

Humanitarian
Outcomes

Country-Based Pooled Funding Mechanisms: Mapping and Comparative Analysis– Final Report

An independent team of professionals providing evidence-based analysis and policy consultations to governments and international organisations on their humanitarian response efforts.

Commissioned by OCHA Funding Coordination Section

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June 2014

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Executive Summary

This study contributes to a broader effort to achieve clarity of purpose for Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs). These Funds, at the disposal of UN Humanitarian Coordinators (HC)s, tend to operate in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), settings that absorb a high proportion of global humanitarian assistance. In FCAS, the humanitarian system plays a wide variety of roles, ranging from strictly life-saving response to disaster preparedness and resilience building. Whether or not the system as a whole should play a broad or narrow role remains a constant source of debate. Critical to analysis in the context of FCAS is the relationship between humanitarian and other forms of assistance: development (in the broad sense); recovery; disaster preparedness; stabilization; and the delivery of basic services in the absence of state systems. To better define the purpose of CBPFs, the report explores the interrelated issues of alignment and breadth of response: should these funds, in support of the humanitarian system, be focused on life-saving assistance, or should they should take a broader approach to humanitarian response, across the breadth of OCHA's mandate and including components like early recovery, disaster preparedness and resilience building?

Looking at both Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) and Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF)s, this report examines the ambiguity of focus within each mechanism. It addresses how CBPFs can be better aligned, both with one another and with other aspects of humanitarian response (including development and preparedness funding). Additionally, the report takes a forward looking approach to identifying what the breadth and scope of response should be within CBPFs, as well as their balance of strategy versus responsiveness and their capacity for incorporating resilience. Using an analysis of key financial data, global and country-level guidelines and evaluations, and annual and financial reports, this study situates CBPFs and their broader purpose as a humanitarian response mechanism in the context of current global policy debates. It undertakes a comparative analysis of ERFs and CHF)s using global guidance and evaluations, and country case studies to situate the global analysis. The case studies examine the CBPFs present in the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Pakistan and Haiti. Each one considers questions of size and scale, and especially how the CBPFs support Consolidated Appeals Processes or alternative response plans. They also provide examples of complementary action between CBPFs, the CERF and other funding streams.

The study concludes that ERFs and CHF)s, while nominally different for historical reasons, are more similar than stated in the long-standing guidance. Global guidance in place at the start of the research period was separate for ERFs and CHF)s and tended, in places, to conflate the scale and the purpose of the Funds, and to cement unhelpful delineation between the two such as the explicit reference to NGO funding in the ERF guidance. The country studies confirm that while ERFs do tend to be smaller overall than CHF)s, some (notably Pakistan and Haiti) have been very substantial and Ethiopia continues to be so. Other large ERFs have adopted strategic allocations, ultimately suggesting that the scale of any given Fund is as important a factor in its potential use as is its designation as a CHF) or ERF). An overarching conclusion of the study, therefore, is that CHF)s and ERF)s should be viewed as variations on a single type of funding mechanism, albeit with a range of scales and a variety of funding modalities. The characteristics of CBPFs should be driven primarily by the context in which they operate. Funds should be aligned with strategic priorities when scale allows and also responsive. CBPFs should be needs-driven and provide funding to the actors best placed to respond the needs targeted. OCHA's updated guidance note, along with new management arrangements in OCHA FCS, takes significant strides in this direction, recognising the similarities between ERF)s and CHF)s and the need to rationalise and harmonise policy support to them.

The country studies include ERFs which have suffered from rapidly diminishing support, notably those that were set up, or re-energised as primary conduits for funding in the aftermath of natural disasters. As such, the study identifies the need to ensure that careful consideration is given to the opening of CBPFs in the aftermath of rapid onset emergencies. While it is clearly useful to have a pooled funding instrument in the aftermath of a large scale response, as one part of a set of funding tools (including the CERF and the START Fund), the capacity for funding levels to diminish quickly has to be taken into consideration and a flexible approach to Fund management considered. As well as being adapted to the context, CBPFs must be fit for purpose in terms of adequate management capacity. If a more flexible approach to activation and de-activation of CBPFs is considered, the management of human resources in an equally flexible and responsive fashion is critically important.

The report draws additional conclusions on the question of whether CBPFs should take a narrow or broad view of humanitarian assistance and/or support recovery, preparedness and early action. The advice from numerous evaluations is consistent and predictable: in the majority of cases, and especially for small ERFs, they have been designed to provide responsive allocations to unforeseen shocks or critical gaps; and CHF, by virtue of having an emergency reserve, have had the same responsive capacity. Over and above this capacity, the CHF model has supported the UN led annual planning and prioritisation cycle. Guidance in place at the start of the research period allowed for considerable flexibility. CHF have offered a much greater scope to support preparedness, early action and recovery if these are identified as priorities by the collective humanitarian system.

In addition, the issue of size and scale presents an interesting challenge to the suggestion that CBPFs should play a central role in resilience. In cases where CBPFs face a reduction in size, there is a clear tendency for them to re-prioritise in such a way that narrows their purpose towards acute needs. As a result, identifying resilience as a key role and responsibility of CBPFs may be problematic. Successfully funding resilience and preparedness requires a more stable funding source than CBPFs can currently offer. The report concludes that a better model would see development, recovery or preparedness instruments complementing humanitarian pooled funds and making cross referrals. Coordination, or indeed any kind of interaction between humanitarian and recovery, preparedness or any other type of funding instrument in the case study countries, was strikingly absent.

Recommendations

1. That ERFs and CHF should be formally aligned, in recognition of their progressive convergence, into a single type of funding mechanism that can have different sizes and use different allocation modalities (rolling basis, more strategic calls for proposals) depending on the needs targeted and the country context;
2. That OCHA should have an internal debate on the best way to ensure increased flexibility in the activation and de-activation of CBPFs to ensure that funds can be quickly activated in cases of emergency, and de-activated when they lose relevance and critical mass. [OCHA FCS]
3. Consideration should be given as to how ERFs might be set up as temporary mechanisms, to meet immediate funding requirements for NGOs in the immediate aftermath of emergencies. A time limited fund could meet immediate needs, and act as a bridging mechanism whilst the viability and potential support for longer term instruments (both humanitarian and recovery) was assessed. [OCHA FCS, donors].
4. OCHA should reach an internal agreement on whether CBPFs are a corporate priority, and consequently should agree to commit capacity and resources to the management of CBPFs in a coherent manner, in support of the chosen approach to increased flexibility

5. That donors and OCHA make a concerted effort to ensure that issues of both funding and human resources for CBPFs, especially ERFs are resolved.

Recommendations

6. That the harmonized CBPF should align with the SRP. As such, 'resilience' activities should be funded to the extent to which they are included in the SRP and are elected as priorities within it. This recommendation comes with a clear caveat, however. CBPFs in their current configuration can offer support to resilience, however, their ability to act in this respect is likely to expand and contract in keeping with the ratio between needs and available funds. This phenomenon alone means that they are far from ideal as a central or consistent channel for this type of assistance. This phenomenon should be recognised explicitly in Global Guidance that while [OCHA FCS]
7. That CBPFs should be needs-driven and provide funding to the actors best placed to respond to priority needs. Given that CBPFs will only ever provide partial funding in any country context, the need for CBPFs to complement other funding sources, including the CERF, should be re-stated. [OCHA FCS, OCHA CBPF Managers].

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the study

The Terms of Reference (TOR) states that this study is “part of a broader effort to identify and develop a clearer purpose for Country Based Pooled Funds;¹ one that supports both the breadth of OCHA’s mandate and the span of expectations on the humanitarian system during the ‘lifetime’ of emergency responses.” The study represents one step in a phased approach to addressing these issues. It was undertaken in parallel with two other important pieces of work: “Financing Recovery for Resilience,”² undertaken by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office at UNDP, and another study commissioned by OCHA Funding Coordination Section (FCS) looking at future options for Management Agent function of the Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF).³ It relates directly to the work of the Pooled Fund Working Group, and also seeks to complement the work of the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Team on Humanitarian Financing, including a recently commissioned study on the role of pooled funds in disaster preparedness.⁴

The study’s TOR draws attention to the 2013 Global Evaluation of the Emergency Response Funds (ERFs), which highlights “an ambiguity related to the focus of the ERF mechanism: the strategic objective of filling gaps in an emergency through supporting life and livelihood saving activities in a direct sense; versus the support of preventive resilience building and Disaster Risk Reduction measures.”⁵ Recognising that similar criticisms have been levelled at CHFs in some contexts, this study was expanded to also take into account CHFs, and to take a forward look at both Fund types. Its ultimate goal is to make recommendations regarding the most appropriate remits of the Fund types going forward, based on their comparative advantage.

1.2 Study structure and methodology

The study was conceived as having two components – case studies followed by a global analysis; in practice these ran concurrently. In the order presented in the report, the first component contains the global analysis:

- A brief comparative analysis of the global guidance for ERFs and CHFs
- A review of global policy debates about the linkages between relief and development
- The ongoing development of OCHA’s CAP model, specifically the shift to Strategic Response Plans
- The current trend for resilience-framed assistance and OCHA’s stated position
- The interface between global guidance and this policy environment
- Donor views on the Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs)

The second component takes these same subjects of analysis, applying them to eight country case studies: DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Pakistan and Haiti. For each country the study identifies the

¹ The collective / generic term for Emergency Response Funds and Common Humanitarian Funds

² Bayat-Renoux, F. and Glenmarec, Y. (2014) *Financing Recovery for Resilience*. New York, UNDP

³ Downs, C. (Forthcoming) Funding Coordination Section, OCHA

⁴ Kellet, J., and Peters, K. (2014) *Dare to Prepare: Taking Risk Seriously*. London, United Kingdom, Overseas Development Institute

⁵ Thompson, D. et. Al (2013) *The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds*. Universalis, OCHA

individually stated purposes/mandates of the Funds, objectives, volumes, eligibility requirements and governance arrangements. In each case, the analysis places each CBPF in its country context, specifically identifying:

- How CBPFs support CAPs or alternative response plans
- Examples of actively complementary action between CBPFs, CERF, other pooled instruments and donor decision-making.

Ultimately, the study aims to provide forward-looking recommendations that enable CBPFs to better deliver for affected populations via operational partners.

The study comprised desk research and interviews, in person and predominantly by telephone. The mapping component at country level included: analysis of key financial data: OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)– Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS); annual and financial reports; as well as annual reports, country level guidance and country level evaluations, either stand-alone or case studies for global evaluations. The global policy component was undertaken largely through desk-based analysis of policy documentation, global evaluations and interviews with OCHA and donor staff.

1.3 Limitations of the study

The study's scope was ambitious for the timeframe. The TOR also specified a relatively short report, out of an understandable desire to have a concise view. As a result, the country and global cases are presented in brief summary form, condensing many important debates. Given the constraints of the exercise, only OCHA staff and donors staff were interviewed for the study; the review of previous evaluations and other relevant papers is intended to provide a broader set of views.

A number of key concerns, repeatedly noted in evaluations around monitoring, reporting and evaluation, are beyond the scope of this study. It equally does not concern itself with questions of quality; for example, issues of allocation relevance and timeliness are not included.

Country Based Pooled Funds are constantly evolving. New Global Guidance, for the first time covering ERFs and CHFs in the same document, was released in draft and for consultation a few days prior to the end of drafting this study. The comparative analysis of ERFs and CHFs, one of the key components of Section 1, had been based on the existing guidance. The timing of release did not allow for a full re-draft based on the new guidance. Where possible, however, major differences have been noted.

2. CBPFs: The Global Context

2.1 Introduction

The study's primary focus is on country-based humanitarian pooled funding instruments, both CHF and ERFs. These funds operate through the UN-led humanitarian coordination system and are managed by OCHA and the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, currently in 18 countries. CBPFs administer a limited proportion of total humanitarian funding: CHF and ERFs combined provided 3.46% of total humanitarian allocations in 2012.⁶

As noted above, the Global ERF evaluation's Recommendation 2 in large part justifies this study:

“OCHA should clarify the focus of the ERF mechanism (where the ERF ‘fits’): an emergency response mechanism versus a tool to promote longer-term resilience building.

This Recommendation refers to ambiguity related to the focus of the ERF mechanism. It is also directly related to the tug and pull between the strategic objective of filling gaps in an emergency through supporting life and livelihood saving activities in a direct sense; versus the support of preventive resilience building and DRR measures (some of which, by implication, would be undertaken in the absence of an immediate emergency as part of a longer term recovery process, and some possibly in advance of a crisis situation).”⁷

Similar commentary in the 2011 global CHF evaluation, as well as an awareness by FCS that the purpose and actions of certain CHF had come into question, spurred the inclusion of the CHF in this study:

“As regards the scope of the CHF, there are differences in perception between donors on the extent to which the CHF can be used for ‘transitional’ or ‘recovery’ purposes.”⁸

2.2 The global policy context

As outlined in the introduction and purpose statement for the study, analysis of CBPFs purpose requires an initial look at the guidelines and core attributes of each. This is followed by a brief overview of the global policy context in which they operate.

2.2.1 Common characteristics of CHF and ERFs: core components and strengths

The delineation of ERFs and CHF has historical roots. ERFs originated somewhat organically, the first example in Angola in 1994 as a means to meet the need for rapid funding packets to priority programmes. In the absence of central guidance at this time, new ERFs tended to take the basic format of the Angola Fund and adapt slightly to context and scale. CHF were a late addition to the humanitarian reform agenda, (the first examples in Sudan and DRC in 2005/6) and were always intended to be funds of a size that could leverage co-ordination and

⁶ In combination with the CERF, CBPFs provided 7.2% of total allocations in 2012. Financial Tracking Service (2013) *Global Overview of 2012 Pooled Funding: CERF, CHF and ERFs*. Pg. 1

⁷ Thompson, D. et. Al (2013) *The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds*. Pg. 37.

⁸ Cosgrave, J. (2011) *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund Country Report: Sudan*. Channel Research, OCHA

strategic planning, as well as support the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator and clusters, i.e. have a mutually reinforcing effect on other elements of reform. As such, a certain amount of emphasis was placed on the distinctions and size and strategy. The key distinctions in defining the CHF's as a separate type of Fund were taken to be size, and the presence of a CAP or jointly constructed humanitarian plan for the Fund to serve.

The following table consolidates and summarises multiple sections from the ERF Global Guidelines⁹ and the CHF Draft standardisation guidelines¹⁰ which were in place at the start of the research period:

Common Characteristics	
CHF's	ERFs
Strengthen the leadership role and accountability of the Humanitarian Coordinator	Operate under the HC's overall management and oversight and facilitate the coordination of emergency response activities
Support priority interventions within the IASC/Humanitarian Country Team's strategic planning framework (CAP or CHAP)	Aim to work within the established objectives of a CHAP or CAP (to priorities defined by the HCT)
Complement other funding channels and improve co-ordination of all funding flows	Complement other funding channels, including the CERF (where HC's are "encouraged to use the existing ERF consultation framework as a basis for identifying and prioritising projects")
The Emergency Reserve provide funding towards underfunded activities within the CAP that emerge as priorities due to a change in the humanitarian situation. Also funds unforeseen emergencies through a rapid response allocation ¹¹	Are not intended to support activities that are outside the scope of the humanitarian response or could be better addressed through development channels
Responds to underfunded priorities and unforeseen needs (not included in the CAP) that arise through changes to the humanitarian situation.	Responds to unforeseen needs (not included in the CAP) that arise through changes to the humanitarian situation
Provide recipient organisations with a rapid and flexible in-country funding mechanism (via emergency reserve)	Provide recipient organisations with a rapid and flexible in-country funding mechanism
No explicit text on partnership but the concept of improved coordination and joint decision making all through the guidance.	Explicitly attempting to facilitate greater partnerships between United Nations (UN) and non-UN actors through: equitable access to funds, representation on an Advisory Board (AB) and Review Board (RB), as well as transparent decision-making mechanisms (also cited as an expression of GHD Principles)
On resilience, the new CHF guidance is not explicit, but, very clearly, where early action, preparedness or recovery are perceived as humanitarian priorities in the SRP, these are eligible for funding	New ERF guidance: "As a secondary objective, depending on the country context, ERFs may exceptionally fund early action, emergency preparedness and resilience activities [...]"

2.2.2 Strategic and responsive funding

CHF's tend to have twice annual allocations bound into the CAP (or SRP cycle and looking to enhance strategy and prioritization within them). While ERFs have been synonymous with responsive funding and 'rolling' allocations, the original guidance also allows for the use of funds in a proactive fashion, for example 'calls for proposals', in a similar fashion to the CHF's standard allocations. Guidance also states that ERFs should strengthen the CHAP/CAP/SRP's role as a clear framework in which accountability and management can be improved. Again, while small ERFs do tend to have short funding windows, the original guidance allows for a 12 month funding cycle.

⁹ OCHA (2012) *Guidelines: Emergency Response Funds*. United Nations

¹⁰ OCHA (2007) *CHF Standardisation Guidelines (Draft Version)*. United Nations

¹¹ This is a common characteristic through the CHF's Emergency Reserve, but a distinction in the Standard Allocation

By virtue of the emergency window, or emergency reserve, as a component of each CHF, these Funds play precisely the same responsive and flexible role as ERFs¹². When viewed from this perspective, the CHF can be seen as an ERF with both a second, larger and predictable funding modality and a much stronger intent to reinforce coordination, needs assessment and prioritization within the CAP cycle (the change in CAPs for 2014 and Strategic Response Plans are discussed below).

Lacking the larger funding window, guidance places some clear limitations on ERFs: to not substitute for development funding, and to be ‘relatively small’ in size. While the duration of funding is not specified (and the 2012 Global ERF Guidelines allows for 12 months when used through a call for proposals), ERFs typically allocate funding for six months. The Global ERF Guidelines also state that ERFs are not designed to be “the primary delivery channel for assistance.”¹³

Funding resilience

Overall, on the key purposes of each type of Fund, the guidance is quite clear in its individual components, but it leaves room for considerable flexibility. An ERF that operates at the limits of this flexibility, funding preparedness or similar activities via 12-month grants and bi-annual calls for proposals, will inevitably look quite different from a smaller ERF that offers ‘rolling’ allocations for rapid-responses. The Global ERF Guidelines state that ERFs should not substitute for development funding.¹⁴ CHF Guidelines state clearly, however, that priorities for the SRP should guide CRF allocations. Section 3 will consider how a selection of CBPFs have adapted and interpreted this guidance to fit country contexts. Before doing so, Section 2 will examine key elements of the global guidance for CBPFs and key findings from global evaluations of CBPFs with a view to understanding whether or not current guidance around CBPFs’ role in resilience is adequate and realistic in practice.

Is the rationale for the NGO bias of ERFs valid?

ERF guidance is also distinct from that of the CHFs in that it suggests explicit targeting of NGOs, the rationale being based on a desire for improved partnership and a deliberate counter-balance to CERF funding. Although there can be differences in arrangements for contract management, there is no fundamental distinction between CHFs and ERFs in their ability to fund NGOs, either international or national. The country case studies will go on to look at examples of complementarity between CERF and CBPFs, but in general, it is possible to say that all CBPFs should be strongly encouraged to complement the CERF. Some do so explicitly, but all are free to do so irrespective of their ERF or CHF designation, and there is no obvious rationale for this distinction at the global level.

2.3 CBPFs in context

In seeking to clarify the ideal role of CBPFs, it is important to restate that the Funds operate through and in support of the UN-led humanitarian coordination system. As such, the role of CBPFs should be seen in the context of debates and policy trends related to the role of this system. Although the definition of fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) is open to some debate, all CBPFs operate in contexts which can be described as

¹² The original CHF guidance states that the emergency mechanism “serves a similar role as a typical ERF,” and echoes the emphasis of the ERF on unforeseen situations outside of the CAP, as well as rapidity

¹³ OCHA (2012) *Guidelines: Emergency Response Funds*

¹⁴ OCHA (2012) *Guidelines: Emergency Response Funds*. Pg.5.

such. Such settings absorb a high proportion of global humanitarian assistance, and the humanitarian system is called upon to play a variety of roles. Whether or not the humanitarian system as a whole should play a broad or narrow role is a constant source of debate,¹⁵ and is central to this study.

Of special relevance in FCAS is the relationship between humanitarian and other forms of assistance: development (in the broad sense); recovery; disaster preparedness; stabilization; and the delivery of basic services in the absence of state systems. As a whole, this is a complex area. It contains a number of long-standing and seemingly intractable policy debates. As such, the role of humanitarian assistance and the balance of principles and pragmatism required at country level present a significant challenge for the preparation of global guidance. To simplify and condense these debates, this section is organised into *three interconnected themes*: alignment, breadth of response, and resilience as an organising concept. These themes address the varying response capacities CBPFs could support given the complex mix of demands on humanitarian assistance in FCAS; namely, alignment, coherence, or independence.

2.3.1 The question of alignment

One enveloping framework for this debate is that of coherence: the extent to which humanitarian assistance can and should be placed within a larger set of political and/or developmental objectives. Another is that of aid effectiveness. As noted in “Financing Recovery for Resilience”¹⁶: “[T]he Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, New Deal and in accordance with effectiveness criteria for Pooled Funds in FCAS, such Funds should promote national ownership, alignment, harmonisation and mutual accountability.” The organising principles of humanitarian assistance, including neutrality, independence and impartiality are hard in practice to reconcile with the Paris Declaration and the sovereign role of the state.¹⁷ FCAS offer a particular challenge, in particular the extent to which it is practical and desirable to work in cooperation with the host government in all or part of the humanitarian response. “Financing Recovery for Resilience” lays out the theoretical architecture that should guide the transition from relief to development. FCAS, however, tend to offer contexts that *exist for very extended periods* in the transitional phase, or that cycle in and out of it.

Notwithstanding the work which has gone into this area in recent years, a fundamental challenge remains at the heart of the international system in that the humanitarian system is predominantly state-avoiding, and the development system predominantly state-embracing. It is often the case in FCAS that host government is a significant part of the problem in the immediate term, yet the only real solution in the long term.¹⁸ “Financing Recovery for Resilience” lays out a number of challenges for the development system in FCAS, notably a lack of coherence between partners in creating joint strategies for transition and supportive financing instruments. It is inevitable that when CBPFs, especially (but not exclusively) CHFs, are very prominent financing instruments in a given country, they are caught between one set of drives for alignment and one set that recognizes the need for independence. This issue would naturally be exacerbated when a country context contains multiple risk factors, and/or ongoing crises of which some would be suited to alignment (preparedness for natural disasters) and others may require an independent stance (e.g., localised conflict to which the host state is a party).

2.3.2 Linking alignment to breadth of response

A seemingly irreconcilable issue for CBPFs is whether they should, as a default, take a limited view of humanitarian assistance and focus on life-saving or acute needs, or adopt a broader stance and seek to cover the

¹⁵ Taylor, G. et al (2012) *The State of the Humanitarian System*. Pg. 45. ALNAP

¹⁶ Bayat-Renoux, F. and Glenmarec, Y, (2014) *Financing Recovery for Resilience*.

¹⁷ Harvey, P. (2010), *The role of national governments in international humanitarian response*. ALNAP

¹⁸ DFID note (unpublished), “Beyond the transition: the missing middle: getting used to life in the grey zone: engaging with the state when the state is the problem.”

breadth of OCHA's mandate, up to and including components of early recovery, disaster preparedness and resilience that are legitimately humanitarian. Over and above these components is the question of service delivery, either on a protracted basis for long-term displaced populations, or for host populations in the absence of state-run facilities.

Linked to this debate, and in almost constant use in evaluations and descriptions of both ERFs and CHFs, are the terms 'responsive' and 'strategic.' 'Responsive' is cited most often as an attribute of ERFs, and 'strategic' of CHFs. They are generally perceived as being in conflict, if not mutually exclusive; for example; "the demand-driven nature of ERFs blurs their country level strategic role."¹⁹ As noted above, existing and forthcoming guidance places ERFs and CHFs firmly within the organising framework of the country-based planning and strategy process, either the CAP or the SRP. Both types of Fund are legitimately described as responsive, via the responsive funding modalities. Ultimately, this paper takes the view that both terms suffer badly from a lack of consistent or common definition, and therefore have little value if not used very precisely and with a clear definition in context.

One facet of this question, disaster preparedness, was addressed specifically by ODI's paper "Dare to Prepare." The paper concludes that ERFs currently fund little in the way of preparedness activities, but that "opportunities should be maximised to include preparedness in the ERFs as part and parcel of good humanitarian practice."²⁰ CHFs currently play a stronger role in this respect, and the paper recommends that preparedness "should be a fundamental part of the work of CHFs"²¹ going forward. The paper, which takes the central importance of disaster preparedness as an entry point, calls for donors to reject the "bifurcated system" going forward. Arguments for the blanket dissolution of the "divided" system, however, seem to ignore the ongoing necessity of an independent and impartial stance in many FCAS or parts of them, and the very entrenched nature of the system.

While the central importance of disaster preparedness is not in question, the question of whether it (or any other facet of response) should be supported *automatically* by CBPFs is perhaps the most relevant one to consider. Global guidance for ERFs and CHFs are explicit that both Funds operate in support of the CAP or SRP or equivalent country-based strategy. It is also important to recall that one founding premise of CBPFs was support to decision-making and strategy at the country level. A number of factors will ultimately determine the priorities set by any given fund: the CAP/SRP, the strategy paper developed by the Fund and the availability of complementary funding provided by other financing streams (including other pooled-funding mechanisms and bilateral flows). Of critical importance to the decision to use any given Fund in a narrow or broad way is the Fund's size. Issues related to Fund size are covered below.

2.3.3 Resilience as an organizing concept

The concept of resilience has, in part, been offered as an operational framework for stronger alignment of humanitarian and development assistance. OCHA's position paper on resilience recognises explicitly that the humanitarian system should not be the primary channel for resilience programming, but that humanitarian actors should engage in emergency preparedness, early action and early recovery "where the humanitarian system has a comparative advantage."²² In reference to the question of alignment, OCHA also recognises that resilience programming should be nationally led where possible, but that in complex emergencies, "the humanitarian system may need to temporarily play a lead role in planning, coordinating and financing of programming that builds

¹⁹ Thompson, D. et. Al (2013) *The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds*.

²⁰ Kellet, J., and Peters, K. (2014) *Dare to Prepare: Taking Risk Seriously*.

²¹ Ibid.

²² OCHA (2013) *Position Paper on Resilience*. United Nations

resilience.”²³

One problem for the concept of resilience is that it is more tangible (and therefore more viable as a basis for programming) in some contexts than it is in others. In the context of cyclical, slow onset crises or predictable natural disasters, strengthening the resilience of both communities and national systems is relatively simple to conceptualise. Resilience to conflict and building resilience during conflict is not a well-defined or well-explored area, nor is it a simple one. Conceptually, resilience in conflict can become quickly entangled and conflated with stabilization. OCHA recognises that “there may be certain circumstances where humanitarian actors may have to distance themselves from resilience efforts in order to preserve the impartiality and neutrality of their needs-based response and ensure that assistance is not politically driven.”²⁴

What resilience does offer, however, is the central drive to improve collaboration between development and humanitarian actors. The primary arguments from “Funding Resilience” are fully supported by findings and recommendations from policy work and evaluations of CBPFs, namely that:

- International interventions as a whole tend to lack a common theory of change shared by humanitarian and development actors (even assuming that the context doesn’t preclude alignment on the part of the humanitarian system).
- Dedicated instruments for service delivery, preparedness and recovery are required, and that these need to relate to humanitarian funds where possible.

For example:

“Well designed and managed humanitarian funds can play a key role in addressing pressing health, nutrition and other immediate imperatives. Sometimes there will be a long-term need for humanitarian responses, in which case humanitarian and development instruments may exist alongside each other, potentially serving complementary purposes.”²⁵

“As noted in both the 2007 evaluation and other recent reports, the existence of different Pooled Funds run separately and with little communication between them is essentially problematic: there is a need for far closer co-ordination between the different funds, and more ‘referrals’ so that projects that do not meet the criteria for the CHF can be recommended to funds concerned with recovery and stabilisation issues.”²⁶

2.3.4 Redefining the role of humanitarian assistance in resilience

OCHA is currently in the process of adapting its long-standing approach to annual appeals. From the start of 2014, all countries (22 in total) will adopt a new approach, based on the Strategic Response Plan (SRP). Not all countries will adopt all elements of the Plan in the first year, however. Each HC will be tasked with undertaking a needs overview and producing an appropriate response plan. As part of this process, Humanitarian Country Teams will need to reach agreement on suitable emergency indicators and priorities, based on the most pressing needs overlaid with an analysis of funding. The HCs will be provided with a tool to assist this process, including the generation of indicators and the assignment of a respective weight (also referred to as “heat mapping”). In essence the tool assists in the production of mapping and prioritisation of vulnerability. In combination with needs assessment, this will give each country the basis for a collective strategy that should drive cluster/sector

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Commins, S. et al (2013) *Pooled Funding to Support Service Delivery: Lessons of Experience from Fragile and Conflict-Affected States*. United Kingdom, DFID

²⁶ Goyder, H. (2011). *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund: Synthesis Report*. Pg. 4-5, 32. Channel Research, OCHA

response planning (note: this is optional for 2014). Budgeting is the final layer of the SRP. For 2014, budgeting may be done in the same way as the majority of CAPs, through the summation of project budgets, but others will use alternative methodologies (for example: average cost per beneficiary based on the response type.)

Specifically, the SRP guidance states that SRPs should “ensure coherence with national recovery, durable solutions, and development frameworks, if present in the context.”²⁷ The guidance goes on to list potentially relevant frameworks and notes that “failure to establish and articulate synergies and distinctions between different planning frameworks misses opportunities and generates confusion over the process, roles, responsibilities and accountability.”²⁸ Through this drive to streamline and improve humanitarian effectiveness, OCHA presents an opportunity to better define the role of resilience in humanitarian assistance.

2.4 Why does size matter?

Beyond the defining characteristic presented in the original ERF guidance of a “relatively small size”, ERF evaluations make multiple references to their typically limited scale. While ERFs are seen as having the potential to create positive influences (as above), size is almost always cited in evaluations as a factor that limits their ability to have such an effect in practice.

As one example: “*Strengthening humanitarian leadership, improving coordination and reinforcing OCHA at the country level are among the anticipated outcomes of the ERF mechanism. However, the ERF alone cannot be expected to make more than a modest contribution to humanitarian leadership [...]. This conclusion is supported by findings related to the impact of the small size of the ERF mechanism [and] issues about its focus...*”²⁹

As well as references to the *absolute* size of ERFs, there are multiple others to “underfunding,” usually in reference to an unspecified ideal (often referred to as a “critical mass”); for example, “many ERFs do not possess a sufficient critical mass to make more than a nominal contribution to the attainment of their specified goals.”³⁰ The concept of underfunding also is often applied to the Funds in relation to their *original* size; for example, “many ERFs are either underfunded, or have lost the perception that they are relevant and thus have faced successive donor reductions.”³¹ The phenomenon of diminishing scale in some ERFs is linked to a sense of both diminishing influence and commitment from donors. CHFs are noted as being of “variable size,” ideally “commensurate to the overall size of the humanitarian response,” and typically holding “\$60 to \$120 million US annually.”³²

Although absolute fund size is important, it appears from numerous references in evaluations that relative fund size is critically important. As a result, questions of alignment, breadth, strategy and fund size clearly intersect. Evaluations cite numerous examples of CBPFs, both ERFs and CHFs, when facing a reduction in size, “retreating” to a narrow definition of humanitarian response; for example, “the reduction in the size of the CHF in all three countries has reduced the possibility of using the CHF for other than clearly humanitarian

²⁷ Programme Support Branch, OCHA (2014) *Strategic Response Planning Guidance*. New York, United Nations

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Thompson, D. et. Al (2013) *The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds*. Pg. 35.

³⁰ OCHA (2013). *The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds: Final Report*. Pg. 52

³¹ OCHA (2013). *The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds: Final Report*. Pg. 36

³² OCHA (2014) *Common Humanitarian Funds*, Accessible at <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/common-humanitarian-funds-chfs>.

purposes.”³³ This phenomenon seems to occur irrespective of the Fund’s absolute size, and whether they are facing a reduction in size along a trajectory, facing a lower-than-expected annual total, or holding a relatively small balance at any point in their annual funding cycle. Clearly, this phenomenon has the potential to complicate the question of purpose from a conceptual standpoint. Funds may be designated a clear purpose or adopt one, but factors outside of the guidance or original intent can clearly change the objectives of the Fund over time.

In the multiple examples of this phenomenon in evaluations, one solution is commonly offered—better alignment with specific, longer-term funding instruments for basic service delivery and recovery/preparedness programming. As these two examples suggest, “one lesson is that these funds require predictability of donor support, and need to be aligned with other support for instruments that could fund recovery activities”; and “given the fall in donor funding for the CHF, rather than widen its scope to recovery activities, the evaluation concludes that the HC and UNCT need to ensure more referrals from the CHF to other MDTFs concerned with recovery and stabilization.”³⁴

2.4.1 Are CBPFs “a priority for OCHA?”

The extent to which OCHA prioritises CPBFs is a secondary issue in the TOR. Issues of management capacity have been raised in evaluations, especially with respect to ERFs:

“There is ambiguity as to degree to which OCHA itself views ERFs as a priority instrument.”³⁵

“OCHA country offices generally have insufficient resources dedicated to the ERFs, which lowers efficiency as well as the ability to undertake functions like outreach, communications and improved performance management.”³⁶

“Many [ERFs] are administered by only one person who is responsible not only for the application processes, but also for the bulk of monitoring and all liaison activity. External stakeholders agree that this minimal level of human resources, combined with progressive reductions in discretionary administrative budgets, is weakening the ERFs and calls into question the degree of priority that OCHA gives the mechanism.”³⁷

Donors tend to reinforce the negative views of the consistency of management, again especially in respect of ERFs (see next section). Interviews undertaken for the study, outside of CBPFs ‘home’ section, FCS, indicate that OCHA’s management recognise the value of CBPFs. In particular, they are seen as having a mutually reinforcing effect on coordination, and empowering leaders at country level, enabling them to (literally), ‘put their money where their mouth is’ and to back up decisions on prioritisation with funding, even in limited quantities.

2.5 Donor views on the purpose of CBPFs

The views of donors, especially those who support CBPFs, are central to this study. These views, expressed in interviews for the study, were clear and consistent. Donors continue to support the core principles of CBPFs. The extent to which each donor explicitly views the Funds as a vehicle for reducing his or her own administrative burden varies, but each is committed to the principle of supporting country-level management, strategy and prioritization through these mechanisms. There was a unanimous view that CBPFs should continue to operate in support of country-led prioritisation processes and allocate funds to humanitarian priorities across the span of

³³ Goyder, H. (2011). *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund: Synthesis Report*. Pg. 30.

³⁴ Goyder, H. (2011). *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund: Synthesis Report*. Pg. 23

³⁵ Thompson, D. et. Al (2013) *The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds*. Pg. 32

³⁶ Thompson, D. et. Al (2013) *The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds*. Pg. 21

³⁷ Ibid.

OCHA's mandate. A clear distinction was drawn by each between support for the CAP model and the SRP model. The SRP model has strong support; there is an expectation that demonstrable linkages to needs assessment, prioritization and the level of clarity of humanitarian strategy with respect to core humanitarian programming and resilience will all improve.

Overall, there was also a high degree of clarity about the theoretical role of each Fund type. ERFs are recognised as responsive instruments, suitable for the delivery of short-term funding allocations. CHFs are viewed as better suited to working across the breadth of OCHA's mandate. Two critical points in this respect are:

- There was a clear understanding that CBPFs can and should support resilience programming when clearly identified as a humanitarian priority. It was recognised and accepted, however, that their purpose should recede to core humanitarian programming— i.e. priority acute needs—when funding levels were reduced.³⁸ It is important to note that donors both recognise and accept that the purpose of a CBPF is likely to fluctuate during its lifespan, and that there is an understandable narrowing of purpose when a Fund's size is reduced.
- There was a strong view that CHFs, in order to retain ongoing support, need to keep pace with what is currently viewed as best practice. This would currently include multi-annual funding for protracted crises; a proactive stance on value for money and risk management; and a strong monitoring and evaluation framework.

The question of the capacity of OCHA to manage CBPFs at either country or global level was inevitably raised during interviews. Concerns were also consistently raised about OCHA's ability to reliably offer an adequate level of staffing for CBPFs in the field, and to manage the Management Agent function for CHFs going forward. These views were entirely unsolicited but consistent. Two donors stated that this was a concern greater than any issue around clarity of purpose of the Funds.

³⁸ This refers to reductions in funding due to external issues (donor behaviour and funding patterns) as opposed to a reduction during the transition of final phase of a crisis.

3. Country Summaries

3.1 Introduction

Section 3 and Annex 1 contain the data from the mapping component of the study. Each country is discussed in very brief summary of the key issues only, and follows the same analytical themes laid out in Section 2. The global evaluations referred to in Section 2 draw their conclusions from country studies in the same narrow pool of countries. As such, it is inevitable that the overall analysis will align. The aim of Section 3, then, is to place the broad findings of Section 2 in a variety of contexts and to deepen the analysis before drawing conclusions and recommendations. As such, for each context, this section addresses the following concerns where significant:

- Variations from global guidance: to what extent, if any, does the Fund follow, or deviate from global guidance?
- Questions of scale and size: how big is the Fund and how does it relate to the national appeal, if at all? Has the Fund changed its scale dramatically? How has this affected its purpose?
- Is there evidence of complementarity with other Funds, either humanitarian- or resilience-based?
- Alignment and breadth of response: does the Fund take a narrow approach to humanitarian issues or Fund recovery? Where does the fund currently fit with respect to global policy in the resilience debate – specifically, what does it fund? How does the Fund interact with government, if at all?
- Management consistency: do evaluations take a view on the strength or consistency of Fund management capacity?

3.2 Country cases: CHFs

3.2.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo

The DRC represents a classic protracted, complex emergency, one that combines several factors: internal conflict and criminality with strong regional dynamics; high levels of internal displacement; and enormous protection challenges. Over and above acute humanitarian needs is a high level of natural disaster risk and extraordinary levels of chronic poverty. The context in the DRC creates a number of fundamental challenges for the humanitarian system. The desire for the HAP to be a strategic instrument has, since its inception, been driven by the recognition that the scale of need, measured by reference to normal humanitarian indicators, outstrips any possible humanitarian response by an enormous margin. The lack of State service provision across a vast territory leaves a seemingly unfillable gap, and the lack of basic infrastructure creates severe physical challenges for access.

Questions of scale and relationship with global guidance

The DRC CHF, known locally as “the Pooled Fund” (PF), was established in 2006 and slightly predates the CHF standardisation guidelines. The PF was set up in addition to the existing ERF and only recently have the two been merged (the ERF is now becoming the emergency window of the PF). The PF has consistently been one of the largest CBPFs, holding 15-20% of the total humanitarian spending since reporting began. It has maintained a clear and strong relationship with DRC’s Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP—the CAP equivalent). The DRC HAP

and PF were designed as distinct from CAP and CHF norms, and were to serve the specifics of the context. Although in keeping with basic CAP guidance, the HAP has sought to be a more dynamic document, better able to support a response strategy and prioritization.³⁹ The Fund is noted throughout a number of evaluations as a significant instrument within the DRC context. Funding has been reasonably consistent; in 2012 the PF contained \$87,872,701, or approximately 13.5% of the total Funding for DRC. Coordination also extends to the CERF, as funding is strategically divided between the CHF and the CERF in response to each one's limited funding.

Alignment/breadth of response and resilience

This context sets up a specific and unique dynamic. Whilst the Fund is the most significant in terms of humanitarian funding available, it remains insignificant in comparison to the scale of need. This means that prioritization has been a consistent challenge; multiple and defensible sets of priorities are available at any one time. Since the inception of the Fund, conflict-related issues in the Eastern DRC have been given a clear priority, up to and including 2012. Disease outbreaks, including cholera and Ebola outbreaks, have also been followed by both the PF and the ERF or emergency window. The PF and the ERF have also been used in support of broader strategic aims through the funding of logistics to enhance access and flight services.

The lack of engagement at the central level from the Government of DRC has effectively left the HAP and PF in something of a vacuum, freer than most others to create management structures and prioritise at will. There has been no noted engagement or Government involvement in allocation processes or in the Fund's management structure. The Ministry of Health, however, has been involved as a partner for implementation of both CHF and CERF projects around disease outbreak.

The UN system in DRC takes the form of an integrated mission (MONUSCO).⁴⁰ As is typical in integrated missions, the humanitarian agencies of the UN and the RC/HC can find it challenging to reconcile their roles in development, stabilization and humanitarian operations. Eastern DRC has been home to a number of stabilisation and recovery programmes and instruments. These have included the Stabilisation and Recovery Funding Facility in Eastern DRC (SRFF). "Financing Recovery for Resilience" notes that the Fund's ambitious governance arrangements and the lack of a truly shared vision between Government and international partners undermined the Fund's ability to deliver, and that it remained under-supported. In keeping with the other CBPFs running alongside such stabilization instruments, the PF has sought to maintain an independent, impartial stance.

3.2.2 Somalia

Somalia has offered an extremely complex aid environment and continues to do so. The recent history of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is dominated by the famine in 2011 and the response through 2012. All humanitarian action in Somalia must be viewed in the context of the ongoing armed conflict and the national and tribal politics of the country. As in Eastern DRC, the engagement of the broader UN system in political and military agendas has led to tensions between the UN's political and humanitarian roles, and strained relations with NGOs.⁴¹ Somalia clearly fits the description of a classic, complex emergency, one involving: localised and international displacement; frequent "natural" disasters (including drought-related food insecurity and flooding) overlaid with a lack of Government structures and services in the centre and south; severe issues of access and protection; and a general lack of basic service provision. The CHF has worked in alignment with priorities within the CAP via standard allocations.

³⁹ Taylor, G. et al (2011) *Strengthening the monitoring and evaluation framework of the Humanitarian Action Plan in DRC – a scoping study*. Humanitarian Outcomes

⁴⁰ United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (replacing MONUC).

⁴¹ Darcy, J., et al (2012) *IASC Real Time Evaluation of the Horn of Africa Drought Crisis*. Inter Agency Standing Committee, United Nations

Questions of scale and relationship with global guidance

The Somalia CHF was launched mid-2010, replacing (or enhancing) the existing ERF (known locally as the HRF). In 2010, the CHF and HRF combined were the third-largest funding channel for Somalia, allocating \$28 million during the year. Together with the CERF, pooled funds were the largest humanitarian funding channel in Somalia in 2010,⁴² and the Fund has played a significant and consistent role. Country-level guidance⁴³ was put in place largely mirroring the global guidance for CHFs. A significant feature of the Somalia CHF is OCHA's role as the Fund's Management Agent, a role normally played by UNDP for CHFs. In the case of Somalia, NGOs lobbied for OCHA to take the role to enhance the independence of the Fund, in light of the broader UN system's visible alignment with the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Management Agent aside, the CHF has a typical set of aspirations: to improve timeliness and coherence, and to support the CAP and its identified priorities. It also has the specific aim of diversifying the donor base.

Alignment and breadth of response

In crude terms then, the Somalia CHF is characterised by its independence rather than its alignment. In keeping with other Funds, however, the health cluster noted partnerships between the Government, communities, and humanitarian health actors, albeit weak ones. The CHF 2012 report demonstrates the prioritisation of acute needs in its "first tier" response, but notes that a second tier targeted support for returnees and IDPs. This tier included an effort to initiate integrated programmes to ensure a suite of basic services in priority areas. Engagement in preparedness is noted around sites of repeated cholera outbreaks. The CERF's PAF report of 2012 notes indirect complementarity between the CHF and the CERF. While the CERF did not utilize the full CHF allocation process on grounds of timeliness, the same prioritization criteria were applied.

3.2.3 South Sudan

South Sudan gained independence in mid-2011. Independence from Sudan brought a new set of humanitarian issues, notably an expansion of border issues and a new refugee crisis. Yet the context is arguably recognisable as a continuation of long-standing issues, many rooted in the lack of State capacity, an extraordinarily weak infrastructure and localised patterns of conflict—all leading to ongoing food insecurity, a variety of protection crises and vulnerability to disease outbreaks. The CHF has operated very much in alignment with the CAP; in 2012, CAP priorities reflected multiple aspects of the crisis, including multi-sector funding in response to a high influx of refugees, as well as single sector responses across regions designated as priorities. Emergency Reserve allocations specifically responded to increases in refugees. The CHF also provided funding to sustain NGO presence in the wake of the refugee crisis, which saw the arrival of four times the number of refugees anticipated by partners for 2012.⁴⁴

Questions of scale and guidance

The South Sudan CHF in its first full year of operation (2012) was the largest CHF and played a significant role in the humanitarian response. A full set of country level guidance was drawn up for the Fund in 2012.⁴⁵ Guidance and the allocation policy paper are in keeping with global guidance for CHFs and there are no notable discrepancies.

⁴² OCHA (2010) *Common Humanitarian Fund – Somalia, Annual Report*. Pg. 2. United Nations

⁴³ OCHA (2010) *Common Humanitarian Fund for Somalia: Guidelines*. United Nations

⁴⁴ OCHA (2012) *Common Humanitarian Fund – South Sudan, Annual Report*. Pg. 5, 42. United Nations

⁴⁵ OCHA (2012) *South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund Allocation Process Guidelines*. United Nations

Alignment/breadth of response

Long prior to independence, donors were keen to see the linkages between relief and development. A 2009 Global Public Policy Institute country study on the topic notes the extensive use of pooled funding instruments as part of this strategy, referring to Southern Sudan as “something of a test case for pooled funding approaches with an extraordinary array of financing instruments.”⁴⁶ These instruments included the CHF and the then-Basic Services Fund,⁴⁷ which is now dissolved, a privately managed, DFID-supported Fund to encourage the funding of predictable basic services with some State involvement. The South Sudan Recovery Fund, which operated until the secession of South Sudan in 2011, allocated \$82 million for early recovery, decentralization, community-driven initiatives and capacity building. The 2012 CHF report notes that funding for health included significant levels of funding for basic service provision “while alternative mechanisms were put in place.”⁴⁸ In interviews with OCHA staff in South Sudan, direct interaction between the CHF and the new Pooled Health Fund for service delivery was noted, i.e., requests for standard health services to the CHF are referred directly to the new fund. In response to the influx of refugees, there was explicit complementarity between the CERF and the CHF (e.g., the CERF Rapid Response window was used to support UN programmes, and the CHF reserve was used to complement NGO projects).

Notwithstanding the desire for linkages with development, the scale of the humanitarian caseload since independence has required the CHF to prioritise acute humanitarian needs.⁴⁹ At the outset of research for this study, it appeared that 2014 would bring a positive challenge for the South Sudan CHF: how to manage allocations across the new SRP, which would include significant transitional elements, and ideally a stronger role for Government. The subsequent relapse of South Sudan into factional violence highlights the need for a strong, independent humanitarian response capacity in such contexts. Again, thus far, central Government has had little involvement in the CHF, though there was some discussion in the Fund’s Advisory Board of possibly involving the Government in the allocation process in order to foster a better understanding of humanitarian financing.⁵⁰ Line ministries have been used as implementing partners through a sub-granting of allocations, however.⁵¹

3.2.4 Sudan

Sudan’s CHF was created during the height of the Darfur response in 2006. Although the bulk of funding was channeled to Darfur in initial years of the Fund, other parts of Sudan, including the East and ‘three areas,’⁵² as well as Southern Sudan, were included relatively quickly. The Darfur crisis, long faded in the headlines, continues at scale with 3.8 million people reliant on humanitarian assistance of some kind in 2012.

Questions of scale and guidance

Sudan’s CHF was the model for the CHF Draft Standardisation Guidelines. The Fund has maintained an inclusive allocation process. It has remained firmly centered on the CAP (known locally as the Humanitarian

⁴⁶ Harvey, P. (2009) “South Sudan: European Commission and U.S. Approaches to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – A Case Study,” in *Raising the Bar: Enhancing transatlantic governance of disaster relief and preparedness*. Global Public Policy Institute

⁴⁷ As well as a “classic” UNDP MDTF and a Capacity Building Trust Fund, aimed at supporting Government capacity and the nascent peace process.

⁴⁸ “The CHF ensured the continuity of basic health services at a time when longer-term funding streams were being put in place and partners, in particular national NGOs, faced serious funding gaps.” OCHA (2012) *Common Humanitarian Fund – South Sudan, Annual Report*. Pg. 25.

⁴⁹ Interview with OCHA staff.

⁵⁰ OCHA (2012) *Common Humanitarian Fund – South Sudan, Annual Report*. Pg. 48.

⁵¹ OCHA (2012) *Common Humanitarian Fund – South Sudan, Annual Report*. Pg. 10, 23.

⁵² South Kordofan, Abyei, and Blue Nile, disputed territories in the lead up to independence.

Work Plan, or HWP), and it has retained a significant role in the humanitarian response.⁵³ The HC's report of 2012 notes a pattern of diminishing funding for Sudan in relative terms: 2012 seeing only 45% funding for non-food assistance requirements in the HWP, as opposed to 63% in 2009. Although seeing a reduction in funding itself, the CHF is reported as having a more important role in the face of reduced funding elsewhere. The CHF and the CERF took a complementary approach to funding in 2012, using funding from the CERF UFE window to meet priority needs in Darfur and the CHF emergency reserve to meet priority needs in Darfur and other regions in Sudan. This was seen as especially important given that limited CHF funds precluded a second allocation round. The CHF also funded response and basic service provision through education, food security, health, shelter, nutrition, protection and WASH clusters.

Alignment

In keeping with South Sudan and DRC, there has been a clear desire for a longer-term approach to aid, notably in Darfur. The MPTF paper "Financing Recovery for Resilience," however, notes that recovery mechanisms that would have partially replaced humanitarian assistance and drawn in greater Government and community engagement failed to gain traction. Two funds, the UN Darfur Community Peace and Stability (established in 2007) and the more recent UN Fund for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development in Darfur, were cited as both failing to reach adequate funding levels as yet. The CHF has funded both road rehabilitation projects and funding for logistics, reflecting the need to address a combination of the protracted nature of the crisis, and the limitations faced by the humanitarian community.

3.3 Country cases: ERFs

3.3.1 Ethiopia

Ethiopia experiences wide-scale food insecurity and frequent natural disasters including droughts and flooding. This has resulted in consistently high levels of malnutrition, disease outbreaks and insecurity, each further compounded by limited access to basic health care. A significant number of IDPs exist due to climate-related disasters as well as localized conflict, generating an ongoing level of emergency need.

Questions of scale and guidance

Ethiopia's ERF (known as the HRF) is the largest of its type. Given its scale and its strong management structures, highly inclusive prioritisation, and the inclusion of "predictability" in its own purpose statement, the HRF has commonly been described as a "hybrid"⁵⁴ funding instrument (part ERF and part CHF). In 2009 there was a discussion about changing its status to a CHF.⁵⁵ Ultimately, given the lack of a jointly constructed humanitarian plan (a CAP or equivalent), and the HRF's "rolling fund" mode of operation, it was agreed that there were no grounds or real advantage to changing the status of the Fund.

Alignment

Arguably, some of the key defining characteristics of Ethiopia's HRF are its relationships with Government and development instruments. In terms of food assistance/food security, while there is no CAP or alternative, food

⁵³ Cosgrave, J. (2011) *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund Country Report: Sudan*.

⁵⁴ Taylor, G. (2009) *Ethiopia Pooled Fund Review*. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian Aid Division

⁵⁵ Ibid.

aid requirements are defined by the Government in its Humanitarian Requirements document. The document is based on joint assessments by the Government and UN (WFP and FAO), but then adapted to the political contexts, leaving needs as substantially under-stated. A significant proportion of the needs are funded through “on-budget” instruments, notably the Productive Safety Net Programme (PRSP). WFP’s stand-alone programme and the HRF play an extensive, gap-filling role in which complementarity to the Government and longer term/resilience programming is essential, but so is independence from it.

Questions of scale and guidance

Coordination is evident between the HRF and the CERF, albeit indirect in practice. CERF via both UFE and RR windows tends to finance UN agencies’ core programmes, including those responding to protracted refugee needs. Because the HRF provides more funding than the CERF, CERF funds complement the HRF by filling gaps in ongoing humanitarian programmes, while the HRF tends to finance unforeseen needs. For example, IOM has used CERF funding for protracted displacement needs, whereas the HRF tends to finance sudden and/or short-term displacement needs. The availability of CERF funding also means that UN agencies often compete less with NGOs for HRF funding. Furthermore, HRF funding is available throughout the year, whereas CERF funding is only available once per year unless there is a major emergency.

The HRF also provides for significant gaps in non-food assistance, including water trucking and malnutrition. Again, this assistance is characterised as filling gaps where Government assistance is relatively absent, Somaliland being an example where an independent humanitarian response is necessary. In water trucking, the Fund has gone to significant lengths to ensure that temporary solutions are aligned where possible with more sustainable options; for example, where water trucking is funded via the HRF, the Joint Action Plan (JAP) for WASH operations coordinates between emergency and development activities, under Government leadership. During 2012, when *funding was perceived to be adequate*, the Fund undertook a number of activities in support of resilience,⁵⁶ including flood mitigation, risk reduction and food security projects. Notwithstanding a desire on the part of the ERF management to continue to look for options in support of resilience, there is an explicit understanding that when funding levels fall, acute humanitarian needs will be prioritised.

3.3.2 Haiti

Coordination is evident between the ERRF and the CERF, albeit indirect in practice. CERF via both UFE and RR windows tends to finance UN agencies’ core programmes, including those responding to protracted refugee needs. Because the ERRF provides more funding than the CERF, CERF funds complement the ERRF by filling gaps in ongoing humanitarian programmes, while the ERRF tends to finance unforeseen needs. For example, IOM has used CERF funding for protracted displacement needs, whereas the ERRF tends to finance sudden and/or short-term displacement needs. The availability of CERF funding also means that UN agencies often compete less Haiti has been a long-term recipient of humanitarian assistance, and is home to a UN-integrated mission. The context has been characterized by chronic poverty, weak State infrastructure and multiple problems associated with urbanization, including high levels of criminality. The earthquake of 2010, which affected Haiti’s capital and surrounding urban areas, caused massive destruction and displacement, adding a new level of complexity for ongoing aid efforts. Furthermore, ERRF funding is available throughout the year, whereas CERF funding is only available once per year unless there is a major emergency.

Questions of scale and guidance

Haiti’s ERRF funding and allocations have fluctuated drastically following the 2010 earthquake. Funding peaked

⁵⁶ OCHA (2013) *Humanitarian Response Fund: Ethiopia, Annual Report*. United Nations

at \$83 million in 2010, and then fell drastically to \$2.2 million in 2012. The ERRF evaluation, notes that the Fund played the function of “topping-up” under-funded projects in 2008 and 2009, but became a primary project funding stream “for many projects”⁵⁷ in 2010. The evaluation goes on to note that this was “contrary to ERF guidance,” and meant that partners’ support costs (limited by ERF guidelines) became challenging to handle.⁵⁸ The ERRF was due to close in 2012, but in the context of falling funding for humanitarian assistance, its value was recognised by the local OCHA team, and an extension was provided to respond to disease outbreaks (specifically cholera) and to build capacity for community response.

Alignment and breadth of response

The ERRF is unusual in that it has a clear and stated intent to support the Government of Haiti. Again the ERF evaluation notes that a significant proportion of the Funds’ projects made a specific contribution to the Government of Haiti in their design. Although not systematically followed through, efforts to clear projects with appropriate Government bodies and to involve them in the selection or clearing process were noted.⁵⁹ The ERRF has coordinated explicitly with the CERF to ensure that cholera response funding was equitable. A portion of this funding also passed through Government. There was no evidence at all of interaction between the ERRF and recovery funds “The Haiti Reconstruction Fund,” nor the work of the Clinton Foundation.

3.3.3 Pakistan

Pakistan is characterised by repeated natural disasters, notably floods and earthquakes, as well as protracted insecurity throughout its northwest. Conflict throughout this region (specifically in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)) has resulted in significant displacement (an estimated 774,000 people in 2012). Monsoon flooding affected 4.8 million people across the country in 2012, leaving 2.8 million in need of humanitarian assistance throughout Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh provinces.⁶⁰ In its first year of operation, the Fund targeted almost exclusively those communities affected by flooding.

Questions of scale and guidance

In its first year of operation, the Pakistan ERF channeled a total of \$36.6 million from 12 donors in total⁶¹ towards the needs of communities displaced by flooding. In the following year, however, the Fund received less than \$2 million. It appears quite clear that the Fund’s original purpose was as a principle funding mechanism, rather than as a stable funding instrument with the normal attributes of an ERF. In 2012 a number of projects in multiple sectors targeted populations affected by insecurity in KP and FATA, but due to funding limitations, did not respond to the monsoon floods.⁶²

The ERF evaluation of 2011 and the subsequent review of recommendations provide telling insight into the path of the ERF. Following the Fund’s initial flush of funding, the funding declined rapidly, although in 2012 and 2013, it recovered. The review finds a decent level of follow-up on the recommendations; that the Fund has worked through some initial challenges and strengthened management capacity (in part due to investment by

⁵⁷ 40% of the portfolio (of which 38% were UN or Int’l. agencies) were approved without mentioning any other related sources of funding.

⁵⁸ Moriniere, L. (2011) *External Evaluation of the Haiti Emergency Relief and Response Fund (ERRF) 2008-2011*. Pg. 35-36. OCHA, United Nations

⁵⁹ Moriniere, L. (2011) *External Evaluation of the Haiti Emergency Relief and Response Fund (ERRF) 2008-2011*. Pg. 39.

⁶⁰ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Pakistan, Annual Report*. Pg. 2. United Nations

⁶¹ Featherstone, A. (2011) *Evaluation of the Pakistan Emergency Response Fund*. OCHA

⁶² “The eight projects supported by the ERF in 2012 addressed the needs of people affected by insecurity in KP (six projects) and FATA (two projects). Funding constraints precluded the ERF from supporting timely humanitarian response to the monsoon floods that affected Pakistan in September.” OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Pakistan, Annual Report*. Pg. 6.

OCHA). This period coincides, however, with a dearth of Funding, which the evaluation suggests may be a combination of a downward global trend in donor funding, as well as a general “*hesitation*” on the part of donors to use the ERF to channel humanitarian resources. The evaluation also makes multiple references to the lack of shared vision amongst international partners, not only for the Fund, but also for the humanitarian response and beyond. There was no explicit reference to coordination with development or recovery instruments. The CERF was utilised for the flood response in 2012, while the ERF was unable due to a limited funding.

OCHA Pakistan would like to see the Fund able to fund transitional or recovery activities “as and when funds are available.”⁶³ A concrete example was offered in the context of Pakistan—the education sector has utilised schools in tents (temporary—too hot in summer, too cold in winter, and a non-durable solution). There is a gap between the Government school-building programme (with an approximately five-year lead time) and the duration of a tented solution (one year maximum). A semi-permanent solution, in the lag period between the temporary and Government programmes should be considered. At the same time, it was acknowledged that given the large discrepancy between funds and needs, prioritisation (done on the spot in the Inter Cluster Coordination Mechanism when new funds arrive) was a challenge.⁶⁴ Fully acknowledging the desire for the instrument to adapt to context, this example highlights the challenges for global guidance. Were the fund to reach a significant level, and the new SRP to state that the provision of such structures were a critical humanitarian priority, it might be possible to argue that such funding was appropriate. The case would remain that transitional instruments, with longer-term, recovery or transitional money, outside of humanitarian budgets would be more suitable for this type of activity.

Alignment

In keeping with a number of other CBPFs, allocations from the Pakistan ERF straddle two distinct sets of humanitarian risks and needs within the same country. Created principally for response to the displacement related to flooding, the Fund has also sought to prioritise the needs related to conflict that affect displacement. As above, the 2011 evaluation⁶⁵ notes the lack of an overarching planning and prioritisation mechanism for both (although the follow-up in 2013 notes the creation of two distinct priority papers “The Humanitarian Operations Plan (HOP) for KP/FATA and Monsoon Humanitarian Operations Plan (MHOP),” which provided a framework for guiding allocations.

There is little explicit reference to the interaction of the Fund with Government, although it is clear that different sets of Government entities are engaged with issues of natural disaster and conflict. Predictably, access to conflict-affected areas has been more sensitive and prone to delays related to clearance. The Government has acted as an implementing partner and beneficiary from the ERF, specifically in the implementation of a capacity-building project that developed a Government-run health facility. Government involvement has also extended to requesting support in the event of widespread displacement, and in coordinating meetings between cluster leads and district health authorities in response to large numbers of IDPs.⁶⁶ A multi-donor trust fund for reconstruction exists, but there is no mention of cooperation or alignment with the humanitarian pooled funds. It was established to support initiatives in KP, FATA and Balochistan, each of which had been affected by conflict between the Government and Taliban. A smaller humanitarian Fund for NGO activities, the Pakistan RAPID Fund, is documented, but there is no evidence that it coordinated with the larger, OCHA-run pooled funds.

⁶³ Interview with OCHA staff.

⁶⁴ Interview with OCHA staff.

⁶⁵ Interview with OCHA staff.

⁶⁶ CERF (2012) *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the Use of CERF Funds, Pakistan*. Pg. 6, 10. United Nations

3.3.4 Yemen

Civil unrest and violent conflict in 2011 tipped a situation of chronic vulnerability into a set of acute emergencies. While humanitarian agencies report both a reduction in conflict and an improvement in access through 2013, chronic vulnerability persists. Widespread food insecurity and malnutrition remain alongside displacement and disease outbreaks. State provision of basic services is very low. The country also faces a slow-onset crisis in food security and malnutrition. The Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) for 2013 noted that over half the country's population is crisis-affected, and a full one-third are targeted for humanitarian assistance. Given that the Yemen Fund is relatively new, there was a lack of evaluatory material overall.

Questions of scale and guidance

Yemen is one of the few Funds that has seen steadily rising levels of funding. In 2012, the Fund allocated approximately 8.5 million USD, or approximately 2% of the total funding requirement. The mechanism is viewed as significant within the Yemeni response. The ERF annual report notes that the ERF provided funding ahead of CERF's RR window for critical activities related to disease outbreak, and added leverage to the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), enabling him to fill critical gaps in the YHRP.⁶⁷ Given the relatively small size of the Fund, however, the report notes that the decision to reserve the final 5 million USD for unforeseen emergencies whenever the Fund's reserve was diminished.

The bulk of 2012 ERF funding was used in response to displacement in the south. In the central part of the country, ERF funds were used to respond to the influx of refugees and assistance for host communities. In terms of disease outbreak, the ERF provided funding to a measles campaign, as well as response to cholera and AWD outbreaks. Additional service provision was funded through the health, protection, nutrition and WASH clusters. ERF funds were disbursed between UN agencies, INGOs and NGOs, with national NGOs used as partners to reach vulnerable populations in remote and inaccessible areas. The ERF also provides seed funding to new INGOs in the country by acting as a complementary source of funding.

Alignment

An OCHA mission report refers to the challenging balance around alignment in Yemen, noting that the Government saw the presence of humanitarian agencies in previously conflict-affected areas as aligned to a stabilization agenda.⁶⁸ Again, the lack of a recovery plans and the slow pace of development actors were cited as problems for the humanitarian system. In keeping with other CBPFs, the Government has had limited involvement in the funds; Yemen's Ministry of Public Health has been involved at a technical level with disease outbreaks. There is no reference to any interaction with recovery or development instruments.

⁶⁷ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Yemen, Annual Report*. United Nations

⁶⁸ Internal Audit Division (2010) *OCHA's Management of Emergency Response Funds*. Office of Internal Oversight Services, United Nations

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1 Size, purpose and delineation of CBPFs

An overarching conclusion of the study is that ERFs and CHF, while nominally different for historical reasons, are more similar than stated in the long-standing guidance. Global guidance in place at the start of the research period was separate for ERFs and CHF and tended, in places, to conflate the scale and the purpose of the Funds, and to cement unhelpful delineation between the two such as the explicit reference to NGO funding in the ERF guidance. OCHA's updated guidance note, along with new management arrangements in OCHA FCS, recognises the similarities between ERFs and the need to rationalise and harmonise policy support to them.

The country studies confirm that while ERFs do tend to be smaller overall than CHF, some (notably Pakistan and Haiti) have been very substantial and Ethiopia continues to be so. They also suggest that the scale of any given Fund is as important a factor in its potential use as is its designation as a CHF or ERF. The ERF in Ethiopia, long recognised as breaking the typical ERF mold due to its size, continues to operate with a principally responsive modality and remains a good fit for its context. A significant amount of what might be covered by humanitarian assistance in other contexts is delivered 'on-budget' through a productive safety net supported by Government and development donors. Furthermore, the Government of Ethiopia rejects the idea of an annual appeal, so an independent mechanism that is complementary to Government programming and response is entirely appropriate. In Yemen, the other current ERF of significant size, allocations have been both strategic and responsive. CHF and ERFs should be viewed as variations on a single type of funding mechanism, albeit with a range of scales and a variety of funding modalities.

Without a detailed review of the inception of the fund in Pakistan and the various re-energisations of the Haiti ERF, it is impossible to draw firm conclusions. Both, however, have clearly suffered from diminishing support. It appears that both were set up, or have been utilized, as primary funding channels in the wake of large natural disasters, which was in contradiction to the guidance and spirit of the instruments.

The responsive nature of the ERF modality (which is common to ERFs and CHF) is universally useful in protracted crises. This being the case, making it continually justifiable to extend the life of a Fund (although OCHA does have clear rules for closing them down). In both cases, there may have been justification for initiating funds for a fixed duration of one or two years to handle large volumes of funding, pending a decision on the feasibility of a longer-term instrument. In both cases, ERFs left in context with diminishing resources, whilst still useful, are unsuitable for anything other than very localized responses and their small size offers a number of challenges.

An overarching conclusion of the study therefore, is that the characteristics of Country Based Pooled Funds should be driven primarily by the context in which they operate. Funds should be aligned with strategic priorities when scale allows and also responsive. CBPFs should be needs-driven and provide funding to the actors best placed to respond the needs targeted.

In addition, the study identifies the need to ensure that careful consideration is given to the opening of CBPFs in the aftermath of rapid onset emergencies. While it is clearly useful to have a pooled funding instrument in the aftermath of a large scale response, as one part of a set of funding tools (including the CERF and the START Fund), the capacity for funding levels to diminish quickly has to be taken into consideration. .

As well as being adapted to the context, CBPFs must be fit for purpose in terms of adequate management capacity. If a more flexible approach to activation and de-activation of CBPFs is considered, the management of human resources in an equally flexible and responsive fashion is critically important. Regardless of whether this takes place at the global level (through a global mechanism) or at the country level (through embedding CBPFs as a capability of each OCHA country office), flexibility would require more capacity at the country and HQ level. Although not a key focus of this study, OCHA's commitment to and capacity to manage CBPFs at country level, were raised consistently. It appears that there is the need for a much more explicit arrangement between donors and OCHA on covering the running costs of CBPFs (on the part of donors), and ensuring consistent human resources (on the part of OCHA).

Recommendations

1. That ERFs and CHFs should be formally aligned, in recognition of their progressive convergence, into a single type of funding mechanism that can have different sizes and use different allocation modalities (rolling basis, more strategic calls for proposals) depending on the needs targeted and the country context;
2. That OCHA should have an internal debate on the best way to ensure increased flexibility in the activation and de-activation of CBPFs, including exploring the option to set up a global ERF facility, to ensure that funds can be quickly activated in cases of emergency, and de-activated when they lose relevance and critical mass. [OCHA FCS]
3. That CBPFs should be needs-driven and provide funding to the actors best placed to respond to needs targeted, tending to favor NGOs in this allocation. A time limited fund could meet immediate needs, and act as a bridging mechanism whilst the viability and potential support for longer term instruments (both humanitarian and recovery) was assessed. [OCHA FCS, donors].
4. OCHA should reach an internal agreement on whether CBPFs are a corporate priority, and consequently should agree to commit capacity and resources to the management of CBPFs in a coherent manner, in support of the chosen approach to increased flexibility. OCHA's commitment to providing more consistent human resources for CBPFs, should come in parallel with an open and transparent conversation with donors on the real costs of running CBPFs and a commitment to support core costs. [OCHA FCS, PFWG donors].

4.2 On the alignment of humanitarian CBPFs

On the question of whether ERFs and CHFs should take a narrow or broad view of humanitarian assistance and/or support recovery, preparedness and early action, the guidance, both existing and forthcoming, is clear and allows for a considerable amount of flexibility. The advice from numerous evaluations is consistent and predictable: ERFs, by virtue of two of their core characteristics (their method of allocation and the short-term nature of their funding envelopes) are designed to suit their core purpose—responsive allocations to unforeseen shocks or critical gaps. CHFs, by virtue of having an emergency reserve, have the same responsive capacity. Over and above this capacity, the CHF model supports (and again, by design) the UN annual planning and prioritisation cycle. In principle, and as identified by the recent ODI study, CHFs offer a much greater scope to support preparedness, early action and recovery if these are identified as priorities by the collective humanitarian system. In keeping with OCHA's position on resilience, a number of caveats exist, however:

- There should be a clear case or comparative advantage in the humanitarian system fulfilling this function
- The jointly constructed SRP should place a clear priority on this type of activity
- The use of CHF in this way must stop short of substituting for development instruments

In addition, the issue of size and scale throws up an interesting challenge to the suggestion that CBPFs should play a central role in resilience. In cases where CBPFs face a reduction in size, there is a clear tendency, acknowledged by donors as appropriate, for them to re-prioritise in such a way that narrows their purpose towards acute needs.⁶⁹ This is in keeping with a commonly acknowledged phenomenon for global funding (re-prioritisation of global funds to a more acute or politically pressing priority), and at country level (the unpredictability of stable funding in the face of the expanding remit of humanitarian assistance and competing areas of need).⁷⁰ Whilst it may be appropriate in principle, and in keeping with global policy shifts, to state that humanitarian Funds should play a bigger role in resilience (or any other static function), it does not appear rational to assume that either ERFs or CHFs will have continuity of purpose in contexts where both needs and funding levels fluctuate. There are numerous examples in case studies across ERFs and CHFs that support this conclusion. This very continuity of purpose, and preferably multi-annual commitments, are the key requirement for the funding instruments required for support to resilience, stable service delivery and livelihood support.

Ideally then, and as recommended in both theoretical models and in CHF evaluations, a better model would see development, recovery or preparedness instruments complementing humanitarian pooled funds and making cross referrals. In undertaking the country-level mapping, there was an expectation that some such interaction would be uncovered. In fact, coordination, or indeed any kind of interaction between humanitarian and recovery, preparedness or any other type of funding instrument in the case study countries, is strikingly absent. Only in South Sudan, noted as a “test case” for pooled, transitional instrument, was there specific reference to direct interaction between the CHF and a specific fund for service delivery in the health sector. “Financing Recovery for Resilience” similarly notes that “the [recovery/reliance] financing system is seldom deployed or materialized as envisaged. When in place early recovery pooled funding mechanisms supported by development assistance tend to be under-capitalized and a far cry from the larger funds expected to complement and build on humanitarian efforts.”⁷¹

Recommendations

1. That the harmonized CBPF should align with the SRP. As such, ‘resilience’ activities should be funded to the extent to which they are included in the SRP and are elected as priorities within it. This recommendation comes with a clear caveat, however. CBPFs in their current configuration can offer support to resilience, however, their ability to act in this respect is likely to expand and contract in keeping with the ratio between needs and available funds. This phenomenon alone means that they are far from ideal as a central or consistent channel for this type of assistance, and it should be recognised explicitly in Global Guidance. [OCHA FCS]
2. That CBPFs should be needs-driven and provide funding to the actors best placed to respond to priority needs. Given that CBPFs will only ever provide partial funding in any country context, the need for CBPFs to complement other funding sources, including the CERF, should be re-stated. [OCHA FCS, OCHA Fund Managers].

⁶⁹ It is also reasonable to assume that given a constant level of funding and a spike in acute needs in relation to overall funding levels, that either ERFs or CHFs may be similarly ‘re-purposed’.

⁷⁰ Poole, L. (Forthcoming) *Needs-based humanitarian funding: An NGO perspective*. Norwegian Refugee Council

⁷¹ Bayat-Renoux, F. and Glenmarec, Y. (2014) *Financing Recovery for Resilience*.

Annex 1: Case Study Mapping Tables

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Financial Data

	Total funding 2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)	Funding 2008-2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)⁷²	Average size of transfers to direct fund recipients (2012)
ERF	Funding: \$2,111,952 (0.32% of total) Allocations: \$1,078,368 (0.16% of total)	2010 funding: \$2,076,915 (0.36% of total) 2010 allocations: \$886,921 (0.15% of total) 2011 funding: \$2,076,915 (0.41% of total) 2011 allocations: \$1,027,565 (0.18% of total) Total funding: \$6,428,883 (0.36% of total) ⁷³ Total allocations: \$2,992,854 (0.17% of total)	\$119,818 (9 allocations) Largest: \$166,811 Smallest: \$10,191
CHF	Funding: \$98,409,651 (15.3% of total) Allocations: \$87,872,701 (13.5% of total)	2008 funding: \$127,459,153 (19.7% of total) 2008 allocations: \$126,151,503 (19.5% of total) 2009 funding: \$130,858,794 (18.9% of total) 2009 allocations: \$117,052,701 (16.9% of total) 2010 funding: \$98,895,799 (17.3% of total) 2010 allocations: \$91,157,165 (15.9% of total) 2011 funding: \$114,884,871 (21% of total) 2011 allocations: \$106,209,709 (19.5% of total) Total funding: \$570,508,268 (18.3% of total) Total allocations: \$528,443,779 (17% of total)	\$574,331 (153 allocations) Largest: \$13,500,000 Smallest: \$10,680

⁷² Calculation of total humanitarian funding includes only years during which the fund was active. If CERF funding was present for one funding window but not the other, the fund is considered active for both.

⁷³ Funding and allocations available in 2010, 2011, 2012

CERF (RR)	Total allocations: \$19,715,742 (3% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$135,314,989 (4.3% of total) Total Rapid response: \$52,868,295 (1.7% of total)	\$1,971,574(10 allocations) Largest: \$4,693,057 Smallest: \$201,390
CERF (UFE)	Total allocations: \$11,770,546 (1.8% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$135,314,989 (4.3% of total) Total Underfunded emergency: \$82,446,694 (2.6% of total)	\$1,471,318 (8 allocations) Largest: \$3,999,986 Smallest: \$200,510

Total Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2012

Year	Amount
2008	\$646,646,655
2009	\$691,982,604
2010	\$571,080,814
2011	\$544,939,784
2012	\$647,941,683
Total:	\$3,102,591,540

Purpose and Scope

	Purpose (as stated at country level)	Scope in Country (geographic, thematic, etc.)	Variations from global guidance	Eligibility for direct access to funds
ERF	<p>An urgent humanitarian funding source in addition to the Pooled Fund and CERF; Responds to small-scale crises not eligible for CHF funding; Provides primarily NGOs and exceptionally UN agencies with an emergency financing window for small-scale crises.⁷⁴</p> <p>Closed in 2013; had been funded through the CHF Emergency Response allocation window since 2006.⁷⁵</p>	<p>Responded to cholera epidemic among IDPs in North and South Kivu; projects outside of conflict zones also responded cholera⁷⁶</p> <p>Active clusters: Logistics WASH Health</p>	Logistics cluster airport rehabilitation project. ⁷⁷	NGOs, UN agencies
CHF	<p>Established in 2006 at the initiative of humanitarian donors to promote Humanitarian Reform processes (including the availability of adequate, timely, flexible, and effective humanitarian financing. Uses the HAP for overall strategic guidance.⁷⁸</p>	<p>2012: No geographic limitations, but concentration in North and South Kivu; funded responses to conflict and health epidemics</p> <p>Active clusters: Logistics Food Security Shelter and NFIs Nutrition WASH Health Protection Education Coordination</p>		NGOs, INGOs, UN agencies
CERF (RR)		<p>Funded: cholera and Ebola response</p> <p>Active clusters: WASH Health</p> <p>Conflict and displacement</p>	Suggestions for country teams: The role of the MoH and other political-administrative authorities is a key factor for the success	UN and IOM

⁷⁴ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annual Report*. United Nations

⁷⁵ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annual Report*. Pg. 4.

⁷⁶ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annual Report*. Pg. 8.

⁷⁷ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annual Report*. Pg. 10, arguably better suited for development funding, or outside of the scope of humanitarian response

⁷⁸ OCHA (2010) *DRC Pooled Fund: Annual Report 2009*, Pg. 11. United Nations

		<p>Active clusters: Agriculture Protection Multi-Sector Coordination/Logistics Food Health</p>	<p>of the response and has strengthened their capacity for future interventions. Ensure that appropriate authorities are involved in all key stages of interventions, rather than just substituting for their role; preparedness is key to responses. Contingency plans should be put in place in order to ensure timely response.⁷⁹</p> <p>The HC to advocate for governments and donors to consider setting aside part of the emergency funds (Pooled Fund, and others) for development interventions alongside emergencies.⁸⁰</p>	
CERF (UFE)		<p>North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga due to deteriorating humanitarian situation.</p>	<p>Suggestions for Secretariat: Ensure discussions for potential contingency planning; ensure review of financing for contingency stocks⁸¹</p>	<p>UN and IOM</p>

⁷⁹ CERF (2012) *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the Use of CERF Funds, Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Pg. 19. United Nations

⁸⁰ CERF (2012) *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the Use of CERF Funds, Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Pg. 9.

⁸¹ CERF (2012) *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the Use of CERF Funds, Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Pg. 47.

Ethiopia

Financial Data

	Total funding 2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)	Funding 2008-2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)⁸²	Average size of transfers to direct fund recipients (2012)
ERF (HRF)	Funding: \$52,054,947 (7.7% of total) Allocations: \$37,955,717 (5.6% of total)	2008 funding: \$68,093,500 (6.3% of total) 2008 allocations: NA 2009 funding: \$45,631,278 (6.4% of total) 2009 allocations: \$995,420 (0.14% of total) 2010 funding: \$54,736,315 (8.7% of total) 2010 allocations: \$25,605,122 (4% of total) 2011 funding: \$78,621,655 (9.5% of total) 2011 allocations: \$46,635,467 (5.7% of total) Total funding: \$299,137,695 (7.6% of total) Total allocations: \$111,191,726 (3.9% of total) ⁸³	\$575,086 (66 allocations) Largest: \$4,074,243 Smallest: \$ 124,892
CHF	NA	NA	NA
CERF (RR)	Total allocations: \$4,072,334 (0.6% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$123,074,517 (3.1% of total) Total Rapid Response: \$49,199,663 (1.26% of total)	\$2,036,167 (2 allocations) Largest: \$2,949,770 Smallest: \$1,122,564
CERF (UFE)	Total allocations: \$9,912,447 (1.4% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$123,074,517 (3.1% of total) Total Underfunded Emergency: \$73,874,854 (1.9% of total)	\$1,982,489 (5 allocations) Largest: \$6,000,000 Smallest: \$499,998

Total Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2012

Year	Amount
2008	\$1,077,818,441
2009	\$707,745,783
2010	\$626,475,530
2011	\$820,838,592
2012	\$669,991,399
Total:	\$3,902,869,745

⁸² Calculation of total humanitarian funding includes only years during which the fund was active. If CERF funding was present for one funding window but not the other, the fund is considered active for both.

⁸³ Allocations made in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012

Purpose and Scope

	Purpose (as stated at country level)	Scope in Country (geographic, thematic, etc.)	Variations from global guidance	Eligibility for direct access to funds
ERF (HRF)	Established in 2006, ⁸⁴ the HRF responds to emergency needs and supports linkages with resilience building programs. ⁸⁵ Engages in some long-term resilience building. ⁸⁶	Responded to cases of malnutrition, IDPs, flood risk, and health risks. Active clusters: Health Emergency Shelter Food Security Common Services WASH Refugees Agriculture Nutrition Education	Flood mitigation project (labeled DRR); Additional DRR and resilience-building ⁸⁷	NGOs, UN agencies
CHF	NA	NA	NA	NA
CERF (RR)		Responded to internal displacement and meningitis outbreak Active clusters: Food Health	“Lessons learned” and “suggestions for follow-up” suggest that, due to the nature of the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia, it can be difficult to classify projects as “life-saving”. ⁸⁸	UN and IOM
CERF (UFE)		Responded to drought in Oromia region Active clusters: Agriculture Health Shelter and NFIs Food Education Multi-sector	Suggestion for the consideration of an emergency preparedness/prevention budget. ⁸⁹	UN and IOM

⁸⁴ Global Humanitarian Assistance (2011), *Emergency Response Funds Profile*, Pg. 2. United Kingdom, Global Humanitarian Assistance

⁸⁵ OCHA (2012) *Humanitarian Response Fund – Ethiopia, Annual Report*. Pg. 4. United Nations

⁸⁶ OCHA (2012) *Humanitarian Response Fund – Ethiopia, Annual Report*. Pg. 24.

⁸⁷ OCHA (2012) *Humanitarian Response Fund – Ethiopia, Annual Report*. Pg. 17, 24.

⁸⁸ CERF (2012) *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the use of CERF Funds, Ethiopia*, Pg. 39. United Nations

⁸⁹ CERF (2012) *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the use of CERF Funds, Ethiopia*. Pg. 12.

Haiti

Financial Data

	Total funding 2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)	Funding 2008-2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)⁹⁰	Average size of transfers to direct fund recipients
ERF (ERRF)	Funding: \$2,291,247 (1.8% of total) Allocations: \$1,142,019 (0.9% of total)	2008 funding: \$4,710,814 (1.9% of total) 2008 allocations: NA 2009 funding: NA 2009 allocations: NA 2010 funding: \$83,330,391 (2.3% of total) 2010 allocations: \$70,464,992 (1.9% of total) 2011 funding: \$13,869,598 (2.7% of total) 2011 allocations: \$8,378,591 (1.68% of total) Total funding: \$104,202,050 (2.3% of total) ⁹¹ Total allocations: \$79,985,602 (1.9% of total) ⁹²	\$190,336 (6 allocations) Largest: \$210,000 Smallest: \$138,939
CHF	NA	NA	NA
CERF (RR)	Total allocations: \$3,947,974 (3.1% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$79,859,420 (1.8% of total) Total Rapid Response: \$66,914,139 (1.5% of total)	\$563,996 (7 allocations) Largest: \$1,018,566 Smallest: \$159,747
CERF (UFE)	Total allocations: \$7,949,515 (6.3% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$79,859,420 (1.8% of total) Total Underfunded Emergency: \$12,945,281 (0.28% of total)	\$794,9651 (10 allocations) Largest: \$2,475,316 Smallest: \$151,888

Total Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2012

Year	Amount
2008	\$243,441,905
2009	\$18,050,192
2010	\$3,586,503,448
2011	\$497,883,070
2012	\$125,914,638
Total:	\$4,471,793,253

⁹⁰ Calculation of total humanitarian funding includes only years during which the fund was active. If CERF funding was present for one funding window but not the other, the fund is considered active for both.

⁹¹ Funding available in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012

⁹² Allocations made in 2010, 2011, 2012

Purpose and Scope

	Purpose (as stated at country level)	Scope in Country (geographic, thematic, etc.)	Variations from global guidance	Eligibility for direct access to funds
ERF (ERRF)	<p>Established in 2007 to enable quick response in a coordinated manner to address unforeseen needs arising from disasters linked to natural hazards.⁹³</p> <p>Initially meant to close in 2012. Funding was extended in order to respond to the impact of hurricanes Isaac and Sandy.⁹⁴</p> <p>Additional objectives:</p> <p>Strengthen coordination mechanisms among partners and minimize duplication through enhanced consultation at different levels; Support joint initiatives in providing capacity to deliver visible and high impact projects that garner public confidence in the state (Government of Haiti), reducing vulnerability and risk; Solidify links with long-term development programs.⁹⁵</p>	<p>Responded to continued cholera outbreak, exacerbated by the increased levels of vulnerability resulting from hurricane damage.</p> <p>Active clusters: Health WASH</p>	Funded cholera early warning system. ⁹⁶	NGOs, UN agencies
CHF	NA	NA	NA	NA
CERF (RR)		<p>Hurricane Sandy response</p> <p>Active clusters: Agriculture WASH Shelter/NFIs Health Nutrition</p>		UN and IOM

⁹³ OCHA (2013) *Management Guidelines for the Emergency Relief Response Fund*, Pg. 1. Haiti, United Nations

⁹⁴ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Relief Response Fund – Haiti, Annual Report*. Pg. 2. United Nations

⁹⁵ Moriniere, L. (2011) *External Evaluation of the Haiti Emergency Relief and Response Fund (ERRF) 2008-2011*.

⁹⁶ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Relief Response Fund – Haiti, Annual Report*. Pg. 6

CERF (UFE)		Cholera response and camp management Active clusters: WASH Protection Shelter/NFIs Health Nutrition		UN and IOM
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Pakistan

Financial Data

	Total funding 2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)	Funding 2008-2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)⁹⁷	Average size of transfers to direct fund recipients (2012)
ERF	Funding: \$6,544,766 (1.4% of total) Allocations: \$1,420,204 (0.3% of total)	2010 funding: \$36,655,292 (1.15% of total) 2010 allocations: \$18,031,910 (0.57% of total) 2011 funding: \$21,197,174 (4.38% of total) 2011 allocations: \$18,582,226 (3.8% of total) Total funding: \$64,397,232 (1.5% of total) ⁹⁸ Total allocations: \$38,034,340 (0.9% of total)	\$177,525 (8 Allocations) Largest: \$249,147 Smallest: \$82,222
CHF	NA	NA	NA
CERF (RR)	Total allocations: \$21,891,110 (4.6% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$148,550,761 (2.9% of total) Total Rapid Response: \$117,149,513 (2.3% of total)	\$754,865 (29 allocations) Largest: \$4,265,287 Smallest: \$75,757
CERF (UFE)	Total allocations: \$14,845,730 (3.1% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$148,550,761 (2.9% of total) Total Underfunded Emergency: \$31,401,248 (0.63% of total)	\$1,237,144 (12 allocations) Largest: \$4,696,260 Smallest: \$59,920

Total Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2012

Year	Amount
2008	\$66,754,845
2009	\$784,032,664
2010	\$3,168,439,848
2011	\$483,125,845
2012	\$467,888,219
Total:	\$4,970,241,421

⁹⁷ Calculation of total humanitarian funding includes only years during which the fund was active. If CERF funding was present for one funding window but not the other, the fund is considered active for both.

⁹⁸ Funding and allocations available in 2010, 2011, 2012

Purpose and Scope

	Purpose (as stated at country level)	Scope in Country (geographic, thematic, etc.)	Variations from global guidance	Eligibility for direct access to funds
ERF	<p>Established in 2010 to ensure rapid and flexible funding to respond to urgent and short-term humanitarian needs; supports humanitarian activities seeking to address short-term emergency needs, re-establish basic living conditions, strengthen preparedness, and facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.⁹⁹</p> <p>Was established in the wake of the 2010 floods, but responds to humanitarian needs resulting from a range of disaster and conflict-related crises.¹⁰⁰</p>	<p>Reference specifically to KP and FATA in guidelines and annual reports, but limited scope not mandated. (2012 – all 8 projects targeted KP and FATA – conflict affected areas)¹⁰¹</p> <p>Active clusters: Food Security WASH Health</p>	<p>Pakistan ERF Guidelines allow for preparedness funding, but no preparedness activities were funded in 2012.¹⁰²</p>	<p>INGOs; NNGOs; UN; IOM</p>
CHF	NA	NA	NA	NA
CERF (RR)		<p>Responded to internal strife and floods; geographical focus on KP and FATA</p> <p>Active clusters: Health Agriculture Multi-Sector Protection WASH Nutrition Food</p>	<p>RC-HC report recommendations: expansion for preparedness funding¹⁰³</p>	<p>UN and IOM</p>
CERF (UFE)		<p>Responded to internal strife (Health, Protection, Food, Shelter, Agriculture)</p>	<p>RC-HC report recommendations: expansion for preparedness funding</p>	<p>UN and IOM</p>

⁹⁹ OCHA (2012) *Pakistan Emergency Response Fund (ERF): Revised Guidelines*, Pg. 4. United Nations

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Pakistan, Annual Report*. United Nations

¹⁰² OCHA (2012) *Pakistan Emergency Response Fund (ERF): Revised Guidelines*.

¹⁰³ CERF (2012) *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the Use of CERF Funds, Pakistan*. United Nations

Somalia

Financial Data

	Total funding 2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)	Funding 2008-2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)¹⁰⁴	Average size of transfers to direct fund recipients (2012)
ERF	NA	<p>2008 funding: \$21,529,641 (3.36% of total) 2008 allocations: \$12,531,103 (1.9% of total)</p> <p>2009 funding: \$22,231,499 (3.34% of total) 2009 allocations: \$9,657,410 (1.45% of total)</p> <p>2010 funding: \$12,930,602 (2.6% of total) 2010 allocations: \$16,616,052 (3.38% of total)</p> <p>Total funding: \$56,691,742 (3.1% of total)¹⁰⁵ Total allocations: \$38,804,565 (2.1% of total)</p>	NA
CHF	<p>Funding: \$93,531,637 (11.7% of total)</p> <p>Allocations: \$87,112,357 (10.9% of total)</p>	<p>2010 funding: \$27,239,577 (5.5% of total) 2010 allocations: \$19,896,183 (4% of total)</p> <p>2011 funding: \$92,198,896 (6.8% of total) 2011 allocations: \$84,816,916 (6.3% of total)</p> <p>Total funding: \$212,970,110 (8% of total)¹⁰⁶ Total allocations: \$191,825,456 (7.2% of total)</p>	\$509,428 (171 allocations) Largest: \$3,243,956 Smallest: \$42,254
CERF (RR)	NA	<p>Total CERF funding: \$125,209,305 (4.7% of total)¹⁰⁷</p> <p>Total Rapid Response: \$100,220,219 (3.7% of total)</p>	NA
CERF (UFE)	NA	<p>Total CERF funding: \$125,209,305 (4.7% of total)</p> <p>Total Underfunded Emergency:</p>	NA

¹⁰⁴ Calculation of total humanitarian funding includes only years during which the fund was active. If CERF funding was present for one funding window but not the other, the fund is considered active for both.

¹⁰⁵ Funding and allocations available in 2008, 2009, 2010

¹⁰⁶ Funding and allocations available in 2010, 2011, 2012

¹⁰⁷ Funds allocated in 2008, 2009, 2011

		\$24,989,086 (0.9% of total)	
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Total Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2012

Year	Amount
2008	\$639,846,702
2009	\$663,909,844
2010	\$490,808,703
2011	\$1,347,051,750
2012	\$795,951,262
Total:	\$3,937,568,261

Purpose and Scope

	Purpose (as stated at country level)	Scope in Country (geographic, thematic, etc.)	Variations from global guidance	Eligibility for direct access to funds
ERF	NA	NA	NA	NA
CHF	<p>Established in 2010 with the closing of the HRF in order to provide a predictable amount of funding (larger than the HRF) at the beginning of the year in order to supplement and complement bilateral funding, and to fill priority cluster and geographic gaps.¹⁰⁸</p> <p>Two main objectives: to improve timeliness and coherence of humanitarian response, and to support priority clusters and regional priorities in response to identified needs.¹⁰⁹</p> <p>Aims to ensure that humanitarian needs are addressed in a collaborative manner; fosters coordination between clusters and humanitarian organizations.¹¹⁰</p> <p>Does not support early recovery or development assistance.¹¹¹</p>	<p>Responded to famine and conflict-related IDPs, mostly in central and southern regions</p> <p>Active cluster: Education Food Security Health Logistics Nutrition Protection Shelter and NFIs WASH</p>		UN, NGOs, INGOs
CERF (RR)	NA	NA	NA	NA
CERF (UFE)	NA	NA	NA	NA

¹⁰⁸ OCHA (2010) *Common Humanitarian Fund for Somalia: Guidelines*. Pg. 1. United Nations

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ OCHA (2010) *Common Humanitarian Fund for Somalia: Guidelines*. Pg. 2.

South Sudan

Financial Data

	Total funding 2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)	Funding 2011-2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)¹¹²	Average size of transfers to direct fund recipients (2012)
ERF	NA	Total funding: \$4,781,259 (1% of total) ¹¹³ Total allocations: \$4,781,259 (1% of total)	NA
CHF	Funding: \$118,272,663 (13.6% of total) Allocations: \$108,145,526 (12.4% of total)	2011 funding: \$66,158,841 (13.8% of total) 2011 allocations: \$66,158,841 (13.8% of total) Total funding: \$184,431,504 (13.7% of total) Total allocations: \$174,304,367 (12.9% of total)	\$607,559 (178 allocations) Largest: \$9,992,998 Smallest: \$51,743
CERF (RR)	Total allocations: \$20,027,456 (2.3% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$62,811,045 (4.6% of total) Total Rapid Response: \$31,337,046 (2.3% of total)	\$2,002,745 (10 allocations) Largest: \$10,031,250 Smallest: \$227,929
CERF (UFE)	Total allocations: \$20,016,635 (2.3% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$62,811,045 (4.6% of total) Total Underfunded Emergency: \$31,473,999 (2.3% of total)	\$2,502,079 (8 allocations) Largest: \$4,200,007 Smallest: \$1,000,025

Total Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2012

Year	Amount
2011	\$477,879,170
2012	\$866,987,346
Total:	\$1,344,866,516

¹¹² Calculation of total humanitarian funding includes only years during which the fund was active. If CERF funding was present for one funding window but not the other, the fund is considered active for both.

¹¹³ Funding and allocations available in 2011

Purpose and Scope

	Purpose (as stated at country level)	Scope in Country (geographic, thematic, etc.)	Variations from global guidance	Eligibility for direct access to funds
ERF	NA	NA	NA	NA
CHF	Established in 2012, the CHF supports the CAP strategy by providing timely response and flexible funding to ensure coordinated procurement, warehousing, transport, and delivery of life-saving supplies to people in need. ¹¹⁴	<p>Prioritised the pre-positioning of emergency life-saving core pipelines and emergency safety nets in identified hotspot areas.¹¹⁵</p> <p>Responded to a larger than expected refugee influx, helped to fill gaps in response and prevent a disruption of activities during the transition to a long-term funding model (particularly in the health sector).¹¹⁶</p> <p>Active clusters: Multi-sector Logistics WASH Health Nutrition Food security and livelihoods Education NFI and Emergency Shelter Mine Action Coordination Emergency Telecommunications</p>		UN, INGO, NNGOs
CERF (RR)	CERF life-saving criteria apply	<p>Responded to conflict and displacement, influx of refugees; geographical focus on South Kordofan and Blue Nile</p> <p>Active clusters: WASH Coordination and logistics Health Multisector Nutrition</p>		UN, IOM

¹¹⁴ OCHA (2012) *Common Humanitarian Fund – South Sudan, Annual Report*. Pg. 5. United Nations

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

		Education Protection Food		
CERF (UFE)	CERF life-saving criteria apply	Responded to conflict and displacement Active cluster: Multi-sector WASH Agriculture Shelter and NFIs Health Nutrition Protection	Suggestion for County Teams: Should put contingency plans in place in order to develop more successful response strategies. ¹¹⁷	UN, IOM

¹¹⁷ CERF (2012) *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the use of CERF Funds, South Sudan*. Pg. 25. United Nations

Sudan

Financial Data

	Total funding 2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)	Funding 2008-2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)¹¹⁸	Average size of transfers to direct fund recipients (2012)
ERF	NA	Total funding (2008): \$1,480,873 (0.08% of total) ¹¹⁹ Total allocations (2008): \$0	NA
CHF	Funding: \$80,588,281 (12.4% of total) Allocations: \$76,811,244 (11.8% of total)	2008 funding: \$167,158,905 (9.57% of total) 2008 allocations: \$146,778,828 (8.4% of total) 2009 funding: \$178,039,885 (10.12% of total) 2009 allocations: \$99,800,211 (5.67% of total) 2010 funding: \$78,517,412 (5.6% of total) 2010 allocations: \$130,398,263 (9.32% of total) 2011 funding: \$94,465,808 (10.9% of total) 2011 allocations: \$85,085,282 (9.8% of total) Total funding: \$598,770,291 (9.3% of total) Total allocations: \$538,873,828 (8.3% of total)	\$449,188 (171 allocations) Largest: \$5,000,000 Smallest: \$22,211
CERF (RR)	Total allocations: \$6,163,967 (0.9% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$104,181,859 (1.6% of total) Total Rapid Response: \$90,187,377 (1.4% of total)	\$2,054,655 (3 allocations) Largest: \$2,705,784 Smallest: \$882,075
CERF (UFE)	Total allocations: \$13,994,482 (2.1% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$104,181,859 (1.6% of total) Total Underfunded Emergency: \$13,994,482 (0.2% of total)	\$1,272,225 (11 allocations) Largest: \$2,493,580 Smallest: \$173,085

Total Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2012

Year	Amount
2008	\$1,745,357,293
2009	\$1,757,612,219

¹¹⁸ Calculation of total humanitarian funding includes only years during which the fund was active. If CERF funding was present for one funding window but not the other, the fund is considered active for both.

¹¹⁹ Funding available in 2008

2010	\$1,399,019,577
2011	\$866,987,565
2012	\$647,393,040
Total:	\$ 6,443,369,694

Purpose and Scope

	Purpose (as stated at country level)	Scope in Country (geographic, thematic, etc.)	Variations from global guidance	Eligibility for direct access to funds
ERF	NA	NA	NA	NA
CHF	<p>In line with CAP priorities, to provide stable and predictable sources of funding; and to allow for the delivery of timely, continuous and critical support for humanitarian action.¹²⁰</p> <p>Supports the timely allocation and disbursement of funds to Sudan's most critical humanitarian needs.¹²¹</p>	<p>Mostly operated in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile; responded to conflict and internal displacement; refugee return and reintegration; and meningitis and yellow fever outbreaks.</p> <p>Active clusters: Basic infrastructure Coordination and common services Education Food security and livelihoods Health Emergency shelter and NFIs Nutrition Protection Refugee multisector Returns and early reintegration WASH</p>		NGOs, INGOS, UN
CERF (RR)		<p>Responded to conflict and displacement (Kosti, White Nile); yellow fever outbreak</p> <p>Active clusters: Food Multi-sector Health</p>		UN and IOM
CERF (UFE)		<p>Responded to conflict and displacement</p> <p>Active clusters: Agriculture Health Protection Multi-sector Nutrition WASH Coordination</p>		UN and IOM

¹²⁰ OCHA (2012) *Common Humanitarian Fund – Sudan, Annual Report*. Pg. 7. United Nations

¹²¹ OCHA (2014) *Sudan: Common Humanitarian Fund*. Available at <http://unocha.org/sudan/financing/common-humanitarian-fund>

Yemen

Financial Data

	Total funding 2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)	Funding 2008-2012 (absolute and as a % of total humanitarian funding)¹²²	Average size of transfers to direct fund recipients (2012)
ERF	Funding: \$13,608,310 (3.1% of total) Allocations: \$8,470,252 (1.9% of total)	2010 funding: \$2,510,023 (1.77% of total) 2010 allocations: \$238,230 (0.16% of total) 2011 funding: \$8,915,018 (3.03% of total) 2011 allocations: \$3,736,433 (3.03% of total) Total funding: \$25,033,351 (2.8% of total) ¹²³ Total allocations: \$12,444,915 (1.4% of total)	\$235,284 (36 allocations) Largest: \$500,000 Smallest: \$46,710
CHF	NA	NA	NA
CERF (RR)	Total allocations: \$23,460,436 (5.4% of total)	Total CERF funding: \$69,474,028 (6.5% of total) Total Rapid Response: \$50,605,561 (4.7% of total)	\$977,518 (24 allocations) Largest: \$2,611,919 Smallest: \$67,838
CERF (UFE)	Total allocations: \$0	Total CERF funding: \$69,474,028 (6.5% of total) Total Underfunded Emergency: \$18,868,467 (1.7% of total)	NA

Total Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2012

Year	Amount
2008	\$136,561,641
2009	\$52,983,470
2010	\$141,254,100
2011	\$293,840,122
2012	\$433,640,999
Total:	\$1,058,280,331

¹²² Calculation of total humanitarian funding includes only years during which the fund was active. If CERF funding was present for one funding window but not the other, the fund is considered active for both.

¹²³ Funding and allocations available in 2010, 2011, 2012

Purpose and Scope

	Purpose (as stated at country level)	Scope in Country (geographic, thematic, etc.)	Variations from global guidance	Eligibility for direct access to funds
ERF	Was established in 2010 to respond to support humanitarian response to sudden onset emergencies and critical humanitarian interventions. ¹²⁴ Responds to unforeseen emergency needs; acts as a fund of last resort for eligible projects not covered by the CAP (YHRP); and provides seed funding to new NGOs. ¹²⁵	Country-wide (no thematic preference in 2012). Responded to an influx of refugees and large numbers of IDPs, and cholera, AWD, and measles outbreaks. Active clusters: Health WASH Multi-sector Nutrition Protection Logistics Early Recovery	Funder of last resort for projects in the YHRP; Seed funding for new INGOs Established a surveillance/early warning system for detecting outbreaks (measles). ¹²⁶	UN (Non YHRP projects only i.e. unforeseen programming) ; INGO and NNGO (New (non-YHRP programming) and underfunded YHRP projects ¹²⁷).
CHF	NA	NA	NA	NA
CERF (RR)	CERF Life-saving criteria apply.	Measles, conflict and displacement Active clusters: Health WASH Protection Shelter and NFIs Multi-sector Food Mine action Nutrition	Concern that country-specific needs may not fit within life-saving criteria Suggestion that the CERF be flexible to allow for funding these needs. ¹²⁸	UN and IOM
CERF (UFE)	NA	NA	NA	NA

¹²⁴ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Yemen, Annual Report*. Pg. 4. United Nations

¹²⁵ OCHA (2012) *Emergency Response Fund – Yemen, Annual Report*. Pg. 14.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ OCHA (2010) *Emergency Response Fund – Yemen, Annual Report*. Pg. 10. United Nations

¹²⁸ CERF (2012) *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the use of CERF Funds, Yemen*. Pg. 19. United Nations

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