

United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

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OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 1999 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan describes the emergency needs of the more than four million war and drought-affected Sudanese living in southern Sudan, the transitional zone and the displaced camps and settlements in the greater Khartoum area which United Nations (UN) Agencies will attempt to meet during 1999. The aim of the 24 projects, totaling US\$ 198,430,939 which are presented in the Appeal is to meet the survival needs and strengthen the resiliency of war-affected and displaced persons through a combination of short and medium-term interventions.

During the next twelve months, humanitarian conditions in some of the areas worst hit by famine are expected to slowly stabilise. The crisis, as of 1998 however, could rapidly develop again if renewed hostilities or natural disasters were to result in massive displacement and crop failure. In the areas served by Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the number of vulnerable people is projected to decline slightly from 1998 although the number of areas suffering acute needs or on the threshold of crisis will rise. During 1999, more specific locations are at risk of developing into disaster zones than at any previous time in OLS history.

Of particular concern is the Bahr Al Ghazal region where hundreds of thousands of famine victims who lost all of their assets last year and were unable to cultivate have no visible means of livelihood. In western Upper Nile, persistent insecurity caused by intra-factional fighting has caused mass displacement and limited the presence of humanitarian agencies. Conditions in this area are fragile and could deteriorate into famine unless populations are stabilised and humanitarian coverage expanded.

The high level of vulnerability in Sudan is linked to events in 1998 when the country faced its most serious humanitarian crisis in more than a decade. The combination of a five-year drought and intensified conflict produced a major famine in the Bahr Al Ghazal region that put more than 800,000 persons at risk of starvation. At the peak of the crisis in July 1998, which the UN declared to be the worst humanitarian disaster of the year, some of the highest malnutrition rates ever recorded were reached in the epicentres of Wau and Ajiép. Renewed hostilities in other parts of the country compounded by the worst flooding of the Nile River in the 20th century and erratic rainfall elsewhere created serious suffering among Sudanese and stretched the capacity of humanitarian agencies almost to the breaking point.

During 1998, OLS mounted the most complex set emergency interventions in its ten-year history. OLS agencies were helped in their efforts to stabilise the famine by the unprecedented access granted by the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements. Generous funding by donors allowed OLS to increase deliveries ten-fold and operate life-saving interventions including feeding centres, vaccination campaigns and emergency health facilities. For the first time in more than eight years, almost the entire amount appealed for by OLS agencies was received.

The 1998 OLS Annual Needs Assessment, conducted in all of the ten areas where OLS is operational, indicates that emergency assistance must be maintained for at least the first nine months of the new year at similar levels. This result was confirmed by the FAO and WFP Crop Production and Food Supply Assessment which found that although cereal production will be higher in 1999 than in previous years, crop failure and limited production in areas with high concentrations of IDPs will create acute localised food deficits which could develop into pre-famine conditions unless emergency relief is provided.

Under circumstances of on-going conflict, finite resources and limited capacity, the most responsible course of action for OLS is to pursue a three-pronged approach based on a clear differentiation between: a) areas with acute needs; b) threshold areas where conditions are already poor and may rapidly deteriorate into crisis; c) areas where chronic emergency conditions continually undermine coping mechanisms. The main priority of OLS will be to ensure that the

survival needs of populations at risk are met. In areas where the majority of people are suffering acute conditions, the aim will be to stabilise populations and reestablish coping mechanisms in order to prevent a reoccurrence of famine conditions. In areas where conditions are severe and factors such as insecurity may possibly lead to crisis, OLS will make every effort to prevent populations from crossing the threshold into famine by extending coverage, bolstering food security and expanding the humanitarian safety net. In areas where populations live in chronic emergency, OLS will provide an integrated set of services and at the same time develop exit strategies from emergency assistance aimed at achieving self-sufficiency. Although the needs of populations living in areas where the UN is denied access are currently unknown, OLS agencies are committed to providing appropriate levels of assistance as soon as access is granted.

The highest priority for UN Agencies in non-OLS areas will be to provide food assistance to vulnerable groups while also responding to possible flood, drought or other emergencies. The needs of drought and flood-affected populations living in areas outside OLS were identified in the 1998 FAO and WFP Crop Production and Food Supply Assessment which indicated that localised food deficits will develop in the western States of North and West Darfur and North Kordofan, and in Red Sea State.

In defining their humanitarian strategy for 1999, the UN Agencies in Sudan recognised that the ongoing conflict is the single most important cause of the distressing humanitarian conditions expected to prevail through most of the country. No real progress on humanitarian issues can realistically be achieved unless the conflict ends. The Agencies also recognise that continued financial support for humanitarian operations is contingent upon political progress. Donors can not be expected to provide millions of dollars of assistance each year if no effort is made to solve the underlying cause of the emergency.

Until a peaceful solution can be found, the UN will continue to try to alleviate the suffering of war-affected populations in Sudan. Efforts to save and protect lives, stabilise populations and promote self-sufficiency will continue to be coordinated through OLS. Although OLS will remain the primary vehicle for providing emergency assistance to war-affected populations, the UN does not regard OLS as a substitute for political action by the international community, nor as a mechanism for resolving the difficult political questions facing Sudan.

The strategy OLS will be using in 1999 to save and protect lives, stabilise populations and promote self-sufficiency will have four components:

Access: One of OLS' main responsibilities is to secure access to war-affected populations. If OLS is unable to do this in the coming year, the advances made during 1998 will disappear and large parts of southern Sudan could rapidly slide into famine conditions. For OLS, access involves more than reaching populations; it also implies a responsibility for using the most cost-effective and safe delivery routes. At the height of the 1998 crisis, the costs of the OLS airdrop operation reached one million US dollars per day. Recognising that financial support of this magnitude can not be sustained over a long period, OLS will be actively seeking ways of lowering costs through the expanded use of surface corridors including the rail corridor to Wau, river corridors and cross-line road corridors.

Operational Environment: Securing access to war-affected populations is only part of the UN's role in ensuring an effective humanitarian operation. Of equal importance is the need to ensure that humanitarian agencies are able to implement their programmes in an operational environment that is safe for humanitarian personnel and the beneficiaries who receive relief assistance. Without assurances from the parties that assistance can be delivered on the basis of the core set of OLS principles - neutrality, impartiality, transparency and accountability-- humanitarian agencies run the risk of having aid diverted or misused. During 1999, the UN will continue its efforts to ensure that the operational environment is free from constraints against humanitarian personnel and property and, to the degree possible in an on-going conflict, facilitate humanitarian operations. To accomplish this, OLS will intensify its constructive engagement with local authorities. OLS will also build on the positive steps taken at the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA) in November 1998 when both parties signed minimum operational standards for the use of the rail corridor and cross-line road corridors by exploring ways of extending standards to cover difficult areas including taxation, personnel movement, etc.

Coordination Tools: In order to maximise the impact of relief assistance, the UN needs to actively use coordination tools to direct the course of the humanitarian operation. Although the UN must work in close partnership with counterparts and implementing partners, UN leadership is required at each stage of the planning and implementation cycle. The UN must be responsible for: first, ensuring reliable early warning systems; second, taking charge of inter-agency planning; third, ensuring humanitarian coverage and avoiding duplication; fourth, developing and ensuring adherence to programme standards and guidelines; fifth, monitoring programme impact, and sixth, developing exit strategies. If the UN fails to assume a leadership role in any of these areas, the humanitarian operation loses direction and risks becoming an uncoordinated set of ad hoc interventions. During 1999, major efforts will be made to

strengthen the UN leadership role over the humanitarian operation by improving coordination tools. Although the UN will initiate reforms for all stages of the implementation cycle, special emphasis will be given to strengthening capabilities in trend analysis. The UN will also significantly improve field coordination by deploying senior officers to key locations who will be responsible for avoiding duplication, promoting humanitarian principles, solving operational bottlenecks and ensuring adherence to programme guidelines.

Core Programme Strategy (CPS): While the main purpose of OLS is to provide a full range of humanitarian relief services aimed at meeting the needs of war-affected populations in Sudan, the total needs of these populations are enormous and can not realistically be met by agencies working within the structure of OLS. The reasons for this are three-fold: first, OLS does not have the capacity to undertake welfare and social programmes which remain the responsibility of local authorities; second, donor resources are finite and subject to competing priorities; third, insecurity constantly limits the locations where OLS can operate effectively. In recognition of these limitations, OLS has attempted this year to further refine and clarify its already highly developed process of prioritisation by presenting a Core Programme Strategy.

The basic structure and purpose of OLS will remain the same in 1999. As in previous years, the main aim of OLS will be to meet acute needs first by ensuring full access, a safe and effective operational environment, and coordinated, high quality programme interventions. The difference between the approaches OLS took in the past and the direction it will be taking in 1999 is that for the first time, OLS will be differentiating between three types of operational areas (acute, threshold, chronic) and implementing a set of specific interventions in each different area. The underlying goal of all OLS programming will be to bolster the resiliency of populations faced with the need to withstand food deficits, displacement, insecurity and other factors associated with on-going conflict. The strategies OLS will follow to strengthen resiliency among famine-affected populations in acute areas, however, will be different from the strategies required to strengthen resiliency among populations whose coping mechanisms function but are being continuously undermined by harsh conditions. By implementing the CPS, OLS will be able to achieve better targeting and more coherence in its programming by fine-tuning interventions to address specific types of conditions.

The UN Agencies are requesting US\$ 198,430,939 for 24 emergency and rehabilitation projects. Although the main emphasis in this Appeal is on meeting acute needs and strengthening the resiliency of war-affected populations, the UN recognises that the aim of humanitarian action must always be to seek durable solutions. Both the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements have expressed strong interest in a focus on rehabilitation and development. OLS, however, will remain first and foremost an emergency humanitarian programme aimed at meeting the immediate survival needs of at-risk populations.

The project section of the Appeal is divided into two sub-sections: emergency needs and rehabilitation. Within the emergency section a clear distinction is made between projects targeting beneficiaries in OLS areas and projects aimed at populations outside OLS areas. In the OLS section, activities that are described will be implemented as part of the Core Programme Strategy. These activities reflect the steps that UN Agencies will take to save lives and strengthen the resiliency of populations living in acute and threshold areas as well as under conditions of chronic emergency. The aim of all of the emergency projects is meet survival needs and help populations cope with chronic food insecurity, lack of primary health care, basic water and sanitation infrastructures and inadequate education opportunities. The OLS section also contains projects aimed at strengthening emergency coordination structures.

The emergency projects fall into the following priority areas:

Emergency Food Assistance (US\$ 142,297,770) for an estimated 2.3 million internally displaced war and drought-affected persons and vulnerable groups in southern Sudan, the transitional zone, Khartoum, Kassala and other northern States. The food needs of refugees do not appear in this Appeal but will be resourced separately.

Emergency Preparedness and Response (US\$ 3,293,350) to enable the UN to prepare for and respond effectively to the emergency needs of war and drought-affected populations in OLS areas; to enable the UN to respond effectively to natural and man-made disasters occurring outside OLS areas.

Health, Nutrition, Water and Sanitation, and Household Food Security (US\$ 24,840,048) will be targeted at 2.3 million war-affected and displaced persons in southern Sudan, the transitional zone, along the eastern border and displaced camps around Khartoum and will focus on: reducing mortality and morbidity caused by communicable diseases through proper case detection; management and effective preventive measures; increasing availability of safe drinking water and improving sanitation facilities and hygiene education; improving the nutritional status of children, pregnant and lactating women; ensuring that targeted households have improved access to sufficient food sources by providing seeds, tools, fishing equipment, animal health services and appropriate training.

Emergency Basic Services for Children (US\$ 3,057,695) will focus on: basic emergency education assistance for 500,000 war-affected children and meeting the special needs of unaccompanied minors, including the reunification of at least 900 children with their families; demobilisation of child soldiers; protection of children's rights and mine risk education and advocacy.

Refugees (US\$ 9,593,300) will focus on: provision of multi-sectoral assistance to 136,000 refugees residing in the camps in the Sudan.

Inter-Agency Coordination and Emergency Programme Support (US\$ 13,665,619) will include: the UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit in Khartoum; the OLS security system, the application of humanitarian principles within OLS. This project will also focus on gender sensitisation; in collaboration with Sudanese humanitarian agencies and INGOs; monitoring and evaluation programmes for UNICEF northern and southern sectors; Lokichokio camp operations and aircraft operations.

The projects in the rehabilitation section aim at improving infrastructure, strengthening social networks and providing exit strategies for displaced populations living in conditions of chronic emergency. The projects describe medium-term approaches for meeting needs in areas where there is relative stability and consistent access. No distinction is made between OLS and non-OLS areas. The projects include:

Rehabilitation Projects (US\$ 1,683,157): resettlement and social integration of displaced communities in Khartoum and Upper Nile States and reproductive health services for displaced women and children.

During the preparation of this Appeal, every effort has been made by the UN Agencies to streamline project proposals and develop realistic budgets. As was the case last year, the UN technical agencies including FAO and WHO will implement projects in collaboration with UNICEF which serves as the lead agency in the non-food sector. In OLS areas, the technical agencies will provide key inputs into projects which are coordinated by UNICEF rather than submitting their own projects for funding.

The purpose of the 1999 Appeal is to seek to help support for the UN Agencies in their efforts to meet the needs of Sudan's war-affected populations during the next year. This can only be done if the donor community responds generously. The UN's ability to help prevent a reoccurrence of the 1998 famine depends upon the availability of funds. All humanitarian actors must accept responsibility for the fact that reduced funding will potentially condemn millions of Sudanese to destitution, disease and, in hundreds of thousands of cases, possible starvation.

**Table I: 1999 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan
Listing of Project Activities
BY APPEALING AGENCY
January - December 1999**

Code	AGENCY/PROJECT TITLE	Appealing Agency	Amount (US\$)
	OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS		
N08	UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit	OCHA	1,804,519
N17	Disaster Preparedness and Response (non-OLS areas)	OCHA	238,050
	Sub-total		2,042,569
	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME		
N19	Settlement and Integration of Displaced Communities, Khartoum State	UNDP	300,000

N20	Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Upper Nile State	UNDP	200,000
	Sub-total		500,000
	UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES		
N18	Multi-sectoral Assistance to Refugees	UNHCR	9,593,300
	Sub-total		9,593,300
	UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND		
N02	Emergency Preparedness and Response	UNICEF	3,055,300
N03A	Health	UNICEF	8,601,570
N04	Nutrition	UNICEF	1,978,800
N05	Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES)	UNICEF	4,200,000
N06A	Household Food Security (HHFS): Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries	UNICEF/FAO	7,698,314
N07	Emergency Education / Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances	UNICEF	2,501,545
N09	Security Operations	UNICEF/UNDP	2,008,200
N10	Mine Action Programme	UNICEF/OCHA	556,150
N11	Monitoring, Evaluation and Information Management	UNICEF	843,000
N12	Humanitarian Principles (southern sector)	UNICEF	595,000
N13	Institutional (southern sector)	UNICEF	743,000
N14	Gender and Development	UNICEF	587,900
N15	Aircraft Operations and Logistics (northern sector)	UNICEF	2,130,000
N16	Field Operations (southern sector)	UNICEF	4,954,000
	Sub-total		40,452,779
	WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME		
N01	Emergency Food Assistance to Population Affected by War, Drought and Floods	WFP	142,297,770
	Sub-total		142,297,770
	WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION		
N03B	Emergency Health	WHO	1,374,364
	Sub-total		1,374,364
	FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION		
N06B	HHFS: Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries	FAO	987,000

	Sub-total		987,000
	UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND		
N21	Reproductive Health and Family Planning Services for the Displaced	UNFPA	623,490
N22	Reproductive Health and Family Planning Services for the Displaced in Unity and South Kordofan States	UNFPA	559,667
	Sub-total		1,183,157
	GRAND TOTAL		198,430,939

**Table II: Total Funding Requirements for the
1999 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan
BY SECTOR
January - December 1999**

Sector	Amounts (US\$)
EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE	142,297,770
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE	3,293,350
HEALTH, WATER AND SANITATION, NUTRITION AND HHFS	24,840,048
OTHER EMERGENCY BASIC SERVICES	3,057,695
REFUGEES	9,593,300
INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION AND EMERGENCY PROGRAMME SUPPORT	13,665,619
REHABILITATION PROJECTS	1,683,157
GRAND TOTAL	198,430,939

**Table III: Total Funding Requirements for the
1999 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan
BY APPEALING AGENCY
January - December 1999**

Appealing Agency	Amounts (US\$)
OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS	2,042,569
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	500,000
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES	9,593,300
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND	40,452,779
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME	142,297,770
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION	1,374,364

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION In addition to the amount of US\$ 7,698,314 appealed for jointly with UNICEF in support of (HHFS) programme.	987,000
UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND	1,183,157
GRAND TOTAL	198,430,939

Localised food deficits ranging between 25 and 90 percent are expected in areas of Bahr Al Ghazal where OLS is operational. OLS is currently meeting the food needs of approximately one million persons in Bahr Al Ghazal and it is estimated that 80 percent of these beneficiaries will continue to depend to some extent upon emergency food relief in 1999. Verification of food-aid beneficiaries needs to continually occur to ensure that food assistance reaches at-risk populations. HHFS will remain the highest humanitarian priority for the region and is expected to absorb the bulk of agency resources. In addition to food deliveries, massive inputs of seeds, tools and fishing tackle, as well as support to livestock will continue to be the most effective strategies for helping populations with few or no assets become resilient.

Although malnutrition rates have improved dramatically since the height of the famine in July and August, current global rates of over 20 percent, and as high as 46 percent in localised areas, indicate a continued need for supplementary and therapeutic feeding. Prevention of epidemics will depend upon a massive broadening of Expanded Programme of Immunisation (EPI) coverage, particularly among children under five whose immune systems were severely damaged during the famine. Fewer than 20 percent of the population has access to safe drinking water. Unsanitary water supplies continue to threaten the health of at-risk populations, especially those who are concentrated in relief distribution points where overcrowding has put enormous strain on existing water sources. Immediate steps are required to improve sanitation through the provision of potable water to health centres, feeding centres and food distribution points. Basic education aimed at helping populations improve literacy, numeracy, animal husbandry and other skills necessary for economic activity needs to be provided, especially to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) whose ability to compete in local economies is severely undermined by inadequate human capital. Children have been especially traumatised by the 1998 famine with large numbers separated from their families and traditional care-givers. Initiatives aimed at improving the psycho-social status of Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances (CEDC) are required.

Serious logistical constraints will continue to affect the timing and amount of humanitarian assistance which can be delivered. Poor infrastructure and inadequate transportation networks limit the use of land routes, although OLS is exploring the use of rail and cross-line road corridors in 1999 following the adoption in November of minimum operational standards by the parties to the conflict.

OLS Goals

- To provide 76,006 MTs of emergency relief food for 831,450 displaced and war-affected people during a period of between 4 to 12 months. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies.
- To provide seeds and tools and support livestock and fishery programmes aimed at promoting greater self-reliance by the year 2000.
- To further reduce rates of malnutrition by maintaining supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes where necessary.
- To increase support to health infrastructure, particularly through the supply of essential drugs and medical equipment, and to extend EPI coverage throughout the region.
- To rehabilitate existing water sources and install water systems in areas without access to safe drinking water.
- To continue or initiate programmes of sanitation and hygiene awareness.

To introduce basic education programmes to improve numeracy, husbandry and other skills necessary for economic activity.

Upper Nile Region

(Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei States)



The Upper Nile basin includes at least three areas, western Upper Nile and Zeraf and Bor Provinces, where populations are already in acute need as well as threshold areas where populations continue to cope but are at risk of sliding into destitution if insecurity, flooding or displacement persist. Current trends indicate that much of the region may rapidly develop into an acute emergency on the scale of Bahr Al Ghazal last year, particularly if insecurity continues to generate displacement and prevent humanitarian agencies from mounting life-saving interventions. During 1998, more OLS personnel were evacuated from this region due to insecurity than from any other area where OLS operates. At present, humanitarian coverage in this region is the lowest of all major OLS areas. Although virtually impossible under present security conditions, OLS must have continued access during 1999 in order to effectively mount interventions aimed at bolstering resiliency and averting a full-scale crisis. A thorough assessment of needs in many parts of the region was not possible due to continued insecurity but it is estimated that a large percentage of the population will face food deficits of between 30 to 75 percent in 1999. Although the 1998 cropping season is considered the best in the last four years, in some areas planting was limited by insecurity and much of the harvest in Jonglei, and the Upper Sobat basin has been destroyed by flood waters. Although populations may be able to take advantage of the flooding by planting in the river basin as waters recede, the chances of producing a second bumper crop risk being undermined by displacement and insecurity. In expectation of continued poor harvests, food relief for a minimum of 30 percent of the population, 253,400 persons in Upper Nile and Unity States, and 362,200 persons in Jonglei, will need to be pre-positioned in the region. Seeds and tools, fishing tackle and support for livestock programmes are required to help at-risk populations either sustain or regain HHFS.

The region's health infrastructure is close to collapse with an acute shortage of essential drugs and almost no EPI programme outside the main urban areas. Sanitation in the region is extremely poor and there has been an increase in water-borne diseases due to the recent flooding. Access to safe drinking water is limited to less than 20 percent of the population. The region's education system has disintegrated and there are a large number of unaccompanied children. Massive interventions in all non-food sectors are urgently required in order to provide a minimum safety net for the most vulnerable communities.

The region is considered to be one of the most challenging environments and least developed areas in southern Sudan. Although many population centres can potentially be reached by river, there is little or no access by road to most parts of the region, and access by air is limited by the substandard quality of airstrips.


OLS Goals

- To provide 38,704 MTs of relief food for 615,700 targeted beneficiaries in the Upper Nile region to meet food needs over a ten-month period. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies. To promote resiliency by the timely provision of seeds and tools, fishing tackle and support for livestock programmes.
- To maintain emergency response capability in the health and nutrition sector, including the stockpiling of emergency kits and essential drugs and to support supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes.
- To maintain emergency WES capacity to provide water and sanitation facilities to populations at highest risk.

- To conduct a full needs assessment of the region when security permits and organise greater coordination and collaboration between UN Agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working in the region.
- To rehabilitate the educational infrastructure and increase the supply of educational materials and to conduct a survey of the numbers and needs of CEDC in the region.
- To establish and maintain an emergency response capacity to address the needs of affected
- populations in the event of increased hostilities or recurrence of natural disasters.

Equatoria Region

(West and East Equatoria and Bahr Al Jebel States)



Although the overall humanitarian situation in the region is not as severe as in other areas, pockets of acute need exist in all three States as a result of both natural and man-made factors including insecurity, access restrictions and flooding. If the security situation is stable during 1999, the highest priorities will be to meet acute needs, gain access to restricted areas and be more effective in assisting displaced communities to achieve self-sufficiency. However, increased insecurity, especially if it is related to an upsurge in hostilities, may create large population movements and would almost certainly lead to a worsening of humanitarian conditions. Under these circumstances, top priority will be given to mounting emergency interventions aimed at stabilisation and meeting survival needs. Even given a static military situation, the overall food security for the region is poor in terms of food availability. 1998 ranked as the second worst in the last five years. Twelve percent of the population, 267,500 persons, will require food relief to meet food deficits of between 20 and 50 percent. In order to ensure HHFS in this key production area, seeds and tools need to be distributed to at-risk populations including IDPs and returnees from neighbouring countries and support to livestock programmes needs expansion.

Supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes should be extended to areas with high concentrations of child malnutrition, including the Labone-Nimule corridor and to Mangala, Liggi, Sirimon and Kuda. Support is also required to continue programmes for the large number of malnourished children in Juba. Although the health sector is more developed in this region than elsewhere, better supplies of essential drugs and expanded EPI coverage would significantly improve the health of at-risk populations. Access to safe drinking water is restricted in rural areas and health and hygiene awareness poor in urban areas. Interventions aimed at improving these conditions would strengthen the resiliency of local populations and provide a buffer against future food deficits or asset-depleting insecurity. Increased provision of educational materials and the expansion of teacher training programmes will help strengthen the education sector which, although functioning, is weak.

OLS Goals

- To provide 20,587 MTs of relief food to 267,500 targeted beneficiaries. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies. To monitor returnees and IDPs arriving in the region and distribute seeds and tools to those returnees and IDPs with access to land. To continue support for livestock programmes.
- To provide essential drugs to health centres and strengthen EPI coverage throughout the region.
- To establish feeding centres in Mangala, Liggi, Sirimon and Kuda and in the Labone-Nimule corridor and provide support for supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes.
- To support local initiatives in expanding and sustaining the Water and Environmental Sanitation infrastructure.
- To increase the supply of emergency education kits and strengthen support to programmes of demobilisation of child soldiers.
- To establish and maintain an emergency response capacity to address the needs of affected populations in the event of increased hostilities.

Khartoum State




The humanitarian situation in Khartoum will remain a chronic emergency during 1999. Improvements in the general situation are unlikely in the coming year due to continued displacement from war zones, difficulties in implementation of Government planning schemes and the lack of a coordinated programme of humanitarian intervention. With an estimated 1.8 million displaced, Khartoum accommodates one of the largest concentration of IDPs in the world,. Residents of Khartoum's four IDP camps and numerous squatter areas do not have access to land for cultivation and are forced to rely principally on wages to achieve food security through purchases at local markets. Ten percent of the IDP population will require food assistance. Despite years of intervention by humanitarian agencies, conditions in the displaced settlements remain poor, with regular outbreaks of disease, chronic food insecurity, higher than normal malnutrition rates and limited access to safe drinking water. The only possible strategy for overcoming the chronic emergency in Khartoum is for UN Agencies, NGOs and local authorities to formulate coherent plans and programmes for promoting self-sufficiency and to integrate displaced communities into the urban environment instead of disbursing funds in haphazard programmes aimed at ameliorating conditions rather than identifying long-term solutions.

OLS Goals

- To develop a realistic, integrated and coherent strategy to meet the emergency needs and the long-term goal of self-reliance for displaced communities.
- To provide a total of 6,871 MTs of relief food for 180,000 targeted beneficiaries in displaced camps during 1999. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food and therapeutic feeding programmes.
- To synchronise interventions between humanitarian agencies and local authorities to avoid unnecessary destruction of infrastructure and ensure a more humane planning policy.
- To create a more structured approach to community participation in planning for emergency and longer-term needs.
- To standardise information management and analysis.

North and South Kordofan States



The majority of the region's IDPs are located in 72 Government peace villages scattered throughout the Nuba Mountains. In the villages where OLS mounts humanitarian interventions, beneficiaries continue to suffer from conditions associated with chronic emergencies. A large part of the IDP population, however, is not accessed by the humanitarian community due to Government restrictions and insecurity, and their condition is not known. Greater access to the region, including to rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains, is necessary to first identify and then meet the needs of all the displaced population, particularly in the event of continued insecurity in 1999. Despite good rainfall in the region in 1998, planting was limited by insecurity and a 35 percent food deficit is expected for 72,500 IDPs identified as being at highest risk during the months of May to September. Food security is expected to be lowest in Sidra Camp, North Kordofan and in Greater Rashad Province. Given the impassability of roads during the rains, food relief will need to be pre-positioned in April before the start of the season. Seeds and tools will also need to be distributed in advance of the rains. The successful goat restocking programme needs further support as part of an overall strategy for improving food security.

The availability of primary and secondary health care is constrained by a lack of trained personnel and a poor supply of essential drugs. EPI coverage is low due to inadequate infrastructure and poor outreach. The successful mobile vaccination programme initiated in 1998 should be expanded. Water supply is inadequate and open defecation is practiced throughout the region. The WES and education sectors received only limited support in the past, making it difficult for populations to achieve resiliency. Basic education suffers from a lack of trained teachers, insufficient educational materials and decrepit facilities. Increasing numbers of unaccompanied children will require CEDC interventions.

OLS Goals

- To provide 2,769 MTs of relief food for 72,500 beneficiaries in targeted villages and pre-position by April. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies.
- To distribute seeds and tools for the 1999 agricultural season, particularly to new IDP arrivals.
- To track IDP movements and provide new arrivals with food and other relief items.
- To expand the free distribution of essential drugs and encourage static EPI strategies in all locations with at-risk populations. To support supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes.
- To increase access to safe drinking water and introduce health and hygiene awareness programmes.
- To strengthen support to the education system by increasing supply of educational materials and introducing teacher training programmes.
- To establish and maintain an emergency response capacity to address the needs of affected populations in the event of increased hostilities.

West Kordofan State



West Kordofan is host to a long-term population of IDPs who have fled drought and insecurity in northern Bahr Al Ghazal. It is expected that the State will continue to serve as a transit point for displaced populations coming from northern Bahr Al Ghazal and western Upper Nile traveling to urban centres or mechanised schemes in the East and North. Some IDPs from the southern conflict zones are expected to remain in the State although the majority are likely to transit the area. Most IDPs are dispersed among the host community but approximately 36,000 IDPs live in

conditions of chronic emergency in IDP settlements in Meiram, Abyei, An Nahud and in the peace villages near Lagawa.

The IDPs have limited access to land and rely heavily on share cropping and tenant farming for food security. Overall crop yields in 1998 were higher than in the preceding years but an estimated 21,600 IDPs, who had little access to land or other casual labor, face a food deficit of between 25 percent and 40 percent in 1999. The food security of the inhabitants of Lagawa peace villages was not assessed due to heavy rains which restricted access to the villages. The most prevalent diseases in the camps are malaria and diarrhea, the latter being particularly prevalent in children under five due to poor sanitation. Pit latrines need to be built and programmes of health and hygiene awareness initiated. The water yards at Abyei, which are the main sources of safe water for nearby IDP populations, require repair. The attendance of IDP children at schools in An Nahud, Babanusa and Al Tobon is low and schools need to be constructed in the IDP camps to encourage greater enrolment.

OLS Goals

- To provide 822 MTs of relief food for 21,600 targeted beneficiaries in An Nahud, Meiram and Abyei for the food gap months of April to July. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies.
- To rehabilitate the water yards in Abyei pit latrines, and introduce health and hygiene education programmes in all IDP settlements.
- To support supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes.
- To encourage greater school attendance by IDP children through school construction and to provide IDP students with educational materials.

South Darfur State



For the first time in OLS history, it may be possible to find a solution to the long-term chronic emergency in South Darfur by facilitating the resettlement into self-sufficient communities of approximately 20,000 IDPs. At the request of UN Agencies, local authorities have set aside land for a pilot project which will give secure land title to IDPs currently living in camps and forced to rely on share cropping as their main livelihood strategy. Once funding is forthcoming, UNHCU, WFP, UNICEF, OXFAM, and SCF-UK will implement the pilot scheme. If successful, efforts will be made to expand the scheme to cover all IDPs living in the region's ten camps.

Tension between the host and IDP communities limited planting in 1998 and a food deficit of 25 percent is expected for 40,000 IDPs until the September 1999 harvest. In addition, 2,000 newly displaced persons who arrived in the State in July and August missed the planting season and will need food relief throughout the year. Seeds and tools are needed for the new arrivals to promote self-reliance. Water and sanitation facilities in the camps are decrepit and require rehabilitation. The water yards at Ad Daein also require rehabilitation, and programmes of health and hygiene awareness need to be extended to all IDP camps where unsafe practices lower the resiliency of at-risk populations. Basic health facilities are satisfactory, although health personnel require retraining. School attendance by IDP children is low, and the supply of educational materials needs to be increased to encourage greater enrolment.

OLS Goals

- To provide 1,602 MTs of relief food for 42,000 targeted beneficiaries during the food gap months from June to September. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies. To support supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes.

- To further explore feasible strategies to promote self-reliance and own-food production and to support pilot schemes with food relief, seeds and tools until communities attain self-sufficiency.
- To strengthen the health infrastructure by retraining health personnel.
- To rehabilitate existing water systems and ensure proper water provision.
- To strengthen the education infrastructure, particularly by training teachers.

Kassala State




Insecurity in the region escalated in 1998 and is expected to continue in 1999, placing a greater number of people at risk of displacement and in need of humanitarian assistance. Prior to 1998, there were few needs in the region and little history of aid intervention for IDPs. The displacement of approximately 40,000 persons from the border in 1998 stretched the coping mechanisms of the State. Although difficulties in accessing the region continue, the State Governor recently requested an increased international presence. Years of drought have undermined food security, particularly along the border areas from where the newly displaced originate. Reduction in border trade and limited job opportunities in Kassala have also diminished the purchasing power of the newly displaced. Displacement and the consequent disruption of the planting season have created large food deficits for 1999 despite predictions of a good harvest. It is estimated that 30,000 targeted beneficiaries will face food deficits of up to 80 percent and require emergency food relief. Supplementary and therapeutic feeding to nurse malnourished displaced children will be required throughout the year. Although most of the newly displaced IDPs have some assets, interventions are also needed in the health, WES and education programme sectors to help these populations recover their resiliency. The large number of landmines in the region is a constraint on the implementation of humanitarian activities and needs to be counter-acted through mine awareness training.

OLS Goals

- To provide 6,871 MTs of relief food for 30,000 targeted beneficiaries with a full food ration until the November 1999 harvest.
- To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies. To support supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes.
- To strengthen the provision of shelter, WES and health care, preferably by encouraging a greater international presence in the State.
- To prepare a buffer stock of emergency food relief and non-food items in readiness for an emergency.
- To ensure all IDP settlements are located in safe areas. To initiate joint UN and Government programmes of mine awareness for all sectors of the populations.

White Nile State



The estimated 34,000 IDPs in the two camps of Goz As Salaam and Laya will continue to live in a state of chronic emergency, with little access to land, limited health facilities and inadequate sanitary conditions. Food security in the camps is expected to be generally good due to income earned in nearby agricultural schemes. However, the most vulnerable quarter of the population, including many female-headed households, are expected to face a 30 percent food deficit in 1999. Although there are health facilities in the two camps, the most vulnerable IDPs can not afford the high cost of essential drugs, especially during the food gap months when income is diverted to foodstuffs. Only five percent of the population has access to safe drinking water and the environmental sanitation in the camps is poor, becoming critical during the rainy season when incidents of infectious, water-borne diseases increase exponentially. High priority needs to be given to a health and hygiene programme and the construction of pit latrines. More than 50 percent of schools in the camps were damaged by recent rains and need to be rehabilitated.

OLS Goals

- To provide 974 MTs of relief food to 8,500 targeted beneficiaries throughout the year. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies. To support supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes.
- To introduce a health and hygiene programme, build pit latrines and install more hand pumps to reduce the prevalence of water-borne diseases.
- To strengthen health interventions and increase the supply of essential drugs.
- To rehabilitate schools in IDP locations damaged by recent rains.

Blue Nile State




At present, OLS meets the needs of 24,000 IDPs living in three camps in Damazin Province. Increased insecurity in the State in recent years is believed to have increased the numbers of displaced. Access to the rest of the State, however, has been restricted although the State Governor recently requested OLS to conduct a full needs assessment of the region at the beginning of the dry season in December 1998. Most of the IDPs achieve food security through produce grown on small plots of land and income earned at nearby mechanised agricultural schemes. Only a minimal food deficit is expected in 1999. The camps have poor health facilities and low EPI coverage. Sanitation is extremely poor and is a probable cause of disease during the rainy

season. Pit latrines have collapsed or are not functioning and the majority of the population practice open defecation. Priority needs in 1999 include programmes in health and hygiene awareness and the rehabilitation and construction of pit latrines. Water supplies in the camp require rehabilitation and the population requires training in water management and maintenance of water sources. Schools in the camps lack sufficient trained teachers and educational materials.

OLS Goals

- To ensure greater access to further determine the needs of the displaced in the region.
- To provide safe clean water and build pit latrines.
- To provide educational materials in IDP schools and introduce education rehabilitation programmes to encourage higher school attendance.
- To provide drugs and equipment to health centres and strengthen EPI coverage.
- To provide agricultural inputs such as seeds and tools.

2. NON-OLS AREAS



North and West Darfur States

Although North Darfur is a chronic food deficit area, the 1998 agricultural season looks very promising and is expected to be the best in recent years. Pockets of food insecurity will persist however, making it necessary to provide food assistance to vulnerable populations. In West Darfur, insecurity has led to population displacement and localised food deficits. Close monitoring of the region's food needs is recommended from the beginning of food gap months in March.

OLS Goal

To provide 630 MTs of relief food to meet localised needs in both States. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies.

North Kordofan State

Although the 1998 harvest is better than the previous year, pest infestation of the millet crop has badly damaged the harvest in the northern Provinces of Bara and Sodari. Food security in these provinces should be monitored in anticipation of low crop yields.

OLS Goal

- To provide 378 MTs of relief food to meet the food needs of vulnerable populations in Bara

and Sodari Provinces. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies.

Red Sea State

Although Red Sea State is a chronic food deficit area, the 1998 harvest was above average. However, 8,000 newly displaced persons in Tokar Province will face food deficits in 1999. The food security of these populations should be monitored to ascertain appropriate levels of assistance.

OLS Goal

To provide 504 MTs of relief food to displaced populations. To provide food for supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes to malnourished children in Tokar Province. To establish a contingency stockpile of ten percent of required food assistance to ensure timely response to unexpected emergencies.

C. YEAR IN REVIEW

In 1998, Sudan faced its most serious humanitarian crisis in more than a decade when the combination of a five-year drought and intensified conflict produced a major famine in the Bahr Al Ghazal region that put nearly 800,000 persons at risk of starvation. At the peak of the crisis in July 1998, which the UN declared to be the worst humanitarian disaster of the year, some of the highest malnutrition rates ever recorded were reached in the epicentres of Wau and Ajiep. Between February and August, hundreds of communities in Bahr Al Ghazal that had managed for years to cope with asset-depleting insecurity, displacement and drought crossed the threshold from subsistence into starvation, while an unknown number of individuals died from hunger, disease and neglect. Although the situation eventually stabilised, with both death rates and malnutrition declining dramatically after mid-August, Bahr Al Ghazal remained a devastated region at year-end with hundreds of thousands of people dependent upon emergency assistance for their survival.

The Bahr Al Ghazal crisis was set off when Kerubino Kwanyin Bol defected to the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) in late January 1998 and attacks were launched against the Government towns of Wau, Aweil and Gogrial in Bahr Al Ghazal. The Government responded to these attacks, which resulted in displacement of approximately 110,000 persons, by imposing a total flight ban over the entire region of Bahr Al Ghazal that paralysed relief operations. After numerous high-level interventions by UN Agencies, the ban was partially lifted in late February when six locations were cleared during an emergency mission by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan, Ambassador Robert van Schaik, and again in mid-March when two further locations were approved. In its efforts to lift the ban, the UN was strongly supported by a number of member states. When full access was finally granted on 30 March, it was estimated that 380,000 persons, including the 110,000 newly displaced, were suffering from serious food shortages. By early June, after comprehensive assessments including nutritional and food economy surveys had been conducted, the number of people in need of food assistance was found to have risen to 795,000 persons.

Once the ban was lifted, OLS' early relief efforts were hampered by lack of funds and logistical constraints. Donor funding began increasing at mid-year following reports of the crisis in the mainstream media. By early July, all operational agencies were receiving generous contributions, allowing OLS to mount a full-scale emergency response. OLS' logistical capacity at its forward staging base in Lokichokio, however, was insufficient to support the heavy cargo aircraft required to mount a full-scale operation in southern Sudan. During a mission by the Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), OLS agreed to open a second logistics base in the Government town of Al Obeid located north of the transitional zone. On 6 June, the base became operational with one C-130 airdropping food into both Government and rebel-held areas of northern

Bahr Al Ghazal. By mid-July, WFP was using 16 cargo planes from four bases as part of the largest humanitarian airdrop operation in UN history. OLS' efforts to meet the crisis were bolstered in early June with the resumption of humanitarian activities by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which had suspended operations in November 1996 following a hostage-taking incident in Bahr Al Ghazal.

Despite calls from members of the international community for a cease-fire, fighting among the parties continued throughout the first half of 1998, particularly in northern Bahr Al Ghazal, Blue Nile State and along the Eritrean and Ethiopian borders in Gedaref and Kassala States. In mid-July, following interventions by the United Kingdom, both the Government and SPLA declared a three-month cease-fire covering the Bahr Al Ghazal region. Although efforts were made by the UN, under the leadership of the newly appointed Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan, Ambassador Tom Eric Vraalsen, to expand both the scope and length of the truce, the parties agreed only to a further three month extension in Bahr Al Ghazal in mid-October.

Humanitarian conditions in other war-affected areas of Sudan continued to deteriorate during 1998. In Kassala State, more than 40,000 persons fled the front-line seeking safe haven and emergency assistance. In western Upper Nile, where intra-factional fighting caused constant displacement, global malnutrition rates reached as high as 40 percent at mid-year. In the transitional zone, Meiram and Abyei received influxes of displaced persons fleeing insecurity and famine in Bahr Al Ghazal. In the Ad Daein displaced camps, tensions between Reizegat and Dinka erupted after the January attack against Wau, forcing thousands of displaced to flee their camps. Insecurity and drought in the Nuba Mountains in late summer led thousands to seek humanitarian assistance in Government areas. An outbreak of hostilities in eastern Equatoria in September created some additional displacement. In September and October, tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees returned to western Equatoria as a result of insecurity in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Although many of the areas which host war-affected populations experienced relative stability during 1998, including Khartoum, White Nile, South Darfur and parts of Equatoria, the long-term trend towards disintegration of communal networks continued. Despite a few initiatives aimed at increasing self-sufficiency, prospects remained extremely limited for the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons living at or below subsistence levels in conditions of chronic emergency.

In late August and September, Sudan experienced the worst flooding for several decades. An estimated two million people were affected, including 100,000 who were displaced by unprecedented high river levels and heavy rains. In some areas up to 70 percent of summer crops were destroyed, seriously undermining the food security of local populations.

During 1998, OLS mounted the most complex set of interventions in its ten-year history. By the end of November, WFP had delivered 88,000 MTs of food. At the height of the crisis, WFP was delivering an average of 15,000 MTs of food per month to an estimated one million beneficiaries using a combination of road, river and air corridors. OLS agencies provided supplementary and therapeutic feeding to more than 100,000 persons and conducted a major measles and polio vaccination campaign that successfully prevented outbreaks of these deadly diseases. OLS agencies also supported and coordinated programmes in primary health care and nutrition, HHFS, livestock, WES, emergency education, CEDC, gender and development, capacity-building, humanitarian principles, protection and child rights.

OLS was helped in its efforts to stabilise the famine by the unprecedented access granted by the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements. With the exception of the two-month flight ban over Bahr Al Ghazal imposed by the Government, OLS was able to access more locations per month than at any other time in its history. On average, 204 locations received flight clearance each month. During a stopover visit in Khartoum by the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, in mid-May 1998, the Government of Sudan agreed to allow an assessment mission in rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains. This breakthrough followed a planned assessment in November 1997 from which the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) had withdrawn. By year-end, no date had been agreed on for the mission.

Although the cease-fire in Bahr Al Ghazal was critical in stabilising the famine, insecurity in other parts of Sudan continued to hamper relief operations. In the most serious incident affecting humanitarian personnel, two WFP staff and one Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRC) worker were shot and killed during an ambush following a food distribution in Government areas of the Nuba Mountains on 9 June. During 1998, 228 relief personnel were evacuated on 45 occasions. Looting of compounds in western Upper Nile forced the shut-down of key programmes including the hospital in Leer. Indiscriminate bombing by the Government of civilian populations was reported on 57 separate occasions during the year. OLS vehicles in southern Sudan, northern Kenya and Uganda were ambushed on 13 separate occasions. The presence of landmines in many of the areas served by OLS continued to cause injury to innocent civilians and impede the flow of humanitarian assistance.

Restrictions on the operational environment also seriously hampered the flow of emergency relief. Food redistributions and diversions in rebel-held areas of Bahr Al Ghazal prevented assistance from reaching targeted beneficiaries. Despite recommendations made in August by a joint Task Force on Targeting and Vulnerabilities, diversions persisted at year-end. Lack of communications equipment in Government areas limited outreach and service delivery and increased the risk for humanitarian personnel. Attempts to impose taxes on NGOs and refusal to grant travel authorisations constrained humanitarian activities in areas controlled by the SPLM. In South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) areas, confiscation of communications equipment and looting of NGO compounds hampered interventions.

At a meeting of the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA), convened in November at the request of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Government of Sudan, SPLM and the UN signed a security protocol and minimum operational standards for use of rail and cross-line road corridors. These agreements, the first OLS documents signed since the 1994 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and Drought (IGADD) access agreement, outline the minimum standards which must be met to facilitate assistance along rail and cross-line road corridors. Negotiations concerning the use of these corridors will continue in 1999.

Although OLS agencies received sufficient funding to cover their emergency programmes, a special WFP appeal for structural improvements on road corridors and at Lokichokio remained seriously under-funded. Entering 1999, OLS agencies were in a strong financial position, especially UNICEF operations in the southern sector which have a carry-over of five million US dollars. Early funding for key programme areas, however, including food relief, HHFS and health, remains a priority.

Implementation of the 1996 OLS review continued. By April 1998, virtually all of the 41 recommendations endorsed by the UN Agencies in the autumn of 1996 had been successfully implemented. At the May 1998 International Advisory Committee (IAC), OLS announced that a final "Review of the Review" would be conducted shortly and that results would be submitted to donors, finalising the OLS review process. This review was postponed due to the Bahr Al Ghazal crisis.

The consolidation of the Southern States Coordination Council (SSCC) stalled during 1998. The status of the Relief Association of South Sudan (RASS), the humanitarian wing of the SSIM, remained unclear, making it difficult to coordinate interventions in areas under its control. Intra-factional conflict within SSIA/M led to the emergence of a new faction, the South Sudan Unity Movement (SSUM). While not officially recognising the new faction, OLS continued to meet humanitarian needs in the areas controlled by SSUM whenever possible.

Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A continued under the auspices of IGAD. Two meetings were held during 1998, the first in Nairobi in May and the second in Addis Ababa in August. Negotiations are expected to resume in February 1999.

D. LESSONS LEARNED IN 1998

1998 was one of the most difficult years in the history of OLS. The Bahr Al Ghazal famine was the world's worst humanitarian crisis in 1998. Hundreds of thousands of people faced starvation and an unknown number died during the acute phase lasting from April until the end of August. OLS responded to the crisis by rapidly assessing the situation and then, as soon as funding was available, immediately and massively expanding humanitarian interventions. By the end of June, deliveries had been increased tenfold, epidemic control mechanisms established, and the largest airdrop operation in UN history was underway.

OLS' structure came under enormous strain during the crisis. In the initial stages, the Government-imposed flight ban over Bahr Al Ghazal, and lack of funding, prevented a massive upgrading and slowed OLS' emergency response. Once funding was available and the operation expanded, it quickly became clear that modalities, which were effective when OLS was a smaller programme, were inadequate for an operation working around-the-clock in more than eighty locations. OLS initiated several studies and assessments in an attempt to learn, as rapidly as possible, from its mistakes and successes. These initiatives included the joint Task Force on Targeting and Vulnerabilities in Bahr Al Ghazal and the Bahr Al Ghazal Programme Design Consultancy in addition to a number of reviews and studies in the HHFS, CEDC, health and humanitarian principles sectors. While some of the reviews were conducted internally, most were undertaken by independent, international consultants or by outside organisations. The aim of these studies was to identify concrete steps for improving OLS' emergency response, in particular, its effectiveness and adherence to humanitarian principles.

OLS' willingness to evaluate its programmes in the middle of the crisis marked an important step forward for UN humanitarian operations. OLS, like other UN operations, had been severely faulted in the past for failing to adjust its programmes during periods of rapid expansion or crisis. The unprecedented efforts by OLS to evaluate interventions in 1998 and take corrective measures are seen as model by OCHA and have been praised by outsiders, for example, by the Programme Design Consultancy which stated: The mission would like first to underline that if the difficulties to deal with the South Sudan crisis are numerous and sometimes rather overwhelming, the capacity of OLS (and its partners) to look critically at what was happening in a genuine collaborative search for appropriate solutions can not be overstated.

OLS' commitment to the lessons learned process reflects the seriousness with which senior managers continue to implement the main recommendations of the 1996 OLS Review. The OLS Review faulted OLS for its failure to adjust to changes in the operational environment and called upon OLS' leadership to institutionalise self-correcting mechanisms. During 1998, OLS was able to show that it was prepared to undertake self-critical reviews and immediately implement appropriate recommendations.

In general terms, the lessons learned process demonstrated both the strengths of OLS and the outer limits of what the operation can realistically achieve. The major lessons learned by OLS in 1998 were:

- A number of interested parties including partners, donors, beneficiaries and other sectors of the UN, in some cases, have unrealistic expectations of what OLS can achieve. Although OLS is capable of addressing the acute needs of war-affected populations and a small portion of their overall humanitarian needs, it is not a substitute for state interventions nor can it be expected to provide welfare and social services in the absence of state institutions and international development assistance. With its present structure, OLS is only capable of meeting the most basic survival needs and taking small steps towards promoting resiliency among populations whose coping mechanisms are under stress or collapsing. Although OLS was created to operate in an environment where there is on-going conflict, it was never envisaged as a programme which could effectively rebuild or strengthen civil society. A main lesson learned during 1998 is that as long as the war in Sudan continues, at best, affected populations will remain on or near the brink of crisis with little possibility of developing the necessary resilience to rebuild their livelihoods and re-establish traditional coping mechanisms.
- A further, related factor that became clear in 1998 is that OLS operates in an environment where there is minimal political engagement by both the wider UN system and the broader international community. Given the absence of political engagement, actors often expect OLS to become involved in matters for which it does not have the mandate, capacity or mechanisms to respond effectively. On the other hand, 1998 also showed that in cases where the donor community works closely with OLS, progress can be made on difficult humanitarian issues, for example, the July cease-fire in Bahr Al Ghazal and its extension in October 1998.
- A significant number of most important donors to OLS did not have sufficient confidence in OLS' early warning of an impending crisis in 1998. Despite a number of statements predicting a major humanitarian disaster in Bahr Al Ghazal, including the 1998 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, donor funding was very limited until the magnitude of the crisis was visually presented through the mainstream western media. While the lack of donor support was in part due to donor fatigue, OLS' predictions were also largely ignored due to the lack of hard supporting data and a general perception that OLS' assessment processes were inadequate, haphazard and open to manipulation by the parties to the conflict. OLS has learned that its appeals must not only be more firmly grounded in hard data, they must also be perceived as being based solely on assessment data.
- Another important lesson learned by OLS during the second half of the year was that the operation can successfully address large-scale humanitarian needs when it has adequate resources. This was clearly demonstrated from July onwards when WFP was able to deliver an average of 15,000 MTs of food per month and non-food agencies including UNICEF were able to prevent disease outbreaks and operate or support supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes for tens of thousands of people. The ability of OLS to maintain access was critical to this effort. Although OLS performed very strongly in terms of securing access and service delivery, it is clear that further efforts must be made to ensure proper coordination in the field.
- OLS recognises that although the different programme sectors performed well when fully resourced during the second half of the year, further inter-sectoral integration is required between food and non-food interventions. In order to enhance the resiliency of at-risk populations to better withstand deficits and asset-depleting insecurity, food deliveries must be linked more closely to the provision of seeds and tools to ensure that beneficiaries do not consume seeds for lack of proper sustenance. Water and sanitation programmes must also be linked to nutrition interventions so that beneficiaries receiving life-saving supplements are not threatened at feeding centres by unsanitary water sources. Finally, greater efforts must be undertaken to promote adherence to agreed upon programme standards and guidelines by OLS member agencies.
- In areas where large concentrations of IDPs suffer from chronic emergency conditions, including Khartoum and the transitional zone, OLS came to the conclusion that after ten years of continuous ad hoc interventions, the only way to improve humanitarian conditions was to implement strategies which promote community self-reliance. In rural

areas, this means programmes which ensure access to fertile land, and in urban areas, programmes aimed at socio-economic integration.

- The killing near Kadugli in June of three humanitarian aid workers, including two staff from WFP, underscored the need for a general overhaul of the OLS security system in the northern sector, including the urgent need for communication and navigational equipment. OLS learned that the safety of humanitarian personnel could best be ensured by having the parties to the conflict sign a joint Security Protocol committing all actors to a clear set of agreed modalities.

E. HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY IN 1999

1. GOALS

The United Nations has four main overarching goals for 1999:

- The UN Agencies in Sudan will work collaboratively with the wider UN system and international community to press for a political solution to the conflict.
- The UN Agencies working under the umbrella of OLS will save and protect the lives of populations suffering from acute distress through emergency relief assistance.
- The UN Agencies working under the umbrella of OLS will stabilise and protect populations living on the threshold of crisis through relief interventions aimed at strengthening resiliency.
- The UN Agencies working under the umbrella of OLS will develop exit strategies from humanitarian assistance for populations living in conditions of chronic emergency.

Ending the Conflict

In defining their humanitarian strategy for 1999, the UN Agencies in Sudan recognised that the single most important cause of the distressing humanitarian conditions expected to prevail throughout most of the country is the on-going civil conflict. UN Agencies agree that no real progress on humanitarian issues can be achieved unless the conflict ends. The Agencies also recognise that continued financial support for humanitarian operations is contingent upon political progress. Donors can not be expected to provide millions of dollars of assistance each year if no effort is made to solve the underlying cause of the emergency. Although ending the conflict is the United Nations' highest priority, progress will depend on a number of factors outside the control of the UN Agencies including the willingness of the parties to negotiate seriously and the commitment of the international community to support the parties in their efforts to find peaceful solutions. During 1999, the leading role in mobilising the international community to deal with the humanitarian crisis in Sudan will continue to be taken by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan.

Assistance to War-Affected Populations

Until a peaceful solution to the civil conflict can be found, the UN will continue to try to alleviate the suffering of war-affected populations in the Sudan. Efforts to save and protect lives, stabilise populations and promote self-sufficiency will continue to be coordinated through OLS. Although OLS will remain the primary vehicle for providing emergency assistance to war-affected populations, the UN does not regard OLS as a substitute for political action by the international community nor as a mechanism for resolving the difficult political questions facing Sudan.

2. OLS HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY

The strategy OLS will be using in 1999 in order to save and protect lives, stabilise populations, and promote self-sufficiency will have four components: a component on access, a second component on the operational environment; a third component on coordination tools, and a fourth component on the Core Programme Strategy. Only by pursuing all four components simultaneously will OLS be able to mount an effective and coherent humanitarian operation.

Prior to the OLS Review, the two sectors of OLS followed relatively independent strategies for achieving humanitarian goals. This changed during the reform period following the Review when OLS implemented the majority of the report's 41 specific recommendations. OLS' two sectors now work more closely together under the direct leadership of the UN Coordinator for Emergency and Relief Operations (UNCERO) and in 1999 will be using the same strategies for securing access, protecting the operational environment, promoting coordination and implementing a set of core

programmes. These strategies and the specific benchmarks against which they can be measured will continue to be agreed and monitored at quarterly OLS Strategy Meetings and shared with field-based donors during joint donors-UN meetings in either Khartoum or Nairobi and with donor capitals at bi-annual IAC meetings.

2.1 Access

One of the main responsibilities of OLS is to secure access to war-affected populations. If OLS fails to do this, humanitarian agencies are unable to provide emergency assistance to hundreds of thousands of persons who are either on the brink of crisis or face chronic emergency conditions that unfairly diminish their livelihood. With the major exception of a two-month flight suspension imposed by the Government over the entire Bahr Al Ghazal region in February and March, OLS benefitted from the best access of its entire history during 1998. This allowed OLS agencies to mount a massive humanitarian operation that literally saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Maintaining this access will remain the cornerstone of OLS' efforts in the coming year. If OLS is not successful, the advances made during 1998 will disappear and large parts of southern Sudan could rapidly slide into famine conditions.

For OLS, access involves more than reaching populations; it also implies a responsibility for using the most cost-effective and safe delivery routes. At the height of the 1998 crisis, the costs of the OLS airdrop operation reached one million US dollars per day. Recognising that financial support of this magnitude can not be sustained over a long-period, OLS will be actively seeking ways of lowering costs through the expanded use of surface corridors including the rail corridor to Wau, river corridors and cross-line road corridors.

Access Objectives

As part of its efforts to secure access in 1999, OLS is committed to the following five objectives:

- To press for a continuation of the current cease-fire in Bahr Al Ghazal and renew efforts to expand both the scope and length of the truce to cover all areas with acute needs until populations are able to achieve self-sufficiency;
- To conduct an assessment mission in rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains and mount deliveries to at-risk populations in this region as needed;
- To continue efforts to secure timely and expanded access to war-affected areas for INGOs working in partnership with the UN Agencies;
- To ensure continued access to war-affected populations during periods of intense insecurity when the parties to the conflict often restrict movement and deny flight clearance;
- To explore the expanded use of surface corridors with the aim of lowering transport costs and increasing outreach to inaccessible populations.

2.2 Operational Environment

Securing access to war-affected populations is only part of the UN's role in ensuring an effective humanitarian operation. Of equal importance is the need to ensure that humanitarian agencies are able to implement their programmes in an operational environment that is safe for humanitarian personnel and the beneficiaries who receive relief assistance. Without assurances from the parties that assistance can be delivered on the basis of the core set of OLS principles - neutrality, impartiality, transparency and accountability - humanitarian agencies run the risk of having aid diverted or misused. The operational environment must be free from constraints against humanitarian personnel and property and must, to the degree possible in an on-going conflict, facilitate humanitarian operations.

2.2.1 Safety of Humanitarian Personnel

During 1998, the safety of humanitarian personnel was constantly undermined by insecurity. By year-end, more than 228 staff had been evacuated on 45 occasions. The detention of staff in both Government and SSIM areas also contributed to a climate of distrust between counterparts and OLS agencies. Following the killing of three humanitarian aid workers near Kadugli in June 1998 inadequate communication equipment was of special concern as it put humanitarian workers at greater risk, especially in Government areas where approval to OLS for equipment was repeatedly delayed.

OLS Security System

The key to ensuring the safety of humanitarian personnel is OLS' security system which was overhauled in the northern sector and expanded to include NGOs following the killing of the three workers in June. The Security

Protocol, signed by the parties in November 1998 at the TCHA, will allow OLS to expand and improve the safety net protecting the more than 1,500 humanitarian personnel who work under the auspices of OLS.

2.2.2 Restrictions on the Environment

During 1998, OLS experienced serious problems in maintaining an open and safe operational environment. Food redistributions and diversions in rebel-held areas may have prolonged the famine, while restrictions on travel permits and delays in approval of communications equipment limited the free movement of personnel in Government areas and hampered the response to emergency needs. Looting of NGO compounds in areas under the control of forces associated with SSIM forced the shut-down of key programmes while the imposition of taxes on NGOs in SPLM areas diverted resources from relief. The general deterioration of the operational environment was linked, in some respects, to the enormous expansion of the humanitarian operation which strained existing structures and created tensions among previously cooperative partners. The deterioration may also be linked to a general disregard for or lack of knowledge about humanitarian principles, a situation which OLS took steps to rectify in 1998 and will continue to address in 1999.

Constructive Engagement

OLS responded to the deterioration in the operational environment by intensifying its efforts at constructive engagement with relevant authorities. In the southern sector, these efforts were conducted on the basis of the Ground Rules which outline clear parameters for the provision of humanitarian assistance. In an important step forward, OLS began during 1998 intensive structured dialogues with key decision-makers in government areas under the auspices of UNHCU's IDP programme. This field-based approach was pioneered by the humanitarian principles programme in OLS southern sector in the mid-1990s. The dialogues, aimed at solving operational bottlenecks and working transparently with local authorities to improve the flow of assistance to targeted beneficiaries, have been successful in helping to create a climate of cooperation and will be used much more extensively in both OLS sectors in 1999.

Minimum Operational Standards

While constructive engagement will remain a cornerstone of OLS advocacy, it became clear during the crisis that further steps were required to more rigorously structure the operational environment. In a highly successful and innovative step, OLS introduced minimum operational standards in cooperation with Government authorities. The aim of minimum operational standards is to define the modalities that need to be implemented for a specific operation to continue. The opening of the new air operations base at Al Obeid occurred after highly specific standards had been agreed upon with the Government. The relocation of IDPs in Wau proceeded after local authorities signed a set of standards which first had to be in place before the IDPs would be moved. In November 1998, OLS took the unprecedented step of seeking written approval by both parties for two sets of minimum operational standards. At the TCHA, minimum standards governing the use of rail corridors and cross-line road corridors were signed by the parties as well as the UN.

During 1999, OLS will continue to develop minimum operational standards in close consultation with the Government and rebel movements. Minimum standards have proven to be one of the most effective ways of directly operationalising humanitarian principles and improving the partnership between the UN and its counterparts by agreeing on clearly defined modalities. OLS will be building on the positive experiences of 1998 by exploring ways of extending minimum operational standards to cover difficult areas including taxation, personnel movement, etc.

Operational Environment Objectives

As part of its efforts to ensure a safe and effective operational environment, OLS is committed to the following five objectives:

- To protect the right of war-affected civilian populations to receive humanitarian assistance by seeking full implementation of the recommendations of the Task Force on Vulnerabilities and Targeting and promoting adherence to the core set of humanitarian principles;
- To improve the OLS security system by ensuring full implementation of the Security Protocol signed by the parties in conflict in November of 1998;
- To develop minimum operational standards in cooperation with the Government and rebel movements to cover taxation, personnel movements and other problem areas;

- To expand the humanitarian principles programme in OLS northern sector and consolidate UNHCU's unique IDP assistance and protection programme;
- To intensify efforts to gain adherence to the OLS Ground Rules and OLS humanitarian principles as well as fully implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

2.3 Coordination Tools

In order to maximise the impact of relief assistance, the UN must actively use coordination tools to direct the course of the humanitarian operation. Although the UN must work in close partnership with counterparts and implementing partners, UN leadership is required at each stage of the planning and implementation cycle. The UN must be responsible for: first, ensuring reliable early warning systems; second, taking charge of inter-Agency planning; third, ensuring humanitarian coverage and avoiding duplication; fourth, developing and ensuring adherence to programme standards and guidelines; fifth, monitoring programme impact and sixth, developing appropriate exit strategies. If the UN fails to assume a leadership role in any of these areas, the humanitarian operation loses direction and risks becoming an uncoordinated set of ad hoc interventions.

Although OLS has been successful in developing fora for coordinating assistance and for advances in all of the areas listed above, only marginal progress has been made in avoiding duplication, promoting adherence to programme guidelines and developing exit strategies. On the positive side, important progress was made during 1998 in developing early warning systems, inter-agency planning and impact monitoring. There are several reasons for OLS' uneven record: a) the various UN monitoring and evaluation units are not integrated nor sufficiently funded; b) no consensus has emerged on which programme guidelines to use; c) OLS' planning horizon has been focused on emergency programmes at the expense of medium and long-term solutions; d) NGOs remain uncertain about UN leadership on matters of coverage, especially in OLS northern sector.

Monitoring and Trend Analysis

During 1999, major efforts will be made to strengthen UN direction over the humanitarian operation by improving coordination tools. Although the UN will initiate reforms for all stages of the implementation cycle, special emphasis will be given to strengthening capabilities in trend analysis. The key to this initiative, which will require significant donor support, will be a concerted effort to agree on precise indicators between OLS northern and southern sectors. Programme coordinators in each sector will be responsible for cooperation with counterparts, NGO partners and UN colleagues to develop a common set of indicators and ensure appropriate data collection on the basis of these indicators. OLS managers will be responsible for ensuring that the data collected in the field using these indicators is incorporated into the assessment process and that programme adjustments are continually made on the basis of recommendations contained in the assessments. If OLS is successful in instituting this kind of comprehensive data and information system, UN Agencies will be in a position to conduct reliable trend analysis for the first time in ten-year OLS history.

Field Coordination

The UN also recognises that in order to strengthen its leadership role, more senior officers must be deployed in the field. In the southern sector, UNICEF will station additional Regional Project Office (RPO) in key locations. In the northern sector, the UN Agencies have agreed to deploy senior officers in key locations with corporate terms of reference. Both the RPOs and senior officers will act as focal points for the OLS security system. In addition to their agency responsibilities, they will also be responsible for avoiding duplication, promoting humanitarian principles, conducting structured dialogues and ensuring adherence to programme guidelines. The input provided by the RPOs and senior officers to the OLS management team will be critical in helping key policy-makers to quickly adjust OLS policies when emergencies and operational difficulties arise. If OLS does not significantly strengthen the links between senior officers in the field and OLS management, the UN will be unable to provide effective leadership.

Coordination Objectives

- As part of its efforts to use coordination tools more effectively, OLS is committed to the following five objectives:
- To agree on specific programme indicators and use these to more effectively collect data for incorporation into the assessment process;
- To deploy RPOs in the southern sector and senior officers in the northern sector responsible for taking the lead in implementing corporate OLS policies;
- To integrate the monitoring and evaluation units in the UN Agencies to strengthen capabilities in early warning and trend analysis;
- To agree on appropriate programme standards and guidelines and ensure adherence to these;

- To widen OLS' planning horizon to include long-term solutions and exit strategies.

Strategic Coordination

The UN Secretary-General's 1997 report on UN reform reaffirmed the three core functions that constitute the mandate of the Emergency Relief Coordinator and OCHA; namely, policy development, advocacy on humanitarian issues and coordination of humanitarian emergency response. OCHA's efforts to enhance strategic coordination of humanitarian assistance in Central and East Africa have continued to focus on ways of helping to build stronger working alliances among humanitarian partners and promoting a culture that places a premium on cooperation and coordination for effective response.

IRIN Central and East Africa (CEA), based in Nairobi, has supported coordination efforts by facilitating wider access to information and promoting information exchanges amongst personnel from UN Agencies and departments, NGOs, international organisations, donor countries, governments, academia and the media. A main objective of the Network is to foster greater awareness of the issues and underlying causes of conflict in the region. In this way, it has been possible to facilitate shared analysis of evolving events amongst the wider humanitarian community and achieve consensus on appropriate responses.

In 1999 IRIN CEA (which covers among others the Sudan) will continue to work closely with the UN system and other humanitarian partners to monitor and report on ongoing emergencies and their effect on neighbouring countries, as well as new crisis. A variety of information products will also be introduced to further enhance information sharing and to ensure access to relevant information for the wider humanitarian community. These include closer ties to OCHA's humanitarian website, ReliefWeb, which will enable those with access to the Internet to receive enhanced IRIN reports with more graphics, maps and photographs.

The 1999 activities and financial requirements of the four IRIN offices are reflected in a separate appeal document. Thus the individual regional or country Consolidated Appeals do not include the costs of IRIN pertaining to their respective areas.

2.4 Core Programme Strategy

2.4.1 Development of Core Programme Strategy (CPS)

While the main purpose of OLS is to provide a full range of humanitarian relief services aimed at meeting the needs of war-affected populations in Sudan, the total needs of these populations are enormous and can not realistically be met by agencies working within the structure of OLS. The reasons for this are threefold: first, OLS does not have the capacity to undertake welfare and social programmes which remain the responsibility of local authorities; second, donor resources are finite and subject to competing priorities; third, insecurity constantly limits the locations where OLS can operate effectively.

In recognition of these limitations, OLS has attempted this year to further refine and clarify its already highly developed process of prioritisation. In a series of joint programme reviews and contingency planning meetings conducted during the last quarter of 1998, OLS identified a set of core programmatic activities for each type of area where it operates. OLS' three types of operational areas were defined in the section on Emergency Needs in Sudan and include: a) areas with acute needs; b) threshold areas; c) areas of chronic emergency.

In developing the CPS upon which this UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal is based, OLS has taken a pragmatic approach to programming. This new approach, which is driven by expected funding levels, differs from the approaches used by OLS in the past. In previous Appeals, OLS has taken the position that it is neither possible nor appropriate for humanitarian agencies to prioritise between needs since all humanitarian needs are of equal importance. In adopting a CPS, OLS is acknowledging that only some humanitarian needs can possibly be met during 1999 and that programme differentiation will be helpful to donors for making funding allocations.

The basic structure and purpose of OLS will remain the same in 1999. As in previous years, the main aim of OLS will be to meet acute needs first by ensuring full access and a safe and effective operational environment. The difference between the approaches OLS took in the past and the direction it will be taking in 1999 is that for the first time, OLS will be differentiating between three types of operational areas and implementing a set of specific interventions in each different area. The underlying goal of all OLS programming will be to bolster the resiliency of populations faced with the need to withstand food deficits, disease outbreaks, displacement, insecurity and other factors associated with on-going conflict. The strategies OLS will follow to strengthen resiliency among famine-affected populations in acute areas, however, will be different from the strategies required to strengthen resiliency among populations whose coping mechanisms function but are being continually undermined by harsh conditions. The CPS will allow OLS to

achieve better targeting and more coherence in its programming by fine-tuning interventions to address specific types of conditions.

2.4.2 Core Programme Objectives

On the basis of the 1998 Annual Needs Assessment, OLS has been able to categorise its operational areas into three groups. Factors such as insecurity, displacement, flooding, crop failure, etc., may easily and quickly change the status of an area. For example, turning a relatively stable area with chronic conditions into a disaster zone with high concentrations of acute needs. Through continual reassessments, humanitarian conditions in each area will be closely monitored during 1999 and changes made to programming strategies where appropriate.

Category A: Areas of Acute Emergency

Objective: To provide life-saving food and non-food emergency assistance to populations in acute distress.

- Bahr Al Ghazal region
- Western Upper Nile Region
- Bor Province, Jonglei State

Category B: Areas on the Threshold of Acute Emergency

Objective: To provide an integrated set of emergency responses aimed at stabilising at-risk populations and strengthening their resiliency.

- Eastern Upper Nile Region
- Pockets of East Equatoria State
- Zeraf Province and Pockets of Jonglei State
- Kassala State

Category C: Areas of Chronic Emergency

Objective: To provide an integrated set of services aimed at meeting basic needs and developing exit strategies from emergency assistance aimed at achieving self-sufficiency.

- East Equatoria and Bahr Al Jebel States
- Northern Upper Nile Region
- West Equatoria State
- Jonglei State
- Khartoum State
- South Darfur State
- North, South and West Kordofan States
- White Nile State
- Blue Nile State

2.4.3 Core Programme Activities

The chart below describes in detail the specific activities which OLS agencies will be implementing in each category area. Certain core activities aimed at meeting survival and acute needs will be implemented in all areas; for example, relief food and seeds and tools will be provided to all at-risk populations whether in Category A, B, or C areas. In some programme sectors, the core activities in Category A areas will be broader than those in Category B and C areas. In other sectors, the scope of activities in Category A areas will not be as broad as in others, but more focused and intensive.

Core Programme Strategy			
Sector	Acute Emergency Areas	Threshold Emergency Areas	Chronic Emergency Areas

HHFS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! relief food ! seeds ! tools ! fishing equipment ! livestock disease prevention and control and training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! relief food ! seeds ! tools ! fishing equipment ! livestock disease prevention and control and training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! seeds ! tools ! fishing equipment ! seed multiplication ! livestock disease prevention and control and training ! women-focused training
Health and Nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! EPI minimum package: polio, measles and vitamin A targeting 500,000 children ! disease prevention and response (including supply pre-positioning) !management of major killer diseases through basic drugs, PHC services and training * 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! EPI: more antigens than minimum package in addition to outreach programmes ! disease prevention and response (including supply pre-positioning) !management of killer diseases through basic drugs* !rehabilitation of PHC facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! EPI: more antigens than minimum package in addition to outreach programmes ! disease prevention and response (including supply pre-positioning) !management of killer diseases through basic drugs * !rehabilitation of PHC facilities ! TB/HIV control activities and guinea worm eradication through existing health facilities
WES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! drilling, maintenance and repair of water points ! sanitation protocols at feeding centres ! training for pump care- takers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! drilling, maintenance and repair of water points ! training for pump care- takers ! emergency equipment and response ! hygiene and health education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! drilling, maintenance and repair of water points ! training for pump care-takers ! hygiene and health education ! spare equipment ! cost-recovery and community management
Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances (CEDC)/Emergency Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! immediate care ! protection ! tracing and reunification ! trauma counseling ! emergency school kits ! basic primary education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! protection ! tracing and reunification ! CRC awareness ! basic primary education !rehabilitation of schools 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! protection ! tracing and reunification ! CRC awareness ! basic primary education !rehabilitation of schools ! teacher training
Humanitarian Principles (HP), Capacity Building, Gender and Landmines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> !enforcement of principle that all food must reach target beneficiaries ! promote greater role for women in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> !enforcement of principle that all food must reach target beneficiaries ! promote greater role for women in food 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> !enforcement of principle that all food must reach target beneficiaries ! promote greater role for women in food

	food targeting and distributions ! ensure safe and effective operational environment	targeting and distributions ! ensure safe and effective operational environment ! training for soldiers in humanitarian principles	targeting and distributions ! ensure a safe and effective operational environment ! training for soldiers in humanitarian principles ! mine awareness * In both northern and southern sector areas, some NGOs will be providing their own basic drugs
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2.4.4 NGO Support to Core Programme Strategy

OLS recognises that the CPS for which it is seeking funding contains the bare minimum in terms of the programme response required for Sudan in 1999. The UN is hopeful that many donors, in addition to funding the proposed activities, will also consider funding the many NGOs who are also part of the OLS southern sector Consortium or implementing partners to OLS northern sector agencies. Generous support to NGOs working within OLS is considered critical for the success of the CPS in Sudan in 1999.

3. CONSTRAINTS AND RISKS

Although OLS has every intention of fulfilling as much of its humanitarian strategy as possible during 1999, events during the past year confirm that it is often very difficult to implement objectives outlined at the beginning of the planning and implementation cycle. Last year, for example, OLS understandably concentrated its material and personnel resources on addressing the acute emergency in Bahr Al Ghazal with the result that certain objectives and benchmarks laid out in the 1998 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal were not fully implemented.

OLS' ability to run an effective humanitarian operation depends upon its readiness to respond to both man-made and natural disasters. During 1998, major steps were taken to improve OLS' emergency preparedness through the creation of Emergency Response Teams (ERT) and Core Teams and the pre-positioning of relief supplies. In preparation for the 1999 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, OLS also conducted a series of contingency and strategic planning meetings in October and November 1998. The purpose of the meetings was twofold: first, to identify the most likely set of developments which will occur during 1999 in each region where OLS operates; second, to be prepared for the worst possible set of developments which might occur in each region where OLS operates. In addition, broad plans of action for each region were discussed between partners, the UN and NGOs.

The meetings identified the following factors which may hamper an effective humanitarian operation in 1999:

- a resumption of hostilities in Bahr Al Ghazal and continuing insecurity in western Upper Nile, the Nuba Mountains and Equatoria;
- insufficient funding for the Core Programme Strategy;
- occurrences of natural disasters, for example, flooding, crop failures and drought;
- continuing restrictions on the operational environment.

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