Evaluation Annual Report
2018/19

July 2019
1. Driving Evaluation Quality, Use and Learning

Evaluation enables DFID to learn about what works to tackle poverty and promote growth at country and international level. This year’s evaluation report covers key achievements in driving quality and use of evaluations, forward-looking plans, as well as bringing together the learning from every evaluation published by DFID during 2018/19.

Driving Quality in Evaluations

DFID remains committed to driving the quality and maximising the utility of its evaluation portfolio. To this end, DFID’s Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service (EQUALS) provides independent quality assurance and technical support services for evaluations of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) funded programmes implemented by DFID and other UK government departments. In 2018/19, EQUALS responded to a total of 213 requests: 191 for quality assurance of evaluation terms of reference and reports, and 22 for evaluation technical assistance and learning reviews. (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. EQUALS completed requests 1st April 2018 until 31st of March 2019

Expanding our Evaluation Toolbox

DFID’s Evaluation Unit manages several programmes designed to inform DFID’s strategic thinking by pioneering new evaluation approaches and methods and generating robust evidence to support DFID policy priorities and fill critical evidence gaps. Highlights of the achievements made by these programmes include: Centre for Excellence of Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL) is a new high quality, multi-disciplinary, academic centre to drive innovation in the field of development impact evaluation and synthesis, and promote better uptake and use of impact evaluations. CEDIL produced and published an evidence and gap map on disability as part of the supporting literature for the DFID organised Global Disability summit held in July 2018, and has informed thinking about intervention design for the £37m DFID programme “Disability Inclusive Development (DID)”. CEDIL’s work to pilot new and rigorous methods will increase the quality of the evidence base available on challenging issues and contexts. CEDIL is currently running a competition for research proposals, to develop methods for evaluating complex interventions, to improve the ability to transfer evaluation findings to other contexts and for better use and usefulness of evaluation findings.

Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) funds and coordinates multi-country randomised controlled trials, clustered by theme, to improve and incentivise innovative research alongside integrated analysis and publication. In 2018/19, EGAP funded 17 studies and has discussed findings with key stakeholders, resulting in early policy uptake of the findings. EGAP’s thematic ways of working are currently being used to inform the strategic development of future evaluation programmes in DFID.
Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) at the World Bank has supported over 150 impact evaluation (IE) studies. In 2018/19, 15 new studies have been concluded, and 34 events have been conducted to present a wealth of new robust evidence to policy makers. In 2018, the group also finalised the analysis of the policy influence survey (2017), which indicated that IE studies were influencing a wide range of decisions, from small operational tweaks to major political issues.

Global Learning for Adaptive Management (GLAM) started its implementation phase in 2018. GLAM, co funded with USAID, provides technical support on using tools and techniques to monitor and evaluate adaptive programmes. GLAM will also look into new use of technologies to increase potential for real-time monitoring and evaluation for adaptive management.

Strengthening the Use and Influence of DFID’s Evaluation Portfolio

DFID’s evaluation unit has also taken steps towards defining the intended use of evaluation findings and targeting specific policy decisions to influence through evaluations. For example:

- EvU developed an easy to navigate toolkit to embed use and influence aspects across evaluation planning, design and implementation. This user-friendly guide for DFID staff covers how to scope, commission, and support the delivery of useful, influential evaluations.
- EvU carried out a qualitative review of the use and influence of published evaluations by DFID in 2017/18. The review identified that factors affecting the use and influence of these evaluations included: credibility, timing, stakeholder engagement, report quality, and consistent evaluation teams.

2. Sharing Evaluation Findings and Lessons Learned

DFID has committed to publish all completed evaluations on DevTracker in line with the UK government’s transparency commitments. DFID also produces two-page summaries called digests of each mid-line and end-line evaluation it publishes. The purpose of the digests is to share evaluation findings and lessons in a readily accessible format. Each digest summarises the programme or intervention under evaluation and how the evaluation was conducted, the findings and lessons learned from the evaluations. The digests that were produced for evaluations published between the 1st April 2018 and 31st of March 2019 are included in the remainder of this report. These digests provide a flavour of DFID’s exciting and varied evaluation portfolio and share key lessons learned from DFID evaluations covering a range of areas from Humanitarian aid to Private Sector Development (see Figures 2 and 3). This year’s report includes 30 digests of published evaluations.
3. The Road Ahead

Our New Vision of Evaluation “Ensuring DFID Learns What Works”

DFID reviewed its evaluation approach during February 2019 and determined that a combined centralised/decentralised system is needed to maximise opportunities for learning. Our new vision for evaluation at DFID sets out four key shifts in DFID’s approach to evaluation:

1) A stronger emphasis on real time monitoring of country level programme outputs and beneficiary feedback;
2) Greater support to adaptive programming at country level, for challenging issues and contexts;
3) Commissioning a limited number of strategic, rigorous evaluations at central/regional level, focused on meeting priority evidence needs; and
4) Strengthening evidence base by better co-ordination between evidence gap maps and evidence synthesis to inform commissioning of rigorous evaluations and programme design.

These four strands aim to ensure that evaluation reports are more strategic, with the right methods, that support the Department to increase learning. Over the next year and beyond, the Evaluation Unit will operationalise the four new shifts.
# Global >> Humanitarian

**Disasters and Emergency Preparedness Programme Summative Report**

**What**

The **Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme** (DEPP) was a £40 million programme funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) to strengthen skills and capacity and improve the quality and speed of humanitarian response in countries that are at risk of natural disasters or emergencies. The DEPP was delivered by two non-governmental organisation (NGO) consortia: the START Network (who received £27 million) and the Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities Network (who received £3 million) from 2015-2018. DEPP comprised 14 individual projects implemented in one or more of 10 priority countries: South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Philippines, with each project operating in some but not all of the countries. DEPP had six outputs:

1. Improving knowledge of individuals by sharing best practice of humanitarian preparedness and response;
2. Improved preparedness for early action with communities at risk;
3. Increased number of coalitions, partnerships, networks able to address humanitarian needs;
4. Improved institutional arrangements and policy environments for humanitarian response;
5. Strengthened evidence based for what works to build humanitarian capacity; and
6. Human-centred design approaches tested and implemented across four innovation labs, leveraging non-traditional local actors to deliver preparedness approaches that are community-appropriate. £10 million was also allocated for an innovation window, which is still ongoing.

**How**

The evaluation was implemented in four phases: an inception phase; a formative phase to evaluate the implementation of the programme by assessing the relevance of outputs and efficiency and effectiveness of programme delivery; an interim phase to assess short-term outcomes; and a summative phase to assess intermediate outcomes and preliminary indicators of impact. The evaluation used a mix-methods quasi-experimental design and was not intended to assess individual project level impact. The innovation labs (output 6) were delayed in implementation and as such were not included in this evaluation. The evaluation methodology included quantitative and qualitative data collection, including organisational and community level assessments, a Value for Money (VFM) assessment, analysis of humanitarian preparedness and response networks, humanitarian response assessments/case studies, observation and site visits, document review and onsite data collection conducted in Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar and the Philippines and remote data collection in the rest of the countries.

Limitations of the methodology included response rates: Response rates were very high for the household survey (98-99%), community survey (100%) and the in-depth interviews (84-85%), but there were lower for organisational surveys (63-72%) which were targeted at country directors of NGOs who had busy schedules and travel commitments. Other limitations were the possibility of exclusion bias as some settings in Kenya and Myanmar were inaccessible due to security issues. Qualitative interviews were conducted via Skype and in English so stakeholders without a consistent or fast enough internet connection or who did not speak English were not included. Of the participants approached by the evaluation, none declined to participate due to language issues and phone interviews were used where internet connectivity was limited.

**Findings**

*Relevance and validity of design:* The evaluation concluded that the intended results of the programme were appropriate, and the objectives were clear, relevant and met a clear gap. It found, however, that the three-year time frame was unrealistic to meet these. The selection of countries was not optimal due to a lack of strategic direction, and the portfolio of interventions varied greatly, potentially missing opportunities to maximise impact. This is attributed to the initial design process, which was not found to be logical and coherent. The order of events at the first network design phase was out of sequence and projects already planned were retrofitted to the business case. Local involvement was not adequately considered.
Relevance and Effectiveness of the interventions: The programme’s interventions were overwhelmingly found to be relevant and appropriate; however, start up delays limited impact. The evaluation found no evidence of improved knowledge on core humanitarian competencies or disaster preparedness but found significant changes in organisations’ capacity, particularly in local organisations. It concluded that greater impact could have been achieved with easier access to funding and a longer implementation period.

Effectiveness of Management Arrangements: The programme’s consortia approach was adopted by projects and partners conceptually as an effective and appropriate mechanism, but there were varying degrees of implementing success in practice. These issues were due to the greater investment needed than was conceived to form effective consortia, and in some cases workstreams of partners were artificially brought together and not complementary enough. This causes inefficiencies and high transaction costs for getting work done.

Efficiency and Value for Money (VFM): Where collaboration was effective, the evaluation found positive reporting by partners on VFM, and that they were able to implement adaptive management approaches. There was not, however, investment from the outset for systems and resources to ensure that there were effective arrangements in place for governance and strategy, portfolio management, joint decision making and consortium costs.

Sustainability of the intervention and likelihood of impact of the programme: Whilst there are examples of DEPP impacting government policies and improving national preparedness systems, on the whole results were uneven and fragmented. Inclusion of gender and other target groups was not adequately planned and designed into the programme. Sustainability planning was also weak and was linked to expectations around the possibility of receiving additional funds from DFID for a second phase.

Lessons Learned
The evaluation highlights the following lessons:

- Programme objectives should be realistic to the timeframe set. The design process should be logical, coherent, locally led and draws on needs assessments with participatory approaches.
- Robust monitoring and evaluation systems are crucial for course correction and to ensure the projects function as a portfolio rather than as standalone projects.
- Future programming should take into consideration the differences in size, scope and priorities of existing response networks to leverage collaboration. It should also consider adopting and standardising value for money indicators. Contractual processes, management decisions and flow of funds should be streamlined.
- Inclusion and of gender and prioritised target groups should be integrated across the whole programme, with regular monitoring.

Publication Information
- Full Reports
- Management response
DFID’s Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP) provided £30 million from 2014 to 2017 to reduce the socio-economic impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war. It does this through a 3-part approach consisting of:

- Clearing the contaminated land
- Conducting mine risk education
- Building capacity of national and provincial authorities to manage mine action programmes

The programme was split into two phases:

- Phase 1 - took place in 6 countries, including Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Laos, Mozambique and Cambodia and involved demining and mine risk education activities
- Phase 2 - took place in 4 countries, including Burma, Somalia, South Sudan, Zimbabwe

The summative evaluation draws on semi-structured Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with DFID and its contractors, as well as interviews with implementors and beneficiaries in 9 of the 10 countries involved in the programme (Mozambique has now been declared ‘mine free’ and as such was not included). The evaluation draws on DFID’s annual reviews and contractors’ quarterly update reports. It used a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, building on 9 case studies, a literature review and 5 main evaluation questions designed around the OECD-DAC criteria and GMAP’s intended outcomes. These questions focused on the following themes:

- GMAP design and relevance
- GMAP efficiency and value for money
- Risk reduction and community security
- Capacity development
- Poverty reduction and supporting livelihoods sustainably

The main limitations to data collection included the evaluators having no influence over site selection for evaluation visits and choice of interviewees, curbed access to stakeholders, and no specific focus on cross-cutting issues.

GMAP was found to be a flexible and effective programme, particularly with regards to the diverse contexts in which it operates. Overall, it has delivered demining activities economically and efficiently, with scope for some improvement, particularly in the area of programme integration with wider national development plans. GMAP has contributed to a safer environment through mine clearance (except for in Burma where no clearance was permitted). However, the beneficiaries’ experiences of the programme are mixed due to mine risk education resulting in some groups feeling less safe after the threat was highlighted. There is strong evidence to show that GMAP has led to improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of national mine authorities in five of the six countries where capacity development activities took place. For example, in Laos there has been a clear improvement in the way that the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) manages mine action, which relates to the global capacity building activities. Overall, the project has been well designed and has largely delivered the results anticipated in the Theory of Change.

Key lessons highlighted in the evaluation include:

- There should be greater emphasis on supporting stabilisation and security benefits when delivering programmes in countries where there are specific peace keeping/security objectives.
- Key British institutions, such as British Embassies and High Commissions, should continue to support the planning and implementation phases of GMAP with host governments to enable capacity development work. This should result in greater responsibility, management and coordination at the local level.
• When working in conflict zones, DFID should maintain flexibility in contracts and grants to enable the programme to adapt to changes in the context.

• DFID should also provide clear guidance on what is expected in terms of gender mainstreaming and conflict sensitivity to ensure that key priorities of the programme are realised.

• Clear lines of communication amongst consortium members should be formally established at the beginning of the programme in order to share assets, information and lessons learned and ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency.

• Contractors should aim to maximise intended outcomes rather than outputs as they can have a positive impact on livelihoods and poverty reduction in the region.

Publication Information

• Full Report
• Management Response
The Responsible, Accountable and Transparent Enterprise Programme

What

The Responsible, Accountable and Transparent Enterprise (RATE) Programme is a five-year, £30 million, global programme implemented from August 2014 to March 2020. The programme aimed to:

- Improve the safety and well-being of poor women and men in developing and middle-income countries whose lives and environment are detrimentally affected by business and industry
- Address widespread social and environmental problems in global supply chains and improve standards and reporting for business.

RATE provided grants to 12 responsible business initiatives (RBIs) which work to improve the way in which businesses manage and account for the social and environmental implications of their actions. RATE funding was intended to strengthen and scale up the RBIs, which deploy a variety of influencing strategies to build corporate capacity. The programme categorised its activities along seven key strands:

- Thought leadership, Convening Leaders, Movement Building
- Influencing investors
- Standards and Tools for corporate reporting
- Business & Industry Capacity Strengthening
- Supply chain transparency, accountability and traceability tools
- Creating new legal forms
- Product and supply chain sustainability standards

By promoting these approaches in the context of responsible business or corporate responsibility, the programme aimed to make changes in corporate behaviours. It worked particularly to encourage changes that have positive impacts on poor workers, communities and the environment in developing and middle-income countries.

How

This formative mid-term evaluation covered eight of the 12 responsible business initiatives that were supported during the period from the programme’s start up until October 2017. The main objectives of the evaluation were to assess the programme’s progress and to identify key lessons to date which could inform the remainder of the grant period.

The evaluation questions focused on the relevance of the initiative, the RBI’s approach to targeting different businesses, the effectiveness of the overall programme and its likelihood of achieving its intended outputs.

The questions also covered specific intended outcomes of the programme, such as whether the programme has built capacity within RBIs and the impact of RBIs in influencing corporate behaviour in participating companies.

The evaluation used the programme’s theory of change to understand and assess the different intended outcomes and impacts.

Much of the data collected was gained from the programme’s partner organisations. This included:

- RATE RBI organisational analyses - which included analysis of RATE partner monitoring data, interviews with eight RBIs, learning workshops with RATE partners, and relevant literature and statistics.
- Wider evidence in the secondary literature on RATE RBIs, non-RATE RBIs, and responsible business in general.
- An in-depth, structured review of secondary information on the ready-made garment sector in Bangalore, India.
- Secondary data sources were used such as the Global Reporting Initiative (on corporate sustainability) and comparing it against the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.
Overall the evaluation’s evidence base was limited as most of the RATE-supported initiatives were at an early stage of their funding, and half of the initiatives funded were relatively new. For this reason, the three most recent grants were not included in the evaluation. The evaluation’s evidence base was also limited by the fact that there is very limited publicly available impact evidence on responsible business, as well as the fact the programme has worked with a significant and diverse number of grantees.

Findings

The evaluation found that all the initiatives funded under the RATE programme were highly relevant to the challenges of responsible business, and to DFID’s objectives. The RBI partners selected, however, were not exclusively targeted at workers in global supply chains, or to poor women and men in developing and middle-income countries whose lives and environment are detrimentally affected by business and industry. The evaluation also found that RBIs did not have tailored approaches for including women and disadvantaged socio-economic groups or for targeting small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which make up the majority of business activity in developing and middle-income countries.

Available data indicated that progress towards achieving the programme’s outcomes was generally positive. There has been an increased uptake of the tools, guidance and standards by some RATE-supported RBIs, but there is limited evidence available regarding long-term business behaviour change.

This aspect was an expected longer-term outcome and indicated a broader direction of travel, so it was too early in the programme to assess this. It nevertheless remains an important outcome on which to focus because the scale of negative business-related impacts remains substantial. Despite a definite increase in the attention given by some businesses to social and environmental issues, achieving positive impacts for poor women and men is likely to remain challenging without focused initiatives in this area.

It was also too early in the programme to fully assess the programme’s impact in relation to sustainability, scaling and systematic change. The evaluation did, however, highlight the risk that the programme’s activities and outcomes are very closely linked to the financial sustainability of the initiatives, and some of these initiatives lack stable funding sources. More clarity is needed on how RATE-supported RBIs can develop clear impact pathways leading to transformative change.

Lessons Learned

The main lessons to be drawn from programme implementation to date were:

- The need for improved logical frameworks- with clear pathways to change- at the outset for the RBI programmes supported by RATE, and for increased emphasis on monitoring and evaluation (including theory of change development) within these programmes as a condition of DFID support.

- The collection of evidence on the extent to which RBI outputs have led to material changes in business practice that are likely to impact on poor people and their environment needs greater priority going forward to demonstrate the programme’s contribution to impacts for poor people.

- DFID and other donors need to be cognisant of the scale and depth of the challenge presented by negative business practices, and realistic about the potential of responsible business to tackle poverty.

- It cannot be assumed that general progress on corporate social responsibility, and RBIs, will generate significant benefits for poor people in developing/emerging economies within a short timeframe or tackle the significant harms caused by negative business practices. One way to address this may be to develop a wider and more critical appraisal and selection process for companies participating in the RBIs to expedite good practice with evidence of positive impacts.

Publication Information

- Full Report
Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence (BCURE)1

What

Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence (BCURE) was a £15.7 million DFID-funded programme, implemented in 12 middle to low income countries. The programme aimed to build the skills and knowledge of decision makers in low- and middle-income countries to access, appraise and use research evidence for policy influencing. This project was designed to strengthen skills of policy makers, build systems and promote access to, use of and application of research evidence and data in policy related decisions.

BCURE took three main roots to promoting evidence-informed policy making at different levels of government. These roots are referred to as ‘impact pathways’. The purpose of the ‘impact pathways’ was to tell a narrative that showed progress. Project activities were focused on: organising training and mentoring; providing technical support to develop evidence tools and guidance; and sharing learning exchanges and policy dialogues. Policy dialogues promote learning by bringing together policymakers and technical teams to collectively develop solutions to challenges.

How

The BCURE evaluation addressed two overarching evaluation questions. The first was focused on the effectiveness of the projects in achieving their stated outcome of increasing the use of evidence in public sector decision making, and influencing longer-term changes in policy quality. The second examined the reasons and circumstances in which capacity building for evidence use works or does not.

The evaluation used a realist evaluation technique and was undertaken by Information, Training and Development (ITAD). Data was collected from six out of 12 countries: Bangladesh, Kenya, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and South Africa between 2013-2017. Both primary and secondary data was used during evaluation; including reviews of annual internal programme evaluations, an impact case study of a non-BCURE capacity initiative, project monitoring data, government policy documents and annual reports. Qualitative data was collected from 500 respondents selected across 12 programmes.

Findings

The evaluation found that there were three levels of success across the impact pathways to improving the use of evidence and the factors that enhance capacity building:

- Significant progress has been made towards catalysing change at scale, with Bangladesh and Sierra Leone achieving change in using evidence for policy making at cross government level, and Kenya within Parliament itself. Technical staff have had their capacities enhanced by using a ‘bottom up’ approach. These gains require adequate resources and the right political will for them to be maintained.

- There was limited success around specific policy processes and capacitated units in single ministry settings. Projects that have been implemented under the programme have been able to identify opportunities and work collaboratively within their specific settings for instance improved capacity within ministries, and or, good quality policies being showcased, with evidence being adopted. While these are successes individually, these examples did not add up to system-level change to embed evidence use, which may impede their long-term influence. There was evidence of ad hoc and ‘one dimensional’ change: There were numerous examples of individuals being able to apply their new acquired knowledge and enhanced capacity, however these are unlikely to facilitate change at a broader level, as they were not joined up to other activities or broader reforms.

Lessons Learned

Key lessons identified were as follows:

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1 This evaluation was published in 2017-18 rather than 2018-19. To ensure that each evaluation published by DFID has a publicly available summary, we have included it in the 2018-19 report.
• BCURE highlights the importance of thinking and working politically. The projects selected to participate were good fits for the initiative ‘on paper’ but the programme would have benefitted from a more in-depth analysis of the institutional dynamics to assess the potential for catalysing change.

• Programmes should accompany change not impose it. BCURE had most success where projects ‘accompanied’ government partners in a flexible, tailored, collaborative way that promoted ownership, and strengthened partner capacity through ‘learning-by-doing’. The process of accompaniment, however, is not straightforward and requires the programme to be flexible to navigate numerous institutional and contextual challenges such as staff rotation within government departments, and changes in government priorities.

• Changing behaviour requires more than building skills through training. There were variations in the extent to which individuals were able to apply new skills and learning. Where BCURE led to more routine changes in evidence access, appraisal and use, it was due to projects succeeding in a combination of strands: building self-efficacy, providing tools that facilitated staff to do their jobs more easily, and tapping into or generating organisational incentives to reinforce behaviour change. In many cases, training did not lead to change in practice as a result of the wider working environment being un conducive to evidence-informed ways of working, and issues with training design and implementation. This highlights the need for training to be highly relevant to the everyday working practices and objectives of participants.

• Catalysing a ‘critical mass’ of evidence users requires specific and targeted strategies. There was a common assumption within BCURE that training a ‘critical mass’ of individuals would diffuse out to influence broader change. However, this assumption did not hold true. A more systematic approach is required, such as building in an explicit ‘training of trainers’ strategy, supported by a ‘clustering’ approach where individuals from the same unit are targeted, may help trainees develop social connections to provide mutual support, or act as a ‘focal point’ for promoting new ways of working.

• Supporting practical tools or policy pilots can showcase the value of evidence. Several BCURE partners provided practical support to policy processes or helped develop tools that enabled officials to engage with evidence more easily. In four countries (Kenya, Bangladesh, Pakistan and South Africa) this approach proved to be one of the most successful interventions, leading to new tools and evidence-informed policies. The success was due to BCURE partners identifying an entry point where there was a real need to solve a policy or service delivery problem, and the potential to build on existing work and partnerships and leverage external resources. A key factor was securing high-level support for the process and involving stakeholders at the right level of seniority and with the right technical and interpersonal skills, from within and outside government.

• Promoting ‘genuine’ adoption of reforms is essential for sustainable change. Projects were most successful when they introduced tools that proved useful to participants and were formally adopted into processes. This implies that they will remain embedded as new ways of working but ‘genuine’ long term adoption requires ongoing government ownership and access to resources beyond the project, as high-level incentives shift, and new opportunities rise and fall in dynamic political environments.

Publication Information

• Full Report
• Management Response
**Amplify Open Innovation for Development Evaluation Final Report**

**What**

Amplify was a £10.1 million DFID-funded challenge fund managed by human-centred design firm IDEO.org from 2013 to 2019. The programme aimed to address the need for innovative thinking for long-standing, complex development issues. The four key challenges of development programming that Amplify set out to overcome were:

- the inflexibility of traditional funding mechanisms;
- the excessive focus on outcomes when designing, planning and procuring programs;
- limited opportunities to integrate target users in design; and
- limited opportunities for innovators and organisations to collaborate.

Amplify ran eight open funding rounds (called ‘challenges’) to find early stage human-centred design (HCD) ideas to tackle issues in DFID’s priority countries, including the safety and learning opportunities of the low-income areas, economic opportunities for youth in East Africa, stigma associated with disabilities and sexual and reproductive health services to girls and women affected by conflict and disaster. IDEO.org then provided small initial grants and design support to pilot these ideas, in order to identify and replicate effective solutions to these development issues. The grants were issued primarily to small, community-based organisations that are typically outside of DFID’s funding reach.

**How**

The aim of the evaluation was to understand which parts of the Amplify programme have the potential to achieve better solutions that would improve the outcomes of populations living in poverty. The evaluation drew on existing secondary data, such as monitoring and evaluation reporting from projects, and programme level data. It also used primary data in the form of interviews with key programme stakeholders, case studies of various organisations, reviews of internal documentation and online surveys conducted on Amplify grantees and participants. The evaluation used six main analytical approaches: theory of change analysis, programme adaptation mapping, contribution analysis, comparator analysis, scaling support analysis and synthesis and co-creation. The evaluation team also held internal analysis workshops to present and validate emerging findings and co-create recommendations with DFID and partners. The key limitations and challenges faced by the evaluation included the broad scope and flexible nature of the programme, and data quality and availability challenges.

**Findings**

Challenges relating to the consistency, quality and volume of monitoring and evaluation data generated by the programme mean that it is not possible to demonstrate whether Amplify presents an effective new format for tackling persistent development challenges.

Amplify did generate momentum and increased engagement from a wide group of development partners, such as the Rockefeller Foundation and USAID. Some assumptions in the theory of change were found to be inaccurate including:

- Grass-roots organisations can build research and Human Centred Design (HCD) capacity quickly
- Three months of prototyping would be sufficient
- Open innovation would enable distant and disparate communities to collaborate

In addition to this, the programme could have done more to incorporate learning from other organisations’ previous attempts at HCD programming. The evaluation found no evidence that Amplify as a whole meets DFID’s need for an innovation mechanism. It furthermore questioned the suitability of HCD within a challenge fund model to address sticky development challenges at scale.
Lessons Learned

The key lessons identified in this evaluation were:

- Experimental programming requires robust monitoring and evaluation systems to gather the evidence needed to demonstrate success and build adaptive capacity.
- Different organisations’ capacities must be taken into consideration in the design stage e.g. small grass-roots organisations had less absorptive capacity than was previously thought and as such were ill-suited to this innovation thereby limiting their operational reach.
- Innovations should be built around successful ideas that are taken to the next stage and draw expertise from the broader pool of experts who are able to contribute to solutions.
- In designing a fund to support innovations, it is recommended that a more flexible approach is built into future models, with improved forecasting and reduced restrictions on capital expenditure caps.

There are also several lessons learned regarding the specific use of challenge funds, human-centred design and open innovation. The report recommends that capacity assessments are used at the project implementation stage and structured reviews held after each challenge fund phase to track progress and use the learning in future activities. In addition to this, a wider community participation should be encouraged by using appropriate incentives.

Publication Information

- Full Report
- Management Response
Trade Advocacy Fund

What

DFID and the Department for Business Innovation and Skills designed the Trade Advocacy Fund to help developing countries address the increasingly complex range of technical and legal issues faced in negotiating international trade agreements. Sanaa and Crown Agents implemented the fund from 2011-2016. As a demand-led program, the fund responded to developing country requests for support. Total project expenditure was £14 million. The average project size was £330,000 with a few larger initiatives valued between £1-2 million. The initiative aimed to assist developing countries to enhance their effectiveness in trade negotiations, so that trade agreements better reflected their interests. The fund design focused on the development of evidence-based analysis and provision of legal advice to support developing countries prepare more robust negotiating positions. To provide negotiation and technical skills support, the fund financed training, workshops and meetings for negotiators and national Secretariats. The fund also financed stakeholder meetings to support consultation and enable consensus building.

How

The final evaluation examines the Trade Advocacy Fund results and impact from 2011-2016. The evaluation was based on 20 evaluation questions against the Development Assistance Committee criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, results, impact and sustainability. The evaluation particularly focused on results (support to progression of trade negotiations) and impact (resultant trade agreements and their effects). It also assessed value for money. The evaluation team reviewed 29 Project Completion Reports for projects valued above £250,000. The evaluation team also developed eight case studies to review the capacity building effects of the programme and examine whether, and how, Trade Advocacy Fund interventions had assisted developing countries in the trade negotiation process. The evaluation identified the risk of positive bias in stakeholder feedback as a potential limitation to the evaluation findings. Due to the challenges in attributing eventual trade benefits solely to the fund activities they were not used as a basis for cost benefit analysis. The evaluation found instead that it was more useful to rely on an assessment of intermediate results such as ratified trade agreements, agreed trade facilitation measures, tariff reductions and trade access for developing countries.

Findings

Performance measures indicate that the portfolio of projects in Africa, Asia and the Pacific generally performed well and 72% of projects had links to trade negotiation processes. The Trade Advocacy Fund also exceeded its output targets, including an increased target agreed with DFID in the final year of the project. Interventions were demonstrably linked to at least five existing or pending trade agreements. The fund clearly made an important contribution to the finalisation of trade agreements that better reflect developing countries’ priorities (though these results cannot be solely attributed to the fund).

Evidence suggests that the fund’s capacity building efforts were less successful. While the fund succeeded in enhancing skills, information and mechanisms for immediate trade negotiation efforts, sustainability has been undermined by external factors and the failure to embed improvements in national level institutions with responsibility for trade negotiations.

The developing country signatories regard the achievement of new trade agreements as very significant and potentially beneficial to trade flows and growth. The World Trade Organisation is clear that a major contribution was made by the Trade Advocacy Fund in terms of supporting the Africa Caribbean and Pacific group in attaining its Trade Facilitation Agreement and its application of the services waiver. The fund also facilitated and accelerated regional agreements in Africa and the Pacific. Commitments and concessions being made under these agreements are likely to generate very significant improvements in trade flows in the medium term. The Trade Advocacy Fund has helped secure the key first step of reaching new trade agreements and has contributed to the foundation for the eventual realisation of trade benefits. Trade Advocacy Fund support, together with the future investments that developing countries now require to implement the Agreements, can potentially unlock the significant projected increases in the value and volume of trade.
The evaluation considered that 7 out of 8 of the Trade Advocacy Fund projects studied achieved value for money and that the benefits justified the expenditure involved.

Lessons Learned

The evaluation identified numerous lessons relating to trade advocacy and trade development work. These include:

- Trade advocacy is an important mechanism for promoting the voice and influence of developing countries and their participation in the international trading system.
- The UK is seen as a reliable and independent source of advice for trade related issues. Supporting trade advocacy and implementation of trade agreements is a long-term proposition for aid donors and requires flexibility.
- Though a demand driven programme, the Trade Advocacy Fund needed to take a strategic approach and target trade agreements with the biggest benefits for the poorest countries.
- The results of trade advocacy support are challenging to define and measure and cost-benefit analysis has limitations. While management costs for such a mechanism can be relatively high, value for money can be achieved, but resources are required to implement and communicate strong control measures.
- The considerable risks of undertaking trade advocacy need to be managed and mitigated wherever possible if trade agreements are to emerge.
- A specific focus on the poverty impact of the trade agreement being facilitated should be included.
- Trade Advocacy Fund support is unlikely to achieve sustainable and systematic improvements. External factors have a large influence on what capacity building can be achieved and how sustainable it will be in practice.

Publication Information

- Full Report
Effectiveness Evaluation of the Prevention of Maternal Death from Unwanted Pregnancy Programme

What

The Prevention of Maternal Deaths from Unwanted Pregnancy (PMDUP) programme was a multi-country programme covering fourteen countries across Africa and Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sough Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The programme was implemented by Marie Stopes International (MSI) in partnership with Ipas. Planned programme expenditure is £64 million over 5 years (2011 – 2016).

PMDUP aims to reduce maternal mortality and improve women’s lives in line with Millennium Development Goal (MDG) MDG 5, especially young and marginalised women. MDG 5 seeks to improve maternal health through reducing the maternal mortality ratio and achieving universal access to reproductive health services.

The programme aimed to:

- Provide and scale up contraceptive services
- Provide and scale up of reproductive health care services depending on the legal framework
- Increase demand for reproductive health services
- Influence the policy environment and build sustainable services

Activities varied slightly across countries but typically included: expanding services by opening new outreach sites, engaging with existing marketing activities (which promote contraception and services) and setting up new or additional initiatives in clinics, promoting helplines for people to access information about services, refurbishing public health facilities, training providers on technical issues, building and participating in coalitions for more effective advocacy and raising awareness of services, providing technical support to governments on abortion laws and guidelines, strengthening commodity chains to ensure more consistent supplies of contraceptives and medication, and supporting NGOs that were active in promoting reproductive health in their local communities.

How

The evaluation assessed the effectiveness of PMDUP’s contribution to reducing recourse to unsafe abortions and increasing uptake of modern contraception by marginalised women in the participating countries.

The evaluation assessed whether the programme’s activities brought about changes in population level i.e. within the wider community, not only among direct service clients. The evaluation also looked for changes within the policy sphere as a result of PMDUP’s efforts to influence decision makers through technical support and advocacy. Putting these two factors together, the evaluation looked at data on unsafe abortions and related adverse outcomes, to assess whether the programme was able to reduce these.

The evaluation’s overarching questions were:

- Has PMDUP been effective in reducing women’s need for unsafe abortion routes?
- Has PMDUP been effective in increasing take up of modern family planning methods?
- To what extent is PMDUP cost effective in reducing women’s need for unsafe abortion routes?
- To what extent is PMDUP cost effective in increasing take up of modern family planning methods?

To assess the programme’s effectiveness, the evaluation used multiple methods. A quasi-experimental design (i.e. comparing sites) was used to establish a relationship between the PMDUP activities and family planning indicators such as women’s knowledge of contraceptive options and abortion morbidity. Qualitative case studies and the use of contribution analysis approach (which analyses pathways to change) helped understand the programme’s influence on the policy environment. A qualitative, long term study involved interviews with women over a period of time to
understand the impact of improved access to safe abortion care on the health, economic and social wellbeing of households.

Findings

- Overall the evaluation found that PMDUP provided services to many women across the focus countries, in a context of rapid policy and programme changes. These services benefited individual women and saved lives. It should be noted, however, that the quasi-experimental nature of the evaluation design means it is not possible to determine complete causation.

- The programme has had a positive impact on the regulatory and policy environments of countries. The creation of advocacy coalitions among NGOs has also been a positive development towards long term change, due to the fact that the advocacy is locally led and efforts to influence decision makes are more likely to be sustained by the participants.

- The evaluation used a range of evaluation designs from quasi experimental studies, to ethnography and desk-based evaluation using secondary data. It developed innovative methodological approaches specifically for the evaluation. In some settings, PMDUP’s work could not be easily isolated for evaluation purposes as others were working in parallel to meet the same needs, particularly in family planning. PMDUP was delivered against a background of rapid change in health status, technology and policy.

- Important changes have been made to the enabling environment in Bangladesh, and progress made towards liberalising access to comprehensive reproductive health services in Malawi. The implementing partner supported existing government-civil society relationships in Bangladesh which overall galvanised policy action around safe abortion care for public health and saving of women’s lives. The partner supported policy changes needed to integrate reproductive health activities across two government directorates - something donors had been advocating for as a way to involve more of the workforce in abortion care for more than a decade. The government also took steps to nationalise MSI’s surgical family planning outreach coordination model.

- In India clarifying the differences between the abortion act and a sex-selective abortion act became one of the main policy objectives for the programme. Confusion between the two meant that communities were misinformed about abortion and thought that it was illegal, rather than being legal in certain circumstances. This lack of clarity extended to health care providers, and the programme implementers worked with the Ministry of Health to provide guidance on the differences between the abortion and sex-selective abortion acts.

Lessons Learned

The main lesson from this evaluation was about the methodology and the context of the programme. The programme was complex, delivering in multiple countries through numerous partners, with activities tailored to the national and local contexts. Ultimately, using a quasi-experimental approach for the evaluation was not well suited to this programme and its contexts.

Publication Information

- Full Report
- Management Response
Global >> Private Sector Development

**Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool-Trust Fund**

**What**

In December 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other development partners including DFID launched the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT-TF). DFID provided £1.8 million to TADAT-TF from 2014 to 2018. The TADAT-TF is part of the international community’s agenda to help countries strengthen their tax systems to better mobilise the domestic revenue they need to provide essential goods and services to their citizens in a sustainable and economically sound way. TADAT provides an objective and standardised assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the administration of a country’s tax system. The TADAT-TF is governed by a Steering Committee, supported by a Technical Advisory Group and implemented by the TADAT Secretariat, which is housed in the IMF’s headquarters.

**How**

The mid-term evaluation covered the first three years of operations of TADAT from January 2014 to April 2017. The focus of the mid-term evaluation was on the extent to which the objectives of the initiative were being achieved and the continued relevance of the fund, with the aim of improving operations through to the end of the current cycle. It also identified lessons learned and made recommendations for refining and improving TADAT for a future cycle.

The scope of the evaluation covers the 42 TADAT assessments completed up to April 2017 and their results. The evaluation also looked at other fund operations such as the design of the TADAT product (i.e. the assessment process), training, research, awareness raising, quality assurance and governance. The evaluation questions focused on the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

The evaluation was undertaken in two main stages; namely, a desk-based review of fund documentation followed by field visits and interviews with key stakeholders. These took place at the IMF in Washington DC and in four-selected TADAT assessed countries (Armenia, Bangladesh, Dominican Republic and Rwanda) where the evaluators interviewed representatives of the countries’ tax administration or revenue authority and other stakeholders. The evaluation team also interviewed TADAT Partners, regional tax administration bodies and TADAT team leaders and assessors. The evaluation noted one change to approach: Bangladesh was not originally included in the projects identified for field visits based on initial selection criteria but was added to ensure representation of South Asia within the evaluation.

**Findings**

The mid-term evaluation concluded that the TADAT product is robust and “fit for purpose”. Drawing on evidence from the countries visited, it found the TADAT assessment process to be very relevant for tax administrations and the development partners that are supporting and/or looking to support the tax administrations. There were numerous examples of the TADAT assessment process having the desired impact, such as refocusing of tax administration reform, development partners technical assistance or efforts to address tax administration weaknesses. Feedback from recipient countries, TADAT Partners, other development partners, stakeholders and assessors highlighted the Secretariat’s energy, responsiveness and support.

The evaluation found that while the TADAT assessment process and the fund’s wider operations had strong results, these could benefit from some fine-tuning as the project moves into the next two years of the current cycle and achieves a greater level of maturity. It also concluded that there could be greater awareness raising for the TADAT scope and process. Additional areas for improvement include the efficiency of the process for all stakeholders involved in a TADAT assessment and post-TADAT assessment of impact and actions by the tax administrations. The evaluation also found that the project could benefit from capturing
and more actively disseminating lessons learned, with a view to contribute to the body of knowledge for good practice in tax administration.

**Lessons Learned**

The mid-term evaluation identified 18 lessons learned relating to the two DAC evaluation criteria of efficiency and effectiveness, which could be used to guide future operations. These lessons predominantly describe operational processes that can be included in the programme Field Guide or in other programme guidance.

- There is a “right time” for a tax administration to undertake a TADAT assessment
- The tax administration core team development requires additional guidance.
- Ensure sufficient consideration of preliminary tasks such as briefing packs, pre-mission checklists, the pre-assessment questionnaire, provision of pre-assessment awareness training to the tax administration and clarification of roles and responsibilities.
- Ensure communication of the revenue administration's next steps after a TADAT assessment, such as drafting a reform or action plan to address the weaknesses identified, and how to start engaging with development partners that will support the process.
- Time is needed to implement reforms and improve scores; reforms should be implemented gradually to ensure that they do not result in undesirable outcomes.
- There are benefits to undertaking a repeat TADAT assessment, but it is not always essential. Where a tax administration is strongly engaged with addressing the TADAT results, it could undertake a self-assessment or seek external verification of improvements.
- Tax administrations and development partners should be prevented from focusing only on weaknesses in Performance Assessment Reports (PARs) and simplistically tying assistance to changes in scores.
- Consider how assessors are appointed for TADAT assessments, how TADAT Partners nominate assessors and clarify the process for quality assuring the PAR.
- To ensure sharing of lessons learned, develop a structured, transparent mechanism to harness feedback from assessors and experts on the activities of the principal investigator and in relation to the guidance material.

**Publication Information**

- [Full Report](#)
**AsCOT >> Governance**

**Improving the Management of Public Funds for the Benefit of People in Burma**

**What**

The ‘Improving the management of public funds for the people of Burma’ programme aims to support the achievement of strengthened public financial management systems and institutions, and improved policy formulation and implementation in Myanmar (Burma). It seeks to support Myanmar’s large-scale transformation efforts after nearly 50 years of military rule and ethnic conflict. DFID contributes £20m to the five-year programme, which commenced in April 2014 and ended in March 2019. The programme has three components: 1) Modernisation of public financial management implemented by the World Bank through a multi-donor trust fund 2) Social accountability, implemented by the Asia Foundation to support fiscal transparency and improved citizen engagement in government and parliament and 3) Management of natural resources through support to Myanmar’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative process and civil society engagement, via a World Bank multi-donor trust fund.

**How**

The performance evaluation was conducted towards the end of the project closure to provide guidance to DFID on the design of future public financial management programmes in Myanmar. The evaluation focused on the implementation process and the results achieved to date, with a view to determining whether the program was designed and implemented in a way that will deliver impact in the longer term. Emphasis was placed on the review and assessment of the programme’s theory of change (how change is expected to occur) and delivery modalities. The approach to the evaluation had three elements: 1) evaluation of programme relevance, effectiveness and efficiency and achievement of value for money 2) evaluation of the institutional and delivery modalities relative to alternative options 3) evaluation of the flexibility of the programme to respond to changes in the political context. The evaluation methods used included a review of programme documentation and public financial management sector knowledge, and interviews with key informants. Weaknesses in the results framework and in the approach to financial reporting mean that it is not possible for the evaluation team to reach overall conclusions on the cost effectiveness or value for money (VFM) of the programme to date.

**Findings**

Overall, the evaluation concludes that the programme remained relevant to the needs of the Government of Myanmar’s central finance agencies and to the government’s stated policy priorities. In relation to component 1 (the modernisation of public financial management), the evaluation found that the programme is based on a solid understanding of the technical PFM issues being addressed and has strong local ownership. The programme was developed in a collaborative effort between the World Bank, the Government of Myanmar (GoM), and development partners, and has become the de facto action plan for the GoM’s PFM Strategy. With regard to component 2 (Social accountability), the evaluation concluded that the programme provided an appropriate level of support (through continuous engagement and support to basic functions) to the identification of opportunities at the subnational (state and regional) level. This could form the basis for future engagement and support to the decentralisation process, which will be a major foundation of any effective peace process in Myanmar. Component 3 (Management of natural resources), which focused on Myanmar’s participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative process, was found to be an important first step in achieving the broader goal of improved governance of natural resources and enabling their more equitable distribution.

**Lessons Learned**

The evaluation highlights the following lessons:

- In order to continue the progress made in improving the governance of the Development Affairs Organisation’s, the technical support provided by the programme will need to expand to include central and sub-national agencies, thereby targeting all three tiers of government, including Union and states/regions.

- To sustain engagement at the national level, it is crucial that support to Multi-Stakeholder Group and the National Coordination Secretariat continues. Adopting a more flexible approach to this support would facilitate better engagement and identification of opportunities.
during the implementation phase. The programme should also create a platform for a dialogue between the stakeholders at the Union level and the states/regions level to increase capacity building in the Intergovernmental Financial Relations Department.

- Extractives governance could be strengthened through support for the implementation policy recommendations from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative reports. In addition, legislative reform around revenue mobilisation and sharing of revenue and expenditure assignments between central and state/region governments would also help to strengthen the governing bodies.

Publication Information

- Full Report
- Management Response
**Interim Report on Impact Evaluation of Skills for Market (SFM)**

**What**

The Punjab Economic Opportunities Programme (PEOP) was a £55 million programme, co-funded by DFID and the Government of Punjab. PEOP aimed to improve income earning opportunities for 145,000 poor and vulnerable people (40% of them women) in selected districts of Punjab by equipping them with market oriented vocational skills.

The Skills for Market component of PEOP ran from 2013-2014 in three districts of Punjab (Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar and Muzaffargarh). SFM specifically targeted rural women and aimed to improve their livelihood and labour force participation through needs-based skills training (stitching garments).

**How**

The Impact Evaluation of Skills for Market (SFM) sought to assess the impact of skills training on economic and non-economic outcomes for the rural population of South Punjab. The impact of three outcomes was assessed:

- Skills acquisition of trainees - measured through engagement in the vocational skill
- Downstream, socio-economic outcomes (including earnings, employability, civic engagement, physical/mental health, gender equality and government services usage)
- General satisfaction of the programme - measured through a revealed preference approach in voting behaviour

Given the hypothesis that women face significant barriers to out-of-village travel, the evaluation of SFM was designed to test different ways of alleviating those constraints. The evaluation conducted eight treatment arms including village-based training, non-village-based training, information sharing about the course content, provision of group transport, and community mobilisation to support girls’ access vocational skills.

To analyse the impact of SFM, the evaluation carried out a Randomised Control Trial (RCT) sampling 9,893 households across 324 villages of which 243 received the intervention (the treatment group) and 81 did not (the control group). The RCT assessed the impact of training on the three outcomes related to skills acquisition, socio-economic factors and general programme satisfaction. Various interventions were introduced to assess the barriers to rural women’s participation in the training scheme. The interventions were randomly introduced so their respective impacts on training outcomes could be isolated. The intervention variants were distance, safety and reliability of transport, stipend amounts and social norms.

Within the treatment group, both village and non-village-based training was given to randomly selected women, with varying levels of information in each one. Household surveys were used to track training outcomes of the households in the villages.

**Findings**

- Results of the evaluation suggest that making skills training in high-demand and popular trades accessible to rural women increases uptake, and the training can successfully provide valuable income-generating skills. Trainings from the programme resulted in increased stitch making activity amongst women and trainees were more likely to both be earning and have increased earnings. With the exception of earning, other downstream outcomes, such as female empowerment and state engagement, were not found to have been affected.

- The evaluation found that completing a training course did not lead to increased state engagement or general employability; instead the evaluation determined that people who were already more employable and more civicly engaged were much more likely to complete the course. This is an important finding as it points to positive selection in offering training courses and highlights that some simple pre-screening before offering vouchers could also significantly enhance completion for those less likely to finish a course.
There was no significant change in aggregate household consumption when comparing households in the intervention area and those outside. However, 17 months after the end of the course, there was a positive impact on individual earnings.

The above results are interim findings. More conclusive findings will be available in the final SFM report, expected by late 2019.

**Lessons Learned**

The report indicates that household surveys are the most effective way to gather data on outcomes such as earnings, employability and service usage. Value was found in hiring a local, professional survey firm to conduct the surveys, and field reports. Spot checking sample response rates and drafting field strategies (for use when response rates were low) to address the issue of non-response also seem to be good practice and a lesson learnt for future.

Another key piece of learning was that villages are the most effective place to locate training centres, given rural women’s travel and security constraints.

**Publication Information**

- [Full Report](#)
- [Management Response](#)
Evaluation of impacts of the financial inclusion component under the poorest state inclusive growth (PSIG) Programme

What
The financial inclusion component of the Poorest State Inclusive Growth (PSIG-Fin) project, is funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) who provided £30 million to support financial inclusion and women's empowerment across four low income states in northern India (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh). The programme ran from September 2012 to December 2018 and works primarily through the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) to increase financial inclusion from a policy, institutional and client perspective. Its primary goal is to facilitate an environment that encourages the responsible provision of financial services to poor people.

How
The midline evaluation, which followed the baseline report, was completed in 2015. This impact evaluation does not seek to track changes since 2015; rather, it is largely a qualitative piece on activities and issues in relation to the three target levels of policy, institutions and households. The primary focus was an in-depth qualitative investigation at household level. The evaluation focused firstly on the broader financial inclusion context from community perceptions and the use of financial services available. It also explored the specific areas of businesses financed by PSIG that supported micro-credit. In particular, it analysed the role of women in these areas, and the opportunities for growth. These findings are based on interviews in 21 baseline clusters across all four states, 50 focus groups/interviews and 124 enterprise case studies.

Findings
At a policy level: The evaluation concluded that the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) has contributed to national policy advocacy for micro finance institutions, some of which have evolved into small finance banks. The PSIG implementing team has been a part of the Responsible Finance Forum for micro finance institutions and SIDBI is furthering this work. There is also a new opportunity which has emerged in the form of a new government initiative from the Micro-Unit Development and Refinancing Agency (which is part of SIDBI). This would link this mechanism with micro and small enterprises for lending opportunities, which aligns with the PSIG objectives.

At an institutional level: PSIG aimed to increase the ability of financial institutions to reach difficult geographies and excluded groups, including women, with appropriate services. There is an overall trend within the country of increased access to financial services. Nevertheless, within this context and with support from the programme, 12 of the participating financial institutions increased the scale of their operations. The overall number of clients of PSIG MFI partners was estimated to have increased from 3.7 million as of March 2014 to 7.8 million in March 2016. The evaluation found that there were higher rates of institutional growth in poor districts compared to less poor districts. The programme targeted hard-to-reach places, but inevitably lower population density and challenging terrain increases the costs of operations and slows expansion. The evaluation found that the programme’s guidelines for reaching more marginalised populations played a significant role in encouraging outreach to low income areas in the PSIG states. PSIG gender initiatives have now been initiated across MFIs in all four states. In UP and Bihar, the MFI management response has been positive. Increasing the ratio of women staff is an objective of PSIG for a sector where most client are women. Branch data obtained from ET field visits indicate that women are around 12% of field staff, or less. Employing women in field operations is seen to be challenging given the long working hours and local travel requirements particularly in rural areas.

At the household level: The evaluation found that most households have bank savings accounts, with community members reporting that opening a bank account is now very easy. However, the very
Poor are often still excluded, or even when a bank account was accessible to them they did not see the purpose of having one if they had nothing to save.

While the programme aimed to encourage savings, women and men were more likely to be motivated to open an account to receive payments and preferred to save cash at home or with their credit association. More trust in banks is needed to overcome current savings practices, particularly as wide sections of low-income populations in the areas have recently lost out to savings scams.

It is important for the financial institutions to provide a diverse range of products for low-income clients. Micro-credit products for generating income are particularly in demand. Community members would like banks to offer more flexible and adaptive payment terms and options for top-up loans. Bank loans, including special schemes for low income businesses, are reported to be largely inaccessible and high cost to low income households. Accordingly, micro-credit – from MFIs and through well-functioning Self-Help Groups – is seen as a significant and mostly ‘clean’ resource for poor and low-income households.

Lessons Learned

Key lessons learned highlighted in the evaluation were as follows:

- Clear communication is needed to establish transparency and trust to encourage savings in banks.
- There are three critical gaps for micro finance institutions: lack of information and use of data; the absence of systematic loan appraisal based on good information about the client’s financial position and the challenge of being able to deliver the loan whilst aligning repayments to cash flow. Financial literacy and capability are critical for clients and service providers.
- The women’s empowerment component of the PSIG is an important element in a context where patriarchal systems are highly prevalent and limit women as staff, managers, board members of micro finance institutions and clients.
- Different social communities including vulnerable groups (e.g. scheduled castes and tribes) and minority groups (e.g. muslims) have used micro-credit for a range of different businesses. The majority of these businesses are managed by men. Women are more likely to manage businesses that are home based, do not require a lot of external market interaction or mobility, and are easily combined with household work. There are, however, some interesting examples of women (mainly urban examples, involving older women) who managed the main household income source, and had grown their business successfully, with higher investment.

Publication Information

- Full Report
Independent Evaluation of Artemisinin Monotherapy Replacement in the Private Sector to Support the Containment of Artemisinin Resistant Malaria in Burma: Myanmar Artemisinin Monotherapy Replacement Malaria Project (AMTR) Independent Evaluation

What

The Artemisinin Monotherapy Replacement (AMTR) project, co-funded by DFID, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Good Ventures was launched in 2012 and ran for five years. Myanmar has seen an overall decline in malaria incidence, declining to levels below 2% in nationally representative household surveys. While this is significant in terms of reduction within Myanmar, the country had the highest burden of malaria in the Greater Mekong sub-region. However, prior to project implementation there were increasing concerns that the most dangerous human malaria parasite was becoming resistant to Artemisinin, which is the main ingredient used in malaria treatments. The project being evaluated aimed to replace the single drug with a combination drug in the private sector to limit drug resistant malaria in Myanmar. Malaria parasites are not resistant to this combination therapy. The project was implemented in an attempt to tackle the most critical issues related to malaria case management within the private sector of eastern Myanmar:

- High usage levels of oral artemisinin mono-therapy (oAMT) with artesunate (to which parasites were becoming resistant)
- Doses being administered but the course of treatment not being completed
- The very low level of availability of quality assured alternative combination therapy (QA-ACT)

How

The evaluation of the AMTR project was conducted by Montrose International. The evaluation aimed to assess the effectiveness of project deliverables and the extent to which outcome targets had been achieved.

The main activities of the project were:

- 8.8 million treatment courses of combination therapy received, packaged and sold
- 7,000 providers trained in the use of Rapid Diagnostic Tests
- 950,000 Rapid Diagnostic Tests correctly used and reported

As a result of these interventions, the project aimed to achieve

- 73% of suspected malaria cases complete a full course of the approved combination therapy within 24 hours of onset of fever
- Proportion of malaria cases in the target areas that are treated with the older single drug fall to less than 10% by Year 2 of the project
- 161,000 DALYs gained in Myanmar over the three years (of which 80,500 are attributable to DFID)

DALYs (Disability-Adjusted Life Year) are a metric for quantifying the burden of disease from mortality and morbidity, and one DALY can be thought of as one lost year of “healthy” life.

The evaluation adopted a mixed-methods methodology. For the qualitative component of the evaluation the evaluators interviewed government representatives, private sector suppliers and UN agencies over the course of three visits to Myanmar.

The quantitative component of the evaluation included an analysis of routine data from the project and analysis of survey results. As part of the project activities the AMTR project undertook annual household, outlet and mystery client surveys, and the evaluation team drew on the reports of the surveys.

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2 This evaluation was published in 2017-18 rather than 2018-19. To ensure that each evaluation published by DFID has a publicly available summary, we have included it in the 2018-19 report.
3 https://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/
Findings

The evaluation found mixed results in that the project was generally effective and efficient, and ‘highly’ relevant; however, its impact was not as high as intended. Overall the evaluation found that there was no guarantee that the trajectory of combination therapy being used in place of single drug treatment would be maintained.

The replacement of single drug treatment with the combination therapy was achieved by creating formal distribution channels. While this is effective, informal channels continue to be used and are outside of the project’s influence, which means that the single drug still found its way into use.

Initially the programme increased the proportion of sales of the combination therapy drug in AMTR priority outlets (providers) in the intervention areas from 2% to 60%. Sales of the single drug treatment within these providers also reduced from 44% to 18% of the providers' total anti-malarial sales. Thereafter, however, sales of the combination therapy drug declined slightly, mainly as a result of high sales rates of other anti-malarial drugs and the single drug therapy retaining a stagnant share of the sales made in AMTR priority outlets.

There were only moderate improvements in relation to the correct treatment being provided for confirmed cases of malaria. 40% of the confirmed malaria cases were treated in such a way that resistance spread could be encouraged. This was mostly a function of low testing rates in the face of declining malaria incidence.

The project aimed to influence behaviour, and the evaluation found evidence that it had success in promoting awareness and knowledge among both consumers and providers. Overall, however, this has been less successful than anticipated, and falls short of the project’s targets. For example, awareness among service providers of drug resistant treatment improved from 25% in 2015 to 47% in 2016, but in both cases remained below the targets of 50% and 60% respectively.

The evaluation showed that the proportion of properly treated malaria cases seen by private sector providers has increased since the start of the project. This certainly can be seen as a contribution towards limiting the drug resistance problem. Nevertheless, 40% of confirmed malaria cases that were still highly inadequately treated with a potential to worsen resistance (reduced from 60% at the start).

Lessons Learned

The evaluation identifies various lessons learnt for containing artemisinin resistance, project implementation and for evaluation:

- The project highlights the important role of the private sector in health service delivery, and its critical role in limiting and eliminating drug resistance malaria in Myanmar. The private sector is and will remain an essential partner in public health efforts.
- Linked to this is the cost of the combination therapy, which is higher than the single drug treatment. This focusses attention on the role of public sector investments and the need for a subsidy to reduce the cost of the combination therapy.
- The role of informal (non-legal) pathways to access treatment continue to facilitate single drug malaria treatment and cannot be ignored in future initiatives.

Publication Information

- Full report
- Management Response
South Asia Water Initiative Phase II (SAWI-II)

What

The South Asia Water Initiative is a US$31 million multi-donor trust fund that aims to increase regional cooperation in the management of the major Himalayan river systems in South Asia to deliver sustainable, fair and inclusive development and climate resilience. It runs across seven countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal and Pakistan. The Department for International Development (56%), Australia (36%) and Norway (8%) have funded SAWI Phase II (SAWI-II) (2013 – December 2018). The World Bank administers SAWI-II on behalf of development partners and the multi-donor trust fund then funds a range of activities in line with the five pathways of change:

- Knowledge-generation and sharing
- Trust and confidence building through dialogue
- Participatory processes that engage diverse stakeholders
- Informing the scope and design of World Bank investments
- Capacity-building of water resources organisations and professionals to manage transboundary rivers.

How

The evaluation spanned the programme from October 2017 to April 2018. The aim of the evaluation was to provide learning for future programming and understand the extent to which SAWI is increasing regional cooperation. The evaluation was theory-based, and the team developed the evaluation questions (EQs) around five pathways of change. The evaluation studied a number of activities in detail, which were spread across the pathways in five of the seven SAWI-II focus countries (India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan). The evaluation team undertook country visits to India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. The team interviewed stakeholders in China and Afghanistan by phone. The evaluation team designed the EQs around the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance’s criteria of relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, impact and value for money.

Findings

Relevance: Respondents perceived activities to be broadly appropriate for the differing needs of the respective basins. The evaluation team found that SAWI-II could have made the role of the Secretariat stronger. The World Bank effectively mobilised expertise and convened participating governments. Intentionally implementing SAWI-II in an unbranded way in India and Nepal affected the programme’s visibility. Some activities could have benefitted from increased advisory support from the World Bank. For example, stakeholders in Nepal cited the need to engage multiple experts from within the World Bank in the development of guidelines for Climate Resilient and Planning Design. At the time of evaluation, World Bank specialists in the energy unit led the development, whilst stakeholders felt that the guidelines would be more robust if other experts from the World Bank had provided more input.

Incorporating gender dimensions into the design of SAWI-II activities remains a challenge, and there is a need for additional strategic guidance on how to adopt a gender-sensitive lens to the programme’s design. SAWI-II has created a platform for federal and state level actors to engage with each other. This has improved regional integration.

Effectiveness: SAWI-II has provided new opportunities for stakeholders to share knowledge and has created more awareness of managing rivers holistically. There is still an unequal starting point amongst actors in terms of technical competence and knowledge gaps, but SAWI has helped to level the field, including through capacity building activities.

Sustainability and Impact: In some countries, governments are taking concrete steps towards changing policy; however, stakeholders across activities felt that initial progress needed to deepen and broaden to achieve the desired impact. In order to improve opportunities for SAWI-II to influence policy change, in some countries stakeholders recommended the World Bank could have used its convening power to engage more senior decision makers from governments within trans-boundary dialogues and capacity-building initiatives. The evaluation noted an example of the Brahmaputra...
dialogue (a river basin shared by China, Bhutan, India and Bangladesh). Here, stakeholders felt that the World Bank’s neutral position could have been used more effectively to bring reluctant government partners on board with dialogue processes and achieve deeper engagement from senior government decision makers in South Asian countries on trans-boundary issues. The reduced visibility of successes and achievements on some SAWI-II activities limited the awareness of senior government decision-makers of the potential of SAWI-II to influence policy change. The evaluation team identified unexpected positive changes such as Afghanistan’s willingness to start a dialogue with Iran about trans-boundary resources. SAWI-II has helped build capacity, research networks and data-sharing platforms which will continue beyond the life of the programme and assist future decision-making. There has been evidence of efforts to avoid duplication across multiple actors.

Value for money: SAWI-II facilitated the formation of two government integrated water resource management units and informed the design of some programmes funded through national or donor-funding. The World Bank identified, monitored and managed risk but did not sufficiently link risks back to the assumptions in the Theory of Change which was a weakness. The World Bank was sufficiently flexible and enabled SAW-II to adjust earmarked funds based on evolving needs which reduced the risk of implementation delays. SAWI-II informed donors of any changes in activity choice. Some donors cited that some lack of awareness of SAWI-II activities and achievements in-country affected some opportunities for harmonisation with other donor initiatives.

Lessons Learned

Key lessons highlighted in the evaluation were:

- For the design of similar programmes, it will be important to obtain an overarching agreement on a blueprint of how planned activities will lead to intended outcomes and impacts. The secretariat should be adequately staffed and resourced to function as an administrative body and complete other functions.

- It will also be useful to have a results framework which tracks changes in the external context, as well as progress on outputs and outcomes achieved.

- In the planning stages, the evaluation team recommended increasing input from experts, adopting longer timeframes for stakeholder needs assessments and consultations and developing a brief sustainability plan.

- In the future implementation of similar programmes, the evaluation suggests adopting a ‘train the trainers’ approach for capacity building and (where appropriate) tailor activities to senior government decision-makers to increase their participation. The evaluation encouraged expanding efforts to hold joint training sessions with staff from more than one country within a basin and then, when dialogue activities mature, institutionalising processes.

- The evaluation noted that for the future of SAWI-II and other programmes, it will be beneficial to build a gender-specific lens in design and implementation.

Publication Information

- Full Report
South Asia Regional Trade and Integration Programme Performance Evaluation Report

What

The South Asia Regional Trade Integration Programme (SARTIP) was implemented from 2012 to 2018 with a budget of 27.2 million. It has been designed as a single coordinated initiative to support the efforts of three multilateral organizations - the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in promoting trade and integration in South and Central Asia. SARTIP focused on the poorest parts of the South and Central Asia region across, Afghanistan, northern Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh linking to South East Asia (into Burma). It responds to DFID’s priorities through its focus on the potential benefits of increased regional trade in goods and power in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction.

SARTIP’s main areas of intervention were to promote intra-regional trade in goods, electricity and foreign direct investment. It was achieved through the production of technical studies, capacity building of stakeholders, effective communications, consensus building and high-level championing to stimulate regional trade, integration and economic growth, thus contributing to poverty reduction across the region.

Programme activities broadly focused on; i) preparing for investment in infrastructure, including feasibility studies, and ii) intra-regional foreign direct investment and trade policy reform, particularly along the borders, but also in trans-border electricity connectivity.

How

The purpose of the performance evaluation was to assess the achievements of expected outcomes of SARTIP theory of change and to generate learning towards subsequent programmes. The evaluation audience included the DFID Asia Regional Team, Country Liaison and Policy team in the region. Other key stakeholders included the SARTIP managers, wider UK government (including those involved in economic and trade relations with South Asian partner countries and those with a broader interest in trade development), the UK taxpayers, and regional stakeholders (other donors engaged in the same sectors, namely USAID, US State Department, DFAT, and beneficiary country governments that may learn from the programme).

The SARTIP was evaluated against five criteria; Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability using an evaluation matrix defining clear evaluation questions addressing, the proposed approaches and data sources against the evaluation criteria. The evaluation primarily adopted a qualitative approach including document review, key informant interviews, verification of log frame indicators, with supplement value for money analysis. The evaluation team also identified number of challenges, including staff turnover, the short evaluation time-frame, identifying longer term impacts, triangulation of evidence and data quality and availability.

Findings

Relevance: SARTIP funded activities were found to be highly relevant to DFID’s country programme, implementing partners and national governments priorities and to have strong complementarity with the efforts of national-level programmes. The SARTIP design and its activities did not explicitly aim to generate benefits particularly for women or to promote gender equity, some activities did specifically target women and contributed to aspects of future programme design. It was found to have been specifically designed to have strong environmental impacts, through the promotion of water borne transport, renewable hydroelectric power, etc. SARTIP’s interventions have also been relevant for the private sector, improving the private sector’s competitiveness in the international arena.

Effectiveness: Overall, the project seems to have been effective, having achieved most of the targets set out in the logframe’s output indicators. Specific achievements include:

- Project supported feasibility studies have been instrumental in accelerating World Bank investment in infrastructure projects. This support has facilitated investment made down the line in national rather than regional projects such as Two hydro power projects in Nepal and Bangladesh Inland Waterways project, which was necessary steps to promote regional integration.
SARTIP support has facilitated national investments which was instrumental to promote regional integration.

Influencing the authorising environment through the Champions Network where the political will to develop regional links was already started to develop (i.e. Bangladesh and Nepal).

In some cases, DFID and FCO relationships influenced national governments to progress authorisation of regional projects.

The electricity and power sector appear to be the most successful intervention, partly due to high demand for power, and benefits of increased regional power transmission throughout the community.

The programme showed flexibility in diverting resources to interventions in other parts of the region where intractable political difficulties in the Pakistan-India relationship hindered progress.

Areas noted as less successful include the transport and trade facilitation sector which requires time to be modified and streamlined. Additionally, inter-agency coordination at the border, including warehousing, infrastructure and traffic congestion challenges, have caused delays and mean that the benefits arising from SARTIP interventions remain limited. Furthermore, it was difficult to assess performance of some outcome indicators in the logical framework due to the nature of the indicators used, the lack of baseline data or targets stated in some cases, and the changing goal posts throughout the project.

**Efficiency:** Overall, SARTIP’s allocated budget and disbursements have been on target, and as almost all output targets have been achieved, it can be argued that the spending and the achievements have been positive, although the financial reporting system only allows analysis of major categories of spending and of major activity spending. Selecting the international financial institutions to implement the project was an efficient and effective mechanism for achieving the programme’s objectives. However, there were some challenges during implementation around internal co-ordination issues within some of the implementing organisations and between international financial institutions. There were also cases of inflexibilities and misunderstandings in the terms governing trust fund relationships between DFID and the financial institutions.

**Impact:** Whilst the evaluation assessed impact based on logframe impact indicators, it noted that the impact of trade and integration programmes on poverty reduction is likely to be indirect in general and therefore difficult to attribute directly to SARTIP. Nevertheless, the following impacts were identified:

- Intra-regional trade of goods increased from USD 45.1 billion in 2012 to USD 47.9 billion, equivalent to a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2%, whilst the region’s global trade showed a slight downturn during the same period, reducing from USD 1.1 trillion to USD 895 billion, a 5% decrease.

- SARTIP countries have experienced a significant increase in foreign direct investment inflows during the duration of the programme. In 2016, the region’s foreign direct investment inflows amounted to USD 61.2 billion, a significant increase from USD 41.4 billion in 2012.

- Cross-border energy connectivity between India and Nepal substantially increased during the implementation of SARTIP, with electricity trade moving from around 694 GWh in 2011 to 2175 GWh in 2017. Similarly, the cross-border energy transmission capacity increased from around 20 MW to 700 MW. SARTIP have contributed towards some of these positive results, though DFID support for the feasibility study for the Nepal-India transmission line was provided prior to SARTIP or as part of an intervention that was rolled into SARTIP.

- Finally, SARTIP countries have experienced a significant increase in FDI inflows during the duration of the programme. In 2016, the region’s FDI inflows amounted to USD 61.2 billion, a significant increase from USD 41.4 billion in 2012. India is the region’s largest recipient of FDI experiencing a major increase in investment inflows. These investments are not directly attributed to SARTIP, but the project contributed in intra-regional investment as compared to logframe targets.

**Lessons Learned**

Key lessons learned include:
• The evaluation highlighted the need to apply a long-term, and flexible approach that can accommodate changes arising from political uncertainty.

• Working with the international financial institutes and through change mechanisms (e.g. feasibility studies and technical assistance) have proved effective, and therefore should remain in place during Asia Regional Trade and Connectivity Programme (ARTCP).

• To enhance the ARTCP’s potential impact, the evaluation recommended to focus on specific trade (transport, energy, and information technology) corridors connecting key target countries with regional and global markets. Additionally, the ARTCP should support, strengthen and extend the Champion’s network.

• Structures for greater cooperation between the international financial institutions should be strengthened, as should mechanisms to enable stronger direction from DFID on the project’s priorities. ARTCP should continue to engage closely with the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade funded South Asia regional trade facilitation programme, and expand its growing relationships with other bilaterals, particularly to further learning on the gender aspects of the programme.

• Greater transparency from international financial institutions in financial reporting, enabling DFID to effectively monitor Value for Money and a stronger decentralisation of project management to international financial institutions country offices and staff in the region could improve the responsiveness and adaptability of the project.

• In terms of regional integration ARTCP could focus on providing technical assistance towards the implementation the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, and lobby for the signature of a multi-modal transport agreement between countries. It should strengthen linkages with regional institutions in South-Southeast Asia, and have greater engagement with China, particularly in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Publication Information

• Full Report
The Enhancing Community Resilience Programme (ECRP) 2011-2017

What

The Enhancing Community Resilience Programme was designed to address the chronic climate vulnerability faced by rural people in Malawi. The programme was implemented between 2011 and 2017. The programme aimed to increase the resilience of vulnerable communities to climate shocks.

The programme's aims included:

- increasing the capacity of village, area and district authorities for disaster risk reduction preparedness and the ability to adapt to climate change
- Increasing the resilience of vulnerable households through working with local government and community-based volunteers (lead farmers, village extension multipliers, village agents etc.) to facilitate village Savings & Loan facilities, agricultural and natural resource management activities
- improving early warning systems
- informing policy
- and strengthening humanitarian recovery and response

The programme was jointly funded by DFID, Irish Aid and the Royal Norwegian Embassy. Its total budget was £30.6m, of which £27m was provided by DFID.

How

The evaluation responded to four key questions:

- What impacts can be attributed to the programme at the household level and what contribution has the programme made to change at community, district and national levels?
- Was the programme theory of change relevant given the programme’s objectives and target groups?
- Was the programme efficient and effective in the way it delivered its results?
- To what extent are programme impacts likely to be sustained without further intervention?

To assess impact at the household level, the evaluation undertook a household survey and facilitated focus group discussions with community members. This data was processed statistically to compare the experiences of households within the programme and outside of it, in order to see if there were differences that could be attributed to the programme’s activities.

The evaluation used a case-study approach to examine the programme’s advocacy work and understand the influences of the programme’s activities on decision makers.

A cost-benefit analysis was conducted to provide a guide to the potential benefits of the programme and the differing cost-benefit ratios of different packages or combinations of activities.

Findings

The evaluation found the programme successful in terms of providing benefits to households and participants despite severe shocks and deteriorating poverty levels.

Households had improved resilience through the adoption of drought tolerant seeds, participation in village savings and loan groups and conservation agriculture. The evaluation also observed increases in the adoption of low carbon technologies (e.g. solar lights and fuel-efficient stoves).

The programme was also found to be cost-effective. The cost-benefit analysis of the programme’s impact on crop production and income flows demonstrated between £2-3 of benefits for each £1 invested over a 10-year period.

The programme strengthened capacity for disaster risk preparedness among communities and district level countries and influenced the development of new resilience programmes by other NGOs and donors at the national level.
In addition, the programme successfully involved female-headed households and wives in male-headed households, despite the lack of formal gender analysis during the programme design stage.

There were some concerns that a lack of ongoing resources and multiple shocks may restrict the sustainability of the programme’s impact.

**Lessons Learned**

The evaluation highlighted the following lessons:

- The programme’s targeting of participants was random rather than focused on specific individuals or communities that have particular interests or needs. In future, the programme could be more intentional about its approach towards targeting but also must evaluate which approach represents the best value for money. More intentional targeting is more time and resource intensive but allows activities to be more appropriately tailored to the contexts of communities.

- The evaluation recommended that resilience programming should last at least five years to allow time to establish systems and maximise efficiency in delivery.

- Learning from the programme showed that resilience programmes are most effective when they combine direct assets transfer, village savings and loan facilities, conservation agriculture and systems that improve access to quality seeds, irrigation and disaster risk reduction.

- Strategies to sustain commitments to gender mainstreaming and the ‘leave no one behind’ agenda should be embedded in the programme design. Gender-sensitive approaches enhance women’s economic empowerment and promote equality in intra-household decision-making. Approaches to ‘leave no one behind’ should set realistic targets and allocate resources for linking with specialist organisations that can support the inclusion of disabled and chronically ill people.

- Working with District Officials and local volunteers in the implementation of activities was effective. Sustainability of these efforts would be enhanced by creating technical manuals and political incentives. Future programmes could consider a more formal joint-management option where implementation is coordinated by District Councils and programme budgeting and planning years are aligned to those used by District Councils.

**Publication Information**

- [Full Report](#)
- [Management Response](#)
Promoting Pro-poor Opportunities in Commodities and Service Markets (Propcom)

What

Propcom Mai-karfi (PM-k) is a programme supported by the Department of International Development (DFID) that aimed to increase the incomes of 650,000 poor men and women in Northern Nigeria. Agriculture is a main means of economic growth for rural Nigerian communities, but growth has been uneven in the sector. DFID funded the programme from December 2011 to June 2018 to the value of £27 million.

Following on from Propcom 1, PM-k aims to increase the inclusion of poor rural farmers in market systems and stimulate sustainable, pro-poor growth in markets using the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) approach. The M4P approach seeks to change the way markets work to benefit the poor, in particular by tackling market failures and strengthening the private sector to enable large scale, sustainable benefits for the poor.

Within PM-k’s Theory of Change (ToC), the programme intended to achieve three linked outcomes:

- Rural market systems selected would work more effectively for poor farmers and small-scale rural entrepreneurs
- Poor women and men engaged in these selected rural markets are less vulnerable to shocks, trends and seasonality
- Private investors, government, non-government organisations and development agencies make changes in their approach to Northern Nigeria as a result of the programme’s influence

How

The evaluation was theory-based and therefore the evaluation questions were set to test the PM-k’s ToC. The key questions considered to what extent, how, why and why not:

- PM-k succeeded at supporting systemic change in support markets
- This change contributed to farms and enterprises using these services, inputs and regulations and farmers and entrepreneurs changing their practices
- This change contributed to better farm and enterprise performance
- This change contributed to higher incomes and poverty reduction
- The programme was effective in meeting its quantitative women targets

The evaluation team selected two primary markets for quantitative data collection and analysis. The team used the primary markets to determine the impact of PM-k on the selected population. Baseline and endline data collection was collected in both markets to compare between intervention and control groups, as well as monitor change over time. The team selected seven secondary markets for qualitative data collection and analysis. The team used the secondary markets to determine the impact of the M4P process at different levels of the markets (e.g. beneficiary level versus farm level).

The evaluation team categorized the evidence in red, amber or green to determine its level of conclusiveness, enabling the team to comment on the strength of the evidence presented. A disadvantage of the methodology was that it did not allow following specific individuals through the programme, as it was impractical given the timeframe and resources.

Findings

Overall, the evaluation found that the programme’s interventions were successful in overcoming identified market constraints. This has led to greater access to goods and services that resulted positive impacts on incomes of poor households. This was then found to increase households’ resilience and decrease their levels of poverty.

Systemic market change: There was a strong degree of confidence that market interventions were relevant in overcoming both demand and supply side constraints in most of the markets evaluated. The evaluation team observed copying (where one household recognises and adopts an intervention behaviour) in numerous market interventions, notably poultry health and maize farming.
Farms and enterprises using these services, inputs and regulations and farmers and entrepreneurs changing their practices: There was substantial evidence of beneficiaries being more likely to see their activity as a business and investment opportunity, which in turn had an impact on farmers and entrepreneurs’ practices. The endline poultry health survey found that the share of intervention households that sells chickens (rather than eating all of them) increased by 10%. Intervention households expanded their flock to 31 chickens compared to 12 at baseline and 6 in the comparison group.

Better farm and enterprise performance: All seven markets with increased incomes also experienced improved productivity. Farmers’ raised productivity was due to increased access and use of higher quality services and/or agricultural inputs such as improved seeds and fertilizer. There was also increased access to information and training, such as trainings on better animal rearing practices.

Increased incomes and poverty reduction: In seven of the nine evaluated markets, incomes of participating households increased. In poultry health-related markets, the average increase was by a factor of 2.7. In the Babban Gona households, maize-related incomes doubled. Households across all seven markets reported using their increased income to buy assets and, in some cases, diversifying their income streams. Households also reported spending additional income on school and medical fees and improving their living standards.

Women’s Economic Empowerment: The programme did not achieve its Women’s Economic Empowerment target of 250,000 women. PM-k achieved 58% of this target, and women and girls were 22% of the overall programme cohort. When women were in control of an asset (e.g. chickens or maize farming), they reported benefitting from increased income. This suggests that when the programme included women in interventions, they experienced benefits potentially to the same level as their male counterparts.

The number of women included varied substantially across interventions.

Lessons Learned

Key lessons highlighted in the evaluation include:

- Women can benefit from both women-specific and general interventions; however, women-specific interventions often take longer, cost more to deliver and may not be scalable. General interventions will require appropriate strategies to identify and communicate with female beneficiaries.

- Reports from women indicate that they are more likely to invest a return on their investment in family members and the community: in education, health care, and social obligation. This is in addition to a reinvestment in their economic activity and/or diversification.

- Longer term M4P interventions are more likely to deliver in terms of scale.

- When beneficiaries display a fast return on investment, there is an increased likelihood of copying. When there is a low barrier to entry there is an increased likelihood of copying.

- Faith-based and community-based organisations can facilitate access to potential beneficiaries, especially women, which increases outreach and therefore potential to scale. This is particularly true for rural areas.

Publication Information

- Full Report
Africa >> Trade

Food Trade East and Southern Africa

What

Food Trade East and Southern Africa (FTESA) was a five-year (2013-2018) regional programme funded by DFID UK (£36 million) to support food staples market development and trade by tackling market failures. FTESA aimed to catalyse lasting changes to enable efficient trade in staple foods across the region and improve the lives of farmers, suppliers, service providers, traders, retailers, and consumers, contributing to price and market stability for staple foods in the region. FTESA aimed to invest in systems that allowed small-scale farmers to access regional grain markets. The programme worked with the private sector and relevant institutions to tackle a constraining set of market failures. FTESA supported interventions across Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, and supported DFID in Southern Africa during the food crisis. Staple food markets in FTESA countries are characterized by fragmented production units, low input/low output production systems, informal value chains, burdensome regulation and low incentives for quality.

DAI implemented the programme and ITAD UK conducted the evaluation of the project. The evaluation was designed to assess the programme’s progress and document lessons learnt during implementation. The programme team wanted to use the evaluation findings to inform DFID’s thinking on possible options beyond the mid-term evaluation and to share lessons learnt for similar programmes (e.g. West Africa Food Markets, WAFM).

How

This mid-term evaluation was a theory-based evaluation and designed to answer key evaluation questions focused at portfolio, market and individual/farmer/consumer level. At portfolio level, the evaluation sought to assess whether the FTESA programme was a coherent theory of change or individual interventions. At market-level, data collection identified the role of different market actors and their interactions with FTESA-funded interventions. At individual/farmer/consumer level it aimed to determine the extent of support for smallholder farmers in structured regional markets.

The evaluation matrix guided the data collection by the team and helped to ensure that the team followed a coherent and comprehensive approach to answering the evaluation questions. The team developed data collection tools such as semi-structured interview guides for each of the evaluation modules based on the matrix and gathered evidence against the questions and indicators in the matrix. Each evaluation module combined secondary and primary data, including systematic document and data review and key informant interviews.

Findings

Portfolio-level grant and programme complementarity: There was evidence of complementarity among FTESA grantees. The PMU scored relatively low on connecting grantees and leveraging complementarities. However, many intended complementarities were slow to develop often due to implementation delays. The evaluation found that Grain soko market (Gsoko) and its complementary grants were likely to have long lasting impact; however, the evaluation highlighted that it would take significant time to demonstrate results and that several challenges experienced during implementation, such as lack of communication would need to be addressed. Many of the complementary grants intended to build smallholder farmer’s capacity to produce crops at sufficient volumes and quality to enter the Gsoko platform, contributing to larger volumes on the platform, thus improving the platform’s viability. In turn, the expectation was that the platform would provide farmers with a link to the regional market, improving the sustainable benefit of the grantee’s efforts.


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4 Gsoko is a digital platform that aims to centralise trade in grains by linking different market actors (including buyers and sellers as well as other players) in staple foods trade in Eastern Africa
Market level systemic change and sustainability: Gsoko and its complementary grants were considered likely to generate significant systemic changes to methods of grain harvesting and trading. Building trust in the Gsoko system and changing farmer behaviour will be critical for the change and will also take significant time and resources to emerge. Gsoko had potential but also faced significant challenges, such as the lack of qualified staff, limited commercial sustainability and was unable to be operational without donor support.

Individual and group level smallholder farmers, gender and consumers: Increased smallholder farmer participation in structured regional markets was a central focus for FTESA and most activities target them. However, the degree to which farmers benefitted could not be fully determined at this stage. The evaluation found that there was limited effort to mainstream gender across the programme interventions. Whilst there were efforts to incorporate gender into the design and reporting of FTESA, grants did not reflect a meaningful consideration of gender dynamics. Gender mainstreaming was largely absent from grantee strategies. Monitoring reports provided gender-disaggregated data but women appeared to be under-represented as compared to men. There was limited effort to consider gender dynamics during project implementation, including Grain market soko (Gsoko).

FTESA had the potential to deliver health benefits through improved quality. Smoother region-wide prices were unlikely to materialise given the scale of the programme and the remaining timeframe. However, there could be localised examples due to the programme (e.g. where the programme facilitated movement of produce from surplus to deficit areas; storage between harvest and hunger seasons).

The VfM framework needed updating to make it robust and comprehensive. There was some information missing, such as disaggregated VfM indicators for different components of the programme. This limited its capacity to generate comparative insights and inform decision making. The programme was found to follow economical practices and processes.

Lessons Learned

The evaluation noted that lessons were difficult to consolidate due to the delays in implementation. Some key lessons identified were as follows:

- Attempting systemic market level change requires longer timelines and funding support to pilot, learn, iterate and expand. This is because changes can take several years to materialise and to become scalable. It also requires the right staff and high staff retention, built on realistic ambitious and a common understanding. It was recommended that similar future programmes should have longer timeframes, such as eight years with break clauses in case of poor performance. This is justified on the basis that it takes time to cement a well-functioning project management unit (PMU) and for systemic change goals to materialise.

- Portfolio-approach programmes should be designed with sufficient resources and mechanisms from inception to ensure that PMUs (or similar) foster coordination and collaboration between implementing partners from the start.

- Consistent demonstrations can be very powerful in influencing behaviour change and it is limiting to expect changes immediately after training sessions as improvements occur over time.

- It could be of help to foster stronger partnership approaches with those already doing similar work, particularly as FTESA covers a broad range of roles and there could be efficiency gains in improved cooperation with others. It was also noted that it is important to find the right balance between prioritising grant management and disbursing funds whilst ensuring simultaneously that the institution can deliver broader complementarity functions.

- The establishment of realistic ambitious and clearly understood objectives will strengthen future programmes. Strong monitoring and evaluation systems that are realistic and fully resourced, but allow for flexibility, are critical to improve monitoring, decision making and accountability.

Publication Information

- Full Report
- Management Response
### Africa >> Education

**The Girls' Education Project Phase 3**

**What**

The Girls' Education Project Phase 3 (GEP3) is an eight-year project (2012-20) managed by UNICEF and funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). It has a budget of £88 million, and seeks to improve school access, retention and learning outcomes for girls in five northern Nigerian states. In between 2014 and 2017, the project piloted a series of interventions in primary schools and integrated Qur’anic schools (IQS). The focus of this evaluation was two of the interventions: an early learning intervention implemented in Katsina and Zamfara and the provision of teaching and school support to IQS in Bauchi, Niger and Sokoto. The early learning intervention seeks to improve the learning skills of children in grades 1 to 3 in their first language Hausa, with a focus on reading and preparing children to learn with English as the language of instruction by Grade 4. The intervention has three components: provision of Hausa teaching and learning materials; early grade professional development for teachers and head teachers; and a set of community awareness and engagement activities to support early grade literacy. GEP3's IQS support (IQSS) seeks to improve education outcomes at IQS, primarily through improving literacy and numeracy (especially girls), improve retention among girls and (to a lesser extent) increase girls’ enrolment.

**How**

The report is the culmination of a multi-year evaluation with extensive school and state-level quantitative and qualitative data collection during the second half of 2017, comparing outcomes with the baseline data from the same period of 2015. It sought to assess GEP3’s overall relevance and sustainability based on GEP3’s theory of change; complete an impact evaluation of GEP3’s early learning intervention (the Reading and Numeracy Activity (RANA)) and a performance evaluation of GEP3’s support to IQS. It used a theory-based, mixed-methods approach. The evaluation team designed the impact evaluation as an experimental clustered randomised controlled trial, meaning that the evaluation compared schools with and without the intervention to measure its effect. Comparisons were made between local government areas and type of school (primary public school vs. IQS). To assess the effectiveness of GEP3’s IQSS, the evaluation drew on contribution analysis methods which facilitated a process of understanding the ‘story’ of how the programme achieved impact.

**Findings**

**Relevance and Sustainability:** The evaluation found GEP3’s theory of change to represent plausible pathways to achieving the programme’s goals; however, there are some constraints to be overcome if the initiative’s objectives are to be achieved within the timeframe of the programme. Progress is reliant on several factors, including school infrastructure, recruitment of sufficient teachers and timely release of financial resources. The evaluation also highlighted the diversity of each state and noted the importance of the programme staff adapting implementation to the different contexts.

**Impact of GEP3’s early learning interventions:** The evaluation did not observe improved learning outcomes in Hausa literacy. There has been progress in other areas such as more pupil-centred activities, more frequent use of learning materials and improved teacher motivation. There has been some improvement in pupils’ English levels. It may be too early to observe changes in learning outcomes, which require consistent focus over a number of years. The time between the baseline and midline of two years would be the absolute minimum to observe any changes.

**Effectiveness of GEP3’s IQSS:** Teaching had not become noticeably more effective yet in GEP3-supported IQS. The evaluation suggested that it is unlikely that the schools will improve conditions for learning, particularly for girls. Wider research shows that shifting teachers’ classroom practices is particularly challenging and the evaluation noted that it was still early in the programme’s implementation.

There had been some minor improvements in facilitators’ pedagogical knowledge, increased use of Hausa, facilitator motivation and more frequent use of teaching materials. The evaluation team also identified improved school management practices and increased community engagement.

**Lessons Learned**

The evaluation highlighted the following lessons:
• Each state’s particular needs, financial resources and level of political commitment all impact the future of GEP3. Embedding girl-centred interventions within government systems have been key components of the most successful interventions and promote sustainability.

• The programme should focus literacy interventions (such as RANA) on bringing up the critical mass of underperforming teachers to a minimum level of subject area knowledge, rather than attempting to change teaching practices. The programme also needs to provide training to help teachers use the learning materials properly. Literacy interventions need time to mature and so it is reasonable to expect more progress in the future if donors maintain funding.

• Language assessments are critical prior to the implementation of activities. There were difficulties with some facilitators at IQS not being competent in Hausa, which impacted on their understanding of the Hausa-based facilitator training. It was not the primary language of all communities and the programme will need to address this in the future.

• Another challenge is that when facilitators are less experienced or have low competency, they need consistent and continuous support. The programme needs to be aware of this.

• The programme adopted a flexible approach for implementation due to the diversity of IQS, which the evaluation team found to be appropriate. This resulted in ongoing revisions of the teaching approach, which made learning difficult for facilitators, some of whom were already challenged by the complex material. The team recommended further consolidation and stability as a requirement before considering scaling up or expanding the intervention.

**Publication Information**

- **Synthesis Report**
- **Technical Report**
- **Management Response**
Learning in Lagos: Comparing Student Achievement in Bridge, Public and Private Schools

What

The Learning in Lagos report is a comparative study exploring differences in learning achievement in three types of schools in Lagos and identify reasons for the differences between students' learning levels.

Nigeria has a high rate of school enrolment with 57% of primary and secondary students attending low-fee private schools, which are accessible to those on the poverty line. Students also have the option of public schools and Bridge International Academies (“Bridge”) schools. Bridge received a £3.45 million outcomes-based contract in 2014 to enter the Lagos market from DFID’s Developing Effective Private Education in Nigeria (DEEPEN) Innovation Fund. The DEEPEN Fund aims to increase competition in the low-fee education market and improve quality in low-fee schools in Lagos.

This study provides a baseline of the current state of Lagos’ private, public and Bridge schools for future work. It also provides findings for the Department for International Development (DFID) to understand the impact of its investment in Bridge schools.

How

The study addressed three key questions: how literacy and numeracy performance of primary 2 students compare between Bridge, public, and private schools; how teacher and school characteristics (e.g. teaching practice, school management, school fees) vary within and among school types; and to what extent are pupil, teacher and school-level factors correlated with student achievement.

The report noted it was not designed to determine the effect of a particular school type on learning outcomes, nor evaluate the value for money of DFID’s investment.

The study analysed data around students’ individual characteristics (e.g. age, gender) and information around students’ family background (e.g. language spoken at home, socioeconomic status). It also drew on literacy and numeracy testing, classroom observation, household wealth index, teacher motivation scale, school management tools and information about school fees.

All 37 Bridge schools were matched with low and medium-fee private schools, combined with the closest public schools. 124 schools were visited across Lagos state. 5 public schools and 12 private schools from the original sample were replaced due to refusal to participate, fees being too high, school change of location etc.

Findings

The study’s findings were divided into three sections:

**Literacy numeracy and value for money:** The study found with a strong degree of confidence that Bridge students perform better in literacy compared to other private school and public school students. Students from Bridge and private schools have a similar performance in numeracy, with 62% and 64% of students respectively perform above the sample average. Both are significantly higher than public school students’ numeracy performance where 24% of students perform above average.

**Students, teaching and management:** All school types enrol equal proportions of boys and girls. Students in Bridge and other private schools are less likely to than students in public schools to belong to the bottom socioeconomic quintiles. 48% of Bridge and 43% private school students speak English at home in comparison to 24% of public school students. Yoruba is most commonly spoken home language (58%) at public schools. Speaking English at home is associated with higher achievement in literacy in private schools, but not with numeracy. Children from public schools are also more likely to be overage. The correlation between student age and tests scores is not statistically significant. Teachers in Bridge schools report higher motivation than those in other schools and Bridge schools are comparatively better managed. Observed teaching in literacy does not differ between schools. In numeracy, teachers in Bridge and public schools spend more time teaching than in private schools.

**Correlations with learning:** The study found that better school management is significantly correlated with higher literacy and numeracy achievement, particularly in Bridge schools and public schools. Teaching qualifications and bachelors’ degrees are not significantly correlated with literacy and numeracy achievement. Girls perform significantly better than boys overall, particularly in Bridge and public schools which requires further research. Adjustments made for pupil age, gender, household wealth and home language reduced differences, particularly in private schools. For literacy, students from better socioeconomic backgrounds have higher learning achievement in private and public schools, but not at Bridge schools. Numeracy achievement is not significantly correlated with wealth across school types.
Lessons Learned
The evaluation highlighted the following lessons:

- Findings suggest that Bridge schools may provide parents better value for money in literacy; however, this is not necessarily true for policy makers, as this requires more information on impact and public/private financial modelling.
- Further research is needed to understand why girls in Lagos have higher literacy rates than boys.

Publication Information
- Full Reports
- Management Response
Supporting Indian Trade and Investment for Africa

What

The Supporting Indian Trade and Investment for Africa (SITA) programme is DFID’s first South-South aid for trade and value chain programme. The six-year, £19 million programme commenced in March 2014 and is implemented by the International Trade Centre (ITC).

SITA’s objective is to enhance trade and catalyse investment between India and selected East African countries across specific sectors. This involves strengthening the competitiveness and productive capacities of East African companies and enhancing the enabling environment through interventions at the policy and institutional levels. To do so, SITA aims to leverage India’s expertise and technological know-how for the benefit of East African partner countries across knowledge, skills, technology transfer and investment partnerships – a unique South-South trade and investment initiative. SITA operates in five countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

SITA’s sector focus spans: pulses, cotton/textiles value chain, leather, sunflower oil, spices, information technology (IT)/business process outsourcing (BPO), and coffee.

How

The Mid-term Review (MTR) is an evaluation that identifies learning about what does and does not work in SITA, the context in which it operates and whether the programme has been successful. The objectives of the evaluation were:

- To estimate SITA’s contribution to the programme’s outcomes and impact, in consideration of the contribution of the programme outputs to outcomes and impacts.
- To highlight lessons from DFID’s first South-South aid for trade and value chain programme: finding out what works, for who, under what circumstances, why, and “so what”? and identify any unintended effects, both positive and negative.

The MTR responds to 13 evaluation questions that address the Development Assistance Committee criteria of programme relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. The evaluation approach tests the programme’s Theory of Change, confirming and defining the expected programme outputs and outcomes and the assumptions that have been made. Initial findings guided the approach to the evaluation, ultimately semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and beneficiaries were the primary method of data collection. This was supported by thematic analysis to understand issues across sectors and countries.

Limitations to the study included the availability of data, the potential for bias (as field work only took place in two countries), and recognition that an accurate assessment of SITA’s impact on poverty is extremely difficult. As a result, the evaluation has only commented on the programme’s ‘line of sight’ link to poverty.

Findings

Overall, the programme was assessed as relevant to the development priorities of the participating countries. The selection of sectors by the SITA project were very relevant to SITA country governments in terms of their potential link to industrialisation and value addition (particularly textiles, garments and leather), modernisation (IT-BPO) and poverty reduction through links to smallholder economies (leather, sunflower oil, spices, pulses and cotton). Within some sectors, however, SITA does not focus on the most pressing constraints to trade and investment which are often at the production level. The potential for beneficial linkages with India through technology transfer and investment are clear in all sectors covered, including skills training, machinery and technology.

Effectiveness results are slow, primarily due to the operating context. With one positive exception, the remaining four outcome results indicate limited achievements against targets. These results have scope
to improve dramatically in the remainder of the programme, but this will depend on many contextual factors outside the scope of SITA’s intervention.

Program efficiency was supported by a strongly performing, well-connected, SITA team; both at headquarters and in-country. However, centralised decision-making across a wide country and sector base can slow implementation on the ground. Expenditure is relatively on track and sectors have high or medium value for money.

Sustainability findings indicate a limited sense of ownership of programme objectives and activities amongst key partners and governments consulted in East Africa, perhaps reflecting the ‘outside’ Indian origins of the programme. Capacity levels amongst the East African partner organisations vary considerably and will affect the likely sustainability of programme activities after SITA ends. Sustainability of outcomes depends on market conditions outside the control of the programme.

At the programme mid-point, it is difficult to judge the potential impact and there are limited conclusive findings.

**Lessons Learned**

Key lessons identified in the evaluation were:

- Programmes aimed at promoting trade in certain sectors are very likely to reveal a wide range of other constraints faced by companies operating in these sectors (supply, production, processing) rather than purely trade-related issues (tariffs e.g.) which creates tension regarding where to best focus efforts.

- Similarly, trade and investment promotion programmes are operating in environments where political economy factors can have a major influence on implementation and the eventual outcomes of programme interventions; the existence of good policy does not immediately imply effective policy implementation and the context must be understood.

- Successful promotion of inward investment is not a straightforward process. It depends on many factors in the host country that are outside of the programme’s control, including: the regulatory environment, government transparency and consistency, the cost and quality of factors of production etc. It requires detailed information, trust, and extensive allocation of time and resources to achieve results.

- It is essential to have a strongly aligned implementing agency that can engage many stakeholders, over a wide-ranging number of sectors and across many countries.

- The SITA experience confirms that, particularly for smaller businesses in more marginal markets, the ability to implement technical recommendations may be severely constrained by limited access to finance.

- The long-term success of trade and investment programmes is dependent on sector market conditions. Attention needs to be paid to sectors with high levels of market volatility – particularly those with quite specific but limited market opportunities. The opportunities from these sectors should be balanced with promotion of product diversification or other forms of risk mitigation for producers and processors.

**Publication Information**

- Full Report
- Management Response
Evaluation of the South Sudan Health Pooled Fund

What

The South Sudan Health Pooled Fund (HPF) covered six of South Sudan’s ten former states in its first phase and expanded to a further two states during its second phase. These were Warrap, Northern Bahr-el Ghazal, Western Bahr-el Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes and Unity, with the addition of Central and Western Equatoria.

The South Sudan HPF is a DFID led, multi-donor programme which is responding to the health needs of South Sudan within the context of ongoing conflict and economic crisis. The first phase of the programme ran between 2012-16 and the second phase between 2016-18.

Most of the health services are implemented by non-governmental organisations but the Ministry of Health remained a principal partner. The Fund supported direct health service provision (basic health services and support to hospitals), the procurement of essential medicines, working with communities, and working with the Ministry of Health at State and Central levels to build capacity in managing the health services. The health systems strengthening component was scaled back due to the difficult political situation causing most donors to withdraw support for central government. A nutrition component was introduced in phase two of the fund activities.

This performance evaluation assessed the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of both phases of the programme as well as how gender equality considerations were integrated. It also aimed to identify areas of best practice; findings should be used to inform the implementation of the third phase of the programme.

How

The evaluation used a realist approach focusing on how different interventions affected different beneficiaries across both phases of the Health Pooled Fund. A realist approach places a strong emphasis on the context and considers the underlying psychological drivers that cause the reasoning of actors. The approach asks, "What works, for whom, in what respects, to what extent, in what contexts, and how?"

Donors were particularly interested in the perceptions of beneficiaries and staff at the county and facility level. Mixed methods for both qualitative and quantitative data collection were utilised including a desk review of programme documentation, interviews with key stakeholders in Juba and fieldwork to four counties whereby a beneficiary survey, interviews, focus group discussions and a health facility observation survey were conducted. Data analysis included a thematic content approach and statistical analysis.

Findings

The evaluation found the programme’s activities and objectives were highly aligned with and responsive to the health needs of South Sudan, including for women and children. It is also well aligned to the Government’s priorities and plans despite having not been able to fully implement the health system strengthening approach.

The programme was found to be effective, having made significant achievements in meeting targets. It was assessed as contributing substantially to the health sector. Indeed, the evaluation suggests many health services would be unlikely to function without the programme’s support to health facilities across the country.

Considerable effort to mainstream gender issues into the programme has been made and is evident by improved knowledge and awareness of gender issues, for example, among health staff, interviewed during the evaluation. There was increased female representation and leadership in community health committees, and implementing partners increasingly promoted responses to gender-based violence within health centres. Gaps do still persist though, especially regarding the social inclusion part of the Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) strategy which aims to increase understanding and sensitivity to population characteristics such as disability and age.

Regarding efficiency, the programme was found to provide good value for money overall. This includes the fund’s tendering (for purchases) and financial management procedures, and its approach to outreach activities that are a cost-effective way of addressing the severe lack of
coverage with health facilities. There are areas that require better planning, for example, renumeration of health staff is low (as it is across the country), which leads to staff shortages or unqualified personnel being hired. This is a major cause of inefficiency. Some elements of the programme were found likely to have some lasting effect beyond the end of the programme, but overall the evaluation found no prospects for long term sustainability without external financing.

Lessons Learned

The evaluation identified a number of lessons:

- The South Sudan HPF is considered a highly successful model, and an effective modality in fragile states, providing the design is based on context. The programme does not aim for long term sustainability given the current political and economic situation; despite this, the health pooled fund in South Sudan has taken steps for build sustainability by aligning with ministry priorities where possible. Should the context change, the Health Pooled Fund could be flexible enough to adjust its approach to have more focus on this aspect.

- The successful elements of the health pooled fund allow for constructive engagement with the government at sectoral level, contributing to better service delivery and system stabilisation.

- A recommendation from the evaluation is that success stories should be communicated effectively to the international community to attract much needed funding.

- Understaffing, rigid procedures and the working environment can all contribute to delays that can cost lives so extra effort to think ahead to foresee problems and be flexible is important.

Publication Information

- Full Report
- Management Response
Zambia’s First 1,000 Most Critical Days Programme

What

The Zambian National Food and Nutrition Commission, in coordination with donors, including the Department for International Development (DFID), developed a bundled, multi-sectoral programme called The First 1000 Most Critical Days Programme (MCDP), to address Zambia’s child undernutrition. The programme began in 2015 and is funded by the Scaling Up Nutrition network in Zambia. Its goal is to reduce stunting in Zambia by 50% by focusing on children under two years of age and pregnant and lactating mothers—the most critical period for stunting. The programme seeks to achieve this by bundling, strengthening, and bringing to scale a strategic subset of routine interventions proven to reduce stunting, such as deworming and vitamin A supplementation; family planning; growth monitoring; iron and folic acid supplementation; iodised salt, micronutrients, and breastfeeding; fortified staples and specialised nutritional products; a mother- and baby-friendly hospital initiative; and management of severely malnourished children.

These interventions are supplemented by a range of training and behaviour change activities designed to take advantage of potential complementarities between child health and improved maternal knowledge, WASH practices, and nutritional intake.

The programme is led by the Zambia Food and Nutrition Commission and involves the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare, and the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. CARE International is the main technical assistance and fund management partner.

How

The final evaluation presents the results from the First 1,000 Most Critical Days Programme and synthesises findings from earlier data collection activities including the Rapid Qualitative Assessment and two rounds of process evaluation data collection. It focuses on implementation of the programme in two districts in Zambia: Chipata in Eastern Province and Mbala in Northern Province.

The evaluation undertook qualitative data collection (interviews) in these two districts to understand programme delivery and programme experiences from the perspective of service providers, key stakeholders, and beneficiaries. It also conducted a household survey in these districts and in two comparison districts that were selected at the inception stage of the research to serve as a ‘without-programme’ scenario. The evaluation questions broadly sought to shed light on: 1) pre-programme infant and maternal health and feeding practices, 2) challenges to current MCDP implementation, 3) additional challenges to scaled implementation and potential adaptations, and 4) effects of the programme. A limitation to ascertaining the effects of the programme, and determining the programme’s specific contributions, was the introduction of other, similar, interventions after evaluation districts had been selected that probably contributed to change in comparison districts. This meant that comparisons between districts where the programme was implemented and those where it was not implemented did not show significant differences in the reduction of stunting among children under five.

Findings

The evaluation identified several contextual factors relating to poverty and malnutrition that need to be considered in depth to support future phases of the First 1,000 Most Critical Days Programme.
These include feeding and dietary practices; work and time allocation; and knowledge and use of mother, infant and young child nutrition and health services.

The principal programme implementation challenges related to communication and coordination, planning and reporting, funding flows and delivery of priority interventions. Both communications and funding flows have improved over time. The programme required tailored implementation approaches – it could not use a one-size-fits-all approach to delivery, but also needed to find a balance between focusing on individual components and the packaged approach on which the project was based. There were challenges coordinating and delivering consistent priority interventions, which also affected the overall delivery of a ‘packaged’ approach.

The programme did not fully scale-up as intended and not all eligible households within the communities received the various programme interventions. The challenging rural context in which the programme operates means that scaling out to new districts will not be easy. However, the evaluation findings and recommendations to simplify the package of interventions has led to prioritising a smaller set of interventions under a second phase of the programme. The overall programme impact was affected by the implementation challenges, as very few households received the complete package of interventions.

The primary aim of the programme is to reduce stunting. The evaluation found that stunting levels fell more in programme treatment districts than in comparison districts (by 4%); however, the difference is too small statistically for the evaluators to be able to directly attribute the change to the programme. Nevertheless, the programme was associated with improvements in young children’s nutritional intake and showed positive results in breastfeeding and nutritional intake for older children. There was also evidence of improvements in relation to child health and reductions in incidence of diarrhoea. More significantly, the evaluation found a reduction in stunting of 9% among younger children (6 to 23 months) in the sample. This age group was likely to have had more exposure to the programme. There was, however, no evidence of impact across some other outcomes. For example, the programme did not increase the proportion of pregnant women receiving iron and folic acid supplements or deworming pills, nor did it improve intermediate WASH outcomes such as handwashing or sources of drinking water. Overall, the programme’s positive impact on young children’s nutritional intake, more significant stunting reduction in children under two years and improved WASH outcomes (such as the reduction in cases of diarrhoea) represent encouraging initial steps towards reducing the prevalence of stunting in Zambia.

Lessons Learned

Key lessons identified in the evaluation include:

- The success or failure of different components of programme implementation often stems from the motivation of the community level Ward Nutritional Coordinating Committees and the coordination between the District and Ward level coordinating committees.

- Going forward, it will be critical to continue strengthening both vertical and horizontal coordination and communication in the programme, as this is critical to successful implementation.

- The sensitisation and behaviour change communication activities were one of the success stories of the programme in priority intervention areas, particularly the promotion of best practices in breastfeeding, in nutrition and health knowledge, and in WASH. The role of community based volunteers to increase outreach has been key.

- An important lesson highlighted in the evaluation is that involving traditional leaders lends credibility and authority to projects focusing on social and behavioural change in rural Zambia. Also, the involvement of men to improve maternal and infant and young child feeding in a context of high gender inequality helped to increase awareness and promote better feeding practices.

- Dedicated clinic days to promote information and services on specific issues (e.g. ‘Under-5 days’, ‘health days’, and ‘growth monitoring’) were especially well-received by mothers. The programme capitalised on these inconsistently. There is high potential for the programme to leverage the positive energy and momentum around these clinic and community-based activities to carry out further programme activities, consolidate work already done, and launch new programme initiatives.
Africa >> Private Sector Development

The Private Sector Development programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo

What

The Private Sector Development programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is an innovative approach to economic development in a conflict-affected and dynamic environment. There are significant constraints to private sector development in DRC that inhibit growth, recovery and economic participation. The programme aims to improve the incomes of the poor by facilitating access to financial services, well-functioning markets, and an enabling business environment that fosters economic opportunities for poor people.

The Private Sector Development programme has three components: 1) ÉLAN RDC (French for DRC Momentum), a £50 million, five-year market systems development project, implemented by Adam Smith International; 2) Essor, a £35 million, five-year flexible facility aiming to improve the DRC's business enabling environment, implemented by PricewaterhouseCoopers; 3) The Decision Support Unit, implemented by Oxford Policy Management, supports ÉLAN and Essor to improve implementation and increase impact through annual reviews, evaluations, and learning and adaptation activities.

How

The Mid-Term Evaluation is principally formative and aims to provide guidance for ongoing programme performance management. It examines the validity of the overall Private Sector Development design concept and how effectively it has been implemented and performed in practice. This includes the effect of key decisions that have been made, how effectively Private Sector Development has been managed, and the performance of the Decision Support Unit (DSU).

The Mid-Term Evaluation was structured around five Evaluation Questions:

- Relevance: To what extent is the Private Sector Development programme appropriately designed to achieve its objectives?
- Effectiveness: What are the consequences of omitting the ‘access to finance’ component originally envisaged for the Private Sector Development programme?
- Effectiveness: How has the staggered implementation of programme components impacted on the effectiveness of the Private Sector Development programme?
- Efficiency: To what extent are the management arrangements for the Private Sector Development programme appropriate to achieve planning results?
- Is the Private Sector Development programme likely to deliver value for money?

The Mid-Term Evaluation was implemented around three elements: A Theory of Change (ToC) analysis, a management and organisational assessment and a value for money assessment. The main data sources were the Mid-Term Evaluation reports of ÉLAN and Essor prepared by the Decision Support Unit. To mitigate against any bias during the evaluation of the Decision Support Unit for the Mid-Term Evaluation, the unit hired two consultants that had not been part of its operations to conduct the Decision Support Unit evaluation and care was taken to maintain the consultants’ independence.

Findings

The original adaptive programme design, complexity thinking approach and ToC were judged as valid and appropriate for the DRC context. The design, however, has not always translated well into implementation. Not all components were implemented at the same time due to procurement processes and availability of resources. The implemented components are therefore not aligned to the original principles and ÉLAN and Essor are implemented almost completely independently of each other.

Initially, the omission of the access to finance component had little impact. ÉLAN managed to compensate for the level of finance immediately required for implementation and Essor was not hampered in any obvious way. In the longer term, however, due to changes in the operating context ÉLAN struggled to expand its pilot initiatives. A systematic market response to the pilot initiatives could have partly depended on greater access to finance for MSMEs.
The staggered implementation of the programme components had some impact on effectiveness. The later start of the Decision Support Unit, two years after ELAN and Essor, impacted the Decision Support Unit's ability to fully appreciate the implications of the changes in the operating context for the programme. It is likely that this negatively affected the ability of ÉLAN and Essor to make appropriate course corrections and achieve results. The staggered launch of ÉLAN and Essor did not have an impact on effectiveness, but this was due to the greater issue of limited meaningful inter-project coordination and the change in the operating context. As such, regardless of launch timing they were operating independently.

In addition, DFID's linking of targeted impact measures to payment, diverted attention away from adaptive results pathways and the pursuit of broader systematic results.5

Finally, the Private Sector Development portfolio was designed in such a way that its overall VFM should be more than the sum of its parts, currently VFM for two of the components is low. There is, however, still time and significant potential for greater complementarity across all three projects.

Lessons Learned

Key lessons highlighted in the evaluation were:

- While the original concept was innovative, resourcing and systems constraints, as well as changes in the operating context, hindered the programme's ability to operate fully as envisaged in the original business case. A loss of institutional knowledge and changing resource and operating environments contributed to the changes in the programme's approach. Delivery of the original concept required strong understanding of purpose and context. A payment-by-results method created incentives to focus only on results targets that had payments attached rather than on longer-term systematic change.

- From a complexity perspective, it might have been wiser to have smaller projects managed by an over-arching facility rather than two large projects. A complexity approach expects some degree of failure, learning from failure and alignment of approach towards more successful interventions. In the early stages, more diversified portfolio of smaller projects would have supported identification of what works best in the context and where resources are ultimately best allocated.

- While not a key evaluation question, the Mid-Term Evaluation highlighted the challenges of gender mainstreaming as a lesson. Integrating gender as a cross-cutting issue in implementation has had mixed success and requires specific, and greater, attention if gains are to be realised.

Publication Information

- Full Report
Africa >> Private Sector Development

Essor

What

Essor is one of three components of DFID’s £100 million private sector development programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Essor is a £35 million, five-year business environment reform project implemented by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) from May 2015 to January 2020.

DRC is emerging from decades of conflict and despite average growth rates of 6% since 2002, official GDP is still the lowest in the world. Within DRC less than 0.5% of the population are employed in formal micro, small and medium-sized enterprise firms and relatively few are employed by large formal firms. Most economic activity (up to 90%) takes place within the informal sector. Improving the business climate in DRC is seen as a key driver to stimulate private sector development and reduce poverty.

Essor was intended as a flexible facility which would, on an as-needed basis, design and implement interventions in business environment reform, access to finance and anti-corruption.

Through increasing the incomes of 40,000 micro small and medium-sized enterprise firms due to savings on taxes and costs of compliance for business owners, the project aims to realise a cumulative net income increase of £10.6 million by the time of project closure in January 2020.

How

The main purpose of the mid-term evaluation was to identify any constraints or risks to the achievement of the objectives of the Essor project and to recommend corrective actions. The evaluation was structured around six evaluation questions: 1) How appropriately is Essor designed sustainably to improve the business environment? 2) Is Essor appropriately organised and managed to perform effectively? 3) Is Essor likely to deliver value for money? 4) To what extent is Essor likely to deliver an improved business environment? 5) Is Essor’s measurement and reporting system appropriate to improve implementation? 6) How can Essor’s impact on the business environment be measured in the final evaluation?

These questions were answered with evidence from a literature review on business environment reform and links to poverty reduction; a political economy context assessment of political and institutional factors in DRC; three case studies on Essor interventions, sector performance reviews of Essor’s six sectors of operation; an independent results verification exercise of Essor interventions; and a value-for-money assessment. The mid-term evaluation was challenged by the limitations of the monitoring and results measurement system and relied mainly on primary data, the literature review and supplemental desk research.

Findings

Essor has not been a high-performing programme due to weaknesses in its design and management and changes in the political context. It has nevertheless made some significant achievements in business environment reform.

Essor is not well designed to improve the business environment because the project does not have a systematic approach to private sector engagement, identification of key challenges and obstacles to reform. It does not have a robust and flexible system to adjust resourcing and planning according to results, particularly where results are promising. It furthermore does not have a clearly articulated Theory of Change (ToC) with well-defined assumptions and the ToC was not used to guide implementation. Due to changes in the operating context, Essor faced difficulties in engaging effectively with the challenges of instability, lack of political commitment to business environment reform, and lack of small and medium-sized enterprise capacity and influence in policy processes. It did not develop a design approach that is specific enough to identify and prioritise the business environment reform issues that would most assist MSMEs.

Essor is likely to deliver some improvements in DRC’s business environment though not to the extent originally envisaged. DRC advanced from 96th in the world in 2017 on the World Bank’s Doing
Business dimension ‘Starting a Business’ to 62nd in the 2018 Doing Business report – a result of business registration reforms that were predominately, designed and implemented under Essor. Given the extremely fragile and challenging environment in which Essor is operating, this is a significant achievement for the project, though more likely to support larger firms rather than MSMEs.

Essor’s management and organization is weak, which has impacted on programme performance. The senior management team has not been effective in supporting the part-time locally-based team leadership, despite project management representing a third of overall project costs. Under the current trajectory, Essor is unlikely to deliver value for money. The Essor monitoring and results measurement system has not been appropriate or effective for improving implementation as it does not provide comparison of achievement across different workstreams to enable readjustment of resources and monitoring of overall progress.

The MTE ultimately did not respond to evaluation question 6, which will be addressed in a separate Approach Paper for the Final Evaluation.

Lessons Learned

The mid-term evaluation identified a number of lessons relevant to Essor, operating in DRC, and business environment reform projects within challenging contexts. These include:

- Development of a clearly articulated Theory of Change for Essor that included key assumptions and was used to guide and monitor results would have improved the effectiveness of project delivery within this challenging context.

- Business environment reform projects that focus on policy and legislative reforms alone are not responsive to the main challenges businesses face in DRC, and are unlikely to produce any significant improvements in the business environment. It is important to understand the political and institutional context in which the project is operating, and to try to align the aims of the programme with political incentives.

- Work on business environment reform in DRC faces significant challenges from the current nature of the political system and the risk of corruption. Projects need to be designed in a way that is adaptive to emerging opportunities and is rooted within a realistic appraisal of the political economy

Publication Information

- Full Report
ÉLAN is one of three components of DFID’s £100 million private sector development programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). ÉLAN is a £50 million, five-year market development programme implemented by Adam Smith International from January 2014 to July 2019. The programme is based on the Making Markets work for the Poor (M4P) and Market Systems Development (MSD) approaches to poverty reduction. It seeks to address the problem that market systems in the DRC are bound by constraints that limit access for poor people, particularly women, who consequently suffer from poverty and exclusion from broader and sustainable economic growth.

Addressing this problem requires market system change interventions that will have the greatest impact on the target low-income groups in terms of both outreach (numbers of people benefitting) and pro-poor income growth. ÉLAN has been designed as a flexible facility, operating in six key economic sectors associated with high pro-poor growth potential: (1) perennial agriculture (coffee and cocoa), (2) non-perennial agriculture (maize and rice), (3) river transport, (4) access to finance for small and medium enterprises, (5) access to finance for individuals, and (6) renewable energy (solar lamps). ÉLAN’s intervention’s generally take the form of pilot projects, developed in partnership with private sector firms, which assess and promote the feasibility of new practices to overcome barriers to growth. ÉLAN’s overall poverty reduction goal is to realise a cumulative net income increase of £88.4 million for one million low-income beneficiaries by 2020.

How

The main purpose of the Mid-term evaluation (MTE) is to identify any constraints or risks to achieving the objectives of the ÉLAN project and recommend corrective actions where required. The MTE is structured around six evaluation questions:

- How well is ÉLAN designed to lead to sustainable market system change?
- Is ÉLAN delivering market system change?
- To what extent are the market system changes delivered by ÉLAN likely to deliver sustainable impact?
- Is the way in which indicators are being measured and reported providing an accurate reflection of project performance?
- To what extent are ÉLAN’s management processes appropriate to achieve planned results?
- Is ÉLAN likely to deliver value for money?

These questions were answered with evidence from a literature review of the relation between M4P and business environment reform for market system change and poverty reduction; six sector studies of the main forms of intervention in each economic sector; six intervention case studies (one per sector) structured around the evaluation questions; a series of 12 focus group discussions with the beneficiaries of the case study interventions; an independent results verification exercise of all ÉLAN interventions; and a value for money assessment. ÉLAN’s Monitoring and Results Measurement (MRM) system is the primary data source for much of the sector review analysis and, to a lesser extent, the intervention case study analysis. In addition to the focus groups, interviews with ÉLAN staff and other stakeholders provided complementary primary data for a more holistic understanding of the ÉLAN project.

Findings

This MTE has found that ÉLAN has had a significant level of success in securing the adoption and adaptation of pilot interventions across several sectors, working effectively with generally appropriately chosen partners. There have, however, been some weaknesses both in the design and implementation of the intervention model. There have been significant differences in the type of M4P/MSD approaches applied across priority sectors, which reflect the differing constraints and opportunities within different sectors. ÉLAN’s intervention logic and assumptions have held in some sectors and conditions, delivering positive market systems change and good prospects for long-term...
inclusive growth. ÉLAN’s design approach and results framework; however, has paid insufficient attention to how ‘expansion’ and ‘response’ will be achieved. In order to deliver rapid impact level results in a challenging environment, market system change has been delivered at the level of the firm, rather than at the level of the market system, which has implications for sustainability of pilot efforts. While it is not yet possible to give a definitive judgement on the validity of the project’s indicators as a performance measure, primary data collection revealed some implementation weaknesses (and, indeed, successes) that are not obvious from ÉLAN’s monitoring and results measurement system. For example, ÉLAN’s adaptive design does not appear to be suitable for a payment-by-results mechanism. In almost all respects, ÉLAN has been very well-managed and has been demonstrably opportunistic and adaptive. A striking project achievement has been the assembly of a highly professional and committed local and international team in a very challenging working environment. Although it is unclear whether ÉLAN will achieve the income change targets for 2020, it is on track to achieve at least the break-even point for value for money, purely in terms of its quantified short-term impact by 2020 exceeding overall investment in the project.

**Lessons Learned**

Key lessons identified in the evaluation include:

- The project purpose needed to be better translated into the results framework. A focus on impact-level targets has created a challenging framework to implement and, while impact-level results have been achieved, has been at the expense of sustained improvements in market systems.

- Sufficient resources must be dedicated early to enable quality design and ToC articulation and testing in order to maximise the effectiveness of the interventions, as indicated in M4P guidance for conflict affected areas.

- Achieving widespread market expansion and response, beyond the pilot-level, requires an explicit strategy, particularly given the weakness within current market institutions. It cannot be assumed that there will be a natural flow-on effect.

- In the short-term, M4P/MSD interventions are unlikely to be an effective way to reach the poorest and most vulnerable. The best-placed to benefit are those with some level of human capital or other resources, who can either take advantage of market opportunities for business or as consumers of market goods and services.

- Successful implementation of M4P/MSD approaches requires a blend of local knowledge and international experience. ÉLAN’s achievements have been enabled through an excellent combination of local staff with a high level of professional and political maturity, along with a small number of first-class international experts.

**Publication Information**

- [Full Report](#)
What

The African Risk Capacity (ARC) is an African-owned weather/natural disaster insurance framework. DFID is providing up to £100 million (up to £90 million in Development Capital and up to £10 million for technical assistance) between 2014 and 2034 to support the framework. Established by the African Union (AU) in 2012, ARC aims to provide African governments with competitive insurance products to quickly and effectively support people either post or at risk of natural disasters. The programme also provides software containing early warning and risk modelling strategies, data on rainfall and vulnerability rankings to participating countries. The impact of ARC is expected at three levels. Across African countries, it should provide competitive pricing for insurance products. Nationally, it should improve government capacity to anticipate, plan and respond to disaster risk. Locally, vulnerable households should be more resilient to disasters through receiving timely support.

Countries who want to join the ARC risk pool must complete a capacity-building programme that includes training on early warning, risk modelling, disaster risk management and risk financing. This includes training on Africa RiskView, ARC’s proprietary software application that estimates drought-related response costs and defines the triggers for parametric insurance.

ARC is comprised of two entities: ARC Agency and ARC Limited (Ltd). ARC Agency is the capacity building and educational arm. ARC Limited is the sovereign-level mutual insurance company that provides weather-related insurance to Member States.

How

The Evaluation was conducted in 2016 by Oxford Policy Management (OPM), in the early stages of ARC’s operation, four years after its establishment by the AU, and two years after DFID funding commenced. This report was the first of two formative evaluations, with the second planned for 2019.

The review team used three evidence streams: country case studies in Mauritania, Kenya and Malawi were completed with 86 key informant interviews; an organisational review of ARC Agency and ARC Limited with interviews of 20 staff and board members; and a global review comprising of interviews with 30 international experts, a survey with 30 representatives from 17 African countries and a context assessment to identify trends across a sample of 20 AU countries.

The first evaluation question (EQ) explored to what extent ARC’s institutional setup and outputs led to the adoption and use of ARC’s insurance products (EQ1). Secondly, it researched the level of ARC’s contribution to timely and effective in-country responses that protected livelihoods and food security (EQ2). It also investigated ARC’s influence on AU Member States’ capacity to anticipate, plan, finance and respond to climate related disasters, as well as specifically with use of ARC products (EQ3). Lastly, the evaluation reviewed the perceived value of ARC’s risk pool and technical assistance based on participating governments and other stakeholders’ perspectives (EQ4).

The report highlighted that at the time of the evaluation it was too early to be able to definitively answer the evaluation questions given the need to collect more evidence over several years to be able to robustly point to the contribution that ARC has made towards its desired outcomes and impact.

Findings

ARC’s institutional setup and outputs led to adoption and use of ARC insurance products (EQ1): The evaluation observed that ARC Agency was evolving from a startup to a larger, more formalised organization. This revealed some organisational management challenges, such as a lack of robust processes and internal and external communication. ARC Agency has addressed some issues by filling key management positions, but some obstacles are more difficult to rectify. For example, the complex governance structure and challenging working relationship between ARC Agency and ARC Ltd presents significant challenges to both institutions’ abilities to deliver their mandates. ARC Ltd is generally viewed positively by the insurance market; however, there were some concerns around the operational demands of the institution, particularly with regard to flexibility of premium payment deadlines and frequent changes to the portfolio. ARC has been building a wide network of stakeholders; however, at the time of the evaluation, it had not developed robust relationships with the World Bank (despite ARC’s efforts) nor civil society. ARC has been developing diverse products however the difficulty of climate modelling has resulted in some Member States being concerned that
ARC is over-extending itself. ARC has been delivering capacity building programmes; however, the quality and flexibility of these trainings is limited.

ARC’s contribution to in-country timely and effective responses that protect livelihoods and food security (EQ2): The evaluation found evidence of improvement in ARC’s work to increase government capacity. Low levels of existing capacity and the frequent turnover of government leaders have been major challenges for ARC. Countries that have completed the official program still require ongoing support. The evaluation observed that although eight African nations have taken out ARC policies, the risk pool has been gradually shrinking. This is due to a number of factors such as the strong view among the nations that premiums are expensive when compared with likely payouts, a generally low level of understanding of how insurance works, and some mistrust of insurance. Late payouts due to political and procedural barriers (as witnessed in Niger and Senegal) have contributed to this.

ARC’s level of influence on AU Member States’ capacity to anticipate, plan, finance and respond to climate related disasters generally and more specifically with ARC (EQ3): The evaluation identified some examples of inter-ministerial dialogue, but it has been noted that it often starts strongly and then tapers off. Regional workshops are difficult due to differing levels of understanding and engagement with ARC. Mauritania has demonstrated some positive levels of government ownership; however, none of the case study countries have embedded ARC into their national budgets, despite premiums being paid fully by countries. ARC staff report that it was in the budgets of four countries.

Perceived value of ARC’s risk pool and technical assistance by participating governments and other stakeholders (EQ4): There are relatively good levels of awareness of ARC’s existence; however, understanding about ARC’s products is limited. The uptake of ARC’s products, measured by growth of the risk pool, appears to be shrinking. There are concerns that in some instances country demand may exist, but uptake is limited by affordability and competing national needs.

Lessons Learned

The evaluation highlighted the following lessons:

- Although ARC’s risk pool is small, ARC is able to make a significant contribution in capacity building in a range of countries. Increasing institutional awareness in relation to disaster risk management could make significant improvements for ARC’s members. This will also ensure that long-term commitments are made to safeguard populations from the growing threat of natural/weather related disasters. Improving ARC’s capacity building programme through increasing flexibility, quality of teaching and formats of delivery (e.g. online, regional workshops) should be a priority.

- Managing public perception is critical to stimulating the risk pool. Increasing understanding of what insurance can do, as well as ensuring outcomes for early adopters is imperative to encourage other countries to consider taking out insurance policies.

Publication Information

- Full Reports
- Management Response

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This evaluation was published in 2017-18 rather than 2018-19. ARC have actively embarked on addressing the lessons learnt therefore a number of findings may no longer be applicable. To ensure that each evaluation published by DFID has a publicly available summary, we have included it in the 2018-19 report.
Improving tax and benefit policy development in partner countries with the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

What
Improving tax policy analysis and development in partner countries (TAXDEV) was a £1 million pilot initiative delivered by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) from 2015/16 to 2017/18. The pilot aimed to strengthen tax-related analytical and policy-making capacity of its two partner countries (Ethiopia and Ghana), and to contribute to the global knowledge base through tax and benefit research generation. Through this pilot, the IFS and partner countries aimed to enhance the collective understanding of tax policy design and reform in developing countries.

Working with the governments of Ethiopia and Ghana, the IFS reviewed both the value-added tax (VAT) and turnover tax (ToT) systems in Ethiopia; and costed tax related manifesto commitments of the incoming government in Ghana. The costing element required a substantial data scoping exercise, which led to further collaboration to improve the quality and availability of data.

Under the programme, the IFS delivered formal training to Ethiopian and Ghanaian tax and revenue authority officials on policy costings processes, principles of tax policy design and microsimulation models. The training took the form of intensive capacity building visits which focused on sharing lessons and embedding new skills and approaches. This included South-South peer-to-peer learning bringing together Ethiopian and Ghanaian officials in Accra to share new approaches for undertaking tax policy costing, and two weeks of in-depth micro-simulation training for officials from the Ghanaian Tax Policy Unit at IFS offices in London – this activity was not possible for Ethiopian beneficiaries due to administrative problems.

An external evaluation was commissioned with a view to a possible next phase of activity. This evaluation covered the programme’s pilot phase from February 2016 until February 2018.

How
The evaluation aimed to assess the impact and performance of the TAXDEV pilot programme, and to identify lessons about “what works” to inform the programme’s second phase. The evaluation methodology was based on the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and scalability. The evaluation asked:

- How relevant were the activities in relation to the needs of the participants and the goals of the pilot?
- How likely were the pilot’s objectives to be achieved, and what were the factors that enabled or hindered reaching goals?
- Was the pilot suitable for scaling to include more participants in phase two?
- How efficiently (cost and time) was the pilot delivered?
- What impacts has the pilot had within two years, and what is the potential for further impacts if the programme continues?
- Will impacts be sustainable with or without further phases of the programme?

Both primary and secondary data sources were used. Secondary data included a review of the programme’s documentation, including the programme’s Theory of Change and Annual Reviews. In addition, available data was reviewed, for example, macro-level research (World Bank, IMF, OECD), and micro-level analysis on specific case studies (for policy analysis usually developed by non-governmental organisations). Primary data was based on field visits to Addis Ababa and Accra whereby interviews with DFID, national governments (Tax Policy Units and Tax Directorates), non-governmental organisations, development partners, and academic researchers took place. Telephone interviews with international experts and researchers (e.g. the University of Oxford and the World Bank) were also conducted.

Findings
Overall, the evaluation found the TAXDEV programme to be relevant to the needs of the participants, namely the Governments of Ethiopia and Ghana. The relevance of the pilot programme was further confirmed by its uniqueness i.e. there were no comparable or equivalent
initiatives focused on this type of tax related technical and analytical training. While it was too early to assess the full impact of the programme, there were positive indicators from partners, for example in Ethiopia the pilot generated interest in gaining more specific tax analysis skills, and in Ghana officials were able to use policy costing models effectively during the budget process. The objective to raise awareness of taxation modelling enhancing capacity was achieved through learning exchanges, training and reports produced by the pilot. This could be further reinforced and fostered by involving a wider range of relevant public bodies in the next phase e.g. the National, Regional and City Tax Agencies collecting specific data in Ethiopia. The pilot raised expectations among partner governments for strengthening risk management measures and further capacity building (i.e. learning-by-doing working collaboratively on micro-simulations). There were some issues with efficiency due to delays in accessing data sources which could have been avoided through a feasibility study or needs assessment review earlier in the process.

Lessons Learned

Key lessons from the evaluation include:

- The implementation of the TAXDEV programme in Ghana and Ethiopia has been largely successful; more progress could be realised with more time to deliver programme activity. A follow-up or second phase of the programme will be essential for both countries if the full range of objectives are to be achieved. The evaluation saw significant value in DFID expanding the current initiative beyond the pilot period for the two countries. In addition, expanding the programme to other governments in sub-Saharan Africa (and possibly beyond) would further the opportunities for South-South learning and peer exchange.

- The programme’s flexibility was appreciated by the government partners, and as new needs emerge, the next phase needs to build in emerging issues that relate to the specific taxation contexts of the partners. To be able to adapt to relevant issues that arise, DFID and IFS could strengthen the programme’s own approach to risk management measures by increasing the flexibility of the programme to add on elements. This may require a larger contingency budget.

- Feasibility studies are needed before the programme is expanded to other countries to assess the availability and accessibility of data in particular, as this was one of the factors that contributed to delays in delivering some of the pilot activities.

Publication Information

- [Full Report](#)
- [Management Response](#)
What

The Education Quality Improvement Program in Tanzania (EQUIP-T) was a four-year (2014-2018) Government of Tanzania programme funded by the Department for International Development (DFID). It aimed to increase the quality of primary education and improve pupil learning outcomes (in particular for girls) in seven of the most educationally disadvantaged regions in Tanzania. It was expected to reach about 2.3 million pupils. The programme aimed to enhance the professional capacity and performance of teachers; enhance school leadership and management (SLM); strengthen systems that support district planning and management of education and strengthen community participation and demand for accountability. The overall budget was £50 million. Some of the key programme activities included in-service teacher training, developing national school quality standards, training Ward Education Coordinators and district and regional officers and facilitating civil society organisations to engage in school improvement.

How

The impact evaluation aimed to assess the impact, effectiveness and relevance of EQUIP-T 20 months into implementation. The evaluation used a mixed methods approach based on three rounds of quantitative and qualitative data collection, combined with secondary information such as financial data. The evaluation drew from the baseline data taken in 2014 and midline data taken in 2016. The sample used was a panel of 200 schools: 100 programme schools and 100 control schools. A limitation of the context was that there have been major education policy changes since the baseline data was reported so it is possible that changes are not all linked to EQUIP-T. This means that demonstrating the contribution of the project to making changes is more challenging.

Findings

- In terms of impact, the evaluation found that there is strong evidence to suggest that EQUIP-T has had a positive impact on Kiswahili literacy skills for poorer performing pupils. EQUIP-T has significantly reduced the proportion of Standard 3 pupils in the bottom performance band for Kiswahili. Mean scores for all the Kiswahili sub-tests (reading speed, reading comprehension and writing) increased between 2013 and 2016. There is no significant impact on EQUIP-T students’ maths performance, which is expected as the teachers’ modules for maths had only just started at the time of the midline survey. The positive trend in the bottom performance is important, however a significant proportion of students are still behind curriculum expectations, highlighting the need for ongoing intervention.

- With regards to effectiveness, teachers reported that the training received was useful, and that most attended school-based sessions. Some of the challenges highlighted include training going too fast to grasp the material properly in a short period of time, insufficient payment and no food being provided, which limited the reach of the training. Teachers receive allowances for training, however, only teachers who attend training away from school are compensated by EQUIP-T. The evaluation also found that a systemic issue is high teacher and head teacher turnover, which reduces the potential benefit of the training.

- Teaching has been found to be more gender-balanced, but issues remained with regards to access to reading books and the use of corporal punishment. Only a small group of teachers in the observed lessons demonstrated a range of teaching practices, and this has not changed significantly since the baseline survey.

- There is no conclusive evidence of a positive impact of EQUIP-T on Head Teachers’ use of performance appraisals, but Head Teachers are engaging more proactively, for example by holding more regular staff meetings. However, there are ongoing systemic issues of chronic Head Teacher absenteeism.

- The Ward Education Coordinators are visiting schools more frequently and contributing to improvement in reliability of data on school performance.
School committees have become more active, and almost all schools have formed teacher parent partnerships. Parents are more involved in monitoring children’s attendance however absenteeism is an ongoing challenge.

The relevance of this programme remains strong. Improving student learning continues to be a critical need, with teacher capacity and performance directly linked to it. There has been a much more rapid shift to decentralized funding than expected. There is significant room for improvement in the community involvement in education.

Lessons Learned

Key lessons learned identified in the evaluation include:

- The modality of teacher training provided by the districts has implications for the cost as residential training costs more per day per beneficiary than cluster-based courses. The modality of INSET training provided by the districts has implications for cost. Future modalities should be chosen based off the cost differentials as well as feedback from participants and facilitators as to how effective the models are.

- The high turnover of beneficiaries (including teachers, Head Teachers, Ward Education Coordinators and District Education Officers) presents a risk for sustainability, and strategies must be considered on how to manage this.

- Many activities will require EQUIP-T funds to continue and as such will require government grants in the future. The programme will continue to require active engagement with stakeholders across national, regional and district level to address systemic issues.

Publication Information

- Full Reports
- Management Response
End Child Marriage Programme: Ethiopia

What

The End Child Marriage Programme (ECMP) was an £11 million programme funded by DFID and the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) from 2011 to 2017. The programme aimed to delay child marriage by at least one year for 37,500 adolescent girls within the East and West Gojam Zones of the Amhara Region in Ethiopia where the average age of first marriage was 14.7. The primary objective of ECMP was to support the GoE to develop a sustainable model to end child marriage that could be scaled up by both government and development partners. The programme comprised four components: community-based work, strategic engagement and communication, capacity building for relevant stakeholders and monitoring, evaluation and learning.

ECMP was implemented in four phases and by endpoint had been implemented in 29 districts. A two-tiered approach was used in phases one to three, whereby some districts benefited from all ECMP activities (the intensive approach) and others received a shorter, reduced set of activities (the expansion approach). In phase four this approach was replaced with the ‘expansion-diffusion’ model (expansion+) which included targeted interventions for those most difficult to reach.

How

The endline evaluation was conducted by an independent evaluation team who also conducted the mid-term evaluation of the project. The endline evaluation assessed the programme’s effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact and equity.

The evaluation methodology focused predominantly on qualitative data, comprising consultations with the implementing partners’ consortium lead Maxwell Stamp PLC, staff and government in five woredas, participatory group discussions with community members, and in-depth interviews with the range of stakeholders.

An innovative aspect of the evaluation methodology was the inclusion of Young Evaluators as formal members of the Evaluation team. This approach was considered successful as it enabled the evaluation team to gain better quality information and understanding of the changes that young people in the communities were experiencing.

A quantitative element of the evaluation was the value for money (VfM) assessment of the programme. A quantitative analysis of the sustainability of the credit aspects of the programme’s Economic incentives was also conducted.

There were some limitations to conducting the evaluation. The programme (rather than the evaluators) conducted the endline survey and the evaluation was able to draw on this data but only the preliminary results were available at the time, rather than the full confirmed dataset. Other data sources were limited or not available at the outset of the evaluation. This included a full assessment of the programme’s work in schools and providing economic incentives. As data and evidence became available during the course of the evaluation, it was incorporated into findings.

Key questions considered in the endline evaluation were:

- Is the Phase 4 expansion-diffusion model working and will it be possible for government to use/adapt it as the basis for future work (which may not receive donor funding)?
- Do people in communities really believe that Child Marriage is ending forever?

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7 This evaluation was published in 2017-18 rather than 2018-19. To ensure that each evaluation published by DFID has a publicly available summary, we have included it in the 2018-19 report.
Does intensified work with HTP committees, in schools, and with faith-based, women’s and other Ethiopian organisations work better than the approaches taken in Phases 1-3? (Phases 1-3 included work with these organisations but not to the same extent as in Phase 4).

Has the programme represented value-for-money?

Was the programme modality most appropriate? Would we do the same thing again?

Findings

Overall, the evaluation concluded that the End Child Marriage Programme in Ethiopia had made a significant contribution towards reaching the government’s commitment to ending child marriage and female genital mutilation by 2025. Key findings from the evaluation were as follows:

Effectiveness: The evaluation found strong evidence of changes in attitudes towards child marriage and other harmful practices, but there is more work to be done to ensure widespread changes in attitudes and practices. The Expansion+-Diffusion approach demonstrated the effectiveness of combining national level commitment with local level government, school and community structures.

Efficiency: The programme represents value for money, even though it did not reach the number of girls originally targeted. The evaluation estimated that the ECMP prevented over 34,000 early marriages. This brings health and education benefits to individuals, families and the communities.

Sustainability: The programme model fostered ownership of the initiative at all levels (government and community); it made full use of existing community organisations and structures; and it works with young people, putting girls at the centre. For future sustainability, ending child marriage will continue to need resources, and champions to ensure that ending child marriage stays on the agenda at national and local levels.

Impact: The rates of child marriage have reduced over the life of the programme. Importantly there was evidence of changing relations between boys and girls who could now talk about issues that were previously taboo, such as menstruation. Young people were able to talk with more knowledge and more responsibility between each other but also with their parents and families. The evaluation highlighted that this is fundamental to changing social norms and encouraging wider social change.

Equity: The evaluation did not conduct a comprehensive equity analysis but highlighted the tensions for programmes between trying to reach the widest constituency and ensuring that the poorest and most marginalised people are not left out. The End Child Marriage Programme intentionally aimed to ensure that participants were not excluded on the grounds of socio-economic status or disability. In addition, working through schools and faith networks meant that significant portions of the populations were reached with the programme messages and information. There will always be those who are not in school or not part of the networks, and programmes need to consider whether and how they can reach them.

Lessons Learned

Key lessons highlighted in the report include:

- Firstly, there is a recognition that child marriage and other harmful traditional practices are not single, social norms but rather part of a wider set of mutually reinforcing and inter-dependent set of norms and values based on gender and power relations. Addressing these complex dynamics requires social change and working with faith-based organisations was found to have a catalytic effect in raising awareness.

- The Evaluation recognised the value of using Young Evaluators on programmes relevant to young people.

- It is essential to take a girl-centred approach in programmes focused on ending child marriage, but it is also important to choose intervention ‘entry points’ which ensure that boys and adults are included in the initiative. Where appropriate, programmes on ending child marriage should work with Faith-Based Organisations due to their potential for catalytic effects in raising wide awareness about child marriage, and other harmful practices.

Publication Information

- Full Report
- Management Response
**Africa >> Infrastructure/Livelihoods**

**Improving Rural Access in Tanzania (IRAT): Mid Term Evaluation**

**What**
The UK is providing £35.4 million in total over five years to fund the Improving Rural Access in Tanzania (IRAT) programme. The objective of the programme is to raise household incomes by increasing the prices agricultural producers receive for their crops and reducing prices for goods purchased by consumers. To achieve this, the programme addresses bottlenecks on rural roads, including through the construction of bridges, drifts and culverts, raising embankments, improving running surfaces on steep slopes, to improve access to markets and essential services for rural communities.

Improving rural access remains a Government of Tanzania policy priority and the approach taken by IRAT is that of tackling bottlenecks using Government systems, with funding channelled to the Tanzania President’s Office of Regional and Local Government (PORALG).

**How**
The mid-term evaluation (MTE) aimed to assess progress to date and to formulate suggestions for strengthening the programme. Key focus areas included a review of IRAT’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and governance. The evaluation also considered the programme’s likely impact, sustainability and cross-cutting issues around monitoring and lessons learnt. Value for money (VFM) is a key theme running throughout the evaluation. The evaluation questions were also designed to test causal links in IRAT’s theory of change.

The evaluation design was based around the OECD DAC evaluation criteria, using eight evaluation questions, both summative (looking back at the performance of the programme to date) and formative (looking forward to ways in which the programme might be strengthened). These questions were designed to test the causal links in the programme’s theory of change and to help maximise the added value of the evaluation in terms of learning and future programme implementation. The MTE relied on data from three main sources; namely, programme monitoring data (quarterly reports and DFID annual reviews), primary data (22 key informant interviews with various stakeholders in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma) and secondary data sources (literature review).

The main limitations relating to the methodology include potential gaps in the data available from the programmes and lack of verification of project reporting data gathered by the implementing partner and Cardno.

**Findings**
The evaluation found the IRAT programme to be delivering bottleneck repairs well against its targets. The programme was found to be relevant to government’s national policy priorities, complementing other development partner’s work and supporting gender and poverty goals. It noted, however, that more could be done to target poorer districts with the highest levels of gender inequality. The programme was also found to be delivering very well regarding effectiveness, having addressed 62 bottlenecks and affecting 2.5 million people since it began.

Areas that could be improved include the prioritisation criteria for selecting bottlenecks; the evaluation found that the prioritised list does not focus on poverty and gender needs well and that the potential benefits from a given bottleneck are not adequately captured. Suggestions formulated include considering elements of geographical targeting on poorer areas as a means to improve the way IRAT targets value for money (VFM), poverty and gender. With regards to efficiency, the review found that the programme has gone a considerable way in refreshing the District Road Management System (DROMAS) having delivered training to engineers in all regions. Costs for addressing bottlenecks varied throughout different phases of the project, and it is suggested that, whilst these have now been addressed, inefficiencies and poorer value for money were characteristic of phase 2.

The governance of the programme was found to be working well despite its complex institutional arrangements. Timely flow of funds from DFID to government to districts is considered a particular strength of the IRAT approach; however, some significant risks have been noted, such as the introduction of the Tanzania Rural and Urban Roads Agency (TARURA) and key programme staff turnover.
While the evaluation findings suggest that it is too early to consider impact, three traffic surveys conducted to date show some increase in traffic volumes suggesting that the bottleneck improvements are increasing accessibility. Regarding sustainability, the quality of work undertaken is considered to be good; but increased, focused efforts on capacity development and continued ongoing maintenance of bottlenecks will be required going forward. Monitoring and learning, a cross cutting issue, is conducted by several institutions and the evaluation suggested that IRAT should maintain more detailed project recording and an updated bottleneck list to help ensure stronger accountability.

Lessons Learned
Lesson learning is an important part of the programme as incorporated into the cross-cutting issue around monitoring and learning.

- The evaluation suggests that lesson learning throughout the programme is helping improve delivery and efficiency, with a key lesson being the need to consider bottleneck repairs in relation to the surrounding road network. This is to ensure prioritisation can take account of whether the surrounding road network also has bottlenecks, which would make localised repairs less successful.

- Other lessons arising from key informant interviews include the importance of continuing to strengthen government capacity and the need for donor and government coordination.

Publication Information
- Full Report
- Management Response