

# Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration

Final report



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## Preface

Each violent conflict includes thousands of personal tragedies. Those men, women and children that are affected, whether these are victims of the conflict or combatants participating in it, face up to new challenges when it is time to reconstruct a functional society of peaceful coexistence. In the short term, everyone's personal security must be guaranteed. In the long term, sufficient conditions must be created so that sustainable development can take root.

An effective DDR-strategy is one key function in meeting the diverse challenges of a post conflict society. Because DDR aims at both short-term security and long-term stability it brings together political, civilian, military and humanitarian actors that together must work towards a common goal. The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration is a contribution to a holistic view of such programmes where opportunities and limitations are considered from the perspective of the overall approach to ensure the long-term personal security for people, rebuild post conflict societies and lay the foundations for sustainable development.

According to Swedish Government Bill "Shared Responsibility: Sweden's Policy for Global Development", adopted in December 2003, all policy areas have a common overall objective for global development policy. It was therefore vital to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mr Hans Dahlgren and State Secretary for Development Cooperation Ms Annika Söder jointly initiated the SIDD in November 2004.

We had seen years of practice, success and failure, stocktaking and learning from past experience. We knew that processes on disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration had to be addressed through a comprehensive approach that supported the post conflict society at large. Yet we hadn't managed to capture these lessons in a systematic way. We still lacked many of the models and tools. The time was therefore ripe to launch an inclusive discussion on shortcomings, dilemmas and challenges within a broad political framework.

The Brahimi report on Peace Operations from August 2000 (A/55/305-S/2000/809) gave some guidance on DDR within an overall peace-building strategy. To follow up on its recommendations, many international and national actors were focusing on different aspects of DDR processes, not least the United Nations internal process on Integrated DDR Standards. The growing worldwide attention only reinforced the conviction that this was a timely approach.

The SIDD has been a fruitful working process. From the start the aim was to create an open atmosphere and a method of work that allowed for discussion on difficult and complex issues. The division of work in interconnected working groups allowed for expansion of the knowledge base while keeping in mind the

comprehensive approach. The inclusive and constructive leadership of Ambassador Lena Sundh, who served as chair of the SIDDR, was also an important factor that helped build a successful result.

The three chairs of the working groups – Dr Virginia Gamba, Director of Safer Africa, Ambassador Jan Cedergren from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Dr Nat Colletta, consultant and representative of the International Peace Academy – took part in all meetings and contributed with their knowledge, experience and hard work to a greater understanding of DDR processes, how they are interlinked and the connections they have to parallel post-conflict programmes.

I also want to acknowledge the work of Mr Jens Samuelsson Schjørlien of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Mr Stefan Juléus, representing the Swedish National Defence College, for their coordinating roles. Throughout the process, representatives of the following organisations have been particularly active in sharing and contributing to the end result: the United Nations' Department for Peace Keeping Operations, Development Programme and Department for Political Affairs, the World Bank and the International Center for Transitional Justice.

All representatives of governments, international and national organisations and independent institutes and consultants have, through their generous sharing and open discussions, helped create a constructive process, contributing to the final report.

However, it is my conviction that the work will not end here. The results of the SIDDR must be presented, considered and implemented in the preparation, management and support to peacekeeping and post conflict processes. Some dilemmas need further attention. Perhaps even an individual dedicated process.

The overall purpose of the report that lies before you is to present recommendations, guidelines and food for thought on how to create the best possible conditions for a DDR programme to be implemented in a post conflict environment. It is my hope that it will help to strengthen the impact of DDR programmes on any peace process so that war thorn societies throughout the world can keep their course set towards reconstruction and peaceful development. Because in the end, there are no winners of a violent conflict.



Laila Freivalds  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

## Executive Summary

The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration was initiated with the aim of proposing ways and means that can contribute to the creation of a predictable framework in which DDR processes can be planned and implemented. The primary aim of DDR programmes is to contribute to a secure and stable environment in which an overall peace process and transition can be sustained. It is only in this kind of environment that political and security restructuring as well as social and economic reconstruction and longer-term development can take root.

A DDR programme is just one of many elements in a peace process. This is an obvious but often ignored fact. A clear view on the potentials and limitations of a DDR programme is required in order to maximise its contribution to a peace process. It is also a highly political element. When implemented, the DDR programme should ideally influence and contribute to a secure environment that can provide minimum basic conditions to enable long-term development without the immediate threat of violent conflicts. The issue of Security System Reform, often considered to be another crucial element in a war to peace transition, thus has close linkages to DDR. This is an area where the report welcomes further studies. DDR programmes must also be designed and implemented in conformity with other parallel programmes that also influence the success or failure of peace processes (i.e. justice and reconciliation, community-based reconstruction etc.).

It is critical to ensure that a combatant need not return to using violence to survive. This report therefore endorses the provision of what has come to be known as a 'transitional safety net' that enables the combatant to survive, take care of his/her family and cope while adjusting to his/her new status as a productive member of society. This immediate short-term focus is called reinsertion so as to separate it from the longer-term focus of sustainable reintegration.

Creating alternative incentives to violence for ex-combatants makes it less likely that they will disrupt ongoing peace efforts while awaiting a more long-

term, sustainable reintegration and return to a productive civilian livelihood. Concurrently, the local communities need to be taken into account. On the one hand they require capacity to absorb returning soldiers. In addition, realisation that the process is also positive for the communities is needed so as not to create new tension and sow the seeds for renewed conflict. Thus, the report endorses the idea of establishing parallel programmes early on to provide communities with support for receiving ex-combatants as a direct complement to the DDR programme. Early in a post conflict situation, DDR funding is usually the only substantial funding available.

The report argues that a key-funding instrument for DDR processes should be multi-donor trust funds, with two windows. One for financing programmes aimed at ex-combatants (men and women) and one for affected communities. The latter should also be used to fund projects in support of non-combatants associated with armed groups (i.e. women and children). In the absence of strong state and local capacity, the private sector and civil society can also provide supporting and sometimes substituting roles, especially in implementation of DDR programming. The report encourages active efforts to establish appropriate links between DDR programmes and transitional justice initiatives. Public trust would be maximised if the different programmes were designed in ways that guarantee maximum inclusiveness.

The various mechanisms of funding DDR programmes have advantages and disadvantages. What is important is to ensure that there is sufficient coordination of various funding streams, that such coordination is linked to an overall strategic peace-building framework and that the issue of national ownership is considered. Ideally, the programming of the implementation of a peace agreement would provide the basis for a coordination framework for funding.

The report highlights dilemmas and provides some recommendations and food for thought to be used as tools by actors involved in DDR programmes. A continued focus is needed if the recommendations of this report are to be realised.



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# Introduction

## 1.1 State of the Field

1. Following the end of the Cold War the involvement of international actors in war to peace transitions around the world have significantly increased. Many of these transitions have made use of Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) of redundant soldiers and armed elements as an instrument to deal with the threat that those ex-combatants can constitute to a durable peace. Since 1994 alone, there have been 34 DDR processes (22 in Africa) (See Annex 1 for a detailed list). Some of the countries concerned have unfortunately gone through more than one process. Notwithstanding the hope that DDR programmes will make a significant contribution to peace processes, the fact is that about half the countries emerging from conflict risk reverting to violence<sup>1</sup> and, to an even larger extent, violence merely changes form and might even increase in the post conflict period.

2. DDR was initially seen as a purely military issue. With the realisation that cantonment and demobilisation were not enough to ensure reintegration into civilian society, a development focus was added to the process. Although DDR, which aims at dismantling one of the primary 'assets' of the armed parties, also is an important part of the political process, it has continued to be divorced from political considerations and neglected as a political tool of a peace process. It has also generally been carried out without due regard for moral and legal concerns. During the year spent working on this report, a change in approach has become visible, not least in the policy work of the UN agencies on DDR called the IDDRS (Integrated DDR Standards).

3. The increased focus on assistance for reintegration of ex-combatants has made DDR programmes one of the few sources of funding in immediate post-conflict situations. This has led to a trend to include a number of objectives in a DDR programme, some of which are impossible to achieve under the programme.<sup>2</sup>

Hence, beyond making a contribution to securing peace, DDR programmes have been considered to be capable of fundamentally transforming social relations, achieving reconciliation, solving structural economic imbalances or helping countries achieve significant developmental leaps. This last tendency is particularly surprising considering so much evidence of the obstacles that awkward financing mechanisms usually impose on DDR programmes, particularly on the more ambitious reintegration components, which almost without exception have ended up being under-funded and therefore either largely unimplemented or clearly incapable of bearing the weight of overly ambitious expectations.

## 1.2 The SIDDR: A Brief Overview

4. The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration ('SIDDR' or 'the Initiative') was launched to review current DDR practice, challenge assumptions, consider the topic afresh and make recommendations with a view to strengthening interventions that support peace processes. The first meeting of the initiative took place in Stockholm 10–12 November 2004, with representatives from 23 countries and 14 national and international organisations, institutes and UN agencies. Since then, 10 meetings have been held, 2 of them plenary meetings and 4 meetings of the three working groups around whose work the SIDDR was organised. External experts including academics and practitioners have participated in the project, contributing 10 specially commissioned papers. The number of participants has expanded throughout the process. A final conference held in Stockholm on 17–18 November 2005 discussed the aims, outline and recommendations of the SIDDR report. All studies and working group reports have been made available to the public through the SIDDR website<sup>3</sup>.

5. The Initiative is mainly intended for, but by no means limited to, the UN: the Security Council, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, the Secretariat, relevant funds and programmes and UN Peace Missions as well as bilateral and multilateral financial donors of DDR programmes. The focus on the UN is explained by its importance in large peace missions where DDR is often part of the mandate. It is also timely in view of efforts within the UN to re-examine its DDR practices i.a., through the ongoing multi-agency effort to develop 'Integrated Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration Standards during peacekeeping operations' (IDDRS<sup>4</sup>). The recently approved recommendation to form a Peace Building Commission reinforces the appropriateness of focusing on the UN, since DDR in many ways exemplifies the dilemmas and possibilities the Peace Building

Commission is expected to address, tying security and development aspects together.

6. The SIDDR has also closely followed other international initiatives that focus on DDR. Some examples of such initiatives are the African Union's policy framework for post conflict reconstruction and development, the conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, jointly organised by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations' Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, and the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) managed by the World Bank for the Central African region (see Annex 2).

7. This report is structured around the three foci of the Initiative: – Political aspects and the role of DDR in a peace process and a transition – Reintegration – Financing DDR programmes. However, in light of the desire to promote a 'holistic' understanding of DDR processes, it is important to emphasise that the divisions respond to analytic purposes alone, and that in fact the three topics are closely interrelated, as the frequent cross-references in this report will underscore.

8. The report highlights tensions and dilemmas, and makes recommendations whenever possible. Regarding such issues where it would not be prudent to advance general recommendations, it attempts to articulate the trade-offs entailed by some of the different courses of action available. This is done in order to at least shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of different options. Where appropriate, it also attempts to point out areas where further attention is needed.

9. A civil war or a serious armed conflict is often ended by the signing of a peace agreement. This report sees the peace process as the process carried out over a time period defined in a peace agreement, often ending with democratic elections. The peace process is also seen as the initial phase of a transition, although the transition generally extends over a longer period of time. The term peace-building framework is broader than the peace process. It describes the overall environment as well as the tools that set the conditions for the implementation of a peace process. More detailed definitions on specific aspects will follow in forthcoming sections.

10. A post-conflict peace process and a transition from war to durable peace provide an opportunity for a war torn country and the population as a whole, supported by the international community at large, to sow the seeds of peace, security, and democratic governance. The immediate objective of this report is to flesh out a conception of DDR that, within the broader framework of peace building, defines appropriate boundaries concerning the aims of DDR programmes, while specifying the points at which they should link with other

initiatives that are also part of a successful peace process.

11. Although various governments, UN bodies and other organisations have been represented in the plenary meetings and the meetings of the working groups, the content of this report does not express a unified position of the participants, but merely reflects on the outcome, ideas and conclusions of the SIDDR process over the past year. In order to achieve a broad applicability, this report keep recommendations on a more general level even though the discussions held throughout the process have often been very detailed and extensive. This does not exclude that there is a need to sometimes undertake a specific approach to DDR-programs, not least in regard to particular requirements for child combatants.

# The Role of DDR in Peace Processes

## 2.1 Finding the proper place for DDR Processes

12. A peace process, based on a peace agreement, provides an opportunity to address at least some of the underlying causes of a conflict, ideally within a peace-building framework or strategy. Just as there are various types of peace agreements<sup>5</sup>, there are different types of war-to-peace transitions<sup>6</sup>. It is obvious that peace processes can fail for reasons that are independent of whatever part DDR programmes may (or may not) play in them. However, failed or misused DDR processes not only threaten the success of a peace process, they also risk severely aggravating the conflict should a relapse occur. The SDDR has focused on negotiated peace. Even though recommendations presented in this report can obviously be relevant in other settings as well, specific recommendations related to these circumstances might require additional attention.

13. A starting point of the SDDR has been to consider DDR programmes in the context of peace processes and transitional processes. This helps define the proper scope and aims of DDR programmes, which is important for their design, implementation and evaluation.<sup>7</sup>

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The two failed efforts to implement a DDR programme in Angola represent a striking example of how such a process can be manipulated by one party with disastrous results as a consequence. One of the two parties to the peace agreements, UNITA, twice hide combatants clandestinely and used them when their leader found the result of the peace processes unsatisfactory. Despite the presence of UN peace-keeping forces, it was not possible to control UNITA's adherence to the agreements, nor was it possible to avoid renewed war fare.

14. One of the fundamental characteristics of the SDDR is that it maintains that the primary aim of DDR is to contribute to a secure and stable environment in which the overall peace process and transition can be sustained. A key common element of DDR processes is that they aim at removing the immediate threat to a fragile peace posed by groups of armed, uncontrolled and unemployed ex-combatants. When implemented, the DDR programme should ideally influence and contribute to a secure environment that can provide minimum basic conditions to enable long-term development without immediate threats of violent conflicts. It is only in this kind of environment that political and security restructuring as well as social and economic reconstruction and longer-term development can take root.

15. A DDR programme is just one of many elements in a peace process. This is an obvious but often overlooked fact. As the SDDR maintains, getting DDR right, and therefore maximising its contribution to a peace process, requires: (a) being clear about the potentials and limitations of DDR programmes, and (b) thinking about the design and implementation of such programmes explicitly in relation to the different stages of peace processes, from preparation to negotiation to implementation, and to do so in a way that makes DDR programmes coherent with other factors that impinge on the success of peace processes. None of this will be achieved if DDR is seen mainly as a technical exercise de-linked from the dynamics of peace processes.

16. The SDDR, as stated above, defends a conception of DDR which aims to stabilise the post conflict situation, while at the same time keeping the long-term peace-building agenda in mind. The way in which DDR programmes can achieve this aim is by meeting the immediate economic and social needs of the ex-combatants at the time of demobilisation. Creating alternative incentives to violence for them makes it less likely that they will disrupt ongoing peace efforts while awaiting a more long term, sustainable reintegration and return to a productive civilian livelihood. Simultaneously, local communities also need to be taken into account in order not to create new tension and thus contribute to renewed conflict.

## 2.2 DDR within a Security Framework

17. The implementation of a peace process will most likely require the establishment of an integrated national defence force and will often also have

implications for the police force. The numbers of ex-combatants to be integrated in the army and possibly the police force will influence the numbers of beneficiaries of a DDR process. In this sense, DDR can be regarded as the flip side of the future national security sector, a programme that will take care of those who will not be able or are willing to be part of the new national army/police force. The issue of Security System Reform, often considered to be another crucial element in a war to peace transition thus has close linkages to DDR. This is, however, an area where the report welcomes further studies, since recommendations for the broader security aspects go beyond the focus of the SIDDR.

18. Although DDR processes deal with disarmament, it must be stressed that DDR focuses on the weapons in the possession of combatants under the control of a warring party and that the disarmament in most cases takes place prior to demobilisation. A DDR process will thus not address the problems of an abundance of small arms in post conflict countries as such, since a large share of those weapons are found among the civilian population. Past experiences have, however, shown that warring parties, including the authorities that engage in peace processes, are reticent to disclose information regarding the number of weapons and their serviceability. The weapons that are surrendered are often old and unserviceable, while those in good condition are never brought in. Furthermore, conflicts sometimes have regional aspects. When designing a DDR programme, it should always be kept in mind that it might influence the flow of arms over national borders. It could then even contribute to conflict escalation in a neighbouring country. The disarmament element of DDR is often a missed opportunity. Although problems related to small arms and light weapons in general should not be forgotten during the generation of transitional structures and measures, this report will only concentrate on the aspects of disarmament within the framework of a DDR programme.<sup>8</sup>

19. The SIDDR, on the one hand, sets the boundaries of DDR programmes based on the goals of security and stability – and therefore does not encourage thinking that these programmes alone can achieve either a rapid or comprehensive transformation of societal structures. On the other hand, to the extent that the SIDDR promotes the idea that DDR programmes ought to be designed and implemented as part of a comprehensive peace-building framework, it provides an incentive to think about the many ways in which DDR programmes need to be linked with other interventions if they are to support the long-term goals of a larger peace process.

20. Thus, the SIDDR defends a conception of DDR that can facilitate the creation

and sustainability of a situation characterised by a) sufficient security and b) minimum basic conditions for long-term peaceful development. The latter requirement calls for designing and implementing DDR programmes in a way that respects and promotes the social, legal, and economic preconditions of peace. This means that DDR programmes cannot sacrifice the legitimate social and developmental expectations of the community at large for the sake of short-term security and stability. Nor can they ignore the justice-related obligations embodied in various international legal instruments, even if the satisfaction of these expectations and obligations cannot be achieved by the DDR programmes on their own. This includes, for example, blanket amnesties for certain categories of crimes.

## 2.3 DDR in Negotiations and Peace Agreements

21. Arguing that DDR programmes should be designed and implemented in the context of an overall peace strategy leads to a number of implications for the approach of the various relevant actors in different stages of a peace process. The aim of the following two sections is therefore to discuss the goals, challenges and dilemmas that might occur when preparing for negotiations or for the implementation of a DDR process when negotiating a peace agreement, formulating a peace agreement and implementing a peace process with a DDR component included.<sup>9</sup>

22. As a general starting point, mediators and facilitators who are advising and brokering peace negotiations should be aware that some kind of security component will be necessary and that this may be a DDR programme. In the peace agreement for DR Congo for example, there was no definition of the security sector, something that led to a significant delay of the DDR programme. It would also be useful to bear in mind certain guiding principles that might help to avoid unwanted results and effects of such a process (See Annex 3 for a sample list of general principles and recommendations that were discussed in Pretoria in March 2005).

23. Placing DDR within the framework of an overall peace process puts a premium on information gathering dealing with the situation prior to the negotiation. In reality this is not easy, since the very nature of negotiations includes weighing different opinions and perceptions of what the real situation is like. However, knowing about the contextual factors and causes of conflict gives the facilitators of a peace process a better starting point. Choices, decisions and trade-offs to be made during negotiations are better supported if mediators and facilitators

understand the parties to the conflict, their core characteristics, their numbers and military strength, command and control structures, their sources of political support and economic power, and the leverage that both national and international stakeholders might have. In addition, the parties' motivations, needs and aspirations should be ascertained during these early stages.

24. In addition to the information on the potential DDR programme participants and their aspirations, it is important to assess the opportunity structure (e.g. labour, land, credit and other markets) into which former combatants (and those associated with the fighting forces) would be absorbed, as well as the international and national institutional capacity to plan and implement DDR programmes.

25. Mediators and facilitators would therefore benefit from advisers who can help with the above but also provide specific guidance on the nature, scope and limitations of DDR programmes and of the role these programmes can play in peace processes. Neutral support to the parties of the conflict would also help in making the process transparent and inclusive. As mentioned in paragraph 12, general recommendations like these can of course be valuable in all types of war-to-peace transitions.

26. Detailed information concerning DDR programmes in the peace agreement itself would in general provide the different parties with accurate information on what to expect from the proposed programme. The material (financial) costs of achieving the proposed programme can, in theory, be calculated. The programme is accessible to all those who meet agreed upon eligibility and selection criteria and promote transparency, and it is time-bound. Implementation and supervisory institutions can be set up at an early stage and, if the peace agreement is brokered with international participation, details concerning the role of the international community in the DDR process (including financial participation) can also be spelled out.

27. It is, however, clear that highly detailed information will probably not be readily available at the time of negotiations, especially given strong incentives to inflate figures in the early stages. Institutions that are still dysfunctional add to that likelihood. Nor can one expect deep and broad consensus among armed parties about a range of issues, from those of a very general nature such as the desirability of disarming, demobilising and reintegrating, to highly specific issues such as the acceptability of the concrete DDR conditions on the table. In the absence of such conditions, it may be naïve to expect a high degree of specificity on the details of a DDR programme in a peace agreement or mandate. Nevertheless,

mechanisms and procedures for obtaining relevant information, planning and implementation should be put into place and the process started in parallel with the peace negotiation process or immediately thereafter.

28. Some kind of framework for DDR in the agreement would facilitate decisions that have to be made further down the line. Such a framework might be constructed in connection with a view to the future security sector, particularly new national and integrated defence and police forces. The framework should envisage an implementation process with the participation of the relevant parties to the agreement, accompanied by representatives of the international community, any important regional actors and ideally representatives of civil society. The positions of relevant stakeholders (i.e. beneficiaries of a DDR programme or of parallel post conflict programmes, victims or participants of truth commissions, etc.) are likely to change over time, and this will have an impact on any DDR process. Changing circumstances may illuminate possibilities that were not apparent in the midst of negotiations as conflict rages or shortly thereafter. Too much specificity regarding a DDR programme in which important stakeholders, such as victims, play no role in its design and implementation may even contribute to the instability of the programme over time.

In a culture where ownership of a weapon shows who you are and also helps in gaining respect, legitimacy and a livelihood, financial incentives to disarm are not sufficient. In the Afghan society, shaped by 25 years of violence, the societal patterns fractioned in numerous ethnic clans, and local war leaders measure loyalty towards one's own group. Commanders can rapidly assemble large forces through their local networks. Even though foot soldiers might be farmers by trade, their strict loyalty towards a clan leader makes it easy to mobilise them for war. Naturally, with such a threat to stability there are few incentives to disarm.

Processing a DDR programme in this context is very much a political issue. The DDR process in Afghanistan became effective only after adding a political incentive for disarmament. The Afghan election law included provisions that no individual with connections to armed militias could be a candidate in the presidential election. Similarly, the political parties' law prohibited political groups from registering as a political party if the group had an armed wing or connection to an armed militia. The threat of exclusion from the political process led to an intensification of the DDR process.

After the first phase of disarmament was more or less completed and the former mujaheddin militias were disarmed, focus shifted towards illegal armed groups, i.e. groups which had not been on the payroll of the ministry of defence. Similar to the process in the run-up to the presidential elections, an attempt was made to make the threat of exclusion from the electoral process into an incentive for disarmament. The electoral authorities compiled lists of individuals with connections to armed groups, forcing a limited group to withdraw from the elections or forcibly revoking the

registration of their candidacy. However, many of the candidates who were suspected of having connections to armed groups were in many cases allowed to run for office.

The security situation and the unstable political situation remains a disincentive for participation in the process of disarmament of illegal armed groups. Nevertheless, the political process became a tool to push the original DDR process ahead and moved many of the key actors into the political sector. Hopefully, the continued efforts to move towards the establishment of a sustainable democracy in Afghanistan can force warlords to transform their power based on military might into power based on political legitimacy.

29. Regardless of the degree of specificity concerning DDR programmes contained in peace agreements, peace agreements and mandates should support national responsibility and commitment to DDR processes from the outset. Where this cannot immediately be translated into full institutional ownership or management of key institutions, parties to the agreements should make key policy decisions and a process be laid out where more responsibility is given to the national structures over time. (National ownership will be addressed further below, as will other DDR-related elements of a peace process).

30. Taking up arms is an indication that governance has failed. The politics of exclusion in one way or another has already manifested itself at an extreme level and many in society see war as the only recourse for dialogue and change. In this context, the first step of DDR is to provide the space for the parties to realise that the military option is no longer legitimate or necessary. A formal peace process and subsequent peace implementation/monitoring mechanisms that are politically visible can provide such a space. In any case, DDR should never be implemented without a proper analysis of the potential political implications it might have on the peace process.

31. Different groups within the armed parties might require different approaches in a comprehensive DDR strategy. Reluctance of rank and file soldiers to lay down their weapons would probably have to do with their need for physical and economic security. Providing some visible, tangible and immediate physical and economic security for these individuals supports the aim of a DDR process and helps stabilise the situation. High-ranking military leaders probably have other ambitions. If they remain outside the national security architecture or are excluded from the political arena there is a great risk that they can become 'spoilers' and lead their rank and file back to the use of force. Taking their interest, needs and ambitions into account might help diminish that risk and would thus support a peace process, even though this might involve a difficult moral trade-off.

## 2.4 Facilitating, Managing and Processing DDR Programmes

32. As previously discussed, to substitute for the scarcity of details in a peace agreement, a DDR process would benefit from an institutionalised structure with participants from the parties, the international community and ideally civil society in order to solve the challenges that might arise when implementing the programme.

33. Peace implementers must always be prepared for the prospect that the ‘real’ weapons will not be laid down until the parties are confident that they have gotten something out of negotiations and there is trust that the transformation of a society and a state from war to peace is fully underway. The construction of shared visions about a future institutional framework, minimum standards and baselines for action for both local, national and international actors can in itself lead to the identification of more stakeholders to the process, the assignment of roles and responsibilities in implementation of agreed activities, and, over time, to a strengthening of accountability and responsibility.<sup>10</sup>

34. Given the important role of the UN in peace missions this report focuses mainly on recommendations for UN peace missions (even if the recommendations can naturally be used by other actors). These missions are usually set up in situations of crisis and conflict, often without sufficient time, resources, information or understanding of the conflict, its causes and actors. This report has already pointed out how critical it is for successful DDR programming to have access to accurate and complete information about a range of issues, especially those most directly concerning the parties in conflict. While it would not be prudent, or even possible, to delay setting up a peace mission until this information is available, missions must establish the capacity to meet this information challenge over time.

35. As discussed in paragraph 25, if expertise on DDR is made available at a sufficiently early stage in the preparation and negotiation process, it could strengthen the peace agreement. Furthermore, beyond the negotiation phase, collection and verification of necessary information would provide great support to the implementers of a DDR programme<sup>11</sup>. A funding mechanism to be put in place at this early stage is equally important.

36. In addition to the general information requirements, it is essential to add competence on DDR issues to the political work of the peace mission. Approaching DDR from both a political and a military perspective, i.a. through discussions

with the political and military leadership of the parties to the peace process, will not only enhance the gathering of information but also facilitate the analysis and understanding of the status and role of DDR during the process. It is also a way to establish connections with different interest groups, including the private sector<sup>12</sup>, which might have leverage on the armed parties.

37. Ultimately, the success of DDR programmes depends on genuine, effective and broad national ownership and responsibility. It is important to keep firmly in mind that national ownership can take different forms at different stages of the process, and that in general, weak capacity should not become an excuse for the international community to exercise control beyond what is necessary, or over particular issues. Initially, compensation can be made for the absence of national capacity. Over time it must and can be built up. Full national ownership implies that national actors have the responsibility for decisions about objectives, policies, strategies, programme design and implementation modalities.

## 2.5 Recommendations:

38. The SDDR recommends the following in relation to DDR in the various stages of the political peace process:

- › The primary aim of DDR is to contribute to a secure and stable environment in which the overall peace process and transition can be sustained. Thus, DDR should ideally facilitate the creation and sustainability of a situation characterised by a) sufficient security and b) minimum basic conditions for long-term peaceful development. DDR is one of many elements in a peace process and it can be used as a political instrument to support a peace-building framework.
- › Peace agreements should at least provide an overall framework for security during a political transition and identify where DDR is relevant. This framework should include an agreement on the future national defence force as well as clear indications on how the parties should deal with DDR during the implementation phase (setting up committees, creating transparency and information facilities, etc.).
- › As not all information is available at the time of negotiations, DDR would benefit from the creation of flexible mechanisms that can allow for the originally

missing information to be included in the implementation in due time. This could include the set up of responsible institutions, technical assistance, capacity development and sensitisation support to stakeholders to allow them to involve themselves in this issue in a meaningful way. It also helps ensuring that the international community speaks with one voice (i.e. is coordinated) when addressing DDR issues.

- › Peace missions must be given the capacity to deal with DDR as a component in a peace process that is highly political in character. This capacity should encompass both military and political elements. The SDDR therefore recommends that specific competence on DDR issues be added to the political work of the peace mission.
- › An international advisory team of independent DDR experts (to be housed amongst the multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental community) should be established to assist in negotiations but also, when needed, the peace mission and the parties to a peace agreement in implementing sound DDR programmes. If mandated to monitor and verify the manner in which agreed upon DDR measures are being implemented, this team can also become a confidence-building measure for the warring parties during the peace agreement negotiations.
- › The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) should have access to a UN technical team trained to analyse the situation from a DDR needs and possibilities perspective.
- › National leadership and institutions should have the leading role and political responsibility for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the ex-combatants, even when internationally or regionally mandated peace missions or international institutions have crucial roles in the organisation, supervision and monitoring of the DDR process.
- › Transparency in decision-making, resource availability and information sharing coupled with broad consultation processes are important tools for building national ownership and leadership in the DDR process.

# Reintegration: Economic, Social and Political Concerns

## 3.1 Towards a More 'Holistic' Conceptualisation of Reintegration

39. The SIDDR, as has been stated, endorses a security-focused understanding of DDR. This has implications for the way in which the reintegration component of these programmes ought to be understood. However, equally important, the SIDDR emphasises the importance of thinking about security as an enabling condition of sustainable peace. This section of the report will flesh out the implications of these two points, showing in the process how the effort to draw clear boundaries around the conception of DDR does not necessarily lead to a narrow understanding of the concept. What it does lead to is greater clarity about the need to establish effective links between DDR and other programmes.<sup>13</sup>

40. In more 'holistic' terms, the SIDDR supports reintegration programmes that would make it more likely for ex-combatants to eventually reintegrate into civil society on economic, social and political levels. Finding employment, gaining acceptance and participating in democratic processes serve as common indicators of successful reintegration. Keeping firmly in mind the fact that the successful reintegration of ex-combatants is a process that depends not only upon their situation but also on the possibility of satisfying the complex expectations of the receiving communities (a point to which the report will return), the importance of drawing links between programmes that target ex-combatants and programmes that target receiving communities is reaffirmed.

## 3.2 Reinsertion: Transitional Reintegration as a Source of Stability

41. No measure or set of measures can guarantee that ex-combatants do not return to violence, whether because of their feeling of discontent or because they are called back by their commanders. This is particularly true in situations in which war has been the only occupation that entire sections of a population have known during their lifetimes. What is virtually guaranteed is that unless ex-combatants have a real opportunity to acquire functional skills or resume or recreate sustainable livelihoods, they will not return to normal civilian life. As it takes time and resources to acquire such skills, it is often necessary to provide some form of social protection to ex-combatants and their families at the time of demobilisation.

42. The SDDR therefore endorses the provision, through demobilisation programmes, of what has come to be known as a ‘transitional safety net’. This would include a mix of in-kind and cash entitlements covering a basket of basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, health and education requirements for a combatant and his/her family. Such a transitional safety net enables the combatant to survive, take care of his/her family and cope while adjusting to his/her new status as a productive member of society. This is critical to ensuring that a combatant need not return to the use of violence to survive.

### The Uganda Veterans Assistance Program “Settling in Package”

In 1992, following 15 years of civil strife in Uganda, the government decided to embark on a demobilization and reintegration program, aiming to reduce the National Resistance Army (NRA) about 50 % from an estimated 80,000 to about 40,000 soldiers. Given the war ravaged state of the economy, in addition to longer term social and economic reintegration programming such as training and employment generation schemes, credit and micro-enterprise development, among others, the government realized that some form of “transitional safety net” would be necessary during the time period from discharge and demobilization until the benefits of planned reintegration programs took effect.

The transitional safety net took the form of a “settling in package” which included food and clothing, temporary shelter and building materials, health and education assistance, agricultural tools and seeds, and transportation to a community of choice. The package was meant to support the transition to a productive civilian life of a former combatant and his/her family of an average size of 5 persons over the course of a single agricultural growing season of six months. All inputs were monetized (amounting to roughly \$ 800 per combatant and his/her family) with the exception of the transport, building materials and school fees (paid directly to the schools).

The rationale for monetizing the bulk of the package was three fold: (a) to reduce third party transaction costs of in-kind inputs, thus providing maximum benefits directly in the hands of the beneficiary; (b) to empower the beneficiary by providing choice and control over the benefits; and (c) to stimulate the local economy by creating purchasing power at the local level. Despite reservations by many, over the potential for corruption using cash payments, the system worked efficiently and effectively. This was due in large part to: (1) direct payments being made to combatants into local bank accounts in two installments over time (first and third months) in their community of return; (2) a tight external, independent financial management and continuous auditing unit; and (3) absolute transparency through a public information campaign as to the program aims, rationale and implementation modalities. The transitional safety net was instrumental in providing stability during the immediate period after demobilization as combatants were able to survive during this transition period to sustainable livelihoods without resorting to crime or a return to violent civil strife.

*Aide Memoire, Uganda Veterans Assistance Program, World Bank, September 18, 1992. Also Colletta, Nat J., Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer, War to Peace Transition in SubSaharan Africa, Directions in Development. World Bank, 1996: Washington, D.C.)*

43. This transitional safety net, when discussed in meetings and studies of the SIDDR process, has been referred to as ‘transitional reintegration’ as opposed to the more long-term ‘sustainable reintegration’. The definitions dovetail with the distinction drawn by IDDRs between ‘reinsertion’ and ‘reintegration’. According to IDDRs, reinsertion is “a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.”<sup>14</sup> For the purpose of not confusing terminologies and in order to facilitate the compatibility between IDDRs and the SIDDR, this report will hereafter use the term reinsertion.

44. Planning, designing and setting up sustainable reintegration programmes requires time. In order to avoid gaps between the short-term and the long-term focus, consideration might be given to temporarily maintaining ex-combatants, who are designated for a DDR programme, in a military structure, i.e. ‘holding pattern’. Such an interim solution would provide the time and space for debriefing and demilitarisation of the mindset of ex-combatants.

45. A positive effect would be that these combatants, while remaining in military structures, could carry out labour-intensive public work, such as road construction

or mine clearance, etc., which the post conflict society will most probably need. Such programmes can contribute to transitional security and ultimate democratic Security System Reform. In sum, they can enable meaningful participation in a military structure, which, in effect, buys time until skills can be acquired through training, the economy has improved and the labour market is more capable of absorbing under-educated and sometimes marginalised former combatants.

The idea of a time-limited military holding pattern has been raised, for example, in the peace processes of both Angola and the DRC. In the latter the idea was to incorporate all armed combatants in the national army until proper DDR programmes could be undertaken. One strong argument for this approach was that the national government would be in control of all armed elements in the country. The idea was, however, never pursued, partly due to the fact that the financing of salaries etc. while combatants remained in the army was not possible since the funds provided for 'Official Development Aid' were not accessible.

The Service Corps in South Africa at the end of Apartheid kept both those who were to be demobilised and those who would be integrated into the new South African defence force together, under military discipline and controls, until such time as they were adequately separated and inserted in re-training programmes. This holding pattern allowed for a concentration of limited resources for a limited period of time while focusing on the basic needs of those serviced. The main reason for success, however, was that all activities were financed by the national government.

46. The SDDDR emphasises the importance of designing and implementing DDR programmes in a gender sensitive way, and is cognizant of the difficulties that have been encountered with gender issues in DDR in the past. A security-focused understanding of DDR clearly calls for making sure that female combatants are adequately addressed through DDR programmes, even if this means that specialised programmes must be created. Similarly, as will be further elaborated on, the SDDDR emphasises the importance of establishing parallel programmes for those categories of women, men and children associated with the armed groups but who, not being ex-combatants or posing a security threat, will normally not qualify for reinsertion assistance.

### 3.3 Sustainable Reintegration to Balance Individual and Community Needs and Aspirations

47. Despite the important role that, from the SDDDR's perspective, reinsertion can play, it obviously does not exhaust the meaning of sustainable reintegration.

A transitional safety net merely provides time-bound and basic benefits (a mix of basic goods, services and/or cash over a period to be measured in months, not years). Therefore, as stated above, the SIDDR distinguishes between reinsertion and more long-term sustainable reintegration. The latter can only be achieved over the long run and through a much broader array of measures and benefits (which might include, for example, long-term counselling, access to technology, credit, land and other productive assets). While it is important to establish programmes that provide such services in parallel with the transitional safety net, these are not, strictly speaking, a part of the latter, nor should they cover exactly the same groups; the programmes offering broader support should also serve broader groups (e.g. conflict-affected communities, not just ex-combatants).

48. Because the SIDDR promotes a conception of DDR that at least during the transitional phase targets benefits to ex-combatants, it is particularly important to address the charge frequently levelled against DDR programmes that they unjustly reward ‘belligerents’ at the expense of victims. This is a charge that the SIDDR thinks should be taken seriously in each instance. If not addressed, it sets the scene for the belief that those that have access to weapons and are prepared to use them are of more importance than everyone else. This can result in a poor foundation for governance processes by, among other things, perverting civil-military relations. It can also become a cause for renewed conflict.

49. The very fact that the transitional safety net endorsed by the SIDDR is short-term (up to one year), that it seeks to meet only basic needs and that it is clearly security-related may actually help to make it more acceptable to the population at large. More importantly, however, and as one more example of the way in which the SIDDR promotes thinking about DDR programmes in connection with other interventions, the SIDDR considers it imperative to implement programmes concurrently with DDR that serve the needs of other war-affected groups. Traditionally, such programmes have lagged far behind DDR.

50. Thus, the SIDDR endorses the idea of establishing matching funds as a direct complement to DDR programmes that would provide communities with support for receiving ex-combatants. This would not only help address the claim that DDR programmes reward those willing to bear arms, it would also help meet the needs of communities (and individuals) affected by the conflict, and may induce confidence on everyone’s part regarding DDR programmes. Public trust would be maximised if the different programmes were designed in ways that guarantee maximum inclusiveness (for instance, avoiding different forms of gender discrimination). A specific focus on affected communities early on in the peace

process would also facilitate the establishment of other post conflict programmes, focusing on internally displaced persons, returnees etc.

51. Public information campaigns could further underscore the balanced approach to those receiving benefits through a targeted DDR programme (i.e. ex-combatants, men and women) and those receiving equivalent benefits through parallel community reintegration and development programmes, regardless of whether they are single female heads of household, children or other war-affected populations. The latter should also be used to fund projects in support of non-combatants associated with armed groups (i.e. women and children).

### 3.4 The Role of the Private Sector and Civil Society: Creating Opportunities for Economic Reintegration

52. One of the greatest problems in the aftermath of conflict and the political and physical insecurity thereof is that no social service programmes are in place, and perhaps never had been in place prior to the conflict. Actors that could provide aid on a local basis, such as the private sector or NGOs, might not be present or operative due to the insecurity and lack of infrastructure, not to mention the degeneration of supply and demand that is a constant of conflict situations.<sup>15</sup>

53. Most of the so-called economic development in immediate post conflict programmes is charity-based or part of emergency humanitarian assistance programmes. This does nothing for the sustainability of livelihoods or the overall evolving socioeconomic environment.

The emergence from conflict provides an opportunity to concentrate on the generation of two key economic umbrellas that can be further developed and ensure sustainability in the long run: a) micro-entrepreneurial ability and micro-enterprise development, and b) self-help cooperative mechanisms for community survival. These two elements, if supported from the beginning of a post conflict process, can develop to occupy a niche in the evolving socioeconomic situation. It is well known that micro-enterprise development starts with skills and minimum funds, it is not formal or set up in a legal fashion. Instead, those who engage in it can pass to the next level, which is the creation of small and medium-sized enterprises which are the backbone of a secure society, and the 'informal' sector as such accounts for the bulk of employment in the early stages of economic development.

In relation to self-help community methods, examples from the past indicate clearly to us that both historically (in the early 20th century) and during harsh periods, people's ability to help

themselves and each other is enhanced, whereas the provision of social security and services or the abundance of charity can often undermine the ability to generate collective well-being – a fresh look at the dynamics of institutions such as the Latin American traditional ‘mutuales’ or at self-help cooperatives and associations of individuals and families for the common good is an opportunity to advance in the right direction.

However, while such micro-level transitional economic initiatives can be necessary ingredients for a successful medium to longer-term reintegration, one should not underestimate the necessity of state policies regarding affirmative action for those individuals and groups most marginalised by the conflict and incentives to local private investors in the form of ease of doing business, access to finance and technology, and provision of risk guarantees, as sufficient conditions for sustainability.

54. In the absence of strong state and local capacity, the private sector and civil society can provide supporting and sometimes substituting roles, especially in implementation of DDR programming. However, all such programmes should include components to strengthen state and local capacities in the process of planning and implementing urgent DDR programmes. In this regard local businesses can both assist and be revitalised through mandatory subcontracting ventures with international and regional investors. Preferred procurement and affirmative action programmes for local hiring and the provision of materials can also help revitalise the local economy and generate jobs and income, thus hastening reintegration. International and local NGOs can help mobilise communities and encourage activities, which build civic trust and democratic participation in the peace and reconstruction process, thus addressing the participation deficit often found in war torn environments.

Experiences from a national NGO on funding cooperation:

Timely financing is essential, but it is equally important to ensure that there is capacity on the ground to implement the programmes. Donors’ constraints when providing funds for reintegration projects are sometimes difficult to handle by implementing parties. The majority of donors have their own agendas, which means that even if they might have noble objectives, they do not always relate to the priorities of the implementing partner. Projects are not sufficiently inserted within the framework of local development. The lack of social activities reaching women and children and the very short period for reintegration of ex-combatants do not facilitate participation and ownership at the community level.

“Although there are no serious conflicts, there are discontentment manifestations from some populations that disagree with the fact that ‘those who brought upon them so much suffering’ (a clear reference to UNITA’s ex-combatants) are now getting more support and benefits than they do.” (Pacheco p.21)

*Study commissioned for the mid-term review in New York, May 2005*

### 3.5 Enhancing Social Reintegration: the Link between DDR, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

55. Beyond the efforts to provide economic support to ex-combatants and other war-affected groups even-handedly, the challenge of sustainable social reintegration can be met by linking DDR programmes with transitional justice and reconciliation<sup>16</sup> measures. The reasons for taking this position are manifold. First, the SDDR, as stated, represents an attempt to think about DDR in its proper context, and in addition to the political dynamics of peace processes. These contexts always include moral and legal obligations that cannot be simply ignored. Second, even a security-focused understanding of DDR must ultimately serve the interests of sustainable peace, and the SDDR supports the view that ultimately, there can hardly be sustainable peace without justice, nor can there be reconciliation without justice. Finally, even from the standpoint of the proper operation of a DDR programme, the SDDR considers that there are useful and under-explored links with transitional justice and reconciliation measures.<sup>17</sup>

56. Since a comprehensive transitional justice policy has as one of its fundamental goals the reconstitution of civic trust in terms of which reconciliation can be understood, it is clear that such a policy can play a critical part in fostering sustainable peace and development. It may facilitate some aspects of the DDR programme: policies that by means of criminal prosecutions, truth-telling procedures or vetting offer receiving communities assurances that those that they are expected to welcome back are not responsible of serious crimes can only improve the chances that returning ex-combatants will indeed be reintegrated. The existence of reparations and or community-targeted programmes for victims can only diminish reservations about the existence of programmes such as DDR that provide some benefits to ex-combatants.

57. While the difficulties of attaining justice in the midst of the bargaining and balance of power in peace negotiations should not be minimised, the SDDR underlines the importance of guaranteeing that peace agreements and whatever DDR components that they may contain fully observe international law requirements, and therefore encourages active efforts to establish appropriate links between DDR programmes and transitional justice initiatives. Some of the potential tensions between DDR programmes and justice-related aims can be resolved through dealing with the issues in different phases of the post conflict peace process. Minimally, however, the SDDR calls for avoiding commitments that may impede the achievement of justice in the future in the course of DDR programming.

### 3.6 Recommendations:

58. The following recommendations are based on the discussion presented above:

- › DDR programmes in the contexts of peace processes should be designed so that they make a contribution to security and stabilisation in the immediate post conflict environment and lay the foundation for future sustainable long-term development.
- › To make sure that reintegration programmes can achieve their immediate security goal without becoming overloaded with other aims and, at the same time, that they remain consistent with the longer-term objectives of sustainable peace and development, assistance towards the reintegration of ex-combatants should be disaggregated into two sequential components: (a) reinsertion (transitional reintegration) assistance in the near-term as a part of or directly following demobilisation, and (b) sustainable reintegration assistance in the medium to longer-term.
- › The reinsertion programmes can be designed through the provision of a cash and/or in-kind safety net, or through the creation of ‘first step’ programmes such as labour intensive public works cleanup and reconstruction, and/or military service corps, with the purpose of ensuring stability while the grounds are prepared for more sustainable reintegration programmes.
- › A security-focused DDR process which emphasises reinsertion should target ex-combatants for support. In turn, donors should try to provide matching funds for parallel programmes, including programmes that provide matching funds for the benefit of receiving communities and other special war-affected groups.
- › Gender sensitive DDR programmes to address female ex-combatants, including gender-differentiated programmes, should be implemented. Similarly, it must be guaranteed that other women, men and children associated with the war who may not qualify for DDR programmes that focus directly on the ex-combatants are addressed through parallel programmes.
- › In the face of the destruction and disruption of productivity and productive assets, DDR programmes may benefit from an enhanced effort to stimulate the local private business sector and dormant civil society to become involved through the provision of affirmative action, reduction of barriers to doing business, access to credit, technology and know-how, and other such incentives and opportunities.

- › The private sector and civil society should be encouraged through appropriate policy and programming incentives to support local capacity building in parallel with support to economic and social reintegration efforts.
- › DDR programmes should be designed and implemented in relation to transitional justice measures. The programmes should not only seek to minimise potential tensions with transitional justice measures (by, e.g. avoiding blanket amnesties), but should capitalise on the potential complementarities with transitional justice measures to reconstitute civic trust and smooth the process of social reintegration.
- › By emphasising reintegration programmes that are inclusive and participatory, such programmes would highlight transparency and accountability mechanisms and promote inclusive democratic governance through inclusive consultation and decision-making.

# Financing DDR Programmes

## 4.1 Issues, Dilemmas and Gaps in Relation to Financing

59. Ideally, funding should be available in advance for all stages of the DDR process, from the negotiation phase to the transitional phase after reintegration. It is a matter of receiving the right amount at the right time in a coordinated fashion for all the different components.

60. So far, most DDR processes have run into funding problems at one stage or another. Delays are quite common. Grant funds at the outset have been difficult to obtain. Components with military connotations, like the sometimes-necessary creation of holding patterns before disarmament, are quite difficult to fund because of OECD-DAC reporting directives and various donor restrictions. The link between DDR funding and subsequent development funding has not always been clear. Coordination between multilateral and bilateral funding has sometimes been difficult. As DDR programmes often are the first internationally funded programmes in post-conflict situations, there is a tendency to overload DDR programmes and to make unrealistic claims on such programmes. It has been difficult to make proper assessments and evaluations of DDR programmes because of lack of data and sufficient transparency.<sup>18</sup>

61. There are various forms of funding mechanisms for DDR programmes. UN-funded peacekeeping missions have assessed contributions for disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion. The definition of what can be included in DDR programmes funded by assessed contributions has been under some development during recent years. The 5th Committee of the General Assembly has, for example, made a reference to reinsertion activities as part of the disarmament

and demobilisation process<sup>19</sup>. The advantage of assessed funds is that they also cover security-related costs that other funding often does not. Even though many peacekeeping mandates urge the mission to assist national committees in the implementation of DDR programmes, one problem is that these funds are managed exclusively by DPKO, thereby precluding opportunities for more national ownership. Assessed contributions will continue to be a very important part of DDR funding.

62. Multilateral trust funds, often managed by the UNDP or the World Bank, have in the last decade emerged as a major source of DDR funding. They are sometimes resourced by the Bank but often combined with contributions from bilateral donors in multi-donor trust funds (MDTF).

63. Specific bilateral, often earmarked, contributions are also common in funding of DDR processes. Bilateral donors are not always willing to contribute to MDTFs for various reasons. Political profiling is one, specific interests in a country situation is another. Bilateral donors often have special funds and procedures for post-conflict purposes, in addition to development funding, which affect funding patterns.

64. The various funding mechanisms have advantages and disadvantages. What is important is to ensure that there is sufficient coordination of various funding streams, that such coordination is linked to an overall strategic peace-building framework, including DDR processes, and that the issue of national ownership is considered. Ideally, the programming of the implementation of a peace agreement would provide the basis for a coordination framework for funding.

65. In UN-supported peace processes, assessed contributions should support core funding for DDR processes, i.e. security-related activities, including reinsertion. This funding should be supplemented by MDTF funds that could have two windows: one for the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants and one for support to affected communities. MDTFs would thereby serve the broader needs of DDR – both the ex-combatants and the communities. Should assessed contributions not be sufficient to cover core funding for the DDR process, MDTFs should be used to finance residual needs. Subsequent funding needs for capacity building, institution building, etc., must be met by traditional development financing. It would be important to involve development actors at an early stage to secure a continuous flow of funding and to avoid gaps.<sup>20</sup>

66. In non-UN supported peace processes where assessed contributions are not

available, MDTFs should integrate backwards and mobilise funding for the various necessary elements of the DDR process while still maintaining the two windows.

67. As regards the management and coordination of funds, this has to be decided on a case-by-case basis. In UN-supported operations the SRSG should have a strong role. MDTFs can be managed by the UNDP and/or the World Bank. Efficiency and accountability must be maintained and local ownership promoted. Bilateral contributions, even though not channelled through MDTFs, should be made only within an overall coordinated framework.

68. DAC reporting directives prevent many donors from financing security-related costs. At the same time, experience on the ground demonstrates that flexibility is possible in this regard and is sometimes crucial for moving the peace process forward.

69. The Peace Building Commission has recently been established in the UN. Its funding modalities should provide another mechanism for ensuring proper financing of DDR programmes. It would be an advantage if this funding mechanism could complement other funding streams and be able to meet urgent funding needs in post-conflict situations. It would be important that funding for all DDR components approved by the Peace Building Commission also be approved as OECD-DAC eligible, including security related costs.

## 4.2 Recommendations:

70. To conclude, the following recommendations are made in relation to the financing aspects of DDR.

- › The international community should give serious consideration to channelling the bulk of DDR funding through a multi-donor trust fund mechanism with pre-committed financing. Such a trust fund should be flexible and able to work with a variety of international and national partners in a highly politicised post-conflict situation. In UN-supported operations the trust fund should complement assessed contributions. Consideration should be given to the possibility of having two different windows for different components of the DDR process: one for the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants and one for support to affected communities. In non-UN supported operations as well as in cases where assessed contributions are insufficient, the trust fund should

integrate backwards and promote financing for all components of the DDR process. Such a pre-committed multi-donor trust fund should finance all necessary elements of the DDR process.

- › Donors supporting pre-committed multi-donor trust funds or member states providing assessed contributions for DDR must show patience and not press for disbursement before the political and security conditions are supportive of DDR, or the technical preparations have been completed.
- › Decisions on institutional management of pre-committed multi-donor trust funds should be made on a case-by-case basis depending upon actual institutional competence, demonstrated comparative advantage and mandate, as well as on the institution's capacity to manage resources in an accountable manner and to mobilise funds.
- › Given the benefits and drawbacks of different financing instruments (trust funds and others), it might be useful to consider sequencing differing financing instruments and sources in accordance with their respective procedures and legal constraints.
- › It is essential that the members of the international community (diplomatic, security and development) support their national partners in undertaking a comprehensive planning process for both DDR and longer-term development and security objectives as early in the peace process as possible. This will help avoid gaps between support provided through DDR programmes and longer-term development and security efforts. This has implications for the institutional approach to DDR planning.
- › To allow for evaluations and monitoring of DDR processes as well as to measure the efficiency of financial contributions, more work should be done on data collection and financial reporting of DDR processes. More transparency is also called for from all actors involved.
- › Funding from the Peace Building Commission can become an important contribution to DDR funding. It would be useful if all DDR funding approved by the Peace Building Commission can be considered as OECD-DAC eligible.

# Conclusions

71. The final conference of the SIDDR held a session on potential future steps. It was suggested that all background studies of the process be published in various formats. The official website ([www.sweden.gov.se/siddr](http://www.sweden.gov.se/siddr)) should be kept open in order to share the background information that had contributed to the final report. Regional and perhaps in some cases national consultations should be held to disseminate the findings of the Initiative. Applications of the findings may be applied in selected capacity building (e.g., integrated mission training) and ongoing peace negotiations where appropriate. Further research should be encouraged and supported, particularly on transitional justice and DDR, the financing of DDR, the experience and effectiveness of ‘holding patterns’, and the links between Security System Reform and DDR processes. Recommendations should be shared in assisting the newly established UN Peace Building Commission. Suggestions were also made regarding the Integrated DDR Standards of the UN, other international DDR processes and initiatives, and the importance of continued close cooperation between these initiatives with respect to the realisation of recommendations and findings.

72. The SIDDR process has been very successful in addressing a complex issue in a creative and inclusive manner, giving added value and global visibility to the centrality, potential and limitations of DDR within the broader peace negotiations framework. Engaged and knowledgeable participants have contributed to the process, resulting in a significantly enriched knowledge base and understanding of DDR throughout the international community.

# Annex I

## DDR Processes, 1992–2005

“Review of international financing arrangements for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Phase 1 Report to Working Group 2”

Country/dates	UN-mandated peace support operations
Mozambique: 10/1992–early 1997	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 12/1992–12/1994
Uganda: 12/1992–12/1995	No
Cambodia: 1991–1993	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
Djibouti: 12/1993–2002	No
Eritrea: 1993–1997	No
Somaliland: 1993–	No
El Salvador: 1992–1996	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 07/1991–04/1995
Haiti: 11/1994–11/1996	United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) 09/1993–06/1996
Angola: 1995–1997	United Nations Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) 1995–06/1997
Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1995–2003	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) 1995–31/12/2002
Mali: 1995–	No
Liberia: 1996–1997	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) 09/1993–09/1997
Sierra Leone: 1996–2004	1) ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG); 2) United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) 06/1998–22/10/1993; 3) United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 22/10/1999–
Guatemala: 1997–	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) 01–05/1997
Rwanda: 1997–early 2001	No
Tajikistan: 1997–	No
Kosovo: 1999–	United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 10/06/1999–
Guinea-Bissau: 2000–	No
Uganda: 2000–	No

Cambodia: 1999–2005	No
Somalia: 2000–	No
Eritrea: 2001–2006	No (UNMEE has no mandate for DDR)
Ethiopia: 2000–2005	No (UNMEE has no mandate for DDR)
Congo, Republic: 2000–	No
Chad	No
Angola: 2002–2006	No
Solomon Islands: 2002–2003	No
Rwanda: 2002–2005	No
Afghanistan: 2002–2006	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Burundi: 2004–2006	United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) 21/05/2004
Liberia: 2002–	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 19/09/2004–
Papua New Guinea: 2003	No
Haiti: 2004–	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) June 1, 2004
Central African Republic: 07/2004–06/2006	No (UN political mission: BONUCA)
Congo, Democratic Republic: 1999–	United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) 30/11/1999–
Sudan: 2004–	United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 24/30/2005–

## Annex 2

### The MDRP in the Great Lakes

#### Contending with regionalism: The MDRP in the Great Lakes

The Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) is a multi-agency effort that supports the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. The largest programme of its kind in the world, the MDRP currently targets an estimated 450 000 ex-combatants in seven countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. Managed by the World Bank, the MDRP is supported by 11 donors with some 30 partner organisations, including several UN agencies. Some \$400 million in trust funds and Bank funding has been contributed to this effort.

The MDRP provides comprehensive support for demobilisation and reintegration, establishing standard approaches throughout the region, coordinating partner initiatives and providing financial and technical assistance. It supports national programmes, special projects (such as work with special target groups including women and children) and regional activities.

To date some 41% of the target caseload in the region has been demobilised, 42% have been provided with reinsertion assistance and some 17% have been provided with reintegration support.

Some of the specific advantages of having a regional programme such as the MDRP are: relative standardisation of benefits provided in the programmes, communication and sensitisation across borders, confidence building and capacity building among governments, sharing of lessons learned and technical expertise, economies of scale and addressing certain regional issues such as ex-combatants who are on foreign soil.

## Annex 3

### General Guiding Principles on the Function, Role and Possibilities of DDR in Negotiations

An example of setting the guiding principles for mediators and facilitators who are advising and brokering peace were discussed in the technical working group 1 meeting in Pretoria, March 2005.

1. In order to define the (short, medium and long-term) objectives of a DDR process, there is a need to place DDR in the broader political concept. It needs to be adapted to the agreed framework for peace processes and conform to relevant conventions on human rights and justice, as well as international norms and principles. As an absolute minimum, decisions regarding DDR in the negotiation stage should not hinder the possibilities of following these principles at a later stage of the peace process.
2. The symmetry of power between the negotiating parties has implications on the design of the peace agreement and eventual DDR programmes. The level of confidence will determine the degree of commitment to deliver on what has been agreed. The ability to balance the power between the parties and the necessity to take into account the power structure is therefore significant.
3. Transparency, accountability and inclusiveness are critical principles in negotiations because they give the parties confidence about the peace process. They can also help lay down the basis for good governance.
4. The aim of negotiations should be for national leadership and institutions to assume the leading role and political responsibility for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of their citizens, even when internationally or regionally mandated peacekeeping operations or international institutions have primary roles in the organisation, oversight and monitoring.

## Annex 4

### Recommendations:

- › The primary aim of DDR is to contribute to a secure and stable environment in which the overall peace process and transition can be sustained. Thus, DDR should ideally facilitate the creation and sustainability of a situation characterised by a) sufficient security and b) minimum basic conditions for long-term peaceful development. DDR is one of many elements in a peace process and it can be used as a political instrument to support a peace-building framework.
- › Peace agreements should at least provide an overall framework for security during a political transition and identify where DDR is relevant. This framework should include an agreement on the future national defence force as well as clear indications on how the parties should deal with DDR during the implementation phase (setting up committees, creating transparency and information facilities, etc.).
- › As not all information is available at the time of negotiations, DDR would benefit from the creation of flexible mechanisms that can allow for the originally missing information to be included in the implementation in due time. This could include the set up of responsible institutions, technical assistance, capacity development and sensitisation support to stakeholders to allow them to involve themselves in this issue in a meaningful way. It also helps ensuring that the international community speaks with one voice (i.e. is coordinated) when addressing DDR issues.
- › Peace missions must be given the capacity to deal with DDR as a component in a peace process that is highly political in character. This capacity should encompass both military and political elements. The SDDR therefore recommends that specific competence on DDR issues be added to the political work of the peace mission.
- › An international advisory team of independent DDR experts (to be housed amongst the multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental community) should be established to assist in negotiations but also, when needed, the peace mission and the parties to a peace agreement in implementing sound DDR programmes. If mandated to monitor and verify the manner in which agreed upon DDR

measures are being implemented, this team can also become a confidence-building measure for the warring parties during the peace agreement negotiations.

- › The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) should have access to a UN technical team trained to analyse the situation from a DDR needs and possibilities perspective.
- › National leadership and institutions should have the leading role and political responsibility for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the ex-combatants, even when internationally or regionally mandated peace missions or international institutions have crucial roles in the organisation, supervision and monitoring of the DDR process.
- › Transparency in decision-making, resource availability and information sharing coupled with broad consultation processes are important tools for building national ownership and leadership in the DDR process.
- › DDR programmes in the contexts of peace processes should be designed so that they make a contribution to security and stabilisation in the immediate post conflict environment and lay the foundation for future sustainable long-term development.
- › To make sure that reintegration programmes can achieve their immediate security goal without becoming overloaded with other aims and, at the same time, that they remain consistent with the longer-term objectives of sustainable peace and development, assistance towards the reintegration of ex-combatants should be disaggregated into two sequential components: (a) reinsertion (transitional reintegration) assistance in the near-term as a part of or directly following demobilisation, and (b) sustainable reintegration assistance in the medium to longer-term.
- › The reinsertion programmes can be designed through the provision of a cash and/or in-kind safety net, or through the creation of ‘first step’ programmes such as labour intensive public works cleanup and reconstruction, and/or military service corps, with the purpose of ensuring stability while the grounds are prepared for more sustainable reintegration programmes.
- › A security-focused DDR process which emphasises reinsertion should target ex-combatants for support. In turn, donors should try to provide matching funds

for parallel programmes, including programmes that provide matching funds for the benefit of receiving communities and other special war-affected groups.

- › Gender sensitive DDR programmes to address female ex-combatants, including gender-differentiated programmes, should be implemented. Similarly, it must be guaranteed that other women, men and children associated with the war who may not qualify for DDR programmes that focus directly on the ex-combatants are addressed through parallel programmes.
- › In the face of the destruction and disruption of productivity and productive assets, DDR programmes may benefit from an enhanced effort to stimulate the local private business sector and dormant civil society to become involved through the provision of affirmative action, reduction of barriers to doing business, access to credit, technology and know-how, and other such incentives and opportunities.
- › The private sector and civil society should be encouraged through appropriate policy and programming incentives to support local capacity building in parallel with support to economic and social reintegration efforts.
- › DDR programmes should be designed and implemented in relation to transitional justice measures. The programmes should not only seek to minimise potential tensions with transitional justice measures (by, e.g. avoiding blanket amnesties), but should capitalise on the potential complementarities with transitional justice measures to reconstitute civic trust and smooth the process of social reintegration.
- › By emphasising reintegration programmes that are inclusive and participatory, such programmes would highlight transparency and accountability mechanisms and promote inclusive democratic governance through inclusive consultation and decision-making.
- › The international community should give serious consideration to channelling the bulk of DDR funding through a multi-donor trust fund mechanism with pre-committed financing. Such a trust fund should be flexible and able to work with a variety of international and national partners in a highly politicised post-conflict situation. In UN-supported operations the trust fund should complement assessed contributions. Consideration should be given to the possibility of having two different windows for different components of the DDR process: one for the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants and one

for support to affected communities. In non-UN supported operations as well as in cases where assessed contributions are insufficient, the trust fund should integrate backwards and promote financing for all components of the DDR process. Such a pre-committed multi-donor trust fund should finance all necessary elements of the DDR process.

- › Donors supporting pre-committed multi-donor trust funds or member states providing assessed contributions for DDR must show patience and not press for disbursement before the political and security conditions are supportive of DDR, or the technical preparations have been completed.
- › Decisions on institutional management of pre-committed multi-donor trust funds should be made on a case-by-case basis depending upon actual institutional competence, demonstrated comparative advantage and mandate, as well as on the institution's capacity to manage resources in an accountable manner and to mobilise funds.
- › Given the benefits and drawbacks of different financing instruments (trust funds and others), it might be useful to consider sequencing differing financing instruments and sources in accordance with their respective procedures and legal constraints.
- › It is essential that the members of the international community (diplomatic, security and development) support their national partners in undertaking a comprehensive planning process for both DDR and longer-term development and security objectives as early in the peace process as possible. This will help avoid gaps between support provided through DDR programmes and longer-term development and security efforts. This has implications for the institutional approach to DDR planning.
- › To allow for evaluations and monitoring of DDR processes as well as to measure the efficiency of financial contributions, more work should be done on data collection and financial reporting of DDR processes. More transparency is also called for from all actors involved.
- › Funding from the Peace Building Commission can become an important contribution to DDR funding. It would be useful if all DDR funding approved by the Peace Building Commission can be considered as OECD-DAC eligible.

## Footnotes

1. According to the Uppsala Conflict Database: [www.pcr.uu.se/database](http://www.pcr.uu.se/database)
2. This emerging tendency need not depart from the traditional, essentially 'technocratic' attitude towards DDR as described in paragraph 2. In fact, sometimes, the two tendencies reinforce one another.
3. [www.sweden.gov.se/siddr](http://www.sweden.gov.se/siddr)
4. The SIDDR has throughout the process worked closely with representatives of the IDDRS. The aim has been for the two processes to reinforce each other, even though focusing on slightly different aspects and including different type of actors.
5. Including ceasefire (an agreement of simply holding fire and positions e.g. Sri Lanka 2003–2005), comprehensive (an agreement that includes all parties and attempts to address underlying issues of the conflict e.g. Naivasha January 2005, Sudan), partial (an agreement that includes some of the parties to the conflict or some of the issues of the conflict e.g. Washington Agreement of Bosnia 1993, Arusha 2000, Burundi) and implementation agreements (a sub agreement that helps facilitate the technical implementation of the comprehensive agreement, i.e. Police restructuring agreement in Bosnia Herzegovina 1996–1997). All of these processes are attempts to induce warring parties to desist from violence and agree on a political/security and economic dispensation which addresses the causes of the conflict.
6. Including victory settlements, military occupations and negotiated agreements.
7. This observation was made as early as the first meeting in Stockholm, November 2004, and has only increased in significance as the process has evolved.
8. The Geneva Forum is, as a follow up on the UN Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, focusing on DDR as a part of a larger disarmament strategy for post conflict societies.
9. This is primarily the result of the first working group that met in Pretoria in March 2005.
10. National ownership and commitment to implement a DDR process have been recurring issues of all discussions in the different working groups. The Swedish National Defence College has conducted an introductory study. This matter does, however, need further attention.
11. One outcome of the IDDRS is to establish a group of technical experts at headquarter level, to support UN-led peace missions in the field.

12. The private sector was a specific focus of working group 3 with a commissioned study on the subject. It receives further attention in section 3.4.
13. Working group 3, based on a commissioned study, presented this discussion on different links in its meeting in New York, April 2005.
14. See draft The UN Approach to DDR, IDDRS 2.10, November 2005, UN: New York.
15. Commissioned by working group 3, the study on the private sector's involvement in DDR processes was presented at the mid-term review in New York, May 2005
16. Reconciliation, minimally, is the condition under which citizens can trust one another as citizens again (or anew). That means that they are sufficiently committed to the norms and values that motivate their ruling institutions, sufficiently confident that those who operate those institutions do so also on the basis of those norms and values, and sufficiently secure about their fellow citizens' commitment to abide by these basic norms and values.
17. Introduced as an important aspect as early as at the opening meeting in November 2004, these observations were further outlined by a study commissioned by and presented for working group 3.
18. Working group 2 commissioned a study for its first meeting in New York, May 2005. One significant finding of the study was that no complete overall data on funding of DDR programmes was kept by any of the donors involved.
19. A/RES/59/296
20. The second meeting of working group 2, held in Stockholm in September 2005, based its discussion on a second commissioned study on financing mechanisms, including field research from Liberia and DRC.

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