UN integration in Burundi in the context of a peacebuilding office BINUB

Lessons learned
From June 2006 to October 2007

BINUB

Bujumbura, February 2008

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
# Table of contents:

List of acronyms

| (1) | Introduction       | 3 |
| (2) | Background         | 3 |
| (3) | Process mapping, methodology and structures | 3 |
| (4) | Objectives of BINUB | 4 |
| (5) | Achievements       | 7 |
| (6) | Themes under consideration: | 9 |
| 6.1 | Transition and integration | 10 |
| 6.2 | Mandate            | 18 |
| 6.3 | Peacebuilding      | 18 |
| 6.4 | Planning, programming and implementation | 20 |
| 6.5 | Delivery and absorption capacity | 24 |
| 6.6 | Coordination       | 25 |
| 6.7 | S-G Reporting      | 26 |
| 6.8 | Operational integration and common services | 27 |

| (7) | Background documents | 28 |
| (8) | People interviewed   | 30 |

Annex 1 Recommendations and follow up actions
Annex 2 Integration timeline
Annex 3 Good practices related to the transition strategy
Annex 4 Questionnaire

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi/ Le Bureau intégré des Nations unies au Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DERSG</td>
<td>Deputy Executive Representative of the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERSG</td>
<td>Executive Representative of the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExCom</td>
<td>UN Development Group (UNDG) Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoB</td>
<td>Government of Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR/J</td>
<td>Human Rights/Justice Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPP</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPPTF</td>
<td>Integrated Planning and Programming Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Burundi / Le Bureau des Nations unies au Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &amp; G</td>
<td>Peace and Governance Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peace Building Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peace Building Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peace Building Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBB</td>
<td>Results based budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMA</td>
<td>Status of Mission Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR/SA</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform/Small Arms Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIC</td>
<td>United Nations Information Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIMT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated office in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISC</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Services Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. A DPKO/DFS template for the lesson learned report.
2. The ExCom consists of the four funds and programmes that report directly to the Secretary General: UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP and UNDP. (The High Commissioner for Human Rights is an Ex-Officio member of the Committee).
(1) **Introduction**

The peacebuilding orientation of the UN in Burundi started officially on 1 January 2007 when the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) came into being. This review starts from June 2006, when the recommendation was made to establish an integrated office and when the UN in Burundi entered a transitional phase. It stretches to October 2007 when the major planning phase ended and implementation phase started, hence its greater focus on the planning and programming phases as opposed to implementation. The report offers a synopsis of the process at a given moment examining the following:

1. Transition and integration
2. Mandate
3. Peacebuilding
4. Planning, programming and implementation
5. Delivery and absorption capacity
6. Coordination
7. S-G Reporting
8. Operational integration and common services

This document is the result of individual interviews, several independent after action reviews (AARs), and end of assignment reports. It also provided inputs to and extracted relevant points from the discussions at the UN retreat held in Bujumbura from 24 - 26 September 2007. In addition, heads of 12 UN organizations and three BINUB integrated sections responded to a short questionnaire related to integration in Burundi, the major findings of which are highlighted in boxes below and also incorporated in the body text.

(2) **Background:**

In November 2005, the democratically elected Government of Burundi (GoB) requested the United Nations to draw down the peacekeeping component from its ONUB\(^3\) operation and determine how best it could support peace consolidation and reconstruction efforts in Burundi. In March 2006, ONUB was tasked by DPKO to sound the views of the UN Country Team (UNCT) in Burundi on the nature of United Nations presence additional to the UNCT that would be required from 1 January 2007 to consolidate the gains and maintain the momentum of peacebuilding in Burundi. A strong consensus emerged concerning the need for a follow-on structure that could sustain an adequate level of delivery in human rights, transitional justice and security sector reform, and peace and governance. A continued capacity for United Nations engagement at senior government level was also considered to be essential, as well as a strong United Nations security management structure in order to offset the departure of peacekeepers at a time when security sector reform, particularly of the police, was in its infancy.

In early May 2006, partly on the basis of the views of the UNCT, the Secretary-General’s policy group recommended to the Security Council the establishment of an integrated office that would perform these functions. An agreement was reached on 24 May under which the Government confirmed its request for the establishment of a United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, following the termination of ONUB’s mandate. As agreed with the Government, the priority areas requiring United Nations assistance are: (a) peace consolidation and democratic governance; (b) security sector reform and civilian disarmament; (c)

---

\(^3\) The UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was a peacekeeping mission active from June 2004 until 31 December 2006 numbering 5,000 military, 200 military observers, 120 police force and 443 civilians. BINUB has been its successor since 1 January 2007 with 471 civilian posts.

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
human rights, judicial sector reform and transitional justice; (d) information and communications; and (e) reconstruction and socioeconomic development.

The recommendation was conveyed to and endorsed by the Government of Burundi, which in turn requested assistance, through an integrated office, in a number of specific areas. These developments were reflected in the seventh report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/429 dated 21 June 2006), and welcomed by the Security Council in its resolution 1692 (2006). Thus, on the basis of the peacebuilding priorities identified for 2007-2008, the United Nations Integrated Office, BINUB, was established as a mechanism agreed upon with the Government of Burundi to bring a coherent and coordinated response of the UN to peace consolidation challenges in Burundi and to harness the collective capacities of the UN System in an integrated and coherent manner. It is an interim arrangement to allow for a smooth transition from peacekeeping towards a development-focused engagement by the UN. BINUB’s mandate is part of the larger framework of UN peacebuilding activities in Burundi and it reflects the change of operation from under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII to Chapter VI.

(3) Process mapping, methodology and structures:

Consultations between the Government of Burundi and the United Nations helped identify five key areas of support, namely, peace and democratic governance, security sector reform and civilian disarmament, promotion and protection of human rights, information and communication, and socioeconomic reconstruction and development. Based on resolution 1719, and taking into account the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 24 May 2006 by the Government of Burundi and the Secretary-General, as well as the role of the Peacebuilding Commission, BINUB focuses on and supports the government in the following areas:

- Peace consolidation and democratic governance
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reform of the security sector
- Promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity
- Donor and United Nations agency coordination

The GoB’s five-year programme (2005-2010) provided an overview of the short and medium-term priorities which should be addressed in order to create the conditions for sustainable development in Burundi. The programme provides for short-term measures critical for consolidating peace, creating conditions for longer-term initiatives, and defining priorities for reviving economic growth and ensuring public welfare. These priorities were further developed and incorporated in the Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – PRSP– (2007-2010) through a broad-based consultative process. Together, the PRSP and the five-year programme constitute the overall programmatic framework that guides peacebuilding efforts and helps ensure appropriate linkages with longer-term development needs in Burundi.

The United Nations system in Burundi supported the GoB in developing a priority plan for peacebuilding (2006). It served as the basis for the allocation of US$ 35 million by the United Nations Secretary-General, drawn from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The priority plan identifies the following priority areas, which were endorsed by the PBC in October 2006: (a) good governance; (b) strengthening of the rule of law within security forces; (c) strengthening of justice, promotion of human rights, reconciliation and the fight against impunity; and (d) the land issue, particularly in the context of the reintegration of affected
populations and community-based recovery especially aimed at women, the youth and affected populations.

Subsequently, the GoB initiated the process of developing the Strategic Framework for Peace Consolidation in February 2007. Consultations were launched to solicit inputs from the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and key stakeholders on the ground (civil society organizations, the private sector, religious communities, political parties, UN agencies and bilateral and multilateral partners). They resulted in a consensus that the Strategic Framework will guide the engagement and dialogue between the GoB, other stakeholders and the PBC in the search for sustainable peace in Burundi. The Burundi configuration of the PBC contributed to the development of the strategic framework through a series of informal thematic meetings and a visit of a PBC delegation to Burundi in April 2007. With the country funding envelope confirmed, the development and approval of project activities is being conducted in Burundi in a process co-managed by the Government of Burundi and BINUB who co-chair the Burundi Joint PBF Steering Committee.

While the UN Peacebuilding Support Strategy focuses on programmatic and sectoral issues, the Strategic Framework focuses more on political, security and governance priority that need to be addressed and also encompasses the commitments of the Government of international and national partners including civil societies, and political parties. In addition, the Peacebuilding Priority Plan aims at interventions that are expected to have an immediate impact on peace consolidation. These interventions, which are funded by the PBF, address some key priorities of the BINUB mandate. These three major strategic and programmatic instruments complement each other and are expected to contribute to the overall goal of peace consolidation in Burundi.

Funds for the UN’s peace consolidation programme come from different sources. The largest and central one is the Peacebuilding Fund, but the UN Integrated Strategy also involves funds reallocated to peace consolidation from the UN Agencies’ programmes, humanitarian funds managed by different agencies, and bilateral contributions. Programme funds will be managed through a combination of different modalities, including single-Agency management, parallel funding, pass through and pooled. In particular, all funds allocated by the PBF, as well as some other funds allocated to the activities of the Integrated Sections, will be pooled under the administrative umbrella of a single agency. Under this arrangement, and for the purposes of BINUB integrated programmes, the UNDP will serve as the Managing Agent (MA), and will be accountable for supporting the Integrated Sections in the implementation of the Integrated Programme through timely disbursement of funds. The MA may engage in resource mobilisation for the Integrated Programme, in consultation with the GoB, BINUB and the participating UN organizations. The pooled funding will also be available to other participating UN organizations.

BINUB is expected to fulfil its mandate in two ways. First, by performing a number of core functions to strengthen UN capacities for system-wide strategic planning, joint monitoring and evaluation, political analysis, reporting, communication, capturing best practices, and mainstreaming cross-cutting issues such as youth and gender. Second, BINUB hosts three major joint programmes in the areas of peace consolidation and democratic governance, security sector reform/small arms (SSR/SA) and justice/human rights. Furthermore it will support a series of coordination mechanisms to ensure the smooth coordination of programme implementation. It has also been entrusted to provide strategic support and political advice to the Government and other national stakeholders in their efforts to manage peacefully political differences. (See section 4 below)

The implementation of the BINUB mandate in the areas of peace consolidation and democratic governance, SSR/SA, and justice/human rights will be achieved through three joint programmes supported by the Integrated Sections within the BINUB structure that will harness the collective capacities of several UN agencies as per the overall framework of BINUB. Three BINUB Integrated Sections (SSR/SA, justice and human rights, and peace and governance) will be responsible for co-ordination and support to their areas of work at the national level, and the implementation of PBF projects, and joint programmes which will reflect peacebuilding priority interventions identified by the GoB. The RBB Framework (A/61/525/Add.6) comprises the integrated programme activities and expected outcomes related to Resolution 1719 (2006). Led by Heads, who in their capacity as Programme Managers are to be accountable to the ERSG for the
management of the Integrated Sections and the delivery of programme results, they fall under the overall authority of the ERSG.

All staff of Integrated Sections retain their parent organization’s contracts, to maintain appropriate institutional linkages and secondary administrative reporting lines to their respective organizations BINUB provides necessary support and services to staff of these sections including office accommodation, communication, transport and logistics services. Further, to ensure the proper management and integrity of the Integrated Sections, all non-DPKO employees have been accorded the same rights, access and responsibilities as DPKO staff in BINUB, including supervisory, management and administrative responsibilities where relevant. Finally, in order to ensure consistency in evaluating the performance of staff of the Integrated Sections, there are efforts to design a common performance methodology. Services provided to staff who are not funded by the UN Secretariat are done so on a cost-reimbursement basis.

Due to the complex post-election relationship between the leadership of ONUB and the GoB which deteriorated in 2006, considering that many senior managers left the mission at the beginning of the second half of 2006 and considering further that there was no formal exit strategy for ONUB, transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding became the primary portfolio of the new DSRSG (ERSG as of 1 Jan 2007) who arrived in October 2006. Thus, the second half of 2006 was mainly dedicated to the transition and planning for integration and restoring and sustaining a cooperative trusting working relation between the Government and the UN.

To a large extent, BINUB was built on the foundations laid down by ONUB and UNCT staff in 2006, the principles of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), and the lessons learned from the integration experience in Sierra Leone. It comprises a small office which supports the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) / Resident Coordinator (RC) / Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and six components focusing on the key areas of its mandate: media and communication, political affairs, best practices, joint monitoring and evaluation, strategic planning, and gender/HIV/AIDS/children. The United Nations country team (UNCT) is the humanitarian and development component of this peacebuilding office. It includes UNDP, Unicef, UNHCR, WHO, FAO, WFP, UNFPA, UNIFEM, UNESCO, UNAIDS, OHCHR, OCHA, ILO and UN-Habitat. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund participate actively in the work of BINUB. The UNCT together with the Heads of BINUB Integrated Sections constitute the United Nations Integrated Management Team (UNIMT) and it’s the principal decision-making body of the UN in Burundi. Its membership also includes Chief of Political Affairs, Chief Security Advisor, Chief Administrative Officer, Strategic Planning Officer, and Best Practices Officer.

(4) Objectives of BINUB

The United Nations in Burundi aims to support the Government of Burundi in its efforts towards long-term peace and stability. Furthermore, it will attempt to address both the structural root causes and consequences of conflict, and create conditions for recovery and sustainable development. In this regard, UN support will be oriented towards strengthening national capacities in order to ensure a gradual shift from international assistance to national self-reliance. Following the completion of BINUB’s mandated tasks, the United Nations system will continue to support longer-term peacebuilding efforts through primarily development-focused engagement.

Accordingly, BINUB, within the timeframe of its existence/mandate, will assist the government to: 1) stabilise the security situation; 2) promote good governance and ensure that the political gains achieved through the adoption of the 2005 Constitution, which followed the Arusha peace process, are sustained and built upon; 3) address other root causes of conflict, including human rights violations, impunity and land disputes, and promote national reconciliation; and 4) enhance national capacities and plan and implement reconstruction and development activities, to ensure that the population benefits from early and tangible peace dividends. BINUB will also optimise and facilitate linkages between donors and other development partners.

---

4ERSG is also head of BINUB, designated official for security and head of UNIC.

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
(5) Achievements:

(a) **Recruitment**: Of 427 national and international DPKO budgeted posts (including 51 UNV posts) and 44 posts funded by OHCHR, UNDSS, UNDG, UNIC, UNFPA and UNDP, at 30 November 2007, 93 per cent have been filled. The total the vacancy rate is 27.4 per cent for international staff in professional categories and 17 per cent for logistic/support staff.

(b) BINUB hosts and supports a series of **coordination mechanisms** in achieving key peace consolidation support benchmarks and milestones.

- The UNIMT - Heads of UN agencies and Heads of BINUB Integrated Sections meet weekly under the leadership of the ERSG to provide strategic guidance and to work together on all critical aspects of peace consolidation in Burundi. It focuses on the implementation of joint programmes and the definition of a joint UN position within coordination fora with the GoB and international development partners. It is responsible for overseeing the integrated approach;
- BINUB Integrated Planning and Programming Task Force (IPPTF) is the UN’s primary body spearheading integrated peacebuilding planning and programming;
- The Administrative Support Group looks into issues pertinent to operational integration, including common services;
- The Information, Communications and Advocacy Committee (InfoComm) is responsible for the coordination of all UN communication activities and strategies. It operates under the guidance of the ERSG and the Head of Media and Communication, BINUB;
- The Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Group comprised of UN system staff
- The UNISC whose are staff are provided by UNDP, operates under the guidance of ERSG in his capacity as RR/RC. It provides administrative, human resources and financial support to all PBF and projects and community recovering projects.
- The Integrated Welfare Services Committee

...and externally:

- Through DPKO, BINUB cooperates with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) headquartered in New York, and acts as its focal point in Burundi for activities related to the work of the PBC;
- The Joint Government/UN Peacebuilding Steering Committee is responsible for the managing and monitoring PBF projects. It comprises a 13-member inter-ministerial government group, a six-member permanent UN group (UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, Unicef, Human Rights/Justice, and Political and SA/SSR sections), two rotating UN members, observers such as the WB and the EU, two bilateral donor representatives, two civil-society representative, one National Assembly representative and one private sector representative. The Government and BINUB co-presides this joint committee;
- **Sectoral and thematic coordination groups** that help strengthen the various coordination structures between national and international partners at the sectoral/thematic level;
- The Partners Coordination Forum is the body in charge of coordination of both the Strategic framework of peace consolidation and the PRSP;
- The Humanitarian Committee is a continuation of the earlier existing forum of exchange among humanitarian actors to ensure the continuous flow and exchange of information on major developments in the humanitarian situation. Stakeholders include GoB representatives, UN Agencies, donors, national and international NGOs,
- The Ad Hoc Integrated Commission for Repatriation and Reintegration;
- A Task Force on children rights comprising UN agencies, national and international NGOs which monitor and report on gross violations of the rights of children pursuant to resolution 1612 (2005). The task force meets monthly;

The UN System in Burundi has achieved several goals highlighted in the High-level Panel Report on UN System-wide Coherence:

- One integrated strategy;
- One integrated structure (BINUB) to ensure coherence and coordination of programmes and operations of the UN in Burundi in support of the peace consolidation;
- One integrated management (ERSG/RC/HC and the UNIMT ) that guides strategically and supervises the work of the UN in Burundi;
- One Integrated Planning and Programming Unit.
(c) Four integrated entities were established (with mixed DPKO / DPA (BINUB), OHCHR, UNDP, UNDG employees):
- Human Rights and Justice Section (HR/J)
- Democratic Peace and Governance Section (P&G)
- Security Sector Reform and Small Arms Section (SSSR/SA)
- Office of the ERSG

(d) A number of planning documents were finalised between June 2006 and June 2007. They include:
- The Common Action Plan between BINUB and Government for the peace consolidation process;
- The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy in Burundi;
- The Peacebuilding Priority Plan agreed with the Peacebuilding Commission;
- The Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi;
- The Mission (Implementation) 2007 Plan (draft)5;

(e) A number of joint programmes were conceptualised and are under implementation under the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy:
1. Support to peace consolidation and governance in Burundi (BINUB, UNDP);
2. Support to security sector reform and small arms (BINUB, UNDP, Unicef, UNHCR, UNIFEM, OHCHR)
3. Support to human rights and justice (BINUB, OHCHR, UNDP)
4. Support to fight against HIV / AIDS (being strengthened)
5. Support to durable integration of population affected by the conflict
6. Some Joint programmes in sectors of education and health have been developed (WHO, Unicef, UNESCO).

(f) Nineteen peace consolidation projects were developed under the PBF facility which has approved 12 of them. Nine of these are already under implementation. The 19 projects can downloaded from http://www.unpbf.org/burundi.shtml

(g) In the domain of Media and Communication:
- BINUB web site for all UN entities in Burundi is operational;
- Twice a day media monitoring and once a day web site news are broadcast;
- BINUB Info magazine is produced monthly;
- Radio BINUB, a bi-weekly magazine, is produced and broadcast on the national radio and five private radio stations;
- Specific training and development programmes are organized by this section to enhance the capacities of media professionals in a post-conflict environment.

(h) Common services: BINUB avails the services from/within existing resources on a cost-recovery basis. The MOU on the establishment of common services in support of UN activities in Burundi was prepared according to which BINUB and the UN agencies are sharing the following BINUB resources:
- Ground Transport/Garage
- Communication and Information Technology
- Air Transport/ MedEvac/ CasEvac
- Assets/waste disposal
- Engineering (equipment loan and expertise)
- Office space at the HQ in Bujumbura and three regional offices
- Medical Level 1+

Specifically:
- HF and VHF communications networks were harmonised to create common radio communication channels. Staff from all integrated UN entities were issued with BINUB telephone PIN and provided access to BINUB e-mail and internet services for ease of e-mail communication and exchange of web based information;
- BINUB headquarters in Bujumbura hosts Integrated Sections, OCHA and to some extent the UNDP and OHCHR. Additionally, three integrated sections operate from BINUB’s headquarters. The UN

5 The 2007 MP was not finalised. Meanwhile the 2008 MP was prepared and disseminated.

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
Integrated Services Centre (UNICS), a primarily UNDP-based entity has an office in BINUB too. Four integrated regional offices of Gitega, Ngozi, Makamba and Bujumbura Rural accommodate BINUB and OHCHR employees;

- In addition to BINUB’s health facilities, the UN dispensary continues its services. Staff are authorized to use either facility on a cost-reimbursement basis;
- Training courses (language, information technology, VC/PHP writing etc.) that BINUB organizes are open to all in the UN System in Burundi on a cost-reimbursable basis.
- The BINUB staff counsellor office assists the personnel of the UN System in counselling and stress management at no cost.
- The BINUB Language and Conference Services Unit extends its services regularly to UN agencies at no cost;

Additionally,

- **Security**: UN security officers are integrated through weekly security cell meetings. They are supported in investigation, provision of escorts and are incorporated in the country security plan. There is now one UN radio check in the country.

(i) A **UN Integrated Service Centre** (UNISC) in Burundi was established to cater for the procurement and supply needs of the PBF projects and joint programmes.

(ii) **Staff Welfare and recreation**
The gym is open to all international and national UN system staff as well as the internationals of diplomatic corps; the PX is open to all international staff regardless of their agency affiliation.

(k) **Other integrated services**

The **SOMA** that the GoB and the UN signed on BINUB status reflects the fact that the UN is integrated in Burundi.

After undertaking the procurement process, BINUB has identified Satguru Travel & Tours to provide the travel services requirements to BINUB from 01 November 2007 through 31 December 2009. **[Action taken: In November 2007 BINUB proposed to UN agencies to piggy-back on that contract under the same terms and conditions]**

(6) **Themes under consideration:**

**(6.1) TRANSITION AND INTEGRATION**

**Best practices & advantages**

**Transition**

- ONUB organized a joint UN-GoB technical team mission to Sierra Leone six month before the official commencement of BINUB. The mission went well and a number of familiarisation activities and discussions took place with UNIOSIL’s ERSG and the staff, officials of the Government of Sierra Leone, the UNCT and diplomatic representatives in Freetown. This has proved to be an excellent initiative worth repeating for other countries contemplating a peacebuilding UN mandates;

- Headquarters deadlines, brought about in part by Security Council scheduling and General Assembly budgeting system, can result in very little time for consultation or consensus-building with key partners, including host governments and the UNCT. Mutual confidence and trust among all United Nations in-country colleagues, built up over time through constant relations, have, therefore, proved crucial whenever sudden developments requiring common views and integrated plans all parties concerned have cropped up. Constant dialogue with the government at several levels was also important in that regard, the work of the ONUB Political Section, based on good contacts.
at several levels, was critical in fostering understanding about the benefits of a follow-on UN mission for Burundi among all parties concerned.
A new strategy was required to effectively engage with the GoB. Although the use of PBC was not thought through in this context, the transition from ONUB to BINUB capitalised on its architecture, thus gaining the major buy-in element for BINUB’s engagement in Burundi. The PBF money has been a catalytic and empowering element of UN integration and of the joint peacebuilding work in Burundi. Some people however feel that the mandate of BINUB has been interpreted to the benefit of the PBC fully and that BINUB should be able to do its work on the basis of its mandate and its budget. The PBF projects were more a life-saving buoy for BINUB. Some question whether the SC and the PBC really manage to respond to the new requirements of the kind of mission that BINUB is.

The strategy of transition was well thought out. Its goal was to attempt to bring all the actors on board and make them comfortable with the idea of an integrated office built on the remnants of ONUB. This was a major challenge in the tense political environment in Burundi in which BINUB was about to be born. There were frank discussions with the GoB to define how to work together through listening to objections and views that ONUB had to be endured rather than embraced. The fruitful activities that were conducted during the transition period and are suggested in future similar contexts are detailed in Annex 3.

Reconciling institutional differences between two entities – the DPKO and the UNCT – also took time. Despite initial faltering and the lack of clear instructions from their headquarters, the agencies/funds, programmes came on board in July/August 2006 and started working together towards the creation of BINUB. The habit of joint planning that had meanwhile developed was now considered extremely important not only in the context of integration but also in view of the likelihood that BINUB’s mandate might not be extended beyond 2008 and that mechanisms put in place will be used in all future planning phases. Along with these efforts, it was as if a generation change took place among UN staffers in Burundi, as UN reform became palpable and somewhat possible.

Integration

Burundi is not a high-speed (UN) activity country; this enabled the UN to devote a very large dose of effort to transition planning. Similarly, the fact that the peacekeeping mission ended and that UN military and police personnel withdrew contributed positively to the spirit of integration; the transition to BINUB and the planning of integrated and joint activities for BINUB was somewhat easier than initially envisaged, as UN entities in Burundi did not have to deal with civil–military relations, look for ways to overcome differences related to varying levels of accountability towards the host country and the beneficiaries, or decide whether the “other party” (UNCT agencies vs. DPKO field mission) has the required level of competence to plan for integrated activities as is the case in other countries of a joint UN operation. The purely peacebuilding orientation of BINUB accelerated the integration processes;

Notwithstanding the absence of a firm agreement on the terminology and the principles of integration / coherence, the UN system in Burundi had matured a great deal; it became clear that its significance rests at the levels of approach and structure. Programmatic integration and a common vision became major milestones while attempts were made to achieve a higher coherence in the common use of each other’s administrative services. The practical understanding of integration in Burundi materialised at four levels: strategic, programmatic, operational and structural. This is not to say that there is no need for a single and clear UN definition of integration. The UN system in Burundi will welcome such an attempt of UN System headquarters.

While acknowledging it should have invested more effort in educating its own staff on the principles of integration/coherence and peacebuilding, the UN system in Burundi offers several additional good examples that could be replicated elsewhere:

- In early 2006 the UN system in Burundi created a strategic planning team to develop the concept for the contribution of different UN organizations and determine how to reorganize and align themselves. The resulting strategy paper served as the basis for the HQ support and discussions at the HQ.
UNAIDS organized internal consultations and produced a discussion paper about the integration of HIV/AIDS in the peacebuilding process that was widely disseminated.

- Security Management Team meetings discussed integration issues continuously.

- Enthusiasm with and goodwill towards the integration and peacebuilding orientation, the choice of experienced staff, and the visionary personality of the ERSG proved to be the key and facilitated a huge amount of work in a short time. The fact that the ERSG has had a working experience with the DPKO, the DPA and the UNDP and acted as a resident coordinator before has been pivotal. Furthermore, having one UN head at the level of ASG under whose umbrella the humanitarian and development UN entities fall as the resident coordinator’s function provided him with the authority to lead the whole UN system in Burundi. His rank is a message to the GoB in itself and opens different doors for these entities in Burundi. Similarly, the single command structure of BINUB where the ERSG oversees work of the entire UN in Burundi helped integrate security.

- Although brief, the overlap between the Acting SRSG (PDSRSG) and a new DSRSG (later an ERSG) ensured a smoother handover and faster induction.

- The integrated sections are directly responsible for the implementation of a number of aspects mandated in SCR 1719 and represent a good test for an innovative way to use resources available in different UN entities for a better overall impact.

- The UNIMT has formed a number of integrated working groups/task forces/committees which have been drawing terms of reference and strategic plans as a stop-gap for the functions and activities for which the staff is yet to be recruited. This is an interim measure to address substantive delays in taking certain action. Such is the case with the Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Group and the InfoComm which have been preparing the ground work in their respective fields. While this reflects integration at its best, it should be taken with caution because of the potential proliferation of task forces, intensification of fora and overstretching of existing staff capacities.

The questionnaire respondents listed a number of best integration practices in Burundi:
- Establishment and work of the Joint PBF Steering Committee that involves national and international partners, the UN and civil society;
- Extension of information and services of BINUB Media & Communications to provide all with media monitoring reports and news analysis;
- One UN security system;
- Task forces and working groups with representation from the whole UN System that serve as a stop-gap to slow recruitment for certain functions;
- Mixed agency and BINUB interview panels for all BINUB recruitment.

**Partnerships**

- The vision, mandate and objectives of BINUB and others from the UN system in Burundi have been realigned with the GoB (and peacebuilding) priorities, thus conforming to the principles highlighted in the High-level Panel Report on UN System-wide Coherence. All the phases of integration and development of activities have been marked by a strong inclusion of national partners.

- One positive aspect of sequencing workshops to prepare the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy in Burundi [revised and adjusted UNDAF] between October and December 2006 was the addition of a new joint programme in December 2006. Through this the idea that the UNIMT should support programmatically sub-regional integration (the idea of Burundi as part of the region and the East African community) crystallised.

**Launch of BINUB**

- The inauguration of BINUB in February 2007 was a great achievement. The event was well organized and heavily attended. The presence of the President of Burundi highlighted the

---

4 Please refer to the AAR of Inauguration of BINUB.
importance of BINUB in Burundian society; it was a strong political statement which also helped in moderating some of the hard political positions that the government maintained during the ONUB period.

Capitalising on existing structures and lessons identified (examples)

- The gradual merger of the OHCHR and ONUB Human Rights Section since the end of 2005, which led to an integrated HR office, dispelled confusion about the responsibilities and tasks of each office in the eyes of the GoB and all other interlocutors. This was a first-hand Burundi integration experience with critical indications of problems to be encountered later in the overall UN integration in Burundi;

- A number of lessons learned and recommendations from UNIOSIL were taken into consideration and implemented. The examples are as follows:
  - Planning of one peacebuilding strategy linked to the UN reform; Programmes were built on the already available knowledge and documents by the UN agencies; Programme interventions were selected according to UN comparative advantages and the added value of an integrated approach; The revised UNDAF is conflict sensitive/peacebuilding centered, as it contains both the development security and political sectors; Careful thought was given to the selection of a GoB interlocutor for the PBC/PBF processes; The joint monitoring and evaluation unit was introduced in the ERSG’s Office; The post of Deputy ERSG was introduced and the Front Office staff has been beefed up; There was closer cooperation between ONUB liquidators and BINUB planner to ensure as smooth transition as possible.

- A certain per cent of all BINUB posts are filled by former ONUB employees. This is in direct relation with the recommendation from UNIOSIL where a major staff turnover took place with the mandate change depleting the office of expertise and affecting continuity. BINUB thus made a conscious effort to retain as many staff as possible, having understood the need to keep the image of ONUB/BINUB as a small downsized mission at a time when many new missions that might be more attractive to staff in general were opening and seeking high numbers of qualified staff.

- Following the example of UNIOSIL, BINUB transition run in parallel with the liquidation of ONUB up to 30 June 2007 allowing for resource-sharing while providing logistical and administrative support for the draw-down of ONUB’s military component. Views differ here however; there was a constant reassignment of the experienced staff working on liquidation; the staff could not focus enough on work due to the job insecurity stress;

- Using the model of a pilot UN office in Cape Verde, UNDP’s Business Centre in Burundi has been converted into a United Nations Integrated Service Centre, as described later in the text.

- ATLAS, a global web-based tool which is used since 2004 to manage UNDP/UNFPA/OPS programmes, human resources, finance, and inventory is now being used for BINUB PBF projects and joint programmes to support a common programme management system after it had been tested in the pilot UN office in Cape Verde;

- The former ONUB PIO and today’s BINUB Media and Communications Section press releases, daily media monitoring, newsletters and radio programme, on which all UN entities are copied, is a most useful feature. There is also an enhanced BINUB web page as an extension of an integrated web page that had already been created during ONUB’s mandate;

- With effect from June 2006, ONUB’s Best Practices has extended services to UN agencies, and shared with the whole of the UN system in Burundi pertinent practical lessons learned and

---

7 Please refer to the AAR of Integration of UN Human Rights presences in Burundi
8 Please refer to the AARs of ONUB drawdown and ONUB’s liquidation.

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
examples of good practices, academia, UN and NGO -generated reports pertinent to peacebuilding and integration/coherence.

**Challenges & lessons learned**

**Institutional change**

- The challenge was how to get the whole of the UN in Burundi under BINUB’s umbrella while avoiding falling into the trap of taking BINUB as the continuation of ONUB and a DPKO offspring in changed circumstances. At the same time, the fact remained that BINUB is a DPKO entity governed by a legally binding SC resolution and funded through the assessed budget unlike other UN entities in Burundi. Initially, some UN agencies felt strongly that they were not made part of it as such. Others would have loved to see the name BINUB encompass the entire UN presence in the country without losing their identity. The question of how we call ourselves remains open though the name was given by the Security Council. This may seem trivial but, if resolved, in future integrative efforts of the UN, it could contribute to balancing out the power relations of all entities in an integrated office because the symbols matter.

- Despite significant changes in the mind-set of all the UN entities towards each other and integration, some competition still persists which is only normal and which thus far has not escalated into serious conflicts. A lot of diplomacy, persistence and tolerance have been cultivated which prevented escalation.

- There might be a tendency to do so much to perfection and to do everything now. Integration is a dynamic process, and only a certain number of issues can be taken at a time. There might be too many experiments of the UN and the UN reform at once imposed on BINUB which, if not properly managed, may lead to the loss of focus, exhaustion of staff and saturation with the subject. Activities and tasks have to be prioritised transparently and the plan of priorities agreed by and shared with all. **[Action taken: during the UN retreat in September 2007 a feasible plan of action, which included deadlines and responsibilities, was drawn up.]**

- More effort should be made to step back and examine how we might work better and more efficiently in a new context, given that the major planning phase is now over. There are inefficiencies and wasted efforts and a better work process could be achieved that requires questioning of set practices and offering solutions. **[Action ongoing: with the fully staffed O/ERSG, plans are under way to enhance staff capacities and organizational improvement. Additionally, a series of well facilitated section retreats will take place according to the schedule drawn]**

- In addition, it is increasingly common to hold meetings to make decisions where UN rules or practices are silent or non-existent.

- Briefing staff should become routine and a reading culture encouraged. One downside of such cumbersome processes that the integrated peacebuilding office brought along in its initial days is the abundance of documents in circulation for which time might not be found. However, to

---

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
counter part of criticisms and the real problem of being uninformed sufficiently, the management should make a conscious effort to foster the reading culture in offices. This is how claims that the staff are still not clear on the meaning/extent/definitions of integration and peacebuilding in Burundi could be mitigated.

- All UN entities espouse integration, however, the challenge remains whether and to what extent everybody should integrate; how and whether to integrate political affairs and some other BINUB-based activities with those of FAO, UNESCO, WFP, and UNAIDS. A discussion should be organized to look into the “loose ends” of integration or those elements and activities that were not the immediate priority to decide on the way forward and if and why there should be an attempt to further integrate. Similarly, the UN in Burundi knows the rationale for the current approach to cross-cutting issues; however, it believes that the UN system should give a thought to generic integrated sections dealing with cross-cutting issues and where the parental ownership is found in several UN entities. It is not always clear why, in an integrated office, the DPKO body should keep a gender, an HIV/AIDS, or child protection advisor if the underlying principle is that UN entities in one country operating in an integrated office should draw on each other’s strengths and should add value to integration. If integration is taken in the sense of extracting from or building on each other’s resources, it would be encouraging to start dealing with this issue at the institutional / headquarters level if the intention is to send a coherent message of the UN to the GoB and the population.

- A number of DPKO missions have been integrating for years now and eight pilot projects for attainment of better coherence of the UN system have been ongoing. Unfortunately, there has scarcely been information sharing on the resolution of problems and lessons learned. The UN System in Burundi however welcomes the idea of regional meetings organized twice (MONUC – BINUB, and UNMIS-MONUC-BINUB). The UNMT welcomed the initiative of the UNDG to make a number of tips and documents for achieving better coherence available on its website.

**Staffing vacuum/recruitment/ budgeting** 9

- When ONUB was requested to leave the country in September 2005, this did not stem out of the natural consolidation of peace and the transition phase. As a result, ONUB’s operating and planning parameters changed abruptly, and the mission never entered a consolidation phase but went straight into transition and pre-liquidation. These phases required different types of processes, skills and knowledge than those available in the mission. Drawing the structure of an integrated office and budgeting for BINUB are some of these examples. The DPKO budget template was not useful in the case of an integrated office. The budget template used for BINUB was that of UNIOSIL. Though it was practical to have a template to start with, UNIOSIL’s template was inadequate, as it lacked a number of posts and activities that are now typical of BINUB. Somehow, it complicated the budgeting process because of lengthy negotiations with the DPKO headquarters that did not necessarily concern BINUB’s budgetary needs but were used more by BINUB to justify why its budget differed from that of UNIOSIL. This exhausting exercise personalised the budgeting for the posts throughout 2006. The staffing table preparation process turned out to be a highly secretive exercise on the ground. It also became one of the most controversial of all the processes related to the transition, downsizing of BINUB and staff planning for BINUB. The BINUB staffing table alone was revised over 30 times between August 2006 and February 2007.

- ONUB’s UN Senior Management Team meetings took place only occasionally in the second half of 2006 between the departure of the SRSG and the arrival of a new DSRSG/ERSG. This had a negative effect on exchanges and information sharing and distorted the feeling of collective ownership of the transition/integration processes. In this context as well as that of the acute shortage of senior staff, the case of the interim RC affiliated to the UNDP, who arrived to replace the outgoing DSRSG for three months and who had a distinct RC function, was also symptomatic. This did not make him automatically a member of the ONUB UNSMT, as he was invited to attend only much later into his stay in Burundi;

---

9 The AAR of downsizing ONUB and recruitment for BINUB refers
Due to the downsizing, during 2006, many senior ONUB staff member’s posts were discontinued or were on TDY elsewhere, or left successively (the SRSG left ONUB in April; the DSRSG in June, the CAO in June, the CAS in July, the COS in July, while the PDSRSG was not in Burundi for most of the second half of the year). Uncertainty about jobs with BINUB made a high number of good staff leave ONUB at the first opportunity (another 30 staff were sent on TDY – temporary duty). A number of staff had been acting or had been officers-in-charge for long periods, working extended hours, and unofficially filling in and acting for several positions. Overall, there was a transition staffing vacuum for one full year, which generated one of the problems of BINUB that have had a harmful impact on the continuity of planning, institutional memory needed in moments of change, and staff morale. Similarly, in UN agencies, programmes, and funds, some senior and middle managers were new in the country at the height of planning processes where building new teams was taxing. Although the UN in Burundi has had the luxury of being in a relatively low-stress country, the amount of work related to the integration efforts actually increased while the number of staff decreased. A long list of transition, integration, peacebuilding-related planning and strategic documents had to be prepared within tight deadlines and with scarce staff while closing and liquidating ONUB.

One of the drawbacks was the depleted and/or almost non-existent ERSG’s front office that ideally would be a major backstop to the ERSG in developing and implementing the vision, preparing the workplans and prioritising work. [Action ongoing: now that the ERSG’s front office has been staffed with the DERSG, the COS, and the special assistant who arrived in September and November 2007, the O/ERSG as well as the O/RC will follow up different recommendations made and report regularly to the UNIMT on action taken]

Overall, the recruitment has been perceived as one of the major challenges of a new integrated office. Recruitment is slow, vacancies for new types of posts that are not generic in DPKO had not been written on time, or because the profiles for peace, justice, development advisors are scarce on DPKO roster. Examples of other reasons are: a multi-layered decision-making process that involves BINUB, the Office of Operations and OHRM at the HQ in short listing, clearance and confirmation coupled with the conflict of interest by some UN entities to nominate candidates for some BINUB integrated sections.

It is also to be noted that at the HQ, less attention is given to missions in transition, since the HQ has to concentrate on new missions. This implies two negative situations: the HQ temptation to meet the requirements of new missions, while not giving opportunities of fast-track promotion to those who accept to join a “closing” mission. Additionally, downgrading of many posts by one level was a hindrance as it was impossible to maintain seasoned staff. It made it very difficult to attract/retain suitable candidates within the missions willing to compete for the available positions.

The switch from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, the mental changes it requires as well as the absence of ready-made guidance and instruction have been equally challenging for both the staff in the field and the headquarters and reflected negatively on many segments of BINUB’s work. Such is the case of the recruitment of military and police advisors for the SSR/SA Integrated Section. There seemed to have been insufficient consultations between BINUB and the HQ on the required profile of advisors who might have been screened using the standard MilObs criteria rather than taking into account the intricate requirements or conditions of their advisory role in the peacebuilding context in Burundi.

In retrospect, the closure of three regional offices is likely to have weakened the current BINUB structure. Much capacity building has to be carried out in the provinces of Burundi and not only at the central level in Bujumbura. For this purpose, and for advocacy on any peacebuilding theme, in particular good governance/democracy, regional offices could have played a strong role as not everything can be run from Bujumbura. This matter should be given a thought in similar downsizing exercises at the time of mandate change.

Recommendations to UN system headquarters:
- The integration has to start at the headquarters with a single point of contact and guidance for an integrated office in the field.
- Policies, procedures and common services have to be harmonised at the headquarters and integrated offices provided with a set of manuals and operating instructions.
- Planning and programming cultures of UN entities should be harmonised. (Questionnaire)
(6.2) BINUB’S MANDATE

Best practices & advantages

- BINUB’s mandate is clear, not over-ambitious, and the result of a fair process that included the views and the number of recommendations of ONUB and agency staff in Burundi;

Challenges & lessons learned

- SCR 1719 did not mention socio-economic development as an integral part of peacebuilding. Key socio-economic issues/concerns, social protection, safety nets and food security have not received the required attention given the high national levels of poverty and food insecurity which could undermine peace consolidation if not tackled at the same time and if the funds for a bigger and long-term solution to these problems are not found. The emphasis on this aspect was however made in the Seventh SG report on ONUB (S/2006/429/Add.1) alongside other mandated tasks. Moreover, one of BINUB’s roles was proposed in this report to be that of a promoter of socio-economic development. However, some claim that it should not be the SC’s role since it does not have authority to deal with development.

- The mandate encompasses the ExCom programmes and funds besides BINUB but its legality does not extend to specialised agencies;

- Although the political (governance) mandate in BINUB is trimmed down to an advisory and confidence building one, and due to the circumstances surrounding BINUB at the closure of ONUB where negotiations with the GoB could have succeeded only to a certain extent, the political framework of BINUB is provided for in the Arusha Peace Agreement, although not very expressly. Additionally, in the context of Burundi, the PBC has a real political mandate. The missing link in BINUB’s political mandate is analysis that has not been incorporated in the mandate for the mentioned reasons. The mandate of the Political Affairs Office more or less remained a traditional peacekeeping mandate whose potential should be better explored institutionally especially in view of the PBC’s political work.

(6.3) PEACEBUILDING

Best Practices & advantages

- The PBF has become a major UN tool for consolidation of peace in Burundi. It gave a full purpose to some BINUB activities that have been a direct continuation of ONUB’s but under improved conditions. A striking example is ONUB’s mandate in the security reform and efforts to set up a new National Police of Burundi by integrating members of the existing police structures and those drawn from the Burundian Armed Forces and the Armed Political Parties and Movements. Even though mandated to execute such a function, ONUB Police faced a drawback due to the absence of any programmatic funds allocated in support of its activities. During two and a half years of its work in Burundi, this section was able only to provide some training to the Burundian police and some minor equipment mainly through fund-raising or in-kind donations from donors present in the country. Although security reform is an essential area in countries emerging from crises where the root causes have to be addressed, this contradiction in the DPKO mandate has now been addressed only through the PBF.

- PBF constitues a platform of mixed expertise of the UN, thus creating a positive learning environment characterised by mutual learning: agencies are learning about security, the military, and police support.
• Opening the PBF Joint Steering Committee membership to ambassadors of some African countries, even though they do not have funds to offer, is very encouraging and opens the responsibility to Africa through a venue other than the Great Lakes Conference.

• One of the great successes has been the involvement of civil society in the planning and programming processes. Integration improved working relations with Burundian civil society because only a single UN interlocutor was appointed for different affairs. Lots of diplomatic skills, a concerted effort of BINUB and the PBC, and the clarity of mandate bore fruits in the sensitisation of the government and the civil society for an intensified partnership with the civil society in Burundi where this stakeholder had been traditionally neglected and undermined for political reasons. However, for historic reasons, the challenge now remains how to involve it more in connection with BINUB’s mandate and make it more of a partner beyond its current consultative role at the adoption of strategic documents.

• BINUB drew on the peacebuilding experiences of some other countries where assistance to the private sector played an important role in resolving conflicts within communities and where enterprises, by creating jobs for poor people and groups at risk, addressed socio-economic issues. BINUB thus engaged on a six month contract a peace and development advisor to develop a private sector and peace consolidation project ($0.5m), sensitise the government about this sector, and identify local businesses that could be peacebuilding-friendly. This post was borrowed for the limited period from among other BINUB posts, the filling of which legged behind. In addition, the Swiss government delegated a junior programme officer who has been assigned to assist in this endeavour.

• There were two perceptions about issues concerning women and youths. On the one hand, people thought that this did not have much to do with the consolidation of peace as an immediate activity. However, the view that these two groups are not only at risk but are also good actors in peacebuilding prevailed and two projects were formulated under the PBF scheme.

• One of the controversial ideas that caused debate was whether the UN should engage in supporting the National Intelligence Service – SNR that is traditionally a bilateral activity. The PBF project was eventually formulated (US$0.5m) to test the water and to address ancient habits that had been the source of human rights violation by certain SNR agents in Burundi and where the analysis of security risks had often been wrong. This project should also help SNR agents to better understand their role in the peace consolidation process. In order to go step by step on this sensitive matter, a number of benchmarks and phases were drawn for this project according to which the funds and subsequent activities would be taking place only once the previous ones have been completed satisfactorily. One of the challenging aspects of this project is its very first phase that brings together the government, civil society, the public and national and international organizations in a discussion forum about the meaning and role of intelligence in a post-conflict set-up.

Challenges & lessons learned

• The allocation of resources under the PBF was a political decision. Agencies were involved in further distributing funds through the projects to be implemented while the overall appropriation had been made in advance. This might be in contradiction to the fairly decentralised way of operation of a number of UN programmes and funds in Burundi. This aspect of peace–building, and the fact that the PBF is run by political decisions, is something with which the UN agencies/funds/programmes in Burundi had to come to grips.

• No PBF projects were earmarked for the return and reintroduction. This was an oversight, considering that peace consolidation is also premised on the returns. The other reason was that the Joint PBF Steering Committee could not reach a consensus on the importance of the community reintroduction and peace consolidation. In the PBF, only $0.7m was allocated to the land issue, which is one of the major issues in Burundi that hinder the return of thousands of refugees. [Action]
taken: the creation of an Ad Hoc Integrated Commission for Repatriation and Return in July 2007 rectified this to some extent. The agencies involved in this Commission regret not having established it much earlier, as they believed that had it been there already this sector could have stood out and enjoyed the attention of the PBF. The Commission has successfully gathered five ministries as well as donors and the UN (Unicef, WFP, WHO, UNHCR, UNDP and UNFPA) whose work has been a new agenda linked to the existing peacebuilding mandate. Additionally, the preparation of a joint programme is on-going. As a result of discussions within the Joint PB Steering Committee on the role of reintegration in peacebuilding, recently, $1.72 m was eventually allocated from the PBF for this purpose.

- Different strategic documents of BINUB had not sufficiently addressed the aspect of communication that is important for the consolidation of peace. The media and communication work planned in the RBB has now been found too vague and should be reviewed to take it a step further from mere coverage of events. The main role of the M&C Section should be to build the capacity of the local media and to work out the modalities for giving publicity to all the programmes and projects planned and implemented by BINUB for the consolidation of peace. Notwithstanding a good public campaign intended to promote the integrated office and the new mandate, the timely design of a media campaign to promote programmatic aspects of BINUB’s peacebuilding work and the role and purpose of the PBC and PBF to the population would have been essential during the creation of programmes. The fact that the BINUB Media and Communication Section had been understaffed could be mitigated by the overall prioritisation of BINUB’s activities and a fully-staffed ERSG’s cabinet. However, the success of the communication strategy will depend greatly on the capacity of the UN to offer human and financial resources. [Action taken: the UN’s InfoComm in Burundi will deal with all questions pertaining to the strategy of communication during its upcoming retreat. The recruitment for the Media and Communication Section has been complete]

- Change to peacebuilding brings a shift in focus from “doing things ourselves for the people of Burundi” to “assisting Burundians to deliver”. This change though incorporated in the vision and the BINUB mandate should be more reflected in the RBM and the mission’s operational budget and the staffing table in particular. While the idea of BINUB is that of peacebuilding, the organization still works in a peacekeeping mode in many operational ways. This contradiction can be seen in a number of activities, and creates frustrations when staff are requested to extend their services to beneficiaries of the country, including ministries and local authorities. While there is a great will to deliver as much as possible even if the delivery of this kind is not typical of DPKO and stretches the material and human resources, this change of vision should have been well translated in the operational budget. This problem, like some others already described, is associated with the change of mission leadership that brings along the change of vision which is not always tied up with the budgeting and planning cycles of DPKO.

- The Joint PBF Steering Committee is perceived overall as one of the most valuable and good experience, because it brought together a number of important actors. The challenge remains how to operationalise and empower everybody to discuss effectively. A real debate seldom takes place because of often tight deadlines imposed by the headquarters for the submission of different documents.

(6.4.) PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Best Practices & advantages

- Working out major peacebuilding planning documents, and peacebuilding fund projects in the second half of 2006 was extremely time-consuming and frustrating at times but worth the exercise, as it brought a needed sense of common identity to the UN entities in Burundi and became a kind of prelude to tasks that followed later.
• Seconding agency planning and coordination staff (from Unicef, UNDP, ONUB/BINUB, OHCHR, UNDG and UNHCR) to work part-time on an IPPTF answerable to the ERSG, established for that purpose from November 2006 to February 2007, proved to be a very good decision. A number of planning documents were produced within four months and took into account the UN reform and the MDG and gave all an equally strong voice in the process.

• All the phases of the planning and programming processes have been highly participative since the moment when the system of alternating chairs and deputy chairs from the UN system was introduced for different thematic groups. This reduced the ownership over the subject by a particular UN entity (DPKO vs. UNCT) to a minimum.

• The UNISC as the extension of the UNDP’s Business Centre builds upon the Centre’s knowledge of different sectoral needs and allows for the provision of services cut to measure. It piggy-backs on the existing long-term contracts that the UNDP has with different providers.

**Programming cycles**

• Four UN funds and programmes of the UNDG’s ExCom operating on the ground extended their programme cycles (that usually cover the period 2005-2007) by one year, e.g. until end of 2008 to comply with the period covered by the UN framework planning documents for Burundi (PRSP and Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy - UNDAF) and BINUB’s life.

**Joint programmes**

• The preparation of joint programmes and peace consolidation projects laid a strong programmatic foundation for a reinforced partnership among different entities that make part of BINUB. Thus, a potential overlap and duplication of activities has been reduced. At the same time, individual agency spirit has not been lost.

• BINUB’s current joint programme on governance and democratisation was built on the existing UNDP governance programme. It’s been a great symbiosis of ideas and resources. Duplication of similar activities was avoided thanks to integration as well as communication with the GoB from two different offices about similar programmes. Furthermore, when the UNDP ran out of funding for governance, BINUB and PBF ensured the continuation of a good programme that has been adjusted in the meantime. Similarly, HR&J has been an integrated programme “avant la lettre”, as OHCHR and DPKO have since the beginning of ONUB integrated their operations in the field of Human Rights. With BINUB, this has been extended to the fields of Justice Sector Reform and Transitional Justice, involving also UNDP, OLA and UNODC.

• To address the problem of lack of programme management skills by joint programme advisors, training of all the advisors and planning and programming staff of the UN system in Burundi in the use of ATLAS programme management software commenced.

**Challenges & lessons learned**

• Although a lot of good planning has taken place, planning was driven by short headquarters deadlines and last minute requests. This should be given a serious thought and an effort made to negotiate with the headquarters to reduce deadline pressure next time in similar circumstances. This was one of the lessons identified in UNIOSIL that unfortunately had not been taken into consideration.

• Development, humanitarian, and the UN Secretariat-based organizations have different rhythms and rules of planning. In the case of the ONUB transition in 2006, the pace of Secretariat planning was in excess of that with which some members of the UNCT were familiar or comfortable. In some cases, hard-pressed planning staff at ONUB would release significant documents at the last minute for UNCT comment, leaving very little time and rendering wider participation and review somewhat perfunctory. Again, constant ongoing dialogue across the UN family is an essential compensating mechanism when it becomes necessary to perform complex planning tasks under rigorous time constraints. This negative practice happened in the early days of BINUB too when a number of...
planning meetings (especially those related to the PBF) were called and the related materials distributed for comments on very short notice.

- It would be beneficial to harmonise the view points on the understanding of what are the causes of the problems and on priorities identification by relying on a recent situation analysis as the basis to start off the planning process. Although it is advisable to take advantage of the existence of the PRSP and its analysis, it is nevertheless important to ensure that it is updated in post-conflict situation which is very unsteady. The analysis that served as the background for 2007-2008 Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy (revised UNDAF) used the PRSP developed before 2005 during the transitional Government era. Yet, many major changes took place after.10

- Planning for a long-term activity and addressing root causes of conflict in Burundi to prevent relapse, without knowing exactly what will happen at the end of 2008 when BINUB’s mandate expires, was challenging, especially for agencies which are used to multi-year country programmes.

- While planning is unavoidable, it could be argued that, ideally, BINUB could have undertaken some quick interventions in parallel to planning, and regular political activities that are not so visible. Such interventions could include quick refurbishing of a police station, for instance, or a prison which could have given immediate visibility to BINUB’s efforts and show its inclination for concrete actions.

- Not all UN entities were able to align their annual programmes with the cycles of an integrated office. While the UNDP, for instance, was instructed in March 2006 by its HQ to close its projects and start joint planning with BINUB, the same was not the case with all other UN entities. For example, UNESCO is not country budget-driven; it does not have a budget for Burundi. UNESCO could not realign its programme with the requirements of BINUB and is finding it difficult to integrate its activities with WFP, for instance, because the mandate does not envisage any synergy between them. UNESCO faces a basic contradiction in that it cannot financially respond to changing situations. This is an inhibiting factor in integration.

- Although it is known that a DPKO/DPA mission/office is funded by the assessed budget which does not plan for the implementation of programmes, some creativity could be enhanced to look into diverting some funds for programmatic purposes too. Without funding from UNDP and other agencies and from the PBF, BINUB’s role is solely that of coordinator, political leader, and provider of some material and expert human resources. ONUB and, later on, BINUB, found itself in a strange situation to plan for BINUB’s programmes while the DPKO component of it would not have a programme budget targeting beneficiaries but would still be part of the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy - UNDAF.

- Rather complex planning processes and the introduction of joint programmes, joint programming, PBF projects, and integrated sections still create confusion not only with regard to the terminology but also for conceptual reasons. The perception is that there are too many planning documents with more of less similar content. In the beginning, there was also a duplication of effort after months of work on a DPKO-designed and driven Common Action Plan (July 2006) and, later, on the revision of UNDAF e.g. the preparation of the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy (November 2006) to realign it with the new programmatic priorities of the GoB and to adapt it for the purposes of peacebuilding and the integrated office. This has had a negative impact on the morale of staff working on these documents, especially as they worked on tight schedules to produce the documents during a period of high rotation and the absence of senior managers even while their future in the BINUB set-up was uncertain. This confusion created the impression that this was mainly due to different agendas of different headquarters, the lack of an integrated decision-making body in New York, and excessive experimentation on coherence and integration in the post-conflict set-up that sought immediate action.

---

10 After Action Review of the preparation of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy (UNDAF)

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
• A number of planning documents do not have monitoring and evaluation strategies. This owes to the tight deadlines by which they had to be produced, prioritisation of overall work and the overdue recruitment of M&E Unit employees. Full attention should now be given to the development of these processes using the available expertise of UN entities in Burundi in this field without waiting for the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Unit to be established and staffed. An integrated M&E system has to be put in place with an agreed calendar, harmonised tools for reporting, a matrix for monitoring and evaluation of the integrated strategy and a plan for the evaluation of projects and programmes. [Action taken] UNIMT formed an Integrated M&E Working Group comprised of focal points from Unicef, BINUB, BINUB Integrated Sections, Unicef, FAO, WFP, WHO, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, UNIFEM, Habitat, UNHCR, and ONUSIDA was established. It has now agreed on its terms of reference and prepared terms of reference for P4 and P3 M&E staff of the unit. Additionally, a three-day retreat took place to develop monitoring and evaluation tools.

• There are new UN system (programming) employees who may not be fully informed about the efforts made thus far or were not put in touch with those who had already worked on the issues. The problem of reinventing the wheel within BINUB can be addressed by more focused induction training that includes all newcomers and where the list of people responsible for each area should be handed out.

In order to consolidate the gains, the efforts of integration should advance in the domains of communication, monitoring and evaluation, and integration at the operational level. (Questionnaire)

Implementation

• The implementation phase started late (September 2007). It is mainly due to the absence of a comprehensive implementation plan, the intensive planning phase as well as the very technical nature of PBF projects for which BINUB did not have initial expertise or capacity. Additional complication at this moment is linked to the capacity of agencies to deliver. The late implementation may also be attributed to the fact that joint programme advisors are lacking programme management skills. This is particularly pertinent with regard to those affiliated to DPKO which does not have a tradition of managing programmes and projects due to the nature of the mandates of its peacekeeping operations. A delay in implementation has a consequence of the overall delay in achieving the benchmarks set in the S/2006/429/add.1.

• The missing link is a comprehensive workplan for the implementation of all segments of all the plans showing clear deadlines, lines of responsibility and priorities. Some documents, such as the draft Mission (Implementation) Plan, though produced in February 2007 in a great hurry and with a lot of staff effort under the pressure of deadlines, were sent to the headquarters but have elicited no feedback. According to the IMPP, the Mission Plan is supposed to be the primary BINUB document to be shared with all staff. Debates were ongoing on whether this document was still necessary since the basic information could be found in the already created strategic documents and considering that the manpower has been so stretched.

Joint programmes

• Misperceptions that joint programmes are only those that extract UNDP or BINUB resources are widespread and, to a certain extent, an obstacle to implementation. Practice has shown that the peacebuilding and integrated orientation of the UN had positively affected the will to commit to joint activities.

Defining joint programming

Joint programming is the collective effort through which UN organizations and national partners work together to prepare, implement, monitor and evaluate activities aimed at effectively and efficiently achieving the Millennium Development Goals and other international commitments arising from UN conferences, summits, conventions and human rights instruments. Joint programming contributes to making UN support towards reaching national goals more coherent, effective, and efficient. It is meant to avoid duplication, reduce transaction costs and maximize synergies among national partners and the differing contributions of UN system organizations. There are three fund management options for joint programmes: a) parallel, b) pooled, and c) pass-through. Joint programmes may require a combination of fund management options (Guidance Note on Joint Programming, UNDG, 2003).
Traditionally, in the case of Burundi too, joint programmes and implementation on the ground present a major challenge for the plethora of approaches and tools.

As the preparation of the Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy (December 2006 revision of UNDAF) was about to be completed, a request was made for comments and inputs to a 12-page narrative and the matrix on joint programmes, but the origin of the format and the purpose were not clear. In BINUB there were two schools of thought in this regard: one of them considered that the ownership of the process and the substance of the document should have emerged naturally and gradually from the Integrated Strategy that was developed later; the second one believed that it was essential to produce the document at a given moment and by surge capacity because the in-country planning capacities were overstretched. The fact is that the work on joint programmes was revived only seven months later when it was actually possible to dedicate the staff time to this matter and the work resumed almost from scratch! [Action taken: the implementation of all programmes and projects has been given priority now and three have been formulated. As regards the implementation, work on making the UNISC efficient has been accelerated]

(6.5) DELIVERY AND ABSORPTION CAPACITY

Best Practices & advantages

- The UN helped the GoB to draft projects for submission to the PBF and intensively strengthened the GoB’s planning and programming capacities. UN teams were established to work on the Peacebuilding Priority Plan and special projects with the GoB by empowering and naming co-chairs of these groups among GoB officials. This planning process fostered collegial relations with the ministries and made their employees comfortable in getting in and out of ONUB/BINUB headquarters.

Challenges & lessons learned

- A major development challenge revolves around the capacity of government and state institutions. There is a major issue with the absence of national capacities and the shortage of absorption capacity for the implementation of PBF projects (totalling to US$ 35 m) that have been planned for one year. National capacity to manage state bodies requires development, through skills transfer and administrative support. A strategic approach to the question of capacity has to be adopted. Burundi has experienced a brain drain due to the protracted conflict; the continuation of planning for the implementation of joint and any other peacebuilding programmes could be seriously jeopardised if the solution is not found reasonably quickly and systematically. The feeling is that most of the human resources needed for peacebuilding from within the country have been utilised but there may be others outside the country.

- Along the same lines is the question of the UN delivery capacities of the necessary logistical and operational support to PBF projects and joint programmes. Additionally, a number of activities traditionally performed by DPKO missions for their own offices and employees have been now extended to different ministries and UN agencies (such is the case with the CITS, Engineering and the interpretation and translation services, to name but a few) stretching the staff time and the equipment capacities that had not been thought out and budgeted for.

(6.6.) COORDINATION

Best Practices & advantages

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
• The fact that the IPPTF originated from and was placed in BINUB was seen as very positive by agencies because it showed DPKO’s seriousness to embrace agencies as warranted. It also helped them to understand how the DPKO operates and what its reporting requirements are, for example. It was a real exchange of experience between two entities and a relationship of equals;

• Most of the participants of this lessons learned exercise said the PBF Steering Committee was a major success. It’s an organ that brings the UN, donors, and civil society together on the same subject. The Committee’s intention was to bring together all partners in Burundi around planning how to spend the US$ 35 million allocated to the country by the PBC. This six-month old coordination body has induced the successful building of a new team and of capacity for new partnership.

Although the target level of integration has not been set, on the scale from 1 to 10, the UN System in Burundi rated the level of integration it achieved thus far at average 6. While acknowledging that it is too early to evaluate the full extent of integration, the respondents recognised that much ground was covered in the past year and a half and great progress achieved. The absence of guiding administrative and financial rules related to integration, the slow rate of recruitment and slow pace of joint programmes are quoted as major impediments at this point in time. Respondents indicated that “the integration would score 10 when all the institutions of the government, whose support base came from the integration for which it was set out, have been strengthened and are capable of functioning well”. (Questionnaire)

Challenges & lessons learned

• ONUB’s Senior Executive forum, and the Senior Management Team forum, and the UN Country Team forum were merged into the UNIMT in late 2006. Intensive planning, short deadlines and the need for making decisions at the end of 2006 and the first half of 2007 required frequent meetings. While some consider UNIMT meetings well structured and a real decision-making and coordinating body, others find the structure too big: the presence of UN entities, IMF and the mixed national and international representation of agencies is not conducive to in-depth discussion on political developments and the human rights situation in Burundi. As a result, a lot of coordination and information sharing is done through informal venues or through similar but smaller meetings than the UNIMT. This mechanism has been overhauled several times in a continuous search for the right formula. It now meets twice a month to exchange information, analysis and planning for the coming week on political and security issues, and twice a month to discuss implementation. One of the biggest challenges of the UNIMT meeting is to put the agenda together that encompasses the themes appealing to all. The frequency and the agenda of these meetings need to be further assessed [Action taken: the Security Management Team weekly meetings have been prolonged by one hour to allow for a political and human rights briefing in a smaller forum of executives. Additionally, BINUB Section Chiefs’ weekly meeting has been re-introduced and is attended by ERSG, DSRSG, chiefs of SSR/SA, HR/J, P&G as well as the COS, the Best Practices Officer and special assistants.]

• There were no terms of reference for the IPPTF, a situation which some of its members deemed positive because it gave room for creativity and flexible reporting lines. By contrast, the absence of TORs brought confusion between BINUB and UN agency staff about its purpose, duration and the follow-on arrangements. The attempt to set up the IPPTF was an excellent idea, but the Task Force was not formalised within BINUB organigram. The composition and membership was dependant on the good will of some agencies who gave their employees on loan. Unfortunately, their role in the IPPTF was not fully recognised by their agencies and they were not given dedicated work time to this cause. Additionally, the selection criteria for and the rank of IPPTF staff were not really agreed upon. In the end all the agency staff returned to their core jobs and the Task Force stayed with one dedicated capacity: the Strategic Planning Specialist, whose post is financed by the UNDGO and who also had the responsibility to manage the Coordination Unit.
• Another challenge was that the structure of BINUB was only defined during the elaboration of planning documents which made difficult to draw up certain plans. Due to a huge workload in the ERSG’s Front Office and the fact that it had been chronically understaffed, the line of responsibilities was somewhat blurred, thereby causing friction among the staff of the Front Office and the IPPTF. [Action taken: The TOR was created recently. Additionally, the Strategic Planning Specialists is now helped through a unit in which some deal with coordination and others with the planning and programming staffed by a JPO, several UNVs and national assistants from both BINUB and UNDP. Further clarification of their roles and lines of reporting and evaluation need to be done.]

• The IPPTF is perceived as the main driver of the integration and programmatic processes, overall coordination, and a number of tasks related to the normal functioning of the ERSG’s cabinet which are huge and different. Because of the shortage of qualified staff and in view of the workload, it is felt that not enough attention has been given to agency coordination which requires a full-time professional; during the entire planning phase, there was a competition between planning needs and coordination needs. Although the link/overlap helped in bringing on board UN agencies and organizing the UNIMT around the planning processes, it did not give enough time and space to the Planning Specialist to do the planning job. It is important that the Planning Specialist is not caught up with multiple coordination (and sometimes routine) tasks but is dedicated to advising and supporting different planning processes. [Action taken: an NPO post budgeted by the UNDG has been created to mitigate the insufficient attention to coordination]

• Information is not passed on and shared because. Sitreps, political analyses, and other reports are not shared sufficiently or at all among UN entities. As they do not have access to the regular political and human rights analysis during UNIMT meetings and do not receive BINUB Sitreps, agencies feel isolated and forced to organize individual and informal meetings with relevant BINUB sections, a situation which could be avoided and time saved. [Action taken: With the recruitment of a chief of staff, this is expected to be improved and the transparency of information guaranteed through the regular dissemination of code cables and other relevant exchanges.]

(6.7) Secretary-General Reports

**Best Practices & advantages**

• The brainstorming and writing process for the 1st SG Report started already in February 2007, with the report being published in the beginning of May. The early start proved to be good, given that broader consultation was necessary as a result of the integration process. Moreover, the delicate passing from ONUB to BINUB was to be analysed and hence having more time was important.

• An initial meeting with the head of the mission gave the overall direction which only he, as the overall political head of the mission, should impart to the report.

• Coordination with the various sections of the mission, including the agencies, was good. Each of them named focal points with whom we had worked beforehand, either on previous SG Reports or for other types of reporting. A continued working relationship with these focal points was helpful in obtaining timely submission of inputs. This will probably change with the next drafting exercise since a number of our former contacts have moved on. In any case, a regular permanent reporting line should prevail within the integrated dynamics.

**Challenges & lessons learned**

• The writing and coordination of report inputs on Peacebuilding Commission activities proved to be tricky, probably because a modus operandi had not yet been established and in its early phase these activities lacked progress to report on. Initially, sections tried to side-step this issue while referring it to the IPPTF. However, the IPPTF rightly pointed out that each Section is responsible for
Most BINUB sections and other UN entities are still making the “mental transition” from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Consequently, their reporting at times fails to link daily activities to the new benchmarks of peacebuilding.

**(6.8.) OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION & COMMON SERVICES**

**Good practices and advantages**

- Recommendations from UNDG Operational guidelines and sample agreements from other DPKO missions were used in the preparation of the BINUB MOU on common services.

- UN agencies are not billed for real costs of BINUB resources and are not subject to any capital investment related to the development of services or administrative fees (12-14 per cent administrative fee is usually associated with integrated operations).

- UN agencies are left to determine whether to use the BINUB services as they see fit. A “menu” of available services and their prices/costs has been developed drawing from similar experiences of the UNDP.

**Challenges & lessons learned**

- The fact that BINUB is a two-year body unlike UN agencies/funds/programmes that are meant to stay with no fixed time frame complicates operational integration such as committing to sharing office space.

- Integration at the operational level has been lagging behind the strategic one. This can be ascribed to the prioritisation of BINUB’s work in the conditions described earlier. The meetings of the Administrative Support Group established in the second half of 2006 that initially met steadily, lost momentum with staff changes, frequent absences of senior managers, succession of acting chiefs on the administrative side, and the absence of handover notes. It has been however commonly acknowledged that operational integration will help in achieving better programmatic integration and greater efficiency of interventions.

- Challenges that still exist and that should be discussed to determine how and whether they should be addressed are:
  - Harmonisation of budgetary procedures of UN agencies and the UN Integrated Services Centre; harmonisation of the administrative procedures of DPKO and UN agencies; harmonisation of working hours within the UN system; harmonisation of work methods through the training of staff of Integrated Sections; harmonisation of contracts for staff working in Integrated Sections and of the lines of responsibilities, supervision and evaluation since the difference in contracts creates a feeling of inequality amongst staff; harmonisation of procurement services. It does not seem possible to organize a common banking system because the NY Treasury makes direct arrangements in countries of operation. Although OCHA and the UNDSS make part of the Secretariat, they cannot enjoy same privileges that BINUB staff enjoy (access to potable water is not under same conditions; integration of OCHA’s server into BINUB’s did not happen for security reasons; OCHA is requested to make a deposit to guarantee the monthly payment of telephone costs etc.)

Defining common services

The UN General Assembly defines Common Services as "Services that are shared by an organisation with one or more other organisations within the UN system, through either formal and informal mechanisms. (GA A/55/461)."
Common Services is a generic term used to describe the implementation of common administrative functions amongst UN system organizations. This allows them to acquire significant organizational benefits from these arrangements. Common Services encompass the following categories:

- **Shared services**, jointly financed and managed by a group of UN system organizations;
- **Lead Agency shared services**, managed by one UN system organization and provided to other UN system organization(s);
- **Out-sourced services to the private sector**;
- **Pooled services**, i.e. individual participating agencies would contribute towards the common service in kind rather than in cash.

(UNDG, Operational guidelines for the implementation of common services, April 2007)

The Integrated Staff Welfare Committee includes a representative of UN agencies in Burundi who cannot influence management decisions since all the staff welfare resources as well as the revenues from the PX and other facilities are drawn from BINUB.

Merging Information Technology systems has been very tasking due to the fact that not enough consideration was given to how integration would harmonise the UN IT infrastructure. Budgeting of posts and the staffing table did not take into account specific needs of the CITS Section which is very evident now if different delays and excessive staff time. To save the situation from total failure, local contractors had to be hired to provide the much needed support. This was not desirable as there are some sensitive areas that need to be manned only by international staff and national staff with regular contracts.¹¹

### (7) Background documents:

**BINUB reference documents:**

- The Government of Burundi’s five-year emergency programme (2005-2010)
- SC Resolution 1645 establishing the PBC 2005
- GA Resolution establishing the PBC (A/60/180), 2005
- 7th SG Report on ONUB (S/2006/429/Add1)
- SC Resolution 1692 (2006)
- Peacebuilding Fund Terms of Reference (A/60/984), August 2006
- Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Secretary-General dated 24 May 2006 and on the role of the Peacebuilding Commission
- Common Action Plan (July 2006)
- Security Council Resolution 1719, October 2006
- International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR): Pact on security and development (December 2006)
- Peacebuilding Priority Plan for Burundi, December 2006
- Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy in Burundi, December 2006
- Peacebuilding Priority Plan - Strategic Note #1, February 2007
- First Report of the Secretary-General on BINUB, May 2007
- After Action Review of the preparation of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy in Burundi (revision and adoption of the UN Development Assistance Framework – UNDAF), August 2007
- After Action Review of ONUB downsizing and recruitment for BINUB, December 2007
- After Action Review of effect of UN integration in Burundi on information technology, December 2007

**BINUB terms of reference (TORs), forms and guidelines:**

- Integrated Planning and Programming Task Force (TOR);
- Integrated ad hoc Commission for Repatriation and Reintegration (TOR);
- Integrated Monitoring & Evaluation Group (TOR);

¹¹ AAR of Effect of UN integration on the IT response

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.
• Rules of Procedure for the Steering Committee of the Peacebuilding Fund in Burundi (TOR);
• United Nations Integrated Management Team (TOR);
• Management and coordination modalities for the projects falling within the framework of the implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan;
• Project submission form for the presentation of projects to the Joint PBF Steering Committee

General:
• References to integration and coherence in the UN documents:
• Reports on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, Expanded UN ECHA Core Group (2004 & 2005);
• An ICRC perspective on integrated missions, Oslo Conference, 2005;
• Some Measures to improve the overall performance of the United Nations System at the country level, Part I & II (JIU, 2005)
• Decisions of the Secretary-General Policy Committee Meeting of 20 July 2005, Decision No. 2005/12
• Resident Coordinator Annual Report – A compendium of Good Practices, UNDG 2003
• Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 17 January 2006
• Integrated Mission Implementation Plan (IMPP), 13 July 2006
• Report of the high-level panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment (A/61/583), 20 November 2006
• Evaluation of results-based budgeting in peacekeeping operations (JIU/REP/2006/1), JIU, 2006
• After Action Review of strategic planning for UNIOSIL, 20 Sep 2006
• End of Assignment Report (Laura Londen), UNIOSIL CAO, 2006
• Synthesis of Resident Coordinator Annual Report, UNDG, 2006
• UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guideline (Capstone Doctrine Draft 3, June 06) & Interim Terminology Glossary
• Some Measure to improve overall performance of the UN System at the Country level (Parts I & II), JIU, 2005 (JIU/REP/2005/2)
• Operational guidelines for the implementation of common services, UNDG, 2007
• Meeting Note: Seminar on Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies, IPA, 2007

Websites:
• BINUB http://www.binub.org/
• Peacebuilding Fund / Burundi http://www.unpbf.org/burundi.shtml
• Peacebuilding Commission http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/
• United Nations Development Group (UNDG) – Delivering as One pilots http://www.undg.org/?P=7

13 Ibid.
(8) People interviewed for this Review or who contributed in any other way (authors):

Kossi A. Ayigan Medical Officer, WHO
Pierre Bardeoux Political Affairs Officer (Planning & Coordination), BINUB
Vital Baranyitondeye Assistant Representative/Programme, FAO
Antonious Broek Representative, UNDP
Mustafa Cassama Representative, FAO
Adama Coulibaly Deputy Resident Representative (Programme), UNDP
Amadou Osmane Chief Media and Communications, BINUB
Cherif Benadouda Programme Coordinator/ Deputy Representative, Unicef
Gianni Deligia Chief Administrative Officer, BINUB
Ismaël A. Diallo Representative OHCHR / Head of Integrated HR / J Section, BINUB
Mbaye Faye Chief SSR/SA, BINUB
Gilles Gagninou Programme Specialist, Unicef
Philippe Gauthier Head of Office, OCHA
Kaba-Guichard Neyaga Representative, UNHCR (until June 2007)
Barbara Jamar, Child Protection Specialist, Unicef
Francis James Chief Justice Unit, Integrated HR/J Section, BINUB
Marco Kalbusch Human Rights Officer, OHCHR
Boubacar Kane Chief Political Affairs, BINUB
Vincent Kayijuka Strategic Planning Officer, BINUB
Bintou Keita Representative, Unicef
Jean-Luc Kister Chief Security Adviser, BINUB
Stephen Kooshek Joint Programmes Advisor, UNDP
Cheick Lamine-Conde Political Affairs Officer, BINUB
Gaston Legrain Programme Coordinator, ONUSIDA
Tharande Manzila Representative, WHO
Christine Mbonygingo Programme Officer, ONUSIDA
Natacha Meden SSR Officer – Governance, BINUB
Françoise Muhinwe Programme Manager, UN-Habitat
Awa Ndlaye Diouf International Expert, Peace and Governance Integrated Section, BINUB
Marie Goretti Nduwayo Programme Manager, UNIFEM
Collin Nichols Representative, UNESCO
Israel de la Piedra Resident Representative, IMF
Barbara Piazza-Georgi Representative, UNFPA
Emmanuel Rejouis Political Affairs Officer, BINUB
Bo Shack Representative, UNHCR (from August 2007)
Valentine Tapsoba Deputy Representative, UNHCR
Gerard Van Dijk Representative, WFP

&
John Almstrom (former COS, ONUB), Karsten Herrel (former CAO, ONUB) and Ibrahima Diallo (former UN Police Commissioner, ONUB) whose relevant points on integration and peacebuilding were extracted from their end of assignment reports produced in 2006 and used in this review with their consent.

Discussions facilitated and report prepared by Ženja Bašagić, Best Practices Officer, BINUB at the request of Mahmoud Youssef, Executive Representative of Secretary-General

Contacts:
Youssef Mahmoud, ERSG, mahmoud@un.org, tel. 191 5188, or (00257) 79 91 76 00
Ženja Bašagić, BPO, basagic@un.org, tel. 191 5433, or (00257) 79 90 98 54

This report reflects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or of the United Nations.