The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars

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Preface

As a sub-field of conflict resolution, peace implementation has been more practiced than studied. Unlike either conflict mediation or long-term peacebuilding, very little analytical reflection has been devoted to the immediate challenges of implementing peace agreements once they are concluded. Too often, those responsible for translating these accords into meaningful action have had to proceed quickly, without either an accurate map of the hazards of the war-torn terrain in which they find themselves or a reliable plan for managing challenges when they do arise. At the most elementary level, what has been missing is clear knowledge of those factors that make the difference between successful peace implementation and failure, between the assurance of peace and the resumption of war.

That such analysis is needed, and needed urgently, becomes clear in surveying the experience of the 1990s. In Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia, and twice in Angola, the failure to get warring parties to live up to their peace agreements not only restarted armed conflict, it also escalated the violence. The breakdown of the 1994 Arusha Accords in Rwanda led to a genocide of some 800,000 people: approximately fifty times more deaths than had occurred in the 1990-1993 civil war. As all of these tragedies suggest, the period immediately after the signing of a peace agreement is arguably the time of greatest uncertainty and danger. It is also the time when most peace agreements fail. Improving our knowledge of the specific challenges of peace implementation might help to improve the odds of success.

Between late 1997 and early 2000, Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the International Peace Academy (IPA) engaged over two dozen scholars to undertake a systematic study of the determinants of successful peace implementation. The project examined every peace agreement between 1980 and 1997 where international actors were prominently involved. The sixteen cases studied covered the full range of outcomes: from failure, to partial success, to success, thereby permitting a more rigorous investigation of what makes implementation work. To strengthen the policy relevance of the research, practitioners contributed to the design of the project and participated in the workshops, conferences, and policy fora in which preliminary findings were presented and discussed. It is our hope that the results of this research will help improve the design and practice of peace implementation.

With this goal in mind, I am pleased to introduce “The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars”, the second in our IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation. Written by Bruce D. Jones, this study identifies strategic coordination among third-party actors as a critical element of successful peace implementation. In surveying several recent cases of peace implementation, however, he finds that effective coordination has been achieved more often by default than by design. The ability of international actors -- the United Nations, in particular -- to meet the growing complexity of strategic coordination will, he argues, depend on their ability to develop and utilize mechanisms to overcome three recurring challenges: the incoherence between the negotiation and implementation phases of a peace process; the divergence of strategies within a given phase; and the contradictory efforts to implement a given strategy.

A fuller version of this paper will be published in a forthcoming two-volume study, entitled Ending Civil Wars, co-edited by project directors Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens. On behalf of the project directors and authors, I would like to express our deep appreciation to the Ford Foundation and the Edward E. Hills Fund for their generous support of this project.

David M. Malone
President
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Executive Summary

• “Strategic coordination” is shorthand for efforts to respond to three common challenges facing third-party implementers of peace agreements: incoherence between the mediation and the implementation phases; conflicting approaches within a given phase; and fragmented, contradictory efforts to implement a given strategy. At worst, failure to deal with these challenges can undermine a peace process; at best, they add costs, reduce effectiveness, and slow success.

• Two trends suggest that strategic coordination problems may figure more prominently in future international conflict management efforts, thereby placing a higher premium on improving the design and application of coordination mechanisms.

1) The growing proliferation of international, state, and non-governmental actors involved in various aspects of peace-making, peace implementation, and post-conflict reconstruction, which complicates assistance efforts; and

2) The possibility of a continued move from traditional, “consensual” peacekeeping operations to increasingly coercive strategies, the added risks of which prompt increased micro-management by participating states.

• The effectiveness of any effort of strategic coordination varies according to the following external conditions: the relative difficulty of the implementation environment; the degree of political and resource commitment of major and regional powers to a peace process; and the relative correspondence of interests and objectives among the major and regional powers involved.

• Evidence from past cases of peace implementation shows that specific features of the coordination mechanism employed can help to mitigate these environmental constraints. Strategic coordination of peace implementation will be easier where there is: a clearly defined lead agency; continuity of third-party actors between the negotiation and the implementation phases; and an established forum for continuous policy consultation among all major implementers.

• To date, strategic coordination has been successful where implementation has been guided by a lead state, whose authority to establish priorities and resolve disputes is recognized by other key implementing agencies. While this approach is ad hoc by definition and renders implementation vulnerable to the biases of the particular lead state, the positive experience of lead states in Bosnia and Sierra Leone suggests an important alternative to UN coordination, especially in cases where the UN’s role is weak or marginal.

• Where the UN does enjoy a central, authoritative role in peace implementation, and where UN headquarters is positioned to provide needed diplomatic support, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General can provide an important source of policy coordination and coherence, both among UN agencies and between the UN and other international actors. The ability of an SRSG, or an equivalent, to ensure strategic coordination in the implementation phase is greater where the SRSG also has been involved in the negotiation phase of a given peace agreement.

• Almost all cases of successful strategic coordination have featured Friends Groups. While the very existence of a Friends Group suggests a pre-existing, high level of international commitment itself an important condition for effective coordination, Friends Groups greatly facilitate the coordination of bilateral inputs and enhance the authority and influence of the SRSG in peace implementation.

• Ensuring operational coordination during the implementation phase, particularly in the areas of demobilization and refugee return, has proven to be an enormous challenge for third-party actors. Operational coordination under a common, coherent strategy is greatly enhanced where a forum for routine communication and coordination has been established, such as the Joint Liaison Committee, created and led by Terje Roed-Larsen in his role as Special Coordinator in the Occupied
Territories, which was effective in bringing together major donors involved in assisting the Palestinian Authority and harmonizing their efforts.

- Recently, the UN and other international actors have experimented with different models for promoting strategic coordination. Within the UN, where most of these efforts have been concentrated, two distinct models have emerged: the Strategic Frameworks Initiative and the Integrated Mission:

  - The Strategic Framework is an initiative designed to bring together all major third-party actors involved in all aspects of implementation to develop broad policy parameters to guide a common approach to peacebuilding. In particular, it aims to help identify and remedy potential conflicts between political objectives and assistance efforts. To date, Strategic Frameworks have been applied in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, but the results were problematic in both instances. These experiences have led some to conclude that the Strategic Framework is too cumbersome a mechanism to generate flexible and meaningful collaboration, and should not, in any case, be attempted in peacekeeping contexts.

  - The Integrated Mission was developed by the UN as it entered Kosovo in May 1999. It has since been adapted to East Timor and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Initially, the Integrated Mission was designed to facilitate a viable, if flexible, division of labor among the various civilian agencies tasked with various mandates of peace implementation in Kosovo (the OSCE, the EU, as well as the UN). While the Kosovo Integrated Mission has been fairly effective in resolving technical policy differences, it has been less successful in coordinating overall strategic questions. Where a large number of agencies and major powers are involved in implementation, effective operations on the ground depend on sustained communication and consultation not just among field managers, but also at the levels of institutional headquarters and member-state capitals.
Introduction

International actors face recurrent challenges of coordinating their approaches and their efforts to implement peace agreements - in short, challenges of strategic coordination. Their efforts to end civil wars suffer from an inconsistency in conflict management strategies across different phases of the peace process; those who mediate agreements sometimes fail to coordinate with those who must implement them. All too often, different actors pursue divergent strategies within a given phase of the peace process. Or, when they do agree on a strategy, their efforts to operationalize it are, at times, diffuse and contradictory. Strategic coordination is particularly vexing for peace implementation and for post-conflict peacebuilding because many more actors are engaged in implementation than in negotiation and the international policy process takes on much greater complexity.

In difficult conflict environments, such problems make peace efforts vulnerable. They create opportunities for opponents of peace to maneuver between the cracks of a diffuse implementation strategy, to manipulate implementers against one another, and, sometimes, to derail a peace process altogether. In less difficult conflict environments, such problems may not be as fatal, but they can add costs, reduce effectiveness, and slow success. In short, incoherence and inconsistency can undermine the viability or the effectiveness of implementation efforts.

Several past cases—including Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mozambique—demonstrate that the challenge of strategic coordination can be overcome by the use of coordination mechanisms such as “Friends Groups” or by major powers taking a lead role in conflict management. Two aspects of these cases, however, powerfully circumscribe their applicability elsewhere. First, in each case of effective coordination, no more than a handful of actors were directly involved in political negotiations, and even in the assistance aspects of peace implementation, the number of international and regional organizations was relatively small. Second, two necessary conditions for effective coordination were in place: a high degree of international commitment and a rough correspondence of interests of the major powers.

The experience of other, more recent, peace missions – Sierra Leone and Kosovo prominent among them – indicates that strategic coordination is a growing policy challenge for peace implementation. This is due to institutional proliferation at both the official and unofficial levels, and also to the weakened authority of the UN relative to other multilateral bodies. The political negotiation field is increasingly characterized by the same phenomenon that complicates the assistance dimension of post-conflict peacebuilding: namely, a multiplicity of actors with overlapping mandates, competitive relations, and minimal accountability for performance. Recent efforts to enhance structures for strategic coordination on the ground, both within the UN and beyond, have been frustrated by the sheer numbers of actors involved, the limited extent to which these actors accept the coordinating authority of the UN, or analogous body, and the absence of policy-coordination structures at headquarters level.
A Recurrent Policy Problem: Evidence from Past Cases

That a lack of strategic coordination is a substantial obstacle to effective conflict management can be demonstrated by reference to three of the most deadly civil wars of the 1990s: Bosnia, Rwanda, and Burundi. Each of these cases illustrates a different type of coordination problem: diffuse intervention efforts in Bosnia; conflicting strategies in Rwanda; and fragmented international responses in Burundi. Depending on the difficulty of the implementation environment, however, any one of these factors can be sufficient to fatally undermine the prospects for peace.

Bosnia: Divergent and Diffuse Efforts

Among the myriad difficulties encountered in the Bosnia mediation and implementation process, one of the more trenchant was the question of coordination among the multitude of international organizations, donors, non-governmental organizations, and others involved in various tasks leading up to or stemming from the Dayton Accords. Elizabeth Cousens highlights the problem of diffuse mediation strategies, characterized by “political mudslinging and competition” and argues that only when the United States began asserting itself in 1995 did the lack of cohesion among mediating parties and interested states abate to the point where it was possible to get coherence around the Dayton process. In this case, the lead of a powerful, interested state, and the informal coherence this provided, was a pre-condition for reaching agreement, let alone for implementation.

The relative cohesion which characterized the run-up to Dayton was short-lived. After Dayton, there were still innumerable difficulties during the implementation phase relating to both strategic and operational coordination. As Cousens describes:

Overall, the considerable political and military resources that international implementers possessed were neither productively linked to one another nor harnessed to a well-conceived, common strategy to put Bosnia’s peace on sounder footing. Instead, a segmented, almost a-strategic approach characterized at least the first eighteen months of implementation.

This was at least as true on the operational side, where there was a large variety of different coordinating or lead entities among which there were very unclear reporting lines or lines of authority.

Peace implementation in Bosnia suffered from a lack of coordination despite the fact that the Dayton Accords went relatively far both in specifying implementation tasks and allocating those tasks to particular agencies. Moreover, the Accords created an Office of the High Representative (OHR) whose function was precisely to ensure both strategic and operational coordination.

According to Cousens, neither of these mechanisms has been sufficient to the task. On the operational question of allocation of tasks, one set of tasks merged into another; therefore, a clear delineation of responsibilities did not prevent overlaps, gaps, the emergence of different strategies to implement the same program or of divergent programs to address the same strategy. This has been particularly true in the movement and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, responsibility for which within the UN system was given by the Secretary-General to UNHCR, whose lead was also recognized by the Dayton agreement. Connected to the refugee question are issues of civilian security (under the UN International Police Task Force), post-war reconstruction (the World Bank), human rights issues (multiple actors), and elections (the OSCE). The task of sorting out the connections, division of labor, and sub-coordination arrangements on refugee issues in Bosnia has been notoriously difficult. As Cousens observes, the “organizational complexity of the implementation plan” was itself a barrier to implementation.

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Most observers have argued that the OHR has not succeeded in providing strategic coordination. According to some senior UN officials involved in the Bosnia operation, the OHR never articulated a coherent strategy that the international community could get behind. Although at one stage the OHR established sub-coordination arrangements to help the High Representative manage the coordination tasks (in the areas of civilian security, policing, refugee resettlement, human rights, and economic reconstruction and development), in the absence of a common strategic vision for implementation, these mechanisms for coordination worked only at the margins.

As Susan Woodward notes, the lack of success in coordination in Bosnia is directly attributable to the fact that the major powers involved in Bosnia engaged from the perspective of differing, even contradictory, policy goals. These different goals in turn affected the strategies of the range of financial and other multilateral institutions operating in Bosnia. This lack of cohesion among major powers emerges as the principal source of overall incoherence in the international response to Bosnia. The important point here is that the multilateral institutions, including the United Nations, were not able to function as a source of coordination in the absence of prior agreement among the major powers.

Given the large international military presence that remains in Bosnia, it is difficult to say with any degree of finality what the impact of diffuse efforts in implementation has been. However, there is a widespread perception that the implementation effort has done little to create the circumstances for a self-sustaining peace. And, as Cousens makes clear, the lack of a strategy to overcome the weaknesses of Dayton means that whatever opportunities there are to build a lasting peace in Bosnia have had few chances to succeed.

Rwanda: Conflicting Strategies

Perhaps even more so than in Bosnia, the case of Rwanda is one where the absence of a coherent, coordinated strategy for dealing with opponents to the peace process emerges as a central flaw in the intervention process, with disastrous consequences. In the pre-negotiation phase, international efforts focused on pressuring the one-party regime of Juvenal Habyarimana into a multi-party system. Leverage was applied primarily through aid conditionalities, and resulted in April 1992 in an invitation by the ruling MRND to selected opposition parties to join a coalition government. The push for multi-party democracy was based in part on an analysis conducted by the French military, and shared with the US embassy, which argued that democratization was a necessary precursor to peace negotiations. This analysis proved correct, as the very first act of the coalition government was to launch political negotiations with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). As a pre-negotiation strategy, democratization was effective. However, it bore costs that would complicate the mediation phase.

The mediation phase in Rwanda centered on a sustained mediation effort facilitated by the OAU and the Tanzanian government, culminating (after five rounds of meetings over thirteen months) in a comprehensive peace agreement, the Arusha Accords. The Accords covered issues relating to the rule of law, the return and resettlement of refugees, the creation of a national army, and the establishment of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG), pending national elections. The agreement called for the BBTG to be secured by a Neutral International Force (NIF).

The most difficult elements of the negotiations related to participation in a joint national army and to the number of seats given to different actors in the BBTG.

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3 Interview, UN headquarters, 1 November 1999.
5 Bruce D. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)
6 This analysis was read to the author by Carol Fuller, former Rwanda desk officer, US Department of State. It was written by Col. Galinie, a military attaché at the French Embassy in Rwanda, in 1991.
The latter issue proved the most difficult to negotiate, and was the last on which agreement was reached. It was on this question that the pre-negotiation strategy complicated the mediation process. The challenge of striking a balance between the RPF and the regime was complicated by the presence of the opposition parties in the government's negotiating party. What emerged from the deal was essentially a three way split of seats: one-third for the ruling MRND, one-third for the RPF, and one-third for the combined opposition parties. While this formula was accepted by the Government of Rwanda negotiating team in the very final round of negotiations, it was poorly received by some members of the ruling party, and was rejected outright by the party of the spoilers, the Committee for the Defense of the Republic (CDR.)

There immediately began a process of jockeying for advantage under the three-way split. What emerged was a two-way alliance between the RPF and the opposition parties, an alliance of mutual interest in wrenching power away from the established oligarchy. The consequence of this, however, was that the ruling MRND began to see that it risked being a minority party in a BBTG dominated by the RPF-opposition alliance. Faced with this prospect, a number of members of the MRND moved towards a closer alliance with the CDR. The CDR played up the issue, and launched a full-scale campaign to recruit 'losers' from the peace process into their burgeoning genocidal movement.

At the same time, the locus of mediation efforts shifted from the OAU to the UN, after the OAU failed to get support for a proposal to establish a Neutral International Force (NIF), as provided for in the Arusha Accords. In its stead, the UN agreed to send a peacekeeping force to Rwanda, UNAMIR, to secure the establishment of the transitional government. The mission was a small, Chapter VI peacekeeping operation with a limited mandate and few financial or physical resources, conditions which reflected the minimal political backing of the major powers.

Thus, when it came to implementing the Arusha Accords, the UN and the 'friends' of the Arusha process were faced with an enormous implementation challenge: the opposition of a wide band of powerful political actors who had lost out in the negotiation process. It was a challenge that they were ill-equipped to meet. Their efforts to establish the BBTG were rivaled by spoilers' efforts to create a machinery for counter-action, including the creation and training of youth militias. Within months of the signing of the Arusha Accords, it was evident that the momentum and energy for implementing a genocide greatly exceeded the capacity available for implementing the accords.

That minimal resources would be available for implementation was arguably a foreseeable reality, given the climate surrounding peacekeeping operations at the time (especially in the aftermath of the Somalia operation). Possibly because the lead implementer (the UN) had been a minimal player in the Arusha mediation, correct judgements about the resources available for implementation were not factored into the mediation process. Equally significant, however, were the unforeseen consequences for mediation of the pre-negotiation efforts at democratization. There was, thus, a critical gap between the pre-negotiation and mediation strategies, and then between the mediation and implementation strategies.

In short, the absence of a consistent strategy for dealing with hard-line opposition fatally damaged the effectiveness of implementation efforts. The lack of strategic coordination undermined the prospects for the peace process, which ultimately fell victim to the far more effectively strategized and tightly coordinated efforts of the genocidaires. There can be no more compelling evidence of the critical importance of effective coordination.

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7 Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda.*

8 This rather complete strategic failure was of course compounded by the humanitarian response to the forced refugee outflow in Goma. In providing humanitarian assistance to the approximately 1.7 million refugees that fled Rwanda to Zaire in July and August 1994, humanitarian agencies inadvertently created a situation in which the genocidal regime had a stable population base from which to rebuild their political and military movement. This contributed to the renewal of warfare in Zaire in 1996.
Burundi: Fragmented International Presence

Since the onset of sustained civil war in 1993, Burundi has been the subject of a blizzard of international and regional peace initiatives. By late 1995, one informed practitioner estimated that there had been over 200 separate peace missions to Burundi, by official and unofficial actors. Since 1996, when Pierre Buyoya overthrew what was left of Burundi’s power-sharing government, the number of actors involved in conflict resolution in Burundi has increased.

The result has been what Fabienne Hara has called a “fragmentation of the international response.” All the efforts described above, and many more, occurred simultaneously in the context of this small country. Various UN Special Representatives and Envoys have sought to ensure that the efforts of the NGOs and others were complementary to the official negotiation process, with limited success. The only tool available to the SRSGs is to cajole donors into using their relationships with the NGOs to push their efforts in one direction or another - a difficult challenge in the face of the characteristic independence of the NGO sector. Ahmadou Old Abullah, UN Special Representative from 1993 to 1995, recalls in his memoir of this period that the process of dealing with multiple NGOs and other unofficial mediators enormously complicated his own efforts.

Hara describes the result in these terms:

The Burundians were clearly able to profit from this confusion, with agents manipulating the different negotiators in order to gain maximum legitimacy. ...In the end, it appears that every political tendency in Burundi has found a temporary ally among the international negotiators, who, in turn, have become part of the problem. ...Burundians have intensified division among the various international agents by underlining and exploiting their different agendas.

While these factors alone are not a sufficient explanation for the lack of progress in the Burundi peace process between 1993 and 1999, they have surely contributed to its overall weakness.

Burundi, Rwanda, and Bosnia provide evidence that the coordination of strategy is a substantial factor in determining the cogency and effectiveness of international roles in support of peace implementation. Its importance becomes most clear when viewed from the perspective of responding to and containing opponents of a peace process, both spoilers and losers. In cases where there are significant opponents of peace, spoilers will seek to gain the advantage over mediators and implementers; they will seek to carve out and expand a political space in which they can demonize opponents, polarize political debate, and mobilize political actors and the population around an exclusionary or hostile agenda. To do so, they will exploit divisions among mediators and implementers, and take maximum advantage of any confusion or disagreement between various implementing agencies. Strategic coordination becomes a critical element of the capacity of implementers to stave off opposition.

In more benign conflict environments, the relative efficiency of international efforts is less consequential for success. There are cases where the nature of the parties and the conditions, and the nature of the mediation process, is such that the cohesion of international actors is only minimally important. Equally, there will be cases where the will of parties to reach and sustain a peace accord will be minimal, and where even the best designed international efforts will yield little success. However, there is a range of intermediate...
cases wherein effective international efforts should be able to help expand the space available to internal supporters of peace implementation, provide neutral space for dialogue on implementation, and contain or at least obstruct and frustrate opponents of a negotiated settlement.

Strategic coherence is far from being the only requirement of effective implementation. It cannot, for example, overcome inadequate financial or military resources, the absence of commitment by major states, or poor strategy. But even with adequate resources, international commitment, and a good strategy, the success of implementation is likely to depend greatly on the ability of the lead implementers to devise a common strategy among the main international parties and on the consistent and complementary efforts to implement that strategy.

tarian NGOs such as ActionAid, CARE, and Oxfam have incorporated conflict resolution activities into their own programs for refugees and victims of the war.


13 Hara, “Burundi”, pp. 149-150.

Lessons from Successful Cases

While there is strong evidence that the absence of strategic coordination can undermine the effectiveness of international efforts, there is also evidence that strategic coordination does occur in civil war negotiation and implementation efforts, either by virtue of circumstance or through the deliberate application of policy. In the cases of Mozambique, El Salvador, and Guatemala, there were significant instances of strategic coordination that aided implementation.

This section identifies key themes, tools, and mechanisms that emerge from a range of cases: the role of UN Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs); the issue of continuity of key actors; the role of “Friends Groups” mechanisms; and the development of internal operational coordination mechanisms.

The Role of SRSGs

There can be little doubt that there is a high correlation between effective strategic coordination and the presence and good management of an SRSG or equivalent. Indeed, effective coordination may be an essential – though, of course, not sufficient – element of what it takes to succeed as an SRSG. It is surely no accident that the cases that serve as good examples of strategic coordination – Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Israel/Palestine – are also those cases in which the respective SRSGs – Aldo Ajello, Alvaro de Soto, Jean Arnault, and Terje Roed-Larsen – emerge with strong reputations. However, it is also evident from a review of a wider range of cases that there are conditions on the deployment and management of SRSGs that frequently limit their capacity to coordinate. It is also true that, within the UN system, there have been a number of less capable SRSGs and that the procedures for recruitment and management of SRSGs have been woefully weak.

On the wider diplomatic front, the forces which lead to the deployment of a Special Envoy or equivalent are various and often have less to do with the needs of conflict resolution than with domestic political considerations.

What can be done to enhance the coordinating capacity of SRSGs? Of course, the personality and disposition of SRSGs are important factors in their performance. For an SRSG to be able to provide effective strategic coordination, however, there are several other factors that are more amenable to policy control.

First, obviously, the peace process must be one in which the UN has a central role. SRSGs have been appointed to a number of conflict settings where the UN was a fairly marginal player. Not surprisingly, the impact of SRSGs in these cases has been minimal. An exceptionally effective SRSG can have an impact despite the limited scope of UN involvement, but this is uncommon.

Second, SRSGs must be well supported by UN headquarters, and by the UN Secretary-General in particular. An often overlooked element of Aldo Ajello’s success in Mozambique was that, at key

15 Though this paper focuses on UN Special Representatives, this is simply for ease of reference. The arguments given about the role of SRSGs would for the most part refer equally to an OSCE Head of Mission or OAU Special Envoy, to give but two alternative examples.
16 The importance of a single mediator as a lead coordinating agent is one of the principal conclusions of Crocker, et. al., "Introduction", Herding Cats, pp. 3-18.
17 At the time of publication, the author is serving as Special Assistant to Terje Roed-Larsen in the Middle East. References and judgements here about Roed-Larsen’s efforts pertain solely to his first tour as SRSG, between 1994 and 1996, and were written before the author took up his present assignment.
19 This section focuses on UN Special Representatives, but many of the thematic issues described here apply in equal measure to diplomatic representatives of governments.
20 Hooper and Taylor, "Command from the Saddle".
moments, he received strong backing from the UN Secretary-General. The support of the Secretary-General is critical both to an SRSG’s standing within the wider international community and his/her ability to coordinate the multiple UN departments and agencies that have a stake in implementation. Within the UN system, an SRSG is typically the only figure whose role as overall coordinator of in-country efforts is generally accepted by the UN departments and agencies. Beyond the UN, an effective SRSG can usually generate a degree of involvement and coordination with other key players such as the World Bank and bilateral donors.

Third, the timing of the deployment of the SRSG is also significant. There have been a number of cases – notably Rwanda – when an SRSG was appointed after the completion of the first phase of a negotiation process. Obviously, this late deployment limits the ability of the SRSG to build strategic linkages across phases of the peace process. This relates to the wider issue of the continuity of key actors, which is discussed below.

Finally, the ability of the SRSG to ensure effective coordination is also a function of the degree to which he/she takes on strategic coordination as a central part of the mandate and job description. In the early stages of the UN’s operation in Kosovo, for example, the UN presence was headed by both an SRSG and a Deputy SRSG (Sergio Vieira de Mello and Martin Griffiths, respectively), each of whom had both experience and an organizational interest in coordination. This is one reason that coordination of the work of both UN and other actors in Kosovo was a central part of the design of the UN mission there.

Continuity of Key Actors

The determination as to when the UN assigns an SRSG to a given conflict is a function of the extent of the UN’s role in that conflict, and depends greatly on the mandates given by the Security Council. In Rwanda, the minimal role of the UN during the mediation phase meant that the SRSG was deployed only after the completion of the Arusha Accords. That case has been described as one in which there was a significant disjuncture between the mediation and implementation phases, particularly in terms of the lead actor (first the OAU, then the UN), resulting in a lack of consistent strategy between the two phases. This highlights a broader issue relating to continuity of personnel, institutions, and international authority.

The importance of continuity as a source of strategic coordination (if continuity is deliberately maintained, it could be referred to as a tool) can best be made by reference to positive examples of where it has worked.

One of the most striking instances of effective continuity is the UN’s operation in Guatemala, where the UN had a substantive, even leading, role among international actors during both the mediation and implementation phase. This institutional continuity was supplemented by continuity of personnel; Jean Arnault, who had observed the Guatemalan negotiations, was left in place to verify their implementation. In turn, Arnault maintained a consistent approach toward parties to the agreement and ensured that the implementation strategy was based on the nuances of the agreement and the relation-

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22 Hooper and Taylor, “Command from the Saddle”.

23 This observation is based on experience within the UN, both in dealing with the role of SRSGs as a generic policy issue, and in implementing policy in cases such as Sierra Leone, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and East Timor. While the role of the SRSG still generates some dispute, the SRSG has reached broader and wider acceptance than that of Resident, Humanitarian Coordinator, or lead agencies. During 2000, this was formalized in the form of a “Note of Guidance on the Relationship between SRSGs, Humanitarian Coordinators, and Resident Coordinators.”

24 Technically, an SRSG can only be appointed on the basis of a Security Council mandate. However, the Secretary-General can appoint Personal Representatives, Representatives, Special Coordinators, and – in some cases – Special Envoys, without a direct mandate from the Council.

ships built up during the implementation process. An important additional element in creating good international coordination was the involvement of key international financial institutions (IFIs) in the negotiating process. Not only was there a high degree of commonality between the peacebuilding concerns of the UN and the financial stability concerns of the IFIs, the involvement of the IFIs in the negotiating process gave an opportunity for the two sets of international actors to remain well-informed of each other's agendas and to ensure the consistency of their actions. One UNDP official involved in these negotiations later commented that the presence and collaboration of the international financial institutions was central to the success of the Guatemala negotiations.

The El Salvador case also is notable for a relatively high degree of collaboration between the UN and the dominant regional organization, the Organization of American States (OAS). The UN was involved from the outset, although its role was modest in the pre-negotiation stages. When the locus of activity shifted towards the UN, there was already a record of involvement. Alvaro de Soto’s successful management of the mediation process is well-documented. What is less well-documented, but important to keeping the implementation process on track, is the role that de Soto has continued to play from his position in the Department of Political Affairs in New York, first as Director of the Americas Division and then as Assistant Secretary-General covering Asia and the Americas. Despite moving from the field to headquarters, the continuous engagement by a key personality appears to have made an important contribution to the successful implementation of the El Salvador accords.

Another form of continuity is illustrated by the case of Mozambique. Although there was a significant shift among lead actors – with the Italians playing a major role, along with the Rome-based Community of Sant’Egidio, in the mediation phase, and the UN coming in only at the point of implementation – continuity was deliberately maintained. First, the Community of Sant’Egidio deliberately kept the UN fully informed of their efforts. Second, the appointment of an Italian to the job of SRSG was designed to keep the Italian government engaged. The support of the Italian government to Aldo Ajello, including the provision of extensive financial resources to the SRSG’s Trust Fund, was a vital element of Ajello’s capacity as SRSG, giving him both a degree of financial flexibility and an entry point to develop his relationship with the wider donor community, both of which enhanced his authority before the parties.

When there is no continuity between mediators and implementers, the chances of maintaining a consistent strategy between phases diminishes because there exist no established mechanisms for country-specific policy dialogue between international, regional, and sub-regional organizations. Also bureaucratic politics and institutional rivalry can disrupt a smooth transition between lead institutions.

The Role of “Friends Groups”

One of the striking commonalties among cases of successful implementation is the use of a “Friends Groups,” or the creation of a deliberate process of bringing together key governments, to ensure a degree of focus and commonality of approaches to the peace process. This mechanism emerges as an important

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27 A UNDP official involved in backstopping the negotiations cites the decision to involve the IFIs as one of the key factors contributing towards success. Author interview, New York, April 2000.
29 For Alvaro de Soito’s account of this period, see Alvaro de Soto and Graçiana del Castillo, “Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador”, Global Governance vol.1, no.2 (May-August 1995), pp.189-204. On the other hand, the El Salvador case is also one where the co-ordination between the UN and the World Bank was an issue which caused problems in the later stages of peace implementation.
source of strategic coordination among bilateral actors and a means by which SRSGs or lead mediators and implementers can bolster their authority, leverage, and coordinating powers vis-à-vis the parties and the implementing agencies.\textsuperscript{34}

The Friends Group mechanism has been widely used in the Latin American context. In Guatemala, a Friends Group served to channel bilateral inputs into the mediation and implementation process, assisting effective strategic coordination overall. The “Friends of the Secretary-General" was an important avenue for keeping focus and pressure on the parties during negotiations in Haiti.\textsuperscript{35} In El Salvador, the members of the “Four plus One" mechanism reinforced de Soto’s role as SRSG. And, in Nicaragua, the “Rio Group" served a similar function during the early stages of negotiation, as did a “Friendly Countries" group during the mediation phase.\textsuperscript{36} In the Israel/Palestinian Authority context, a similar entry was constructed, partially through the efforts of Roed-Larsen (prior to taking on the job as SRSG): the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for International Assistance to the Palestinian People (AHLC) was formed out of the Oslo Process as a forum bringing together key donors, the parties, and the key multilateral agencies.

The Friends mechanism has been less frequently used in the African context, perhaps reflecting the lower levels of western commitment to peace processes on that continent. In Mozambique, however, Ajello was supported by a “core group" of Ambassadors on the ground. A similar mechanism was used in Rwanda, in the form of the “Five Musketeers," a group of the five most influential Ambassadors in the country. Rwanda’s fate, however, cautions that the use of some sort of a bilateral coordination mechanism is no guarantee of success. However, one of the distinctions between a Friends mechanism and a core group is that a formal Friends Group typically exists and meets not only in-country but also at the level of capitals and at the UN in New York. This signals a higher level of commitment to the peace process on the part of the respective members than is typically evidenced by collaboration amongst in-country Ambassadors. This higher level of commitment typically results in higher levels of financial resources provided for the peacebuilding process.

The relationship between a Friends mechanism and an effective strategy of implementation depends on pre-existing levels of commitment. Certainly, it is the case that strategic coordination cannot generate political commitments or resources. While donors often have at times argued that a lack of effective coordination is the source of their reluctance to commit funds to peace implementation processes, the causal relationship is more likely the reverse. This said, it is not clear that there is a linear relationship between pre-existing commitment and the level of strategic coordination. In a context where a range of states are providing resources, coordination of their strategies for peace implementation may be a critical asset. There have clearly been cases where the coinciding interests of a group of key states (for instance, in Haiti) or the dominant interest of a single state (as in Bosnia) will

\textsuperscript{34} For Aldo Ajello's own account of his role as SRSG, see Aldo Ajello, “Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement” in Crocker, et. al., \textit{Herding Cats}.
\textsuperscript{35} Andrea Bartoli, “Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant'Egidio”, in Crocker, et. al., \textit{Herding Cats}.
\textsuperscript{38} Hooper and Taylor, “Command from the Saddle”.
\textsuperscript{40} Caroline Hartzell, “Peace in Stages: The Role of an Implementation Regime in Nicaragua” in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens eds., \textit{Ending Civil Wars: Volume I. From Mediation to Implementation} (forthcoming).
\textsuperscript{41} Malone, \textit{Decision Making in the UN Security Council}.
\textsuperscript{42} On the role of Terje Roed-Larsen, as UN Special Coordinator for the Occupied Territories, in shaping donor policy towards the reconstruction of the Palestinian Territories, see in particular Rex Brynen, \textit{A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza}, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).
be the deciding factor. But there have also been cases where an SRSG or equivalent can play an important role in harmonizing somewhat divergent donor strategies (as in the Middle East).

Friends mechanisms serve other strategic coordination functions. Most particularly, good collaboration between an SRSG and a Group of Friends lends considerable political support to the SRSG in terms of his authority as an overall leader of international efforts. For example, de Soto has observed that the use of a Friends mechanism in El Salvador helped him fend off potential competitors for the lead mediation role.39 Establishing a lead role in turn enhances the ability of an SRSG to perform coordination tasks vis-à-vis UN agencies and other actors. Indeed, recent experience in Sierra Leone and elsewhere suggests that collaboration and coordination between key donors and the SRSG or equivalent is in fact the central ingredient in overall strategic coordination.

The involvement and interest of a large number of different state actors in a negotiation or peace implementation process can, of course, present a major obstacle to coherent conflict management, particularly in the absence of a lead state. An obvious example is Germany’s unilateral move to recognize Croatia as a sovereign state, a move that complicated outside efforts to prevent the outbreak of war. Later in Bosnia, the United States took on a lead state function when it became more fully engaged in the management of the international effort to end the war there. Once the US put the full weight of its political, military, and financial capacity behind a particular strategy, that strategy – well-conceived or otherwise – won the day.

Coordination Mechanisms

In a number of cases, SRSGs or lead political actors have created mechanisms to channel common inputs into a mediation process, such as the Civil Society Assembly in Guatemala. More commonly, lead political actors have established mechanisms to tackle operational coordination during the implementation phase. However, ensuring a common agreement to and a synchronized enactment of strategy within this phase has proven enormously challenging.

Poor operational coordination has proved to be a serious constraint on peace implementation in the areas of demobilization and refugee return, although instances of effective coordination on demobilization and reintegration can be found in Mozambique, Central America, and to a lesser extent, Cambodia. In a number of cases, the establishment of coordination mechanisms by lead actors – SRSGs, High Representatives, lead agencies, or their equivalents – has served an important strategic coordination function. Although the mechanisms in question were designed to provide coordination in an operational sense, their existence in and of itself serves a strategic function. Requiring actors to work within a common operational framework can generate the development of common strategy. Coordination mechanisms provide a forum within which an SRSG or a functional equivalent can communicate a strategic vision; and the mechanisms offer limited oversight by political actors over the operational implementation of assistance and other peacebuilding tasks.

An example of how the establishment of a coordination mechanism can serve to build support for a given strategy is Terje Roed-Larsen’s role as Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories. Early on, Roed-Larsen helped create an effective architecture for coordination on the ground by reaching agreement with the World Bank and the Norwegian government to co-chair a local donor coordination mechanism, the Joint Liaison Committee. With support from the World Bank and other donors, Larsen also ensured that he represented the entire UN family of agencies in the local coordination structure. Bringing key players together around donor issues allowed Larsen to help shape the agenda in a way which strengthened his efforts to assist the Palestinian Authority.40 Here, Larsen’s prior role in the Oslo peace process strengthened his ability to forge these relationships.

40 Brynen, and others, count this as one of the most important variables in the consolidation of the peace process at a critical juncture. See Brynen, A Very Political Economy.
The central lesson here is that there are tools available to perform the essential functions of strategic coordination, when basic conditions - a degree of international commitment and rough correspondence of the interests of the major powers - allow for it. Major weaknesses occur when there is a significant disjuncture in institutions or personnel, especially at different phases of the process. Problems also arise when there is a significant divergence of interests or strategies between key states. Within a moderate range, however, divergent strategies can be harmonized by coordination models, either multilateral or state-based. When underlying conditions permit, the application of operational coordination tools can enhance the effectiveness and the impact of international efforts to support the negotiation and implementation of a peace accord.
A Growing Challenge?

The key question, then, becomes whether the basic conditions that create the possibility of strategic coordination will likely obtain in the future. Two trends suggest that they will not, which means that strategic coordination will likely become a greater problem in future international conflict management efforts. First, in Guatemala, Mozambique, and El Salvador, no more than a handful of actors were directly involved in political negotiations, while even in the assistance aspects of peace implementation, the number of international, regional organizations, and even non-governmental organizations was relatively small. By contrast, by the mid-1990s there had been an explosion of the number of actors involved in various aspects of conflict management, including in the sphere of political negotiations, thus placing a much higher premium on creating and strengthening coordination mechanisms. Second, implementers in these cases pursued a traditional peacekeeping strategy, based on consent, neutrality, and impartiality. If the international community faces more difficult conflict environments than El Salvador or Guatemala, there is greater likelihood that they will need more coercive strategies. Such strategies engender much more controversy within the United Nations and are often divisive to long-standing military alliances such as NATO. Moreover, as Karen Guttieri observes, the more coercive the strategy of peace implementation, the greater the interference of states in the day to day operation of the mission.

Tough Cases and Strategic Disagreement

Recent experiences in Kosovo illustrate how difficult conflict environments and disagreement over coercive strategies pose greater challenges for peace implementation operations. The struggles between the OSCE and the UN prior to and during the NATO bombing campaign, and the process by which the UN was assigned the lead role in post-conflict Kosovo, underscores the absence of any mechanism - other than simple political bargaining - through which the international community ensures that the basic conditions for strategic coordination are in place.

From the outset of the Kosovo crisis, it was evident that the OSCE would play a leading role in handling this European affair. The crisis began to mount at a moment when UN relations with the US had once again deteriorated over the Iraqi question. The US and major European actors kept the UN out of the mediation process. The key political roles were played by NATO, the OSCE, the US government, and the G7. At this time the UN feared that it would be sidelined both in Kosovo and in the military brinkmanship and eventual air strikes in Iraq, thereby further undermining the already corroded authority and primacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.

In the end, of course, the settlement process returned to the UN, in part because of the need to bring Russia on board as a means of concluding an agreement with Serbia, and also because some European powers were concerned with the US decision to support NATO’s intervention outside of the legalizing and legitimating framework of the UN Charter. The central point for strategic coordination, however, is that the decision as to which organization would take the lead in the implementation of the settlement had little to do with considerations of strategy or with the comparative advantages of the respective organizations. This created a major (if inevitable) disjuncture between those who had managed the mediation and settlement process and those who would oversee the settlement. In the end, the return of the UN was decided less because of any issues directly related to Kosovo and more because of wider political debates about the future architecture for the management of European collective security.


Author interviews, NATO member state diplomats, New York, December 1999.

Interviews with diplomats posted to the UN revealed a range of perspectives. Many within NATO - among them Canadian, French and even some British diplomats - were concerned about the extent to which the US was willing to push the organization beyond the UN framework. Nevertheless, many others questioned the relevance of the UN to European security; younger diplomats in particular preferred to seek solutions through the OSCE and other European instruments.
Due to the scope of the mandated agreement, Kosovo is not a case of peace implementation comme les autres—although it may represent a widening trend towards the creation of transitional authority missions. It does illustrate, however, that the processes for determining which entity will have a leading role in managing the mediation or the implementation process, and thus whether there will be continuity and strategic coordination, function not on the basis of any kind of strategic decision-making but are negotiated on the basis of inter-state and inter-organizational politics and rivalry. This problem is especially pronounced when coercive strategies are pursued in the absence of a broad international consensus.

Kosovo also demonstrates that even when one organization is finally assigned a lead or coordinating role, other roles within a mission area will tend to be determined according to organizational prerogative, rather than comparative advantage. International activities in Kosovo fall broadly among four international and regional organizations: civil administration, including international police, is led by the UN; humanitarian assistance is orchestrated by UNHCR; economic reconstruction is led by the European Union (EU), in collaboration with the World Bank; and institution-building is led by the OSCE. The NATO-led KFOR force ensures an international security presence. That the division of labor between these organizations is spelled out in Security Council Resolution 1244, which authorized the UN Administration in Kosovo, masks the fact that the division was actually worked out through an ad hoc process of high-level political negotiations in Pristina.46

Proliferation of Actors: A Growing Coordination Challenge

The challenge posed by institutional bargaining and politics has been further complicated by the growing proliferation of actors involved in peacebuilding. This proliferation occurred first in areas related to the aid aspects of peace implementation and had a number of dimensions: the creation of post-conflict units in a number of multilateral development agencies, notably the World Bank, and in bilateral aid agencies; the creation of emergency response units in such development or technical assistance organizations as the UN Development Program, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and even the International Labor Organization; and the increased number of non-governmental agencies involved in the business of emergency relief and reconstruction.

By the late 1990s, an increasing number of actors were also getting involved in conflict resolution and mediation. This involved, first, the expansion of a number of regional or functional economic organizations into the political sphere—notably including the European Union (EU) and the G8. Second, a number of regional organizations (particularly the EU and NATO) began involving themselves in political negotiations beyond the regional limits of their composition, for example, the EU Special Envoyos to the Great Lakes and to Ethiopia/Eritrea and NATO’s role in political negotiations concerning Kosovo. Third, regional organizations that had been previously passive took on significant operational roles in the 1990s—notably the OSCE, in the form of both the High Commissioner for Minorities and direct operational missions such as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). Fourth, there was a growth of a new sector of NGOs specializing in conflict resolution activities—Conciliation Resources, International Crisis Group, Responding to Conflict, International Alert, to name just a few. Finally, a number of the development and relief NGOs began moving into the conflict resolution field, especially in the areas of peacebuilding and reconciliation.

The involvement of an expanding number of actors has been a significant factor in virtually all peace


45 Among the responsibilities of the author in the UN Advance Mission in Kosovo was the task of drafting the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of UNMIK and to facilitate the planning process through which the EU, the OSCE, and the UN agreed on a division of labor within the mission structure.
missions since Rwanda. The number of actors involved directly in political negotiations varies considerably from case to case, but in almost all of them it considerably exceeds the numbers involved in the successful cases cited earlier. The proliferation of regional and extra-regional organizations has been most notable in Europe, of course, with Kosovo standing as the current high-water mark of this phenomenon. However, the phenomenon is not limited to Europe, first because the European institutions have begun playing active roles outside of Europe, and second because of the increasingly global scope of NGO activities.

The most notable case of extensive NGO involvement in conflict resolution is Burundi. As early as 1995, there were already a substantial number of NGO-sponsored conflict resolution programs operating there, under the auspices of International Alert, Responding to Conflict, and various other agencies. This activity subsequently expanded. Development and relief NGOs, such as ActionAid, have taken on significant conflict resolution activities within their normal programs for assistance to displaced persons. The more established mediation NGOs such as International Alert and The Community of Sant’Edigio played direct roles in various back channel negotiations. Meanwhile, a growing number of conflict resolution NGOs, including International Crisis Group and Search for Common Ground established offices in Bujumbura. As observed above, the proliferation of unofficial actors has contributed to the fragmentation of the international presence.

Proliferation of Coordination Mechanisms: A Partial Response

As the number of actors has increased and the international response has become more fragmented, the UN and others have experimented with coordination models designed to promote coherence. Different mechanisms have been tried in various settings. Within the UN, where most coordination efforts have been concentrated, two distinct models have been used to attempt to enhance coordination: “Strategic Frameworks” and “Integrated Missions.” A brief review of these efforts highlights both the prospects for and the constraints on effective strategic coordination.

(a) Strategic Frameworks

There are two central notions behind the Strategic Framework Initiative. The first is that all major actors involved in a given country—UN political and assistance actors, NGOs, bilateral agencies, and local authorities—should come together to find common strategies and programmes in support of ‘peacebuilding.’ Second is the idea that these strategies should draw on all aspects of the international presence, incorporating humanitarian relief, development assistance, human rights, and political efforts into one common framework.

To this end, the Strategic Framework Initiative has sought to articulate some broad parameters to guide policy and to take account of the potential trade-offs between different policy elements. The overall political task of consolidating peace and stability is clearly the primary objective of Strategic Frameworks— as is indicated by the fact that in the two applications of the Strategic Framework to date, the UN Department of Political Affairs took the lead from the outset. However, the Strategic Framework concept is predicated on the idea that political and assistance efforts should “inform and be informed by” one another—as articulated in the UN’s “Generic Guidelines” for Strategic Frameworks, a document negotiated at some length in the UN in 1999.47 The Generic Guidelines suggest that political efforts should not be allowed to pre-empt essential, life-saving humanitarian assistance, but also that rehabilitation and development efforts should be geared towards political efforts—a statement of implied conditionality. Further, noting the potential for a clash between human rights-based approaches and humanitarian approaches, the Guidelines state that the two should be reconciled where possible, but that human rights activities should not interfere with life-saving humanitarian assistance. However imprecise, the

47 The author represented OCHA during these negotiations and was on the core team of drafters that compiled the final draft of the “Generic Guidelines” for consideration by the UN Deputy-Secretary-General and the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC).
negotiation of this document represented a significant step forward within the UN to identify priorities between competing elements of the UN’s overall response.

The mechanisms for implementing the Strategic Framework have been focused around the SRSG and the UN Resident Coordinator, the normal in-country coordinator of operational activities. The basic idea is that these two actors undertake to chair a series of coordinating bodies that bring together UN agencies, local and international NGOs, donors, and national authorities. Decisions as to the application of a Strategic Framework are to be made by the Deputy Secretary-General of the UN on the joint recommendation of the Conveners of the Executive Committees responsible for Peace and Security, Humanitarian Affairs, and Development (DPA, OCHA, and UNDP).

The Strategic Framework was first implemented in Afghanistan, initially under the lead authority of the Department of Political Affairs, which headed the UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA), a small political negotiation mission. However, primary responsibility quickly fell to OCHA, which had a much larger field presence than DPA. This change of responsibility substantially altered the character of the Strategic Framework in Afghanistan. As many commentators have since noted, the Strategic Framework lost its political character. Rather than serving to shape political strategies, it evolved instead into a framework devoted exclusively to the coordination of aid (although, of course, in the Afghanistan context, aid was and is a heavily politicized issue.) This transformation was reflected in the name of the coordinating body that was eventually established – the Afghanistan Programming Body. This body met under the lead of a rotating donor chair, rather than the head of UNSMA as was originally envisaged. This change also reflected the fact that, whereas the Strategic Framework was envisaged primarily as a body for orchestrating post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, Afghanistan had not reached that stage. Indeed, even as the Strategic Framework was first being designed, the bulk of UN personnel were withdrawn from Afghanistan following presumed Taliban attacks on UN staff members in the wake of the US cruise missile strike in Afghanistan.

Many have attributed the problems encountered by the Strategic Framework initiative in Afghanistan to contingent circumstances rather than any inherent flaw. A second Strategic Framework experiment was launched. The country chosen for the second application was Sierra Leone, despite the fact that many of those working on the Strategic Framework felt that it should not be attempted in peacekeeping contexts, since peacekeeping missions had their own, pre-existing tools for overall coordination.

The Strategic Framework for Sierra Leone proved no more successful than its predecessor in Afghanistan. After an entire year, collective efforts had produced little more than a general statement of existing coordination problems and of the need for greater links between the political, development, and humanitarian coordination mechanisms. The establishment of a Strategic Framework did not prevent considerable coordination gaps from occurring, notably with respect to the critical task of demobilizing ex-combatants.

Furthermore, the Strategic Framework did little to help rationalize the pre-existing coordination mechanisms. At one point, there were four distinct UN coordination structures in Sierra Leone none of which bore any formal or substantive relationship to the others. These included: a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation, under the responsibility of an SRSG and reporting to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); the Strategic Framework initiative under the lead of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA); a Humanitarian Coordinator, who was also the UNHCR Resident Representative and the UN Resident Coordinator (who thus reported to OCHA, UNHCR, and the UNDP respectively); and a “Brookings Process” initiative – an effort by the World Bank, UNHCR, and UNDP to coordinate efforts for linking relief and development initiatives to meet post-conflict challenges.

48This observation was made on the basis of the author’s responsibility, within OCHA, of monitoring the implementation of the Strategic Framework and other similar coordination mechanisms in UN missions.
Given that the poor experience of the Strategic Framework initiative in Sierra Leone in many ways mirrored the experience of Afghanistan, many in New York concluded that the weakness of the Strategic Framework in Sierra Leone was due to flaws in the design of the Strategic Framework itself. Both experiences suggest that the Strategic Framework is too cumbersome a mechanism to generate serious collaboration or flexible coordination and does little to actually empower lead coordinators such as the SRSG. Partially as a result, there was within the UN a move towards another model: the Integrated Mission.

Before turning to the Integrated Mission model, however, it is important to note one other feature of the Sierra Leone case. Notwithstanding the multiple coordination efforts of the UN, a significant – if unofficial – coordinating agent in Sierra Leone was the British government. Sierra Leone became, in effect, a case of “lead state coordination,” though this was never officially recognized. Britain took on a number of important coordinating and lead functions: it chaired a donor forum to galvanize international financial support; it took the lead in financing ECOMOG’s mission when ECOMOG re-intervened in Sierra Leone following the take-over attempt by the joint forces of the AFRC/RUF; it provided critical funds for demobilization when there was a shortfall; and, in a number of other ways, it ensured a degree of consistency, forward planning, and sustained international commitment to Sierra Leone. Most critically, in May 2000, the UK government fielded a rapid-reaction force to Sierra Leone to bolster the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone when efforts to demobilize Fodeh Sankoh’s troops, as required by the Lomé Accords, resulted in the RUF taking 500 UN troops hostage and launching a renewed attack on the Government. Throughout, the UK government worked closely with the UN SRSG at the time, Francis Okelo, not through the formal Strategic Framework mechanism. The contrast between the critical role played by the UK government and the multiple, overlapping, and frankly ineffective coordination mechanisms promoted by UN headquarters was sharp.

(b) Integrated Missions

In a very different part of the world, another UN experiment in coordination was evolving. This was the Integrated Mission in Kosovo, deployed immediately after the cessation of NATO’s bombing campaign in May 1999.

A number of aspects of the Kosovo mission have already been discussed. At the political level, Kosovo reveals that the means by which different regional or international organizations are allocated tasks and responsibilities within an overall division of labor has little to do with their comparative advantage or respective expertise, and much to do with major power competition over Atlantic security policy. The result was a hybrid mission consisting of a NATO security presence and an UN-led civilian operation with substantial components tasked to UNHCR, the OSCE, and the EU. The EU’s presence was bolstered by a joint EU/World Bank Task Force based in Brussels, which would bring World Bank expertise in reconstruction to bear on the EU’s efforts.

Having learned in Bosnia about the difficulty of ensuring policy coherence among these different regional and international organizations, the UN took the lead in establishing a structure designed to ensure greater coherence. Specifically, the UN established an Integrated Mission, in which the UN Special Representative would lead a joint structure comprised of the various key organizations. In practical terms, this meant that the EU, the OSCE, and UNHCR were asked to join this integrated mission structure.

The task of delineating an effective division of labor was complicated by the breadth of tasks for which the international community was responsible: assuming basic civilian administration of health, education, energy, public utilities, and post and telecommunications; establishing a legal framework; restoring functioning public services; overseeing humanitarian activities, including the protection of minority enclaves, the evacuation of minorities under threat,
the provision of emergency food assistance, and emergency shelter reconstruction; building institutions (including media, police, political parties, and judicial bodies); rebuilding the economy, including the reconstruction of customs services, legal currency, tax collection, and the provision of micro-credit loans and of fuel supplies; demilitarizing paramilitary forces and creating the Kosovo Protection Corps; monitoring human rights and ensuring institution-building; and safeguarding the environment. These tasks were fundamentally inter-related. It is, for example, next to impossible to define a meaningful division between public administration (in a context where UNMIK is essentially a government) and capacity-building, between providing emergency shelter and longer term economic reconstruction, between the legal protection of minority rights and the humanitarian protection of minorities, or between the UN’s law and order responsibilities and the public security tasks of NATO. The precise responsibilities of each organization within this potentially unwieldy superstructure were negotiated over the first weeks of its operation. What was eminently clear, however, was that any such division would be a flexible arrangement.

Recognizing that policy coherence would not arise automatically from the integration of these organizations into one structure, a careful division of labor was articulated through in-country negotiations and through a series of coordination mechanisms established within the mission structure. In particular, the mission established an Executive Committee wherein the four Deputy SRSGs met with the SRSG to set overall policy; a Joint Planning Team, again comprised of the four organizations and serviced by a small secretariat, whose terms of reference were to ensure consistency of planning and implementation; and the post of a Principal Deputy SRSG (also pushed for by the US government), whose primary function was to ensure effective integration of the mission elements.

Still, effective implementation of the agreement among the UNMIK component organizations proved highly dependent on the performance of senior officials from each of those organizations. The primary power base of both the SRSG and the Deputy SRSGs is their own organizations’ programs, money, staff, headquarters position, and reputation. The varying clout of the Deputy SRSGs within the European political context also weighed heavily on their ability to implement programs and their degree of responsiveness to efforts by the SRSG or Principal Deputy SRSG to coordinate strategy and the implementation of programs within the mission. Furthermore, some of the Deputy SRSGs had preexisting relations with various Kosovo parties, and held different political views from the SRSG. The ability of the SRSG to contain separate political initiatives or relationships on the part of the Deputy SRSGs was, therefore, heavily constrained.

Interestingly, this structure brought into the open another coordination issue which proved very important, namely competition within individual states between the bureaucrats and politicians involved, respectively, in EU, UN, and OSCE affairs. Poor coordination is usually experienced by government officials or local authorities in receiving very different messages from a series of UN organizations. In Kosovo, the tables were turned. A very strong coordination mechanism at UN headquarters – involving, inter alia, daily meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General with all relevant UN entities – meant that there was little divergence within the UN, as disagreements were resolved internally. On the other hand, UN staff members in Kosovo frequently had the experience of being given profoundly contradictory messages by individual member state representatives to the OSCE, EU, and NATO.

In short, Kosovo illustrates that in cases where a large number of institutions and major powers are involved, effective operations on the ground depend on strategic coordination at the level of both institutional headquarters and the member-state capitals. Short of this, actors in the field will use their own political connections and resources at headquarters to pursue different agendas and implement divergent strategies. Within one organization, this already poses a significant challenge. When dealing with multiple headquarters of multiple organizations, in a context where there

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49 See the Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council on the UN Administration in Kosovo (S/1999/779).

50 The author was responsible for facilitating the drafting of the S/1999/779, wherein these coordination mechanisms were established.
is no established mechanism for policy dialogue or harmonization among them, the prospects for ensuring the basic conditions of strategic coordination are low and, thus, the likelihood of forging or implementing a common strategy is minimal at best.

Of course, policy disagreements in Kosovo have been amplified by the vagueness of the Security Council resolution concerning the nature of the final settlement. This uncertainty has enormously complicated the challenge of setting clear policy directions. Given both a vague end-state and diffuse international efforts, the bargaining position of the international community vis-à-vis aspirants to legitimate power, such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), is very weak.

The net result has been a fairly good ability to coordinate technical policy differences between the implementing organizations, but a far more constrained capacity to coordinate overall strategic questions. In this respect, the Integrated Mission structure has been more effective than the Strategic Framework, but has still reflected the limits of strategic coordination in the context of political and institutional diffusion.

The greater perceived effectiveness of the Integrated Mission structure in Kosovo has lent momentum to applying this model elsewhere. Notably, the Integrated Mission was used for East Timor, and elements of it have been incorporated into the UN’s mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo. More generally, efforts are underway within the UN to ensure that humanitarian and development elements are routinely incorporated into UN political missions led by SRSGs. Within the UN, some debates about the precise limits of the SRSG’s authority remain but, by this stage, these are debates of fine tuning, not of basic policy. The Integrated Mission concept is clearly becoming the basic building block around which UN coordination will occur in peace implementation settings.

Of course, enhanced coordination within the UN does not solve the far greater problem of coordination between the UN and other actors. Experience in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, as in other cases, reveals very serious limits to the extent to which the various regional organizations or NGOs recognize the coordinating authority of the UN or of any other actor.
Conclusion

Ideally, strategic coordination should establish clear lead actors in the mediation and implementation of peace agreements. It should allow those lead actors to set priorities, to ensure that those priorities are pursued by all the third-party actors involved, and to provide consistency across phases of a political process, such that implementation efforts are grounded in the realities of the negotiating process. Lead actors should also be given the authority to resolve disputes between third-parties about those priorities or about the strategies used to achieve them. In some cases, a coincidence of interests among major states, a degree of institutional continuity, and the deliberate application of policy tools has allowed for effective strategic coordination in the terms just described.

Neither the UN nor any other actor is currently equipped to fulfill this idealized version of strategic coordination. The proliferation of third-party actors, the prevalence of political competition between major powers, and the weakened authority of the UN have all constrained the capacity of the UN to perform essential strategic coordination functions. A clear, consistent alternative has not yet emerged. The positive experience of ‘lead states’ in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere suggests an important alternative to UN coordination. But this model, too, has serious limits, both because this approach tends to be ad hoc and because coordination by a major power will tend to be coordination in support of one party, as distinct from impartial support to the peace process itself.

The limitations on the UN’s capacity to fulfill critical strategic coordination functions are unlikely to abate substantially in the near future. The diffusion of organizations involved serves a very important political purpose, because it means that any state with a particular interest can find an organization to represent that perspective in the conflict resolution process. Powerful states and institutions are not likely to give up their independent authority or their room for maneuver.

On the other hand, that organizations such as the OSCE and the EU have agreed to serve under the UN’s lead (at least to a certain extent) in Kosovo suggests that there is some degree of support for coordination. If experience in the humanitarian world is anything to go by, repeated encounters with the negative consequences of incoherence will lead to a rising degree of support over time for the establishment and strengthening of more robust coordination structures. Of course, the most powerful states and organizations involved will seek to ensure that they lead those coordination mechanisms.

What is clear, in any case, is that absent effective coordination by the UN, a comparable regional or international organization, or a lead state, the effectiveness of implementation efforts will be heavily constrained. This will, of course, be more consequential in cases where implementation is more difficult – but it is precisely in the most difficult cases that an effective international effort is most needed to ensure peace.
APPENDIX I
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APPENDIX II

Ending Civil Wars: Volume 1. From Mediation to Implementation
Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens, Editors

A Project of the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the International Peace Academy

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   Caroline Hartzell

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   William Stanley
   David Holliday

5. Implementing the Arusha Peace Accords in Rwanda: The Problem of Myopic Strategy
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   Sumantra Bose

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   Marie-Joëlle Zahar

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**Other Studies of the CISAC-IPA Project on Peace Implementation**

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The Attempt that Worked: Peace Implementation in Namibia
   Lisa M. Howard

Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: The Case of Sierra Leone
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Somalia: From Flawed Agreement to Failed Implementation
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