BUILDING PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy research seminar in Cape Town on 25 and 26 February 2010 on the theme: “Building Peace in Southern Africa”.

The meeting assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding challenges by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the sub-region’s principal Regional Economic Community (REC), which constitutes 15 member states (Madagascar, included in this number, was suspended in March 2009). Adopting the approach that peace and security are essential prerequisites for development for Southern Africa’s 250 million inhabitants, and that building peace requires a holistic approach, the seminar critically assessed the broad institutional, security, and governance challenges that have confronted SADC in the two decades since it took its present form in 1992. Particular attention was paid to four priority areas that the SADC secretariat itself has identified: governance; military security; food security; and HIV/AIDS. Other topics discussed included: regional integration; the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and prospects for a free trade area in Southern Africa; the role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA); the impact of climate change; xenophobia and issues of migration; and the regional role of external actors, such as the United States (US), China, the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU).

1. SADC’s Institutional Architecture

The Southern African Development Community has been urged to strengthen its institutional architecture in order to promote effective security and accountable governance, which are the bedrocks for peace in the region. At present, few of SADC’s more than 40 protocols are being implemented effectively. Southern Africa’s regional institutions are generally weak and have failed to function efficiently. SADC’s heads of state summit meets once a year and decisions are taken on a consensual basis, representing the views of the lowest common denominator. The Botswana-based SADC secretariat, which is mainly responsible for the operation of the organisation’s agenda, lacks sufficient staff and resources in key areas such as peace and security. A more effective system must be devised to take decisions between the meetings of heads of state, while the important role being played by the Executive Secretary of SADC – currently Mozambique’s Tomáz Salomão – in relation to policy development and implementation, requires strengthening.

2. Regional Integration

Regional integration in Southern Africa has evolved over more than three decades, but market integration is still lagging. Some SADC member states – the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe – are also members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). A Southern African Free Trade Area is being implemented to promote regional
industrial development and integration within SADC, but South Africa remains dominant, accounting for more than 70 percent of the sub-regional economy. The idea of introducing a monetary union in Southern Africa has been discussed and it would, inter alia, result in a reduction in the transaction costs associated with trading goods and services between countries using different currencies. But there is much work to be done if the Southern African sub-region is to realise a common market by 2015. Peace and security throughout the sub-region will also be essential for attracting greater foreign direct investment.

3. Governance, Peace, and Security

Democratic governance is a prerequisite for peacebuilding efforts to succeed in Southern Africa. Several SADC members are seeking to establish ‘liberal democracies’, but ‘free and fair’ elections alone are insufficient to entrench democracy. A key component of democratic governance is the strengthening of public institutions for the effective delivery of social services to citizens. Public sector reform and institutional capacity-building, particularly within national civil services, are vital to achieving this goal. National parliaments should be empowered, the independence of judiciaries strengthened, and the autonomy of oversight institutions such as anti-corruption commissions, human rights bodies, auditing institutions, and ombudsmen, must be safeguarded. A SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG) is being established as part of the African Union’s (AU) Standby Force (ASF) and is supposed to be deployable by 2010. Training for the brigade is being organised by SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), and through its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation. However, many details about the effective functioning of SADC BRIG still remain unclear, and the effective operationalisation of the brigade should be spelt out urgently.

4. Food Security and HIV/AIDS

Human security and traditional state security are now increasingly viewed as complementary and mutually dependent. SADC countries face a number of significant challenges in order to ensure food security in Southern Africa. For example, years of drought have crippled agricultural production in Lesotho, while riots over increases in food prices in Mozambique have led to deaths. The agriculture sector in the sub-region generally remains under-funded and underdeveloped. SADC’s strategy to tackle food insecurity includes: improving access to food through promoting employment and developing safety nets for vulnerable groups; increasing general nutrition; developing effective forecasting and early warning systems for disasters such as droughts and floods; building capacity to implement food security programmes; and taking account of gender issues in this sector. The sub-region’s natural resources such as water, fisheries, forest, and wildlife should be better utilised for the benefit of citizens. In addition, food security cannot be isolated from the land question. Land reform and land redistribution may help to eliminate poverty in countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa.
On another issue of human security, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has affected the SADC region more severely than any other sub-region in the world. Over 14 million of the 40 million people worldwide living with HIV/AIDS are in Southern Africa. Mobile populations, such as migrant workers, facilitate the spread of HIV/AIDS, which exacerbates poverty. The accelerated economic integration of Southern Africa could ironically extend the reach of the virus. Acute poverty among child-headed or elderly-headed households in Southern Africa is also increasing due to the pandemic. HIV/AIDS may lead to resource competition between civil and military institutions, adversely affecting the economy and potentially depleting the capacity of key sectors such as health and education. Weakened militaries may compromise the territorial integrity of states, as well as drain resources for care, support, and treatment of the rank and file. A number of Southern African militaries have implemented a broad range of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programmes, which could form the basis for a common SADC policy on HIV/AIDS management. A comprehensive policy to deal with communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis on a sub-regional basis is also urgently needed.

5. The Development Bank of Southern Africa

The post-apartheid South African government radically transformed the Development Bank of Southern Africa’s agenda in a bid to meet the sub-region’s infrastructural and developmental objectives. The DBSA has granted financial assistance to projects in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia. The Bank seeks to foster human and institutional capacity, broad-based economic growth and job creation, and to finance development projects and champion democratic governance across Southern Africa. The DBSA also promotes tourism, energy, telecommunications, transport, and mining. However, the institution faces financial constraints and would need a vastly increased budget – the annual financial value of DBSA interventions presently stands at $2.44 billion – to fulfil all its key objectives adequately.

6. Climate Change

Evidence has mounted of climate change negatively affecting Southern Africa, and consensus has increasingly emerged about the severity and likely impact of this phenomenon. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed in 1994, has served as a platform for talks to promote climate change and led to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol which set binding targets for rich and developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Industrialised countries are now being held to account for more than 150 years of industrial activity, which has resulted in high levels of GHG emissions and made it possible for these countries to become wealthy in the process. SADC must thus formulate coherent and effective policies on how best to respond to global climate change challenges.
already had an impact on the sub-region, negatively affecting Southern Africa’s human security and peacebuilding efforts by, for example, posing threats to agricultural production through droughts and water scarcity.

7. Migration and Xenophobia

There has been a long history of the movement of people across Southern Africa. South Africa’s mines, farms, and industry attracted hundreds of thousands of workers from neighbouring countries, becoming a major source of revenue for Mozambique, Malawi, and Lesotho. None of these workers were ever offered permanent residence in South Africa, despite contributing to building the country for decades, until amnesties in 1995-1997 granted about 124,000 foreigners South African citizenship. By 1999, an estimated 55 percent of mine-workers in South Africa were from neighbouring countries. South African farms also employed workers from Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, often on seasonal contracts. The free movement of people remains an important issue for SADC, which attempted to craft its first Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in 1995.

The issue of horrific xenophobic attacks in South Africa against citizens from neighbouring countries in May 2008, which resulted in at least 62 deaths and 100,000 displaced people, has not been resolved, as attacks against foreigners continue. While coping with migration in a rapidly globalising environment is a policy challenge facing many governments, the free movement of people and steps to counter future xenophobic violence constitute important and urgent issues for SADC to address.

8. External Actors

China has become the third largest foreign investor in Africa after Europe and the United States and the world’s second largest economy after the US. Beijing has signified its intention to play a greater role in peace and security issues on the continent, recently contributing 1,700 troops to seven UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. China’s most lucrative trade relations in Africa are with Angola and South Africa, while Beijing also has important interests in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and the DRC. China has, however, been criticised for selling arms to African governments, condoning autocratic regimes, and destroying African textile sectors through the export of cheap Chinese goods – South Africa and Lesotho have been particularly adversely affected.

The United States’ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 has boosted trade between Africa and the US: exports from AGOA-eligible countries grew over 300 percent from $21.5 billion in 2000 to $86.1 billion in 2008, and included cars from South Africa and apparel from Lesotho, though oil exports accounted for most of this growth. External actors such as the US can potentially play a critical role in supporting SADC’s development and security efforts. Realising the potential benefits of this relationship will
depend on continued stability in Southern Africa. Investing in African national armies and sub-regional organisations to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts can reduce the need for the deployment of external peacekeepers. American military goals in Africa will be pursued in future through the controversial US Africa Command (AFRICOM). While AFRICOM aims to build partnership capacity, some SADC governments and civil society activists view the new initiative as a form of American military expansionism, launched in the name of the “War on Terror” under the administration of US President George W. Bush (2001-2008). Washington has provided bilateral and multilateral security assistance to African militaries and sought to support the development of an African Standby Force, but a major focus has also been anti-terrorism activities.

The United Nations has played a critical role in relation to Southern Africa’s peacekeeping challenges in SADC countries such as Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. In recent years, the UN has had a 20,000-strong mission in the DRC. The challenges include those of: rebuilding the political, security, and socio-economic dimensions of societies emerging from conflict; addressing the root causes of conflicts and promoting social and economic justice; as well as putting in place political structures of governance and the rule of law to consolidate peace, reconciliation, and development. Concrete efforts by the world body have included: humanitarian relief; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; security sector reform; and long-term development support.

The adoption of a new strategy for Africa entitled ‘The European Union and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’ in December 2005 provided EU leaders with a comprehensive, integrated, and long-term framework for managing Europe’s relations with Africa. This approach was designed to guide interaction between the EU and pan-African institutions such as the AU and sub-regional organisations such as SADC. The plan was built on four pillars – “good governance”; peace and security; trade; and health, education and a safe environment – and sought to support Africa’s efforts to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals’ aim of halving poverty by 2015. The EU has supported SADC’s peacekeeping efforts through the €300 million Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership. However, unequal trade relations between Africa and the EU persist. Brussels continues to pay European farmers large production subsidies of €50 million annually and to apply import tariffs. The huge disparity between the EU’s economy of $8 trillion in contrast to South Africa’s $276 billion reduces the impact of the EU/South Africa Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement and hampers regional integration efforts. The agreement has caused large revenue losses to other SADC states. Non-SACU Southern African countries have argued that this accord undermines SADC’s regional agenda. Southern African countries have also adopted different responses to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) proposed by the EU because preferential treatment in earlier arrangements now run contrary to World Trade Organisation rules.
The different responses to the EPAs threaten the very survival of SACU. Common policies across the sub-region towards the EU, and more equitable trade deals with Brussels, have therefore been identified as important areas of policy concern.

Policy Recommendations

The following ten policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town policy seminar:

- First, more synergy should be created between SADC member states on its major policies, and greater emphasis placed on the adoption of a regional approach to issues of development and security. Peacebuilding in one country cannot take place in isolation. Regional considerations often have a major bearing on whether or not peace-building efforts succeed;

- Second, SADC should move urgently from rhetoric to action and speedily implement its more than 40 protocols. A properly integrated plan of action and a streamlined list of priorities are urgently needed. Key policies should be developed into coherent programmes of action and monitoring. Common SADC policies should be crafted and implemented on key matters, such as responding to HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases;

- Third, communication between political elites and ordinary citizens within Southern Africa must be urgently improved. The goals set by SADC are often not communicated beyond its leadership; the more people become part of the process, the less elite-driven regional integration becomes, and the more likely it is that the organisation's integration goals will be realised. SADC's work should thus be more widely publicised across Southern Africa;

- Fourth, a clearer division of labour is needed between the African Union and its sub-regional organisations such as SADC, which should work more closely with the AU to achieve its core functions, as enshrined in the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) of 2001, and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) that SADC launched in 2004;

- Fifth, closer collaboration must also be fostered between SADC and other African sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to benefit from diverse conflict management experiences;
• Sixth, historically, Southern Africa’s efforts to achieve effective democratic governance have been hampered by a lack of strong political parties, which can provide the backbone for strengthening governance in the sub-region. Furthermore, political parties must work more closely with civil society actors, and actively engage the media to gain their support for peacebuilding efforts in Southern Africa.

• Seventh, the establishment of the SADC Brigade will require its member states to make collective decisions concerning the procurement of military equipment. Interoperability of armies and equipment is critical in this regard. SADC’s contribution to the African Standby Force to be deployable by 2010 will also require regular pre-deployment training for the brigade to be effective;

• Eighth, the SADC secretariat should be better capacitated, in the area of peace and security, in terms of its staffing and absorption and use of funds. A clearer system is needed to take more effective decisions between the annual summits of heads of state. The role of the SADC Executive Secretary should also be strengthened to be able to develop and implement policy more effectively;

• Ninth, climate change should be a priority for action, especially as it can affect the most vulnerable members of society. Early warning systems and strategies should be established to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change. SADC also needs to develop common polices on managing natural resources such as water in order to avoid future conflicts; and

• Finally, despite Southern Africa’s regional integration efforts and support for the idea of the free movement of capital and labour, tighter controls are actually being imposed on the free movement of people across the sub-region. SADC should introduce robust policies that filter down to the national level in order to maximise the free movement of people regionally and prevent future xenophobic violence.