Beyond the Headlines: Forgotten Fragility in Ethiopia

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Disclaimer
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Major Acronyms

| ALC | Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity |
| CAD | Canadian Dollars |
| CIFP | Country Indicators for Foreign Policy |
| CPIA | Country Policy and Institutional Assessments |
| DAG | Development Assistance Group |
| ENDF | Ethiopian National Defense Force |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| FiAP | Feminist International Assistance Policy |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| GAC | Global Affairs Canada |
| GERD | Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam |
| GoE | Government of Ethiopia |
| GTP II | Second Growth and Transformation Plan |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons/Populations |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| MoE | Ministry of Education |
| MoWCY | Ministry of Women, Children and Youth |
| MoP | Ministry of Peace |
| MoA | Ministry of Agriculture |
| MoFEC | Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation |
| M/F | Male/Female |
| NEBE | National Electoral Board of Ethiopia |
| NTRM | National Tax Revenue Movement |
| OGD | Other Government Donors |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| PBF | Peace Building Fund |
| PM | Prime Minister |
| SME | Small and Medium Sized Enterprises |
| TPLF | Tigray People’s Liberation Front |
| UN | United Nations |
| UN OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization |
| WDI | World Development Indicators |
Executive Summary

As a cultural mosaic of over 80 diverse ethnic groups, interethnic tensions, power dynamics, and historical context are central to understanding all aspects of Ethiopia’s political, economic, and social affairs. Faulty democratic structures, declining legitimacy, persistent isomorphic mimicry, and a frail social contract are presently driving Ethiopia’s fragility. These structural flaws manifest most prominently across governance, security, and demographic clusters, rendering these the primary drivers of fragility. While flawed democracy, interethnic conflicts, and growing internal displacement are central to discussions of fragility in Ethiopia, the State’s inability to address ethnic and gendered inequalities, aid dependency, and low environmental resilience cannot be overlooked. Despite high hopes following the appointment of Prime Minister (PM) Abiy Ahmed in 2018, declining authority and capacity has created a vicious feedback cycle, undermining State legitimacy. Projecting to May 2021, scenarios consider political uncertainty related to the indefinite postponement of federal elections, authoritarian security enforcement, and intensifying interethnic conflicts, all against the backdrop of a displacement- and climate-induced humanitarian crisis. Recognizing strong Canada–Ethiopia bilateral relations and significant investment in Ethiopian development, this policy brief is directed to Global Affairs Canada (GAC). Building off of an evidence-based analysis of Ethiopia’s fragility and informed projection of future trends, this brief provides several policy options as entry points for reducing fragility by supporting national peacebuilding strategies, deepening democratic governance, and promoting resilient agricultural development. GAC is well-positioned to address a number of structural causes of Ethiopia’s fragility and support the country’s transition towards greater authority, capacity, legitimacy, and ultimately, State resilience.
Methods

The analyses and conclusions presented in this brief required both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Following Carleton University’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy’s (CIFP) framework, primary quantitative data was collected on six clusters: Governance, Economics, Security and Crime, Human Development, Demography, and Environment. Decadal trends for indicators relevant to each cluster were collected from online databases where possible. This data collection also included the use of qualitative sources such as government documents, organizational publications, and international and domestic media. It is worth noting however, that a State-controlled domestic media landscape created challenges in incorporating events-based analysis, as seen with the current State-imposed telecommunications shutdown in Tigray. Scholarly literature on fragile states and the Ethiopian context supplemented primary data collection by providing historical and global grounding for primary data. This data, alongside an application of CIFP’s Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity (ALC) framework, was used to identify the drivers and potential threats to Ethiopia’s fragility.

This report drew from four prominent concepts regarding State fragility: Hybrid Regimes, Legitimacy Traps, Capability Traps and the Social Contract (see Annex 2). The integration of both quantitative and qualitative data from an array of primary and secondary sources, with the broader discourse of Fragile States, allowed for a robust analysis of Ethiopia’s fragility. This process culminated in the production of three informed policy options for GAC consideration.

Background

Ethiopia is a landlocked country in the Horn of Africa, and the second most populous African nation. It comprises ten ethnically based regional states (see Annex 1). With one of the fastest growing economies in the world, the country is an attractive partner for investment and trade relationships.

In 1991, The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) joined other ethnically based opposition movements to form the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to overthrow the ruling communist junta, the Derg. Under the EPRDF, Ethiopia’s ethnic-federal system was formalized, decentralizing power to regional states and granting ethnic groups the right to self-governance under the constitution. Since then, Ethiopia has achieved remarkable economic growth. In 2016, protests and unrest sparked a government-imposed state of emergency and the resignation of PM Hailemariam Desalegn. Abiy Ahmed was elected by EPRDF executive committee members as chairman of the ruling coalition, and as such, was made the next PM of Ethiopia. PM Abiy Ahmed announced sweeping reforms, and in 2019 was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for his work in establishing peace with Eritrea, formally ending the twenty-year conflict. Combined with its booming economy, the country has earned a positive reputation on the world stage, quickly becoming a ‘donor darling’ in the process.

Domestically, however, the country remains fraught with demographic tensions arising from its youth bulge and ethnic cleavages. Identity politics dominate a fragile political state in which ethnic groups compete for power and influence. In December 2019, PM Abiy Ahmed announced that the EPRDF was being dissolved to form the Prosperity Party, founded on a pan-Ethiopian identity. The TPLF, harbouring resentment for their declining political clout, refused to join the Prosperity Party. Tensions between the Tigray Regional State and PM Abiy Ahmed erupted into violence in November 2020 (see Annex 10). Conflict among ethnic groups across the country, and an indefinitely postponed national election pose additional risks to Ethiopia’s fragility in the near future. Climate insecurity and the impacts of COVID-19 serve to exacerbate these tensions and risk increasing ethnic, gendered, and rural–urban horizontal inequalities.

Stakeholders

Stakeholders most relevant to the proposed policy options have been identified below. See Annex 4 for a comprehensive list of all stakeholders’ influence, interests and behaviour.
End User
The following analysis and policy options are directed to GAC’s Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau, and Ethiopia Development Division. Canada and Ethiopia have a long-standing bilateral relationship, sharing common goals for development and poverty reduction. In 2018–19, Ethiopia was the top recipient of Canadian international assistance with a total disbursement of CAD203M through bilateral and multilateral funding channels. Canada’s development investments in Ethiopia prioritize economic growth as a pathway to poverty reduction, in alignment with the Government of Ethiopia’s (GoE) Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II). This includes programming to address chronic food insecurity, resource management, SME development, and youth entrepreneurship. In line with the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) core Action Areas, Canada also promotes the empowerment of women and girls through sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR)–targeted initiatives, and support to women’s rights organizations. In February 2020, Canadian PM Justin Trudeau made a commitment to work with Ethiopia specifically on innovative climate action, clean technology and SME development. All considered, it is important to highlight strategic opportunities for policies and development entry-points which have the potential to both address fragility and strengthen Canadian–Ethiopian relations (see Annex 5).

Internal
Prosperity Party and PM Abiy Ahmed: The Prosperity Party is the ruling party in Ethiopia and is led by PM Abiy Ahmed. It is the successor to the EPRDF, a coalition party made up of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Oromo Democratic Party, the Amhara Democratic Party and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement. The EPRDF was dissolved in order for the creation of a pan–Ethiopian party, which garnered support from “Ethiopian nationalists”. The rural political elite share the “federalist” sentiments prominent in rural states which value cultural pluralism and believe that ethnic groups should have autonomy from the central state. While the rural political elite run the state machinery, it is the urban elite that hold more political influence and provide the basis of support for pan–Ethiopianism. The Prosperity Party maintains power through a “well–manoeuvred decentralization scheme” that allows the State to exert control at the household level. PM Abiy Ahmed perpetuates Ethiopia’s top–down administration, and has implemented new urban megaprojects in the economic interest of domestic elites.

Executive Government: The Ministry of Peace (MoP) (Minister Muferihat Kamil) was established by PM Abiy Ahmed in 2018 to advance sustainable peacebuilding reforms in Ethiopia. Most notably, the MoP is currently collaborating with the Ministry of Women, Children, and Youth (MoWCY) (Minister Filsan Abdullahi) to implement a national peacebuilding strategy funded by United Nations (UN) entities, aimed at addressing intercommunal conflict and ethnic cleavages in Ethiopia’s most conflict–prone regions (see Policy Option 1). Minister of Defence, Kenea Yadeta, replaced longtime ally of PM Abiy Ahmed Lemma Megersa who had vocally opposed the decision to merge the EPRDF. The Ministry is currently at the forefront of Ethiopian politics given its involvement in the Tigray conflict. Additional State ministries are also responsible for economic, social, and human development portfolios, alongside their respective regional and local government units, including Regional Bureaus and Woreda Offices. Among them, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC) is the primary entity responsible for the management of national–level financial and economic policy, and the allocation of resources. As a counterpart to MoFEC, the Planning and Development Commission (PDC) is the forward–planning development body, whose mandate includes the drafting and implementation of national development strategies across ministries, including the 10–Year Perspective Development Plan (see Policy Option 3).

National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE): The NEBE is the body responsible for the supervision of national elections and the provision of the legal, regulatory and operational framework for electoral conduct. Birtukan Midekssa, a lawyer, judge and former leader of an opposition party was recently appointed as the chair. While the appointment of Midekssa indicates greater respect for the independence of the NEBE, she remains dependent on the government’s commitment to reform to ensure a free and fair election. The NEBE has a reputation for political interference and is under–staffed and under–resourced. Despite this, it has been competent in managing the electoral process.
**Media:** The Ethiopian media landscape is predominantly State-owned, undermining State accountability and transparency. The handful of private media is controlled by 2016 terrorism laws that have been used to deem opposition media sites as “terrorist organizations.” The Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority, under Director-General Getachew Dinku, is the federal media regulatory body that controls licensing and registration. Further, the GoE has a monopoly over Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), a feature of the media landscape that is set to be changed in February 2021 when Ethio Telecom will be privatized.

**The Legal and Justice Affairs Advisory Council:** The council was established by the Office of the Attorney General in 2018 to lead reforms in the legal and justice system. The council is to propose well-researched pragmatic reform packages to the Ethiopian Government that address the institutional shortcomings in Ethiopia’s judicial system. It will be targeting the media, anti-terrorism and CSO laws that impede on democracy.

**Ethnic Stakeholders:** Although Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups comprise 60% of the population, Ethiopia has over 80 ethnically diverse groups. Ethnic cleavages are a significant feature of Ethiopia’s context, and peacebuilding is incumbent on consideration of ethnic stakeholders. Intercommunal ethnic conflict is common, particularly by majority groups asserting ethnic dominance over minority populations. Most visibly, conflict has been instigated by the country’s numerous ethnic militias such as the Oromo Liberation Army, Oromo nationalists, and rebel wings of ethnically-based political opposition parties. Informal ethnic networks such as the Qeerroo (male youth-led Oromo movement) have also been prominent stakeholders in voicing State opposition and instigating intercommunal violence as a means to settle historical grievances of marginalization.

**Civil Society:** In recent years, non-governmental organizations such as the Interreligious Council of Ethiopia and Ethiopian Peace Development Centre, as well as traditional cultural authorities have collaborated with the MoP to address interethnic cleavages and advance the MoP’s peacebuilding strategy. More broadly, Ethiopian citizens are impacted by all matters of political, social, and economic development, and are therefore primary stakeholders. Rural communities, women, and internally-displaced populations (IDPs) are key stakeholder groups primarily impacted by the country’s humanitarian crises (IDP crisis, food insecurity), and/or disproportionately marginalized in achieving human development outcomes such as basic healthcare access and literacy.

**Tigray Conflict:** Ethnic tensions between Tigray minorities and the majority Oromo have heightened following Oromo PM Abiy Ahmed’s appointment. In contrast to their historical domination of the political sphere, Tigrayans have felt targeted by PM Abiy Ahmed’s political reforms and shifts towards ‘pan-Ethiopian politics.’ The most recent escalation of conflict in Tigray (see Annex 10) was between the Ethiopian National Defense Army and the Tigray regional security forces led by the TPLF (Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael). Neighbouring Amhara regional state security forces were also reinforcing federal efforts against the TPLF, effectively deepening Tigray-Amhara tensions. After a month-long standoff between PM Abiy Ahmed and Gebremichael, the PM’s claims of capturing the Tigrean capital Mekelle and consequent victory over the TPLF have not yet been validated, and suspicions of continued fighting exist.

**External UN Entities:** Demonstrative of the significant external development actor support in Ethiopia, there are currently 26 UN operating agencies focused on various priorities such as economic and human development, humanitarian aid, and gender equality (Annex 6). Most relevant entities for policy implementation are detailed in Policy Options.

**Fragility Risk Assessment**

The Fragility Risk Assessment identifies primary and secondary drivers of Ethiopia’s fragility. All clusters are classified by impact on fragility and general direction of trends for key structural indicators over the past decade (see Legend). Fragility risk assessments were based on available structural indicator data, and contextualized by both events-based analysis (i.e. media sources, surveys), and qualitative assessments (i.e. country reports). Governance, Security & Crime, and Demography are primary drivers, where the structural causes of fragility – namely a hybrid regime, capability trap, legitimacy trap, and weak social contract – have the most detrimental
implications for the country’s present state and future circumstances. In practice, these structural causes present challenges of weak democratic governance, deceptive illusions of state capacity to deliver basic services, and declining legitimacy for a majority of Ethiopia’s population, as explained in cluster-specific analyses below (see Annex 2 for further details). As secondary drivers, Human Development, Economy, and Environment are less impacted by these structural causes, yet Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity (ALC) gaps in these clusters pose the risk of exacerbating fragility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legend</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact on Fragility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decadal Trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving (↑)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*approximated to 2009–2019 when possible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Primary Drivers of Fragility

| Governance ↓ |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| **Indicator** | **Value and Overall Trend** |
| **Government Effectiveness** | World Governance Indicators
Measures the quality of public services and quality of policy formulation and implementation. Rating on a scale from -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high) |
| 2009 | 2014 | 2019 |
| - | - | -0.6 |
| Though decadal trends are unavailable for this indicator, 2017–2019 data show a consistently low score over recent years. |
| **Voice and Accountability (of citizens) in Decision Making** | World Governance Indicators
Captures citizen participation in government and freedoms of expression and association. Rating on a scale from -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high) |
| 2009 | 2014 | 2019 |
| - | - | -1.0 |
| Particularly in regard to land-use decisions, citizens are systematically excluded from political processes; however, due to proposed reforms to anti-terrorism laws, this measure has improved from -1.4 in 2017. |
| **Political Pluralism and Participation** | Freedom House
Includes measures of political rights and opportunities. Scored from 0 (less free) to 16 (more free). |
| 2010 | 2015 | 2020 |
| - | 2/16 | 5/16 |
| Increased political pluralism and participation is largely the result of higher female representation in politics. |
### Electoral Process

**Freedom House**

*Assessment of free and fair elections. Scored from 0 (less free) to 12 (more free).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>1/12&lt;sup&gt;64&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2/12&lt;sup&gt;65&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethiopia’s last election was not held in accordance with democratic standards and the current PM was not brought to power by free and fair elections.

### Freedom of Expression and Belief

**Freedom House**

*Measures academic, media, and religious freedoms of expression. Scored from 0 (less free) to 16 (more free).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>3/16&lt;sup&gt;66&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4/16&lt;sup&gt;67&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethiopia’s media landscape is predominantly state owned. In 2018, Abiy pursued reforms that freed journalists and encouraged exiled activists to return to Ethiopia. However, these reforms have been largely repealed following the postponement of the 2020 election.

### Stability of Democratic Institutions

**Bertelsmann Stiftung Index Reports (BTI)<sup>48</sup>**

*Performance of, and commitment to, democratic institutions. Ranking from 1.0 (hard-line autocracy)-10.0 (democracy in consolidation).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethiopia’s democratic institutions correspond to a “moderate autocracy” ranking by BTI.

### Functioning of Government

**Freedom House**

*Combines measures of corruption and transparency. Scored from 0 (less free) to 12 (more free).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>4/12&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3/12&lt;sup&gt;70&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequent internet and communication blackouts by the State serves to suppress information on government activity during tense events.

### Political Participation

**Ibrahim Index of African Governance<sup>71</sup>**

*Captures the civil society space, political pluralism, and integrity of elections. Ranking from 0-100 where 100 is the best score possible.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The low score is indicative of the inability of Ethiopia to uphold foundational democratic practices such as political pluralism and elections with integrity.

Ethiopia’s government demonstrates the characteristics of a hybrid regime<sup>72</sup> due to the presence of all the necessary structures to be deemed democratic,<sup>73</sup> yet exhibiting a lack of democratic principles in practice. This has contributed to a prominent capability trap.<sup>74</sup> For example, the state has adopted democratic anti-terrorism reforms, yet has failed to uphold these in practice, as seen through the recent arrest of Oromo political activist Jawar Mohammed.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, the judiciary system is not immune to political pressures.

The absence of capacity and political will to implement reforms is due to Ethiopia’s single-party dominance, a consequence of its First–Past-the–Post electoral system.<sup>76</sup> The current dominant party, the Prosperity Party, is led by PM Abiy Ahmed and is the successor to the EPRDF. While many ethnic minorities feel like their interests are threatened following the dissolution of the EPRDF, the TPLF have refused to join, contributing to the escalating tensions and subsequent violence between the State and the Tigray regional state. Heavy-handed governance is not exclusive to the security sector; a “well-maneuvered” decentralization scheme allows local agents of the state to wield arbitrary power over local citizens by means of local administrative networks, *Kebele.*<sup>77</sup> Only the State has
the right to own land under the constitution, and as such, local elites are able to designate land for development.\textsuperscript{78} Land acquisition deals take place between the State and --predominantly foreign-- investors without meaningful consultation of citizens.\textsuperscript{79,80} As such, \textit{Kebele} are employed as mechanisms to enforce top-down decisions rather than a site for political representation of local people. Ethiopia’s State-led model of development excludes the voices of citizens, contributing to their further dispossession and regional inequalities.\textsuperscript{81}

The role of \textit{Kebele} in day-to-day administration, and impact on daily life, explains that while Ethiopia has impressive representation of women in high-politics—holding 32% of seats in parliament\textsuperscript{82}—concerns regarding women remain woefully unaddressed. In local governance structures, women remain underrepresented; one study conducted in an Oromia region found that women account for only 5% of \textit{Kebele} cabinet members.\textsuperscript{83} Additionally, a State monopoly over the ICT sector and a restrictive domestic media landscape contributes to a weakening social contract, preventing transparency and accountability. For example, the GoE has a tendency to shut down the internet during times of political tension or intercommunal violence. The internet was disabled nationwide between late June 2020—mid-July during Oromo-led protests\textsuperscript{84} and is, alarmingly, currently disabled in the Tigray region in response to the escalating violence (See Annex 10).\textsuperscript{85} Risks to Ethiopia’s weak governance structure include the indefinitely postponed election and escalating tensions between PM Abiy Ahmed and Tigray and Oromo ethnic groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value and Overall Trend</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rule of Law (F)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Freedom House&lt;br&gt;Captures existence of due process, an independent judiciary and protection from illegitimate force. Scored from 0 (less free) to 16 (more free).</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia consistently performs poorly for rule of law as a result of abuses perpetrated by state security forces and the use of anti-terrorism laws that denies opponents of the government fair trials.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Number of Fatalities: State-based Violence<br>Uppsala Conflict Data Program\textsuperscript{88}<br>Reports the number of deaths resulting from violence perpetrated by state forces. | 2009 | 2014 | 2019 |
| | 151 | 49 | 27 |
| Decadal trends indicate a decline in fatalities resulting from state-based violence. |

| Total Number of Fatalities: Non-State Violence<br>Uppsala Conflict Data Program\textsuperscript{89}<br>Reports the number of deaths resulting from violence perpetrated by non-state entities. | 2009 | 2015 | 2020 |
| | 75 | 178 | 232 |
| Declining state-based violence has been accompanied by more frequent non-state violence. |
The State lacks a monopoly of force as evidenced by the prevalence of armed militias across the country. These militias are responsible for instances of violence perpetrated against ethnic minorities. At least 15 were killed in a militia attack in September, following a similar incident in which 30 were killed. Most recently, 54 were killed in an attack in the Oromia state. Concerningly, government troops abruptly withdrew from the area just before the attack. This is indicative of the security force’s lack of effective responses to the pervasive security threat of widespread interethnic violence. Relative to other countries in the African continent, Ethiopia does not score high on violence against citizens; however, the extent of militia presence points to State’s capacity gaps. Additionally, State security forces are known for committing human rights abuses such as extrajudicial executions and the destruction of people’s homes and property. This absence of rule of law impacts the judiciary system as well which is characterized by a lack of due process, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment of political opponents such as Jawar Mohammed. As such, judicial institutions often function to maintain state authority rather than serve as a mechanism for accountability. Further, despite being a landlocked state, Ethiopia is not embroiled in external conflict. Indeed, PM Abiy Ahmed was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for achieving peace with Eritrea. However, the Tigray Conflict poses a risk for military involvement of Eritrea. Another external insecurity is caused by the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) which has been the source of tension between Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia. While tripartite negotiations have resumed, tensions remain high.

The ongoing conflict in Tigray exemplifies the violence resultant of fragility in the security sector (see Annex 10). This conflict reflects a pre-existing trend across ethnic groups in Ethiopia in which sentiments of political marginalization are reflected in episodes of violence. Since PM Abiy Ahmed’s appointment as the first Oromo PM, Oromo militia have been frequently cited as the perpetrators of violence. This suggests that Oromos feel emboldened to “settle old ethnic scores” resulting from historical oppression and political marginalization. The second largest ethnic group, the Amhara, have also sought to settle these scores as evidenced in the failed 2019 coup. The Amhara regional security chief, Gen Asaminew, was the alleged ringleader of a coup that left two dead and over 100 injured. He had garnered a reputation for ethnic nationalism in his calls for autonomy for the Amhara people. Against this backdrop, the violence in the Tigray region, and its causes, did not come as a surprise. However, the TPLF’s military capacity makes this conflict unique, and renders sustained violence possible. Unlike other ethnic groups, the TPLF has a significant paramilitary due to its military role in overthrowing the Derg, as well as numerous military bases in the region due to the previous war with its northern neighbour, Eritrea. Given these contexts, intra- and inter- state conflict pose the risk of exacerbating fragility in this cluster.
## Demography (اسي) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value and Overall Trend</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population, Total</strong>&lt;sup&gt;107&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85,233,913</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Despite significant gains in modern contraceptive use, average annual population growth rate remains high at 2.56% (2020 estimate), with a decadal average of 2.7%.&lt;sup&gt;108,109&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Diversity (2016 estimates)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;110&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Oromo (34.9%); Amhara (27.9%); Tigray (7.3%); Sidama (4.1%); Welaita (3%); Gurage (2.8%); Somali (2.7%); Hadiya (2.2%); Afar (.6%); Other (12.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA Factbook</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 80 ethnically diverse groups exist in Ethiopia, yet Oromo and Amhara communities comprise 60% of the population.&lt;sup&gt;111&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Bulge (% of population 0–14 yo)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;112&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Development Indicators (2006–2019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slight decline from a high baseline. 2019 estimates report 70% of the population under the age of 30.&lt;sup&gt;113&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural Population (% of total population)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;114&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Development Indicators (2006–2019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Declining rural population corresponds with the increasing urban growth rate due to rural–urban migration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Conflict- and Disaster-Induced Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;115&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)</td>
<td>Conflict: 200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disaster: Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 2019, IDMC reported a total of 1,414,000 (conflict) and 390,000 (disaster) IDPs. Sharp escalation in 2020 is likely due to TPLF-State conflict and greater interethnic conflict linked to postponed federal election.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugees Context Linked to TPLF-State Conflict</strong>&lt;sup&gt;116,117&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Media Sources</td>
<td>Refugee Outflow: The UN Refugee Agency estimates that more than 43,000 Ethiopian refugees have entered Sudan.&lt;sup&gt;116&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees Hosted: Ethiopia hosts roughly 165,000 Eritrean refugees, particularly concentrated in Tigray.&lt;sup&gt;117&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The State lacks capacity to mitigate demographic pressures influencing fragility. Interethnic conflict is common, and is often instigated by Oromo nationalist groups seeking to settle historical grievances since PM Abiy Ahmed’s appointment.\textsuperscript{118,119,120} Violence is particularly prevalent along regional borders.\textsuperscript{121} Interethnic conflict is the primary driver of Ethiopia’s internally displaced population (IDP) humanitarian crisis (see Annex 7)\textsuperscript{122,123,124} Secondary to interethnic conflict, climatic shocks also disrupt livelihoods, worsening displacement amongst Ethiopia’s mostly rural population and driving landless youth seeking employment to already strained urban job markets.\textsuperscript{125,126} Ethiopia recently established a MoP, enacted the national Durable Solutions Initiative to address displacement, and ratified the Kampala Convention for IDP protection, yet interethnic violence has not subsided and government actions have been criticized for facilitating premature IDP returns and failing to develop regional capacities for policy implementation.\textsuperscript{127,128,129} Flare ups in interethnic conflict and subsequent displacement caused by Tigray–Oromo and Tigray–Amhara ethnic cleavages aggravated during the TPLF–State conflict is a risk, especially as Ethiopian refugees potentially return from Sudan.\textsuperscript{130,131} The TPLF–State conflict has also triggered concerns as Ethiopia is a key host of Eritrean refugees.\textsuperscript{132} The GoE’s capacity to address urgent food insecurity and human rights violations of refugee populations linked to the TPLF–State conflict remains uncertain.\textsuperscript{133}

Ethiopia has a prominent youth bulge. Ethnic, gendered, and rural–urban horizontal inequalities manifest in youth–specific challenges such as sexual and reproductive healthcare access, low educational attainment, and formal–sector unemployment.\textsuperscript{134} In absence of State capacity to address concerns, Ethiopia will not benefit from a demographic dividend.\textsuperscript{135} Although the GoE enacted the National Youth Policy in 2004 to support youth engagement across political, economic, and social sectors, implementation issues due to inadequate resources, accountability, and intersectoral coordination have weakened the social contract for the overwhelming majority.\textsuperscript{136} In recent years, the Qeerroo have been particularly vocal in expressing youth grievances.\textsuperscript{137,138} Despite initial optimism following PM Abiy Ahmed’s appointment, youth opposition and ethnically–tinged political violence throughout 2019–2020 signify declining State legitimacy and is likely to worsen amidst uncertainties caused by the indefinitely postponed federal election.\textsuperscript{139,140,141}

### Secondary Drivers of Fragility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value and Overall Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Development (HDR)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>Overall: 0.470&lt;br&gt;M: 0.507&lt;br&gt;F: 0.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)\textsuperscript{142,143,144}</td>
<td>Overall: 0.453&lt;br&gt;M: 0.489&lt;br&gt;F: 0.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite index of key human development measures. Index score of 0–1, with increasing scores indicating greater human development</td>
<td>Overall: 0.412&lt;br&gt;M: 0.452&lt;br&gt;F: 0.339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite steady improvement from a low baseline, Ethiopia ranks 173rd out of 189 countries, and has not achieved gender parity.\textsuperscript{145}
Maternal Mortality Ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births)  
UNDP\textsuperscript{146}  
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
2005 & 2010 & 2015 \\
\hline
743 & 523 & 353 \\
\hline
\end{array}

Despite a significant decline, Ethiopia still has one of the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world.\textsuperscript{147}

Population with at least some secondary education (% of ages 25 and older)  
UNDP\textsuperscript{148,149}  
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
2010 & 2015 & 2018 \\
\hline
M: 16.1\% & M: 20.7\% & M: 22.0\% \\
F: 7.0\% & F: 10.8\% & F: 11.5\% \\
\hline
\end{array}

Low secondary school enrollment rates are mostly due to an average 62\% primary school dropout rate between 2007–2017.\textsuperscript{150} Ethiopia has also not achieved gender parity.

Proportion of population using at least basic drinking water services (%)  
World Development Indicators (2006–2019)\textsuperscript{151,152}  
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
2007 & 2012 & 2017 \\
\hline
Rural: 19\% & Rural: 26\% & Rural: 31\% \\
Urban: 78\% & Urban: 79\% & Urban: 80\% \\
\hline
\end{array}

Despite improvements, two-thirds of the rural population lack access to basic drinking water services.

Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)  
World Development Indicators (2006–2019)\textsuperscript{153}  
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
2008 & 2013 & 2018 \\
\hline
33.9\% & 27.5\% & 19.7\% \\
\hline
\end{array}

One-fifth of Ethiopia’s population is undernourished.

Child Marriage: Women Married by age 18 (as a % of married women ages 20–24)  
UNDP\textsuperscript{154}  
\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline
2003–2018 \\
\hline
40\% \\
\hline
\end{array}

High prevalence of child marriage is a significant barrier to education. Male secondary school enrollment rates are double the rates for females.\textsuperscript{155}

---

Economic growth has enabled significant human development progress.\textsuperscript{156,157} Ethiopia was amongst the top five Sub-Saharan African countries allocating the greatest share of public expenditures towards health in 2013 and education in 2014.\textsuperscript{158} Primary healthcare expansion, community health education (Health Extension Programme), and free primary schooling have enabled key achievements such as a 67\% reduction in under-5 mortality (1990–2014 estimates), an increase in average life expectancy from 45 to 64 years (1990–2014 estimates), and a tripling of primary school enrollment (2000–2016).\textsuperscript{159,160} However, these achievements were low-hanging fruit, and the country has since failed to achieve sustainable outcomes. Initiatives such as the Health Sector Transformation Plan (2015/16–2019/20) and Education Sector Development Program (2015/16–2019/20) create the illusion of commendable government ambitions, yet Ethiopia’s service delivery sectors persist in a capability trap engaging in isomorphic mimicry, unable to deliver functional outputs.\textsuperscript{161,162}
Roughly a third of the population lives under the international poverty line, average years of schooling totals a mere 3.9 years (males) and 1.6 years (females), and 57% of children under-five suffer from anemia, a critical indication of undernourishment.\textsuperscript{163,164,165} Ethnic, gendered, and rural–urban horizontal inequalities are undeniable. Disaggregated by ethnically concentrated regional states, 2015/16 HDI scores for Somali and Afar were 0.441 and 0.456 respectively, relative to 0.758 in Harari (see Annex 8 for regional HDI scores).\textsuperscript{166} The gap in prevalence of skilled birth attendant deliveries between Addis Ababa (97%) and Afar (16%) demonstrates rural–urban disparities in healthcare access, and such disparities will become more prominent as the COVID–19 pandemic unfolds.\textsuperscript{167} Similar inequalities are evident in education, as well as water and sanitation access.\textsuperscript{168} Oppressive gendered practices such as child marriage explain failures to achieve gender parity, particularly in education–related development.\textsuperscript{169} Despite a weakened State–society contract, ethnic fractionalization hinders collective mobilization to galvanize the State to address existing inequalities. Rather, a strong external development actor presence and financing upholds the current state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Development (فصل)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth (Annual %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Development Indicators (2006-2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual % growth of GDP based on constant local currency\textsuperscript{170}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia has experienced consistent growth in the last 10 years, with a decadal average annual growth of 9.8%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Current $ US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Development Indicators (2006-2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of gross value + resident producers + product taxes – subsidies not included in product values. No deductions for fabricated assets, depletion, or degradation of natural resources\textsuperscript{171}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia has nearly tripled its GDP in the last 10 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Official Development Assistance Received (% of Central Government Expense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Development Indicators (2006-2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA received from OECD-DAC members, non-DAC countries, and multilateral organizations as a % of government budget for the provision of goods and services. Provides a measure of aid dependency\textsuperscript{172}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| While still heavily aid dependent; Ethiopia has reduced its reliance on ODA by nearly half.
**Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the last 10 years, Ethiopian markets have steadily increased openness to foreign direct investment.

**Gini Index (World Bank Estimate)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Decadal trends indicate that income inequality in Ethiopia is increasing.

**Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains (% of Revenue)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethiopia has more than doubled tax revenues in the last 10 years.

**CPIA Equity of Public Resource Use Rating**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poverty measurement tools are used to generate reliable data. Expenditures are adequately tracked. Strategies are in place to address the needs of vulnerable groups, but implementation is inconsistent. Public expenditures are mostly aligned to development priorities.

**CPIA Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management Rating**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policies and priorities in Ethiopia have been inconsistently reflected in the budget. Actual expenditure deviates between 10-15% from the budget. Reports are prepared quarterly with delays.

**Unemployment Rate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite high rates of economic growth, unemployment in Ethiopia remains high.

Overall, Ethiopia has experienced positive economic growth in the last ten years. While continued progress is likely as a result of the appointment of PM Abiy Ahmed and his ambitious economic reforms for market liberalization, poor public financial management, over-reliance on agriculture, and ethno-regional income inequality persist. Macroeconomic imbalance including unemployment rates, particularly amongst youth, continue to pose a significant challenge for the state. As such, regional grievances related to horizontal inequalities have been a
Despite having policies in place to address the needs of vulnerable groups, including the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II), program implementation is inconsistent. It is estimated that from 2005–2015, between US $1.26M–$3.15M left Ethiopia through illicit financial flows (IFFs) through trade mis-invoicing, price transferring, and corruption. Public financial management capacities are highly variable. In its most recent Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment, Ethiopia scored particularly low in terms of Transparency of Public Finances, Management of Assets and Liabilities, and Policy-Based Fiscal Strategy and Budgeting.

Ethiopia is also highly aid dependent. As evidenced by its five major food crises since 1984, the State has limited capacity for the provision of public goods, services and infrastructure. More than a third of national GDP is attributable to the agriculture sector in Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s agrarian–based economy is therefore highly impacted by environmental shocks and resource price fluctuations. As an additional stressor, the demand for goods and services is presently failing to return to pre-COVID-19 rates. Businesses are under significant financial stress, with many struggling to pay wages. However, decadal value-added trends support steady movement away from agriculture as Ethiopia’s primary source of economic growth.

The recently-tabled 10-Year Development Plan boasts a number of ambitious macroeconomic targets, including the promotion of industry as a contributor to national GDP, private sector stimulation, and the equitable participation of women and youth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment (⇒)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment in Agriculture (%) (M/F)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
World Development Indicators (2006-2019)  
Modeled International Labour Organization (ILO) estimate of working aged individuals engaged in the sector.  |
| 2009 | 2014 | 2019 |
| M: 79.7% | M: 76.4% | M: 73.1% |
| F: 69.4% | F: 62.5% | F: 58.1% |
| Decadal trends indicate slow, but steady movement away from agriculture as the primary source of income for both men and women. |
| **Disaster Preparedness**  |
| Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index  
Assessment of preparedness to reduce risk of natural disasters. Rating is on a scale from 0.0–1.00, where 0.00 is best.  |
| 2009 | 2014 | 2019 |
| 0.288 | 0.288 | – |
| Ethiopia ranks moderately on the Disaster Preparedness indicator. This is misleading, however, as in the overall country assessment combining vulnerability and readiness Ethiopia ranks 157/181. Ethiopia is the 20th most vulnerable country, and the 44th ‘least ready’ country. |
IIAG Sustainable Environment
Assessment of the consideration of (1) environmental concerns in policy, (2) enforcement of environmental regulations, and (3-4) quality of air & water resources, and (5) resource management. Rating on a scale from 0.0–100.0, where 100.00 is a perfect score.196

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While Ethiopia’s score looks to be improving on the decade (+10.4), the final score is reflective of the average across five indicators. High scores on resource quality pull the overall score upwards. Nonetheless, Ethiopia has moved from the 22nd position to 12th out of a possible 54.

CIPA Policy and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability Rating
World Development Indicators (2006–2019)
Assessment of the extent to which environmental policies contribute to the sustainability and protection of natural resources. Rating on a scale from 1 (Low) to 6 (High).197

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capacity and quality of environmental assessments are low. Government ministries have only a basic knowledge of environmental issues in their sector. Regulations and policies for sustainability are in place, but gaps still exist. Control of access to resources is weak.198

Ethiopia’s reliance on agriculture as a means of subsistence means that it feels the adverse impacts of climate change more acutely. While decadal trends indicate a slow decline in the number of people employed in agriculture, it remains the primary source of revenue for the majority of Ethiopians. Despite this focus on agriculture, environmental stressors and poor resource management have left Ethiopia in a persistent state of food crisis. There are an estimated 7.1 million people living in food security Crisis (IPC Phase 3), and 1.4 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in Ethiopia, contributing to Ethiopia’s extremely high humanitarian need.199 In 2020 alone, UN OCHA has identified upwards of 500,000 people impacted by environmental crises.200 Flooding has forced nearly 135,000 people from their homes in the Gambella, Oromia, SNPP, and Somali regions.201 The 2020 East African Locust Plague has also caused extensive damage in Somali, Afar, Oromia, SNPP, Tigray, and Amhara regions.202 While agricultural adaptation strategies have been identified (diversifying crops and varieties, soil conservation, irrigation, etc.), barriers exist in policy implementation.203 Farmers lack access to land, adequate information, and credit to make sustainable changes.204 As an additional stressor, the COVID–19 pandemic has interrupted delivery of basic services, and poses major health risks, particularly for displaced populations.205 Where schools are not in session, school-feeding programs have also halted.206 Environmental stressors, as a secondary driver of fragility, have multidimensional reach as they exacerbate fragility in other clusters. This is particularly true of the State’s poor management of the IDP crisis and climate-induced intercommunal conflict over scarce resources.

### ALC Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact on Fragility</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projected Future Trends</td>
<td>Improving (⇑)</td>
<td>Stable (⇒)</td>
<td>Deteriorating (⇓)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the CIFP framework, Ethiopia’s annual fragility scores across ALC dimensions are presented below. Each dimension is scored from 1 to 9, with higher scores indicating greater fragility, and scores above 6.5 indicating severe fragility. ALC are classified by impact on fragility and projected future trends (see Legend) based on the preceding cluster assessment, events-based analysis, and qualitative information to describe both linear indicator trends and non-linear context-specific dynamics in Ethiopia.
Authority
CIFP rankings indicate severe fragility. Across all clusters, the State has established institutional frameworks which create false illusions of State authority over democratic processes, due diligence in justice systems, progressive human development, and alleviation of demographic and environmental pressures. In essence, Ethiopia represents a hybrid regime, engaging in isomorphic mimicry of a fully functioning democracy. Democratic principles exist in theory, but fail to be exercised in practice. The government lacks a monopoly of violence, as demonstrated by the prevalence of ethnic militias across the state and the rapidly escalating Tigray conflict. State security forces are unable to combat interethnic conflict perpetrated by ethnic stakeholders seeking to assert ethnic dominance and settle grievances. Loyalty to ethnic identity undermines authority. As such, PM Abiy Ahmed’s creation of the pan-Ethiopian Prosperity Party has rekindled fears of inadequate minority representation at the federal level and threatens constitutional rights to ethnic autonomy. Significant bouts of youth-led ethnic and political violence in 2019 – such as an attempted coup on the Amhara regional government, and injustices perpetrated against Oromo activist Jawar Mohammed – demonstrate weakening authority. Ethiopia’s ongoing IDP crisis is largely due to the State’s failure to adequately address interethnic conflict. Facilitated by out-of-date investment policy and law, there is a substantial illicit economy beyond the legal market framework (i.e. trade mis-invoicing, informal remittances). The government is ill-prepared to manage environmental pressures as a result of minimal political will. The indefinite postponement of federal elections risks worsening Ethiopia’s fragile authority.

Capacity
Current events and qualitative data are particularly important to understand capacity dynamics given unavailable CIFP capacity rankings over time. State-led development largely excludes citizens from local decision-making processes. Ambitious economic reforms have produced remarkable growth, while widening inequalities. Further, economic growth has failed to bolster service delivery capacities or shock resilience. As previously alluded to in the human development cluster analysis, failure to achieve sustainable human development outcomes and address ethnic, gendered, and rural–urban horizontal inequalities despite government expenditures and sector strengthening initiatives suggests Ethiopia’s social service infrastructure is engaging in isomorphic mimicry. Implementation of policies for addressing fragility risks rooted in youth perceptions of disenfranchisement and interethnic tensions has been hindered by insufficient intersectoral coordination, resource insufficiency, and low local capacity development. While the National Tax Revenue Movement (NTRM) was introduced in early 2019, taxes still make up a small proportion of government revenues. In regards to environmental policy, agricultural adaptation strategies have been identified such as crop diversification and soil conservation, yet capacity deficiencies prevent operationalization. Ultimately, while ambitious sector reform agendas garner high external legitimacy amongst international development actors, Ethiopia is stuck in a capability trap upheld by significant external development support. Projecting to 2021, potential risks which may further undermine Ethiopia’s severely fragile capacity include worsening horizontal inequalities in healthcare access due to COVID-19 and anticipated food security concerns due to irregularities in the upcoming belgrainy season (Feb/Mar–May).
Legitimacy

Ethiopia’s fragility is the most critical in regard to legitimacy. PM Abiy Ahmed’s progressive and ambitious reform agenda has effectively unlatched Pandora’s box, raising citizen expectations of the State, unmasking ethnic tensions, and inviting greater criticism of the government. Resultantly, Ethiopia finds itself in a legitimacy trap. Despite democratic reforms in 2018, political opponents continue to face arbitrary arrest and imprisonment—notably, prominent activist Jawar Mohammed was charged with terrorism following Oromo-led protests in July. Lack of security sector accountability for human rights abuses and indefinite postponement of the 2020 election also dilute State legitimacy. Weak authority and capacity create a vicious ALC cycle by contributing to significant declines in legitimacy. Failure to achieve sustainable human development outcomes, effectively respond to horizontal inequalities, and mobilize resources for disaster response threatens output legitimacy, ultimately weakening the social contract.

Although ethnic fractionalization has impeded collective mobilization in expressing public grievances, the Qeerroo movement have historically been successful in expressing dissatisfaction of the ruling regime due to lack of economic opportunity, lack of cultural recognition, and corruption. In recent times, Oromo youth movements, ethnic militias, and the outbreak of violence in Tigray region are the primary manifestations of the State’s declining legitimacy.

Scenarios

Baseline (Most Likely)

PM Abiy Ahmed upholds commitments to a free and fair election sometime in 2021, contingent on the absence of further COVID-19 disruptions. However, uncertainty over the PM’s potential abuse of indefinite election postponement to maintain power further risks state legitimacy and government opposition, particularly amongst vocal Oromo and Tigray opposition networks such as the Qeerroo, ethnic militia, and TPLF rebel wings. Amidst regional telecommunication shutdowns, PM Abiy Ahmed’s alleged claims of successfully capturing Mekelle (Tigray capital) are externally validated, officially ending the TPLF–State conflict. State security forces’ inability to manage ongoing interethnic conflicts continues, but conflict will likely escalate as the nearing election provides an opportunity for ethnic opposition groups to express grievances. Further, heightened interethnic tensions between Tigray–Oromo and Tigray–Amhara due to the TPLF conflict unfold as Ethiopian refugees potentially return from Sudan. Increased conflict worsens the country’s IDP crisis, and the State’s heavy reliance on humanitarian actors such as UN OCHA intensifies, especially due to climate–induced food security crisis projections in southeastern SNNPR, Oromia, Somali, Harari, and Afar (Annex 9). COVID-19 widens healthcare access inequalities across ethnic, gendered, and urban–rural divides. Economic downturns due to COVID-19 magnify widespread unemployment, further fueling public unrest.

Best Case

The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia commits to an election date and provides the necessary oversight to ensure the election is free and fair. In the months leading up to this date, PM Abiy Ahmed allows for sincere political opposition and revitalizes the ethnic coalition party so that ethnic tensions can be resolved in formal political avenues and meaningful citizenship can be fostered. This will allow the TPLF to engage in the federal political system and for the Qeerroo movement, as well as other ethnic militias, to avoid resorting to violence. After active armed conflict in the Tigray region is terminated, the Ethiopian Reconciliation Commission facilitates resolution of ethnic-political grievances. Reforms to the judiciary system enforce the rule of law, prevent arbitrary arrest, and hold security forces accountable for human rights abuses. To address demographic pressures, there is increased accountability and resource availability for implementation of the National Youth Policy and regional capacity building to confront the country’s interethnic cleavages and resultant IDP crisis. In order to combat declining legitimacy, PM Abiy Ahmed channels development aid to address horizontal inequalities in education and healthcare. Stable economic recovery from COVID-19 entails sustainable climate considerations for the agricultural industry. No major climate events materialize, and food aid remains uninterrupted by conflict.

Worst Case

A spike in ethno-regional political opposition by the TPLF, Qeerroo, and other ethnic militias leads to intercommunal violence. New opposition materializes from previously silent regional states such as Afar, Somali and SNNPR. The
State launches a campaign to repress opposition which, in turn, leads to additional incidents of rebellion. Major climate events occur, or conditions worsen (flooding, locusts, drought). Where the State fails to adequately respond, smallholder farmers lose their livelihoods and conditions for food crisis materialize. These climate stressors combined with aforementioned violence prompt the worsening of Ethiopia’s IDP crisis. IDP returns are inadequately managed, and the State fails to deliver humanitarian assistance to those in need. Horizontal inequalities based on gender, regional, and ethnic divides worsen significantly, particularly as COVID-19 cases rise and access to healthcare becomes more challenging. Contentious GERD negotiations prompt external security threats from Egypt, and Sudan. Ethiopia’s failure to comply with the terms of GERD tripartite negotiations results in major cuts to donor funding.

**Wildcards**

**USA & GERD:** In an attempt to right the wrongs of the previous administration in the Horn of Africa, American President Elect Joe Biden commits the US to act as an independent mediator in the tripartite GERD negotiations. Parties reconvene to broker a deal, and normal diplomatic relations between the four countries are restored. Restrictions on US aid to Ethiopia begin to loosen.

**Inter-state Conflict:** Tensions between the State and the TPLF in the Tigray region re-ignite. Tigrayan members of the Ethiopian National Defense Force defect to join the regional cause, resulting in a push for secession. As a result of fractionalization, PM Abiy Ahmed calls on newly re-established diplomatic ties with Eritrea. Eritrean forces invade the Tigray region from the North, and Ethiopian forces push forward from the South. Civil and inter-state violence ensues once again, compromising stability in the Horn of Africa.

**Natural Disaster & COVID-19:** An unforeseen climate event in the Amhara region causes a mass exodus of population to IDP camps near the Tigray border. Handwashing and hygiene facilities are compromised, and an outbreak of COVID-19 erupts. Contact tracing is rendered impossible by fluidity of movement. Internet shutdowns in the Tigray region prevent effective public health and prevention messaging, contact tracing and disease surveillance. Cases increase exponentially, overwhelming health systems.

**Policy Options**

Policy options emphasize key GAC priorities for consideration by the Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau and Ethiopia Development Division. Policy options address the structural causes of fragility – Ethiopia’s hybrid regime, capability trap, legitimacy risks, and the weakened social contract – as manifested in the primary and secondary drivers. Policy options are intended to increase the likelihood of the best case scenario while avoiding the worst case. Based on the ALC analysis, options aim to strengthen Ethiopia’s authority and capacity dimensions, creating a positive feedback loop for the purpose of improving legitimacy. Proposed evaluations frameworks for each policy option can be found in Annex 12.

**Option 1**

Provide institutional support to the UNDP earmarked for the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF) to ensure uninterrupted and continued implementation of the national peacebuilding strategy following anticipated termination in December 2020.

**Policy:** The Inclusive Governance Strategy and Conflict Management Support to Ethiopia was launched in March 2019 in collaboration with PBF UN partners (UNDP, IOM, UN Women, and UNESCO) to support sustainable peace, social cohesion, and reconciliation in the country’s most conflict-prone regional clusters – Oromia–Somali and Oromia–SNNPR. UN agencies collaborated with the MoP and MoWCY to train community leaders in facilitating peace dialogues, organize community-level conflict management forums, and train community members in gender-sensitive, inclusive peacebuilding. Engagement activities have attracted local-level legitimacy, evidenced through active engagement and support from traditional cultural leaders involved in peacebuilding discussions. During the 2020 annual review, domestic and international partners identified future priorities of strengthening
national, regional, and local engagement of youth and IDP host communities. However, the COVID-19 pandemic coupled with growing security concerns earlier this year related to the postponed federal election have slowed project implementation. Project funding will be terminated on December 13th 2020. In the short-term, continuation of the national peacebuilding strategy is imperative for strengthening national and local capacity for conflict management and fostering public perceptions of State legitimacy, especially considering increasing risks of interethnic conflict, subsequent IDPs, and violent youth opposition approaching the 2021 federal election. In the long-term, there may be future opportunities to expand project implementation into Tigray to address aggravated tensions between Tigray-Oromo and Tigray-Amhara ethnic groups following the TPLF-State conflict.

Cluster/ALC Targets: Governance, Security & Crime, Demography / Legitimacy, Capacity / Gender as a cross-cutting priority

Relevance: PM Abiy Ahmed recently established the MoP and National Reconciliation Commission, clearly indicating his prioritization of peace and security in Ethiopia’s reform agenda. GAC is well-positioned to support continued implementation of the national peacebuilding strategy as it aligns with Canadian priorities of promoting inclusive governance, peace, and security in both Ethiopia and the broader African region. The strategy’s gender-sensitive programming also aligns with Canada’s FIAP (Action areas (1) Gender Equality and Empowerment, (5) Inclusive Governance, and (6) Peace and Security).

Access Points: Continued implementation can leverage existing strategic implementation partnerships between UN agencies, the MoP, MoWCY, regional administration units, various CSOs (e.g. women’s forums, community groups), as well as local youth, cultural leaders, and traditional authorities. Bilateral Peace and Development Bureaus established during earlier project implementation can support continued engagement with project activities. Moreover, future peace strategy priorities of youth engagement and IDP complement existing UN partnerships and national policy frameworks, namely the Durable Solutions Initiative for IDP protection and National Youth Policy.

Risks: The peacebuilding strategy is targeted at the two conflict-prone regions. Given the sensitivity of interethnic tensions and potential for escalating interethnic conflict nearing the election, the peacebuilding strategy may exacerbate ethnic grievances and threaten State legitimacy amongst excluded groups on the basis of perceived State favouritism. Additionally, should the PBF project expand into the Tigray region, implementation partners may face challenges in rapidly scaling up the project to prevent future crises. Further, interethnic tensions may be too sensitive in the short-term window post-conflict, which may hinder local receptivity of peacebuilding activities in Tigray.

Measuring Results: The UNDP has identified two broad outcomes in evaluating the PBF’s contribution to the Inclusive Governance and Conflict Management Support for Ethiopia: (1) contributing to the national peacebuilding strategy and (2) promoting security and social cohesion in Ethiopia’s most conflict-prone regions. Outcome measures identified in Annex 12 align with these overarching objectives and will provide justification for continued funding to support Ethiopia’s peacebuilding strategy as necessary in the future.

Option 2

Provide democracy assistance by developing the capacity of GoE’s democratic structures including the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, the media landscape, and judiciary system.

Policy: GAC could support GoE’s institutions and reform initiatives to ensure they uphold democratic norms with a focus on the electoral process, civilian voice and legal reforms. This policy targets the structural causes of Ethiopia’s fragility by combatting the capability trap and hybrid regime characteristics exhibited in the Security & Crime and Governance clusters (see Annex 2). GAC would be well positioned to pursue four relative action items: (1) Provide electoral observation and support to the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia; this would be enacted immediately, terminating at the end of the 2021 election in order to provide a foundation for the remaining action items; (2)
Provide technical assistance to The Legal and Justice Affairs Advisory Council in the implementation of incipient legal reforms pertaining to anti-terrorism laws and an independent justice system. This, in turn, would uphold citizens’ right to a fair trial, freedom of expression and a free and independent media; as well as assist in enacting reforms to combat the challenges posed by authoritative features of Ethiopia’s digital technology; (3) Promote the meaningful democratic participation of women by developing voter educations campaigns to inform women of voting rights and promote the inclusion of women in local governance, and; (4) Strengthen the independence of the judiciary system and oversight bodies in order to enhance the accountability mechanisms among government branches, provide a greater voice for citizens and formalize rules governing executive power. By addressing Legitimacy and Capacity, as well as structural causes of fragility, this policy could engender sustainable democratic institutions in Ethiopia. This would be complementary to GAC’s ongoing government accountability project, *Strengthening Federal Governance and Pluralism in Ethiopia*, which aims to enhance government accountability by formalizing inter-governmental relations and improving consultation between the State and civil society.

### Cluster/ALC Targets
**Governance, Security & Crime / Legitimacy, Capacity / Gender as a cross-cutting priority**

#### Relevance
PM Abiy Ahmed came into power with a reformist zeal promising free and fair elections, representation of women in governance and a review of anti-terrorism laws. However, this rhetoric espoused in 2018 is incongruent with the reality of the events in 2020. In the midst of political strife regarding the upcoming election, action items 2-4 may not be able to overcome the impediment of weak political will. However, the State and NEBE have expressly requested international support for the election. After free and fair elections are accomplished, bolstering incipient reforms with the remaining action items, rather than introducing novel projects, will increase the likelihood of success for this policy. This policy is complementary to GAC’s FIAP Action Area 5 (Inclusive Governance), with particular relevance to the key performance indicators described in Annex 12.

#### Access Points
This policy would make use of the 2021 Federal Election as an opportunity for partnership with the NEBE, which is interested in receiving technical assistance. Following the election, the reforms introduced under PM Abiy Ahmed can be used as a window of opportunity in which technical assistance is effective. The Legal and Justice Affairs Advisory Council work on constructing a pragmatic reform package addressing repressive laws and institutional shortcomings will be a crucial access point for action items 2 and 4. An access point for combatting authoritarian features of the ICT environment is the upcoming privatization of Ethio Telecom (the state-owned telecommunications company), facilitated by the Ethiopian Communication Agency. Finally, Ethiopia’s decentralized governance structure can be taken advantage of by utilizing *Kebele* as a site to ensure the involvement of women in local decision-making processes.

#### Risks
The risk of this policy initiative is the perceived bolstering of a government rapidly losing legitimacy in the eyes of its public. However, these activities seek to provide long-term stability to Ethiopia’s democratic institutions rather than enhance the current party’s power, and initially support free and fair elections so that the PM derives legitimacy from the democratic process. Further, sincere democratization is dependent on an impetus for this process from the recipient country, as such, the success of this policy is contingent on political will in Ethiopia.

#### Measuring results
Potential outcomes and impacts include securing and expanding Ethiopia’s democratic achievements by strengthening the capacity of democratic structures through the measurement of a number of indicators (see Annex 12).

### Option 3

**Work with the Planning and Development Commission, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation, and local stakeholders to increase the use of sustainable, resilient and efficient climate-smart agricultural practices and promote climate resilience.**

**Policy** This policy option aims to address the secondary drivers of fragility (Environment; Economic Development; and Human Development) by investing in capacity building at the State–level to address the Capacity and Legitimacy gaps in goods and services delivery. The manifestation of these secondary drivers, namely climate and food crises, aggravate and exacerbate the primaries: Governance, Security and Crime, and Demography. Action
items for this policy option are three-fold: (1) Increase funding allocation for food aid to address immediate needs of the population. (2) Complement short-term food assistance with long term investments in agricultural development, vocational training, administrative management, economic diversification and business development services to promote sustainable and resilient livelihoods. This should include specific interventions targeting women-led SMEs. (3) Provide technical assistance to the PDC and the MoFEC in the final stages of review for the new Ten Year Perspective Development Plan.

Cluster/ALC Targets: Human Development, Environment, Economic Development, Authority, Legitimacy, Capacity and Gender as a cross-cutting priority

Relevance: As a result of its agri-dependent economy and population, Ethiopia feels the impact of environmental stressors and shocks more severely. There are presently an estimated 8.5 million people living in food security Crisis and Emergency (IPC Phase 3 & 4). Canada is well-positioned to advise on targeted policies for women and girls’ economic empowerment, as well as sustainable natural resource management. Canada’s assistance to Ethiopia aims to address these issues through agricultural support, business development services, and food delivery, with a targeted focus on women and girls. The proposed policy would contribute to the achievement of key FIAP performance indicators relating to Action Area 2: Human Dignity; and Action Area 3: Growth That Works for Everyone; Action Area 4: Environment and Climate Action.

Access Points: Ethiopia’s GTP II was the guiding policy instrument of the national development strategy from 2015 until late-2020. In June 2020, the draft Ten Year Development Plan was tabled as its successor. GTP II included Environment and Climate Change as ‘cross-cutting sectors’ (Pt. I, Ch. VII, 7.7) and Environment and Climate Resilient Green Economy as ‘cross-cutting issues’ (Pt. II, Ch. VIII, 8.2). While the Climate Resilient Green Economy has been identified as one of the six strategic pillars of the 10-Year Plan, there are opportunities for further integration as it works its way through the consultative process. During a high-level visit to Addis Ababa in February 2020, PM Justin Trudeau announced Canada’s intent to work with Ethiopia on innovative climate action, including investments in clean technology and SME development. Canada has already invested in Ethiopian federal Agriculture policies; through its World-Bank-managed Resilient Landscapes and Livelihoods for Women initiative for the GoE Sustainable Land Management Program (SLMP).

Risks: The GoE’s implementation capacity is low. Isomorphic mimicry poses a risk to the proposed policy, as weak institutional capacity and coordination capabilities could compromise the Ministries’ effective partnership on the initiative. Reliance on short-term policy measures over longer-term capacity-building investments may further aid dependency and declining legitimacy. Further, there is a risk that working with local representatives of the State could result in the politicization of goods and services delivery, particularly for regions where ethnic minorities are not reflected in the regional Kebele leadership.

Measuring Results: Progress towards achieving the outcomes of the proposed would be measured by a number of indicators, each of which contributes to the achievement of FIAP Key Performance Indicators (see Annex 12).
Annexes

Annex 1: Regional State Profiles

Source: BBC (2019). Ethiopian referendum: Sidama poll could test Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.286
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional State</th>
<th>Profile</th>
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</table>
| **1. Tigray** | **Population:** 5.4 million (2019 estimate), fifth most populous state.  
**Ethnic Composition:** Majority of Ethiopia’s ethnic Tigrayans live in Tigray.  
**Rural–Urban Composition:** 75% of Tigrayans are rural agrarian communities, but Tigray faces aggressive urbanization, with an annual urban growth rate of 4.6%.  
**Regional Government:** Regional President is Debretsion Gebremichael, who is also the leader of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) political opposition party.  
**Additional Notable Facts:** Long-standing interethnic tensions between minority Tigray and majority Oromo and Amhara populations, particularly since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s appointment in 2018. Refer to Annex 10 for a detailed TPLF–State conflict timeline. |
| **2. Afar** | **Population:** 1.3 million (based on 2007 national census).  
**Ethnic Composition:** Afar minority group.  
**Rural–Urban Composition:** Majority of Afars are nomadic herding communities.  
**Regional Government:** Regional President is Awol Arba.  
**Additional Notable Facts:** Historically, Afar communities have been significantly marginalized, and face challenges to accessing basic government services. |
| **3. Amhara** | **Population:** 21.1 million (2017 estimates), second most populated state in Ethiopia.  
**Ethnic Composition:** Most of Ethiopia’s ethnic Amharas live in Amhara state.  
**Rural–Urban Composition:** 84% of the regional population are agrarian-dependent rural communities.  
**Regional Government:** Regional President is Temesgen Tiruneh Dinku, leader of the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) political party, was recently appointed in July 2019 following the attempted coup of the regional government in June 2019.  
**Additional Notable Facts:** The failed coup in June 2019 perpetrated by ethnic militia groups in Amhara and led by the Amhara state security head, General Asamnew Tsige. Amhara state also has a history of border disputes with neighbouring Tigray, and interethnic tensions have escalated during the TPLF–State conflict. |
### 4. Harari

**Population:** Harari is Ethiopia’s smallest regional state, with only 0.3% of the total population. Harari’s population is projected to be 257,000 (2019 estimates).

**Ethnic Composition:** Roughly composed of Oromo (56%), Amhara (23%), and Harari (9%) ethnic groups.

**Rural–Urban Composition:** Unlike the majority of Ethiopia’s regional states, most individuals in Harari (56%) reside in urban areas.

**Regional Government:** Regional President is Ordin Bedri, leader of the Harari National League (HNL).

**Additional Notable Facts:** Harari was the highest-performing regional state according to the UNDP Human Development Index in 2018 (see Annex 8). Harari has seen an escalation of interreligious conflicts between Islam and Christian communities in recent years, but regional security forces appear to be capable in responding and enforcing rule of law. Interethnic conflict between Harari minorities and Oromo majority population is evident, as seen in the recent bout of Oromo intimidation and property destruction against Harari property owners.

### 5. Benishangul-Gumuz

**Population:** Population of 1,127,000 (2019 estimates), only about 1.1% of the total population.

**Ethnic Composition:** Various ethnic minority groups such as the Berta (indigenous Benishangul), the Gumuz, the Shinasha, the Mao, and the Komo.

**Rural–Urban Composition:** Largely agrarian-dependent population, most communities residing in rural (77%) rather than urban (23%) regions.

**Regional Government:** President Ashadli Hasen.

**Additional Notable Facts:** Border region with Oromia was one of the three most-impacted regions by interethnic conflict flare-ups along Oromia borders in 2018. Recent interethnic conflict against ethnic minorities in Benishangul-Gumuz (i.e. Amhara, Agaws) is indicative of interethnic tensions.

### 6. Somali

**Population:** Estimated population of 6 million, which is 6% of total Ethiopian population. The regional state is the second-largest in size, following Oromia.

**Ethnic Composition:** Most ethnic Somalis live in Somali state. Somali is in the top four largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia.

**Rural–Urban Composition:** Majority of population are pastoralist communities.

**Regional Government:** Regional President is Mustafa Muhummed Omer (Action).

**Additional Notable Facts:** Somali state is known for being marginalized in terms of access to basic government services, and ranks as one of the lowest states for human development. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was a significant rebel group operating in Somali, but in 2019 (aligning with Abiy’s national peacebuilding agenda), Somali state approved an agreement to move towards ONLF disarmament and reintegration into society.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Ethnic Composition</th>
<th>Rural–Urban Composition</th>
<th>Regional Government</th>
<th>Additional Notable Facts</th>
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<tr>
<td>7. Oromia</td>
<td>Population: Oromia is the most populous state, with 37 million individuals.</td>
<td>Most ethnic Oromos reside in Oromia, but other ethnic groups and minorities exist as well, such as the Amhara.</td>
<td>Roughly 84% of Oromia’s population are pastoralist and/or agrarian communities residing in rural regions.</td>
<td>Regional President is Shimelis Abdisa.</td>
<td>Conflict instigated by Oromo ethnic groups are very common relative to ethnic violence instigated by other ethnic communities. Interethnic conflict is often seen along Oromia bordering regions and is typically against non-Oromo ethnic minorities residing in Oromia. Aggressive vocalizations of historical ethnic grievances have significantly increased since PM Abiy Ahmed’s appointment in 2018.</td>
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<td>8. Gambela</td>
<td>Population: Total population of 259,000.</td>
<td>Diverse ethnic composition despite relatively smaller regional landmass when compared to other regional states. Ethnic groups include Nuer populations (40%), Agnuak (27%), Amhara (8%), Oromo (6%), and other ethnic minority groups.</td>
<td>Approximately 90% of the population are agrarian communities in rural regions.</td>
<td>Regional President is Omot Ojulu Obub, leader of the Gambela People’s Democratic Movement.</td>
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<td>9. Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR)</td>
<td>Population: Contributing to roughly a fifth of the population, SNNPR is one of the most highly populated regional states. Total population is 20,087,000 (2019 estimates).</td>
<td>Extremely high ethnic diversity, comprised of over 56 distinct ethnic groups.</td>
<td>Roughly 84% of the population are agrarian and/or pastoralist communities residing in rural regions.</td>
<td>Regional President is Erstu Yirdaw.</td>
<td>The Sidama ethnic group within SNNPR officially formed an independent regional state on July 18, 2020. Leading up to the succession, fatal ethnic violence was rampant across SNNPR.</td>
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<td>10. Sidama</td>
<td>Population: Estimated population of 3 million based on the 2007 national census.</td>
<td>Main three ethnic groups within Sidama are the Sidama (93%), the Oromo (2.5%), and Amhara (2%), alongside other ethnic minorities.</td>
<td>The majority of the population are agrarian communities in rural regions.</td>
<td>Regional President is Desta Ledamo.</td>
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Additional Notable Facts: Sidama is Ethiopia’s most recently formed regional state, officially declared on July 18, 2020. Prior to internal succession, the Sidama were the largest ethnic community in SNNPR.
### Annex 2: Structural Causes of Fragility

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<th>Structural Cause</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Impact in Ethiopia</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1) Hybrid Regime</strong></td>
<td>Hybrid regimes are defined by Menocal et al. as “ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits.”(^{347}) Characteristics of hybrid regimes include: weak political participation outside of elections and lack of government accountability, lack of judicial independence, and a weak State capacity.(^{348}) They are also characterized by presidentialism, a concept defined by a personalization of power around the figure of the PM.(^{349})</td>
<td>Beyond elections, there are only limited opportunities for political participation in Ethiopia. Notably, the country ranks low on the civilian voice in decision making processes.(^{350}) The weak democratic performance of Ethiopia’s institutions is most visible in the judicial system as it functions as an apparatus of the state rather than an independent body. Disillusionment regarding true democracy has caused mass unrest in Ethiopia with protests and violence ensuing for a year following the 2005 election.(^{351}) Ethiopia also exhibits presidentialism as PM Abiy Ahmed is inseparable from the state. The groups that reject the legitimacy of the State make frequent reference to discontent with Abiy himself.(^{352})</td>
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<td><strong>2) Legitimacy Trap</strong></td>
<td>Countries caught in a Legitimacy Trap are those that have demonstrated a high capacity to provide security and services to the population but inequalities and authoritarian qualities harm State legitimacy.(^{353}) The cycle of this trap features gains in legitimacy and capacity resulting in rising public expectations regarding social inclusion, political participation and economic equity. The inability of the State to respond to these demands results in declining legitimacy.(^{354})</td>
<td>Ethiopia has followed Takeuchi’s legitimacy trap cycle: the employment of international assistance to achieve human development growth and impressive economic growth.(^{355}) However, stark regional disparities have placed this legitimacy at stake. Another way in which Ethiopia has developed a legitimacy trap is through PM Abiy Ahmed’s 2018 political reforms including the opening of the media and the encouragement of political exiles to return to Ethiopia. While this served to enhance the perception of legitimacy it also effectively opened Pandora’s box as these political opponents, and privately-owned media were the very actors that attacked the PM’s reputation.(^{356}) Consequently, the legitimacy of the State has suffered.</td>
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<td><strong>3) Capability Trap &amp; Isomorphic Mimicry</strong></td>
<td>The concept of the Capability Trap arises from isomorphic mimicry in which outward forms (appearances, structures) of functional States are adopted to camouflage a lack of persistent lack of function.(^{357}) These</td>
<td>In Ethiopia weak State institutions are veiled by isomorphic mimicry. For example, the judiciary system is independent as stated in the constitution (Article 78).(^{360}) An examination of the judiciary practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>States often have isomorphic organizational structures (for example, ministries whose organizational charts look like those of developed democracies). The resulting phenomenon is a Capability Trap in which a government performs activities that enhance external legitimacy without sincerely improving. reveals it serves the executive branch and the interests of the PM by failing to uphold the rule of law. Further, the GoE virtue signals positions that are congruent to international politics despite insincere efforts to achieve such virtue domestically. For example, women make up 32% of seats in Ethiopia’s upper parliament. However, the country has appalling human development statistics for women (see Human Development cluster). As previously mentioned, the State engages in isomorphic mimicry within its social service infrastructure, as evidenced through unsustainable achievements of human development outcomes and persistent gendered, ethnic, and rural-urban horizontal inequalities.</td>
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<td><strong>4) Social Contract</strong> Social Contract Theory assumes that state formation is made possible by the population’s sacrifice of sovereignty and subsequent delegation of authority to political representatives. In the absence of constraints to this power, State ‘agents’ may be persuaded to act in interests other than those of their primary ‘principal’, the people. The social contract relationship between the State and its citizens is further complicated by foreign intervention, as asymmetrical power relations among ‘principals’ incentivize and persuade State ‘agents’ behaviour. In Ethiopia, the State has repeatedly demonstrated its preference for FDI over domestic entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, the general population, a less powerful principal, remains in a state of persistent food crisis. Moreover, the tax rate lies below 8%, indicative of a lack of accountability of the State to its citizens. Despite cumulative collective grievances, ethnic fractionalization prevents effective societal mobilization to incentivize the State to respond.</td>
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Annex 4 (II): Issue/Stakeholder Map

See works consulted for Annex 4 on Page 58

Legend
Border colour indicates the cluster the issue exists within
- Governance
- Security
- Environment
- Human Development
- Demography
- Economic growth

Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Quaternary

32
Annex 4 (IV): Issue/Stakeholder Map
See works consulted for Annex 4 on Page 58

Intercommunal Ethnic Violence (+ Oromo Nationalism)

UN Agencies
- Promote social and human development
- Focus on gender equality, promotion of education and health, nutrition, food security, etc.
- Providing support to IDPs and funding for Ethiopia’s national peacebuilding strategies

UN Agencies
- Preserving access to water resources of the Nile
- Soviet by USA and Israel in GERD negotiations; somewhat hostile as GERD poses a potential threat to Egypt’s water access

Sudan
- Provided a $3B loan program with conditions to support PM Abiy Ahmed’s reform agenda
- Beef-practices advocacy programming in support of the most vulnerable populations
- Target aid to Ethiopia, and development assistance coordination with the IMF, country’s vision, securing overall alignment with global Sustainable Development Goals and GTP II.

Egypt
- Target aid to Ethiopia, and development assistance coordination with the IMF, country’s vision, securing overall alignment with global Sustainable Development Goals and GTP II.
- Beef-practices advocacy programming in support of the most vulnerable populations
- Target aid to Ethiopia, and development assistance coordination with the IMF, country’s vision, securing overall alignment with global Sustainable Development Goals and GTP II.

Development Assistance Group
- High volume of aid provided to Ethiopia, contribution in part to aid dependency
- Beef-practices advocacy programming in support of the most vulnerable populations
- Target aid to Ethiopia, and development assistance coordination with the IMF, country’s vision, securing overall alignment with global Sustainable Development Goals and GTP II.

Voice criticism of Abiy Ahmed
- Oromia Media Network (E.D. Jawar Mohammed)
- Imprisoned due to terrorism charges for force criticism of the State and PM Abiy Ahmed

State-owned media landscape and monopoly over ICT sector
- Legacy of State-Led Top-Down Development
- Single-Party Political System (Coalition of Ethnic Groups)
- Menocal et al., Hybrid Regimes

Crisis (Floodings, Droughts, Locusts)
- Destroying Livelihoods

Population Pressure
- Urban/Rural Disparities

Lack of Sustainable Human Development Outcomes
- Systemic Horizontal Inequalities (Ethnic and Gender Divisions)

Intercommunal Violence
- Internal Displacement Crisis

Youth Bulge
- Political Elite Management
- Under-Developed Private Sector

Aid Dependence, Food Aid Dependence

State-Led Top-Down Development Strategy

Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict

Ismail, Social Contract

Youth Bulge
- Political Elite Management
- Under-Developed Private Sector

Aid Dependence, Food Aid Dependence

State-Led Top-Down Development Strategy

Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict

Ismail, Social Contract

Ismail, Social Contract

Ismail, Social Contract

Legend
Border color indicates the cluster the issue exists within:
- Governance
- Environment
- Security
- Human Development
- Economic growth
- Internal
- External
Annex 5: End User Profile
The following table is adapted from Carment et al.’s *Key Measures of Relevance Assessment.*

### Development Linkages

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<td><strong>Total bilateral aid (Figures include OGD)</strong></td>
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<td>CAD 131.59M</td>
<td>CAD 124.65M</td>
<td>CAD 127.01M</td>
<td>CAD 104.4M</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total multilateral aid (Figures include OGD)</strong></td>
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<td>CAD 58.81M</td>
<td>CAD 68.27M</td>
<td>CAD 71.14M</td>
<td>CAD 98.73M</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Priority of aid relationship for donor</strong></td>
<td>With CAD 203.15M in programming, Ethiopia was the top recipient of Canadian international assistance funding in FY 2018–19. Ethiopia has ranked similarly high in the last five years, second only to Afghanistan in 2017–18 (CAD 198M) and 2016–17 after being first again in 2015–16.</td>
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<td><strong>Likely effectiveness of aid</strong></td>
<td>Canada’s development investments in Ethiopia prioritize economic growth as a pathway to poverty reduction, in alignment with the Government of Ethiopia’s Second Growth and Transformation Plan. This includes programming to address chronic food insecurity, resource management, SME development, and youth entrepreneurship. Canada also promotes the empowerment of women and girls through sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR)–targeted initiatives, and support to women’s rights organizations.</td>
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### Economic and Trade Linkages

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<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral trade measured as a percentage of total trade</strong></td>
<td>Two-way merchandise trade between Canada and Ethiopia totalled over CAD 170 million in 2018. This consisted of CAD 130 million in exports to and CAD 40 million in imports from Ethiopia. Canada and Ethiopia are set to co-host the first Canada–Africa Clean Growth Symposium in Addis Ababa in 2021 to facilitate links between Canadian clean–tech companies and Ethiopian stakeholders.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total remittance flows</strong></td>
<td>In 2017, 55% of Ethiopians living in Canada sent money to relatives or friends living outside of Canada. The average transaction was CAD 2,225, for a total of CAD 41.5M.</td>
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### Security and Strategic Linkages

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<tr>
<td><strong>Importance of country to regional stability (measured by country’s share of regional GDP)</strong></td>
<td>Canada values Ethiopia’s contribution in promoting peace and security in East Africa. Ethiopia is a new member of Canada’s Military Training Cooperation Program for the delivery of training and security capacity building.</td>
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### Demographic Linkages

| Diaspora population as a proportion of the total population | There are approximately 44,000 Ethiopians living in Canada based on census data. However, it is estimated that the actual figure is much higher. |

### Cultural Linkages

| Location in a region or sector with previous involvement with/a history of engagement | Canada established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in 1965, and has long been one of the top bilateral donors in the country. |

### Other

| Recent events | A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Canada and Ethiopia in June 2019 on Collaboration on Infrastructure Development using Public Private Partnerships (PPP). This commitment was reaffirmed when Prime Minister Trudeau made a high-level visit to Addis Ababa in February 2020, which produced a number of financial commitments – most notably, to clean growth and women’s economic empowerment. |
Annex 6: United Nations Entities in Ethiopia

There are 26 United Nations entities operating in Ethiopia.  

1. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO)  
2. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)  
3. International Labour Organization (ILO)  
4. United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM)  
5. International Trade Centre (ITC)  
6. International Telecommunication Union (ITU)  
7. United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)  
8. United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)  
9. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)  
10. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  
11. United Nations Habitat (UN Habitat)  
12. United Nations Women (UN Women)  
15. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  
16. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  
17. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)  
19. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)  
22. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UN DRR)  
23. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)  
24. United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)  
25. World Food Programme (WFP)  
26. World Health Organization (WHO)
Annex 7: Ethiopia’s Humanitarian Needs Overview Map

The below figure summarizes humanitarian needs identified by UN OCHA in Ethiopia, mapped in accordance to the populations in need and severity of needs (refer to legend in bottom right corner of figure). 394

TOTAL POPULATION: 99.3M
PEOPLE AFFECTED: 10.6M
PEOPLE IN NEED: 8.4M
PEOPLE IN ACUTE NEED: 6.2M

Annex 8: Human Development Index Rankings, Disaggregated by Regional State

HDI for Ethiopia’s regions, 2012/2013 and 2016/2017

Annex 9: Ethiopia’s Food Security Outlook Projections up to May 2021

Source: Famine Early Warnings System Network. (2020). Food security crisis expected to continue despite timely start to dry season in areas of Somali Region. 396
Annex 10: Tigray Conflict Timeline

Historical Overview

1991: TPLF overthrow government and assume power as the leaders of EPRDF

1995: TPLF leader, Meles, becomes Ethiopia’s first Prime Minister

1995: Ethnic Federalist system introduced

2012: Meles dies in office & PM Desaleng elected

2018: Desaleng resigns over protests and Abiy Ahmed is...

2019: Ruling coalition, moves to form a new pan-Ethiopian Party. TPLF are the only former EPRDF group who do not join

2019: TPLF feel as though they are being targeted by Abiy Ahmed’s reforms & security crackdown

Fall 2020 – Present

COVID-19

Sept. 2020: Tigray holds independent elections in protest of federal government, Abiy maintains this is...

Nov. 4th: Tigray forces launch attack on an ENDF command post in Tigray

Nov. 7th: Federal Parliament declares Tigray

Nov. 9th: 500 civilians killed in Mai Kadra (Allegedly at the hands of Tigray Forces)

Nov. 14th: Tigray launches rockets on Eritrea’s capital,

Nov. 30th: PM Abiy Ahmed claims victory,

Present: Ongoing clashes, limited humanitarian access, and still no

Massive population movement
As of November 30th, Ethiopia has recorded a cumulative total of 112,000 COVID-19 cases, including nearly 2000 deaths. Just under 40,000 remain active in the country, making it the fourth-highest ranking African country in terms of infection rate. Cases have risen exponentially in November, and the trend is expected to continue.
Annex 12: Policy Option Measurement Frameworks

Option 1: Provide institutional support to the UNDP earmarked for the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF) to ensure uninterrupted and continued implementation of the national peacebuilding strategy following anticipated termination in December 2020.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Verification Method</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced incidents of interethnic and intercommunal conflict in project implementation zones (Somali–Oromia and Oromia–SNNPR regions)</td>
<td>Total number of fatalities: Non-state violence Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program*</td>
<td>Reduced interethnic conflict and conflict-driven displacements would signify improvements in interethnic social cohesion and correspondent narrowing of ethnic social cleavages. Improved social cohesion within conflict-prone regions would ultimately contribute to the country’s overall peacebuilding agenda.</td>
<td>Events-based analysis through various local and international media sources Consulting Regional Peace and Development Bureaus and local implementation stakeholders in perceptions of community-level cohesions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in conflict-induced IDPs and sustained IDP returns</td>
<td>New and total conflict-related IDP populations Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix* *Note that the IOM is a PBF UN partner</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incorporating baseline and periodic monitoring (i.e. annually) throughout project implementation IDMC consolidation of latest news on conflict-related IDP developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved public perceptions of ethnic and gender recognition in peacebuilding efforts</td>
<td>Community-level public perception surveys Potential Source: Bilateral Peace and Development Bureaus</td>
<td>Improved regional and local-level capacities to address community-level conflict and incorporate gender inclusive peacebuilding would strengthen perceptions of State legitimacy</td>
<td>Baseline and periodic monitoring (i.e. annually) throughout project implementation Consulting Regional Peace and Development Bureaus and local implementation stakeholders (i.e. women-focused CSOs) in perceptions of adequate ethnic recognition and gender inclusivity Broader country-level structural indicators such as ‘Protection against Ethnic Discrimination’ Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Option 2: Provide democracy assistance by developing the capacity of GoE’s democratic structures including the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, the media landscape, and judiciary system.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
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<th>Verification Method</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The development of meaningful participation in the political system—particularly of women</td>
<td>Voice and Accountability (of Citizens) in Decision Making Source: World Governance Indicators&lt;br&gt;Political Pluralism and Participation Source: Freedom House</td>
<td>Enhanced role of citizens in decision making processes by increasing participation in the 2021 election, as well as engagement in local decision making processes.</td>
<td>Collection of data and event monitoring during the 2021 Federal Election. Monitoring project implementation through regular contact with local level administrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened mechanisms of State accountability</td>
<td>Rule of Law; Violations of Internet User Rights; and Free and Independent Media Source: Freedom House</td>
<td>Increased autonomy for accountability mechanisms, notably, an independent judiciary. A media landscaped free from political control to allow for informal mechanisms of state accountability. The abandonment of authoritarian practices regarding ICTs.</td>
<td>Establishing periodic monitoring of project implementation consisting of consultation with key stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased State capacity for the implementation of reforms</td>
<td>Government Effectiveness Source: World Governance Indicators&lt;br&gt;Stability of Democratic Institutions Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung Index Reports (BTI)</td>
<td>Greater State capacity would serve to strengthen legitimacy. The successful implementation of democratizing reforms would enhance the stability of Ethiopia’s institutions.</td>
<td>Baseline and periodic monitoring throughout project implementation.</td>
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</table>
Option 3: Work with the Planning and Development Commission, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation, and local stakeholders to increase the use of sustainable, resilient and efficient climate-smart agricultural practices and promote climate resilience.

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<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased economic empowerment, particularly for women and youth</td>
<td>Number of people reached by projects that support women’s economic empowerment (m/f) <em>Source: FIAP Key Performance Indicators</em></td>
<td>Diversification of income generation sources. Increased access to economic opportunity for women, youth, and vulnerable groups.</td>
<td>Collection of baseline data and subsequent monitoring throughout project implementation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Number of entrepreneurs, farmers and smallholders provided with financial and/or business development services through projects (m/f) <em>Source: FIAP Key Performance Indicators</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased resilience to climate shocks</td>
<td>Number of beneficiaries from climate adaptation projects (m/f) <em>Source: FIAP Key Performance Indicators</em></td>
<td>Increased State capacity to deliver goods and services contributes to movement out of the legitimacy trap. Better coordination across Ministries strengthens State authority.</td>
<td>Collection of baseline data and subsequent monitoring throughout project implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased trust in public institutions</td>
<td>Equity of public resource use (Scale) <em>Source: World Development Indicators, CPIA</em></td>
<td>Increased capacity of state ministries to deliver goods and services contributes to Ethiopia’s movement out of the legitimacy trap.</td>
<td>Collection of baseline data and subsequent monitoring throughout project implementation.</td>
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<td>Institutional trust (Scale) <em>Source: InterAfrica Group Public Opinion Surveys</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduction in moderate or severe food insecurity</td>
<td>Percentage of population experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity (%) <em>Source: World Development Indicators</em></td>
<td>Increased access to food and nutrition resources. Increased capacity of state ministries to deliver goods and services contributes to Ethiopia’s movement out of the legitimacy trap.</td>
<td>Collection of baseline data and subsequent monitoring throughout project implementation. Data collected from WDI.</td>
</tr>
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