The Problem of Small Arms in Developing Countries

The current international debate and recommendations for Development Cooperation, in particular Technical Cooperation

Eschborn 2001
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Foreword

Small arms and light weapons have come to be regarded as the true ‘weapons of mass destruction’. Largely neglected in the past, the consequences of the uncontrolled spread and misuse of small arms and light weapons have now assumed central importance at international level. At the same time, it is now clear that this theme presents a new challenge for Development Cooperation: the use of these weapons, which include hand grenades, pistols, rifles, machine guns and portable rocket launchers, prevents sustainable political and economic development and the establishment of civil-society structures in the countries affected. The successes achieved through Development Cooperation projects over several decades are being destroyed by violence carried out with small arms. Combating the uncontrolled spread and misuse of these weapons is therefore an essential task for Development Cooperation in the framework of crisis prevention.

This issue is politically highly sensitive and reveals an intrinsic potential for conflict, as small arms are also the instruments employed by the state for maintaining its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Complete prohibition is therefore not an option, as was the case in the campaign against anti-personnel mines. A range of diverse measures is required to combat the misuse of these weapons within the framework of a coherent strategy. The present study examines the role which Development Cooperation can play in this regard. It commences by reviewing the state of current debate and then proceeds to outline options for hands-on Development Cooperation activities.

Combating the uncontrolled spread and misuse of small arms is only one element of a comprehensive strategy towards establishing acceptance for the concept of “human security”, which must go hand in hand with comprehensive reform of the security sector. This topic is already subject of a GTZ publication; the present study makes a further contribution.

We would like to express our appreciation to the authors, Sami Faltas and Wolf-Christian Paes of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), for preparing this study.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
</tr>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKUF</td>
<td>Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, University of Hamburg</td>
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<td>BASIC</td>
<td>British American Security Information Council</td>
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<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
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<td>BMZ</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>BSR</td>
<td>German Federal Security Council</td>
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<td>CASA</td>
<td>Coordinating Action on Small Arms</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CPN</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Network</td>
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<td>DDA</td>
<td>Department of Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>DED</td>
<td>German Development Service</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>IANSA</td>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IMI</td>
<td>Israeli Military Industries</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>Nationale Volksarmee (army of the former German Democratic Republic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>ZFD</td>
<td>Civil Peace Service</td>
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Summary

For Development Cooperation to achieve real progress it must be conducted in an environment in which peace prevails. In many developing countries, however, people face the threat of violence and insecurity as they go about their everyday activities. In recognition of this, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has made its commitment to peace-building, crisis prevention and conflict management a matter of priority in its relations with developing countries.

The worldwide spread and misuse of small arms is one of the greatest obstacles to progress in this area. Their use, especially in intra-state conflicts but also in other forms of criminally- and politically-motivated violence, has a destabilising effect and jeopardises the success of Technical and Financial Cooperation measures in developing countries.

Combating the uncontrolled spread and misuse of these weapons must therefore be a central development-policy concern. It involves a number of measures from various fields, such as the disarmament of societies, regulation of the ownership and use of firearms, and controlling the channels of supply. Corresponding legislation, effective government authorities, trained personnel and sufficient equipment are essential for the success of these supply-oriented measures. Information dissemination strategies are also necessary in order to inform the population about these measures and to convince them of their benefits.

Many states confronted with the consequences of the uncontrolled spread of small arms lack the well-developed government institutions needed to control and regulate trade in these weapons. Legislation and control mechanisms are not yet in place. In part, these states exist only on paper, or are crumbling. Under these circumstances, it would be unrealistic to expect these countries to implement the strategies formulated here. On the supply side, one of Technical Cooperation’s main tasks is to support partner countries to implement control and reduction measures. Furthermore, weapons control programmes should be integrated into a coherent development strategy which promotes, in particular, good governance, rule of law, and security-sector reform.

With the aim of reducing demand for small arms at societal level, poverty reduction measures conducted within the framework of Development Cooperation can help remove the base conditions on which cultures of violence feed. At government level, the promotion of the rule of law and good governance can lay the foundations for a democratic state. These measures should be part of a comprehensive strategy for security-sector reform. For without restructuring the security forces, with the aim of promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law, combating the
spread of small arms will remain ineffective. Technical Cooperation can assist by providing advisors.

A number of initiatives to combat the small arms problem have already been implemented at international, regional, national and local level. In order to achieve these goals it is now imperative to supplement the resolutions, appeals and recommendations made so far, above all with hands-on measures.
1. The problem of small arms in developing countries

“Civil war is development policy’s most deadly enemy.”

(Volker Mathies)

“Development policy is peace policy.” These words, coined by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt 25 years ago and highlighting the fight against poverty, inequality and injustice as one of the essential preconditions for preventing war and neutralising the potential for conflict, are still valid today. With regard to the current state of debate on developing-country problems, it would be more fitting, however, to turn Brandt’s words around: “Peace policy is development policy”. For in many countries, violence and insecurity are impairing and destroying the population’s chances for a better future. Today, securing peace in these threatened societies is regarded as a major task for any policy geared to sustainable development. Governments, for example in Britain and Germany, have made peace-building, crisis prevention and conflict management priorities in their relations with developing countries. In these countries too, governments are emphasising that without peace, stability and security, there is little chance of achieving the desired economic growth and social progress.

Nevertheless, attempts to create political stability and public security in developing countries meet with many obstacles. These include the uncontrolled spread and availability of assault rifles, pistols, hand grenades and other small arms, as well as light weapons as used by the military. Small arms have thus become a problem which development policy must address. The present study firstly aims to delimit and describe the issue. Subsequently, some initiatives which target the problem of small arms in developing countries are discussed. Finally, views are presented on how the Federal Republic of Germany might approach this problem within the scope of its Technical Cooperation measures in developing countries.

1 The term ‘small arms’ as used throughout this study also signifies light weapons and their ammunition. Cf. UN definition in box 1.
1. THE PROBLEM OF SMALL ARMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

1.1 The spread of small arms – background and characteristics

Today, very few wars and armed conflicts are fought between states in the traditional manner; they mostly take place within states. This trend began several decades ago, and continued in the period 1997 – 1999. With only few exceptions, wars in the late nineties were fought in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung 2000a, b, c).

**Box 1 - Definition**

The United Nations limits its definition of small arms and light weapons to “those which are manufactured to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war. ... Broadly speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew.” The UN definition covers the following weapon types:

**Small arms:**
- i Revolvers and self-loading pistols;
- ii Rifles and carbines;
- iii Sub-machine guns;
- iv Assault rifles;
- v Light machine-guns;

**Light Weapons:**
- i Heavy machine-guns;
- ii Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers;
- iii Portable anti-aircraft guns;
- iv Portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles,
- v Portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems;
- vi Portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems;
- vii Mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm;

**Ammunition and explosives:**
- i Cartridges (rounds) for small arms;
- ii Shells and missiles for light weapons;
- iii Mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems;
- iv Anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades;
- v Land mines;
- vi Explosives.

**Source:** United Nations 1997, §24.
Military-style small arms are the most commonly employed weapons in these armed conflicts. Experts, politicians and public opinion are unanimous in the view that private ownership of the weapons listed above constitutes an unacceptable risk to human security and political stability. It is therefore expedient initially to restrict efforts to achieve a stricter control of small arms to military-style models, although civilian models, hunting and sports weapons can also be put to illegal use.

There are estimated to be at least 500 million military-style small arms and light weapons in the world today, of which c. 125 million are assault rifles. In the USA alone there are between 190 and 250 million small arms in private ownership, comprising both military and civilian models. The number of small arms in developing countries is likely to amount to at least some 100 million. It is important to bear in mind that these are estimates, as no exact statistics are kept on small arms. Some authors estimate the numbers to be higher (Klare 1999a, p. 21; Renner 1999, p. 24).

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), a US federal authority, estimates that the legal export of small arms and the corresponding ammunition constitute 13 per cent of world trade in conventional arms. From this it follows that the international trade in small arms is worth c. US$ three billion annually. The illegal global trade in small weapons must be added to this sum, and is likely to lie somewhere between US$ two billion and US$ ten billion. Finally, the value of international trade in machine guns, light artillery and anti-tank weapons should be added to the sum, as these are not included in the ACDA estimates. After these adjustments have been made, the total value of legal and illegal international trade in small arms and light weapons, including ammunition, amounts to roughly US$ six billion annually (Renner 1999, p. 24). This sum does not include the value of small arms and light weapons sold on domestic markets. In the knowledge that almost half of all small arms and light weapons are located in the USA, one can conclude that the turnover in domestic markets must be considerable. Currently, no reliable statistics on small arms exist, and so the numbers presented here are only rough estimates. The actual value of the international trade in small arms might in fact be more than twice as high the figures quoted. Although it is safe to assume that this is not of major significance for the global economy, it is of economic importance in certain parts of the world.

The most explosive problem with regard to small arms is, however, neither the direct costs nor the opportunity costs of the arms trade. In 1999, in his article “The Kalashnikov Age”, Michael Klare described how Charles Taylor triggered civil war in Liberia in 1989 with a ‘ragtag invasion force of some 150 amateur soldiers’ armed with Kalashnikovs. As a result of his offensive 200,000 people died, and millions were made homeless. “Taylor had unleashed the most deadly combat system of the current epoch: the adolescent human male equipped with a Kalashnikov – an AK-47 assault rifle.” (Klare 1999a, p. 19). The lethal nature of these weapons together with
their ready availability and ease of handling is at the root of the small arms problem in developing
countries. Armed with these weapons and sufficient ammunition, just a few men, women or even
children are capable of killing or injuring hundreds of people within minutes. The fact that such
acts of violence occur with alarming regularity in poor countries has several causes. It would be
mistaken to try to attribute these exclusively to the wild behaviour of adolescent males, en-
trenched enmity between peoples and tribes, or poverty in society. Sometimes such factors do
in fact play a role. But the problem of violence in developing countries is, first and foremost, a
result of the interplay between three factors: the failure of traditional and modern authorities, the
lack of mechanisms for non-violent conflict resolution, and the uncontrolled spread and, there-
fore, general availability of rifles, pistols, hand grenades and mines.

Box 2 - How weapons are smuggled

*The US journalist Kathi Austin travelled with weapons transports to Africa. She gives us an insight into the working methods of professional weapons smugglers.*

"They often collected weapons from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, trans-shipped them through airports like Ostende in Belgium or Burgas in Bulgaria, filed false flight plans to Cairo, Kinshasa, or Lagos, and 'secretly' delivered their lethal cargoes to UNITA rebels in Angola and Hutu perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide based in eastern Congo.

They carried with them maps and diagrams of various clandestine airfields and depended on their well-greased relations with rogue officials to ensure the secure off-loading of their merchandise. False manifests described their cargo as 'farm machinery', but they were rarely, if ever, subject to cargo inspections. Normally, traffickers are caught only if they fail to pay an expected bribe, if a fired or disgruntled crew member snitches, or if a plane crash exposes the weapons concealed in the hold.

Circuitous air routes, forged export licenses and bills of lading, and fictitious end-user certificates to show to unsuspecting officials are all standard. Even humanitarian organizations can be trapped, not always unwittingly, into ferrying weapons into conflict-riddled zones. Planes under the supervision of the World Food Program, the U.N. High Commission on Refugees, and nongovernmental relief organizations like Oxfam have been commandeered. Chinese arms industries' weapons shipments—labeled 'farm implements'—are carried on the same Chinese ships that bring beans and tools to needy Great Lakes refugees."

*Source:* Austin 1999, p. 35

### 1.2 Arms transfers from industrialised countries

The majority of small arms circulating in developing countries were originally produced and
supplied by industrialised countries. Even prior to the colonial era, European rifles were ex-
changed for African slaves and gold. But the mass supply of firearms to developing countries
began with the emerging East-West conflict, as the superpowers sought to increase the military
strength of their allies and the enemies of their rivals. Between 1950 and 1975 the USA donated
2,174,000 rifles alone to friendly countries in Europe and the Third World (Walter 1993, p. 32).
In the eighties, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) distributed weapons worth between US$ six billion and US$ nine billion to Afghan combatants in their struggle against the Soviet Union. *Stingers* - portable US anti-aircraft missiles - were at first used in Afghanistan to combat Soviet military aircraft, but later came to be regarded as a threat to international civil aviation. For this reason, the CIA endeavoured to buy these weapons back. The Soviet Union either sold or donated millions of Kalashnikovs - its ‘export winner’ - to armed forces and guerrillas in developing countries (see box 3: Heavily-traded automatic weapons). And Russia still supplies large quantities of these weapons to African countries today.

After the end of the bipolar confrontation at the beginning of the nineties, the former Warsaw Pact and NATO countries undertook a hitherto unparalleled reduction in their arsenals. This wave of disarmament was not, however, mirrored in developing countries. For most of the weapons which had become superfluous in the industrialised countries were sold or provided free of charge to less industrialised nations. The disposal of weapons from the NVA – the army of the former German Democratic Republic – in the early nineties is just one example. Re-unified Germany handed over many former NVA major weapons systems, such as military vehicles and ships, to Turkey, Indonesia and other countries. Comparatively little attention was aroused when Germany donated 304,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles to Turkey, together with 83 million rounds of ammunition, from former NVA stocks (Nassauer 1995, pp 45 – 46, 58 – 59).

Reduced trade in arms on domestic markets meant that weapons producers became more dependent on foreign business to maintain production capacity levels or to ensure the very survival of their plants. Firstly, this prompted the respective governments to grant approvals for large-scale arms exports. This is evident especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where (alongside China) Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation are the major suppliers of weapons for Africa’s wars. Secondly, there are signs of an increase in weapons exports which have not been properly authorised. Weapons smuggling is a thriving business, and the authorities responsible are either incapable or unwilling to act.

In addition to traditional suppliers in Europe and North America, developing and threshold countries are becoming increasingly prominent as manufacturers and exporters of weapons and ammunition. Around forty countries, including Egypt, North and South Korea, India and South Africa, are currently engaged in the industrial manufacture of small arms; a number of other countries produce the necessary ammunition. In addition to industrial production, small arms workshops, in particular in Pakistan, manufacture illegal weapons, or maintain and recondition...
used weapons. These local services in the informal sector have only limited impact on the global or regional spread of small arms, but they may constitute a significant income-generation factor in the region concerned. For this reason, these services should not be overlooked when a comprehensive strategy is drawn up for combating small arms proliferation on a country-specific basis.

**Box 3 - Heavily-traded automatic weapons**

The famous AK-47 was developed two years after the end of World War II by the Russian soldier Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov and adopted as the **Automat Kalashnikov-47** by the Soviet army. In the decades that followed the robust and reliable Kalashnikov became the most popular and most often used assault rifle in the world. Its price was another reason for its success. On the black market a Kalashnikov normally costs around US$ 200; western products, for example the German G-3 or the American M-16, cost around four times as much. A good supply can push prices down even further. The Kalashnikov was originally produced by the state arms manufacturers in the USSR. Fourteen countries have produced the AK-47, or variations thereof, under licence; others have manufactured copies illegally. The total number of all Kalashnikovs produced since 1947 is likely to lie between 50 and 80 million. Around 78 states, many guerrilla groups and individual fighters use the AK-47, for example the armed forces in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Syria.

Eight million **M-16** (Colt Industries, USA) assault rifles have been produced in seven countries. They are used by armed forces in 67 countries, including Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Turkey and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Between five and seven million Belgian **FAL** (Fabrique Nationale Herstal, Liège) assault rifles have been produced in 15 countries (mostly the **FAL-7**). This weapon is used by the armed forces in 94 countries, including Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Colombia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Turkey and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Total production of **Uzi** automatic pistols made by Israeli Military Industries (IMI) amounts to around 10 million units. Like the Kalashnikov, the Uzi was invented by a soldier, whose name it bears. It has been copied many times, both legally and illegally. The armed forces in 47 countries use the Uzi, including Algeria, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Ethiopia, Iran, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Sources:** Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) 1996; Renner 1999.
1.3 The circulation of weapons in areas of tension

The supply of weapons on a massive scale by industrialised countries has flooded the market for used weapons in the last few decades, particularly in developing countries. In these states it is possible to purchase a used Kalashnikov in working order for only a few dollars, and so avoid the considerable effort and outlay entailed in importing a new, expensive assault rifle from Colt, Fabrique Nationale or Heckler & Koch. The ready availability of these kinds of weapons for little money and in almost unlimited quantities is especially evident in crisis zones. It is no longer appropriate to view the trade in small arms exclusively from the North-South perspective, focusing solely on supplies from industrialised to developing countries, as is the case for large weapons systems. For in addition to these cross-border transfers, in-country circulation is also a major factor contributing to the uncontrolled spread of small arms.

The oversupply of small arms is chiefly fuelled by the legacy of civil wars. For example, in Latin America the weapons originate from the stocks of the opposing forces in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. After the cessation of hostilities weapons were ‘privatised’ by their owners, to appear later on the regional markets, where they are either acquired by criminals or from where they find their way to the incipient civil wars in South America (Colombia, Peru). The ready availability of weapons, combined with the dismantling of government security forces as wars end, has led to an explosive increase in armed crime. In turn, the failure of the forces of law and order to fight crime effectively leads to increased weapons ownership among the population, lynch law and an expansion of the private security sector.

Similar developments are taking place in southern Africa. Weapons from the civil war in Mozambique find their way via clandestine markets in South Africa to the war regions in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Here too, the arming of the population and a marked tendency towards taking the law into their own hands (vigilantism) can be observed. Not surprisingly, a tightening of weapons legislation planned by the South African government met with bitter protest from some parts of the opposition.

In Europe, this problem is most acute in the Balkan region. The various conflicts between the states emerging from former Yugoslavia have attracted a flow of weapons from other parts of Eastern Europe. In Albania, the government itself was a victim, as military camps and police stations were looted in March 1997 by rampaging citizens. In the days following the collapse of the state savings scheme, more than 650,000 small arms were carried off. To date, only few of these weapons are back under the control of official bodies. The majority of them are likely to have found their way into criminal hands or into neighbouring Kosovo.
The trade in these weapons is partly legal and partly illegal. It is not difficult to conceal the transport of small arms, if at all necessary. Rifles and pistols are small and easy to take apart, and consequently simple to conceal, load onto vehicles and transport. Where greater distances are involved, illegal routes are often superfluous. In most cases, small aircraft can deliver smuggled goods undetected to remote airfields. If transported by land, the smugglers have little to fear from border guards, customs officials or the police. In the event that officials actually carry out freight checks, small bribes are sufficient to ensure safe passage. The risk of being attacked by bandits or rebels is considerably greater. In order to defend themselves in such emergencies, smugglers usually carry arms themselves.

The critical problem with regard to the intra-state and regional circulation of weapons in developing countries is, however, the ill-defined legal situation and insufficient law enforcement. The institutions needed to ensure effective control are often lacking. The responsibility for restricting and controlling the trade in small arms therefore falls to a large extent within the purview of the developing countries. Development Cooperation, however, can make an important contribution to dealing with the legacy left by the industrialised nations.

1.4 Consequences of availability

At first sight, a positive correlation between the availability of small arms and the number of gunshot wounds seems eminently plausible. Medical research indicates an empirical correlation between gun ownership and rates of homicide and suicide (Cuiker 1998; Killias 1993), and other violent crimes (Miller and Cohen 1997). These results were summarised in a study by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1999. The study emphasised, however, that a causal relationship between the availability of small arms and human rights violations, or the use of violence against the civil population, is not proven (International Committee of the Red Cross 1999).²

² In this context, guns and handguns in civil use also play an important role; these are not included in the UN definition given above.
David Meddings, an ICRC medic, conducted an examination on gunshot wounds in conflict situations where disarmament measures were absent (Meddings 1997). In the Afghan province Kandahar he studied the frequency of gunshot wounds during and after periods of conflict involving rival clans. He found that the number of gunshot wounds decreased by only about one-third after the end of hostilities. Most ‘post-war injuries’ were not attributable to mines, but to the direct use of weapons (International Committee of the Red Cross 1999, p. 41).

In addition, the ICRC conducted a survey on this theme among leading field workers. Those questioned reported that weapons had spread widely in the countries in question, and that assault rifles were the most frequent cause of injuries and deaths among the civil population. ICRC employees are frequently threatened by armed persons, thus hindering or interrupting aid operations. The majority of those questioned were convinced of the connection between weapons availability and human rights violations, as well as the deterioration in the living conditions of the civil population (International Committee of the Red Cross 1999, p. 46). It is certainly not possible to prove beyond all doubt that a causal relationship exists between the availability of small arms and their frequency of use. However, the results of the ICRC study support the claim that the availability of weapons is perceived by individuals as a threat, which in turn fuels further demand.

1.5 “Weak States”

When citizens and groups in a country have unauthorised access to instruments of war on a large scale and can promote private or political interests by threatening or exercising violence, then the government in question is deprived of one of its essential features: the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Countries which do not have effective government or the societal prerequisites for non-violent conflict resolution are at risk of being torn apart by violence. This risk is significantly increased if Kalashnikovs and other modern weapons are available in great quantities. El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia and Mali are cases in point. In the past, this danger was also prevalent in Albania, Eastern Slavonia and the Central African Republic. To some extent these countries exist only on paper, or face processes of massive disintegration. Under such conditions it would be unrealistic to expect them to implement the strategies formulated here. One recommendation is, however, that weapons control programmes be integrated into a broader development strategy, in particular into programmes which promote good governance, the rule of law and security-sector reform.
For the government, these measures create a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Citizens, however, will only feel secure once legally vested rights are guaranteed through government institutions. Security means law and order - in the original meaning of the two terms. The strong arm of the law must be counterbalanced by an independent judiciary and a free press. A distinction is often drawn today between national and human security. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has made the term human security a cornerstone of its development philosophy. This rests on the assumption that the security of a community depends on the individual security of each of its members.

### 1.6 The modified view of “disarmament and development”

Twenty years ago, development problems were viewed by politicians and academics primarily as a result of economic imbalances between industrialised and non-industrialised countries. The endogenous factors which were responsible for war or peace, security or weapons accumulation in developing countries played a comparatively minor role in the debate. This is reflected in the final report of the Brandt Commission, which focused on the opportunity costs of the arms race for developing countries:

“The world’s military spending dwarfs any spending on development. Total military expenditures are approaching $450 billion a year, of which over half is spent by the Soviet Union and the United States, while annual spending on official development aid is only $20 billion. If only a fraction of the money, manpower and research presently devoted to military uses were diverted to development, the future prospects of the Third World would look entirely different. In any case there is a moral link between the vast spending on arms and the disgracefully low spending on measures to remove hunger and ill-health in the Third World” (Brandt 1980, p. 117).

The central assumption underlying these conclusions was that the key to development in non-industrialised nations lay in making extra resources available, and this could be achieved in part by reducing military expenditure in industrialised countries (‘peace dividend’). Today this assumption is much disputed: firstly, the development problem is defined less and less in terms of resources; secondly, fewer resources than originally hoped for are released through the disarmament processes in the industrialised nations; and thirdly, such resources are used to a limited extent only for measures which have positive impacts for developing countries. The gap between expenditure on arms and development aid still persists. In 1997 US$ 680 billion was spent worldwide on military purposes (Bonn International Center for Conversion 1999, statistical annex), whereas expenditure on official development aid amounted to only US$ 48 billion (World Bank 2000). Yet, over this period international political relations have changed fundamentally.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the reduction in Russia’s sphere of influence led to a dramatic fall in military spending in the East and, to a lesser extent, also in the West (Bonn International Center for Conversion 1999, statistical annex). In total, global military spending between 1987 and 1997 fell by US$ 1.7 trillion (at 1993 dollar prices), compared to the amount if 1987 expenditure levels had been maintained in real terms (Bonn International Center for Conversion 1999, statistical annex). The ‘peace dividend’, however, turned out to be a disappointment, particularly for developing countries (Brömmelhörster 2000). During economic recessions, much of the money supposedly saved was never generated in the first place, for example in Russia. And part of the money no longer required for arms spending is needed to cushion the social impacts of demobilisation at home. Other parts of these funds are employed to reduce budget deficits. In cases where the ‘peace dividend’ was actually used for productive investment, it was of little benefit to developing countries.

This experience throws a shadow over the assumption that diverting large sums of money from armaments programmes into development aid is a simple matter. Firstly, the savings made through disarmament are smaller and the costs of the programmes higher than expected. Secondly, it seems unlikely in the present circumstances that governments or private bodies will invest these savings in developing countries. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that the developing countries are generally not following the disarmament trend; indeed, they are absorbing part of the weapons now superfluous in industrialised nations.

Against this background, both industrialised countries and those countries directly affected are beginning to realise that the consolidation of peace, inter alia by combating the uncontrolled spread of small arms, is one of the most important challenges facing Development Cooperation.
2. Initiatives for combating the spread and misuse of small arms

2.1. Political measures at international and regional level

As the Cold War came to an end, the international community first recognised the spread of small arms as a problem for international security and a barrier to development. Until the end of the eighties, all eyes were on the East-West confrontation and the ‘balance of terror’ inherent in the accumulation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Today global attention increasingly focuses on regional conflicts and on the concomitant problem of small arms, as the true ‘weapons of mass destruction’. The United Nations (UN) and various regional organisations (including the European Union (EU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)) are addressing the problem of small arms control within the framework of their political and diplomatic activities and through their peace-building and peace-keeping measures.

United Nations: at the UN, initiatives for combating the trade in small arms were forthcoming, in particular, from the General Assembly. The following resolutions serve as examples:

- **A/46/36 H of 6 December 1991** urges UN Member States to combat the illegal arms trade through regional cooperation, and to harmonise corresponding legislation.

- **A/50/70 B of 12 December 1995** calls on the UN Secretary-General to prepare a report on the problem of small arms with the assistance of a panel group of governmental experts. The report, submitted on 27 August 1997, called inter alia for an integrated approach to security and development policy, support for weapons collection programmes in former crisis zones, and the destruction of all weapons not required for defence or the maintenance of law and order (A/52/298). On 5 June 1999 another UN expert group advised the international community to pay particular attention to the control of small arms ammunition (A/54/155).

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3 Cf. overview in annex 2.
• *A/51/45 L of 10 December 1996* welcomes the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection and disposal, and calls for support for similar undertakings.

• *A/51/45 N of 10 December 1996* emphasises the particular importance of practical disarmament measures for achieving lasting peace in post-conflict regions.

• *A/52/38 G of 9 December 1997* underscores the importance of support for the countries affected and invites interested states to establish a group to facilitate this process (working group of interested states).

• *A/53/77 E (Small Arms) of 4 December 1998* decides to convene an international conference on the illicit arms trade no later than 2001. In the meantime, New York has been selected as the location for the conference, to take place from 9 – 20 July 2001.

Since the mid-nineties, the UN Security Council has also increasingly focused on the problem of small arms. In October 1998, the Council unanimously called for joint action to combat illicit arms flows, in particular in Africa (Resolution 1209, 1998). On 8 July 1999 the President of the Security Council issued a declaration on the ‘maintenance of freedom and security and post-conflict peace-building’. This states, inter alia, that ‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration [of ex-combatants] cannot be seen in isolation but rather, as a continuous process which is rooted in and feeds into a broader search for peace, stability and development’ (S/PRST/1999/21). In September 1999, the President made a further declaration, calling on the Secretary-General to develop a handbook on the ecologically sound destruction of the weapons collected (S/PRST/1999/28). On 11 February 2000, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council containing a detailed discussion of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the context of UN peace missions. Among other things, the report called for the destruction of the weapons collected (S/2000/101).

Many other UN organisations are also actively involved in this field of work. In September 1998, for example, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, pointed out the relationship between the general availability of small arms and the refugee problem in Central Africa.

**European Union (EU):** on 26 June 1997 the EU Council of Ministers adopted a *Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms* which, inter alia, provides for the improved exchange of information on weapons transactions as well as support to third countries in combating the illicit arms trade. The *EU Code of Conduct on the Export of Arms* from 25 May 1998 for the first time provides for member-state coordination on arms exports: rejected export applications are automatically passed on to other member states. On 17 December 1998
the Council of Ministers adopted a Joint Action to combat the problem of small arms (see annex III). In spring 1999 the member states of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the associated states in Central and Eastern Europe acceded to both the Joint Action and the EU Code of Conduct. The EU Development Council passed a resolution on 21 May 1999 requiring the EU to implement the Joint Action, to integrate the problem of small arms in its dialogue with ACP states and other development partners, to support the elimination of excessive stockpiles of weapons in developing countries, and to assist these nations to establish the institutions necessary for effective arms control. In addition, they wish to make a contribution to peace education and to combating the ‘cultures of violence’ in developing countries (see annex IV).

**OSCE:** In addition to the EU, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) addressed the problem of small arms in November 1999. In preparation for a meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in November 2000, a seminar on small arms and light weapons was held in Vienna in April of that year.

**ECOWAS:** In Africa, efforts to find a political solution are being undertaken first and foremost by the states in West Africa, where the problem is particularly acute. On 31 October 1998 ECOWAS adopted a moratorium aimed at prohibiting the trade in small arms (ECOWAS 1998). A resolution, comprising a package of measures to facilitate the implementation of the moratorium, followed in December 1999. This provides, inter alia, for a code of conduct and a regional arms register. Arms control initiatives are also underway in southern and eastern Africa, and these were followed in January 2000 by the founding of the Institute of African Firearms in the Ugandan capital Kampala.

**OAS:** On 13 November 1997 the OAS adopted the *International Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials.* This Convention also provides for the alignment of national guidelines, clear marking of small arms by the manufacturer, and the establishment of a system of import, export, and transit licences.
2. INITIATIVES FOR COMBATING THE SPREAD AND MISUSE OF SMALL ARMS

2.2 Operative measures for combating the problem of small arms: micro-disarmament and ‘peace-building’

Arms control and micro-disarmament are necessary prerequisites for peace-building and crisis prevention. The objective is not the cessation of all conflicts, but to prevent violent forms of conflict resolution. In a study conducted by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the present status of the discussion on small arms was summarised as follows:

- There is a close and symbiotic relationship between light weapons trafficking and contemporary forms of conflict.

- The outbreak of ethnic and internal conflict in weak and divided societies often produced an “internal arms race” that further drives the acquisition of small arms and light weapons.

- The emergence of internal arms races and the outbreak of conflicts in weak and divided societies is fostered by an immense worldwide abundance of small arms and light weapons.

- Even relatively small quantities of light weapons can prove highly destabilising in vulnerable and fractured societies.

- Light weapons flow to existing and potential belligerents through a wide variety of channels, both public and private, licit and illicit (Klare 1999b, p. 13-20).

In other words, crisis prevention and peace-building are not feasible without effective arms control at national and international level. In practice, arms control means the disarmament of the civil population (society), regulation of the ownership and use of small arms, and the control of supply channels. Relevant legislation, effective government authorities, trained personnel and the corresponding equipment are indispensable if these measures are to be successful. The population must be informed about these measures and convinced of the benefits.
United Nations peacekeeping missions play a leading role in the disarmament of civil populations, although other organisations, such as ECOWAS and NATO, have also assigned troops and civil personnel to disarmament operations in the past. The main focus of these disarmament missions lay in Africa, and to a lesser extent in Central America and Eastern Europe. The experience and knowledge gained by the UN in these missions has been summarised in a handbook by the Lessons Learned Unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (United Nations 1999), and in a report by the Secretary-General dated 11 February 2000 (United Nations Secretary-General 2000). In El Salvador and Guatemala, for instance, the UN accompanied the demobilisation and disarmament of former guerrillas within the framework of a restricted mandate for observation missions. After the expiry of the UN mandate, a weapons buy-back programme was initiated in El Salvador by an alliance of civil society groups with the aim of continuing the disarmament process. Since 1996, under the title ‘Goods for Guns’, this civil-
society alliance has exchanged more than 9,500 weapons for much needed consumer goods. There are also openings for Technical and Financial Cooperation in this area, and not only in the large-scale UN disarmament operations.

An interesting approach is being pursued by the weapons collection project in the Albanian province Gramsh. In 1999, at the request of the government in Tirana and in close cooperation with the local authorities, the UNDP and the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA) collected some of the weapons misappropriated from government storage facilities in 1997. The novel aspect of this project was that those handing in weapons received no individual reward - to avoid the impression that stealing government property and the ownership of illegal weapons are profitable for those involved. This model provided no extra impulse to the market for weapons through the purchase of small arms. Instead, the villages and areas handing in the weapons were rewarded: roads were built and telephone lines installed, street-lighting improved in the provincial capital, and the chief of police received three vehicles and mobile radio transmitters. This considerable success has however been overshadowed by the government’s failure to keep its promise to destroy a significant portion of the weapons.

On the path to peace: children from Gramsh province, Albania, taking their fathers’ rifles to the collection station. (Photo: UNDP Albania)

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4 This positive result, however, is outweighed by the rise in arms imports, so that the number of weapons in private ownership is increasing rather than decreasing.
Disarmament projects are without doubt problematic in countries where the international peace corps is not met with trust by the local population, where the peace corps cannot guarantee public safety, or where the necessary resources are not made available. One example is the disarmament programme in Liberia. NATO is also currently facing this problem in troubled Kosovo. It is becoming clear that disarmament operations must be part of a comprehensive strategy, which, if it is to succeed, must include measures targeting confidence-building, the strengthening of civil society, and the maintenance of security and order.

In the pursuit of sustainable development, the UNDP too has actively supported peace-building measures. Through reconstruction programmes in many countries it has promoted the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. Activities are gradually expanding to encompass the elimination and disposal of illegal and surplus weapons. The UNDP leaves the collection and storage of weapons to the authorities on the ground or peace keeping missions, itself concentrating on the organisation, financing, educational measures and implementation of development projects related to disarmament.

**Disarmament initiatives with international participation (selection)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>International Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>ECOWAS, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1994-96</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Slavonia (Croatia)</td>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>UN, WEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Yugoslavia)</td>
<td>since 2000</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1992-93, since 1996 a national programme</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3 The role of non-governmental organisations (NGO’s)

Non-governmental organisations are playing an increasingly important role in shaping political opinion and formulating policy in the field of disarmament at both national and international levels. The role of civil society in the negotiations aimed at banning the use of landmines is widely known and received recognition in 1997 through the award of the Nobel peace prize to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

As was the case for landmines, civil society is providing the impetus for governments throughout the world in the search for political solutions at global level. Non-governmental organisations are increasingly using the United Nations as a forum for articulating their interests, and they serve as contacts and sources of information for official bodies. The International Conference on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development in October 1998 in Brussels, which brought together over 200 representatives of NGO’s and governments, is just one example. The Brussels Call for Action, which focuses on the problem of small arms, was adopted at this conference. Civil society is also playing a major role in the preparations for the UN Conference on Small Arms in July 2001.

It is not only well-organised, internationally networked and high-profile organisations which can become involved, such as the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Saferworld, Human Rights Watch, International Alert, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and IANSA. Local groups working with limited means in poor countries are potentially more important partners for peace operations in the development-policy framework. It is difficult here to differentiate between peace operations and other Development Cooperation activity areas. Practical measures which can be carried out in partnership with such groups are recommended in chapter three.

The Post-Conflict Unit at the World Bank has pointed out that the private-sector can assume an active role in peace-building. On the one hand, the goal is to prevent firms from financing and supporting wars. On the other, it makes sense to integrate the private-sector constructively into peace-building activities. Above all, companies whose activities suffer as a result of hostilities and the war economy should be interested (World Bank 1999). So far however, the private sector has played a prominent role in peace-building programmes only in isolated cases. One of these

5 The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) played an important role in this context (see: www.iansa.org).
is the weapons collection programme in El Salvador, mentioned above, which was sponsored by local companies.

2.4 BMZ – position and activities

The political leadership of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) highlights the spread of small arms as a “main concern” (Wieczorek-Zeul 2000, p. 54). In numerous speeches the Minister has emphasised the problem of small arms for Development Cooperation, and has announced intent to follow up the agreements on rules with “practical measures on the ground” (Wieczorek-Zeul 2000, p. 54). She identifies the creation of greater transparency, the marking of weapons, and the integration of non-governmental organisations to monitor the flows of small arms as priority fields of action (Wieczorek-Zeul 1999, pp. 8-9). Within the context of a sector project on this theme to run for several years, the GTZ will develop concepts and strategies to curb the uncontrolled spread and misuse of small arms, and apply these in its Development Cooperation approach.

An important instrument for more stringent control of small arms supplies has also been embodied in arms export procedures: consideration of the consequences of transfer for sustainable development in the recipient country opens up the possibility to place added emphasis on development-policy criteria, especially with regard to small arms. This is all the more important since the BMZ became a fully fledged member of the Federal Security Council (BSR) in 1998. However, the unanimity requirement for BSR decisions has been lifted, with the result that individual ministries, or two ministries on their own, can be outvoted.

One success scored by the minister in combating the spread of small arms was the adoption of her draft, mentioned above, as a resolution by the EU Development Council on 21 May 1999 (annex IV). This creates an instrument at European level with which support for the control and destruction of small arms can also be provided to developing countries through development-policy measures.

The German government has also undertaken efforts towards effectively tackling the problems associated with small arms in the framework of the United Nations. At German initiative and under German chairmanship a group known as the ‘Group of Interested States’ (GIS) was set up at the United Nations in 1998. In its annual catalogue of demands for general and comprehensive disarmament, on 10 December 1996 the General Assembly adopted a text recommended by Germany for the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures.
As stated in the preamble, the plenary session is “convinced that a comprehensive and integrated approach towards certain practical disarmament measures, such as, inter alia, arms control, particularly with regard to small and light weapons, confidence-building measures, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, demining and conversion, often is a prerequisite to maintaining and consolidating peace and security and thus provides a basis for effective rehabilitation and social and economic development.” (United Nations, A/RES/51/45/N)

Thus, at international level, German undertakings in this area have met with success. The fact that more remains to be done is evident from annex II: Recommendations for combating the problem of small arms in developing countries. This catalogue of proposals and plans for combating the problem of small arms is taken from a list of approved, but not yet implemented, European Union projects, and recommendations from international committees and organisations. The most pressing task is to develop a coherent overall concept in consultation with individual departments and ministries, to ensure that the cross-impacts between various problem fields are taken into account and that the corresponding synergies are harnessed.
3. Recommendations for combating the problem of small arms within the framework of German Development Cooperation

3.1 Improving public security

In the past, assisting developing countries to better ensure public security has not been counted as a typical development-policy task, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The professional training or equipment required by the military, police, judges, prison staff or parliamentarians is not generally provided by development ministries, but through the administrative channels and financial resources of other ministries and departments.

Nevertheless, in cooperation with other departments and ministries, development policy can make an important contribution. For instance, it can undertake or support initiatives to enhance transparency and rule-of-law processes during reform of the police, military, or the legal and penal framework, and promote societal and political control (Wulf 2000). By promoting professionalism in the security sector and consequently strengthening the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force, such reforms help curb the spread and misuse of small arms. The ultimate objective of such reforms is to ensure that security forces respect human rights. A strategy of this kind can engender improvements in public security (from the subjective and objective point of view), and so reduce the demand for privately-owned weapons.

3.2 Demobilisation and reintegration

Over a period of several years, Technical Cooperation projects have focused on the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. The GTZ has built up know-how through a number of measures in Africa and Asia. This area of expertise is critical for combating the spread of small arms, since before demobilisation or, especially, reintegration can take place it is first necessary to disarm the combatants (Gleichmann 1997, p. 18). In its handbook, the Lessons Learned Unit at the United Nations DPKO makes the following statement concerning the knowledge gained through peace-keeping operations in recent years:

*Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration form a continuum. Demobilisation is only possible when there is some measure of disarmament. Similarly, the success of demobilisation efforts is contingent upon effective rehabilitation of the former combatants and their integration into civilian life or the restructured army (United Nations, 1999 § P3).*
Technical Cooperation does not offer the appropriate framework for the military aspects of disarmament. But beyond this, other TC fields, such as health care, training, and income-generation measures, are of considerable importance. In addition to meeting material needs, it is necessary to provide psychological support for victims and perpetrators. In these kinds of activities, the GTZ can apply the experience it has gained in other areas.

Such programmes should not merely be regarded as reactive measures for remedying the damage caused by war. Providing assistance to frustrated and poverty-stricken ex-combatants also serves to defuse the risk to stability which they represent, and to tackle problems and acute need which can lead to new outbreaks of violence and war. It is thus possible to help to eradicate the structural causes of violent conflict, through a now firmly established development-policy activity area. For example, when former child solders are disarmied and demobilised, given psychological, medical and educational support so that they can regain their lost childhood, these are at one and the same time curative and preventive measures. They may also have positive social, economic and political side effects.

### 3.3 Combating ‘cultures of violence’ and promoting non-violent conflict resolution

Voluntary peace educators are facing an enormous challenge in southern Sudan. After decades of civil war, the male population is largely familiar with the proverb, which rhymes in Arabic: ‘Live with the Kalashnikov, and you will live for free’. The Russian assault rifle is a tried and tested means of acquiring respect, wealth and power, not only in southern Sudan, but also in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other parts of Africa. It will be essential to implement educational measures and to dismantle the cultures of violence if these circumstances are to change.

Today, German Development Cooperation is already engaged in many areas of adult education. Where necessary, this activity should be extended to include specific educational inputs on the problem of small arms. These can target multipliers (teachers, journalists, traditional leaders) or the whole population. Experience gained in other GTZ awareness-raising programmes (for example health education) as well as curriculum-development know-how can be exploited here. Technical Cooperation is able to support the actors directly involved through advisory inputs and by mobilising resources. Apart from inputs provided by government bodies and other official organs, it is important to recognise the important role which civil-society representatives can play.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING SMALL ARMS WITHIN GERMAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

in this respect. In concrete terms, initiatives in the following areas are both possible and desirable:

- promotion of education and awareness-raising measures on the risks and disadvantages associated with weapons ownership and misuse. In many cases these can be integrated into other projects which target education and the dissemination of information.

- promotion of civil-society institutions working in the field of non-violent conflict management (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (1999, pp.2-3).

Combating cultures of violence is not an activity which requires only experts. Development-aid workers are also needed. Although their specific areas of competence lie elsewhere, they can be provided with the skills needed to combat cultures of violence – a fact which should be more closely considered during the training and preparation of development-aid workers. Cooperation with the Civil Peace Service (ZFD, Ziviler Friedensdienst) would appear expedient in this regard. ZFD, whose main focus is on combating cultures of violence and promoting non-violent conflict management methods, is being established by the German Development Service (DED, Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst) in cooperation with other organisations. Representatives from non-governmental organisations and civic action groups can also be similarly integrated. A number of people in developing countries would be prepared and are capable of acting as multipliers in an effective campaign to combat weapons ownership and misuse. As they do not share the male fascination for firearms, women are often able to convince their sons, husbands and friends of the dangers of weapons use.

If Development Cooperation is able to prevent the emergence of cultures of violence in areas where Kalashnikovs are not yet part of everyday life, it can effectively counter the outbreak of civil wars.
3.4 Arms trading, ownership and manufacture: reduction and transparency measures

The regulation and control of arms manufacture and export does not constitute one of the main tasks of Technical Cooperation. Nevertheless, it can provide inputs by:

- assisting partner countries to develop the government services and legislation necessary for effective control of the arms sector, in cooperation with authorities which have the relevant professional competence;

- supporting developing countries in their efforts to combat corruption, nepotism, and similar deficiencies in regulatory authorities;

- undertaking efforts to halt international business activities through which wars are funded;\(^6\)

- supporting developing-country initiatives which, firstly, combat the proliferation, manufacture and misuse of arms in their region through moratoriums and similar measures and, secondly, enhance the transparency of these activities.

In addition to providing support to government actors, Technical Cooperation measures can enhance the capacities of non-governmental organisations through consultancy services and the mobilisation of resources. In the Horn of Africa, GTZ and BICC are currently implementing a project which assists non-governmental organisations to analyse and combat the spread and misuse of small arms. This is, in effect, civil-society capacity-building. Projects of this nature are feasible especially in areas where local groups have already taken the initiative.

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\(^6\) These include the trade in diamonds, oil, illicit drugs and other commodities. Economic sanctions may offer an appropriate means of control.
3.5 Promoting the collection, safe storage and disposal of small arms

The comparative advantages which Technical Cooperation enjoys in this area should be exploited. In terms of management, logistics and financial administration, the organisation and administration of projects which tackle the storage, collection and disposal of small weapons have much in common with other technical development projects. Although the GTZ does not have the required technical competence in terms of weapons, this kind of know-how can be obtained from external consultants. German authorities, companies and scientific institutes can provide assistance here. From the Development Cooperation side, it is generally considered desirable to involve local experts. However, the nature of weapons collection and disposal dictates that these activities generally take place in a tense, politically-charged atmosphere - and civil servants often serve interests other than those of their employer. The reliability of local actors is, therefore, difficult to assess in advance.

The following are concrete examples of where GTZ engagement, in the form of consultancy services and resource mobilisation, is feasible:

- supporting local partners to store safely and monitor small arms and ammunition;
- providing assistance to campaigns for the voluntary surrender and collection of small arms;
- promoting measures for the environmentally-sound destruction of small arms and ammunition which are also effective in terms of their political/psychological impact.

The costs of such measures vary greatly. Destroying rifles and pistols is relatively inexpensive. Disposing of explosives is a job for specialists, but not especially problematic. In contrast, locating and removing landmines is time-consuming and dangerous. In political terms, weapons disposal can take on a high symbolic value, and this can be exploited in the interests of peace-building. The most difficult task is to persuade people to voluntarily surrender the weapons they own. The results are largely dependent on the timing, organisation, symbolism and the nature of the incentives involved.

This Weapons-in-Exchange-for-Development model, based on the experience of the UNDP in Mali and other countries, should be tried out in other parts of the world. UNDP has already established a fund for this purpose, but, to date, little support has been forthcoming from the rich nations.
4. Summary of recommendations

**Security-sector reform:** In addition to supporting initiatives aimed at reforming the military, the police and other armed government units, Technical Cooperation should support legal, penal and constitutional reform. The objective is to enhance transparency, respect for human rights, and the civil control of these organs. This will serve to underpin public safety, strengthen the state monopoly of force and reduce the demand for small arms.

**Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants:** In projects targeting the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, safeguards should be included in the project planning to ensure that disarmament measures are carried out before demobilisation commences. Health care, training, income-generation measures as well as psychological support for traumatised combatants, in particular child soldiers, should be part of an overall strategy to reduce the demand for small arms.

**Combating ‘cultures of violence’ and promoting non-violent conflict resolution:** Education and awareness-raising measures which address the risks and disadvantages of weapons ownership and misuse should be promoted within the framework of existing (adult) education projects. In addition to capacity-building for government institutions, a further recommendation is to promote civil-society resources, taking advantage of the special role which women can play. Through awareness-raising measures, development-aid workers from other fields should learn about cultures of violence. Attention should also focus on traditional non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms, and modern mechanisms and rule-of-law institutions should be strengthened.

**Weapons collection and destruction:** In projects which target weapons collection, storage and/or destruction, it is recommended that especially local partners receive support. Experience gained through Weapons-in-Exchange-for-Development projects should be systematically recorded and applied in other projects. Contacts to private-sector actors through public-private partnerships (PPP) can be expedient in terms of gaining technical expertise.
5. Bibliography


Annex I
Measures and initiatives for combating the uncontrolled spread of small arms (selection)\(^7\)

**International Initiatives**


- **Group of Interested States:** Basis: UN Res. 51/45N 1996, tabled by Germany; GIS has been under German chairmanship since it was founded in 1998; Objective: to support projects in cooperation with affected states; various workshops have been conducted; for further information see: [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981218.dc2623.html](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981218.dc2623.html).

- **UN Committee and Group of Governmental Experts:** two reports with valuable information for research into small arms: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/rep54258e.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/rep54258e.pdf).


- **IANSA:** International Action Network on Small Arms, [http://www.iansa.org](http://www.iansa.org).


**Africa**


- **OAU:** Resolution of the General Assembly on the illicit spread, circulation and trade in small arms and light weapons, July 1999, emphasising that the OAU should undertake a coordination function in combating the spread of small arms on the African continent; for further information see [http://www.oau-oua.org](http://www.oau-oua.org).

- **Meeting of OAU ministers in Bamako, Mali from 30 November to 1 December 2000; Adoption of Bamako Declaration.**

- **Meeting of African experts on small arms in Addis Ababa, May 2000; International consultation on the illicit spread and circulation as well as the illegal trafficking in small arms and light weapons, Addis Ababa, June 2000.**

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\(^7\) For a summary of the most important documents cf. Clegg et al. 2000, Annex (p. 27ff.).

• Draft for a Regional Action Programme to combat the spread of small arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region (cf. SADC action programme).

• Nairobi Declaration on the problem of the spread of illicit small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and in the Horn of Africa, adopted in Nairobi by the foreign ministers of ten states, 15 March 2000; http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/BUILD%20PEACE/NairobiDeclar00.html.

Asia

• Regional seminar on illicit arms trafficking, organised by the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, the governments of Japan and Indonesia.

The Americas


• MERCOSUR: Support for the OAS Convention, inter alia through the creation of a joint registration mechanism for firearms, ammunition, explosives and related materials; further information at http://www.mercosur.org; http://www.mercosur-comisec.gub.uy.


Europe


• EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 8 June 1998; further information at http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/eucode.htm.


• Workshop on arsenal management and security of small arms and light weapons, Thun, Switzerland, March 2000.


Annex II
Recommendations for combating the problem of small arms in developing countries

1. Improve Public Security

1.1 General

- As a rule, combine national policies and international programmes to build and reform the security sector with initiatives for the promotion of good governance and sustainable development.
- Provide technical and financial assistance for security sector development, growth and reform in developing countries.
- Encourage professionalism of armed services and the strict separation of tasks (military tasks: defence in the face of external threats; police tasks: internal enforcement of law and order).

1.2 Policy and capacity development

- Strengthen relevant governmental and non-governmental civil institutions to manage and oversee the security sector efficiently and legitimately by providing technical and financial aid for capacity-building at:
  - Ministries of defence, justice or internal or domestic affairs;
  - Independent ombudsmen’s offices;
  - Civilian review boards;
  - Penal institutions;
  - Legislatures;
  - Budget office, audit units and finance ministries;
  - Civil society bodies such as NGO’s and community based organisations;
  - Professional associations, trade unions;
  - Journalists;
  - Political parties;
  - Research and advocacy institutes and universities.

This can be pursued in the following ways, including:
- Training civilian officials and NGO’s in security studies, defence budgeting, planning, management and equipment procurement, conflict management and related subjects.
- Offer training for journalists on accurate and ethical political reporting.
- International training missions and exchanges, university courses, seminars etc., both in the donor country and in the recipient country.
  - Where feasible, do this for regions rather than for single countries;

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8 This overview is an edited version of the list produced by BICC in September 1999 on behalf of the European Commission. Measures to curb and control arms exports to developing countries are not included here. For effectively combating the problem of small arms these are, however, equally indispensable.

9 See Wulf, 2000.

10 This includes transparency, rule of law and respect for human rights.
- Stimulate the capacity of government agencies to disseminate information on the security sector both within the government and to the public;
- Generally, wherever possible, foster a climate in which civil society can actively and critically monitor the security sector and engage the government in an exchange of views on military and security policy.
- In weak or collapsed states, investigate how the use of weapons by armed units can be regulated in the framework of traditional cultures and structures. Consider promoting such regulation on the condition that minimum standards of respect for human rights are maintained.
- Promote the tight regulation of the rights and obligations of private security forces
  - Discourage the recruitment and use of private militias;
  - Seek a total ban on the recruitment and use of foreign mercenaries.

1.3 Accountability and transparency

- Strongly promote the full accountability and civil control of all military and law enforcement agencies.
- Promote democratic control - the security sector should take its orders from a civil government authority that answers to parliament.
- Encourage the establishment of civilian review boards.
- Help train civilian government officials to monitor the security forces.
- Encourage parliamentarians to oversee military and law enforcement agencies.
  - Promote international exchanges and study visits;
  - Support the development of laws and procedures that enable parliaments to perform this task better;
  - Support debate and education on the supervisory role of parliament.
- Ensure that this accountability extends to the use of all resources entrusted to them, e.g.
  - strongly promote transparency on expenditure for military and law enforcement purposes;
  - ensure that they answer to independent courts for criminal offences under national and international law and infringements on the rights of citizens;
  - ensure that they will face serious penalties if found guilty of grave misconduct, especially violations of human rights.
- Provide technical and financial assistance to other states where needed and appropriate, to promote transparency and accountability in the security sector. This can comprise:
  - special missions of security, justice, political and development officials at all levels;
  - assistance in defining the separate areas of responsibility of the military and the police;
  - staging conferences on transparency and accountability in the security sector.
- To promote transparency and accountability,
  - discourage all political activities by military and law enforcement agencies and their members on active duty;
  - discourage commercial activities undertaken by the military and other security agencies because such “military business” leads to conflicts of interest and a lack of accountability;
  - promote the regular and independent monitoring and evaluation of efforts and initiatives like those described here with a view to terminating programmes that are not effective and to further developing and funding programmes that are bearing fruit.
1.4 Community relations

Promote trust and confidence between the security sector and the civilian population by
- improving public security (see section 1.7).
- taking local culture into account when organising and training the security sector.
- ensuring a balanced composition of the security sector (ethnicity, age, gender, etc.).
- emphasising human security as the mission of the security sector (see section 1.1).
- training the security sector in community relations and human rights (see section 1.5).
- stimulating public debate on the role of military and police in society, e.g. by encouraging
  the staging of regional conference on such topics.
- stimulating and empowering civilian institutions to monitor the security sector e.g. by
  - organising international exchanges, secondments and study visits;
  - supporting law schools and other organisations to develop training programmes for
    trainers who are to build the capacity of civil society to monitor the security sector.

1.5 Training

Provide material and organisational support for training measures for military and law enforce-
ment officials, either at home or abroad, with following objectives:
- Enhance professional skills and attitudes.
- to instil in them a rule of law and the rights and liberties of citizens under national and
  international law.
- Support programmes to "train the trainers" in this field.

The following points must be borne in mind:
- Provide training exercises based on real situations.
- Operational mandates, equipment and training must be harmonised.
- In weak or collapsed states, seek possibilities to promote the respect for human rights
  among the armed units led by warlords and tribal chiefs. In general, provision of develop-
  ment aid should be contingent upon respect for human rights.

1.6 Specifics on military reform

- Improve professionalism and effectiveness.
- Promote exchanges and secondments between armed forces.
- Provide sustained advice through medium to long-term advisers, mentors and/or monitors.
- Support national and regional military academies, e.g. through:
  - organisation of training measures to establish a code of conduct for dealing with ci-
    vilians;
  - develop courses which address the role of the military in society and the significance
    of civil rights;
  - develop curricula and train-the-trainer measures.
- At home and abroad, critically review military forces and consider promoting changes
  that would:
  - Direct their missions toward external security and away from police duties;
  - Accordingly adjust their size and budget;
  - Accordingly review their internal organisation;
Accordingly modify their composition in terms of age, skills, ethnicity;
Accordingly modernise their recruitment and training;
Accordingly ensure that they obtain the resources and equipment they need.

1.7 Specifics on police reform

- Improve **professionalism** and effectiveness (see section 1.5).
- Promote **exchanges** and secondments between police forces of different countries.
- Long-term secondment of advisors and facilitators.
- Support national and regional **police academies** teaching concerning particularly:
  - police codes of conduct based on international standards;
  - knowledge of the law;
  - criminal investigation;
  - community relations;
  - community-based policing;
  - techniques for combating drugs, fraud and corruption;
  - develop training teams and curricula for trainers.
- Strengthen the capacity of police forces to implement change and conduct strategic **planning**.
- Promote the effective monitoring of police forces and assist the development of capacities to this end.
- Promote adequate remuneration of police and customs within the framework of programmes to combat corruption Consider directly subsidising law enforcement developing countries.
- Stimulate the development of law enforcement policies and strategies to combat drugs, fraud and corruption.

1.8 Specifics on judicial and prison reform

- Support conferences on judicial reform.
- Support the strengthening of the role and power of judges; specifically, establish control of the prisons by the judiciary (not the police or the military).
- Support the development of independent systems for judicial appointment.
- Support debate on the constitutional rote and competence of the judiciary.
- Support the provision of EDP systems for courts, to facilitate
  - case tracking;
  - record keeping;
  - budget management and;
  - personnel management.
- Train judges, prosecutors, lawyers and other judiciary officials (see section 1.5):
  - Provide technical and financial assistance;
  - Enhance professionalism and independence;
  - Improve the protection of the human rights of offenders;
  - Help to develop training materials.
- Support independent legal institutions, such as:
  - documentation centres for judges, prosecutors and legal professionals;
  - law libraries and bar associations;
  - legal counselling groups;
  - NGO's training “paralegals” as a simple first-tier judiciary.
- Support the development and implementation for special programmes to deal with juvenile delinquency.
• Support the development and implementation of special programmes and guidelines to deal with gun law offenders, paying special attention to
  - male adolescents;
  - ex-combatants;
  - social rehabilitation;
  - vocational training;
  - detection and disposal of illegal firearms.
• Support establishment of administrative and judicial control mechanisms for prison services.
• Support prison reform by:
  - establishing prison regulations in conformity with international reforms;
  - reviewing recruitment, training and promotion of prison personnel (see section 1.5);
  - rehabilitation of prison infrastructure.
• Promote adequate remuneration of judiciary and prison officials within the framework of programmes to combat corruption; consider directly subsidising the remuneration of judiciary and prison officials in certain critical situations in developing countries.

2. Address Fighters and Victims

2.1 Prevent the recruitment of child-soldiers and combatants

• Encourage all states to sign, ratify and implement the UN Convention banning mercenaries.
• Promote the adoption of the optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, raising the minimum age for recruitment and participation of children in hostilities to 18.
• Promote the subsequent ratification and implementation of this in national law (i.e., make it a criminal offence to recruit or abduct children under 18 for active combat roles).
• Support regional judicial measures protecting the rights of the child, e.g. the African Charter on the Rights of the Child.
• Support the training of personnel involved in peace missions in the protection, rights and welfare of children, especially girls.
• Build up international pressure on armed groups that abuse children, e.g. by making clear that recognition of rebel groups as governments will be harder if they recruited child soldiers.

2.2 Demobilise and reintegrate fighters

• Support programmes to demobilise and reintegrate soldiers and other combatants and their dependants.
• Verify that the participation of all parties concerned, including local communities, is assured.
• Verify that local conditions and culture are taken into account.
• Ensure that this is included in peace accords and that control mechanisms are established.
• Provide food, clothing, housing and other basic needs for ex-combatants.
• Support specific measures for retired “political” officers.
• Provide resources to establish and maintain demobilisation centres.
• Combine demobilisation programmes with programmes to promote social development and economic opportunities for the ex-combatants and their dependants and for the community at large through:
  - Promoting surveys on skills and needs to determine an appropriate approach;
  - Supporting vocational training schemes and provide formal schooling;
  - Establishing courses on how to start a business;
  - Providing micro-credits for female-headed households;
  - Promoting salary-support schemes for ex-combatants.
2.3 Rehabilitate victims

- Promote the provision of special care for the victims of armed conflict.
- Include the ex-combatants themselves, especially child soldiers.
- Give special consideration to women, disabled people and children.
- Provide culturally appropriate psychosocial trauma counselling and other kinds of counselling to victims, especially former child soldiers.
- Provide therapy and care for child soldiers and their families and communities to facilitate their return.
- Enable all victims to fully participate in post-war recovery programmes.
- Provide both immediate relief and long-term medical care.

3. Reverse Cultures of Violence (see section 4)

- Discourage the glorification of violence and the trivialisation of its impact in the media and in popular culture by:
  - Discouraging the advertising and distribution of combat toys and violent games;
  - Banning all advertisements of small arms, ammunition and related equipment except in limited-distribution professional military and police journal;
  - Encouraging the media to discuss and portray cultures of peace;
  - Encouraging the media to discuss and analyse causes of violence and war.
- Commission research and debate on causes and patterns of violent behaviour among men, especially male adolescents, investigating their social conditioning toward such behaviour and male patterns of conflict resolution. Seek ways to counter men’s inclinations to violence.
- Investigate the role women can play in discouraging men’s interest in guns and their inclination toward violence.
- Support public education and awareness programmes on the dangers and disadvantages of firearms and armed violence, in particular by:
  - Working at the local, regional and national level;
  - Closely involving local groups and using their expertise for instance, publicising information on numbers and stories of the victims of armed violence;
  - Developing special campaigns for specific audiences;
  - Developing school curricula;
  - Developing campaign materials;
  - Engaging popular personalities;
  - Effectively using mass media;
  - Paying special attention to the problem of child soldiers;
  - Highlighting the cost of the undesirable use of firearms;
  - Highlighting the risks of wanting guns for self-protection;
  - Stigmatising certain categories of weapons e.g.
    - weapons that are particularly destructive like semi-automatic rifles,
    - arms prone to kill unintentionally, like hand-grenades,
4. **Promote Non-violent Conflict Resolution (see section 3)**

- Seek to encourage the reassertion of skills and values conducive to non-violent conflict resolution and the limitation of violence by
  - involving extended families, elders, teachers, the clergy, traditional leaders and other figures of influence capable of reinforcing such values;
  - paying special attention to values and taboos protecting non-combatants during violent conflict;
  - developing educational programmes to promote such values;
  - promoting and supporting conflict resolution skills training.

- Promote education and awareness programmes for peaceful conflict resolution by
  - encouraging and enabling victims of violent conflict to be involved;
  - stimulating local capacities and actions in favour of peace;
  - supporting peace and reconciliation media programmes.

- Promote social cohesion, reconciliation and trust between communities by
  - promoting women’s participation in post-conflict society;
  - supporting mediation training for local NGO’s;
  - supporting mediation training for community elders;
  - supporting Human Rights campaigns for affected groups;
  - supporting civil society groups and identify stake-holders of peace, e.g. appropriate sectors of industry such as tourism which stand to benefit from effective gun control and reduction of violence.

- Help developing states build institutions for managing change and resolving conflict, maintaining law and order and resolving conflict without resorting to violence or oppression (see section 1.1)
  - Build on and support community-based administrative and conflict settlement structures;
  - Establish a Human Rights Ombudsman;
  - Support conciliation, mediation and arbitration programmes for traditional institutions, neighbourhood panels or “juges de la paix”;
  - Support establishment of regional dispute resolution mechanisms;
  - Promote regional conflict prevention measures, including early warning and early action on potential conflicts.

- Promote the establishment and operation of war crimes tribunals and truth-finding and reconciliation commissions.

5. **Limit the international trade in small arms**

Development-policy recommendations include:

- Support the UNDP Trust Fund for the Reduction of Small Arms Proliferation.
- Establish a EU Fund to support initiatives to combat the problem of small arms in developing countries.
- Assist developing countries to formulate laws, establish services, create instruments and train personnel for the effective control of the trade in and transport of small arms (see section 1.2 and 1.5).
- Provide assistance to developing countries in the fight against corruption in such authorities.
- Support programmes to combat illegal business activities (e.g. drug trafficking, trade in protected animals and plants, smuggling diamonds and oil), which are linked to weapons trafficking and violence.
- Limit opportunities for funds and services which were set up to promote economic and social development being used to procure arms.
6. **Enhance transparency in small arms**

Development-policy recommendations include:
- Support initiatives to establish and maintain regional registers on the ownership, stockpiles, production, transfer and use of small arms and their ammunition in developing countries.
- Support initiatives to strengthen democratic control of government policy in the area of small arms.

7. **Promote safe storage, collection and disposal of small arms**

Development-policy recommendations include:
- Support measures and initiatives for the safe storage of small arms and their ammunition.
- Support measures and initiatives to collect surplus and undesirable stocks of small arms.
- Support measures and initiatives for the environmentally sound destruction of surplus small arms, and which have media impact.
- Urge organisations with international development-policy operations to promote the collection and disposal of small arms in developing countries.

8. **Improve domestic gun control: use, ownership, purchase and sale**

Development-policy recommendations include:
- Assist governments and parliaments in developing countries to create the legislation and authorities necessary for effective control of the use, ownership and purchase of small arms.
- Provide assistance to civil society in developing countries to raise awareness in the population of the dangers of small arms and violent action.
Annex III
Joint Action of 17 December 1998

- adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (1999/34/CFSP)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article J.3 thereof,

Having regard to the general guidelines of the European Council held on 26 and 27 June 1992, which identified the areas falling within the security sphere which could, as from the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, be the subject of joint actions,

Whereas the excessive and uncontrolled accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (hereafter referred to as ‘small arms’)\(^1\) has become a problem of great concern to the international community and this phenomenon poses a threat to peace and security and reduces the prospects for sustainable development in many regions of the world;

Whereas the European Union welcomes the adoption and declaration of a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in Ecowas Member States by the Authority of Heads of State or Government of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) at its 21st session;

Whereas the UN Security Council adopted unanimously on 19 November 1998 Resolution 1209 (1998) on the situation in Africa, illicit arms flows to and in Africa;

Whereas the UN General Assembly addressed, in particular in Resolutions 52/38J on Small arms and 52/38G on consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, the problems caused by the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms;

Whereas the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms has been re-established by the Secretary-General in accordance with Resolution 52/38J, to continue the work already accomplished under the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms;

Whereas the UN Economic and Social Council recommended that States work towards the elaboration of an international instrument to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition within the context of a United Nations convention against transnational organised crime;

Whereas the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) is actively pursuing its efforts in the fight against the criminal use of firearms;

Whereas in the spirit of the ‘Brussels call for action’ and in the interest of upholding State responsibility to protect citizen security within a framework of good governance and integrated approach to security and

\(^1\) See Annex.


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sustainable development it is required to take comprehensive measures for the elimination of uncontrolled circulation of small arms;

Whereas the present initiative builds on, and is complementary to already existing EU initiatives, in particular the EU programme for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms adopted by the Council on 26 June 1997 and the EU code of conduct on arms exports adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998;

Whereas the European Community has supported actions of demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and of weapons collection in the context of its humanitarian aid, reconstruction and Development Cooperation policy,

HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

1. The objectives of this Joint Action are:

   - to combat and contribute to ending the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms,
   - to contribute to the reduction of existing accumulations of these weapons to levels consistent with countries’ legitimate security needs, and
   - to help solve the problems caused by such accumulations.

2. This Joint Action entails the following elements:

   - building consensus on the principles and measures referred to in Title I,
   - making a multifaceted contribution as referred to in Title II.

TITLE I

Principles on preventive and reactive aspects

Article 2

The European Union shall enhance efforts to build consensus in the relevant regional and international forums (e.g. the UN and OSCE) and among affected States on the principles and measures set out in Article 2 and on those set out in Articles 3 and 4 as the basis for regional and incremental approaches to the problem and, where appropriate, global international instruments on small arms.

Article 3

In pursuing the objectives set out in Article 1, the European Union shall aim at building consensus in the relevant international forums, and in a regional context as appropriate, for the realisation of the following principles and measures to prevent the further destabilising accumulation of small arms:

(a) a commitment by all countries to import and hold small arms only for their legitimate security needs, to a level commensurate with their legitimate self-defence and security requirements, including their ability to participate in UN peacekeeping operations;
(b) a commitment by exporting countries to supply small arms only to governments (either directly or through duly licensed entities authorised to procure weapons on their behalf) in accordance with appropriate international and regional restrictive arms export criteria, as provided in particular in the EU code of conduct, including officially authorised end-use certificates or, when appropriate, other relevant information on end-use;

(c) a commitment by all countries to produce small arms only for holdings as outlined in (a) above or exports as outlined in (b) above;

(d) in order to ensure control, the establishment and maintenance of national inventories of legally-held weapons owned by the country’s authorities and the establishment of restrictive national weapons legislation for small arms including penal sanctions and effective administrative control;

(e) the establishment of confidence building measures, including measures to promote increased transparency and openness, through regional registers on small arms and regular exchanges of available information, on exports, imports, production and holdings of small arms, and on national weapons legislation, and through consultations between the relevant parties on the information exchanged;

(f) the commitment to combat illicit trafficking of small arms through the implementation of effective national controls, such as efficient border and customs mechanisms, regional and international cooperation and enhanced information exchange;

(g) the commitment to challenge and reverse 'cultures of violence', by enhancing public involvement through public education and awareness programmes.

Article 4

In pursuing the objectives set out in Article 1, the efforts of the European Union shall aim at building consensus in the relevant international forums, and in a regional context as appropriate, for the realisation of the following principles and measures to reduce existing accumulations of small arms:

(a) the assistance as appropriate to countries requesting support for controlling or eliminating surplus small arms on their territory, in particular where this may help to prevent armed conflict or in post-conflict situations;

(b) the promotion of confidence-building measures and incentives to encourage the voluntary surrender of surplus or illegally-held small arms, the demobilisation of combatants and their subsequent rehabilitation and reintegration, such measures to include compliance with peace and arms control agreements under combined or third-party supervision, respect of human rights and humanitarian law, the protection of the rule of law, in particular as regards the personal safety of former combatants and small arms amnesties, as well as community-based development project and other economic and social incentives;

(c) the effective removal of surplus small arms encompassing safe storage as well as quick and effective destruction of these weapons, preferably under international supervision;

(d) the rendering of assistance through appropriate international organisations, programmes and agencies as well as regional arrangements.
Article 5

The Member States will promote, where appropriate, in the context of resolving armed conflicts,
(a) the inclusion of provisions with regard to demobilisation, elimination of surplus weapons and integration of ex-combatants into peace agreements between the parties to the conflict, into mandates of peace-support operations or other relevant missions in support of the peaceful settlement,
(b) the consideration of the possibility of making necessary provision for measures ensuring the removal of small arms in the context of demobilisation by the UN Security Council in case the country or parties concerned are not in a position to comply with the relevant obligations.

TITLE II

Contribution by the European Union to specific actions

Article 6

1. The Union will provide financial and technical assistance to programmes and projects which make a direct and identifiable contribution to the principles and measures referred to in Title I, including relevant programmes or projects conducted by the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, other international organisations and regional arrangements and NGO’s. Such projects might include, inter alia, weapons collection, security sector reform and demobilisation and reintegration programmes as well as specific victim assistance programmes.

2. In providing such assistance, the EU shall take into account in particular the recipient's commitments to comply with the principles mentioned in Article 3; their respect of human rights; their compliance with international humanitarian law and the protection of the rule of law; and their compliance with their international commitments, in particular with regard to existing peace treaties and international arms control agreements.

Article 7

1. The Council shall decide on:
   - the allocation of the financial and technical contribution referred to in Article 6,
   - the priorities for the use of those funds,
   - the conditions for implementing specific actions of the Union, including the possibility of designating, in certain instances, a person responsible for its implementation.

2. The Council shall decide on the principle, arrangements and financing of such projects on the basis of concrete and properly-costed project proposals and on a case-by-case basis, without prejudice to Member States’ bilateral contributions and operation of the European Community.

3. The Presidency shall, under the conditions set out in Article J.5(3) of the Treaty:
   - ensure liaison with the United Nations and any other relevant organisation involved,
   - establish, with regional arrangements and third countries, the contacts needed to implement the Union’s specific actions.

It shall keep the Council informed.
Article 8

The Council notes that the Commission intends to direct its action towards achieving the objectives and the priorities of this Joint Action, where appropriate by pertinent Community measures.

Article 9

1. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the consistency of the Union’s activities in the field of small arms, in particular with regard to its development policies. For this purpose, Member States and the Commission shall submit any relevant information to the relevant Council bodies. The Council and the Commission shall ensure implementation of their respective action, each in accordance with its powers.

2. Member States shall equally seek to increase the effectiveness of their national actions in the field of small arms. As far as possible, actions taken pursuant to Article 6 shall be coordinated with those of Member States and of the European Community.

Article 10

The Council will review annually the actions taken in the framework of this Joint Action.

Article 11

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Article 12

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal.


For the Council

The President

W. MOLTERER

ANNEX

The Joint Action shall apply to the following categories of weapons, while not prejudging any future internationally agreed definition of small arms and light weapons. These categories may be subject to further clarification, and may be reviewed in the light of any such future internationally agreed definition.

(a) Small arms and accessories specially designed for military use

- machine-guns (including heavy machine-guns),

- submachine-guns, including machine pistols,

- fully automatic rifles,

- semi-automatic rifles, if developed and/or introduced as a model for an armed force,
- moderators (silencers).

(b) Man or crew-portable light weapons

- cannon (including automatic cannon), howitzers and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre,
- grenade launchers,
- anti-tank weapons, recoilless guns (shoulder-fired rockets),
- anti-tank missiles and launchers,
- anti-aircraft missiles/man-portable air defence systems (Manpads).

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Annex IV - Resolution of the EU Development Council, 21 May 1999

CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

- SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS - RESOLUTION

1. The excessive and uncontrolled accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (hereafter referred to as "small arms") has become a problem of global proportions. Particularly in crisis zones and countries where the security situation is unstable, the excessive supply of small arms and a lack of controls has fuelled internal or interstate conflict and has been an obstacle to peaceful economic and social development. Moreover, the ready availability of cheap small arms facilitates the exploitation of children as soldiers.

2. Illicit trafficking in small arms has also been identified as a serious problem, contributing to the increase in banditry, smuggling and similar criminal activities.

3. Recalling the Joint Action of 17 December 1998 on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons, the Council confirms its sustained interest in fulfilling the commitments contained therein in order to ensure coherence of EU activities in the field of small arms. At the same time, the Council draws attention to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 8 June 1998 and the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms of 26 June 1997. Finally, the Council recalls the Conclusions on the Role of Development Cooperation in Strengthening Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution of 30 November 1998, as well as the Resolution on Coherence of 5 June 1997.

The Council recalls the "Brussels Call for Action", proposing amongst others an International Program of Action for Practical Disarmament and Peace-building; and the "Oslo Platform" addressing the humanitarian, developmental and security concerns provoked by small arms.

The Council equally recalls initiatives within the UN, in particular UN General Assembly Resolution 53/L 31 on consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, the problems caused by the destabilising accumulation and spread of arms as well as UN General Assembly Resolution 53/E 77 on small arms and light weapons.

4. The European Union aims at combating the excessive and uncontrolled accumulation and spread of small arms. An integrated and comprehensive approach is required by the international community which adequately addresses the complexity of the small arms problem and its political, economic and social causes and takes account of the aspect of security as a prerequisite for development. In particular, a contribution must be made to ensuring that existing stockpiles are reduced to a level consistent with the country's legitimate security needs.

5. The Council recommends that in the field of Development Cooperation, the Community and the Member States devote particular attention to the following measures:

• inclusion of the small arms issue in the political dialogue with ACP and other Development Cooperation partner countries of EU;
• Development Cooperation support for countries seeking assistance in the control or elimination of surplus small arms, as well as other incentives to encourage the voluntary surrender of small arms and their destruction;

• the combating of illicit trafficking of small arms through the promotion of appropriate measures, including regional and international cooperation and independent monitoring;

• the effective demobilisation of combatants and their subsequent rehabilitation and reintegration into civil life; this is an area in which development policy can make a great and important contribution;

• the challenging and reversing of "cultures of violence" by means of public education and awareness programmes, taking into account the important role of local communities;

• considering support, where necessary, to strengthen appropriate government institutions and legislation to better control small arms.

The first interventions could be focused on Southern Africa (SADC) and on West Africa (ECOWAS), where significant progress has been made and frameworks for combating small arms proliferation have been developed and agreed. EU, Community and bilateral Member State interventions should build upon the ideas and programmes existing in these regions and be extended to other regions, where similar initiatives have been taken.

6 In providing assistance to measures recommended in paragraph 5, the EU shall take into particular account the recipient’s commitments to comply with the principles mentioned in article 3 of the Joint Action of 17 December 1998; their respect of human rights; their compliance with international humanitarian law and the protection of the rule of law.

The Council believes that it is an important prerequisite that recipient countries are also committed to establishing social and political stability and, in time, making their own contribution to relevant initiatives.

7. In order to ensure a coordinated and complementary approach, the Council recalls the following guidelines mentioned in the Joint Action of 17 December 1998:

• At global level: consultation with relevant UN agencies and bodies, in particular UNDP, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, which coordinates the small arms issues within the UN, and the Secretariat’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, relevant international institutions and, where applicable, the International Financial Institutions.

• At regional level: consultation and close cooperation with regional organisations involved in the small arms issue.

• At national level: coordinating within the recipient country between the Commission delegation, the missions of the Member States and of other donors and actors, the authorities of the host country and all relevant bodies, taking into account the mandates of the international organisations concerned, in particular the UN.

• At Community level: ensuring coherence of EU activities in the field of small arms, particularly with respect to the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. To this end, the Member States and the Commission will transmit all relevant information to the responsible Council bodies. The Council and the Commission will, in accordance with their mandates, take care of the implementation of their respective activities.
8. In order to assist the full implementation of this Resolution and to improve proper coordination, the Council, with reference to the Conclusions on Peace Building and Conflict Prevention, invites the Commission, together with the relevant experts of the Member States, to define the conditions and guidelines for specific Development Cooperation activities relevant to the matter.

The Council will review the progress made in implementing this Resolution on the basis of the Commission’s reporting on the issue of peace building and conflict prevention, as requested by the November 1998 Council Conclusions, which should also include the aspect of small arms, starting in the year 2000.

COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

1. The Council welcomes the Commission’s report on progress made in following the Council resolution concerning an integrated and coordinated approach to the campaign against anti-personnel landmines of November 1996.

2. The Council is firmly convinced that such an approach offers a valid framework for measures against anti-personnel landmines and should be pursued by the Commission and the Member States.

3. The Council welcomes the fact that the Commission is currently drawing up a memorandum in which the strengthening of the capacity of the EU to pursue the integrated and coordinated concept is recommended. After submission of this memorandum to the Commission the Council shall take up this question anew.
The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) facilitates the processes whereby people, skills, technology, equipment, and financial and economic resources are shifted away from the defense sector and applied to alternative civilian uses. BICC supports governmental and non-governmental initiatives as well as public and private sector organizations by finding ways to reduce costs and enhance effectiveness in the draw-down of military-related activities. As a result, BICC contributes to disarmament, demilitarization, peace-building, post-conflict rehabilitation and human development.

**International think tank**

BICC conducts research and makes policy suggestions. Experts provide comparative analyses and background studies on topics such as military expenditures and the peace dividend, management and disposal of surplus weapons, and the conversion of military research and development (R&D) infrastructures.

**Project management and consulting services**

BICC provides practical support to public and private organizations in a range of conversion projects. For instance, BICC staff advise local governments confronted with the difficult task of redeveloping former military installations. They help former defense industries cope with the transition to producing civilian goods. BICC also links development assistance and conversion by providing help with demobilization, reintegration and peace-building.

**Clearinghouse**

Using its independent status, BICC provides conversion support and information to international organizations, government agencies, non-governmental organizations, companies and the media as well as to individuals and organizations from the private and public sector. In this role, it mediates and facilitates the conversion process at all levels – local, national and global.
BICC’s six program areas:

- Reduced military expenditures – A lasting peace dividend?
- Reorientation of military R&D – A potential largely untapped
- Defense industry restructuring – Facing a changed environment
- Demobilization and reintegration – Opportunities for human development
- Base closure and redevelopment – A challenge for communities
- Surplus weapons – Dismantling the remnants of conflicts