessons both for the Bank and its partners in terms of the usefulness of a regional approach and operation of DDR. Regional approaches contribute to enhanced cooperation and dialogue among neighboring countries, promotes pooling of resources targeting the same problems, it applies the concept of national ownership in fragile and post-conflict settings and tackles the issue of cross-border activities such as combatants on foreign soils (COFs). Yet, these approaches are known for their greater complexity and difficulty in implementation. There is a problem of alignment of regional and national priorities and establishing incentives for those countries involved in order for them to think beyond their national interests. Thus, despite the clearly recognizable benefits to regional peace building initiatives, expectations in terms of outputs should be modest. The question now remains whether the MDRP can be replicated in other regions for example, West Africa.

3.9 Furthermore, the Bank through the Fragile States Unit (OSFU) and in conjunction with the World Bank funded a DDR study on the reintegration process of ex-combatants and special needs groups in Southern Sudan. The study was to inform the Bank's best practices of reintegrating ex-combatants without creating tensions in the communities within which they are reintegrated. Most importantly, this study was carried out in order to aid the Government of Southern Sudan know how effective the DDR program has been, and what could be improved. From the study it was noted that there were a limited number of projects targeting ex-combatants mainly spearheaded by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In addition to this, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are only targeting communities receiving internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees. This raises the issue of donor coordination- every donor is doing what works best for them. Given the scale and duration of the war in Southern Sudan, most if not all the communities are in a state of deprivation. Therefore, coordination between donors of all on-going programs weather targeted toward ex-combatants or the communities is important in order to maximize the synergies that exist and not replicate each others efforts while making more efficient use of the existing external resources.

3.10 It is important to note that the Bank's work in relation to contributing to selected demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration efforts to create

¹⁸ African Development Bank Group, Human Development Department.1 Appraisal Report on Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Transitional Support Program, February 2009.

¹⁹ *ibid*

opportunities for those most affected by conflict has been in close collaboration with other development partners, for example the World Bank. This is based on the complexity of DDR programs and therefore a huge task for any one donor to tackle alone.

3.11 Despite the important role that DDR has and continues to play in some of the Banks regional member countries, e.g. DRC, Burundi, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Sudan, the program faces many obstacles. These include: lack of sustained financing and support, poor planning and implementation of the reintegration phase of DDR, fragmented and uncoordinated donor approaches, lack of national institutional capacity to carry out the program successfully and the absence of mutual trust between participants of the process. It is against this backdrop that the Bank should consider increased engagement in this arena for improved outcomes. The Bank has demonstrated its effectiveness through its partnerships approach well supporting a coordinated reengagement in certain countries.

3.12 The reintegration of ex-combatants is more extensive than the first two phases of D&D because it comprises of the economic as well as social aspects of both the returnees and the over all communities they are joining. It is a long-term process that takes time to bear dividends, and requires patience, planning and committed financing that external donors may not be able to provide or commit to. It is in the context that the Bank can step in to support DDR in RMCs. Reintegration of returnees is very important for post-conflict and fragile states, because ex-combatants are a vulnerable group that poses a threat to the newly restored or existing peace. There is the possibility that they may relapse into conflict since they cannot economically sustain themselves and may have no other skills besides military training²⁰. In a special report titled "Would you fight again? Understanding Liberian Ex-combatant Reintegration" by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the authors noted that although wealth and money were not one of the motivations cited by the ex-combatants to return to war, poverty, joblessness and unemployment among the youth and those who held jobs before the war, were given as reasons as to why the ex-combatants interviewed would re-consider fighting.²¹

4. Lessons Learnt

4.1 This paper has attempted to elaborate on the Bank's experience in DDR and how these programs fall into the overall discussion of Security Sector Reform. The lessons drawn here are not exhaustive but indicative of some of the areas that will be critical for further understanding the design and impact of DDR in post-conflict situations.

²⁰ Ginifer, Jeremy. 2003. Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. In Meek, Sarah, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer, and Patrick Coke (eds). 2003. *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*. Institute for Security Studies Monograph No. 80. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies.

²¹ Special Report by Richard Hill, Gwendolyn Taylor, and Jonathan Temin, "Would You Fight Again? Understanding Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration", United States Institute of Peace, September 2008. 23 May 2011.

< <http://www.usip.org/publications/would-you-fight-again-understanding-liberian-ex-combatant-reintegration>>

- There has been more emphasis placed on the Disarmament and Demobilization phases of DDR and less on the Reintegration phase which is a longer term process and requires more resources to implement.
- Reintegration programs are unlikely to lead to major improvements in social and economic recovery if they are not backed by secure and planned funding. Funding short falls in these programs create gaps which disillusion ex-combatants. They lose trust and morale to participate in the program, and may seek unconventional means, for example through criminal activities to make a living.
- The above is also closely linked to community and ex-combatant expectations of reintegration programs. The importance of community and ex-combatant sensitization of what DDR is and is not cannot be underscored. This is to avoid high expectations and disappointment by ex-combatants in DDR programs which are sometimes viewed as a cash cow.
- The regional dimension of conflict in Africa highlights the importance of supporting sub-regional and regional bodies (e.g. Mano River Union, International Conference on Great lakes) deal with cross cutting issues such as repatriation of ex-combatants to their country of origin. Repatriation and resettlement of foreign fighters maybe beyond the capacity of a single country.
- Adopting the individual-based approach instead of a community-based approach is not sustainable. The expectation that ex-combatant economic packages will rub off to benefit the local communities or act as the catalyst for economic development, instead creates a burden for the communities absorbing the ex-combatants. These communities for example in Southern Sudan and DRC are already poor and have extensively suffered the brunt of war. Reintegration programs should be inclusive and seen to benefit the whole community that ex-combatants are being reintegrated into. This will help increase community acceptance and reduce resentment towards ex-combatants who will not be seen as being rewarded for participating in conflict.
- More should be done to engender DDR programs. Gender mainstreaming is insufficient in many DDR programs as female ex-combatants and women associated with fighting forces (WAFF) are usually left out and not direct beneficiaries of these programs even though they may have played a role just as crucial as their male counterparts.
- Monitoring and Evaluation of the Bank's support to reintegration programs should be undertaken more frequently to ensure that poorly-performing projects can be restructured, and project components/sub-components that are no longer relevant be cancelled. This will make for effective use of resources by both the Bank and the beneficiaries. Half-year evaluations to assess the implementation of programs in order to propose measures to improve the performance will be necessary.
- The dissemination of timely information to the public and among those targeted by reintegration programs is critical. Strong, continuous and consistent campaigns that communicate relevant information on the objectives of DDR should be mounted before and during the life cycle of these programs.

- The planning and preparation process for vocational training support takes a while depending on certain factors such as data availability (e.g. how many ex-combatants are being reintegrated), ex-combatant skills and education levels, and what training the target group will prefer. Therefore, preparatory tasks such as carrying out a market analysis to determine the skills and services required by the specific regions that the ex-combatants will be settling in, should be undertaken before the vocational training component can be designed.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration continues to play an important role in peace and state building initiatives as it contributes to a secure environment required for long term development. It should also be borne in mind that DDR is directly linked to opportunities for reforming the overall security sector in post-conflict situations and therefore, policy makers should take into account this interdependence.

5.2 Synergies between DDR especially reintegration efforts, and development programs by the Bank and its partners in RMCs should be harnessed. These synergies are necessary for the sustainability of donor interventions and for the transition from fragility post-conflict phase to long-term development.

5.3 DDR programs should be designed and implemented in a way that avoids creating new social status. The use of labels such as “ex-combatants” or “the demobilized” has normative, economic and bureaucratic implications associated with it. These names/labels may be necessary at the beginning to help identify target groups and beneficiaries of DDR, but they must eventually disappear, and these individuals must become permanently integrated into society.

5.4 There is need to enhance the absorptive capacity of host communities. The programs should be specific and associated with identifiable community needs. This calls for a needs assessment of communities. DDR programs should be designed based on the aspirations of both the community and ex-combatants.

5.5 Further research is needed on country specific experiences in post-conflict reconstruction and reintegration. In addition to this, the motivations and underlying causes of conflict (human rights abuses, weak electoral systems, high corruption and government ineffectiveness, break-down of rule of law and ethnic tensions among others) in post-conflict countries need to be addressed otherwise the probability to return to violence for the same reasons is high.