

# United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia

January - December 1999

## OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA)

### FOREWORD

As 1999 approaches, nearly four years after the departure of the last UNOSOM II peacekeeping troops from Mogadishu, Somalia presents two very different faces.

In the populous central and southern parts, there is the threat of a recurrence of famine comparable in scale to the 1992 famine, when over two hundred thousand Somalis died. Civil unrest and repeated natural disasters have undermined household food security, obliging thousands of families to move towards urban centres and Kenya to seek assistance in order to survive. The present Appeal includes the estimates of 1999 requirements to contain this emergency.

Last month, the United Nations and its partners issued a Donor Alert to the international community. We again urge donors to contribute quickly in order to avoid a potential humanitarian catastrophe in these crisis zones.

The other aspect of Somalia gives some hope for the future. In 'zones of recovery,' particularly in the North of Somalia, the people have created environments of relative peace and stability. The local administrations, however, remain fragile. As the UN Secretary-General observed earlier this year, these areas deserve to reap a "peace dividend". The United Nations therefore proposes in this Appeal to provide assistance to build capacities in such areas in order to make progress towards the goals of good governance, peace and renewed prosperity.

We therefore urge donors to address both aspects of Somalia: The need to save lives and reduce human suffering, and the need to foster hope through projects that promote sustained human development.

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The present document is the third United Nations (UN) Consolidated Appeal for Somalia since the departure of UNOSOM in early 1995. In this Appeal, the UN Country Team (UNCT) has attempted to present a brief but a holistic picture of Somalia, covering the requirements of the continuing humanitarian crisis, which deserves generous funding, as well as the opportunities to invest in peaceful areas. While Somalia has an unfolding crisis in the South, there is hope particularly in the North, for the future in the form of nascent administrations being formed, which may become one day the foundation for a new central government. The main objective of this Appeal is to prevent the current situation in the South from developing into famine because of recurrent drought, floods, epidemics and insecurity, and at the same time to assist in establishing basic conditions for sustainable livelihoods.

Part I provides an update on the Appeal process during 1998, reviews the recent history and the current situation. To better understand the complexities of Somalia today, a conceptual framework ('zones of crisis, transition, and recovery') is presented. From the analysis of the situation a number of key issues are emphasised, such as the need for improved emergency preparedness and response on the one hand, and on the other, for improved governance. In the last section of Part I, the UN's Common Humanitarian and Development Action Plan is outlined, taking into account the best and worst case scenarios envisaged for 1999. UN Agencies programme is aimed at more or less the whole population of Somalia of some six million, of whom some four million are expected to be direct beneficiaries if the programme can be fully implemented. The emergency operations are targeted at providing emergency assistance to at least one million persons, of whom more than 300,000 are at very high risk. Based on the prior analysis and the projections for next year, five short-term goals have been set. To make progress in achieving these goals, the Somalia UNCT will utilise all resources at its disposal within a common framework of basic strategies and principles, including an 'exit strategy' to facilitate an end to the need for relief aid to Somalia:

- Emergency preparedness and response;
- Household food security;
- Reintegration of returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs);
- Rehabilitation of essential social services;
- Good governance.

In Part II, the priorities for action are presented. Priorities for three geographic areas are outlined: the Northwest, the Northeast, and the Centre and South. The emphasis, however, is placed on explaining and describing the priorities in each of five main sectoral and two 'cross-sectoral' areas. In order to facilitate inter-agency technical coordination, the five main sectors are essentially the same as those now used in the five Sectoral Committees of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB). They form the foundation for the programmes and projects of UN Agencies in 1999, which in turn will contribute to the achievement of the short-term goals described in Part I:

- Food Security and Development of Livelihoods;
- Health and Nutrition;
- Water and Sanitation;
- Education;
- Public Administration.
- Cross Sectoral: Human Rights; Planning and Coordination.

An important feature of this Appeal is that it clearly outlines the sectoral priorities but does not pretend to present specific project proposals except in a cursory manner as provided, agency-by-agency, in the annexes. This approach has been taken in order to focus attention, both of the UN Agencies and of donors, on the priorities rather than on too many specific project details. The priorities were derived from a joint inter-agency analysis of the situation in Somalia with respect to each sector, and from consideration of the basic principles and strategies described in Part I. By determining priorities in this way, the present Appeal aims at accurately reflecting the aspirations of the Somali people in combination with the best judgement of the technical expertise of the United Nations and its partners. As a result, the description of priorities in Part II is intended to be the foundation upon which UN Agencies will present their individual and joint project proposals to donors. Based on this Appeal, the process of project formulation by UN Agencies, together with their NGO partners and interested donors, will continue throughout 1999. It is expected that all parties involved in helping Somalia to a better future through humanitarian assistance and development cooperation will find this document useful.

**Table I : Priority Funding Requirements for the HUMANITARIAN Activities  
of the 1999 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for SOMALIA  
By Sector and Appealing Agency  
January - December 1999**

APPEALING AGENCY	SECTOR						FUNDS REQUESTED US\$
	Food Security and Development of Livelihoods	Health and Nutrition	Water and Sanitation	Education	Public Administration and Institutional Capacity-Building	Cross-Sectoral (Human Rights/Coordination and Planning)	
FAO	1,503,000						1,503,000
UNCAS *						4,475,000	4,475,000
UNDP			191,000	595,625	3,500,000	764,000	5,050,625
UNESCO				2,180,317	100,000		2,280,317
UNHCR	15,133,290	2,085,493	3,578,773	2,342,950		1,746,154	24,886,660
UNICEF		8,590,000	2,700,000	2,000,000			13,290,000
UNIFEM					304,150	495,000	799,150
WFP	8,155,345	2,000,000		1,093,319			11,248,664
WHO		1,718,500	410,000				2,128,500
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24,791,635</b>	<b>14,393,993</b>	<b>6,879,773</b>	<b>8,212,211</b>	<b>3,904,150</b>	<b>7,480,154</b>	<b>65,661,916</b>

\* The Common Air Service is administered by WFP.

**Table II : Complementary Priority Funding Requirements with Emphasis on REHABILITATION and RECOVERY Activities**  
**Outside the 1999 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for SOMALIA**  
**By Sector and Appealing Agency**  
*January - December 1999*

APPEALING AGENCY	SECTOR						FUNDS REQUESTED US\$
	Food Security and Development of Livelihoods	Health and Nutrition	Water and Sanitation	Education	Public Administration and Institutional Capacity-Building	Cross-Sectoral (Human Rights/Coordination and Planning)	
FAO	688,000						688,000
OHCHR						129,000	129,000
UNDP	800,000	200,000	380,000	150,000	4,185,000	180,000	5,895,000
UNESCO				756,088		120,000	876,088
UNFPA		150,000					150,000

UNICEF		6,260,000	1,600,000	1,670,000		800,000	10,330,000
UNIFEM					250,000	350,000	600,000
WFP					9,891,716		9,891,716
WHO		742,100					742,100
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,488,000</b>	<b>7,352,100</b>	<b>1,980,000</b>	<b>2,576,088</b>	<b>14,326,716</b>	<b>1,579,000</b>	<b>29,301,904</b>

## **PART I. THE COMMON HUMANITARIAN ACTION PLAN**

### **1. The 1998 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and the Flood Response in Review**

During the past three years, UN Agencies active in Somalia have become increasingly aware of the need to link relief and development both conceptually and operationally. The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) has facilitated a systematic and holistic approach to addressing the continuing crisis in Somalia, including the extraordinary crisis caused by the 1997/98 floods, the most devastating to have hit Somalia in living memory. The UN approach attempts to integrate an overall vision for relief, rehabilitation, early development and peace-building.

In 1997 and 1998, the Appeal process contributed significantly to the improvement of inter-agency cooperation in three main ways. Firstly, at the field level, the Appeal served as a reference document and framework for operational coordination between UN Agencies and their partners, particularly international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Secondly, in Nairobi, joint UN committees were formed to facilitate and coordinate various joint programme activities. Joint planning became commonplace, contributing to inter-agency agreement on the nature of critical humanitarian needs and on the related UN programmes. And thirdly, the cooperative process required for the preparation of the Appeal has further strengthened the capacity of the UN system in Somalia to respond more quickly, effectively and efficiently to new emergencies.

#### **Status of the 1998 Appeal**

The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Humanitarian Appeal for Somalia requested US\$ 79 million for the period January to December 1998. Its launch was delayed until March 1998 as a result of the pre-occupation of many agencies working to mitigate the impact of the severe floods which began in November 1997. Excluding funds received for the flood operations (see below), as of 26 October 1998, a total of US\$ 22.5 million had been received, covering only one third of the Appeal requirements. UN programmes most affected by lack of resources pertained to food security, emergency, rehabilitation and governance. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that donors provided an additional US\$ 33.5 million for humanitarian assistance in Somalia, outside the framework of the 1998 Appeal.

<b>Donor Contributions per Programme in 1998 (US\$)</b>		
<b>Programme</b>	<b>1998 Appeal Amount</b>	<b>Contribution</b>
Emergency	2,895,000	441,176
Food security	3,256,000	0
Rehabilitation	21,660,000	1,540,057

Reintegration	38,525,909	18,652,523
Governance	7,685,000	495,860
Joint operational support	5,013,600	1,376,582
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>79,035,509</b>	<b>22,506,198</b>

The funding received under the 1998 Appeal tended to favour activities in areas of recovery, particularly in the North, thereby providing a certain 'peace dividend.' However, under-funding in most sectors seriously constrained the efforts of UN Agencies and their NGO partners to respond to the most pressing needs of people in situations of crisis and transition. This decline in funding resulted in many humanitarian NGOs ending their operations, particularly in the central and southern regions, thereby diminishing the capacity of the international aid community to respond to new emergencies.

### **The 1997/98 Flood Response**

In November and December 1997, central and southern Somalia was severely flooded in storms presumed to be related to the El Niño weather phenomenon. The crisis caused by flooding lasted six months, though many families never recovered their losses. During the 'flood response,' inter-agency coordination and management were seen as successful by many, and undoubtedly many lives were saved. There was a very rapid and generous donor response, mobilising some US\$ 29 million through two UN "Flash Appeals" in November 1997 and January 1998. UN Agencies and NGOs were engaged in a massive operation to address the relief needs of the population in affected areas of central and southern Somalia. However, whilst donor funds were easily mobilised during the floods, the first months of 1998 saw very little by way of donor remittances for the 1998 Appeal, leaving most of the rehabilitation needs unmet. For instance, the farming communities living along the Juba and Shabelle rivers are now very vulnerable to any flooding since the repair of the embankments is very slow without external assistance. Now much of central and southern Somalia is threatened by a new crisis, one of severe hunger and high risk on the part of at least 300,000 persons living in Bay and Bakool regions, and surrounding areas. The requirements for this crisis have been included in the annual appeals for 1998 and 1999, partly in response to the need to ensure that the immediate crisis is catered to, followed by a neglect which again could further exacerbate the humanitarian situation.

### **Formulation of the 1999 Consolidated Appeal**

The present Appeal process has been highly consultative. In August 1998 the UNCT decided that it would again be necessary to prepare an Appeal for 1999, given that the prospect seems poor for dramatic improvement of the overall crisis in Somalia. In early September, the UNCT met at length with representatives of the Geneva office of OCHA. It was again agreed that a new Appeal - indeed a more appealing Appeal - would be necessary for 1999, despite the fact that the 1998 Appeal had resulted in contributions of only one third of the total. It was also agreed that the Appeal had proved to be an important process facilitating joint planning and joint responses. A work plan was determined, and an outline of the 1999 Appeal was reviewed. The UN Coordination Unit took the lead reviewing the plans for 1999 which had already been formulated by the UN Agencies. At the end of September it was agreed to structure the Appeal in terms of more traditional sectors (health, education, etc) along the same lines as the sectoral committees of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB). The five 'programmes' of the former appeals (i.e. "Emergency Preparedness and Response; Food Security; Reintegration; Rehabilitation; and Governance) were retained as the 'short-term goals' of the 1999 Appeal.

The process of determining the priorities for 1999 was a challenge. Agencies involved in a given sector met on several occasions to discuss what they estimated the situation would be in 1999 and ways to provide effective assistance towards positive change. The result was, as described in each sectoral plan in Part II of this Appeal, a coherent strategy which takes into account the different kinds of responses needed in areas of crisis, transition and recovery, while keeping in mind the need to make progress toward achieving the short-term goals. Many programme planning meetings were held. A rough draft of

the Appeal was widely distributed before mid-October, prompting substantial comments from many agencies, including NGO partners.

Concurrently in each of the operational areas in Somalia, the UN Agencies and their partners - both NGOs and local authorities - discussed priorities for UN assistance in 1999. These discussions resulted in substantive inputs, particularly from the groups in Hargeisa and Bosaso. Comments from UN Focal Points located in the centre and south of Somalia were complemented by a brief field mission to several locations, to discuss priorities for interventions in 1999. All of these inputs from Somalia helped to provide a 'reality check' on the priorities set for 1999. After several drafts of the document were reviewed by agencies in Nairobi, it was sent by OCHA to UN Agency headquarters for comments and inputs. OCHA-Geneva consolidated and inputted UN Agency Headquarters' comments after which it was edited, formatted and sent to the printers. The Appeal was prepared to be launched on 16 December 1999.

## 2. The Situation in Somalia

### 2.1 Introduction

This section looks back to the socio-economic landscape prior to the civil upheavals of 1988 and the subsequent impact of the civil war over the last ten years. It provides a glimpse of Somalia's political and economic collapse, which plunged it into a complex emergency. The present analysis of contemporary Somalia distinguishes between three different political and humanitarian situations within the country using the descriptive labels of: zones of 'crisis,' zones of 'transition,' and zones of 'recovery.' Each of these situations requires a different humanitarian and rehabilitation strategy and distinct types of external assistance.

The overview and analysis lead to the identification of five issues, which are believed to constitute the most critical areas for intervention. These are: (i) food insecurity and lack of livelihood; (ii) massive and recurrent population displacements; (iii) collapse of social services and infrastructure; and (iv) lack of good governance (and associated security) needed to address these issues. These four problems all contribute to the fifth issue, the recurrence of emergencies and lack of emergency preparedness on the part of the Somali communities. In this respect, adequate governance includes provision of security and administrative requirements to allow the pursuit of food security and livelihoods, settlement or resettlement of the displaced, repatriation of refugees and the revival of social services. Without good governance, chronic vulnerability will continue to degenerate into critical emergency situations requiring international humanitarian disaster relief interventions.

The five areas of concern comprise the main humanitarian, rehabilitation and recovery challenges that need to be addressed by the UN and its partners in Somalia. These issues are explored below and give rise to the UN's five 'short-term goals' described in section 3 of Part I, below.

To facilitate understanding of the prevailing complex situation and needs for external assistance in Somalia, this Appeal document approaches the issues from three different angles: by sector (e.g. health); by three geo-political areas (the northwest, northeast and central/south areas) and by three 'zones' (crisis, transition, recovery). The main approach is by sector as outlined in Part II of the document. For each sector, the humanitarian issues are examined for Somalia as a whole, by geo-political area and by zone of crisis, transition and recovery. These three approaches overlap in the document and are intended to facilitate the reader's understanding of the issues.

### 2.2 The impact of the civil war

The war that erupted in 1988 plunged southern Somalia into a complex emergency from which it is yet to emerge. During the Cold War the Siad Barre government had become dependent upon external powers. For years the external aid had intensified the polarisation of Somali society along clan lines, fatally weakening the Barre regime. When the Cold War ended, there was an abrupt end to the massive influx of unregulated military and economic assistance. New rivalries fueled by clan-based politicians and militia

leaders came to the fore and, in a country inundated with arms, the result was the eruption of civil war with clan identity as the dividing line. Siad Barre's 20-year rule left Somalia with a legacy of militarism, inter-clan hostility, misuse of state authority and abuse of foreign assistance. Somali faction leaders continue to be preoccupied with external aid. Many believe that the rulers of any future state will surely have aid as a source of income. This belief contributes to the continuing conflicts amongst rival factions.

As political confrontation and civil war degenerated into clan conflict, the remnants of government structures collapsed. What remained of Somalia's physical, economic and social infrastructure was largely destroyed. In 1991-92, the heavily populated inter-riverine areas (between the Juba and Shabelle river valleys) were very vulnerable. With crop failures and the escalation of clan conflict combined with drought and flood, thousands of people became destitute. Famine resulted in mass population displacement, and widespread loss of life. A very similar scenario is now unfolding. As noted above a 'Donor Alert' was issued by the UN in November 1998 in hopes of staving off a repeat of the 1992 disaster.

In 1992 the combination of protracted conflict and drought caused widespread famine in the inter-riverine areas of central and southern Somalia, causing an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 deaths. The international response was slowed by insecurity due to marauding factions and rampant banditry. Massive infusions of relief aid during the period from August through November 1992 helped to mitigate the impact of famine, but could not eliminate its causes. In December 1992 a US-led UN military intervention sought to provide a safe environment for humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Instead of disarming and dispersing the predatory militias, the intervention sought to provide safety by protecting aid convoys and installations. This approach proved to have limited potential and was not sustainable. In early 1993, the task was devolved to a new UN operation, UNOSOM II, which attempted to play a broader role in Somalia, including attempts to bring peace between warring factions. However, the window of opportunity to disarm the militias and bandits closed, as factions took advantage of the huge influx of aid in order to strengthen their forces. In June 1993 'General' Aideed's militia attacked Pakistani UNOSOM peacekeepers in south Mogadishu. Sporadic clashes between UNOSOM II forces and Aideed's militia continued until October 1993 when a small US force was ambushed, suffering heavy casualties. The US withdrew its forces, and by March 1995 all remaining UNOSOM forces had left.

Chronic insecurity in Mogadishu and in much of central and southern Somalia has continued to thwart humanitarian relief and rehabilitation efforts there. The lack of good governance has created an environment in which the stresses of recurrent natural problems (such as drought) are not dealt with effectively by any government. Moreover, external aid to assist in such calamities is severely constrained. In contrast, the progress towards recovery in the north-west and north-east, as well as some notable pockets elsewhere, demonstrates the importance of fostering good governance in combating the Somalia crisis.

### **2.3 Political complexity, civil conflict, insecurity**

Nearly eight years after the start of the civil war, Somalia remains without a central government. The country is characterised by the growth of diverse clan-based and regional polities. These complexities can be simplified conceptually by reference to three descriptive categories differentiated primarily by their degree of political maturity and levels of peace and security, namely, zones of crisis, transition and recovery.

Whilst the North of Somalia is typically seen to be a 'zone of recovery,' there are nevertheless many communities or even regions in the North which are 'zones of transition' and some areas which are 'zones of crisis,' such as the areas blighted by land mines. By the same token, in central and southern Somalia there are 'zones of transition', although the Centre and South are sometimes categorised as being an unrelieved 'zone of crisis.'

#### **Zones of crisis**

Such zones are characterised by recurrent complex emergencies. They often lack legitimate local authorities and have highly fragmented political structures; power may be in the hands of the controller of militias. There are typically high levels of insecurity, abuse of human rights, sporadic armed conflict, and frequent population displacements. Most of southern and much of central Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu and the principal southern port town of Kismayo, comprise zones of crisis. Effective assistance in such zones has proven to be particularly difficult and costly. Humanitarian aid workers are at high risk in trying to bring resources to the most vulnerable groups. Militias or bandits have little respect for humanitarian principles, rendering anyone who has relatively unprotected resources to be vulnerable to kidnappings, or theft of property, and endless haggling or even threats over how aid resources are to be allocated at the local level.

At times, self-interest groups take the attitude that if they do not obtain what they consider to be their rightful allocation of aid goods, they may take retribution against the humanitarian workers, or against competitors for aid goods. In zones of crisis, where governance is weak, the strength of clan affiliations makes it unwise to leave such allocations exclusively in the hands of Somali UN staff. Frequently some of their own clan members will not comprehend why all UN resources are not given entirely to his or her own clan. Therefore, with few exceptions, it is imperative that international UN staff take responsibility for such allocation and for monitoring. The unrestricted and safe access of all staff, including expatriates, to any operational area is therefore a determining factor as to whether or not international assistance can be delivered.

### **Zones of transition**

Much of Somalia is currently experiencing levels of governance, security and economic activity that fall somewhere between crisis and recovery. In these zones, transition towards a more stable environment is occurring but is fragile and reversible. Political authority in these zones is generally highly localised and economic activity stunted. However, militia activity is minimal, settlement patterns and property ownership are relatively stable and some level of rehabilitation and reintegration work is possible. In these zones, there is a move from direct assistance to indirect support and planning assistance where interventions can be aimed more at capacity-building, extension of successful pilot projects, enhanced community participation and ownership, and long-term sustainability. As of the end of 1998 zones of transition are found in many parts of Somalia. In the north this includes most of the rural areas in Togdheer, Sanaag, Sool, Bari, Nugal and Mudug. In central and southern Somalia some parts of Galgaduud, Hiraan, Middle and Lower Shabelle, Gedo and Middle Juba are considered to be zones of transition.

### **Zones of recovery**

In the north of Somalia there have been significant political development and economic recovery. As noted above, the north is generally now seen as mostly zones of recovery and transition. The economy in the north has demonstrated surprising resilience, with expanding inter-regional and export-oriented trade. A number of setbacks have occurred in this process. In early 1998, for example, Saudi Arabia imposed a ban on the importation of Somali livestock. This was due to Saudi fears of possible public health problems following an outbreak of Rift Valley fever amongst livestock in the region that occurred after the severe flooding of late 1997. The ban significantly suppressed the livestock trade, causing drastic income reductions for the local authorities in the north. On a more positive note, economic activity in 1998 for both the north-western and north-eastern areas is believed to have equaled or even surpassed pre-war levels. For example, Berbera has become the most active Somali seaport and the second most important seaport for Ethiopia, after Djibouti. Similarly, airports such as in Hargeisa, Berbera and Bosasso provide an important source of revenue for local authorities and also encourage economic development. Nevertheless, the stability of these areas is fragile. Zones of recovery still need much help to build their capacities in order to sustain and improve upon their achievements since the end of the civil war.

In the North, and particularly in the north-western part of the country, substantial rehabilitation, governance and reintegration assistance has been possible. In the central and southern parts, only a few successful examples of such work can be cited. Most projects have been designed to give essential support towards improving administrative capacities and private economic expansion. Training

programmes have been provided for local administrative structures, assistance given to urban planning and management, as well as to road repair and sanitation. UN Agencies, often working closely with international NGOs, have succeeded with numerous small, self-sustaining projects, particularly in the urban areas of these zones of recovery.

It must be noted, however, that natural and man-made disasters can still easily disrupt any process of transition and recovery. For example, in parts of central and southern Somalia, which are largely in a fragile state of transition, political crises and natural disasters can render any area easily vulnerable to recurrent emergencies. This is a major concern at this time, with the looming food crisis threatening Bay, Bakool and the surrounding, highly populated regions.

## **2.4 Human development**

Somalia is amongst the least developed countries in the world due to a complex combination of climatic, geographical, socio-cultural, historical and political factors. Its harsh, arid climate, low levels of technology, and rudimentary infrastructure predispose it to subsistence level productivity and hence to poverty. Periodic drought, flood, pest infestation and crop failure impede any accumulation of surplus resources, reinforce the poverty of large sections of the population and limit the possibility of investment in improving productivity and maintaining a buffer against destitution. Extreme poverty leads to high vulnerability to any sharp deterioration in existing conditions. Poor governance, parasitic elites and warlordism all tend to further escalate levels of vulnerability. The relationship between very low levels of human development and ongoing political crisis constitutes a vicious cycle out of which the people of Somalia need desperately to escape.

UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) ranks Somalia amongst the very poorest countries in the world and highlights a number of determining factors that indicate its extremely high levels of vulnerability. The HDI estimates life expectancy at 41 to 43 years, reflecting very high child and maternal mortality rates. Mortality of children under five exceeds 25 per cent, and maternal mortality, at about 1,600 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, is amongst the highest in the world. The practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) and the lack of reproductive health, family planning and obstetric services all exacerbate the high death rate of women in childbirth. Less than two in ten adults are literate, with great disparities between male and female literacy rates. Primary school enrolment is generally under 16 per cent. Despite a resurgence of the private sector in a few areas, national income is only about 60 per cent of pre-war levels. However, these statistics are averages hiding significant disparities in human development and well-being between regions and areas within regions, between livelihood groups and between households.

Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable; in some areas half of the households are headed by women, who shoulder all household responsibilities whilst generating family income through commerce or farming. There is throughout Somalia an increased role of women in meeting household needs, in participating in community affairs, in agricultural production and in business activities. Since the collapse of the state, the role of women in commerce has grown markedly. The element of rapid change has been important; for many women it has made them more vulnerable, while for others it has opened vistas of opportunity virtually impossible in Somalia before the war.

The social context of human development in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to clan affiliation. Lineage identity is a central organising force in Somali society. At the grassroots level, clan elders and other community leaders play a vital role in providing most of the day-to-day governance throughout Somalia, in the absence of effective state authority, and are often instrumental in maintaining local stability.

One of the paradoxes of contemporary Somalia is that some of the most powerful social and economic forces are simultaneously sources of both stability and insecurity. On the one hand, clan networks provide an essential level of physical and social security to many Somali households; the clan is a vital source of group protection, social security and customary law in the absence of state infrastructure. On the other hand, clannism is a powerful force contributing to unstable alliances, diffusion of power and communal conflict over scarce resources. In the period of state collapse, it has proved to be a divisive and

destructive tool in the hands of political leaders. A second force, economic and business interests, at times promotes inter-clan and inter-factional accords for the sake of improved market conditions. However, these players also resort to armed conflict in pursuit of market control and price-fixing.

The Somali struggle against poverty takes place against a backdrop of environmental degradation and stress. Extreme poverty and vulnerability, together with the absence of state range management has led to over-grazing and degradation of pastureland, as well as destruction by poor people of forests for charcoal production, to be exported to Gulf states by unregulated business enterprises. Increased pollution sanctioned by faction leaders seeking hard currency, who agree to the dumping of toxic waste by international companies in areas under their control, has also been noted. Each instance of environmental degradation in this fragile, semi-arid setting reduces the carrying capacity of the land and increases both the risk of desertification and the vulnerability of the population. Until internal governance is improved, there is little that external aid can do to halt such degradation of the environment.

## **2.5 Humanitarian, recovery and development issues**

From the above analysis of the situation of Somalia in 1998, five main issues emerge which will require sustained assistance over the next few years:

- 1 Emergency preparedness and response;
- 2 Household food security and livelihoods;
- 3 Reintegration;
- 4 Rehabilitation of social services and infrastructure;
- 5 Governance.

### **Issue 1: Emergency preparedness and response**

Political turmoil is frequently accompanied by humanitarian crises. Continuing insecurity throughout the inter-riverine area (i.e. between the Juba and Shabelle Rivers) and much of southern Somalia has restricted agricultural production and disrupted traditional livestock movements. The result has been a sharp drop in harvest size compared to pre-war levels and a sharp rise in levels of chronic malnutrition amongst some sectors of the population particularly young children. Conditions are further exacerbated by natural disasters.

Drought conditions in late 1996 and early 1997 led to poor harvests and high levels of severe malnutrition in parts of southern Somalia. In November and December 1997 disastrous flooding in the Juba and Shabelle valleys killed more than 2,500 people and 34,000 head of livestock, displaced over 250,000 people, left approximately one million in vulnerable conditions and devastated agriculture over wide areas, setting the stage for subsequent humanitarian crises.

Crop forecasts for 1998 suggest that the 1998 grain harvest could be the lowest since 1993. In view of the extreme poverty and hence, chronic vulnerability of much of the population of central and southern Somalia, another emergency is expected in early 1999. There is a near certainty of emergency situations recurring in large parts of central and southern Somalia where the majority of the population are essentially destitute. Social services, where they exist, are minimal. Approximately one million persons are seriously threatened, of whom some 300,000 are at very high risk. In terms of food insecurity, and lack of access to health and other essential services, this population is extremely vulnerable to the periodic droughts, crop failures and fluctuations in the level of insecurity, which frequently push them over the brink into life-threatening emergency situations. Until there is a basic improvement in this level of vulnerability, emergencies will continue to occur and capacity for prompt emergency response will be crucial to the survival of large numbers of people in Somalia's zones of crisis. As noted above an urgent "Donor Alert" was issued in November 1998 to draw attention to this impending disaster.

However, unlike 1997, the international community has less capacity now to respond to a serious crisis in southern Somalia. Due to lack of funding and, to some extent, to local insecurity, many of the international NGOs have left the country. Similarly the UN, particularly United Nations Children's Fund

(UNICEF), has been obliged to scale down its presence. Much of the area is liable to civil conflicts. The pattern of insecurity is constantly changing, requiring monitoring by UN security officers who estimate the relative levels of insecurity and decide the extent to which UN staff are permitted to access any location. The UN and its NGO partners have in the past been relatively well prepared with substantial quantities of relief items. The World Food Programme's (WFP) reserves for food relief are not adequate at the time of writing this (11/98), nor are the non-food items in adequate stock (e.g. tarpaulins, oral rehydration salts, 'SuperMix' for supplementary feeding of malnourished children, intravenous fluids and other items normally stocked by UNICEF and World Health Organization - WHO.) The UN's ability to monitor the situation in Somalia has to some extent improved, particularly in terms of the performance of the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU), which cooperates with United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) and other agencies. But the increasing difficulties faced by the UN and NGOs in their international staff gaining access to the central and south makes monitoring quite difficult and at times dangerous for field staff.

## **Issue 2: Household food security and livelihoods**

The severe poverty prevailing in many areas of Somalia is reflected as inadequate food security at the household level and the widespread lack of viable livelihood opportunities. The impact of poverty is particularly acute in the crisis zones of central and southern Somalia, where chronic insecurity and inadequate governance constrain food production and trade, economic recovery and the development of sustainable livelihood options. The impact of poverty in the country is uneven, with populations in zones of recovery in the northwest and northeast enjoying more stable and higher levels of health, education and income than their counterparts in central and southern Somalia.

Within each region, disadvantaged and vulnerable groups suffer disproportionately. These include ethnic minorities, the urban poor, female-headed households, internally displaced persons (IDPs IDPs are those who have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence and/or violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters. They have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.), returnees and communities depending on subsistence-level farming and livestock raising. However, acute variations occur even within communities. Some groups, including wealthy merchants and traders, large-scale livestock and plantation owners and employees, as well as contractors of international agencies are relatively well-off and able to privately secure adequate health and educational services for their families.

Households with access to remittances from family members working abroad also manage better to secure basic needs. An indication of the Somali economy's inherent weakness is the extent to which Somalis depend on remittances from relatives abroad. In income terms, export of labour is second only to livestock exports as a source of external income.

Somalia's main productive sectors, livestock and agriculture, were already weak before the civil war and have been severely damaged in the course of ten years of armed conflict and state collapse. The decline in economic production in Somalia has reduced both household income and potential local governmental tax revenues used to cover basic development needs. Most basic infrastructure, such as seaports, airports, roads, bridges, piped water supplies and electricity, has either been destroyed or has seriously deteriorated, thereby hampering commerce and production. Agricultural yields have declined sharply from pre-war levels due to deteriorating canal and flood control systems, lack of agricultural inputs, badly-timed food aid and poor security. The absence of government livestock health certification has negatively affected the key livestock export sector, particularly with respect to the 1998 Saudi ban on Somali livestock due to perceived disease risks.

Somalia's ability to feed itself has steadily declined over the past few decades and has been punctuated by sharp fluctuations in food production following periodic crop failures due to drought, floods, pest infestation and outbreaks of livestock diseases. Drought-related crop failures tend to occur every three to five years. State collapse and insecurity since 1990 have destroyed much of the agricultural infrastructure, deprived pastoralists of access to veterinary services, and weakened other productive sectors that

generate hard currency for food importation. The high level of food aid needed each year is evidence of the gap between Somalia's purchasing power of imported food and its total food needs.

The rehabilitation of basic services, essential to livelihood creation and recovery, requires sustained revenue for public administration. However, even where such revenue sources exist, such as in the form of seaports and airports, the capacity to manage them is often lacking. To prevent further deterioration of existing services and maximise efficient use of facilities, capacity-building must be carried out to provide a trained work force that can manage these processes effectively. These changes will encourage larger and more sustained private enterprise which in turn can provide a stable, potential source of income to local administrations through taxation.

Human development and economic recovery are also constrained by the displacement of large numbers of Somalis, particularly skilled workers, who are either internally displaced, in refugee camps or resettled abroad. Much of the skilled professional workforce has opted for resettlement, constituting a serious 'brain-drain'. For many households with a certain financial stability, the desire to secure basic development needs has prompted them to resettle abroad. Rough estimates suggest that between 15 to 20 percent of the pre-war population of Somalia now exists as a diaspora in North America, Europe, East Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

### **Issue 3: Reintegration**

It is unlikely that the Somali diaspora can be attracted to return to a country where mere survival is often the main priority, development beyond aspiration and where social services and economic and administrative infrastructure have collapsed. Effectively addressing these gaps in services is crucial to the reintegration of the absolute poor, including returning refugees, IDPs and the poorest sectors of the urban and rural populations, who live on the brink of disaster.

Large numbers of Somali refugees remain in camps in neighbouring countries. Security conditions permitting, UN priorities include the ongoing repatriation of these refugees and their reintegration into communities within Somalia. A concurrent priority is the provision of assistance to both these vulnerable groups and to the receiving communities, to alleviate the added burden on existing facilities and resources.

Until security issues are addressed, recovery or progress towards it through reintegration, will remain under threat. Insecurity is a key component of recurrent emergencies in Somalia and one that needs to be taken into account in order to find viable and enduring solutions. Rehabilitation and reintegration interventions have significant potential to reduce insecurity. In particular, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-militia during rehabilitation phases contribute to overall security in a region. Settling the militia has been a pre-requisite for lasting peace and security in current zones of recovery and transition.

### **Issue 4: Rehabilitation of social services and infrastructure**

Rehabilitation of health and education facilities and other essential public infrastructure is vital to poverty alleviation and reintegration. Health and education are especially critical.

Nearly all health facilities were damaged and looted during the war and most of the trained health personnel subsequently migrated to other countries or to more secure areas, creating shortages of both trained health workers and operative health centres. In light of limited access to curative health care, added importance is being given to the strengthening of existing health services, as well as preventive measures such as health information, immunisation services, improved sanitation, hygiene and safe drinking water.

The collapse of Somalia's educational system is likely to constrain recovery and development for decades. Somalia faces the prospect of two 'lost generations' without the necessary education and training to take up productive and leadership roles in the future. Recent estimates suggest that at most only one out of six

school-age children (aged 6 to 14) is enrolled in school. This is one of the lowest enrolment rates in the world. Almost all of these students are concentrated in the lower grades. Secondary education is nearly non-existent and the 14 to 18 age group is almost entirely out of school.

The extremely low access to schooling is exacerbated by the very poor quality of most of the few schools which do operate. The lost educational opportunity represents a violation of the fundamental right of the child to education. Moreover, this loss of 'human capital' represents a disastrous setback to both the individual household and to a society attempting to rebuild a shattered economy and government. Poor and inadequate education is also an important factor deterring Somali refugees from returning to even peaceful regions of the country. Revised curricula should contain an element of civic education. Among the few children receiving education, there is a serious gender gap. Only about half as many girls as boys are enrolled in primary schools. This gender imbalance could seriously hamper development of the next generation of women and possibly undermine important gains made by Somali women over the past thirty years.

Access to safe water is another fundamental and crucial rehabilitation issue. Adequate, year-round access to safe drinking water is rare. This chronic problem has been seriously exacerbated by the widespread destruction and looting of water supply systems, sources and services and general lack of maintenance during the civil war and its aftermath. Recent UNICEF surveys indicate that on average only 31 per cent of the population in the north-west and 19 percent in the northeast have access to safe drinking water. In the central and southern zone, the figure is likely to be well under 20 per cent. The lack of access to safe water surely contributes to widespread diarrhoeal diseases, including cholera, which are among the leading causes of mortality in Somalia.

Rehabilitation of life-sustaining infrastructure is important for zones of crisis, as well as zones of recovery. Contrary to conventional wisdom, an appropriate emergency response in the centre and south should be the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure. The rehabilitation of roads, basic communication systems, water supplies including water points for nomads and flood dikes should be of high priority. This would contribute to improvements in the welfare of the majority of people and enhanced transport and communications would also reduce the isolation of the areas. Such initiatives are treated further under the section for public administration in Part II, below.

## **Issue 5: Governance**

The issues of insecurity and inadequate governance affect all areas of aid interventions. They are among the principal constraints to enhancement of food security and livelihoods, reintegration and rehabilitation. As such, they are also amongst the leading causes of recurrent emergency situations.

In Somalia, the relationship between the ongoing political crisis and the low levels of human development constitutes a vicious cycle. State collapse and endemic conflict have shattered community-based safety nets and social services, reversing past gains. The chronic lack of governance continues to fuel conflict and prolong state collapse through political fragmentation, the associated lack of livelihoods and collapse of social services. Populations of young men with no access to education gravitate towards militias as the only viable source of 'employment,' thereby exacerbating insecurity and hampering rehabilitation and development. As mentioned earlier, trained professionals are being lost to an international 'brain-drain', since few Somalis with links abroad are willing to stay and raise a family without access to security, education, health care and clean water. To this loss of trained workers must be added the reduction in productivity of the labour force through chronic illness and high morbidity rates.

Political authority in central and southern Somalia is highly localised, weak and unstable. It lacks administrative and managerial capacity and the ability to collect revenue, essential to the sustainability of any administration. Few local administrations are able to collect taxes to fund even minimal levels of community development. However, in zones of recovery in northern Somalia, governance is more participatory and responsive today than at any other time in recent decades. In 'Somaliland', the administration, with the support of traditional structures, has established a functional state apparatus, police force and basic school and health care systems in a safe and lawful environment, which in turn has

contributed significantly to the growth of a revitalised commercial economy. Political development and governance in the northeast, namely 'Puntland,' is less advanced but the environment is generally peaceful, with increasing inter-regional cooperation.

Improved governance is essential to sustainable development in Somalia where the governance crisis is seen as the core impasse. For at least one generation, poor governance or lack of governance and consequent conflict and lawlessness have been major obstacles to human development. International agencies and NGOs working in Somalia could contribute significantly to the strengthening of Somali governance institutions through joint collaboration and capacity building. In this respect, increasing Somali capacity to plan and implement rehabilitation will be an integral element of the UN's humanitarian programme.

International assistance has an unavoidable impact on local governance. Such help can make an important, positive contribution where aid interventions are designed and implemented to enhance local governance capacity and promote good governance. The provision of external assistance to sectoral activities provides opportunities for promotion of a wide range of governance and development goals. These include protection of human rights, capacity-building, provision of basic social services, participation and accountability, promotion of an enabling environment for economic growth, and development of livelihoods, adding hitherto unexploited value to all interventions.

Despite continuing efforts towards reconciliation and resolution of the Somali conflict, there has been little significant progress towards reviving a Somali state nor is this likely to be achieved in the near future. Many peace initiatives have failed, in particular due to their inability to address the basic issues underlying the conflict. Faction leaders have largely focused on dividing power amongst themselves rather than seeking agreement on basic principles and mechanisms of joint governance. It is therefore particularly important to focus attention on promoting improved capacity for governance amongst local political entities.

### 3. Common Humanitarian and Development Action Plan

#### 3.1. Scenarios expected in 1999

It is, of course, impossible to predict what will happen to the Somali people in 1999, yet in preparing the present Appeal it has been necessary to think about likely scenarios. This has involved foreseeing the worst and best case scenarios for each of the zones of crisis, transition and recovery. The assumption made is that the actual events of 1999 will be somewhere between the worst and best cases envisaged today. UN Appeal priorities are based upon this mid-way projection.

People have little control over certain 'environmental' factors. These imponderables include the weather, epidemics affecting humans or livestock and crop-destroying pests. On the other hand, more predictable factors exist such as the population's health and nutritional status, their food and seed stores, their financial and physical assets, remittances and external assistance.

The main factor within the control of Somali communities is the quality and extent of their own governance. Good governance in zones of recovery will help local populations to be socially stronger at the outset of 1999 and better able to withstand the stresses caused by adverse 'environmental' conditions such as those mentioned above. The chronic lack of governance in zones of crisis, however, makes the populations there relatively weak, especially since local coping mechanisms have been so severely strained in recent years. In addition to such lack of resilience, the populations in such zones have little capacity to respond effectively to natural disasters. Compounding the inadequate preparedness and inability to respond effectively, the chronic civil conflicts throughout zones of crisis result in conditions that can easily deteriorate into a vicious cycle of very high death rates and large-scale population displacements.

#### **Worst case scenario:**

In zones of crisis, populations would be seriously afflicted by a combination of drought, flood, malaria, measles, cholera, livestock diseases and crop-destroying pestilence. In zones of crisis, the population itself would be weakened from the effects of the terrible floods of 1997/98 and extra-ordinarily poor harvests in 1998. The failure, in August 1998, of the main cereal harvest in central and southern Somalia and the expected failure of the November secondary (Deyr The deyr season is the short and less reliable rainy season from October through November.) harvest would give rise to critical food shortages, particularly in the Bay and Bakool areas. Many people would be weak and malnourished, particularly young children and women. Food stores at the household level would be empty and little money would be available to buy food. Livestock, the base of the economy, would perish in large numbers. Remittances from abroad and external assistance would become disproportionately important to the most vulnerable families. Civil unrest in virtually all of central and southern Somalia would exacerbate the stress of the natural disasters. Looting of household food stores would be widespread. This would lead to population displacement towards the Juba and Shabelle rivers, towards Kenya, Mogadishu, and Kismayo. The need for large-scale humanitarian interventions would become very evident but the ability of the international community to respond would be severely hampered by insecurity and by the haunting memories of the 1992 famine and ensuing debacle. A humanitarian disaster of even larger proportions than 1992 could unfold before mid-1999.

In zones of transition this particular 'worst case scenario' would be less dramatic than the above due to the absence of civil unrest and the ability of communities to work together with external humanitarian aid agencies to mitigate the effects of natural disasters. In this scenario, populations would also be seriously afflicted by a combination of drought, flood, malaria, measles, cholera, livestock diseases and crop-destroying pestilence. In zones of transition, the population itself would not have suffered so much from the effects of the terrible floods of 1997/98. Harvests in 1998 have been poor but not disastrous. Assuming that the November secondary season crop fails, serious food shortages would require a response involving external food aid. Some food in household stores would permit an easier carry-over during the March to May period until the main harvest is gathered. Livestock vaccination programmes would be possible, helping to prevent large-scale losses. Remittances from abroad and external assistance would be important and the relative peace and stability of these areas would permit relatively easy access to all communities. Population displacement would be unlikely, provided external assistance was prompt and appropriate. The need for substantial humanitarian interventions would become very evident and the international community would be able to respond effectively to prevent a humanitarian disaster.

The worst case in zones of recovery would involve, as above, any combination of natural disasters and also any sharp deterioration of the economic situation arising from a continuation of the embargo on Somali livestock exports. This situation could lead to pockets of civil unrest and severe hardship but the environment of relatively good governance would permit effective local and internationally assisted remedial measures. These would include appropriate measures to mitigate drought, flood, epidemic or pestilence and so forth, as well as increased support to social services, continued assistance to improvement of administration capacities (particularly those associated with the disaster response) and the promotion of an enabling economic environment.

**Best case scenario:**

In zones of crisis, the weather patterns would return to normal, permitting a somewhat better harvest in November 1998 than is currently expected. Widespread hunger amongst many communities in the central and southern parts would require substantial food aid, given the very low levels of household food stores. Seed stores and other basic agricultural and livestock inputs are also severely depleted and would require external inputs. Basic health and nutrition services would be necessary to help protect against potential epidemics. No further drought, minor flooding and no serious epidemics would lead to a good main harvest in August 1999. Repatriation and resettlement of some refugees now in Kenya might be possible in a few areas. Access would improve, insecurity would decrease, and donors would increase their response.

Assuming that the zones of transition will not be afflicted by serious natural disasters and that current levels of security and governance would persist, a continued focus on rehabilitation of social services, improved governance and food security will be possible. Improved security and governance in some zones of transition could allow an increased focus on support to governance capacities, economic development, rehabilitation of social services, and reintegration of returnees.

In this scenario, few natural disasters, the lifting of the livestock ban, continued improvement of governance and economic growth are foreseen in zones of recovery. This would allow continued focus on rehabilitation of social services, as well as improvement of governance and of many socio-economic aspects such as human rights and gender equity.

### **3.2. Short-term Goals**

The overall goals of the UN humanitarian operations in Somalia are to save lives and reduce human suffering, to promote peace and dialogue, and to promote and safeguard human rights. In light of the existing situation in the country and the priority areas for action referred to under 'The Situation in Somalia' above, five short-term goals have been identified for UN intervention; they represent a continued emphasis on the programme priorities described in the Appeals of 1996 and 1997. The goals apply to the entire population of Somalia, currently estimated at approximately six million.

#### **Goal 1: Emergency preparedness and response**

All of Somalia remains susceptible to recurrent and life-threatening emergency situations, often arising from drought, floods, epidemics, and crop-destroying pestilence, exacerbated by conflict and its associated strife. At this time (11/98) the food crisis in central and southern Somalia is depleting virtually all UN stocks of emergency items. The goal of the UN Agencies in Somalia in this respect is to address the immediate needs of those at risk and protect human life, and to re-stock the emergency items at the earliest opportunity. In addition, training of staff will be done within UN Agencies, their partners and their Somali counterparts to respond rapidly and effectively. The measures to be taken include:

- Preparations to provide emergency relief assistance during temporary severe food deficits;
- Stockpiling adequate emergency supplies in strategic location for the initial response;
- Stockpiling and pre-positioning essential supplies for the provision of safe water;
- Strengthening health services including epidemiological surveillance and immunisation;
- Undertaking Disaster Management Training Programmes (DMTP) for emerging local administrations;
- Developing drought preparedness programmes with a view to enhancing local coping mechanisms.

#### **Goal 2: Household food security**

Recent crop estimates foresee severe food shortages in parts of southern and central Somalia in early 1999, affecting an estimated 700,000 people, of whom about 300,000 are now (11/98) seen to be at very high risk. If nothing is done to assist, central and southern Somalia could enter a period of famine and death similar to the disaster of 1991/92. To promote food security and capacities for food self-sufficiency, measures have been announced in a "Donor Alert" covering the period November 1998 through June 1999. In general, the following priorities are advocated by the UN to improve food security:

- Timely provision of life-saving emergency food, non-food and medical relief where necessary to save lives and to permit highly vulnerable farm families to continue to farm, towards production of a harvest in mid-1999;
- Support to vulnerable farm families through providing cereal seed and tools;
- Rehabilitating irrigation systems to enhance crop production;
- Improving animal health and livestock export certification;
- Health, nutrition and water supply assistance for farm families;
- Coordination of nutritional surveillance efforts throughout the country.

### **Goal 3: Reintegration of returnees and IDPs**

Reintegration of returnees and IDPs will be achieved by:

- Repatriating up to 96,000 refugees to northern Somalia from refugee camps in neighbouring countries, and strengthening social services in the receiving communities;
- Assisting in the resettlement and reintegration of IDPs and demobilised militia in areas to which they can safely return;
- Improving and strengthening social services and local administrations in the communities that will accommodate the returnees.

### **Goal 4: Rehabilitation of essential social services**

Even before the war's destruction of most of Somalia's essential infrastructure and social services, they had reached a level of neglect requiring emergency action. Building essential infrastructure will require a modicum of stability and good governance (see Goal 5, below) on the part of local administrations. Most health facilities and water supply systems were destroyed. With special attention to fostering Somali ownership and participation, interventions in this area will be aimed at:

Improving health services through:

- Strengthening essential health services, including development of health manpower;
- Control of major communicable diseases;
- Reproductive health care (RHC);
- Expanded programme of immunisation (EPI).

Improving access to safe water through:

- Rehabilitation of water supply systems including an increase of 10 per cent or 133,000 people gaining access to safe water;
- Ensuring reliability of water supply for at least 60 percent of existing water points during 1999.

Improving access to education through:

- Equitable expansion of access to quality education, with emphasis on basic education (literacy, numeracy, life skills including civic education);
- Vocational and technical training relevant to the demands of Somali's private sector.

### **Goal 5: Good governance**

Somalia's condition has been characterised by poor and inadequate governance, insecurity and civil conflict. The short-term goals of the UN humanitarian programme in this respect aim, wherever possible, to:

- Improve governance through capacity -building and support to help establish effective public institutions and administration at local, district, and where possible, regional and inter-regional levels;
- Build the capacity of local administrations to manage and maintain essential public infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, dykes, ports and airports.
- Support civil protection, including demining and law enforcement through capacity- building of local administrations.

### **3.3. Strategies to achieve the goals**

To make substantive progress toward the achievement of the five goals noted in the previous section, the UN must employ the resources at its disposal wisely. In order to arrive at the strategies to achieve the goals, we first state our basic assumptions concerning the situation in which Somalia will find itself during 1999. The strategy of the UN is to be governed by certain key principles, as well as by operational strategies which are the product of lessons learned. The general principles and strategies described in

the present section apply to all of the more specific sectoral strategies and programme priorities described in Part II below.

### **3.3.1 Main assumptions**

It is assumed that Somalia will require a broad range of approaches from external actors for the foreseeable future, due to the diversity within the country. The UN and the international community will continue to operate in more or less the same environment as it has known in 1998, which will require a mix of emergency, rehabilitation and development programme approaches. Local political entities will increasingly develop their own governance systems in some areas, particularly in the north, and will therefore require external assistance related more to development than to humanitarian relief. Unfortunately, for the most populous areas of central and southern Somalia, it is assumed that in 1999 good governance will still be a distant goal, and we therefore assume these areas will continue to be afflicted by chronic disasters exacerbated by lack of governance or even civil strife. The requirements in these areas will be humanitarian relief, and wherever possible, building capacities of local administrations to support the provision of basic social services.

### **3.3.2 General principles and practices**

There are several principles to be respected in all situations, affecting all people. The implications in practice may vary depending upon the situation, e.g. whether the situation is in a zone of crisis, transition or recovery. In this section several important guidelines to good practice are also noted.

#### **The right to life**

The right to life is inherent and inalienable, governing the actions of all human beings. The full spectrum of this right is defined by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, and international humanitarian law, and cannot be violated through the arbitrary act of any individual or institution. The lack of respect of the fundamental principles of protection has led to violence against life, in particular murder, mutilation, and cruel treatment and torture; the taking of Somalis, as well as international relief workers as hostages; the operation of irregular judiciary without guarantees of fair trial; and other violations. Non-combatants, women, children, and other vulnerable groups have been the main victims of these practices.

#### **The principles of Somali ownership and participation**

The Somali state exists. Respect for domestic jurisdiction and state sovereignty is fundamental, reflecting an attribute of equality between states, as well as a state's duty to comply faithfully with international obligations, including those inscribed in the Conventions. All member-states shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.

The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy all human rights and freedoms: civil, cultural, economic, political and social.

The UN and its partners must always strive to maximise Somali participation in and ownership of the assistance process, including prioritisation of needs, allocation and mobilisation of resources, implementation and evaluation of projects. Encouraging Somali ownership and building of Somali capacities to manage their own affairs are essential elements in fostering good governance. This includes empowerment of individuals through access to education and information, empowerment of Somali communities by accepting their leaders as partners in progress, and insisting upon their taking the fullest possible responsibility, thus enhancing their ownership. The sustainability of governance is primarily a reflection of the degree to which the people and their leaders appreciate their ownership of the process and of the products, thereby helping to ensure long-term maintenance. Even in zones of crisis it is

imperative to engage constructively with all possible elements of Somali civil society, particularly local NGOs and community interest groups, in order that they may participate effectively in the humanitarian programme.

Fostering Somali ownership and participation will involve improving communication channels between UN Agencies, their partner organisations and the Somali people. Such channels should allow a two-way exchange of information and ideas, and foster mutual respect and understanding.

Given the continued divisions in Somalia, a consequence of this principle has been the increasing decentralisation of UN operations in Somalia, reflecting area-based approaches to planning and coordination of aid, thereby maximising access of the Somali people and authorities to the process, and enhancing their participation and ownership.

### **Principles protecting the rights of children and women**

The child enjoys special protection and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law and other means, to enable him or her to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner, and in conditions of freedom and dignity. Discrimination against women is fundamentally unjust and constitutes an offense against human dignity.

### **UN humanitarian aid principles and practices**

Humanitarian assistance must be provided to all in need, based upon the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

**The principle of humanity:** human suffering should be addressed wherever it is found. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

**The principle of neutrality:** humanitarian assistance must be provided without taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

**The principle of impartiality:** humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion; relief for the suffering must be guided solely by their needs, by their physical access, and by security considerations for humanitarian aid workers.

Free and unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance activities for those in need must be granted by all parties concerned. All non-combatants affected by the conflict have the right to request and receive protection and humanitarian assistance from the authorities and/or the international community, and no one should be persecuted or punished for making such a request.

In situations of armed conflict, civilians are protected under international law from attacks, torture and other violations of human rights. Primary responsibility for the protection and well-being of civilians rests with the Government of the state, or authorities in control of the territory in which the endangered persons are located. Insurgent groups and militias should be held to the same standard of responsibility as Governments.

IDPs comprise a particularly vulnerable group, requiring special protection and assistance. They enjoy, as a minimum and in full equality, the same rights and freedoms under humanitarian and human rights law and domestic law as do other persons in their country.

Refugees are to be recognised as a group requiring special protection and assistance, and are to enjoy the full spectrum of rights afforded them by refugee, humanitarian and human rights law.

**The principle of 'Do no harm':** assistance must not become a source of damaging conflict nor weaken or undercut legitimate local authorities. Furthermore, it must never replace or suppress local initiatives. UN interventions must not encourage practices harmful to the natural environment; instead the UN will seek to protect the environment and to promote environmental concerns.

**The principle of staff security:** humanitarian aid is an international mandate, but cannot be provided when insecurity threatens the staff of aid organisations. Local authorities are held responsible for the provision of adequate security for international aid agencies. This principle continues to be a vital element in reducing problems of extortion and insecurity for international agencies and their local staff. In this regard most local authorities have been made aware of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) Code of Conduct which applies to all humanitarian aid workers in Somalia.

Promotion of reconciliation and good governance: reflects recognition that lack of good governance is at the core of the Somalia crisis. Improved governance is a pre-requisite for any sustainable end to the crisis. The UN is committed to do all it can to enhancing reconciliation.

A key strategy will be support to the demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration of militia and armed groups that pose an actual or potential threat to public security and the rule of law.

Governance can be strengthened by a wide variety of capacity-building measures to assist public administrations, and by setting interventions at the highest viable administrative level to enhance the capacities and legitimacy of district and regional level administrative structures.

With respect to increasing the financial sustainability of services, the well-established principle in Somali culture of payment for much valued services such as water, health and education must be recognised. Efforts will, therefore, be made to take into account this tradition when providing essential services to communities, thereby reducing dependency on external funding and enhancing sustainability. A public-private mix of service provision will be encouraged. The UN humanitarian programme will promote poverty alleviation by facilitating the private sector, job creation and enhanced access to credit and banking services where feasible.

Good management practices: the UNCT is comprised of 13 UN Agencies. The members of the UNCT as of November 1998 included FAO, ICAO, UNSECOORD, UNCHS, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNV, WFP and WHO. The UN Political office for Somalia participates actively in UNCT matters, as do observer agencies including ICRC, IFRC and IOM. In addition, the UNCT includes participants from the War-torn Societies Projects (partly funded by UNDP), UNOPS, as well as several important UNOPS-executed UNDP projects, such as the 'Somalia Rehabilitation Project' and 'Somalia Civil Protection'. , several large project teams, as well as a number of organisations with observer status. Each of these organisations has a responsibility for good management towards effective achievement of its individual mandate. In addition to their individual agency responsibilities for good management, collectively, the UNCT is responsible for good management in four main areas affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions in Somalia.

First, good Country Team management implies that there must be an ongoing consensus on the priority problems, the strategies to be employed to address them, and the division of labour among the UN Agencies and their partners. The present document is an example of how the UNCT works toward this aim. Also, common sectoral and inter-sectoral strategies are developed together with partners in the various SACB sectoral committees. Several of these committees have developed important guidelines and tools that enhance effectiveness and reduce duplication and sub-optimal use of resources.

Second, the Country Team must strengthen its 'area-base' approach. In this way there will be the necessary flexibility to take into account differing circumstances and attitudes in different parts of Somalia, as well as employing participatory approaches and emphasizing Somali leadership and responsibility. In recognition of the diverse and fluctuating conditions of present-day Somalia, the area-based approach will allow for possible expansion and contraction of activities depending on the prevailing conditions of security, local commitment and community inputs. Primary attention will be given to zones of recovery or

transition, with targeted interventions in areas of crisis. Working together closely in each area promotes linkage whereby aid is not compartmentalised by programme, sector and agency but 'linked' to prevent initiatives working at cross-purposes. The process of developing joint assessments, planning together, and implementing as partners helps to integrate different programme activities, improving inter-sectoral coordination.

Third, the Country team must improve its monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance and development activities, as a management tool. Monitoring and evaluation will play an enhanced role, concentrating its focus on the assessment of outputs and impact, with a view to strengthening and, where necessary, re-orienting programme activities. Together with Somali and other international partners, evaluations of project and programme implementation are needed to help ensure good project management. Rapid assessments and similar evaluative processes will be used to identify 'success stories' and to derive best practices for emulation.

Fourth, the UN Agencies must continue to seek ways to reduce and to share the high costs of operation in Somalia. In 1997/98, good progress was made in reducing the overall cost of air transport through the UN Common Air Services. Efforts will continue to make savings through the use of common premises and common communications systems in field stations. Equitable sharing the costs of security, logistics and coordination services will help to reduce the burden borne by only a few of the Agencies.

### **3.3.3 Comparative advantages of UN Agencies and NGOs**

NGOs and UN Agencies have comparative advantages which can be, and often are, highly complementary. Lack of coordination between UN and NGO agencies can result in wasted efforts and worse. Although some larger NGOs work in very similar ways to UN Agencies and vice versa, NGOs are generally viewed as being more focused on achieving impact in particular communities. UN Agencies are generally viewed as having greater 'coverage' in space and over time, and achieve their impact typically through cooperation with local and international NGOs, as well as with local administrations.

Clearly, it is to the mutual advantage of UN Agencies and NGOs to work together; and their mutual advantage also translates to greater benefits to the Somali people. UN and NGO agencies work closely together with local authorities at the field level. And in Nairobi, UN and NGOs work closely with the donor community within the framework of the various SACB committees. The comparative advantages of NGOs are generally recognised as being their intimate knowledge of local circumstances, their ability to engage in approaches appropriate to the specific context, to build local capacities, and their flexibility and ability to respond rapidly to people's needs, their commitment to local empowerment and participation. UN Agencies form a network that can provide a broad spectrum of expertise for use in programme planning and implementation. They can play an important catalytic role in fund-raising. UN Agencies have long-standing experience of working with governments, and contribute much to inter-agency policy dialogue and the preparation of technical guidelines within the SACB sectoral committees.

### **3.4 Long-term goals**

The five short-term goals for the UN's humanitarian intervention in Somalia are a means of pursuing longer-term rehabilitation and development. The aim is for interventions undertaken now to help the Somali people to meet their own emergency, rehabilitation and development needs in a sustainable way. With regard to 'emergency preparedness and response', the UN programme in Somalia aims to build Somali capacity to prepare and respond to natural and man-made disasters. In the sphere of 'food security', the aim is to move from the international community providing assistance to the Somali population achieving its own food security as a result of improved farming and livestock production, improved movement of food resources through marketing networks, and overall economic welfare at the household level. In pursuing the 'reintegration of returnees and IDPs,' the aim is to resettle and reintegrate these groups in communities that are adequately equipped to receive them so that they become integrated, productive community members. The aim of the 'rehabilitation of essential public infrastructure and social services' is to move from external assistance in these spheres to local provision,

financing and management. Lastly, in promoting 'governance', the aim is for Somalis to set up functioning, sustainable structures which provide good governance.

The longer-term goals for the UN programme in Somalia will address some of the major concerns as have been identified by UNDP for human development in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. These include:

- Combating poverty and inequality to ensure minimum consumption for all (e.g. safeguarding the right of equitable access to social services, including health and education);
- Safeguarding and consolidating democracy (e.g. good governance, strengthening civil society and respect for human rights, institutionalising the rules of law, etc.).
- Addressing the issue of conflict ( e.g. through conflict-resolution and peace-building);
- Addressing gender bias;
- Capacity-building of human resources and diversification of processes to take advantage of globalisation;
- Addressing the issue of Human Immuno-deficiency Virus /Acquired Immuno-deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS);
- Implementation of national and international measures to minimise environmental degradation and its negative impact, which particularly affects the poor;
- Raising consumer awareness and protecting consumer rights;
- Addressing the abuse of the mildly narcotic drug qaat or khat which constitutes a major diversion of household income in Somalia.

The definition of long-term goals will be pursued in 1999 through UN cooperation with other international entities to develop a Strategic Assistance Framework for Somalia that will guide the international community's interventions in this country. This framework will intend to comprise a broad-based assessment and analysis of the situation in Somalia including priorities, constraints, past failures and successes, as well as statements on principles, policies, strategies and practices on aid and trade that are agreed to by all involved. Organisations expected to participate in the genesis of the framework would include UN Agencies, NGOs involved in Somalia, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab League, and interested donors. The SACB would play an important role in this endeavour.

### **3.5 Exit strategy**

The gradual emergence of zones of recovery gives hope that the Somalia of the future will not be a continuation of the present. No one could wish that the recurrent natural disasters should continue, unmitigated by even rudimentary governmental structures. The apparently chronic need for rehabilitation and recovery assistance cannot, it is fervently hoped, continue forever. Although it appears that UN humanitarian assistance will continue to be required for some years to come, we must make a clear and conscious effort to move from emergency towards development, by interventions to support and strengthen viable coping mechanisms and the sustainability of local economies. This is our 'exit strategy.' It seems to be working albeit with great fragility at this early stage.

The rehabilitation of basic services in public administration, health, education, regulation of the private sector and other aspects of recovery requires sustained sources of local revenue. As a key element in the strategy to help Somalia into a situation of full recovery, capacity-building must be carried out to provide a trained work force that can manage ports, airports and other key industries capable of producing taxable revenues as sources of income to local administrations. Investment in human development to reduce dependence on humanitarian assistance, as well as a more coherent strategy for promoting development in Somalia's transition zones must also form part of any exit strategy. The UN's monitoring capacity in Somalia needs to be improved so as to identify appropriate indicators for the health of fledgling administrations and their surrounding economies. This effort may help to refine identification of problems and appropriate interventions before there is general deterioration of the hard-won level of governance in any administrative area of concern.

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**Note:** The full text of this appeal is available on-line in Adobe Acrobat (pdf) format and may also be downloaded in zipped WordPerfect format.

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