Electoral Violence and Reconciliation

Zanzibar

This report draws heavily on the conflict analysis methodology developed by the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response – Africa (FEWER Africa).

Three assumptions/values permeate this report. Firstly, good and operationally relevant analysis is not neutral or impartial, but strives to be balanced. It should reflect local voices as much as possible and concomitantly incorporate regional and international perspectives. Secondly, deep concern of the eminent conflicts throughout the Africa continent is in the spirit of the conclusions drawn. In some instances this make the analysis seemingly partial with certain groups, however, as previously mentioned, the analysis and conclusions drawn aim to be balanced. Finally, analysis is about making judgements that are based (where possible) on carefully supported evidence. Nonetheless, there are always many interpretations of facts and their significance.

It is the objective of this monitoring report to contribute to the better understanding of the current conflict dynamics in the pre-electoral period in Zanzibar, and to identify entry points of engagement for conflict prevention in the electoral/post-electoral period. Given also a free mandate to draw tough conclusions, this report could possibly appear quite controversial for some. Its objective, though, is to be a thought-provoking report, rather than a consensus document.

Fewer Africa is currently seeking support for its analytical and peacebuilding activities in Zanzibar for the period of 2005-06.

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1 On the 27th January 2001, violence broke out in Zanzibar when the riot police violently cracked down on a peaceful demonstration staged by the opposition in response to the election results of the October 2000 elections.
Introduction

The two islands that comprise Zanzibar, Pemba and Unguja, form with mainland Tanganyika the United Republic of Tanzania. Despite a thriving tourist economy, however, the islands lag behind the rest of Tanzania in social and economic terms, prompting criticism that they have been marginalised, with an unequal distribution of resources between the mainland and the islands. Zanzibar has its own president, parliament, and jurisdiction over the islands’ education, social and cultural affairs; the mainland is responsible for programmes including defence, immigration and foreign affairs.

The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has held power both nationally and in Zanzibar for the last 40 years. President Benjamin Mpaka, due to stand down at the elections in favour of current Foreign Minister Jakaya Kikwete, is politically dominant on the mainland, but highly criticised in Zanzibar. The opposition, the Civic United Front (CUF), with its power base in Zanzibar, is determined to turn around its defeat in the polls of 1995 and 2000 – elections criticised for fraud and repression.

Against the backdrop of unrest that followed the disputed elections in 2001, fears of a resurgence of violence are growing as the elections approach. Following the 2000 elections, 40 Zanzibaris were shot dead and a further 600 injured when the Tanzanian army and police opened fire on a crowd of CUF supporters who were protesting against the results of the ballot. In the days following the 2000 elections, Tanzanian security forces, backed by ruling party officials and militias, went house-to-house arresting, beating and sexually abusing residents. During that period, an estimated 2,000 Zanzibaris fled to Kenya.

A majority of independent electoral observers agree that the CUF won the 1995 and 2000 elections in Zanzibar, and that the CCM retained power through fraud. CCM supporters admit isolated irregularities, but deny widespread fraud. The CCM is likely to win elections on the mainland, though the separate contest for the presidency and the seats in the House of Representatives of Zanzibar is far less certain. The upcoming elections will cast light on the quality of governance in Tanzania, which is a self-proclaimed model of African coexistence.

On October 2001, the CCM and CUF signed a political reconciliation agreement, the Muafaka II. The main objective of the Muafaka Accord was to create a level playing field and a conducive atmosphere for 2005 elections. However, the current tensions and violence related to the

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2 April 2003 - The Economic Research Bureau of the University of Dar es Salaam reported that the GDP per capita of Tanzania is US$600 whilst that of Zanzibar is US$220. 61% of Zanzibaris are without basic livelihood needs. In the Pemba Island the poverty rate is 64%. Water, sanitation, energy, transportation, health and educational services are very poor.

3 Elections are being held on 30th October 2005


5 The Accord included constitutional and electoral law amendments to restructure the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), create a permanent voters register, and reform the Zanzibar judiciary and state-owned media. The parties agreed to hold by-elections on Pemba in 2003. Following the Muafaka Accord, political tensions on Zanzibar eased, despite CUF complaints at the slow rate of implementation. No major violent incidents occurred in the run-up to 2003 by-elections. Both parties expressed their satisfaction with the formation of the new ZEC in mid-2002 (the ZEC was restructured to include two
registration process indicate that more violence is likely during and after the October elections. It is imperative to address these issues. Local analysis over the next three months, combined with support for the mechanisms of reconciliation between different stakeholders in the post-electoral period, will help address the root causes of the conflict and work towards prevention rather than management of conflict in Zanzibar.

**Chronology, May 1 – July 3\(^{rd}\), 2005\(^{6}\)**

**May 3** (UNPO) - 244 petitions are filed at the Vuga Court with opposition parties on Zanzibar alleging that over 34,000 Zanzibaris were barred from registering for the October elections. ZEC says it is looking into allegations of underage registration raised by the opposition during the voter registration exercise in Zanzibar. The ZEC denies widespread irregularities and CCM officials dismiss the CUF’s charges.

**May 5** (Mwananchi) - Vuga Resident Magistrate in Zanzibar dismissed appeals lodged by 33 people who were disqualified from registering as voters. Eleven appeals were accepted. The Registrar of the High Court said a total of 192 appeals have been lodged. In some cases the appeal papers were not stamped by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) and so they were sent back for endorsement.

**May 14** (Majira) - Police in Zanzibar are accused of misusing their “Operation Dondola” by raiding bars and houses of entertainment where they eat and drink without paying. Sources say the police on night patrol force bars and clubs to close before the official closing time.

**May 16** (Nipashe) - Some government ministries in Zanzibar are said to have asked their staff members to submit their voter cards to their offices. The employees are also asked to name their local leaders. It is revealed that such instructions have been issued by the Ministry of Finance and Chief Minister’s Office. The Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) pointed out that this behavior is illegal.

**May 26** (Mtanzania, Nipashe, Majira) - An Arusha-based opinion poll gives CUF’s Zanzibar presidential candidate Seif Shariff Hamad a 93% lead over Amani Karume.

**May 27** (Mtanzania) - The chairman of CUF, Professor Ibrahim Lipumba, said that “President Benjamin Mkapa has no intention to ensure a peaceful and smooth election in Zanzibar”. Continuing, “This is pathetic. The Zanzibar election date is not known while the registration of voters is marred by violence and intimidation. And CCM tells us they are going to win like a tsunami.”

**May 30** (The East African, Nairobi) - The CCM has paraded its presidential candidates in most parts of Tanzania, but through police force the government has prevented the CUF from doing the same. Although the CUF will be allowed to introduce presidential candidates along with other candidates, they will not be allowed to hold processions. According to the police, this would lead to a breach of the peace in the Isles.

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party nominees each from CCM and CUF. The commission was also given greater control over the ZEC Secretariat, in particular the Director of Elections).

\(^{6}\) Public Reports and events are complimented by analysis and field research, *in italics.*
June 1 (ipp media) – The Zanzibar government is to start issuing compulsory national identity cards. 450,000 eligible Zanzibaris are to be given the ID cards. The projection is 49,000 less than the 499,007 people registered as voters in the Isles ahead of October’s election. The CUF strongly opposes the ID Act which makes it mandatory for all Zanzibaris aged 18 years and above to acquire IDs, arguing that this is part of a wider plot to rig elections on favour of the CCM.

June 5 (CUF) – a mentally retarded boy is allegedly kidnapped by CCM youth and sodomised. The boy was seriously disturbed. CUF human rights department is currently investigating the story.

June 6 (The Citizen) – A CUF mob allegedly attacks the family residence of CCM’s presidential candidate Kikwete just before a rally by the opposition party in Bagamoyo. The youth reportedly set on fire a house used as an office by the ruling party and tore down CCM flags. The opposition’s version of the events has not been covered by media.

June 7 (The Citizen) – Three CUF members are held over a Kikwete attack in Bagamoyo. CUF accuses CCM for instigating the violence. However, there is little attempt to cover the oppositions’ point of view of the incident. It is also clear that Kikwete’s wife was not in the residence at the time, as claimed by CCM and the main newspapers.

June 8 (The Citizen) – CCM demands apology for the attack on Kikwete’s home in Bagamoyo. CCM reportedly stated that “only by CUF abiding by those conditions [condemn the violence and apologise to the nation] would CCM think of returning to the good relations with the opposition party.” This led to the cancellation of a crucial meeting that was to be held on Saturday (11th June) in Dar es Salaam between the two parties. On the agenda for this meeting was the issue of a unity government in Zanzibar.

June 10 (The Citizen) – CUF refuses to apologise for the alleged attack on Kikwete’s residence, claiming that it’s another CCM attempt to create chaos and justify the use of violence against CUF supporters. It was a ‘clever plot’ by a ruling party engineered by its publicity secretary Omari Ramadhani Mapuri, says CUF leader.

June 10 (Guardian) - ZEC decides that the Isles’ polls for presidential, civic and House of Representatives seats will be held simultaneously with the Union government polls on October 30th.

June 11 (various sources) – a scheduled meeting of the Secretary General Committee of Muafaka is postponed indefinitely by CCM.

June 12 (Sunday Observer) - CUF is finalizing arrangements with its legal advisers to file a petition in the high court challenging the October 30 date set for the Zanzibar general elections by the ZEC, seen as a deliberate violation of the Zanzibar constitution. According to the Zanzibar Constitution, Isles’ elections should be held at least 60 days before the incumbent president’s term expires, but not later than 30 days past the date he was sworn in. In this context, the polls are supposed to be held between September 8 and October 8, 2005. The Constitution also states that the president has a five year term in office.

President Amani Karume’s (sworn in on November 8, 2000) five-year term expires on November 8,
2005. The nomination date for candidates was set for September 3, while campaigning will start on September 5 and run through to October 29, 2005.

**June 13** (Radio Tanzania Zanzibar) - More than 700 CUF members crossed over to CCM in Pemba to join the ruling party. It was reported that the former CUF members made their decision public in Chake Chake-Pemba, at a CCM meeting attended by the Zanzibar president Amani Abedi Karume. There are supporting government sources to this, including statements from the Zanzibar Minister of State. However, field observations between February and June 2005 revealed no evidence of this phenomenon, and thus are likely to be partially exaggeration and government propaganda.

**June 25** (The Guardian) – President Mkapa opted to remind the two principal rival parties, CCM and CUF, of making use of the reconciliation committee.

**June 30** (MISA/IFEX) – Minister of State, Ali Juma Shamhuna, has invited private electronic and print media to operate in the Isles in a bid to expand the coverage of economic, political and social issues. This comes two years after the only independent newspaper (Dira) was closed down. In this period Zanzibar has been without any independent media.

**July 3** (The Citizen) – CCM and CUF accept on the responsibility of the incident in Bagamoyo a month earlier and promised to respect the peoples will and do all they can to ensure fair and free elections. The joint party secretary generals committee (which oversees the Muafaka commission) finally met, after the postponement of the planned meeting in June. This is interpreted by many as a positive step towards a revival of the CCM-CUF dialogue.

### Important Dates

- **6 August** (JPSC) - the Secretary General Committee is scheduled to meet
- **20 August 2005** (NEC) – nomination day for Union elections
- **9 September 2005** (ZEC) – nomination day for Zanzibar elections
- **30 October 2005** (NEC/ZEC) – election day for Union and Zanzibar Government

### KEY ISSUES

**1. Increasing tension**

Events that unfolded from April to June 2005 testify to the rising tension in Zanzibar in the run-up to the October elections. The government has cracked down on demonstrations, and

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7 Interview June 9th, 2005.
protesters have thrown home-made bombs on both government and tourist targets. Tanzanians from the mainland are reportedly being harassed by islanders in order to force them off the isles.

In April, after CUF followers complained of being barred from voter registration, police launched a wave of arrests of residents who are suspected of sympathising with the CUF. At least four people were killed in election-related attacks, and youth gangs affiliated to the CCM have clashed repeatedly with CUF supporters. There is minimal documentation of repression against the opposition supporters, particularly since the only independent newspaper, Dira, shut down in 2003.

Repression against opposition supporters is not limited to violent confrontation, but includes humiliation and degradation by local authorities. According to several CUF supporters, as well as international residents, authorities have increased a crack-down on CUF supporters since the beginning of the registration period. Acts of humiliation include forcing CUF supporters to drink urine; people have been tortured and refused registration; others were attacked with iron rods and machetes while queuing at voters' registrations centres.

2. The Muafaka Accord

The Muafaka Accord is a concise, to-the-point agreement that outlines in 18 articles the political reforms to be undertaken. However, implementing its measures is more problematic. The parties have disagreed on the interpretation of the accord, and how it should effectively be implemented. These disagreements – or the ambiguity of the Muafaka – may stem from the fact that the accord is supposed to serve, at the least, three purposes understood as mutually exclusive and contradictory by the parties:

- Primo, the accord is an overall political reconciliation agreement, addressing issues and grievances of the past in order to settle old disputes and hatred.
- Secundo, the accord is a technical reform program, outlining the necessary steps to be taken to streamline the Zanzibar judiciary and government/state bureaucracy in accordance with principles of good governance, multi-party democracy and human rights standards.
- Terzio, the accord is an initiative for political cooperation and power-sharing for a possible future government of national unity.

Aside from its perceived incongruence in its substance, another major stumbling block has been the process of the accord’s implementation. Postponing execution of the Joint Presidential Supervision Commission’s (JPS or the Muafaka commission) and other affiliated bodies’ recommendations suggests a lack of political will to truly invest in the process. This is interpreted as a deliberate tactic of deferral by the Zanzibar president/government (the supreme implementing entity in most cases). While Muafaka basket fund committee on the mainland deplore the lack of compliance measures to assure implementation of Muafaka decisions, there

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8 A bomb damaged an office of CCM on April 24, 2005,
9 The Zanzibar government suspended Dira on November 24, 2003, claiming that the newspaper was violating 'professional ethics'.
10 Interviews June 7th, 2005, Zanzibar
11 Interview, June 9th, 2005, Zanzibar
has been little concrete action to put pressure on the Zanzibari government to effectively implement the decisions.

After the latest violence in Bagamoyo,\textsuperscript{13} a planned meeting of the Secretary General Committee of the Muafaka was postponed without further notice by CCM, who supposedly, will not negotiate with CUF until they officially apologise for the incident. This was seen as a clear confirmation that the Muafaka is dead.

For months, the overall Muafaka process has been seen as more or less dead or redundant. Nobody considered the JPSC office an important actor in the process anymore, not even its own commissionaires. The parties did not trust the JPSC as the appropriate body to handle the political crisis. Most activities have ceased, except some seminars, in a time of dire need for reconciliatory mechanisms. One CUF commissioner (JPSC) stated, “The harmony and peace that initially was created by the Muafaka has disappeared.”\textsuperscript{14} The Minister of State confirmed this, alleging that “political leaders have started to mistrust each other.”\textsuperscript{15}

However, in the end of June, President Mkapa publicly instructed the two parties to meet again and make use of the reconciliation body. The joint party secretary generals committee (which oversees the Muafaka commission) met on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of July in Dar es Salaam for the first time in one year. According to both parties, the meeting went well, and there is a renewed optimism for a negotiated solution to the process. Some of the most important topics discussed between CCM and CUF Secretary Generals were: the political context in general a head of the elections; the Muafaka accord and its implementation; the establishment of a joint party committee, including all opposition parties (which was done in early July); and, a possible power-sharing/government of national unity in Zanzibar.

The Secretary General committee met again on the 16\textsuperscript{th} of July. According to one participating CUF commissioner, the meeting went well, though there are still many outstanding issues to be handled, such as the issue of registration (eligibility), continuous harassment of the opposition, and the lessening of both number of youths in youth camps as well as the number of youth camps, and the issue impartiality within ZEC and the judiciary.\textsuperscript{16} According to opposition sources, CCM cannot commit to any of these issues until its central committee meets this month (July).\textsuperscript{17} In principal, it has been agreed that the JPSC will continue its work beyond the elections. A new Secretary General committee meeting is scheduled for the 6\textsuperscript{th} August.

Some parts of the international community see this as a change of mood from the side of CCM and are henceforth much more positive towards the developments of Muafaka II and the forthcoming elections.

\textsuperscript{13} See June 6-11 in Chronology above.
\textsuperscript{14} Interview June 7\textsuperscript{th} 2005, Zanzibar
\textsuperscript{15} Interview, June 9\textsuperscript{th}, 2005, Zanzibar
\textsuperscript{16} Interview, June 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2005, Nairobi/Zanzibar
\textsuperscript{17} Idem.
3. The electoral process

The electoral process itself deserves particular attention. CUF does not trust the ZEC secretariat as it has not been reformed according to Muafaka standards (for example, a new director of elections has yet to be appointed). Moreover, the recruitment of ZEC registration officers friendly to CCM has tarnished the image of ZEC as a neutral body. “Shehas” are local community leaders appointed by the government who are in charge of their respective shehia (small local districts). The role of the shehas (as local leaders) in the registration process has proven the CCM ‘control’ over ZEC processes on the ground. As explained by a CUF commissioner (JPSC), “The Shehas should not be the last decision makers in the registration process as to who is eligible to register. However, the government forced the ZEC and the Shehas, so that the Shehas were the last decision makers. Hence ZEC is not neutral and independent. This was stopping people from registering.”

On the other hand, when asked about the independence of ZEC, a CCM commissioner of JPSC replied, “It is not possible to have an independent ZEC when parties are in the commission. It is not democratic.”

3.1 Permanent Voters’ Registration (PVR) and the appeal process

The complaints and appeal process for individuals rejected from the permanent voters register (PVR) will be a time- and resource-consuming affair. The PVR on Pemba was released during the first week of April; 2,402 rejections have been filed in Pemba according to the ZEC. The main reasons for objections are:

- Registration of under-aged persons;
- Non-citizens;
- Non-residents of constituencies;
- Reported cases of death.

The display of PVR is underway in Unguja and may be up before the end of June. After that the register will be complete. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) announced on the 5th of July, that voters have up to the end of this month to correct their names in the permanent voter register. However, at the time of writing (July), the PVR was still not publicly published in Unguja.

Considering CCM’s political control over the judiciary on the Isles, one can assume that the process will be politically biased (the numbers processed so far seem to substantiate this). The

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18 According to the Muafaka, the ZEC secretariat is supposed to be reformed and a new director of elections appointed. This has not been undertaken.
19 Interview June 7th, 2005, Zanzibar
20 Interview June 7th, 2005, Zanzibar
21 Currently, the number of similar petitions that have been heard and cleared by the court remains low, even after the Civic United Front secretary-general Seif Sharrif Hamad successfully petitioned the Zanzibar Electoral (ZEC) to rescind its decision to bar him from registering.
22 Interview with ZEC Information Officer, June 8th, 2005, Zanzibar
23 Interview with ZEC Information Officer, June 6th, 2005 Zanzibar
24 The Guardian, 06.07.2005
25 According to an interviewee, only 11 out of 375 complaints that the Zanzibar Legal Service Centre had launched on the voters behalf, had been heard by 12th June. Interview, June 12th, 2005, Dar es Salaam.
reform of the Judiciary outlined in the Muafaka Accord has not been implemented; there is a general concern that the partisanship of the Judiciary will have serious implications on the appeal process.\textsuperscript{26}

The estimated number of rejected voters (9,000) might influence the outcome of the vote. It depends how these numbers are distributed amongst the constituencies, because several constituencies will be severely contested; thus only a handful of votes could affect the results. Additionally, there may be complaints of people who have been allowed to register but who are not eligible according to the law. The appeals process regarding rejected voters and eligibility are key proximate conflict indicators to be monitored during the coming months.

3.2 Constituencies
In February this year the Electoral Commission announced the redrawing of the constituency borders. It was decided with 5 CCM votes against two CUF within ZEC.

Constituencies on Pemba, which is more staunchly pro-CUF than Unguja, were reduced from 21 to 18, and increased on Unguja from 29 to 32: this might correspond better to the actual demographical distribution between the two islands. Even though such an adjustment can be explained with demographic data, it will surely lead to protest and unrest. Since Zanzibar’s House of Representatives has only 50 contested seats, this shift could be decisive in elections. The opposition immediately rejected the new borders, claiming them to be straightforward gerrymandering. However, they later realised that these changes might well be in their favour.

Three constituencies (Mlandege, Mikongoni and Mwembe Makombi) in the Urban District are gone and a new one added (Mpendae), hence from 12 to 10 constituencies in the Urban District. In the West District there were five constituencies previously; three were added and one was divided, increasing the number to nine.

According to the ZEC information officer, the electoral law states that ZEC has the right to make the changes at any time, bearing in mind the changes in population density. He stated, “According to the latest data from the national census [August-September 2000], the statistics show that the population on Pemba is less than on Unguja. There have also been changes in administrative areas. For example, the West District is a big area that has grown extensively over the last 10 years and there are more people residing there than in other districts.” \textsuperscript{27}

3.3 Registration of party candidates
The candidate registration process will be undertaken over this summer as well. The nomination date for the Union Elections is set for August 20. The ZEC met on June 10\textsuperscript{th} and set the date of the nomination and elections Zanzibar.\textsuperscript{28} The nomination date is set for September 9, after which the electoral campaign will start. The elections will be held on October 30, the same day as the Union elections.

There are rumours that CCM will try to deny certain key CUF leaders to register as candidates on the basis of their origin, residence criteria or criminal charges (among them Seif Sheriff

\textsuperscript{26} See Appendix I of the Muafaka Accord.
\textsuperscript{27} Interview with ZEC Information Officer, June 6\textsuperscript{th}, 2005, Zanzibar
\textsuperscript{28} Interview June 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2005, Zanzibar
Hamad himself). The CCM nominated Kikwete, a mainlander, as its candidate for Tanzania’s president; his main CCM rival, Salim Ahmed Salim, is a Zanzibari who islanders believe would have tried to build bridges with the CUF.

3.4 Campaign Period
The official political campaign period will commence late August/early September. It is expected that tensions on the Isles will increase dramatically. The international community should be prepared for active, in-field monitoring of the process. At this time the Muafaka will officially close, ending the only official space for open dialogue between the two parties.

3.5 Identity Cards
The Zanzibar government has started issuing compulsory identity cards: 450,000 eligible Zanzibaris are to be given ID cards, of a population of 981,754 (according to a 2002 census). According to the ID Act, for one to qualify for a Zanzibar ID, he/she has to be a Tanzanian of Zanzibar origin aged 18 and above and must have lived in Zanzibar for at least 10 years. The ID cards must not be confused with citizenship cards, but are residential IDs. A qualified Zanzibari who refuses to register and get his or her ID card without valid reasons will be subject to a jail term of one year, a fine of 100,000 Tanzanian shillings (100 USD) or both. Zanzibaris who reside abroad will not receive an ID card until they return and declare a permanent stay. Tanzanians who originate from the mainland will be allowed to reside on the Indian Ocean archipelago without being required to secure residence permits.

ID cards will be issued to Zanzibari residents only. The exercise will be conducted by local leaders (shehas) under the supervision of a Registrar of persons appointed by the president. The exercise is to run until September 2005.

The CUF strongly opposed the bill, arguing that it’s a waste of money and part of a wider plot to rig elections in favour of the CCM. The 16 CUF representatives in the House opposed the bill; CCM’s 63 representatives voted in its favour. The leader of the opposition in the house argued that ‘it was absurd for the government to spend close to 5 million USD (5 billion Tshilling) on the exercise when it was constantly complaining that it did not have enough money to organise elections.’

According to ZEC, the ID cards will not interfere with the preparation of the elections. ZEC’s voter registration was implemented first, and the ID cards are therefore an independent matter, at least for the 2005 elections. For future elections, it may be required that voters have a Zanzibari ID card.

CUF predicts incidents such as in President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: checkpoints on the way to polling stations to stop people from registering unless they carry an ID card. By law, a lack of ID cannot stop people from voting, but as one Zanzibari commented, “Law didn’t matter before, and

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29 Seif Sharrif Hamad successfully petitioned the Zanzibar Electoral (ZEC) to rescind its decision to bar him from registering.

30 Interview with ZEC Information Officer, June 8th, 2005, Zanzibar
I doubt if it matters now. Anything can happen here.”31 In certain circles, President Mpaka has the nickname Benjamin ‘Mugabe’.32

On the other hand, the ID cards have had some positive response from the islanders. They claim that Zanzibar cannot take on many mainlanders, and the cards will distinguish between the residents of the Isles and those who are not. They will distinguish who is who, particularly in relation to criminal responsibility, and may lead to deportation of those who do not belong to the Isles.

Others question why the ID cards have come about just before the elections, and why the dates for registration have been restricted (June through September). “Do they think no one will be born after September?”33 The first ID cards were issued on the 16th of July. President Karume was the first to receive the card. He dismissed the accusations that the ID cards had anything to do with the upcoming elections and added that “the sole purpose of issuing the IDs was to formally identify residents of Zanzibar for security reasons and enable the government have accurate data when drawing economic plans”.34

Conclusion: Implications for the Peace and Reconciliation in Zanzibar

The apparent revival of the Muafaka agreement ought to reinvigorate the JPSC to serve as a proper body for conflict mediation and prevention during the crucial electoral phase. It is crucial to continue to hold a forum for the CCM decision-makers (i.e. the Zanzibar president and Mkapa) to meet and be challenged by CUF on matters related to the troubled Zanzibar electoral process.

Both parties continue to stir discourses of violence, and both sides appear to be preparing for (and in many ways provoking) the worst and most likely scenarios. Considering the increased tension and heated rhetoric35 on both sides, and few concrete initiatives of conflict prevention and reconciliation, it is likely that incidents of pre- and post-election violence will occur. 

Although CUF stated that if they win they will form a government of national unity, few within the international community believe this will happen.36 The Union Government must realise that should violence occur during elections, action will be taken against both governments.37 One option is to bring representatives from each side together to discuss the jobs to be divided in a joint government of national unity; to discuss winners and losers, not CCM and CUF, and make sure that each party understands and agrees to the results of the elections and the implications therein.

31 Interview 7th June 2005, Zanzibar
32 Interview 8th June 2005, Zanzibar
33 Interview June 10th, 2005, Zanzibar
34 The Guardian, “Karume issued with ID card”, 18.07.2005
35 For example, the Zanzibar Minister of State alleged that “the government is accusing the opposition for instigation of violence” (Interview, June 9th, 2005, Zanzibar).
36 Interview June 6th and 7th, 2005, Zanzibar
37 Interview June 13th, 2005, Dar es Salaam. After the previous elections in 1995 and 2000, the international community didn’t take any measure against the Union Gov.
The decision to set the date for the Zanzibar elections on the same day as the Union elections (30 October) creates contentious issues that require monitoring. That the date may be in violation of the Zanzibar constitution, as claimed by CUF, may or may not be correct, depending on the interpretation of the constitution. However, holding elections on the same day creates practical problems that may have a negative effect on the election process and its outcome. First, having elections on the same day requires two polling stations in each constituency (one for Union vote and one for Zanzibar) because not everyone who can vote in the Union election is eligible to vote in the Zanzibar election. Second, it will likely create a resource shortage of administration and lax regulation at polling stations; parties may not have sufficient numbers of observers to overlook the process. Third, it may create voter fatigue. Most voters will have to vote twice, spending the whole day in queues. Depending on the extent of voter harassment, many may refrain from casting their second vote.

To conclude, with the possible revival of the Muafaka Accord, effective pressure for dialogue must be pursued. Possible alternatives to the Muafaka should not be completely sidelined, because of the latest positive trend, but should be explored as an alternative route, should the revival of Muafaka II fail. Attempts at election manipulation will likely lead to violence. In view of this, it is crucial to closely follow the election process, as well as the various scenarios that may follow the election result.

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38 The Zanzibar Constitution’s Article 27 (3), states that the elections should be held no earlier than 60 days before the date of the inauguration of the last President, and no later than 30 days before this date. Karume was inaugurated on the 8th Nov. The elections should therefore, according to CUF’s claim, be held sometime between the 8th September and 8th October.