



DARFUR PEACE PROCESS CHRONOLOGY

2006

5 May: The predominantly Zaghawa Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and the Sudanese government sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja; SLA-Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur (SLA-AW) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) do not. Limited support for the agreement and a failure to sell (or even explain) it to civil society, Darfur's Arabs, and the masses in the displaced camps, plus scant attention to implementation as insecurity deepens, condemn it to irrelevance. A decision to seek wider support by allowing splinter groups to sign Declarations of Commitment backfires, encouraging factional splits and divide-and-rule tactics. In September United Nations (UN) special envoy Jan Pronk will tell the UN Security Council: 'In hindsight, maybe we should have taken more time. Not to get a better agreement, but in order to bring on board all parties.'

30 June: Non-signatories, including JEM, form the National Redemption Front in Eritrea, creating a military alliance that hands the army a number of crushing defeats before it breaks apart at year-end.

16 November: The African Union (AU) and UN decide to 're-energize' the peace process by organizing talks between the government and non-signatories. Tanzania's Salim Ahmed Salim, chief mediator in Abuja, and Jan Eliasson, a former Swedish foreign minister, are appointed joint mediators for the AU and UN, respectively.

2007

8 June: The mediators announce a three-phase 'road map' that consists of aligning regional initiatives; uniting the rebel movements; and holding new talks. In July, Chad, Eritrea, and Libya agree to coordinate with the 'hybrid' mediation and phase one is declared a success. But SLA-AW stays away from a meeting of the armed movements in Arusha, Tanzania, in early August and talks between the movements and the government in Sirte, Libya, in October are boycotted by the three most significant movements—SLA-AW, JEM, and SLA-Unity. The hybrid mission ends in failure: it does not create a genuine consensus among neighbouring states, does not bring all the armed movements on board, and does not restrain the parties on the battlefield.

2008

30 June: Ending the experiment in joint mediation, Djibril Bassolé of Burkina Faso is appointed chief mediator for the peace process, representing both the AU and UN.

21 July: The AU Peace and Security Council authorizes a High-Level Panel on Darfur—since October 2009, the AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, or AUHIP—headed by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, to focus on peace, reconciliation, and justice.



9 September: A League of Arab States resolution proposes that Qatar should host new peace talks. The UN acquiesces, needing a sponsor for the talks, and Bassolé begins working alongside Qatar's minister for foreign affairs, Sheikh Ahmed bin Abdalla al-Mahmoud.

16 October: With the International Criminal Court (ICC) demanding that President Omar al Bashir stand trial for genocide, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) organizes the Sudan People's Initiative to provide 'national' solutions to the Darfur conflict. The conference, in Khartoum, is attended by most main political parties and, unusually, civil society, but internally displaced persons (IDPs) are not represented. The government agrees to incorporate the movements' demands for compensation and a single Darfur region into its negotiating position at future talks. But the initiative stalls as efforts to defer the prosecution of the president fail, and the mediation and Western nations show no interest.

10 November: Chad and Sudan restore diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors.

2009

February: The government and JEM sit down together, in Doha, for the first time since June 2007. On 17 February, they sign a goodwill agreement that combines a ceasefire with a commitment to exchange prisoners and facilitate the delivery of aid. The agreement stalls over the sequencing of the ceasefire and prisoner releases.

15 March: Libya, chair of the AU for the coming year, convinces five factions—SLA-Unity, SLA-Khamis Abaker, the United Resistance Front, Democratic JEM, and SLA-Juba—to join the Doha process.

18 March: US President Barack Obama names Scott Gration, a retired Air Force general, as his special envoy to Sudan. Reflecting concern over the lack of Fur representation in Doha, Gration prioritizes unifying Fur commanders who are critical of SLA-AW and its refusal of negotiations until security is restored and the government-supported militias, popularly known as 'janjaweed', are disarmed.

20 March: JEM suspends talks with the government, citing Khartoum's expulsion of 13 international relief agencies in response to the ICC's decision to issue an arrest warrant for President Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

June: Mandate Darfur, a civil society conference planned by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to draw up 'an authoritative mandate' for rebel negotiators, collapses when the government arrests the Darfur coordinator and threatens to charge with treason anyone attempting to attend the meeting in Addis Ababa.

13 July: JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim threatens to pull out of the Doha talks if mediators invite other insurgents.



August: Almost a dozen rebel factions coalesce into two groups—the ‘Addis Ababa Group’ (otherwise known as the ‘road map group’) formed by Gration, and the ‘Tripoli group’ formed by Libya. JEM dismisses most as ‘Internet groups’, insists that they join JEM if they want representation in Doha, and regrets that ‘some birds are trying to move away from the flock’. The talks stall.

29 October: The Mbeki panel makes public a road map of its own for a ‘global political agreement’—a cessation of hostilities, rebel unity, and inclusive negotiations. The panel proposes a ‘hybrid’ court—envisaged as a chamber of the existing judicial system, hybridized through international staff—to bring to trial individuals with particular responsibility for the gravest crimes committed in Darfur. It supports the ICC as ‘a court of last resort’.

7 November: The ‘Tripoli group’, renamed SLA-Revolutionary Forces, declines an invitation to Doha, prioritizing rebel unity. The Doha talks, due to begin on 16 November after an eight-month hiatus, are postponed indefinitely.

6–19 November: With other tracks stalled, civil society representatives are invited to Doha—for the first time since the peace process began in Abuja in 2004. JEM and SLA-AW condemn the meeting, alleging that most of the representatives are NCP sympathizers. The ‘Doha Declaration’ issued at the end of the meeting does not bear out this claim: it calls for an immediate ceasefire and negotiations; justice and an end to impunity; settlement of land disputes, including the return of all IDPs to their villages; and the evacuation of settlers. Follow-up talks with civil society and the armed movements are scheduled for January 2010. JEM rejects them.

26 December: Sudan and Chad agree to enforce border controls on each other’s armed opposition movements. Within days, Darfur-based Chadian rebels move back from the border.

2010

January: Government forces and militias attack JEM positions near the border with Chad.

9 February: Chadian president Idriss Déby visits Khartoum for talks with Bashir.

23 February: Squeezed by the rapprochement between N’Djaména and Khartoum, JEM moves its fighters out of Chad and into Darfur and signs a ‘framework agreement’ with Khartoum in Doha. The agreement has only two operative paragraphs—for a ceasefire and a prisoner release—but sets an agenda for substantive talks, to include a permanent ceasefire, the future status of JEM combatants, compensation, and power-sharing at all levels of government. Qatar offers a sweetener: nearly USD 1 billion for development in Darfur. Darfur’s Arabs, especially, are unhappy over a second emerging deal with a Zaghawa-based movement.



Ten factions in the Addis Ababa and Tripoli groups unite under the name Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) for the purposes of negotiation. (Their military commands, such as they are, remain separate.) They choose as leader Tijani Sese, a widely respected Fur politician and former governor of Darfur who has lived abroad for 20 years. The mediation hopes Sese will win Fur support for the peace process, especially in the IDP camps. JEM snubs him, saying he has no history in the rebellion.

Government troops and planes attack SLA-AW positions in Jebel Marra in the wake of heavy intra-rebel fighting as part of which SLA-AW seeks help both from JEM and government-backed militias.

3 March: JEM threatens to leave Doha if there are ‘multiple agreements’.

18 March: Disregarding JEM, the LJM and the Sudanese government sign a framework agreement.

26 March: Khalil Ibrahim travels to Doha to demand the expulsion of the LJM. The state-run Sudan Media Centre accuses JEM of violating the ceasefire 23 times in one month.

April: The government intensifies its offensive against JEM, claiming it has moved out of four agreed locations. JEM scatters its forces. Fighting spreads.

2 May: JEM freezes its participation in Doha, citing ‘continuous aerial and ground assaults’.

8 May: Meeting in Addis Ababa, the Sudan Consultative Forum¹ introduces a distinction between the peace process and the political process. The peace process is between the belligerents, for a ceasefire and a political settlement; the political process is a wider initiative that would address all issues—including reconciliation and accountability. With Bassolé’s term due to expire in June, African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) chief Ibrahim Gambari wants an All Darfur Conference under UNAMID auspices, with a continuing strong Qatari role to guarantee development money for Darfur.

10 May: Justice Minister Abdel Basit Sabderat says the Sudanese government has asked Interpol to arrest Khalil Ibrahim to face 14 charges including murder and waging war against the state.

15 May: Government forces occupy Jebel Moon, JEM’s stronghold in north-western Darfur. JEM claims it has already expanded into other parts of Darfur and Kordofan.

19 May: Khalil Ibrahim flies into Chad from Libya, aiming to travel overland to Darfur, but is detained at N’Djaména airport for 19 hours before being sent back to Libya. Sudan asks neighbouring states not to give him refuge. JEM and government forces fight in South Darfur, with heavy casualties on both sides.



25 May: In a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, JEM says the government is seeking a military solution to the conflict. It alleges that the Doha process is only ‘for public relations business and image improvement’. Demanding ‘radical reform’ of the Doha forum, JEM says it will not negotiate under ‘intimidation and menace’. Presidential adviser Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, in charge of Darfur’s political file for the government, says Khartoum is ‘not concerned and not interested in the positions of the Justice and Equality Movement, especially as it has no real desire to negotiate for peace.’

27 May: JEM and SLA-AW clash with government forces around Deribat in eastern Jebel Marra. A JEM official says privately that ‘JEM will do whatever possible to keep Jebel Marra free or in hands other than the government and the “janjaweed”’.

30 May: Bassolé tells Khalil Ibrahim that UNAMID cannot fly him from Libya to Darfur without Khartoum’s permission. JEM makes its presence in Doha contingent upon its commanders’ ability to return to Darfur, where, by UN count, 440 people died in May in fighting between government forces and JEM. UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes says the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is hostage to the lack of progress in Doha.

5 June: President Bashir says that following the April elections, ‘the current Doha round will be the last for any armed group. There will be no legitimacy through the gun—only through the ballot box.’

6 June: Talks between the government and the LJM resume in Doha, after a two-month break for elections. The backdrop is not auspicious: the February 2009 ceasefire has collapsed—with fresh government offensives against JEM and SLA-AW in May causing the largest number of recorded violent fatalities in Darfur since the arrival of UNAMID in January 2008—and JEM is refusing further negotiation. Four smaller factions also boycott the round: the original SLA-Unity, Democratic JEM, the United Revolutionary Front Forces (URFF), and a group of commanders including Ali Haroun Dud, Abdalla Khalil, and Babiker Abdalla, who left SLA-AW—in part over Abdul Wahid’s rejection of negotiations. The commanders resent mediation pressure on them to join the LJM, which they consider an artificial creation that will not respond to the needs of Darfurians—and especially the Fur—and want to unite Fur dissidents under a separate umbrella. URFF leader Ibrahim al Zubaidi accuses the mediation of lacking neutrality.

14 June: Khalil Ibrahim says ‘Doha is over’ and warns that an agreement between the government and the LJM that excludes the two original movements, JEM and SLA-AW, will not bring peace. He cites the DPA as an example.

22 June: Government negotiators in Doha turn away delegates of the Heidelberg Committeeⁱⁱ—Darfur academics, activists, and civil society organizations brought together in 2008 by the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg, Germany, in tandem with



the Peace Institute of Khartoum University. The delegates had travelled to Doha, at the invitation of the mediation, to present proposals for peace drawn up in nearly three years of discussions.ⁱⁱⁱ The proposals, strongly supported by the LJM, include reuniting the three states of Darfur as one administrative territory, creating ways to allow IDPs to return to their homes and be compensated—both individually and collectively—and expelling settlers from neighbouring countries. The Sudanese government spokesman in Doha, Omer Adam Rahman, claims the Heidelberg group is biased towards the armed movements. The LJM warns that rejection of the Heidelberg proposals will mean a return to war.

24 June: The government and the LJM begin talks on wealth sharing. The mediation's timetable requires a number of protocols to be finalized by the end of July, despite the absence of the main movements and the breakdown of the ceasefire.

29 June: The government and movements meet with civil society representatives, for the first time, in the framework of discussions on compensation and the return of refugees and IDPs. The government bans leaders of Kalma IDP camp, one of the most militant in Darfur, from travelling to Doha. The LJM threatens to walk out.

30 June: Speaking in Port Sudan on the 21st anniversary of the coup that brought him to power, President Bashir says: 'Whoever wants peace should go to Doha. Whoever wants something else will be taught a lesson they will never forget.'

5 July: The United States and British special envoys are absent from a meeting for international envoys called by UNAMID chief Ibrahim Gambari in al Fasher to review 'the Darfur political process, including the way forward to help Darfurians and all the people of the Sudan achieve lasting peace'. The scheduling of the meeting so close to US Independence Day celebrations on 4 July and only two weeks before special envoys meet in Khartoum under the auspices of the Consultative Forum is widely criticized, with Mbeki suggesting a two-week postponement, which Gambari refuses. The divided and acrimonious international environment continues to contribute to the Darfurians' lack of confidence in any mediation process.

8 July: Under military pressure in Jebel Marra, Abdul Wahid meets Qatari officials in Paris but reiterates his refusal to go to Doha until security is restored in Darfur. Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who had reportedly been considering asking the rebel leader to leave France, says this marks an important step forward in the peace process. Others—including IDPs in their seventh year in camps—believe it is a sign of Abdul Wahid's growing weakness.

12 July: The second civil society forum opens in Doha, overshadowed by new tensions within civil society that complicate a proposal to hold 'broad-based and inclusive political consultations inside Darfur' to provide 'structured popular input into the Doha negotiations during June–August'. The consultations are necessary, the mediation says in a strategy document, to 'give particular focus to those communities whose support of any agreements is critical for their durability, in particular newly elected officials, IDPs, and Arab communities'.



15 July: Civil society delegates, including IDP representatives, call for Darfur to be reorganized as a single administrative region. The chief government negotiator, Amin Hassan Omer, questions the delegates' right to speak for Darfurians; delegates question the government's commitment to peace and express concern over reports that it intends to launch a parallel initiative inside Darfur. They believe that any 'domestic' initiative will be subject to government manipulation, bribery, and coercion, and fear that Western nations seeking Khartoum's cooperation in peaceful Southern secession after the referendum will be unwilling to exert pressure to rein in government abuses in Darfur. The talks adjourn until mid-September.

26 July: Bashir extends Ghazi Atabani's management of the Darfur file and announces a high-level 'follow-up committee' composed of the ministers of defence, interior, foreign affairs, finance, and media, Darfur's three state governors (hardliners elected in the April 2010 elections, which were widely boycotted in Darfur), and a representative of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) headed by SLA-MM. The announcement heralds a more aggressive, hands-on approach to the Darfur problem. The committee is charged not only with crafting a new peacemaking strategy, but also with monitoring and assessing international media reports on Darfur 'in order to counteract hostile reports'.

27 July: Clashes break out in Hamadiya camp, near Zalingei, between supporters of SLA-AW and the Ahmad Abdel Shafi faction that joined the Doha talks. Three Abdel Shafi supporters are killed and homes are burned. A number of Fur elders claim that Abdul Wahid ordered the killings from Paris. Ibrahim Gambari tells the UN Security Council about encouraging signs of a deal to end the conflict, with 'civil society [...] now more involved in peace talks than ever, the Government of Sudan [...] demonstrating renewed commitment to negotiations, and the leaders of most armed opposition movements [...] either participating in or [...] expressing an interest in participating in the talks'.

29 July: The clashes spread to Kalma camp, which houses almost 100,000 of Darfur's 2.7 million displaced, leaving 35 dead and displacing 25,000, according to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. South Darfur Governor Abdel Hamid Musa Kasha accuses SLA-AW loyalists of attacking Kalma with heavy and light arms to sabotage the Doha talks; SLA-AW accuses the government of infiltrating agents and weapons into the camp. UNAMID refuses to surrender six IDPs who sought refuge in a UNAMID police post, and local authorities respond by closing Kalma to international relief organizations. President Bashir says anyone attempting to block or hinder the work of the authorities will be expelled 'the same day'.

The NCP approves a new 'domestication' strategy^{iv} that emphasizes recovery and development (rather than a negotiated political agreement in Doha) and is premised on the assertion that 'the war is over'. The reality in Darfur suggests otherwise. While violent death is much reduced in comparison to 2002–04, intra-Arab fighting took some 700 lives in the first half of the year. Ghazi Atabani lists his top priorities as security and development. Secondary priorities include justice, through national mechanisms; a shift from relief to development aid; and the conclusion of a peace



agreement—to be signed before the end of the year with the movements in Doha and with other sectors of society in Darfur.

If Doha is neglected, ‘domestication’ risks making the movements into spoilers of any initiative—especially at a time when President Bashir, already risking the wrath of his powerful security services for giving Southerners the option of independence, may well be reluctant to offer new concessions to Darfurians. All the armed movements oppose the new strategy, which JEM calls a replay of the ‘peace from within’ strategy implemented in the Nuba Mountains in the 1990s. That strategy sought to co-opt Nuba leaders and make them accomplices in their own oppression. It was accompanied, in the name of development, by the sale—to supporters of the regime—of large areas of land ‘cleansed’ of their original inhabitants.

4 August: President Bashir travels to Libya to defuse a diplomatic crisis caused by Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s refusal to expel Khalil Ibrahim. Reports circulating in Khartoum say Libya has rearmed JEM, with B-10 rifles, anti-aircraft guns, and AK-47s. The weapons are said to be stored at two locations—one close to Libya’s border with Chad and the other near Darfur. After two days of talks, Bashir says Gaddafi has pledged not to allow attacks on Sudan from Libyan territory.

9 August: South Darfur Governor Musa Kasha says the government will dismantle Kalma camp, a ‘military base and political platform’ for Abdul Wahid and ‘a hideout for criminals fleeing from justice’. Echoing the language of genocide used by Western activists, Abdul Wahid appeals to the international community to take a stand against this ‘Final Solution’.

23 August: Vice-President Ali Osman Taha announces USD 1.9 billion worth of recovery and development projects to support ‘domestication’. The projects include the completion of the Western Salvation Road linking Darfur to Khartoum, planned for the past two decades but bedeviled by conflict and corruption.

26 August: After meeting with Ghazi Atabani in Cairo, the AU, UNAMID, and the United States give unqualified support to Sudan’s new peace strategy. The Arab League follows five days later.

16 September: The Sudanese cabinet endorses the strategy, stressing the importance of collecting illegal arms and punishing law-breakers. Previous disarmament efforts have focused on non-Arabs.

8 October: Negotiations between the government and LJM resume in Doha, with the parties considering a draft agreement assembled by a third party (the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations). The deadline for agreement—19 October—recalls the failed ‘deadline diplomacy’ of the last days of Abuja. Bassolé meets with Abdul Wahid in Paris and Khalil Ibrahim in Libya, acknowledging that ‘without the participation of these movements besides the Sudanese government, LJM, and civil society, peace will remain fragile and unstable’.



19 October: With security and power-sharing issues resisting consensus, the first Doha deadline passes and is extended—by a week.

23 October: JEM announces it will send a delegation to meet Bassolé in Doha, but says it will return to the negotiating table only as part of a single ‘resistance’ group.

6 November: Bassolé presents a plan to conclude Doha by 19 December at the Sudan Consultative Forum meeting in Addis Ababa. At the same time he predicts that ‘the fighting will continue’.

7 November: President Bashir holds talks with the joint mediators in Doha. The LJM says it will not compromise on the issue of a single region and demands a vice-presidency for Darfur.

11 November: Bassolé asks for another extension of the process—into 2011—apparently believing there is a chance of convincing JEM to approve a final document alongside the LJM.

13–14 November: As Khartoum accuses the Sudan People’s Liberation Army of aiding JEM and launches air raids across Darfur’s southern border, just inside South Sudan, a JEM delegation holds two days of talks with mediators in Doha. The delegation is headed, for the first time, by a non-Darfurian—Mohamed Bahr Hamadein, JEM’s deputy chairman and a member of the Missiriya tribe from Kordofan. The appointment shows the new interest JEM has in areas bordering Darfur as government troops target JEM fighters in Darfur.

1 December: Angry students shouting ‘Bassolé is a foreign agent’ stone mediators during a tour of Darfur marred by violence and protests.

3 December: The army declares SLA-MM a legitimate military target two weeks after a senior NCP official accuses Minawi of moving to Juba to seek Southern support for a new rebellion. An army spokesman says ‘a large portion of Minawi’s forces [...] are moving towards the South’ with weapons and vehicles. The bank accounts of the TDRA headed by Minawi are frozen. One day later, Minawi cadres are arrested in al Fasher and Nyala, and vehicles seized in Khartoum. Two days later, Minawi is removed from the TDRA by presidential decree and replaced with West Darfur Governor Jaafar Abdel Hakam, widely accused of having mobilized ‘janjaweed’ in 2002–03.

10 December: Government forces attack Khor Abeche, 80 km south of Nyala. Minawi says the DPA is dead.

12 December: In a meeting in London, seven small factions announce another coalition—the Charter of Sudanese Alliance Resistance Forces in Darfur—with JEM. The seven groups are the United Revolutionary Forces Front; the Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Babiker Abdalla, who died in January 2011 after a long illness; a Libyan-supported LJM splinter led by Magoub Hussein; the United Resistance Front; the mainly Masalit Sudan Liberation Movement splinter led by



Khamis Abaker; the Democratic Revolutionary Forces Front; and the Democratic Justice and Equality Movement of Idris Azraq, a splinter of JEM that has accused JEM of tribalism, nepotism, and corruption.

The alliance is seen as a Libyan-supported attempt to counter the LJM's claim to represent a broad spread of Darfur opinion. With the exception of JEM, it has little military strength. It is not expected to have any political or military impact.

13 December: Dane Smith, a former US deputy chief of mission in Khartoum, is appointed to take the Darfur file for the Obama administration, working alongside Gration.

16 December: US National Security Council spokesman Mike Hammer says 'the United States is deeply concerned about reports that the Sudanese Armed Forces attacked and burned' Khor Abeche.

24 December: UN agencies say more than 18,000 people have been displaced in the new fighting and request urgent humanitarian assistance. An army spokesman accuses the rebels of having established a new base outside Darfur, in Bahr al Ghazal in South Sudan.

26 December: JEM meets mediators on the sidelines of the talks in Doha, returning to Doha for the first time in seven months.

29 December: Ghazi Atabani says Khartoum is withdrawing its delegation from Doha because 'negotiating in the conventional manner' is not helpful. JEM, which has boycotted most of the Doha process, calls the withdrawal 'a declaration of war'.

30 December: The mediation hands the two parties proposals to end the deadlock, including over the administrative status of Darfur, participation in the institution of the presidency, compensation and justice. The package includes a regional authority and vice-presidency for Darfur. Khartoum rejects the proposals as being inconsistent with the constitution and the framework agreement already signed in Doha.

31 December: Ghazi Atabani and his team leave Doha to prepare for a political process inside Darfur.

2011

3 January: Salva Kiir announces that he is expelling all Darfur rebels from South Sudan. He says 'no opposition in the North shall take Juba as a base'.

4 January: The LJM accepts the mediators' compromise proposals.

5 January: Mbeki says the outcome of the Doha process will 'be submitted to an inclusive process which will take place in Darfur to give the people in this region the opportunity to help to determine their future'. Two days later, US Senator John Kerry calls for the Doha talks to move to a neighbouring capital to get the 'Darfur peace



process back onto the agenda in a larger, more significant way’ at ‘a larger venue with more players at the table’.

23 January: Darfur members of the National Assembly reject the armed movements’ demand for Darfur to be reorganized as a single administrative region. The bloc’s leader, Hasabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman, says the movements do not represent the people of Darfur.

3 February: Minni Minawi formally withdraws from the DPA, declaring that he ‘will work by all means to overthrow’ the government.

5 February: AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra says the mediation is aiming to have a Darfur agreement ready to sign by July, when South Sudan is due to become independent.

6 February: Addressing security and intelligence officers, President Bashir says ‘Darfur will be cleansed of outlaws [insurgents] by the end of July’.

10 February: The Sudanese government says it will send a ‘limited’ delegation back to Doha to review compromise proposals drafted by the mediation.

18 February: A JEM delegation travels to Kenya to meet Abdul Wahid. The two sides agree to hold talks on working together, possibly as early as mid-March. Meeting in Nyala amid heavy fighting between government and rebel forces, special envoys from more than half a dozen countries including the United States, China, and Russia agree that talks with Darfurians other than the movements—the Darfur Political Process or DPP—will open in Darfur only when the Doha process is complete, with or without a signed agreement. (The NCP and AUHIP had agreed in January that the DPP would begin in February and would not be delayed by lack of agreement in Doha.)

23 February: The mediation hands the parties new proposals on outstanding areas of disagreement.

25 February: JEM and the LJM reject the new proposals. JEM says they do not meet even the minimum demands of the movements, including a single region and a vice-presidency for Darfur.

28 February: JEM asks the UN to rescue Khalil Ibrahim from Libya and says it is willing to resume negotiations in Doha.

2 March: Having failed to convince the mediation to wind up the talks by 15 March and hand over to the DPP, Ghazi Atabani announces the government’s plans to hold a referendum on the administrative status of Darfur, previously a focus of effort in Doha, within three months. JEM calls the initiative ‘yet another attempt to undermine the efforts of the mediation’ to pave the way for a domestic process under NCP control; the LJM says the announcement is tantamount to ‘the abolition of the



negotiations'. The two movements form a joint committee to establish a unified position on the issue.

5 March: Speaking for the pro-government bloc of Darfur parliamentarians in the National Assembly, Hassabo Mohamed Abdul Rahman proposes further division of the region, with two new states in Jebel Marra (capital Zalingei) and Bahr al Arab (capital al Daein). The government quickly endorses the proposal, raising the possibility of a five-state region rather than the single region the armed movements say is the prerequisite for any peace agreement. Ghazi Atabani says the parliamentarians' proposal was adopted because it represents 'the will of the people of Darfur'. Citing the DPA, he says there is a 'legal obligation' on the government to hold the referendum by April.

10 March: In a joint press statement, JEM and the LJM announce agreement to cooperate and coordinate in the peace process. They inform the mediation they are also coordinating efforts to bring Abdul Wahid and Minni Minawi into a single platform. The government delegation in Doha, until now scathing of rebel disunity, says the announcement undoes the progress already made with the LJM. Amin Hassan Omer warns the movements that the government has 'other keys' to end the conflict in Darfur.

13 March: Seeking a success to strengthen its case for the continuation of the Doha process, the mediation proposes that the parties adopt the four chapters they agree on—Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Justice and Reconciliation, Compensation and Return of IDPs and Refugees, and Wealth Sharing—and keep talking about the remaining disputed issues, including the administrative status of Darfur.

21 March: A UNAMID delegation headed by Gambari meets Abdul Wahid in Kampala. SLA-AW announces an initiative—identical to that already announced by JEM—to unite all armed movements in order to build 'a state of citizenship and democracy'. After the meeting, UNAMID officials express the hope that Abdul Wahid may soon travel to Doha. In Doha, the mediators announce an 'all Darfur stakeholders' conference', reportedly of some 400 people, to be held in April. They invite government officials; representatives of the armed movements; civil society groups; IDPs, and refugees; tribal leaders; political forces; and regional and international partners. Speaking privately, government officials say the meeting is an attempt to force Khartoum to bow to the movements' demand for a single region, and they reject it.

27–31 May: All Darfur Stakeholders' Conference (ADSC) convened. The precise purpose of the ADSC was left unfixed in order to adjust in accordance with evolving circumstances at the negotiation table. It was announced at the end of the conference that the ADSC had endorsed the draft peace document being negotiated by the rebels and the government, but the reality was more complicated. Endorsement was not universal, nor were the participants in the ADSC fully representative of Darfur's many stakeholders.



14 July: The LJM and government sign the Darfur Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD).^v Many members of the international community are absent. A Follow-up Committee to oversee the agreement's elaboration and implementation is also created, led by Qatar, the United States, and the European Union. The first meeting of the committee is scheduled for early September 2011.

19 July: Professor Ibrahim Gambari is appointed interim joint AU/UN mediator for Darfur. Former Darfur mediator Djibril Bassolé leaves the post to become foreign minister of Burkina Faso.

29 July: The UN Security Council renews UNAMID's mandate for one year. Despite the AU's endorsement, the Security Council fails to support the Darfur Peace Process of ex-President Thabo Mbeki until certain preconditions are met.

7 August: The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), SLA-AW, and SLA-MM sign a political alliance announcing the establishment of the Sudan Revolutionary Front Alliance. The three signatories agree to unite their political and military means to overthrow the NCP-led government and set up a liberal and secular state. JEM is not a part of the agreement, but remains in negotiations about joining the alliance.

22 August: Libyan opposition forces reach Tripoli, causing JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim to flee Libya. The Libyan conflict creates a windfall of material support for a number of Darfur rebel movements, especially JEM, but also SLA-MM.

27 August: The government appoints Amin Hassan Omer to lead on the Darfur file, including the implementation of the recent DDPD.

29 August: JEM delegates visit Burkina Faso and meet with President Blaise Compaoré to discuss how to revitalize the Darfur peace process.

4 September: SLA-AW, JEM, and SPLM-N call for a no-fly zone over Blue Nile.

7 September: An LJM advance delegation arrives in Khartoum to prepare for the movement's integration.

11 September: Inaugural meeting of the International Follow-up Committee convenes in Doha.

16 September: North Darfur Governor Osman Kibbir confirms JEM's return from Libya and says that Khalil Ibrahim is in Wadi Huwar, North Darfur.

26 September: JEM deputy chairman Mohamed Bahr Hamadein is relieved of his position.

7 October: The LJM advance delegation to Sudan completes tour of Darfur. Announces the formation of two technical committees in preparation for establishing the Darfur Regional Authority.



12 October: The government says it will not send a representative to a planned DDPD implementation meeting in Washington on 27–28 October because it objects to the United States’ intention to discuss ways of accommodating non-signatories such as JEM.

19 October: The fourth meeting of the special envoys takes place in Darfur. A reference is made to potential ‘targeted measures’ against DDPD non-signatories. UNAMID outlines its initial thinking on a new AU/UN road map for peace in Darfur.

23 October: LJM leader Tijani Sese arrives in Khartoum for the first time since the Doha process. He is received by Nafie Ali Nafie, Amin Hassan Omer, Joint Special Representative Gambari, and Qatar’s mediator, Al Mahmoud.

24 October: LJM leader Tijani Sese is sworn in as head of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority.

24 October–3 November: Tijani Sese tours Darfur, meeting with displaced communities and NCP leaders, and finishing with further meetings in Khartoum with opposition parties. Two people are killed in Kalma IDP camp in violence attributed to clashes between supporters and opponents of the DDPD. Support for and critique of the DDPD characterize Sese’s meetings; caution is voiced regarding the danger of premature return and the need for further outreach to DDPD non-signatories.

14 November: The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is formed, consisting of four groups: SPLM-N, SLA-AW, SLA-MM, and JEM. SRF calls for regime change, the end to partial political processes, and the unification of all of Sudan’s opposition forces.

15–16 November: A closed-door US Institute of Peace workshop is held, bringing together DDPD non-signatories JEM and SLA-MM (now represented under the single banner of the SRF), the LJM, civil society groups, UNAMID, special envoys, and other representatives of the international community.

22–23 November: US congressmen call for a single, unified peace process throughout Sudan. The SRF issues a similar position statement the following day.

2 December: ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requests an arrest warrant for Sudan’s Defence Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed between August 2003 and March 2004 in Darfur. (During that time, he served as interior minister and special representative of the president in Darfur.)

12-13 December: First Malawi and then Chad are referred by the ICC to the UNSC and the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC for allowing Bashir to visit their countries without taking action to apprehend him.



20 December: The Kenyan Court of Appeal declines Sudan's request to suspend the ICC warrant against Bashir, prompting Sudan's president to threaten sanctions and the expulsion of Kenya's envoy to Sudan.

21 December: LJM field commanders are arrested in West Darfur.

22-23 December: JEM forces rally and begin moving east to Kordofan. JEM announces this is the beginning of regime change. JEM claims Government of Sudan (GoS) defectors join its ranks: the GoS counters that this is fabrication.

22-24 December: JEM's leader Khalil Ibrahim is killed by an aerial bombardment during a battle in Wad Banda, North Kordofan. Tahir al Faki is subsequently appointed interim chairman. Other members of the SRF opposition alliance say they continue to stand with JEM and the armed struggle against the GoS.

26 December: Ten ministers and five commissioners are appointed as part of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. Four are chosen from the LJM, two had taken part in the Abuja Agreement, and two came from civil society organizations. The two chosen from civil society are Amna Haroun (the first woman to hold a ministerial post in Darfur) and Muhammed Ali. Abdul Hamid Ahmed Amin, a civil society figure, is appointed Justice and Reconciliation Commissioner.

28 December: In response to Khalil Ibrahim's death, JEM and NCP student groups clash at Sudan University, Khartoum, leading to a GoS crackdown and temporary closure of the university.

29 December: The GoS lodges formal complaints at the UNSC and the AU PSC (the third since South Sudan became independent) against South Sudan for hosting the JEM: it alleges 350 combatants and 79 armored vehicles crossed from South Darfur state into Bahr al Ghazal, South Sudan, through the "Al-Sarag and Sakara" crossing point, south of Ed Daein before finally settling in Tumsaha.

30 December: Chadian President Idriss Deby becomes engaged to the daughter of Musa Hilal, a prominent 'janjaweed' leader in Darfur.

1 January: In a formal letter, the SRF coalition asks the National Consensus Forces (NCF), a Khartoum-based political opposition coalition pursuing political change by peaceful means, to abandon the political track in favour of a unified armed struggle with the SRF. The NCF consists of a variety of Sudanese opposition political parties, including the Popular Congress Party (PCP) and the NUP.

3 January: Sudan's intelligence chief, Mohammed Atta, claims to have evidence linking PCP leader Hassan al Turabi to the SRF in planning a coup.

10 January: President Bashir issues three decrees further to DDPD implementation that create two new states, Central and Eastern, and appoint three governors.



ⁱ Co-chaired by the African Union (AU) and the UN, the forum brings together Sudan, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, the League of Arab States, AU partners, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the European Union, and other relevant bilateral partners to support implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the North–South war.

ⁱⁱ For a description of the Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue, see

<http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/research/details/know_transfer/sudan_peace_project/die_projekte/heidelberg_darfur_dialog.cfm>.

ⁱⁱⁱ See <http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/hdd_outcome_document.pdf>.

^{iv} See <<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/darfur-peace-process/HSBA-Darfur-Peace-Process-New-Strategy.pdf>>.

^v See <<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/darfur-peace-process/DDPD.pdf>>.